Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.
- COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JULY 27, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-37 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 27-741 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California Will Hurd, Texas Jimmy Gomez, California Gary J. Palmer, Alabama James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Greg Gianforte, Montana Sheria Clarke, Staff Director Robert Borden, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna General Counsel Mike Howell, Senior Counsel Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on National Security Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Ranking Member Justin Amash, Michigan Val Butler Demings, Florida Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Peter Welch, Vermont Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Mark DeSaulnier, California Jody B. Hice, Georgia Jimmy Gomez, California James Comer, Kentucky Vacancy C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on July 27, 2017.................................... 1 WITNESSES Mr. Kerry Sleeper, Assistant Director, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation Oral Statement............................................... 5 Written Statement............................................ 8 Mr. George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships, Department of Homeland Security Oral Statement............................................... 11 Written Statement............................................ 13 Ms. Raheel Raza, President, Muslims Facing Tomorrow Oral Statement............................................... 17 Written Statement............................................ 19 Mr. Adnan Kifayat, Director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation Oral Statement............................................... 33 Written Statement............................................ 35 Mr. Seamus Hughes, Deputy Director, Program on Extremism, George Washington University Oral Statement............................................... 39 Written Statement............................................ 41 APPENDIX Opening Statement of Chairman Ron DeSantis....................... 64 April 2017 GAO report titled, ``Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts,'' submitted for the record by Chairman DeSantis....................................................... 70 July 26, 2017, letter from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch............... 71 July 27, 2017, letter from the Brennan Center for Justice, submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch............... 79 DHS response to GAO report, submitted for the record by Mr. Selim 80 July 28, 2017, letter from the Anti-Defamation League, submitted for the record by Ranking Member Lynch......................... 84 COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM ---------- Thursday, July 27, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:42 p.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Gosar, Hice, Comer, Lynch, Welch, Demings, and DeSaulnier. Mr. DeSantis. The Subcommittee on National Security will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. In the words of DHS Secretary John Kelly, the United States is experiencing a, quote, ``unprecedented spike in homegrown terrorism.'' Currently, the FBI has open terrorism investigations in all 50 States. As of June 2017, the U.S. Government has charged 128 individuals with offenses related to the Islamic State over the last three years. Radical Islamic extremism is the primary driver of this problem and deserves the government's immediate attention. In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to combat this problem under the guise of a program called Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE. Three cities were used to conduct pilot programs: Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis. Minneapolis is a particularly troublesome area, as it is a major center of Islamic terrorist activity. The region is home to the largest concentration of Somali refugees and has been the epicenter for domestic radicalization. From 2007 to 2015, over 20 Somali-Americans are known to have left Minnesota to join the al-Shabaab terrorist organization in Somalia. Over the last three years, Federal prosecutors have charged 13 individuals from Minnesota for connections to the Islamic State. Minnesota is second only to New York, which has four times as many residents, in number of ISIS terrorists charged. The terrorist problem in Minnesota led former U.S. Senator Norm Coleman to warn that the State is in danger of becoming, quote, ``the land of 10,000 terrorists.'' Now, as the chairman of this subcommittee, I visited Minneapolis last December to meet with Federal and local law enforcement officials and community groups who were involved in the Countering Violent Extremism program. The area is obviously a ground zero for recruitment. Now, I invited Richard Thornton, the FBI's special agent in charge of the Minneapolis Division, to testify today about the problems our country is facing in that part of the country, but he is not here. Instead, the Bureau has sent Assistant Director Kerry Sleeper from headquarters with the expectation he can speak to Thornton's specific experience and interactions in Minneapolis. I look forward to hearing specifics about FBI's efforts in Minneapolis so the committee can evaluate the effectiveness of this CVE approach. Our law enforcement and intelligence community have their hands full with preventing radicalization and interdicting terrorists before they commit acts in the name of their ideology. The Department of Homeland Security leads the government's Countering Violent Extremism efforts. CVE refers to ``proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.'' Currently, the Department still follows the Obama-era policies related to CVE. And guidance developed during the Obama administration specifically limits any intelligence or law enforcement investigative activity through CVE. By leaving this information on the table, CVE efforts are potentially missing opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist plots. Obama-era guidance also fails to properly identify the threat of radical Islamic ideology. The nearly 4,000-word October 2016 CVE strategy does not even mention radical Islamic terrorism at all. The Obama administration's strategy also relied heavily on non-governmental organizations with vague and immeasurable goals. One week before President Trump's inauguration, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the grant recipients of $10 million appropriated by Congress for CVE efforts. The selections reflect a preference for working through community- based organizations, some with questionable programs and immeasurable goals. For example, the Obama administration selected for funding an organization who suggested countering violent extremism through, quote, ``collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and performance.'' Another suggested hiring college students to make video games. This was not a serious attempt to stop the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS. After President Trump took office, DHS froze the $10 million in grants, reviewed the organizations, and announced they were removing 11 Obama-era grant recipients but adding six new ones. A committee review of the organizations indicates a preference for law enforcement organizations over community- based organizations. Now, despite this step, some of the law enforcement organizations designated for funding have questionable agendas. For example, the city of Houston's application relied on so- called community experts with vocally partisan and anti-Israel agendas. The city of Denver submitted an application that prioritized an agenda unrelated to CVE, suggesting working through organizations such as Black Lives Matter. The Committee requested the applications of all grant recipients to determine what taxpayer dollars were funding, but DHS has still not produced these applications. The committee requested a briefing on the rationale for the selection of the grant recipients, but DHS refused. Today, the subcommittee seeks to understand what this administration's policy is for countering violent extremism. According to DHS, this policy is currently under review, and DHS has declined to share any details about this process, including when this review is supposed to be complete and which organizations are participating. For Congress' immediate purposes, we must determine what is driving DHS's agenda: the assumptions of the Obama era about countering this threat or the President's pledge to put political correctness aside and defeat the Islamic State at home and abroad. We will question witnesses on whether the FBI and DHS are properly vetting organizations and individuals who participate in the program. We will also hear from non-governmental witnesses on the role of the private sector in CVE efforts and the scope of violent extremism problem facing the United States. I thank the witnesses for their attendance and look forward to their testimony. Mr. DeSantis. And I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lynch, for his opening statement. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, in advance, thank the witnesses for their willingness to help this committee with its work. I would like to thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman, to reexamine our efforts to address violent extremism and terrorist radicalization. I would also like to again thank the witnesses here involved, DHS and FBI especially. I know that there was some back and forth about getting witnesses to come forward. I am glad that we were able to resolve that. The recapture of the city of Mosul by Iraqi forces earlier this month marked a significant development in the U.S.-led global coalition effort to degrade and destroy ISIS. The loss of Iraq's second-largest city, coupled with ongoing advances by coalition-backed Syrian rebels in the self-declared ISIS capital of Raqqa in eastern Syria are the most recent indicators of the continuing loss of geographic territory by the terrorist organization. According to global data monitoring company IHS Market, ISIS currently controls an estimated 14,000 square miles, an area roughly the size of Maryland. That is a 60 percent decrease from January of 2015. The terrorist group has also experienced a corresponding loss in annual revenue by about 50 percent. However, battlefield losses on the ground in Iraq and Syria do not signify the complete degradation or destruction of ISIS, as recently underscored by Lieutenant General Mike Nagata at the National Counterterrorism Center. ISIS' ability to absorb this damage and continue to direct, enable, or inspire terrorist attacks worldwide indicate that, and I quote, ``We do not fully appreciate the scale or strength of this phenomenon,'' close quote. In the midst of the coalition-backed defense in Raqqa, the New York Times reports that top ISIS operatives have already relocated to the town of Mayadin, Syria, about 100 miles away, along with the recruitment, financing, propaganda, and external operations functions necessary to facilitate and motivate attacks here in the West. Regrettably, we have already witnessed the devastation caused by ISIS-inspired ideology and the influence of extremist social media content here at home with the 2015 terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, that resulted in 14 deaths, and the 2016 terrorist attacks in Orlando, Florida, that killed 49 people. The program on Extremism at the George Washington University has identified at least 16 successful attacks perpetrated in the United States alone since ISIS announced the so-called caliphate in 2014. The majority of the attackers, including Orlando shooter Omar Mateen, openly pledged their allegiance to ISIS. In light of the continuing national security threat posed by terrorist-related attacks, we must work on a bipartisan basis to conduct robust oversight of Federal efforts to combat violent extremism and maximize our ability to mitigate the threat of radicalization based on fact. As highlighted by the Independent Government Accounting Office just this month in its report on ``Countering ISIS and its effect,'' and I again quote, ``The Federal Government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the countering violent extremism effort,'' close quote. Moreover, programs designed to counter violent extremism at the Federal level have lacked a clear mission and objective, receiving insecure or inadequate funding and have failed to reflect meaningful and collaborative Muslim community engagement and input. In 2014, the Obama administration announced the establishment of key pilot programs in Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and my own city of Boston designed by the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center to counter violent extremism and stop radicalization through community-based outreach and education. The greater Boston region was selected as a pilot area as a result of a preexisting collaboration between law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and local communities, including the Muslim community. In fact, President Obama recognized Boston as one of the 10 cities where local elected officials, law enforcement, faith organizations, youth groups, and others have already worked together to achieve marked improvement in community policing. In the New England area, local Muslim community leaders and organizations occupy a strategic role to prevent online radicalization and other forms of terrorist recruitment and promote community engagement. The Islamic Center of New England, which is in my district in the city of Quincy, has sought to develop a faith-based curriculum for young people that educates them on the prevalence of misinformation on the internet and particularly social media, while reinforcing positive Islamic values. In addition, Imam Khalid Nasr of the Quincy Mosque has sought to increase community outreach and interaction through open houses designed to afford all members of the community the opportunity to visit the mosque and meet with their Muslim neighbors, especially during Muslim holidays. Since the inception of the regional pilot program, the Federal Countering Violent Extremism program has expanded to include a grant program authorized by Congress to assist States, localities, and nonprofit organizations in preventing terrorist recruitment and radicalization. As announced by Secretary of Homeland Security General John Kelly in June of 2017, the agency awarded 26 grants totaling $10 million to organizations dedicated to securing our communities and preventing terrorism--the list of grants, including an approximate $485,000 to the Boston Police Foundation, a nonprofit organization that works with the Boston Police to implement innovative youth outreach programs. Unfortunately, the current administration has frozen this $10 million in funding in its fiscal year 2018 budget, proposing zeroing out the $50 million for Countering Violent Extremism program altogether. Rather than weakening our effort to combat violent extremism, we have to work together to identify what works and what additional steps we must take to improve collaboration and cultivate a solid relationship of mutual respect and deeper understanding between law enforcement and local communities based on a shared commitment, and that includes the Muslim communities--that is based on a shared commitment to preventing radicalization and recruitment. To this end, I look forward to today's hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. I will hold the record open for five legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. I am pleased to welcome Mr. Kerry Sleeper, assistant director, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. George Selim, director of the Office of Community Partnerships, Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Raheel Raza, president of Muslims Facing Tomorrow; Mr. Adnan Kifayat, director, Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation; and Mr. Seamus Hughes, deputy director of the Program on Extremism from the George Washington University. Welcome to you all. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify, so if you can please rise and raise your right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Thank you. Please be seated. All witnesses answered in the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to five minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part of the record. And with that, Mr. Sleeper, you are up for five minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF KERRY SLEEPER Mr. Sleeper. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the threat of homegrown violent extremism. My name is Kerry Sleeper. I'm assistant director with the FBI in charge of our Office of Partner Engagement. The FBI utilizes a comprehensive violence reduction strategy, which focuses on all pathways to violence but is not limited to this sole focus of homegrown violent extremism. Our violence reduction strategy is primarily composed of prevention and intervention lines of effort. In the area of prevention, the FBI has a long history of engagement in outreach and education initiatives and continues this effort as we identify and adapt to current trends and threats. In collaboration with our State and local partners, the FBI has historically been very successful in outreach programs designed to reach certain communities who are at a greater risk for radicalization. For example, FBI Minneapolis served as a pilot program for the Bureau immediately after 9/11 when their executive management regularly hosted focus group meetings with specific audiences such as Somali elders in order to address their concerns and needs. Some of our popular outreach programs that have a positive impact on our community relationships are the Campus Liaison Initiative, the Private Sector Liaison, the Correction Initiative, the FBI Citizens Academy, and the Junior G Man program. These efforts are managed by our division outreach coordinators in conjunction with our JTTFs and local partners. Additionally, the vision outreach coordinators assess the needs of their individual community groups and develop specific programming tailed to integrated community and law enforcement goals to mitigate local risk factors for violence. The FBI also focuses on education for different catalysts for radicalization designed to help the public increase an awareness of that radicalization. These public--these products are widely disseminated to the law enforcement and community partners for further engagement with the public and demand continues to increase for additional products. The FBI created a website ``Don't be a puppet; pull back the curtain on violent extremism'' specifically designed for the public and for use by educators and community leaders and organizations for school-age children. Visits to this website average nearly 7,400 visits a month. Also, in reaching out to communities, the FBI has produced other media-based products, including preventing violent extremism in school, recognizing pathways to violent extremism, campus attacks, targeted violence affecting institutions of higher education, and workplace violence issues and response. We have also produced and distributed documentaries A Revolutionary Act, Redemption, and Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat. I left with the members to be distributed a copy of A Revolutionary Act. This was a video that we created for State and local law enforcement. It documented the murder of two Las Vegas Metro PD officers by domestic terrorists two years ago. The reception by the State and local law enforcement community has been very, very strong. It's an example of the type of work we do for the law enforcement agencies to then engage with their communities and have discussions. In our intervention area, the FBI is closely coordinating with our State and local partners to best meet the needs of their communities. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement identified as a best practice used by police departments, the crisis intervention teams, and their partner multidisciplinary teams composed of community mental health and social welfare providers. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement is currently initiating closer coordination with police department crisis intervention teams in order to develop a coordinated strategy to identify potential individuals appropriate for intervention. The FBI also conducted a pilot program to assess the viability of off-ramping. The idea behind off-ramping subjects is to take them off the path of violence before they commit a crime. This process must be completed with the utmost attention to detail, sensitivity to law enforcement and community partners, and a forward-leaning approach. The FBI's pilot program indicated the best results would be achieved by close collaboration with our State and local law enforcement and government partners. The FBI continues to work with these partners to form a cohesive and beneficial plan to implement off-ramping efforts and to better serve our communities. In conclusion, I am pleased to be here today to talk to you about the FBI's work with our State and local partners in combating homegrown violent extremism. Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Kerry Sleeper follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. Mr. Selim, you are up for five minutes. STATEMENT OF GEORGE SELIM Mr. Selim. Good afternoon, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, other members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. My name is George Selim, and I lead the Office for Community Partnerships at the Department of Homeland Security, and I also serve as the director of the Interagency Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, which is tasked to manage the synchronization and integration of a whole-of-government effort to empower local partners to prevent violent extremism here in the United States. I have built on my nearly 12 years of homeland security- related work experience in the executive branch, including the Department of Justice, most recently DHS headquarters, as well as the National Security Council to further the Department's and the Interagency's key priorities on fostering relationships, promoting trust, and finding innovative ways to expand the toolbox for both law enforcement officials and civil leaders to prevent and intervene in the process of radicalization. Terrorism prevention programs complement traditional counterterrorism investigative and prosecutorial processes. Prevention focuses on disrupting the beliefs of violent extremists and their will to act on those beliefs through criminal or other violent actions. Community-driven prevention programs are designed to mitigate recruitment and interdict individuals radicalizing to violence earlier in the process, and that way, thus contributing to our collective homeland security. Historically, my office, the Office of Community Partnerships, has pursued a number of activities to advance the terrorism prevention mission. We educate our communities, working with departments and agencies to provide community awareness briefings that demonstrably increase the understanding of how terrorist groups recruit and radicalize and thus incite to violence. We have engaged with community stakeholders around the United States to open doors to dialogue and build trust. My office has deployed field staff to more than a dozen cities nationwide to bolster engagement with and between governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, not the least of which are our State and local law enforcement partners, as well as community and civic groups. Additionally, we have engaged young people through the internationally recognized public-private partnership titled the Peer-to-Peer Challenging Extremism Competition, which was featured last week in the New York Times, which its aim is to challenge teams of students from colleges and universities both across the United States and abroad to develop and implement social media programs targeting the narratives and online recruiters of violent extremism. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security worked with Congress to secure a first-of-its-kind funding for the CVE grant program, which the chairman referred to earlier, that supports communities seeking to do more to combat the ongoing threat of terrorism here in the homeland. Six months later, the Department of Homeland Security released our Notice of Funding Opportunity for this grant program. The application period closed last September, and almost 200 applications received were reviewed by a combination of experts to evaluate the strengths and merits of each individual application. After a leadership review panel reviewed the scoring results in the five focus areas and ensured important programmatic soundness was met such as the optimized use of funds to avoid duplication and other similar projects. After a deliberate process, then-Secretary Johnson made a determination on funding options presented to him and publicly announced grants on January 13 of 2017. My office anticipated approximately 30 days later from the announcement to make the formal award offers and allow time to finalize many of the administrative tasks associated with the grants. After the inauguration of President Trump on January 20, the new DHS leadership asked to put a pause on the program, reviewing the entire effort, alongside numerous other efforts at the Department of Homeland Security. What I can tell you today is that the review was comprehensive. New DHS leadership imagined--examined the goals of the program, the processes, and how the grant program would measure its own efficacy. As a result of the review, and consistent with the authorizes granted to the Secretary and as outlined in the Notice of Funding, the Department considered three additional factors among the pool of applicants, including the applicant or proposal's level of engagement with law enforcement and the community, the proposal's likelihood for it to be highly effective, and the proposal's level of resource dedication or long-term sustainability. In the end, the application of these factors resulted in some changes in the list of intended awardees. Moving forward, the 26 projects funded by the Countering Violent Extremism grant program are designed to establish a solid foundation for prevention of terrorism in our American communities. The grants support a full range of terrorism prevention activities, including awareness campaigns, engagement, trust-building, intervention efforts, and direct opposition of terrorism narratives these days. The awards span communities across the country and focus on all forms of violent extremism. In conclusion, our team recognizes that now comes the hard part. We are working with all 26 project teams to ensure that the awardees detail their progress towards their goals through ongoing and rigorous monitoring. In doing so, my office will identify promising practices and tools to keep extremists from luring more impressionable people towards terrorism. We will add to the dataset on existing terrorism prevention programs, and we will share the result from these grants publicly so that other communities and the public and you, the committee, can learn firsthand what works and what does not in the field of terrorism prevention. We are grateful for bipartisan support from Congress on this program to date and look forward to keeping you informed on our progress and ensure that it lives up to the Congress' standards. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of George Selim follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. Ms. Raza, you are up for five minutes. STATEMENT OF RAHEEL RAZA Ms. Raza. [Speaking foreign language.] I begin in the name of God, most beneficial, most merciful. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to deliver this testimony. My name is Raheel Raza. I'm a practicing Muslim, president of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, founding member of the Muslim Reform Movement, and advisory board member of the Clarion Project. I've engaged in dialogue about these issues in the U.S., at the U.N., and in the Canadian and U.K. Parliaments for over two decades. I have four main recommendations: 1. Shift government focus and efforts to tackle the Islamist ideology. 2. Designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an entity that aids and abets terrorism. 3. Prevent funding of U.S. educational institutions and mosques by foreign extremist sources. 4. Invite voices of reform-minded Muslims to also be heard in these esteemed chambers. Firstly, there is a serious error at the heart of the countering violent extremism policy. We must confront radicals before they become violent. Before World War II, Nazism was an ideology expressed in Mein Kampf. Before two million Chinese died in the Cultural Revolution, ideas were written down in a Little Red Book. And in 1928, another ideology appeared with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, which seeks a totalitarian system of government and forced implementation of Sharia law, the trickling effects of which we don't want to see in the United States. This ideology fuels ISIS and al-Qaida, subjugates women, executes homosexuals, kills Christians, and inspires some American Muslims to commit acts of terror. The Clarion Project's short film By the Numbers puts numbers to these assertions based on Pew research. Twenty-seven percent or 237 million Muslims believe nonbelievers should be executed, and 26 percent of young American Muslims believe suicide bombings against non-Muslims can be justified. Fortunately, most Muslims don't hold this radical ideology, but hundreds of millions do. Some claim ideology is not a clear predictor of terrorism. They are dead-wrong. A 2016 study traced the path of 100 violent jihadists. Fifty-one percent of them began their journey in nonviolent Islamist movements. By the time an extremist becomes violent, it's too late. As such, the U.S. must defeat, humiliate, destroy, and discredit this poisonous radical ideology of Islamism stemming from the Wahhabi Salafi ideology, Khomeinism, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which brings me to recommendation number two, designate the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism. As I've already explained, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish a worldwide Islamic State and build a new world civilization based on Sharia law. In fact, Russia, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have all listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. The U.S. must follow suit. Next, number three, remove foreign extremist funding from American campuses and mosques. Saudi Arabia is thought to have spent $70-100 billion to disseminate their intolerant version of Islam worldwide. Saudi Arabia gave $20 million to Georgetown and $20 million to Harvard. A Saudi billionaire named as a defendant in a 9/11 lawsuit donated $10 million to establish a Center of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale. Iran is also complicit in funding Shia mosques, Islamic schools, and organizations. We should not have Iran or Saudi Arabia teaching their version of Islam to our youth. Final recommendation number four, a seat at the table; listen to martyred Muslims. Mohamed Elibiary helped craft the Countering Violent Extremism, the CVE program, yet he called for the political integration of mainstream Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood. Also, CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, is a radical group which claims to speak for American Muslims. CAIR does not speak for me or most Muslims. CAIR was designated as a terrorist group by the United Arab Emirates, and its L.A. director called the work of this committee a myth. CAIR's recommendation to the House Committee on Homeland Security was to refuse a legitimizing platform to organizations and individuals they deem ``Islamophobic.'' Let me clarify that anti-Muslim bigotry is real, but that's not a permission slip to call every dissenting voice an Islamophobe. I've raised two sons with Muslim values while keeping them from radical views and will do the same for my four grandchildren. Does educating youth about the dangers of radicalization make one an Islamophobe? Of course not. These labels keep us from critical debate such as the one we are having now and stops the Muslim communities from becoming pluralistic, tolerant, embracing of democracy, freedoms, and liberties, and accepting of all paths and people. On behalf of Muslims Facing Tomorrow, reform-minded Muslims, and the Clarion Project, thank you for letting our voices be heard. [Prepared statement of Raheel Raza follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. I now recognize Mr. Adnan Kifayat for five minutes. STATEMENT OF ADNAN KIFAYAT Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak before you on behalf of Gen Next. My name is Adnan Kifayat. I'm the head of global security for Gen Next Ventures. Gen Next Foundation leverages a venture philanthropy model to help private sector individuals use their talents, knowledge, and resources to solve big challenges, and countering violent extremism in the homeland is one of our core areas of focus. I come here before you as a private citizen, but before I became a private citizen again, I served in government in a number of roles at the Treasury Department, the State Department, and the White House for both Democratic and Republican administrations. I first became involved in countering violent extremism work when I was at the National Security Council under President Bush. Back then, we used to call it the ``War of Ideas.''It is now commonly referred to as countering violent extremism, but we must always recognize that in the 15 years since 9/11, we have learned a great deal about the enemy, about what the enemy uses, and how the enemy radicalizes, recruits, and activates would-be terrorists. When I served in government, I had always hoped and sometimes daydreamt that there would be outside entities in the private sector that were keeping pace with the threat that we're finding real-world solutions to this menace. These entities could do what government alone was not equipped to do. They could innovate, they could keep pace with the internet, they could use new and sophisticated technologies, and they could take risks that sometimes government is unable to take. Today, there are small but committed groups of people, including Gen Next, who are finding ways to rally American ingenuity and creativity to counter homegrown terrorism. There are strong and powerful growing voices in the private sector that are echoing across our country, and I urge you to listen to those voices and the solutions that they are finding. Five years ago, Gen Next Foundation, Google Ideas, and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue launched the first-ever global network of former extremists called the Against Violent Extremism network. AVE, which now numbers 470 members, uses the voices of former extremists both online and offline to dissuade youth all over the world from being radicalized and recruited by groups like ISIS and al-Qaida. Almost 1,000 online interventions have taken place and hundreds of deradicalizations through person-to-person engagement have occurred. Since our initial investment, multinational corporations, international institutions, and foundations have all helped scale AVE's footprint because it works. Last year, Gen Next helped launch the first-even online effort to redirect at-risk youth searching for in that terrorist groups like ISIS and al- Qaida put out there towards content that is nonviolent and non- extremist. By using marketing and advertising techniques, our partnership with Google Jigsaw, and experts at Moonshot CVE, known as the Redirect Method, is leveling the playing field online and challenging the narrative of the terrorists. There are many other examples of the private sector organizing, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted those in the written testimony for additional study. Last year, I co-chaired the Department of Homeland Security's Advisory Subcommittee report on countering violent extremism, which had strong bipartisan support. It detailed a national blueprint for partnering with city leaders, mayors, local leaders, as well as the private sector. In today's complex maze of networks, we can't just pay lip service to partnering with people outside of Washington. We have to find concrete ways to do so. Some of these efforts will require resources like money, talent, and access to technology or just convening. While Gen Next Foundation serves as a convener and incubator of new solutions in the private sector, this space is by no means saturated. As an example, the government has done with the defense and intelligence communities through organizations like the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, and In-Q-Tel to bridge the divide between public and private sectors, provide risk capital, eliminate some unnecessary and slow processes, develop key performance indicators and measurements that work, and potentially reduce some of the fierce politicization of this issue so that we can get to finding solutions. We know today that to be lured by Islamist or jihadist ideologist, one can be rich or poor, boy or girl, religiously observant or not. The threat is varied, and we have to find varied solutions to this threat. The examples I've shared with you, AVE and Redirect are just two examples. We must work together and welcome innovation and risk-taking in the private sector if we are to truly find solutions to counter homegrown extremism that leads to terrorism. Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members of the subcommittee, today, we must fight the War of Ideas radically different than we did 15 years ago. There are solutions out there today, and there are solutions waiting to be found. Thank you very much. [Prepared statement of Adnan Kifayat follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. Mr. Hughes, you are recognized for five minutes. STATEMENT OF SEAMUS HUGHES Mr. Hughes. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to be invited to speak here on the threat of homegrown terrorism and efforts to prevent it. As the chairman noted, homegrown terrorism inspired by groups like ISIS has been a persistent threat in the U.S. The FBI has reported some thousand active investigations in all 50 States. Since March 2014, 120 individuals have been charged with terrorism-related activities in connection to ISIS. A near majority were accused of attempting to travel or successfully traveling to the so-called caliphate. Nearly 30 percent were accused of domestic plotting. These individuals represent a very diverse group. Their backgrounds vary. There's not a typical profile of an ISIS recruit. They're old, they're young, they're rich, they're poor. It runs the spectrum. A careful review of the cases points to a mobilization of individuals and not necessarily a widespread community-level phenomenon. It is homegrown terroism in the truest form of the word. They are born and raised here. The vast majority are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. While considerably smaller than other Western countries, ISIS mobilization in the United States is unprecedented. The backbone of the response has been through traditional counterterrorism approaches. However, they must be augmented with other non-law enforcement efforts. As such, the U.S. must develop a more robust, transparent, and effective domestic prevention program. The U.S.'s domestic Countering Violent Extremism or CVE program efforts can best be understood in a series of fits and starts. In 2011, the U.S. Government released their first domestic CVE strategy. It was broken up in three parts: first, enhanced engagement with communities; second, build expertise with State and local officials; and three, counter extremist propaganda. The strategy was explicit in acknowledging that no new resources would be devoted to the issue. Local officials, particularly U.S. Attorneys' Offices, were directed to use existing funding. The Federal Government provided guidance where needed. This new approach was introduced to hesitant local officials and community partners, which struggled to understand the intricacies of radicalization and recruitment. As a result of a lack of an explicit definition of CVE and direction for CVE, it became a catchall phrase for programming from broad-based engagement on non-terrorism-related programming to more direct one-on-one intervention of radicalized individuals. Lacking dedicated funding and a focused resource, government officials struggled to complete the strategy's goals and objectives. It is with that backdrop that the previous administration refocused their efforts on three pilot cities. Minneapolis focused largely on societal-level issues or what they saw as societal-level issues, Boston on individualized intervention programs, and Los Angeles primarily on community engagement. Following the completion of the pilot program, the U.S. Government created a CVE Task Force. This interagency group, with a rotating leadership from DHS and DOJ, would be comprised of detailees from various different agencies, a hub of CVE activity. There are a few challenges to quickly note. Radicalization is not a linear process. Humans by their very nature are complex. We float in and out of our extreme. There's not a step-by-step guide for why individuals join terrorist organizations, while others with similar experiences do not. Conversely, the radicalization disengagement does not adhere to a straight-line path. Developing CVE programs must not fall in a trap of one-size-fits-all. The administration's proposed budget significantly curtails CVE funding. While the continuation of DHS grants or more focused continuation of DHS grants is a step in the right direction, the ability to scale up these projects without an influx of new grant funding is doubtful. Moreover, the proposed budget cuts to reduce the number of employees at DHS and other agencies that serve the CVE task force may limit our innovation in the future. CVE efforts in the previous administration and the current one has largely focused on one form of extremism. The previous administration, while not explicit in its public messaging but clearly in its implementation, focused nearly entirely on countering ISIS-inspired terrorism. By nearly all outward accounts, the current administration also indicates this singular focus. Of course, there should be a prioritization of resources, but CVE programs would do well to concentrate not only on the threat posed by individuals like Omar Mateen but also those by the Dylann Roofs of the world. Domestic CVE is in a tenuous state. Decisions by government and community partners in the coming months will determine whether CVE is truly a viable option. CVE is a delicate tool, if properly implemented, can help sway young men and women away from radicalization and violence. And families that I met with in Minneapolis, in Boston, individuals who have dealt with loved ones who've joined terrorist organizations and are grappling with these questions, we haven't provided them any form of support from the Federal Government or local effort. We need to step up and provide this. And by the way, it's also an important goal to help adjust resources for the Federal Government so the FBI can focus on more immediate threats, while communities and non-governmental partners can focus on other things. Thank you, and I welcome your questions. [Prepared statement of Seamus Hughes follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. DeSantis. Well, thanks for the witnesses. The chair now recognizes himself for five minutes. Mr. Selim, we have looked at some of these pilot programs, specifically Minnesota. How do you at the Department evaluate the effectiveness of the CVE pilot program in Minneapolis? Mr. Selim. Chairman DeSantis, thanks for the question, and again, thanks for having us here today. I think there have been a number of ways that we can assess the pilot program in Minneapolis. Overall, I would assess that it has been successful in a number of different categories. It's validated the assumptions that at the local level solutions to CVE programs need to be constructed. Second, it's validated that working by, with, and through State and local law enforcement, municipal officials, and councilmembers and individuals that hold some type of position, having them act as some type of facilitator or convener is a positive step forward and brings communities closer together. And three, a number of both governmental and nongovernmental organizations have validated that they want to participate in these efforts, that they would like to participate in programming related to preventing and intervening in the process of radicalization but lack the resources to do so. And in the volume of applications that we received for the grant program, we've seen an overwhelming response from the Twin Cities area, and fortunately, we've been able to act on a number of those very strong applications and make some awards in that place. Mr. DeSantis. I would note for the record, and I ask unanimous consent to submit a GAO report. GAO disagrees with that. They say there is no cohesive process for measuring outcomes. So, I ask unanimous consent that this be added to the record. Mr. DeSantis. So, let me ask you this. There was a major trial in Minnesota, I think 13 guys for material support to ISIS, and the U.S. Attorney's Office did a good job, FBI, but is that a success of CVE or is that a failure of CVE when something like that happens? Mr. Selim. I think that's serve--that's not CVE. A counterterrorism investigation and arrest and a prosecution -- -- Mr. DeSantis. So, then, basically, that would mean that the CVE community-based programs were obviously not successful at steering those individuals away from a violent ideology, correct? Mr. Selim. I would say that the CVE-related programs and the small amount that are being implemented across the country are just one facet of the broader counterterrorism approach. So, to the extent that a CVE program in one city can help bring in a tip, can help contribute to an intervention for an individual, that's a positive contribution, but it's not a catchall. It's just one piece in our broader homeland security strategy. Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Mr. Sleeper in terms of the Minnesota--we were able to meet with the folks at the FBI down there on the ground. I will ask you. The effectiveness of the community-based programs, has that been a gamechanger? It seemed to me when we were there, there were still significant threats that they were monitoring. Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I spoke with SAC Thornton last evening prior to coming here. The challenge remains. The SAC would indicate that communication has improved between government authorities and the community, but it's still not what it should be in order to ensure an effective exchange of information to prevent individuals from either harming other people or harming themselves by traveling overseas. This is going to be a long-term commitment to ensuring that the community develops enough confidence to be able to keep the information flow going. Mr. DeSantis. One of the things that was a little surprising is the community there, the Somalis, is primarily a refugee community, but yet they are--particularly some of the problem people would travel back and forth. And so if they are coming as refugees, then why are they just going back and forth? It was a little odd to me that that would be something that would be okay. You would think if you are fleeing an area, you wouldn't want to just keep going back, but that seemed to be--I mean, I know a lot of these guys who were convicted, they were going back. They had government money they were using. I mean, it was really, really dispiriting to see. Mr. Sleeper. There are some examples, sir, of individuals that have traveled back, yes, sir, and returned. Mr. DeSantis. All right. The use of funds, let me ask Mr. Selim. I mean, we looked at some of these grants. For example, there was $160,000 to a group called Music in Common whose task was ``empowering diverse cultures and faiths to discover common ground through collaborative songwriting, multimedia, and performance.'' So, in terms of effectiveness, collaborative songwriting, is that an effective approach to warding off terrorism? Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, what I could say about that application in particular is that was not one of the ones that was awarded in June of 2017. I think you're referring to one of the earlier ---- Mr. DeSantis. Right. Mr. Selim.--awards from January of 2017. What I can say conclusively--and I think I would echo some of the comments that Mr. Hughes made earlier--is radicalization is not a linear process. There are multiple ways that individuals in the United States and across the globe have been radicalized, and thus, the solution sets to preventing and intervening in the process of radicalization are equally diverse and multidisciplinary. Mr. DeSantis. I think that that is true, but I just--is this a good use of tax funds for this particular group? Was there any measurable success as a result of awarding this grant? Are there other groups which I would say are more fuzzy in terms of their approach--has there been documented success from there? Because we looked for it. It was hard for us to find it, and it is a concern. Mr. Selim. I understand your concern, Mr. Chairman. Here's the best way I can try to answer that. Mr. DeSantis. But, I guess--I mean, the fact that this group got dropped is probably an indication that it had not been having a lot of success, correct? Mr. Selim. Part of the reason that group and a number of others were dropped is because of the additional factors that Secretary Kelly and DHS leadership infused into the grant program and to--sorry. Mr. DeSantis. No, finish your thought. Mr. Selim. And to address your point on measurement and evaluation, looking at each and--each individual grant--grantee and program that we will be funding, overall, I guess I would summarize we're looking at readiness overall, and we're looking at readiness of preventing radicalization here in a couple different facets. The first is in this grant program are we raising awareness on the threat of radicalization and recruitment? Are we creating willingness within communities to engage with State, local, and municipal law enforcement? And third, are we demonstrating an increased level of capabilities for State, local, and nongovernmental actors to do something if radicalization and recruitment is detected? Overall, what this grant program is trying to do is up our readiness game and factors that we need to work on moving forward. Mr. DeSantis. Let me ask Ms. Raza. When you see something like the collaborative songwriting, you have been very clear about going after the ideology. I mean, is that the approach you think would be successful or are you arguing for more of a direct acknowledgement of what the threat is? Ms. Raza. Thank you for having me here, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for that question. Yes, I would say that the time has come to definitely have a more direct approach. With due respect to the songwriting project, I mean, ``fluff stuff'' and interfaith dialogue really hasn't led to much deradicalization and hasn't led to countering violent extremism. There need to be specific policies put into place that tackle the ideology, as I have mentioned in both my oral and written testimony. Mr. DeSantis. So in terms of the ideology, I notice the government manuals recently, they will not mention radical Islam or they don't use anything associated with the word Islam, but then when I look at people in the Middle East who are fighting this like General President el-Sisi of Egypt, I mean, he gave a speech in front of all those Islamic clerics, and he said, look, he is like, you know, I am a devout Muslim but we can't use the faith to be at war with other people. So, he seemed to view it as really a debate within Islam, and he wanted the nonviolent--which I think is the majority for sure-- to really carry the day, whereas I think the government view has been to just say this has nothing to do with Islam; all violent extremism is the same. It just seems like Sisi is confronting the ideological a little more directly. It seems like some of the government manuals, you know, they kind of dance around the core ideological point. Is that a fair description of the difference? Ms. Raza. Yes, it is, and thank you for bringing that up because this point has come up more than once that the word Islam is--radical ideology should not be used. As a practicing Muslim, let me point out that to separate Islamist ideology from the spiritual message of Islam is a very pro-Islamic thing to do. It's not about political correctness. There are people here in the West who are afraid to use the word Islamist ideology because they think that it is anti-Muslim. It is actually very pro-Muslim because it makes the ordinary masses of people understand the difference between the faith of Islam and an ideology, which is political in nature and which is evil in its agenda. And in order to fight that ideology, we have to name it. We have a mandate in our organization where we say you have to use the three E's, expose the problem, educate the masses, and then erase the problem. Mr. DeSantis. So, you mentioned designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist-supporting organization. If the U.S. Government did that and that preventing money from flowing to some of the domestic groups, do you think that that would help neuter some of the economic fuel for the extremist ideology? Ms. Raza. Yes, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization that aids and abets terrorism definitely would be a step in the right direction, especially when other Muslim countries have already done this. And the--they fuel and feed the radical ideology that eventually leads to terrorism. Mr. DeSantis. For Adnan Kifayat, the good thing about the private sector what you are trying to do is you are not really burdened by some of the bureaucratic scriptures and you guys can kind of see things and react. So, you mention some of these online interventions that have been successful, so can you describe, what does that entail and how some of those have worked? Mr. Kifayat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, so some of our online work right now is focused on really understanding the narratives and the content that groups like ISIS, al-Qaida, others put out there and the kinds of messages that they use to basically get people to go down those pathways. And what we're learning is geography, so where those searches are taking place, where that content is being consumed, potentially deploying some off-ramping, as has been talked about, some off- ramping programs, hotlines in those geographies. Two, we've learned about--more about the complexity of the messaging, so it's everything from religious argument, as has been noted a number of times, to things like seeking adventure, things like protecting one's culture, protecting one's community. And understanding what those message points are is very helpful to us as we create content and repurpose content to push back against those messages. We've also learned, Mr. Chairman, that terrorists are not-- they don't start off by viewing beheading videos or the bloodiest or the most gruesome of the content. They actually start off by consuming what might appear to be mild content but has tinges of hate, tinges of hate, intolerance, and so forth. And so nipping it in the bud has been one lesson that we've learned. Mr. DeSantis. Great. I am over my time. I will recognize the ranking member, Mr. Lynch. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for a threshold matter, I have a couple of documents that I would like to submit with unanimous consent. I have a letter here from the Muslim Justice League of Boston, and I have a letter as well from the Brennan Center for Justice addressed to you and I. Mr. DeSantis. And you would ask unanimous consent that they ---- Mr. Lynch. I do. Mr. DeSantis.--be entered into the record. Without objection. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lynch. One of the difficulties here that I know my colleagues are struggling with is really identifying the metrics for success. So, we have got these--we are expending these resources, and we are trying to--it is difficult, I have to admit, to measure or count an attack that doesn't occur, right? If we are putting people out there and trying to reduce radicalization, you know, the strongest evidence is a lack of attacks, and that is, you know, that's a proven negative. But, Director Sleeper and Mr. Hughes, you have been out there, sort of law enforcement capacity, and we have talked about or heard a lot about trust today from a number of witnesses. There seems to be almost an organic friction between law enforcement coming in and investigating and a faith a mosque--any faith or a church for that matter in which constituents are coming there to practice their religion confidentially, and there is that trust between the imam and the Oma, just as there are, you know, in my faith there is a relationship, a confidential relationship between the priest and Catholics. So, I am struggling with how do we balance in a way-- balance our need to intervene here and at the same time do it in a respectful way that doesn't isolate some of these mosques? Because I have heard in various parts of my community, in the Muslim community that those who accept money, CVE money, are tainted. There is almost a collaborator label among some that say, oh, that mosque is accepting CVE money. They are cooperating with the FBI or with the Boston Police, and so for some, they get a black mark and are seen as less worthy. And others that refuse to take the CVE seek to take on this role of legitimacy in the Muslim community. How do we deal with that, Mr. Hughes? Mr. Hughes. I spent a lot of time, about 3-1/2 years, working for the National Counterterrorism Center on this exact issue and a lot of time actually in your district. Mr. Lynch. Yes. Mr. Hughes. And so my biggest takeaway from kind of traveling around the country and meeting with Muslim American community leaders throughout the country was you just got to be honest and talk about it in human stories. So instead of 128 people have been arrested for terrorism charges, it's my name is Seamus Hughes, I'm a father, and I'm worried about these kids. And I tell the story of a young man from Minneapolis who disappears on election day and doesn't--and his mother's worried about him, goes to Somalia, realizes it's his bill of goods and is killed there for his doubts. And at some point in his radicalization he was reachable. My name is Seamus Hughes and I want to save that young kid because I never want to sit in a room like I used to in a basement of an apartment building talking to mothers of--grieving sons. And so if you frame the issue in terms of human aspect, I think you'd get a lot farther than you would. And I think you also need to have a bright line between counterterrorism operations and CVE efforts. So, my engagement with community partners I didn't share my notes with the local FBI office because I needed to let--build levels of trust, and that doesn't happen overnight. So, going to Boston every couple weeks, talking to folks, knowing who their kids are, where they play soccer, things like that, those things matter in order to actually build this level of trust. It's not just a one-and-done thing. Mr. Lynch. That is great. Director Sleeper? Mr. Sleeper. Thank you for the question, sir. I have been a police officer for four decades, the first three decades in State and local law enforcement. Outreach to communities is the cornerstone of law enforcement. It's the essence of how local government communicates with its citizens in order to prevent violence in the communities, all violence. It's an effort to prevent violence from happening, to encourage dialogue between families, community groups, religious organizations, and to open up dialogue so that if someone see something, if they're concerned about a friend or a family member that may be going in the wrong direction, that that's communicated and that violence is prevented. That's really what this program is about is preventing violence. The FBI looks at it from a very broad perspective of looking at all potential avenues of extremism and violence that may be dealt with in a community. We're very cognizant that all cities and communities are different, and it's the citizens of the community that are best to identify the level of engagement, the type of engagement, and allow them to dictate back to the law enforcement community what they need and what they would like in order to exchange and open up that dialogue, sir. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. So, it just so happens that Mr. Russell and I have spent a fair amount of time in refugee camps on the Syrian border, Syria and Turkey, Syria and Lebanon, Syria and Amman, Jordan, and on one of my visits we actually had an opportunity to bring in six of these so-called moderate rebel groups, the leaders of these groups. They came up out of Aleppo and met with us. And one of my conversations I asked each one of them as they came in separately, I said, how do you communicate? And they are all on WhatsApp, okay? So, not surprisingly, a lot of the radical content that we are seeing on our end here in the United States is also coming through WhatsApp. And I don't want to single them out. There are a few others. But one of the folks that I deal with on this issue, who is Dr. Nabeel Khudairi, he is the former chairperson of the Islamic Council of New England, he had a great quote. He said, ``If we are going to do battle against extremists, we have to bring something in the same genre of the social media to balance a young person's opinion of what to do.'' So, what are we doing in terms of--and now, I am talking about the social media aspect of it that is oftentimes the point of contact between efforts of others to radicalize our sons and daughters here at home? What is the counterpoint that we are using to sort of push back on that? And has anything that you have been doing so far been successful, Mr. Sleeper or Mr. Hughes, I guess? Or Mr. Selim actually, yes. Mr. Sleeper. There's a number of areas, sir, that are being pursued. Some of those fall into the true counterterrorism effort in the sense of identifying and eliminating individuals that are responsible for creating and sending those messages. There's significant work that's being done with the private sector, and there's been significant success with the private sector recognizing that their applications are being leveraged by people, so there are successes there. And I know George is working a number of initiatives at a different level. Mr. Selim. Seamus, do you want to ---- Mr. Hughes. Yes, if you don't mind. I interviewed an American ISIS supporter who spent about four months in ISIS last month, and he was using WhatsApp to communicate with other friends when he crossed the border. So, absolutely, the online environment does matter for these folks, and in many ways, it's a logistical support and a level of connectivity they wouldn't normally have. Mr. Lynch. Just to be clear, it is the level of encryption there that ---- Mr. Hughes. It's ---- Mr. Lynch.--allows that, right? Mr. Hughes. It's the debate that the FBI would talk about, the ---- Mr. Lynch. And it is owned by Facebook, right? Mr. Hughes. I believe so, yes. Mr. Lynch. Yes. Mr. Hughes. So, in terms of what we're doing domestically, not a whole lot. So, we have a few programs. We have peer-to- peer program which the U.S. Government and Facebook have stepped up in form and encouraged the university students to create counter-messaging. But I think there's a few low-hanging policy questions I think we can solve pretty quickly. One is community partners like the one you mentioned, giving them some level of a legal understanding of what's right and left latitudes online, so they're not crossing against material support to terrorism clauses if they're engaging with a would- be jihadist, right, so letting them know what the latitudes are. The second one is informing them of how ISIS and other groups use the online environment. So, it's not Twitter anymore. It's largely concentrated on Telegram. And what do those channels look like and how do you get involved and what are the messages that are there? We're not doing enough of that type of work. And the last part, and I think Adnan would have a point to raise on this is, you know, the Federal Government's not really going to step up in this spot. It's uncomfortable there. It raises a whole host of kind of legal issues and the ability for the Federal Government to move and shift in the online space is very little, right? So, this is where foundations like Gen Next can step up. Other foundations, family foundations and things like that can say, okay, community partner in Boston who has a great idea, you need X amount of money. It's a small amount of funding. Let's try this out, and if it works, let's take it to L.A. or let's take it to Seattle and get the Federal Government out of this process and help kind of do that connective tissue. Mr. Lynch. Mr. Selim, Mr. Kifayat? Mr. Selim. Yes, thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, and please feel free to jump in on this. I guess I would only amplify and add one or two points from what my colleagues mentioned. In the past number of years that I've been working on this issue, I've seen a fair bit of progress from industry, from the technology companies, from the social media companies, from the internet service providers in this space. Next week, in northern California for the first time ever, a number of these companies are convening a forum to talk about this issue with Federal, State, and local officials. Facebook, Google, Twitter, and a whole host of others are convening officials. I think the public-private aspect of this that Mr. Hughes alluded to earlier is critical to two parts of the question that you asked. One is the content and the encryption--how do you remove it or take it down--but then there's another important part of that issue, which is how do you amplify other non-extremist content? How do you amplify the voices of individuals that are in refugee camps, American Muslims or other civic leaders in the United States to help drown out those voices that are online that are trying to recruit and radicalize? And I think a stronger partnership with industry on these issues can help address both those issues, and I think we need to do it sooner rather than later. Mr. Lynch. Right. Mr. Kifayat and Ms. Raza, if you have anything to add. Mr. Kifayat. Just to amplify one point, sir, the--there are huge conversations taking--huge tectonic plates of young-- Americans having conversations about culture and identity and what civilization means and talked about what religion means, and the problem we've seen online, social media, is that there is an ample amount of really bad information out there that tells you how to act and what adventure means and what a call to action means and what living in a community of nonbelievers means. And what we have been doing in our partnerships with the technology sector is to, as--to pick along what George said, is to drown those out, right, to relegate those to make them impotent online. And so we're putting out narratives that counter those concepts, counter those ideas at the nip so when they begin. And that, I think is where the future is if we are to save the internet and save the online space, sir. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Ms. Raza? Ms. Raza. Thank you so much for having us here. The question of social media is extremely important, and our organization has been approached to create an alternate narrative. And with regards to the conversation that you had brought up before as well, NGOs, nongovernment organizations, need to be part of this movement and to create an alternate narrative on the internet, on social media so that it can drown out, as Mr. Kifayat said, the extremist voices. And one of the measures that we have looked upon, which has been very successful in terms of community relationships, and you had mentioned your concern, along with Mr. Russell, is to empower the Muslim communities themselves to take responsibility to bring about some of the change so it doesn't seem that it's just law enforcement or CVE or someone else who is telling them to. And the best example of that I can give you is what happened last week at a mosque in Davis, California, where the imam Ammar Shahin who is at the Islamic Center of Davis called for Muslims to fight the Jews and annihilate them. This was following the troubles at Temple Mount. And it was the Muslim communities that actually took upon this challenge and started an online petition to actually have him fired and hire another imam. And this is something new and different, which is what we need to focus on is while we want to counter violent extremism through government, we also want to do it from within the communities themselves. Mr. Lynch. That is great. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your extreme courtesy. I appreciate that. I yield back. Mr. Russell. [Presiding] And I thank the gentleman, the ranking member. We have certainly seen firsthand a lot of these issues as we have tried to address them. I am going to yield myself some time for questions here. I think that there is really a responsibility in messaging that goes just beyond the Islamic communities. I think it goes even nationwide with our media. For example, when you see a story reported about ISIS, the B-roll in the background is, you know, these people sneaking around with tennis shoes and AK's riding on tanks, you know, looking like they are some heroic figure rather than the barbarians that have committed atrocities that have not been seen since the Dark Ages. I think we bear some responsibility when our own media will not engage in the betrayal. If all you show is this positive, glorious image, then that can be extended through social media, and then we see a lot of those issues there. It is just a false characterization also of our military targeting where somehow the military, which our military is the most accurate and the most human-rights-conscious. When we have to unsheathe the sword, we try to make sure that it is accurate to the point of enormous expenditures to have our weaponry to be accurate so that we don't cause undue suffering. And yet the opponents, you know, don't abide by any of these rules, and then our media will somehow attack our country, our soldiers, our warriors instead of those that are sawing people's heads off, setting them on fire in cages causing untold human suffering, displacing hundreds of thousands and millions of people, leveling cities. Other than that, they are all pretty nice guys. What is interesting is that we have large Muslim communities in this country, and a lot of them have lived quite peacefully for decades. And, you know, I think of, you know, little Baghdad in San Diego. You know, not only do they contribute to the economy, not only have we seen very little radicalization from these areas--you know, I think of my own hometown in Oklahoma City. We have got folks that have come from both an Arab, Sunni Arab, Persian Shia background due to different things that have happened in the '50s, '60s, '70s, '80s, '90s, you know, 2000s, live quite peacefully in the community with very little radicalization. And then we get to other areas where we have just an outrageous proportionate level of radicalization. For example, Minnesota has produced 26 percent of young foreign fighters recruited in the United States, and more terrorist suspects charged in connection with ISIS than any other State besides New York, and when you compare the population of Minnesota and New York, well, my goodness, you know, you--and so I guess my question to you, Mr. Sleeper, would be why is Minnesota such a significant center of terrorist activity and recruitment? Mr. Sleeper. It's difficult for us to articulate the reason why that's happening, sir. Obviously, there's a large Somali population, 100,000-plus, in that ---- Mr. Russell. There is a large Somali population in D.C. -- -- Mr. Sleeper. Geographic ---- Mr. Russell.--but we don't see a recruitment from that. I mean, there has got to be a reason. I mean, one thing I learned as a warrior, you know, fighting--I have lived in these cultures. I have gone to weddings, wakes, you know, done the land grab and the bulls, everything and have made great friends. But when you have enemies that percolate in an area, there is a reason. And so, you know, let's see if we can get some ideas to this. Mr. Hughes, you are raising your hand. I will come back to you, Mr. Sleeper. Mr. Hughes. Sure. Looking at the Minneapolis cases, I think we talked a lot about the online environment, this idea of online radicalization, online recruitment. Minneapolis is much more of a peer-to-peer recruitment. So, the reason why you had a number of guys try to join ISIS later is because their brother joined al-Shabaab a few years before that or their roommate before that. And there was--and there's a connectivity there that I don't think we fully understood. So, Abdi Nur goes over to Syria and then FaceTimes with his buddies back in Minneapolis and says it's time to join the so-called caliphate. So, that human interaction actually matters quite a bit. It's the reason why Minneapolis had a higher number with a very-- with a large Somali population and Lewiston, Maine, or San Diego doesn't. That peer-to-peer network does matter. Mr. Russell. And, Mr. Sleeper, what would be the profile of these terrorist suspects or recruits that are coming out of Minnesota, you know, to speak to what Mr. Hughes is--what would that profile look like? Mr. Sleeper. There really is no profile. We spent a tremendous amount of time, research, and analysis looking into individuals that are becoming radicalized so that we can get ahead of the curve, behaviors, indicators ---- Mr. Russell. But, see, we got to do better than that. And look, you know, when I was thrust in combat environments, you know, one of the first things I said is three questions: What does the enemy look like? How can he hurt us? And how can we hurt him? Now, we have the most incredible, phenomenal intelligence services in the United States. We have millions of Muslim Americans that are willing to help and serve their country. How do I know? Because I served with quite a few of them. So just to say, well, we can't identify what they look like, we can't make a profile, you really think that is true? I mean, you represent the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I mean, boy, if that is true--because if we can't identify the problem, we can never solve it. Mr. Sleeper. It is difficult to identify any commonality -- -- Mr. Russell. Life's tough, but it is tough if we don't identify the problem. I mean, so, help me out here. What ---- Mr. Sleeper. So, if you look at the number of investigations we have open right now, several hundred investigations in this country right now, I'd say the FBI is very effective at identifying individuals that articulate a desire and we determine there's predicated information that they're prepared to act on it. Mr. Russell. And to your point ---- Mr. Sleeper. Prior to that, it's a very difficult process to do in consideration with First Amendment rights, freedom of speech. Mr. Russell. Sure. And to your point on the good job that the FBI does, I don't want you to think I'm picking on you; I have great respect for the Bureau. And ISIS self-turned air traffic controller just caught two weeks ago, charged, indicted in Honolulu, I mean, imagine the destruction and damage he could have done if our Bureau had not been Johnny-on-the-spot. And so, you know, we do appreciate the work that our military and the Bureau does every day. But I refuse to accept that we can't identify a profile. Anyone else want to take on what that might--Mr. Selim? Mr. Selim. Sir, if I may just add one note to this. Part of the group of folks who work for me is there are a group of folks dedicated to working with the latest and greatest, both analytical and social science community on this. Going back to your earlier question on why--in Minneapolis, why is the spike so high, what a number of studies and what a lot of research has shown is that individuals who come to this country that have a higher exposure to violence from wherever they came from may possess a higher propensity to radicalization and recruitment. Mr. Russell. But, gosh, do you think that is true when you look at like what happened with Beirut? We have had a lot of people come from Lebanon, and we have not seen this problem. We have had civil wars and destruction of all kinds of things before where we see a migration of population and we don't see radicalization. So, do you get my point? Mr. Selim. I do. I think it's just--it's one of the factors that we've seen particularly differentiating in the Twin Cities with some of the Somali community attacks that we've seen in Ohio and other places. It's one of the factors, in addition to a whole host of others. Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you. And I am consuming some time here, and I have some very patient colleagues I have great respect for. And I will come back on some other things, but I want now to recognize Ms. Demings from Florida. Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and believe me, this topic, this conversation deserves all of the time necessary because it is a very important issue. I want to thank our witnesses for being here, thank our ranking member as well, Mr. Lynch. The FBI has confirmed that there are active ISIS-related investigations in all 50 States. To date, 26 States and the District of Columbia have had at least one charge with offenses related to the Islamic State within their borders. So, Mr. Selim, I would like to start with you. What is the Trump administration's justification for proposing that the CVE grant funds be eliminated? And what would the impact be if those funds are eliminated? Mr. Selim. Ma'am, thank you for that question. I can answer it a few different ways. The first is that the program that we recently announced, these awards that we announced in June, this is a--that award was not a one-year award. That award was a two-year award. So, that $10 million in awards that we've administered will last for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019, and we're about to start that period of performance and that cycle now. So, I'm aware that the presidential budget request did not reflect the CVE grant program in fiscal year 2018. However, there's--it's not that there's zero dollars being spent in '18; it's that this is a two-year period of performance in which I'm very confident, as the director of the office and the program manager here, that we'll be able to demonstrate a high degree of excellence on these 26 awardees. And hopefully, by fiscal year 2019, we'll be able to have the best practices and lessons learned to be able to make the case to the Congress for more funds in this area. Mrs. Demings. Do you agree--and I would also like to hear from Director Sleeper as well on this. Do you agree with the GAO that the Federal Government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for assessing the overall CVE effort? And we will start with you, Mr. Selim? Mr. Selim. So, I am aware of the GAO response on that issue, and there is a DHS response to the GAO report, which, if the committee allows, I'd be happy to submit that for the record as well. Mr. Selim. I do not agree with that view that there is no measurement and evaluation of any of the programs. Specifically on the CVE grant program, we have robust measurement put in place for all 26 of the grantees, both qualitative and quantitative. To give you an example of some of the qualitative measure that we're looking at, in the CVE grant program, there are five focus areas overall. So one of the questions that the committee and you may be wondering is how do you measure the ability to do training on countering violent extremism or radicalization and recruitment? And we're really looking at a number of different factors. When we're looking at training the space, we're looking at both the number and type of people being trained. Are they State and local law enforcement professionals, are they civic leaders, are they spiritual leaders, and so on? And we're also conducting pre- and post-survey assessments on the level of knowledge acquisition. Historically, in any law enforcement or military training, the nature and scope of the training, the level of knowledge acquisition that's attained, so we're taking into consideration a very broad swath of data that we'll be collecting, and we'll use that to implement and hone our own training in the Federal Government moving forward. Mrs. Demings. Director Sleeper? Mr. Sleeper. This is an incredibly complicated issue. We're not the only country dealing with it. Virtually every Western country is currently wrestling with this. We can always be better, coordinate more effectively. We need to if we expect to meet the challenges facing us. Mrs. Demings. And I have to agree with our chairman's statement earlier that we do have to do better. This is an ever-critical issue. Do you agree that the evaluation process that is in place is adequate? Mr. Sleeper. I have not actually reviewed the report, ma'am. Mrs. Demings. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Russell. Very efficient on your time. I thank the gentlelady. And I would like to recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch. Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to acknowledge the presence of Kerry Sleeper, who served, Mr. Chairman, as our commissioner of public safety in Vermont, and we are pretty proud of him. And I want to ask you, Director, in your new job one of the things you did so well in Vermont was walk this tightrope that I think folks in law enforcement have to walk between being all-in, very aggressive, very vigilant to protect our safety on the one hand and also create positive relationships with the community, whose support you need in order to effectively do your job. And I would think that in this mission that all of you now are engaged in of countering violent extremism, that community support continues to be important, but the threat probably that you are all dealing with is even greater than what you have faced on a day-to-day basis when you were the commission of public safety. Congress tends, I think, to focus understandably on the potential violence that we want to give you the tools to control, but, as you did in your job in Vermont, you also displayed some ability to see the importance of maintaining that community support that is intentioned sometimes with aggressive actions that have to be taken to contain violence. And I wonder if you could just speak a little bit about that and how the FBI managed that. Mr. Sleeper. I believe the FBI does an outstanding job, sir, at reaching out to communities, particularly communities at risk. The communities most at risk are those that need the most outreach and communication. We see all across our country right now a number of cities that are struggling with relationships between their police departments and their communities, and violence is resulting as a consequence of that. This specific threat that we're discussing today requires that the FBI and the communities engage in dialogue with very specific segments of those communities, and the threat requires that there be open, trusted dialogue. The members of those communities recognize the first most fundamental role of the FBI is to protect the citizens of this country and to uphold the law. There's no doubt about that. That's the tough part. The fair part is that we engage in dialogue with those communities so they understand why we need to enforce those laws, why we need to protect those communities. And if we think particularly of the Somali community members who are leaving Minneapolis, they're going to fight in a far-distant war. The vast majority of them are going to come home in a body bag. So what we're trying to do is protect those people, communicate. And as most of the Americans that have traveled to fight for ISIS, they will eventually end up in a body bag, so we're trying to communicate to their friends and families that there's consequences to this type of behavior. That's the type of dialogue and communication that we want to have with those communities so they understand clearly our role and the likely consequences of their actions. Mr. Welch. When we have that kind of trust, does it also lead to you being able to get actionable information? Mr. Sleeper. It is, and again, we are seeing in the communities where we engage the communities do respond and recognize--we have been thanked by parents of children who we caught before they traveled for saving their children's lives, and that's the message and the dialogue that we want to put out there that we're about not only protecting the communities and the citizens but the individuals themselves that are making decisions regarding travel. But there is no doubt we are here to investigate and to uphold ---- Mr. Welch. Right. Mr. Sleeper.--the safety of the citizens of the United States first and foremost. Mr. Welch. Yes. Well, I really appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, you probably--in your own work serving our country probably had similar tension between the need to use force in appropriate circumstances but try to get the trust of the folks in the country where you were serving, a hard job. Well, I thank you. Thank you, Director. Mr. Russell. And I thank the gentleman, and I would agree with those comments and associate with Mr. Sleeper's earlier comments that community type of interaction is essential. One of the things that made it even harder is when you are not even from the country, you don't have the language, you are automatically hated, you are occupying the territory, and you are trying to earn trust. But guess what? It can be done, even those tall-order things. And we are not facing that. Although maybe in reverse as they come back we see some of those factors play in. And I would like us, before we close, a couple of additional questions if I may to Mr. Sleeper. You had made mention that there is a number of open investigations earlier in your comments. About how many is that? Mr. Sleeper. We've publicly acknowledged in several environments that there's over 1,000 open investigations across the country right now. I can't be specific, but there's over 1,000. Mr. Russell. Okay. Thank you for that. And how many individuals approximately have left the United States to fight for ISIS or other associated terror groups like al-Shabaab, et cetera? Mr. Sleeper. I don't have that number readily available, but we can ensure that you're provided with that. Mr. Russell. Sure. And if we have to provide it in a secure setting, you know, we can also arrange that. And can you get with us so that we can nail that down? Mr. Sleeper. Yes, sir. Mr. Russell. Thank you for that, sir. And then to Mr. Selim, you know, this morphing grants and, you know, we are going to add this many, we are going to subtract this many, and all of that, can we get full, complete without redaction examples of what those grants are and their parameters? Is that possible to provide to the committee? Mr. Selim. Mr. Chairman, I believe so. Currently, just to give you an accurate sense of where it is, I believe in a full and high degree of transparency with this and any other of our overseers, the stack of paper that we're looking at that's currently underneath review with our general counsel and so on is over 500 pages. And we're looking to make sure that there's no PII and whatnot, and that's the type of redaction. In addition to supplying that information on the grant applications to this committee, we want to make as much of that as publicly available and transparent as possible ---- Mr. Russell. Sure. Mr. Selim.--so I'm committed ---- Mr. Russell. Personal ---- Mr. Selim.--to doing so. I need to circle back with our counsel and just ensure what the parameters of delivering that to the committee are. Mr. Russell. Yes, personal identifiers, Socials, like that, I don't think--let me check with my legal counsel. I don't think that that is an issue, but we don't want, you know, oh, you know, here are the two sentences on page 1, so ---- Mr. Selim. No, I can assure you we're not looking to reduce any of the substance but just the appropriate things for scoring and so on. Mr. Russell. Okay. And I appreciate that. And then I thank the committee today not only for the broad bipartisan concern and interest but, you know, for the excellent witnesses on both sides. And I want to thank the ranking member for his tireless work on national security. You know, not only have we developed a friendship; we have traveled large portions of the globe together. And I also want to thank all of you today that have come before us. And I know it wasn't a convenience to, oh, sure, you know, let me--but I really appreciate the work that you do and the unique perspective that you provide, and I hope that we can work with you more in the future. And with that, I would like to thank all of our witnesses that are before us today. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]