ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE: ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS

Senate Commerce Committee Senate February 28, 2026

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

[Senate Hearing 119-521]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-521

 ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE:
 ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH
 NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS

=======================================================================

 FIELD HEARING

 before the

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME, 
 AND FISHERIES

 of the

 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 FEBRUARY 28, 2026

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
 Transportation

 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov

 ______
 

 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-582 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026

 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware

 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director

 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME, AND FISHERIES

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware, 
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio GARY PETERS, Michigan
TIM SHEEHY, Montana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page
Hearing held on February 28, 2026................................ 1
Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 1
 Article dated December 29, 2025 from The Wall Street Journal 
 entitled, ``China's Push to Master the Arctic Opens an 
 Alarming Shortcut to U.S.'' by Daniel Michaels and Sune 
 Engle Rasmussen............................................ 5

 Witnesses

Hon. Mike Sfraga, Interim Chancellor, University of Alaska, 
 Fairbanks; former U.S. Arctic Ambassador and former Chair, U.S. 
 Arctic Research Commission..................................... 11
Randy ``Church'' Kee, Director, Ted Stevens Center for Arctic 
 Security Studies............................................... 13
General Joe Ralston, USAF (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint 
 Chiefs of Staff; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; former 
 Commander, U.S. European Command; and former Commander; U.S. 
 Alaska Command................................................. 15
 Prepared statement........................................... 16
Joy Baker, Port Director, City of Nome, Alaska................... 18
Steve White, Executive Director, The Marine Exchange of Alaska... 20
 Prepared statement........................................... 22

 
 ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE:
 ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH
 NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS

 ---------- 

 SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2026

 U.S. Senate,
 Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and 
 Fisheries,
 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
 Anchorage, AK.
 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., AKST, 
at the University of Alaska Anchorage, Hon. Dan Sullivan, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
 Present: Senator Sullivan.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

 Senator Sullivan. I sincerely hoped that the concerted 
diplomatic efforts of the U.S. Government with Iran would have 
borne fruit to avoid conflict. That has not happened. For 
almost 50 years, the terrorist regime in Iran waged war against 
the U.S., responsible for wounding and killing thousands of 
American servicemembers during this time. Thoughts and prayers 
this morning are first and foremost with our brave military 
members in the Middle East, who are undertaking very injurious 
duty. It is my hope that their heroic efforts can bring about 
an end to the Iran-sponsored violence and terrorism that has 
plagued the region for almost a half century.
 One final point. Yesterday I once again called on Senator 
Schumer and my Senate Democratic colleagues to fully fund the 
Department of Homeland Security, including our Coast Guard, 
FEMA, and TSA. That call is more urgent than ever, now that we 
have the risk of Iran terrorist retaliation across the globe 
and here in the United States.
 But we are not focused on those issues, despite their 
importance this morning. We are focused on security here in 
Alaska, the Arctic. I want to thank all of you for being here 
as we examine one of the most consequential national security 
challenges facing our country, whether the United States is 
making the right infrastructure and force posture investments 
to secure our Arctic and North Pacific approaches in an era of 
great power competition.
 Let me set the stage. During some of our Nation's most 
existential crises, like World War II and the Cold War, Alaska 
played an immensely important role in defending our country. 
When we won the Cold War something dangerous began to happen. 
The Pentagon's understanding of the importance of Alaska began 
to face. Bases closed. Armories shuttered across Western 
Alaska. Alaska drifted from strategic cornerstone to strategic 
backwater in the eyes of many in the Pentagon.
 I saw this national security amnesia about our great state 
firsthand when I arrived in the Senate in 2015. The Arctic then 
was considered a strategic backwater. The Obama administration, 
when I joined the Senate in 2015, announced plans to cut 40,000 
active-duty Army forces, including a 5,000 strong 425 at JBER, 
the only airborne brigade combat team in the entire Asia 
Pacific.
 Just a few years later, the Coast Guard announced it had 
plans to reduce its presence and footprint in Alaska. In 
countless hearings and meetings and provisions in the National 
Defense Authorization, putting holds on the confirmation of 
senior military and civilian officials, and of course, 
engagements from so many Alaskans in communities throughout our 
state, who knew our history, and voiced strong opposition 
against military cuts in our state, we have changed the 
dynamic.
 We are now undergoing the largest military buildup and 
expansion, billions of dollars in investment, in Alaska since 
World War II. The 425 at JBER has expanded into the Army's 11th 
Airborne Division, now fully centered in our state. Eielson was 
not shuttered but is now home to two squadrons of F-35s, and 
when combined with the two squadrons of F-22s here at JBER, 
gives Alaska over 100 fifth-generation fighters. No place on 
the Planet Earth has that kind of fifth-gen combat-coded 
firepower.
 Our role as the cornerstone of missile defense, literally 
protecting the whole country, is expanding significantly, 
particularly in the interior. A billion-dollar, long-range 
discrimination radar system finalized, the clear Golden Dome 
Initiative, which is in the Working Families Tax Cuts Act, has 
a downpayment of $25 billion.
 Ted Stevens Center for the Arctic, which I was able to get 
into an NDAA bill a few years ago, with over 60 dedicated 
veterans at JBER, has rapidly become one of the world's premier 
national security think tanks.
 The infrastructure we need in Alaska to project American 
power is expanding. The half-a-billion-dollar investment in a 
brand-new runway at JBER, $400 million to start the building of 
the deepwater strategic port in Nome, the Working Families Tax 
Cuts Act $115 million to start reopening the Navy base at Adak, 
one of the most strategic places in the Indo-Pacific.
 None of this is including the historic Coast Guard 
investments we are making in Alaska. But are we doing enough? 
That is the question this hearing will focus on today. My 
belief is we are doing a lot, but we need to do more. The 
Arctic is a strategic front line of the defense of the American 
homeland. Nowhere is the need for sustained investment clearer 
than here in Alaska, America's only Arctic state. We are seeing 
the importance of the Arctic play out in real time, 
particularly from our near-peer adversaries, China and Russia.
 Take a look at this chart right here. Russia continues to 
expand and modernize its Arctic footprint--deepwater ports, 
airfields, radar systems, and forward operating bases--let 
alone 54 icebreakers, many of which are nuclear and weaponized. 
China, despite having no Arctic territory, calls itself a near-
Arctic state, and is rapidly expanding its polar capabilities.
 [The information referred to follows:]

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 Over the past few years, joint Russian and Chinese naval 
and air operations have occurred off Alaska's coastline with 
increasing frequency and sophistication. Let's take a look at 
this chart. By the way, we had a Russian incursion just 10 days 
ago, so that is a new one. But the very significant and 
unprecedented element of this chart are the green examples of 
incursions either into our water or our airspace. The green are 
joint Russian-Chinese strategic bomber or naval task force 
operations. That is not happening anywhere else in America. 
Only in Alaska.
 And I would like to submit this article for the record. 
Without objection.
 [The information referred to follows:]

 December 29, 2025

 The Wall Street Journal

 China's Push to Master the Arctic Opens an Alarming Shortcut to U.S.

 By Daniel Michaels and Sune Engle Rasmussen

 Chinese research submarines for the first time traveled thousands 
of feet beneath the Arctic ice this summer, a technical feat with 
chilling military and commercial implications for America and its 
allies.
 U.S. national-security officials say the Chinese undersea 
expeditions offer fresh evidence of a growing threat from China in the 
Arctic region, known as the High North. This year, Chinese military and 
research vessels have operated around Alaska's Arctic waters in 
unprecedented numbers, the Dept. of Homeland Security reported in 
November.
 For China, mastery of Arctic travel could yield valuable data about 
the natural resources awaiting below melting ice caps, significantly 
reduce travel time for commercial shipping and position nuclear-armed 
submarines closer to potential targets, including the U.S., say Western 
marine strategists and military officials.
 ``The Chinese are being more and more aggressive'' across the High 
North, said U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the top military 
leader of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Chinese vessels on 
research missions often give cover to military purposes, he said.
 China has declared itself a ``near-Arctic power,'' an informal 
designation Beijing hopes will place it alongside the U.S. and Russia. 
China's Foreign Ministry says its activities in the Arctic are 
reasonable and lawful, ``contributing to the maintenance and promotion 
of peace, stability, and sustainable development in the region.''
 Beijing views future sea routes through the High North as a 
shortcut for global commerce, a so-called Polar Silk Road. China this 
summer sent a cargo ship to the Polish port of Gdansk by skirting the 
North Pole, a route twice as fast as travel times using the Suez Canal. 
Chinese officials have said they plan to expand trans-Arctic cargo 
traffic with Russia, particularly imports of liquefied natural gas.
 During the Cold War, the Arctic marked a front line dividing NATO 
members and Moscow. Its waters offered Russia gateways to the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans, which the U.S. and its allies closely patrolled 
until the early 1990s--and are now policing again.
 Arctic waters provide a military advantage because of the North 
Pole's proximity to other nations. The U.S. in 1959 sent the world's 
third nuclear submarine there to pop up from under ice, delivering a 
potent warning to the Kremlin. Moscow reciprocated in 1962. Today, the 
two rivals are again dispatching submarines on Arctic exercises.
 Tensions over the High North, renewed by Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine, are being amplified by China's reach. The U.S. and its allies 
expect Beijing will be able to send armed submarines to the North Pole 
within a few years. China already has military-grade surface vessels in 
the Arctic region while expanding its fleet of ice-breaking ships.
 The U.S. and allies are training more Arctic troops in response to 
new dangers. They have beefed up sub-hunting patrols out of Iceland and 
other locations. President Trump struck a shipbuilding deal with 
Finland to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet and has pressured Denmark 
into expanding defenses on and around Greenland.
 Grynkewich in December put NATO members Denmark, Sweden and Finland 
under the alliance's Atlantic and Arctic command to bolster the defense 
of the High North, citing ``the alignment of our adversaries.''
 Chinese and Russian military planes last year flew patrols near 
Alaska for the first time, with Chinese long-range bombers operating 
from a Russian air base.
 Such cooperation not only gives China new abilities to strike North 
America but raises the prospect of a joint attack by America's most 
powerful adversaries, Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot, commander of the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command, or Norad, told Congress in 
April.
`Basically warships'
 China in 2015 updated its national-security law to include 
defending national interests in polar regions, seeking unfettered 
access to new sea lanes and resources, said Ryan Martinson, an 
associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime 
Studies Institute. There is much evidence, he said, that China's goal 
is to conduct naval operations in the Arctic Ocean.
 Beijing says its commercial and research vessels in Arctic waters 
are peaceful. That was accurate until recently, according to Rob Bauer, 
a retired Dutch admiral who served as one of NATO's top military 
officials until this year. Beijing, in addition to staging joint air 
patrols with Russia, is now sailing coast guard vessels that resemble 
frigates near the Alaska coast, he said.
 ``They're basically warships, but they're painted white,'' Bauer 
said. Joint patrols with Russian navy ships indicate China's aim is 
gaining military advantage, he said, not coastal security. When more 
ice melts along international waterways in the High North, the same 
shortcuts used by commercial vessels could speed China's navy into the 
Atlantic, he said.
 Arctic travel by Beijing's commercial and scientific vessels 
benefits China's navy by gaining experience and data about a region 
relatively new to its military leaders. China's policies merge its 
civilian and military spheres, aiming to strengthen its armed forces 
through collaboration with universities, research institutions and 
defense companies.
 Beijing's polar exploration echoes its military expansion in the 
South China Sea. China launched research expeditions and published 
academic papers about the region almost 20 years ago. In 2013, Beijing 
used what it learned to begin building artificial islands that now hold 
military air bases, according to intelligence officials from the U.S. 
and Pacific allies.
 In the Arctic, the U.S. and NATO worry most about subsea warfare. 
Submarine navigation relies on detailed knowledge of ocean-floor 
topography and undersea conditions. China is cataloging the world's 
oceans to build computer models to guide submarines and help them evade 
detection, military experts say.
 ``China doesn't field the world's largest fleet of oceanographic 
survey ships because they want to save the whales,'' said Hunter 
Stires, a naval strategist who until this year advised the Secretary of 
the Navy. ``China aims to take the lead in marine and climate science 
because understanding the ocean and the climate is a critical enabler 
to success in naval operations, particularly in anti-submarine 
warfare.''
 U.S. analysts say data China gathered from its Arctic dives north 
of Alaska and Greenland isn't just about studying climate change, as 
Beijing's state news agency reports, but also to educate the Chinese 
navy, which operates relatively noisy submarines that are easily 
tracked by U.S. forces.
 Arctic ice impedes airborne submarine detection that works in other 
oceans. Water temperature layers and changing salinity from melting ice 
interfere with sonar. Icebergs colliding and the chatter of marine 
mammals generate sounds that complicate submarine detection. 
Information gathered on Chinese Arctic voyages enables its scientists 
to build computer models of undersea conditions, which its navy can 
later tap to plot routes allowing them to operate more freely in the 
open sea.
 China's ultimate aim, said Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command, is to end ``American undersea dominance,'' he told a 
conference in Canada in 2024. To help Beijing reach that goal, Paparo 
said, ``I expect Russia to provide submarine technology.''
Partners of convenience
 Beijing sells Russia electronics and components for military 
equipment Moscow needs to wage its war in Ukraine, and ships civilian 
products restricted by international sanctions over the war.
 Western military officials believe Russia is repaying China's help, 
in part, by sharing advanced technologies in space, stealth aircraft 
and undersea warfare. Russia's nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed 
submarines, and its agility in deploying them, have kept the country a 
superpower, despite its economic decline since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union.
 China is already mastering other complex naval domains. It now 
deploys three aircraft carriers, among the most demanding surface 
warships to build, manage and deploy effectively. Only the U.S. has 
more.
 Both Beijing and the U.S. are short of vessels capable of 
navigating thick Arctic ice compared with Russia, which has more than 
40. China last year commissioned its fifth icebreaker. The U.S. has 
only two such vessels in operation, and Trump is buying more.
 After years of development, China launched its first domestically 
built icebreaker in 2019 with Finnish help. Last year, it built and 
deployed its first domestically designed icebreaker in 10 months, a 
swift accomplishment noted with worry in Arctic countries.
 Russia also has advocated for greater Chinese involvement in 
governance of the High North and invited China to develop 
infrastructure in Arctic Russia. The two nations created a working 
group in 2023 to develop northern sea routes. They agreed to coordinate 
Arctic maritime law-enforcement, initiated by their recent joint 
patrols.
 ``China wants to shape rules before they are settled,'' said David 
Cattler, a former U.S. intelligence officer and NATO Assistant 
Secretary-General for intelligence and security. ``Early presence 
shapes future influence.''
 China's expanding presence and influence in the Arctic helps Russia 
now, but it might prove to be a problem for Moscow later, Western 
military officials said. Since the Cold War, the Arctic has offered 
Russia a remote sanctuary for much of its nuclear arsenal. Until now, 
only the U.S. could seriously threaten Russian bases or military assets 
there.
 Chinese vessels operating north of Russia could complicate matters 
for Moscow, especially if the national interests of the two countries 
diverge and the current ``no-limits partnership'' breaks down. 
``Chinese operations in the High North are as direct a challenge to 
Russia as to any other power,'' Stires said.
 For now, Western countries are the ones sounding the alarm about 
China's naval advance in the Arctic.
 French Adm. Pierre Vandier, who oversees NATO's efforts to prepare 
for future warfare, sees the possibility of China's navy sailing from 
the Pacific to the Atlantic over the Arctic, bypassing more easily 
observed and defended routes through the Suez or Panama canals or 
around South Africa.
 ``For all of us, for NATO and the U.S., it means the threat that is 
in the Pacific is ubiquitous,'' Vandier said in an interview. ``If we 
have Asian forces in the Atlantic, it would be a huge game-changer. And 
we need to be prepared for that.''

 Senator Sullivan. This is a Wall Street Journal article, 
written on December 29, about China's push to master the Arctic 
Ocean, an alarming shortcut to the U.S. This article, in part, 
said, quote, ``For China, mastery of Arctic travel can yield 
valuable data about the natural resources awaiting below 
melting ice caps, significantly reducing travel time for 
commercial shipping, and positioning nuclear-armed submarines 
closer to potential targets, including the U.S.''
 The Chinese are being more and more aggressive across the 
High North. U.S. Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, the top 
leader of NATO, said Chinese vessels on research missions, 
which we had off the coast of Alaska, literally all summer, 
last summer, often give cover for military purposes, and that 
is what we know the Chinese were doing off the coast of our 
state this past summer.
 These activities are deliberate. They test our readiness, 
our response time, and our resolve. The question before us is 
simple: do we have the posture to deter them? If not, what 
platforms are required? What if is required?
 Let me begin with the Navy. Strategic hinge between the 
Arctic and Indo-Pacific runs through the Aleutian Island chain. 
This is a slide that depicts where our Navy has been investing, 
and it is significant. If you look in the central avenue of 
approach, billions and billions of dollars. But the northern 
avenue of approach, which is much quicker, where all the 
activity is in terms of aircraft, in terms of shipping, in 
terms of undersea cables, has almost nothing in terms of 
infrastructure.
 The strategic hinge, as I mentioned, in the Arctic is the 
Aleutian Islands. Adak sits at that hinge. If you look on this 
map, again, the $115 million tag, but we were able to get a 
budget reconciliation bill to reopen Adak. When the Naval Air 
Facility at Adak was closed in the 1990s, our assumptions about 
the security environment changed. The geography did not. 
Forward naval presence at Adak would dramatically reduce 
transit times into the Bering Sea and Arctic approaches, 
increase on-station time for surface ships, submarines, and 
maritime patrol craft, and strengthen anti-submarine warfare 
surveillance and rapid crisis response. As noted, we were able 
to get a start of $115 million, forward basing at Adak. It is 
not about nostalgia for an old base. It is about credible 
deterrence. Presence prevents crisis. Absence invites testing.
 We are undertaking an exciting example of rebuilding a 
military base in our state that is going to involve the private 
sector, the Aleut Corporation, the State of Alaska, which has 
already put in $30 million to repave the runways, and all 
services--Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and the 
Army. That is happening. Senior-level Pentagon officials have 
put forward a task force, beyond just the Navy, to reopen this 
very important base.
 Just as the Pentagon did not downsize in Alaska's plan, the 
Coast Guard didn't either. They made sure of that by putting a 
hold on the confirmation of the Commandant of the Coast Guard 
when they had plans to reduce their presence in Alaska, and I 
said, ``Admiral, you need to provide a plan to increase your 
presence in Alaska, or you will not get confirmed.'' So he did 
that. We are now expanding, with hundreds of millions of 
dollars, in so many communities across our great state. 
Investments in Kodiak, Ketchikan, Seward, Sitka, Valdez, 
Petersburg.
 But here is the really exciting thing with regard to the 
Coast Guard. The Working Families Tax Cuts Act included the 
largest investment in the Coast Guard in American history, $25 
million. As the Chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, I was 
honored to write a lot of this. Here is what it entails: 16 new 
icebreakers, 22 new cutters, 40 new helicopters, $4.5 billion 
in shore-side infrastructure, $300 million for Juneau to 
homeport the icebreaker Storis in Alaska, the first icebreaker 
ever homeported in the state with the ice. Imagine that.
 This funding is a result of years of sustained advocacy 
across four administrations, but we are not done. I recently 
chaired a Coast Guard Subcommittee hearing with the Commandant 
of the Coast Guard. When I asked about potential for more 
icebreakers being homeported in Alaska, he responded by saying 
that the Coast Guard is considering homeporting up to four more 
icebreakers in our great state. That is exciting.
 And what else is exciting about the buildup of the Coast 
Guard, in Alaska it is spurring some of the most exciting 
economic activity we have seen in years, a boom in shipbuilding 
and heavy maintenance activity throughout our state, from 
Kodiak to Seward to Ketchikan. Even Wrangell is now looking at 
a major shipbuilding operation. This is exciting. Literally 
hundreds and hundreds of new paying jobs have expanded in our 
state, with room to grow as we get more ships from the Coast 
Guard and NOAA.
 But ships alone are not enough. Without forward logistics 
hubs, deep-draft ports, maintenance capacity, and operational 
staging areas, cutters and naval vessels spend too much time 
transiting from the Lower 48. This is where Nome comes in. The 
Port of Nome is poised to become the United States first 
deepwater port in the Arctic, a critical asset for national 
security, Arctic logistics, and regional economic development. 
As sea routes become more accessible and vessel traffic through 
the Bering Strait increases, the absence of a deepwater port 
north of Dutch Harbor has been a glaring strategic gap for our 
country, and certainly for our state. Nome will serve as a 
forward staging hub for the Coast Guard and the Navy, 
strengthening maritime domain awareness, and improving response 
times for research and rescue in environmental emergencies.
 Just take a look. You can see there on what our current 
NORTHCOM commander and previous NORTHCOM commander have all 
said about Nome and how important it is. General Guillot, our 
current NORTHCOM commander, said, ``The presence is the best 
form of deterrence in the Arctic. The Port of Nome is a game 
changer for operations in the Arctic.''
 Similar, the former NORTHCOM commander, General VanHerck, 
said, ``An Arctic port north of Anchorage capable of 
accommodating large naval surface combatants and polar security 
cutters would provide significant benefits to the maritime 
homeland defense mission of USNORTHCOM. I would reiterate the 
need for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, and I fully support the 
Army Corps of Engineers' plan to build a port at Nome.''
 By the way, just take a look at this map. It is something 
else that is a little frustrating as Alaskans. You see the 
Eastern Seaboard of the United States. There are big strategic 
ports everywhere up and down, but not in our state. We do not 
have anything along the entire western part of Alaska. Well, 
that is going to change with the Port of Nome. And we are 
excited about all the work that we have done, Joy and others. 
We have been able to expedite the feasibility study, and we are 
going to start building it this summer.
 I also want to do a shout-out to my staff, my excellent 
staff. Where is Scott? Scott Leathard, he very brilliantly got 
in an infrastructure bill that we got through the Senate a cost 
share change, just for Alaska, from 65/35--that's a 65, the 
state or local communities pay 35--to 90/10, for all Alaska 
infrastructure projects. I have got a really great staff. That 
has saved our state and local communities literally hundreds of 
millions of dollars, going 90/10 on infrastructure matches, 
which is just fantastic for Alaska.
 When we talk about the Arctic we do so in terms of 
strategic importance, transportation routes, and the wealth of 
resources in this part of the world. But here is something that 
is often left out in the debates--the people, how investing in 
the Arctic could be more transformative for the brilliant 
people who live in the Arctic, otherwise known as Alaskans.
 Deepwater port Nome will transform the area. It will 
support more than 50 surrounding communities, many of them 
Alaska Native communities facing some of the highest costs of 
goods in the country. It will lower the cost of goods and 
services, including for fuel, and provide enormous economic 
opportunities to the area, including good-paying jobs.
 Arctic security requires an integrated architecture--the 
Navy forward presence at Adak, the modernized and expanded 
Coast Guard icebreaker fleets, deep-draft port infrastructure 
at Nome and other places. Joint operational integration of air, 
sea, and surveillance assets across Alaska.
 The Arctic is growing in global importance--strategically, 
economically, and militarily. We want to deter aggression, 
protect American sovereignty, increase our economic 
opportunities, and maintain stability in the High North. Our 
infrastructure and force posture must reflect this operational 
reality. The United States is an arctic nation because of 
Alaska. It is time our investments fully reflect that fact.
 One final point. I mentioned that the engagement of Alaskan 
communities is so important. We, all of us, have made huge 
differences. The Tiger Team in Fairbanks kept the dial center 
open. When the 425 was threatened with closure, the colonel in 
charge of going around the country to hear from communities 
came back to me after visiting every community in America where 
they were looking to cut these 40,000 troops. He just walked in 
my office, shaking his head, saying, ``Senator, I have never 
seen anything like it. Everywhere I went in Alaska, giant 
turnout, bands, marching bands, everybody for the troops.'' And 
that unit, the only place in the country he saw that.
 We have made a difference. That is why having an official 
Senate field hearing in Alaska is so important. The idea here 
is we are bringing the Senate to all of you, so you don't have 
to travel 5,000 miles to D.C. And finally, it is also an 
opportunity to showcase our deep knowledge--our deep 
knowledge--from our own fellow Alaskans.
 This brings me to the introduction of our witnesses today, 
five of the world's foremost experts on Arctic national 
security and infrastructure issues. You saw, in that final 
slide, all the different articles that are happening with 
regard to the Arctic, and that is just a sampling. But there is 
an awakening, and that is good news. But what is really good 
news is that in our state we have some of the foremost 
knowledge on these issues. Five of them are here today, with 
some in the audience, like Mead Treadwell.
 So I want to welcome our witnesses, and let me quickly 
introduce each one.
 Ambassador Mike Sfraga, Interim Chancellor of the 
University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and the Nation's first 
Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs. Ambassador Sfraga is a 
three-time Presidential appointee, former Chair of the U.S. 
Arctic Research Commission, a Fulbright Scholar, and a 
recognized leader in Arctic policy, security, and international 
affairs, with nearly four decades of experience working on 
Arctic issues. Welcome, Ambassador.
 Next we have Major General Randy ``Church'' Kee, U.S. Air 
Force (retired). He is the Director of the Ted Stevens Center 
for Arctic Security Studies. General Kee leads the Department 
of Defense's newest regional center focused on Arctic security 
cooperation. He previously served 30 years in the Air Force, 
culminating his military career as a two-star general and 
Director of Strategy, Policy, Planning, and Capabilities at 
U.S. European Command. General, welcome.
 General Joe Ralston, U.S. Air Force (retired). One of my 
favorite people in the whole world. Vice Chairman of the Cohen 
Group, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, probably the coolest guy in 
the U.S. military, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO Commander, 
Commander of European Command. Hundreds of combat missions in 
Vietnam. General Ralston brings decades of senior military 
leadership experience and deep expertise in trans-Atlantic and 
global security matters.
 Next, another favorite of mine, Ms. Joy Baker, Port 
Director of the City of Nome, Alaska. Joy has more than 34 
years of public service with the City of Nome, including 
serving as Harbor Master, Special Projects Master, and Port 
Director. She recently returned from retirement--thank you--to 
help lead the transformational expansion of the Port of Nome 
into a deep-draft Arctic port, for our Nation's security.
 And finally, Captain Steve White, Coast Guard Captain Steve 
White, Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska. 
Captain White joined the Marine Exchange in 2021, after a 31-
year Coast Guard career, where his final assignment was Sector 
Commander and Captain of the Port for Southeast Alaska. He 
brings extensive operational and maritime domain awareness 
experience across Alaska and beyond.
 To our witnesses, thank you. Thank you for your decades of 
service, the amount of service to our country here is in the 
hundreds of years, and I am very much looking forward to each 
of you delivering your opening statement. You will be 
recognized for five minutes, and a longer statement can appear 
in the record if you would like that.
 So why don't we begin with you, Ambassador Sfraga, for your 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE SFRAGA, INTERIM CHANCELLOR

 OF UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, FAIRBANKS; FORMER U.S.

 ARCTIC AMBASSADOR AND FORMER CHAIR, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH 
 COMMISSION

 Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Chairman 
Sullivan. Thank you for convening this important hearing. I am 
Mike Sfraga. I am the Interim Chancellor at the University of 
Alaska Fairbanks.
 My central message today is Arctic infrastructure and 
Alaska infrastructure are national security imperatives, as you 
noted, Senator, and Alaska sits at this nexus of domestic and 
foreign policy. I think that is often overlooked and should be 
injected into everything we talk about in terms of Alaska and 
the new Arctic. National Security, homeland security, economic 
security, energy security, mineral and resource security, and 
community security all rely on robust, integrated, well-
resourced Arctic infrastructure.
 A tall order, maybe even more complicated by the Arctic's 
harsh and changing landscape. Ports, maritime access, 
icebreakers, communication systems, logistics nodes, research 
platforms are not simply economic assets. They are the 
foundation of American presence and sovereignty. These 
foundational principles are described in the White House's 
recently published in America's Maritime Action Plan.
 If there is a focal point for Arctic maritime 
infrastructure investment I believe it is in the Bering Strait 
region. Consider the Port of Nome, as you have done, Senator. 
The Port of Nome is strategically significant because it is the 
closest U.S. port to the highly transited Bering Strait, and it 
is being developed to become our Nation's first deep-draft 
American port.
 As we look to address the increase in Arctic shipping and 
increases in coordinated Russian and Chinese military 
operations in the region, we should reconceptualize the Port of 
Nome, and I believe we should be thinking about a port complex, 
co-locating various Federal, state, and local agencies, 
monitoring vessels, supporting research, and enabling economic 
development. Aggregating such resources in one location is in 
our national and state interest, and just like Arctic Legos--
Arctic Legos--it builds on existing infrastructure footprints 
to leverage missions and relationships and reduce costs while 
supporting advanced and expanded capabilities.
 Scientific research and maritime security are mutually 
reinforcing in the Arctic. Research improves forecasting, 
mapping, charting, environmental monitoring, and operational 
awareness, all essential for safe and effective maritime 
operations. A deeper understanding of the evolving maritime 
domain strengthens the Coast Guard's ability to operate 
effectively and safely. Simply put, Arctic research is a 
foundational pillar of Arctic security. Security in the Arctic 
begins with presence, presence requires access, access requires 
infrastructure.
 Let me leave with eight recommendations, quickly.
 Number one, I think we should adopt an integrated Arctic 
infrastructure strategy, ensure Federal investments in ports, 
icebreakers, communications, and logistics are coordinated 
across agencies and designed for multi-mission use.
 Two, prioritize the Bering Strait region. Advance 
infrastructure development, particularly in Nome, as a 
strategically integrated maritime hub. I would like for us to 
reconceptualize the area of the Bering Strait and think about 
it as the Bering Strait security, economic, and research 
corridor, and the Nome Port as the Nome Port complex.
 Three, revitalize Adak Naval Air Station. Strategically 
located on the Aleutian Islands, as you have indicated, Adak 
affords the United States an unparalleled air and maritime base 
from which we can monitor the region, project power, complement 
existing ports in Alaska, and further build on the long-needed 
string of ports in America's North.
 Number four, plan now for long lead time maritime assets. 
Begin deliberate planning for future icebreaking and shoreside 
capacity to avoid capability gaps later in this decade.
 Number five, embed research and domain awareness in 
infrastructure design. Ensure research capability, charting, 
communications, and monitoring systems are incorporated into 
maritime infrastructure planning.
 Six, sustain whole-of-government coordination. Empower 
coordinating bodies to ensure Arctic investments are 
complementary, fiscally responsible, and strategically 
coherent.
 Number seven, establish a sequenced Arctic infrastructure 
roadmap. Align port development, icebreaker recapitalization, 
communications upgrades, and logistic capabilities and capacity 
within a unified, multiyear strategy.
 And finally, number eight, review, and just review, the 
overlapping yet complementary combatant command structures and 
mission sets, like USNORTHCOM Norad and U.S. Coast Guard Arctic 
District and consider, just consider, a joint command structure 
between USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard where the Arctic 
District maintains responsibility for shoreside activities and 
duties, yet activities and duties that extend beyond that area, 
at a distance to be determined, are coordinated between 
USNORTHCOM and the Arctic District, because of the activities, 
Senator, you have pointed out.
 So in conclusion, the political, physical, economic, 
social, cultural, and security landscapes of the Arctic are 
rapidly changing. The question is not whether the Arctic will 
matter to the United States in the near or the long term. It 
already does. The question before us is whether and how we will 
make deliberate, strategic, systematic, and sustained 
investments in Arctic research and infrastructure at the scale 
necessary to preserve American leadership and presence in the 
region. Through integrated Arctic infrastructure investments, 
the United States can ensure a region that is secure, 
resilient, prosperous, and governed by stability rather than 
uncertainty.
 Infrastructure in the Arctic is not merely concrete and 
steel. It is access. It is presence. It is resilience. It is 
national security.
 I thank you very much for this opportunity to testify, 
Senator.
 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ambassador. That is excellent. 
And the good news is we are starting to take off some of those 
eight recommendations, but we have got a lot more work to do.
 General Kee, sir, the floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF RANDY ``CHURCH'' KEE, DIRECTOR, 
 TED STEVENS CENTER FOR ARCTIC SECURITY STUDIES

 Mr. Kee. Chairman Sullivan and distinguished panelists, in 
particular Ambassador Sfraga, General Ralston, Joy, and Steve, 
thank you for the privilege and opportunity to offer remarks 
today. It is important to recognize the vital necessity to 
align U.S. maritime infrastructure investments with national 
security needs.
 These are reflections from me. Of course, they are based on 
years of experience in Arctic security and defense and not 
necessarily representative within the Pentagon or the 
Department of War.
 However, the recently released National Defense Strategy 
provides the language and suitable framework to address the 
principal focal points of the priority needs, and they are 
directly applicable to this hearing. They are, one, defend the 
homeland; two, deter China in the Indo-Pacific through 
strength, not confrontation; three, increase burden sharing 
with U.S. allies and partners; and four, supercharge the U.S. 
defense industrial base. These are directly tieable to Alaska.
 The NDS clearly states that American interests are under 
threat throughout the Western Hemisphere, including North 
American Arctic. Homeland defense is the Department's stated 
top priority, and deterring China from a position of strength 
starts with the first island chain, but deterrence should 
extend across the depth and breadth of the Pacific.
 Here is where the geography and key training in Alaska is 
inferred in the NDS. Alaska is the top of the Indo-Pacific, the 
northwest corner of the American homeland, and deeply connected 
to the Arctic. As a 30-plus-year veteran of U.S. Air Force 
service, I am reminded daily of the wisdom of the great General 
Billy Mitchell, who in essence highlighted Alaska as the most 
strategic key terrain for the ages.
 Further, the recently released White House Maritime Action 
Plan provides a number of policy and programmatic 
recommendations to revitalize America's lagging capacities in 
shipbuilding, workforce, protecting the maritime industrial 
base, and connecting national security interests, to economic 
security, industrial resilience for maritime communities. These 
are somewhat connected to your reflections, Ambassador Sfraga.
 The specific aspects of the Maritime Action Plan rightly 
key on needed policy actions and are programmatically directly 
related to the topics of this hearing. I can certainly 
elaborate on these in the Q&A, sir.
 Sea Lines of Communication in the U.S. and pan-Arctic 
region are emerging as strategic arteries of national power, 
economic stability, and military mobility, and ensuring the 
freedom of navigation, domain awareness, and credible presence 
along these routes is central to maintaining strategic 
stability and securing U.S. national interests in the high 
latitudes. Infrastructure development and logistical support 
will determine whether the United States can effectively 
operate, protect maritime interests, deter adversaries, and 
uphold sovereignty in this critical region.
 From a strategic economic vantage, it is soon to be the 
Bering Strait is going to be as important as the Straits of 
Malacca. Securing many of America's national interests in the 
Arctic is increasingly defined by the need for ready Coast 
Guard and Department of War forces as well as appropriate 
infrastructure. Competitors and adversaries have invested in 
ice-capable fleets, port infrastructure and logistic networks, 
and surveillance systems designed to establish enduring 
operational reach and create security advantages aligned to 
their interests. We should carefully consider their example.
 The United States currently faces infrastructure challenges 
that constrain operational flexibility. Limited deepwater port 
capacity in Alaska, sparse logistics staging nodes, 
communications, positioning, navigation and timing 
vulnerabilities and insufficient domain awareness 
infrastructure reduce America's ability to protect U.S. 
security interests, defend the homeland, and surge capability 
to and through the Arctic. In a region where distance, extreme 
climatic conditions, and logistics define an operation's 
success, infrastructure is strategically viable.
 In the Arctic, groundwork for future advantage is not laid 
on the battlefield but in ports, airfields, shipping lanes, 
comms tables, cables, satellite coverage, and industrial 
capacity. For the United States this means investment in 
maritime infrastructure and expeditionary forward basing as 
active instruments to deterrence and, in sum, resourcing that 
needs outlined in the White House Maritime Action Plan. Failing 
to build presence and resilience during peace time, seize 
initiative in competition, when outcomes can still be 
influenced at far lower costs and risks than during crisis, 
where historically winning demands brute force investment in 
regardless of the price tag.
 Infrastructure, sir, is the operational enabler, and it is 
required for mission success. Effective maritime operations 
depend on four foundational infrastructure pillars: access, 
sustainment, awareness, and connectivity. This, too, I can 
build out during the Q&A.
 Alaska is America's Arctic. Investments made here serve not 
only local communities but national defense, readiness, and 
allied cooperation. We are NATO's northwest flank. 
Infrastructure in Alaska enables homeland defense in the 
Nation's northern approaches while supporting safety, economic 
activity, and emergency response. Community safety and national 
security are actually mutually reinforcing.
 The Arctic is a strategic maritime center of gravity. 
Infrastructure is the enabling foundation for security, 
defense, safety, and cooperation. Without deliberate, sustained 
investment the United States risks operational disadvantage in 
a region essential to homeland defense and maritime leadership.
 As the United States pursues a strategy of peace through 
strength as an enduring condition of prosperity, in the U.S. 
Arctic such a strategy can be achieved through a well-prepared 
and equipped Joint Force, with the infrastructure that enables 
that Joint Force to deter and dissuade America's adversaries, 
and if deterrence fails, providing the means to defeat such 
adversaries with minimum risk.
 Sir, thank you for the opportunity to present this. I look 
forward to further Q&A. It is a privilege to be a part of this 
conversation.
 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. General Ralston.

 STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOE RALSTON, UASF (RET.),

 FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF;

 FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE; FORMER

 COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND; AND FORMER

 COMMANDER, U.S. ALASKA COMMAND

 General Ralston. Chairman Sullivan, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify at this important hearing. I will make a 
brief statement and submit the remainder of my remarks for the 
record.
 Senator Sullivan. Without objection.
 General Ralston. I have lived in Anchorage for over 20 
years. I had the privilege of serving as Commander of Alaskan 
Command in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
 The Arctic is evolving into a highly contested front in our 
strategic competition with both China and Russia. I want to 
commend you, Senator, for your continued leadership in drawing 
attention to this region's significance, both through holding 
this hearing and for your efforts every day in Congress.
 Given the growing importance of the Arctic to our national 
security, the U.S. must invest in infrastructure that supports 
a credible U.S. presence and strategic deterrence in the 
Arctic. In my opinion, this requires reopening Naval Air 
Facility Adak and establishing a deepwater port in Nome.
 When I was stationed in Alaska I saw firsthand the 
importance of a robust U.S. presence in the High North. Adak 
was a crucial operational hub for U.S. forces and a vital 
forward location for logistics, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The 1995 BRAC decision to decommission Adak was 
part of the post-Cold War realignment and was based on the 
security reality of that era. However, three decades later, 
strategic realities in the Arctic have shifted considerably. 
While the number of incidents fluctuates, as you pointed out, 
the trend is that our principal adversaries increasingly, and 
more aggressively, seek to test America's strategic resolve in 
the region. The growing threat posed by China and Russia and 
the Arctic demands persistent monitoring and a force posture 
capable of rapid response. Adak would strengthen deterrence by 
denial.
 As the westernmost municipality in the U.S.--and Senator, I 
know you know this, but unfortunately I think many of your 
colleagues in Washington don't--Adak is 1,100 nautical miles 
closer to the Taiwan Strait than any of our bases in Hawaii. 
Accordingly, Adak would also bolster U.S. operational readiness 
and enhance our military's ability to rapidly deploy forces to 
respond to any potential conflict in the Pacific.
 With regard to the Port of Nome, as the American shipping 
industry is positioned to soon take advantage of new Arctic 
shipping routes, the Port of Nome can serve as a strategic 
gateway to the Arctic. However, we cannot properly patrol these 
areas and protect U.S. commercial interests if our icebreakers 
are homeported thousands of miles away. For example, in August 
2025, several Chinese research vessels were operating north of 
Utqiagvik. Fortunately, the U.S. icebreaking cutter Healy was 
nearby and could quickly dispatch to observe the research 
vessels. If the Healy, homeported in Seattle, was at homeport, 
it would have taken up to two weeks to get to Arctic waters. 
The Coast Guard has made significant investments to expand the 
U.S. fleet of Arctic security cutters. Developing the Port of 
Nome is a critical opportunity to homeport new icebreakers to 
ensure our access to the Arctic, as demanded by the new 
National Defense Strategy.
 In conclusion, Adak and the Port of Nome are not niche, 
remote facilities. They are strategic fulcrums that sit at the 
intersection of the Arctic, North Pacific, and Indo-Pacific 
operating areas. Arctic security cannot be effectively managed 
from outside of the region. A permanent presence is required to 
ensure we have military capability, where we need it, when we 
need it. It would also extend homeland defenses to the Arctic 
and to the residents of Alaska, who are increasingly concerned 
by the unprecedented intrusions of our adversaries in their 
backyard.
 Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look 
forward to questions.
 [The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

 Prepared Statement of General Joseph Ralston (USAF, ret.) Vice 
 Chairman, The Cohen Group
Introduction
 Chairman Sullivan, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this 
important hearing to examine the United States' security infrastructure 
in the Arctic.
 I have lived in Anchorage for over 20 years and served as Commander 
of Alaska Command from 1992 to 1994. Throughout my 38 years of military 
service, I also had the privilege to serve as Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander 
of U.S. European Command.
 In light of the growing importance of the Arctic region to our 
national security, I believe the Nation needs to invest in military 
infrastructure that can more readily respond to threats. I strongly 
recommend the Department reopen Naval Air Facility Adak and establish a 
deep-water port capability in Nome. Together, these assets would help 
to re-establish a capable and credible U.S. presence in the Arctic that 
supports strategic deterrence, operational readiness, and enhanced 
maritime domain awareness. It also is fully consistent with the 
National Defense Strategy issued last month, which states that the 
Department ``must guarantee U.S. military and commercial access'' to 
the Arctic.
Naval Air Facility Adak
 As Commander, Alaska Command, I saw firsthand the importance of a 
robust U.S. presence in the High North both as a means of projecting 
power and deterring our adversaries. During the Cold War, Adak served 
as a crucial operational hub for U.S. forces supporting air defense and 
anti-submarine missions, as well as providing vital forward location 
for logistics, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The BRAC-1995 decision 
to decommission Adak as part of the post-Cold War realignment was based 
on the security reality of that era. Three decades later, strategic 
realities in the Arctic have shifted considerably and demand that our 
Nation act to meet the new reality.
 The rapid increase in military exercises and coast guard patrols by 
China and Russia separately and jointly enhance their abilities to 
project power and challenge U.S. interests in the Arctic. While the 
number of incidents fluctuates, the trend is that our principal 
adversaries increasingly and more aggressively seek to test the 
boundaries of America's strategic resolve. In 2021, PLA Navy ships 
including a guided missile cruiser and destroyer passed less than 50 
miles from the Aleutians, and in 2022 and 2023, larger joint Russian/
Chinese naval patrols did the same. In July 2024, Russian and Chinese 
nuclear-capable bombers for the first time conducted combined air 
operations near Alaska. While American and Canadian fighter jets 
intercepted the bombers, this intrusion, along with the joint naval 
patrols, reflect a troubling trend and a new geopolitical reality. 
These expanding intrusions cannot be counteracted by episodic 
deployments. The growing threat posed by China and Russia demands 
persistent sensing and monitoring, with a force posture capable of 
rapid response enabled by enhanced operational infrastructure in 
forward locations. An operational base at Adak would strengthen 
deterrence by denial.
 The strategic value of reasserting a U.S. force presence at Adak is 
not limited to our interests in the Arctic. These investments would 
have considerable, and often overlooked, implications for our 
operational readiness in the Indo-Pacific. Adak is the westernmost 
municipality in the U.S. and, as Senator Sullivan has pointed out on 
several occasions, is 1,100 nautical miles closer to the Taiwan Strait 
than Hawaii. Looking to Europe, Adak is also closer to NATO's northern 
border with Russia than are Air Combat Command's bases on the U.S. East 
Coast. Proximity matters. Adak and additional infrastructure along the 
Aleutian Chain would enhance our military's ability to rapidly deploy 
forces to respond to any conflict in the Pacific or northern Europe.
 The immediate threats to our military assets in Guam and Okinawa in 
the event of open hostilities with China are well documented. Adak 
could function as a secluded rearguard for both resupply and 
rearmament. INDOPACOM's recent Northern Edge warfighting exercise, 
which used Adak as a staging ground, clearly displayed Alaska's ability 
to support the projection of U.S. military assets into the Indo-
Pacific. That potential capability and operational range are key 
reasons why the INDOPACOM Commander has called for the reopening of 
Adak.
Port of Nome
 The Port of Nome is a strategic gateway to the Arctic. 
Infrastructure upgrades will better position it to protect American 
commercial, scientific, and security interests. The American shipping 
industry is positioned to soon take advantage of new Arctic shipping 
routes. We cannot protect and assist American companies in the Arctic 
if current and future icebreakers are homeported thousands of miles 
away.
 China continues to expand its commercial and scientific 
exploration, which often is cover for military intelligence activities, 
into the Arctic as northern sea routes become more accessible and 
present new avenues for movement. In August 2025, five Chinese research 
vessels were operating in the U.S. Arctic north of Utqiagvik, including 
over the U.S. Arctic Extended Continental Shelf, which is seabed 
claimed by the United States. Fortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard 
icebreaking cutter Healy was nearby conducting a patrol and could 
quickly dispatch to observe two of the research vessels. If the Healy 
had been near its homeport in Seattle, nearly 2,000 nautical miles 
away, it could have taken up to two weeks to reach Arctic waters. We 
cannot adequately monitor and respond to adversarial operations if we 
cannot quickly deploy required capabilities to the region, especially 
as new icebreakers join the fleet in the next few years.
 The Coast Guard has made significant investments for new Arctic 
Security Cutters through the U.S.-Finland Icebreaker Agreement and the 
ICE Pact. Developing the Port of Nome is a critical opportunity to 
homeport the new icebreakers near where they will operate to ensure 
unfettered and rapid access to support U.S. military and commercial 
access to the Arctic as demanded by the new National Defense Strategy.
Conclusion
 Adak and the Port of Nome are not niche, remote facilities. They 
are strategic fulcrums that sit at the intersection of the Arctic, 
North-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific operating areas. Arctic security cannot 
be effectively managed from outside of the region. Enhanced permanent 
presence is required to ensure we have military capability where we 
need it, when we need it. It also signals a commitment to our allies, 
partners, and, above all, the residents of Alaska who are increasingly 
concerned by the unprecedented intrusions of our adversaries in their 
backyard. Together, Adak and Nome would enhance regional maritime 
domain awareness and surveillance capabilities while enabling rapid 
responses to encroaching military and other threatening activities.
 As a result of Senator Sullivan's ongoing leadership and advocacy 
on this issue, Congress has already provided a down payment to enhance 
and modernize our military posture in the Arctic. Congress has 
appropriated $115 million for the redevelopment of existing Arctic 
infrastructure to improve the operational capabilities of INDOPACOM and 
better our homeland defense. The redevelopment of these facilities 
should take place in close coordination with state and local 
stakeholders, including Alaska's native communities.
 Investments in maritime and aviation support infrastructure, to 
include Adak's existing runways, would help to realize near-term 
logistics and sustainment benefits by cutting down deployment times, 
fuel costs, and wear on military assets. Further investments in the 
Port of Nome will ensure our icebreakers have a homeport that meets our 
operational requirement to deploy rapidly to the Arctic. Going forward, 
additional investments to upgrade ISR, command-and-control, and 
communications capabilities would significantly enhance our readiness 
in the Arctic.
 Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. Thank you for your 
service. I would add, you mentioned a lot of my colleagues 
don't know it is 1,100 miles closer in terms of Adak from 
Hawaii. I would say a lot of admirals and generals don't know 
that either, which is part of our oversight role, as you know, 
in the Senate.
 Next we have Ms. Baker. The floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF JOY BAKER, PORT DIRECTOR, 
 CITY OF NOME, ALASKA

 Ms. Baker. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for providing to me this opportunity to testify today on behalf 
of the City of Nome. My name is Joy Baker, and I serve as the 
Port Director and Project Manager for the Arctic deep-draft 
port at Nome.
 I will be talking today about the importance of the project 
for Alaska and the Nation. This is an exciting time for the 
project, and honestly, Senator, without your leadership we 
would not be where we are today.
 Before I focus on the importance of the Arctic deep-draft 
port I would like to quickly put the strategic nature of Nome's 
location into perspective. Everyone in this room is familiar 
with General Billy Mitchell's 1935 statement to Congress. I 
believe that in the future whoever holds Alaska will hold the 
world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the 
world.
 His prediction was validated during World War II, when 
Alaska and Nome played a critical logistical role to support 
the lend-lease program and the delivery of military aircraft to 
the Soviet Union. More than 8,000 aircraft were delivered via 
the Alaska-Siberia route.
 Alaska's locational importance continued into the Cold War, 
and when you visit Nome you can still see the White Alice up on 
the summit of Anvil Mountain.
 Today, Nome is proving once again to be vital for U.S. 
national security. The Arctic deep-draft port project in Nome 
is designed to serve as the critical refueling and resupply 
facility in the U.S. Arctic for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 
vessels. Without this vital maritime infrastructure, U.S. 
national security operations in the Arctic will be constrained, 
and the U.S. will fall further behind Russia and China, who are 
operating in the region with increasing persistence.
 As China and Russia continue to escalate activities in the 
Arctic, the U.S. must have a physical, shore-side presence to 
protect the Nation's northwest flank. The solution is the 
construction of America's deep-draft port.
 Since 2011, the Alaska congressional delegation, the State 
of Alaska legislature, the City of Nome, and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers have collaborated toward achieving 
development of the Nation's first Arctic deep-draft port. There 
have been a few bumps along the road, but we are finally moving 
forward into construction this year.
 Mr. Chairman, one of the key milestones in this process was 
the meeting you convened in D.C. three years ago. After hearing 
that interagency miscommunication could jeopardize the basic 
functionality of the project, you brought together Army Corps 
leadership, Navy and Coast Guard technical representatives, and 
the City of Nome to make sure the design of the project would 
support national security missions. The focus of that meeting 
was to get the depth right, minus 40 feet, and we did that, 
with a basin large enough to accommodate heavy polar security 
cutters, Navy destroyers and cruisers, national security 
cutters, and fuel tankers. We walked out of that meeting in 
agreement on those criteria, and the final design of the 
project reflects the priorities to support these national 
security vessels.
 Now it is time to make good on these commitments and 
deliver the Arctic maritime infrastructure necessary to support 
vessel operations in the region. Mr. Chairman, here are my 
recommendations for the next steps needed to advance U.S. 
maritime national security interests in the Arctic.
 Ensure the full construction of the Arctic deep-draft port, 
as originally designed by the Corps and authorized by Congress.
 Begin seasonal Coast Guard operations in Nome to establish 
a U.S. national security presence in the Bering Strait region.
 Develop shore-side infrastructure and capabilities to 
support the national security vessel operations.
 And homeport a new heavy- and medium-class icebreaker in 
Nome.
 These steps will send a much-needed strong message to 
Russia and China that the U.S. is protecting its interests in 
the Arctic region, and Nome is ready to provide these ships 
with a place to refuel, reprovision, and help protect our 
Nation's interests.
 In conclusion, U.S. national security vessel operations 
must be supported through strategically placed coastal marine 
infrastructure adjacent to the Arctic. We need your continued 
leadership and the steadfast support of the Alaska delegation 
to see this project through to completion. Construction of 
Nome's Arctic deep-draft port will strengthen U.S. national 
security interests throughout the Arctic.
 I stand by to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Baker. Captain White. You 
are batting clean up, but that does not mean you are not very 
important.

 STATEMENT OF STEVE WHITE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
 THE MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA

 Mr. White. Ahoy, Senator. Thanks for the opportunity to be 
here. And yes, I could probably throw away all these prepared 
remarks because I think they all just got said by the group, so 
I am going to go off script a little bit, at great risk.
 Yes, I have got about 40 years of experience in the 
maritime, so I am going to shift my comments a little bit to 
talking about what is happening on the water, and maybe why 
these groups and these SAGs and all this traffic is here. It 
was mentioned, all the resources and how rich Alaska is, and 
the fishing, the mining, the oil, the natural resources. That 
is why these other folks are coming up here.
 It is also why it is a transit zone. Our maritime borders 
here, that route you talked about, you called it the Northern 
Route, the Great Circle Traffic Route, it is a shorter route 
from Asia to our western ports. It is full. If we were to look 
at a picture right now, there are all kinds of ships that are 
going on, that we just do not think about on a day to day. 
Alaska is strategically close to some of these actors that are 
coming through here, that Bering Strait's waterway.
 And if you can advance a couple of slides, this waterway 
here is a chokepoint, and when things are going on, like they 
are in Iran, where we have some shipping chokepoints that 
affect the world's, really, economy, this is one of the few 
chokepoints in the world that is going to become more 
significant. It is not just about water opening up with ice but 
the traffic that is coming through this Bering Strait is going 
to increase. You can look at all the routes that come through 
the Arctic, and they all come by this route right here in Nome.
 So it is critically important to Russia. Twenty percent of 
their GDP is coming through the Bering Strait and right through 
our waters. Our traffic, on the U.S. side, it is to support 
what we have going on in the U.S.--research, some tourism, 
fisheries, supporting the communities up there, and of course, 
the military and the Coast Guard that operates there.
 So we need to have investments--I guess I am foot-stomping 
on that--not just in the Coast Guard. It is beyond icebreakers, 
all these needs, with all this traffic and all these ports, to 
serve as governance for the fisheries, for research, for 
protection of our mariners that are out there, is important. 
And I believe that we are not just bringing icebreakers closer 
to ice, we are bringing patrol cutters closer to the fight for 
all these other reasons too. So thank you for your investments 
in that.
 The other thing I can't emphasize enough, these ports, and 
having the right logistics to support the maritime community. I 
pulled in Adak when I was an ensign. There were swimming pools, 
McDonald's, fuel, groceries, everything you needed to patrol 
these waters. And it is just sad. I patrolled in there--I did 
seven tours in Alaska. I did finish up here. I started there. 
And when I pulled in the last time we had more people on the 
ship than we did living in the town, and it was a lot harder to 
get the Schlitz we needed to keep doing the job. So having some 
logistics ports where we can do the missions that we need to, 
to protect the Arctic is very important.
 And I am going to finish with this. The answer is 
collaboration. Mr. Sfraga mentioned it, working with research, 
collaboration between the military and the Coast Guard with the 
locals. Because the people up here in Alaska, they are the 
greatest resource. Forget all the oil and the money and the 
fisheries and all that. Living in seven different places, being 
stationed in seven different places in Alaska--in fact, I 
married a commercial fisherman; she helped steal my heart 
toward this--but I met the fabric of Alaska and the spirit of 
Alaska that makes it work up here. And that collaboration with 
people who have the knowledge and the buy-in, who understand 
how important it is, needs to happen. The military brings a lot 
of Schlitz, but they change out people a lot. They need to 
collaborate better with the people who actually live here and 
have the buy-in to be more effective. That includes the Coast 
Guard.
 And I believe this fullheartedly, that public-private 
partnerships, we can do things faster, we can address these 
capability gaps by working together. So working with academia 
and funding to get that knowledge, but it has got to lead to 
what everybody mentioned here, closing the capabilities gap. We 
do not just need to do research. We need to do research that 
builds capacity. Putting in more military up here, more Coast 
Guard up here, communications infrastructure to close the 
capacity gap if we are going to govern the Arctic.
 We are behind. We have seen what the adversaries have done. 
They have built out the ports. They have built out the 
capabilities. We need to get on it here.
 And thank you for all your work to help with the 
communications equipment up here, help with research. I also 
chair the AOOS board. I know you were instrumental in getting 
more funding for the research community up here during a hard 
time, and all the work you have done with the military and the 
Coast Guard. I will close by saying that.
 I don't think I went over. I am looking at my old boss, 
Admiral Bell, and see if he is giving me a glaring eye yet.
 Yes, these public-private partnerships and the investment 
into the military, the Coast Guard, and programs that leverage 
local knowledge and buy-in should be considered as a quick, 
expedited way to help close some of these infrastructure, 
communication gaps that have been mentioned by everybody here.
 Thank you so much.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Captain Stephen White, U.S. Coast Guard 
 (Retired), Marine Exchange of Alaska
Introduction
 Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I am 
honored to testify today on an issue that is both professionally and 
personally significant to me: the urgent need to align U.S. maritime 
infrastructure with the rapidly evolving Arctic environment. My name is 
Steve White and I serve as the Executive Director of the Marine 
Exchange of Alaska a non-profit maritime organization founded in 2001. 
My testimony today reflects on nearly four decades of experience in the 
maritime domain-31 years in uniform with the U.S. Coast Guard and the 
last several years supporting the maritime community.
 My Coast Guard service took me from the Academy in 1990 to 
assignments across the contiguous United States, overseas, and includes 
seven tours in Alaska patrolling, enforcing laws, and coordinating 
operations in some of the most challenging waters on earth.
 I have patrolled the U.S.-Russia Maritime Boundary Line, operated 
along disputed boundaries with Canada, and served as Incident Commander 
for Operation Arctic Shield. I've chaired international enforcement 
committees, coordinated operations with Canada, Russia, Japan, and 
South Korea, and served in several joint military commands. Later, as 
the Coast Guard Captain of the Port for Southeast Alaska, I learned 
firsthand the power of public-private partnerships; an approach that 
has become essential to safe and sustainable Arctic operations. I 
retired from the service in 2021 and assumed my current role as 
Executive Director of the non-profit Marine Exchange of Alaska where we 
provide the Alaska maritime community with the capability to implement 
agile technological solutions and standards of care to enhance safe 
efficient, secure and environmentally sound maritime operations.
 My experiences around the globe have shown me that Arctic waters 
are far different than other maritime regions. They are environmentally 
rich but fragile, remote, and subject to extreme cold and heavy sea 
conditions. Scarce resources make governing this region and responding 
to marine threats and casualties more challenging than anywhere else in 
the United States. Enabling safe and efficient Maritime Commerce while 
ensuring our fisheries, marine mammals and communities remain viable, 
safe and secure requires a different approach and relies on 
collaboration between Federal, State, Local, Tribal governments and 
partnerships with industry. Increased accessibility to Arctic waters 
introduces increased risk. We need to assess, monitor and manage these 
risks. This includes ensuring timely and accurate environmental data is 
available, modernizing systems to both monitor and communicate with 
mariners as well as increasing our capabilities to respond to emerging 
threats.

 Arctic Maritime Traffic: Maritime activity in the U.S. 
 Arctic is rapidly evolving and steadily increasing as Arctic 
 waters become more accessible for transit. At present, most 
 traffic in the region supports scientific research, oil and gas 
 exploration, and the delivery of goods and materials to remote 
 communities. Tourism has also shown consistent growth. Russia 
 relies heavily on the Bering Strait as a critical corridor for 
 transporting resources essential to its economy. Since the 
 start of the war in Ukraine and the decline of European markets 
 for Russian exports, Russia has shifted significant portions of 
 its trade southward through the Bering Strait to reach markets 
 in East Asia, including China. Other nations, recognizing the 
 Arctic's vast natural resources, are increasing their interest 
 and activity in the region as well. In many ways, the Arctic 
 resembles the ``wild west''-characterized by limited 
 governance, expanding exploration and extraction, and competing 
 territorial and economic claims. Military incursions into the 
 U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by Russia and China, 
 occasionally conducted jointly, have become increasingly 
 common. All of this is unfolding in a region rich in cultural 
 history and home to Indigenous communities that still depend on 
 a subsistence lifestyle to sustain their way of life.

 Dynamic Operating Environment: The region is experiencing 
 changing weather and ice conditions. Violent storms have rocked 
 the region and the reduction in ice coverage is impacting sea 
 conditions. Fisheries and marine mammals are shifting their 
 behavior. Increased traffic has added more human impact to the 
 region and even created conflicts between different user 
 groups. Peer nations are more present than any time in history. 
 The pace of change has not been matched with an equal amount of 
 resources to govern (communications, procedures and 
 enforcement).

 U.S. Arctic Ports: As maritime activity increases in the 
 Arctic, the United States will require significantly expanded 
 logistics capacity to support Coast Guard cutters, Navy 
 vessels, research ships, offshore supply vessels, tug 
 operations, small cruise ships, and other traffic operating in 
 the region. Current capabilities at the northernmost U.S. port 
 in Nome will be insufficient to meet these growing demands. 
 Expansion of the Port of Nome represents the most viable option 
 for establishing a Northern Base of operations positioned near 
 the critical Bering Strait maritime chokepoint. Federal 
 investment in dredging and construction of an outer breakwater 
 will strengthen the Nation's ability to take advantage of 
 emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic while fulfilling 
 our responsibility to protect U.S. Arctic waters from unsafe or 
 environmentally harmful maritime activities. The natural deep-
 water harbor at Port Clarence should also be considered a 
 complementary asset. Any future strategy for the region must be 
 developed collaboratively with the local communities that live 
 and subsist there, ensuring local needs and sovereignty are 
 fully respected. While Adak is remote, it occupies a 
 strategically important location near the westernmost extent of 
 the U.S. Maritime Boundary Line. The port facilities and 
 services have rapidly declined, and the long-term viability of 
 this deep-water port is at risk due to neglect and abandonment. 
 Because of its strategic position, Adak warrants serious 
 consideration for at least a minimum level of maintenance and 
 preservation as a U.S. operational resource.

 Beyond Icebreaking Capacity: The Coast Guard's Polar 
 Security Cutter initiative is essential to protecting U.S. 
 interests in an increasingly accessible Arctic. Today, only a 
 limited number of vessels and aircraft operate in the U.S. 
 Arctic, leaving few assets capable of responding to mariners in 
 distress or enforcing laws and treaties. As Arctic waters open 
 to greater maritime activity, the Coast Guard's 
 responsibilities are expanding rapidly and must be matched with 
 appropriate resources. This need goes far beyond icebreaking. 
 It is about ensuring the United States has the capacity to 
 safeguard its interests, protect its shores, and support the 
 mariners who operate in this emerging frontier. The Coast 
 Guard's force posture must reflect the growing demand for 
 services in this dynamic operational environment. No other 
 region within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone has experienced 
 the level of bold foreign military activity observed in the 
 Arctic. Ensuring adequate presence and capability in this 
 region is therefore not just strategic--it is imperative

 Technological Solutions: While maritime technology continues 
 to advance rapidly across the nation, Alaska and the broader 
 Arctic remain significantly underserved. The region lacks the 
 basic communications and navigational infrastructure that 
 mariners elsewhere take for granted. These deficiencies 
 directly affect safety, environmental protection, and the 
 United States' ability to govern its northern waters.

 Terrestrial AIS-A Proven Arctic Solution: The Coast Guard R&D 
 Center, in partnership with the Marine Exchange of Alaska, 
 conducted a five-year project: the Arctic Next Generation 
 Navigational Safety Information System, which demonstrated that 
 AIS transponders can effectively transmit navigational safety 
 and environmental information to vessels in Arctic waters. The 
 Marine Exchange of Alaska currently operates one of the most 
 extensive terrestrial AIS networks in the nation, consisting of 
 more than 134 receivers and 80 transceivers. These terrestrial 
 sites are integrated into the National AIS System to provide 
 near real-time vessel tracking and safety broadcasts. This 
 capability is essential because satellite AIS cannot transmit 
 information back to vessels, and it cannot match the accuracy, 
 refresh rate, or reliability of terrestrial AIS in coastal and 
 high traffic areas. Terrestrial AIS also plays a critical role 
 in identifying AIS spoofing, dark target detection and AIS 
 manipulation through verifying vessel positions within a 
 particular receiver range. Both terrestrial and satellite AIS 
 are indispensable components of maritime domain awareness in 
 the Arctic.

 VHF Communication: VHF radio remains the standard for maritime 
 communications. Yet shoreside VHF coverage in Alaska is 
 severely limited. The Coast Guard's 33 VHF sites cover only 19 
 percent of Alaska's coastline and do not extend beyond Cold Bay 
 or north of St. Paul Island. Medium Frequency radio once helped 
 fill these gaps but was disestablished within the last decade. 
 The contiguous U.S. has 100 percent coverage, over lapping for 
 redundancy, and VHF direction finder capability. Recognizing 
 the gaps in Alaska and the risk this creates, the Marine 
 Exchange of Alaska has constructed 25 new VHF transceiver sites 
 over the past three years. These sites extend coverage farther 
 west and north than the Coast Guard's system and have already 
 saved lives by receiving distress calls in areas where no 
 Federal coverage exists. They are used regularly to broadcast 
 critical safety information, both to and from vessels. 
 Additional sites are planned, but the system currently operates 
 without Federal funding or sustained government support, 
 despite its demonstrated value. The Marine Exchange is in 
 conversation with the Coast Guard regarding possibilities to 
 utilize this system to support mariners and Coast Guard 
 operations in and around Alaska/Arctic waters.

 Collaboration, not Competition: Public-Private partnerships, 
 like the Marine Exchange of Alaska are an effective, efficient 
 and responsive model for addressing technological and 
 governance gaps in the Arctic. These partnerships leverage 
 local knowledge and interest with government resources to meet 
 countless demands in this dynamic environment. There are 
 several examples of how these relationships between the public/
 industry, and the government have helped build the extensive 
 system operated by the Marine Exchange of Alaska to serve the 
 national interest and address local concerns. While the 
 challenges we face in the Arctic are significant, the pathway 
 to success is leveraging resources and commitment from those 
 willing to collaborate. This model is a proven path to help the 
 U.S. expedite closing the gap between challenges faced in the 
 Arctic and the technological capabilities to address those 
 challenges.

 Arctic Watch: Arctic Watch is a real-time Arctic maritime 
 monitoring and safety initiative based in Alaska, created to 
 enhance vessel safety and protect the environment, coastal 
 communities, and wildlife. Operating 24/7, it collects and 
 shares environmental data, vessel locations, and safety alerts 
 across the Bering Strait and the broader Arctic region. Founded 
 by a coalition of organizations and agencies (Including the 
 Marine Exchange of Alaska and its capabilities), Arctic Watch 
 serves as a collaborative platform to address regional 
 challenges. Its real-time data supports both mariners and local 
 communities, while the infrastructure built for the program 
 simultaneously advances U.S. national interests by closing 
 critical capability gaps in the Arctic. Arctic Watch has been 
 widely recognized as an efficient, resource-leveraging model--
 one that unites diverse partners to achieve shared goals. As a 
 U.S. initiative, it demonstrates how a focused, purpose-driven 
 program can maximize the strengths of multiple organizations 
 working together to solve common issues and can serve as an 
 example for similar efforts around the world.
In Conclusion
 The Arctic is no longer a distant frontier--it is an active, 
strategic, and rapidly changing maritime region where the United States 
must be prepared to lead. The challenges we face there are significant, 
but they are neither insurmountable nor beyond our reach. What is 
required is sustained attention, targeted investment, and a willingness 
to harness the strengths of both government and industry.
 Modernizing infrastructure, enhancing communications, improving 
maritime domain awareness, and ensuring adequate operational presence 
are not abstract goals; they are the essential elements of responsible 
governance in a region experiencing unprecedented change. The Marine 
Exchange of Alaska supports this effort and provides technologies and 
initiatives, such as Arctic Watch, as examples of how collaboration can 
accelerate capability, reduce risk, and deliver tangible results for 
mariners, communities, and the Nation.
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before you 
today. I am willing to answer any questions you may have and pleased to 
provide additional information to the Subcommittee members and staff at 
any time.
 ______
 
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 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Captain White. I want to thank 
all our witnesses. By the way, I also want to thank UAA. This 
probably is one of the first Senate hearings where there is 
significant ``swag'' for everybody to see, water, great-looking 
UAA ties. I am not even sure what this is. OK, coffee beans. So 
I want to thank the University, in all seriousness.
 Well, look, I think this was a demonstration. These are our 
local witnesses who I think demonstrate that they are some of 
the most knowledgeable people in the whole country, maybe even 
the whole world, on these important Arctic issues.
 So let me begin, and I will start with some of our--you 
know, I can open up these questions to really all the 
witnesses. But you saw the chart that my team and I keep very 
close tabs on, and that is just the increasing number of 
incursions, and the really unprecedented element here is the 
joint operations between Russia and China. That has not 
happened.
 So why don't I start with you, General Kee. Can you talk 
about, you know, does this pattern, from your perspective, 
represent temporary signaling effort, or are we witnessing the 
normalization of sustained great power competition here in the 
Arctic? I think it is clearly the latter, but you are, again, 
at the forefront of the Pentagon's most important think tank on 
the Arctic. What does this signify to you, including--and I do 
not think we even have it listed--the Chinese up in the Arctic 
all summer? Let's face it, they were not doing research to save 
the whales, right? They were spying on us. We know that. And 
the green slides, which I think are really, really important 
and very unprecedented.
 Mr. Kee. The briefest answer, Senator, is you are right. 
The latter is correct. I will build that out.
 Over the past several----
 Senator Sullivan. Meaning we should anticipate this being 
the new normal?
 Mr. Kee. This is the new normal. This is not the preceding. 
This is the new normal. This pattern is a normalization of 
sustained great power competition in the Arctic between Beijing 
and Moscow against the United States and the West.
 Over the past several years, joint activity between Russia 
and China in the vicinity of Alaska, including coordinated 
bomber patrols entering Alaska defense identification zone, or 
ADIZ for folks in the audience, and their combined naval task 
groups transiting near the Aleutians has shifted from sporadic 
demonstrations to increasingly routine operations. What was 
once episodic signaling tied to specific geopolitical moments 
now reflects recurring, seasonal patterns of presence. And that 
distinction, ladies and gentlemen and Senator, distinguished 
colleagues, truly matters. Classic signaling is typically 
reactive and bounded. For example, a response to an exercise, a 
sanction, or a crisis somewhere else, putting pressure in this 
region as a result.
 Instead, what we are seeing here is a sustained, 
operational repetition. Repetition builds familiarity, improves 
interoperability, and normalizes presence. In sum, this is a 
shaping operation, from my vantage point.
 Senator Sullivan. Can I ask, just to interrupt here, and 
maybe, General Ralston, you can jump in here too. When 
countries do joint ops, and they are launching--can you go back 
one slide here--the Anadyr, you see that in Russia, so that is 
an Air Force base right there under the adversaries, that is 
where they are launching these strategic bomber operations. So 
the Chinese are using that Russian airbase as a very close 
jumping-off point. You see how close that is to Alaska.
 But General Ralston, you cannot just throw together a joint 
strategic bomber task force with Russian and Chinese strategic 
bombers and fighters, or I think even more complex, two summers 
ago they had a 12-ship strategic naval task force, and then the 
prior summer before that it was a 7-ship strategic naval task 
force. You are an Air Force expert but you are also a Combatant 
Commander, so you understand Navy ops and Air Force ops. How 
hard is that? How much planning does that take? And again, at 
the strategic level, those strategic ops probably have to get 
sign-off from Putin and Xi Jinping. Would you agree with that?
 Can you just talk a little bit, in your experience, again, 
going back to the green indicators there on this slide, those 
are not easy to put together, and they are very unprecedented. 
They are not doing that on the East Coast. They are not doing 
that pretty much anywhere else, certainly in America, but 
around the world. How important is that, and how should we take 
note of that?
 General Ralston. Senator, that is a very good question, and 
let me say upfront, this is not something that you just put 
together casually. To give you an example, in 1993, I led the 
first U.S. exercise to Russia after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. We took the 210th Air Rescue Squadron here from 
Anchorage, a bunch of troops, two C-5s, helicopters, and we 
deployed to Russia to do a joint exercise with the Russians. 
That took months of coordination to do that, and it also took 
approval from the highest levels of the U.S. Government and the 
highest levels of the Russian government.
 Senator Sullivan. Do you think that is the same here? Xi 
Jinping and Putin are signing off on these ops?
 General Ralston. No question they do that. And the other 
thing, why are they doing that? Well, they both have got 
interests in the Arctic. The shipping routes, potential 
shipping routes in the future, they are both very interested in 
that. So yes, there is interest, and it does take strategic 
cooperation at the highest levels to put exercises like that 
together.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Let me go to the next kind of 
element of the focus of this hearing. And if we are responding 
to this, which we must, in my view, and I think most Alaskans 
and most Americans would agree, there's kind of two different 
ways to think about it, from a military perspective, that 
relates to forward infrastructure. And that is during the Cold 
War we maintained forward infrastructure in places like Adak or 
Galena or other places in our state. From a deterrence 
standpoint, how different is it to surge-to-respond, which is 
kind of what we are doing now?
 If you can go back one slide there. So you look at where we 
are launching our Air Force assets--Eielson, JBER primarily--
and you look at the numbers we have on that chart, it is almost 
1,000 miles--1,000 miles--to get to our ADIZ, which is where we 
want to meet the Russians. They are not going 1,000 miles 
launching from Anadyr. So that takes tanking missions, that 
takes all kinds of sophisticated logistical operations. But 
previously our persistent presence forward with regard to 
infrastructure was in some ways deterrence.
 So right now I would call this kind of a surge-to-respond 
model--launching 1,000 miles just to meet these guys--same with 
our Navy. In fact, they are launching from San Diego. That is 
like 4,000 miles. But how much more deterrence capability does 
it give us if we have the forward infrastructure at Nome, at 
Adak, but in other places? I mentioned a new runway at JBER. A 
lot of people are not tracking that. I have talked to senior 
Air Force officials. They say that is going to make JBER 
probably the most strategic Air Force base on the planet, 
certainly in the INDOPACOM, by having two major, massive runway 
capabilities.
 But for everybody here, because this is a question that is 
kind of at the heart of the hearing, the infrastructure forward 
helps us in different ways. Ambassador, do you want to take a 
first crack at that, and then I will open that up to everybody. 
And are we missing infrastructure opportunities? I have always 
talked about the west coast of Alaska as needing a series of 
ports, not just Nome but other places, as well. There are other 
communities that are looking, there is Port Clarence, out at 
Kotzebue, Cape Blossom. There is a whole host of other areas. 
So can you all talk about that?
 Mr. Sfraga. Senator, thank you. With your permission, I 
have a couple of slides. You and I used these slides at the 
Munich Security Conference just a couple of years ago. Yes, the 
Pacific slide is a good one. Maybe back one to the North 
American.
 This is how I view the Arctic, but also, Senator, I think 
it is to your point and to, General, your point about being a 
fulcrum, the state being a fulcrum, and to General Kee's 
comment about the western flank of NATO. So if you look at this 
graphic, I think about forward basing, and not just surging, 
for NATO, for the North American Arctic, to counter the Russian 
arc, that Russian influence. I see that, and actually North 
Korea, as well. I think we need to consider their motives and 
their capabilities, which are just growing each and every day.
 But on the Pacific side, this is how I see it. And although 
it is not an arc--it looks more like a teardrop--it kind of 
gets the point across, I think, where if you actually put base 
out a Adak, if you build Nome, if you think about a port in 
Port Clarence or Cape Blossom, and then you think about 
INDOPACOM's capacity, I am trying to link the two. What is 
NORTHCOM doing, what is INDOPACOM doing, what is our Coast 
Guard doing? How do we nest those together, not just to surge 
but to actually have the presence there. Link it with Guam and 
Hawaii so that, as I said before, we have an integrated 
approach to the Arctic. Because this is a Pacific arc. I think 
that is how the Chinese see it. I think that is how they see 
the Straits of Malacca. I think that is how they see the South 
China Sea. I think that is how they see themselves in the 
Arctic.
 They do not see themselves, I think, in sort of silos. They 
see themselves as a global power. They want to be that Blue 
Ocean Navy, and we need to counter that by having presence, and 
also working with our friends in Japan and Korea so that we 
have a robust integration of our capabilities with our allies. 
But nothing--nothing--takes the place of having in-place 
capacity, because our adversaries know that in-place means a 
whole lot more to them and to us than it does to surge. They 
have a lot more time. And then it would become reactive. We do 
not want to be reactive. We want to influence the theater. We 
do not want to be reactive to the theater.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts on that, for 
all of our witnesses.
 Mr. Kee. I have a few suggestions and then I will give the 
floor to General Ralston. Number one, distances. Adak to Seoul 
is 2,500 miles. Anchorage to Seoul is 3,800 miles. Honolulu to 
Seoul is 4,600 miles.
 Senator Sullivan. I've done this little test with our flag 
officers in the Pentagon, including four-star admirals and 
generals. I think probably well over half failed that test. 
They just don't know. They don't know those numbers. It is 
really shocking to me how few, very senior military members do 
not know those numbers, at all.
 I will give you my sense of it. You go to INDOPACOM. My 
last billet in the Marine Corps was out at INDOPACOM. Every 
senior leader in INDOPACOM has a map, a giant map, on his or 
her wall, and in the middle of it is Hawaii, because that is 
where INDOPACOM is, and then Alaska is not even on the map. It 
is just the tiny end of the Aleutian Island chain in the corner 
of the map. And yet the INDOPACOM commander's forces, which he 
owns in Alaska, 100 fifth-generation fighters, the 11th 
Airborne Division, all those forces are closer to Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan, than Hawaii.
 But they are looking at Hawaii as the center of the 
universe, literally on everyone's map, and we are not even on 
their map. And it is just kind of shocking, because they have 
no idea that the forces the INDOPACOM commander owns and 
controls are much closer to what would be the contingencies, if 
they had to use them. So it is a frustration. It is a huge 
blind spot for our military.
 Mr. Kee. They need to be all taught great circle routes 
matter, and the Earth is fatter in the middle than it is at the 
top. I will explain that more later if you like, sir.
 Senator Sullivan. You are the one guy who can do that for 
the Pentagon more than anybody. Because remember, the Ted 
Stevens Center is still part of the Department of War, so you 
are in there, educating these admirals and generals. I think it 
is very important.
 Mr. Kee. It is a principal point. We have 3,000 graduates 
of our programs now, trying to make U.S. and allied security 
practitioners smarter about this region.
 Sentinels and pickets. So we need our coastal regions to 
have the understanding of what is out there. And we need to 
have pickets, in other words, to be able to demonstrate 
deterrence to our adversaries that this will defend.
 When we look at it, what does it actually mean? It means 
looking at a port complex not just connected via air and sea. 
We need to think about how you connect surface routes from the 
rail belt to places like Nome and perhaps the Port Clarence and 
Nome port complex. It is taking the idea that Adak as a main 
operating base, for example, but then look at fix operating 
sites, places like we used to have during the Cold War, like 
Attu, like King Salmon. So if you look at this aspect of what 
other areas that would, if we were periodically there, would 
demonstrate deterrence that this, too, we will defend.
 The last piece that I would offer is that when we look at 
the need for such investments, we need to make it Arctic ready. 
Before going into the Air Force in 1985, I worked with U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers in Alaska District on Adak and Attu as 
operation places during the Cold War. We were trying to get a 
lot of renovation done quickly in the latter part of the 1980s, 
and we did not necessarily make it Arctic proof or Arctic 
ready.
 So if you look at Adak today, you have kind of a mess out 
there, that kind of needs to be picked up and swept up and 
rebuilt, be built this time Arctic ready, because the 
infrastructure that was put in during that renovation period 
was not suited for the conditions where they are building. 
Respectfully submitted.
 Senator Sullivan. General, Joy, any other thoughts?
 General Ralston. Let me just add a couple of points. I 
won't talk about the Indo-Pacific, but one of the things that 
people sometimes forget, our F-35s at Eielson are closer to 
Europe than the same airplanes on the East Coast of the United 
States. Our F-22s at JBER can be in Europe before the F-22s out 
of Langley Air Force Base at Virginia. So it is, again, 
something that FedEx and UPS figured out a long time ago, and 
that is why they have got major hubs here in Anchorage. They 
can be anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere in 8 hours. So that 
is an important piece of our infrastructure.
 One other point. One of the hats that the Alaskan commander 
has is the Commander of the Alaska NORAD Region, which is 
responsible for intercepting the airplanes that come into our 
ADIZ. That is an enormously complex operation with the 
infrastructure we have got today. The first thing you have got 
to do is launch AWACs, and then you have to launch tankers out 
of Eielson, and then you launch fighters out of either Eielson 
or JBER. But it takes several hours to get to the places that 
we need to be to, to intercept those airplanes. So the 
infrastructure is critically important.
 Senator Sullivan. Joy, do you have a view on that?
 Let me ask, I want to go back to a slide that I had brought 
up. It was the one of the bases across the--that one. So, 
again, I would like just to comment on that. We have talked 
about the Northern Route, but here is the challenge. It is kind 
of a hard slide to read, but the Pentagon is doing a bunch of 
very significant infrastructure in that central route. Again, 
some of that makes sense, but some of that, in my view, is way 
overbuilt.
 If you look at Guam, which is very strategic, but right now 
they are talking about $50 billion of infrastructure investment 
in Guam. I have called that what I think is one of the 
Pentagon's biggest strategic mistakes, to concentrate so much 
money and firepower and assets on one small island.
 So again, I want to just ask, in terms of diversification 
of our forces and our force posture, particularly more along 
the Northern Route--which, by the way, historically I was 
reminded, somebody recently mentioned this to me. If you 
actually look at the route that the Japanese Naval Task Force 
took to invade Midway and Pearl Harbor, they went up north, 
kind of near us, and then they came down toward those islands.
 So what I have been trying to do with the senior leadership 
is say you need to diversify your infrastructure force posture 
in INDOPACOM, again, toward the Northern Route, but also away 
from such a heavy concentration on Guam. Does anyone have a 
view on that? General Kee, do you want to comment?
 Mr. Kee. I do, sir, and I'll yield the floor quickly. Years 
ago I was a colonel in Joint Staff, as a staffing pogue working 
global defense posture. At the end of the table was Senator 
Stevens and Senator Inouye, and we were, at the time, working 
the discussions about how to reduce the pressure in Okinawa by 
putting more infrastructure in Guam, just to reduce, 
essentially, the geopolitical pressure the United States was 
feeling at the time with Japan.
 Years later, I was responsible, as the Vice Commander of 
the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott Air Force Base 
of conducting the surge to Afghanistan. And so there is an evil 
volcano in Iceland that blew up during this time, that was 
closing down air routes across the Atlantic to Europe and 
onwards, to Afghanistan. We went as far north as we could, and 
we went as far south as we could, and we couldn't get assets to 
Afghanistan.
 So one night, in a fit of frustration, I said, ``To hell 
with it. We're going west,'' and we were going to move the bulk 
of the force on C-17s via the Great Circle Route to the north, 
and then take the C-5s and do the central route. We were so 
much faster moving from the north than through the fat part of 
the central that we closed the northern portions far in 
advance. I finally just took assets out of the central portion 
and rerouted them north in order to close this faster.
 The central piece is too fat. You can't move forces. It 
requires so much more fuel and time that you don't have when 
the crisis is there. Moving north is far faster, and far more 
efficient, from my vantage point.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Other thoughts on that? General?
 General Ralston. I had one quick thought. Guam is very 
vulnerable to the ballistic missile threat out of China, so you 
cannot afford to put all of your assets in one piece there. 
That is why you need to have a diversified infrastructure.
 Senator Sullivan. Yes. My concern, if there was ever a 
conflict with China, and I hope there won't be, but that Guam's 
runway, the Anderson Air Force Base there, that might be 
cratered within minutes. And we have a lot of assets, and we 
are still concentrating forces there. It just seems to be a 
big, big strategic mistake.
 Let's go to a topic that I think everybody cares about, 
which is icebreakers as strategic enablers. And once again, we 
are finally making progress on both building icebreakers and 
homeporting them here in Alaska. It is kind of remarkable when 
you think about it, that the Pentagon, through the history of 
the United States, without having icebreakers homeported here. 
Some of you were at the homeporting ceremony for the Coast 
Guard icebreaker, the Storis, this August, in Juneau. That is 
going to be homeported in Juneau. We had $300 million in the 
budget reconciliation bill, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act, 
to homeport that icebreaker in Juneau.
 There are a number of icebreakers that are going to be 
built out as part of that bill, as I mentioned, 16 right now. 
In the hearing I had recently with the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard he talked about up to four more. We will see. I think 
that would be great. But even if it is not four, it still would 
be very significant.
 So can I ask all of you, in terms of icebreakers, they 
certainly do not just do research. They enable military 
mobility. They enable commercial escorts. They enable freedom 
of navigation in ice-covered waters. Russia clearly understands 
this and has invested accordingly. We have a gigantic, what I 
have termed the icebreaker gap. Russia has, as I mentioned, 54 
icebreakers, many of which are nuclear powered. They can run 
kind of continuously, and they are weaponized. We are finally 
playing catch-up.
 But what strategic risks do we incur if we continue to 
operate with such a small icebreaking fleet, but more 
importantly, for the purposes of this hearing, our friends in 
the Coast Guard, what message would you say to them as they are 
looking at and studying right now where to put some of these 
new icebreakers. I think it is very exciting that the 
Commandant said they are looking at up to four more in Alaska. 
I would love all four. But where would you look at homeporting 
those, and how important is that? Ms. Baker, I have a feeling I 
am going to know what your answer is, since you have already 
testified to it.
 But this is important. This is a hearing of the 
Subcommittee in charge of the Coast Guard, and even though we 
do not have any active-duty Coast Guards we have got Captain 
White here. But as they are looking at this, the Coast Guard is 
actively looking at this right now, what to do, where to put 
them. And the Trump administration, with Finland, with Canada, 
this icepack, is really moving out to build icebreakers, first 
in Finland, then in the United States. But give me your 
thoughts on that. I am assuming everybody here would welcome 
four more, but also the strategic importance and then where to 
put them.
 General Ralston. Let me jump in, and if you will permit me 
let me tell you a little story that I think is embarrassing to 
the United States of America, and my good friend, Pete 
Leathard, I think we are the oldest two guys in the room here, 
we remember this from 1988. In 1988, there was an event that 
happened north of then Barrow, Alaska, that got worldwide 
attention. There were three whales that got trapped in the ice 
up north of Barrow, and everybody, from the White House around 
the world, was focused on how in the hell are we going to save 
these three whales. And this is the heart of the Cold War, 
1988. The United States of America had to go to the Soviet 
Union and beg for an icebreaker to come in and rescue the 
whales north of Barrow.
 So that is something I think was an embarrassment to the 
United States, but it also points out that we need those 
icebreakers further north than where they are now, further 
north than Seattle, and further north than Juneau. And that is 
why I support Nome, but wherever else we can get them to the 
north.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Other thoughts? Ms. Baker, do you 
want to, for the record?
 Ms. Baker. For the record, Senator, yes. Nome has, 
obviously, been pushing for quite some time to homeport an 
icebreaker or other forward operating maritime Coast Guard 
assets. We have been working on the shore-side development to 
help them with seasonal activity of office crew quarters, 
storage space, something to work as a foundation to build upon 
the development of a complex that would support a full-time 
homeported vessel. And we would be thrilled if the--we will 
take any of the Coast Guard vessels to be full-time homeported, 
and we would bring out the marching bands for the actual 
icebreaker. Yes, we could definitely make that happen.
 And as we have all stated here today, I think it is a 
crucial and essential component of building out capacity in the 
Arctic by bringing the Coast Guard assets to the Arctic so that 
they can work more closely and be refueled, resupplied, and 
supported for all of their missions. For a very long time now, 
all of our large, whether it be commercial or military fleet, 
having to go to Dutch Harbor to refuel has been a problem. And 
it will continue to be until the 40-foot protected deepwater 
base is built and we are able to supply those vessels with 
everything they need to serve their missions without having the 
distance in travel.
 Senator Sullivan. Good. So look, I actually do think 
whether there is going to be an icebreaker homeported in Nome, 
but I think clearly with the deepwater strategic port, that is 
going to be able to utilize the Coast Guard icebreakers. But to 
your point, when we had that final kind of meeting with all the 
services, the idea that planning the design for the strategic 
port in Nome is to be able to handle essentially every ship in 
the Coast Guard and Navy inventory, with the exception of a 
U.S. aircraft carrier, at Nome. So I think you are going to be 
able to see, if it is not homeported, deployment there, that we 
can use Nome as a jumping-off point for not just icebreakers 
but, as we talked about, national security cutters, destroyers, 
frigates, all kinds of military hardware that has not had 
anywhere to go on the West Coast of Alaska.
 Captain White, do you have a view? You are based in Juneau 
so you have the first icebreaker that is coming. That was the 
Coast Guard's decision, when they were looking at it, and now 
they are looking at other areas in Alaska that could be the 
potential for homeporting. Any thoughts on that, from your 
perspective?
 Mr. White. I think when you talk about--let's go to your 
Northern Route slide, Senator--I think you should adjust this a 
little, with all due respect. The one with the Northern Route 
and the one crossing the Central, Scott. I think you need to 
move that Northern Route to end in the United States a little 
more north. That is a much shorter route to getting to the 
fight. And when I talked about the fight, and you are talking 
about Coast Guard cutters in particular, I keep hearing 
icebreaking, when we talk about a real governance, again, 
enforcement, border protection, fisheries, service to all that 
maritime traffic that is out there, and increasing in Alaska 
waters.
 By moving that Northern Route and having it end not on the 
West Coast of the United States but having it end in Alaska you 
really shorten up that line, and you are really putting assets 
closer to the fight, whatever port.
 And then, Scott, one more slide, just to Joy's point, my 
slides, if you go down to the one with all the pictures. In the 
bottom middle picture, that is the Coast Guard cutter Alex 
Haley tied up at Nome, just to give everybody a visual of what 
we are talking about. That is the biggest cutter that has been 
able to pull in there. And it is tight and it is small in 
there.
 But what an asset, to be able to pull any vessel, any kind 
of response--you are talking search and rescue, oil spill 
response, enforcement of laws, border security--to be able to 
pull in there and get the Schlitz you need, again, to get 
logistics, is that forward operating base model that Church was 
talking about. You are closer up there. If you had to surge 
force up here, forces are going to be surged here to address 
all these concerns, from food security for the locals to 
changing weather and responding to the disasters we have seen 
up there, to foreign adversaries. You need to be able to have 
logistics and ports to operate out of, and right now it is 
minimally effective and does not match what others have.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. We have talked a lot about Adak, 
but I just want to kind of emphasize this. In hearings over the 
course of the last couple of years--we can go back to that 
slide that had the two routes--I have had the INDOPACOM 
commander and the NORTHCOM commander saying how important that 
is to reopen that base. And again, to General Ralston's point, 
during the 1990s, when we thought the peace dividend was here 
to stay and we were not going to have any adversaries, I think 
that was a very strategic mistake to shut down that base. Many 
Alaskans know that, but that base was a naval air station, but 
it also had deepwater access, one of the biggest fuel storage 
facilities in the world, 22 million gallons, two 8,000-mile 
runways, a giant hangar, and even a sub base, which, as most 
people know, that is the one weapon system that the Chinese 
still fear dramatically, to have something that close.
 By the way, the Chinese government has been watching the 
idea of reopening the Adak Navy base, and they really dislike 
it. So that is, in my view, a very good indication of we are 
onto something.
 So my question is, for again, just the panel in general, 
and particularly those of you who may have served out there or 
spent time there, restoring logistics, aviation capability, 
response times, domain awareness in the North Pacific, 
protecting our fisheries which are under pressure from China 
and Russia. If you can provide just a little bit more insight, 
and then if you have any insights on how to go about moving 
this forward.
 We were able to get commitment, I was, from the Secretary 
of War, Secretary Hegseth. I did have to put a hold on the 
confirmation of the Chief of Naval Operations because they were 
not responding to me quickly enough. But they have now set up a 
very high-level task force within the Pentagon, way above the 
Navy, so it is Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, the private sector 
is involved, the State of Alaska is involved. I actually think 
it is an exciting model, to look at building out American 
infrastructure. It is actually the model, in many ways if 
people do not know, that was used a lot during World War II. 
When we built out infrastructure throughout the world it was 
kind of private sector led, not just the Navy Seebees or the 
Corps of Engineers.
 So any other thoughts on Adak that we have not covered? 
$115 million is not going to build it immediately, but it is a 
pretty darn good start. And they have a plan, and you can use 
Adak for testing, for intel. But our goal is to have that as a 
very important facility here soon, but to be innovative, and I 
think we are off to a pretty good start. Any thoughts on that?
 Mr. Sfraga. Senator I have some thoughts. I agree with 
every reason that we have all stated, why Adak is so important 
to the United States and our allies. Adak, if you build Adak, 
Adak becomes, at least to me and many of the people I work with 
at the University, a key component of Golden Dome. It is an 
extension, in our mind, of Golden Dome.
 Here is how. There is a relationship between the 
Geophysical Institute, Poker Flat, HAARP, our research capacity 
there, and Alaska Aerospace Corporation. There is an MOU signed 
between all of us, to work together, because the capacity we 
have together--Kodiak, Poker--it is phenomenal. The capacity at 
HAARP, to be able to manipulate the ionosphere, it actually 
works, and now it is part of the University's portfolio of 
assets.
 We believe, researchers believe, that you can detect 
hypersonics earlier than we currently can now, if you create a 
hypersonic test range in the Aleutians, by triangulating our 
current resources--we will need more. There are a lot of other 
assets that would be needed.
 But if you were to build Adak out, it becomes a key 
component, in our mind, of an Aleutian test range for 
hypersonics, detect them earlier. And that, to me, is a 
significant deterrence.
 Senator Sullivan. Great.
 Mr. Sfraga. That is in discussion now with members of our 
group.
 Senator Sullivan. Adak is a key component.
 Mr. Sfraga. A key component.
 Senator Sullivan. And hence for America.
 Mr. Sfraga. Correct. If you put some assets out there that 
can correspond with the other assets that we have together with 
Alaska Aerospace, you can then build a hypersonic test range to 
test the research thesis that you can detect earlier. That is 
Russia, that is China, and I would also add North Korea to that 
portfolio of adversaries we need to worry about. And that needs 
more work, but we talked about that with General George. Thank 
you for coming to the University and hosting General George. To 
have a member of the Joint Chiefs on campus was pretty good, 
and also General Clarke, as well. Just the concept it is 
public. But that puts Adak in a very different place, in 
addition to all the other things you have mentioned.
 Senator Sullivan. By the way, I do not think I am revealing 
anything, but next week ICEX is happening with, again, senior 
Navy officials, I think maybe even including the Secretary of 
the Navy, in Alaska, doing the submarine ice exercises above 
us, which is also pretty exciting.
 Anyone else on Adak?
 Mr. Kee. Very quickly, sir, also on the 15th and 16th of 
March I will be up on ICEX, as well.
 Senator Sullivan. Great.
 Mr. Kee. Connecting with Navy sub labs, and it is all about 
the partnerships that Captain White mentioned earlier.
 Ambassador Sfraga and I, and our respective institutions, 
are triangulating with the Geophysical Institute regarding this 
discussion he just mentioned about the hypersonics. The aspects 
about the instrumentation of the Aleutians is critical for 
this. In looking at the spot for sensing, for example, Cold 
Bay, Dutch, Adak, Eareckson and Attu, are all locations that 
could help support, with sensors of this aspect.
 The other aspect about this, as well, is if you take a look 
at projecting power and defending our interests into the North 
Pacific, thinking about leveraging the partnership and the 
bilateral defense relationship we have with Japan is one other 
piece to this equation. We can counter what Beijing and Moscow 
are doing in the North Pacific by thinking jointly with Japan, 
as an example, to provide the presence, but thinking how it 
would also burden shift to have some more of the work in the 
North Pacific region shouldered in partnership with the 
Japanese.
 Senator Sullivan. Good. Other thoughts on Adak?
 I'm going to wrap up here and then we are going to do a 
couple of things that are a little unconventional in a Senate 
hearing. Normally we would have a few more Senators so we might 
take advantage of some of our brilliant attendees.
 Domain awareness. Captain White, you have a very important 
role in terms of what you are doing now, but can you talk a 
little bit about the lack of domain awareness in the Arctic, in 
the North Pacific, and again how infrastructure can help us 
build out that. And maybe even describe what that means, domain 
awareness.
 Mr. White. Yes. Maritime domain awareness is knowing what 
is going on out on the water, and it is important when you talk 
about not just national security but just governing our waters. 
In order to do domain awareness you need to have the right 
capabilities out there, and Alaska lacks them, from the rest of 
the United States, severely. Just knowing what is there.
 The Coast Guard has built an Army Corps in the Lower 48, a 
system where they can track boats via satellite and via 
terrestrial AIS, and real quick, just for the record, 
terrestrial AIS is needed because it has got a higher refresh 
rate, it picks up national security things, like if a vessel is 
spoofing its position it battles against that, if there are 
dark targets. And it really helps create that full picture. So 
you need to have satellite and terrestrial to have a system.
 Senator Sullivan. Just to be clear, we talked about an 
icebreaker gap, which definitely exists. Do we have a domain 
awareness gap, relative to the rest of the country?
 Mr. White. We do, and we have closed it. This might be an 
example of what everybody has been talking about here, using 
resources together. The Coast Guard R&D Center and the Marine 
Exchange of Alaska did a 5-year study, saying how can we get a 
way of detecting vessels up here in Alaska and communicate with 
them. They determined that terrestrial AIS would help do that. 
It would cost millions to build that out for the Coast Guard. 
They worked through a public-private partnership, and I think 
there might be a slide on it, Scott, just on the system that's 
built out.
 The Coast Guard had nothing up here. We put up 134 AIS 
receivers for them to close that gap, and that has been 
incorporated in what is called the National AIS System, to get 
maritime domain awareness. In addition, these can communicate 
with vessels, to send information up.
 We started doing that with VHF comms, VHF comms which are 
enjoyed by our mariners. Anywhere in the Lower 48 you can pick 
up the radio and call out and somebody is going to answer from 
the Coast Guard. Up here in Alaska, about 19 percent of the 
coast is covered. That means for our fishermen, for the people 
moving oil, for the people moving mining supplies, they do not 
have that. That is a massive gap.
 Thirty-three states in the Coast Guard has it, and we just, 
in the last two years, put up 25 more. And I will point out 
that they are in Adak, Dutch Harbor, all the way up north. We 
just put some in at Kotzebue and at the Red Dog Mine. We were 
all prepped for the hurricane that was going to hit, or the 
typhoon, that went a little south. Unfortunately there were no 
comms there. It was a severe gap. It hindered our response to 
get to the people who needed help. In the Y-K Yukon Delta we 
are putting up three of them this summer.
 But that is an example of how public-private partnership 
helps national security because it closes maritime domain 
awareness gap while providing a service to our mariners in 
Alaska, which really deserve the same that mariners in the 
Lower 48 have.
 Senator Sullivan. Good. Let me ask, Ms. Baker, you have 
done a great job on the Port of Nome. We are talking all about 
national security, which is very important. But can you also 
talk a little bit about what the Port of Nome is going to do 
for economic development, for safety, for the environment, for 
other things that are a little bit more closer to home, for the 
region that you have done such a good job of representing?
 Ms. Baker. Yes. Thank you, Senator. When we worked with the 
Army Corps to develop the feasibility study one of the major 
components, as the project was authorized under the Remote and 
Subsistence Harbors bill, was the generation of extensive jobs 
with the port expansion to boost the regional economy that has, 
over the years, severely lacked with the good-paying jobs to 
support these regional communities as well as Nome.
 The additional infrastructure will bring those jobs, those 
maritime jobs, as well as the corresponding jobs on the shore 
side and in the community, to address those gaps that have been 
building over the years, across Western Alaska, as well as the 
increased infrastructure. The expansion of what we call the 
east side of the port, to add docks for what we call our 
pedestrian traffic, will increase safety by separating that 
from the industrial and military traffic on the west side, and 
in addition to having the ability to stockpile and position oil 
spill response and search and rescue assets in the region, at 
this position, so that they are not trying to pull oil spill 
responses and life safety mission resources from Lower 48 or 
Lower Alaska in responses to the events that are happening 
further north of us.
 The cruise industry has blown open. They are building more 
ice-strengthened hulls for tourist ships. We are seeing more 
traffic. At this time we are seeing larger vessels that need to 
anchor offshore because of their draft. They are bringing more 
and more people to the Arctic. The resources to respond to any 
type of an incident just must be positioned closer to where 
those incidents are going to occur, and the infrastructure that 
will be developed will help enhance that positioning of those 
oil spill response assets and resupply and refueling the marine 
assets that are needed to transport that to the events.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. And then what about the mining 
that is going on in the Nome area, as well?
 Ms. Baker. Resource development, we have been working with 
Graphite One on the graphite mine for staging their export 
quantities out in our increased laydown area at the port. They 
have recently, as of last year, determined that the 40-foot 
basin is critical in their ability to export their resource for 
the vessels that they need to bring to Nome to take that 
resource out for processing.
 So before they were discussing being able to use the 
backhaul capacity for the local cargo carriers, but that has 
since changed, and that is not going to be sufficient to meet 
the demand.
 In addition, I did not bring a map but there are a number 
of natural resource locations and potential sites across the 
Seward Peninsula that can benefit from the expanded capacity 
for export of all sorts of those critical minerals, in addition 
to graphite, to be exported with the expansion of the Port of 
Nome.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Listen, you have been a great 
panel of witnesses. We are a little bit over an hour and a half 
in this hearing, so I want to thank everybody. Because I am 
chairing it and it is a field hearing, we are going to do two 
things that are a little bit unconventional. But I am chairing 
it, and we are in Alaska, so we can do that.
 We have a lot of experts in the audience. I see Mead and 
others. Maybe just take a few questions from our audience, and 
then we are going to turn to a press conference with the press 
that is here, if they have additional questions, and that is 
going to involve me but also, I think we checked with the 
press, to have the press conference open to our experts too, if 
they have any questions for you.
 So as we wrap it up, again I want to thank our excellent, 
excellent witnesses. I think it is just a great demonstration. 
You know, this would be an all-star panel. If we were back in 
D.C., in front of the whole Commerce Committee, this would be 
an all-star panel, for the country. And the fact that it is all 
Alaskan citizens, that all live here, who are all doing great 
work, it just shows you the depth, in my view, of the expertise 
that we have in our state, and, as I mentioned earlier, that 
people care.
 When the Pentagon was kind of going, hey, Alaska, sorry, 
you are not important anymore, we knew that was wrong. We knew. 
We knew it. Collective memory, knowing our history. And we all 
kind of fought back and said, no, no, no, no, we are not going 
to go into strategic irrelevance. You generals and admirals 
need to wake up and figure out, read a map for goodness sakes, 
and see how important we are. And that is happening. I do 
think, and I know it is in large measure because of our very 
well-informed citizenry that made the case to our military 
leaders in D.C., and helping me and our delegation do that.
 So, do we have any final thoughts? Mead, have you got one, 
for the panel?
 Mr. Treadwell. Yes, thank you, Senator. I really have two 
questions, one starting with Ambassador Sfraga. When we talk 
about the Chinese research in the Arctic Ocean, and both of us 
were chairs of the Arctic Research Commission. We looked for 
cooperation in research internationally. But was the Central 
Arctic Fisheries Agreement kind of a gold-plated invitation for 
the Chinese to come up and do a lot of fishing research in the 
Central Arctic, and is there anything we should do with that 
agreement to more moderate that, especially now that we own the 
ocean bottom in a large part of the Central Arctic, that we 
have some sense to control.
 That is my first question. And then, Senator, for the whole 
panel, I just have read what you got in the Coast Guard 
Authorization Bill, this year and in recent bills. We have a 
new security effort in the Bering Sea to look at these, and 
that will be a CMTS joint effort. Something that we got in 4 
years ago, that you helped us get in, and Ambassador Sfraga and 
I worked on this with you, was a Federal advisory committee on 
shipping, and Church, you may have some things to report on 
that.
 I see your assistant Scott there, and a group of us have 
worked on raising the standards for oil spill research.
 So all of these things are going to contribute to more 
Arctic presence in the Bering Sea, and I was wondering if the 
panel had comments on those two things, China and the other 
thing.
 Senator Sullivan. As the former chairman of the Arctic 
Research Commission that was a heck of a lot of observations.
 Mr. Sfraga. He certainly does, and we learn from him all 
the time. On the issue of China and research, to the Senator's 
point, four or five research vessels off our coast this last 
summer, and if you nest the storyline of joint naval 
operations, joint Coast Guard operations, FSB-PRC Coast Guard 
operations, it all sums up to they are not just here to 
innocently, I believe, research the area. I think there is a 
whole lot else going on, a whole lot else going on. I think 
that is pretty clear.
 Senator Sullivan. Proven.
 Mr. Sfraga. Yes. With regard to their cooperation with the 
Central Arctic Oceans Fisheries Agreement, I think that at the 
time when that was built it was also in line with other 
international postures the U.S. and others had in terms of 
bringing China into the fold, whether it was the International 
Monetary Fund or many, many multilateral organizations, with 
the hope that they would integrate into and be transparent 
about their work. That is still a hope. I would put a big 
question mark on that because of the activities that we see off 
our coast.
 So they seem to be engaged. The research enterprises seem 
to be engaged. But one thing we should never forget is there is 
no separation between civilian use and military use within the 
PRC. It is one thing, from the Antarctic to the Arctic to the 
oceans, to all these spaces.
 Senator Sullivan. By the way, that is a great point, 
because I think sometimes we mirror image that and we think, oh 
no, they do not do that. And if our commercial guys are out 
there, they are not military, so that must be the same with 
China. And it is a great point, because it is not the same with 
China.
 Mr. Treadwell. But Mike, should we use our power of 
inspection now that we have this undersea, to make sure they 
are not--I mean, they cannot use the ocean bottom in their 
research without our permission, now that we own that land, two 
California's north of our EEZ. And I am just wondering if there 
is some way to get more visibility on what the Chinese are 
doing.
 Mr. Sfraga. Yes, I think we have to. I believe we have to 
have a far more robust inspection review process. I think 
hearings like this help, because we are having trouble figuring 
out our own domain and our own capacities. So I worry about our 
capacity to do our work and then our capacity to monitor others 
to ensure that they, too, are doing things the way they should.
 So yes, I think it needs to be robust across all, like in 
the Antarctic, where you can have, quote/unquote, ``surprise 
investigations'' of stations in the Antarctic. It should be, I 
think, along those lines, as well.
 Senator Sullivan. Any others?
 Mr. Kee. I want to hop on this for a second, and two things 
I would offer. Number one, first of all, Mead is not only, of 
course, a distinguished former Lieutenant Governor and former 
chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission but also serves as 
the Economic Energy Chair at the Stevens Center.
 I worked a little bit on the Commission myself before 
coming to start at the Stevens Center, and one piece of this is 
that during that time I also served at the Arctic Domain 
Awareness Center at the University of Alaska Anchorage.
 We did not cover one important piece about domain awareness 
that I think is important for the record, distinguishing 
between day-to-day where the traffic on the surface and the air 
are cooperative versus when they are not. How do we capture 
domain awareness for dark targets is a critical piece of the 
equation that we did not address.
 The second piece is when the crisis happens, connectivity 
day-to-day that we rely on may not be available. Just a few 
days ago I was with the 11th Airborne up in JPMRC, at a 
military exercise with the 11th Airborne on the interior. It is 
an exercise, and these folks are using technology we have 
available today, a lot of the folks are maintaining battlefield 
awareness in this exercise with Starshield. That is fine with 
day-to-day, but when we are in a contested environment, how 
reliable are these. And these technologies we have become 
reliant on in day-to-day. When the crisis goes on I am sure 
that connectivity is not going to be as reliant, or it may be 
susceptible to just spoofing.
 So to Mead's point, though, when you look at the aspects of 
the shipping and increasing of economic opportunity through 
essentially the Transpolar Route, because if you look at the 
routes today between the Northwest Passage, right now, of 
course, it is pretty frozen over. It has a min draft of about 
33 feet. The Northern Sea Routes have a draft of about 38 feet. 
You are looking at the Transpolar Route as the only one that 
has an unlimited draft. You are seeing a lot of newer vessels 
that are moving in, with a 50- to 60-foot draft, putting 
essentially the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route 
pretty much out of business. Transpolar is going to matter.
 Mead Treadwell put together an effort a number of years ago 
called Qilak, looking at the aspects and authorizations and 
thinking about how you have a St. Lawrence Seaway of the 
Transpolar Route, not for today but as it is coming as we are 
getting to a diminishing ice environment.
 We at the Stevens Center are hosting a workshop on the 13th 
and 14th of April called the Arctic-Pacific Security Dialogue, 
one of our regional security dialogues, workshops focused on 
addressing thorny problems. How do we look at Arctic shipping 
and the shortfalls and limitations that are coming when we look 
at taking advantage and getting ahead of the ball, or perhaps 
skate to where the puck is going to be, in trying to figure 
this problem out. So I am looking forward, if folks are 
interested in that, come take a look with me later. We can get 
you an invite.
 Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts on that. 
Captain?
 Mr. White. Yes. We are looking at Arctic shipping right 
now. We have got a live watch. There is a program called Arctic 
Watch, created by Alaskans, using technology. And I want to say 
something about all these ships operating. They are assets to 
our country. We are putting sensors on them. We just put a 
sensor, a camera, on the Sikuliaq that operates up in the 
Arctic, so you can see everywhere it goes. It is down in the 
Antarctic right now. You can go on a webpage and you can look 
and see everything that vessel is seeing as it operates.
 We are putting sensors on boats and working with local 
communities to gather information and bring it to a fusion 
center, and it is for industry, it is for managing that 
maritime transportation system, but it is totally beneficial to 
national security. So it addresses that whole spectrum of 
issues. And that is how we have got to continue to work 
together. That program, Arctic Watch, is also working with 
locals in the communities to gather information and have a 
fusion center. And it might be stuff that is relevant to 
Customs or the Coast Guard or DoD, or it might be stuff that, 
hey, this is important for managing our ports and our maritime 
safety and logistics up there. But we need to work together if 
we are going to close this gap.
 Senator Sullivan. Any other questions from the audience?
 Mr. Leathard. I was up there and saved the whales, and the 
ship that came in and sliced through that 15-foot wall of ice, 
like butter, was a cargo ship, an icebreaking cargo ship from 
the Soviet Union. That is how far behind we have fallen behind.
 Senator Sullivan. Well, we are making progress. Listen, I 
want to thank the panel again. I want to thank our audience. 
Two hours, that is a long hearing, but I think it is very 
important.
 So I think now we are going to just turn to, I think we 
have some press here. The whole idea was to do a little bit of 
a press conference.
 [Whereupon, at 1:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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