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- EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTHCARE, BENEFITS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ MARCH 22, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-33 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://oversight.house.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 27-116 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Jason Chaffetz, Utah, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Peter Welch, Vermont Steve Russell, Oklahoma Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Mark DeSaulnier, California Will Hurd, Texas John Sarbanes, Maryland Gary J. Palmer, Alabama James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Jonathan Skladany, Staff Director Rebecca Edgar, Deputy Staff Director William McKenna, General Counsel Natalie Turner, Counsel Kiley Bidelman, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on HealthCare, Benefits, and Administrative Rules Jim Jordan, Ohio, Chairman Mark Walker, North Carolina, Vice Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois, Chair Ranking Minority Member Darrell E. Issa, California Jim Cooper, Tennessee Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Columbia Mark Meadows, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Paul Mitchell, Michigan Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on March 22, 2017................................... 1 WITNESSES Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration Oral Statement............................................... 5 Written Statement............................................ 7 Mr. Bruce Leicher, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Testifying on Behalf of the Association for Accessible Medicines Oral Statement............................................... 12 Written Statement............................................ 14 Gerard Anderson, Ph.D., Director, Center for Hospital Finance and Management, and Professor, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Oral Statement............................................... 25 Written Statement............................................ 27 Mr. David Mitchell, President and Founder, Patients for Affordable Drugs Oral Statement............................................... 33 Written Statement............................................ 35 APPENDIX Questions for the Record for Dr. Janet Woodcock, submitted by Ms. Plaskett and Mr. Welch......................................... 52 EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN ---------- Wednesday, March 22, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Health Care, Benefits, and Administrative Rules Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Jordan [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Jordan, Walker, Grothman, Mitchell, Krishnamoorthi, Kelly, Watson Coleman, and Plaskett. Also Present: Representatives Cummings and Welch. Mr. Jordan. The Subcommittee on Health Care, Benefits, and Administrative Rules will come to order. And without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recess at any time. And I ask unanimous consent that all members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform be allowed to participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. I want to do a brief opening statement and then our ranking member will do his opening comments as well, and then we'll get right to it. I do want to thank our witnesses for being here, especially the FDA. I know you've testified a number of times in a very short period of time. So we do appreciate, Doctor, you being with us, and all of our witnesses being with us today. The nature of this week is kind of hectic around here, so we will try to get your testimony and maybe a few questions. But it's an important subject and I don't want to shortchange it, but I just want to kind of give you some context as you all know what's going on here on Capitol Hill this week. The subject of today's hearing affects Americans across the country: The rising costs of all patent drugs that lack generic competition. To facilitate competition in the pharmaceutical market, the Hatch-Waxman Act created an accelerated pathway for approving generics, while maintaining incentives for companies to invest in developing new innovative products. Hatch-Waxman continues to promote the development of low-cost generics. According to a recent report, generics are only 27 percent of the total drug costs in the United States, yet fill 89 percent of prescriptions. Last year, however, we saw that there are some medicines with increasing prices, and even though those medicines are not protected by remaining patent life or regulatory exclusivity, they lack lower-cost generic equivalents. The big one, of course, was Turing Pharmaceuticals. Turing acquired the drug Daraprim and quickly increased the price about 5,000 percent from $13 a pill to over $750. Even though the FDA approved Daraprim in 1953, over 60 years ago, there remains no cheap generics for competition of this particular pharmaceutical. What is not as well known as the exorbitant price is the manipulation of the regulatory framework. Not only did Turing increase the price of Daraprim, but the company also adopted a strategy to block generic competition, thereby frustrating the intent of the law. Strategy is simple. Generic manufacturers are generally not required to submit full clinical trial data to establish safety and efficacy, they instead rely on FDA's previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved medicine. For the generic applications, generic manufacturers obtains samples of the approved medicine and demonstrates their product as bioequivalent to that approved product. Simple enough. But then enter bad actors. Turing thwarted the generic competition by blocking generic companies access to samples of Turing's pricey product, inhibiting generic manufacturers from conducting the bioequivalence testing for the generic application. Indeed, Turing testified--Turing testified admitting to this blocking strategy to try and block the generic competitor for at least 3 years. Companies should not be able to use the system to block generic competition. Such abuse is leading to debilitating drug costs. At the same time, however, distribution restrictions oftentimes serve important purposes, such as ensuring the safe use and distribution of medicines with heightened safety concerns. In 2007, Congress gave the FDA authority to order risk evaluation and mitigation strategies, programs for medicines with heightened safety concerns. REMS, this REMS program ensured that the benefits of medicine with a known or potential safety concern outweigh the risk of the medicine. FDA can mandate that certain distribution restrictions are part of the REMS program. This hearing will distinguish between the good actors and those companies like Turing that self-imposed restricted distributions for medicines with no apparent reason other than to block the competition. The panelists today will help us examine the scope of the misuse of this restricted distribution system to block generic competition and help to identify solutions. This Congress needs to find a way to help the FDA spur the interest of generic competition into the market. This hearing is designed to help us move towards that goal. Finally, I'd like to thank our ranking member for his interest in this issue. There's a good chance that we aren't going to agree always on what may be the solution, but I am pleased that our staffs have been able to work together on this issue so well. And with that, I would like to recognize Mr. Krishnamoorthi for his opening statements. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing today. And thank you to our witnesses for taking time out of your precious schedules to be here as well. The topic of today's hearing is restricted distribution systems in the prescription drug market. This is a very important issue. When drug companies use restricted distribution systems and other anticompetitive practices to prevent potential generic competitors from coming onto the market, they drive up prices and impose added costs on our healthcare system. Even more importantly, these anticompetitive practices harm patients. One such patient is here to testify today. David Mitchell has multiple myeloma, an incurable blood cancer. For over 5 years, Mr. Mitchell took the drug Revlimid, which is made by Celgene. Celgene has come under fire for using a restricted distribution system to prevent generic competitors from getting access to the drug samples they would need to bring a generic version of Revlimid to market. As Mr. Mitchell will testify, over the 5 years he took Revlimid, his copays increased by 500 percent. During this period, Celgene's revenues from Revlimid also steadily increased, without facing any competition from generics, from $2.5 billion in 2010 to almost $6 billion in 2015. This was an increase of 132 percent. Given these figures, it's no wonder that some drug companies take extraordinary steps to prevent potential generic competition. But it is important to acknowledge that the challenges we face in the prescription drug market go beyond just restricted distribution systems. For instance, we are seeing incredible price increases for decade's old drugs. Most recently, Kaleo pharmaceuticals increased the price of its autoinjector version of naloxone, a lifesaving drug first approved in 1971 to reverse opioid overdoses, from $690 in 2014 to $4,500. The opioid epidemic is ravaging my home State of Illinois, as it is many parts of the country. It is wrong for a drug company to raise the price of a lifesaving overdose antidote by more than 500 percent in a span of just 2 years. That's 500 percent in the span of 2 years. And although we absolutely rely on new breakthrough therapies to treat the most challenging diseases, new drugs are being introduced at higher and higher prices that our healthcare system simply cannot support. Some of these drugs are true clinical breakthroughs, but others add little clinical value over drugs that are already on the market. Lifesaving treatments only save lives when people can afford them. According to a 2014 survey, one in five Americans did not fill a prescription because they could not afford it. Prescription drug prices affect all of our constituents. This is an issue they desperately want us to address. And I am so thankful that Mr. Jordan, Congressman Jordan, has agreed to do this bipartisan hearing on prescription drug pricing. In fact, a recent Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 60 percent of Americans, including a majority of Republicans, think lowering prescription drug prices should be a top priority for President Trump and for Congress. And I'm glad President Trump has actually made this a priority for his administration. According to this poll, more Americans want us to deal with rising prescription drug prices than repeal the ACA. Of course, we do not want to stifle innovation. We want drug companies to be able to earn a fair profit that allows them to recoup their research and development costs and invest in the next cure. But no company should be able to misuse public safety regulations to stifle competition and secure a monopoly advantage. I hope today's hearing will allow us to begin a constructive conversation about what we can do legislatively, in a bipartisan way, to a handle on runaway prescription drug prices. Discovering a lifesaving drug is complicated, but lowering prescription drug prices is not. We know what the tools are. Among them are promoting generic competition in the market, increasing transparency in the pharmaceutical chain, and letting Medicare negotiate for a better deal on drugs. Congress has only to remove the legal hurdles to lower prices. I look forward to today's discussion. I hope, with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, to address this issue on behalf of our constituents. Mr. Chairman, I just want to do one last thing, which is I would like to allow Mr. Welch on my side 1 minute to talk about a bipartisan bill that is directly relevant to today's hearing. Mr. Jordan. Only for the gentleman from Vermont would we make such--no, we're glad to do that. We're glad to do that. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Welch. Well, thank you very much. And I really want to associate myself with your statement. And, Mr. Jordan, it's great you're doing this hearing. If we can bring down the cost of prescription drugs, we've got to do it. I've got a REMS bill with Steve Stivers, and I think that's going to help in one of the areas that would allow us to make certain that we're not abusing a review process for the advantage of higher prices at the expense of consumers. I also had a chance to meet with President Trump with Elijah Cummings. And it was very clear to me that he gets it that Americans are paying more than we should be paying. And it's not about getting in the way of research and development. You know, drug companies do good things. They create life- extending and pain-relieving drugs. That is a good, good thing, but they can't kill us with the cost. And there are a lot of market failures, I think we get specific on this REMS being one of them, and work together to get the benefit of fair and accessible drug prices for all of our constituents. That's the goal. So thank you both for allowing me to wave on to this hearing, and I look forward to working with you to get some things done. Mr. Jordan. Without objection, we'll let Mr. Welch be a part of the hearing. And I want to thank the ranking member and Mr. Welch for their statements. Let's get right to our witnesses. The committee will hold open the record for 5 legislative days for any other members who would like to submit a written statement. We want to recognize our witnesses. First, we have Dr. Janet Woodcock from the FDA. We appreciate you being here. As I said, I know you've testified several times in the last few days. Mr. Bruce Leicher. Mr. Leicher. Leicher. Mr. Jordan. I appreciate you being here. Senior vice president and general counsel for Momenta Pharmaceuticals, testifying on behalf of the Association for Accessible Medicines. And we have Dr. Anderson, director of the Center for Hospital and Finance and Management, as well as professor at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. And Mr. David Mitchell, president and founder of Patients for Affordable Drugs. Welcome again to you all. And pursuant to committee rules, we actually swear you in. So if you stand up and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? All right. Let the record show that everyone answered in the affirmative. And we will start with the gentlelady on my left. Dr. Woodcock, you're recognized. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF JANET WOODCOCK, M.D. Dr. Woodcock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members. I'm really pleased to testify at this hearing on a very important issue. But first, I'd like to note for the record that appearing on this panel does not waive the Administration's policy of not appearing concurrent with nongovernment witness, nor the Administration's policy of not appearing with less than 2 week's prior notice. I am appearing in the spirit of accommodation and comity. Mr. Jordan. Thank you. Ms. Woodcock. Yes. So to move to the topic at hand, the generic drug program that we operate at FDA has been highly successful. Its estimated savings to consumers has been about $1.5 trillion in a decade. And as you said, about 90 percent of prescriptions in the United States now are generic, at much lower cost obviously than the innovators. However, sometimes the benefits to patients are delayed beyond the legal constraints of patent or exclusivity. Innovators may use various routes or maneuvers to delay availability of a competitor generic. And among these, although there are many others, but among these is the use of REMS or a voluntary restricted program that is set up by the manufacturer, not required by FDA, to keep competitors from getting access to the drug. Specifically, most generic applicants need a relatively small quantity of brand drug to use as a comparator when they do what's called bioequivalence testing to make sure the generic is absorbed into the body the same way that the brand drug is. And, of course, anyone who gets filled a generic instead of the brand they prescribed, we're guaranteeing to them it's going to have the same effects. So we want them tested to make sure they're absorbed correctly. And some innovators have been refusing to provide drug for this bioequivalence testing. For REMS, which certain restricted distribution requirements set up by the FDA for safety reasons, what FDA has done to try and mitigate this is have procedures to review the generic drug bioequivalence protocol and notify the innovator drug in writing that we believe it is adequate and that the REMS restriction does not apply. So to remove that barrier and get us out of the way. Of course, that doesn't really occur for the voluntary restricted programs because there is no barrier to simply providing that in the open market. In that case, no letter is needed. Nevertheless, sponsors do continue to withhold products. We've had around 150 inquiries from generic firms about difficulties that they have had obtaining product for bioequivalence testing. And I really would be happy to answer any questions you might have about this. [Prepared statement of Dr. Woodcock follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Dr. Woodcock. We go now to Mr. Leicher. STATEMENT OF BRUCE LEICHER Mr. Leicher. Good afternoon, Chairman Jordan and Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing. I'm Bruce Leicher, senior vice president and general counsel of Momenta Pharmaceuticals, and chair of the board of the Biosimilars Council, a division of the Association for Accessible Medicines. We commend you for holding today's hearing. Increasingly, patient access to affordable medicines is prevented by certain brand drug manufacturers' use of restricted distribution programs, including FDA-mandated risk evaluation mitigation strategies, REMS, to limit generic and biosimilar development. Having worked in the biotechnology industry for over 25 years and the biosimilars industry since its inception, I'm concerned. These anticompetitive practices are contrary to the careful balance of the Hatch-Waxman and biosimilar laws and threaten generic competition from the emerging biosimilars market. For over 30 years, generic companies have safely purchased branded drugs on the free market to conduct testing necessary for FDA approval. But in recent years, certain brands have used restricted distribution schemes, including REMS, to block such purchase and testing. If brand products cannot be purchased, then affordable generic drugs and biosimilars cannot be developed. Momenta and the generic and biosimilar industry are committed to ensuring that Americans have access to safe, effective, and affordable medicine. We do not support policies that would endanger patients. We comply with the same rules administered by the FDA. Generic medicines are almost 90 percent of prescriptions dispensed in this country, yet account for less than 30 percent of drug spending. Generic drugs save hundreds of billions of dollars annually, $1.46 trillion in the last decade alone. And biosimilars present the same opportunity. Consider that branded specialty medicines are only 1 percent of all prescriptions, but more than 30 percent of total pharmaceutical spending. Their utilization is only expected to increase, making the competition promised by biosimilars even more important to patients and to taxpayers. The high price of many new biologics will only incentivize further abuse of these arrangements, if they continue, and create excessive spending for the healthcare system. The FDA recently reported that over 64 biosimilar programs are under review for over 23 different brand biologics. Momenta alone has seven biosimilar development programs, and that's required us to more than double the size of our workforce. Various studies estimate savings for American taxpayers and patients between $42 billion to as much as $250 billion over the first 10 years following biosimilar market formation. But if we're not able to access the product for development, this can't happen. These brand restrictions take the form of self-imposed restricted distribution schemes with wholesalers or specialty pharmacies that mimic FDA REMS programs, hiding behind the veneer of patient safety. For instance, when we've sought to purchase brand products from customary wholesalers in the supply chain, we're now asked if we're conducting generic or biosimilar studies. On multiple occasions, they inform us that their contract prohibits them from selling the brand product to us for that purpose. Ironically, when we attempt to purchase the same product for use in a comparative novel drug development program, where far less is known about product safety, we don't encounter these refusals. It's clear that this has nothing to do with safety, but everything to do with preventing competition. As a result, in our company's development decision-making process, we're now forced to consider how difficult it will be to obtain the brand product. In cases where access is restricted, we have not initiated some programs. Uncertain litigation is often the only remedy available, and some large companies with the necessary resources have been suing over access for years. However, litigation is too costly and time consuming for companies like Momenta. The bottom line is simple: A generic or biosimilar manufacturer is prevented from obtaining the brand drug, is unable to perform the required FDA testing, and patients will miss out on generic and biosimilars savings and access. These barriers to competition need to be removed and customary access restored. Mr. Chairman, the House is currently considering legislation that would study these abuses further, but I believe there's no need for further study. My written statement mentions law firms promoting the use of these programs as a tool for profitability. Almost 5 years ago, the Senate passed legislation that included language, at FDA's request, to address REMS abuse and it was removed in conference. The House has considered similar legislation, Mr. Welch's legislation, in the 113th and 114th Congress; will again this year. The FDA has testified about the problem repeatedly, most recently just yesterday before the Senate Health Committee, and Dr. Woodcock is here today, I can say now. Committees in both the House and Senate have discussed these abuses on numerous occasions. Some may tell you that this is too small of a problem to address legislatively, but the numbers and this hearing say otherwise. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated various reform proposals for saving billions of dollars for taxpayers. Experts and patient advocates have called for fixes to these abuses. A study will only further delay competition. It's time to act on legislation. And I would be pleased to answer any questions after the statements. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Leicher follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Walker. [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Leicher. Dr. Anderson. STATEMENT OF GERARD ANDERSON Mr. Anderson. Thank you. Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today. Today I'm presenting, and it's not as a member of the Johns Hopkins University, but as a faculty member of Johns Hopkins. So I'm not the corporate representative for Johns Hopkins. I'm working on the issue of drug pricing with a team of faculty at Johns Hopkins with funding from the Arnold Foundation from The Commonwealth Fund, and a variety of other entities. I don't receive any funding from the pharmaceutical industry, wholesalers, insurance companies, or any other entities involved in the pharmaceutical supply chain. Last December, I had the opportunity to testify at the Senate Aging Committee about the rapid increases in off-patent drugs. Your committee had similar hearings with Martin Shkreli and others. I made a number of very specific suggestions on how to deal with the issue of rapid increases and the prices of off-patent drugs. These ideas are in my written testimony, but they are basically expedited FDA reviews on allowing compounding importation in very, very restricted circumstances. At the time of our testimony, we really didn't understand exactly how Martin Shkreli and others were able to use limited distribution chains to stifle competition. It was only after the investigations of several congressional committees that we learned all the details of what they were able to do. Now, just a little bit of background. What happens in most cases is that the wholesaler takes the drugs from the manufacturer and brings them to the pharmacy or the hospital and they're given to patients. The wholesalers compete against each other, and as a result, the cost of distributing drugs is very low. As Dr. Woodcock said, the FDA created the REMS programs, which required pharmacies, wholesalers to take special precautions in--for very specific drugs. Now, this is totally appropriate and very good medical practice. Drugs are put into these limited distribution networks for safety reasons. In contrast, what we're hearing about today is companies that have put these drugs in limited distribution networks to stifle competition and raise drug prices. Safety is not their concern; it's profits. As we've already noted, a problem is that they prevent generic drug companies from creating the bioequivalents. Without access to the drugs, a competing drug company just cannot submit an application to the FDA to manufacture the drug. There are other concerns as well. The fact is that putting it into a limited distribution chain allows the drug company to find out very detailed information about who's taking that specific drug. Because there's only one distributor, it's possible to track every single patient using that drug. So patient confidentiality is very much compromised. There's other problems as well. Working at a hospital, what I know is for most drugs you can get the drugs 24/7. All the wholesalers make them available. But when there's a limited distribution chain, that may not be true because they may not be working 24/7. There is the lack of Federal guidance on when drugs can be put into one of these limited networks, if the decision is left to the pharmaceutical company, if it's not part of REMS. And they're doing it for financial, not safety reasons as in most cases. We at Johns Hopkins are assembling an inventory of drugs that are being dispensed in these limited distribution chains and the characteristics of them. We're looking at whether or not the price increases when they're put into a limited distribution network. And hopefully, in a couple of weeks, we'll be able to provide the committee some more information. So we have three policy recommendations for the committee to consider: The first one is what Congressman Welch essentially has proposed, which is to limit the drugs placed in limited distribution networks to only the REMS drugs. If the Congress doesn't think that this is appropriate, a second alternative is to require drug companies to sell their products to all competitors. And the third one is to have it announced when they're putting it into a REM--into a limited distribution network when they put an application into the FDA. For me, the main problem, besides the issue of access, is the issue of confidentiality. We're also looking at another alternative, and that's creating a nonprofit drug company to compete against these activities. So they would only focus on drugs where there are no competition, and they would only focus on where there's been very rapid price increases. The hospitals, everybody's getting clobbered by this, and we need an alternative. I'm happy to answer any questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Anderson follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Walker. Thank you, Dr. Anderson. Mr. Mitchell, we recognize you now for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF DAVID MITCHELL Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me here today. I'm David Mitchell. I'm founder of Patients for Affordable Drugs. We're a national organization focused exclusively on policies to lower prescription drug prices. To maintain our independence, we don't accept funding from any organizations that profit from the development and distribution of prescription drugs. We're about patients first, last, and always. More importantly, for the committee, I'm a relapsed cancer patient with multiple myeloma. It's an incurable blood disease. Drugs are keeping me alive, and because my cancer finds its way around drugs, I'm going to need new ones. So the importance of innovative, affordable drugs is not theoretical for me; it's literally life and death. I hope to watch my youngest son graduate from high school in 3 years, and to have one of my older kids give me a grandchild one day. I'm very grateful for the drugs produced by the science and research sector in our country. But lifesaving drugs have to come at prices that'll bankrupt patients and ruin the lives of people who are struggling to maintain their health. Yesterday, I sat in an infusion room for almost 5 hours and I received a two-drug combination that costs more than $26,000 a month. Prior to this drug regime, I took Revlimid, made by Celgene, for 5-1/5 years, and I participated in a risk evaluation and mitigation program. I obtain my drugs only from specific specialty pharmacies. And each month, I received counseling on the dangers of this drug and I participated in a survey designed to remind me of those dangers. The counseling consisted of a nurse reading a list of cautions to me. The survey was an automated phone call, press 1 for yes, 2 for no, and the whole process took 5 to 10 minutes. It could easily have been duplicated by any generic manufacturer. It wasn't rocket science. Of course, during the same period, Celgene was doing its best to delay generic versions of the drug by hiding behind its restricted distribution system and REMS, refusing to give samples to generic drugmakers. Here's what that meant for me: My out-of-pocket cost for Revlimid went from $42 a month in 2011 to $250 a month by the time I had to stop taking it last year because of side effects. As you can see from this invoice, the retail price for one 4-week cycle of Revlimid is $10,691, more than $500 per capsule. Now, I'm lucky. At the time, I had good employer-provided insurance. I'm on Medicare now. But Medicare beneficiaries aren't always so fortunate. They're paying thousands of dollars out of pocket every year. It is the most expensive out-of-pocket Medicare drug. Members of the committee, that's the impact of REMS abuse for real people, and it's a part of the problem with drug prices in America. Patients are foregoing their medications, they're spending their retirement funds and their kid's college savings when a generic competitor sits right around the corner. In 2016, Revlimid accounted for 62 percent of Celgene's revenue. Revlimid is key to propping up its stock price. It's clear to me that Celgene is gaming our system, or as the chairman said in his opening remarks, manipulating the regulatory framework. It's using bogus pretext of risk evaluation mitigation to unlawfully deny samples to generic manufacturers in order to prevent them from developing a cheaper alternative. It's blocking market competition. We need to reform the law and stop these abuses. But speeding generics to market will only address a fraction of the problem of high drug prices. The problem is that instead of a competitive free market for prescription drugs, we have a system of monopoly pricing by the drug companies through government policy. We have pharmacy benefit manager middlemen who process billions in drugs each year but who keep all their deals secret. As President Trump has said, and 82 percent of Americans agree, it's time to allow Medicare to negotiate prices for drugs on an open market instead of allowing drug companies to act as monopolies. I also believe that requiring transparency into PBMs and into prices set when a drug is invented using taxpayer funding would go a long way to making drugs more affordable. And we should set prices based on the value they deliver to patients. I'm extremely encouraged that members on both sides of the aisle are focusing on drug prices. In my experience, the most enduring legislative successes in our country have come with bipartisan action. Thank you for your attention. [Prepared statement of Mr. Mitchell follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Thank you all on the panel for being here today. I will at this time recognize myself for 5 minutes. I'd like to start with Mr.--is it Leicher? Is it the long A? Mr. Leicher. It's Leicher. Mr. Walker. Leicher. Okay. All right. I missed it in two areas then. Mr. Leicher, in 2014, the trade association representing generic manufacturers commissioned a study showing that the annual cost of misuse of restricted distribution systems to delay generic market entry was about $5.4 billion annually. The estimated cost to the Federal Government was $1.8 billion. In the past few years, has Momenta Pharmaceuticals encountered more difficulty accessing samples or have they encountered less difficulty? Could you answer that, please? Mr. Leicher. So we've encountered more difficulty accessing samples, because what I think has happened is companies have found that the law is not being enforced that exists today, and that the litigation that's been brought against them for engaging in these activities has been able to delay access. Mr. Walker. In your testimony, you said that at times when you have tried to purchase samples from wholesalers, they ask you if you are conducting generic or biosimilar studies. And when you respond yes, they tell you their contract prohibits them from selling samples to you. Do you then go to the manufacturer or try to obtain samples? And if so, how do they respond? Would you break that down, first? Mr. Leicher. Yes, I'd be happy to. So we would go to a wholesaler typically to buy the product. And for many products, we're able to buy the product, because there's just certain companies that are engaging in these practices. We have chosen to go and develop other products in cases where we haven't been able to purchase from the wholesaler, just because we had other options for development available given our size. It would be--we don't believe that we would have--we believe we would have ended up in protracted negotiations if we had gone to the manufacturer, based on our experience with talking to other companies. Mr. Walker. Just a couple more questions. Are these expensive products that have been off patent for a while? Mr. Leicher. These are all products that we designed in the development program to launch when the patents expire. That's the intent of the biosimilar law in Hatch-Waxman. You access the product near the end of the patent life to do the development, and then you prepare to launch at the time the patents are over. Mr. Walker. Okay. Well, I think it's pretty clear. I appreciate your articulation. I guess my last question would be how do we fix the problem? Mr. Leicher. Well, we think the best way to fix the problem is to--and there are proposals in terms of the FAST Generics Act and the CREATES Act in the Senate--is to recognize more explicitly that a condition of an FDA approval is a recognition that products will be sold on commercially reasonable terms to generic and biosimilar companies so that we can fulfill the promise of Hatch-Waxman and the promise of the biosimilar law. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Leicher. At this time, I'm going to yield 5 minutes to Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Are we getting closer? I know we're still working on that. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Pretty close. Mr. Walker. Okay. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Call me Raja. Mr. Mitchell, thank you again for appearing before the subcommittee and sharing your very personal experience with us. As we heard in your testimony, you've experienced rising prescription drug prices in a deeply personal way through your battle with cancer. You described your experience with one drug in particular, Revlimid, which is made by the drug company Celgene. Celgene has been accused of improperly using its restricted distribution systems to prevent would-be generic competitors from getting access to samples of Revlimid which they need to eventually get FDA approval. In fact, the FTC warned, in a 2014 amicus brief filed in a lawsuit against Celgene, quote, ``If a brand firm can effectively block generic firms from accessing brand product for bioequivalence testing, it may be able to continue to prevent generic competition, even after its patents on these products expire.'' So we're really talking about a time period after the patents expire. The FTC also warned that this practice could, quote, ``undermine the core principle of the patent system that patents have a limited duration.'' Mr. Mitchell, what does the prospect of generic competition mean to you as a patient? Mr. Mitchell. It means lower prices for drugs that will work just as well as the brand name drugs that are being given to me and other patients. Sticking with Revlimid, the Kaiser Family Foundation reports that the median out-of-pocket cost for a Medicare part D beneficiary on Revlimid is $11,500 a year. This is from a company that runs profits in the high 20s and paid its CEO almost $100 million over the last 3 years. So there's room there to lower the price and continue investment in R&D, produce a good return for investors, but lower the cost for patients for a drug that will work equally well. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Well, the interesting thing about what you said is that your out-of-pocket expenses are almost $12,000 a year. Think of what it's costing Medicare to provide these drugs to yourself. I mean, this is why Medicare is going to go bankrupt if we don't get control of these prescription drug prices. Mr. Mitchell. Well, and it's not only Medicare; it's employers---- Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Right. Mr. Mitchell. --who are trying to provide good health benefits to their employees. When they're confronted with rising costs like this, it becomes increasingly difficult to provide the benefits that people need at prices that they can afford. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Absolutely, you're right. It's going to bankrupt, you know, our healthcare system, these prescription drug prices rising as fast as they are. Dr. Anderson, I know you researched restricted distribution systems in-depth. In addition to blocking generic competition, how are these restricted distribution systems harmful to the drug market as a whole? Mr. Anderson. Well, essentially what they do for a patient perspective is that they gather all sorts of information about you when it's on one of these restricted--so they know exactly what Mr. Mitchell's circumstances are. So they have all the information they want to know about him. And you might think that is fine; I am actually very concerned about the privacy type of issues that are involved with this. And as a hospital, it's very difficult sometimes to access these drugs. Most drugs are available very easily when you need them. And, you know, Cardinal is coming to Johns Hopkins, one of the big wholesalers, every day with truckloads of drugs. But when you're on a limited distribution chain, you might not get it for several days. And if you need that drug on a Saturday, you might not get it. So there are patient safety issues in these concerns as well. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Dr. Anderson, can you estimate or do you have an idea, a ballpark estimate, of how many drugs are, you know, in this kind of bucket of drugs that are basically being--flowed through the restricted distribution systems in this kind of what I believe to be an anticompetitive fashion? Mr. Anderson. We don't know an exact number, but we think it's somewhere in the 150 to 250 range. And what we know is that the investment bankers know exactly who it is, and that's where the Martin Shkrelis and other people are looking for these kinds of things where there are no, in fact, competitors and they're going out and buying those particular activities. So it's a market opportunity for the investment banking community. Mr. Krishnamoorthi. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Walker. Thank you very much. We usually would rotate back to the gentleman from Wisconsin. Mr. Grothman, would you be okay if I yielded time to our overall ranking member on the committee? We'll come back to you after that and put you back into sequence. Mr. Grothman. Well, it depends who the overall ranking member is. Mr. Walker. It would be Mr. Elijah Cummings. Mr. Grothman. Well, sure. Mr. Walker. Mr. Cummings, you're recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the issue--and I want to thank the ranking member and you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. The issue of drug prices has been one of my top priorities for the past several years. As a matter of fact, just last week, Congressman Welch and I, along with the president of Johns Hopkins Hospital met with President Trump on this issue. And I appreciate that Chairman Chaffetz has worked with me in a bipartisan manner at the full committee level to address this issue, which affects all of our constituents. We all agree that innovation is key, especially when it comes to prescription drugs that save lives. We rely on drugs to help us fight disease, and we want pharmaceutical companies to develop the next cure. We also want them to make a reasonable profit. We also expect drug companies to make a profit. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry has been one of the most profitable industries in America. Mr. Mitchell, I thank you for your testimony. And I'm going to make sure that President Trump hears your testimony, because you're right. I mean, he gets it, he really does. And I think your testimony is jarring, because there are a lot of people that are going through what you're going through. And I thank God that you take your pain, turned it into a passion to do your purpose. To do your purpose. And I appreciate it. And I really mean that. But what have we seen year after year, investigation after investigation? Are drug companies exploiting the system and taking advantage of consumers like Mr. Mitchell, while making obscene profits at their expense? We've seen drug companies swoop into the market to buy old drugs and then jack up the price. Mr. Mitchell, Shkreli sat where you sat, where you're sitting right now, and he basically called us imbeciles because we wanted to make sure that the American people could afford drugs that would keep them alive, keep them healthy. And then he took the Fifth and then, you know, sashayed out of here. So going back, no R&D, no commitment to patients, just a cold, pricing strategy, designed to take advantage of a temporary monopoly. But one of the things that, I guess, bothers me with all of this, and when I look at you Mr. Mitchell, I--it bothers me that our country and certain industries, certain folks in the pharmaceutical industry don't mind something called collateral damage. In other words, people are unable to afford the drugs that they need. Why? Because of, in many instances, greed. Shkreli is a perfect example. I know everybody is not like Shkreli. I know that. But there are a lot of Mr. Mitchells. There are a lot of you. As a mater of fact, I just met some ladies getting off the elevator who had been in my office who told me that for a certain disease, they were here lobbying, they said for a certain disease, I can't remember which one, she said 3 years ago it cost $8,000 a year, now it's $85,000 a year. Come on now. We are a country that is better than that. And so we've obtained internal documents that exposes business strategy, and we have called drug company CEOs to come before the committee to justify their actions. But they never-- this is the thing that gets me, Mr. Mitchell. You know what? They come, they do a song and a dance, they do the rope-a-dope, they talk about all these drug programs that they have for discounts, they sashay their way out of here, get on their planes, and they never lower the prices. Collateral damage. People left to get sicker. People left to die. So we've seen this time and time again. And then they get upset when the stock prices go down. Oh, the stock prices--they make millions, while people are sitting right now, watching us, with chemo dripping through their veins, trying to figure out how they're going to survive--not only how they're going to survive, but how are they going to do their daily chores. So, again, I hope that we don't just come, have a hearing, and then move on, because there's too much at stake. With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence, and I yield back. Mr. Walker. Thank you to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. With that, we'll yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Glenn Grothman. Mr. Grothman. Thank you. I'm not sure which one I'll lead with. Maybe Mr. Leicher. I don't know if I got that right. Just in general, you know, there's a general perception out there, and I'm sure the government wouldn't do a very good job if they had to come up with these new drugs, but a general perception that, to me, both sometimes drugs are overprescribed and sometimes you wonder about the price. I don't think you guys have looked at financial statements, but, obviously, a drug company, like any company, has expenses. Some of those expenses are the literal production of the drug. Some of those expenses are the research and approval of the drug. Some of those expenses are sales and promotion of the drug. If somebody spends 10 bucks on a drug, do one of you folks give us a ballpark as to how much of that 10 bucks went into research, how much went into sales and marketing, how much went into administration, that sort of thing? Mr. Anderson. So if you were talking about a brand company, not a generic company, then it's about 17--$1.70 for what goes into R&D and about $2.50 that would go into marketing, about $2.50 would be profit. Very little would actually be manufacturing, and the rest would be a variety of other things. Mr. Grothman. You still have 33 percent to go. Do you want to take a crack at the other 33 percent? Mr. Anderson. Essentially--I'd have to come back to you on that. Mr. Grothman. Okay. Anybody else have a crack? Mr. Leicher. I'm not sure I can give better numbers than that. But what I would add to that is that from a generic and biosimilars business perspective where marketing is not a significant factor, and all the activities associated with commercialization are not a factor, that's what provides the opportunity for, in the generics business, up to an 80 percent reduction in price when there's multiple competitors entering the market when patents expire and, you know, estimates of, you know, initially, a 30 percent and perhaps more reduction of price for biosimilars. Mr. Grothman. And maybe you guys don't know. You say 25 percent is marketing. Do you know what that is compared to, say, the cell phone industry or the automotive industry? It doesn't have to be this high, but is it high? Mr. Anderson. It is higher than most other industries, but I couldn't give you an exact number for all of those. Mr. Grothman. Okay. We'll fire away with some of the other more expected questions. Dr. Anderson, what lessons have you learned from examining drug shortages that could be used to help address egregious situations like Turing? Mr. Anderson. So, essentially, what you see is generally a two-pronged approach. One is a shortage occurs and it's very hard to get access to a drug. And then following that, what you see is a fairly steep price increase. So they take advantage of when there's a shortage. Often, it is when there are two companies that are manufacturing a drug and one of them stops manufacturing that drug, either because it's not profitable for them to do so anymore or they run into some production problem, and therefore they can't manufacture it. And what we're seeing is a lot of mergers in the generic space. And those things are cutting down the amount of competition. And so you're seeing that as a third problem. Mr. Grothman. Okay. What can we do to encourage more competition among generics? Mr. Anderson. Well, essentially, what you need to do is to try to get them to--you've got to stop the mergers, is the first thing. And the second thing is to make it easier for them to--when there is no competition, to enter the market. And so that's why I proposed the expedited review by the FDA, which the FDA is starting to do now. So make it easier for a competitor to enter the market. Mr. Grothman. You said stop the mergers. Mr. Anderson. Yep. Mr. Grothman. It does--in all industries, compared to when I was a child, it seems like everything is mergered into a few industries, but how many major drug manufacturers are operating now in the United States? Like if there should be a market for a new pharmaceutical, how many drug companies are out there who have the ability to develop the generic and market it? Mr. Anderson. There are still a number, but what we saw last year is the number one generic firm acquired the number three generic firm in the United States. So we're seeing some mergers of very large generic companies occurring. Mr. Grothman. And when number one swallows number three, or vice versa, do you notice an increase in price? Mr. Anderson. Well, you don't notice an increase in where there are not competitive drugs. Mr. Grothman. I mean, what I'm saying is I assume sometimes if one swallows three, that there now is no competition. I guess that's what I'm trying to get at. Mr. Anderson. That's what I'm saying. You know, the generic industry works incredibly well when there are three, four competitors in the market. It looks less well when there are two, and it doesn't work at all when there's none. Mr. Grothman. Okay. I guess I'm well past my time. So thank you for the indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Grothman. At this time the chair yields 5 minutes to Ms. Kelly. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair and ranking member. Mr. Mitchell, thank you so much for joining us today and for your testimony. You represent the voice of many of our constituents on both sides of the aisle, that they are the financial burden that is the consequence of companies' anticompetitive behavior. And in your testimony, you stated that your prescription went up nearly 600 percent, in essence, doubled since 2011 when you stopped taking it due to side effects. And the company that manufactures Revlimid, Celgene, reported $1.6 billion in 2015, which accounted for 62 percent of that revenue Revlimid did. Mr., and I'm going to say, is it Leicher? Mr. Leicher. Leicher. Ms. Kelly. Leicher. Okay. Are you aware of any companies that have benefited in such a great manner from anticompetitive behavior, and how common is the practice? Mr. Leicher. I'm not sure we're experts on how common that practice is because it's not something we seek to engage in, certainly at my company. But we're aware of the scenarios that you've described, the Daraprim scenario, and the fact that they were using restricted access programs as a way to prevent competition. Those are largely what was just described, efforts by companies to purchase what may even be an old generic drug in a shortage situation rebranded and launched it as a branded product with a very high price often when the patents have expired. And what we see as the real solution here is to reduce the barriers to entry. And one of the big barriers to entry is what this hearing is all about, is if we can't obtain reference product from a brand company to test and develop a generic, we won't have generic or biosimilars to compete and actually use the most effective tool available, which is competitive competition to bring the prices down. Ms. Kelly. It's just amazing to me. Do they think that, you know, people aren't going to notice or not say anything? I know you're not a psychiatrist, I don't think you are, but I don't get it. Mr. Leicher. You know, it's amazing to me too, because what they're doing is they're waiting to see if they're going to lose the litigation. The larger companies--you know, that's what I mean by a barrier entry. We can't afford to litigate for 3 years to purchase some samples at a fair market value from a company and then start development 3 years from now. So they're using that delay of litigation to prevent us from entering that business. And, you know, it answers the question that was asked earlier, you know, what about all the mergers? Well, Momenta is an example. We're not the only one. We're an example of a company that's a new entrant into this business in the last 10 years. We're providing very significant competition. We developed generic enoxaparin, which was a very significant cost reduction in the country. We developed a generic version of Copaxone. We're working on seven biosimilar programs. But if we can't access the referenced product, none of that can happen. Ms. Kelly. So you see that as the main---- Mr. Leicher. We see that as--I've put that as number one on our list of barriers. Ms. Kelly. And what's two and three? And if anybody wants to join in. Mr. Leicher. Two and three? Ms. Kelly. If you have a two and three. Mr. Mitchell. Barriers to generic drugs or barriers to lowering prices? Ms. Kelly. Well, barriers to assess, and what are the barriers to lowering the prices? What can we do? What are best practices we can implement? What can we do to change this? Mr. Anderson. So, I mean, I guess we need a little more help from you in terms of we can do it in brand space, we can do it in the generic space. Those are very different spaces so---- Ms. Kelly. Well, I guess what can Congress do to help you? Mr. Anderson. Right. So one of the things about Revlimid and others is the whole issue of negotiation. What you heard was $11,000 in out-of-pocket expenditures for a Medicare beneficiary. If you're making $22,000 on Social Security, $11,000 is just prohibitive. What you've got to recognize is who's paying most of that cost. Eighty percent of the cost is paid for by the Medicare program. Medicare cannot negotiate those prices one little bit when it's paying 80 percent of the cost in the Medicare catastrophic amount. I helped design the Medicare Catastrophic bill. We did not anticipate drugs that cost $75,000 on it. It was designed to help the person who had multiple chronic conditions that was taking a lot of very inexpensive drugs, but a lot of them, and they would enter the catastrophic amount. The drug companies looked at this and said, oh, if I charge $80,000 for a drug that a Medicare beneficiary might take, Medicare is going to pay $64,000 of that. And the beneficiary will end up paying a fair amount too, and the PDP, the Medicare drug plan only pays 15 percent. So it wasn't designed for what's happening today. And this is something, you know, now 14 years later, we need to revise. Ms. Kelly. Thank you. I know my time has run out. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Ms. Kelly. At this time, we'll recognize Mr. Mitchell for 5 minutes. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Woodcock, can you please help me understand a few things here. Can you explain the role that the FDA currently plays in ensuring timely and full access to generic medications? Dr. Woodcock. FDA--what FDA does is approve--try to approve those generics at the time all patents expire and exclusivity expires. So as is already explained, the way the system is set up, people can file before that---- Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Right. Dr. Woodcock. --or do their development--not file an application, but do their development process, and then they can file and then they can get approved right at the time or even tentatively approved prior to, a little bit prior to, so they know they have a path to market. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. In the last year or two, can you share with the committee how many complaints you've received from generic manufacturers that they aren't able to access approved medications in order to proceed with research and production? Dr. Woodcock. Well, overall, we've received over 150 inquiries. And we don't--about their inability to access the reference listed drug, and that's in the generic space. We have not--we don't have it nailed down in the biosimilar space, which is a new program where---- Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. What's your distinction between an inquiry and a complaint? Dr. Woodcock. Oh, okay. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. I come from a very simple world here. Dr. Woodcock. Well, we wouldn't call--we hear about them, all right. And obviously, they're complaining. They inquire if we can get the drug somehow or something like that, and I've explained what we do. If there is a real FDA-imposed REMS program that actually restricts the drug, we have a way we go. We send a letter--after reviewing the protocol, we send a letter to the reference listed drug holder saying that it's safe to provide that drug and that the REMS doesn't apply. But that doesn't mean they're going to go and give the drug. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Why does it not mean they're going to give the drug? Dr. Woodcock. Because we don't have the authority to order them to do that. We simply are telling them that the REMS restrictions, which means they can't just give the drug out to anyone because of safety---- Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. I understood that. Dr. Woodcock. --doesn't apply in this situation, and that we have actually reviewed the generic protocol to make sure that it doesn't make any safety risks. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. So the FDA's position currently is, well, we'll waive REMS or--but if you--if the manufacturer of the brand name drug doesn't want to provide access, they're left to litigate. Is that the best answer that they have? Dr. Woodcock. We also have referred all these circumstances to the FTC. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. And what's happened at the FTC, for entertainment purposes? Dr. Woodcock. I do not know the answer to that. We can get back to you. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. I think the committee would be interested in that. Mr. Chair, can we request that information? Is that feasible? Anybody else want to weigh in on this question? It seems to me that we send them a letter, say, gee, it would be nice if you sent the medication. If they choose not to, you can, you know, gain yourself--bring on some attorneys and sue. Mr. Mitchell. I do know from preparing for the hearing, Mr. Mitchell, that the FTC has filed amicus briefs in cases, including the case involving Celgene and Revlimid, saying that Revlimid--Celgene's behavior is anticompetitive and arguing that the REMS' excuse is just that, a pretext. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. And how long has that--as an example, how long has that case been going on? Mr. Mitchell. I believe that case has been going on since 2014. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Any solutions side on that that you've seen, or we're still in appeals process? Mr. Mitchell. No, sir. I'm not a lawyer. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Well, neither am I, sir. Mr. Leicher. What I could add to that is the FDA has done an effective job in documenting that generic and biosimilar companies have the safety capability to handle these products when asked. But the FDA does not have authority to regulate competition among competitors, and that's really where the issue is. And that's where some of the statutes, you know, Mr. Welch's bill is directed, which is--goes to the core of what Hatch-Waxman said and what the biosimilars law said, which was that you need to have access to the reference product commercially. They don't give us samples. It's described as samples. We purchase them at full price. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Well, see, I don't see it as regulating the competitions. It's, in effect, allowing the sale of the drug that they would to any other party. Mr. Leicher. Exactly. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. It's not like they're trying to just provide the drug at the same retail price anybody else pays. Mr. Leicher. I stated it backwards. It's regulating the anticompetitive prevention. Mr. Mitchell of Michigan. Okay. Maybe that--okay. I'll yield back. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Welch, looks like they have called votes, but I believe we have time, not normally on the subcommittee, but we yield you 5 minutes for your questions. Thank you. Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. First of all, I want to thank Mr. Mitchell for his questions, because I think they really do go to the heart of the issue. It's not a safety issue; it's an anticompetitive issue. And ideally, we would have the drug made available for research and then the patent holder of the drug has the full benefit of that legal patent for the period of time of protection. So the patent holder here--and tell me if you disagree--is basically trying to extend the life of the patent, i.e., the monopoly beyond the legally protected timeframe. Is that correct? Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Mr. Anderson. Yes. Mr. Leicher. Yes. Mr. Welch. Well, that doesn't sound right. So, I mean, this is where there's some, I think, reason why there's some bipartisan support here, because I think most of us up here support competition, and we also oppose gaming the system. I mean, it's a very significant legal benefit to an owner of intellectual property, whether it's a patent--whether it's a pharmaceutical drug or something else, to get something that can only be given by law, and that is a period of exclusivity where, essentially, they have market dominance and are able to then profit on that company. And none of us here in this legislation are suggesting an attack on that scheme. But I think all of us in support of this legislation are opposed to gaming that. Mr. Mitchell, I want to just say, I agree with Elijah Cummings. And I want to say to all the witnesses, you don't know what a breath of fresh air it is to have folks coming in here that aren't asking for some special advantage and are trying to help us on a bipartisan basis understand what we can do public policywise to help a lot of Americans who just want to live their lives, but do need medication along the way. So this is like unusual for us, okay. And thank you. Dr. Anderson, could you just go through just the specifics again, because I think it's helpful for all of us to hear about it, about how the obstacles are put in the way of the generic companies to get the sample that they need in order to do the research required to then have Momenta put a generic drug on the market. Mr. Anderson. So it's pretty simple. You basically create, and most of these companies are creating their own specially distribution networks or they're working with some existing thing to do it, and then they're very much restricting access to these drugs. It's true both in the brand side, which Mr. Leicher has been talking about mostly, but it also turns in the off-patent activities as well, where this drug has been around for 50 years. But only in the case of Turing Pharmaceuticals, there's only about 5,000 of those drugs that are being distributed every year. So the company knows exactly who's buying it and can say, you know, Mr. Welch, you don't have that disease, you're not entitled to that drug, because then you can't give it to Mr. Leicher for him to make it. So, essentially, what they're doing is keeping that access to that drug and then they can't apply to Janet Woodcock. Mr. Welch. Okay. You mentioned the legislation. I'm a cosponsor with Mr. Stivers on the Republican side. Would that address, in your view, the issue that you're speaking about? Mr. Anderson. No, I think it very much would. I mean, it's a great piece of legislation, and I totally--I can't endorse it as a faculty member, but I think it makes complete sense. Mr. Welch. And I'll just ask you this: Congressman Cummings was talking to his new best friend, President Trump--I can't say that. But I was sitting there when President Trump was very enthusiastic about price negotiation. And the concern that I've heard from some opponents of negotiation authority for Medicare is that that would be the equivalent of price setting. And can you give me your reaction to that. Mr. Anderson. Well, essentially what you have, and especially in the Medicare program for these very expensive drugs, is Medicare is a silent partner paying 80 percent of the cost. So that makes absolutely no sense to me. So if I were to start in the price negotiation activity, it would be where Medicare is paying 80 percent of the cost and has no negotiating ability at all. You know, I think you could do broader than that, but I think if I had to start somewhere where I think there should be some level of bipartisan agreement on it, it should be where Medicare is paying 80 percent of the cost. Mr. Welch. Okay. I thank you, all. And I yield back. Mr. Walker. Thank you very much. With that, I'd like to thank certainly the FDA for showing up today, some last minute things, but we're grateful. In fact, Dr. Woodcock, Mr. Leicher, Dr. Anderson, especially you, Mr. Mitchell, for having the courage today to come and share your story. That's an honor for us to be part of listening to you and hearing you out, really the importance of why this is so much--important, really for all of us. So thank you all. I would ask unanimous consent that members have 5 legislative days to submit questions for the record. Without objection, so ordered. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]