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- EMBEDDED THREATS: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, HIDDEN HARDWARE, AND LICENSING FAILURES IN AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EMBEDDED THREATS: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, HIDDEN HARDWARE, AND LICENSING FAILURES IN AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-52 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 62-658 WASHINGTON : 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Chair DARRELL ISSA, California JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland, Ranking ANDY BIGGS, Arizona Member TOM McCLINTOCK, California JERROLD NADLER, New York THOMAS P. TIFFANY, Wisconsin ZOE LOFGREN, California THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVE COHEN, Tennessee CHIP ROY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin Georgia BEN CLINE, Virginia ERIC SWALWELL, California LANCE GOODEN, Texas TED LIEU, California JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington TROY E. NEHLS, Texas J. LUIS CORREA, California BARRY MOORE, Alabama MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania KEVIN KILEY, California JOE NEGUSE, Colorado HARRIET M. HAGEMAN, Wyoming LUCY McBATH, Georgia LAUREL M. LEE, Florida DEBORAH K. ROSS, North Carolina WESLEY HUNT, Texas BECCA BALINT, Vermont RUSSELL FRY, South Carolina JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California BRAD KNOTT, North Carolina JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida MARK HARRIS, North Carolina DANIEL S. GOLDMAN, New York ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas BRANDON GILL, Texas MICHAEL BAUMGARTNER, Washington ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey, Chair BARRY MOORE, Alabama JASMINE CROCKETT, Texas, Ranking ROBERT F. ONDER, Jr., Missouri Member DEREK SCHMIDT, Kansas JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida BRANDON GILL, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., Georgia CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Majority Staff Director ARTHUR EWENCZYK, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, January 21, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page The Honorable Jefferson Van Drew, Chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of New Jersey......................... 1 The Honorable Jasmine Crockett, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of Texas.............. 3 The Honorable Jamie Raskin, Ranking Member of the Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Maryland....................... 4 WITNESSES Emily de La Bruyere, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Oral Testimony................................................. 6 Prepared Testimony............................................. 9 Rocky Cole, Co-Founder, Chief Operating Officer, iVerify Oral Testimony................................................. 16 Prepared Testimony............................................. 19 Chris Spear, President, Chief Executive Officer, American Trucking Association Oral Testimony................................................. 22 Prepared Testimony............................................. 24 Rob K. Knake, Chief Executive Officer, TPO Group Oral Testimony................................................. 38 Prepared Testimony............................................. 40 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC. SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING All materials submitted for the record by the Committee on the Judiciary are listed below..................................... 59 An Interim Staff Report entitled, ``The Weaponization of CISA: How a `Cybersecurity' Agency Colluded with Big Tech and `Disinformation' Partners To Censor Americans,'' Jun. 26, 2023, Committee on the Judiciary, Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, submitted by the Honorable Brandon Gill, a Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of Texas, for the record Materials submitted by the Honorable Jasmine Crockett, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight from the State of Texas, for the record An article entitled, ``DOGE Put Critical Social Security Data at Risk, Whistle-Blower Says,'' Aug. 26, 2025, The New York Times An article entitled, ``Transportation Department targets 3,000 truck driving schools for non-compliance,'' Dec. 1, 2025, AP News EMBEDDED THREATS: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, HIDDEN HARDWARE, AND LICENSING FAILURES IN AMERICA'S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS ---------- Wednesday, January 21, 2026 House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight Committee on the Judiciary Washington, DC The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Jefferson Van Drew [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. Members present: Representatives Van Drew, Onder, Gill, Crockett, Raskin, and Johnson. Mr. Van Drew. The Subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We welcome everyone to today's hearing on foreign involvement and threats to America's transportation system. I now recognize the doctor, the gentleman Dr. Onder from Missouri, to lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance. All. I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. Mr. Van Drew. Remain standing for a moment of silence. I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. Again, I want to welcome everyone, and I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I guess you could say this hearing is about control and who ultimately pays the price when we give that control away. Every day, millions of Americans travel on our Nation's highways, leaving behind a detailed digital record of who they are, where they go, what their destination is, and how they got there. I want to say on this hearing today--and I may be wrong; we are going to find out there may be some bipartisanship, not on all the subjects of the hearing, but particularly on this piece of it. I am hopeful for that. We are going to find out. We all agree that this is a serious issue. Electronic toll collection systems like E-ZPass were sold to the public as a convenience. You drive through; you get a bill later. Those bills get pretty big, by the way. Your data also does get tracked. In an alarming trend, more and more of this data is being stored and being controlled by foreign entities. In my home State of New Jersey, the E-ZPass system used by millions of residents--some of the most traveled roads in the United States of America are in the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey Turnpike, for example, used by millions and businesses as well, is now operated by a company under foreign government control, a Singaporean company with documented ties to the Chinese Communist Party. That means Americans are paying tolls into a system that is not under American control. Interestingly enough, New Jersey had a choice. There was an American company that submitted a lower bid to operate the system. Many believed it was a responsible bid. Instead of choosing the option that would have kept control here at my home and save residents money, the State went with the higher, more expensive foreign bid. This is at a time when families are struggling with inflation, high prices, and increased cost-of-living pressures. New Jersey taxpayers were asked to pay more for less accountability and less security. Higher costs, less transparency, more foreign control--it is a bad formula. The problems do not end with those who operate our toll systems. It extends to what is embedded inside the infrastructure itself. The United States has become dangerously dependent on Chinese-manufactured infrastructure components, including batteries, sensors, and cameras. In 2024, the Department of Homeland Security estimated that at least--at least--12,000 Chinese-made internet cameras were already in use across United States infrastructure. The February 2025 DHS report revealed that many of these cameras lack basic data encryption and security settings, and by default, they can communicate directly with their manufacturer located in China. That means foreign entities may have visibility into American facilities, American operations, and American vulner-abilities. Chinese State-sponsored cyberattack groups linked to the Chinese Government have demonstrated the capability to infiltrate U.S. infrastructure, steal sensitive data, and maintain persistent access inside our networks. Once again, it comes back to control. If we do not control the systems, the hardware, and the data, then we don't control the risk. The loss of American control does not stop with toll systems or infrastructure. Under the Biden Administration, States were allowed to issue CDLs, commercial driver licenses, to individuals who were not qualified and not proficient in English. This is where it may not be as bipartisan. Truck drivers must be able to read road signs. If you are driving an 18-wheeler, a semi, on the road, you have to be able to understand the signs. I don't know why that is complicated. They have to be able to communicate with law enforcement and respond in emergencies. When States ignore those requirements, Americans pay the price. Let me give you a few examples. On March 13, 2025, Austin, Texas, a tractor trailer driven--slowed for a stop in traffic plowed into more than a dozen vehicles, killed five people, including an infant and a child. The driver couldn't read and write English. On November 14, 2025, Boone County, Indiana, an illegal immigrant from the country of Georgia driving with a New York-issued nondomiciled CDL lost control of an 18-wheeler, killing a National Guardsman by the name of Terry Frye. In Ontario, California, a semitruck driven by an undocumented immigrant crashed on Interstate 10, killing three Americans and injuring several others. In St. Lucie County, Florida, a commercial truck driver with limited English proficiency made an illegal maneuver on the Florida Turnpike, and it resulted in a crash and killed three people. In Washington State, an undocumented commercial driver struck a stopped vehicle on a State highway killing a motorist. These are not just statistics. These are families. These are brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, daughters and sons, people whose families were destroyed because of what happened. Once again, it does come back to control. When States abandon enforcement of Federal law, Americans-- American families--suffer the consequences. Safety on American roads is not optional. American roads should be controlled by Americans. American data should be controlled and protected by Americans and American safety standards should be enforced for the benefit of Americans. I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I do look forward to your testimony. I now recognize the Ranking Member from the great State of Texas, Ms. Crockett, for an opening statement. Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the witnesses for appearing today to discuss threats to our transportation system. This is a serious national security issue. I appreciate the opportunity to have a bipartisan discussion, something that does not happen very often here, about how our foreign adversaries target America's critical infrastructure. Just last fall, the Federal Highway Administration warned that spyware had been found inside foreign-manufactured systems used to operate the signs, traffic cameras, weather stations, and vehicle chargers that line our highways all across the country. These communication devices could be used to collect individuals' transportation data, could be used to hack into government systems, and could even be used to cause outages in major American cities. Infiltration of our supply chains is just one vulnerability our adversaries can exploit. We consistently see our adversaries target our critical infrastructure with cyber espionage and cyberattacks. Unfortunately, from sending the names of CIA operatives over email to including a journalist in a Signal group chat discussing war plans, President Trump's Administration has shown a blatant disregard for our cybersecurity. The President has gutted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, our core civilian cyber defense agency. He also fired the head of the U.S. Cyber Command, DHS' Cyber Safety Review Board, and cybersecurity professionals at the NSA and NIST. The DHS determined the Critical Infrastructure Partner Advisory Council as a key advisory group that provided space for public-private collaboration to coordinate and craft cybersecurity plans to protect critical infrastructure. Experts repeatedly emphasize that public-private partnerships are necessary to protect the cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, which facilitates the public-private cyber threat intelligence ecosystem, expired last fall, and the Republican-led Congress has failed to reauthorize it. President Trump's Administration has also disbanded key operations targeting foreign malign influence. Attorney General Pam Bondi dissolved the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard dismantled the intelligence community's Foreign Malign Influence Center. It appears that there is no longer any Federal body dedicated to tracking and analyzing foreign-State efforts to interfere in American society. Meanwhile, the President seems to get friendlier with the heads of authoritarian adversarial Nations every day. This dismantling of the Federal Government's cybersecurity and national security resources and the continued politicization of our Federal agencies has left State and private officials reluctant to trust and share information with our Federal Government. This threatens the security of all critical infrastructure, from our healthcare to our elections to our transportation systems. It is vital that we address the ways our foreign adversaries target our key critical infrastructure sectors. In my opinion, the largest threat to our national security and critical infrastructure is not undocumented immigration or foreign investment. It is the incompetent folks at the highest levels of our government that have dismantled our cybersecurity resources. Thank you, and I yield back. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member. With that, I will recognize the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, Mr. Raskin. Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Chair Van Drew. Thank you to all our witnesses for joining us today. To the extent that our colleagues have called this hearing to examine how foreign threat actors are compromising our national security by targeting transportation and critical infrastructure, that is a valid and meaningful subject of inquiry. I salute the Chair for this initiative. China is in strategic competition with the United States and is using cyber espionage to undermine our defenses. Cybersecurity is of serious concern in the transportation sector because of the vast number of targets that operate new technologies and are run by a wide array of government and private entities. From AI-driven software to trip-reliant hardware, advancement in technology of course has great promise to make transportation faster, cheaper, and safer. We must be vigilant to ensure these systems are not vulnerable to infiltration or attack from malign actors, like Putin's autocratic Russia or the Stalinist bureaucrats of China. We cannot honestly discuss and debate the issue without addressing how President Trump has gutted the safeguards that protect our transportation and critical infrastructure against foreign threats. The programs and personnel in the U.S. Government that keep us safe have been cut wholesale and have been bizarrely politicized, jeopardizing our national security. Trump removed a third of the workforce at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which helps government and business work together to identify cyber threats before it is too late. That reduction included the Department officials dedicated to local government coordination with business, which is crucial to transportation infrastructure security. Trump fired the Chair of the Joint Chiefs and other top- level military leadership, eliminating continuity in national security, and his Attorney General shut down the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, the group responsible for identifying and combating malign foreign influence operations targeting the people of the United States. Trump's approach to national security, especially cybersecurity, is that of a coach who is friendly with the coaches of foreign teams and then suddenly takes his goalie off-net. To my mind, I don't think we can have a serious conversation about hardware vulner-abilities if we are going to ignore the fact that President Trump has made our infrastructure substantially less safe in just one year's time. What is even more confusing to me about today's hearing is that we are examining foreign threats as though Donald Trump isn't systematically ceding more global power to China every single day, even as he multiplies and deepens his own personal business ties to China. During his first term, Trump collected millions of dollars in payments from the Chinese Government and State-owned companies. In exchange for these unconstitutional emoluments, he opposed sanctions against Chinese telecom companies and banks even when they threatened our national security. He even tried to cancel military exercises with Japan and South Korea because China complained about them. In his second term, we have seen even more of enthusiastic Presidential embrace of the tyrants and dictators. Over the last year, the administration has dismantled USAID, giving China free rein to swoop in and offer countries around the world assistance with their infrastructure construction projects, their agricultural programs, their food aid, and public health, dramatically expanding China's sphere of influence. Trump has also hurt American consumers by imposing unlawful and arbitrary tariffs and hamstrung our ability to respond to threats by firing government workers, including key experts on China and national security personnel. All the while, he has been using his crypto ventures to pocket hundreds of millions of dollars directly from Chinese billionaires with ties to the CCP. In May, a tiny Chinese tech company with ties to the government announced it had bought $300 million of President Trump's memecoin, despite the fact that it has no revenue and only eight employees. Gee, I wonder where the money is really coming from. One year in Trump's second term, we've learned that other countries think that Donald Trump is indeed making a country great, but that country is not America. It is China. In a 21- country poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the majority of respondents around Europe said that while the U.S. is less feared by its adversaries and less revered by its friends, they fully expect China's global influence to continue to grow over the next decade. It is no wonder why they think, Mr. Chair, when Trump is inviting China, an egregious human rights violator, to join the Gaza Board of Peace and reverse its course and allows U.S. chip exports to China in a move that Anthropic CEO likened to selling nuclear weapons to North Korea. My friends, I wish this could just be about the problem of hardware technology in transportation, but it exists in this larger political context. That we have to make that clear for everyone if we are serious about confronting the problem of Chinese and Russian tyrannical influence in our government. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member. Let me say--only conjuncture here. I am not sure, but I have this sneaking suspicion, this intuitive feeling, the other side doesn't like President Trump all that much. Am I right? Ms. Crockett. I have never met him. Mr. Raskin. I have never met him. It is not personal. We were looking just at what the effect is on the American people. Mr. Van Drew. I know. I am trying to have a little levity. With that, I thank Mr. Raskin. Without objection, all other opening statements will be included in the record. Mr. Van Drew. We will now introduce today's witnesses. The first witness--I am going to try not to murder your name; we will see how I do--Ms. Emily de La Bruyere. Pretty close? OK. Thank you for being here. The floor is yours. Ms. de La Bruyere. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Van Drew-- Mr. Van Drew. Actually, let me--you know what? Let me do a little history of you. I am sorry. You are a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracy. It is a think tank that conducts research on our national security and foreign policy issues. Your work focuses on China, economic security, international organizations, and supply chains. Now the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF EMILY de La BRUYERE Ms. de La Bruyere. Thank you, Chair Van Drew. Thank you, Ranking Member Crockett. Thank you for this opportunity and both having names much easier to pronounce than mine. The Chinese Communist Party wants to control global resources, markets, and information so that it can control the world. Beijing pursues this ambition by leveraging nonmarket industrial policy through which it subverts critical supply chains and networks, a strategy of military-civil fusion through which it turns that positioning into a forward-deployed military presence, and a program State-sponsored data collection through which every Chinese company and component becomes an asset for influence and espionage. Transportation systems are a core part of this Chinese strategy. Beijing defines transportation systems as part of the military-civil fusion ecosystem because they are necessary for industrial operations, social functioning, and military mobilization. For that reason, China protects its own transportation systems domestically while looking to penetrate them internationally. Transport systems also represent a massive economic opportunity. The U.S. auto sector, for example, alone accounts for some 11 million jobs and $1.2 trillion of national output a year. Beijing wants those markets. Beijing also wants the military-relevant tech and industrial capacity that undergirds them. China wants something else from transportation systems, too. Today's technological trends are pushing the transport ecosystem toward an intelligent, connected, data-is-everything paradigm. In that environment, every foothold in a transport system, whether that is a component or a piece of software or a vehicle, becomes a possible back door. Everything is a computer. China is hacking all of it. For this reason, China's presence in U.S. transportation systems, (a) threatens U.S. industry and supply chains and markets, and (b) grants Beijing access to critical information on American society, the power to influence that information and therefore society, and the ability to disrupt the foundational networks on which our country depends. This isn't a notional danger. It is not something that is on the horizon. Our system is already embedded with Chinese components, and we are already under attack. LiDAR offers a valuable example. Autonomous vehicles use LiDAR to map their surroundings. Airports use it to track movement and crowds. Bridges use it to scan for defects. China controls 90 percent of the world's LiDAR market. The Chinese entities that are leading this charge are companies like Hesai, RoboSense, DJI that the U.S. Government has already identified as tied to the Chinese military. Those Chinese military-tied companies sell to GM's Cruise and Nvidia's Drive Hyperion. Their LiDAR sensors have been installed at JFK International Airport and Charlotte Douglas International Airport. Chinese LiDAR sensors are on intersections in Chattanooga and on drawbridges in Sarasota. Every purchase of a Chinese LiDAR sensor funds the Chinese Communist Party. Every Chinese LiDAR sensor risk collecting information on behalf of Beijing, and all of them could be turned off at China's command. This isn't a unique case. LiDAR is not isolated. The same story plays out across the broader ecosystem of components that go into modern transportation systems, whether those are IoT modules, optical transceivers, or cameras. Moreover, moving beyond the component level, Beijing is also building out the platform and software level of modern transportation. China is the world's largest player in in-car AI agents. Beijing is also developing unrivaled global shipping and transportation and logistics solutions, for example, LOGINK, a Chinese national platform that provides a centralized window into the otherwise fragmented world of global shipping under the Chinese Government's control. Washington needs to stop further Chinese penetration of our transportation systems. Those efforts can start with direct restrictions. No company that uses Chinese components software or those made by a Chinese-influenced entity should be eligible for Federal procurement, Federal tax incentives, or any other Federal incentives. In establishing restrictions like that, Washington should also tighten and clarify FEOC and PFE rules to make it clear what it is that is a Chinese entity and to make that a stricter definition. Targeted measures like this can directly bolster the security of American transportation systems, but Washington should also take broader action to change the State of play that has allowed China to embed itself into our critical infrastructure systems. Tariffs on Chinese goods can help dissuade the U.S. private sector from buying from Chinese entities and therefore from being complicit with the Chinese Communist Party. Tariffs can also create the circumstances in which to rebuild a trusted American industry. On the data front, no company that stores data in China should be permitted to collect data in the United States or be eligible for Federal procurement, defense industrial-based procurement, Federal tax credits, or other incentives. Washington should leverage trade deals to compel U.S. allies and partners to enact their own defenses against China, such that they don't serve as conduits for the Chinese Communist Party. It might seem impossible now to think that China could supplant American giants like FedEx, Boeing, and Ford. That scenario is on the very, very near horizon. Should it come to pass, China will claim a determinative advantage. Washington needs to fight back. Thank you for your time. [The prepared statement of Ms. de La Bruyere follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. Very informative. That outlines the seriousness of this issue. I know it is not the sexiest issue in Congress that everybody is talking about, and I get it. This room should be packed, and everybody should hear this and listen to it. It is a serious, serious issue. Again, as I said before--and I understand components of what you are talking about in your issues, but it should be a bipartisan one as well. Now, your name, on the other hand, Mr. Cole, is Rocky Cole. Couldn't be easier than that, right? Mr. Cole. Correct. Mr. Van Drew. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF ROCKY COLE Mr. Cole. Thank you, Chair Van Drew, Ranking Member Crockett, and the distinguished Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify today. The topic of the hearing is embedded threats in America's transportation systems, and I will certainly address those directly. However, I believe, as several other people have pointed out, that these threats are best understood in the broader context of adversarial cyber operations against America's critical infrastructure as they constitute one piece of a larger strategic landscape. My name is Rocky, and I have worked to counter America's top cyber adversaries for almost 20 years now, first within the United States intelligence community, then at Google, and now at a U.S.-based, venture capital-backed company called iVerify, which secures the very powerful computers in our pockets, mobile phones. I have witnessed a strategic evolution of cyber operations from the earliest days of mere cyber espionage to what can only be called today's cyber cold war. My experiences have informed a somewhat unique perspective on both the problem and steps we can take to mitigate the threats. In cyberspace, America has two historical rivals, China and Russia. Historically, both Chinese and Russian cyber operations were focused on intelligence gathering. For China, this meant extracting intellectual property to feed their Made in China 2025 strategy, which a former Director of the NSA described as the greatest transfer of wealth in human history, while Russia focused on more traditional espionage goals. However, we have recently, in within the last five years, reached a watershed moment where the objective of cyber operations has shifted to prepositioning for disruptive effects. Modern doctrine now views cyberspace as a basic platform for hybrid warfare where blinding cyberattacks are intended to paralyze command-and-control networks before kinetic operations even begin. The U.S. intelligence community assesses with high confidence that these actors are embedding, quote, ``sleeper software'' within our infrastructure to be activated at will. The threat from China is particularly acute through several multiyear campaigns aimed at achieving information dominance. The Volt Typhoon campaign, for example, targets energy, water, and yes, transportation sectors specifically to disable military mobilization and sow domestic chaos that would distract U.S. leaders during the potential invasion of Taiwan. Furthermore, Salt Typhoon has compromised the backdoor systems used by telecommunication providers for court-ordered wiretapping and allowing China to monitor law enforcement, track the real-time geolocations of millions of Americans, and compromise our mobile devices. These operations have even expanded to targeting toll systems and compromising State-level commercial driver's license databases, all which are vital for our national logistics. To evade detection, these actors have refined their methods to bypass modern defenses through malware-free intrusions. They utilize techniques like living off the land, which means using legitimate system administration tools to blend in with normal activity and avoid detection, using largely stolen credentials like passwords and tokens as their initial access point. Finally, as per the topic of this hearing, they increasingly utilize supply chain operations to gain backdoor access to critical technologies. This could manifest as tampering with or implanting hardware components, inserting malicious codes into software updates, or compromising the integrity of manufacturing processes for devices like routers, servers, and even large industrial equipment such as port cranes. Despite the magnitude of the threat, the United States remains hamstrung by a patchwork regulatory landscape and structural challenges that impede a unified defense. Our defensive posture is characterized by voluntary frameworks that have failed to keep pace with the adversary's strategic pivot to prepositioning. Compounding this is the complexity of coordinating between the Federal Government and 50 State-level regulatory bodies. This asymmetry demands a significant structural and legal overhaul to achieve true cyber deterrence both on the offensive side and on the defensive side. This includes formalizing the authority for the United States Cyber Command to, quote, ``defend forward and disrupt adversarial groups within foreign networks before they reach the homeland.'' We must also address systematic personnel failures within the United States Cyber Command by transitioning toward an independent cyber force that establishes uniform standards for recruitment and training and bypasses the traditional military standards that have frankly hindered our cyber readiness. Most importantly, we should consider advancing a framework that treats cyberattacks on critical infrastructure that may imperil a human life as the acts of war that they are, equivalent to kinetic strikes. We must also harden our domestic resilience by moving beyond purely voluntary standards. Congress should fund States to build high-maturity response capabilities and convert voluntary resilience standards into mandates for systematically important entities requiring redundant power and physical hardening across physical sectors. We must shift the legal duty of care to software manufacturers and away from the end users like local governments, instead holding the software designers liable for design flaws while mandating a move to secure-by- design principles rather than today's voluntary pledges. Finally, to mitigate supply chain risks, Congress should consider implementing mandatory screening and the eventual phase-out of Chinese-manufactured hardware with remote communications capabilities within highly sensitive critical infrastructure and Federal networks, akin to the rip-and- replace campaigns that Congress has already funded to remove Chinese-made telecommunications gear from America's core networks. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Cole. With that, let me say you're the co-founder and COO of iVerify, a cybersecurity company focused on mobile phones, and previously worked at Google and Deloitte and served with the National Security Agency. Mr. Chris Spear is next. Mr. Spear is the President and Chief CEO officer of the American Trucking Association, an organization made up of trucking companies. He also serves on the Board of Directors for American Transportation Research Institute and the Trucking Cares Foundation. Mr. Spear? STATEMENT OF CHRIS SPEAR Mr. Spear. Chair Van Drew, Ranking Member Crockett, and the Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. For over 90 years, the American Trucking Associations has represented an industry that employs the hardest-working men and women in the country. Safety is in our DNA, and it is at the forefront of everything that we do. The overwhelming majority of America's 3.6 million truck drivers take immense pride in their work. They meet every requirement every day, and they move our economy forward with proficiency and with pride. Safely operating a tractor trailer requires specialized skills and an adherence to high standards of professionalism. A CDL should represent a promise that the person behind the wheel of an 80,000-pound vehicle is qualified, competent, and accountable. Regrettably, years of lax and uneven enforcement have undermined that promise. Serious vulnerabilities, particularly related to driver training and CDL issuance, have been exposed through several high-profile, tragic, and preventable crashes. CDL mills which masquerade as legitimate schools have fast- tracked prepared individuals into trucking by putting profits before training. Meanwhile, State licensing agencies handed out improper credentials, and Federal regulators looked the other way, enabling unqualified individuals to climb into the driver's seat. ATA has long warned that insufficient compliance allows unsafe operators to obtain CDLs. Fortunately, Secretary Duffy has made it a priority to close these loopholes. Our federation has been working hand-in- glove with USDOT to implement comprehensive solutions. We know that meaningful oversight works. Since December, FMCSA at DOT has removed nearly 7,000 CDL mills from the training provider registry and put an additional 450 noncompliant providers on notice. These actions, coupled with upholding Federal driver qualifications and implementing regular audits, are critical steps toward improving the CDL system. We appreciate the Subcommittee's focus on these issues, and we look forward to being a resource as you seek to codify these regulations. While the integrity of CDLs is foundational to highway safety, the systems that monitor driver compliance and enable roadside enforcement are just as critical. In recent years, the proliferation of noncompliant electronic logging devices has emerged as a serious and rapidly evolving threat. Cheating has gone high-tech, with some devices using AI to produce fake documentation, like fuel and food receipts, to fabricate hours of service. Equally concerning are digital back doors that could provide U.S. adversaries access to sensitive supply chain data. When operators are able to purchase devices that falsify logs or conceal violations, it rewards unsafe behavior and penalizes carriers who invest in compliant systems. ATA strongly supports FMCSA's efforts to strengthen electronic logging device certification, which have led to the removal of nearly 100 noncompliant devices in just the last two months. An additional 250 devices have been removed, underscoring the need for better vetting on the front end. We urge Congress to improve device screening, apply greater scrutiny to foreign-owned ELDs, and enhance penalties against violators. Another growing concern involves cross-border trade with Mexico. The B-1 visas allow Mexican drivers to haul freight between Mexico and the U.S., but not within the United States. When B-1 drivers haul domestic freight, it is called cabotage, and it is illegal. This underhanded practice exploits Mexican drivers, and it is unfair to law-abiding motor carriers and American truck drivers. ATA is pushing for stepped-up enforcement against these violations. Finally, I would like to draw the Subcommittee's attention to a transportation security lapse within the Department of Defense that was identified by ATA's Government Freight Conference. The Department is improperly awarding shipments to unauthorized carriers to move sensitive cargo like M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. This practice compromises safety by putting military freight in the hands of unvetted carriers and drivers. Last year, ATA worked with Congress to enact several provisions in the NDAA aimed at this problem, and we will continue to partner with you to shore this up. ATA thanks the Subcommittee for your interest in identifying foreign ownership risks and hidden vulnerabilities across our transportation system. I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Spear follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Spear. Mr. Rob Knake is the Chief Executive Officer of TPO Group, a cybersecurity consulting firm. He previously served as the Deputy National Cyber Director with the National Security Council and at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Knake? STATEMENT OF ROB K. KNAKE Mr. Knake. Thank you, Chair Van Drew, and thank you, Ranking Member Crockett and the Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify on this subject. While I can't speak to the issues that my colleague Mr. Spear has addressed, I think you are going to find that the bipartisan approach that you were hoping for, Chair Van Drew, really has emerged, at least within the cybersecurity community, on these topics. There is very little that I could disagree with in either the tone or the substance of what my other two panelists have said about the cyber threats. As not to repeat much of what they have said, let me make a series of points about how we address these threats. First, let me applaud the focus on embedded threats. As Mr. Cole pointed out, our critical infrastructure is compromised through remote hacking capabilities that China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea have deployed. This is a serious issue. This is a serious risk, and more needs to be done to address that traditional threat. The threat from embedded systems that are dependent on Chinese-produced electronics, Chinese IT components, and Chinese products is unique to China because of the scale of their manufacturing and the lack of capacity that we have in the United States today. I will primarily focus my remarks on the cyber aspects here, but it should be noted that in the event of a conflict with China, they will have the ability to cutoff supplies for critical minerals, critical goods, critical parts, and services that our economy needs to run. That alone means that we need to diversify our supply, onshore our supply, and build trusted supply networks with our allies overseas. While we need to diversify our supply, we also simply cannot simply trust that something produced by an ally or something produced by a U.S. company, built by U.S. citizens, is necessarily trusted. Let me go for another point of bipartisanship here by quoting Ronald Reagan. This is an area where the mantra needs to be, ``Trust but verify.'' We need to verify that the systems we rely on are in fact secure, regardless of whether they are produced by a U.S. company from entirely U.S.-made components or they are produced by our allies through an extended and secured supply chain. We cannot simply assume that onshoring will address this risk. We have seen the risk from transshipment where U.S. companies may think that they are building from chips that did not in fact come from China, but those chips may have been transshipped from China through Vietnam, Mexico, or another country. A drone or other device that you may think is secure and is U.S. and American made may have a risk inside it that even the company that manufactured it does not know about. That is why it is critically important that we invest in the ability not only to produce these goods domestically and with our allies but also be able to identify and recognize when these supply chains have been compromised and when there are back doors or logic bombs or other threats embedded in these systems. We can envision a future in which we have trusted supply chains, but to get there, we need much stronger government action. Chair Van Drew, to your point about a more expensive Chinese system, I think what we are seeing today is that, typically, Chinese suppliers are often cheaper, but in some cases they in fact have better capability than some U.S.- produced goods. What that will mean on the market is that companies are going to purchase the cheaper good, particularly if it is more effective than an American-made good. I was part of a long-running--what I would call a whispering campaign against Huawei to say that Huawei's technology shouldn't be trusted; it shouldn't be put in our core infrastructure. The FBI did briefings. We did briefings at the NSC. What finally worked was banning that technology, and then for the rural broadband telecommunications providers that were incapable of investing to replace that, subsidizing that investment. We need a far broader approach like that to the categories of technology that China is dominant in today, and we need to develop and invest in the ability to verify that the replacement technologies produced in the United States are, in fact, secure and have not been compromised. Thank you for this opportunity. [The prepared statement of Mr. Knake follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Knake. All good statements. I am going to ask you all to rise to be sworn in. Raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm under penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about to give is true and correct to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you God? You may be seated. Mr. Raskin. Point of order, Mr. Chair. Mr. Van Drew. Yes. Mr. Raskin. Does that apply also to testimony they have already given? Mr. Van Drew. Correct. Mr. Raskin. Thank you. Mr. Van Drew. Thank you for that. That does apply to the testimony you have already given. What the Ranking Member is pointing out in his gentle way is I should have done that at the very beginning when you started your testimony. That is a good point. Thank you. With that being said, we are going to begin with the questions. I am going to start with the gentleman from Missouri, Dr. Onder. Mr. Onder. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Over the past decade, Federal agencies and infrastructure operators have embedded software-driven electrical equipment throughout America's roads, ports, rail systems, and power networks. Through this rapid modernization, we have quietly opened a dangerous national security vulnerability. Foreign- manufactured hardware now sits at the core of systems that keep the American economy running and the military moving. Nowhere is the threat more acute than in the power sector. Chinese-made inverters, batteries, and transformers have become foundational to the power grid and critical infrastructure. The components are designed, built, and in some cases remotely controlled by firms operating under the authority and influence of the Chinese Communist Party. As a result, the CCP is increasingly positioned to monitor, disrupt, or manipulate the infrastructure that underpins U.S. commerce, public safety, and national defense. Ms. de La Bruyere, can you explain why it is inherently dangerous for U.S. roads, ports, and rail systems to rely on electronic components manufactured in China, particularly when those components are embedded deep inside operational systems? Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes. There are three main reasons from the informational perspective. (1) The first is those components give China access to critical American information: Who is traveling, where, when, and how. That is like a personal privacy risk, but it is also a strategic asset. We are in a competition where data is the new oil. Data is the single most dominant resource. In the great power competition with China, if Beijing has full information on our society, that is how it can target all its attacks. (2) China can shape information: If information is fueling transportation and you can shape information, you can decide who is moving where, when, and what. You can pick winners and losers, what company, shipping route, and software add-on is going to win. That means that Beijing controls our society. Then, there is the disruption threat. All these two things are short of any outright conflict scenario. That is just happening. If China decides it is time, they can shut off our systems. They can interfere with our systems. They can destabilize our society. (3) That is informational threat: On top of it, there is just a basic supply chain and industrial threat. China can stop providing these components. We are trying to build new infrastructure or modernize infrastructure. We are at their mercy? Plus, our industrial base depends on being able to produce these critical goods. Our country depends on having an industrial base. Our economy depends on that. If we forfeit that to China, there goes American growth and freedom. Mr. Onder. What categories of U.S. infrastructure, like EV charging stations, tolling stations, rail signaling, port cranes, traffic management systems, currently depend on foreign-manufactured electronic hardware? I am afraid you are going to say all the above. Ms. de La Bruyere. All of the above. At so many levels, too, that we aren't--you mentioned inverters. No one is talking about inverters. Mr. Onder. Right. Ms. de La Bruyere. That is a huge risk to the grid. All of those sectors. Every sector. Data centers. Optical transceiver--building them at rapid scale. Optical transceivers are necessary for data centers. We increasingly depend on those for so many other industries. What if China shuts those off? Mr. Onder. Yes. I was at an energy conference in Houston a few months back, and someone, one of the speakers, talked about Chinese-made batteries. Any kind of reliance on so-called green energy when their solar is going to rely on massive battery- charging capability, or even one's--the electrical panel on one's roof, private home, would depend on a battery. Apparently, a large percentage of these are being made in communist China right now. Those could, in theory, be remotely flipped off or even remotely made to overheat, causing electrical power or even explosion risk. Mr. Cole, I see you nodding. Any comments on this? Mr. Cole. Congressman, I was just discussing with the other witnesses before the hearing that there are virtually no cybersecurity standards around electric vehicles as a category, whether that be batteries that can communicate directly, perhaps, with China, or other cybersecurity standards of the self-driving components of the vehicle. You can imagine a world where the United States is trying to mobilize for a conflict, and suddenly EVs are blocking roads, the interstates, and cities. Mr. Onder. Yes. It is frightening. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Georgia. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Hostile foreign nations like China are targeting critical infrastructure here in America. Donald Trump is enriching himself with money from China while weakening United States programs that protect us from their security threats. For example, the Chinese Government and its State- controlled entities spent over $5.5 million at Trump-owned properties during the first Trump Administration. In this second administration, the greed and corruption is turbocharged. A Chinese company recently announced that it would buy up to $300 million of President Trump's cryptocurrency. Coincidentally, the Trump Administration is systematically weakening our defenses against China's security threats. Ms. de La Bruyere, would you agree that the U.S. needs to be the No. 1 country for artificial intelligence? Ms. de La Bruyere. I would agree with that. Mr. Johnson. You would agree also that Nvidia chips power the Nvidia or the AI revolution, correct? Ms. de La Bruyere. They are among the components that power the AI revolution, yes. Mr. Johnson. Does it surprise you that Trump has discarded America's strategic technological edge over China insofar as AI chips by changing the rules and allowing the export of Nvidia's AI chips to China? Ms. de La Bruyere. What surprises me the most is that-- Mr. Johnson. Does that surprise you? Ms. de La Bruyere. I think what surprises me the most is that we don't actually have an edge in AI chips over China anymore. Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. You want to take me in a different direction. Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes, sir because it is important Mr. Johnson. I don't want to go in the direction you are trying to take me. I am going to now ask Mr. Cole. Mr. Cole, Elon Musk and his DOGE musketeers benched hundreds of cybersecurity professionals at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, also known as CISA, and at the National Security Agency. Nearly a third of CISA's staff was cut, including divisions that coordinated with States and businesses which provide key assistance for transportation infrastructure. Was that a wise move by Trump? Mr. Cole. Well, first, Congressman, I'm a native Georgian, so it is a pleasure to meet you. Mr. Johnson. Well, good to meet you, too, sir. Mr. Cole. I have always wanted to. To answer your question, I do think now is not the time to cut CISA's budget or operational-- Mr. Johnson. That was a bad move. His budget request to Congress now includes an additional 18 percent cut to CISA's Cybersecurity Division, which leads efforts to protect government networks and helps defend critical infrastructure. Was that a good move or a bad move? Mr. Cole. Congressman, if you go around the country and talk to the State cyber leaders, they will all tell you they would like additional Federal support to respond to cyberattacks. Mr. Johnson. Well, it was a bad move. That is probably what you are trying to say. Let me ask you, Mr. Knake. We have seen our foreign adversaries exploit cyber vulnerabilities against our communications, energy, and water sectors, among others. It may be easy to discount national security risk to our transportation infrastructure because we haven't yet seen widespread consequences in this field. While embedded technology like undisclosed radios and batteries in cranes clearly shows that our adversaries may have the capability to conduct espionage or even cause outages in transportation infrastructure, when local governments or private companies are acquiring technology, they may be willing to overlook the national security risk in favor of getting technology that they need more quickly or for cheap, or cheaper. Does the fact that we haven't yet seen a major cyberattack against our transportation infrastructure mean that we don't have to worry about this national security threat? It comes at a time when Trump's net worth increased by $3 billion over last year. With this security threat, does it mean we need to be worried, or do we have cause for concern as the President gets richer and our security is eroded? Mr. Knake. Sir, we have absolutely seen campaigns carried out against our transportation infrastructure for the purposes of collecting intelligence and for the purposes of planning future attacks. What we haven't yet seen is significant disruption of that infrastructure because the geopolitical moment in which our adversaries would want to take advantage of that has not emerged yet. Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman. I am going to yield five minutes to myself. This is to Mr. Spear. How does weakened enforcement of Federal CDL and English proficiency requirements undermine safety on American roads? Tell me if you agree this should be viewed as a national security and rule-of-law issue rather than just a regulatory problem. Mr. Spear. Well, the criteria or the standards that you are speaking to come from the United States Department of Transportation, handed down to the States. The States administer the tests. Some States do it very well, and there is a handful that aren't. We have seen over the last few years a whole host of CDLs get issued to people that shouldn't have them, candidly. First, they may not be here legally. They may not be able to speak or understand English. They shouldn't be operating an 80,000-pound heavy-duty truck, moving freight across the country. Those standards and the relationship between the Federal and State Government is absolutely essential to make sure that all States are doing the same thing on those fundamentals. Mr. Van Drew. If I was to ask you if Federal CDL and English proficiency standards have been consistently enforced, am I being fair when I say that some of the fatal crashes we discussed today probably could have been prevented? Mr. Spear. There is absolutely no question. Your opening statement covered several crashes that we have also watched very closely. A lot of the folks that you cited in those actions, those drivers, were not able to speak English, understand English, probably should never have been driving in the first place. They were issued CDLs when they shouldn't have had them. You don't want people like that behind the wheel of a 40-ton U.S. truck. Mr. Van Drew. I would think. Thank you. I am going to ask you a rapid-fire question here, and if you agree we do need to do more, if you could catch up with us and get information to me. What I am going to ask is, do you believe, in the United States of America, we need to do anything legislatively? Does Congress need to do something to make us more safe and more secure? Very briefly. I am going to ask all of you, so we have to go quickly. Ms. de La Bruyere? Ms. de La Bruyere. Yes, absolutely. First, a low-hanging fruit stopping an unforced error is, with any Federal incentives or procurement, having actually enforced stringent restrictions on the ability of Chinese or Chinese-influenced entities with clear rules of what those are to receive them. Mr. Van Drew. I know you don't write bills, but if you could get us that information, get it to my office and also to the Committee, of what you saw, this bill gives us priorities on that. Mr. Cole? Mr. Cole. Yes, Mr. Chair, I do believe Congress needs to act in a few ways. First, I believe the United States Cyber Command needs additional authorities to be able to operate at the speed with which our adversaries are. I believe Congress must do more legislatively to increase our resiliency against cyberattacks. To some degree, we have to assume that Nation-State adversaries have already compromised our infrastructure, and that means giving States the ability to more quickly respond to threats as they emerge. That could mean additional funding or clearer frameworks. Finally, I agree with Ms. de La Bruyere that we should take a legislative approach to data sovereignty as well. Mr. Van Drew. Please get that to my office, both of you, as quickly as you could. Thank you. Mr. Spear? Mr. Spear. On the English language proficiency, we would advocate, for the American Trucking Associations, that Congress fully codify English language proficiency for all drivers, that all States should test for this consistently across the board. This is a safety issue. If you are operating a vehicle, you shouldn't be pulling a U-turn on the Florida Turnpike. You should be able to understand weather signs in, say, Wyoming. You need to understand English. You need to be able to operate that equipment safely around the motoring public. Congress needs to codify this to ensure that all 50 States abide by this and aren't just handing CDLs out carelessly to people that shouldn't be driving a 40-ton truck. Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. Please bring that to my office as well. Mr. Knake? Mr. Knake. I would say the most important thing, from my perspective, is to fill gaps in regulatory frameworks so that we have comprehensive ability to oversee regulation in this space. Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. I will yield back the rest of my time. With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member of this Committee, Ms. Jasmine Crockett. Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. I will point out that being a bad driver doesn't necessarily have anything to do with whether or not you can speak English. I also will point out that I have had the privilege, or maybe not so much the privilege, of driving in multiple countries, and I was not required to get another license. I was able to rent cars in other countries and drive because some things are kind of universal. Frankly, if somebody passes the test as it is laid out, then I think that this is what it is. If we need to change the test, then we need to change the test. Nevertheless, one of the things that has become clear over the past year is that this President can be bought. If you have enough money, you can get favorable regulations from this White House. You can get pardons, you can get contracts, and you can get influence with this President, even if you have ties to a foreign government, which the Justice Department has described as--and I quote, ``a significant risk to U.S. national security.'' We have already established that the Trump Administration has shown a blatant disregard for our cybersecurity. In his first month in office, the President dismantled nearly all of the DHS' advisory committees that study major cyberattacks and provide actionable recommendations to defend against those attacks. Mr. Knake, what role did these advisory committees play in protecting our critical infrastructure? How does their dissolution make us less safe? Mr. Knake. Thank you, Ranking Member Crockett. Absolutely, these committees were essential to establishing the mechanisms for coordinating and collaborating on cybersecurity with our industry partners. They were necessary but not sufficient. They laid the groundwork for the real-time collaborative engagement that has been emerging over the last five years. We have gone from having just these discussions on policy and risk and threat to actually working with government agencies, with CISA, NSA, Cyber Command, and the FBI. Ms. Crockett. If I am to understand you correctly, you believe that they were necessary, but you believe that they weren't even sufficient in their current form. If anything, you believe that they should have been beefed up, not deleted, correct? Mr. Knake. There is absolutely a need to expand these collaborative mechanisms with industry and to make them real time and substantial. Yes. Ms. Crockett. Now, I represent the State of Texas, which is the largest exporting State in the country. Texas has 32 official ports of entry that serve as critical gateways to global trade. Mr. Knake, as you probably know, 80 percent of cranes at U.S. ports are manufactured by a Chinese State-owned entity, and the government has found communication devices embedded on these cranes that could be used to track port activity and enable cyber espionage. What concerns are raised when the technology used inside a critical infrastructure system is manufactured by a foreign adversary? Mr. Raskin. In the case of these devices, what we are talking about is an ability to both monitor and control and disrupt the infrastructure, should it be in China's interest to do so. It is an absolutely critical risk that we be able to maintain our trade in the event that they feel they are compelled to use that capability. The focus here, in my view, needs to be retrofitted at this point. We don't need to replace the steel that holds up the cranes. We are certain that is pretty strong. What we need to do is replace the electronics, rip and replace the electronics, and operate them with trusted hardware and trusted software that we know is not communicating back to China. Ms. Crockett. The costs associated with operating technology needed for critical infrastructure are increasing. It doesn't help that the Trump Administration's policies are partly responsible for the cost increase. However, States are weighing the costs and availability of the technology they need to operate and maintain their critical infrastructure. There aren't domestic manufacturers for many of these necessary machines, such as cargo ships or port cranes. Let me ask you this. We did have the CHIPS and Science Act, and my predecessor in Congress was actually the one that ushered that through. That was to make sure that we could manufacture more chips right here domestically. It is so unfortunate because there were so many plans, and there were so many that were saying, ``We are going to take advantage of this bill and pull down on these dollars,'' and now those plans have fallen by the wayside because of some of the terrible tariff policies that currently are taking place. It is harming us not only economically, but it is harming us from a security standpoint. This was not fiscally responsible policy that this administration has engaged in, but it has also been very harmful to us domestically. The last question is, so what solutions are there to mitigate the risk posed by foreign technology and infrastructure supply chains? Mr. Knake. We badly need to make a government investment in the retrofitting of these technologies. The markets simply are not going to support this investment on their own, given that these are national security risks, and no risks that are necessarily going to be borne by shareholders of companies. Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much for your time. I yield back. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the Ranking Member. I would just make one minor point that, probably, when she was driving in those foreign countries, she wasn't driving an 18-wheeler. I could probably guarantee that. Ms. Crockett. How do you know? Mr. Van Drew. Well, I am hoping not. I couldn't even drive one. The CDL requirements are much more specific and much harder. Do you have an CDL? I don't have an CDL. Ms. Crockett. I am just saying I may have. Mr. Van Drew. You could. You could. Ms. Crockett. I got a license to carry. [Simultaneous speaking.] Mr. Van Drew. Jasmine, so do I. So, do I. You never know. With that, we have--the gentleman from Texas has a UC request. Mr. Gill. I would like to ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record this report, ``The Weaponization of CISA: How a Cybersecurity Agency Colluded with Big Tech and Disinformation Partners to Censor Americans.'' Mr. Van Drew. Without objection. I will ask the gentleman to go forward and present testimony--questions. Mr. Gill. Thank you, Mr. Chair for holding this hearing. In 2016, the Obama-Biden Administration issued internal guidance that weakened enforcement by discouraging roadside interviews and out-of-service penalties, effectively nullifying a core safety rule without changing the law. Since that time, fatal truck crashes have increased, and multiple deadly incidents have involved nondomiciled or non- English-proficient drivers who should have never been licensed or allowed to operate in the first place. In many cases, they shouldn't have even been in this country in the first place. The Trump Administration has moved to restore the rule of law by rescinding the guidance, and even Democrat-led States such as California couldn't hide the damage inflicted by the radical Democrats' open-borders policies and revoked 17,000 commercial driver's licenses given to illegal aliens. Thank you, witnesses, for taking the time to be here. Mr. Spear, do you consider the Obama-Biden Administration 2016 rule guidance which discouraged out-of-service enforcement for English proficiency failures to be a breakdown in regulatory control over critical transportation sector? Mr. Spear. I do. That decision cost lives. Respectfully, Congresswoman Crockett, the accident that was cited in the Chair's opening statement killed people because that driver did not understand what he was doing. An 80,000-pound vehicle is much different than a car. It does not stop on a dime. It doesn't turn on a dime. These are very heavy vehicles that need to have people trained and skilled to operate them, and they need to understand the language we speak. Here in America, that is English. I have lived and worked in five continents, driven in all five--Arabic, Chinese, you name it. You have to understand that country's language to understand how to operate a vehicle. It is for the safety of those around you. That 2016 decision by the Obama Administration took the lives of innocent people because it put people out on the road behind the wheel of an 80,000-pound vehicle that should never have been driving. We need stronger enforcement. That rule has been in the books since the 1930s. It should be consistent no matter what party you are for. If you care about the safety of people driving in your district, then this needs to be enforced in all 50 States evenly. It is simply fundamental. There is absolutely no compromise when it comes to safety. We don't hedge on any of that. I want to be very clear. We need to enforce it. It needs to be done by every State. It needs to be done evenly. Yes, the language does matter. Mr. Gill. You are exactly right. It does cost lives. It cost the life of the son of one of my constituents. A little over two years ago, eight-year-old Barron Ritchey of Pilot Point, Texas, was killed on I-35 near Hillsboro when a wheel hub and tires broke off a semi and struck the Ritchey family's SUV as his mother drove him home from a school trip. The non-English speaking illegal alien Martin Monreal- Alvarado had overstayed a B-1 visitor visa that expired six months prior to the incident. Further, Monreal-Alvarado was a party to RTD Carriers trucking company, an entity with an abysmal Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration record. The RTD Carriers employed other foreign drivers, as well, without valid work visas and sent Monreal-Alvarado on an unlawful route beyond the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement commercial zone. The reality was that if even one of these issues had been policed, Barron Ritchey would still be with us today. Mr. Spear, what can Congress do to confront unsafe carriers such as RTD from closing and reopening under a new name, reusing the same dangerous equipment and dangerous personnel? Mr. Spear. Well, certainly, work with your colleagues in the Transportation Infrastructure Committee to give the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration at DOD the authority it needs to clean up the registry. OK? We have people come on, off, on, off. They have an accident; they come back on. They change their name. This system is broken. The Federal oversight and ability to manage the motor carrier populace properly, safely, is broken. Secretary Duffy understands that. They are going back to the basics and enforcing the laws that you have given them. Where there are shortfalls, you all in Congress need to step up and give these agencies the power they need to have interstate commerce standards applied equally in all States. These are just fundamentals. When you take a test in a State like California for a CDL, you need to be able to speak English. You need to be here legally. You need to have training to acquire the CDL, not some online one-day source, and you get the CDL. This has got to be enforced. I look to Congress to work with DOT to shore that up. I can guarantee if you call over there now, they will give you a list of things that we support that will help them ensure that all States take steps forward to ensure that lives like that are not lost. Mr. Gill. I agree, Mr. Spear. Learn English or get out of our country. Thank you for being here. I appreciate it. Mr. Van Drew. I thank the gentleman from Texas. That concludes today's hearing. Ms. Crockett. Oh, I have got a UC. OK. ``DOGE employees shared Social Security data.'' Court filings show employees detailed to the Social Security Administration shared sensitive data through a nonsecure server, the Justice Department disclosed. This is from The New York Times, January 20, 2026. My final one is Federal review finds 44 percent of U.S. trucking schools don't comply with government rules. Nearly-- this is from December 1, 2025. This is the AP. It says nearly 44 percent of the 16,000 truck-driving schools in the U.S. may be forced to close if they lose their students after a review by the Federal Transportation Department found they may not be complying with the government requirements. It did not say anything about languages. Mr. Van Drew. Without objection. Ms. Crockett. OK. Now, I am good. Mr. Van Drew. That concludes today's hearing. We thank our witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today. I thank you all. You did a great job. Looking forward to the correspondence from all of you. Without objection, all Members will have five legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses or additional materials for the record. Without objection, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] All materials submitted for the record by Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight can be found at: https:// docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=118875. [all]