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- TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JUNE 23, 2022 __________ Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov ___________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 47-897 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS Senate House JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts, DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Co-chair MARCO RUBIO, Florida CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma THOMAS SUOZZI, New York TOM COTTON, Arkansas TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN MAST, Florida ANGUS KING, Maine VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JON OSSOFF, Georgia RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia MICHELLE STEEL, California EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS Not yet appointed Matt Squeri, Staff Director Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- Statements Page Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China..... 1 Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.......................................................... 2 Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey......................................................... 4 Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of international law and executive president of Kreddha........... 5 Statement of Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City University of Hong Kong........................................ 6 Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC........... 8 Statement of Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose... 9 APPENDIX Prepared Statements van Walt van Praag, Michael...................................... 31 Lau, Hon-Shiang.................................................. 34 Tethong, Tenzin N................................................ 38 Bork, Ellen...................................................... 39 Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 41 McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 42 Submissions for the Record Statement of the International Campaign for Tibet, submitted by Representative McGovern........................................ 43 ``The Genuine `China Version' of Tibet's History: Tibet Was Never Part of China since Antiquity,'' by Hon-Shiang Lau............. 55 CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 122 Witness Biographies.............................................. 123 (iii) TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT ---------- THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2022 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Washington, DC. The hearing was held from 9:05 a.m. to 10:56 a.m., room H- 313, the Capitol, Washington, DC, and virtually via Cisco Webex, Senator Jeff Merkley, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, presiding. Also present: Representative James P. McGovern, Co-chair, Senator Jon Ossoff, and Representatives Chris Smith and Michelle Steel. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM OREGON AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' will come to order. More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese rule in Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of unrelenting opposition. Chinese authorities routinely violate Tibetans' freedom of religion, expression, and assembly and deny Tibetans self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign of ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially sanctioned interpretations of religion and culture, not the authentic practice and teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary to that practice and teaching, the Chinese government even insists on its own authority to select the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, whom authorities label a security threat. Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished. Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with Chinese rule in Tibet. Punishments range from warnings to surveillance to interrogation and detention. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database currently includes records of 715 Tibetans detained or imprisoned for political or religious reasons. We note that there are considerably more cases of detention in China than we can capture in the database. Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people. Earlier this year, we heard testimony about insidious efforts to separate Tibetan children from their parents, with nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children now placed in boarding schools to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of language and culture. We are observing an extension or expansion of that practice now to children going to kindergarten. This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. In today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to address the aspirations of the Tibetan people that their basic rights and self-determination be respected. Sadly, that dialogue has been frozen for 12 years, as Chinese authorities refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote dialogue without pre-conditions to achieve a negotiated agreement on Tibet. In other words, we recognize that this remains an unsettled conflict that must be addressed. Yet the Chinese government would have the world believe that Tibet is an internal affair and that issues of its status are resolved. This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's hearing aims to set the historical record straight. Our witnesses will share with us their considerable experience analyzing the history of Tibet, the international law dimensions of the conflict, the barriers to resuming dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. I hope this hearing helps cut through Chinese propaganda and helps bring attention to the true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for autonomy. I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile--it's good to have you here--the International Campaign for Tibet, dignitaries, and other friends of Tibet who are with us this morning while they are in town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. Thank you for joining us. The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination need champions all over the globe, and I look forward to continuing to work with my fellow parliamentarians to advance the cause of human dignity and freedom wherever we can. Among global elected officials, few have been as great a friend of Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for many years has led the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation and advocate for the Tibetan people. I now recognize him for his remarks. STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too, want to welcome our friends who are visiting Washington for the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. I want to especially welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in- exile. We have two members of the Canadian Parliament here. I want to welcome my friends from the International Campaign for Tibet, and I want to welcome my dear friend Richard Gere, who has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights in Tibet. We're delighted you are all here. You know, I appreciate that we're holding this hearing on Tibet, the status of dialogue, and a path forward in the Tibetan quest for rights and dignity. Congress has had a long and abiding interest in Tibet. It created Tibetan-language broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid programs for Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed the landmark Tibetan Policy Act and codified the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. Congressman Tom Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by side with the Dalai Lama. So did President Bush and Speaker Pelosi, who presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal in 2007. I've had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet bills to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act seeks to enable diplomats, journalists, and tourists to travel to see Tibet with their own eyes, because Chinese officials have closed it off. The Tibetan Policy and Support Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its key feature, the bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th Dalai Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, not by China. Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people, but the core problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot advocate for themselves. They are forced to live in an authoritarian system under a paranoid central government that sees any expression of distinct identity as a threat to their power. His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this way. He's right. For decades, he sought to negotiate with Chinese authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side did agree to 10 rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai Lama's envoys, but they did not do so in good faith. Chinese officials say they will return to the table only if the Dalai Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only unreasonable, but false. The U.S. Government, to its credit, has consistently called on the Chinese to return to dialogue without pre-conditions, but that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood ready, the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we keep doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic or strategy? That's the question we will explore in this hearing. Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of perspectives--legal, historical, policy, and personal--on the Tibet-China dialogue. We hope to hear what Congress and the U.S. Government can do to help. Should we be countering false Chinese narratives? Should we reorient how we talk about the basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in the current environment, and what would the alternatives be? So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider these important questions, and I look forward to our hearing. Chair Merkley. Congressman Smith, I know you're with us on Zoom. Do you wish to make an opening comment? STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY Representative Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I thank you again, and our co-chair, for convening this important hearing. I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses, and Richard Gere, who has been an extraordinary advocate for the people of Tibet and especially for the Dalai Lama. Simply put, the barrier, obviously, is the Chinese Communist Party. It has an ideological commitment to control Tibet far beyond what previous Chinese governments sought to do, which has been evident since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Indeed, one year after the communist government took power in Beijing and completed its control of the mainland, it invaded Tibet and sought to annex it. 1959, of course, marked an even greater attempt to control Tibet and led to the dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama from his home country. All these years he has been in exile, while the world has benefited from his personal holiness and his example. He truly is a treasure, and I, like my other colleagues, have met him and have been so deeply impressed by his goodness and his holiness. Well, we saw the extreme cruelty of the Cultural Revolution, where Mao's Red Guards despoiled so much of Tibet's religious and cultural patrimony. Then there was the kidnapping and disappearance of the Panchen Lama, which personalizes how evil and totalitarian the CCP is and underscores the extent to which they will go to deny the Tibetan people the right to practice their faith freely and without interference. Now, today, under Xi Jinping, the suppression of Tibetan Buddhism--indeed, the suppression of all religion, which Xi Jinping seeks to sinicize--has intensified. The Chinese Communist Party is intent upon committing cultural genocide. This must end. The Tibetan people must be free to practice their own faith and choose their own spiritual leaders. We look forward to our distinguished witnesses giving us guidance on the path forward. I yield back. Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman. We'd now like to introduce those witnesses. I'll introduce all of them now. Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international law and executive president of Kreddha, an international non- governmental organization created to help prevent and resolve violent interstate conflicts. He is the author of Tibet Brief 20/20 and he previously served as legal advisor to the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Hon-Shiang Lau is a retired professor who taught at the City University of Hong Kong, Oklahoma State University, and Washington State University. Since retiring, he has devoted his time to Chinese history. He is the author of the book Tibet Was Never Part of China since Antiquity. Tenzin N. Tethong is a former Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He's served in several roles in the Central Tibetan Administration, including as kalon tripa, the equivalent of prime minister. He has served as the director of the Tibetan language service at Radio Free Asia and is currently the director of the Tibetan language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a personal capacity. Ellen Bork will be joining us via Zoom. She is contributing editor at American Purpose. She previously served as the senior professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the Washington Post, and other publications. Thank you all for joining us for this hearing. Without objection, your full statements will be entered into the record. We ask that you keep your oral remarks to about five minutes. We'll start with Michael van Walt van Praag. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF KREDDHA Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My testimony today is based on the findings of 10 years of collaborative research, historical and legal, most of which I carried out during my tenure at the School of Historical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and the findings are published in these two books: Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chenggis Khan and Tibet Brief 20/20. Today, I'd like to call your attention to one of those findings and its international legal ramifications. Contrary to what the PRC claims, Tibet was historically not a part of China. Though not always independent in the modern legal sense of the term, and over the centuries subject to various degrees of Mongol, Manchu, and even British authority or influence, Tibet was never a part of China. The PRC did not inherit Tibet from the Republic of China or from earlier empires, as it claims. Tibet was, in fact, an independent state in the modern sense of the term in fact and law from 1912 to 1951, when the PRC took it by force. So the PRC's military invasion of Tibet constituted an act of aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force against another state. This informs the legitimacy, or not, of China's presence in and rule of Tibet. China does not have sovereignty over Tibet, and therefore it is occupying Tibet illegally. That, in turn, informs the international community's legal obligations and its responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict. Governments are prohibited under international law from recognizing China's annexation of Tibet, and they have the positive obligation to help bring about a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict, to end the occupation of Tibet, and to enable the Tibetan people to exercise self-determination. As you stated, it is U.S. policy to support a negotiated resolution to the conflict between China and Tibet, but U.S. Government actions run counter to that policy. The U.S. Government has stated more than once that it considers Tibet to be a part of the PRC. If it and other governments continue to do so, Beijing no longer will have any incentive to negotiate with the Tibetans. The international community will have satisfied the PRC's needs without Beijing having to make any concessions to the Tibetans. The PRC wants two things above anything else regarding Tibet: legitimacy and no foreign interference or criticism. Beijing's strategy to obtain legitimacy in Tibet from the Tibetans is failing. The Dalai Lama disputes the PRC's only claim to entitlement to Tibet, namely that Tibet has been an integral part of China since antiquity, and he is not giving in to pressure to make a statement to that effect. Beijing has, therefore, started demanding of other governments that they recognize that Tibet is part of China, and is using their statements as a substitute for true legitimacy. Once a government agrees to regard Tibet as part of the PRC, it also accepts that Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations are China's internal affair, outside its purview. Beijing's needs are then satisfied and Tibetan negotiating power, which depends heavily on the international community's upholding of international law in keeping with Tibet's status as an occupied country, is then severely weakened. And not only that, endorsing China's sovereignty claim to Tibet conditions the Tibetans to envision a settlement that can bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know about China's treatment of Tibetans and also its treatment of Uyghurs and Beijing's determination to eradicate their very identity, I ask: Is marginal change what the U.S. really wants for the Tibetan people? The conflict will not be resolved with marginal change. It can only truly be resolved if the Tibetans' basic needs are satisfied. At a very minimum, this requires a robust autonomy with guarantees and international protection endorsed by the Tibetan people in accordance with their right to self- determination. To arrive there, the international community needs to play its role--uphold international law and treat Tibet as an occupied country and the conflict as a matter of international responsibility. Thank you. Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We'll now turn to Professor Lau. STATEMENT OF HON-SHIANG LAU, RETIRED CHAIR PROFESSOR, CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG Mr. Lau. I want to thank this distinguished audience for enabling me to make this presentation. My theme is that China's pre-1949 official historical records clearly show that Tibet was never part of China before the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950. This is an important issue because China is a signatory to the relevant covenants of the League of Nations and the United Nations which means that, since 1919, China has promised not to gain territories through military conquest thereafter. Moreover, the PRC incessantly condemns other countries for their past colonial conquests and their past bullying of China. Therefore, the PRC needs to cover up its 1950 Tibet conquest as a unification of a territory that has been part of China since antiquity. Sadly, today many governments incorrectly believe this ridiculous lie, and this is part of the reason why many Western democracies fail to provide adequate support for upholding Tibet's sovereignty. There are two important foundational concepts behind my theme. Foundation A: There is an abundance of authentic and reliable pre-1949 Chinese official historical records. The PRC version of Chinese history is very, very different from the version of Chinese history reflected in these pre-1949 official Chinese records. Foundation B: We used a comprehensive range of objective criteria to examine whether Tibet was part of China. Thus, to judge whether Tibet was part of China during China's Ming dynasty, we used official classical Chinese records to examine, for example: (1) Whether the Ming Empire had designated Tibet as part of China or as a foreign entity, say, via a promulgated map. (2) Was the Ming Empire able to conduct censuses or collect taxes in Tibet? (3) Was the Ming Empire able to appoint and dismiss judges or governing officials in Tibet? (4) Was China's language, legal system, and monetary system used in Tibet? etc. Combining Foundations A and B, we can prove the following conclusion: China's pre-1949 official records clearly show that Tibet was never part of China before the PRC's 1950 invasion. We also prove that the PRC's so-called evidence of sovereignty over Tibet is based on not only distortions, but outright fabrications and forgeries of pre-1949 Chinese records. This means that a current permanent member of the UN Security Council militarily conquered a foreign country in 1950 and continues to subjugate it today. This crime obligates the intervention of the international community. I'm going to show you two examples of these proofs. The first example is a Ming dynasty map. It's on your tablet. This is labeled as Map 1, purported to show the entire Ming Empire. [Map 1 appears on page 36 in the written statement of Mr. Lau.] Regarding my Foundation A stated earlier, this proof is from a Ming dynasty 1461 A.D. government publication. That is, it comes from a very authoritative Chinese source. Regarding my Foundation B, it relates to an objective sovereignty claim, depicted on a national map. In this map, labels for Chinese territories are framed in white lettering on a black background. In contrast, the map labels non-Chinese territories, such as Japan in the east and then Tibet over here in the west, in non-framed black lettering on a white background. The contrast is literally in black and white. In other words, the Ming government clearly declared that Tibet was a non-China foreign entity. If you would flip the tablet, you will see Map 2, which is an example of a Qing dynasty proof. This is from a Qing dynasty 1732 government publication, purported to show the entire Qing Empire. [Map 2 appears on page 37 in the written statement of Mr. Lau.] On this map, the Qing government shows the position corresponding to today's Tibet Autonomous Region (the TAR) as a blank space. Hundreds of similar proofs are presented in this book that I have written. Most of them involve textual records, and not just merely pictorial proofs like this. And they are, of course, much more reliable. Thank you very much. Chair Merkley. Professor, thank you very much for your comments and for sharing these maps and this history. We will now turn to Mr. Tethong. STATMENT OF TENZIN N. TETHONG, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Tethong. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, it is my distinct honor to offer testimony this morning in this hearing on Tibet and to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in the 20th century, including efforts toward a resolution of the Tibet issue. Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. One of Mao Zedong's earliest declarations was his intention to liberate Tibet from the West, and the Tibetan people from a backward and oppressive society. The Tibetan government protested immediately, citing Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan kings to the rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu Qing dynasties. With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the United Nations and the global community, especially to India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unfortunately, China did not heed Tibet's protests, and the global community did not come to Tibet's defense. The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950, easily overwhelming the Tibetan Army and militia. China knew right then that rhetorical justification for such an invasion was not enough and called for negotiations to formalize an agreement. Tibetan representatives negotiated in Beijing but, disregarding any proper ratification process, were forced to sign what is called the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government tried to work within the broad confines of the agreement, which promised no change in the status of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government. However, China did not live up to these commitments, nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had received from Mao Zedong. Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years, and protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the uprising in Lhasa on March 10th, 1959, which led to the escape of the Dalai Lama, and the escape of thousands, to India and neighboring countries. For the next 20 years, Tibet was completely shut off from the rest of the world. An extreme overhaul of Tibetan life, from its traditional Buddhist roots to Chinese Marxist socialism, was introduced, which in the latter years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue important enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to Beijing and declared that short of separation everything would be discussed, meaning that short of granting Tibetan independence, China would be open to all Tibetan concerns and aspirations. This breakthrough meeting led to renewed dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Four delegations of exile leaders were able to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had transpired under two decades of Chinese rule. By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in deliberations with Chinese officials to address larger issues related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, party general secretary and the main proponent of changes in the Tibet policies, died. This was soon followed by the Tiananmen student protests and the massacre. China stepped backwards, and the Tibetan issue also retreated. In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, and envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in Beijing, where the Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's Middle Way policy, seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. The envoys met many times, even after the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests that called for greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the envoys' last meeting was to be in 2010, when the Chinese ended the dialogue process. This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should show that even at the most challenging of times, China has seen the need to address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet and that there is perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of their rule. China has also repeatedly initiated direct communication with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, demonstrating the obvious need to find a meaningful resolution to these outstanding issues. Ever since the exile delegation visited Tibet in the 1980s, to the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's envoys in Beijing, the Chinese leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan perspectives of their rule in Tibet and of the unvarnished aspirations of the Tibetan people, both of which contradict the official Chinese narrative. Worldwide attention to Tibet has been an important part of creating greater awareness of the Tibetan issue, even in China, allowing for more liberal and reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan hopes and demands to have some standing. There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, through the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concern for the cultural and human rights of the Tibetan people, has been an important factor in the U.S. Government's attention on the issue--which has been sustained to a large degree by individual Members of Congress. The continued efforts of the United States will help remove barriers to this unresolved conflict and will advance the Tibetan people's desire for greater freedom and democracy. I thank you. Chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Tethong. We're now going to turn to Ellen Bork, who is joining us via Zoom. Welcome. STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK, CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, AMERICAN PURPOSE Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Thank you to the members of the Commission and staff, and I appreciate appearing alongside the other witnesses very much. As you all know, the United States has charted a new course toward China on a lot of issues, but Tibet, so far, has not been the subject of a considerable revived agenda. It should be. Unfortunately, Tibet is often viewed as a fait accompli, a tragic but closed chapter of history. That is not the case, of course, for the Chinese Communist Party. Tibet, for them, remains a cornerstone of China's aggression, both territorially and ideologically. It is part of China's assault on liberal democratic norms, which in turn will advance the Party's plan to control the succession of the Dalai Lama, or at least gain preference and acquiescence to its choice of successor. Addressing that challenge by building support for the authentic Dalai Lama now and in the future, and in particular building support for Tibetan democracy, which is his legacy, should play a much larger role in the U.S. response to China. Unfortunately, the foundations of American Tibet policy make this difficult. A look back at history shows America's Tibet policy was not the product of historical fact or international law but of outdated perceptions of America's strategic interest in subordinating Tibet to China. U.S. involvement in Tibet is, compared to some other powers, relatively recent, but it has played a decisive role in what's happening today. First, of course, the United States accepted Great Britain's application of the concept of suzerainty over Tibet. This is something short of sovereignty. According to many scholars, it is not even applicable, but Great Britain found it useful while it was involved in the great geopolitical competition of the Great Game in the region. The United States accepted that term, but if you read through a lot of the diplomatic memos you'll see how uncomfortable and ambivalent officials were about it, as well as about the concept of sovereignty. And for several decades, policy fluctuated in terms of the language used and the way the United States thought about what had happened in Tibet from the 1950s, and even before. Officials really accepted that it was de facto independent, even though the United States refused to accept requests to recognize Tibet's independence. Later on, after several decades--it was when the United States forged a rapprochement with Beijing at Taipei's expense that the position on sovereignty really gelled. Again, this was the result of its perception of the strategic need with regard to China, and deciding to choose one Chinese priority, in Tibet, over another. I don't think it's too far-fetched to say that in that way, it transferred deference to China over Tibet from one dictatorship that never exerted authority there-- meaning Chiang Kai-shek--to a totalitarian regime that it decided to favor at the time. As a result of this decision--incidentally, Vice President Mondale visited Beijing in 1979 and sort of said: We will no longer view the Dalai Lama as a political leader. And we've essentially said we're going with your sovereignty over Tibet. Not surprisingly, with that decision taken, Tibet had to become diminished within U.S.-PRC relations. It's not uncommon for diplomats to consider that it's an irritant in the U.S.-China relationship and even that Tibet can only be helped if we lower the temperature with Beijing over Tibet, and I think exactly the opposite. Above all, this meant that the United States would not focus on legitimacy questions about the PRC's role in Tibet or give adequate attention to the extraordinary achievement of democracy in exile. That democratization process was carried out under the Dalai Lama's leadership and with the support of the Tibetan people in exile, at exactly the same time that democratic transitions were occurring in Asia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and later Indonesia, and that has been the basis of American policy toward the region ever since. By contrast, of course, Tibet is a huge priority for the Party. And it has an international Tibet agenda. It's not just the domestic repression, or inside Tibet's border, that we need to focus on. It has a really corrosive agenda for Tibet, trying to impose litmus tests on the way countries and NGOs deal with Tibet. And it has a Buddhist agenda in its Belt and Road investment initiatives. It seeks to appropriate Buddhist sites and cultivate and co-opt leaders and make Tibet a core interest--a condition of its good relations. I'd just like to note, before I give a few recommendations, the importance of understanding that many brave Chinese democracy advocates have over time challenged the Party on Tibet. It's very easy to imagine that the Chinese people are sort of inherently nationalist when it comes to Tibet, and I think that's false. It's the product of intense propaganda and fear. It's important to recognize that going back to Wei Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo, there's been a thrust among Chinese democrats increasingly to see democracy as the solution to both Tibet and China's problems. Charter 08, the democracy manifesto of 2008, took this up, and although I think it was too sensitive to use the word ``Tibet'' in that document, there was a clear reference to the goal of ``federation of democratic communities of China.'' In that sense, the first recommendation I would make is to reintroduce support for democracy in China and to support Chinese and Tibetan political prisoners and activists, lawyers, and journalists more than we currently are in our relationship with Beijing. I think I'd like to suggest also an independent review of U.S. policy, to go deeply into some of the issues I mentioned about the choices the United States made from the '40s on, to see how United States policy or attitudes about Tibet's status fluctuated, and why the United States made these decisions, and how they are not related. As Michael points out, our position is in violation of international law. How did this happen? And what should we understand about not only Tibet's status but how the United States treated Tibet and subordinated it to China historically? Finally, I would say we should enlist allies in a common position on the Dalai Lama's succession and make that very public. Give the elected Tibetan exile government more access and support and include it in forums like the Summit for Democracy, and counter Chinese influence in international organizations and on campuses and at state and local levels, not only on Tibet but on other questions, like Taiwan. Thank you. Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Ms. Bork, and I thank all four of you for the expertise you bring to this conversation. We'll now have a period of questioning. I think we're set for seven minutes. I'll be handing the gavel over to Representative McGovern after my questions because I have another hearing to chair, but I'll tell you, this Member of the Senate will never recognize as legitimate Chinese control over Tibet. In the hearings that we have held in this Commission about what China is now doing in Tibet--in particular I can't get out of my mind the fact that 80 percent of the children are being sent to boarding school to separate them from their parents, and to essentially re-educate them in a false narrative and destroy the religious and cultural foundations of the Tibetan people. This is truly an enormous crime against Tibet. I appreciate the historical perspectives. I was struck by two of you testifying about 1979. Mr. Tethong, you noted that in 1979 Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to come and said that, short of separation, China was open to discussion of how to address Tibetan concerns and aspirations. Then Ms. Bork, you noted that in 1979, Vice President Mondale went to China and essentially recognized--if I understood your testimony correctly--recognized that the United States saw China as having legitimate authority over Tibet. How do we reconcile these two things happening in that particular year? How did one precede the other? And are they tied together? I'd invite both Ms. Bork and Mr. Tethong to help us understand that. Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think, as I'll try to explain very briefly, that even though China had just come out of the very serious period of the Cultural Revolution, to set China on the right course they had to deal with many important issues. Obviously Tibet was right up there on their agenda. It shows that Tibet remained a key issue in the Chinese government's state of mind. Unfortunately, what Vice President Mondale declared during the Carter administration, shall we say, overlooked the importance of the Tibetan human rights situation. In part, maybe we were unable to present our case to a President who had a strong interest in human rights. But maybe at the time, President Carter was very engaged in establishing normalized relations with China. That's all I can say. Chair Merkley. Thank you. Ms. Bork, would you like to comment on the juxtaposition of those two events in 1979? Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. I don't know the interaction or the interplay between those two events. I think that would be a really interesting thing to explore. I suspect that getting the Tibetan leadership to acquiesce, to sort of buy in to some solution, is not inconsistent with getting the United States to settle its position on Tibet's sovereignty. But it would be very interesting. I've done a little research. It's not easy to know what went into the preparation for Vice President Mondale's trip. I think that would be a great subject for an independent commission. Chair Merkley. Thank you. Let me turn to our two professors, Professor Lau and Professor Michael van Walt van Praag. Where is American leverage in bringing China back to the conversation through the dialogue about autonomy with Tibet? Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you. Because China's primary objective in the international field in relation to Tibet is precisely to obtain legitimacy for its rule in Tibet, questioning that legitimacy creates leverage. In other words, in the reverse, accepting or otherwise identifying Tibet as a part of China or as a part of the PRC or accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet today takes away any leverage the Tibetans have. It takes away the need for the Chinese leaders to approach the Tibetans, to negotiate with them and find an agreement that will end up with an arrangement where the Tibetans accept some form of Chinese sovereignty, rule, relationship, that works for both parties. If the international community, and therefore the U.S. as perhaps one of the most important players in relation to China, does not question China's legitimacy in Tibet, China's sovereignty in Tibet, then that takes away that leverage. Chair Merkley. Thank you. Professor Lau. Mr. Lau. Thank you, sir. I can only echo what Michael has just said. I think that the United States and the world should actively counter and oppose the PRC's narrative, by producing solid proofs to show that the PRC's version is incorrect, or that they're just basically telling lies. I think in the past I've heard many people denying the PRC's version but without producing believable and authoritative proofs. I think it's about time that the world becomes more explicit in contradicting the PRC's claim by doing more than just simply saying: ``You are wrong, I am right.'' Show the proofs. That's all I know. Thank you. Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I'll close with this question to Ms. Bork. Thank you, by the way, for your five recommendations. One of the things you talk about is enlisting allies in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan process for selecting the next Dalai Lama. Can you comment for just a moment on your general sense of the disposition of the European Union, both in terms of that specific issue, but more broadly on the issue of establishing a clear, united position that China's control or authority over Tibet is illegitimate. Ms. Bork. Thank you, Senator. There's no question that the Chinese government has made great inroads in Europe, but that, I think, on a number of issues has been slow, if not completely reversed. Like in the United States, there are many countries where there's great reverence for Tibet and the Dalai Lama. It's not viewed there as quite as huge a matter. It doesn't get quite as much attention. I think that the attention to the reincarnation issue that the U.S. Congress has shown is also spreading in Europe. I'm optimistic that some of the leading countries there in support for the Dalai Lama would step forward, but they've always been treated to that kind of divide and conquer. They've suffered so much--as you remember, the way Norway suffered after the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. So it's essential that there's some kind of shared burden and protection for people--for countries as they take this position. I'm very heartened by the appointment of the new special coordinator, Uzra Zeya, and believe that there is prospect for greater attention to Tibet within U.S.-Europe relations. Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We're now going to turn to Co-chair McGovern. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all the panelists for being here. And let me make clear, the reason why we're doing this hearing, the reason why we've done other hearings on Tibet, the reason why we have passed legislation on Tibet, is because China is not living up to the expectations of the international community with regard to Tibet. You know, I think there might be a perception in China that the world will soon forget and move on to something else, but I hope we're making it clear that that's not going to be the case. In fact, activity in the United States Congress on Tibet has intensified in recent years. More attention is being devoted to Tibet, and some of the topics that we're talking about here today many members of Congress are unaware of. They will be enlightened by this hearing, and it will bring additional perspective as we deal with other legislation impacting China in the future. I just say to the government of China, who always gets annoyed when we do these hearings--you know what? You have a Tibet problem. Deal with it. You can go back to the negotiating table. I mean, that would be a good first step. Let's try to resolve these differences. But as long as you don't, as long as you pretend that there's not a problem here, please be assured that activity focused on Tibet in the United States and in other countries around the world will intensify. Professor Lau, would you say that the Chinese government's insistence that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity is tantamount to a demand that the Dalai Lama say something that is false? Mr. Lau. Absolutely. I agree with that 100 percent. The PRC knows that that claim is a lie, and they are forcing the Dalai Lama to lie with the PRC. Co-chair McGovern. OK. Mr. van Walt, you testified that governments using the Chinese narrative that Tibet has always been part of China is an obstacle to resolving the conflict through dialogue. Now, there has been no dialogue in 12 years. Assuming that governments made such statements as a concession to get the Chinese to the table back then, is there any reason for them to continue saying the same thing? Mr. van Walt van Praag. I think it was a mistake for governments to play China's game, and I don't know what the objective was of making those statements acknowledging Tibet being a part of the PRC. But I think it was a mistake to do so, if the hope was that this would encourage China to negotiate. I think it's quite the contrary. And I think we must realize that the Middle Way approach of His Holiness the Dalai Lama can only work if we're conscious that the kind of genuine autonomy that we're talking about is only a possible middle path if it is the middle between the legitimate right of the Tibetans to restore their independence on the one hand and China's intention to fully integrate Tibet into China on the other. If we take away this legitimate right of the Tibetans, then there's really very little to negotiate that is left. Co-chair McGovern. I think it's fair to say that those governments that bought into the Chinese narrative, maybe thinking that it might make the Chinese government more reasonable with regard to Tibet, it didn't work. Mr. van Walt van Praag. It didn't work, and I think it is counterproductive today. Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Tethong, the Chinese insist that they have the right to select the next Dalai Lama, and demand that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. Do you think that these reveal a latent insecurity within Chinese leadership about the legitimacy of their claim to own Tibet? Mr. Tethong. Definitely, Chairman. We've all touched on this issue of legitimacy. I believe that even within the Chinese leadership and the Chinese mindset, legitimacy of the rule of the CCP is what is at stake. Tibet or the Tibetans were the ones who contested that legitimacy. That's why there is total control over Tibet, yet China often finds itself needing to address it somehow, because the question of legitimacy will never be fully satisfactory for the Chinese until the Tibetans have a proper role in that. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Ms. Bork, given what the other three witnesses have said, what actions should the United States Government take to get the parties back to the table? Do you agree that the State Department should stop using the ``Tibet is part of the PRC'' phrase, as they did in the Tibet negotiations report this month? And given that the PRC was founded in 1949, would it be fair to say that the U.S. statements do not endorse the Chinese position that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity? Ms. Bork. I'm not sure what the intention of the department was in that particular matter, but I do think there's a lot to be done before approaching Beijing. I think dialogue can take many forms, and people may have different attitudes about it. I'm not a particular supporter of the idea of dialogue, at least not without much more coordination among the allies in support of the Tibetans. I think that without that, I don't think it's going to go anywhere. I'm deeply skeptical about Chinese intentions with regard to any kind of dialogue. By all means, again, review the defects in the American position, why they've used language in the past and the fact that they should stop using it. Again, it's because it's not accurate historically and not helpful right now. Yes, they should stop using that and begin to talk about Tibet in a different way. Co-chair McGovern. I appreciate that, and whatever the deficiencies in U.S. policy have been over the years, I think it is fair to say that we are reorienting our policy in a way that is more in tune with what the Tibetan community wants. I just want to say that we're working on a bill that we'll be introducing soon to help the U.S. Government counter Chinese disinformation on Tibet and ensure that U.S. policy supports the basis for the Dalai Lama's quest for genuine autonomy. And also making it clear that, you know, facts matter and that you can't rewrite history because you want to. I mean, history is history. Facts are facts. And so, again, I think that there is a renewed interest in the United States and in other countries around the world, as we witnessed yesterday talking to parliamentarians from all over the world who are in Washington to find ways to support the Tibetan people, and I think things are changing globally. I wish they'd changed a long time ago, but they're now changing. My time is up right now. I'm going to recognize Senator Ossoff. Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to our panelists. I'd like to ask each of our panelists to comment on the intersection of press freedom and the issue at hand today. Last week in the Commission we heard from Under Secretary Zeya, who committed to work with my office to expand press freedom internationally and strengthen U.S. leadership for press freedom. My question, please, beginning with you, Mr. Tethong, is: How does the CCP repress freedom of reporting and publication within Tibet, and more broadly within China? How does the CCP seek to influence reporting and publication on related issues internationally? And when you've concluded, we can move to Ms. Bork. I'd like to hear from each panelist on this. Thank you. Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Senator. There is no press freedom in Tibet, or in any of the Tibetan areas within the PRC. No foreign journalists are allowed to visit Tibet freely. Very rarely and occasionally, groups of Western journalists who are stationed in Beijing might be allowed on a short trip that is fully managed by Chinese officials. So with regard to press freedom, I think Tibet is regarded as one of the worst, even worse than North Korea, according to Freedom House, I believe. We are only able to get news items, news reports through personal contacts of Tibetans who are in exile and occasionally through social media. Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Ms. Bork. Ms. Bork. Oh, I'd certainly concur with what Mr. Tethong has said. I think it's important to think about the way China is challenging norms of freedoms, and we have to be really very attuned to the way they treat rights and the way they'd like to alter the way the world respects universal norms. I don't have anything to add about inside Tibet, but I would be very alert to the way Chinese Communist Party officials talk about democratic norms, including press freedom, and try to shape them, particularly in countries where they have a great deal of influence or where they're trying to acquire influence. Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. van Walt van Praag. Mr. van Walt van Praag. Yes. I don't have anything to add about press freedom or the lack of it in Tibet. What I would say is that at the same time, China is, in a sense, abusing the freedom of the press internationally, outside of China, but using the press very actively to project its narrative on Tibet, to project also its vocabulary on Tibet. For example, many members of the press write articles in which they refer to Tibetans as a minority--one of China's minorities, which is an implicit acceptance of Tibet being part of China and the Tibetans being one of China's peoples, minorities. Whereas, in effect, the Tibetans are not a minority. They are the population of Tibet. They are the people of Tibet. And they are a people under international law with the full right to self- determination. That's just one example, but there are so many examples of articles in the press and reports in the press that use Chinese terminology in regard to Tibet. Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. Lau. Mr. Lau. Thank you. I'm not an expert in this area and have nothing of value to add, but I would like to use this opportunity to emphasize something else that was brought up just now. China or the Qing Empire never had any power in selecting the Dalai Lama. It is clearly reflected in the official Chinese records. The Qing Empire only made a request to the Tibetans to use a golden urn to do one minor step of the selection by drawing lots. That was all, and even that request was not consistently followed or acceded to by the Tibetan authorities during the Qing dynasty. Thank you. Senator Ossoff. Thank you all for your responses. Thanks for the additional context and information. I worked prior to my election producing investigative reports of crimes, official corruption, crimes against humanity. Freedom of the press and freedom of publication are under attack worldwide. The United States Government must strengthen and redouble its commitment to stand en garde for press freedom around the world. And this hearing will help inform our efforts to that end. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Senator. Congresswoman Steel. Representative Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Every person has the right to religious and cultural beliefs, and all governments, including the CCP, have no right to restrict this fundamental ability. It is inexcusable that the people of Tibet are not free and are currently threatened with punishment ranging from warnings and surveillance to interrogation and detention. We cannot sit still while Tibetans are being detained and imprisoned for political and religious reasons. I was honored to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama in my district. We have to make the world know that the leader of Tibet cannot go back to his own country and his own people because of CCP oppression. With that, to all the witnesses, with the current abuses by the CCP oppressing autonomous regions, what should the United States and other countries do to stand with the Tibet people. I'm just asking all the witnesses. So if anybody wants to answer, I'd love to hear that. And can local global corporations play a role in raising awareness about the Tibetan oppression? That's what I asked last year, before the Winter Olympics. I wanted these corporations that were going to spend billions and billions of dollars in advertising to use their platform. But I didn't get a response from any of those 17, the Olympic sponsor corporations. So could you just let me know? You can start, I guess, Ms. Bork. Ms. Bork. I'm so sorry. If someone else could start, please. I'm having trouble hearing. Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman, if you could just repeat the crux of your question again, because it kind of went in and out. Representative Steel. Oh. With the current abuses by the CCP oppressing the autonomous regions, what should the United States and other countries do to work together to stand with Tibet's people? And can global corporations play a role in raising awareness about the Tibet oppression? Ms. Bork. Thank you very much for the question. I think international solidarity and coordination on all these points is vital, given the Party's adept use of tools like financial diplomacy and propaganda, and various other kinds of intimidation, not to mention that we haven't even talked about how China continues to redefine Tibet, to the point that it is referring to northeast India as southern Tibet. So this is very much an ongoing issue that requires staunch and coordinated reply. There was an interesting proposal, unrelated to Tibet, from a fellow in Scandinavia about an economic Article 5 for NATO. I think it's certainly worth discussing the kind of retaliation that countries could experience if they take a more thoughtful and principled stance on Tibet. We really can't prepare enough for that eventuality, and I'd certainly recommend that Congress think about that as well. As for global companies, they haven't really--I guess I'm too negative. I only know the bad examples. Maybe someone else knows some good examples with companies on Tibet. But I do think that attitude is changing as a result of the Olympics and some other--you know, the NBA, and things like that. I think unfortunately there's still a market for companies to kowtow to the Chinese line on Tibet and other issues. But I do think it's changing, and people are more sensitive to that, so I'm a little more optimistic than I might have once been. Representative Steel. Thank you. Any other witnesses? Mr. van Walt van Praag. I would like to make two observations that follow on what Ellen Bork has just mentioned. Regarding cooperation among countries, I think it's also very important to emphasize that not only is this of crucial importance for Tibet and the Tibetan people themselves, but this has broader international ramifications, because the appeasement of China on Tibet for the past 70 years is not unrelated to China's expansion today--or its efforts to expand--in the South China Sea, where it uses a similar historical narrative as it does to claim sovereignty over Tibet, and its aggressive stance in relation to northern India, both in the eastern and western part of northern India, and as Ellen Bork mentioned, even calling one part of northeast India southern Tibet, where it makes territorial claims, again, directly related to its historical narrative of Tibet. One cannot accept the historical narrative on Tibet and then contest China's claim to northern India. Or perhaps it even makes it difficult to contest their claim to the South China Sea islands. And the second question, regarding corporations, the only thing I would mention is that, again, under international law, because China is denying the Tibetan people their right to self-determination, which they have, and because it is occupying Tibet, corporations and governments are forbidden from benefiting from the exploitation of resources in Tibet, because those resources under international law belong to the Tibetan people and therefore cannot be exploited, and one cannot benefit from it without the express permission of the Tibetan people, given freely. Thank you. Representative Steel. Thank you very much for those answers. The CCP continues to have oversight of Tibetan religious life by mandating political education for monks and nuns and creating apparatus to surveil and manage monastic institutions. Can you expand more on how CCP authorities continue to reorient Tibetan society? I think maybe Professor Lau. Mr. Lau. Actually, I would like to comment on the earlier topic that you brought up. I think it's important for the world to realize that the Tibet issue is not necessarily just a China issue. I read in mainstream newspaper articles in the past several days, and you have pointed out, that Putin is going to re-create the old Russian empire by bringing up all these historical ``territorial rights,'' even over the Baltic nations. If you look at the Chinese records, these records clearly show that Tibet was not part of China, but they do indicate that Burma, Korea, Thailand, Laos, and a whole bunch of other areas were clearly part of China. They also indicate that even countries like Holland and Portugal were tributary countries to China. We have seen what has developed in Putin's and in Ukraine's case. If we do not explicitly reject this kind of attitude, there is a strong possibility that 20 years from now, when China becomes even stronger, that they could bring up these old claims of sovereignty over Korea and over Vietnam and then, as I've said, even over Portugal. I think that's the point that I would like to make. Thank you. Mr. Tethong. I would just like to add a comment, that yes, for the last 20 or 30 years, global attention to what is happening in Tibet, and especially concerns expressed by the United States Congress, has had a tremendous impact on the situation in Tibet and on the rights and safety of the Tibetan people; to a great degree they have been provided simply because the outside world is watching, especially the United States. For a long-term goal to help resolve the Tibet issue, I think, as my co-panelists have said, we should not look at Tibet and the Tibetan people as a unique element on their own, but that this is an issue that concerns the whole world. When we deal with any development in Tibet, of course, we are going to look at it from the perspective of the human rights of an individual Tibetan, and therefore the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be a central theme to work with. And along with that, as far as the Tibetan people are concerned, their right to self-determination should be an underlying feature of how we deal with Tibet in the future. Representative Steel. I totally agree with Professor Lau because China is one of the biggest threats in the whole world. If we don't stop the CCP's invasion and oppression of autonomous regions right now, then in 20 years, what kind of map are we going to have? So this is a very important hearing. I really appreciate that we can hear from our witnesses. Thank you for coming out. I yield back. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. I have a series of questions. I'm trying to get through them all, so bear with me here. Mr. van Walt van Praag, your testimony addresses the concept of self-determination as core to your thesis. Can you discuss the gap, if any, between the basis of the right to self-determination in international law, and the extent to which governments honor and protect that right? And how would you respond to those who say Tibetans are not entitled to self-determination? Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much for your question. Self-determination, under international law, is a basic right. It is both a basic right and it is codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its very first article, because there is a recognition, and there was a recognition when those two conventions were written, that without honoring the right to self-determination, many of the other human rights are difficult to conceive of and to respect, and therefore, those rights are dependent, to some degree, on respecting the right to self-determination. But self-determination is also a fundamental principle of international relations. As many UN declarations make clear, respect for the right to self-determination is a fundamental requirement for friendly relations among states and so both these things are truly fundamental. At the same time, self- determination, as it has developed, was for a long time considered to be primarily a right of countries to de-colonize from Western colonialism. But increasingly, it is being recognized that when we're speaking about colonialism, we're speaking about the nature of rule, the nature of the relationship between dominant power and a subjugated country, a subjugated people under alien domination. Regardless of whether it is a Western power, regardless of whether there is an ocean between the cosmopolitan country and the colony, colonialism is about the nature of relations between the dominant and the dominated and about the latter's exploitation. Under that concept, Tibet very clearly is under colonial rule today, and I think it should be recognized that way. The PRC just introduced this, at an earlier session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, a resolution on--and I don't know the exact words but--something like the continuing consequences of colonialism. Even within that context, we should be using colonialism to address the situation in Tibet. Aside from colonialism, Tibetans also, because they are a people--under any definition in international law--a people with a right to self-determination, fit squarely in that category. In terms of the difference between, in other words, their right to full self-determination and the honoring of that right internationally, there is, I think, a big gap. In the 1950s and '60s, a number of countries, including the United States, recognized and supported the Tibetan people's right to self-determination. And as we know, there is a United Nations General Assembly resolution on that subject from the 1960s that recognizes the Tibetans' right to self-determination and calls for its respect and for its implementation. So Tibetans have had that recognition internationally. The discrepancy is that today many countries, probably most countries, do not refer to the Tibetan people's right to self- determination anymore, simply out of fear of displeasing China. And I think it is very important to restore the situation to where it was universally recognized that Tibetans had the right to self-determination. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Ms. Bork, you have written about how democracy should be a component of our policy on Tibet, keeping in mind that the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has established a democratic form of government-in-exile. The Biden administration has created a process to prioritize this issue called the Summit for Democracy, and as I understand it, the CTA was not involved in the first summit meeting last December. Would you recommend that the administration include the CTA in the upcoming summit this December? And if so, how? Ms. Bork. I would very strongly recommend that. It seems to me a great oversight to continue to neglect this achievement, especially if the administration is trying to develop support for the reincarnation as an element of, effectively, liberal democracy and liberal democratic norms being effective, human rights, and so forth. So yes, I would strongly do that. I don't know the governing basis for inclusion. Whatever it is, it can include representatives of the democratically elected body, even if they are not a sovereign country. So I hope so. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Mr. Tethong, you have firsthand experience dealing with Chinese interlocutors, including during your participation in a fact-finding delegation to Tibet. What perspective can you provide on the Chinese attitude toward dialogue with the Dalai Lama? Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think through the interactions we've had with the delegations that visited Tibet in the '80s-- I was a part of one of the groups--and the later interactions that the envoys have had, which have been very extensive, although the Chinese government brought the process to an end, we know that during that process many key officials in the Chinese government and the United Front officials became fully aware of, shall I mention, the misrule in Tibet, and also fully aware of what Tibetan intentions or Tibetan hopes and aspirations were. And so there is, within the Chinese government and leadership, I think, a full understanding of where the Tibetans stand and where it could make accommodations. It's not as though the Chinese leadership is ignorant about the real situation. So while on one level it seems like the negotiations have stopped, we know that there are elements within the Chinese leadership and the Chinese government who can, given the right circumstances, take up Tibet once again. So this process and the possibility of renewed dialogue, and an initiative from the Chinese side, I think, remains very possible. Co-chair McGovern. Professor Lau, are the maps and documents that you cite available in archives inside of China? And do researchers and historians in China have access to the information? And to what extent is this information digitized and online, or otherwise available at libraries outside of China? Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. Please allow me to answer the preceding question. Co-chair McGovern. Absolutely. Mr. Lau. Yes. I want to add to what Michael had said about self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party in the earlier version of the Party constitution, in the 1930s, repeatedly affirmed the self-determination rights of the so-called minorities, with an explicit sentence stating, ``up to the level of independence and seceding from China.'' In other words, they practically advocated the right of the Tibetans and, well, actually the Xinjiang Uyghurs too, to form independent countries. They only deleted those clauses after they gained power after 1949. Now, to answer your question. Actually, in my book, which is written in Chinese, and my target audience is people in China, I wanted to sort of convince the people in China that they haven't done the right thing with respect to Tibet. So I have taken a totally Chinese chauvinistic approach. I dismiss all Tibetan records. I dismiss all Western records. I only use Chinese records that are authored by Chinese, written in the Chinese language, from the 13th century up until 1949, before the Chinese Communist Party took power. And I also restrict myself to only those records that are reprinted by the People's Republic of China, indicating their acceptance of the authoritativeness of these publications. And yes, most of them are digitized by companies or libraries under PRC rule. And I think actually 80 percent of them are not only available and digitized, they're available free of charge on public websites. Also, I explicitly tell my readers: Don't believe a single word in my book. Go to the internet and check it out yourself. The two maps that I'm showing over here, they are available for free on websites, many of them operated within the PRC, many of them operated by official units of the PRC. Co-chair McGovern. Well, maybe President Xi ought to visit the library or go online. (Laughter.) Mr. Lau. Well. (Laughs.) Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman Steel, I don't know if you have an additional question. I see you're still on the line. Do you have additional questions? Representative Steel. No, I don't. Co-chair McGovern. OK. Thank you. Representative Steel. Mr. Chairman, I just love to listen. Co-chair McGovern. Very good. Thank you. Mr. van Walt, what other governments have made statements about Tibet being part of China? I mean, how many also say ``since ancient times''? Can you provide examples of how the Chinese narrative has been embraced by the international community? Mr. van Walt van Praag. I can't give you exact numbers of how many governments have and how many governments have not. I know that some governments--and I know that because I've spoken to their officials--have been very careful not to make any explicit statements, despite pressure. Others have been pressured by China, especially after, for example, somebody higher up in the government, the minister of foreign affairs or the prime minister, has received His Holiness the Dalai Lama. After that, they're subjected to a tremendous amount of pressure from Beijing, and a number of them then make a statement to the effect that they recognize or that they identify Tibet as a part of the PRC. A good example of that is France. After President Sarkozy, in his capacity as president of the European Union, met with His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Poland, France was put under a lot of pressure and made a statement that since the time of Charles de Gaulle, France recognized that Tibet was a part of China, which is actually not true, or not accurate, I should say. But that is an example. The statement continues by saying that this will not change. Denmark was pressured to make a similar statement. They added that the Danish government does not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama added that statement as well. I think that addition is even more harmful, and completely unnecessary. It takes away and violates the Tibetans' right to self-determination to say that they cannot have any say in their future because we do not support a particular outcome. Again, this type of statement reduces the leverage for Tibetans, should negotiations take place. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I think our position is that Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as recognized by the Tibetan people. That is the direction that our government should follow, as well as other governments around the world. Mr. Tethong, the position of the Central Tibetan Administration is that the Middle Way approach proposed by the Dalai Lama is the only viable solution to the Tibet problem--and would you characterize the Chinese government's response to the Tibetan position as their disagreement that the Middle Way approach is viable, or is it a denial that there's even a Tibetan problem at all? Mr. Tethong. That's a difficult question to answer. It seems very complicated. I couldn't understand what you were saying, actually. Co-chair McGovern. Yes, I mean, I guess the question is that His Holiness outlined this Middle Way approach, and the Chinese government hasn't responded, right? The question is, is it that they cannot see themselves getting to the Middle Way approach, or is it basically that they feel they don't have to, because there isn't a Tibetan issue they have to deal with? Mr. Tethong. I think it may be more of a lack of confidence on their part on how to deal with the Tibet issue--afraid that if they give in to the Tibetans, other issues will arise within China. Also, the Tibet situation is not entirely comparable to any other. That may be one reason. And the basic reason, I think I tried to point out earlier, is that within the Chinese leadership, from a position of being confident and trying to find a solution during Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping's time, it has retreated to another direction. And this Middle Way policy may have suffered. Co-chair McGovern. I apologize. I just have a few more questions. I just think it's important to establish a full record here, not only for the Commission but for my colleagues. Ms. Bork, there have been many meetings between U.S. Presidents and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Would you say that these meetings have strengthened the hand of the Dalai Lama vis-a-vis China? And if President Biden were to meet with His Holiness during his term, what would you advise him to say? Ms. Bork. I think the reception by U.S. Presidents of the Dalai Lama has been extremely important, and also because it has become so regular. It would be wonderful for President Biden to be able to visit with the Dalai Lama, or if travel for either one of them were a problem, having the vice president call on His Holiness would signal American support and an effort to break down some of the isolation that His Holiness has experienced over the years. What should he say? I think it's very much a part of the broader U.S. policy for China. A democratic basis of government for Tibet and China would be what the U.S. President seeks, and committing to that and committing to support Tibetan democracy in exile, but also Tibetan democracy eventually and Chinese democracy, under whatever arrangement most people can agree on should be the goal. I don't see any problem with the United States standing for that. In fact, I think it's imperative. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Professor Lau, Mr. van Walt's books argue that it is inappropriate--and if I'm mischaracterizing your books, correct me--that it is inappropriate to apply the modern definition of sovereignty to Tibet and its neighbors because ruling powers in East Asia are related to each other in ways that were distinct from the Western notion of sovereignty that was applied later. Does your research conform to this view? And how would you characterize Tibet's relations with its neighbors over the centuries? Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. As far as I could tell, there are many places in Chinese official records where entities were referred to as ``countries,'' which in Chinese is guojia, (country). And Tibet is also referred to as a country, guojia, just like Vietnam and Holland, and other countries. So if you look at the history of Tibet over the past 1,000 years, they are not that dissimilar or that different from the histories of Germany, or China, whatever. Sometimes they are unified into a central administration and at other times it was fragmented. And sometimes there were all these principalities. So I guess your question itself would take hours to debate, and I'm not good enough to answer the question. Certainly, by the Qing Empire's time, or actually even before that, I think by the 15th or 16th century, Tibet became sufficiently unified. They had all these structures of government such as legal codes, central taxation, and so forth, that qualified them to be a country. But I've always felt that--pardon me for saying this--it's a less relevant question. The more relevant question is, was Tibet part of China? And if Tibet wasn't part of China, to put it bluntly, it's really none of your business whether Tibet itself was a country. So on one hand I would say, yes, Tibet was definitely a country, compared to the standards that would be applicable to China and Germany since the 15th century or so. But again, I want to repeat that that's probably an unnecessary confusion of the issue. The more important issue is that nobody has the right to judge whether Tibet was a country. The more important thing is whether Tibet was part of somebody else's territory. And if it wasn't, then leave Tibet alone. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you for clarifying all that for us. Let me ask one other question, and then, to everybody here, any closing remarks that you want to make. In a May press conference with the Japanese prime minister, President Biden said, ``I believe what Putin is attempting to do is eliminate the identity of Ukraine''--the identity. He can't occupy it, but he can try to destroy its identity, and you know, I think those words are true, what Putin is trying to do in Ukraine, but I think they're also applicable to what China is trying to do in Tibet. When we visited Lhasa back in 2015 with Speaker Pelosi, it was clear what they're trying to do--deny Tibetans access to their religion, prevent them from speaking their language and honoring their customs, you know, being who they are. They're doing it in a thousand different ways, and displacing people. And it really is quite horrific what is going on; the brutality is really horrific. How should we view Tibet through the lens of President Biden's comment about eliminating the identity of Ukraine? And I will ask you all to respond, and also with anything that you think we should add for the record. This is the time to make that clear as well. So why don't we begin with Mr. van Walt. Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much. I think what is happening in Ukraine--Russia's war within Ukraine is bringing home a number of issues that are directly related to Tibet as well. I mean, we are obviously shocked by the blatant aggression against Ukraine and are reminded that exactly the same happened a little over 70 years ago, in relation to Tibet. President Biden also made a statement to the effect that taking another's territory by force is unacceptable, that it violates fundamental norms of our international order. I couldn't agree more. And I think that should apply to Tibet. In terms of the destruction of the very identity of the Tibetans, and I believe the same is true when we look at the Uyghurs in East Turkestan, it has become very clear, I think, at this point, that the very policy of the PRC and of the Chinese Communist Party is precisely this: To destroy the identity of these peoples because they have found them to be an obstacle to their full integration in China. And not only that, but they have found that as long as there is a sense of identity in the Tibetan case and in the Uyghur case, both very closely linked to their religious beliefs and traditions, that the CCP will not be able to fully control the Tibetans. This is linked also to the question of the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. All Chinese policies today under Xi Jinping are geared at full and total control of the Tibetans, whether it is through the Dalai Lama, by picking him and educating him in accordance with CCP views, or whether it is by taking the children and placing them in this network of colonial schools, or whether it is by suppressing religious freedom, and other things as well. So, yes, the intention is to rub Tibet off the map in terms of the identity and the distinctness of the Tibetan people. As part of that, there is a strong effort to rob the Tibetans also of their history, since that's also tied to their identity and is a continuing embarrassment to China's attempt to continue to rule Tibet. Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Lau. Mr. Lau. Well, I would like to reiterate two points. The first point is I hope the United States and other governments would counter directly the claims of some of these empire revivalists. We're seeing that, of course, in Putin's case, and then very likely a few years from now we'll see that explicitly expressed in China, that they can use historical fabrications to justify their attempts to reunify their ancestral lands. And that comes to the second point, which is that I hope in the future, in schools throughout the world, people will try to change this perception that I know is very deeply ingrained among the Chinese, that it's very important to be a national of a big country, of a powerful country. They believe that it is essential to their well-being. My background is that I was born in Singapore. And of course, I've seen countries like Liechtenstein and Switzerland; people in Singapore and Liechtenstein have no interest in enlarging their countries. And people can live very well. But people who are educated in Russia and China, it never comes to their minds that they could live happily ever after if they lose Xinjiang, or Ukraine, or Tibet, or whatever it is. They think it's the end of the world if their country is splintered, and then Tibet is gone, and Xinjiang is gone. I think it's important for us, using the Voice of America, or whatever, to try to somehow tell people explicitly that people in Switzerland and Liechtenstein live very well. This is all the message that I have. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Mr. Tethong. Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Chairman. With reference to what's happening in Ukraine, I think one can say that 70 years ago Tibet was in the same situation, and unfortunately, the world community could not come to Tibet's assistance. We hope attention and focus on Ukraine will be much better, and the outcome will be better too. For the record, I would like to take the opportunity, on behalf of all Tibetans, to express acknowledgement and gratitude to the United States Government for the attention and focus on what's happening in Tibet. Clearly a tremendous amount of change has happened in Tibet, for the better, because there is attention from the outside world, and especially the United States. We especially acknowledge Members of Congress who have taken the lead, and your leadership at this time on the Tibet issues as well. I would like to say thank you on behalf of the Tibetan people. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Ms. Bork. Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Just in closing, as you're talking about what happened 70 years ago, I just wanted to mention that the United States took a very principled position in support of the Baltic states against the annexation by the Soviet Union. There are some dissimilarities, but not really serious ones, in my view. It's really valuable for the United States to look back at the constraints it's imposed on itself all these decades, acting on behalf of Tibet and making the Tibetan exile government's position stronger in trying to reach some kind of improvement. In that regard, I think a strategic focusing on Tibet as a strategic issue is vital. For the record, I will pass along to the staff a readout of a tabletop exercise that several of us conducted in 2019 about the future, with the passing of the Dalai Lama and how governments will respond at that time. Clearly that is an exercise that needs to be repeated. And it would be something that I think Members of Congress would find useful to think about--being prepared for that eventuality, and what China will do and what the United States and its allies should do in preparation. Thank you very much. Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, and thank all of you for your testimony. I think this is a very important hearing because in our discussions on Tibet, and some of the topics that we covered here today, we don't include the historical fact that Tibet has not been a part of China since ancient times. I think everybody here has disputed that very clearly. Our focus is on standing with the people of Tibet to protect their identity, to protect their history, to protect their culture, and to protect their human rights, and I believe that we in the United States--and, Mr. Tethong, I appreciate your kind words, but to be honest with you, we're not doing enough. The world community is not doing enough. You know, if we were, we would be having a very different discussion right now. And it's complicated. There are corporate interests involved, urging governments not to rock the boat because they're all worried about continued corporate profits and strategic issues. Nobody wants to rock the boat with China. We're very good at talking the talk; we're not very good at always walking the walk on these issues. But I think that's changing. I really do. I mean, I look at the last few years here in the United States Congress. We have legislated more; we have created more policy on Tibet than at any other time. As I said, Tibet's true representatives are His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as recognized by the Tibetan people, and I think that that should be our guiding principle here as we move forward. I mean, it's not up to President Biden, or it's not about what President Xi wants for Tibet. It's not about what the President of France wants. It's what the Tibetan people want. So any solution, any way forward, has to be what the Tibetan people want. It can't be imposed by somebody who's not part of the Tibetan community and I think there's a growing recognition of that. The Tibetan government-in-exile is showing an embrace of democracy, which is really inspiring. I witnessed some of the election. I've watched online as people voted in far-off places, participating in this process. It really is inspirational. But I've also met with families who have been torn apart, people who don't know where their mothers or fathers are, who were disappeared. It's cruel and it is horrific. Again, we are moving forward with additional legislation. We are encouraged by the new special coordinator in this administration. We will work with her to have her not only be a spokesperson for what U.S. policy should be but to work with the international community. I was particularly grateful that this hearing is being held at the same time that the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet is meeting. This is not just a U.S. issue. It is a global issue. If you care about human rights, this has to be a central issue. I mean, you go all over the world and you have these countries go, Oh, human rights, human rights, human rights. Well, if you can't stand up to China on something like this, then stop talking about human rights. And to the Chinese government, look, if you want to do something constructive right now, you should re-enter the direct dialogue that you walked away from 12 years ago. This issue is not going away. I appreciate everybody being here. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. Without objection, I'd like to enter into the record a written statement from the International Campaign for Tibet and an additional paper by Professor Lau. The record will remain open until the close of business on Friday, June 24th, for any items that members would like to submit for the record or any additional questions for the witnesses. And with that, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the hearing was concluded.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X ======================================================================= Prepared Statements ------ Prepared Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag Contrary to what the People's Republic of China claims and to what many people take for granted, Tibet was historically not a part of China. This is one of the outcomes of a multiyear collaborative historical research project that I recently completed and published.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The 10-year research project, which involved some 100 leading scholars worldwide, resulted in the publication of Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan, co-authored/edited with Timothy Brook and Miek Boltjes, Chicago University Press, 2018, and Tibet Brief 20/20, co-authored with Miek Boltjes, Outskirts Press, 2020. Sacred Mandates won a 2021 International Convention of Asian Scholars Book Prize. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is relevant and requires our attention because the PRC government has made agreement on its version of history a precondition to Sino-Tibetan negotiations, which have been in deadlock now for 12 years.\2\ More fundamentally, the PRC bases its entitlement to Tibet solely on its assertion that Tibet has been an integral part of China since antiquity.\3\ Whether or not Tibet was historically a part of China therefore determines whether the PRC has the legitimacy to rule Tibet or not. And that in turn informs the international community's obligations and responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ See State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, Tibet's Path to Development Is Driven by an Irresistible Historical Tide (Beijing, April 15, 2015). \3\ Tibet Brief 20/20, op. cit. pp. 6-10. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Addressing the plight of the Tibetan people has been one of my lifelong goals, and my contributions have mostly been in the international legal and diplomacy spheres, in line with my career. I undertook this academic historical research to get to the bottom of what informs the PRC government and the Dalai Lama in their opposing views on Tibet's historical status, with the aim to be able to come up with strategies for those with access and clout to encourage the parties to break through the stalemate and resume their dialogue. In the process it became clear that the PRC's historical narrative--that Tibet has always been a part of China--stands in the way of Sino-Tibetan negotiations in more than one way. The international community has started to buy into that narrative and governments have started to act accordingly, treating Tibet as if it was China's internal affair and even stating they consider Tibet to be a part of China. I strongly believe that this development is one of the main obstacles to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through negotiations. It is also in violation of international law. Our research firmly establishes that though not always `independent' in the modern legal sense of that term and over time subject to various degrees of Mongol, Manchu and even British authority or influence, Tibet was most certainly never a part of China. The PRC could therefore not have `inherited' Tibet from the Republic of China or earlier empires, as it claims. As a matter of fact, Tibet was an independent state de facto and de jure from 1912 to 1950/51, when the PRC invaded it. Because Tibet was not at any point in time a part of China, the PRC's military invasion of Tibet in 1950/51 constituted an act of aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force against another state.\4\ This informs the legitimacy of the PRC's presence in and rule of Tibet the past seven decades: China does not have sovereignty over Tibet. It is occupying Tibet illegally. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ A peremptory norm is an international obligation ``so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that [its] breach [is] recognized as a crime by that community as a whole''. International Law Commission Rapporteur Roberto Ago. Quoted in Cassese, International Law, p. 202. Aggression is a prime example. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- International law prohibits governments from explicitly or implicitly recognizing China's unlawful annexation of Tibet, from doing anything that helps China consolidate its hold on Tibet, and from denying the Tibetans the exercise of their right to self- determination.\5\ It also prohibits states from benefiting from the exploitation of Tibet's resources so long as Tibetans are denied the ability to make decisions concerning them.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ International Law Commission, `Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)' (2001) YILC Vol. 2, Part 2, Arts. 40, 41, and commentary para 5. See also, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Friendly Relations Confirmed by the International Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), paras 119, 124, ICJ Reports 1971; and in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras 155-159, ICJ Reports 2004. \6\ Court of Justice of the European Union in a landmark case concerning the Sahrawi people's rights, in 2016, CJEU, Judgment in Case C-104/16 P Council v Front populaire pour la liberation de la saguia- el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Dec. 21, 2016 https:// curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/ cp160146en.pdf, accessed 08/28/2021. Confirmed by the UK High Court on 2019, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? g=e9a48d23-358c-4948-b754-3f8868bda922. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the same time, governments have the positive obligation to take action to help bring about a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict, end the occupation of Tibet and enable the Tibetan people to exercise self-determination.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ International Law Commission, ARSIWA, op. cit., Commentary to Art. 41(1). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many governments are today acting contrary to these obligations, in plain violation of international law and to the detriment of the resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. This includes the US government. Two developments stand out in this regard: governments make statements recognizing that Tibet is a part of the PRC, and they treat Tibet as China's internal affair, outside their purview. When governments state that they consider Tibet to be a part of the PRC, they take away the PRC's principal incentive to negotiate with the Tibetans as well as reduce the latter's main source of leverage. In the first place, Beijing uses these statements as `evidence' for its claim that it has sovereignty and legitimacy in Tibet, and even for its historical claim. The more such statements it obtains, the less it feels the need to turn to Tibetans for legitimacy. Instead, it uses the international community's pronouncements as a substitute for true legitimacy, that is, the legitimacy that would result from the consent of the governed--through an exercise by the Tibetans of self- determination or through a process of sincere negotiations with the Tibetan leadership. Secondly, once a government states that it considers Tibet to be a part of the PRC it cannot but treat Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations as China's internal affair. This is effectively happening today: most governments are limiting their expressions of concern to human rights abuses. In this way Beijing has largely succeeded in containing international scrutiny and reproach to where it can manage it. Some governments, including the U.S., have also added that they do not support or are opposed to Tibetan independence.\8\ Such statements not only violate the prohibition against recognizing annexation by force, but also constitute a denial of the Tibetan people's right to self-determination, an equally serious violation of international law. Even though states cannot actually take away the right to self- determination--including the option of independence--from the Tibetan people, such statements do the Tibetans a great disservice and encourage Beijing to ignore the Tibetans' rights. By supporting the aggressor, not the injured, they also fail to fulfill the fundamental role international law requires the international community to play--to prevent war and promote friendly relations and cooperation among states based inter alia on the principles of non-use of force against other states and of equal rights and self-determination of peoples-- frustrating the very purpose of international law in the process. For, as the International Court of Justice underscored in the Namibia case, \9\ it is precisely to the international community that the injured people must look for ending the illegality and for realizing its rights. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ See, e.g., President Barack Obama--February 21, 2014, Readout of the President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama. See also, `Note Verbale' of the Danish government of Dec. 9, 2009. Reported by AFP, Dec. 10, 2009. \9\ International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, para 127, concerning South Africa's illegal annexation of Namibia. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is for Tibetans, and Tibetans only, to make concessions with respect to their right to independence--if and when they so decide. Ruling out independence one-sidedly disempowers the Tibetan side. It weakens the Tibetans' negotiation position, exacerbates the already stark power asymmetry, and conditions the expectations of the Tibetans as well as of the international community to envision a settlement that can bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know, not only about China's treatment of Tibetans \10\ but also of Uyghurs, as detailed in the recent Newslines Institute Genocide report,\11\ and the fact that Tibetans are resorting to self-immolation to protest Beijing's oppression and policies to eradicate Tibetan identity,\12\ I ask: is marginal change in Tibet what the U.S. wants for the Tibetan people? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ See Tibet Action Institute, Separated from Their Families, Hidden from the World; China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools inside Tibet, December 2021; Tibet Advocacy Coalition, Assaulting Identity: China's New Coercive Strategies in Tibet, March 2021. \11\ Newslines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, March 2021. \12\ There have been 160 confirmed cases of self-immolation since 2009. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The need for the international community to take responsibility and effectively address the Sino-Tibetan conflict is not just a legal and moral imperative, it is also a political necessity. Looking the other way with an underlying ``let's not make the Tibetans' problem our problem'' has been a mistake for which the international community is today paying a price as it tries to deal with an emboldened PRC and Russia asserting expanding territorial claims and influence. Beijing's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and threatening moves towards India and Bhutan to press territorial claims, as well as its genocidal policies against Uyghurs, all taking place at the time of this writing, cannot be treated as unrelated to the years of international appeasement of Beijing as concerns its unlawful seizure and occupation of Tibet and its implementation of oppressive policies of integration and assimilation there. And neither can Russia's attempt at forcefully annexing part or all of Ukraine. It is U.S. policy to support a negotiated resolution of the Sino- Tibetan conflict. U.S. Government actions, however, run counter to U.S. policy. Supporting a negotiated resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict requires the political will to be vocal about the lack of legitimacy of China's presence in and rule of Tibet, not statements that imply an acceptance of China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. It requires calling and treating Tibet what it is: an occupied country, and the Tibetans what they are: a people under alien subjugation and domination, not a `minority' or `ethnic group of China'. Adopting such PRC terminology denies the Tibetan people its proper status and implicitly its right to self-determination. And lastly, it requires the Sino-Tibetan conflict to be called and treated what it is: an international conflict, falling squarely within the international community's--including the U.S. Government's--purview and responsibility, not China's internal affair. It is also U.S. policy not to recognize a country's attempt to annex territory by the use of force. President Joe Biden recently reiterated that taking territory by force is unacceptable. He said so publicly in reference to Taiwan and Ukraine.\13\ The prohibition against taking another country's territory by force is a cornerstone and fundamental norm of modern international law and the international legal order. No derogation from this is allowed, and governments are prohibited from recognizing such territorial expansion. Just as Russia's attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory cannot be accepted or recognized by the international community, so China's attempted annexation of Tibet must not be accepted or recognized. Only in the absence of such recognition may the PRC government be moved to negotiate with the Tibetan leadership to resolve their conflict. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/ 2022/05/23/remarks-by- president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint- press-conference/. President Biden accused President Putin of attacking ``the norms and principles that are the foundations of our international order.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Department of State stated on March 12, in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, that the U.S. is committed to ``putting the Ukrainians in the strongest possible negotiating position''.\14\ Tibet's leaders are committed to non-violence and do not seek weapons. But they do need coordinated international action to--at a minimum-- firmly anchor Tibet's international legal status, to bolster its negotiating capacity and to bring China to the negotiating table. The U.S. and other governments have shown in recent months how coordinated diplomatic and economic measures, including sanctions, can be deployed in efforts to stop and punish aggression. Such coordinated action is overdue to address China's occupation of Tibet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-ready-take-diplomatic- steps-ukraine-will-find- helpful-state-dept-2022-03-12/ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Prepared Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong Hon. Chairman, It is my distinct honor to offer testimony this morning at this hearing on ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' and to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in the 20th century, including efforts towards a resolution of the Tibet issue. Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. One of Mao Zedong's earliest declarations was his intention to ``liberate'' Tibet from the West, and the Tibetan people from a backward and oppressive society. The Tibetan government protested to the new Chinese state citing Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan Kings to the rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu Qing dynasties. With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the United Nations and the global community, especially to India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Unfortunately, China did not heed Tibet's protests and the global community did not come to Tibet's defense. The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950, easily overwhelming the Tibetan army and militia. China knew right then that rhetorical justification for such an invasion was not enough and called for negotiations to formalize an agreement. Tibetan representatives negotiated in Beijing, but disregarding any proper ratification process, were forced to sign what is called ``The 17 Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.'' Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government tried to work within the broad confines of the agreement which promised no change in the status of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government. However, the Chinese did not live up to their commitments nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had received from Mao Zedong. Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years and protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the uprising in Lhasa on March 10, 1959, which led to the escape of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and thousands to India and neighboring countries. For the next twenty years Tibet was completely shut off from the rest of the world. An extreme overhaul of Tibetan life from its traditional Buddhist roots to Chinese Marxist socialism was introduced, which in the later years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese Cultural revolution. However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue important enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to Beijing and declared that short of separation, everything could be discussed, meaning that short of granting Tibetan independence, China would be open to all Tibetan concerns and aspirations. This breakthrough meeting led to renewed dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government, and four delegations of exile leaders were able to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had transpired in the two decades of Chinese rule. By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in deliberations with Chinese officials to address the larger issues related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, Party General Secretary and the main proponent of change in their Tibet policies died. This was soon followed by the Tiananmen student protests and the massacre. China stepped backwards and the Tibet issue also retreated. In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, and Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in Beijing, and the Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's Middle Way policy seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. The Envoys met many times, even after the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests that called for greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the Envoys' last meeting was to be in 2010 when the Chinese ended the dialogue process. This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should show that even at the most challenging of times, China has seen the need to address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet. And that there is perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of their rule. China has also repeatedly initiated direct communication with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, demonstrating the obvious need to find a meaningful resolution to these outstanding issues. Ever since the exile delegation visits to Tibet in the 1980s, to the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in Beijing, the Chinese leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan perspectives of their rule in Tibet, and of the unvarnished aspirations of the Tibetan people, both of which contradict the official Chinese narrative. Worldwide attention to Tibet has been an important part of creating greater awareness of the Tibetan issue even within China, allowing for more liberal and reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan hopes and demands to have some standing. There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, through the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concerns for the cultural and human rights of the Tibetan people, has been an important factor in the U.S. Government's attention to the issue, which has been sustained to a large degree by individual members of Congress. The continued efforts of the United States can only help in removing barriers to this unresolved conflict and will advance the Tibetan people's desire for greater freedom and democracy. Thank you. ______ Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I am also grateful to the Commission staff for their advice and expertise. The Trump Administration began, and the Biden Administration continues, to chart a profound change in American policy toward Communist Party-ruled China. So far, however, Tibet has not been the focus of significant policy revisions by the executive branch. Certainly, Tibet today would be far down the list of most Americans' concerns when it comes to China. Compared to China's aggression in the South China Sea, coercive financial diplomacy, and the threat to Taiwan, Tibet is sometimes viewed as a closed, albeit tragic, chapter of history. By contrast, more than 70 years after the invasion, Tibet remains a high priority for the Chinese Communist Party. This priority is evident in the attention and resources the Party devotes to surveillance, repression and control, to General Secretary Xi Jinping's goal of sinicizing religion, to the exploitation of natural resources and to building up military forces along Tibet's border with India. Furthermore, the Party's ambitions regarding Tibet are international and expansive. They are a part of China's assault on liberal democratic norms. This in turn serves Beijing's ultimate goal of gaining international deference to its choice of the next Dalai Lama. Preventing that, reversing the diminution of support for the Dalai Lama and building support for Tibetan democracy should play a much greater role in America's response to China. The foundations of American Tibet policy make this more difficult than it should be. A look back at history shows that America's Tibet policy is not the product of historical facts, or principles of international law, but rather of outdated perceptions of America's strategic interest in subordinating Tibet to China. Washington had little involvement in Tibet until World War II. Before then, the U.S. favored China's territorial integrity even while its empire was disintegrating. During World War II, Washington was allied with Chiang Kai-Shek. That relationship had profound and lasting effect on Tibet. Chiang hoped to recover lost imperial territory, including Tibet. American officials did not wish to undermine him, even though officials knew that he exerted no authority there and they considered that Tibet had been de facto independent for decades since the collapse of imperial rule. Also damaging was Washington's acceptance of imperial Britain's assertion of Chinese ``suzerainty'' over Tibet. Less than sovereignty, suzerainty is an anachronistic and inapt concept which neither Tibet nor China accepted but which imperial Britain introduced in order to fend off Russia's eastward advance during the geopolitical competition in the region known as the Great Game. Even so, American officials seemed uncomfortable with the term, and resisted using it. From the 1940s through the 1960s, in internal documents, officials considered different views of Tibet's status in response to developments. At the time of the invasion, a memo by the State Department's legal advisor suggested that recognition of Tibetan independence was a possibility. Later on, in the 1960s, there was sympathy for the idea of Tibetan self-determination, including in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Dalai Lama. But it was easy enough to say this while doing little except provide some support to Tibetan rebels, and while the U.S. was still allied with Chiang Kai- shek, who had fled to Taiwan. Only decades after the invasion did the U.S. recognize Chinese sovereignty. In 1987, the State Department, responding to questions about unrest in Tibet, dated this position to 1978. That reference appears to have been an internal decision rather than a public statement. And it took place around the time of the break in relations with Taipei. Visiting Beijing in August 1979, Vice President Mondale told Deng Xiao-ping, ``our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is part of China.'' The Vice President also said that henceforth, the Dalai Lama would be received as a religious figure, not a political leader. In short, America's approach to Tibet fluctuated according to its perception of its strategic interests with regard to China--and with regard to which Chinese government it favored--the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China. Ultimately, Washington transferred its deference to China over Tibet from a cultish dictatorship that never exerted authority there to a cultish totalitarian regime that invaded and repressed it. Once this was done, Tibet became problematic within U.S.-PRC relations. As Melvyn Goldstein writes, with policy focused on improving its accommodation with China, Tibet became ``an embarrassment for the United States,'' ``no longer relevant to U.S. national interests'' and even ``potentially harmful.'' \1\ The characterization of Tibet as a problem in U.S.-China relations that should be neutralized, including for Tibet's own sake, has persisted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Melvyn Goldstein, Snow Lion and the Dragon,(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 57-58. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Of course this approach to Tibet, and the decision to accept the PRC's sovereignty, meant that the democratization of the theocratic government in exile--and the illegitimacy of Party rule there--could not be a major factor in America's policy. The extraordinary accomplishment of Tibet's democracy in exile would not be discussed alongside the democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and South Korea at the end of the last century which have shaped America's approach to the region ever since. It should also be noted that America's approach to Tibet had been out of step with the principled stance Washington took against communist aggression in Europe and the annexation of the Baltic states. * * * * * * * For its part, the CCP has maintained an ambitious agenda for Tibet, and not only inside its borders. In neighboring countries it has used border settlements, security relationships, investment and the development and appropriation of Buddhist sites to advance its interests. In fact, even today, Chinese officials maintain territorial ambitions with regard to Tibet, speaking of parts of northeastern India as ``Southern Tibet'' and putting pressure on India across the Tibet- India border. Beijing also pursues its Tibet agenda aggressively in foreign capitals and international organizations. Beijing uses its self- proclaimed ``core interest'' in Tibet to impose litmus tests in the United Nations, and in foreign capitals. In this way, Tibet is an instrument of the Party's assault on liberal democratic norms. It is also intended to help the Party win international deference to its selection of the next Dalai Lama. In 2019, I convened a group with expertise in Tibet, China, India, and American foreign policy to consider how governments would respond when the Dalai Lama dies, and China seeks to install an impostor. The group concluded that the Dalai Lama's succession is a matter of strategic competition and should be viewed as such by the U.S. and its democratic allies. A final note: the Party's intense propaganda and control makes it seem that Chinese people are irredeemably nationalist when it comes to Tibet. This has an effect inside China, of course, but also outside, making new thinking about Tibet seem hopeless. In fact, leading Chinese dissidents have offered criticism of Party policies in Tibet. Going back to Wei Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, pro-democracy activists, lawyers and others have bravely linked Tibet's fate to China's, stressing that the solution for both Tibetans and Chinese is democracy. Liu Xiaobo wrote in 2008, ``a confrontation between freedom and dictatorship has been made to look like a clash between ethnicities.'' \2\ The democracy manifesto, Charter 08, referenced Tibet indirectly in its call for a ``federation of democratic communities of China'' and the resolution of ``disputes in the national minority areas of China . . . to find a workable framework within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Liu Xiaobo, ``So Long as Han Chinese Have No Freedom, Tibetans Will Have No Autonomy,'' April 11, 2008, No Enemies, No Hatred, Perry Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, Liu Xia, editors, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 263. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is a message from inside China that American officials should consider. Taken together with the democratic achievement of the Tibetan people in exile, the U.S. can chart a new approach based on Tibet's strategic importance, not only in the territorial sense, but in the ideological one. A few recommendations follow: Renew and redouble support for Chinese and Tibetan political prisoners, dissidents, democracy activists, independent journalists and lawyers. Conduct an independent review of U.S. Tibet policy since the end of Chinese imperial rule, including the diplomatic history, and of internal deliberations that have influenced America's approach to Tibet. Bring Tibet policy into line with America's interest in combating China's assault on democratic norms, including international law, and in advancing democracy in the Indo-Pacific by enlisting allies in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan process for selecting the next Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama, or his designee, should regain the access he once had in foreign capitals. Receive elected officials of the Central Tibet Administration (CTA), the Sikyong, his cabinet and other Tibetan officials at the highest levels of government and include them in the Summit for Democracy and other gatherings. Make Tibet a part of efforts to counter Chinese influence in international organizations, on university campuses and at the state and local level. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' will come to order. More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese rule in Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of unrelenting oppression. Chinese authorities routinely violate Tibetans' freedom of religion, expression, and assembly, as well as denying their self- determination. The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign of ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially sanctioned interpretations of religion and culture, not the authentic practice and teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary to that practice and teaching, the Chinese government even insists on its own authority to select the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, who authorities label a security threat. Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished. Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with Chinese rule in Tibet. These punishments range from warnings to surveillance to interrogation and detention. The Commission's Political Prisoner Database currently includes records of 715 Tibetans detained or imprisoned for political or religious reasons. We note that there are considerably more cases of detention in China than we can capture in the database. Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people. Earlier this year, we heard testimony about insidious efforts to separate Tibetan children from their parents, with nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children now placed in boarding schools to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of language and culture. We are observing an expansion of that practice to children going to kindergarten. This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. In today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to address the aspirations of the Tibetan people for their basic rights and self- determination to be respected. Sadly, that dialogue has been frozen for 12 years as Chinese authorities refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote dialogue without preconditions to lead to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. In other words, we recognize that this remains an unsettled conflict that must be addressed. Yet the Chinese government would have the world believe that Tibet is an internal affair and that issues of its status are resolved. This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's hearing aims to set the historical record straight. Our witnesses will share with us their considerable experience analyzing the history of Tibet, the international law dimensions of the conflict, the barriers to resuming dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. I hope this hearing helps cut through Chinese propaganda and brings attention to the true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for autonomy. I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in- Exile--it's good to have you here--the International Campaign for Tibet, dignitaries, and other friends of Tibet who are with us this morning while they are in town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. Thank you for joining us. The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination need champions all over the globe and I look forward to continuing to work with my fellow parliamentarians to advance the causes of human dignity and freedom wherever we can. Among global elected officials, few have been as great a friend of Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for many years has led the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation and advocate for the Tibetan people. ______ Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern Thank you, very much Mr. Chairman, and I too also want to welcome our friends who are visiting Washington to participate in the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. I want to especially welcome the members of the Tibetan parliament- in-exile. We have two members of the Canadian parliament here. I welcome our friends from ICT. And I welcome my dear friend Richard Gere, who has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights in Tibet. We are delighted you are all here. I appreciate that we are holding this hearing on Tibet, the status of dialogue, and a path forward in the Tibetan quest for rights and dignity. Congress has had a long and abiding interest in Tibet. It created Tibetan language broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid programs for Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed the landmark Tibetan Policy Act, and codified the position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. Congressman Tom Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by side with the Dalai Lama. So did President Bush and Speaker Pelosi, who presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal in 2007. I have had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet bills to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act seeks to enable diplomats, journalists,and tourists to travel and see Tibet with their own eyes, because Chinese officials have closed it off. The Tibetan Policy and Support Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its key feature, the bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th Dalai Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community. Not by China. Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people. But the core problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot advocate for themselves. They are forced to live in an authoritarian system under a paranoid central government that sees any expression of distinct identity as a threat to their power. His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this way. He's right. For decades he sought to negotiate with Chinese authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side did agree to ten rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai Lama's envoys. But they did not do so in good faith. Chinese officials say they will return to the table only if the Dalai Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only unreasonable, but false. The U.S. Government, to its credit, has consistently called on the Chinese to return to dialogue, without preconditions. But that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood ready, the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we keep doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic or strategy? That is the question we will explore in this hearing. Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of perspectives-- legal, historical, policy, and personal--to the Tibet-China dialogue. We hope to hear what Congress and the U.S. Government can do to help. Should we be countering false Chinese narratives? Should we reorient how we talk about the basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in the current environment, and what would the alternatives be? Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider these important questions. I look forward to our hearing. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Witness Biographies Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of international law and executive president of Kreddha Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international law and executive president of Kreddha, an international NGO created to help prevent and resolve violent intrastate conflicts. He is a Senior Fellow at the Sompong Sucharitkul Center for Advanced International Legal Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, and a member of the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. He has served as a Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Social Sciences, University of California Davis, as Visiting Professor of Modern International Relations and International Law, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and as Legal Advisor to the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. He is the author with Miek Boltjes of Tibet Brief 20/20 and author and editor of Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan. Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City University of Hong Kong Hon-Shiang Lau's ancestry is Guangdong province, China. He was born and educated in Singapore. He obtained his bachelor of engineering degree from the University of Singapore in 1969, and a Ph.D. in business administration from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1973. He was Full Professor of Business Administration at Washington State University starting in 1980, Regents Professor at Oklahoma State University starting in 1987, and Chair Professor of Operations Management at the City University of Hong Kong starting in 2000. He took early retirement in 2011 to devote his time to Chinese history. The Chinese-language edition of his book Tibet Was Never Part of China since Antiquity was published in 2019; its English-language translation will appear soon. Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representive of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC Tenzin N. Tethong is the former Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He served in several roles in the Central Tibetan Administration based in Dharamsala, India, including as Kalon Tripa (Chief of Cabinet) and Kalon of various portfolios such as the Departments of Finance, Home, and Information & International Relations. He headed the second delegation of Tibetans to Tibet and China in 1980. From 1997 to 2011 he was a Distinguished Fellow and taught in the Tibetan Studies Initiative at Stanford University. He previously served as Director of the Tibetan language service at Radio Free Asia and currently serves as Director of the Tibetan language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a personal capacity. Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose Ellen Bork is a contributing editor at American Purpose. She writes about American foreign policy with an emphasis on democracy and human rights. She served as the senior professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the Washington Post, and other publications. She graduated from Yale University and the Georgetown University Law Center. [all]