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- OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY [Senate Hearing 119-280] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-280 OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ======================================================================= HEARING before the SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE of the UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 29, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 62-707 WASHINGTON : 2026 SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.) TOM COTTON, Arkansas, Chairman MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico JOHN CORNYN, Texas ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JERRY MORAN, Kansas MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JON OSSOFF, Georgia TODD YOUNG, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona TED BUDD, North Carolina JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ex Officio CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Ex Officio JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio ---------- Ryan Tully, Staff Director William Wu, Minority Staff Director Kelsey S. Bailey, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- JANUARY 29, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas........................... 1 Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia....................... 2 WITNESSES LTG Joshua M. Rudd, Nominee to be Director of the National Security Agency................................................ 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 27 Additional Pre-Hearing Questions................................. 41 Post-Hearing Questions........................................... 70 OPEN HEARING: NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ---------- THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2026 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in Room SD-106, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Cotton, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Cotton (presiding), Warner, Gillibrand, Rounds, Budd, Young, Kelly, King, Collins, Lankford, Wyden, Ossoff, and Cornyn. OPENING STATEMENT BY HON. TOM COTTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Cotton. I want to begin by welcoming you all to our hearing to consider the nomination of Lieutenant General Joshua M. Rudd to be the director of the National Security Agency. General Rudd has already endured a lengthy confirmation hearing at the Armed Services Committee where he was warmly received. I'm sure he's excited to be back testifying in front of Congress yet again. I do want to note for the audience that we welcome your attendance to observe the hearing today, but Vice Chairman Warner and I agree that we will not tolerate any disruptions. Anyone who disrupts the hearing will be removed from the hearing room and could face potential further sanctions to include being barred from the Capitol grounds. As I mentioned, General Rudd has previously testified for his nomination at the Armed Services Committee. Our committee has sequential referral, our goal for this hearing is to consider the nominee's qualifications and give members ample opportunity for thoughtful deliberation. General Rudd has already provided substantive written responses to dozens of questions from this committee. Today members will be able to ask additional follow-up questions and hear from the nominee directly. Our members are familiar with General Rudd from their visits to PACOM and also from his previous testimony to our committee in closed session where he was also warmly received. I want to take this opportunity to once again thank General Rudd for his lifetime of service and answering the call once again. And also, I would like to recognize his wife Ansley, his daughter Hayden, his son-in-law, JT, who are joining us today; welcome. As well as his mom who is watching from South Carolina and his younger daughter, Hollis, who is watching virtually. She was at the Armed Services Committee. I guess she thought better of a repeat performance. On behalf of this committee, thank you all for your support through this process and for your husband and your dad's decades of military service. General Rudd is a Special Forces officer who currently serves as the deputy commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. In addition to various special operations and interagency task force assignments, General Rudd has commanded at the platoon, troop, company, squadron, group and combatant command functional component levels. Among his previous assignments, General Rudd has served as chief of staff for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, commander of Special Operations Command Pacific, and deputy commanding general for operations for the 25th Infantry Division. If confirmed as director of the National Security Agency, General Rudd will be asked to serve as the head of the NSA and as commander of the U.S. Cyber Command. With this in mind, I look forward to hearing from you about how your wide ranging experience equips and prepares you to fulfill this dual hatted role and assume the enormous responsibility of protecting Americans and our homeland from harm. Again, I want to thank you, General Rudd, for your many years of service to our nation and for your willingness to continue serving our country in this new role. I now recognize our distinguished vice chairman for his remarks. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA Vice Chairman Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Rudd, it's good to see you again and it's great to meet your wife and daughter and son-in-law. Um, again thank you for making time to meet with me the other day. We all know that NSA has been without a Senate-confirmed director for over nine months. Given the sustained pace of cyberattacks against the United States by our adversaries, the complexity of maintaining the world's premier system and the sheer volume of intelligence requirements from combatant commanders, I'm eager to provide the tens of thousands of employees at NSA with steady permanent confirmed leadership. However, as I told you when we last met, I have a few priorities and I'll need your commitment on them if you want to earn my vote. First and foremost, I remain deeply concerned about the politically motivated firings of career civilian and military leaders across our national security enterprise. That includes the firing of your predecessor, General Tim Haugh. I worry about the message these firings send that political loyalty is valued over competence. That message risks chilling the ICs' willingness to speak truth to power or even to produce vital intelligence that may conflict with preferred talking points or messaging of the day. So, as we discussed the first time, and I will ask you this in--in my questioning, I just-- the IC--if the IC is unwilling to tell policymakers what they need to hear and not just what they want to hear, America is less safe. So, I will need your commitment that you will always be candid with policymakers, and nothing in your background reflects that you wouldn't be, but that you will always be transparent with Congress and you'll foster a culture at NSA that prizes candor and transparency; including standing up for your workforce if they are unfairly targeted. Second, as we discussed, I strongly support NSA's traditional SIGINT message, but I also believe there are areas where NSA can and should play a bigger role. One of those areas is technology; that means leveraging existing technologies to make NSA more effective, and it means better targeting our adversaries advances in technologies that weaken American security. In this endeavor, I hope NSA will lean into strong relationships. Within the U.S. government, for example, we talked about some of the cross-pollination with the Department of Commerce, with the private sector and with allies and partners abroad, which brings me to another priority, strengthening alliances and partnerships. NSA has deep and long standing SIGINT relationships across the world, especially with our Five Eyes partners, but I suspect that many of our partners are feeling confused and even abandoned. That confusion is driven by tariffs imposed on our close trading partners, by open talk of a military action against a NATO ally and by a defense strategy that walks back our commitments in Europe and the Pacific. As members of this committee know well, our allies and partners provide critical intelligence that complements our own, and when these relationships are jeopardized, again, America is less safe. Finally, I want to briefly focus on election security. I have often noted, and I know all the members of this committee appreciate it, that it was the credit--to the credit of President Trump during his first term that we built a robust infrastructure to identify adversary attempts to interfere in U.S. elections, to inform the public, and to disrupt and dismantle adversary infrastructure such as troll farms--troll farms. And as you know, the NSA and prior leadership played extraordinarily important role in all of those activities. So, it is ironic and highly unfortunate that in this term President Trump and his team have literally dismantled that infrastructure they built. While at the same time, senior officials, including the person responsible for leading our nation's intelligence community, appear willing to blur the line between intelligence and domestic political activity. There are only two explanations for why the Director of National Intelligence decided yesterday to show up at a federal raid tied to the president's obsession with relitigating the 2020 election. First, she believes there is a legitimate foreign intelligence nexus, in which case she has violated her legal obligation to keep this intelligence community and committees fully and completely informed. Or, she is simply attempting to inject the nonpartisan intelligence community into a domestic political stunt designed to legitimize conspiracy theories that undermine our democracy. Either scenario represents a serious breach of trust and a dereliction of duty to the solemn office, which she holds. So, I'll be looking to you among others to ensure that we defeat real adversary efforts to mess with our elections and to help ensure that the intelligence community never allows itself to be used to advance political narratives instead of protecting domestic institutions. There are, of course, other issues and I know we had a robust discussion about Section 702, which is going to need reauthorization. I look forward to discussing those--these, issues and many others and working with you as I expect you will be confirmed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Look forward to the presentation. Chairman Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. General Rudd, before we move to your opening remarks, the committee has a series of standard questions we posed to each nominee that require a simple yes or no answer for the record. Although if the answer is no, there will probably be need for explanation, which is the equivalent of your instructor stomping his foot in an Army study review. So, here we go. One, do you agree to appear before the committee here and in other venues when invited? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. If confirmed--two, if confirmed, do you agree to send officials from your office to appear before the committee and designated staff when invited? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Three, do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Four, will you ensure that your office and your staff provide such material to the committee when requested? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Five, do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee of Intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the chairman and vice chairman? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd. We'll now proceed to your opening statement, after which we'll go to members by seniority at the gavel for five minutes each. General Rudd, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSHUA M. RUDD, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Lt. General Rudd. Chairman Cotton, Vice Chairman Warner, and distinguished members of the committee, I'm deeply honored and humbled to appear before you today as the nominee for director of National Security Agency, chief Central Security Service and commander U.S. Cyber Command. I want to thank President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, the chairman and the chief of staff of the Army for the nomination and their trust in me to lead this critical national security role. I would like to acknowledge my family in attendance. First of all, Ansley, my wife, best friend and partner in this journey for the last 35 years. Our daughter Hayden, who works on the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation is also here along with our son-in-law, JT, who is a data scientist and AI engineer. Our other daughter Hollis, who lives in Texas, couldn't be here, but I know she is watching, along with our extended family in South Carolina. Each of you have--each of you have made profound sacrifices that have been instrumental in my life of service. You have positively impacted our military, their families and civilian communities, and I am eternally grateful for your unwavering support. My career has also been shaped by the remarkable men and women with whom I've served. I'm particularly indebted to the noncommissioned officer corps whose leadership and professionalism have inspired me for the past three plus decades. And we must always remember and honor our nation's fallen and their families who have made the ultimate sacrifice. My path in the Army has been unconventional, starting as a logistician before I transferred to Special Forces. This background has given me a unique operational lens. I spent over 25 years leading our nation's special operations missions, integrating high consequence capabilities, which has given me a deep practical understanding on how to use intelligence to drive operational success, while ensuring the protection of our most critical sources and methods. These leadership roles involve pioneering highly technical solutions through close collaboration with American industry and ensuring these complex multi-domain systems were seamlessly woven into--into operations. My last six and a half years in the Indo-Pacific have made clear that we are witnessing a surge in adversarial activity. These complex threats are amplified by low cost, widespread proliferation of disruptive technologies including AI, cyber capabilities and autonomous systems, which place advanced capabilities in the hands of a broader range of actors. Today's threats are no longer distant. They are immediate challenges to our critical infrastructure and democracy. However, through a growing ecosystem of trusted partners in industry and academia, we are developing, experimenting and rapidly improving solutions to address these challenges head on. This relentless pursuit of excellence is central to my personal and professional ethos and it respects--it reflects the spirit of American innovation. A critical asymmetric advantage that ensures we remain ahead of dynamic adversarial threats. As a leader, consumer, enabler, generator and integrator of NSA and cyber command capabilities, my focus has been on defending the homeland, deterring adversaries and strengthening partnerships by delivering credible technologically advanced capabilities in all domains. If confirmed, I am prepared to lead these organizations as an integrated and essential team dedicated to increasing the speed and agility of our support for the nation's toughest challenges while cultivating and retaining a uniquely qualified workforce. Central to this will be the delivery of accurate and timely intelligence, advice and options always conducted with frequent transparent communication with Congress and absolute fidelity to our Constitution. With this committee's support, my focus will be to lead the NSA in its vital foreign intelligence mission driven by the pursuit of innovation with a commitment to unbiased objective analysis. Thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you closely and I look forward to your questions. [The written statement of the witness follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Cotton. General, you have an extensive career as a special forces operator. You've deployed numerous times on combat operations in the Middle East and the Pacific. During that career, we've seen cyber play an increasing role in special forces operations. Could you give us a flavor of how you've used or supported cyber operations throughout your career and what lessons you've learned from that? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the--the vast amount of joint combined and interagency leadership roles that I've had the privilege to fulfill throughout my career, especially in combat operations, has generated an experience that is rich and replete with examples where I've worked closely with the interagency. Again, the--the most recent example that I can share on that one was the, you know, committee briefing that we had previously with one of our agency partners. Um, so, a rich experience of--of working collaboratively across interagency. But more specifically to NSA and Cyber Command throughout-- through out my career, the--the foreign intelligence capability and the mission set of the NSA has informed and certainly enhanced and enabled the mission outcomes in a variety of mission sets. Equally paired is experience with Cyber Command and cyber capabilities. They work hand-in-hand, they work best when they're integrated across the joint force and in all domains. And increasingly when we think about and talk about deterrence, there's opportunity to couple what DOD is doing with the whole of government. Chairman Cotton. Thank you. As I mentioned at the outset and you alluded to, this is technically two jobs, NSA director and the commander at Cyber Command. How have you thought about balancing the roles of those two jobs and ensuring that both missions are executed effectively? Lt. General Rudd. So, Mr. Chairman, I think I would draw upon my experience right now at USINDOPACOM as an opportunity to learn and highlight the responsibility of INDOPACOM, not only geographically is vast, but its pans the entirety of the joint force. It has over 300,000 assigned forces. So, as--to your point, two--two giant organizations that I would be responsible, if confirmed for this, I think the scale in the size of it are manageable. What I would hope to do, if confirmed, is ensure that the unique capabilities, the unique authorities that both of these organizations bring to bear are fully integrated both within support and interdependence of each other's missions, but then in support of the warfighter and providing the best option to our decision makers. Chairman Cotton. CYBERCOM is significantly smaller than NSA. Have you developed any thoughts yet on how that organization might need to grow or change to ensure the missions are balanced? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of my priorities, if confirmed for this, would be scale across both organizations, not only in the workforce, but also in the capabilities, the technologies and how we enhance that. But my understanding is there is a deliberate approach in, in, in effect right now under CYBERCOM 2.0 to man, train and equip the cyber force. Certainly, if confirmed, I would like to understand how that's being implemented, are there ways to accelerate it and then provide best advice on how to do that. Chairman Cotton. As the vice chairman noted in his opening remarks, FISA Title VII specifically Section 702, expires in less than three months unless Congress reauthorizes it. Section 702 explicitly--explicitly applies to foreign nationals on foreign territory. Can you talk to us about how critical Section 702 is for the NSA's mission and how detrimental it would be if the authority expired? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, or Mr. Chairman, from an operational perspective as you highlight, that foreign intelligence mission focuses on non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. As--you know, throughout my career and my firsthand experience as a consumer of that intelligence and enabler to those capabilities, it's indispensable. I know it's been critical to mission outcomes. Its force protection of our men and women in harm's way, and I know it saved lives, uh, here in the homeland. Chairman Cotton. Thank you. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, general, enjoyed our conversation and I'm going to ask you a couple of questions, which, uh, you can simply answer, yes or no as well. Uh, I have great faith that you will answer, yes, but I want to make sure we get these on the record. First, do I have your commitment that if you're confirmed that you will stand up for your workforce if they are unfairly targeted? Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Do you have--do I have your commitment, and this is one of the things I'm extraordinarily concerned about. You know, the ICs got to speak truth to power and so, do I have your commitment you will always be candid with policymakers, even if you have to tell them something they don't want to hear? Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, I will, and you do have my commitment. Vice Chairman Warner. I think your record reflects that. One of the things, and again I touched on this in my opening statement, where the Director of National Intelligence is suddenly appearing, uh, at a FBI raid around elections from frankly 2020, which I have no idea what she was doing there. But I am concerned that we've seen much of the election security infrastructure that was put in place extraordinarily well by the first Trump administration, where, again, the NSA played a critical role, be dismantled and there's no less threat from foreign adversaries about trying to mess with our elections. So, do I have your commitment that if confirmed that the NSA will continue to prioritize information sharing on threats to U.S. elections, on foreign threats to U.S. elections? Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, you do. The electoral process is fundamental to our values, our way of life. And throughout my entire career, I've been committed to upholding those and protecting those. I think anything that poses a threat to the electoral process needs to be taken seriously. And if confirmed, Mr. Vice Chairman, I commit to working with the executive and the legislative on this. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. Because, again, the NSA and particularly in the 2018 through 2020 cycle played a very important role. This is something we've not talked about, but we all know AI has enormous potential, um, and both DOD and the intelligence community is looking to take advantage of those AI capabilities. But we also know that there's a number of AI tools that still have a tendency to hallucinate and, um, with that tendency, sometimes it poses major security risks. I've been concerned that Secretary of Defense Hegseth has um--starting to unleash AI both across classified and unclassified networks, including models such as xAI's Grok model, which has got, again, more of a history of hallucination than most. If confirmed, will you ensure that appropriate policies are in place to stand, safeguard, DOD and NSA's critical mission and that while we use these AI tools that there are appropriate safeguards? Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, this is a critical area of competition and I know INDOPACOM is relying heavily on the adoption of AI, and I suspect, and expect, that CYBERCOM and NSA are as well. In fact, I know they are. My understanding and really the approach that we've taken with the adoption of these technologies is while they are absolutely imperative to advancing our skill set as joint warfighters enabling us decision superiority. We will never abdicate our responsibility to maintain those guardrails. The guardrail is the human on the loop or in the loop in terms of what those technologies are providing, what they're producing and then how we apply them. So, you have my commitment. Thank you Mr. Vice Chairman. Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. I look forward to working with you on that. Finally, and I know, and this was in, over at SASC. I think in your testimony, you noted, North Korea's heavy reliance on cryptocurrency. I'm in the midst of, looking around the table, I don't think any of my colleagues are as deeply involved in trying to make sure we've got some rules of the road around market structure for crypto. I think it's going to be an incredibly important part of our financial system going forward, but boy, it is complicated. So, do you believe that the federal government needs to do more across the interagency to track, disrupt and abate foreign malign actors access to these digital ecosystems? Lt. General Rudd. Mr. Vice Chairman, that's something that I would have to take a closer look at. Certainly, we're looking at it from an INDOPACOM lens on what it means for national security and implications. But, Mr. Vice Chairman, if confirmed, I commit to looking at---- Vice Chairman Warner. My time's up but I just want to make the comment that you--crypto has great possibilities, it's not going away. But boy, oh boy, there are some national security implications around this that we have to get, right. So, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Collins. Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I want to follow up on a discussion that we had in our meeting and it relates to some degree to questions that have already been raised. I have been greatly concerned about cybersecurity issues affecting all branches of government, the private sector and our critical infrastructure. Ransomware attacks and Salt Typhoon intrusions continue at an alarming rate. However, when it comes to the federal government's defensive and offensive capabilities, we seem to be stove piped. There's a cyber czar, FBI's involved, CISA, your predecessor, have all used terms like team effort, collaboration, coordination, and yet there appears to be no lead. And yet we see these ongoing attacks that get ever worse. In fact, just last month, another Salt Typhoon intrusion was detected against staff of the House of Representatives. So, we need to stop Salt Typhoon intrusions. We need to secure our critical Infrastructure from being taken over by hostile actors. We've seen in the state of Maine hospital data being hacked with some of the most sensitive data possible. What can we do to detect, cease and get ahead of these cyber intrusions? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I appreciate the opportunity to meet and thanks for the time. On this particular topic, first and foremost, it's aggressive vigilance. We have to understand what the threats are, where they emanate from and then what are the options of capabilities that can be applied. And then to your point about the various entities across the government that have responsibility for this, my experience says continuous collaboration coordination, unity of effort is what makes us most effective in that, and if confirmed for this role, I would pledge to be a part of that. Senator Collins. Do you see yourself as the lead in trying to combat this ever increasing threat? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I see us as a lead from the department and from the military aspect, certainly on the cyber capability piece of this question. Um, I don't know that we've been designated the lead for this effort. Senator Collins. I think that's part of the problem, that we do need a designated lead. Let me switch to another issue. We understand that the Department of Defense has prioritized the effective adoption of artificial intelligence to secure American military AI dominance. My understanding is that this is meant to help drive efficiencies and improve decision making. The adoption of these technologies, however, is not without risk. It has the potential to introduce significant cyber risk if the AI systems themselves are not properly protected and managed. As the incoming director of NSA and Cyber Command, how will you bridge that gap between the adoption of AI and AI security? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think that's a critically important topic and with any new technology, there's always risk. But what I see in this particular technology is an imperative that we adopt it, apply it, understand it. And to your point, how do you secure it? I know there's efforts going on right now within NSA around AI security that extends through collaboration and Intel driven recommendations to commercial partners. And certainly we have to make sure that we protect that. Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, we have talked in the past about this question of cyber and one of the huge gaps in our cyber policy in this country is the lack of any cyber deterrent. Our adversaries pay no price for their attacks; whether it goes back to the Sony hack or the recent, Volt and Salt Typhoon. Do you believe that it would be important for us to establish a deterrent strategy that our adversaries would be aware of and would color their decision making as to whether or not to launch an attack, a cyberattack, against this country? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, thanks for the opportunity to meet, and I appreciate the opportunity to revisit this topic. The short answer is yes, I do. Senator King. I appreciate that and I think that's very important and I hope you'll work with NSA and CYBERCOM to develop that capacity because otherwise we can never patch our way out of this problem. The adversaries are going to continue to evolve. And at some point, we have to make them have second thoughts about whether to attack this country in cyberspace. Second question, I just want to reiterate your conversation with the--with the vice chairman. It's so important that our intelligence community provide candid, clear, unvarnished, nonpolitical advice to policymakers, uh, because otherwise, we have--we can have real catastrophes involving our national security. So, I just want to reiterate that you answered the question, yes. You're committed to that. It's somewhat easy to answer that question here, it's going to be a little harder in practice if you're sitting in the Oval Office or in some other setting that is inherently intimidating. Uh, but I want you to reiterate your commitment. Straight talk, straight advice and the facts to the policymaker, is that correct? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I am committed to that, as I have been throughout the entirety of my career. I pride myself on a leader who has always been candid and given best advice even if it wasn't popular. Senator King. Thank you. Final area. In your work in INDOPACOM, I know you came to realize the value of the allies that we have in the Pacific. In my work on this committee and the Armed Services Committee, I've come to realize our asymmetric advantage in the world is allies. China has customers, we have allies. Russia doesn't have much in the way of customers or allies. But it's so important to maintain those relationships; particularly in the intelligence community. Talk to me a little bit about the Five Eyes and how important it is to maintain that intelligence sharing enterprise and particularly to--to be sure that there's a trusting relationship so that we will have the maximum advantage of the--of the ability of our--of our allies to work with us in order to protect the national security of this country. Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I've had the incredible fortune throughout my career to serve alongside with and through allies and partners. I think our strategic documents identify clearly the importance of that and the emphasis that--that we put on that. The Five Eyes in particular some of my closest colleagues in professional relationships are within that community and certainly rely upon them. As--as it relates to INDOPACOM, it's a--it's a daily effort. We have embedded liaison officers from throughout our allies and partners within the region and it's a consistent engagement. We operate together, we exercise together, we train together and that's part of our strategic approach to delivering deterrence. Senator King. It's true, is it not, that allies are a tremendous force multiplier for our ability to have our policies respected and have our national security protected? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I think that's a--that's a great way to characterize it. Senator King. Thank you. I'll leave it at that. Chairman Cotton. Senator Lankford. Senator Lankford. Mr. Chairman, thank you, General. Thank you. Thank you for your decades of service already to the nation and for stepping up into this role. It's a tough role. We'll have lots of conversations in the days ahead, but they won't be in open settings like this. So, I think it would be helpful just for you to be able to articulate, what do you see as the principal threats that NSA needs to be focused in on? As you look around the globe and the issues that are out there in this open setting, what would you see as some of the principal threats? Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. The--I--you know, my assessment aligns with our national security strategy and national defense strategy and how we articulate the priorities. Um, certainly from where I sit at USINDOPACOM day in and day out, China, Russia, North Korea, those are all critical threats that we pay attention to varying degrees of, uh, how we characterize those and how we prioritize those. But I think it's pretty clear that those two state actors; certainly Iran continues to pose concern and threat to the nation. Um, I would couple alongside with that, violent extremists will be an infinite problem and I think increasingly narcotics and narco terrorists. Senator Lankford. Okay, thank you. I want to follow up on Senator King's question to you as well. I have a similar question dealing with how we prepare for a response and a deterrent. You would have the unique responsibility of preparing a portfolio for the president if we have a cyberattack to be able to handle the president, here are the options. Then he has to obviously make the decisions on that, but you'll have the role of actually handing that to him and saying here's a set of options. So, my question to you is, what do you plan to do to be able to prepare that set of options? What are your boundaries and limitations for the options that you would hand to any president? And to say these are--these are the options that you have that fall within legal bounds, but that also are an effective deterrent. Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think it speaks to what I would--how I would frame my priorities if confirmed for this and the initial approach. Obviously, making an assessment of where the organizations are at. But the first priority is speed. Second one is scale, the next one is innovation and then integration. We've got to move as fast as we can to ensure that we've got the right technologies, the right capabilities and able to generate multiple options. We need to be able to scale those options and not only just scaling within the size of the workforce as we--as we mentioned, relative to Cyber Command size, certainly there's an approach by the department to, uh, address that. But I think increasingly, we look at other partnerships as a means to scale. Innovation, as I highlighted in my opening comments, that is an asymmetric advantage. And that is something we, as the United States, do better than anybody. So, we have to continue to harness innovation. As a leader, I would empower the workforce to explore, test, try, fail and figure out what's working. And then ultimately, those capabilities and options have got to be integrated. They've got to be integrated across the joint force, they've got to be integrated in all domains and increasingly those options should be provided that enable us to integrate and pair those with other elements of national power. Senator Lankford. OK, it's helpful. You've been a consumer of some of the intelligence information that's come across your desk and trying to be able to prepare for operations. I'm a consumer of intelligence documents as well. I have noticed over the past 10 years among some of our agencies that the documents and the analysis has gotten safer and safer and safer in the way that it's written. Sometimes I read some analysis and I read it twice and think this doesn't say a thing. This is supposed to be telling me something, and I can't tell what this is trying to tell me because it's written so safe in it. One of the challenges that I would have before you is that NSA and with your analysts and folks as they're gathering SIGINT, to be able to make sure that the documents that are written and the reports that are done just say it bluntly. And that there is a sense of permission to say it frankly even at times and to not have a perception of being safe. I don't know if you've experienced some of the same things as you've read some of the intelligence documents in the past and some of the information reports, but I would encourage you to say it, frank, instead of safe, when it comes out of your analysts. You don't have to respond to that one way or the other on it because you'll have to be able to read it. One last question that I had is a follow up on what the chairman was saying on 702. I think what I'm looking for, for anything is clarifying for the American people, the protections that have been put in place in statute to protect the American people that no one is spying on them, but also making it clear that this is an essential authority that we have to have to protect the safety of the Nation. I'm looking for not just someone who will stand up and say, yes, we need that, but someone who will be an advocate for 702 to be able to explain it to people that need to hear it and to be able to articulate how the American people are actually protected by 702. Is that you? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, certainly I would do everything I can to provide the best advice as we look to reauthorize or extend this, this critical authority. Senator Lankford. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General, enjoyed talking with you and I think you know that one of the key issues for me in this position is basically adhering to what Ben Franklin was talking about, who said anybody who gives up their liberty to have security doesn't deserve either. And that's what we talked about, and I want to, as we talked about, get into some more, kind of specifics, not to like pin you down or something, but to get a sense of where you're actually headed on striking that balance that I think is so essential. So, the administration, a number of months ago, secretly decided that its agents can break into homes without a judicial warrant. Basically, they said the Fourth Amendment doesn't matter anymore. So, here's the question a little bit broader than I talked about with you yesterday so we can see if we can find some common ground. And that is, General, if you are directed to target people in the United States for surveillance, will you insist that there be a judicial warrant? And I would like to have a yes or no answer to this, and happy to have some context. Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, Senator, I--again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you yesterday. Um, certainly this speaks--this question speaks to the mission of NSA and the authorities that it has been given. What I can tell you, Senator, is that if confirmed, I will absolutely commit to executing the foreign intelligence mission of the NSA in accordance with the authorities that it's been given and within all applicable laws. Senator Wyden. That respectfully though doesn't get close to what I'm talking about. I mean, that is about as vague as anything I've heard on--on the subject and, uh, it seems to me that unfamiliarity with basic constitutional rights is not something that can be accepted in this position. It's so, crucial and I continue to believe that what I described you as not mutually exclusive. I think smart policies give you security and liberty, not so smart policies give you less of both. So, would you like to take another crack at perhaps telling me a little bit? As I said in the office, I'm interested in hearing, in your words, how you might deal with one of these issues. Not to spell it out in text and the like, but to get a sense of how you would strike this extraordinarily important issue in a sensible way. Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, as again, as we discussed, I have utmost respect and commitment to the civil liberties that are outlined in the Constitution. I've sworn an oath several times throughout my career to uphold that Department. Senator Wyden. Let's move on so we can get some more questions. Do you believe that U.S. person searches of Section 702 collection should require a warrant except in emergencies, which has been largely the position of those who would like to find some common ground as we go forward? We would say, look, if somebody says this is a four alarm crisis for the country, they can get the information they need and come back and settle up later, which strikes me again as a constructive step. So, what are your thoughts with respect to saying that you should have a warrant except in emergencies? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, that's--that's a topic that I'd need to look into and get a better understanding to give you a more fulsome and complete answer on that one. Again, what I would highlight though is supreme confidence that the men and women of the NSA are committed to protecting civil liberties and privacy of American citizens. Senator Wyden. Let me go a little bit further on the Greenland issue then you've gone today. Donald Trump's threat to invade Greenland is just one of many ways, in my view, we would damage NATO. You talked about the importance of intelligence relations and intelligence relationships. How concerned are you that these relationships could be damaged by the current tensions that we are talking about now with Greenland? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the alliances and partnerships that we rely on to execute our missions are absolutely critical. Senator Wyden. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Rounds. Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General Rudd, first of all, thanks for your service to our country. I've appreciated our--our discussions already in armed services and then in my office as well. And I look--I have just--I look forward to supporting your nomination. But I thought this was an opportunity in a public discussion, different than what we normally do within a classified situation in which we can kind of share with the American people some of the concerns and some of the directions that we really have to go in order to, number one, gather good data to make good decisions, but also how we protect the American public from adversaries that have some pretty decent offensive cyber weapons systems that they're not afraid to deploy. It--if we could for just a minute, let's talk a little bit about artificial intelligence and the need to be able to deploy it. I think some folks in--in the United States today have thought that, you know, if we have concerns about this, this new thing about being able to make decisions very, very quickly, which is what artificial intelligence allow sand to look at a lot of different data, uh, what happens if we were to simply say, you know what, we're just going to take our time in terms of deploying artificial intelligence in our, uh, data gathering, uh, or in our weapons systems. Does that stop an adversary in any way, shape or form from integrating artificial intelligence as quickly as they can? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it wouldn't. And I think this is an area of--of competition that we have to accelerate in. It's--it's a critical capability that its adoption and integration into our joint warfighting functions and our intelligence collection has got to be adopted. That is what will enable us to maintain our advantage in all these--all these categories. Senator Rounds. Would it be fair to say that in any warfighting situation, speed can make the difference between a life and death situation? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly my experience. Senator Rounds. So, you've been around the horn a little bit. You've been with young men and women that have been in harm's way. Would it be fair to say that if we deploy our tools faster than the bad guys can at a strategic level and we provide assistance to our young men and women in uniform at a faster pace, uh, and give them more information more quickly than what an adversary can, that we save lives? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would agree with that. And again, the examples you give are, uh, very personal to me. I understand what it means to, uh, command forces in harm's way and what it means to make decisions quickly so that we protect our forces. But I would offer increasingly this is a strategic advantage, our decision making, our speed and our ability to outthink and outmaneuver the enemy before there's conflict is critically important as well, senator. Senator Rounds. I'm going to bring this down now to a little bit more direct level, and we've talked a lot about 702 and about the need, and I fully support the continuation of 702 operations. A huge amount of the data that we're able to collect overseas, uh, to be able to give our war fighting teams an advantage is because of what we collect using 702. I know there's always a concern that we not collect any information on U.S. citizens. But can you talk a little bit about what it means to a young man or a woman who is on the front lines and the ability for us to be able to know in advance what a bad guy is going to be doing near or around their areas and how critical it is that we take advantage of those opportunities to collect that data and not tie the hands of those individuals that collect it? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would again offer my personal experience as a warfighter where I know that authority has enabled NSA to provide timely foreign intelligence to the warfighter that has saved lives. Senator Rounds. Thank you. Let me go one step further now with regard to artificial intelligence. We've got to be able to collect as much data as we can as quickly as we can. And yet in order to do that, we can't simply rely on what we call government sources. We've got to be able to work with the private sector. A huge amount of the data that's collected, that's out there right now in terms of being able to make AI work even faster at the cutting edge is coming from private sector initiatives.u Can you talk a little bit about how important it is to be able to integrate the private sector into our systems to make us faster than the adversaries? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, it seems reasonable that that would naturally accelerate and enable scale. What I would also highlight is that as we do that, again, the same respect and safeguards for civil liberties and private data need to be adhered to. Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Kelly. Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, just like Senator Rounds, I wanted to talk about AI and FISA 702. I got one other topic. Just want to start by saying that I have legislation with Senator Warner and Cornyn and Lankford called the ENABLE IC Act, which is going to get these--get us moving faster on this. And also an advanced AI Security Readiness Act which is going to help with something you talked about General Rudd, uh, the private sector more involved here. So, I think we all agree that we need to move faster and innovate more and the world is moving credibly fast, especially with AI, and these tools that are being developed and these novel methodologies are incredible, but they also come with a lot of risk, especially when we're talking about a highly classified work environment. Uh, and highly classified data. So, can you talk a little bit in more detail about how you're going to approach integrating AI and other tech tools into NSA systems that we currently have while guarding against the risk? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would--I would offer on risk, the first way that we mitigate risk is to understand it. Where are the risks? Where do they exist? And then what do we need to do to ensure that we are continuously assessing that we've provided a solution to that. Within the realm of AI, obviously, the data is a key part of this, but then also equally important, a layer of cybersecurity around that. So, how do you ensure that the data is authoritative? How do you ensure that it's feeding the right models? But equally important, coupled with that is the ability to protect that data. My understanding is that NSA has that responsibility. They're executing it very well. And certainly, Senator, if confirmed, it would be a high priority of mine to ensure that we continue to do so. Senator Kelly. And, General, also, you know, one priority I think you're going to need to put somewhere near the top of the list, and I know, um, one of my colleagues brought up the election threat issue, but certainly AI being used by our adversaries against us in an election is going to be I think here in 2026 is going to be more significant than what we've ever seen before and certainly in 2028. On the FISA 702 question, um, we're going to have to have to reauthorize it here pretty soon, just a few months. Um, I don't think the public understands what this is. I mean we're talking about something, I mean an acronym with a number and a letter after it and it just seems something that's, you know, out of reach for most people. Can you try to explain here in just about 30 seconds or so, why this should matter to the average American? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, in as plain as language as I can put it is, first and foremost, it is the collection of foreign intelligence against non-U.S. persons who are located out the United States--outside of the United States. And again, what I've experienced in in my career is that this provides the warfighter, the decision maker, the ability to have critical insight into threats that enables decision making. And again, we've talked about speed. Critical to speed is-- is a deep understanding. Senator Kelly. But for a family, hardworking American family, not--and they shouldn't have to pay much attention to this, how does it affect them? Like what are the consequences to them and their children let's say a few months from now if we did not reauthorize 702? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, again in my experience, it's quite simply, it saves lives. Senator Kelly. Save lives, could it--could we be potentially talking about their lives, the lives of their family members, friends, coworkers? Lt. General Rudd. Again, Senator, the lives of men and women in harm's way, but also threats to the--to the homeland, the United States. I would put that in the category of saving lives. Senator Kelly. Yeah, and I agree with you, and I--and I think that is a key part of this. This is a--an authority that the intelligence community has, but the reason it has it is it keeps Americans safer. Not just the IC, not just DOD, not people that are regularly in harm's way, it results in safety for the American people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Budd. Senator Budd. Thank you, Chairman. General, thank you for your years of service. I enjoyed our conversation in the office a week or two ago. You know, we talked a lot about this morning and in that conversation in the office about the many hats of this role and you certainly had the experience to do that, but I understand that in a peacetime. But let's say there's a--an invasion by China to Taiwan, um, and it's no longer peacetime, but it's a period of conflict. How do you balance the roles in a situation like that as best you can see it? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, it's a continuous assessment of the situation and where the balance lies between the two organizations and the capabilities that each brings to bear. Certainly on one side, you need deep insight into the threat, into the adversary, to understand. And then on the other side, you need to be able to deliver capabilities and options that would change the course even before conflict but if in conflict, certainly there's capability to bring to bear. There's obviously a constant awareness and understanding of that. But I think the current construct puts us in a position that enables unity, of command unity, of effort to make decisions and over those two rapidly. Senator Budd. Thank you, general. You know, we've talked about your years of service and certainly a unique pathway to get to this point. So, congratulations for that. But, you know, this is a highly technical civilian organization at NSA, which it's different than a lot of what you've done before. Uh, tell us how you want to, and you think you will be adapting your military leadership experience to lead an organization like this? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator. The, uh--first of all, if confirmed, I look forward to this--this unique experience and challenge, uh, gaining a deeper understanding and appreciation of a largely civilian highly technical workforce. My career to- date is not without those experiences and opportunities perhaps, but this would definitely be a different one. What I have always applied as a leadership principle to any organization, but certainly ones that are different or have different capabilities or different expertise, uh, is first a willingness to get in and learn as much as I can. But connect, connect with the workforce, connect on a personal level, get to know them. Certainly, I'm not going to get to know every single individual in the--in the agency, but get to understand their culture. The second piece is what I just said, understand. And in doing the connection and understanding with the workforce, it enables a leader to best position themselves to empower, to enable, and to really harness what their capability--their incredible expertise is. And certainly if confirmed, I look forward to applying that with this organization. Senator Budd. Thank you, General. You know there's an executive branch policy where the NSA is prohibited from producing and disseminating finished intelligence. I found that interesting. And yet the agency NSA has some of the best cybersecurity expertise in all of the U.S. government. And it does, in fact, produce products that look and read a lot like finished intelligence. So, is that a good policy? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, that's something that I would want to take a look at and come back to you with a recommendation on. Senator Budd. That's my next question. So, you will commit to looking at that to see if that policy needs to be modified? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, if confirmed, I'll look into it. Senator Budd. Thank you. Um, you spent a lot of time in the Indo-Pacific, where do you see opportunities to work with our-- our partners like Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, to build capacity in countering--against cyber threats and, um, how could we cooperate with them more? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, we're doing it on a daily basis. Certainly there's opportunity to do more, but there's a very deliberate approach in campaign plan to working with our allies and partners. I think there's tremendous opportunity to do more certainly on the cyber front, and if confirmed, I would look--I would look forward to exploring those opportunities. Senator Budd. Thank you, General. Chairman Cotton. Senator Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For nearly a decade, the intelligence community produced a steady stream of relevant intelligence on foreign threats to U.S. elections informing congressional policy makers. Will you commit to continuing to produce and disseminate intelligence reporting made available to Congress on foreign plans, intentions and activity targeting U.S. elections? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, the electoral process is fundamental to our democratic values and Americans writ large. And I've committed throughout my career to serve to defend and uphold those values. Any foreign threat to the electoral process should be viewed as a national security concern. And, Senator, if confirmed for this, I commit to working with executive and legislative sides on this. Senator Gillibrand. I appreciate that. In your responses to the Senate Armed Services Committee, you suggested very similar to that statement that U.S. election defense is currently better positioned than in the past given efforts with interagency partners which allows for the rapid sharing of threat intelligence. Under this administration, however, key elements of that interagency process have been entirely eliminated, as in the case of the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, or been paralyzed from funding cuts and rollbacks of information sharing duties. Do you believe that there's still an effective interagency for you to engage with? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, if confirmed for this role, I would look forward to being part of whatever the construct exists. Certainly, again, throughout my career, I've seen--I've seen and I've been a part of a number of interagency efforts. So, if confirmed, I look forward to being part of this. Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Several years ago I led the creation of the DOD Cyber Service Academy Scholarship program, which creates a cleared and trained workforce pipeline. These are for nonmilitary roles appropriate for NSA, CIA and other civilian positions. Since then, I've worked with my colleagues to continue to improve this program and expand the number of scholarships. What value do you see in this type of program and how would increasing the number of scholarships benefit NSA's work? If confirmed, do I have your commitment to work with me on this project? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I'd certainly like to learn more about this. But I--the way you describe this concept certainly seems like a--an avenue that could be explored to enhance and expand the scale of the workforce, certainly an opportunity to generate talent for the workforce. And so, Senator, if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about this. Senator Gillibrand. Yeah, and when we created it, it has up to 1,000 slots a year, but we have not done a good job in telling our high schools around the country that these scholarships are available. And so, we have not had sufficient applications. In the last few years it's been in the hundreds, not in the thousands. And so, all slots are not being filled. Um, we've also worked to get more schools signed up. There's over 600 schools across the country that have signed up for this ROTC type program as long as they have the curriculum that our security and intelligence teams need across the DOD and across the Intel Community. So, I would like your commitment also to work with us in making sure high school students around the country know about this and that all your services know that they can find great graduates through this program. Lt. General Rudd. Senator, again, I look forward to learning as much as I can about this and supporting it as able. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last year, DNI Gabbard fired over 100 intelligence officers deemed to be misusing the chat platform hosted by the NSA on Intelink. These officers were alleged to have misused these systems, in some cases with valid allegations of inappropriate conduct and others potential for discriminatory reasons. You've answered to many of the members on this panel about your review and judgment with regard to the use of AI platforms on NSA systems. What is your perspective on making sure these systems are not misused to harass or target other service members or intelligence personnel? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I appreciate that concern. Certainly the responsibility of any leader of any organization is to safeguard the workforce and ensure that there's compliance within how we use the tools and systems to accomplish the mission. And if confirmed for this role, I would pledge to continue that. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Young. Senator Young. General Rudd, good to see you again. I enjoyed our visit in the office, appreciate your answers to my many questions. You noted in your committee questionnaire before this hearing that one of your priorities for improving NSA's coordination with the rest of the IC will rely on fostering interagency training, exercises and experimentation. Can you unpack this for the committee, please? Lt. General Rudd. Well, Senator, I think the way that we build connective tissue through organizations, not only within the department, but to the point of the question within the interagency, is through repetitions and sets, you know, whether it be training, training exercises, tabletop exercises. Those are ways that we exercise the muscle, the connective tissue, of organizations and enhance the way we work together. Senator Young. Thank you. You also noted in your questionnaire a desire to leverage commercial innovation. We hear about this a lot. We need to hear about this. But beyond the obvious role for the commercial tech sector to play in making NSA more effective, more cutting edge, can you speak to how you might seek to increase opportunities for outside experts to come in to lead on emerging tech or economic competition to enhance your analytical capabilities? Lt. General Rudd. Yes, Senator, I think that's a critically important effort and certainly we need to look at every opportunity to expand our expertise. Again, CYBERCOM and NSA have tremendous expertise, talent, probably the best in the world at what they do and we have to continuously find those opportunities where we learn, enhance, never be complacent that what we're doing is sufficient, especially in--in the world of technology that's moving so fast. And so much of the commercial sectors moving out at a very fast pace. Senator Young. General, can you describe the role you see for NSA in helping shepherd safe and effective U.S. government and IC artificial intelligence technologies, especially through the AI Security Center? Lt. General Rudd. Yeah, thanks, Senator. That's the example I was going to mention, the effort underway that uses Intel driven understanding to make recommendations and solutions to enhance the security around AI, not only within the department, the organization, but with our commercial partners where applicable as well. Senator Young. Will you commit to working with this committee and identifying any shortfalls, whether it's of resources, authorities or prioritization for NSA and the ICs development and use of AI? Lt. General Rudd. Senator the--the role of any commander, leader, director is certainly to identify what those are. And if confirmed, I do commit to that. Senator Young. OK. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Cotton. Senator Ossoff. Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank you for your career of service to the United States and congratulations on your nomination to this important post. Before I engage with you, I just want to note for the committee that my constituents in Georgia, and I think much of the American public, are quite reasonably alarmed and asking questions after the Director of National Intelligence was spotted bizarrely and personally lurking in an FBI evidence truck in Fulton County, Georgia yesterday. And so, I encourage all of us on a bipartisan basis to pursue the facts as swiftly as possible to understand whether the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is straying far outside of its lane. At unrelated--I regret to share my observation that the president at this point is clearly using federal law enforcement in order to pursue personal vendettas. That has nothing to do with you and your career to-date, nor is it something for which I hold you accountable or would expect you to explain, but it is a well-known fact, and it quite reasonably, given the immense surveillance capabilities of the National Security Agency, raises the concern that there might be some abuse of the NSA's authorities. And so, my question for you is that if there is some alteration or withdrawal of current prohibitions, administrative prohibitions, on surveillance targeting Americans, for example, in Executive Order 1233, PPD-28, USSID 18 or otherwise, will you promptly inform this committee with our oversight responsibilities of such a change? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I will pledge, if confirmed, to ensure that the NSA executes its mission within the authorities and all applicable laws and that I will execute the duties of this position that enables this committee to exercise its oversight responsibilities. Senator Ossoff. General, I appreciate the answer and I want you to think a little bit more deeply about the question and consult with your team and follow-up with more precision for the record. Because the challenge I'm identifying is that you may be asked to do things that are manifestly unethical and improper, but following some alteration of present administrative policy, may indeed be lawful. And this committee needs to know if such administrative policies, which currently protect American civil liberties but are not in statute, are changed. And my view would be that under existing law, anyone in the seat that you hope to hold would have a statutory obligation to inform this committee of any such change. So, I hope to get some more detail beyond boilerplate on that for the record. You will also be taking this post, General, if confirmed. So, can I get a commitment that you will respond with a more fulsome answer for the record please, general? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I look forward to looking into that topic and responding to you. Senator Ossoff. Thank you. If confirmed, you'll take this post after a series of events that suggest a crisis for information security and operational security practices in the federal government. You had the Secretary of Defense inadvertently text strike details to a national political reporter, including time over target for U.S. aircrews before those U.S. aircrews had launched into hostile enemy airspace. Multiple major news outlets were reportedly aware of the imminent raid targeting Maduro in Venezuela before the raid was executed. This week, here's a headline from Politico, Trump's acting cyber chief uploaded sensitive files into a public version of ChatGPT. NSA has a crucial role supporting information security, cryptographic integrity and best practices across the federal government. How will you and your role constructively address these many failures and the broader problem of information security failures in the federal government? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I recognize the critical role that NSA plays in this space and certainly, if confirmed, I pledge to ensure that it continues to execute its mission to its fullest. Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General. Chairman Cotton. Senator Cornyn. Senator Cornyn. Welcome, General, and congratulations on your nomination and I appreciate the ability to talk to you, although because of weather concerns, it was on the phone. But, um, you obviously have a lengthy record of distinguished service to our nation and I look forward to supporting your nomination. In your current capacity as deputy commander of INDOPACOM, do you occasionally have to talk to a lawyer or maybe more than one lawyer? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, there is a very talented legal team at USINDOPACOM. Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it seems like a blessing or a curse, just speaking as a recovering lawyer myself, but it seems like you can't--you can't make a move without consulting legal authorities. And so, do you happen to know how many lawyers are at NSA CYBERCOM? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I don't know that. Senator Cornyn. Yeah, it's a whole bunch, and they're very talented. Lt. General Rudd. I would guess there is and I would--I would expect that they would be. Senator Cornyn. Will you be consulting with them on issues like, uh, let's say, 702, Section 702 FISA? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, I would expect to consult with the legal experts at both CYBERCOM and NSA on a whole host of issues to ensure, again, the execution of that mission set is done within the authorities consistently and that we're never outside the bounds of that. Senator Cornyn. I have--I have no doubt about that. The Judiciary Committee also has jurisdiction over the 702 issue. But, um, I, like others, believe that it's absolutely-- absolutely essential authority, but there's a phenomenon in Washington, DC, where, uh, certain narratives take root, which have no basis in fact. And, I just want to clarify a few things. First of all, one of the reasons why 702 had come under suspicion is because of its abuse in the case of Carter Page, but that was a Title I, 7--of 702, which is targeting an American citizen. In this case, an alleged agent of a foreign power. That law is not subject to any reauthorization. It doesn't expire. But just in terms of 702, Title VII, which is what, uh--so, what we're talking about. I know there's a line of questioning by one of our--one of the panel talking about targeting U.S. persons. You can't target a U.S. person without a warrant, and that's under Title I not on--on under Section 702. But you understand that, um, 702, Title VII, um, is--uh, addresses only foreigners abroad. Is that--is that your understanding? It's a foreign intelligence surveillance. Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's my understanding that 702 is focused on foreign intelligence against non-U.S. persons outside the United States. Senator Cornyn. And it's an invaluable resource, correct? Lt. General Rudd. In my experience it is, Senator. Senator Cornyn. And I'm sure you, like all of us, are very attuned to the balance between national security demands and privacy of American citizens. But in this case, this is focused solely on people overseas. So, there is no targeting of American citizens, of course, unless you have a--unless you have a warrant and you got to show up in front of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and prove that you are entitled to that warrant. But we're not talking about that here. But here again in DC, it seems like the--whoever has the--that you have this phenomenon of competing narratives, and I read a long time ago that whoever has the best narrative wins in the debates here in Washington, DC, whether or not they're based on facts. Another issue that's come up, and let me just ask, and I mean this with all due respect, you have an incredible record, but you are not a lawyer by training, are you sir? Lt. General Rudd. No, Senator, I'm not. Senator Cornyn. You're unburdened by that--by that credential. So, that's why you're going to be talking to your lawyers before you make any decision. But there's also this false narrative that lawfully collected intelligence that somehow you ought to be able to you ought to have to go out and get a search warrant in order to search what you've already lawfully collected. And of course, intelligence is prospective. Law enforcement is retrospective based on trying to solve a crime. But do you have a--are you prepared today, or would you like to give it some thought and maybe we can engage further on whether or not a warrant should be required to query lawfully collected intelligence? Lt. General Rudd. Senator, that's certainly something I'd like to take a deeper look at. Senator Cornyn. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you. Chairman Cotton. Thank you, General Rudd, for your testimony here today. For the benefit of members, and General Rudd, it's my intention to hold a committee vote on your nomination as soon as possible. Therefore, for planning purposes, any senator who wishes to submit questions for the record after today's hearing, please do so by noon tomorrow. General Rudd, I trust that you'll be equally prompt with your answers so we can move your nomination forward as quickly as possible. Thank you all, the hearing is adjourned. (Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 11:35 a.m.) [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]