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- FIVE YEARS LATER: A REVIEW OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT [House Hearing, 115 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] FIVE YEARS LATER: A REVIEW OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 1, 2017 __________ Serial No. 115-10 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Jason Chaffetz, Utah, Chairman John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Darrell E. Issa, California Ranking Minority Member Jim Jordan, Ohio Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Mark Sanford, South Carolina Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Justin Amash, Michigan Columbia Paul A. Gosar, Arizona Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Trey Gowdy, South Carolina Jim Cooper, Tennessee Blake Farenthold, Texas Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Robin L. Kelly, Illinois Thomas Massie, Kentucky Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Mark Meadows, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Ron DeSantis, Florida Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands Dennis A. Ross, Florida Val Butler Demings, Florida Mark Walker, North Carolina Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Rod Blum, Iowa Jamie Raskin, Maryland Jody B. Hice, Georgia Vacancy Steve Russell, Oklahoma Vacancy Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Vacancy Will Hurd, Texas Vacancy Gary J. Palmer, Alabama James Comer, Kentucky Paul Mitchell, Michigan Jonathan Skladany, Staff Director William McKenna, General Counsel Tristan leavitt, Senior Counsel Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Government Operations Mark Meadows, North Carolina, Chairman Jody B. Hice, Georgia, Vice Chair Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia, Jim Jordan, Ohio Ranking Minority Member Mark Sanford, South Carolina Carolyn B. Maloney, New York Thomas Massie, Kentucky Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Ron DeSantis, Florida Columbia Dennis A. Ross, Florida Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri Rod Blum, Iowa Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on February 1, 2017................................. 1 WITNESSES Mr. Robert P. Storch, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Chair, Whistleblower Ombudsman Working Group, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Oral Statement............................................... 5 Written Statement............................................ 8 Mr. Eric Bachman, Deputy Special Counsel for Litigation and Legal Affairs, Office of Special Counsel Oral Statement............................................... 12 Written Statement............................................ 14 Mr. Thomas M. Devine, Legal Director, Government Accountability Project Oral Statement............................................... 25 Written Statement............................................ 27 Ms. Elizabeth Hempowicz, Policy Counsel, Project on Government Oversight Oral Statement............................................... 50 Written Statement............................................ 52 APPENDIX Letter of January 26, 2017, to White House Counsel submitted by Ms. Watson Coleman............................................. 78 FIVE YEARS LATER: A REVIEW OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT ---------- Wednesday, February 1, 2017 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Meadows [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Meadows, Hice, Jordan, DeSantis, Ross, Blum, Connolly, Cummings, Maloney, Clay, Lawrence, and Watson Coleman. Mr. Ross. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on Government Operations will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. I will defer at this time to the ranking member of the subcommittee for an opening statement. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I know Mr. Meadows will be here shortly. Federal employees who blow the whistle on waste, fraud, and abuse are on the front lines in the effort to ensure that our government functions efficiently and effectively. This committee has a long history of strong bipartisan support for those whistleblowers, and I want to thank the chairman, Mr. Meadows, for holding today's hearing to examine how we can continue to improve protections for those employees. Whistleblower protection is rooted in civil service protections. Due process and merit-based hiring and promotion free of discrimination, retaliation, and political influence form the bedrock of the very whistleblower protections we are concerned about and have been for a long time on this committee and subcommittee. Five years ago, the bipartisan Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 significantly strengthened the rights of Federal employees who disclose waste, fraud, and abuse. This legislation marks substantial progress, but as we discovered, gaps remain, and we must continue to work to protect all Federal employees who disclose wrongdoing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about challenges to protecting those whistleblowers under current law, such as vacancies at the MSPB, loopholes for sensitive positions, retaliatory investigations, as well as proposals to address those challenges. In fact, tomorrow this committee, the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, will be marking up a bill that I cosponsored, H.R. 657, the Follow the Rules Act. Last year, a Federal court ruled that an employee who refused to obey an order is protected from retaliation only if that order violates a statute, which was never the intent of the law. This bill clarifies that the Whistleblower Protection Act, as originally intended, protects employees who refuse to violate a rule or a regulation. It need not be a statute. But legislative changes will not be enough. Congress must provide inspectors general and the Office of Special Counsel with the resources they need to investigate and enforce whistleblower protections under the law. For example, we've heard reports of egregious whistleblower retaliation at TSA. OSC has already taken action in some of those cases, but there is a backlog. Without additional resources, these whistleblowers won't be protected; in fact, one hears descriptions at TSA that sound like the Wild West. And a lot of cleanup has to occur there, not only whistleblowers but performance, measurements, and the like. Finally, we can't ignore the committee's oversight responsibility. I was alarmed to hear news reports last week, only days after the inauguration, that certain Federal agencies had issued gag orders on Federal employee communications. One memo issued by the acting secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services on the very first day in office of the new President states, and I quote, ``No correspondence to public officials, that is Members of Congress, governors and the like, unless specifically authorized by me or my designee shall be sent between now and December 3rd.'' That language, which ostensibly prevents an employee from speaking with Members of Congress on his own, appears to violate, however, a number of Federal laws, including the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act itself. And it certainly sends a chilling message to our Federal employees. So I plan to send a letter to agency heads asking them what steps they're taking to ensure that their communications to employees comply with the law. I ask my colleagues across the aisle to join in these oversight measures. It's my hope that moving forward we can work in a bipartisan manner, as we always have on this subject. We must ensure that civil service and due process protections, the bedrock of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, remain in place and are vigorously enforced, and we must provide diligent oversight to verify that agencies in this administration are implementing the protections required under the law. And with that, I yield back. Welcome, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman from Virginia. And I also thank the gentleman from Florida for gavelling us in, and certainly, thank each of you. My apologies for being tardy. The chair notes the presence of our colleagues from the full Committee of Oversight and Government Reform. We appreciate your interest in this topic and welcome your participation today. And so with that, I ask unanimous consent that all members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform be allowed to fully participate. Hearing no objection, so ordered. I'm going to go ahead in the interest of time and skip my opening statement and actually go with recognizing each of you, and let's hear from you on that. Mr. Connolly. Don't worry, Mr. Chairman, I pretty much--I spoke for both of us. Mr. Meadows. Oh, well, there's no doubt about that, knowing that we are attached to the hip. But so I would--we'll hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any member who would like to submit a written statement. Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, could I ask just a quick unanimous consent request. I have a statement from National Treasury Employees Union for the record. I ask unanimous consent it be entered into the record. Mr. Meadows. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend. Mr. Meadows. I'm pleased to welcome Mr. Robert Storch, deputy inspector general at the U.S. Department of Justice. Welcome; Mr. Eric Bachman, deputy special counsel for litigation and legal affairs at the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, welcome; Mr. Thomas Devine, legal director at the government accountability project; and Ms. Elizabeth Hempowicz, policy counsel at the project on government and oversight. Welcome to you, all. And pursuant to committee rules, we ask that all witnesses be sworn in before they testify. If you will please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? I do. Please let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate if you would please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. But, Mr. Storch, before I come to you, the chair recognizes the ranking member from the full committee, the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings, for an opening statement. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate your indulgence. I want that thank Chairman Meadows and Ranking Member Connolly for this hearing today. Whistleblower protections are built on the foundation of our civil service system and its due process protections. I look forward to the testimony today on how we can continue to strengthen whistleblower laws to ensure that all Federal employees who blow the whistle are protected. The topic of today's hearing is the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, and it could not be a more timely subject. I was an original cosponsor of this bill, which significantly expanded the protections available to government workers who risk their jobs to disclose wrongdoing. And we have had a number of them to come before us over my 21 years in this committee. Unfortunately, it appears that the Trump administration in its first week has already violated the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. Just last week, only days after President Trump's inauguration, we learned that Federal agencies issued gag orders on Federal employee communications, including their communications with Congress. For example, we have obtained one of these memos, which was issued by the new acting secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. This memo tries to prohibit Federal employees from speaking to Members of Congress. Let me repeat that: The Trump administration is trying to prohibit Federal employees from speaking to Members of Congress. Something is absolutely wrong with that picture. On its face, this memo violates the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act because it does not include mandatory language, that we in Congress required, to protect whistleblowers who want to report waste, fraud, or abuse. We required, and I quote, ``any disclosure policy, form, or agreement,'' end of quote, to include a mandatory statement that it does not supersede the rights of employees, including specifically, quote, ``communications with Congress,'' end of quote. And we passed this unanimously. Now, my understanding is that the Trump administration first tried to deny that memo was sent to its employees. Then they reportedly sent out some kind of clarifying statement. But my understanding is that even the clarifying statement still failed to include the mandatory statement we required in the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this committee--I ask this committee to seek and obtain all emails and other communications in the possessions of anyone at HHS relating to this directive, its drafting, circulation, and subsequent clarification, as well as any communications about prohibiting Federal employees from speaking to Congress. Will you join me in a letter to HHS and other agencies requesting those documents, Mr. Chairman? I'm just making a simple request, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. Would the gentleman from Maryland repeat his request? I'm sorry, I was otherwise engaged. That deer-in-the- headlight look was because I had no idea what you asked. Mr. Cummings. I apologize. I didn't mean to catch you off guard, Mr. Chairman. And you have been absolutely wonderful and a good bipartisan member, and I really appreciate it. But I didn't mean to--what I said, I asked this subcommittee to seek and obtain all the emails, and other communications in the possessions of anyone at HHS, relating to a directive in the drafting, and circulation, and subsequent clarification, as well as, any communications about prohibiting Federal employees from speaking to Members of Congress. I think that should be a no-brainer for most of us. Mr. Meadows. The gentleman knows very well that regardless of who is in the White House, that the chairman believes that having open communication between members of the Federal Government and Members of Congress is something that should not be inhibited. And so certainly, I'm open to following up and making sure that we get clarification, and hopefully on this, making sure that the message is loud and clear, that an open and transparent government is not only something that this committee supports but the administration supports as well. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. I really appreciate it. And I'm almost finished, Mr. Chairman. This is not the only action that the Trump administration has taken that could chill whistleblowers. In December, President Trump's transition team asked for the names of employees at the Department of Energy who had worked on climate change initiatives. Another transition team request was made to the State Department for information regarding staffing and positions related to gender equity, and violence against women. Just 2 days ago, White House spokesman Sean Spicer announced that State Department employees who voiced dissent regarding President Trump's immigration order should, quote, ``either get with the program or they can go,'' end of quote. To quote Walter Shaub, the director of the Office of Government Ethics, quote, ``Tone from the top matters,'' end of quote. I fear the President's tone will discourage whistleblowers from reporting waste, fraud, and abuse, exactly the opposite of what we hope to accomplish through the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. There's still time for this administration to change. In a letter I wrote with my colleague, Ranking Member Pallone, to White House counsel Donald McGahn, we requested that the President take immediate action to rescind all policies on employee communications that do not comply with the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. We also urged the President to issue an official statement making clear that all Federal employees have the right to communicate with Congress and will not be silenced or be retaliated against for their disclosures. I urged the President to adopt these recommendations immediately and send a clear signal to Federal employees that whistleblowers will be protected, as this committee has made it clear, on both sides of the aisle, we will protect whistleblowers to the nth degree. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence, and I yield back. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman. The chair is certainly committed to making sure that we have an open and transparent accountability. And I think that that serves the American taxpayer well regardless of party, regardless of any partisan outlook. And so I look forward to working with not only the ranking member of the full committee but the ranking member of the subcommittee on that. And with that, Mr. Storch, I recognize you for 5 minutes. I apologize to some of your staff who was actually here earlier today, and so you're recognized for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. STORCH Mr. Storch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Whistleblowers perform an invaluable service when they come forward with what they reasonably believe to be evidence of wrongdoing, and they should never suffer reprisal for doing so. Thank you for inviting me to speak today about the important role that the Offices of the Inspectors General play under the WPEA with regard to informing whistleblowers about their rights and protections. I have served as a whistleblower ombudsperson at the DOJ OIG since our program was established in the summer of 2012. In November of that year, the WPEA was enacted requiring the creation of such positions in the offices of all presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed IGs, and many designated Federal entity IGs have such programs as well. We are responsible under the act for educating agency employees about the prohibitions on retaliation for making protected disclosures and informing employees who have made, or are contemplating making, disclosures about their rights and remedies against retaliation. The DOJ OIG strongly supports reauthorization of this important provision. The OIG's work in this area is entirely consistent with the importance of whistleblowers as reflected in the Inspector General Act itself, which specifically provides for OIGs to receive and investigate complaints provided by agency employees and to protect their confidentiality and prohibits the taking of personnel actions against them for coming to us. Just as OIGs are well placed within agencies to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, whistleblowers are very much at the front lines, direct witnesses to potential wrongdoing, and they play a critical role in bringing forward such information. Ensuring that whistleblowers are comfortable, informed, and protected is therefore of central importance to the OIG's core mission. We, and many of our fellow OIGs, carry out our role under the WPEA by creating and disseminating educational materials and conducting training programs. At DOJ OIG, we filmed an instructional video that is now required viewing for all DOJ managers and supervisors and available online for all employees. We also prepared informational fliers that have been posted in offices throughout the Department with contact information for the OIG and the Office of Special Counsel, which plays a central role in addressing many cases of suspected reprisal. We have worked with the FBI and other components to develop particularized training programs for their workforces, and in the case of the FBI, to address the specific requirements applicable to its employees, including, under the recently enacted FBI WPEA. We, and other OIGs, also prepared informational brochures for employees of department contractors, subcontractors, and grantees. And like many of our counterparts, we created a robust page on our website with a range of information regarding whistleblower rights and protections. Shortly after the passage of the WPEA, we worked through the Council of the Inspectors General to create a working group which meets quarterly to share information, discuss best practices on current issues, and host speakers from within an outside government. Our colleagues from OSC have been active participants, providing their expertise, and facilitating coordination and cooperation between OSC and the OIGs. And representatives of many other leading groups, including both GAP and POGO have met with us as well. The working group also has facilitated meetings with congressional members and staff to discuss these issues, and we partnered with OSC, OSHA, and congressional staff in organizing last summer's successful celebration here at the Capitol of National Whistleblower Appreciation Day. As Congress considers reauthorization of the ombuds provision, I'd close by mentioning a couple of areas that have surfaced in the working group: First, the work we do generally does not include much of what is often done by traditional ombudsmen. And some of their activities might even be seen as inconsistent with our independent position as OIGs. This may result in some confusion about our roles, and I would be pleased to work with the committee to discuss possible ways to address this. Second, many of the working group discussions have reflected what we found at DOJ; namely, that both our educational activities and the underlying whistleblower reprisal investigations are resource intensive. And our ability to do this, along with our other responsibilities, is impacted by the limitations on our available staffing and resources. Our work in this area is only expected to increase as whistleblower rights and protections are expanded and made permanent and more educational activities take place. I'd be pleased to work with you and your staffs on these issues. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. And I'd be happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Storch follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you so much. Mr. Bachman, you're recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF ERIC BACHMAN Mr. Bachman. Thank you. Good afternoon Chairman Meadows, Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the U.S. Office of Special Counsel and our enforcement of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, the WPEA. My testimony today will discuss the key parts of the WPEA, how its new safeguards have helped OSC protect more whistleblowers than ever, and suggestions on how to make the law more effective. OSC is an independent agency, and one of our primary missions is to protect employees from whistleblower retaliation. Since the WPEA was enacted nearly 5 years ago, the number of whistleblower retaliation complaints filed with our office has increased by 15 percent, and we've helped a record number of whistleblowers. For example, OSC has increased the number of favorable outcomes from whistleblowers by 150 percent; we've increased the disciplinary actions against retaliators by 117 percent; and we've taken further steps to strengthen the whistleblower law through our amicus briefs and our outreach programs. These protections are important because whistleblowers are a vital tool in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse in the government and have helped saved hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. And we want to thank Congress and this committee for its forceful, bipartisan support of Federal whistleblowers in OSC. In particular, we thank Representative Blum for his sponsorship of H.R. 69 to reauthorize OSC, which passed the House earlier this year. This committee's enthusiastic backing has made our office far more effective in helping whistleblowers, and we look forward to continuing this productive relationship in the new Congress and beyond. The WPEA is landmark legislation, and it has unmistakably helped Federal whistleblowers. The WPEA provided many new protections, including, among other things, authorizing OSC to help shape the whistleblower law by filing friend-of-the-court briefs, bolstering the remedies that are available to whistleblowers who win their retaliation claims and granting full whistleblower protections to all TSA employees. And for every new safeguard in the WPEA, OSC has succeeded in securing victories for whistleblowers. For example, we used our new amicus authority to file a brief with the Supreme Court in the Department of Homeland Security vs. MacLean case. And in a seven-two decision, the Supreme Court agreed with our arguments on behalf of the whistleblower. And since 2012, OSC has received and investigated about 243 whistleblower retaliation cases from TSA employees, which we would not have been able to investigate prior to the WPEA. Another new element of the WPEA is this anti-gag order provision, which ensures that whistleblower protections supersede any agency nondisclosure agreements or policies. It requires that any nondisclosure agreement or policy include language that clearly states that the employee may still blow the whistle even if they have signed the agreement or are subject to the policy. OSC has vigorously enforced this anti- gag provision, and since 2013, we've obtained nearly three dozen corrective actions and also issued specific guidance to agencies on this important topic. The WPEA also contains two valuable provisions that are set to expire at the end of this year: The whistleblower protection ombudsman program that Mr. Storch discussed, and the all circuit appellate review program. OSC strongly recommends that both of these programs be made permanent. Finally, although the WPEA has undeniably strengthened protections for Federal whistleblowers, further enhancements should be considered. For example, the WPEA sets a higher evidentiary burden for disclosures that are made in the normal course of duties. Congress intended this heightened burden to apply to jobs like investigators and auditors, where investigating reporting wrongdoing is an everyday job function. But recent court decisions have applied this heightened burden to a much broader universe of jobs, jobs like teachers and purchasing agents. And this risks making it harder for many Federal employees to be able to prove their whistleblower retaliation claims. So we recommend that Congress clarify that this additional burden applies only to that small subset of Federal workers who investigate and report wrongdoing as a core job function. We greatly appreciate the committee's robust support for office and for Federal whistleblowers. I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I'm happy to answer your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Bachman follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Bachman. Mr. Devine. STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. DEVINE Mr. Devine. Thank you. This hearing is significant because action is essential to address newly emerging threats in loopholes that obstruct or circumvent the WPEA's mandate, and because 2017 will be the year of truth for unfinished business on the due process structure to enforce the law's rights. If Congress acts effectively, after 39 years whistleblowers will have legal rights on which they can rely, a genuine metal shield against retaliation. 2016 continued a pattern since the WPEA's passage. The last 5 years have been the best and worst of times for whistleblowers. My written testimony summarizes encouraging news about closing the loopholes, Supreme Court support for the law, the Office of Special Counsel's effective track record, and unprecedented impact from whistleblowers in making a difference. To illustrate the latter, in Supreme Court oral arguments for Air Marshal Robert MacLean, whose disclosures stopped TSA from going AWOL during a more ambitious rerun of 9/11, we argued that Mr. MacLean acted to better protect the Nation. Justice Scalia interjected, ``And he was successful.'' It's no wonder that whistleblowers are receiving more respect than ever before. Unfortunately, it is the sad truth that the Office of Special Counsel's track record of 5.2 percent corrective action against retaliation reflects the best option that exists. As a rule, employee rights under the Whistleblower Protection Act continue to be a mirage when agencies violate them, and whistleblowing is more dangerous than ever before. Consider four primary causes: The first is administrative agency enforcement. Despite best efforts, the special counsel is hampered by resource-based tradeoffs that result in almost no litigation and excessive delays that unemployed whistleblowers cannot afford and that undermine the relevance of its decisions on current events. Special counsel can never be more than anecdotal source of justice that makes impressive points. To consistently achieve the X purpose, no remedial agency can substitute for due process. And unfortunately, whistleblowers are not getting it at the Merit Systems Protection Board. Board members have been good-faith, responsible stewards of the act, but the hearings are conducted by administrative judges who are openly hostile to the act, ruling against whistleblowers from 95 to 98 percent of the decisions on the merits. When you combine that with OSC's 5 percent corrective action rate, whistleblowers do not have more than a token chance of justice under this law. Consider the ordeal of Kim Farrington, who is an FAA inspector, fired after she challenged the Agency's failure to assure proper training of flight attendants. Her case has been pending for 7 years. In 2012, the board overturned a hostile administrative judge decision but remanded rather than reversing. The AJ then held a hearing but never issued a decision. When the AJ retired, a new judge was appointed, who held another hearing in December 2013, but again did not rule. In May 2016, Ms. Farrington protested the delays to the full board and the administrative judge promptly responded with a June decision that rejected all of her claims without even referencing the hearing audiotape. There was no transcript because the court reporter had died during the delays. Her case is again on appeal, but due to vacancies, the board cannot issue decisions and there is no end in sight. The lack of credible due process at the MSPB is the Whistleblower Protection Act's Achilles heel. Shifting tactics have made the law less effective. Because it is more difficult to fire employees, agencies are opening more retaliatory investigations with criminal prosecution referrals. And currently, there is no defense against this even uglier form of harassment. Then there's the sensitive jobs loophole, an all- encompassing national security loophole that will subsume the entire merits system if Congress does not act. And finally, there is lack of acceptance. Mr. MacLean's experience is a microcosm. Immediately after his victory, TSA lagged 4 months and then assigned him to air marshal missions on flights to the Mideast despite intelligence that ISIL was combing the internet to find the identities of undercover air marshals, and he was the most visible air marshal in history. After the OSC intervened, the Agency reassigned him to an empty room with no duties for 4 months. It refused to consider him even routine promotions, forcing him into bankruptcy. Although he continues to make impressive disclosures on security breaches, they will not assign him any duties due to lack of seniority caused by his own illegal termination. It held up processing his security clearance for 10 months, although required to forward it within 14 days. He has still lost by winning due to the poor attitudes. Mr. Chairman, my written testimony has a full menu of suggestions for how we can deal with these challenges. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Devine follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Mr. Devine, thank you so much for your passionate and articulate testimony. And I can assure you that we will be following up in earnest. Some of these things are things that we were aware of; some, obviously not, but working with OSC in making sure that their success rate is greater and not laborious is something that this committee is committed to. But thank you so much. Ms. Hempowicz. STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH HEMPOWICZ Ms. Hempowicz. Ranking Member Cummings, Subcommittee Chairman Meadows, and Ranking Member Connolly, and members of the Subcommittee on Government Operations, thank you for inviting me to testify today and for your dedication to ensuring proper implementation of whistleblower protections. Five years ago, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, closing many loopholes and upgrading protections for Federal workers who blow the whistle on waste, fraud, abuse, and illegality. The WPEA codified an anti-gag statute championed by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Chuck Grassley that requires agencies to issue a statement notifying employees that statutory rights to communicate with Congress and whistleblower protections supersede agency restrictions on disclosures or communications. In addition, the WPEA clarified that any whistleblower disclosure may be protected, including when a whistleblower makes a reasonable disclosure to his or her supervisor even if that supervisor is involved in the wrongdoing. Similarly, it clarified that a whistleblower's intent in making a disclosure should not be factored in when determining whether he or she made a protected disclosure. These changes provided essential channels to report through and prioritized disclosing wrongdoing as being the primary public interest. Finally, the law created a pilot program for Federal employees who appeal a judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board to file their appeal in any U.S. Court of Appeals with jurisdiction. This committee led the charge in extending that pilot program 2 years ago and should now work to make that right permanent. While the positive impact of this law is significant, its enforcement has not been without issue. A report released by Senator Grassley, 2 years after the passage of the WPEA, revealed that only one agency out of the 15 studied was fully compliant with the anti-gag provision of the law. This important provision has been called into question as recently as last week when several agencies ordered staff to cease or limit external communications. As members of this committee have recognized, these directives may violate the law. Efforts to prevent government employees from communicating with Congress and the public could represent a serious threat to public health and safety, and continued congressional oversight is necessary to make sure that this important provision continues to be implemented properly. Despite broad protection laws like the WPA and the WPEA, the totality of whistleblower protection laws include a patchwork of protections dependent on where a whistleblower works in the government and in what capacity. The WPEA afforded new and necessary protections to many Federal employees when it was enacted, but it excluded intelligence community contractors despite having a proven track record of success with previous protections. Although IC contractor whistleblowers have some protection under presidential policy directive 19, it is too narrow to be considered comprehensive and can be revoked at the President's discretion. Whistleblowers must have safe channels to report abuses of power that betray the public trust, and Congress has a responsibility to fill these accountability loopholes. The next round of whistleblower protection legislation must include protections for intelligence community contractors. Congress should also consider requiring mandatory punishment against supervisors who retaliate against whistleblowers. Without mandatory punishment for those who retaliate, there is no substantial deterrence to violating these laws. Any legislation should carefully balance due process rights of employees accused of retaliatory actions with the proper chance to present a defense and appeal a final decision. Recently passed legislation creates a minimum 12-day unpaid suspension when a complaint that a supervisor has retaliated against a whistleblower is substantiated. This should serve as a model. As you mentioned, Ranking Member Connolly, it is also important to update the law to undue a recent curtailing of whistleblower protections in cases where Federal employees refuse to obey an order that would break a rule or regulation created by the agency. Another area of concern is the implementation of former President Obama's insider threat program. This program was created in order to ensure responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. It includes a provision prohibiting the use of the program to identify or prevent lawful whistleblower disclosures. Despite this, we've repeatedly seen government training materials conflate whistleblowers like Thomas Drake with terrorists like the Fort Hood and Navy Yard killers. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has assured POGO that these errors have been corrected and its general counsel's office has fastidiously implemented whistleblower protection training for the intelligence community. However, increased congressional oversight may be helpful to make sure this program isn't used improperly. Additionally, the House should create a whistleblower ombudsman office to train congressional staff on working with whistleblowers and to provide assistance and advice to staff on working with whistleblowers. Many of these issues that I have raised in my testimony hinge on congressional oversight. Passing stronger laws is a necessary first step, but continued congressional oversight ensures that whistleblowers are championed and not punished. I look forward to your questions, and thank you again for holding this important hearing. [Prepared statement of Ms. Hempowicz follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Meadows. Thank you so much for your testimony. I'll now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Ross, for 5 minutes. Mr. Ross. Thank you, Chairman. And I thank the panel for being here very much. You know, as we talk about the WPEA, it leads one to believe that it should have a dual purpose: First being a shield, a shield to protect those who have seen the wrongdoings or the corruption and allow them the opportunities and, quite frankly, the incentives to report them; and then it should be a sword as well. It should be a sword to be able to go in and cut off the wrongdoing and enforce what needs to be done. But it seems, through some of this testimony, that the sword has been turned back and it has been turned back on the whistleblower. And so my first question is to Mr. Storch in regards to retaliatory investigations. It said that for every one whistleblower complaint that in most cases there's a counter complaint against them by the person whom the complaint is lodged. So now, is this something that is routine for you or any other inspectors general to investigate as to the source or the circumstances surrounding the complaint to see if it may be a counter complaint? Mr. Storch. Thank you very much for the question. I mean, it raises important issues. Obviously, as inspectors general, we receive information in our offices from employees throughout our departments that we oversee, right. And one of the things we always take into account is the source of the information, and we evaluate that as we evaluate the information. People may have lots of reasons they come forward. That doesn't in any way invalidate the information that they provide and, in fact, it can be very important information for us to have in order to conduct our oversight functions. So, the primary thing we want to do is encourage people to be able to come forward and to be comfortable coming forward knowing that they'll be protected under the WPEA in doing so. Mr. Ross. But will they be protected? I mean, will they really be protected? In other words, they make themselves subject of a counter complaint if they're not careful. And I think that's the protection I'm trying to make sure that we can nip in the bud, either through cross-referencing in the complaints or maybe there's a logarithm that can be worked out to find out that. Mr. Storch. Right. No, it's a difficult question, and I think our colleagues from OSC referred to it in their prepared statements; that there certainly are competing interests here because we want to encourage legitimate investigations, but we don't want to have investigations be used to in any way deter people from coming forward with information. Mr. Ross. I agree. Mr. Storch. And so the question is how do you strike that balance---- Mr. Ross. And protect due process. Mr. Storch. --in a way that protects whistleblowers and encourages them to come forward. And we certainly would be very happy to continue to work with OSC, with you, and the committee on this. Mr. Ross. And that leads me to my next question, Mr. Bachman, with regard to the OSC. How important is subpoena power? Mr. Bachman. Thank you for the question. The subpoena power for us, we currently have under an OPM rule---- Mr. Ross. For documents or for testimony? Mr. Bachman. For both. Mr. Ross. Okay. Mr. Bachman. But the issue that we have, it's really a related issue, is our access to information where we think it would be extremely helpful for Congress to clarify, give us statutory direct access to all relevant information and documents and witnesses and not be subject to perhaps an incorrect assertion of attorney/client privilege by the Agency, similar to what the IGs currently have. So having that ability to know what the Agency knows so that we can investigate whether wrongdoing occurred is essential. Mr. Ross. So if somebody files an objection to a subpoena, what's the court of competent jurisdiction there? Is it an ALJ? Is it--who decides whether there should be enforcement? Do they have to come--where do they go? Mr. Bachman. It's unfortunately a cumbersome process. Mr. Ross. Yeah. Mr. Bachman. We need to go to the MSPB and ask---- Mr. Ross. That doesn't have a quorum now---- Mr. Bachman. Exactly, yes. Mr. Ross. --which Mr. Devine pointed out is problematic. Mr. Bachman. So they would not be able to move forward with that. If there was a quorum, the MSPB, not OSC, would make the decision of whether or not to attempt to enforce that subpoena. Mr. Ross. And then that subpoena, if still objected to, would have to be enforced eventually---- Mr. Bachman. In district courts, yes. Mr. Ross. --in district courts. Okay. Lastly, Mr. Bachman, there has been some positives with the WPEA, but one of the things has been its lack of enforcement where I really think the sword should be. Can you articulate in any way what additional measures of enforcement may be necessary in order to make it really effective. Because as one who is a student of the law, you know, deterrents have an impact on future behavior and future performance, especially if somebody decides that they don't want to have that repercussions against them if they know what the law will be and how it is enforced. Any suggestions as to further enforcement or additional enforcements of the WPEA? Mr. Bachman. Yes. We couldn't agree more that disciplinary actions play an important deterrence role in the Federal Government. They have ripple effect. They show that managers can be held accountable. At OSC though we have made a decision though that we need to prioritize getting the whistleblower back on their feet and back on their job and protect them first---- Mr. Ross. Yes. Mr. Bachman. --to the extent we can though. I think we are proud of the fact that we've been able to increase the number of disciplinary actions by 117 percent since the WPEA was passed. Of course with additional resources, I think we can do even better than that. Mr. Ross. Look forward to working with you on that. And I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, the ranking member, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend, and welcome, again, to our panelists. Mr. Storch, do you recall that back in 1988, a long time ago, then-Senator Chuck Grassley--who is still with us in the Senate, been there a long time--he had something called the anti-gag rule. Can you describe that to us if you're familiar with it. Mr. Storch. I'm not familiar with the rule. Mr. Connolly. Anyone familiar with it? Yes, Mr. Devine. Mr. Meadows. If you'll hit your mic, please. Mr. Devine. Thank you. It was instituted in December 1988 to thwart a nondisclosure policy being ordered throughout the Federal Government that prevented employees from disclosing classifiable information without prior approval. And since classifiable is designed as any information that could or should have been classified, it created basically a backdoor official secret set. The restrictions on funding to implement or enforce that were passed unanimously without exception through the time of the WPEA when Congress codified both rights, sir. Mr. Connolly. And it was in some ways designed, was it not--well, that anti-gag rule, even writ larger, it was ultimately incorporated into the Whistleblower Protection Act. Is that correct? Mr. Devine. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. And so let me ask you this: We have the acting secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services on the very first day of the new administration writing, quote, ``No correspondence to public officials, for example, Members of Congress and governors''--his example, not mine--``unless specifically authorized by me or my designee shall be sent between now and February 3rd.'' How does that comport with the anti-gag provision of the Whistleblower Protection Act? Mr. Devine. Well, the official who issued the order said, new team, new rules. But those new rules cancel the rule of law, Congressman. It violates three provisions in the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. It violates two appropriations writers. It violates the Lloyd LaFollette Act of 1912, and by the way, the First Amendment. Mr. Connolly. Oh. Other than that, it's just helpful guidance? Yeah, okay. Anyone else on the panel want to comment on that? Mr. Storch. Mr. Devine has just said, what I read from a member of the new administration, violates the law, a number of laws, and the Constitution itself in a number of respects. Mr. Storch. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. You're from the Department of Justice. Would you concur? Mr. Storch. I was a prosecutor at the time of Senator Grassley's rule that you referred to, but I have been with the Office of the Inspector General and acting as the ombuds for our OIG for the last 4 and-a-half years. And I'm very familiar with the provision in the WPEA that requires that appropriate language be put in place in any policy or agreement that would attempt to deter communications by whistleblowers, communications with Congress. And the law seems quite clear in requiring that. And anything that doesn't do that, that falls within those parameters, would be in violation of that provision of the WPEA. Mr. Connolly. You would concur, Ms. Hempowicz? Ms. Hempowicz. I would, and I would even go a little bit further. Even if these statements or these guidance documents are reissued with the disclaimer that they're required to have, they've already had a chilling effect. So that, you know, I would encourage this committee to continue its rigorous oversight and keep watching. Mr. Connolly. I mean, what could go wrong with the chilling effect? Ms. Hempowicz. Well, if you don't have whistleblowers feeling like they can come forward through protected channels, you'll see more and more increased leaks to the media, to the press. And I think you always want the strongest whistleblower protections in place because you want to incentivize people within an agency to go through those proper channels. And they're not going to if they're not going to be safe from reprisal, but they're also not going to go through those channels if they don't find that they're meaningful channels, if they don't see that the complaints that they're making to-- through those proper channels are being taken seriously and addressed within the agency. Mr. Connolly. And one might note that this committee historically has been the recipient of whistleblower information that has often led to useful legislation and sunshine hearings that, you know, spotlight an issue that otherwise wouldn't get covered. So the chilling effect in deterring people or discouraging people from providing that information to elected Members of Congress actually can really preclude the ability to reform and fix problems we identify because we're not identifying them. I yield back. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Blum, for 5 minutes. Mr. Blum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel for being here today. My questions are primarily for Mr. Storch or Mr. Bachman. How many whistleblowers have there been over the last 2 years, the last session of Congress? Mr. Bachman. Thank you for the question. I can tell you, for OSC, this past year we received a total of 6,000 complaints across all of our program areas. Of those 6,000, 2,000 alleged that they had been retaliated against for blowing the whistle, and that's consistent over the last 2 years. Mr. Blum. So a third of them. Mr. Bachman. So let's say, 4,000, about 4,000 from our office. Mr. Blum. Is that trend up or down, number of whistleblowers that we are aware of? Mr. Bachman. That trend is up. Mr. Blum. And why do you think so? Mr. Bachman. I think there's several different factors. I think, number one is the enhanced outreach and education that OSC, the IGs, the ombudsmen have been doing throughout the government. People are---- Mr. Blum. Ombudsperson. Mr. Bachman. Excuse me, yes. Thank you for that. Mr. Blum. I do the same thing. Mr. Bachman. Although that is what is in the law. But I think more and more agencies and employees are better informed about their rights and where to go to make these complaints. I think there has been increased attention through Congress and the media on these rights, and I think it's encouraged more people to come forward with complaints. Mr. Blum. Of these cases, how many were threatened by management, either explicitly or implicitly? Mr. Bachman. Of the whistleblower retaliation cases we get, most--I mean, I would say almost all of them are---- Mr. Blum. So the 2,000 of the 6,000? Mr. Bachman. Yes, are saying that they have been subjected to some sort of personnel action. Mr. Blum. And then how many positive outcomes? And would you define a positive outcome. Mr. Bachman. Positive outcome covers a range of issues. It could be us settling the case, or helping to settle the case between the whistleblower and the employee where they get their job back, they get some sort of damages for backpay if they were out of their job, maybe they get a suspension rescinded, or were able to temporarily halt their termination while we investigate it. So those are the types of things that we'd say are a favorable outcome. For whistleblowers, over the last couple of years coming to our office, it's ranged about 200 favorable outcomes a year for whistleblowers coming to our office. Mr. Blum. Do you need more staff? Mr. Bachman. Absolutely, we could use more resources. We are stretched to capacity. Our folks are doing a fantastic job. They're achieving record levels of successes, but they're also carrying caseloads that are two or three times as high as they normally would be. Mr. Blum. I'm from the private sector, from Iowa, and there's a perception there, as across the Nation, I think, that the Federal Government is bloated, that the Federal employees are overpaid, and most importantly, it's next to impossible to terminate a Federal employee. And I know it's not particularly your area of expertise, but what we're talking about here's accountability. So I'd like to ask, in the context of whistleblowers and retaliation, what happens to the manager, the supervisor who threatened the retaliation? What happens? Because, you know, often people sit here and they've done things that are, you know, it's waste, fraud, and abuse, and I ask, did you get a bonus? The answer is yes. Did you get promotion? Half the time it's yes. Worst case is they get reassigned. Where is the accountability in Federal Government? What happens to supervisors who threaten retaliation against a whistleblower? What happens? Mr. Bachman. That's an excellent question, and we couldn't agree more about the importance of the deterrence factor when it comes to disciplinary actions. As I mentioned, we have increased our rate of achieving those by over 100 percent, but---- Mr. Blum. What kind of number are we talking about? Mr. Bachman. We're talking going from 23, in the years prior to the WPEA, to 50 over the last 4 years. But in addition to that---- Mr. Blum. So 50 out of 2,000? Mr. Bachman. Fifty out of the 2,000, although I do want to clarify one issue on that denominator of 2,000. When we're talking about that, that 2,000 number includes a number of cases, for example, 15 percent, that are actually discrimination claims which we defer to the agency process on that. So we don't handle those. Another 12 percent or so we don't have jurisdiction over, and then another portion of that just don't meet the statutory limits. Mr. Blum. How can we increase that? It's such a serious thing for a supervisor to retaliate against an employee who is trying to do well, trying to do something good for the taxpayers. We need to increase that number. Mr. Bachman. Excuse me, I'm sorry. Resources absolutely would help. But I do want to add that there are other ways that we help to get discipline imposed, for example, through our disclosure process. With the VA, over the last couple of years, the VA alone has disciplined about 40 or actually more than 40 employees who were implicated in wrongdoing that was brought to light by whistleblowers coming to OSC and us referring that case to the VA. They subsequently disciplined those employees. So it doesn't always have to be a formal investigation into whistleblower retaliation that leads to this accountability. It can happen through our other program areas as well, and it does. Mr. Blum. Once again, thank you to the panel. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time I do not have. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman from Iowa. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for coming and for your testimony. We heard reports last week that multiple Federal agencies issued gag orders on Federal employee communications. And one of the memos obtained by the committee appears to specifically prohibit employees from speaking to Congress, in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. And now White House press secretary Sean Spicer has declared that State Department employees who utilize the Department's dissent channel to object to the President's executive order on immigration should, quote, ``Get with the program or they can go,'' closed quote. Mr. Devine, do you believe that the State Department's dissent channel is a means by which the State Department employees can blow the whistle? Mr. Devine. Yes, ma'am, and indeed, it's the type of channel that the posters on the wall of every office in the government direct employees to bring their concerns if they want to blow the whistle. This is the proper channels that you're supposed to use if you're a public servant who's following in respecting the Code of Ethics. It is incompatible with the Whistleblower Protection Act to threaten people with termination or ask them to leave because they're doing what the Code of Ethics says they're supposed to. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. I think you answered my second question. So is it your understanding that communication in this manner through this dissent channel should be protected? Mr. Devine. There could be no credible disagreement that under the laws as it's written, that's legally protected speech, and there should be discipline against those who try to cancel the flow of information to Congress. To respond to the earlier question, one way to achieve some deterrence would be empowering judges, whether they're administrative or article III court judges, to order discipline as part of the relief when they find a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act. They could do it on the same record instead of expecting the OSC to do it for them. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Would you say that if indeed the White House press secretary threatened those employees by saying that, quote, ``Get with the program or they can go,'' that that sounds like a potential violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act's prohibition on taking or threatening to take retribution against whistleblowers? Mr. Devine. Well, Mr. Spicer didn't have the--he's not eligible to violate the Whistleblower Protection Act because he can't recommend or take a personnel action. But he wasn't speaking for himself. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Absolutely. Mr. Devine. So the people behind that policy were violating the law. Mrs. Watson Coleman. So I'm glad to hear that and sorry to have to deal with that issue, because I certainly am alarmed by the tone that the President Trump has said in his first few days in office. But he certainly does have the time to make changes that would create a better tone. I'd like to enter into the record a letter dated January 26, 2017, from Ranking Member Cummings and Ranking Member Pallone to the White House counsel, Donald McGahn. And I have it right here. Mr. Meadows. Without objection. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. This letter recommends that the President immediately rescind all policies on employees' communications that do not comply with the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act. Mr. Bachman, do you agree with this communication? Mr. Bachman. Thank you for the question. And I can't speak directly on this issue because I don't want to prejudge a case or an investigation that may come before my office, but what I can do is speak more broadly about the idea that everybody shares the goal of cutting waste, fraud, and abuse in our government. But in order to do that, you have got to encourage whistleblowers to come forward. They're the ones who know about that waste, fraud, and abuse. And tone at the top really matters in these situations. And that's what's going to encourage and give employees that comfort that if they come forward they're not going to be retaliated against. So on a broader level, we have two recommendations here: The first is that to cure any potential chilling effect on whistleblowing that nondisclosure agreements or policies may have had, agency leadership, once they're installed, or if they're already installed, should make it very clear in writing to all their employees that any nondisclosure agreements or policies that went out do not wipe out whistleblower protection. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Just really quite briefly, do you believe that it is important that the President of the United States set the tone by stating affirmatively that there is whistleblower protection; that individuals do have the right to speak to Congressmembers; and that, there is nothing that this administration will do that will place any daunting upon whistleblower protection? That's a yes or no, and if you would each just give me a yes or no on that, I'd appreciate it. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. Yes. The gentlewoman's time has expired, but please, you can give a brief answer, each one of you. Mr. Bachman. Yes, tone at the top is critical, and support of whistleblowers is paramount. Mr. Storch. I agree. Mr. Devine. Yes, if the President wants whistleblowers to help him drain the swamp, he can't feed them to the alligators, ma'am. Ms. Hempowicz. I agree, and I think it's important for any incoming administration to make that clear from the beginning. Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentlewoman. You'll be pleased to hear that today Chairman Chaffetz and I are joining Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley to send a letter to the White House encouraging it to use whistleblowers as an ally to identify waste, fraud, and abuse, and mismanagement of the Federal Government. We're suggesting that the White House clarify any confusion that may exist regarding various transition memos as they relate to the WPEA or the anti-gag provision which Senator Grassley authored. These are issues that are extremely important to those of us that are committed to making government work more effectively through the oversight process, and we will ensure that whistleblower rights to communicate directly with Congress are not impeded. And with that, I will recognize the vice chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice. Mr. Hice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I thank each of you for being here. Mr. Bachman, I think I heard you said, and I'm not sure that you really meant this, but you said everyone in government wants to deal with waste, fraud, and abuse. I'm not so sure that that's an accurate statement. I actually have come to more or less believe that the three real branches of our government are waste, fraud, and abuse. They feel like that sometimes. And this is a serious problem, but the whistleblowers, as you did go on to say, are an essential ingredient to dealing with this problem. Can you give me a couple of examples of what the retaliation of these whistleblowers looks like. Mr. Bachman. Certainly. We have had a number of cases recently with the VA. Before I go into this, I do want to say the VA has been an excellent example of good tone at the top. I think they really have made strides to improve their protections of whistleblowers. That being said, we've had a number of whistleblower retaliation complaints with them. One of them involves an employee in the Puerto Rico facility who had blown the whistle about activities that the director of that facility was engaged in that he believed evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation. Very soon after that, this employee found himself detailed to a position in which he had basically no job functions, no office, and no real career path after that. After he filed a complaint with OSC, we were able to get involved, get him temporarily put back into his job while we investigated. Ultimately, was able to get his job back full-time, get him damages for what he suffered. And the VA has recently announced the removal of the director of that facility. Mr. Hice. Okay. That's a good outcome when all is said and done, but that's somewhat of a typical retaliation, an outward change in their job or responsibilities or something along--are there more subtle retaliations? What would a subtle--and I'll just open this up, but if you could answer relatively quickly because I want to drive somewhere with this. What is a more subtle, less obvious retaliation? Mr. Bachman. I mean, for example, just getting less glamorous assignments within the agency, the ones that aren't going to get you the awards or get you the recognition for the promotion that's coming up in another year or so, that--you know, it's hard to really put your finger on exactly what it is, but you know it's affecting your career. And those can be extremely damaging and, frankly, extremely difficult to investigate as well. Mr. Hice. Okay. Ms. Hempowicz, I would like--you were ready to go. Ms. Hempowicz. I would refer again to the retaliatory investigations that have been mentioned earlier. We called them the weapons of choice for retaliation against whistleblowers because it's a lose--it's a win-win situation for the agency. Either they find something and then they can take whatever action they want to against the whistleblower and have a reason for it, or they don't find something and it just looks like they were doing their due diligence. Mr. Hice. Okay. So in your testimony, I believe you suggested some legislative solutions. What would--how do you draw the balance in providing an agency the ability to investigate and at the same time protect the whistleblower? What does the legislation look like to you? Ms. Hempowicz. I believe that was in Tom's. Mr. Hice. Okay. Mr. Devine. Yes, sir. It's really not a different balance than any other personnel action. We need to terminate employees who don't perform properly. We don't want to abuse that responsibility. And it's the same with investigations. We'd recommend just exempting routine, ministerial, administrative, nondiscretionary investigations from the X coverage. But the discretionary ones are very, very commonly used. They're more chilling than the actual personnel action when they lead to criminal prosecutions. And even when the investigation is closed, we have seen a very common phenomenon of serial witch hunts. There's another one opened 1 or 2 months later, and it just goes on indefinitely. This has a far greater chilling effect than conventional personnel action. Mr. Hice. So the congressional action would be? Mr. Devine. The congressional action would be similar to what we have in all the corporate whistleblower laws and in many State whistleblower laws and the First Amendment, that you can challenge a retaliatory investigation as a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act. We agree that there should be limitations on it so that it can function the routine necessary--you can't interfere with the routine necessary functions of government, but when it's misused--this is a start of almost every case of retaliation, to shift the spotlight from the message to the messenger and try to destroy their credibility, ruin them and make an example. And you can do that without ever touching the Whistleblower Protection Act, because they're defenseless until the other shoe drops, a formal personnel action. And if the other shoe is a prosecution referral, the act never becomes relevant, the whistleblower is defenseless. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. Mrs. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my ranking member. Last month, the Republicans included the Holman act as part of the rules package for the 115th Congress. This rule allows lawmakers to slash the salary of an individual Federal employee to $1. Imagine a Federal employee who is considering blowing the whistle on wrongdoing. Even if that disclosure is protected, meaning the agency cannot take retaliatory action, nothing prevents Congress from slashing that employee's salary. Mr. Devine, and I ask the other ones too, what do you think the Holman Rule--do you think it would have a chilling effect on the whistleblower disclosure? Mr. Devine. It should have a chilling effect because it creates a deep vulnerability. It allows Members of Congress to engage in the same actions that would be illegal if taken by an executive branch employee who actually is familiar with the whistleblower's performance or work. So it's a serious new loophole that should be addressed. Mrs. Lawrence. Mr. Bachman. Mr. Bachman. I agree. I think that anything like the Holman Rule or nondisclosure agreements that might have a chilling effect on employees, that might give somebody pause or more than pause about coming forward to expose waste, fraud, and abuse in the government, that's something that, from a whistleblower's point of view, is not helpful. And I'll leave it at that. Thank you. Mrs. Lawrence. Mr. Storch. Mr. Storch. Yes. I certainly agree. I mean, as we've said from the outset, and I think everyone in the room has said, we want to encourage people to come forward with information. That's the only way we can find out what's really going on and be able to address it, if appropriate. And if people in our government agencies don't feel comfortable coming forward, whether it's because they feel they're going to suffer reprisal in their jobs or they feel they're going to suffer some other economic consequences, that's a thing that could deter them from coming forward and something we want to stop. I didn't get a chance to mention it before, but I will now. We get over 12,000 complaints a year on our hotline at DOJ, which is just one agency. Something like 500 of those in the last year were within the ambit of what are considered whistleblowers. Now, not all of those, fortunately, are reprisal cases, because a lot of those go to the OSC. But having said that, we do see a lot of reprisal and we see it increasing. We oversee the FBI, we have jurisdiction to investigate there. And with the FBI WPEA, that's only going to increase, which is a great thing. We support it expanding the ambit of people that FBI employees can report to. But with that comes a cost, a cost in terms of resources. But that's something we think is important to do because we want to encourage people to come forward. And anything that stops that from happening or deters that in our view is a bad thing. Mrs. Lawrence. You know, I served as an EEO investigator for a Federal agency. And the one thing I will say, and I'm glad that you all are saying it, the act of discrimination or a case that's filed, the culture of organization is based on that reprisal point. And if we do not manage that and make sure that we're clear that reprisal of a person whistleblowing or a victim of discrimination will not be tolerated in an agency, it is extremely chilling and damaging for any organization. The last thing I want to say--I wanted to hear from you, Ms. Hempowicz. Ms. Hempowicz. I agree with my copanelists that we are deeply concerned that the Holman Rule can be used to retaliate against whistleblowers. As Tom said, it would be perfectly legal for it to. It's not against the WPEA. And so, unfortunately, it creates more work for the members of this Committee on Oversight over that rule in making sure that it's not used as retaliation against whistleblowers. I think employees of Federal agencies are going to look to you and to the House Whistleblower Protection Caucus to make sure that you are conducting that oversight and making sure that it's not being used as a new tool to retaliate against whistleblowers. Mrs. Lawrence. I just want to say to the chairman, it's refreshing to hear that the party, my colleagues are actually taking on the banner of saying how important our whistleblowers are to the health and the trust of the American people and that we are doing our job. And we must continue to protect the whistleblower. Thank you, and I yield back. Mr. Meadows. I thank the gentlewoman for her kind comments. The chair recognizes himself for a series of questions. So let me start off by saying for those that are whistleblowers that are watching here today, this is something that the ranking member and I, the retaliation, we will not tolerate. And by saying that, it means that we won't forget. There are people here in the audience, there's also people here that are watching that are hoping against hope that, Mr. Bachman, that you can help them or that they can get their reputation back. And sometimes it's not even the financial aspect. It is really the humiliation of being treated the way that they've been treated by a government that should and can do better. And so I say that because it's real easy to have hearings and assume that nothing's going to happen. That's not the way that I conduct my hearings. In fact, if anything, this is normally a culmination of fine, fine work by the staff. I'd like to take all the credit for their great work, and yet it is their work that brings forth a hearing, but also has a follow- up hearing. The gentleman from Virginia and I are committed to making sure that protections are there. With that being said, Mr. Bachman, I am concerned that a third of the whistleblowers are retaliated against. Did I hear you correctly, out of 6,000, some 2,000 are retaliated against? Mr. Bachman. No, I'm sorry. Let me clarify that. The overall number of cases that OSC receives across all program areas is 6,000. In terms of whistleblower retaliation complaints we receive, it's 2,000. Mr. Meadows. Okay. Okay. So even if we look at whistleblower retaliation, one of the things that we've talked about, we talk about chilling effects, is there any consequences to those that actually do the retaliation? Because I'm not seeing a whole bunch, other than, at times, maybe a slap on the wrist or even that may be more than they get, they get a letter in their file. Mr. Bachman, are we seeing any of that? Mr. Bachman. Well, I think--we couldn't agree more that we would like to see more disciplinary actions. I think, you know, as I said, we've made an over 100 percent increase in those numbers. We obviously want to do more. Our main focus has been to help the whistleblower. You know, when they come to us, they've been fired, we need to get them back on their job and back on their feet. I do think getting them back on their job does send a message. It's not the same thing as getting that manager fired, but it does send a message to the other employees that this person was protected, they were brought---- Mr. Meadows. And I do get that and I understand that, but I guess here is my concern with that. Having been in the private sector for a long time, I'm rewarded for those things I get rewarded by and I do them more. And those things that I don't get rewarded for or that I get punished for, I don't do them. And if there is neither the reward for good behavior, I mean-- and so maybe we look at this as if you have zero whistleblower retaliation events, that you get some kind of recognition. I'm not sure how we go about this, but I can tell you the ranking member and I were having a private conversation, the time is now. And what I would ask of each of you is to give this committee some of your recommendations on how we can do that. Because if we've got senior level managers who will continue to do this, and, Mr. Bachman, with all due respect, you're doing a great job, but they can thwart you as we do know with TSA and some of the other events that I'm familiar with, they thwart you and they try to run out the clock. And when they are running out the clock, bringing one person back sends an unbelievable message to all those other whistleblowers. And the reason I know that is I get calls from agencies all across the country. And they're calling and they make sure their numbers are unidentified, and they call with aliases just because they know that I will actually do something about it. But the other problem that we have there is, is if they're that fearful to talk to a Member of Congress, then we've got a systemic problem that we've got address. So I would ask, are you all all willing to give recommendations to this committee in terms of how we can maybe incentivize or discourage the behavior, and give me two recommendations on what you think? Mr. Storch, are you willing to do that? Mr. Storch. Yes, sir, absolutely. I am happy to participate in that very important discussion. One thing I would add that we've been doing for a while, and I was very happy to see in the IG Empowerment Act, was posting of instances where there's been reprisal. And that's something--we always look at these reprisal cases, and we don't have the volume that OSC does, but say in the FBI area or other areas. We look at them both in terms of whistleblower, obviously, and the harmed that they have suffered for coming forward and performing the service of doing that. But also we look at the person who engaged in the reprisal and whether or not that we can show that that constitutes misconduct, and if so, then to our standard procedures we would refer that. We had a posting not long ago where we posted a fairly high level person within the FBI who we found, based on our investigation, had engaged in reprisal against someone who had blown the whistle. And we publicly reported on that. And we're not the adjudicative body, as you know, that goes to another part of the Department, but still, hopefully, there's a deterrent effect from that, right? And very happy to see that in the IG Empowerment Act. And I think others in the IG community do that, and as more of that happens, hopefully, people will see that there are consequences for supervisors and managers who engage in that concept. Mr. Meadows. So since you do it there at DOJ, would you say that that's something we need to implement through OPM or some directive from OPM? Mr. Storch. Well, my understanding of the IG Empowerment Act is that now all of the IGs will be reporting when they find instances of reprisal against---- Mr. Meadows. Yeah, but it kind of bypasses OSC when you--I mean, indeed, if it's an IG investigation that applies and it's--I'm very familiar with that Act, but at the same time, it's critical that we send a message. So if you all would do that. Mr. Bachman, are you willing to do that? Mr. Bachman. Yes, absolutely. And very quickly, I think one thing to point out that has had a concrete effect is including within performance evaluations. So every employee gets an annual performance appraisal. We at OSC have now made that part of our supervisors and managers performance appraisals that they will be judged upon having an open atmosphere that would encourage whistleblowing. That has also been made a part of the VA's performance appraisals. So we think that could have a big impact as well. The second part is tone at the top, as I mentioned previously, and I just want to commend you and this committee and Senator Grassley for ``walking the walk.'' And planning to send this letter, I think, sends exactly the right message to whistleblowers across the---- Mr. Meadows. It either is gone or about to go out. So by the time we will gavel out, it'll be there. Mr. Devine. Mr. Devine. Sir, I agree with Mr. Bachman's priorities that the OSC has to focus on saving the careers of people who are being purged as a top priority. And that's why I think that structural reform in franchising the ability to seek discipline as part of the due process dimension of the list of our protection act is the most effective and direct solution, that a whistleblower should be able to seek discipline as part of the relief when prohibited personal practice is proven. The other alternative is to restore personal liability for constitutional violations, which historically existed but the Supreme Court canceled in 1983 due to passage of the statutory provisions. And Congress could restore that liability and that also would create deterrence. Mr. Meadows. Those are good recommendations. The latter one will be much more difficult to have happen. So, Ms. Hempowicz. Ms. Hempowicz. Yeah. I would be happy to give you some more recommendations after the hearing. But I will just repeat what I said in my testimony, that I think it's incredibly important that we make punishment for those found to have retaliated against whistleblowers mandatory. It was in the VA bill last year and went through. And when you have this mandatory punishment for somebody who retaliates, you've got to make sure that you have due process in place to make sure that you're not going to be punishing somebody who doesn't deserve it. But a mandatory suspension for the first offense sounds fair to me and sends that picture that retaliation is not acceptable and won't be rewarded. Because like you said, a lot of times, these people who are retaliating against whistleblowers receive bonuses, are promoted, or are moved up and out of the agency. Mr. Meadows. All right. So one final question and then I'll recognize the ranking member. Mr. Bachman, in terms of former Federal employees and the protections there, I mean, what kind of circumstances would you be able to help with former Federal employees? Mr. Bachman. That's an excellent question and identifies one of the big gaps in our enforcement areas. Right now, if you're an employee or an applicant for a Federal position, you are protected from retaliation. However, if you've left the Federal Government and then somebody retaliates against you because of what you had disclosed while you're with the government, the WPEA does not cover that. So right now, we are not able to---- Mr. Meadows. What about things they disclose after they've left? So they're a retiree. I've had some come to my office just afraid to share anything because they're afraid of potential retaliation with either clearances or retirements or anything else. Mr. Bachman. And if that--for example, if they retired and then blew the whistle and then were considering being a, you know, reemployed annuitant or something like that, yes, I think that should be covered. And we--OSC has actually taken that position recently in an amicus brief that any disclosure means any disclosure, regardless of whether you're an employee at the time. If you then seek employment with the Federal Government and they hold that against you, that's whistleblower retaliation. Mr. Meadows. All right. Well, with that, I would look forward to maybe some clarifying language that we could work in a legislative manner. And I'll recognize the ranking member. Mr. Connolly. Just underscoring your point, Mr. Meadows. I think we would be interested in trying to look at some kind of set of standards for disciplinary action when somebody is conclusively found to have retaliated against a whistleblower. The adjudication is going to be important because I am aware of cases of the opposite, where somebody claimed to have been discriminated against, and when you look at the evidence, it's simply not true. And they either have it in their head or they have a grievance against somebody and want to tarnish their good name. And so we have to be careful about that too in protecting reputations. The interesting thing to get at, for me, what I hear the most about is retaliation is more subtle than that. Putting someone in a broom closet without a phone and without a window, everyone can kind of catch on to that. But it's the subtle performance erosion in the evaluation and the lack of promotion that follows from that because you've got a bad evaluation or suddenly issues are cropping up. You know, and it's done cleverly and in an almost sinister way to damage your career and your good name over time. I think that is one that I worry a lot about because it's much harder to get at. It's harder to prove, but in some ways it's even more insidious. I don't know if anyone wants to comment on that before we close the hearing. Mr. Storch. I would agree entirely. You're absolutely right. And I would just say, based on our experience, when we've done these investigations in the FBI contacts, with the contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and the like, the more subtle the discrimination or the action, the more difficult it is to ferret out. And that--not that this is a play for resources, but I will say that it feeds into that problem, because they are very resource intensive investigations. I know I don't have to tell OSC that. I know from our working group OIGs across the community, we believe in the importance of whistleblowers. They're really key partners in the work we do. And we don't want to see them suffer reprisal. So there is not a lack of commitment. There are issues with resources---- Mr. Connolly. Yeah, but don't get too carried away. I know of one example, at least in an OIG office---- Mr. Storch. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. --where this occurred and it was the IG doing it. Mr. Storch. Right. No, I don't claim anything is absolute, but I think people--certainly, I can speak for our office, we get and others in our working group have talked about the importance of these principles, but also have talked about the difficulty of ferreting out just that sort of subtle discrimination. So the reason I bring it up is I really do think it feeds into this issue that these are really important issues that we want to be able to tackle and work with you on tackling and work with you on getting the resources to make sure we can do it effectively. Mr. Bachman. And for OSC, we couldn't agree more on the importance of the subtle forms of retaliation. And we've really made it a point, in our office, for our complaints examining unit who are the initial front line to review these complaints, if they see something like this and they believe there's an evidence of a violation, that we want to address this as quickly as possible because, A, it stops the bad action from happening, it helps the whistleblower. But B, it lets the agency, it lets the folks know we're looking at the little stuff too. We're not just going--you know, we're not just looking at the termination, we're looking at these subtler forms of retaliation. And also in terms of our outreach programs where we go to agencies, we train them, we make sure to include that these smaller personnel actions, that's retaliation too and you can't do it. Mr. Devine. So your insight about subtle retaliation is very well taken. The Whistleblower Protection Act shields against harassment, such as refusing to give people training that would allow them to advance in their careers. One of the common tactics that I come across is in a performance appraisal, having a comment in the appraisal that, I'm disturbed that Mr. Smith is not a team player. And that sends a message to all future employers in all job applications that are reviewed. And your question is a cue for the importance of the amicus briefs by the Office of Special Counsel and the job duties, so a short portion of the Whistleblower Protection Act. That's the only portion that requires actual retaliation. And the board has been drifting into expanding the scope of the job duties loophole and having high burdens of proof for it. And this should be interpreted very, very narrowly. There is no public policy relevance to whether a whistleblower commits the truth as part of an assignment or a personal initiative. And the same causal link that can cancel adverse actions for taking a personal initiative should be there when you're just doing your job properly. Ms. Hempowicz. I don't know if I have anything to add. However, it is definite that's something that we're very concerned about, and I'm happy to hear that you share that concern and plan to do more on that going forward. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. Mr. Meadows. Well, thank you all for your enlightening testimony. I can assure you that it will be followed up on. Our staff here is one that are not only diligent, but they're tenacious and so--in doing that. If there's no more business before the committee, the committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]