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- EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MAY 20, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov www.cha.house.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-819 WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman LAUREL LEE, Florida, Vice Chair JOSEPH MORELLE, New York, BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia Ranking Member H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama GREG MURPHY, North Carolina NORMA TORRES, California STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma JULIE JOHNSON, Texas MARY MILLER, Illinois MIKE CAREY, Ohio Mike Platt, Staff Director Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS LAUREL LEE, Florida, Chair BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama, GREG MURPHY, North Carolina Ranking Member MARY MILLER, Illinois JULIE JOHNSON, Texas C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statements Chair Laurel Lee, Representative from the State of Florida....... 1 Prepared statement of Chair Laurel Lee....................... 3 Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell, Representative from the State of Alabama........................................................ 3 Prepared statement of Ranking Member Terri A. Sewell......... 5 Witnesses Honorable Thomas Hicks, chairman, U.S. Election Assistance Commission..................................................... 6 Prepared statement of Honorable Thomas Hicks................. 9 Honorable Christy McCormick, vice chair, U.S. Election Assistance Commission..................................................... 22 Prepared statement of Christy McCormick...................... 24 Honorable Benjamin Hovland, commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance Commission.......................................... 31 Prepared statement of Benjamin Hovland....................... 33 Honorable Donald Palmer, former commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance Commission, and Senior Legal Fellow, The Heritage Foundation..................................................... 108 Prepared statement of Donald Palmer.......................... 110 Submissions for the Record Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference letter. 118 EXAMINING BEST PRACTICES FOR STRENGTHENING ELECTION SECURITY ---------- May 20, 2026 Subcommittee on Elections, Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Laurel Lee [Chair of the Subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Lee, Murphy, Miller, and Sewell. Staff present: Michael Platt, Staff Director; Abby Salter, Deputy General Counsel; Kristen Monterroso, Director of Operations and Legislative Clerk; Josh Weber, Counsel; Libby Sippel, Deputy Director of Member Services; Sage Dobbs, Professional Staff; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Samuel Iacobellis, Minority Senior Advisor; and Nikolas Youngsmith, Minority Policy Director. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAUREL LEE, CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA Chair Lee. The Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House Administration will come to order. The title of today's hearing is ``Examining Best Practices for Strengthening Election Security.'' I note that a quorum is present. Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any time. Also, without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials they wish to be included therein. Thank you, Ranking Member Sewell, Members of the Committee, and our witnesses, for participating in today's hearing. Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the different ways that States can strengthen election security. The best practices that we will cover today include enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity. Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it prevents an issue before it arises. I look forward to discussing best practices for securing elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts. I would first like to highlight the different resources the Federal Government makes available to elections administrators for election security. The resources include Federal grants, testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance Commission. One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate functionality, accessibility, and security. There is also great work that many States and localities are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against threats to their elections. For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity. To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats, North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to the same statewide system. In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond to cyber threats. To respond to physical threats, several States have implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at polling locations. What is great about these physical-security upgrades is that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very interested in hearing more about how these grants are administered and what the results of past grants have been in States across America. Another important measure that increases voter experience and voter confidence is access for election observers. The Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and individual candidates also deploy observers, because their presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties. While no two States administer their elections the exact same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure elections. They should consider every factor to minimize security risks. By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout increases. That is a good thing for our democracy. The best practices we will discuss today can help every State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our conversation. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Sewell for an opening statement. [The prepared statement of Chair Lee follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIR OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS LAUREL LEE Today, the Subcommittee on Elections will discuss the different ways that States can strengthen election security. The best practices that we will cover today include enhancements to physical security and to cybersecurity. Addressing potential vulnerabilities improves voter experience and voter confidence. Preparation and resilience strengthens the integrity of our election systems, because it prevents an issue before it arises. I look forward to discussing best practices for securing elections and how Congress can be supporting those efforts. I would first like to highlight the different resources the Federal Government makes available to elections administrators for election security. The resources include Federal grants, testing programs, and guidance from the Election Assistance Commission. One great example is the EAC's Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP. This program offers voluntary security standards and evaluations for nonvoting systems like poll books, election day reporting systems, or other election supporting systems not covered by the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. The EAC's Voluntary Voting System Guidelines serve as a baseline certification for new voting systems to evaluate functionality, accessibility, and security. There is also great work that many States and localities are doing on their own to enhance security and protect against threats to their elections. For example, in 2024, the University of South Florida hosted a cyber tabletop exercise with county supervisors of elections, the FBI, and local law enforcement to strategize responses to potential threats to election cybersecurity. To quickly disseminate information about cyber threats, North Dakota uses a whole-of-government approach, which allows agencies, cities, counties, and localities to have access to the same statewide system. In North Carolina, the National Guard and State Emergency Management Agency work collaboratively to monitor and respond to cyber threats. To respond to physical threats, several States have implemented common-sense integrity measures like tamper seals for ballots, monitoring systems, and backup power sources at polling locations. What is great about these physical security upgrades is that HAVA grants can be used for this exact purpose. I am very interested in hearing more about how these grants are administered and what the results of past grants have been in States across America. Another important measure that increases voter experience and voter confidence is access for election observers. The Committee on House Administration deploys congressional staff to serve as election observers for U.S. House races and ensure elections are run in a secure manner. State parties and individual candidates also deploy observers, because their presence at polling places builds trust with voters and allows for the rapid flow of information to necessary parties. While no two States administer their elections the exact same way, one thing should be universal: Election officials must take a comprehensive approach to administering secure elections. They should consider every factor to minimize security risks. By implementing strong risk management approaches, they not only strengthen election systems, they also build trust and transparency. When voters feel confident in elections, turnout increases. That is a good thing for our democracy. The best practices we will discuss today can help every State improve their election security efforts. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to our conversation. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRI A. SEWELL, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA Ms. Sewell. Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are gathered here today for your testimony. As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our elections are fair and secure. Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self- government. Every American, regardless of race, religion, party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will be counted accurately and that their election will be administered fairly. Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted, whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from radical groups at home and abroad. Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed to undermine our collective belief in democracy. Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five-alarm fire to the voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South are franticly redrawing Jim Crow-era maps that will erase Black political representation at all levels of government. As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch. Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer-financed slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is hypocrisy at its highest degree. We are here today doing important work to guarantee that election workers have the financial resources they need to do their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers' dollars. During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election officials across the country are being asked to administer elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our election officials must navigate these changes while also suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding streams. In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators and county officials are responsible for running elections across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated equipment that must still meet modern security standards. Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems, strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election administration improvements. Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with much-needed assistance to better support county elections. Congress has the responsibility to act before vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far lower than the cost of repairing public trust. Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens. Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in American history with resolve. As primary elections are currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair and secure. Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee, will continue to provide. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee, and I yield back the balance of my time. [The prepared statement of Ranking Member Sewell follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS TERRI A. SEWELL Good afternoon, everyone. I want to thank Chairwoman Lee and those witnesses who are gathered here today for your testimony. As Ranking Member of the Elections Subcommittee, I take very seriously the responsibility that Congress holds to our constituents and to the Constitution to ensure that our elections are fair and secure. Our elections are the foundation of public trust in self- government. Every American, regardless of race, religion, party, or ideology, deserves confidence that their votes will be counted accurately and that their election will be administered fairly. Yet the threats facing our elections are growing at an alarming pace. Voters at home see their right to vote targeted, whether by hostile State legislatures or really aggressive courts, while all election officials face targeted threats from radical groups at home and abroad. Moreover, our President and his allies have widely spread debunked conspiracy theories and false claims that are designed to undermine our collective belief in democracy. Now the conservative Supreme Court recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais has ignited a five alarm fire to the voters of this country. As this hearing occurs, Republican State legislatures like mine in Alabama and across the South are franticly redrawing Jim Crow era maps that will erase Black political representation at all levels of government. As this administration continues to perpetuate that the lie that the 2020 Presidential election was stolen, voter suppression and discrimination is at a fever pitch. Just this week, President Trump created a taxpayer financed slush fund for January 6th insurrectionists who violently tried to overturn the results of the 2020 election. I think this is hypocrisy at its highest degree. We are here today doing important work to guarantee that election workers have the financial resources they need to do their jobs effectively, all while this President is paying out to people who committed heinous crimes money out of taxpayers' dollars. During a moment of incredible political turmoil, election officials across the country are being asked to administer elections while Republican State legislatures change the rules of the game in their scramble to consolidate power. Our election officials must navigate these changes while also suffering from inconsistent and often inadequate funding streams. In my home State of Alabama, local election administrators and county officials are responsible for running elections across 67 counties, often with constrained budgets and outdated equipment that must still meet modern security standards. Federal support through the Help America Vote Act has helped Alabama and other States improve voting systems, strengthen cybersecurity, and modernize election administration. Since Congress passed that Act, billions of dollars have been distributed nationwide to support election administration improvements. Even that funding has not been enough. Additional sustained Federal funding would provide Alabama and other States with much needed assistance to better support county elections. Congress has the responsibility to act before vulnerabilities become crises. The cost of prevention is far lower than the cost of repairing public trust. Our democracy is one of the most important institutions we have, not just as Members of Congress but as American citizens. Future generations will judge whether we meet this moment in American history with resolve. As primary elections are currently underway and we are getting closer to the midterm elections, Americans must know that our elections will be fair and secure. Let us stand up for democracy. Let us stand up for the truth. Voters and the power of the ballot depend upon it. Let us provide every State with the tools, resources, and sustained Federal support necessary to protect the sacred right to vote. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, as well as the work that this Committee, this important Subcommittee, will continue to provide. Chair Lee. Without objection, all other Members' opening statements will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today. Today, we have one witness panel. I will now introduce our witnesses. First, we have Election Assistance Commission Chairman Thomas Hicks. Next, we have EAC Vice Chair Christy McCormick. We also have a third EAC Commissioner, Benjamin Hovland. Finally, we have former EAC Commissioner Don Palmer. Each witness will have 5 minutes to provide an opening statement. I now recognize Chairman Hicks for the purpose of giving an opening statement. STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS HICKS, CHAIRMAN, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE CHRISTY MCCORMICK, VICE CHAIR, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN HOVLAND, COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; AND THE HONORABLE DONALD PALMER, FORMER COMMISSIONER, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION, AND SENIOR LEGAL FELLOW, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman. I ask that my full statement be accepted into the record. Chair Lee. So ordered. Mr. Hicks. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the election security work of the United States Election Assistance Commission. As an independent, bipartisan agency, the EAC offers trusted sources grounded in Federal law and responsive to the practical realities of State and local election officials. We appreciate the Subcommittee's important oversight and your close engagement with the EAC. Election officials have been the first line of defense against escalating security threats and cannot be expected to defend their election systems alone. These are our neighbors, PTA members, and part of our congregations, armed not with guns or bullets but with the law and the Constitution. Many officials describe their work as increasingly technical and security-focused, even though they do not have dedicated cybersecurity personnel and their budgets have remained stagnant. In recent years, the demand for assistance has grown significantly. Since the establishment of the agency under the Help America Vote Act, the EAC has engaged with officials from jurisdictions of all sizes to support ongoing election security work spanning four core areas: physical security, cybersecurity, personal security, and contingency management. Election officials work daily to meet the demands of an increasingly complex security environment. As the public profile of elections have grown, election infrastructure has become an active target for a broad range of bad actors. Physical-security and cybersecurity measures focus on the protection of infrastructure and are the backbone of election security. These measures include chain of custody, bipartisan teams, and protections against phishing and other cybersecurity attacks. Election officials across the country have also faced a growing number of threats to their personal safety, including swatting incidents, suspicious packages, and bomb hoax threats targeting election officials and polling places--even yesterday, with the incident that happened in Pennsylvania. A 2024 national survey of election officials found a third have experienced harassment in connection to their work, while half knew of someone who had left the profession due to safety concerns. The EAC has helped to facilitate a sharing of best practices between State, local, and Federal Government partners to improve the overall security of U.S. elections. These efforts promote safe, secure, accurate, and accessible elections for every voter. While we offer online and in-person training on topics such as chain of custody, physical security of election facilities, and contingency planning, for many jurisdictions, especially smaller and rural offices, these trainings are the only source of nationally recognized, nonpartisan election security guidance. So far, more than 7,000 officials who serve more than 100 million voters have participated in EAC training. This direct, no-cost support represents about $1.6 million in savings for local offices. One of our most popular resources is the Election Scenario Test Deck, which provides real-world scenarios to election officials that they can use to participate in training and evaluate their incident response. To date, more than 5,500 decks have been distributed nationwide. The common thread through all the work is the human element. Election officials are the best tool for ensuring elections are secure. While HAVA was enacted with security in mind, the threat landscape and the presence of malicious actors has grown. Today, State and local officials are incorporating cybersecurity protections and physical-security measures into nearly every aspect of election administration, even under significant staffing and funding constraints. For the United States to continue to be a world leader in election best practices, the Federal Government must support and invest in our election infrastructure. I have full faith and confidence in election officials to carry out their duties. The EAC will remain a dedicated Federal partner through 2026 and beyond. Thank you for convening this important hearing and for your ongoing support. I look forward to continuing our work for the American people, and I am here to answer questions you may have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS HICKS [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chair Lee. I now recognize Vice Chair McCormick for the purpose of giving an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK Ms. McCormick. Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome the chance to highlight the ongoing work of the Election Assistance Commission, the EAC, to bolster election security. This hearing demonstrates your commitment to election integrity across America, and we thank you for your efforts. The EAC partners with States to support secure, effective administration of Federal elections. Strong election security depends on proven practices like pre-election testing, auditing, and paper ballots, along with constant vigilance against evolving threats. Through practical tools, best practices, and direct support, the EAC helps election administrators protect the systems and processes that sustain public confidence in our democracy during the 2026 midterms and beyond. HAVA funds help States in this endeavor by allowing them to invest in security resources that strengthen election infrastructure. Grant reports show that States use funds to support sustainable security practices such as network monitoring, endpoint protection, multi-factor authentication, automatic system backups, physical security, and cybersecurity efforts. Over the past year, the EAC's Election Technology Office modernized the Nation's voting system infrastructure by certifying two voting systems to the latest Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, VVSG 2.0, and we have five additional systems under test. Some of the enhanced security requirements of VVSG 2.0 include use of paper ballots, increased support for auditing, improved cybersecurity requirements like air gap systems, enhanced access controls, and secure system updates; upgraded physical standards limiting unauthorized access and what can be connected to the systems; and preventing undetectable changes in the software that could alter results. VVSG 2.0 also emphasizes transparency, reflecting what election officials are already doing to secure systems, and managing risk through measures like tamper-evident seals, two- person integrity, chain-of-custody procedures, and continuity planning. The Testing and Certification Division has also drafted VVSG 2.1. This initiative reflects the agency's commitment to continual improvement of election systems and the modernization of guidance centered around election integrity. Realizing the value that the VVSG certification process has provided to States, the EAC launched the Election Supporting Technology Evaluation Program, or ESTEP, in 2023. This started a focused EAC effort to research best practices around election-supporting technologies that are used year-round, such as electronic poll books, electronic ballot delivery, voter registration, and election-night reporting systems. In May 2024, the EAC launched the Nation's first Federal Voluntary Electronic Poll Book Certification Program. The program has already certified three systems, with two more systems under test. The value of this process is proven by the fact that, just weeks after certifying the first electronic poll book system, North Carolina adopted the agency's certification requirements for its own certification program. As jurisdictions continue to modernize their equipment, the EAC is analyzing emerging election technologies and translating those findings into practical guidance, such as list maintenance, grants, and physical security. In all of this, we strive to be transparent while ensuring the safety of all involved in the electoral process, from administrators to poll workers, to observers. With security top of mind for election officials, the EAC will continue to move forward in our work to protect the election infrastructure that supports America's representative democracy. We are a small agency but one exclusively devoted to fulfilling the promise of the Help America Vote Act and meeting the evolving needs of election administration across the country. Thank you for your support of the EAC and your tireless commitment to State and local election officials and to election integrity. We look forward to collaborating with you on these and other important matters, and I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you have. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. McCormick follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTY MCCORMICK [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chair Lee. I now recognize Commissioner Hovland for the purpose of giving an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND Mr. Hovland. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, Ranking Member Sewell, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important topic and the work of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. When Congress created the EAC with the Help America Vote Act of 2002, it charged the agency with a clearinghouse function to look at best practices across the Nation. The EAC has embraced this part of our mission in recent years, particularly as election administration has evolved. My colleagues and I work with State and local election officials from all 50 States, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia. From that experience, I can confidently say that no one cares more about the security and integrity of our elections than the Americans who run them. The challenges faced by election officials today would have seemed nearly unimaginable to the officials serving when HAVA passed. The reality is that administering elections is harder and more expensive than it has ever been before. Our State and local election officials do an amazing job with limited resources. In the years since HAVA, Congress has provided significant funding, which helps support essential aspects of elections, such as secure and accessible voter registration, accurate ballot tabulation, auditable results, and safe and secure election facilities. Federal funding, however, has covered less than 5 percent of the estimated total cost of running elections during that time. Similarly, the EAC tries to help fill some of those gaps but is often limited by our level of funding. Last fiscal year, the EAC saw a 15-percent reduction in agency funding, at a time when demand has only increased. We have been doing our best to respond by sharing best practices, creating resources that help election officials, and offering technical assistance where possible. In fact, this past month, we held meetings with our advisory boards, made up of election officials from across the country and other key stakeholders. We heard resounding enthusiasm for the EAC's work and the direction we are heading. The agency is nearing a point where funding cuts will impact what we can accomplish and the support we can provide election officials, especially related to election security. My colleagues spoke about our election technology and field services team. They are doing amazing work, but they are a team of only 10 people. With over 8,000 election jurisdictions in the United States, there are limits to our capacity, but not to our desire or our commitment. We continue to work creatively and thoughtfully to respond to election officials' needs. We are piloting a number of efforts, including those to enhance election security and technology in a way that informs future programs and allows for rapid scaling if appropriate funding is provided. This is also part of why we designed the EAC's Learning Lab, to release new content on a rolling basis and provide asynchronous trainings accessible to election officials anywhere in the country at no cost. Additionally, one of the agency's most significant accomplishments was the development and adoption of the 2.0 version of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. As Vice Chair McCormick noted, there are now two systems certified to this standard and five more in the testing process. A report that we shared with Congress this week notes that much of the voting equipment in use is nearing the end of their recommended lifespans and conservatively estimates a cost of $2.7 billion for jurisdictions across the country to make this transition. I mention this because we must consistently invest in our election administration infrastructure. Too often, we are bailed out by the innovation and hard work of the public servants that run our elections. Many seasoned election officials have left the profession, taking with them valuable institutional knowledge. To fully meet the challenges of this moment and ensure our elections remain secure, there needs to be greater support for elections at the local, State, and Federal levels. We know this investment matters. Since 2018, States report using HAVA security grants to replace paperless voting systems, harden statewide voter registration databases, increase cybersecurity training, and enhance physical security. Many of these improvements to election security were made possible because of the Federal funding and congressional support. At the EAC, we are committed to continuing to do everything we can to ensure elections are safe, secure, accurate, and accessible. Thank you for the opportunity to testify about our work and the challenges facing election officials. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hovland follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN HOVLAND [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chair Lee. I now recognize former Commissioner Mr. Palmer for the purpose of giving an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER Mr. Palmer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee and Ranking Member Sewell. As you know, I have recently moved to The Heritage Foundation as a senior legal fellow for election integrity, and the views expressed today are my own and should not be reflected on The Heritage Foundation. I really do appreciate the opportunity to talk about cybersecurity and the election security of the voting systems and the election systems that we use--election officials use. We want them to be able to concentrate on administering the election, not worried about the back-end security of those systems. That is why I really appreciate the work that my colleagues to my right have done over the last decade. As I sit back and I think about, you know, since I have moved on, what are some of the recommendations that I would provide to the Committee, I have a few. I would, No. 1, support the existing SECURE IT concept that would add a formal vulnerability testing program. There is great work that is done on the testing of voting systems, but there needs to be--we need to add to that concept. The SECURE IT Act was made a part of the National Defense Authorization Act. It required penetration testing, and it was the first step to simulate real-world attacks on election systems and voting systems where you tabulate votes. Unfortunately, there was no appropriation attached, and, obviously, that is going to slow the work. In my mind, things need to be going quicker, not slower. The work is way too slow to stay ahead of our adversaries in this area. The window to secure elections and increase voter confidence is urgent on your mind. That window could be closing. That is why this is the most rapid approach, using a vulnerability testing program to do that. I think there should be a fully funded vulnerability testing program, that it should be the highest priority, and that every voting machine needs to go through that process. The second recommendation is that--we heard a lot of great information on the ESTEP program, both from the Chair and from the EAC Commissioners. That is a very positive program that really should be expanded--the Congress should look at expanding that. There are huge success stories with the certification of electronic poll books. That has been a concern of the Congress for a number of years. Now there is actually a functioning program, with systems being reviewed, and that should be expanded. The third recommendation I would make is that we prioritize voter registration system security and modernization. As the Committee is aware, the voter registration system is really one of the core functions of the Help America Vote Act. It holds all of the voter registration data of the citizens that will vote, and we want to make sure that is secure and it is accurate. There has been bipartisan concern over the years over the security of those voter registration systems, both from the Congress and from outside groups. Even more so, there have been documented instances of vulnerabilities being identified and those vulnerabilities being exploited. Now, we know that breaches of a voter registration system that is outward-facing to the internet does not necessarily mean results are going to be changed, but the impact on the public could be very negative. We need to do everything we can--I say ``we''--the country needs to do everything we can to secure those voter registration systems. I can tell you right now, we are not doing everything we can. We should be doing everything we can, but we are not doing everything we can. My next recommendation is that we encourage coordination between the Federal partners and the EAC. That just makes a lot of sense, that there be a sharing of responsibilities on coordination. That would save taxpayer money. CISA has reduced its footprint in elections, but election officials want more election focus on the products. I think the EAC realizes that and has tried to step up to the plate and provide scenario training, in coordination with other Federal partners. I think that targeted funding to the EAC which would allow additional coordination would be helpful and to provide additional cybersecurity offerings that are election-related. My last recommendation is: Obviously, local governments and local law enforcement are the most critical aspect of physical security of local election officials. The FBI has really stepped up with the trainings and--and significant trainings, particularly on bomb threats, for example. How can Congress help? I would just give you one example. Targeted assistance to increase the accessibility of polling places, that was a congressional initiative, and I think the same can be done for the physical security of polling places and election offices. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Palmer follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD PALMER [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chair Lee. Thank you. I will now begin our questions today, followed by the Ranking Member. I now recognize myself for the purpose of witness questions. Chairman Hicks, I will begin with you. From 2020 to 2023, the largest share of Election Security Grants were disbursed for cybersecurity. Can you share with us some of the uses of those grant funds and your assessment of whether that investment in cybersecurity was valuable? Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Chairwoman. I do believe that that investment was valuable. The one criticism I would have is that it was not enough. The fact is that most of these jurisdictions use this money to protect IT systems against foreign attacks. I do not want to remind the Committee how we are in conflict now with a very dangerous adversary, and that adversary attacked our systems back in 2016, 2020, and 2024. That is nothing that is secretive to anyone. There are also other foreign actors that are out there who want to do the U.S. harm. We provided the jurisdictions with money to strengthen and harden their systems, but that was not enough. They have updated their voting systems in certain jurisdictions, and they have improved the accuracy of their voting rolls, and other activities as well. I do believe that, in order to ensure that we combat this foreign threat over and over again, more resources will be needed. Thank you. Chair Lee. In 2024, the EAC authorized the use of HAVA grants for physical security. Can you share with us some of the expenses that would be covered under that new guidance? Mr. Hicks. We also authorized things in 2022 for the personal safety of election officials overall, similar to what Congress did to ensure that their Members remain secure and safe. In 2024, we basically offered more trainings for election officials, but we also ensured that they can use this to upgrade systems that they have, basically harden those systems, whether or not that is two-step authentication or other aspects as well. Chair Lee. Vice Chair McCormick, you discussed VVSG 2.0 during your testimony. Would you share with us some of the key distinctions between 2.0 and 1.0? Ms. McCormick. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. VVSG 2.0 includes major improvements to cybersecurity guidelines, including requiring air-gapping from any kind of public network. We have prohibited wireless technology in the machines. We have also provided that there must be multi-factor authentication for all the systems. Another thing we have done is that we have required physical-security and data-protection requirements. Those are strengthened significantly to make sure that there is no intrusion on the systems that cannot be detected. As well, that goes to our software independence, which is now required. Software independence helps us identify whether there has been any compromise to the systems. We also now are requiring penetration testing before the systems even come in for test. We have done a number of upgrades to the VVSG 2.0. As I said, we have two systems that have gone through this process and have been certified by the EAC now. Those are now hitting the market for the first time. We have five systems under test. We are also looking to upgrade from 2.0 to 2.1 and looking at things such as barcodes and wireless technology and other ways we might be able to continue to strengthen the security aspects of our guidelines. Chair Lee. Mr. Palmer, you just mentioned during your testimony--you gave several really interesting recommendations, but one related to helping State and local officials with cybersecurity. You touched on the evolving role of CISA, where CISA has a reduced footprint in the elections arena. Is there another agency--is it the EAC? Do you think there is another entity that could step up to help? Or would your recommendation be that CISA reengage in a different way? Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think that CISA is reducing its footprint, and the EAC, because it is the agency that focuses on elections, primarily, or solely in its core mission, that we have a responsibility to provide services across the board to election officials. Many of those services have been picked up by the EAC. Sometimes it is the Federal agency coordination or it is trainings that have been going on across the country. In discussions with CISA that I have had, those services are still available. Sometimes I think the EAC could serve as a translator and work with CISA, in coordination with CISA, to provide those services, because election officials like it; they like to have election-centric services. The EAC has former election officials that serve on it. Many of its Commissioners have been involved in elections. A very professional group of former election officials that can, you know, sort of translate for the rest of the Federal Government what they want from the Federal Government. So---- Chair Lee. Thank you, Mr. Palmer. Mr. Palmer. Thank you. Chair Lee. We are out of time. I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes. Ms. Sewell. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for your testimony. You know, I truly believe, and we hear over and over again in this Subcommittee, that we are not funding the Election Assistance Commission and election-security and--integrity infrastructure enough. I wanted to ask you, Chair Hicks: I know that administering the Federal Election Security Grants is one of the biggest responsibilities that you all have. Am I correct that the Congress has gone from providing a high of $425 million in recent years to a low of $15 million in 2025 in those grants? Mr. Hicks. Yes, you are correct, Ranking Member. Ms. Sewell. How has that decrease--and that is a big decrease--how has it manifested itself in our States? What are you seeing in terms of what is not going funded that should be going funded because of this reduction? Mr. Hicks. States are basically trying to make sure that the Federal Government pays its fair share, in terms of having the biggest footprint on the ballot and so forth for elections overall. I believe that election--the officials that I have talked to have said that they are going to have to cut back on a few things in order to ensure that things remain safe and secure for the elections moving forward. Ms. Sewell. Ms. McCormick, I know that we appropriated about $45 million in 2026. I am hearing from lots of secretaries of state that that simply is not enough and directly from election administrators that that is simply not enough. What do you see is going undone because of the decrease in the amount of funding? Ms. McCormick. $45 million has to be distributed between the 50 States and the territories, and so we hardly even---- Ms. Sewell. That turns out to be about, what, $200,000 per State? Ms. McCormick. I am sorry. Ms. Sewell. That $45 million turns out to be about $250,000 per State. I mean, the total is $45 million, right? Ms. McCormick. Right. It is a minimum amount of money. Ms. Sewell. Yep. Ms. McCormick. States cannot use that money to do things like purchase new voting systems--which a lot of them are in the position of needing to do at this point--to strengthening the systems that they already have, to provide training for their personnel. They need to do physical security as well--physical barriers, cameras, card readers, secure transportation for voting systems and ballots--cybersecurity risk assessments, incident response, threat testing, threat monitoring on social media, and, again, securing their voter registration system. Ms. Sewell. All of that costs money, right? Ms. McCormick. Yes, it does. The Federal---- Ms. Sewell. Right now we are not funding that. Ms. McCormick [continuing]. Government is just a drop in the bucket. Ms. Sewell. Yes. You know, Mr. Palmer, I know you are a former Commissioner, but I think hindsight is 20/20 vision, right? What would you recommend to this Committee and to Congress in terms of funding, adequately funding, the Commission? What do you see as the biggest threat? Mr. Palmer. Well, if we are talking about the Commission, I think that many of the programs that we have talked about, like the ESTEP program and the vulnerability testing program, there is already a framework to do that. The Congress has set that up. I mean, I know the EAC---- Ms. Sewell. Are we funding it? Mr. Palmer. No, it is not being funded, and it is coming out of the nickels and dimes that the EAC is finding in the sofa, trying to keep that alive. I just think that that is a critical piece of national security--vulnerability testing. It just makes a lot of sense. It is an investment for the rest of the election community, a very small investment, that would have huge dividends. Ms. Sewell. Absolutely. Commissioner Hovland, what would you say is the most essential function that the Commission runs? How do you see the reduced funding affecting that mission? Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member. I think that, you know, again, we have our four core mission areas, but as we look to expand the clearinghouse function as well as our election technology initiatives, there is really a need. Again, we have provided information to Congress, to Appropriations, on how many of these programs are, sort of, ready and turnkey because we have done pilots, because we have done the work to see how best to spend this money and how it can have an immediate impact. Again, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, when you look at the 8,000 jurisdictions across the country, really, the scale that we are talking about is significant. Right now---- Ms. Sewell. Do you think that $250,000 is enough per State to be able to adequately fund elections? Mr. Hovland. On the grant side, again, I do not think that is sufficient. I know from election officials that every dollar matters, but, again, when you are talking about capital purchases, whether that is replacing voting equipment or upgrading the security of statewide voter registration databases, you know, one of the things that we often hear about from Congress is the unspent funds---- Ms. Sewell. Yep. Mr. Hovland [continuing]. and, often, when the amounts are lower, they are waiting--the States are waiting to make those capital purchases, like replacing their statewide voter registration database, or making those significant investments. Ms. Sewell. Madam Chair, thanks for indulging me for going a little over. I would like to request unanimous consent to submit for the record a letter from 84 voting, civil-rights, faith, labor, environmental, and disability-rights organizations, led by the Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference, that call on Congress to allocate considerably more funding for election administration in Fiscal Year 2027. Chair Lee. Without objection, so ordered. Ms. Sewell. Thanks. [The Southern Poverty Law Center and The Leadership Conference letter follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Dr. Murphy, for 5 minutes. Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Madam Chair. They gave me a cheat sheet for your names, because I am too old and I cannot read everybody's name down there. Thank you very much for convening this Subcommittee hearing. Obviously, this is a bipartisan issue. We want people to have access to what is a tremendous right that we are given here in the United States to vote, and we want to make sure that they are safe and secure. I was just reading--I was not aware of what happened in Pennsylvania. Thankfully nobody was injured. I would like to go just a little bit, quick, off-script to ask Mr. Palmer about what is the deal going on with Maryland. My understanding is, they sent out 500 wrong mail-in ballots. Oops? Mr. Palmer. Well, I mean, I saw some of the conversation about that, sir, and I would say that, you know, it is a mistake that just cannot happen. That type of mistake cannot happen. Dr. Murphy. Five hundred thousand. Mr. Palmer. It is a lot, sir. It is a very--it is a huge mistake. I know the people that--you know, and then, obviously, you can point at the vendor and say, well, the vendor made the mistake, but the buck stops with the election officials. I---- Dr. Murphy. That is exactly right. Mr. Palmer. I--you know, I have sympathy for them. I have been in a position where one mistake can have an impact on an election. It is that type of thing that hurts confidence. I have hope that continued training and professional training will, you know, sort of---- Dr. Murphy. This is where, again, this Committee and Congress, you know, one way or the other, is supposed to provide oversight. Their response is, ``Well, we will send another 500,000 out.'' What could go wrong there? It just shows that there are problems with our election system, and it is OK for us to question it, and it is OK for us to do due diligence on these type of things. That just amazed me. I have known some patients of mine who have come in and said they got mail-in ballots and they got them for people that lived in their residence 3 and 4 years or 5 years before. There are obviously problems that go on with this. I want to talk a little bit about cybersecurity. We live in a digital world where now there is AI, there is quantum physics that are pushing out insane amount of data and really jeopardizing our systems. We live in a dangerous time. There are enemies that want to destabilize, divide us at home. We have seen this in so many different instances. Commissioner Hovland, I just want to ask about the EAC. How does it work to stay informed to the constantly evolving cyber threats? What does it do to not only figure these out but also to communicate to, you know, State and local levels to make sure that people know what is going on? Mr. Hovland. Thank you for the question. You know, it is a real challenge. Often, one of the biggest challenges, when you talk about the scope and scale of 8,000- plus jurisdictions across the country, is communicating to that last mile. One of the ways that we have been doing that--we communicate a number of things, but really so much on cybersecurity is about the basics. You know, even when we look at threats from artificial intelligence and AI, so much of the prevention comes down to being good at the basics. That is why we address that with both resources that we provide, various, you know, training guides, et cetera, but also pieces of our Learning Lab. Some of the trainings in that platform walk through best practices, and it can help---- Dr. Murphy. Do you guys communicate, State and local, as literally as--currently, how often do you guys do that? What is your relationship with those folks? Mr. Hovland. We have regular contact with election officials all across the country and---- Dr. Murphy. What does ``regular contact'' mean? Mr. Hovland. Every day. Dr. Murphy. OK. Mr. Hovland. You know, again, it depends. We have a monthly newsletter dedicated to election officials. We have a platform to communicate with election officials. Our board meetings that I mentioned earlier have State and local officials from every State and territory in the country. Through those processes, we get very widespread feedback-- small jurisdictions, large jurisdictions, State officials, local officials--and that really helps inform our work and makes it better. Dr. Murphy. OK. Great. Mr. Hicks, just one question, because I never understand--I do not know what the answer to this is, when people say ``pay their fair share.'' I have never had an idea when, you know, taxation--this, that, and the other stuff. How much, in your opinion, should the Federal Government be paying versus what should the State be paying as far as elections? What is the fair-share number? Mr. Hicks. That is a hard question to answer, Congressman-- -- Dr. Murphy. Well, you are the one that brought it up. Mr. Hicks. Yup, yup, I agree, I agree. I would say that elections, overall, cost close to $6 billion per election cycle. I think adding--2 years ago for the Congress to appropriate $15 million is not enough. If I had my druthers, I would say the Federal Government should pay 100 percent of Federal elections. That is not for me to decide. That is for Congress to decide. Dr. Murphy. OK. Mr. Hicks. So ``fair share,'' I think, is a significant amount. Dr. Murphy. OK. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. Chair Lee. I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes. Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Chairwoman Lee, for hosting this important hearing and to the witnesses for taking time to be here. American citizens deserve secure elections and to know that their votes are guaranteed. They are tired of fraud, and their faith in our elections is dwindling. We all know the Democrats want to cheat by not passing the SAVE America Act, but I will continue to fight every day to get that piece of legislation to the President's desk. In this Committee, we passed H.R. 8721, the Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act, that makes important changes to our election laws by prohibiting foreign nationals from funding ballot-harvesting and ballot-collection efforts. This common-sense bill put forth by my colleague will help the American people gain confidence in their elections while curbing foreign influence that seeks to undermine our institutions. I look forward to the continuing good work that this Committee is doing. My first question is for Mr. Hicks. What steps has the EAC taken in an effort to mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens? Mr. Hicks. Congresswoman, States run the elections. It is illegal for non-citizens to vote. What we do is, we do not play an active role into who can vote and who cannot vote. The eligibility of voters relies on the States. Mrs. Miller. Right. It is illegal for them to vote. Mr. Hicks. Correct. Mrs. Miller. It is illegal for illegals to vote. My question is, what steps has the EAC taken to make sure that illegals are not voting in our elections, non-citizens are not voting in our elections? Mr. Hicks. The EAC does not run elections. We cannot do anything to ensure that. That is a State issue. Mrs. Miller. You should be taking steps, though, to mitigate illegal voting by non-citizens. Also, if you want the Federal Government to pick up the tab for elections, then maybe the Federal Government could say, you have to have a photo ID and you have to be a U.S. citizen. Mr. Palmer, how does poll-worker training contribute to election integrity and voter confidence? What does poll-worker training look like? Mr. Palmer. Poll-worker training is--I mean, that is the front lines of helping voters cast the ballot. That poll-worker training is imperative. What it really means is, officials at the county office, as well as other poll workers who are long-term--served a long time, they provide guidance on the different missions that take place inside a polling place, if it is confirming the identity of someone, if it is giving them the right ballot, making sure that there is calm and no chaos in a polling place. That is the importance of a poll worker. Mrs. Miller. I am just curious, how do you train a poll worker to keep non-citizens from voting when they do not have to show an ID? Mr. Palmer. Well, poll workers, they are going to follow the rules of the jurisdiction. It is up to us, as the policymakers, it is up to the Congress to set the rules--the State legislatures--set the rules of the eligibility of who is going to be casting a ballot. We expect the poll workers to follow the instruction of the legislature. In some ways, I do not want to put that onus on them. They will follow the rules and procedures that are provided to them. Mrs. Miller. Which is why it is so important that we pass the SAVE America Act. Ms. McCormick, as jurisdictions modernize their elections, what steps can they take to proactively ensure the security of their systems? Ms. McCormick. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman Miller. There are a number of things that election officials can do. The first thing that they can do is rigorous testing of the election equipment both before, during, and after an election. They can also engage in stringent auditing practices. All States now require the elections to be audited, and we now have 98 percent of the country using paper ballots. The best way to do that is to do an eye exam--hand examination of the ballots to make sure that they match the results. I agree with you that we have a crisis in election confidence right now, and we need to be able to assure our voters that our election outcomes are accurate, they are fair, and they are secure. Part of that is to the allow observers into the polling places to be as transparent as possible. Those are some things that election officials can do to strengthen the security and the transparency of our elections. Mrs. Miller. I have to say, across the country, Democrats and Republicans want--they election integrity. They want people to show voter ID and proof of citizenship. We have to pass our legislation here to require States and local governments to prove that you are a U.S. citizen before you are voting. With that, I will yield back. Chair Lee. I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing before us today and sharing your experience, your expertise, and your insight. Members of the Committee may have some additional questions for you, and we ask you to please respond to those questions in writing. Without objection, each Member will have 5 legislative days to insert additional material into the record or to revise and extend their remarks. If there is no further business, I thank the Members for their participation. Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] [all]