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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] BEFORE THE WHISTLE: ASSESSING INFORMATION SHARING AND SECURITY COLLABORATION AHEAD OF MAJOR EVENTS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 24, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-40 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-779 WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chair Ranking Member Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas Vacant Keighle Joyce, Staff Director Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Statements Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security....................................................... 1 Honorable Nellie Pou, a Representative in Congress From the State of New Jersey.................................................. 3 Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: Prepared Statement............................................. 5 Witnesses Mr. Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association: Oral Statement................................................. 8 Prepared Statement............................................. 10 Mr. Raymond A. Martinez, Chief Operating Officer, FIFA World Cup 2026 Miami Host Committee: Oral Statement................................................. 16 Prepared Statement............................................. 17 Mr. Joseph Mabin, Deputy Chief, Kansas City Missouri Police Department: Oral Statement................................................. 20 Prepared Statement............................................. 21 Mr. Travis Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff and Homeland Security Advisor, Office of the Governor, State of Maryland: Oral Statement................................................. 23 Prepared Statement............................................. 25 For the Record Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: Letter From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino....................... 6 Letter From Honorable Steve Scalise............................ 7 BEFORE THE WHISTLE: ASSESSING INFORMATION SHARING AND SECURITY COLLABORATION AHEAD OF MAJOR EVENTS ---------- Tuesday, February 24, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Andrew R. Garbarino [Chairman of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Garbarino, McCaul, Gimenez, Pfluger, Strong, Crane, Biggs, Evans, Van Epps, Thompson, Correa, Hernandez, Pou, Carter, Green, and Walkinshaw. Also present: Representative Alford. Chairman Garbarino. Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any point. Without objection, I seek unanimous consent that the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford, be permitted to sit with the committee and ask questions of the witnesses. The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the information-sharing environment and the security operations among our Federal, State, local, and nongovernment partners ahead of a record number of major national events. The Chair reminds all Members that the Chair will enforce the rules of decorum at all times and urges all Members to be mindful of their remarks. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good morning. I want to start by thanking our witnesses for appearing before the committee today. The United States is preparing to host a mega decade of mass gathering events starting this summer with the 2026 FIFA World Cup and nationwide celebrations to mark the 250th anniversary of our Nation. These events are an incredible opportunity to showcase the best of America, but they also will be--will also require unprecedented collaboration between leaders at the Federal, State, and local levels to secure the events and keep the public safe. Today we will hear directly from some of those leaders about the security preparations already under way to ensure that we already meet this moment. The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be held throughout North America in June and July and will include more than 70 matches played in 11 different cities across the United States. With 5 million fans traveling to the United States and as many as 6 billion viewers expected worldwide, this will be the largest sporting event in history. At the same time, America 250 celebrations will be held in communities across the country this summer to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. Recognizing the years of planning that have already gone into these efforts, the committee established its Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States last spring to ensure continued prioritization of these events by Congress, Federal agencies, and State, local, and private-sector partners. I want to thank the task force Chairman, Mr. McCaul, and Ranking Member Ms. Pou for their leadership, and all Members of the committee for their consistent engagement on these security preparations through the many briefings, hearings, and roundtables that have convened. Over the last year, Congress has taken concrete action to ensure the United States will be well-equipped and well- prepared for the months and years ahead. I am proud of the role that this committee has played and will continue to play in moving these critical priorities forward. One of the greatest security risks facing our Nation today is the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems or drones. The prospect of weaponized drones being used to attack mass gatherings in open-air stadiums is a scenario that keeps policy makers and law enforcement professionals up at night. In response to these threats, I was proud to work with the Trump administration and lead efforts to pass vital counter-UAS authorities to for State and local law enforcement in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which will help support real-time mitigation efforts and counter the adversarial use of this technology. Republicans of Congress also provided historic security investments to the enactment of the One Big Beautiful Bill last summer, which included $625 million for the 2026 FIFA World Cup security and $500 million for State and local investments in counter-UAS capabilities. As we approach the 25th anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks later this year, the solemn milestone reemphasizes the importance of our collective mission in the face of constantly-evolving threats. The Department of Homeland Security and this committee were both created after 9/11 to ensure that a similar attack on the United States would never happen again. In just the last 3 months, this committee has heard directly from Secretary Noem and leaders from several DHS components, including TSA, CBP, and CISA, whose agencies will play critical roles in safeguarding these events. Twenty-five years later, the threat landscape has not diminished. It has intensified, diversified, and evolved in ways that demand constant vigilance and decisive action. But DHS and the Federal Government cannot achieve this mission alone. Close collaboration, communication, and information sharing between Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, along with industry stakeholders and private- sector partners, is essential. These games and festivities designed to bring people together, enjoy in celebration also present an array of targets from nefarious actors who seek to carry out violent attacks or exploit these gatherings for other illicit purposes. It is not an even playing field. The dedicated men and women who protect our communities every day must overcome these threats every single time. Those who seek to inflict harm only need to be right once. But that doesn't mean we give up. It means we must be prepared for every possibility and ready to combat any threat. The goal of today's hearing is to engage directly with representatives from law enforcement, host cities, and fusion centers that serve on the front lines of this whole-of-society security effort. Our shared objective is to ensure these partners are receiving the timely intelligence, resources, and coordination they need to carry out their responsibilities effectively and safeguard the communities they serve. If there are challenges, we have a collective responsibility to identify them and work together to find actionable solutions. Protecting public safety is not a partisan issue. It is imperative that we work together to do so. As Chairman, I am committed to ensuring that all partners in this effort are receiving the support they need to succeed. I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and to a productive discussion on how we can all work together on these efforts moving forward. I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Pou, for her opening statement. Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. Good morning to all. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very important hearing and welcome to our witnesses. I want to thank you for your valuable testimony that I know we are all going to be receiving from you today. I am stepping in for Ranking Member Thompson, who will be joining us momentarily. I serve as the Ranking Member of this committee's Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States. Our task force has a deeply important mission as our country prepares to host some of the world's largest gatherings and celebrations over the next 3 years. Events like the 250th anniversary of America's founding, the 78 matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games will put the United States on display for the entire world to see. I am particularly proud that the final match of the 2026 World Cup will be held in my district in Northern New Jersey. While the hospitality and the camaraderie of these events are exciting, it is essential that we ensure the safety and security of these mass gatherings. Both Congress and the Executive branch have a responsibility to make certain that our State, our local, Tribal, and territorial partners have all the resources that they need to get the job done. That is why today's hearing is so, so very important. While conducting oversight as Ranking Member of the task force, I have seen first-hand how this administration's actions are jeopardizing our security preparedness. Over the last year, the Trump administration has dismantled security cooperation at all levels of government, reduced counterterrorism personnel and resources, politicized FEMA funding and grants, and has openly refused to work with States run by Democratic Governors and elected officials. Now the Trump administration is choosing to withhold $625 million in security funding that Congress has already appropriated for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. This is money meant to help cities and States keep their games safe. These funds are just sitting there collecting dust, waiting for FEMA approval and to be disbursed. States, host cities, and local law enforcement are begging FEMA to release this money to be able to prepare for and secure the World Cup games. The time for action is short. This isn't competency. It is chaos. I urge my Republican colleagues to join me and my Democratic colleagues in calling for the administration to release these funds now. These communities must have the resources needed to ensure the events are safe for everyone. As we go forward, we must keep in mind that it is not just stadiums and parking lots we must protect. It is fan festivals, entertainment districts, bars, and gathering spaces where countless people will be celebrating. Still, New Jersey will do whatever we can to provide safe and fun activities for the World Cup. In doing so, we will ensure that all people and spaces are adequately protected. I want to be clear. Everyone, everyone deserves to be free and safe at the upcoming games. Whether it is my constituents traveling from Paterson to East Rutherford or fans arriving from the other side of the world, all fans and players deserve to enjoy the games and know that our Federal Government is doing everything imaginable to make these events safe and secure. I have repeatedly stated concerns about Secretary Kristi Noem's out-of-control and unlawful enforcement actions. We have all seen dangerous DHS violent immigration tactics which were especially apparent during the recent outrageous operations in Minnesota. DHS personnel killed 2 American citizens and harmed countless others. So when Director Lyons refused to rule out conducting ICE enforcement at and around the World Cup events, when I asked him this very question, chaos ensued. Countries have issued travel advisories. Groups and businesses are raising alarms. Residents and fans are expressing fear for their safety. All while local officials report minimum communication by ICE about what exactly it plans to do. These tactics pose an unacceptable risk not just to Americans, but all foreign visitors seeking to enjoy the World Cup and other events. Make no mistake, security planning cannot succeed amid complete uncertainty, opaque planning, and unilateral decision making. We need to explore these issues further and conduct real oversight of DHS's out-of-control immigration enforcement policy to ensure the World Cup is safe for everyone. I have seen first-hand the amazing work that men and women at the State and local level are doing to make these the most secure games we have ever seen. Fusion centers in New Jersey are working. Police departments in my districts are planning. Governor Sherrill's office are coordinating together. These are groups that are getting ready before the first whistle blows. The question is whether or not DHS will do the same. This committee has the responsibility to ensure that Homeland Security's policy is not driven by politics or retaliation, but by risk assessment, operational realities, and Federal and State coordination. Because when millions gather in my district in New Jersey or Miami or Kansas City, the American people will not care about the interagency turf battles or grant paperwork backlog. Americans will expect that their Government works together because security is a shared responsibility. But leadership starts at the top, and it is time for DHS to lead. I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to hear from our witnesses today and about how we can ensure that this agency can improve and do just that because time is really running out. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson February 24, 2026 I welcome the opportunity to discuss information sharing and security collaboration for upcoming events like the America 250 celebration, 2026 FIFA World Cup, and 2028 Los Angeles Summer Olympics and Paralympics. Democratic Members of the committee represent communities that will host these events, and we all have a vested interested in ensuring their security for local residents and visitors alike. Rep. Nellie Pou, who serves as the Democratic lead on the committee's ``Task Force on Enhancing Security for Special Events in the United States'' and whose district will host the World Cup final, is an outstanding leader on this issue. Several of our other Members from New Jersey, New York, and California represent districts that will host or are located near World Cup and LA 2028 events. They, too, are championing robust Federal, State, and local partnerships to ensure successful events. The Federal Government has a critical role to play to support State and local governments that are hosting these events, which will draw millions of visitors from across the country and around the world. Historically, administrations of both parties have collaborated with communities hosting major events like these. Their relationships may have not always been perfect, but everyone worked from the premise that a safe, successful event was good for the host communities and the country as a whole. Unfortunately, that has not been the case with the Trump administration. In fact, the Trump administration's record when it comes to supporting communities through information sharing, law enforcement collaboration, and necessary Federal funding is--in a word--atrocious. President Trump has politicized the Federal Government's relationship with States and cities. He has called Governors and mayors he disagrees with names, sent troops and secret police to their streets, and blocked State and local law enforcement from investigations in their own jurisdictions. The Trump administration has even withheld Congressionally- appropriated funding based on whether communities are ``red'' or ``blue.'' Apparently, this President thinks that only those Americans who voted for him deserve support from the Federal Government. That's not how our country is supposed to work. His petulant, punitive behavior toward communities he doesn't like is a warning sign about whether his administration will fulfill its responsibilities to World Cup and LA 2028 communities and stakeholders. Right now, I am extremely concerned that the Federal Government is withholding critical financial support to communities that will soon play host to World Cup events. Congress appropriated $625 million last year to help World Cup host cities bolster security and ensure the safety of everyone associated with the matches and fan events. It is FEMA's job to provide these funds through the State Homeland Security Program, but DHS is weeks overdue awarding the money. Kristi Noem has no problem wasting taxpayer money to buy herself multiple new jets, but she can't manage to get this money to communities where it is desperately needed. It's outrageous. States and host cities--who are already laying out huge sums of their own taxpayer dollars and have dedicated untold local resources for these events--are getting worried--and rightfully so. Time is running out to finalize security preparations. Congress has already appropriated this money--there is no excuse for DHS to stick local taxpayers with the tab. It must be released without further delay. To make matters worse, several States are already suffering under Republican cuts to the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, and Emergency Management Preparedness Grants. The Trump administration needs to stop playing politics with security. Today I hope to hear from our witnesses about what the lack of Federal support means for their communities--and what keeps our witnesses up at night as they think about the events later this year. And finally, to the Governors, mayors, and public safety professionals across the country working to make America 250, the World Cup, and LA 2028 safe and successful--Democrats see your hard work and are doing everything we can to ensure the White House fulfills its responsibilities to you. I hope my Republican colleagues in Congress will do the same. Chairman Garbarino. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Mr. Mike Sena serves as president of the National Fusion Center Association and executive director of the Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. He brings 28 years of law enforcement experience, including serving as the veteran investigator at the State and local level. Mr. Ray Martinez serves as the chief operating officer of the 2026 FIFA World Cup Miami Host Committee. He has 35 years of law enforcement experience, beginning his career in 1979 in the Miami Police Department, where he rose to the ranks from police officer to assistant chief of police. He later served as assistant chief and subsequently chief of police for the Miami Beach Police Department. A limited exception was made today due to unforeseen circumstances and inclement weather disrupting travel to allow Mr. Martinez to appear before this committee virtually. Without objection, I will enter into the record two letters: the first requesting this exception be made under those circumstances, and the second from the Majority leader permitting this virtual testimony today. [The information follows:] Letter From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino February 23, 2026. The Honorable Steve Scalise, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, H-107 Capitol, Washington, DC 20515. Dear Majority Leader Scalise: On Tuesday, February 24, 2026, the Committee on Homeland Security (Committee) will hold a hearing titled, ``Before the Whistle: Assessing Information Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of Major Events.'' This hearing will allow the Committee to examine operational and strategic considerations involved in the collection, analysis, and sharing of information among Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners in preparation for major events scheduled to take place in the United States, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup. One of the witnesses scheduled to testify is Mr. Raymond A. Martinez, Chief Operating Officer for the FIFA World Cup 2026 Miami Host Committee. Mr. Martinez's travel has been disrupted because of inclement weather. Despite his best efforts, he is unable to get to Washington, D.C. before the hearing. Mr. Martinez's perspective is vital to the Committee's understanding of the preparation, needed resources, and multi-entity coordination required to carry out various major mass gathering events safely. The Committee formally requests that Mr. Martinez be permitted to testify virtually using Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) approved software from a remote location. Should you require any further information, please contact Keighle Joyce, Staff Director with the Committee at 202-281-5786. Thank you for your consideration, the Committee looks forward to your response. Sincerely, Andrew R. Garbarino, Chairman. ______ Letter From Honorable Steve Scalise February 24, 2026. The Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. Dear Chairman Garbarino: This letter serves as written approval for the Committee on Homeland Security to receive remote participation from committee witness Mr. Raymond A. Martinez, Chief Operating Officer for the FIFA World Cup 2026 Miami Host Committee, during the February 24, 2024 hearing titled, ``Before the Whistle: Assessing Information Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of Major Events.'' Your February 23, 2026 letter requesting the remote participation of Mr. Martinez affirms that his travel was disrupted due to inclement weather and that his testimony is necessary to inform the Committee of preparations for the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup. I have determined that Mr. Martinez's inability to travel due to the winter storm passing through Washington, DC on February 22-23, 2026 constitutes an ``exceptional circumstance'' under the 119th Congress' ``Regulations for the Remote Participation of Committee Witnesses.'' Please ensure that Mr. Martinez's remote participation adheres to the requirements described in the 119th Congress' ``Regulations for the Remote Participation of Committee Witnesses.'' Further, please ensure that your February 23, 2026 letter and this response letter are entered into the official hearing record. Sincerely, Steve Scalise, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives. Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate---- Ms. Pou. Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino. Yes, the gentlelady is recognized. Ms. Pou. I am reserving the right to object. Mr. Chairman, I will not object. But I would like to get your assurance that witnesses invited by the committee Democrats will be afforded the same opportunity to participate remotely in committee proceedings. On behalf of the Ranking Member Thompson, can I get your commitment to work with our side in the future when remote participation is required by our witnesses? Chairman Garbarino. Yes, and I will--as I was saying, this was a very limited exception. It is in the rules and it was a very difficult lift. I am happy that the Majority Leader agreed. It took a lot of convincing, but because of the weather and the gentleman not being able to make it up here, we were granted this very late last night to allow him to do this. So I will work with you if same situation arises. You have my word I will do what I can to get the same cooperation from the Majority Leader in the future again. But as I was told by the Majority leader, this is a very limited circumstance due to the weather that--and how the District of Columbia doesn't really know how to handle a snowstorm, which we didn't get anyway. But I will do my best in the future. You have my commitment. Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although it is 55 degrees---- Chairman Garbarino. Yes, I know. Ms. Pou [continuing]. In Florida, I might add. Chairman Garbarino. Well, I am pretty sure Mr. Martinez just didn't want to come up and leave the beautiful weather that is down in Florida. We should have done a field hearing down there. Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino. So I do appreciate the Majority Leader's willingness to grant this rare exception in order to ensure the committee can hear Mr. Martinez' valuable and time- sensitive testimony as the beginning of the World Cup games are only months away. Deputy Chief Joe Mabin serves as commander of the Patrol Bureau for Kansas City Missouri Police Department. He previously served as interim chief for the police and deputy chief of the Investigations Bureau. He has progressed steadily through the ranks, serving as sergeant, captain, major, and ultimately deputy chief with nearly half the department's personnel under his command. Mr. Travis Nelson serves as the deputy chief of staff and homeland security advisor for the Maryland Office of the Governor, officially assuming the role in June 2025, after serving as acting director for over a year. He has over 20 years' experience in the public safety, emergency management, and law enforcement, including 19 years with the Maryland State Police. I thank all the witnesses for being here today. Pursuant to committee rule VII(C), I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Garbarino. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have all answered in the affirmative. Thank you very much and please be seated. I now recognize Mr. Sena for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION Mr. Sena. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and Members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Mike Sena and I am the president of the National Fusion Center Association, which represents the 80 designated fusion centers across America. Fusion centers are the backbone of the Homeland Security information-sharing enterprise. Every day, over 3,200 analysts and officers from every level of government work side-by-side with the private sector to identify threats, share intelligence, and coordinate operations. During major events we collaborate with real-time crime centers, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, regional information-sharing system, watch centers, intelligence commanders with the major county sheriffs and major city chiefs, the U.S. Attorney's Offices, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Homeland Security Task Forces, and the Center for Internet Security to ensure actionable intelligence reaches decision makers. Two weeks ago, we wrapped up security operations at Super Bowl LX, which happened to be in my area of responsibility. I want to share a few examples of how we worked together and how things played out in real time and why it is so important for Congress to continue supporting us. In Sacramento, law enforcement mitigated a potential drone threat to the Super Bowl based on a tip from the Central California Intelligence Center days before the game. The night before the Super Bowl, CISA and DHS I&A briefed our team on the passenger rail sabotage threats that occurred the previous day at the Winter Olympics in Italy. Our analysts quickly identified the tactics and patterns, developed a Threat Bulletin that we sent out to first-line responders across the Bay Area before the crowds arrived the next morning. We also helped law enforcement and nongovernment organizations in their fight against human trafficking, contacting 73 adults and 10 juvenile human trafficking victims, including a 12-year-old child. Law enforcement arrested 29 suspected human traffickers and our fusion center analysts played an important role supporting the Santa Clara County Human Trafficking Task Force. That level of collaboration was made possible by our use of technology that combined mapping, communication, and collaboration in a single platform. We were able to integrate tips, share on-line indicators of human trafficking, analyze field reports, and receive investigative requests from multiple agencies. While we're proud of the accomplishments, and I want to point out that we do have gaps that I believe Congress can help us address, we must address the ability to integrate the many threat reporting systems that remain fragmented today. Upcoming major events will test our ability to coordinate across jurisdictions under very compressed time lines. There are multiple systems which are not fully integrated with State and local platforms, creating delays and, more importantly, operational risk. We also must strengthen the field presence of DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. I&A is the only element in the intelligence community required by law to share intelligence with State and local partners. We appreciate this committee for including the NFCA for discussions on how I&A can be improved. Any reform must strengthen I&A's presence at all AD fusion centers while keeping a strong core component at headquarters. Regarding drones, we are grateful that Congress gave State and local law enforcement the legal authority to mitigate drone threats by passing the Safer Skies Act last year. Now Congress must provide the resources to expand the counter-UAS training we are required to complete to use the authorities. Congress should also provide dedicated resources for first responders to integrate drones for our daily operations. Congress should continue to provide robust support for the State Homeland Security Grant Program, SHSGP, and the Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI. These programs support analysts, training, and technology that make information sharing and threat analysis possible at every level every day. Without those two grants, fusion centers cannot fully contribute to the security of major events or the overall Homeland Security mission. Congress should also help resolve on-going uncertainty around FEMA grant guidance and restrictions. The ability to carry out missions like ours at the fusion centers should not be penalized for policy decisions we do not control. When eligibility requirements shift and when disbursements are delayed it doesn't just affect local budgets, it derails national priority projects designed to prevent major threats. Cyber threats may present the greatest risks surrounding major events. A cyber attack of power, water, or transportation during the World Cup would create cascading failures that overwhelm response. Congress should require Federal cyber partners to better integrate with and provide cyber analytical training to State and local partners. Congress should provide DHS the resources to accelerate security clearance processing for fusion center personnel. Clearance delays can lock out people from secure coordination spaces at the moment they are needed most. That is a gap in coverage we cannot afford. Finally, reliable public safety communications are an absolute requirement at major events. FirstNet has been an essential partner and Congress should ensure it continues by reauthorizing the FirstNet authority this year. In closing, planning for threat analysis and information sharing around major events is not optional. It is mission- critical. When information sharing is timely and properly resourced, threats can be mitigated before harm occurs. We appreciate this committee's leadership and I appreciate your invitation to testify today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Sena follows:] Prepared Statement of Mike Sena February 24, 2026 introduction Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on information sharing, intelligence coordination, and security preparations for major national events--where timely, accurate intelligence and effective coordination are essential to public safety. My name is Mike Sena, and I serve as president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA), representing the 80 State and major urban area fusion centers that make up the National Network of Fusion Centers nationwide. I also serve as executive director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) and the Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (NC HIDTA), where our team works daily with Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners on threat identification, intelligence analysis, investigative support, information sharing, and operational coordination in collaboration with Real-Time Crime Centers (RTCCs), Fusion Centers, High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), the Regional Information Sharing Systems' (RISS) Watch Centers, and the Center for Internet Security (CIS). I want to thank Members of this committee, including Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Chairman Pfluger and Ranking Member Magaziner and Chairman Strong and Ranking Member Kennedy, for including NFCA and our law enforcement association partners in broader discussions on major event security, information sharing, and proposed reforms to DHS intelligence and field operations at the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). These discussions are critical as we all recommit to securing the homeland from a wide range of threats. Decisions about intelligence reform, field engagement, investigative tools, training, and information-sharing systems directly affect how fusion centers and State and local agencies identify threats and respond in real time--especially during major events, where time lines are compressed and consequences are immediate. Across the National Network of Fusion Centers, more than 3,200 personnel from State, local, Federal, and private-sector partners collaborate every day to analyze threats, share intelligence, and support operational coordination, while safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Since 2001, fusion centers have become a cornerstone of the homeland security enterprise, complementing Federal partners such as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Homeland Security Task Forces, as well as other DOJ and DHS components. During major national events in particular--such as the upcoming FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games--fusion centers function as the primary hubs for consolidating threat information, coordinating across jurisdictions, and ensuring that actionable intelligence reaches decision makers and front-line agencies when it matters most. There is no substitute for the National Network of Fusion Centers--they fill a unique role that cannot be replicated by any one entity. Working together with the Intelligence Commanders Groups of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the Major County Sheriffs of America (MCSA), and in collaboration with State-wide investigative agencies that are part of the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA), fusion centers play an essential role helping to protect America. Today, I will focus on how information sharing should function during major events, what we have seen work well in recent large-scale security operations, and where gaps remain--particularly in threat reporting, real-time coordination, staffing, training, and access to intelligence. I will also discuss the role of DHS I&A and other Federal partners in supporting fusion centers in both steady-state operations and during major events, including the resources and authorities needed to ensure this system functions effectively in the years ahead. major event preparation Major events such as the FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the Olympic Games place extraordinary demands on the homeland security enterprise. These events are not single venue or single jurisdiction challenges. They extend across multiple cities, counties, and States well beyond the secured perimeter. Threats associated with major events often emerge far from the venue and long before the event itself, surfacing through routine law enforcement encounters, on-line activity, and tips from the public. The scale and duration of these events test how well our information- sharing systems work in practice, making real-time, multi- jurisdictional coordination mission-critical. Fusion centers exist to meet this challenge by consolidating tips and leads, integrating intelligence from multiple sources, identifying patterns across jurisdictions, and ensuring actionable information reaches the right partners in time to act. what is working When Federal, State, and local partners are aligned in the field, our Nation's information-sharing apparatus works the way it was intended by the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report. When Federal partners deploy alongside fusion center analysts and threat liaison officers with a shared mission and real-time access to disparate sources of information, communication improves immediately. Intelligence products become more timely and relevant, questions are resolved more quickly, and operational decisions move faster. The collaboration that occurred in my area of responsibility during and preceding Super Bowl LX, which happened in the city of Santa Clara, Santa Clara County, and included NFL events in the city and county of San Francisco, is a clear example of how the information-sharing environment approach was intended to work. Sustained planning and real- time coordination between the FBI, HSI, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and other Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security components, including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), along with fusion centers, the Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), Center for Internet Security (CIS), and State and local public safety agencies, enabled integrated threat reporting and shared situational awareness. That coordination allowed partners to identify risks early, align protective measures, and respond quickly as conditions evolved. For example, days before the Super Bowl, the Central California Intelligence Center (CICC) in Sacramento identified a subject that had shared on-line content indicating his intention to violate restricted air space during the game at Levi's Stadium with an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). The significance of the threat was that the subject had been convicted of violating the same restricted air space and dropping objects from a drone after entering Levi's Stadium on November 26, 2017. Thanks to CICC's swift action in passing the lead to the NCRIC, all the personnel that were protecting the venue were aware of the threat and law enforcement partners in Sacramento were able to mitigate the planned drone incursion by seizing the drone. The night before the Super Bowl, the NCRIC team and our public safety intelligence and transportation security partners were briefed in the Super Bowl Regional Coordination Center (RCC) in the city of San Jose, on passenger rail sabotage threats related to the 2026 Winter Olympics in Italy by our CISA and I&A partners. The tactics, techniques, and patterns were quickly identified and a team of local, State, and Federal analysts worked with our fusion center personnel to develop a bulletin that was quickly disseminated to front-line personnel from multiple agencies around the San Francisco Bay Area to increase awareness and improve the ability to detect and mitigate potential threats to the public. During the weeks ahead of this month's Super Bowl, law enforcement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) worked together to fight against human trafficking and contacted 73 adult and 10 juvenile human trafficking victims, including a 12-year-old child, and offered the victims of sex trafficking support to escape their traffickers. Law enforcement also arrested 29 suspected human traffickers by the time the first whistle was blown on Super Bowl Sunday. The Santa Clara County Human Trafficking Task Force spearheaded the collaboration with over 60 partner agencies in 11 counties, with the support of NCRIC analysts. By consolidating human trafficking data sources through an information-sharing environment that combined the technologies from a common public safety Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis tool with a commonly-used chat, video, and file-sharing technology, analysts and officers were able to integrate tips, on-line threat indicators, field reporting, and investigators' requests for information across multiple jurisdictions. The fusion center analysts were able to identify patterns and support the joint investigative effort of the partner agencies with real-time analysis that would not have been possible through isolated reporting or other information-sharing platforms. persistent gaps in threat reporting and coordination Despite these successes, it is imperative that we improve how information sharing, information access, and analytical collaboration function when those functions must operate at scale and speed ahead of and during major events. Threat reporting overall, despite improvements, remains fragmented. Tips and leads enter the system through multiple pathways--including local agencies, Federal partners, private entities, venue security, and the public. But there is no single, reliable workflow to rapidly consolidate, deconflict, and disseminate that information across jurisdictions. During fast-moving events, this fragmentation can undermine shared messaging and situational awareness. At the same time, Federal systems used by DHS and the FBI are not fully interoperable with State and local platforms. Agencies are often working from partial information, and critical data does not always reach the right analysts or decision makers in time, which means that front-line personnel who are best positioned to recognize, report, and respond to potential threats are less aware. During major events, these gaps are not theoretical, as during the Super Bowl, we had several information-sharing platforms that operated at the same time. This creates an operational risk at large-scale events and creates stress on an already overtaxed network of analysts and officers. The upcoming FIFA World Cup highlights these challenges in very real ways. In some host regions, State and local law enforcement agencies are facing significant security responsibilities without clear coordination or operational alignment across all partners involved in the sprawling events from practice locations, team hotels, to official and unofficial events for fans. As a result, local agencies are not as connected as they should be for planning, staffing, coordination, and real-time information sharing for a complex, multi-jurisdictional event. For events of this scale, that approach means serious risks may go unaddressed. World Cup security is not confined to a single venue or jurisdiction; it extends across host cities and surrounding communities. Without clear coordination, defined roles, and aligned support, information sharing becomes more difficult, and local agencies whose resources are already stretched too thin, are left to manage complex, multi-jurisdictional threats under significant time pressure. These challenges underscore why major international events require a coordinated, multi-jurisdictional approach that aligns Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners around shared information, shared expectations, data security, and shared responsibility. dhs office of intelligence and analysis Within the broader information-sharing framework, the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis plays a unique and irreplaceable role. I&A is the only element of the U.S. intelligence community statutorily charged with facilitating intelligence sharing with State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, regarding terrorism and other threats to the homeland. From our perspective in the field, I&A is most effective when it is forward-deployed with access to Federal information and the authority to appropriately share it with State and local partners. I&A personnel embedded in fusion centers enable a timely two-way flow of information and the collaborative analysis and development of intelligence-- increasing the likelihood that the reporting of threats reaches State and local partners quickly, while insights developed at the local level inform the national intelligence picture. During major events, this field presence can determine whether threat-related information and intelligence arrives in time to help personnel on the ground recognize and prevent an incident, or whether it is too late to be useful. In major urban areas that host major events, a single I&A representative is insufficient. Effective support requires that field teams have access to the right information and the authority to share that information and develop joint intelligence products with State and local partners. I was lucky enough to have the highest tier of support possible from DHS I&A during the Super Bowl, as they sent 14 members of their team from their Field Intelligence Directorate and Special Events Program to assist the NCRIC. Those forward-deployed intelligence analysts and officers must also be supported by a headquarters structure at I&A that is capable of sustaining and scaling those efforts for future major events and daily fusion center operations. For these reasons, we are grateful that the committee has included NFCA and our law enforcement partners in discussions on proposed legislative reforms to strengthen I&A's ability to support State and local law enforcement and all our communities. Stakeholder input is essential. Decisions about staffing, authorities, release processes, and coordination mechanisms directly affect whether intelligence sharing works under the compressed time lines and heightened risk of major events. Any reform effort should strengthen--not weaken--I&A's field presence and ensure it is backed by a robust headquarters enterprise with access to relevant information from other Federal partners and the intelligence community and the authority to share appropriately with State and local partners including fusion centers. drone threats at major events Unmanned aircraft systems present a growing threat to both major events and everyday public safety. We appreciate Congress's action in December 2025 through the Safer Skies Act, which passed as part of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, which granted State and local law enforcement and correctional agencies the authority to detect, track, and mitigate malicious and unauthorized drones, subject to appropriate training and equipment requirements. From the field perspective, the challenge now is implementation. Access to the FBI's required counter-UAS training is severely limited, and demand already far exceeds available capacity. As a result, many State and local agencies--particularly those preparing for major events--do not yet have trained personnel in place to operationalize this authority in a meaningful way. We are encouraged by the administration's intent to consult closely with State and local law enforcement and corrections as implementation of the Safer Skies Act begins this year. We encourage Congress to allocate the funding necessary to increase availability of FBI training for State and local agency personnel so we can take quick action to mitigate drone threats to our major events and every-day community safety. Under the Safer Skies Act Congress also authorized the use of existing Justice Department grant programs, specifically Byrne JAG and COPS grants, to support the acquisition of drones for public safety missions and also counter-UAS systems. In addition, funding provided in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act through FEMA's State Homeland Security Grant Program supports law enforcement activities that include counter- UAS and other capabilities relevant to major event security. These tools are critically important, but they are not sufficient on their own. Counter-UAS capabilities require sustained investments in training, staffing, equipment, and operational integration that exceed what these programs can support. I urge Congress to consider how the Federal Government can support State and local efforts to build and maintain robust drone first-responder capabilities and counter-drone operations to protect the public. Addressing these gaps will require additional, flexible Federal resources. Without that support, State and local agencies will continue to face challenges translating the new authority that Congress has provided into effective protection for our communities. grants and resources Federal grant programs play a critical role in enabling State and local agencies to contribute to the national security mission every day and to scale those capabilities for major events. These resources support the personnel, training, technology, and coordination that make timely information sharing and threat detection possible across jurisdictions. Fusion centers and our State and local partners use programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to support analysts, training, analytical technology, and multi-jurisdictional exercises and coordination. These programs are central to local, regional, and national threat prevention efforts, yet agencies continue to take on expanding responsibilities and increasingly complex threat environments while planning and execution have been complicated by uncertainty around grant guidance, eligibility requirements, and the timing of fund disbursements that if not resolved soon, will hinder or derail national priority projects that have been designed to prevent and mitigate major threats to our Nation. Information-sharing capacity does not scale up on demand without dedicated planning and resourcing. The analytical workforce and coordination mechanisms required for major events such as the FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the Olympic Games must be built and sustained over time. Because threat actors routinely cross State lines and international borders, and because each part of Federal, State, and local governments may have information, capabilities, or resources, the Federal Government has a responsibility to contribute funding and personnel to supplement and help sustain State and local capabilities. Delayed guidance or funding time lines directly affect readiness across the system. As this committee considers homeland security and public safety priorities, it should ensure that FEMA preparedness grant programs provide predictable funding, timely guidance, and sufficient flexibility to support sustained information-sharing capabilities across jurisdictions. These investments enable fusion centers and our partners to fully contribute to the homeland security and national security missions and ensure coordinated readiness for major national and international events. cyber threats Cyber threats may represent the greatest vulnerability surrounding major events because adversaries do not necessarily need physical proximity to cause harm. A successful cyber attack against power, water, communications, or transportation systems during a major event could create cascading effects that overwhelm response capabilities. For major events, cyber threats underscore the need for real-time information sharing well beyond the event's geographic footprint. Fusion centers often lack timely access to cyber threat indicators and trend data, and despite progress in recent years there is no fully integrated national approach to State and local cyber threat response. Fusion center and partner agency analysts also need continued DHS ITA Cyber Analyst Seminar and Webinar training, as well as advanced cyber analyst training. Strengthening information sharing in this area will require better integration between Federal cyber partners, fusion centers, and other State and local officials. It will also require clearer pathways for sharing actionable cyber threat information from Federal entities to State and local agencies, and sustained investment in analytic capacity at the State and local levels. Without these connections in place, cyber risks associated with major events will continue to outpace our ability to detect and respond in time. law enforcement tools and investigative technology Effective information sharing for major event security depends on access to a range of lawful tools and data--not a single technology. Fusion centers and their partners rely on investigative technologies, including commercially-available data, to identify potential threats early, connect disparate data points, and support timely operational decisions before and during large-scale public events. Tools such as automated license plate recognition (LPR), facial recognition, and social media open-source intelligence analysis support threat detection and situational awareness for planned and unplanned events. These tools help identify patterns and emerging risks early enough to share information across jurisdictions, enabling coordinated prevention and response efforts before harm occurs. As Congress considers consumer data privacy frameworks, it is critical that any approach be developed in consultation with State and local law enforcement and account for the real-world public safety needs. Data privacy proposals could have a major impact on investigative efforts given the ubiquity of data across our world today. One of those proposals--the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act (FANFSA)--would force analysts and investigators who are trying to prevent harm and protect the public to be blind to information that others can readily access. That makes no sense from a public safety or homeland security standpoint. Efficient, timely, and privacy-protective sharing of digital evidence is essential. Legislative frameworks must preserve lawful access necessary for timely information sharing while maintaining strong privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections. communications and information access Effective information sharing for major event security depends on reliable communications and timely system access. Fusion centers require access to local, regional, State, and Federal information at both the Classified and unclassified levels, including law enforcement records, criminal intelligence databases, the Homeland Security Information Network, the Homeland Security Data Network, FBI Criminal Justice Information Services systems, DHS law enforcement and screening systems, and tip and lead intake platforms. This access allows fusion centers to add critical local context to national intelligence and support coordinated, multi-jurisdictional threat prevention efforts. During major events, delays or barriers to system access directly undermine situational awareness and slow decision making for personnel responsible for public safety on the ground. Current Federal platforms offer some functionality, but they remain limited in their ability to support real-time, large-scale coordination across agencies and jurisdictions. As Congress considers legislative reforms to DHS I&A and other Federal components, any legislative or policy changes should ensure fusion centers retain timely, operational access to necessary systems and prioritize interoperability and real- time communications across jurisdictions that allow analysts and officers to enter the data once, instead of the several times that they have to enter the same data today into multiple systems. Without these capabilities, fusion centers are far less able to support major event security or rapidly share threat information before harm occurs. security clearances Timely security clearances are essential to effective information sharing during major events. On-going delays limit fusion center personnel's ability to access critical intelligence and fully participate in secure coordination with Federal, State, and local partners. During major events, personnel without timely clearances may be unable to access or share threat information or participate in secure coordination spaces, directly undermining joint situational awareness and response planning. As Congress and the administration consider reforms to personnel security and information-sharing policies, I urge you to prioritize timely clearance processing and access for State and local fusion center personnel, including appropriate use of reciprocity and provisional access to meet time-sensitive operational needs. closing The upcoming World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and Olympic Games will test the homeland security enterprise in ways we have not experienced in decades. Threat-related analysis and information sharing is not a supporting function for these events--it is an essential mission that must be developed and exercised routinely to protect our communities. Fusion centers sit at the center of that mission, connecting Federal intelligence with State and local operational response. When information sharing is timely, integrated, and properly resourced, threats can be identified and mitigated before they reach the public. We appreciate the committee's engagement and its inclusion of the NFCA in discussions on major event security, information sharing, and I&A reform. We stand ready to continue working with you to ensure our analytical and information-sharing systems and practices are prepared for the challenges ahead. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Sena. I now recognize Mr. Martinez for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF RAYMOND A. MARTINEZ, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FIFA WORLD CUP 2026 MIAMI HOST COMMITTEE Mr. Martinez. Thank you, Commissioner Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and distinguished Members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding public safety and security preparations for the FIFA World Cup. My name is Ray Martinez and I serve as the chief operating officer for the Miami Host Committee. As stated previously, I've served for 35 years in local law enforcement, my last 2\1/ 2\ years as the chief of police of the Miami Beach Police Department. Upon my retirement from law enforcement, I moved into the event world and have worked on several large-scale international events, including music festivals, the college football playoffs in 2021 and just last month here in Miami. I also served as the president and CEO of the Super Bowl Host Committee for the 2020 game, which was held in Miami. Working with me on the Host Committee are several law enforcement executives with similar, if not more impressive, backgrounds. Those experiences and lessons learned from the-- learned informed the approach we are taking with World Cup planning. The FIFA World Cup 2026 will be the largest sporting event ever conducted globally. Miami is one of 16 host cities across 3 countries and North America hosting matches. We will host 7 matches, including a quarterfinal and the bronze medal final match. The Miami Host Committee is planning on producing a 23- day fan festival where we expect hundreds of thousands of international visitors. This presents a tremendous opportunity, but also a historic operational challenge. On behalf of the 11 U.S. World Cup committees, I want to thank this committee for providing the $625 million in security funding to the host cities. Those resources are critical to ensuring that host committees have capabilities necessary to execute a safe and secure tournament across multiple weeks and venues. In Miami, our security framework is built on three pillars: unified command; integrated local, State, and Federal partnership; and intelligence-driven operations. First, a unified command. Public safety operations in Miami are led by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office under a unified command structure that integrates municipal police, fire and rescue, emergency management, and State agencies across multiple jurisdictions. Second, integrated Federal partnership with State and local agencies. The White House Task Force on the World Cup has played a central role in aligning Federal agency support with local agencies and host committee planning. We are grateful to the White House Task Force and Executive Director Andrew Giuliani's efforts to support and partner with the FIFA World Cup host committees. Federal partners, including the FBI, Secret Service, FEMA, CISA, DHS, provide threat assessments, intelligence integration, cybersecurity protection, contingency planning. This coordination ensures access to national capabilities and support if threat conditions evolve. Third, intelligence-driven operations. The South Florida Fusion Center, working with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and Federal intelligence partners, lead to proactive information sharing and threat monitoring. Both the Miami Stadium and Bayfront Park will operate with layered security perimeters, credential and entry screening, dedicated emergency access lanes, and a Joint Operations Center that provide real- time situational awareness and coordinated decision making. One of the most significant emergency threats is unauthorized drone activity. Malicious or reckless drone operation presents risks ranging from surveillance to operational disruption. In coordination with Federal partners, we will be implementing temporary flight restrictions, detection capabilities, and counter-UAS planning integrated into our overall security posture. We appreciate the Congressional support, and particularly this committee as well as President Trump's administration, for dedicated counter-UAS funding to support these efforts. The Department of Homeland Security has assigned elevated Special Assessment--Special Event Assessment Ratings to the Miami matches, including a SEAR 1 designation for the Bronze Medal final match. These designations reflect the scale into international visibility of the event and reinforce the importance of robust Federal, State, and local coordination, which is well under way. Miami's preparedness reflects the on-going coordinated efforts of all 11 U.S. host committees as we work each day to ensure a safe and secure and successful FIFA World Cup. Together we are committed to demonstrating that no nation is better equipped to host and deliver a World Cup than the United States of America. I thank you for this opportunity to appear for you today and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez follows:] Prepared Statement of Raymond A. Martinez February 24, 2026 introduction Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today regarding public safety and security preparations associated with the FIFA World Cup 2026TM and, specifically, Miami's role as one of the official host cities. I appreciate the committee's leadership and continued oversight in ensuring that major international events hosted in the United States are conducted safely, securely, and in a manner that reflects the highest standards of intergovernmental coordination and operational readiness. overview of the fifa world cup 2026 in miami and operational environment The FIFA World Cup 2026TM represents the largest sporting event ever conducted globally. Miami has been designated as one of 16 host cities for the FIFA World Cup 2026TM, and will host 7 official matches at Hard Rock Stadium in Miami Gardens, which will be rebranded as Miami Stadium for the duration of the tournament. These matches will include group stage matches, a Round of 32 match, a quarterfinal match, and the bronze, or third-place, game. The tournament will run from June 11 through July 19, 2026, and will also include a 23-day FIFA Fan Festival in downtown Miami's Bayfront Park, which will serve as a major public gathering and celebration site. This global event is expected to attract hundreds of thousands of international visitors, and the Miami metropolitan area faces both an extraordinary opportunity and a historic operational challenge. Public safety planning encompasses law enforcement, fire rescue, emergency management, health care infrastructure, transportation, cybersecurity, and community engagement components to ensure coordinated and resilient operations across all venues and activation zones. We thank the committee for providing $625 million in security funding in Pub. L. 119-21. These funds will be vital to support the complex safety operations associated with an event of this scale. To support State-level preparation, the South Florida Regional Multi-Agency Coordination Group (MAC) was formally established to ensure unified planning, coordinated response capabilities, and strategic policy alignment across jurisdictions. At the Federal level, the White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup has been established to coordinate nationwide interagency support, accelerate security and infrastructure readiness, and align host city preparations with Federal capabilities, intelligence resources, and operational support frameworks. We are grateful for the White House Task Force and Executive Director Giuliani's efforts to support and partner with the FIFA World Cup. The MAC structure is designed to coordinate executive-level policy decisions, resource prioritization, and strategic guidance for complex incidents or major planned events. It serves as the bridge between executive leadership and operational Incident Command, ensuring unity of effort across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines. Public safety planning for the World Cup in Miami is centered on a unified command structure led by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office is responsible for stadium security, perimeter control, and crowd safety operations, working in close coordination with Miami-Dade Fire Rescue, which provides emergency medical support, fire safety services, specialized rescue capabilities, and on-site incident response. The city of Miami Police Department and Fire Rescue Department provide operational support for downtown venues, including festival operations and transportation hubs. State law enforcement and transportation agencies support traffic management, surge staffing, and specialized operational needs. Federal partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Secret Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security, play critical roles in threat assessment, intelligence integration, cybersecurity protection, and contingency planning. The White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup has played an essential role in ensuring that Federal partnerships are maximally leveraged to create a safe environment for fans to enjoy the event. The United States Department of Homeland Security classifies special events using Special Event Assessment Ratings (SEAR) Levels 1 through 5 with SEAR 1 events being the most significant. These designations reflect factors such as the presence of high-profile attendees, international media interest, geopolitical considerations, and the level of Federal coordination required. The 7 matches scheduled in Miami carry significant SEAR designations, with the first 6 matches classified as SEAR 2 events and the Bronze Medal match classified as a SEAR 1 event. The concurrent FIFA Fan Festival is rated as a SEAR 2 event. These ratings necessitate elevated interagency coordination at the Federal, State, and local levels. The Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management has hosted several full-scale and tabletop exercises available for all public safety agencies during the past year. In January 2026, a multi-agency Region 4 World Cup tabletop exercise was conducted to test emergency response protocols, evacuation procedures, intelligence sharing, cyber disruption scenarios, and incident command coordination under the National Incident Management System framework. These exercises strengthen interagency coordination, validate operational communications, and enhance preparedness for complex and evolving threat scenarios. information-sharing framework and operational integration The South Florida Fusion Center, in coordination with its regional intelligence partners--including the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force-- continues to conduct proactive intelligence collection, comprehensive threat assessments, and robust information sharing across local, State, Federal, Tribal, and international agencies. This effort includes close collaboration with FIFA's Safety and Security Intelligence Group to ensure unified situational awareness and operational alignment. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis provides weekly intelligence briefings to support planning and decision making. The Intelligence Operations Center serves as the regional clearinghouse for intelligence matters, maintaining direct liaison with Federal agencies and host city fusion centers nationwide. Sensitive information is disseminated to all participating partners through the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Information Network. venue security, public safety operations, and emerging threat preparedness Security planning at Miami Stadium incorporates lessons learned from prior high-attendance events and international best practices. These measures include multi-layered security perimeters, early ticket verification and credential screening, expanded screening capacity including bag checks and X-ray systems, hardened fencing and engineered pedestrian flow corridors, and rapid deployment crowd control units. Operational readiness is supported through real-time situational awareness platforms and joint operations centers, enabling continuous coordination and rapid decision making among participating agencies. These capabilities support proactive threat identification and coordinated operational responses. Bayfront Park will serve as the official FIFA Fan Festival site, accommodating up to 30,000 daily visitors over 23 days. Public safety measures at this location include secured perimeters with controlled entry and exit points, magnetometer screening, dedicated emergency access lanes, and coordinated ingress and egress management. On-site public safety infrastructure includes emergency medical services, fire suppression capabilities, rapid medical transport access, and coordinated law enforcement and private security staffing. High- visibility patrols and a robust volunteer program will support situational awareness, public safety, and visitor assistance. One of the most significant emerging threat vectors associated with this event involves Unmanned Aerial Systems, commonly referred to as drones. Recent threat assessments indicate a significant rise in malicious or unauthorized drone activity at large-scale events worldwide. These systems present risks including aerial surveillance of security operations, delivery of hazardous payloads, unauthorized incursions that could disrupt operations or create panic, air space conflicts with law enforcement and emergency aircraft, coordinated swarm activities, and signal interference affecting communications systems. Mitigation measures include the implementation of Temporary Flight Restrictions coordinated with Federal aviation authorities, deployment of counter-UAS detection technologies such as radio frequency sensors and radar systems, joint counter-drone coordination with Federal technical teams, public awareness and enforcement campaigns, rapid interdiction protocols, and specialized response team training. Counter-UAS planning is fully integrated into operational planning and emergency response exercises. We appreciate this committees' support for $500 million in C-UAS grant funding through the Department of Homeland Security and the Trump administration's efforts to prioritize the first half of that funding for FIFA World Cup 2026TM host cities. In addition, the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office leads proactive human trafficking prevention initiatives, including enforcement operations, victim services coordination, public awareness campaigns, and reporting mechanisms. Regional transportation agencies are implementing adaptive signal timing, expanded transit operations, managed ride-share staging, pedestrian safety corridors, and coordinated traffic management strategies to ensure safe and efficient movement of visitors and residents. federal coordination, community engagement, and operational support The White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup serves as the central Federal coordination body supporting World Cup Host Committees. The Task Force assists host cities synchronizing Federal agency support across security, transportation, border operations, and infrastructure protection, facilitating intelligence sharing and threat assessments, coordinating Federal grant pathways and resource allocations, and aligning national counterterrorism and cybersecurity capabilities with local operational planning. This coordination enhances host city access to Federal intelligence streams, specialized technical capabilities, and rapid Federal surge support if threat conditions evolve. We are grateful for the good relationship between Host Committees and the Task Force. In particular, Executive Director Giuliani and his team have been extremely helpful and attentive to addressing Host Committee issues as they arise. This relationship has been fundamental in ensuring that Federal resources are leveraged to enhance our security operations. Community engagement and public communication are essential components of World Cup preparation. Pre-event outreach includes presentations to community organizations, businesses, and local stakeholders. During the event, a large-scale volunteer deployment will support multilingual visitor assistance, safety messaging, crowd flow management, and emergency reporting awareness. Public communications will emphasize entry procedures, prohibited items, drone restrictions, emergency contacts, and transportation guidance. conclusion Miami's World Cup preparedness reflects a layered, intelligence- driven, and Federally-integrated public safety framework. Unified command leadership by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office, supported by municipal police departments, fire rescue agencies, Federal partners, counter-UAS capabilities, and coordinated Federal support through the White House Task Force on the FIFA World Cup, positions Miami to deliver a secure, resilient, and globally-credible tournament environment. These efforts ensure the safety of participants, visitors, and residents while establishing a model for interagency coordination and public safety operations for future major international events hosted in the United States. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much, Mr. Martinez. I now recognize Deputy Chief Mabin for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MABIN, DEPUTY CHIEF, KANSAS CITY MISSOURI POLICE DEPARTMENT Mr. Mabin. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on information sharing and security collaboration ahead of major events. My name is Deputy Chief Joseph Mabin and I command the Patrol Bureau of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department, which is a member of the Major City Chiefs Association. KCPD has a current staffing of over 1,100 sworn law enforcement officers serving a city of more than half a million residents. In less than 16 weeks, Kansas City is projected to welcome more than 650,000 visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Kansas City has hosted major events in the past, including championship parades and iconic American sporting events, such as the MLB All-Star Game and the NFL Draft. However, this event will require the largest coordinated deployment of mutual aid partners in our city's history. The 2026 FIFA World Cup is the single largest sporting event in the world. For the Kansas City metropolitan area, it represents both an extraordinary opportunity and a historic challenge. Kansas City is the smallest market among the 11 U.S. host cities, yet we will operate one of the largest overall footprints. We'll host 6 matches and 4 team base camps. In addition, Kansas City is planning a FIFA fan festival that will operate for 18 days throughout the tournament. Our tournament footprint spans 10 counties across 2 States, Missouri and Kansas. This bipartisan--excuse me, bi-State effort requires a unified approach to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Crossing State line adds complexity to communication and coordination, making seamless information sharing essential. The scope and visibility of this event require thoughtful, comprehensive planning. Safety and security remain our top priorities. Our goal is to deliver a safe, seamless, and welcoming experience for residents and visitors alike. As with any event of this scale, we are preparing for a range of potential public safety considerations, including unauthorized UAS, cyber disruptions, routine criminal activity, and increased demand on emergency and health care services. Central to our approach is timely, actionable information sharing with local, State, Federal, and international partners. Since 2003, Federal Homeland Security grants, particularly the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant Program, have allowed our region to build a mature, multidisciplinary preparedness framework. These investments helped establish and continue to sustain the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center, our primary intelligence hub. Through this Federal support, we have built interoperable radio communications and strengthened intelligence sharing. We have enhanced specialized response capabilities, including HAZMAT, EOD, and tactical WMD response teams. We conduct thousands of hours of training each year through tabletop functional and full-scale exercises. All of this allows for real-time situational awareness and response across jurisdictions. These capabilities are the direct result of sustained Federal and local partnerships, which are critical to our success. They are the foundations on which we are building our World Cup security posture. The challenges facing Kansas City are driven primarily by the scale and complexity of the tournament's footprint within the region. This is not a single venue or single-day event. It involves coordination of operations across multiple sites, jurisdictions, and several weeks. At the same time, we must operate with finite resources. Law enforcement personnel, specialized teams, and critical equipment are limited not only locally, but also nationally. Host cities will draw from the same pool of Federal resources and specialized capabilities. We are grateful for this committee's work and support toward World Cup safety and security. The counter-UAS authorities under the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act provide critical resources to detect, track, and mitigate UAS threats. The FIFA World Cup Security Grant Program is necessary to fund the personnel, equipment, and operational needs required to deliver a safe event. We appreciate the continued support and partnership as we approach this historic tournament. Kansas City's investments, backed by Federal homeland security grants and State and local commitments enhance not only our regional readiness, but our Nation's preparedness for high-profile international events. Before the first whistle blows later this year, we want to ensure that information flows faster than threats, that partnerships are stronger than vulnerabilities, and that everyone experiences a safe and secure World Cup. Thank you for your continued partnership and support. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Mabin follows:] Prepared Statement of Joseph Mabin February 24, 2026 Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on ``Information Sharing and Security Collaboration Ahead of Major Events.'' My name is Deputy Chief Joseph Mabin, and I command the Patrol Bureau of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department, which is a member of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. I lead the Department's largest bureau within an agency of over 1,100 sworn law enforcement officers serving a city of more than half a million residents. In less than 16 weeks, Kansas City is projected to welcome more than 650,000 visitors during the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Kansas City has hosted major events in the past--including championship parades and iconic American sporting events such as the MLB All-Star Game and the NFL Draft. However, this event will require the largest coordinated deployment of mutual aid partners in our city's history. The 2026 FIFA World Cup is the single-largest sporting event in the world. For the Kansas City metropolitan area, it represents both an extraordinary opportunity and a historic operational challenge. Kansas City is the smallest market among the 11 U.S. host cities, yet we will operate one of the largest overall footprints. We will host 6 matches and 4 team base camps, including 3 of the top 10 ranked teams in the world. In addition, Kansas City is planning an ambitious FIFA Fan Festival that will operate for 18 days throughout the tournament. Our tournament footprint spans 10 counties across 2 States-- Missouri and Kansas. This bi-State effort requires a unified approach to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. Crossing State lines adds complexity to communication and coordination, making seamless information sharing essential. The scope and visibility of this event require thoughtful, comprehensive planning. Safety and security remain our top priorities. Our goal is to deliver a safe, seamless, and welcoming experience for residents and visitors alike. As with any event of this scale, we are preparing for a range of potential public safety considerations, including unauthorized unmanned aircraft systems, cyber disruptions, routine criminal activity, and increased demand on emergency and health care services. Central to our approach is timely, actionable information sharing with local, State, Federal, and international partners to ensure coordinated and effective operations. Since 2003, Federal homeland security grants--particularly the Urban Area Security Initiative and the State Homeland Security Grant Program--have allowed our region to build a mature, multi-disciplinary preparedness framework. These investments helped establish and continue to sustain the Kansas City Regional Fusion Center, our primary intelligence hub. Through this Federal support, we have built interoperable radio communications and strengthened intelligence sharing. We have enhanced specialized response capabilities--including hazmat, explosive ordnance disposal, and tactical WMD teams--that train together and can deploy region-wide. We conduct thousands of training hours each year through tabletop, functional, and full-scale exercises. All of this allows for real-time situational awareness and response across jurisdictions. These capabilities are the direct result of sustained Federal-local partnerships, which are critical to our success. They are the foundations on which we are building our World Cup security posture. The challenges facing Kansas City are driven primarily by the scale and complexity of the tournament's footprint within our region. This is not a single-venue or single-day event--it involves coordination of operations across multiple sites, jurisdictions, and weeks, requiring sustained planning and collaboration at every level. At the same time, we must operate with finite resources. Law enforcement personnel, specialized teams, and critical equipment are limited not only locally, but nationally. Host cities will draw from the same pool of Federal resources and specialized capabilities. Additionally, Federal funding time lines create uncertainty in operational planning, staffing, and logistics. We have strengthened communications across agencies, but at the scale of a global event, this remains a challenge. The World Cup requires coordination not only locally, but nationally and internationally. Beyond connected systems, the greater challenge is identifying and communicating actionable intelligence to support real- time decision making. We are grateful for this committee's work and support toward World Cup safety and security. The counter-UAS authorities under the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act provide critical resources to detect, track, and mitigate UAS threats. The FIFA World Cup Security Grant Program is necessary to fund the personnel, equipment, and operational needs required to deliver a safe event. We appreciate continued support and partnership as we approach this historic World Cup tournament. Kansas City's investments--backed by Federal homeland security grants, and State and local commitments--enhance not only our regional readiness, but our Nation's preparedness for high-profile international events. These capabilities represent thousands of hours of planning, training, and coordination among public safety partners. Before the first whistle blows later this year, we want to ensure that information flows faster than threats, that partnerships are stronger than vulnerabilities, and that everyone experiences a safe and secure World Cup. Thank you for your continued partnership and support. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Chief. I now recognize Mr. Nelson for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF TRAVIS NELSON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF AND HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF MARYLAND Mr. Nelson. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Pou, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I serve as the deputy chief of staff and homeland security advisor for Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland. I receive public safety and homeland security for Governor Moore with direct oversight of State departments, including the Department of Emergency Management, State Police, Department of Public Safety, Office of Homeland Security, and others representing first responders, emergency managers, and law enforcement professionals who work tirelessly to secure our communities. I am deeply grateful for and appreciate the essential work of our local, State, and Federal public servants who continue to do their duties in a constantly evolving world. As all of you know, our Nation is entering a time of major special events that we have not encountered in decades, from the celebrations of America 250 to the multicity hosting of the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. While these events are proud moments for our Nation, they can also strain local resources and come with an increased threat to our critical infrastructure. However, as the threat profile expands and the demand on our State and local resources increases, the financial support provided by the Federal Government to State and local partners is diminishing. The events of September 11, 2001, underscore the critical need for seamless collaboration between local, State, and Federal agencies during major events. This realization drove the development of coordinated planning and preparedness strategies. With crucial Federal financial assistance, standardized and interoperable plans, training, and equipment were adopted nationwide. The foundational work, centered on the Incident Command System and the National Response Framework, ensures that limited resources can be rapidly deployed and integrated across the country as personnel share a common operating framework. Advisory councils composed of subject-matter experts from local jurisdictions have guided policies and procedures based on unique experiences. FEMA training centers allow first responders, hospital clinicians, and emergency managers to learn alongside their colleagues from across the country. This model empowers Federal field office personnel from local offices to become familiar with their Government counterparts, developing trusting relationships and collaborating. Maryland's CCTV Situational Awareness platform, MView, networks 399 Federal, State, and local first responder agencies to over 40,000 cameras used to prepare for, prevent, and respond to major events or incidents. The program supports first responders in Virginia, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. This includes over 950 Federal first responders from 44 agencies. Many of the Federal users of the platform are directly responsible for the security of Federal assets. The MView platform is a proven tool, having been deployed for hundreds of major planned events, including Fleet Week, inauguration, and professional sporting competitions. It has also been vital during emergency response, such as the aircraft collision over the Potomac River and the Key Bridge collapse. The MView team is currently collaborating with organizers for the upcoming FIFA World Cup to integrate Delaware and New York into the platform. Furthermore, MView is scheduled for use as a force multiplier to assist in monitoring potential threats for tonight's State of the Union address. A large portion of this program is directly dependent upon UASI funding, but, unfortunately, the dramatic reduction in the NCR allocations left the future of the program uncertain. The Maryland License Plate Reader Program is another initiative that directly supports criminal investigations, critical infrastructure security, and major event security throughout the region. The program is carefully managed to uphold citizens' civil rights and civil liberties, exclusively focusing its support on criminal investigations. In recent years, this program has directly contributed to thousands of Federal partner criminal investigations, including security operations. Following the sudden reduction of Federal funds from the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Emergency Preparedness Grant, and the Urban Area Security Initiative has left several States, including Maryland, very vulnerable and faced with no option but to reduce personnel and capabilities. The cancellation of the Targeted Violence Terrorism Program on July 21, 2025, is deeply concerning in regards to the rising threats against local officials. Between the Federal fiscal year 2024 and 2025, we saw a reduction of over 1.3 million in SHSGP and UASI's funding was cut by 44 percent, a total of 21 million. Then with the fiscal year 2026 grant notification, the NCR was further decreased from 25.5 million to 4.4 million, a 90 percent reduction. The administration and Congress deserves praise for their efforts in tackling the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems. This response highlights the readiness of local and State officials to collaborate seamlessly with Federal agencies to address this complex threat, which spans multiple jurisdictions. Maryland is eager to continue working with the National Security Council and others. Failure to address the funding shortfalls jeopardizes the safety of upcoming special events regardless of their size and scope. Thank you for your leadership and commitment to our safety in our homeland. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:] Prepared Statement of Travis Nelson February 24, 2026 Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I serve as the deputy chief of staff and homeland security advisor for Wes Moore, Governor of Maryland. I oversee public safety and homeland security for Governor Moore, with direct oversight of State departments including the Maryland Department of Emergency Management, Maryland State Police, Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, the Governor's Office of Homeland Security, and others representing first responders, emergency managers, and law enforcement professionals who work tirelessly to secure our communities. I am deeply grateful for and appreciate the essential work of our local, State, and Federal public servants, who continue their duties in a constantly-evolving environment. As you all know, our Nation is entering a time of major special events that we have not encountered in decades--from the semi- quincentennial celebrations of America 250 to the multi-city hosting of the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, California. While these events are proud moments for our Nation, they also can strain local resources and come with an increased threat to our critical infrastructure. However, as the threat profile expands and the demand on State and local resources increases, the financial support provided by the Federal Government to State and local partners is diminishing. The events of September 11, 2001, underscored the critical need for seamless collaboration between local, State, and Federal agencies during major incidents. This realization drove the development of coordinated planning and preparedness strategies. With crucial Federal financial assistance, standardized and interoperable plans, training, and equipment were adopted nationwide. This foundational work, centered on the Incident Command System and the National Response Framework, ensures that limited resources can be rapidly deployed and integrated across the country, as personnel share a common operational framework. Advisory councils composed of subject-matter experts from local jurisdictions have guided policies and procedures based on unique experiences. FEMA training centers allow first responders, hospital clinicians, and emergency managers to learn alongside their colleagues from across the country. This model empowers Federal field office personnel from local offices to become familiar with their local government counterparts, developing trusting relationships to share information and plan collaboratively for upcoming events. It has also helped us to adapt to the constantly-evolving threats that we are faced with. Following the Paris Attacks of 2015, when 9 terrorists launched coordinated shootings and suicide bombings in Paris and Saint-Denis-- killing 130 people and injuring over 400--I chaired a work group in the National Capital Region focused on ensuring we could quickly share resources and information across jurisdictional boundaries with little notice. This identified the need for dedicated liaisons embedded within State and local organizations for speedy assessments and to prevent cascading incidents. Effective public safety preparedness for special events relies heavily on Emergency Management and fusion center personnel and programs. This approach builds upon the established success of our fusion centers, which are significantly bolstered by Federal grant funding and personnel. They dedicate themselves to months and years of advanced planning to dramatically reduce risk and ensure adequate resources are efficiently positioned and utilized. Based on my experience participating in the planning and execution of numerous special events, our most significant vulnerabilities and oversights have consistently stemmed from rushed or inadequate planning due to insufficient resources. The tools we have developed over the years are now essential to our success. Maryland's CCTV situational awareness platform, MView, networks 399 Federal, State, and local first responder agencies to over 40,000 cameras used to prepare for, prevent, and respond to major events or incidents. The program supports first responders in Virginia, DC, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. This includes over 950 Federal first responders from 44 agencies. Many of the Federal users of the platform are directly responsible for the security of Federal assets. The MView platform is a proven tool, having been deployed for hundreds of major planned events, including fleet weeks, inaugurations, and professional sporting competitions. It has also been vital during emergency responses, such as the aircraft collision over the Potomac River and the Key Bridge collapse. The MView team is currently collaborating with organizers for the upcoming FIFA World Cup to integrate Delaware and New York onto the platform. Furthermore, MView is scheduled for use as a force multiplier to assist in monitoring potential threats during tonight's State of the Union Address. A large portion of this program is directly dependent upon the National Capitol Region (NCR) Urban Area Security Initiative funds. Unfortunately, the dramatic reduction in the NCR allocation has left the future of the program uncertain. Although nearly all of the National Special Security Events that Maryland supports within the National Capital Region are located in the District of Columbia, we understand the significant risk and impact and the need to be a part of the process. Recent incidents, such as the 2024 France railway arson attacks during the Summer Olympics Opening Ceremony and the suspected network attack that recently disrupted Italian rail service during the 2026 Winter Olympics, highlight the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. These events underscore the urgent need for robust cyber resilience, demonstrating how quickly and with little warning operations and services can be significantly disrupted. The Maryland License Plate Reader program is another initiative that directly supports criminal investigations, critical infrastructure security, and major event security throughout the region. The program is carefully managed to uphold citizens' civil rights and civil liberties, exclusively focusing its support on criminal investigations. In recent years, this program has directly contributed to thousands of Federal partner criminal investigations, including national security cases. For instance, in 2025 alone, the Maryland Fusion Center responded to over 670 requests from Federal partners related to criminal cases. Unfortunately, the program has received only partial financial support through UASI grant funding. The sudden reduction of Federal funds from the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Emergency Management Preparedness Grant and Urban Area Security Initiative has left several States, including Maryland, very vulnerable and faced with no option but to reduce personnel and capabilities, which our neighboring States and Federal partners have relied heavily upon. The cancellation of the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Program on July 21, 2025, is deeply concerning, especially given the unprecedented level of threats currently facing local and State elected officials. This program was vital for assisting States with early detection and intervention concerning individuals showing a pathway to violence. Between Federal fiscal year 2024 and 2025, we saw a reduction of over $1.3 million in the State Homeland Security Grant Program. The NCR UASI grant was cut by 44 percent, a total of over $21 million. Then, with the FFY26 grant notification, the NCR was further decreased from $25.5 million to $4.4 million, a 90 percent reduction. Following a catastrophic flood in Western Maryland, which significantly exceeded the minimum State threshold for FEMA assistance, the much-needed Federal funding was ultimately denied despite having bipartisan support from Maryland's Congressional Delegation. This decision forced the State and local jurisdictions to independently manage the devastating financial burden on the rural community. The inability to rely on Federal FEMA funds further complicates budgeting for preparedness activities when there is such a high level of uncertainty for Federal support following a disaster. While we would welcome working with the Department of Homeland Security to reimagine grant distribution in the interest of being more efficient; this sudden reduction has left us with no choice but to decrease capabilities. Due to the upcoming special events, maintaining the service level of previous years will be extremely challenging. Information sharing is one of the most basic and fundamental services the Federal Government can provide to States to enhance preparedness. In June 2025, the United States Fire Administration discontinued the EMR-ISAC. The EMR-ISAC shared unclassified intelligence products with a significant distribution list of over 187,000 police officers, emergency managers, firefighters, and EMTs. Currently, this resource is unmanaged. In March 2025, at the direction of FEMA Headquarters, the U.S. Fire Administration stopped hosting monthly Fire Service Intelligence Exchange calls. This regularly scheduled call was canceled without discussion or input from any of the participating agencies. Recognizing the importance of information sharing among this community, the Maryland Fusion Center has managed the calls since then and has been working to expand its reach. Multiple agencies, including the FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness appreciate the value of these calls and their role in continuing to protect the homeland. Currently, 123 unique agencies from 27 States and D.C. are represented. The administration and Congress deserve praise for their efforts in tackling the threat posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). This response highlights the readiness of local and State officials to collaborate seamlessly with Federal agencies to address this complex threat, which spans multiple administrative jurisdictions. Maryland is eager to continue working with the National Security Council, FAA, US- DOT, DHS, DOW, and our neighboring jurisdictions to establish a leading model for Counter-UAS programs. Failure to address these funding shortfalls jeopardizes the safety of upcoming special events, regardless of their size or scope. The impact, though not immediately apparent, will certainly be felt by our already over-extended, hard-working public safety professionals. This moment offers the United States a chance to demonstrate our national strength and resilience. Thank you for your leadership and for your commitment to the safety of our homeland. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of questioning. I will be--well, maybe not today. I will be strictly keeping to the 5-minute rule, but if we go over, it is OK today. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Martinez, can you explain what goes into the planning? You are the head of the World FIFA World Cup Miami Committee. Can you explain what goes into the planning for the city of Miami? Mr. Martinez. Sure. Thank you. Obviously, it's very intense and very detailed, obviously, working collaboratively through the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office. As I indicated in my opening, the sheriff's office is the lead law enforcement agency here at the local level. We have recently created a regional committee to cross jurisdictional lines. The multi-agency committee includes agency directors and representatives from across four counties, not only Miami-Dade County, but Broward County, Palm Beach County, and Monroe County to our south, bringing together stakeholders, public safety agencies to coordinate on the planning and coordination of the activities that are going to be taking place here in South Florida. Chairman Garbarino. It is not just the games, though. There are other things that you are planning for, festivals and like watch parties, those things like that? Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir. Chairman Garbarino. How much planning for security goes into that? How much--I mean, it takes quite a bit, correct? Mr. Martinez. It's immense. I mean, we've never handled anything like this even though we are used to working on major events here in South Florida and Miami. But a 23-day fan festival in downtown Miami in a city park is something that has never been tried and never been done. But, you know, we're expecting, you know, as I indicated, hundreds of thousands of people to come to South Florida to be part of the game and understanding that, you know, not everybody's going to get into the stadium. So, you know, the fan fest is going to be the location where people are going to go to enjoy the matches, to see the matches, to be with their, you know, fellow countrymen, and to be able to celebrate hopefully their victories. Then on top of that there will be regional watch parties across the three counties and really across the State of Florida. So you know, that coordination is critical and making sure that these, the information is shared and you know, goes across jurisdictional lines. Chairman Garbarino. So the money we--the One Big Beautiful Bill had--the reconciliation bill had $625 million in FEMA grants for measures. I think Miami was supposed to get around $70 million of that. I think that is what you all applied for. Has any of those funds been received yet? Mr. Martinez. No, sir, they have not. Chairman Garbarino. Now, let me ask you a question. What happens when--I mean, I am sure you put it into your budget, these FEMA grants, what happens if you don't get that money? So when is the drop-dead date for you to start having to cancel things if you don't get that money in? Mr. Martinez. I mean we're quickly approaching that. We're 107 days out from the tournament, but, more importantly, we're about 70-something days out from starting to build the fan fest. These decisions have to be made, I mean, generously I'd say within the next 30 days is the drop-dead date. I know that the local agencies are very anxious, but without receiving this money it could be catastrophic for our planning and coordination. Chairman Garbarino. So if you don't get the FEMA grants in the next 30 days, the city of Miami, is going to have to start canceling because you can't prepare for the security of those sites. Mr. Martinez. That is correct. We have to start making some really tough decisions and it starts with our fan festival. Obviously, the matches up at the stadium, you know, will take place but, you know, preparing for all of the impromptu events and, you know, watch parties that we're expecting to see will become--will be in jeopardy as we continue. Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate that answer. I am running out of time so I want to move over. Mr. Sena, we heard about Special Assessment Ratings, SEAR, and these events are getting SEAR 1 or SEAR 2 events, so extra resources are made available following those designations. We are currently experiencing a partial Government shutdown, specifically Homeland, the Department of Homeland, and I want to know has the shutdown negatively affected information- sharing networks that you deal with? You know, being with the fusion centers, head of fusion centers, are you seeing a negative effect from the shutdown or do you expect to see if this lasts longer a negative effect from the shutdown? Mr. Sena. Currently, we're not seeing a major issue with the shutdown, but as time progresses, I definitely believe that we will. We rely heavily on our coordination with our partners in the Department of Homeland Security. If any of their resources are available, one of the primary ones is, you know, that coordination with FEMA on the grant process. I mean, we're already dealing with many delays, which we don't know if and when we're going to get funding to continue operations. So the longer they are not around and not at their desk and not working on this process, the longer we don't know what's going to happen with the money we need to execute for these World Cup games. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much. My time has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member for today, Ms. Pou, for 5 minutes of questions. Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you to all the witnesses for testifying today. I just want to make sure to mention once again that, you know, we all understand that recent DHS enforcement has raised some serious alarms about its impact on public safety. Polls show that most Americans believe that actions have gone too far and makes us less safe. As we prepare to host the World Cup in my district, including the title game, which we cannot have roaming packs of masked ICE agents harassing fans and players. At our last hearing, I directly asked Director Lyons about ICE plans at the World Cup. He confirmed ICE presence and refused to rule out immigration raids. His refusal raised concerns, grave concerns, within my district and sent shockwaves across America and the world. Mr. Martinez, has DHS directly briefed you regarding the ICE plan at the World Cup matches in Miami, yes or no? Mr. Martinez. No. Ms. Pou. OK. ICE publicly stated that it would have a key role at that World Cup. Are you concerned about that, yes or no? Mr. Martinez. Not at the moment, no. Ms. Pou. Mr. Martinez, are you aware that conversations between FIFA and DHS regarding ICE enforcement activity at the World Cup, yes or no, sir? Mr. Martinez. Yes. Ms. Pou. Has FIFA specifically asked DHS to suspend immigration enforcement actions at the official World Cup venue or events--and events? Mr. Martinez. I am not aware of whether FIFA has made that request or not. Ms. Pou. What is the point of giving President Trump a Peace Prize if we cannot keep his masked agents from terrorizing fans and players? It is absolutely absurd. Mr. Martinez, if a fan is detained by ICE at a Miami World Cup game or FIFA fan event, have you and DHS set a process to inform family members or legal counsel? Mr. Martinez. We have been in constant communication with our Federal partners and we have received no indication of immigration enforcement that will be taking place during the tournament. We are laser-focused here at the Miami Host Committee and providing a safe and secure event. The only thing I can base on is in recent experience during the last year of our major events, which includes the College Football National Championship, Formula One, and the Club World Cup, which was held this past summer, and we did not experience any ICE enforcement activity as described. Ms. Pou. OK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Martinez. Mr. Martinez, with only roughly 4 months to go, some cities still reports that they have not received this funding. I think you have just--the Chairman just asked you that very question and you have indicated that you have not received that. This is completely unacceptable and certainly close to kickoff. As you have pointed out, you have a drop-dead date of time of 30 minutes. Officials in Foxborough, Massachusetts, for example, are still waiting for $1 million. They say they cannot hold games if they do not receive the money. Mr. Martinez and Deputy Chief Mabin, have either of you received Federal funding? I know, Mr. Martinez, you indicated that you have not. Mr. Chief--Deputy Chief Mabin, can you tell me if you have received any information with regards to the actual funding that you are expected to receive? Have you received that or not? Mr. Mabin. No, ma'am, we have not. Ms. Pou. What kind of delays or impact will that have if you do not get that and, similar to what the Chairman asked, what your drop-dead time frame in order to do that? I have like 34 seconds, so let's do real quick. Mr. Mabin. The drop-dead date is immediate. We need commitments from mutual aid partners to help supplement our officers just because of the scope, scale, and duration of the games, and they need assurances that they will get reimbursed for overtime, for travel expenses, for lodging. So we need that information right now. Ms. Pou. Is there any concern on the overtime of your personnel as a result of not having the wherewithal to do that? Mr. Mabin. Yes, ma'am. That is a consideration for our budget. We definitely need an answer on that and to release the funds as soon as possible. Ms. Pou. Thank you, Deputy Chief and Mr. Martinez. My time has run off. Thank you so very much. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back. I now recognize the Chairman of the task force and the former Chairman of this committee, Mr. McCaul from Texas, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start out by saying I remember back when I chaired this committee, the Boston Marathon bombing, just really a sporting event that went really bad and it was avoidable. It was preventable had Federal, State, and local been sharing information. The FBI had information about Mr. Tamerian's trip to Dagestan where he radicalized, came back. They did not share that adequately with the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Specifically, the Commissioner of Boston didn't have any of that information, even though he had 2 agents or 2 officers on the task force. We changed that by law. But it is all about connecting the dots. Mr. Sena, you are in charge of the fusion center, which sometimes comes under criticism. We formed the fusion centers to share--you know, everybody talks about connecting the dots after 9/11. That is exactly what you are doing. What do you see as one of the biggest threats as you look at the environment out there and the threat matrix? What keeps you up at night the most? Mr. Sena. It's a combination of things. You know, the first thing in the back of my head always right now is the financial piece, because we do need the resources to get things going. Mr. McCaul. I will get to that in a minute, yes. Big threat. Mr. Sena. It's a threat because if we don't have the right people in place---- Mr. McCaul. Correct. Mr. Sena [continuing]. To do the job, it won't get done. The other thing is the multimodal communication systems that we've got right now, the lack of getting that tip and lead, that piece of information. We do a lot of work educating our law enforcement, public safety, private-sector partners on what we need as far as those tips and leads, those suspicious activity reports. But we have a lot of different places those go right now, multiple Federal systems, multiple private-sector parties that take tips and leads. The problem is when you have so many silos, how do you connect them all? Then when it comes to game day and those operations ahead of time, how do you bring people together? For example, during Super Bowl we had 7 different systems up. So that worries me tremendously, merging those technologies. Mr. McCaul. Well, the Super Bowl is a test. Mr. Sena. It's a test for us because we're having a--FIFA's coming to town, so that was a test. Mr. McCaul. Yes. Mr. Sena. I can tell you that came up in the after-action when people were talking, you know, how do I watch 7 systems that I'm having to put data into 7 different platforms, my own people especially? But how do we merge those? Technology is there. It's policy and practice and training. Mr. McCaul. Well, the technology is there. Is it policy and practice prohibiting that? Mr. Sena. It is. Everyone has their own silo, so everyone has their own policy. Mr. McCaul. OK. That is a real problem because we only have--it is going to be March and they start in June. You got 100 games---- Mr. Sena. Yep. Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Over 100 games in 3 countries, you know, Mexico, Canada, United States. Let me ask you quickly. We were down in Mexico and got a joint training program with our military, both respective United States and Mexico, passed by their parliament. We saw the recent events in Mexico. They have drones, the violent uptick after the Jalisco cartel member was taken out. I know this is not in your purview, but you have to learn from those mistakes. How concerned are you about the games in Mexico? Mr. Sena. The big concern I've got, especially with drone activity, is that--and for that example, I had a person that was planning on flying a drone right into the Super Bowl. So that part of that is that we can and have countermeasures there, but there are so many other locations that we don't have people trained and equipment in place for countermeasures, that they can go anywhere a crowd is at and immediately hit those targets and cause mass destruction. We don't have the capability across the board to fight every drone threat. Mr. McCaul. That is a great segue to my next point and that is under the Safer Skies Act the Chairman introduced and my task force recommended, we got that passed in the National Defense Authorization. That gives the ability to share with State and local as the counter drone authorities, which is critically important. I am surprised we had any opposition to that. However, about $625 million, we passed a continuing resolution out of the House on DHS funding. That was already authorized and appropriated by Congress to go forward and be implemented under FEMA to security for the FIFA games. However, the Senate is playing politics with this and had decided to shut down the Federal Government. I would argue it is going to be on their head if they don't get this Government back open and get this money directly to your fusion centers and these State and locals here. If something bad happens, it is going to be on their head, you know. I urge them to get this thing done and stop playing games because at the games we are talking about, you are going to see another Boston bombing if we don't get that money out the door. I think all of you have testified how important that grant funding is. I know the Chairman and Ranking Member here were both very vigilant about staying, you know, on top of that. Final minute on--well, I will talk to you off the record later about your drone mitigation at the Super Bowl, but I think that is really the threat here. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa. Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses today being here and sharing your intel. A little history, 9/11 we had silos, information on one hand, information on the other hand, they could have been shared, maybe 9/11 could have been prevented. That's why Homeland Security was created, sharing information. Mr. Mabin, you talk about the fact that FIFA will be the single largest sporting event in the world. That is impressive and that is also a big target. Mr. Sena, you mentioned that shared info is the backbone of intel. A few months ago, we had my good Sheriff Don Barnes from Orange County here, 8 months ago, and he was talking about the withholding of billions of dollars of FEMA funding for fusion centers. He said, and I quote him, ``stepping back from our posture in our fusion centers.'' I think Sheriff Barnes is trying to say that not getting that FEMA funding is going to hurt your posture defending our citizens, preventing a major catastrophe. God knows we have a lot of frenemies out there right now. So your fusion center in Northern California is 100 percent funded through FEMA preparedness grants. How long has it been since you have gotten these grants? Mr. Sena. Actually, we've been receiving these grants for our center since 2004. Mr. Correa. Lately? Mr. Sena. Well, we have not gotten our last 2025 allocation, so we are going to be short this year if it doesn't show up. Mr. Correa. So right now you are beginning to feel the challenges of not being properly funded in order to defend our citizenry with this FIFA coming up and the Olympics coming up and so on and so forth. Mr. Sena. Absolutely, sir. Without the personnel to do the analysis, without the threat liaison officers to do the outreach and training on suspicious activity report, without the technology in place, and some of the technology we have built is actually supporting all of FIFA for the entire Nation. So without that, those resources and capabilities, we will, you know, be blinded to the threats. Mr. Correa. Well, I just wanted to thank you for being here today. I am in concurrence with my colleagues. We got to stop playing politics with this stuff, with these funds that are so critical to defending our country. We had a lesson, 9/11. I don't want to relive that lesson. Sheriff Don Barnes, who I think you know very well, he has got to protect Disneyland. We are a very high target on people's lists. We have the Anaheim Angels, the Anaheim Ducks, a lot of things going on in Southern California. I guess I am going to ask you to help us get the message out. In Washington, there are a lot of things that we get caught up with that are supposed to be important, but heaven forbid we have another 9/11 coming at us. It will change us again in ways we can't even imagine. So I would ask you to continue to come up here and talk to my colleagues and myself, both sides of the aisle, remind people how important it is to protect our citizens through proper funding and hopefully we get that FEMA funding up and running so that you can do your job. Fusion centers, love what you do out there. Very impressive, good intel, and, God knows, there is a lot of information out there you got to sift through to get to the bottom. So thank you very much and I just wanted to, again, invite you to come back and let us know what is important at the end of the day. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I am sitting here listening to some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle complaining about ICE enforcement and apparently ICE enforcement is the issue that has caused us to shut down DHS. The problem is that ICE is funded like through 2027. So what it is that they are all complaining about and shutting the Government down, it doesn't affect the thing that they are complaining about. So this is all political theater and, unfortunately, you are going to be paying the price because the people that are supposed to be processing the grants are nonessential, therefore, they are not working. So those folks that you are relying on to get the money for the FEMA grants, it is not coming until the Government reopens. I hope that that doesn't mean that there is going to be some kind of tragedy happening in the United States because the Government and DHS itself is closed. Now, the facts are there are some jurisdictions that are going to be able to absorb this a little bit better than others. I know that you are all going to do what you have to do in order to protect the public regardless if we give you the money. We will give you the money. Eventually you will get it. OK? The question is your capacity to float, you know, that until you finally get the money. Because we are notorious here for saying we are going to give you stuff and we won't give it to you for about 5 years. OK? So just think about that. Chief Martinez, good to see you. I mean, I know you are in Miami, you are smart guy just stayed there. My concern for--my main concern, a big concern I have is drones and the usage of drones and as a potential terrorist threat. Do you feel that you have the authorities needed in order to handle that threat now? Mr. Martinez. Well, certainly with the changes that have been made, we feel more confident. Local representatives from the major agencies, including Miami-Dade Sheriff, city of Miami Police, Broward County, Florida Highway Patrol, have either attended or are scheduled to attend the required training. So we feel confident that we will be able to deploy teams to these critical sites, both at the stadium and the fan fest. The issue is being able to cover other areas that may be popping up, you know, impromptu celebrations, watch parties that could hold, you know, 500, 1,000, 2,000 people across the region. So, you know, we don't have the resource to cover every spot, but we do feel confident that we will have the resources and the technology to cover the main ones, which are the stadium and the fan fest. Mr. Gimenez. Do you feel that you have the technology that will allow you to actively incapacitate any drone that may be a threat to, you know, to the population? Mr. Martinez. Well, I know the agencies are in the process of obtaining and procuring those resources and those technologies. They have not been received yet. So, you know, we're hope, obviously we're piggybacking on the Federal Government to be able to source those technologies. So, you know, again, yes, we do feel confident if everything comes to fruition and we feel that, you know, we're moving in the right direction to support that. Mr. Gimenez. Will you require Federal resources for that? Are they going to be the only ones that have the authority to do something about that or has that authority been delegated also down to the local law enforcement agencies? Mr. Martinez. Some of it has been delegated down to a limited scope, and that's what the required training is for. But we also will be depending on our Federal partners to assist us in those matters, especially at the stadium. Mr. Gimenez. Are you comfortable with that or would you feel more comfortable and also getting additional authority to be able to handle the situation as you see fit? Mr. Martinez. I mean, certainly having additional authority, you know, would be beneficial, no question. You know, understanding the difficulty in doing that, you know, we're thankful for what we have, but certainly we would welcome, you know, increased authority, especially, you know, as it relates to these international type of games and matches where, you know, obviously the crowd size and the target and the threat, you know, is significant. Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you very much. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. I proudly represent New Orleans, the greatest city in the world to host major events, like last year's Super Bowl. The allure of the city means we are responsible for protecting countless mass gatherings throughout the year: Mardi Gras, Jazz Fest, Essence Fest, the Sugar Bowl, Taylor Swift concerts, the list goes on and on. The terrorist attack last year on the early hours of New Year's Day on Bourbon Street served as a stark reminder of how terrorist tactics are evolving and the importance of enhanced coordination between our Federal, State, and local security agencies during these events. However, the administration has repeatedly obstructed FEMA, politicizing the agency in delaying disaster preparedness and response. Last week, it reportedly told FEMA to halt all travel, seemingly to create fallouts from DHS's funding lapse, despite FEMA's testimony to Congress that it will continue disaster response use of funds unaffected by the shutdown. The politicization of FEMA makes America less secure every day, especially while preparing for large-scale events when communities are most vulnerable to security threats. Mr. Nelson, Maryland is no stranger to the Trump administration's politicization of disaster aid. When historic flooding hit Western Maryland in 2025, did Maryland meet the criteria for receiving Federal assistance? Do you feel that President Trump made an objective, nonpolitical decision when he rejected Governor Moore's request for assistance? Mr. Nelson. Well, thank you for that question and, yes, we did meet the threshold. We are currently at $34 million in damage for the $13 million minimum and was really not given any true reason for why it was denied. Mr. Carter. For each of our other speakers, would you agree that the disbursement of emerging emergency funds should not, I underscore not, be decided by politics or party? Mr. Sena. For me, sir? Mr. Carter. Just yes or no? Mr. Sena. Yes, sir. Mr. Carter. Thank you. Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir. Mr. Nelson. Yes. Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir. Mr. Carter. Thank you very much. Has there been or could there have been in the future a fiscal impact on Maryland's taxpayers or local government if DHS continues to delay these reimbursements? Mr. Nelson. Yes, absolutely. Mr. Carter. We have witnessed an increase in attacks on religious institutions recently, including an arsonist who set fire of a synagogue in Ranking Member Thompson's district in Mississippi. Despite this heightened threat environment, DHS has not released nearly $300 million in nonprofit security grants that Congress appropriated almost a year ago. Mr. Nelson, are you concerned that delays in disbursing funding for nonprofit security grant programs could further jeopardize the security of houses of worship in Maryland? Mr. Nelson. Yes, I am. Mr. Carter. Can you expound on that? Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. So the instability, these are funds that are directly distributed to places of worship, so it's difficult for them to be able to budget and to balance in the security needs. If we can't commit to them, the funding that is going to be passed down to them, they have to make difficult decisions on what they are going to invest in with their places of worship, ultimately opening up to vulnerabilities. Mr. Carter. Thank you. Let the record reflect, Mr. Chairman, that all of the witnesses said affirmatively that the disbursement of funds for natural disasters that happen not by party, not by race, not by socioeconomic standards, but by Mother Nature, by acts of perhaps the issues of mankind with climate change, should not be withheld for political party, political purpose, political theater. They should be given according to meeting the minimal thresholds of a natural disaster or an emergency declaration, which Maryland did. We are hopeful that we will not see further cases where resources are withheld because it wasn't my party, wasn't my president, not my problem. We are Americans. Natural disaster and FEMA and the resources should be given as needed, regardless of any politics. Mr. Chairman, I yield. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson. As we prepare to host the FIFA World Cup, Olympics, America 250, and even college sporting events, we face an unprecedented mix of security challenge. It is past time to unleash counter- UAS to defend America and its citizens from drone attacks. Much of that technology is developed in my district. Our ability to protect fans, athletes, and host communities will depend on how well we are prepared, trained, and share information and respond under pressure. I am proud to represent Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, where the FBI recently opened the National Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training Center, America's premier hub for training law enforcement and security professionals to counter the threat posed by drones, all under one roof. Deputy Chief Mabin, the threat posed by rogue unmanned aircraft systems to stadiums and fan venues may represent one of the greatest security challenges we face in hosting these large-scale events. Congress recently extended authorities to State and local law enforcement to mitigate these drone threats. How do you anticipate these expanded authorities will help your officers secure World Cup sites, stadiums, and fan festivals, which is, you think about the World Cup itself, it is equivalent to 7 Super Bowls at the same time? Mr. Mabin. Absolutely. It's a question of scale. We will get Federal support, counter-UAS support, but it's limited. By expanding these authorities to local police departments, we're able to cover down on the other areas. It's more than just the stadium. It's also the FIFA fan festival areas. So once we get the training and procure the resources, then we'll be able to be better positioned to counter any kind of UAS threats. Mr. Strong. Thank you. Has anyone from your department coordinated with or received training through the FBI's Counter-UAS Training Center at Redstone Arsenal? Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir. We have individuals scheduled to go down for the training right now. Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Martinez, building on that point, how have organized committees been working with Federal, State, and local partners to ensure strong counter-UAS mitigation procedures in place? Mr. Martinez. So we've been making sure, obviously, that the, you know, responsible agencies, as I mentioned earlier, from the Miami-Dade Sheriffs, the city of Miami Police Department, Broward County Sheriffs, and across the State from the Florida Highway Patrol are able to receive that training. As I indicated, many have already received it, and those that have not are scheduled to receive it in the next month or two. So working with our Federal partners, you know, to ensure that those trainings are provided for those jurisdictions is critical. We're continuing to work, obviously, with our Federal partners in communicating, you know, what our overall drone plan will be and, you know, collaborating with them on the deployment of these resources. Mr. Strong. Do you see any gaps in preparedness as we approach summer? Mr. Martinez. Well, the gaps for us is really in the funding as been highlighted. You know, it is absolutely critical to be able to get this funding. You know, as Congressman Gimenez indicated, you know, the agencies will step up and provide, you know, the resources that are needed. But our fear is that decisions will be made on budget instead of threat assessment, especially as we get closer and the actual scale of it starts to show itself. So that's why we feel it's absolutely essential to be able to get that money released so the agencies have the comfort in knowing that they will be reimbursed. Mr. Strong. Thank you. Switching gears, with over 36 years' experience as an emergency medical technician and 40 years as a firefighter, I take emergency response and public safety extremely serious. When we host events of this scale, it is critical that fire and EMS officials are not only present, but fully trained, equipped, and integrated into security planning. Mr. Martinez, what are the greatest areas of need for fire and EMS officials ahead of these games? How are you ensuring they are fully prepared to respond if the unthinkable occurs? Mr. Martinez. Absolutely. We've been working very closely with the major fire and emergency management agencies here, including the Miami-Dade Fire Department and the Miami-Dade Department of Emergency Management. We have held already several large-scale, full-scale exercises, as well as numerous tabletop exercises to develop responses and capabilities and understanding of what those capabilities are for all of the agencies involved. The Miami-Dade Fire Department is taking the lead and coordinating with local municipal fire departments, including city of Miami, Miami Beach, Coral Gables, for mutual aid and as well as coverage in their jurisdictions. So we feel we have a very strong, you know, assessment of our capabilities as well as training, on-going training that has been taking place over the last year-and-a-half, and it will continue on leading up to the games themselves. Mr. Strong. I want to thank all of our witnesses. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, 5 minutes. Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome all our witnesses today. According to several States and stakeholders, the Trump administration continues to withhold over $1.2 billion in FEMA counterterrorism funding that should have been provided to communities almost 6 months ago for programs such as Urban Area Security Initiative and Nonprofit Security Grant Program. The Trump administration is even challenging court orders that would make this funding available immediately to first responders, nonprofits, and other local partners. In many communities, this lack of funding is jeopardizing security preparations for upcoming large events, such as the FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and 2028 Olympic Games. As my colleague Mr. Carter mentioned, we had a synagogue bombed in my district recently, and the money that identified the culprit was the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, that the cameras caught him, and subsequently he has admitted to the cause. So if this money is not available or delayed as it currently is, Mr. Nelson, can you discuss those impacts on Maryland's preparedness when DHS delays and fight court orders to provide necessary counterterrorism funding going to nonprofits, first responders, and other local partners? Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. So in response to that, we recognize that it's critical and, in fact, the State was deeply concerned that the Federal Government would not provide the funds and actually found a way to supplement some State funding because of our increased concern around this risk area. So in that sense, we are deeply concerned about the sustainability of the nonprofit security grant and distributing those funds efficiently down to the places of worship and other eligible applicants to better protect those vulnerable populations. Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that those programs are not only essential, but pretty much required if we are going to protect houses of worship and other places like that? Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. As much as Governor Moore has dedicated State funding to back up that fact. Mr. Thompson. Well, another comment that, Mr. Chairman, we come in contact with is right now, the Secretary is signing each grant award of $100,000 or more. Chief Martinez, do you--right now are you applying for monies in excess of $100,000? Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir. Mr. Thompson. Would a delay in this execution of those contracts create a problem for your agency? Mr. Martinez. Yes, sir, they would. It could be catastrophic for us. Mr. Thompson. Mr. Mabin. Mr. Mabin. Yes, sir. Mr. Thompson. Would that be a problem for you, too? Mr. Mabin. Yes, it would, sir. Mr. Thompson. Well, and as I think a lot of us have already indicated, that is for the third-largest Government agency to get down to the 100,000 contract signing, that slows down the process. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to us trying to work with the Secretary to unblock the backlog of contracts on her desk because that creates a problem. Now, the other question, Mr. Nelson, UASI is a good program, and do you see any dangers in not funding those UASI cities in a timely manner? Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. To the point that the response today for the State of the Union address, some of those capabilities will be diminished in future years if we don't receive the funding. Mr. Thompson. Yes, and that is for the big cities. You know, it is not for the little folk. But we created a special program for those large areas because they need the assistance. If, for whatever reason, those funds are not made available, then those communities become susceptible to potentially any kind of danger. So I look forward to trying to unblock the log jam and get the monies to the communities where they need it. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for 5 minutes of question. Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this committee. Thank you to our witnesses for showing up today. You know, it is just unbelievable to me that we sit here in this hearing today, which is about security and intelligence sharing for these large events coming up in the United States of America, like the FIFA World Cup, the Olympics, et cetera, and my Democrat colleagues continue to blast the Trump administration for not funding the Department of Homeland Security and all of our efforts that are designed to keep these people, our citizens, foreign travelers, and these events safe from attack. Yet not one single one of them voted for the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill. People ask me all the time, is Washington, DC, as bad as we think it is? This committee hearing right here is a perfect example of how bad it really is. They will sit here and talk about the Trump administration and how they are not distributing funds for these events and to keep our communities safe, and yet not one of them voted for the Department of Homeland Security appropriations. That covers the Coast Guard, it covers CISA, cybersecurity, it covers ICE, Department of Homeland Security, all of it. They didn't vote for any of it. Mr. Sena, what are your thoughts on that? Mr. Sena. From my perspective, you know, what we're able to do and capable of doing right now has been built up over 20- plus years, and we're still not quite where we need to be as far as the information sharing and overcoming the silos. I think on the funding piece that---- Mr. Crane. No, that's not what I asked you, sir, with all due respect. Mr. Sena. Yes, sir. Mr. Crane. I know, I get it. I get it. You are trying to be a nice guy in here. I asked you, when you hear all these comments from people that voted against funding the Department of Homeland Security, is there a part of you that is like, really? This is political theater. That is what it really is. Mr. Sena. I do think that the impasse that we have right now with the grant funding and with the support of the Department overall, I can tell you that on a daily basis, we work with partners from all of the DHS components and without their resources in place, we can't be successful. So without them being fully open and operational, it causes problems for us in fighting the threats from transnational organized crime to human trafficking to counterterrorism. They need the resources as much as possible to get, and that includes DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis. Without their backbone supporting us, that's a problem. Mr. Crane. How about TSA? Right? Mr. Sena. Huge. Mr. Crane. The folks that, you know, work in airports every day to make sure that folks coming into these events are going to be able to get here and attend these events. Is that open right now? Is that funded? Mr. Sena. That's a problem. Especially the support that we get from the Federal Air Marshal Services on counter-drone activities and detection. I mean, they are great partners in this. So there's a lot of components with the DHS that the longer that they don't have funding, the longer we have huge gaps that we will see. Mr. Crane. I want to read some quotes that I heard just in this hearing today from some of our Democrat members. ``This admin has jeopardized Homeland Security efforts. The time for action is short. Release these funds now. Everyone deserves to be safe and free at these events. Security planning cannot take place during insecurity. We are Americans. Funding should be given regardless of politics.'' Did you guys hear those? I just want to make the point again, if you are a Democrat on this dais and you voted to fund the Department of Homeland Security, please raise your hand. That is what I thought. So, you know, it is just too hard to sit here and listen. They are hoping that nobody calls them out on their gaslighting. They are hoping that nobody does and that we all just play nice in here. I am not going to do it. That is not why my constituents sent me to Washington, DC. Chief Mabin, if you guys don't get the funding that you need, how is it going to impact Americans that not just in their regular lives, but if they are going to trying to go to the FIFA World Cup? Mr. Mabin. Specifically with FIFA, our security plans rely on mutual aid partners, and they need assurances that they will be refunded or be able to seek overtime and travel funds. So that would negatively impact our security posture. Mr. Crane. Mr. Sena, I do want to hear more about this droning attempt with the NFL. Did that drone have a payload? Mr. Nelson. It was intended to have something, but it turned out to be flyers. But it could have been anything attached to it. Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Pfluger [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking Member as well. I say sincerely that I am most appreciative for this hearing. I did not vote to support many of the things that I find onerous within Homeland Security. But that is a discussion that I will be willing to debate at another time with a Member who is appropriately ready to debate. Now, moving on to today's hearing, I don't have any gotcha questions. I really want to find out what we are doing in the area of human trafficking. I want to find out because my county, Harris County, is one of the leading counties in the country when it comes to human trafficking. I am interested in knowing what is our approach, how will we deal with recovery and response, rehabilitation to a certain extent, how will we deal with prevention? These are some serious questions that we need to answer because with human trafficking being more than $200 billion in terms of an enterprise globally, more than $200 billion, we have got to concern ourselves about the young ladies, the children who are going to be trafficked at an event such as what we will have in Houston, Texas. I am concerned about the entire country, but I just want to make sure that we protect people who are going to be at this event. Chief, if I may ask you, Deputy Chief, what are your thoughts in terms of where we are with human trafficking in terms of preparedness to deal with it? Because we know that it will occur and it will occur in a huge, massive way in Houston, Texas, if we are not careful. So how do we deal with it? Mr. Mabin. I'm glad you raised that issue, a very important issue. Major sporting events around the world are known to have human trafficking occur when they happen. So we're educating our front-line officers and teaching them to recognize the signs of human trafficking. We're partnered with the FBI on different task forces that target human traffickers and internet crimes against children crimes. We're also reaching out to our private partners, hotels, to let them know what the signs are, and the airport. We're really doing a broad education campaign so that people can report these signs and we can respond appropriately. So I think we are positioned well to combat human trafficking, and we know it is a major concern. Thank you. Mr. Green. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate you saying it is a major concern and where you are positioned. But it is my understanding that you need money to facilitate and to activate the necessary people power to make the difference. Ms. Sena, is that correct? Mr. Sena. That's correct, sir. Without the resources, I mean, we have analysts that are working every day to fight this issue. I have to compliment, you know, Mike McDaniel, the HIDTA director for Houston, who's been at the forefront of this in this human trafficking effort. But one of the things that we do is bring together technology, bringing together our Microsoft Teams and ESRI platform, which we used successfully at the Super Bowl. Thanks to, you know, the task force there, led by, you know, our team from Santa Clara County, we were able to bring together over 60 agencies and identify---- Mr. Green. Let me intercede just a moment and ask this question, please. We are less than 4 months away from this activity actually being initiated. So with this limited amount of time, at some point you can receive dollars and you cannot use them efficaciously because time is not on your side. Do you not need to have the funds now? Mr. Sena. We needed them 6 months ago, actually, but we do need them now. We've got--and the other part of this is that there are gaps in this. As you mentioned earlier, once we contact victims, getting them the support that they need, it's horrendous the situation we're in right now with no place to put people, no housing, not having Child Protective Services folks available and others to help out in that situation. Mr. Green. You said Child Protective Services. Children. We're talking about children as old--as young as what, sir? Mr. Sena. At the Super Bowl? Twelve years old. Mr. Green. Twelve years old being trafficked. Mr. Sena. Being trafficked. Mr. Green. Well, and you can prevent much of this if you have the funds that you need for recovery and response, which means to help them through the trauma that they are suffering. This is a part of it, is it not? Mr. Sena. Absolutely, sir. Without those resources, we can't get the victims to help and they can get pulled back into being trafficked again. Mr. Green. Thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes. I thank you all for being here. We have a lot of activities that are going to be on-going in the next 2 to 3 years: America's 250th birthday, the World Cup, the Olympics, not to mention the normal pace that we keep up with just normal events around the country. So I will start by saying thank you. The work that you do is incredibly important. I have visited several fusion centers, and, Mr. Sena, I appreciate just how nuanced it is and agree with my colleague, Mr. Crane, that if this is not bipartisan, if we can't move in a bipartisan way to fund the security of our homeland, then what are we doing? You know, let's get to some of those questions about just how important it is. So given the activity that we have seen from the cartels recently that have happened in Mexico in the last 3 to 4 days, what kind of threat are we looking at, at the possibility? Is this something that you are concerned about? Mr. Sena, I will ask you, what can the fusion centers be doing? What are they doing to mitigate that threat? Mr. Sena. Transnational organized crime groups out there are a tremendous threat to our country. You know, fusion centers and the HIDTAs and risk partners have worked for a long time to fight those threats. But every day we see this increase in rhetoric. Not only that now we see, you know, violence south of our border. They are not that far away to cause problems here. Our country is a location where they raise funds and we are the source of their income. But we don't know how they will react to whatever threat they perceive from anyone, whether it be Mexico or the United States, and what harm they may cause. I mean, right now with fentanyl trafficking, and I think we've discussed this, you know, privately, is that, you know, I had and still have over 500 Hondurans that have been operating in our region, at one point all selling dope in a square mile area in San Francisco. We have fought back on that thanks to the support the city and county of San Francisco, the mayor's office, the district attorney, the police chief, and the sheriff, as well as the United States Attorney's Office and our DAs from around the region, the sheriffs and other chiefs of police. We are going to be receiving an award for the HIDTA program for our San Francisco Metro Task Force because we have pushed back on that. The city is much cleaner place. It's a much safer place. People are not dying in the numbers and droves that they were in that city before. But we cannot turn our backs on these groups because they continue to be a major threat. When we talk about special events, those folks are there to sell fentanyl, to sell dangerous drugs, and to sell human beings. And there's no reason they can't turn to violence while they're there, depending on what the geopolitical environment is at the time. Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that. Chief Mabin, thank you for being here. From the local and State level, how important is it to have qualified I&A personnel for deployed to the fusion centers? What kind of information do you need? How do you work together? Give us a sense of what we just heard mitigating these threats. Mr. Mabin. Thank you. It's absolutely important to have them work in the fusion center. We can't just show up one day in the middle of a critical incident and start working together. So we have to have them embedded in the fusion center real time, for months in advance, years in advance, to establish those relationships. They act as a critical bridge between other cities, between the IC community, and local law enforcement, to be able to push out intelligent products and safely secure these events. So it is critical. Mr. Pfluger. Let's talk about drones. That was a previous discussion. Just looking at the rapid expansion, I know there is many, many drone incursions that happen on the Southwest Border. We saw one in El Paso recently, or I think alleged that it was a drone activity. What can we be doing? How do the fusion centers react and what is the threat that we are worried about mitigating at the major events in the next year, Mr. Sena? Mr. Sena. For me, it's, (A), you know, having State and local partners, not just with the authorities, but the tools and resources to prevent the threat. Without those, we're lost. The other piece of this is that the ability for drones to carry a payload, even if it's a small payload, can cause panic. If it's a white powder dropped, well, who knows what that is? The stampede alone will injure people. Even worse if it's, you know, some type of, you know, poison that could harm people, like fentanyl. You know, there are a lot of threats out there, but we need the resources, early detection, and that integration like we see in Las Vegas, where we have Federal Air Marshal Service personnel in the fusion center. We need the people in the center. That's the whole purpose of a fusion center, is to bring people together. So without those Federal, State, and local resources in the same place at the same time, looking for the same threats, we're going to miss things. Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. My time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening today's hearing and to our witnesses for joining us. I represent Fairfax County, a proud part of the national capital region, largest jurisdiction in the National Capital Region. As Mr. Nelson knows, our region is designated as a high-threat, high-density area, which permits us, and I know this has been discussed by the Ranking Member and others, to receive Urban Area Security Initiative Grant funding, which enhances our regional preparedness, strengthens public safety, helps fund and refund terrorist response training, camera networks, emergency alert systems, and coordination tools, all of the tools that keep our national capital region in our Nation's Capital safe. But as the threat levels remain very high for our region as we prepare for major events, America 250, the World Cup, the administration moved last year to slash $40 million in Homeland Security funding from our region, cutting preparedness grant funding by 90 percent. I know there has been some conversations around the DHS funding situation and the shutdown at DHS right now, which we need to work together to resolve. But it is important to note that the administration has been shutting down elements of DHS throughout this term, and this grant program is one of them. So State and local entities in Virginia and across our region have served as reliable partners in emergency response efforts. We sent law enforcement and first responders to help recovery efforts after the tragic and deadly collision near National Airport. I was just at an event with the families of those who lost their lives in that tragic collision. Fairfax County police officers were here at the Capitol on January 6, 2021, working to repel the insurrectionists. But these drastic cuts to grants would erode Fairfax County's and, I think, other jurisdictions in our region overall emergency preparedness and response capabilities. National security--national special security events occur frequently in our region. It is not a rare thing. It is a weekly thing. It would also hinder our ability to conduct training and obtain new equipment that might no longer be able to be paid for by local funding and reimbursed. It is defunding the police is what it is when the administration cuts these grant programs that help to fund local law enforcement. It jeopardizes safety of Americans in our region all across the country. I think Virginians and all residents of our region deserve clear answers as to why the administration believes they don't need the resources to protect against terrorist threats and other incidents. I want to ask Mr. Nelson, in the past year, in your view, has the threat level to our region, the national capital region, increased or decreased, the overall threat level? Mr. Nelson. Increased and also in regards to at the local and State level. So the Federal threat has always been high here. However, we're seeing an increase in threats at the State and local level that is also increasing now, which is making it even more complex. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Can you just speak specifically how these grant cuts, the cuts to these Homeland Security grants, UASI and others, would hinder the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia State and local law enforcement from working collaboratively to respond to incidents? You know, there is a lot of conversation with nationally right now about the need for Federal law enforcement and local law enforcement to cooperate and partner. How do these cuts or would these cuts make that cooperation more difficult? Mr. Nelson. It would make it much more difficult. Following the Paris attacks in 2015, I actually chaired the National Capital Region Complex Coordinated Attack Working Group where we built systems, information-sharing platforms, and resource management programs to address the complex threats in this region. Those programs will likely erode and be demobilized as a result of the decrease in funding. Mr. Walkinshaw. Maybe specifically, how would it or will it hinder our ability to prepare for America 250, 4th of July celebrations, big upcoming events like that? Mr. Nelson. In addition to breaking down the products such as the CCTV program or other types of information-sharing platforms, it also--there's other existing programs outside the grant program, such as the information-sharing platform that was run by DHS that has also been sunsetted that we had to pick up as a State and begin running for the Nation to try to ensure that that information flow still occurs. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and to our witnesses for joining us. Thank you for your efforts to keep Americans safe. Like many Americans, I am excited for the America 250 celebrations and the World Cup matches. I also recognize the huge security concerns that these events bring with them and our law enforcement's significant work to ensure the United States hosts the most successful and peaceful events in the world. Among them, DHS I&A is specifically and uniquely equipped to manage threat response during national special security events. But the threats are always changing. Modern UAS and generative AI means nearly anyone anywhere can disrupt these events with serious consequences. We must ensure that never happens. Sticking with the theme of interagency coordination and information sharing, Mr. Sena, what real-time intelligence- sharing mechanisms are there to ensure all threats are reported accurately during these events? I know you talked about the 7 systems and some of the synchronization challenges, but if you would care to expound upon any of that. Mr. Sena. No, definitely. At the Classified level we have the Homeland Security Data Network, HSDN, which fusion centers have within their operations to connect with DHS intel and what's available within that platform. But on the FBI side you also have their own separate high-side systems as well, and JWICS and military-side technologies. We also have the Homeland Security Information Network, which has a SharePoint site which is, you know, Microsoft-based technology, along with an Adobe Connect system. Those two systems don't actually talk to each other. We also have within our partners at the FBI, within their CJIS Division, they also manage the LEEP, Law Enforcement Enterptise Portal, Virtual Command Center, VCC. We also have a number of partners at the State and local level that are using everything from Microsoft to Slack to Signal to communicate. We also have local emergency operations channels and various EOC- type communication areas. The problem we have with much of these technologies is that none of them connect to each other. Many of them have similar tools and resources. But ultimately, because folks don't want to pick a favorite and everyone has their own, it's hard for people to communicate. That's why a lot of work's been done over the last 4 years to do that direct integration between Microsoft Teams and ESRI because most of government has Microsoft and most of government has ESRI technology. So that was what really helped us out tremendously on our human trafficking effort during Super Bowl. But, you know, ultimately we've got to figure out bridges between technology, otherwise they fall into pockets. As far as the reporting of threats, we have the National Threat Operations Center, the NTOC, which is at CJIS Division in West Virginia. They handle about 1.3 to 1.6 million tips and leads per year. I have to tell you, that's overwhelming. We also have various hotlines for human trafficking. So those go into those pots of information. But the ultimate issue we have is with all these multiple pots of tips and leads information, they all aren't consolidated. So we don't know what we're missing until bad things happen. Even during the Super Bowl, there was a belief that we were missing some tips and leads from one source party. One of our partners actually called in a tip to see if somebody would send us the tip, and it never came in. So those are the types of issues we have trying to make sure that there is a constant flow of communication. Fusion centers were designed to help facilitate that and to help move the data. But as, you know, technology has not progressed with the issues we have today, we have these silos of excellence that don't connect anybody. Mr. Van Epps. So building off of that, could you, and maybe this is for Mr. Martinez as well, but could you walk us through what the intelligence-sharing process would look like if there was an active threat at one of the World Cup events? You know, what are the crucial communicating tools and the potential gaps there as well? Mr. Sena. Absolutely. Unfortunately, each of those systems I mentioned would be one of those things that analysts probably have to enter data into. But the real thing is people in the room talking to each other. So what we've done and built in the past and which every location will have is a regional collaboration, coordination, and communication centers. There will be ops centers, but I can tell you that we had about 6 operation centers just during the Super Bowl. So I can only imagine that there'll be many more based on how spread out the FIFA operations are to bring information together. But if there's a critical threat it's going to be communication between people in the room and then the ability to bring people in, most oftentimes in that Microsoft Teams environment, to host a call very quickly to say, this is the threat. That's what I've done in the past in my own center. If something escalates to a point where we've got to get general information out, people are not always tied to their email. They're not always tied to even their text messages. But if you get the alert out and bring people together physically and virtually, brief them on the threat as quickly as possible. The only problem comes in if the threat is Classified and then trying to get the classification down. That's where clearances become important for especially our State and locals. We have had that, you know, that effort to try to get people as many clearances as possible to bring them into a room and tell them this is the threat. But not everyone has remote communications at a Classified level. So there are urgencies that we have to get information out. I can tell you, years ago, we had that same problem in San Francisco. Ultimately, they built a room that we could hold 300 people to get them briefed. That's a rarity. Not many cities, locations have a place that is reasonable to get to in a Classified space to get briefed up on urgent threats. But ultimately, when there's a crisis, we communicate because we work together, we train together, we have tabletop exercises, and we plan out and get to know each other before the event, before the big game day. Then we work on these are the communications channels we will use, but we make sure that that happens. Everyone in my region has my cell phone number and I have theirs, so we can talk to each other if all else fails. Mr. Van Epps. Thank you. Thank you, sir. My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. That was a great answer. That is why I let you go long, because it was very important to get on the record. I recognize the gentleman from Puerto Rico, Mr. Hernandez, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Hernandez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is about security preparedness. What concerns me the most is that DHS has shown a consistent pattern of failing American citizens, the United States, the 50 States, the commonwealths, and the territories in securing their reconstruction after natural disasters, after major events, and in securing their citizens and their residents from their policies. Now, this is a direct failure of leadership and policy at the DHS level. We have in place what I have to call a stupid policy that requires the DHS Secretary to approve any expense over $100,000, and that is delaying the reconstruction and the projects in Puerto Rico and in many States that will prepare us to better handle major events or major natural disasters. I have received outreach from constituents. Projects like the Hector Sola Coliseum in Caguas or projects like the back-up generators from Fundacion Comunitaria that give power and water to over 37,000 residents in Puerto Rico are stalled because of this stupid policy. I am concerned that as we speak of major events, like the World Cup, like the Olympics, we are not ready to meet the demands of these events if we have not been able to meet the lesser demands of previous events. So, Mr. Nelson, it is my understanding that DHS owes Maryland nearly $1 billion in disaster-related expenses, including for costs that the Federal Government approved years ago. Can you describe the types of projects currently stalled because of the delays? Mr. Nelson. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question because there has been an extreme delay. What this also is causing is not just for these projects to be completed, similar to as they are in Puerto Rico, where we've had projects that are started, but we are uncertain if we'll be able to continue them because of the policy of the $100,000, but it's also the local time that these employees are investing into trying to manage these projects. Those are a lot of the same employees who are dedicated to special event planning and doing other emergency management activities that are now bogged down with the administrative--just administrative burden of trying to manage this unpredictable nature. Mr. Hernandez. Can you speak to how the time line for disbursement has changed since this new policy was implemented? Mr. Nelson. Certainly. Well, there--I think it's fair to say that we don't know what the time line is. There's consistent holds that are put for administrative review and there's no real certainty on when the funds would be released. So we're still trying to rectify, you know, 2025 and 2024 funds. The future is really uncertain if we don't even know when those funds will be released. For example, we're on a deadline to accept awards by the end of 27 February. However, those funds haven't been released, so we don't even know how can we accept them if there's an administrative hold? It gives us a very tight window by which we can do anything if we're not even notified in time to react. Mr. Hernandez. So if another major disaster were to strike tomorrow in Maryland, would your State be in a weaker position because of these funding delays? Mr. Nelson. Maryland will always lean in and take care of their people first. The Governor is committed to doing that. However, it has greatly changed our posture and put more stress on our local governments and our State budget of trying to always put public safety first and ensuring that. But other critical programs will likely have to sacrifice as a result. Mr. Hernandez. So by extension, other States, commonwealths, and territories would also face, due to these policies, more strains, more risks, more adversity in accessing disaster funding and prevention capabilities? Mr. Nelson. Maryland also realizes that we're in a position where we often lend assistance to other States and territories in a time of need. We'll be less positioned to do that because of decreasing capabilities and personnel. So it doesn't just impact Maryland. It impacts our ability to support other States and the regions because of our limited capability and needing to maximize our resources. Mr. Hernandez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina, Mrs. Biggs, for 5 minutes of questions. Ms. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. This year, it is a special year for the United States. Between the America 250 celebration and the FIFA World Cup, our country will host over 70 major events across more than a dozen States. Each event will need varying levels of security with millions of Americans and foreign tourists and athletes traveling around the country. As we go into an eventful year, we must contend with a new potential avenue for threats, which is drones, which we have already talked about a little bit. The 2026 NDAA expanded the drone mitigation, and the counter-UAS authority is given to State and local authorities. I know we talked a little bit with my friend from Alabama about the training and what is going to be required and even with technology. But I would like to hear a little bit more on how you think the Federal, State, and local authorities will work together to mitigate those threats of drones to the major events in dozens of cities across the United States. Is there any way that counter-UAS authorities could be improved for quicker and more efficient response to threats? I will leave that open to anyone who wants to respond. Mr. Nelson. If I may start, Mrs. Biggs. The area that we're currently in, the national capital region, has the most complex air space of anywhere in the country. So the ability for us to deal with countering UAS is extremely important. However, I would just say that in addition to the capabilities, which has been--it's been great and moving at a great pace. However, we need to ensure that the plans and procedures are there and the network of which we're sharing information about the threats and our policies. During the Army-Navy game in Baltimore just this past December, there were several occasions where different Federal agencies were mitigating drones. We're not properly communicating that with our State and local partners to know what other risks may be at play. So I would just again highlight the importance of good planning and coordination between all levels in addition to training and capabilities. Mr. Mabin. I'll echo that. We have a wonderful working relationship with our Federal partners in Kansas City. So one aspect is to detect, identify, mitigate, but we also have to have boots on the ground to go to interdict the operators. So we're working to train together so that we're ready and prepared for a World Cup. Mr. Sena. For the last few years, across the world, people have been expanding drone capabilities to implement attacks. At the same time, we've been fighting to get those resources at the State and local level. Now that we finally have the authorities to implement, now it's getting the training and technology in place. The problem is that we have to defend large perimeters, large areas that need coverage, not just the game day facility, but the practice fields, the fan fest areas, the official ones, and the unofficial ones. How do we cover all those places with mitigation technology? It's very difficult because we're way behind. I feel that, you know, if we had been having this conversation 2 years ago, we'd be in better shape. But today as we're approaching these games, we're nowhere near the capability we need. But we continue to have to press forward with the technology and the training and getting it out to the largest group of people possible from the law enforcement side so we can cover all those simultaneous events that you were talking about that are spread across a huge geographical area. It's something that we have not dealt with in a long time to cover this much area in such a very short period of time with limited resources. Ms. Biggs. If there is one thing that you could ask Congress to step in and help with right now, what would that be to help you be prepared? Mr. Sena. That prioritization of funding to train the personnel and get them to that training site. We need that immediately. Mr. Mabin. The release of the FIFA funding would be critical for our staffing and our mutual aid partners to come in and assist because we just don't have enough officers within my own department to cover down on all the threats. But we're going to be relying on those mutual aid partners and connections. Mr. Nelson. Yes to both their comments. In addition to the personnel that are working on these plans and coordination are the same limited personnel that are doing the other special event planning and that are also--many of their salaries are contingent on the funds that have not been released. So we are at a pivotal time where we may not just lose that capability, but the block from Jenga is about to cause the whole thing to come down. Ms. Biggs. Well, thank you so much for the work that you do. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Mr. Martinez, look like you might be about to say something. Did you want to just say anything? Mr. Martinez. No, I just like to echo what the other witnesses stated. You know, the release of the funds that have already been approved is absolutely critical. Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Evans, for 5 minutes. Mr. Evans. Thank you, Chairman, and, of course, our Ranking Member, for this important hearing. Want to thank the witnesses for being here today and for all of your on-going work and everything that you do to keep our Nation and our communities safe. We are, unfortunately, all aware right now that we are in a partial Government shutdown because my Democrat colleagues want to hold the Federal Government hostage and hold that funding hostage for vital national security and law enforcement agencies. Just in case we need a reminder, ICE has already been funded under provisions we secured last year in the Working Families Tax Cut. By refusing to pass the DHS funding bill, ICE isn't being defunded. What is being defunded is FEMA and TSA and the Coast Guard and FLETC, Federal Police Academy, and multiple other safety measures that are absolutely necessary ahead of massive events like the World Cup. In my home State of Colorado, let's talk about FEMA. There have been historically low amounts of snowfall this winter, which sets us up for a very dry season accompanied by very high wildfire risk. FEMA support is absolutely vital to the safety of my constituents, even before a wildfire begins. I know this because I served in the U.S. Army and the Colorado Army National Guard for 12 years. I was a Black Hawk helicopter pilot. I have flown on, dropped water on, and commanded National Guard soldiers assigned to fighting type 1, so national priority, incidents in the State of Colorado. To prepare for that, we would always do, typically in April, a pre-operation planning conference just to make sure everybody is on the same page. Multiple different agencies, you know, 15, 20 agencies, Federal, State, and local, are on the same page to support and strengthen that collaboration in preparation for the wildfire season ahead. Without adequate funding for DHS, for agencies like FEMA, this interagency coordination is jeopardized and more communities, more lives are at risk, to say nothing of the environmental damage that happens if we can't respond to things like wildfires. In addition to being in the National Guard, Mr. Mabin, my first question will be to you, I was also a local cop for 10 years, city of Arvada, first ring suburb, just to the northwest of Denver, which is another major city's agency. So I wanted to ask you about, from your perspective, working for a major cities but local government agency, what lapses in funding are you seeing as a host city for the World Cup? What information and what resources and capabilities do you see potentially lacking to close any information sharing or other planning gaps as you prepare to be a host city? Mr. Mabin. As far as information sharing, we are seeing, you know, the regional Kansas City Fusion Center is our major intelligence-sharing hub and we haven't seen any lapses with regard to that. The information is flowing. We're sharing with our Federal partners, our other State and local partners. We chip in and help each other to cover down on those kind of incidents. But just more broadly, we do need to see a release of the FIFA funds so that we can get staffing for officers. Because when it comes to the end of the day, we need X-number of officers in these point positions, control positions, to execute our planning for World Cup. Mr. Evans. Thank you. So, again, I was a cop for 10 years and so I kind-of know how to read between the lines. So when you say ``chip in and help each other,'' that makes it sound like there is probably some Band-Aids that are being applied. Obviously, we are in an open forum here. We don't want to forecast any mission-critical shortfalls. People would be surprised to know how many cops I often didn't have when I was trying to keep a city of 125,000 people peaceable and getting along. So I appreciate you commenting about chipping in and helping each other and the implications that go along with that. I am also glad to hear you talk about fusion centers. My next question will be to Mr. Sena. Again, I mentioned 12 years in the National Guard, Black Hawk helicopter pilot. So rotary wing, low-level aviation operations, things like drones, counter-drone technology, super important to me both as a rotary wing aviator, also a police officer, and everything that happens typically between 0 and 3,000 feet AGL. So here, in my remaining about 30 seconds here, can you just comment on what is needed in this information-sharing space to be able to effectively counter the emerging UAS threat? Mr. Sena. The detection equipment, the personnel in place, the threat liaison officers to get the information out there on suspicious activity reporting. We need tips and leads. That Central California Intelligence Center threat to the Super Bowl that we received regarding drones, it's tips and leads. That's the bottom line. So we need people that can do the outreach, we need people that can do the training. We also have field intelligence team members that are out there on the ground looking for those threats and working with teams to mitigate them as quickly as possible. Without the funding, without the resources, those teams aren't there, those analysts aren't there, those tips and lead processes are not there. Mr. Evans. I think as we have seen, this is a game-changing threat that we need to be able to counter. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Alford. Well, thank you, Chairman Garbarino, for allowing me to waive on to this important hearing today. Kansas City is proud to serve, as you all know, as one of the host cities of the World Cup in Missouri's 4th Congressional District. Across the Kansas City region, local, State, and Federal partners have been working diligently to prepare for the influx of visitors and the complex security environment that comes with an event like this. That is why today's hearing is so important. Strong, timely intelligence sharing between Federal, State, and local and Tribal territories and private-sector partners is essential for preventing threats, managing crowds, and ensuring public safety. When that information flow works well, it enhances situational awareness and allows our local law enforcement to act quickly and confidently. I am particularly interested in ensuring that host cities like Kansas City are receiving the support, intelligence, and resources they need to execute security missions effectively. Deputy Chief Mabin, good to see you here in the swamp. Mr. Mabin. Thank you. Mr. Alford. Yes. Thank you for appearing before this committee today. The funding is not coming through from the Federal Government due to the hold-up. What does that mean to Kansas City? Because the Kansas City budget is in trouble as it is. In fact, Chief Stacey Graves, who has done a wonderful job of managing the great Kansas City Missouri Police Department, is now having to cut costs severely to ensure just basic services. How is this hold-up in funding affecting our plans to keep Americans safe in Kansas City this summer? Mr. Mabin. We began planning, full-time planning, for this probably 2 years ago. We've taken into account multiple different contingencies. We have planning at the stadium, at the different hotel venues, at the fan fest, equipment, intelligence, and just operationally. As we have those plans in place, if we do not have people to execute those plans, then those plans are ineffective. So right now we're in a critical stage where we need those funds committed and released so that our mutual aid partners have assurances and they can come in and assist us with just boots on the ground for those plans. Mr. Alford. For those who don't know, Kansas City is in the heart of America, Heart of Missouri, Heart of America. It sits at the intersection of I-49 and I-70, which before now was already a hub for human trafficking. I know that is a huge concern for your department and those also dealing with the safety talk about that. Mr. Mabin. We are aware that on major sporting events it's also always a concern of human trafficking. So we're trying to get that message out to our local partners. We're working with hotels and the airport to recognize signs of human trafficking. We've trained our officers to recognize signs and to be able to respond and get folks resources. We're also working with the FBI on task forces so we can combat human trafficking. It is a major concern and that--it features heavily in our plans for the World Cup. Mr. Alford. Of course, the border is shut down a lot better than it was under President Biden, but fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine are still big issues in the Kansas City region. Mr. Mabin. Yes, they are as they are with other large cities. So we work closely with our Federal partners on task forces to combat drug trafficking organizations, human trafficking, and other violent criminal organizations. Mr. Alford. Well, Deputy Chief, thank you again for being here. To all of our partners in Kansas City, thank you as well. It is going to be a fabulous turnout. We are expecting some 600,000 people to converge on Kansas City for this, to show off Kansas City once again. I will say to the Democrats out there listening now, we have fully funded ICE through the One Big Beautiful Bill, so that fight is not a good fight for you to take up right now. What you are putting in jeopardy is the safety of American citizens that rely on FEMA, that rely on the Coast Guard, that rely on the Secret Service, that rely on cybersecurity to keep us safe in America. It is time to end the partial shutdown led by the Democrats. With that, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I want to thank the witnesses all for traveling here today. One thing clear, got to get you all the money. So that is our job. So thank you all again for being here. I want to--I have additional questions that I will be submitting in writing and the Members of the committee may have some additional questions for you. We would ask that you all respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] [all]