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[Senate Hearing 119-524] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-524 CLOSE CALLS: IMPROVING SAFETY ACROSS THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION of the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JUNE 23, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-617 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking JOHN THUNE, South Dakota JACKY ROSEN, Nevada TED BUDD, North Carolina JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania TIM SHEEHY, Montana ANDY KIM, New Jersey SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on June 23, 2026.................................... 1 Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 1 Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 2 Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 29 Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 31 Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 33 Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 40 Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 48 Prepared statement........................................... 51 Witnesses Governor Christopher T. Sununu, President and Chief Executive Officer, Airlines for America.................................. 5 Prepared statement........................................... 6 Todd Hauptli, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Association of Airport Executives.............................. 8 Prepared statement........................................... 10 James A. Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association............................. 13 Prepared statement........................................... 14 Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association.... 19 Prepared statement........................................... 21 Appendix Doug Woehler, Director of Business Development and Federal Programs, ADB SAFEGATE, prepared statement..................... 55 Response to written questions submitted to Chris Sununu by: Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 58 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 63 Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 64 Response to written questions submitted to Todd Hauptli by: Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 64 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 68 Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 70 Response to written question submitted to James A. Viola by: Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 71 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 71 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 74 Response to written questions submitted to Captain Jason Ambrosi by: Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 75 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 81 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 82 CLOSE CALLS: IMPROVING SAFETY ACROSS THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM ---------- TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2026 Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation, U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Cruz, Sheehy, Capito, Cantwell, Duckworth, Rosen, and Hickenlooper. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS Senator Moran. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for your presence this morning. Thank you to our witnesses for joining us. And Duckworth, it has been good to work with you, and bringing this subcommittee's hearing to fruition. And I now call that subcommittee to order. Our hearing is titled, ``Close Calls: Improving Safety Across the National Airspace System''. We have with us today Governor Sununu, Governor Chris Sununu, President CEO of the Airlines for America; Todd Hauptli, the President and CEO of American Association Airport Executives; James Viola, President CEO of General Aviation Manufacturers Association; and Jason Ambrosi, President of the Air Line Pilots Association. Thank you for your commitment to maintaining the safest air system in the world. This subcommittee, and certainly I as its Chairman, the safety of our aviation system is our highest priority. United States has built a remarkable safety record through decades of collaboration, innovation and commitment to learning from mistakes, but we certainly should not be complacent. Today's hearing reflects a growing concern shared by industry, government, and traveling public regarding numerous close calls we have seen in recent years across the Nation. Just this past weekend, at the Boston Logan International Airport, a Delta Airlines flight was forced to abort its landing and execute a go-around after an aircraft departed from an intersecting runway. While the flight landed safely and no one was injured, the incident serves, again, as a reminder of why continued vigilance and safety improvements across the National Airspace System remain essential. These incidents have occurred in a variety of different environments and different circumstances. These close calls did not become tragedies because of safety professionals, pilots, air traffic controllers, and airport personnel responded to the dangers, and our safety system worked. But regardless of that outcome, they still remain a warning call for, and a reminder that our aviation system is fragile and that we must act, FAA, the private sector, Congress should act, and always responsible, before a tragedy occurs. Today, we will evaluate the trends we are seeing across the system, whether current training programs are sufficient, if aviation professionals have the tools and resources they need, and whether we are utilizing all available technologies. We will also review the steps that can be taken by Congress, by the FAA, and industry to reduce risk and improve safety. The challenges facing our aviation system are not limited to a single issue, they include runway incursions, surface safety incidents, increasing operational complexity, workforce shortages, controller staffing concerns, aging infrastructure, and the need for technologies' modernization. Addressing these challenges require a systemwide approach and a commitment to continuous improvement. As we consider how to strengthen safety across the system, we should also evaluate how new technologies can help identify risks early. Recent reporting highlighted FAA's efforts to evaluate how artificial intelligence could assist with air traffic management, reduce congestion, and support operational decisionmaking. While these tools are not intended to replace and cannot replace the judgment of aviation personnel, they may offer new ways to identify emerging risks, improve situational awareness, and increase the safety of our air system. In the coming months, coming weeks really, I intend to introduce the Runway Safety Awareness and Focused Effective Training and Technology Act, of course, it turns into some set of letters, the Runway Safety Act. This legislation would focus on improving airport driver training, and supporting technologies to reduce runway incursions, and other safety-- surface safety incidents. Close calls should not simply be viewed as warnings, they are critical opportunities to strengthen the system, procedures and technologies that keep the flying public safe. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the trends they are seeing, the lessons that can be learned from recent close calls, and how Congress can partner with industry to make certain the United States maintains a high standard of aviation safety. Again, I thank our witnesses for your presence here today. And I recognize the Senator from Illinois, Senator Duckworth. STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Moran, I want to thank you so much for your continued work, and there is no question as to your dedication to aviation safety. Thank you for bringing together this panel of industry experts for a very critical conversation about an issue that should concern every American, the alarming rise in close calls in the National Airspace System. In November 2023, I chaired a committee hearing on this very topic. National Transportation Safety Board Chair, Jennifer Homendy, warned that, and I quote, ``The concerning uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign that the U.S. aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot wait until a fatal accident forces action. We must act before there is tragedy''. That warning has only grown more urgent. Today marks 510 days since an Army Black Hawk helicopter collided midair with Flight 5342 over the Potomac, a tragedy that robbed families of the chance to ever see their loved ones again. 67 people lost their lives. And we have four of those families here today. I thank you for your continuing dedication to turning your grief and loss into improving the air traffic control system for the rest of us. Last month when Administrator Bedford testified before this committee, I pressed him to commit to implementing the NTSB's recommendations stemming from the DCA mid-air collision. And I asked the same of this panel that is here today. We must learn from this catastrophe and from the hundreds of warning signs we see in close calls that happen every single year. While this is a hearing on close calls, I want to acknowledge tragedies that took place in the last two weeks. My heart goes out to the families of the 12 individuals that lost their lives in Butler, Missouri, when a single engine turboprop plane crashed in the field and caught on fire. And to the families of the eight people who were fatally injured when a B-52 crashed shortly after takeoff on Edwards Air Force Base. Our aviation system safety depends on layers of redundancy, when multiple layers begin to fray, the entire system becomes vulnerable. And in May, at Newark Liberty International Airport, United Flight 169 struck the light pole on final approach. The light pole then flew into a tractor trailer that was traveling southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike. I always knew that New Jersey Turnpike was dangerous, but, holy cow. Senator Kim is not here, but he would probably respond to that. The incident put 221 passengers, 11 crew members, and countless travelers at risk. Luckily, the truck driver only sustained minor injuries. And just this past Saturday, as the Chairman has mentioned, around 11:30 a.m., Delta Airlines Flight 2351 was on approach at Boston Logan International Airport, air traffic control cleared American Airlines flight 3161 to take off moments before Delta Flight 2351 was about to touch down on an intersecting runway. The crew of the Delta flight spotted the American Boeing 737, and executed a go-around to avoid a collision, saving the lives of the 129 passengers and six crew members on board. These close calls remind us of the tight margins for the calculations made by pilots and air traffic controllers. In far too many of these incidents, the difference between a close call and a deadly disaster has come down to a single highly trained and professional individual taking emergency action. We have been fortunate to have experienced pilots and air traffic controllers who prevent disaster, and we must continue to invest in those pilots and air traffic controllers. That is why I fought to protect the 1500-Hour Rule to ensure that pilots have the training necessary to make split- second decisions that save lives. The 1500-Hour Rule that came out of the Colgan air tragedy must be maintained. The safety of our skies would not be possible without the dedicated air traffic controllers, who are too often overworked, understaffed, and forced to use antiquated equipment. While I anticipate today's conversation will focus on the equipment that is needed to keep our skies safe, the workforce must be part of that conversation. The workforce is critical to that conversation. While new equipment is necessary, many of these issues that threaten aviation safety are far harder to tackle than replacing wires. Like rewiring the culture of complacency at the FAA, addressing the dire mental health issues that pilots and air traffic controllers too often experience, and building a robust aviation workforce. An effective modernization of the National Airspace System requires sustained focus and dedicated funding. And I can't believe that we are sitting here today, almost a year after the one big, beautiful bill that provided only a third of the funding required to modernize the air traffic control system. In fact, our President seems far more interested in spending $300 billion to reconstruct Iran, instead of spending a fraction of that, around $50 billion, to build an air traffic control infrastructure that would secure the safety of our skies. Think about that. He would rather spend $300 billion repairing Iran because of his war of choice, than actually investing in our air traffic control system, which we have said is critically in dire need of that investment. You know, that is in addition to the billions that the President jammed through Congress in his massive spending bill, and the millions in taxpayer dollars he has wasted on his pet projects, like his Marie Antoinette ballroom. Republicans may control both Chambers of Congress and the White House, but there is bipartisan agreement that we must strengthen the safety of the NAS. We must remain steadfast because real progress requires every stakeholder, industry, labor, regulators, policymakers on both sides of the aisle who are dedicated to this, we must work together. We frankly have no other choice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth, thank you very much. I would now like to introduce our witnesses. Our first witness is Governor Chris Sununu, the President and CEO of Airlines for America, which represents the country's major carriers and cargo companies. Mr. Sununu is the former Governor of New Hampshire and the longest-serving Republican Governor in nearly a century. Our second witness is James Viola, President and CEO of General Aviation Manufacturers Association. In his role, Mr. Viola represents the interest of over 140 airframes, avionic engine and component manufacturers. Our third witness is Todd Hauptli, President and CEO of the American Association of Airport Executives. Mr. Hauptli represents the interests of airport employees ranging from the C-suite, to the terminal, and airfield. And our final witness is Captain Jason Ambrosi, President of the Airlines Pilots Association. In his role, Mr. Ambrosi advocates for more than 75,000 pilots, serving as the spokesperson and leader for the organization, he advocates for pilot safety, and sustainable aviation industry. Governor Sununu, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR CHRISTOPHER T. SUNUNU, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA Governor Sununu. Well, thank you very much. Sir, good morning, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, Members of the Aviation Subcommittee. My name is Chris Sununu serving as President and CEO of Airlines for America. So thank you for inviting us, and on behalf of Airlines for America, and our members, we appreciate the opportunity to participate in this review of recent near misses and the work needed to further strengthen what is the safest aviation system in the world. Let us begin, obviously, by taking a moment to recognize the lives of those that have been lost and those affected in the recent accidents and to thank all those first responders who risk their lives in those situations. These moments are a somber reminder that aviation safety demands constant vigilance. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board, led by FAA administrator Bryan Bedford, and NTSB Chair, Jennifer Homendy. Their drive toward aviation safety and dedication to this critical mission is foundational to its success. U.S. commercial aviation remains extraordinarily safe and that record has been built through decades of disciplined collaboration among airlines, manufacturers, airports, pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers, and traffic controllers. Our industry is defined by its people and their commitment to learn from every incident. Airlines utilize data- driven, non-punitive, and highly collaborative safety programs to identify precursors and implement mitigations before harm occurs. Central to this approach are our air carrier Safety Management Systems, known as SMSes which institutionalize proactive hazard identification, risk assessment, and continuous improvement across operations. SMSes provide a structured organization-wide framework for managing safety risk through clearly defined policies, formal processes, and a strong safety culture, by integrating data from voluntary reporting programs, operational performance metrics, safety analysis, it is these SMSes that enables air carriers to prioritize their resources, address those emerging risks, and continuously monitor mitigation effectiveness. In addition, this cultural bedrock of safety, airlines utilize technology to combat challenges both in the air and on the airport surfaces. Technologies that reduce the likelihood of mid-air collisions by providing traffic and resolution advisories that direct pilots to maintain or increase separation. Those are a core safety component for our air carriers. Ground-based technologies that improve controller awareness, and reduce runway incursion risks are also integral in reducing those incidents and accidents. We always say aviation safety is a journey, it is not a destination. And while industry stakeholders and regulators continue their efforts to identify, assess, and mitigate systematic risk, there is also a key role for Congress to play. Most importantly, Congress must support the people, the infrastructure, and the operational stability that the National Airspace System requires. This includes supporting policies that promote the sustained hiring, training, and retention of safety--critical aviation workers. A modern safety system requires enough certified controllers, enough instructors, and enough training capacity to support the system safely and efficiently. Congress should absolutely build upon its $12.5 billion downpayment toward air traffic control modernization with the next round of funding, to ensure that technology gaps that have been ignored for the past 30 years finally get addressed. Air traffic modernization is one of the few policies that does enjoy bipartisan, bicameral support, as well as the support of nearly--the 60-member Modern Skies Coalition, consisting of stakeholder organizations across the entire industry. If I had an eighth page, I would read it to you. In closing, it is really all about making sure that the policies going forward are applicable, and timely, and making sure that we are not delaying anymore, whether it is in funding, whether it is in technology for operational safety, or making the investments in the most important part of the system, which is the people. We have the safest aviation system in the world, and that is something to be very proud of, but it also comes with the responsibility of maintaining that, and living that journey every single day. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Governor Sununu follows:] Prepared Statement of Christopher T. Sununu, President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Airlines for America Good afternoon, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Chris Sununu, and I am the President and CEO of Airlines for America (A4A). Thank you for inviting me here today, and on behalf of all our A4A members\1\, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's examination of recent near misses and the continued work we can all do to further strengthen the safest aviation system in the world. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ A4A is the trade association for the leading U.S. airlines, both passenger and cargo carriers. Members of the association are Alaska Airlines; American Airlines; Atlas Air; Delta Air Lines; FedEx; JetBlue Airways; Southwest Airlines; United Airlines; and UPS. Air Canada is an associate member. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Remembrance and Vigilance. I would be remiss not to take a moment to honor the lives of those lost and those affected in recent accidents and to thank all of the first responders who risk their lives reacting to these events. Safety is so interwoven in every facet of our operations and culture that when these rare moments of tragedy occur, they are somber reminders that aviation safety demands constant vigilance. Our thoughts are with those lost and the families left behind. Our industry is not defined by our response to tragedy alone, but by its commitment to learn from every incident, report and piece of safety data. Recent events such as the fatal runway collision at LaGuardia (March 2026) and a string of near misses at John F. Kennedy International Airport (May 2026), Newark Liberty International Airport (March 2026), Nashville International Airport (April 2026), along with multiple commercial crew reports of helicopter conflicts underscores that safety is not static, and it requires constant watchfulness, investment and continued evolution. In many cases these incidents are not the result of a single failure, but they reflect system complexity, with multiple layers of people, procedures and technology that must work together flawlessly. In several instances the multiple safety layers worked exactly as designed, onboard collision avoidance systems issued alerts, and pilots responded decisively to avoid tragedy. However, the system performing as intended should not be confused with a system beyond improvement. Our industry recognizes a clear obligation to identify root causes and conduct rigorous, forensic reviews that strengthen resilience. Every incident, regardless of its complexity, is an opportunity--and a responsibility--to learn. When any layer exhibits signs of stress, whether localized or systemic, it demands a deliberate and appropriate response. We must methodically strengthen the system, capturing every insight to ensure we are not just responding to incidents but preventing them entirely. Commercial Aviation Safety Commitment and Framework. U.S. commercial aviation remains extraordinarily safe, and that record was built through decades of disciplined collaboration among airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), manufacturers, airports, pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and air traffic controllers. As noted above, the system is safer today because the aviation community does not wait for accidents to reveal risk. Instead, our industry uses data-driven, non-punitive and highly collaborative safety programs to identify precursors and implement mitigations before harm occurs. Central to this approach are air carrier Safety Management Systems (SMS), which institutionalize proactive hazard identification, risk assessment and continuous improvement across operations. SMS provide a structured, organization-wide framework for managing safety risk through clearly defined policies, formal safety assurance processes and a strong safety culture. By integrating data from voluntary reporting programs, operational performance metrics and safety analyses, SMS enables air carriers to prioritize resources, address emerging risks before they escalate and continuously monitor the effectiveness of mitigations. That work is supported by programs such as the U.S. Aviation Safety Team (USAST) which includes the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA). These programs, together with broader SMS, help airlines to proactively identify and reduce risk. Addressing Close Calls. Near misses and close calls pose challenges both in the air and on the airport surface. Pragmatic adoption of new technology will play a key role in improving our system both in the air and on the ground. In flight, air carriers operate with established collision- avoidance systems that are independent of ground-based air traffic control. The Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is a set of onboard safety systems that includes Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II and newer ACAS X variants that are designed to reduce the likelihood of midair collisions by providing traffic advisories and, when needed, resolution advisories that direct pilots to maintain or increase separation. These capabilities are a core safety component for air carriers. Additional tools under discussion across the aviation community, including broader use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast In (ADS-B In) and related cockpit traffic-display capabilities, may further enhance situational awareness in certain operating environments. However, these technologies should be evaluated carefully with attention to certification requirements, integration with existing avionics and supply chain challenges, among others. It is important to note that not all aircraft fleet models are the same, and the ability for air carriers to utilize these technologies in the future is heavily dependent on factors outside the control of the air carrier, in particular, access to an FAA-certified solution. While these tools hold promise, there must be an appropriate amount of time to allow equipment to be designed, manufactured and installed in a normal maintenance cycle. A4A looks forward to continued work with the Committee on these solutions that can improve safety for all system users. On the airport surface, FAA has deployed or is expanding tools such as Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), the Surface Awareness Initiative, and Runway Incursion Devices to improve controller awareness and reduce runway incursion risk. In the wake of the LGA accident, the FAA has also increased focus on the use of vehicle movement area transmitters and runway warning systems to improve airfield safety. These investments are important for improved timely surveillance, clear communication, and situational awareness for both controllers and vehicle operators. A4A supports these efforts. Recommendations. Congress can play a critical role in reducing risk by supporting the people, infrastructure and operational stability that the National Airspace System (NAS) requires. While indirect to the specific incidents, Congress can provide predictability and stability through strategic investment for the foundational components necessary to not only maintain our system but also grow and improve the operational capabilities of the NAS while also improving safety through risk mitigation and durability. Specifically-- Air Traffic Controller Staffing. Continued attention to air traffic controller staffing and training is essential. FAA's 2026-2028 Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan underscores the importance of sustaining hiring, training and retention to rebuild staffing levels over time. A modern, resilient safety system requires enough certified controllers, enough instructors and enough training capacity to support the system safely and efficiently. Build the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS). A4A, as part of an unprecedented, industry-wide ``Modern Skies Coalition'' strongly supported Congress's $12.5 billion downpayment toward air traffic control modernization, and we continue to advocate in support of additional funding of at least $19 billion to completely build a new air traffic control system. Appropriations Regular Order. It is extremely important that Congress avoids disruption and prioritizes returning to regular order in the annual appropriations process, particularly when it comes to the funding for the FAA and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which provide monopoly services to the traveling public and aviation industry. Ensure the Traveling Public Is Not Harmed by Another Government Shutdown. Short of regaining regular order in the appropriations process, in any future shutdown instance, institute a governance and funding system that will provide stable and predictable funding to avoid future shutdown impacts on the traveling public. Travelers have paid for these services, and they should not be impacted by governmental policy differences that are unrelated to the operation of the aviation system. A4A is grateful for the work that has been done on controller staffing and ATC modernization but emphasizes near-term gains should not overshadow the long-term commitment and hard work necessary to fulfill the vision of a modernized ATC system. Conclusion. A4A appreciates the Committee's sustained attention to aviation safety and focus on measures to produce meaningful safety gains across the entire system. The U.S. has built a commercial aviation safety record that is second to none, and that record has evolved through decades of collaboration across the entire aviation ecosystem. Airlines do not compete on safety. Instead, we share information, we learn from mistakes and close calls and we work continuously to strengthen every layer of protection in the system. We welcome these discussions. Let me end with a clear and unequivocal point: The U.S. aviation system remains the safest in the world. Congress can, and should, optimize our safety capabilities through dedicated and sustained commitment to both the foundational workforce and technology components of the system. While risk can never be entirely eliminated, a stable, well-resourced system enables us to continuously reduce and manage risk across the system--strengthening safety for all users and the traveling public. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. Senator Moran. A better close than if you had a piece of paper. Governor Sununu. Thank you. Senator Moran. Well done. Mr. Hauptli, while I didn't introduce you in that order, Mr. Hauptli, you are now recognized. STATEMENT OF TODD HAUPTLI, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES Mr. Hauptli. Thank you. And thank you for the invitation. It is always an honor to be before the Committee, and thank you for your continued focus on aviation safety. Recent tragedies and incidents reinforce that we can never become complacent, take safety for granted, or lose our shared resolve to mitigate risks. To successfully mitigate risk and enhance safety, I believe we need to focus on process, people, and technology. Three points this morning: One, process. Safety management systems are an effective framework for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating hazards and risks. Airports, airlines, tenants, and the FAA utilize SMS to identify local risks and to tailor mitigation efforts to unique airport-specific circumstances. While the broad implementation of SMS across industry and government is enhancing safety, we need to strengthen FAA and industry coordination and data-sharing as my written testimony describes in more detail. Point two, people. There are opportunities to enhance safety on or near runways by addressing human factors, including more consistent initial and recurrent training. All workers who operate on airport movement areas, including runways, are required by the Federal Government to undergo extensive driver training, which often involves classroom or computer-based training, written tests, supervised driving, practical exams, and annual recurrent training. AAAE has decades of experience training airport workers. In the past year alone, we have delivered more than 67,000 movement area driver training courses and nearly 430,000 non- movement driver-training courses at 325 airports. And we are deploying AI capabilities to provide enhanced recurrent training that recognizes individual learning habits and adjusts accordingly to promote improved learning retention and training results. And while effective training tools are available and improving, we believe more can be done. Specifically, we support the establishment of a taskforce at FAA to develop recommendations on how to improve the consistency of movement area driver training and basic skills nationwide while preserving flexibility to address airport-specific conditions. We appreciate the conversations that we have had with you and your staff, Chairman Moran, and look forward to working with you to develop legislation in this area, recognizing its promise in improving runway safety at airports across the country. Point three, technology. Increased investments in technology and facilities to modernize the ATC system are producing real enhancements to safety and efficiency that we can build on in the years ahead to the benefit of travelers for generations to come. In the airport environment surface surveillance tools are expected to be in place at more than 200 airports in the months ahead. These systems promise to enhance safety and mitigate near misses and can be bolstered with the installation of vehicle movement area transmitters where possible. Airports differ in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, runway configuration, weather and low visibility operations, construction activity and vehicle access needs. And they must have the ability, through SMS and other assessments, to evaluate and prioritize technology deployment and safety investments to effectively target each dollar toward its highest and best safety purpose. Current airport resource limitations are real and growing. AIP is overs subscribed by a factor of three. PFCs have not been adjusted by for more than a quarter of a century. Billions of dollars in annual IIJI investments are expiring, and some in Congress are contemplating limits on the ability of airport operators to utilize technology to charge users for their use of airport facilities. We need to address those challenges recognizing that they impact the ability of airports to fund safety projects and other critical improvements. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hauptli follows:] Prepared Statement of Todd Hauptli, President and CEO, American Association of Airport Executives Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today's important hearing on close calls and improving safety across the national airspace system (NAS). While tens of thousands of commercial, general aviation, cargo, and military flights are completed successfully in the United States each day, recent tragedies and incidents reinforce that we can never become complacent, take safety for granted, or lose our shared resolve to mitigate risks. Your continued focus on safety--along with Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and the members of the committee--and your efforts to enhance aviation safety and invest in critical infrastructure on the ground and in the air are having a demonstrable benefit for the traveling public and all Americans. As public entities with a public safety mission, airports are grateful for your leadership and dedication, and we are committed to continuing our work with the committee, our industry partners, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address safety concerns on or near runways. Personally, it is always an honor to appear before the Commerce Committee and the Aviation Subcommittee on behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), the world's largest professional organization representing the individuals who work at public-use commercial and general aviation airports. AAAE's more than 12,000 members represent 950 airports as well as hundreds of companies and organizations that support the airport industry. In addition to advocating on behalf of our members, AAAE has a rich heritage of providing safety-related training and professional development opportunities for airport and aviation workers that we believe are relevant to today's hearing. While the focus of my testimony is primarily on those areas for which airports have responsibility, I want to note the importance of collaboration, cooperation, and communication among airport operators and our government and industry partners. Our nation's airspace and airport operating environments are exceedingly complex and unique, which adds to the challenge we face and limits the effectiveness of one-size-fits-all solutions. Safety requires constant vigilance, attention, and appropriate action by all who operate in the dynamic airport environment. Specifically, our efforts to successfully mitigate risk and enhance safety require us to constantly evaluate and enhance the processes, people, and technology at work in the airport environment. Safety Management Systems--Effective Framework for Risk Management Safety is a core focus and function of airports, consistent with their public nature and public mission. While that has been the case for decades, the broad implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS) allows airports to more effectively identify and mitigate systemic risk, including those related to close calls, runway incursions, and other safety hazards. Airport operators are using SMS to proactively identify and mitigate safety risks at their facilities. In 2023, the FAA issued a rule requiring certain Part 139 certificated airports to implement an SMS over a five-year period. A core component of these systems is safety risk management (SRM). As part of SRM, airport operators are required to establish a systemic process for (a) identifying operational safety hazards, (b) analyzing the level of risk associated with each of those hazards, and (c) mitigating the risk of the identified hazards. The tremendous value of SMS is enabling airport operators to identify safety risks and appropriate mitigation measures that are unique and tailored to their operating environment. Individuals with access to the airside are trained on how to report hazards, ensuring facility-specific risks are readily understood. Airport operators closely evaluate this data and implement corrective actions designed to mitigate the highest-risk hazards, such as additional training, new signage, or targeted infrastructure modifications. The SRM process avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes that no two airports face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures that limited financial resources are allocated where they will have the greatest impact on improving safety. In addition to identifying risks and implementing mitigation measures, Part 139 certificated airports falling within the purview of the rule must also adopt safety policies, promote and encourage safety across the organization, and maintain processes to ensure that any mitigation measures remain effective over time and the system is functioning properly. Together, these important SMS components help cultivate a safety culture and ensure continuous safety improvements. It is important to emphasize the role of airport SMS relative to FAA's and other stakeholders' SMS frameworks. Commercial airlines are governed by their own SMS requirements, and the FAA leverages its internal SMS program to guide decision-making on a wide range of operational and safety issues. This means that several different organizations may be utilizing distinct risk management processes simultaneously at a single airport. If a risk is identified by the FAA, an airport operator, or an airline, one or more of these organizations may need to implement mitigation measures, depending on which entity holds the operational capability to address that risk. The overlapping nature of these programs highlights a shared responsibility for risk management and the need for effective collaboration. As part of the SMS implementation process for airports, one major gap identified is the inability of FAA air traffic control facilities, air carriers, and other operators to confidently and efficiently share hazard data collected through their SMS programs with airport operators. As public entities, airport operators are generally subject to open records laws (commonly known as freedom of information laws) and must disclose safety data to the public upon request. These laws, while well intended, stymie safety by inhibiting the data disclosures and collaboration among entities that are needed to address issues before they arise. Given that reality, we urge the committee and Congress to protect safety data that FAA and other stakeholders share with airports from public disclosure under open records laws. Allowing data sharing among stakeholders without fear of retribution is critical to ensuring the highest levels of safety. Worker Training--Opportunities for Enhanced Safety While establishing and maintaining an SMS is critical to enhancing aviation safety on or near runways, addressing human factors, including effective initial and recurrent training, are equally important. Notably, many workers at airports--and all workers that operate on airport movement areas--are required by the Federal government to undergo extensive training and to demonstrate appropriate proficiency. In most instances, employees receive required training as part of their onboarding and in conjunction with the badging process, which all employees must undergo before working in secure areas of an airport, including the critical air operations area (AOA). Many airports require classroom or computer-based training, written tests, supervised driving, practical exams, annual recurrent training, and enforcement measures. For more than three decades, AAAE has played an important role in providing training to airports and their employees, tailoring options to meet the unique needs and budgets of individual airports. AAAE's Digicast system provides on-demand, web-based video training on safety, operations, maintenance, security, firefighting, customer service, human resources, and other topics. Digicast educates aviation employees about the complex airport work environment, promoting safe and efficient operations, and supporting airport compliance with federally mandated training. AAAE also provides customized, computer-based training for more than 125 individual airports through Interactive Employee Training (IET). AAAE's IET allows airports to report training results in real- time to allow for necessary adjustments and upgrades. Training courses and interactive exams are tailored to each airport operation and offer an easy method to deliver recurrent training. The system reduces paper recordkeeping and errors. Notably, AAAE has partnered with Blank Slate--a leading provider of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based training to the U.S. military and other leading institutions--to deploy enhanced recurrent training that recognizes individual learning habits and adjusts accordingly to promote improved learning retention and training results. IET courses cover the full range of airport operations and training needs, including Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) and sterile area security at both commercial service and general aviation airports; active shooter situations; Americans with Disabilities (ADA) training; customer service; fuel handling safety; insider threats; public vehicle inspection; airport terminal evacuation; cybersecurity; and human trafficking awareness, among others. With regard to airfield safety, the IET includes movement and non- movement area driver training courses, which review FAA Part 139 airport certification requirements for driving on those respective areas of the airfield. The courses review proper vehicle safety, definitions and causes of incidents, prevention of accidents and runway incursions, how to communicate with the tower, and review all movement area and non-movement area marking, lighting, and signage. Currently, 325 airports use IET and Digicast to deliver and track successful completion of FAA Part 139 movement and non-movement area driver training courses. Since 2025, AAAE's IET and Digicast systems have delivered more than 67,000 movement area driver training courses and nearly 430,000 non-movement area driver training courses. The IET also provides SMS training, which gives employees and tenants an overview of the airport's SMS plan. It highlights the airport's safety culture, clarifies a badge holder's reporting responsibilities, reviews tools that support the airport's SMS plan, and gives examples a badge holder can follow to demonstrate compliance. While AAAE is proud of our heritage in providing training to airport workers and constantly seeking to build upon our training platforms, including with the deployment of AI capabilities, we support an examination and review of FAA's requirements for initial and recurrent training to determine effective ways to improve the consistency of airside driver training programs. Specifically, we recommend the establishment of a task force at FAA to develop recommendations on how to improve the consistency of movement-area driver training and basic skills nationwide while preserving flexibility to address airport-specific conditions and factors. We appreciate the conversations we have had with you and your staff, Chairman Moran, and look forward to working with you to develop legislation in this area, recognizing its promise in improving runway safety at airports across the country. Technology and Infrastructure Investment Consistent with your efforts to enhance aviation safety, we also appreciate the leadership of the committee in advancing investments to modernize the Nation's air traffic control system, which are producing meaningful results that we hope to build on in the years ahead to the benefit of travelers for generations to come. Continued investments in technology and facility upgrades--including new tower construction-- will pay huge dividends with enhanced safety and improved efficiency throughout the NAS. AAAE recognizes the value of technology and surface safety surveillance tools to enhance safety, including FAA's deployment of Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems at 44 airports. While ASDE-X and ASSC have been effective, the industry needed more cost- effective solutions that could be quickly implemented, especially for smaller airports. Congress recognized the importance of surface surveillance in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Under section 347, FAA was directed to identify and deploy systems that may provide or improve surface surveillance at airports needing such capabilities. We appreciate the work that FAA has done thus far to implement section 347 and deploy Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) systems as part of the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS). The agency has installed the SAI systems at approximately 90 airports to date, and we understand that plans are in place to eventually reach 220 airports. These systems promise to enhance safety in the airport environment and mitigate near misses through improved situational awareness. Consistent with the SMS process and in consultation with FAA, we understand that airports with surface surveillance tools (ASDE-X, ASSC, or SAI) are evaluating the installation of vehicle movement area transmitters (VMATs) to improve situational awareness. It is important to note that these devices are not yet widely deployable at all airports across the country given where FAA is in the process of rolling out surface surveillance systems; the need for driver and controller training; supply chain and bandwidth concerns; and the lack of available resources to procure, install, program, test, and maintain the technology. Airports differ significantly in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, runway configurations, weather and low-visibility operations, hot spots, construction activity, and vehicle access needs. Given this complexity and the growing disconnect between available resources and airport investment needs for safety projects, capacity enhancements, terminal upgrades, and other critical projects, airports must have the ability through SMS and other assessments to evaluate and prioritize technology deployment and safety investments to ensure that each dollar goes toward its highest and best safety purpose. While we hope to see an increase in Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funding, a long-overdue adjustment to the Federal cap on local passenger facility charges (PFCs), and an extension of expiring Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) programs in the months ahead, airports currently face a growing list of worthy projects and a shrinking pool of resources to pay for them. Airports are meeting their immediate, highest priority safety needs, but their ability to work their way further down a growing list of important projects is limited. Finally, I would like to thank Senators Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Steve Daines (R-MT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) for introducing S. 3929, the Air Traffic Situational Awareness Enhancement Act. This important safety bill authorizes funds to pay for the acquisition, installation, and operation of Airborne Position Reference Tools (APRTs) at contract towers that lack Standard Terminal Automation Replacement Systems (STARS). This long overdue equipment upgrade will allow controllers to use situational awareness displays to keep track of nearby aircraft and avoid potential accidents in line with the focus of today's hearing. Thank you again for the invitation to appear before you on behalf of AAAE, and thank you for your continued leadership. Senator Moran. Mr. Viola, welcome. STATEMENT OF JAMES A. VIOLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION Mr. Viola. Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify and for holding today's hearing. I am proud to represent General Aviation Manufacturers Association, better known as GAMA. GAMA is an international trade association representing more than 130 companies across the General Aviation manufacturing and services sectors. Our members include the world's largest manufacturers of General Aviation airplanes, rotorcraft, advanced air mobility, powered lift aircraft, engines, avionics, components and related technology. GAMA members are also providers of maintenance and repair services, fixed-base operations, pilot and maintenance training, and aircraft management companies. In the U.S., our industry supports $339 billion in economic output, and 1.3 million jobs nationwide. I personally have a comprehensive aviation background. I flew Black Hawks in the Army's 82nd Airborne, and Chinooks in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and later served at the FAA overseeing pilot certification and General Aviation safety. Just this weekend, I flew both an OH-6 Loach Helicopter and a Grumman Tiger airplane. I hold an air transport ratings for both categories and I am a flight instructor with 8,000 hours. I, again, offer my condolences to the families affected by the tragic accident at Reagan National last January. That tragedy reminds us all to keep strengthening aviation safety culture. GAMA applauds the commitment and leadership of this body to respond to the tragic accident. GAMA values the work being done to foster technologies developed by aviation manufacturers to advance safety and operational improvements. GAMA is also proud to be serving on the Committee of the Modern Skies Coalition which is supporting the modernization of our air traffic control system. GAMA is focused on helping foster aviation safety, and we support many key initiatives including the implementation of SMS, the Safety Management Systems and the work of the GAJSC, or the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee. It is a public- private partnership with the FAA that has helped reduce fatal accident rates for issues like controlled flight into terrain through better situation awareness technology. The numbers for General Aviation show real progress. The General Aviation fatal accident rate has improved from 1.12 per 100,000 flight hours a dozen years ago, to an FAA preliminary estimate of 0.58 last year. That progress comes from the safer aircraft, better pilot training standards, and technology adoption such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast systems, better known as ADS-B. As of the beginning of this year, over 171,000 aircrafts are now equipped with ADS-B Out, which transmits the aircraft's position and flight information. And the vast majority of those operators have voluntarily installed ADS-B In to see other traffic. Electronic flight packs provide these safety benefits to aircraft without installed displays, giving pilots traffic, weather, and terrain awareness on a tablet. General Aviation Manufacturers continue to innovate and provide solutions that improve runway and taxiway safety, and give pilots three-dimensional views of traffic, terrain, and weather in the cockpit. Next-generation collision avoidance systems are being layered on top of ADS-B to give pilots even earlier warnings of nearby traffic and obstacles. These technologies are real. Many are available today and this is proof that our industry is investing in safety solutions. I do, however, want to highlight that making progress in safety involves the entire aviation ecosystem. New safety technology only reaches cockpits if the FAA has the resources and the workforce to certify promptly, if FAA and global regulators harmonize the standards, if the supply chain can deliver parts, and if our maintenance and repair shops already near capacity can install it. I thank this subcommittee for its leadership and commitment to enhance aviation safety. Your sustained attention and your willingness to work with industry on solutions makes a real difference in how quickly these technologies can reach pilots and passengers. GAMA stands ready to be a resource on technology certification and safety policy as you continue this important work. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. And I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Viola follows:] Prepared Statement of James A. Viola, President and CEO, General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members of the Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation, on behalf of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), thank you for inviting me to testify on how aviation safety can be enhanced through technology in the air and on the ground. The general aviation sector is a leader in safety innovation, and I am privileged to represent general aviation manufacturers and maintenance providers who are at the forefront of these efforts to prevent close calls and safety incidents. While I firmly believe flying is safe, recent events have justifiably raised the public's concern, and GAMA appreciates the subcommittee's focus on this topic. I have an extensive background in aviation that is relevant to the conversation about improving aviation safety including addressing recent close call incidents. My career began with the United States Army, with much of my military flying done in the 82nd Airborne Division and in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. My final military assignment was as Division Chief for Army Aviation, Current Operations in the Pentagon. After my military career, I served at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a Senior Executive in the position of acting Deputy Associate Administrator of Aviation Safety, and Director of General Aviation Safety Assurance. In this role, I was responsible for maintaining consistency and standardization in the application of safety oversight activities for the general aviation community. I am also strong proponent of general aviation and a frequent user of its products as a pilot in the U.S. airspace. I fly an R-44 Robinson Helicopter and an AG-5B Tiger airplane. I also hold airline transport pilot ratings for helicopters and airplanes and am a dual-rated certificated flight instructor, having flown more than 80 make and models of aircraft. I have accumulated over 8,000 flight hours, which includes 1,100 hours with night-vision goggles. I was appointed the President and CEO of GAMA in 2025. GAMA is an international trade association representing more than 130 companies across the general aviation manufacturing and services sectors. Its members include the world's leading manufacturers of general aviation airplanes, rotorcraft, advanced air mobility powered-lift aircraft, engines, avionics, components, and related technologies. GAMA members are also providers of maintenance and repair services, fixed-based operations, pilot and maintenance training, and aircraft management companies. In the U.S., general aviation supports $339 billion in total economic output annually and 1.3 million total jobs\1\. General aviation contributes to the economies of all 50 states and the District of Columbia, with GAMA companies having facilities in 49 states. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Contribution of General Aviation to the U.S. Economy, PwC, February 2025 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- General Aviation and a Multi-Faceted Approach to Safety and Culture Given my experience in the military, at the FAA, and as a general aviation pilot of both fixed-wing airplanes and rotorcraft, I want to again express my condolences to the families of those affected by the tragic accident at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in January of 2025 as well as others impacted by recent accidents and incidents. These events are a reminder that we all must strive for a stronger aviation safety culture and better outcomes. This includes building on past efforts and prioritizing the ongoing work of government and private entities that collaborate to improve aviation safety. GAMA applauds the commitment and leadership of the Senate to respond to the tragic accident at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport last year. GAMA values the work being done to foster technologies developed by aviation manufacturers to advance safety and operational improvements. As the Senate and House continue their work on their response, GAMA stands ready to be a resource on technology developments, certification, and related issues to further progress important aviation safety initiatives. GAMA is focused on helping foster aviation safety and I would like to highlight several of our initiatives in this area. GAMA and our members continue to support the development and implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS) for manufacturers. A mature SMS is a significant contributor to a positive culture that drives a continuous focus on safety. Ahead of the May 2027 deadline for implementation of an SMS for production and type certificate holders,\2\ manufacturers have made meaningful progress implementing SMS, building upon voluntary SMS initiatives that our industry has undertaken over the past few decades to meet international obligations. Our members have approached building an SMS with a spirit of collaboration, including with operators, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and suppliers, learning from challenges and sharing how to continuously evolve a positive safety culture. We appreciate the work of this Committee in supporting these efforts, including for the FAA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Aircraft Certiï¬cation Safety and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GAMA is also a longstanding leader, along with industry colleagues, of the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC).\3\ This is a public-private partnership, in collaboration with the FAA, that since 1997 has sought to reduce the general aviation accident rate and improve aviation safety through data analysis and identification of systemic issues. We also support similar work under the United States Helicopter Safety Team (USHST)\4\, a companion effort between industry and the FAA focused on reducing the rate of rotorcraft accidents. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ GAJSC.org \4\ USHST.org --------------------------------------------------------------------------- An early initiative under the GAJSC was to facilitate policies for providing improved situational awareness to general aviation pilots. Work in the late 1990s placed focus on the FAA facilitating digital display equipment installation, specifically to provide terrain data to pilots to prevent Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).\5\ Providing pilots with the ability to see the terrain in which they operate around, as well as obstacles, using installed displays and portable devices has resulted in a reduction in the CFIT fatal accident rate in general aviation operations by approximately 80 percent. This is without the FAA taking any regulatory action but instead enabling use of installed and portable equipment in general aviation operations. The GAJSC and USHST have continued to make progress on issues like pilot medical fitness, maintenance practices, risks associated with accidental flight into instrument meteorological conditions (UIMC), and midair collision risks (MAC). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ General Aviation (GA) Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) Final Report [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Figure: GAJSC safety dashboard by CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Classification for U.S. fatal accidents showing rate of CFIT fatal --------------------------------------------------------------------------- accidents. GAMA also works with our member companies to facilitate and support conferences that advance safety and technology adoption. For example, last week my staff and I were privileged to help facilitate and attend the annual FAA and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) International Aviation Safety Conference where regulators and industry met collaboratively to discuss and advance aviation manufacturing and safety. The conference agenda focused on certification and validation of aircraft and systems, including how to manage equipage approvals across U.S. and foreign states of design to address mandates such as for new datalink communications, 25-hour cockpit voice recorders, and radio altimeter systems. The conference also discussed work over the past decade to equip aircraft with Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out across U.S. domestic airspace and in foreign jurisdictions and Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting System (ROAAS) to learn lessons that can guide future work, as well as establishing appropriate level of involvement, and utilization of bilateral partners, especially amongst the four leading States of Design: Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and the United States. In the wake of the accident at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, the aviation industry collectively came together to form the Modern Skies Coalition\6\. GAMA is a proud Steering Committee member along with others assembled here today. These stakeholders, including airlines, operators, manufacturers, labor unions, and airports are working collectively and collaboratively to support increased aviation safety through air traffic system modernization. We remain a strong proponent of the coalition's efforts to support targeted investments in critical aviation technologies and infrastructure which will provide certainty for the aviation sector in the near and long-term. GAMA and its members thank policymakers for their past support of this initiative and continue to urge congressional focus to support further investments for the entire aviation sector and flying public. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Modern Skies Coalition --------------------------------------------------------------------------- General Aviation Safety Status Today There are many factors that play into general aviation statistics on safety, culture, and operations that merit being highlighted. First, general aviation aircraft are well-equipped with safety enhancing technology thanks to a strong array of products in the marketplace today. The U.S. general aviation and on-demand Part 135 accident rate has improved over the past dozen years from 1.12 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flight time to 2025 when the FAA preliminary estimate of 0.58 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flight time. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will provide the official update for last year in the next few months.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ FAA on-demand Part 135 and general aviation survey --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The improvements in safety have not come from one initiative, but from newer and safer aircraft being introduced into the fleet, the introduction of risk management into primary flight training through the deployment of new Airmen Certification Standards (ACS), and the continued investment in new technologies, including the mandate for ADS-B Out equipage and enabling improved situational awareness in the cockpit. As of January 1, 2026, over 171,000 aircraft have been equipped with ADS-B Out equipment with approximately 160,000 of those aircraft being in the general aviation fleet.\8\ This is important because ADS-B Out enables the use of ADS-B In application. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ AC 20-165B--Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast OUT Systems --------------------------------------------------------------------------- FAA statistics on ADS-B In equipage show that somewhere between 143,170 and 158,358 general aviation aircraft leverage this solution through installed equipment.\9\ This includes aircraft that receive ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft or transmitted from the ground to receive ADS-B In on either the 1090 MHz or 978 MHz spectrum link, or both.\10\ Basically, of those aircraft that are equipped with installed ADS-B Out for operation in certain airspace, the vast number also made the independent choice to equip with ADS-B In to take advantage of the safety benefits from seeing other traffic. Additionally, many also chose to leverage FAA's uplinked Flight Information Services Broadcast (FIS-B) data using the ADS-B surveillance ground infrastructure to provide weather and other safety information --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys | Federal Aviation Administration \10\ ibid --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notably, these statistics do not reflect the other general aviation aircraft that access ADS-B in situational awareness applications via electronic flight bags (EFBs) also referred to as portable devices. Widely used by general aviation pilots both by those with installed ADS-B In displays and those without an installed display system, EFBs and portable devices are used for a variety of situational awareness and other purposes including access to navigational charts, checklists, operations manuals, weather, and for algorithmic functions like weight and balance, performance, and fuel calculations, as well as terrain information and other traffic.\11\ They can be portable, attached to a mounting device, or have a receiver installed on the aircraft which transmits the uplinked data, such as ADS-B Out, to the tablet using Bluetooth or other capability.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ AC 91-78A--Use of Electronic Flight Bags \12\ ibid --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While the statistics and technologies highlighted illustrate an array of solutions found in the general aviation marketplace, there are some unique challenges for specific aircraft in their quest to utilize and derive the overall safety benefit from everyone having ADS-B In. This underscores the importance of solutions like EFBs and portable devices which can provide flexibility and utility while maintaining safety. Any policy effort in this area must reflect the reality of general aviation's leadership in ADS-B Out and ADS-B In equipage over the past dozen plus years. We are also starting to hear conversations about ``electronic conspicuity'' (EC) and its potential role in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). The ``EC'' term describes a broad umbrella of technologies, but most are rooted in ADS-B and the capabilities brought to the aviation industry by making aircraft more electronically conspicuous, hence the term. The initial focus has been on how to use a portable ADS-B Out solution for aircraft that cannot practically install ADS-B Out equipment, such as those without electrical systems or where the installation simply is not practical. Congress directed the focus on this work in Sec. 810 and 906 of the 2024 FAA Reauthorization Act and we are eagerly looking forward to the release of the reports called for in the law. These initial efforts have grown and now encompass efforts sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to explore the use of EC for drone integration. The FAA has advanced a proposal as well as the Part 108 Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rulemaking project. Additionally, foreign aviation regulators including Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom are fleshing out what EC will mean to them, sometimes based on ADS-B and the protected aviation spectrum while others are using cell phone technologies and unprotected spectrum. For GAMA, EC may serve a role to improve see-and-avoid between pilots of manned aircraft. More work will be needed to flesh out the potential role of EC for purposes of UAS integration, including establishing a certification threshold appropriate for an application that is more complex than what was originally envisioned for ADS-B Out and ADS-B In technologies. An Illustration of Technology in General Aviation Numerous general aviation ADS-B In applications exist today. FAA-- working with industry--has enabled several applications focused on enhancing situational awareness of the pilots including cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) and related applications for airborne operations as well as those that improve surface and runway safety using GPS and ADS-B Out generated data. The safety benefits they yield are important to aviation safety and traffic management in the air and on the ground and in many cases build off the data and situational awareness provided by ADS-B. This includes applications that further runway and taxiway safety, situational awareness and collision avoidance, and improved delivery of clearances. Other technologies are also provided by these avionics system vendors to facilitate the reduction of runway incursions, runway excursions, avoiding other aircraft while airborne, and providing pilots with an improved weather picture. And, of course, they also make traditional collision avoidance systems such as TCAS I, and TCAS II as well as Traffic Awareness Systems, technologies still in wide use across the fleet today and complemented by ADS-B Out and In systems as well as next generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) technologies. These initiatives focus on many different areas from: 1) Precise enroute spacing yielding better airspace management; 2) 3-dimensional depictions of traffic obstacles, terrain, and flight plan overlay during challenging weather as an aid to pilots; and 3) Runway technologies increasing flight crew awareness and providing alerts during taxi, takeoff, and landing helps to address runway incursions caused by nearby airborne aircraft, aircraft on the ground, and ground vehicles. We are also looking for more effective communication between controllers and pilots at more airports in the aviation system. Mobile clearance technology builds on work at 78 larger airports that now have the capacity via a terminal data link to provide pre-departure clearances on installed systems. While installed systems have been embraced in the general aviation fleet with close to 6,300 general aviation airplanes and business jets\13\ having voluntarily upgraded their aircraft with this capability to utilize these services at the 78 airports over the past half-a-dozen years, as of last week. The mobile clearance program shows how this same capability can be brought to portable devices and using over-the-air Internet to facilitate similar functions for the NAS and the larger general aviation fleet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ FAA Data Communications Implementation Team (DCIT) Briefing --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This technology enables clearances to be delivered digitally, instead of via voice communication, reducing read back and hear back errors. These advancements enable safer and more efficient traffic management in a more consistent and precise manner, and we appreciate the partnership of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) with this work. We appreciate the support of the U.S. Congress in supporting this program (Section 614) in the recent FAA reauthorization and we have high hopes for this program and its expansion. Challenges with Innovation Reaching the General Aviation Marketplace Furthermore, this discussion on new technology underscores how critical FAA certification and its work with other regulatory authorities plays in the adoption of technology and safety into the general aviation cockpit. Simply put, if the FAA does not have the focus, resources, workforce capacity, and technological expertise to provide appropriate oversight and approval, it may inhibit safety enhancements from reaching the marketplace in a timely manner. Modernization of FAA certification processes to keep pace with innovation enables safety through new products and technologies and is critical given the current state of innovation and other regulatory demands that are increasing. Additionally, depending in the policy path chosen, certifying and equipping aircraft with new airborne technologies will take time, making it essential that the direction that the United States will take, especially if there are changes needed to aircraft and their systems, is known years prior to any requirement entering into effect. Another important component to developing and certifying safety enhancing equipment is FAA participation and collaboration with industry and global standards bodies to achieve technical consensus for new products and technologies. Development of these standards takes considerable effort and can vary based on the complexity of the subject matter. In addition, like FAA policy and guidance, these standards must be routinely reviewed and amended to keep pace with change. For this reason, continuous engagement by both industry and FAA in standards development for certification is a key component of getting critical safety technologies into the general aviation cockpit. The FAA must remain an active partner with standards bodies, other regulators, and industry partners to help promote harmonization of standards for products in the global marketplace. Once a new safety technology has met the appropriate standards and is certified by the FAA, product availability moves to the forefront. Like other industries that are complex, the aviation sector has experienced challenges associated with its supply chain. First, FAA certification of safety enhancement is followed by production approval of the product and individual parts and equipment. As such, if there is a supply chain impediment with a part it can impact the ability of the broader safety enhancement getting to the marketplace. Second, aviation supply chain and operations are international, so broader domestic or international trade policies can potentially impact or constrain the marketplace. Installation of equipment is the final step in this process. Aircraft are routinely serviced and inspected to ensure safety and airworthiness. Today, many of GAMA's member companies who work in the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) space share that they are nearing or at capacity with existing work. For this reason, any additional mandatory or voluntary equipage requirements put forward by policymakers or regulators will necessitate coordination and facilitation with the MRO community to be implemented effectively. As an example, the FAA's ADS-B Out equipage rebate program\14\ that provided an incentive for installation was coordinated with the MRO community and avionics providers to effectively manage parts supply and maintenance capacity. Moving forward, this example serves as a model but also highlights the need for collaboration amongst government and industry to enable safety solutions to reach the cockpit. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ FAA ADS-B Out Rebate Program for General Aviation --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Conclusion On behalf of GAMA and its membership, I am hopeful that the safety efforts on behalf of our industry, the overview of general aviation adoption, and the examples of current technologies and challenges are beneficial to understanding how our sector is working to address close calls and improve safety. This includes continued collaboration and engagement with regulators, technical experts, policymakers, and industry on both a domestic and international basis to build upon and advance the solutions highlighted. General aviation manufacturers and maintenance providers will also continue to design, certify, and install new safety technologies that aim to address the challenges we collectively all desire to address. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to elaborating on these topics and addressing any questions you may have. Senator Moran. Thank you very much. Captain Ambrosi, welcome. STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you. Good morning, Chair Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify and present the perspective of the 80,000 commercial airline pilots of the Airline Pilots Association International. My name is Jason Ambrosi, and I am a current and qualified 767 Captain at Delta Airlines, and President of ALPA since 2023. As I speak before this committee today, my thoughts are with my Union brothers, we have lost to two tragic collisions in the past 16 months. Captain Antoine Forest and First Officer Mackenzie Gunther who lost their lives in the ground collision at LaGuardia in March of this year, and Captain Jonathan Campos, and Honorary Captain Samuel Lilley and the 65 others who died in the mid-air collision in DCA in January 2025. The unfortunate truth in aviation is that we make the most progress on safety only after lives have already been lost. Yes, we honor the lives of those lost by strengthening aviation safety, but I can assure you we would all rather have our Union brothers flying the line with us. And I know their families would certainly rather have them in their lives rather than honoring their legacy. ALPA is calling for urgent action with the full knowledge that technologies that could have prevented these accidents exist and are readily available right now. I commend the quick work of this committee and the leaders in the Senate who drafted and passed the ROTOR Act which seeks to close the gaps in the aviation safety net that allowed the Potomac mid-air collision, and similar accidents to happen. Your collective urgency matched the gravity of the moment. The mid-air collision exposed a safety gap, the lack of an integrated ADS-B In mandate, without it, pilots are forced to rely on last-second warning systems, like TCAS, that offered limited alerting time, insufficient call-out information, and are suppressed near the ground, like in the airport environment. Pilots are the safest when we are aware of and can avoid threats. Of particular importance for this hearing, the ROTOR Act also has substantial benefits for surface safety, including runway incursions. The Legislation's performance standards require integrated capabilities for pilots on the airport surface. This would include adopting the use of ADS-B In applications for direct runway safety-relevant traffic, and runway alerts to flight crew on cockpit display of traffic information. Much like the airborne benefits of ADS-B In that have been discussed at length, ROTOR's surface applications will give flight crews better awareness of what is happening around them at the airport. These tools identify the runway traffic status under normal operational conditions, alert pilots to any abnormal traffic conditions, and enable them to take evasive action. There are other critical technologies and systems that we must implement and support to reduce the risk of close calls and accidents. In the airport environment, we must invest in systems that could prevent collisions similar to the accident at LaGuardia earlier this year. While the NTSB continues that investigation, it is clear from other close calls that we need to do more to protect against runway incursions with surface technologies like Airport Surface Surveillance Capability. In addition to emerging technologies, the FAA must continue to support existing tools like runway status lights, and Airport Surveillance Detection Equipment, Model X. ALPA proudly stands with the administration's support--and supports the administration's commitment to modernize air traffic control, and urges further investment to bring this plan to reality in order to maintain safe airspace for existing users as well as new entrants. 95 years ago, ALPA was founded by pilots who refused to accept that dying on the job was simply a part of flying. We fought for the very standards that today help make aviation the safest mode of transportation. Maintaining this safety record is knowing that, when not to accept good enough. Two fatal accidents in months tell us good enough is no longer good enough. This is the time for action, not the time to give in to special interests fighting progress. We cannot stall. We cannot water down the safety advancements of the ROTOR Act. We must keep moving forward. We owe it to the 67 lives lost in the Potomac mid-air collision, and every life lost in aviation accidents, to continue the fight for safety. The time to act on aviation safety is now and I commend this committee's dedication to make our system safer. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ambrosi follows:] Prepared Statement of Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International On behalf of the nearly 80,000 pilots represented by the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), I want to thank you for inviting me to testify for this timely hearing: ``Close Calls: Improving Safety Across the National Airspace System.'' My name is Jason Ambrosi, and I am a current and qualified international captain on the Boeing 767 at Delta Air Lines and serve as the president of ALPA. ALPA is the largest pilot union as well as the largest non- governmental aviation safety organization in the world, with a history of safety advocacy spanning more than 90 years. Over the last several decades, the collective efforts of industry, labor, and government, alongside advances in technology and legislative and regulatory intervention, have helped create the aviation industry's strong safety record. The industry remains safe for both passenger travel and cargo operations, particularly in commercial 14 CFR Part 121 operations. However, advancements in safety are never guaranteed, and complacency is often the biggest threat to the aviation system. Too frequently, tragedies are the forcing event for necessary change and long overdue improvements to safety. Unfortunately, commercial aviation has seen two fatal accidents since I last testified before this Committee: the 2025 Potomac River midair collision between PSA Flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter, and the 2026 LaGuardia ground collision involving Air Canada Flight 8646 operated by Jazz and a Port Authority Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) truck. ALPA pilots were killed aboard both aircraft, in addition to the many lives lost on PSA Flight 5342 and those injured at LaGuardia. There is no question that additional life-saving technology could have been deployed to either prevent or mitigate each accident. ALPA remains steadfast in our commitment to work with this Committee, including implementing the ROTOR Act's core requirements, to ensure the lives lost in these preventable accidents are not in vain and to establish the highest standards for safety. This includes, first and foremost, requiring the installation and operation of fully integrated ADS-B In situational awareness technology in the flight deck and the closure of ADS-B Out loopholes for military aircraft in shared airspace. It also means continued deployment and installation of additional surface awareness safety systems, comprehensive air traffic control modernization, improved analysis of existing safety data, and continued cooperation between industry stakeholders and regulators. Prior to the PSA and Air Canada fatal accidents, the U.S. aviation system experienced a record level of safety, as the number of fatalities associated with U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased more than one-third over the last decade. This success stemmed from decades of industry-wide work and commitment to collaboration, data collection and analysis, hazard identification and mitigation, and technological advancements. However, just as the last major legislative action to improve aviation safety was borne from the tragedy of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident and the Boeing 737 MAX accidents, continued advancements in safety must be made in response to these recent fatal accidents. The Safety System At the airline level, Safety Management Systems (SMS) are used to identify, address, and reduce organizational and systemic risks. The goal of SMS is to identify active failures and inadequate mitigations so that hazards can be contained while preventive measures can be adopted or reinforced. SMS adds value to an organization's safety structure by identifying hazards and mitigating risks before they develop into full accidents. The systems are complex and require assessments of human factors and their relation to other workplace components. The most successful SMS incorporate a collaborative effort between the organization, labor, regulator, and manufacturers to build a robust and diverse SMS team. One of the foundational activities in SMS is the use of voluntary safety programs, where pilots and other front-line workers can anonymously raise safety concerns through an aviation safety action program (ASAP) report. Airlines with a healthy and positive safety culture will receive a significant volume of reports. On a recurring basis the airline management, pilots, and an FAA representative review all reports to determine what lessons can be learned and how to address any identified safety risks. It is this continuous evaluation of new risks and hazards that is core to safety management systems. The system is at work at the airport level, too, where collaboration between air traffic controllers, pilots, airport leadership, the FAA, and other stakeholders takes place regularly. At each airport with an operating air traffic control tower, Runway Safety Action Teams (RSAT) review operational issues, concerns, and risks. These meetings are FAA-led, and ALPA participates as a partner. Airports with commercial airline services are now implementing SMS programs following the FAA's Final Rule on Airport Safety Management Systems promulgated in 2023. We believe that requiring certain airport certificate holders to develop, implement, maintain, and adhere to an airport SMS will further increase airport safety. Close Calls: Actions & Technological Solution The last hearing in this Committee on close call events focused on the rebound in air traffic following the COVID-19 pandemic, including a massive retraining event for pilots who were shuffled between fleets and aircraft types to accommodate carrier growth. While the reallocation of labor and substantial hiring growth for pilots has subsided, the tension of close call events, and now fatal accidents, serve as a warning for our National Airspace System (NAS). Most of these incidents and accidents are centered in and around the airport operating environment and can be precipitated by various underlying factors, including degraded situational awareness, high workload, unfamiliar settings or procedures, reduced visibility, communication errors, and insufficient technological standardization. ALPA is concerned with the close calls in the airport and terminal environments, especially in complex airspace, where FAA air traffic controllers manage the movement of aircraft and other surface vehicles. The following steps, at a minimum, must be taken: Surface safety systems need to be installed at all airports as soon as possible, regardless of the costs, given the urgency of the current situation. For more than two decades, the Airport Surveillance Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) was deemed suitable for widespread deployment. ASDE-X relies on surface radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide air traffic controllers with the ability to monitor the movements of aircraft and ground vehicles that are equipped with position transmitting devices. The system includes visual and auditory alerts to warn controllers of potential runway incursions and collision hazards. ASDE-X is only installed at 35 airports around the country. Similarly, ASSC Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), which is installed at only nine airports, is the next generation of surface surveillance system that was developed as part of the FAA's NextGen modernization program. ASSC can transmit surface traffic information to not only the controller's tower display. The preliminary NTSB report determined the ARFF truck involved in the March 22 accident at LaGuardia did not have an ADS-B transmitter that would have allowed it to be depicted as a vehicle on these systems. Although the FAA recently announced plans to equip all of the FAA surface vehicles with ADS-B transmitters, there are no FAA requirements to equip ground vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up to airports to voluntarily install them. This is a policy choice rather than a standard. ALPA was pleased the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 included guidance to the FAA to ensure that legacy surface safety systems, including the ASDE-X system, remain fully operational, but we strongly urge the Committee to eliminate whatever barriers the FAA identifies to rapidly expand surface surveillance to all airports with an air traffic control tower, and ALPA fully supports ongoing efforts by FAA to deploy commercially available technology as part of the Surface Awareness Initiative. However, the FAA's SAI system does not have alerting features. ALPA strongly urges Congress to require the FAA to modify the SAI requirements to include alerts. Another important legacy tool is the Runway Status Lights (RWSL) system, which requires the ASDE-X or ASSC system to be installed as a prerequisite. Embedded in the pavement of runways and taxiways, the lights automatically turn red when other traffic makes it dangerous to enter, cross, or begin takeoff to alert pilots and vehicle operators to stop when runways are not safe. The lights provide direct, immediate alerts and require no input from controllers. Runway Status Lights are operational at 20 airports across the U.S. There is a critical need for expanding Runway Status Lights to more airports and to more runways. While the cost is high, if we are going to prevent near misses as well as accidents, the cost- benefit decision-making process must be reconsidered to aggressively pursue these safety advancements, and new or existing Federal grant programs should be utilized to fund and facilitate deployment at more airports. Air Traffic Control Modernization Technological and infrastructure improvements are required to efficiently manage current NAS operations, and our Nation's aging air traffic control system is in dire need of comprehensive modernization. Outdated telecommunications infrastructure, dilapidated facilities, aging radars, and obsolescent computer systems used by controllers must be replaced. ALPA supports the Administration's efforts to establish a ``Brand New Air Traffic Control System'' and believes that additional resources from Congress are needed for additional upgrades including a new common automation platform for controllers, additional air traffic control and airport infrastructure improvements to provide safe and efficient gate to gate operations for both passenger and cargo operations, as well as widespread upgrades or replacement for aging air traffic control towers and other facilities. Modernization must continue to outpace demand from the wide variety of existing aviation users, as well as new entrants into the NAS. The future of air transportation will bring a combination of commercial air carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles, general aviation, advanced air mobility, and commercial space flight. The NAS of the future will involve a wider and more complex variety of operations that our air traffic control infrastructure must manage safely and efficiently. ALPA was pleased to see that the FAA has renewed the charter for the National Airspace System Advisory Committee (NAC) and solicit nominations. For many years, the NAC has served as a consensus-based Federal Advisory Committee providing recommendations to the FAA on ATC system modernization priorities, policies, and strategies. Improving the system-wide controller staffing shortage, as this Committee sought to do in the 2024 FAA bill, is necessary to safely and efficiently meet all the operational requirements of the NAS. It is especially important to have the personnel necessary to research, develop, deploy, and then train the existing workforce on new processes, technology, and modernization initiatives. Without sustainable hiring, training, and staffing, the FAA will struggle to maintain the current capacity and safety of the system, much less modernize or expand it for new users. ALPA would support extending the maximum controller hiring requirement in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and increasing such requirements in future years as the FAA Academy expands its capacity and additional Collegiate Training Initiative schools are certified. ATC modernization is necessary to support the integration of new types of aircraft such as eVTOL and UAS. It is anticipated that large volumes of small UAS (sUAS) will operate in airspace at altitudes that are generally considered to be ``below the NAS.'' The low altitude sUAS operations will need some form of assistance to ensure safe separation to avoid collisions with manned aircraft, other sUAS, terrain, and obstacles. Certain foundational decisions need to be made about the role of the FAA in offering low-altitude separation services. ALPA recommends that the air navigation services at low altitude be provided by the same service provider of all other airspace in the NAS. In other words, the FAA should be providing separation and surveillance services. This ensures consistent application of safety risk mitigation policies and procedures. ROTOR Act While all aviation stakeholders claim to prioritize safety above all other issues, the fact remains that two preventable fatal commercial aviation accidents have occurred in this country in the last two years, resulting in the deaths of 69 people. Legislative and regulatory intervention is necessary to close these safety gaps. As this Committee knows, on Jan. 29, 2025, a Sikorsky UH-60L helicopter operated by the U.S. Army collided with PSA Airlines Flight 5342 approximately 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, fatally injuring the two pilots, ALPA members Captain John Campos and Honorary Captain Samuel Lilley, two flight attendants, 60 passengers aboard the airplane, and all 3 crew members aboard the helicopter. The ensuing NTSB investigation identified limitations in the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews, as a contributing factor. The tragic midair collision exposed a specific safety gap: the lack of an integrated ADS-B In mandate forces pilots to rely on near-imminent collision avoidance technologies, like TCAS, that offer limited alerting time, insufficient call-out information, and are inhibited in the airport environment. I want to thank Chair Cruz and Ranking Member Cantwell, as well as Chair Moran and Ranking Member Duckworth, for quickly responding to the tragedy, working with ALPA and other stakeholders, and passing the ROTOR Act. Collision avoidance technologies like TCAS provide protection through two layers: a resolution advisory (RA) that tells a pilot to climb, descend, or take action and a traffic advisory (TA) that provides a preliminary aural warning--approximately 19 seconds prior to collision in the case of the DCA accident--of nearby traffic. These two layers of protection are insufficient, particularly in a low-altitude, congested, high-workload environment like the approach performed by the PSA Flight 5342 crew to DCA runway 33. Section 4 of the ROTOR Act fixes these deficiencies through its integrated ADS-B In mandate with clear performance requirements that significantly increase the length of alerting time for pilots in both the air and surface environments, provide directional traffic symbols on a display, and generate aural alerts indicating the clock position, relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency of nearby traffic. Collectively, these standards and the ROTOR Act's firm implementation timeline will ensure pilots have optimal situational awareness and the ability to more quickly identify potential intruder aircraft and take evasive action. Such standards would likely have saved 67 lives last January, and ALPA stands firm that any final aviation safety legislation must incorporate these life-saving provisions. The ROTOR Act's carefully crafted requirements for integrated ADS-B In safety applications with clear performance standards have substantial benefits compared to alternative technologies under consideration, including quicker adoption, superior alerting and situational awareness capabilities in both the terminal and en route environments, reduced human factors complications, and safety applications for surface operations. ADS-B In has long been recommended by the NTSB, is a proven technology in use, and has the benefit of significantly quicker adoption to save lives. Manufacturers have successfully developed fully integrated systems for commercial aircraft, retrofits for several aircraft types, including MHI RJ's announcement of retrofit kits for regional jet aircraft, and low-cost options for general aviation. Some stakeholders have pointed to other emerging technologies, such as ACAS-Xa, as a possible solution. Unlike ADS-B In, ACAS-Xa is currently inhibited at low altitudes in the airport environment, does not require directional traffic symbols and the same advanced audio alerts as ADS-B In for pilot notification, and provides less alerting time compared to ADS-B In situational awareness technology. Even if such modifications to ACAS-Xa are possible, the existing ACAS-Xa standards would need to be revised, including altitude inhibition, and approved before the FAA can complete the rulemaking process to implement ACAS-Xa. Completion of the rulemaking process, avionics certification, production, and installation of this new technology is highly unlikely by 2031, and the House-passed ALERT Act allows the FAA to extend the rulemaking portion of the process until 2035. To be clear, ACAS-Xa represents an improvement over TCAS and provides another layer of safety, but it does not include the enhancements that leverage ADS-B In capabilities, which are specifically designed to improve pilots' broader situational awareness. Simulations conducted by the NTSB show that if PSA Flight 5342 had been equipped with the expanded suite of ADS-B In safety capabilities, the pilots would have received visual and aural alerts considerably earlier than ACAS-Xa. In terms of the specifics of ADS-B In standards, some suggest alternatives to the ROTOR Act's integrated ADS-B In requirement, including the voluntary adoption of electronic flight bags or tablets, for commercial aircraft operations. This is a mistake and will limit ADS-B In's safety-enhancing capabilities and even create new risks associated with human factors issues. The intent of the ROTOR integration language is to ensure that the ADS-B In capability is installed in the flight deck so that it is integrated with the existing panel-mounted displays, flight deck audio controls, panel-mounted moving maps, and audio and visual alerting capabilities of the aircraft. This allows pilots to multitask and make use of ADS-B In within the crew's primary field of view without losing situational awareness or creating risks from too much cognitive load or distraction. In contrast, an electronic flight bag or a tablet will simply provide a data feed to an iPad/flight bag that is mounted somewhere in the flight deck, likely in a poor location, or on the pilot's leg. Pilots will then use an ``ADS-B In app'' that would allow access to an ADS-B In display but only when not using their iPad for some other purpose. This could create conflict in how ADS-B In comports with other iPad needs by a pilot and whether using ADS-B In would take focus from other functions of the pilot that must be monitored simultaneously. As such, it could create field of vision issues, as pilots must physically tilt their heads down toward their lap to see a flight bag display rather than view the display while also being able to see outward. The absence of integration could result in audio or visual alerts potentially not being heard. During the NTSB investigation, the U.S. Army Aviation Brigade pilots told investigators that ``they did not monitor the tablets when flying low-level on the DC helicopter routes because the flying task was too demanding.'' ADS-B In can only be valuable for commercial operations if it is appropriately integrated into the flight deck to allow the pilot to make use of it while performing the other functions of their job. Inappropriate use or placement could create separate, contradictory safety problems. The ROTOR Act also has substantial benefits for runway safety, including runway incursions. The legislation's performance standards require integrated capabilities for pilots on the airport surface, which would include adopting the use of ADS-B In applications for example, Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Surface with Indications and Alerts, or ``SURF-IA.'' SURF-IA provides direct runway safety relevant traffic and runway alerts to flight crew on cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). The ADS-B In surface safety application both ``indicates'' to pilots safety-relevant traffic and provides alerts to facilitate pilots' immediate awareness and response to a potential collision hazard. Much like the ``airborne'' benefits of ADS-B In that have been discussed at length, the ROTOR's surface applications will give flight crews better awareness of what's happening around them at the airport by identifying the runway traffic status under normal operational conditions and alert pilots to any abnormal traffic condition and enable them to take evasive action. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Source: NTSB The ROTOR Act will also improve the airspace and prevent close calls, particularly at airports with high-density, mixed traffic operations, by properly regulating military aircraft. The ROTOR Act requires all aircraft that are required to be equipped with ADS-B Out to be equipped with safety-enhancing ADS-B In, including military aircraft. ROTOR preserves national security interests through ongoing exemptions for fighters, bombers, and other special mission aircraft so they don't have to have ADS-B equipment or broadcast their location via ADS-B Out. The legislation also provides statutory requirements for ASD-B Out transmission requirements nationwide to vastly improve aviation safety by ensuring civilian aircraft can see military aircraft. The ALERT Act's approach, while commendable, provides the military with too much discretion, including the sole authority of whether and how to equip with ADS-B In. Further, the ALERT Act relies on discretionary agency authority related to how helicopters broadcast their position with ADS-B Out and simply establishes ``procedures'' for ADS-B Out that are, again, subject to the discretion of the U.S military. Given the NTSB's identification of a failure of traffic awareness and collision alerting systems for military aircraft and the military's policies of keeping ADS-B Out off, the ROTOR Act provides the appropriate balance between safety and security for the Nation's civilian and military operations. Closing Much as the safety system improvements that created a safer airline industry over the last 10 years did not come about by happenstance, the failures and problems we have today require action. Recent accidents and the proliferation of near-miss incidents require Congressional and regulatory action, continued collaboration among aviation stakeholders, the immediate deployment of necessary runway, surface, and flight deck technologies, and the greater use of data, to identify hazards and mitigate risk before an accident can occur. ALPA reiterates our call for Congress to enact the key provisions of the ROTOR Act, make additional investments to modernize the air traffic control system, and ensure that pilots have the necessary technology to keep the flying public safe. Thank you for your commitment to aviation safety and for inviting me to testify today. Senator Moran. Let me start my questions on this issue of ADS-B In. And Mr. Hauptli, even you, in your testimony I think, I tried to find it in the written testimony and couldn't, but you were somewhat subtle in your suggestion that there is an avoidance of technologies which may result in less fees being collected by airports. Mr. Viola, you talked about alternatives and the bag. And Captain, you were direct in your support for ADS-B In. What is the controversy among the interested parties that needs to be resolved so Congress can more quickly move forward with the passage of the ROTOR Act? What is it that is the difficult circumstance that keeps this from happening, beyond just the House has a bill and the Senate has a bill? How do you see it? Mr. Viola? Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. I am glad to start. I think there is no question that ADS-B In is something that even when I was at a forum and I asked the probably 500 people in the audience, how many people voluntarily equipped, and the numbers were probably around 90 percent. So that is something we are doing. We know we all need it. I think everybody here agrees that ADS-B In could have avoided the accident here in D.C., for sure if people had the equipment on and were operating it properly, as you are trying to do with the bill. So we certainly support ADS-B In. Senator Moran. Anything else, Captain? Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. I will be direct. I don't know why anybody would be opposed to this. It is a readily available technology, as Jim just said, that many General Aviation airplanes, even the aviation airplane I flew, have this technology. But yet I don't have it on the flight deck of our airliners. So this is ready, readily available, it is proven, it has been an NTSB recommendation for almost 20 years to have ADS-B In. So I don't know why anybody would be opposed to it. Senator Moran. Mr. Hauptli, would you be less subtle, and remind me of why this might be an issue for some? Mr. Hauptli. Sure, Senator. Thank you for the question. The House version of the legislation contains a provision not in the Senate version that airports are very concerned with. It is Section 105 of the House Bill. And that would preclude airports from their ability to use ADS-B for fee collection purposes. We think it is an important tool, a technology tool for airports to be able to use that for fee collection so that we can make sure that we have got appropriate safety projects going on at airports. And we don't think that turning off that technology, as some pilots have threatened to do in air, we don't think that-- to avoid having to pay those fees, those small landing fees, we don't think that is good for safety. That was what I was referencing, Senator. Senator Moran. And those are fees that are already required to be paid? Mr. Hauptli. Yes, sir. Senator Moran. Small airports, let me focus on that coming from where I come from, these near misses are a challenge everywhere, small airports aren't exempt, and unlike larger airports, many of those airports lack radar in the most basic situational awareness tools. Regional airlines have shared with me numerous examples of close calls between regional aircraft and general aviation aircraft at non-towered airports. Mr. Hauptli, maybe this is, again, a question for you. What steps need to be taken to make sure that all aircrafts are utilizing safety procedures? Mr. Hauptli. Sure. A couple of things, Senator. One, ATC modernization, writ large, is beneficial for the system, large airports, small airports, towered airports, non-towered airports. Two, commend the FAA for the widespread deployment of surface awareness initiative systems. There are 90 in place with plans to put 220 in place, including Wichita as an example. That is definitely helping with greater situational awareness at these airports. And then the third point I would raise, if Senator Sheehy-- I will raise it anyway--if Senator Sheehy was still here, I would give him a shout out for his legislation that would require situational awareness displays at contract towers that do not have the STARS platform in place. I think that is something important that Congress can and should do to help some of these airports that you are talking about, at some of these smaller facilities. Senator, you are a big proponent of the contract tower program. We appreciate that. And this is one more area of support that we think would be beneficial. Senator Moran. Thank you. Mr. Viola, General Aviation operators share airspace with commercial airlines, military aircraft, and other users every day. From GAMA's perspective, what safety challenges are unique to General Aviation community and how do they intersect with the broader airspace safety concerns? Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. The General Aviation aircraft are such a wide range of aircraft to include, you know, aircraft without electrical systems at the lower end with the Experimental Aircraft Association. And so being able to have one size that fits all is very difficult to do with mandates. And so as part of that, you know, having the flexibility to make sure that we have the performance base that you are after, which is, that see and avoid of the ADS-B Out, ADS-B In, and having the technology on board that helps keep the aircraft separated is key to General Aviation. So that flexibility of not being able to mandate was one, one side. Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. As a General Aviation pilot who paid more for my 2006 F-150 than I did my 1958 Comanche, I hear you. And in fact, maybe there is some sort of sliding fee scale we can put in for those airport fees that maybe reflects what we do with ground vehicles where we charge trucking higher fees than, you know, somebody driving my mom mobile, my minivan. Captain Ambrosi, in 2023, you told this committee that it is clear, and I am quoting you, ``It is clear the system is under strain and we need to aggressively pursue solutions to stop these events''. In that same hearing, you highlighted the importance of surface safety systems like ADS-B, like Airport Service Detection Equipment, Model X, or ASDE-X. On March 22 of 2026, the CRJ-900 operating as Air Canada Flight 8646 collided with an aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicle while landing at LaGuardia Airport. The captain and first officer were fatally injured. The NTSB preliminary report found that the ASDE-X system did not generate an aural or visual alert on the displays in the ATC tower to warn controllers of the potential runway conflict, because the fire truck did not have a transponder. It is not just the aircraft, but the fire truck, the ground equipment on the airport did not have a transponder. And ASDE-X is installed at 35 airports around the country, including Chicago Midway O'Hare, and LaGuardia. But without transponders on the vehicles, the ASDE-X system could not provide an alert to controllers. Captain Ambrosi, with proper transponder equipage, the very safety system you advocated for in 2023 could have made a difference for those two pilots. Today's committee hearing is a reminder of how, too often those critical warning calls have gone unanswered. Captain Ambrosi, do you believe that listening to the recommendation of pilots will increase safety standards throughout the National Airspace System? Should be an easy question. Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. Well, thank you for the question. Absolutely. Senator Duckworth. A softball. Mr. Ambrosi. We are out there every day. Senator Duckworth. It is an underhand. I am not even going over---- Mr. Ambrosi. We are out there every day. Out there every day. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So could you please explain why pilots need integrated alerting technologies today? And you talked about ADS-B In, especially given workload demands when navigating high-density operations and why alternatives to integrated systems like electronic flight bags are not sufficient. And I think this is important for you to make this distinction, because there are those who are pushing for alternative systems, which are not sufficient, in my opinion. But could you give us your expert professional input? Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely. As a fellow pilot, you understand that. Senator Duckworth. I flew way lower and slower than you. But go ahead. Mr. Ambrosi. That is where most of this is what we are talking about right now---- Senator Duckworth. This is true. Mr. Ambrosi.--are these near misses. So first, back to the, you know, FAA is asking that--or mandating transponders on these ground vehicles, and they should go to everywhere, that should be there, so that when we get these tools like ADS-B In or the ASDE-X, that it does give us that alert. But specific to the ADS-B In technology on our integrated displays versus yet just another app on an iPad, let us think about the situation, the tragic situation, the Potomac, if it was on our integrated displays, it would have given us warning, given us more time, and it would be in our field of vision while those pilots were conducting that maneuver near the ground. If it is on an iPad over here, I have to look over here and not focus on what is going on in front of me, as well as I have a lot of other apps and things that I need to have on that iPad. I have my charts. I have my weather. Our flight plans now save trees. It is all on the--it is all on this one device. So now I am fumbling through apps trying to find like collision avoidance technology while I should be, heads up, looking forward. So in an integrated display where it can't be off, it can't be in--the app not open, it can't not hear the alarm or the alert, is essential. That is why we are so focused on making sure that it is integrated into our flight deck displays. Senator Duckworth. And that is what the electronic flight bag systems and some of these other alternative proposals that have been put forward are? They are not fully integrated, correct? Mr. Ambrosi. That is correct. It would be basically one more app, an eighth app, per se, on our iPad, or our flight bag. Senator Duckworth. And I do want to note that the pilot on the flight controls of Black Hawk of the flight 5342 tragedy, did have an iPad, did have the information, but it was strapped to her leg, and was not wired into her headset. So she never got the alerts. And then she was flying goggles, which means you look, I mean, your field of view is even further reduced in that situation. Thank you. Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. Senator Moran. Senator from West Virginia. STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. It is an important topic. I just have a kind of off-the-wall kind of question that I would like to ask each one of you, if you could be as honest as you possibly feel comfortable with. I have a feeling there is a lot more near misses, or near-tragic instances than what is formally reported. Are you each satisfied with the data, the formal data that we see in front of us? And do you believe it is collected properly so that we have the full scale understanding of what is happening and what could possibly happen? And I will start with you, Mr. Sununu. Governor Sununu. The data is absolutely there, but there are many more, thousands of more of near misses than are probably out there in the public in that, you know, get the headlines. There are hundreds of them every single day. Senator Capito. OK. Mr. Hauptli. OK. Senator, we have a concern, and that is information sharing between pilots, air traffic controllers, airports. Airports aren't getting all the information we would like to get. And part of that reason is because airports are subject to open record laws and FOIA requests, and so there is a reluctance from time to time from other parties to share that important safety information with our members for fear that it will be published publicly. So there is an important issue there for Congress to address. Senator Capito. All right. Mr. Viola. Mr. Viola. I think the close calls have benefited from aircraft being equipped with ADS-B and having that additional information. And as we are learning with the data that is being put into the system, I think it is helping us as we are doing this mitigation, as we are holding this hearing today, that we are moving in the right direction. To get as much data as possible, and then how do we implement it to continue to increase the safety in the system? Senator Capito. Thank you. Captain Ambrosi. Captain? Mr. Ambrosi. There can always be more data. Senator Capito. OK. Mr. Ambrosi. We appreciate your initiative in the FAA Bill to get more voluntary safety reporting data available. So getting more data and more reports, not just from pilots or air traffic controllers, but from other people involved in the aviation ecosystem is essential. And then, as has been--as it addressed, is the actual sharing and working through that information. So go back a little bit in the way-back machine, the CAST, or Commercial Aviation Safety Team, was very good about digesting this data. That has seemed to fall off a little bit. So we would urge in this process to make sure that there is more, you know, again, de-identified, but get that data together so we can address that. Senator Capito. So there is a sense of agreement here, that more data, better data, and there probably are gaps in the data. So we may be looking at a larger problem. But the good news is all of you have brought solutions here, and we are working toward solutions. I want to talk about a near miss with the West Virginia plane, actually. And I just met the pilot yesterday, coincidentally, Derek Long, was flying from Charleston, West Virginia into Teterboro on a company plane, and as he was flying, the TCAS system alerted the pilot to descend immediately. I am sure you are familiar with this accident. It was well publicized. I understand it is still under investigation. But I did want to commend the pilot, Derek Long, for his quick thinking and saving many lives that day. I think we have covered things that--but in an instance like that where it is more, Teterboro, I think, is known as more of a General Aviation, high-end General Aviation airport. Is there anything else that you have left out of here that might have helped in that particular accident from what you are aware of? Does anybody have anything? Yes, Captain. Mr. Ambrosi. I will echo that having ADS-B In technology would have given more warning. TCAS is great, it is a last line of defense product, but having more time for the pilot to see, be aware of it, would make it less of a close call. Senator Capito. Mr. Sununu, you obviously have the larger airlines within your realm. And we hear so much about AI, AI, AI, to the point where we are wondering where this is going. Where does AI go to help with this system and help prevent us accidents? Do you see a future for that? Or is that something you guys are---- Governor Sununu. AI can be an amazing tool. There is no question about it. But at the end of the day, it is all about the people, right, that are behind the tool and the analytics used. Senator Capito. Mm-hmm. Governor Sununu. So we see AI being integral in flight planning, things of that nature, warning systems, potentially, but you have to have the training and the people behind it, which is why our effort is always about whether it is air traffic controllers, pilot training, whatever it might take so that that tool is being properly utilized. But it is a tool. It is not a solution. Senator Capito. Right. Yes. Well, I mean, I think the captain stated it when he started talking about the iPad off to the left side of the pilot or the right side of the pilot, if you have ever flown into Charleston, West Virginia, you don't want the pilot's eyes anywhere but right on the runway. And many of our regional and smaller airports, and larger airports, are exactly like that. So I applaud your efforts and thank you all for being here today. Thank you. Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper, I am going to put bipartisanship above my well-being, and recognize you before I recognize the Chairman of the Full Committee. Senator Hickenlooper. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO Senator Hickenlooper. I will make it up to both of you. Thank you. I would like to ask each of you just quickly, across the board, I actually lost an old close friend to an accident, a small plane accident in Colorado not too long ago, and I know for the family, it is very frustrating that they are not going to get a full evaluation of what caused the accident, what the circumstances--the causes were for one to two years. That is pretty standard. Does that satisfy you guys? In this modern world? Does it really take that long to get all the witnesses and everyone together to get the information, and then make an assessment, and then speak about it? Governor? Governor Sununu. I would say this. I can't speak for the NTSB, which is obviously, you know, in charge of doing a lot of these investigations. I will say I think Jennifer Homendy has done a fantastic job trying to keep up with a backlog, and give themselves, you know, a limited time line to meet those frustrations, to meet those issues that have been hanging out there. So I do commend her and her staff. But again, I can't speak for her, but you know, more staffing, more expertise in the area of the NTSB would always be helpful to take care of that backlog. Senator Hickenlooper. Todd? Mr. Hauptli. Senator, I understand the impulse behind that. It is a litigious society that we live in, and I suspect that fear of litigation ends up being part of the time it costs to get those answers. Senator Hickenlooper. Almost as if, if enough time goes by that somehow that risk diminishes. I am not sure where the logic comes from, but anyway, thank you. Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. And GAMA, we are supportive of the NTSB also being funded and properly staffed to carry out that intent of Congress, in less than those 24 months, or ideally sooner, or as soon as possible. And also, I would like to mention that the GAMA membership, the manufacturers track every incident and accident, and they are part of that workforce that goes out there to the accident scene to make sure that we can try to prevent these accidents and incidents in the future. Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Mr. Ambrosi. Sorry for your loss, Senator. It is a fine line, right, because we want faster information in this society, but you also want it right. We need to make sure that the information we get is right. So as the Governor said, I can't speak for the NTSB, more funding, more of all of the above to help them do it, but making sure that at the end of the day, they get it right, so we really know what happened, and why it happened is essential. Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Well, I appreciate that from all of you, and I realize you can't directly impact this, but it is frustrating. And I think it has been one to two years for as long as I can remember, certainly the five and a half years I have been here. So if that time-frame is always the same, then that means that the staff is working at the same consistent rate. So hire some consultants, whatever, get caught up, and then start getting it done in 6 months would be a suggestion. Captain Ambrosi, as a pilot, you understand--well, all of you understand, but you perhaps understand best the value of accurate aviation weather forecasting in terms of maintaining safety at all times. Meteorologists at the center weather service units around the country provide up-to-date information, up-to-the-moment information to aircraft controllers, to pilots. And these meteorologists use capabilities developed by the National Science Foundation, National Center for Atmospheric Research, or NCAR, which of course is based in Colorado. And NCAR scientists have been working with the FAA to develop systems that identify turbulence, and this is very small amounts of turbulence. We have all seen those reports, where out of nowhere people are thrown against the ceiling. The prediction of hazardous in-flight icing conditions, runway hazards due to heavy rain, microbursts that can surprise an aircraft at any time, and looking--doing a better job of predicting wind closer to the ground. So I guess I would want to ask, what is your sense, your perspective, as a pilot who understands this, about the importance and priority of accurate weather prediction for pilots? And how do you--how do you utilize forecasts and weather reports in your job, and what happens to air safety if funding cuts result in less accurate weather prediction? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. It is absolutely essential that we have the tools we need to do our job the safest, and weather is certainly an example of that. We have, whether it is strategic, looking at the weather ahead of time and making a plan to verify, or whether it is tactical, because we encounter that turbulence you are talking about, and now we have to make a decision. So tools have come a long way in recent--or this iPad we have been talking about a little while ago that is over here, has turbulence forecasting models, and it can tell us, hey, let us change our altitude at this point of our flight to try to avoid turbulence to the extent possible. But again, having that information presented to us is essential so we can make our decisions. Senator Hickenlooper. Right, I look at it--I am out of time, but I look at it, you know, a hundred years ago we still used leeches as part of a medical treatment because we just understood so little. I feel we are the same place with weather, and that we--this is not the time to roll back our applications of resources and technology to get better weather forecasting. I think we are right on the edge of really beginning to understand it more thoroughly. Anyway, thank you all for being here, and for your efforts to keep our skies safe. Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper, thank you. I am pleased to recognize the Chairman of the Full Committee, Senator Cruz. STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of the witnesses for being here. I want to first express my condolences to the families of the victims of plane crash during the skydiving trip in Missouri, and also to the families of the victims of the B-52 test flight in California. That flight that went down was named the Spirit of Aggieland, and many in the Texas A&M community are grieving, grieving the loss of those individuals. I likewise want to express my deep condolences to the loved ones of Josh Baer, an Austinite and an entrepreneur who tragically died in the plane crash in Laredo just last week. I knew Josh for many years. And he was here in D.C. meeting with my staff just a week before he crashed. As chairman of this committee, I will be paying close attention to the FAA and the NTSB's investigations into the crash, and to upholding the highest aviation standards. Captain Ambrosi, earlier this month, I met with pilots from Texas, all of whom were vigorous champions for requiring ADS-B In. Just this weekend, two commercial airliners came within 300 feet of colliding in Boston. It is clear to me that better situational awareness tools should be deployed in cockpits like what is required in the ROTOR Act. In your judgment, how valuable would it be for pilots equipped with integrated ADS-B In to have real-time visibility of both other aircraft and ground vehicles operating on taxiways and your runways? Mr. Ambrosi. Sir, thank you for your question. Thank you for your leadership on ROTOR. It has been great to partner with you on that. It is essential. We need it. It is technology that is readily available. The NTSB is saying we should have it since 2008. You know, why don't we have it? So I completely agree. No sense taking more time. Let us get it. Let us get it now, and prevent a couple of tragedies. Senator Cruz. Yes. Thank you for ALPA's hard work on it. I think it is critical safety--a critical safety measure. Had it been the law, we would have prevented the crash over DCA, and 67 souls would still be with us. Mr. Viola, in your judgment, does the mandate in the ROTOR Act put an unreasonable burden on General Aviation? Mr. Viola. General Aviation certainly has some--you know, some unique requirements, but ADS-B In is what we need to do to increase the safety in the airspace. And as you said, and as Captain Ambrosi said, that accident in January probably would not have happened if we had ADS-B In in both aircrafts. Senator Cruz. So I appreciate your saying that, and saying that on the record that the resistance in the House of Representatives, one of the main arguments, is that it is somehow an excessive burden on General Aviation. And your testimony to the contrary is it is helpful. I think the House's position was driven by that, and also driven by very significant misinformation from the Pentagon. And I have had, I think the Washington term is, frank and candid conversations with the Secretary on that topic. Mr. Viola. With the safety--I would like to just follow up with the safety continuum of what--the aircrafts are actually using that technology, that is where in General Aviation, you know, what Captain Ambrosi has in his aircraft into what that aircraft would know electrical system can put in theirs. And that is where we need the FAA and the flexibility to make sure we have the same ability. You know, it is based on what kind of safety you are looking for. It is absolute safety, but the safety continuum of being able to get it installed in that aircraft, that is where we need the work to get done with the FAA. Senator Cruz. Terrific. That is helpful. Let us turn to a different topic, which is mixed-use airspace at non-towered airports, which remains a high-risk area for runway incursions and near misses, as these airports have no control tower to manage and direct traffic. Pilots landing at these airports are then expected to talk to one another over the radio to manage the flow of the traffic at an airport. This has led to numerous instances of miscommunication between General Aviation aircraft and regional carriers. Governor Sununu, what inherent risk does this operation pose to the airspace when pilots are expected to both communicate with other pilots and to land their aircraft without guidance from ATC? Governor Sununu. So just to be clear, our operators on the commercial side almost always land at towered sites. But in those cases, a couple things to realize, number one, our pilots are trained, but it definitely increases the risk. It puts all the risk on that flight crew to make sure that they are maintaining that visual separation. So yes, it is a higher-risk operation without a doubt, and other technology solutions that can be implemented without a doubt. Senator Cruz. Thank you. Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Governor Sununu, as you know, the FAA is currently working on the development of the Strategic Management of Airspace Routing Trajectories, otherwise known as SMART--and it is a very long name just to get a great acronym--system, to predict airspace conditions and optimize the National Airspace System. And the SMART system will propose scheduled changes to air carriers to help deconflict the airspace along with providing controllers predictive analytics, something that I think is very positive. Effective rollout of SMART will require the support of all air carriers. Governor Sununu, how is FAA engaging with carriers on the development of the SMART system? Governor Sununu. I will say this. I think the FAA is taking steps I have not seen before in a really positive way in terms of engaging with, not just the carriers, but subject matter experts in all aspects of aviation. It could be the manufacturers themselves. They have asked some of our carriers to provide subject matter experts in a variety of different disciplines, to come in even before a contractor was proposed, when they just were kind of looking at this as an idea. What were the barriers? Where does the system break down? What can we do and not do? And maybe how to separate out the project into various phases so we can collect kind of the short-term wins and deal with more of the longer-term issues down the road. So I don't mean to say this in a derogatory manner, but it is not just a bureaucratic process with a bunch of folks behind the scenes. It is a process that Bryan Bedford and the FAA really has engaged the private sector. Senator Duckworth. So it is good that they are engaging all these stakeholders. Governor Sununu. Very positive, yes. Senator Duckworth. Wonderful. The FAA is also, I understand, developing a Common Automation Platform, the CAP, to streamline how controllers receive and share flight data. Governor Sununu, given A4A's involvement in the development of SMART system and how important the stakeholders' input is, which I agree with you, could you speak to the importance of involving stakeholders, specifically air traffic controllers, in the development of CAP and any system to manage the airspace? Governor Sununu. Yes. Senator Duckworth. Does the air traffic controller person then need to do this? Governor Sununu. Absolutely. So you know, one of the--I go back to the Modern Skies Coalition that was put together, this is 60 different organizations, it is everyone from the pilots, to the manufacturers, to the carriers themselves, making sure that everyone has a voice in that. Because everyone has a different piece of that responsibility. Everyone has a voice when it comes to the Common Automation Platform opportunities. I will say that while a lot of the Common Automation Platform, issues have been discussed without the second round of funding, or at least another round of significant funding, for air traffic control modernization. Right now it is still an idea, and not a lot of significant portion of the first $12.5 billion was allocated to Common Automation Platform. Just a little bit to kind of get it started. The real opportunity is in that next round. And our biggest fear is that if that next round of funding doesn't happen, given the speed that the FAA has performed so far, we feel very confident that making sure that those dollars come in in that next round, that is how you really achieve both bringing in the industry and making sure we get something real for the NAS. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I couldn't agree with you more on the importance of dedicating that funding, but also the importance of having the air traffic controllers be part of the development of the system. And then, you know, as you said, you know firsthand the importance of involving stakeholders in decisions about safety technology. Do you also believe that listening to the recommendations of pilots will increase safety standards throughout the National Airspace System? Pilots are a part of this? Governor Sununu. Pilots are more than part of it, right, they are right in the middle of it. So absolutely. You know, the fact that there is this non-punitive system, I mean, I am taking a little bit of a step back, that allows pilots, or flight crews, or folks in a tower to be able to report without the punitive aspects of it, to do it in an anonymous way or unidentifiable way, has allowed that information, that data to flow, you know, very freely. But that is a great example of why the pilots, the air traffic controllers, the flight crews, the management systems back--especially on the commercial side, all that data has to be readily available. But they have to talk to them. They have to integrate them. They have to bring their voices to the table. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And, you know, Captain Ambrosi testified in front of this very committee, 3 years ago, about the importance of ASDE-X. And today, we heard from him again about the critical need to provide pilots with alerting technology, especially ADS-B In, and you have emphasized that. The NTSB has actually urged FAA to require ADS-B In at least 18 times over the last 20 years. And frankly, I don't think we can wait to equip aircraft with technology pilots desperately need. Will A4A listen to pilots and commit to ensuring its members equip fleets with ADS-B In to advance the safety of our national airspace? Governor Sununu. So we love the concept of ADS-B In, but a couple pieces here. Number one, it should be all across the board, right. It shouldn't just be one crew, or one piece of equipment, or excluding all these loopholes that have existed for many years. Close the loopholes. Enough is enough. Everybody. If we are going to participate, all the blips have to be accounted for in the airspace. The second, and I think it is a very significant piece is, there isn't a certified solution for a lot of pieces of equipment currently out there. And to go through design, certification, manufacturing, and then finally start getting it implemented on all the equipment out there, that isn't months or even a couple years, that is many, many years. So one of our frustrations is the certification process does take so long, and it is not there right now. So are we going to wait three, five, 6 years to get--even after a mandate comes--to actually get it potentially implemented, because the technology, even if you started today, would take so long to get it in every piece of equipment out there. So are there other shorter-term solutions out there? Are there other technologies? We are kind of technology agnostic, we would love to see something in the cockpits, we would love to see it sooner than later. But we just want everyone to appreciate the time to design, certify, manufacture, and implement is quite a breadth. And why should we wait, right, why should we have such a gap? Senator Duckworth. But you are not saying--but you are not saying that alternative equipment provides the same level of safety, right? You are just saying that if you are going to have ADS-B In, have it in for everybody across the board, everybody should have ADS-B In? Governor Sununu. I am saying--well, what I am saying is it is better to have something than nothing in the short term while we build to a stronger solution. You know, that is a-- that is a positive thing. Senator Duckworth. But you are not opposing a mandate for-- -- Governor Sununu. Yes. Senator Duckworth.--everybody to have ADS-B In? Governor Sununu. As long as it is there for everyone and everyone appreciates the time line. If you say it has to be done, and it has to be done in 3 years, that is physically not possible. So that is our frustration. We would love to see it done. But again, the design, implementation, manufacturing, supply chain issues. We have talked to the manufacturers, you know, the supply chain, being with the military, being with competing with all the other aspects of what is going on in aviation, that itself is going to hold things up. So we just don't want to see no solution while we wait for a solution, the more permanent, maybe even a better solution, 7 years down the road. We would love to see something implemented across the board sooner than later. Senator Duckworth. But I would not--would it be correct to say that you are not saying let us do these alternatives, which Captain Ambrosi has said is not sufficient, instead of ADS-B In, you are just saying, you want something---- Governor Sununu. Let us do them both. Senator Duckworth.--while you support---- Governor Sununu. Right. We are agnostic. Senator Duckworth. You will support both? Governor Sununu. I think doing both wouldn't be the worst idea in the world, because we know that something is potentially in there before the extensive time line of getting the firmest and the best. And by the way, if I may? By the time you get the next technology in, seven, 8 years down the road in the entire fleet, we could have even a better technology. So let us just be fairly technology agnostic and make sure we are always trying for the best. Senator Duckworth. OK. I just want to make clear that the pilots at the heart of the operation are asking that air carriers equip aircraft with ADS-B In, and that you don't resist that. And at a time when every month seems to bring a new chilling runway incursion, a near miss, or collision, I urge you and the air carriers you represent, to listen to pilots, and do your part to ensure the safety of the National Airspace System, which I think you care deeply about. Governor Sununu. Of course. Senator Duckworth. But I just don't want costs to come before safety---- Governor Sununu. Oh. No. Senator Duckworth.--when it comes to a system like ADS-B In. Your pilots are asking for it? Governor Sununu. Yes. Cost has never been an issue. No. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Senator Moran. Senator Rosen, I am going to go to you in just a moment. I want to follow up on this point that Senator Duckworth was making. And then I have got a few e got a few questions, and we will try to conclude this hearing, unless others appear in the interim. There is an issue out there with certification and manufacturing, and maybe Mr. Viola can talk about manufacturing, its capabilities, if there was a mandate, if the ROTOR Act became law today, I don't exactly know what the date in which it is required for ADS-B In to be included? Mr. Viola. Anyone? Senator Moran. Anyone. So can you manufacture the necessary equipment just to equip the current and growing fleet, Mr. Viola? Mr. Viola. So thank you for that question. So as in my written testimony as well as the oral, I think I said it would be a challenge to do everything and have it done by that time. Certainly sporty, I think is what my staff has told me, for meeting those time lines. That is why I think as we are trying to--as you are working on this, if we do some more collaboration as, what we can do today, what we can do tomorrow, and what the long-range answer is, as well as that it is performance-based. So you are not identifying a certain type of technology, but you are longing to, as a flight instructor, I fly around with this because this is my ADS-B In. I get it on my iPhone. I get the audio alert, and I won't fly an aircraft that doesn't have ADS-B In, because of the safety that is involved. Senator Moran. And as the Governor indicates, I mean there is another issue, it is the FAA and certification. Mr. Viola. Yes. Senator Moran. My impression is that that process, in and of itself, at the FAA is time-consuming, and time-consuming is months now--it is more than months, it is years, and huge challenges. Mr. Ambrosi, what is your response to these, I guess, practical or impractical circumstances that are out there? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, we have talked to the major aircraft manufacturers and they have told us they are comfortable with the time line. They have told us that, for example, 787s, they can just push a software update and have it tomorrow. That you know---- Senator Moran. That is my impression from conversations with Boeing, except the concern about certification. Those tools---- Mr. Ambrosi. Well, the FAA--are ones that already certified on that airplane? Senator Moran. OK. Mr. Ambrosi. People today could buy that as an option, but instead, if this law passes, it is now a safety requirement, so they will turn it on for them, basically. So it is available. Does every airplane have a solution available today? I think we have time to--by 2031, to find a path there. If we don't have a deadline, it will never happen, because we know how things work around here. Because if there is no deadline, if we get to December 2031 and it is not done, look, we just kicked secondary barriers. We are at 25 years from 9/11, and the FAA gave another extension on putting secondary barriers on a flight deck. Not related to our discussion today, but when they ask for extensions, they seem to get it. Senator Moran. You know, any on the panel have knowledge of what is the capability of the FAA, regardless of the passage of the ROTOR Act, to require the implementation of the ROTOR Act provisions as it relates to ADS-B In? Do you know, Captain? Mr. Ambrosi. I am going to restate the question to make sure I got it right. Senator Moran. OK. Mr. Ambrosi. Does the FAA intend on pushing forward with ADS-B In mandate regardless? Senator Moran. It wasn't ``intend'', but could they, are they capable of doing that if they wanted to? Mr. Ambrosi. They could. Senator Moran. That is my belief as well. Mr. Ambrosi. They could, but I don't believe they would without a mandate from Congress. Senator Moran. And I think that is what we heard in our last hearing from the FAA Administrator, that this was not going to be done on the FAA's own volition. Anybody have anything to add to that aspect of this? Mr. Viola. I would say that almost every aircraft coming off the production line today probably has ADS-B In. They know that it is the right thing to do, and that has been coming off the line that way, just as Jason said here, with the 777, is that General Aviation aircraft that are being produced today have ADS-B In integrated. Governor Sununu. If I may? The only other piece I would add to that is, look, I think the FAA is working as fast as they can on certification. It takes years to certify a seat, a seat configuration on a plane, it takes them years to get through that, and it is more of a personnel, my understanding, at least, it is not a lack of trying. They are working as hard as they possibly can, but with all the different pieces of an airplane and all the aspects that have to get certified, there is a backlog there that needs to be addressed. Senator Moran. I read in some publication, Governor, that the airlines, broadly, were interested in upgrading their seats on aircraft to induce, encourage additional high-end travelers by providing more comfort, and the barrier to doing so was the amount of time it would take for the FAA to certify new seats. Governor Sununu. That is right. Senator Moran. And then I started down the path of trying to figure out how we get around that problem. Not that I am one of those passengers, but it was not the part that caught my attention. The part that caught my attention is that certification on a seat would take years to change the seats on an airplane. Governor Sununu. That is right. Senator Moran. Senator Rosen. STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, this is such an important topic and such an important committee. And I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today and for everything that you do. I want to talk about runway incursion technology because at large international airports, like Harry Reid International Airport in Las Vegas, hundreds of airport vehicles operate on the airfield every day in close proximity to active runways and taxiways. According to the FAA, 20 percent of runway incursions in 2023 involved surface vehicles or pedestrians. So Mr. Hauptli, what role does real-time vehicle monitoring and other data-driven safety technologies play in helping airports reduce this risk of runway incursions and other surface safety incidents? Mr. Hauptli. Senator, thank you for the question. It plays an absolutely critical role. At Las Vegas, they have ASDE-X, which gives that surface surveillance capability and the automated response, and the automated alerts. Critically important, that is one of the 35 airports that has that ASDE-X technology in the United States. So absolutely critical. Senator Rosen. Thank you. I guess it just adds, like, to all these other things. What are the safety measures? I want to talk a little bit more and I am going to talk and ask, again Mr. Hauptli, and to Governor Sununu, a little bit about the impact of customs and border protection on our airports and on our economy. Give you something to think about. So like many who care about air travel, I was outraged by DHS Secretary Mullin's recent threat to remove U.S. customs and border protection officers from airports and places the administration deems are not following its immigration agenda. It is not only illegal and counterproductive, but also unnecessary. Not only does every international passenger who boards a flight to the U.S. pass through a pre-departure screening, but nearly all of them must go through some type of verification process or application. And moreover, international tourism, it has already steadily declined due to this administration's policies. I am gravely concerned that this would further impact international travel at a time when we need to be expanding tourism into this country. It is critical for our economy, top economic driver in every state in this Nation and in our country, as you know. So Mr. Hauptli, I will ask you first, can you describe what losing CBP officers at some of our Nation's largest and busiest gateway airports, probably on our coasts, right, at those international hubs, what would they do, number one, to the daily operations of those airports? And what would international travel look like? And then I will follow up with you, Governor. Mr. Hauptli. I am going to use more words, but the first word I will use is ``chaos''. [Laughter.] Senator Rosen. I am not surprised about that. Mr. Hauptli. When this proposal, or whatever you would like to call it, thought bubble was out there, the first thing we did was wrote a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security talking about the very concerns that you raised, Senator. Concerns, we were initially very concerned that there was going to be some sense of immediacy that could negatively impact the World Cup celebrations that is occurring in the United States. Thankfully, that has not occurred. I haven't heard as much about this proposal recently. It seems to have quieted down. I am thankful for that. But if it were to be put in place, it would have a devastating impact on commercial air travel, and on the ability of people to come in to the United States and be processed appropriately. Senator Rosen. Thank you. So, Governor Sununu, I am going to ask you a few things because, particularly as a former Governor, you know about the economics of a state and what tourism, and business travel, and all of that depends on. So what are your concerns if the proposal is enacted? Of course, I am going to ask you, what is the economic impact to the airline industry? But more broadly, like I said, tourism--business travel, tourism, top economic driver in every state in this country. What do you think the impact to our entire economy is in the United States? Governor Sununu. It would be huge, without a doubt. Let us take the case of Newark, that was kind of the most recent example where, as Todd said, more of a thought bubble there. What we were able to do is provide a lot of data. Everything from the incoming travel, travelers coming just to Newark, or I should say through Newark, tens of thousands a day on the international side, most of which don't live in Newark, right, they are just part of the larger---- Senator Rosen. Right, they are not only hurting that state. Governor Sununu. No, no. Senator Rosen. Those are gateways to the rest of the country. Governor Sununu. Very little impact to actual, Newark. In fact, I think the most common traveler that flies internationally through Newark ends up in Florida, or in our heartland of America. Senator Rosen. I hope they end up in Las Vegas. [Laughter.] Governor Sununu. Who doesn't end up in Las Vegas, Senator, at some point? But no, so we made it very clear about the fact that the majority, I think it is about 60 percent of international travelers coming back into Newark are American citizens. So it is not--it has a disproportionate effect upon American citizens. And then the commerce aspect, nearly $100 million of international commerce through FedEx, UPS, Atlas, these folks are flying into Newark, into that port every single day. The number one product, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment that is coming through. So the fact that every day, tens of millions of dollars of highly needed products, if you will, that again, that get dispersed across America would be affected. So it isn't minor. It is extremely major. It doesn't really affect Newark, it affects everybody else across America. And again, given a place like Newark, it is such a central hub, specifically for the East Coast, and products coming in through Europe, travelers coming in through Europe, I think chaos is the right word. And it is chaos on day one. And then, if I may? Senator Rosen. Mm-hmm. Governor Sununu. What is the exit strategy there, right, at what point do we--is it back to normal? I think that was our other bigger concern. Is this a 2-day exercise? Could this go on as a political battle for a long time? I do want to take the opportunity and say, Secretary Mullin was very open, sat down with our CEOs, took in the data. Obviously, you know, they made their decision, or at the time made the decision for Newark and understands, I think, the implications. But to your point, yes, the implications are very real and very severe. And like anything, we just always hope that anything that is political in nature doesn't bring in the airlines, and the airspace, and the American traveler, whether it be shutdowns, or closing ports, or things of that nature. It never really seems to be about us, but everyone at this table, and all the industries that we represent are massively affected by it. Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more question? Senator Moran. You may. Senator Rosen. Thank you. It is about drones. You know, airports and runways are increasingly operating, of course, in more congested environments. We have seen it. This was like my first question. So how do we better manage mixed-use airspace? For example, in World Cup games, we have already seen DHS need to address the drone incursions. Obviously, it is a growing concern for a number of airports, including Harry Reid International Airport. It is right by Allegiant Stadium, soon to be by other stadiums and so many hotel rooms. And it is my understanding that both DHS and DOD have been developing counter-UAS technologies to dissuade, prevent, or destroy drones that are inappropriately in certain airspaces. And so I know that, Chairman, they want to close out the Committee, but what I want to ask, and what I would ask for all the witnesses, with your permission: Is how do we better manage those mixed-use airspaces to avoid collisions, particularly over sporting events, concerts, these one-time events that happen, and everyone is trying to get that video? Senator Moran. That's fine, go ahead. Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. But you know, the proliferation of UASes, it is not going to stop, and it is not just about the danger of it there is just--well, it is all about the danger of it, we think it is fun for the pictures, but not fun if they are bad actors. So I guess we will start with you, Governor. And we will just go down the line. Governor Sununu. Integrating UAS safety regulation into all aspects of our, whether it is through the FAA or other modes and other regulatory frameworks that manage the national airspace is absolutely integral. There can't be any loopholes. They are just as much of a--as we call a blip, whether it is a commercial airline, a private jet, or UAS, they all present a risk and therefore have to be fully integrated as soon as possible. Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Hauptli. Mr. Hauptli. I would just add on to what the Governor said. In the case of airports, there is also a concern about the counter UAS. Some airports would be interested in having that command and control authority, and other airports believe that that is a Federal responsibility. And that is an issue that still needs to be resolved. Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Viola. Mr. Viola. Thank you very much for the question. So as far as the, you have participating and non-participating. On the participating side, certainly to detect and avoid technologies that are there. And as mentioned, we want that full integration of the airspace so that not only do--we know what is there, they know what is there. And again, we are sharing all that data that we think the technology is there to fly safely. Senator Rosen. Thank you. And Captain? Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. From the pilot's perspective, you know, we welcome this new technology, all these new entrants, but we have to proceed with caution because as you add more to the airspace, it is more congested. We need to make sure that the average passenger that buys an airline ticket that expects to be completely safe on their destination to Las Vegas doesn't know all these drones may be around or what have you. Senator Rosen. That is right. Mr. Ambrosi. We need--we have a responsibility as an industry to make sure that they are integrated safely. Absolutely. Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of you. So many questions. Thank you for your work. Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth. Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. I just have a couple more questions. In May 2025, less than 4 months after the DCA crash, another Army helicopter incident forced two commercial flights to abort landings at DCA. It was reported that the dedicated direct access line connecting the Pentagon Tower with the DCA Tower had not worked since 2022. Included in the 2027 NDAA, in Section 342, is a provision I secured directing the Department of Defense to conduct a risk assessment of its air traffic control systems and develop a modernization plan aligned with the Department of Transportation and FAA's brand-new air traffic control system. The Fiscal Year 2027 NDAA includes a whopping $1.5 trillion in funding for national defense. Think about that. The proposal for our national defense budget is $1.5 trillion. If you include the supplemental that the President is requesting for his war of choice in Iran, that amount is going to be equivalent to the defense budget of every other nation on earth combined. We will have the same size defense budget in our Nation as that of every other nation on earth combined, and yet we can't spend $48 billion on our air traffic control system. It is absolutely ludicrous. Governor, do you believe that the Department of Defense should modernize its air traffic control system aligned with USDOT and FAA's modernization initiative? And how would an improved DoD-ATC system impact commercial air carriers in shared airspace? Governor Sununu. A hundred percent, no loopholes, especially around commercial airports. So the fact that there are loopholes that exist, they take advantage of it and there are questions around it and puts every--puts the entire system at risk. Senator Duckworth. Right. What they did was, especially in this system here, at the National Airspace System was that they took a loophole and made it SOP, and so instead of just only turning off their transponder, their ADS-B Out, occasionally when they had, you know, a high-profile VIP on board and they needed to have maintained security, they actually--it just became the norm for every flight. I agree with you. We need to close those loopholes. Governor, what would be the impact of DOD also using a fraction of its more than trillion-dollar budget to ensure military aircraft are equipped with and using ADS-B Out? Governor Sununu. It would be a game changer. It would be a game changer not just for the commercial aircraft coming in, I think it would be a game changer for the Military pilots. What Military pilot doesn't--wants to fly around an airport and not know, and think that the incoming aircraft doesn't know where they are? So I understand it might be a top-down SOP that is coming, but I can't imagine being a Military pilot flying around a busy airport saying: Gee, I hope nobody can see me. Makes no sense at all. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I love the way you put that. Mr. Chairman, can you indulge me with one last question? Senator Moran. Yes. Senator Duckworth. Thank you Mr. Chairman. We are really good friends and so, yes, he indulges me all the time. I promise 1 day when I am chair I will indulge you. [Laughter.] Senator Duckworth. To close out, I have one final question for all the witnesses here today. What is one commitment that you can make to this committee today to prevent close calls and increase the safety of the National Airspace System? I will start with you Governor. Governor Sununu. Again, I think speaking for all the carriers, we are ready to implement technologies, make sure they are certified, move that process along as fast as we can, whether it is ADS-B In, or the next technology down the road, or a quicker technology that can be implemented. Maybe it is not as good, but at least it could be something that can be put in. We want to make sure it is there and work with the FAA to make sure that the certified process and the manufacturers can meet the demands of whatever the mandate might come. Senator Duckworth. But you are not going to oppose or push back against ADS-B Out? Governor Sununu. Oh, no. Oh, gosh, no. No, no. We want all the technology we can. I don't know any pilot--again, I don't know any pilot who doesn't want every single piece of technology they can to make the airspace safer on behalf of their customers. Senator Duckworth. OK. I just wanted to clarify. Thank you. Mr. Hauptli. Mr. Hauptli. Thank you. For the airports, I think the focus on initial and recurrent training and enhancing that training and incorporating AI to make that training more robust and safer. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Viola? Mr. Viola. Thank you very much for that question. Certainly from GAMA's perspective, you know, modernizing the certification and validation systems, and possibly streamlining a special certification or less than certification for the safety enhancing equipment to get on board as soon as possible. Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you, Senator. You have my commitment to not take my foot off the gas on the ROTOR Act and the ADS-B In mandate to prevent another tragedy like happened in DCA and LaGuardia. So we are doubling down, and we are with you on that. Senator Duckworth. The 1500-Hour Rule? Mr. Ambrosi. Well that is there too. We have got a lot of things in our cart, but the alligator closest to the boat right now is getting support for this ADS-B In integrated in our displays. Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Any closing statement? Senator Moran. OK. Do you want to give it? I am going to ask a couple questions, but do you want to give your closing statement now? Senator Duckworth. Go ahead. No, no, no, I will wait. I will wait. Senator Moran. A few questions that I want to follow up with. Visual separation, following the FAA's March 18, 2026 decision to suspend the use of visual separation between helicopters and airlines near major airports, that occurred after the January 29th collision, there was a reported close call on March 24, 2026, in Southern California involving a United Airlines Boeing 737 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter. What is the status--maybe this is a question for you, Captain--what is the status of the enforcement of visual separation, suspension? Mr. Ambrosi. My understanding is the rule is being enforced, not boots on the ground, it would be--it probably would be a good question for our brothers and sisters at the Air Traffic Controllers Association to find out what the latest status on that is. But in any event having an integrated ADS-B would have given those pilots in that situation more warning and more time, so they didn't have to get to that last line of defense, which was a TCAS resolution advisory. Senator Moran. Captain you were on--you are on message and--well, it strikes me that the FAA announces, and it is only a few short period of time and still it is apparently not--has not been implemented, not being followed. A better question for the FAA, you are right. Mr. Hauptli, the FAA reported over 1,600 runway incursions last Fiscal Year, and over 800 runway incursions reported already this Fiscal Year. What specific changes in airport operations are needed to further reduce the collisions and enhance overall aviation safety? And maybe we are back to ADS-B In again, but are there other things? Mr. Hauptli. Sure, Senator. Thank you. A couple of things. Technology integrations, one, enhanced training, and as I indicated earlier in my testimony, better communication among all the parties. Airports would really benefit from access to information that some of the other elements in the aviation ecosystem have but are reluctant to share with airports because of this issue that I raised earlier about the Freedom of Information Act. Senator Moran. You know, Mr. Hauptli, that I am in the process of developing the bill I mentioned in my opening statement, the Runway Safety Act that would establish a taskforce to evaluate airport driver training and support deployment of technologies that improve situational awareness for ground vehicle operators. From your perspective of an airport operator--from your perspective of airport operators, where do you see the greatest gaps in driver training and surface safety today, how would legislation--what legislation can we utilize to reduce the incursions and improve that surface safety? Mr. Hauptli. Yes, Senator. First of all, thank you for working on that legislation. We look forward to working with you on that. We believe that the initial training and the recurrent training could benefit from a good scrub on that. We also believe that the task force would be a great place, to a convening place for folks to talk about the integration of AI and enhanced training to try and deliver a better product for the American people. Senator Moran. Thank you for that. Senator Cantwell is on her way, so I am going to utilize my opportunity to filibuster, it is for her arrival. Governor Sununu, FAA staffing challenges, particularly among air traffic controllers, seem still to be a concern. What do you--what can you tell us about staffing shortages affecting airline operations and safety margins, especially high-volume airports? Governor Sununu. I will give you a quick example. There was a close call, a near miss, actually, earlier this year, and there was one air traffic controller in the tower in charge of both landings, and takeoffs from parallel runways, all at the same time. Yes, that is just--that is a recipe for a significant problem, unfortunately. So staffing is absolutely critical. The people aspect of this equation is absolutely critical. So making sure that we are encouraging, it is not just hiring more, encouraging more people that want to enter the air traffic control space, that want to enter the national aviation--the National Airspace System. I would be remiss if I didn't take the opportunity and remind folks, look, when you have two Government shutdowns and you very nationally, on the front page, tell people we are not paying air traffic controllers for six consecutive weeks, there is nothing, how do you encourage a young person to want to become an air traffic controller? Right, God bless them for entering the field knowing that that is, not just a risk every few years, or something like that but we have literally done it, at least with air traffic controllers, and/or at least with TSA agents, twice in one year. So that is a huge discouragement in itself. The new Air Traffic Control Modernization Bill, the fact that there is money and it is being deployed for new training centers, and new simulators, and all that sort of thing, is great. We feel very--we have seen a lot of this technology it is being implemented already, that is very exciting stuff to make sure that folks are getting the training time. And another issue was always the time you had to sit in the seat in the towers. And that was hard, right, to make sure that that the trainee had time in front of the screen, that often delayed how long it took for someone to become a fully certified air traffic controller. So it is not just the people, it is, I think, encouraging the opportunities that are there. I mean, they get paid, especially in air traffic controls, they get paid good money. it is not just a job, it is a career. It is amazing skills. We should be encouraging that, not discouraging it as much as possible. And making sure the technologies are there to get them fully certified and in those seats to back up, you know, all their brothers and sisters that are landing planes, you know, short staffed as is. Senator Moran. I would indicate my view which is while they are sometimes worthwhile causes that we seem to shut down Government over, they are never more--we are never gaining any been more benefit than what the damage has done by the shutdown. So you can have your cause, and you are willing to fight in a way that demonstrates how forceful you want to be in shutting down Government, but the consequences of the shutdown always outweigh, the detriment always outweighs, and it is particularly true when it comes to TSA and air traffic control. And so I hope we are able to avoid that consequence--that occurrence this year as we try to work our appropriations bills through. My final question. I Chair an Appropriation subcommittee that has the funding responsibilities for the National Weather Service, and I fly frequently, nearly every week, every week of the year, and weather seems to be more of a problem and challenge than it used to. But maybe that is just the annoyance of it that has built. But tell me how the National Weather Service plays this. Maybe you, Captain, or you uh Todd--Mr. Hauptli. The weather that we get from the National Weather Service, which is sometimes seen as a place that should be less funded, is there value to aviation safety in the work that the National Weather Service does? Mr. Ambrosi. Sure, I will take that. As the guy up there in the air where the weather is, we absolutely need accurate and reliable weather data, whether reporting, everything that we need to you know it seems like more of a problem today, one of those reasons is more aircraft, right. 40 years ago when we are flying across the country in our 727, there was less airplanes in the sky. So going around that thunderstorm, or line of weather was a lot easier. Well, now our brothers and sisters in air traffic control are trying to get maybe a thousand airplanes around the same weather going across the country, so it makes it more difficult. But having accurate weather is essential to what we do. Senator Moran. Anything else? Mr. Hauptli. I would just briefly add, Senator, that if Senator Hickenlooper were still here, I would say that he asked the question about the weather service. I have a sneaking suspicion, partly, because in Denver, you get all four seasons in 1 day, and you get that in the Denver airport. Senator Moran. Before they moved east across Kansas. [Laughter.] Senator Moran. That is true. We have a National Weather Service Station in Goodland, Kansas, the first community that is on the Kansas side of the border. And we are working hard to make sure that it is accurately--I am sorry--adequately funded because it has the consequence of everything that comes across those mountains headed east. Do you want to do your closing statement before I call on Senator Cantwell? Senator Duckworth. If she doesn't mind. Thank you. I have to run to another meeting. So thank you for the indulgence of both the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, as well as Chairman Moran. Thank you to all our witnesses here today for this critical conversation on aviation safety. As I have said before, it should not take a tragic accident to tell us that action is needed and we must act now. I reiterate my commitment to the families of those who have lost loved ones, that I will continue to pursue all available avenues to enact robust aviation safety legislation, and ensure that investment in the ATC system prioritizes our air traffic controllers and their ability to execute their core mission of safety. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth, thank you. Thank you for your cooperation in today's hearing. We are pleased to be joined now by the Vice Chairman, the Ranking Member of the Full Committee. Senator Cantwell, you are recognized. STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Senator Moran. Thank you to you and Senator Duckworth for conducting this hearing this morning, and for your continued interest in pushing aviation safety. Appreciate both of you. And I will enter a longer statement for the record, but I wanted to, since I know we have been going for a while here, I do want to recognize that we have family members here from the DCA air crash accident. Really appreciate their continued focus on aviation safety. But also want to focus on the announcement yesterday of the FAA's award on a contract for Strategic Management Airspace Routing Trajectories, the SMART platform, which is designed to use data to optimize flight schedules to prevent congestion and delays. So while, you know, much news has been made over the Delta and America Airlines flights at Logan Airport this past weekend, and the investigation is ongoing, to me, obviously this has been a year when we have had many, many serious close calls, obviously the fatality accident here in DCA as well. So I wanted to ask you Captain Ambrosi, what capacity do you see I mean to me there is efficiency tools, and it is great to have efficiency tools, and the FAA needs to implement targeted initiatives to prevent runway incursions, and address risks in the airport environment, but is this SMART system going to give us all that we need when we are seeing these increased rates of close calls on runway incursions? Mr. Ambrosi. And specifically, thank you for your question, Senator. And first thank you for your leadership on ROTOR, and pushing forward for aviation safety. As far as the SMART system goes, we all want something that help efficiency, flying more passengers is a good thing, getting more people to their destination every day safely is essential. But there is no silver bullet. AI can't replace the decisionmaking of a human. Any AI or any program like that should still--any decision made should rely on an air traffic controller, or in the pilots, and the people that are out there on the front line, and it can't be a replacement for safety initiatives like the initiatives in the ROTOR Act because it certainly is not going to suddenly say, yes, do this and we won't have any more runway incursions. That is just not going to happen. Senator Cantwell. Well, I just wanted--I am not saying that that is what the FAA is saying, per se, but I am just pointing out that this announcement coinciding with this hearing, I just wanted to make sure that we are making this fine point because that doesn't do anything for the air traffic controller sitting in looking at what are possible incursion conflicts on planes landing and what is on the runway; is that correct? Mr. Ambrosi. That is correct. Again, the future of surface traffic avoidance is ADS-B In through SURF IA Initiatives, and things like that. And you know, through the ROTOR, we are trying to get ADS-B In, on the flight deck displays right now. So you know, that sounds like a good complement for the future because that technology is going to be needed anyway. Senator Cantwell. Right, and so how do you think we get that message out? I am not saying somebody is trying to confuse us, but it is confusing. And so the point is, it is not a substitute for the ROTOR Act. It is not a substitute to fixing air traffic controller staffing. It is not a substitute for this near-miss technology that is needed both in the sky and on the ground. So how do you suggest we---- Mr. Ambrosi. You have our commitment to continue keeping our foot on the gas to make sure that message is loud and clear, along with yours. Senator Cantwell. So do you think that would be better for the consuming public to understand this as almost like a list of improvements that need to be made so that the whole system continues to function as necessary? I mean, I have a belief that what is affecting us now, particularly now, is that these 2018/2019 levels, succeeding them. So we had COVID, and we then returned and are growing past that. My belief is that our system is showing that it is at capacity, beyond capacity in this context of--like the level of--but you know I am from Seattle right now, and Seattle is just building, building, and booming, booming, booming, so maybe that is a Seattle feeling that we have. But to me, I think this is the type of inventory we need the FAA to do and then tell us a list of infrastructure that solve the problems that we are seeing now, because the incidents we just saw in Boston is just another reminder; is it not? Governor Sununu. It is. it is an all-the-above approach, right. You know, proud to be with these gentlemen here, where we are all part of the Modern Skies Coalition and saying, we have to fix ATC, we need to get it modernized, we need to spend the money. There has been a lot of discussion here today about allocating more resources to get air traffic control right. That needs to happen, but not at the expense of other important things like, you know, Collision Avoidance Technology on our aircraft, on the ground, everything else. We can't grow the system if we don't modernize the system. Senator Cantwell. Well, I would appreciate it from the Pilots Association, if there was a list like this of infrastructure investment that you think is necessary to return us to the safety standard, that would be great. Governor Sununu, why is it important that military operators are--be held to the same accountability as everyone else in the national airspace? And as A4As view that more could be done to better enforce Federal aviation regulations applying to military operations? Governor Sununu. Yes, absolutely. I mean, I will reference a little bit what I spoke with Senator Duckworth about. Every, as I would call it, blip in the air is a risk, right? Whether it is an unmanned vehicle, whether it is Military, whether it is General Aviation, or whether it is a commercial jet, that there is a risk for collision there. So why, even the Military would want their own pilots flying around an airport and not telling anybody where they are, is beyond me. You have to close those loopholes. If you are in an active military operation overseas, of course, you don't want to tell people where they are. That is not what is happening around DCA. That is not what is happening around Seattle. It is not what is happening around any of our commercial airports here in in the U.S. So it does nothing but help the system to make sure that every piece of equipment in the air is accounted for, and from a technology standpoint so that the system is--I mean the National Aviation System is effectively a telecommunication system, at its core, right, well what is the point of that if someone isn't listening or someone isn't talking. So the technology needs to be there, it needs to be certified, and it needs to be turned on. Senator Cantwell. Well, I think in the era of digitization, we are saying that you can digitize. And one of the issues--the reason why I became acutely interested, let us just say, is when a worker stole a plane at Sea-Tac and was able to get it up in the air. And so when you think about the ground operations, you would like to know where everything is at every moment. And that is what technology can do for you. In that case, the air traffic controller should have realized that that plane was not even supposed to be moving, let alone--I don't know. I can't remember now the details whether they actually cleared him, or they were yelling at the time that he took off, to stop. But the details are that is what we need. That is what we can what we can do at this point. We can know where every piece of equipment is on the ground and we can have alert systems that basically help air traffic controllers, but we aren't--we need that technology, and so we need that. And we need the ROTOR Act, so. Governor Sununu. That is right. Senator Cantwell. So if anybody else has anything to say about those priorities. Mr. Viola or Mr. Hauptli? No--yes? Mr. Viola. Yes, I think, well said, that all the above, anything we can do to increase safety, and knowing where the other vehicles are, where the other aircrafts are, are certainly accepted. So anything we can do again with the ADS-B In, we are in favor of. Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, we all--as this committee has to work very closely with our House colleagues and get that over the goal line. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and to our witnesses, thank you for your testimony. Today's hearing is another call to action to address the serious close calls we have witnessed in our aviation system that remains under strain. From the beginning, this committee has pursued system-wide reforms to address aviation safety risks and to raise safety standards nationwide. This continued mission requires the collective collaboration and urgency of everyone here today to enact change. This morning, I also want to acknowledge those lost in last week's B-52 aircraft accident at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The flight was part of ongoing testing and evaluation work, including efforts to expand our understanding of aircraft performance, systems behavior, and flight conditions to support stronger safety enhancements for the future. Our thoughts are with the families of the service members and Boeing employees we lost in this tragic accident. In the safest aviation system in the world, we are seeing too many events that are simply unacceptable, namely the mid-air collision near DCA that took 67 lives. On March 22, Air Canada Flight 8646 struck an aircraft rescue vehicle while landing at LaGuardia Airport. The NTSB found the airport's ASDE-X system--a runway and taxiway collision warning system--did not alert controllers because unequipped ground vehicles could not be reliably tracked. At a major U.S. airport, that gap in technology and procedure is indefensible. The Port of Seattle in my home state of Washington is not waiting for another incident to occur. The Port is equipping all its ground vehicles at Seattle Tacoma International Airport with ADS-B Out transponders, despite no Federal mandate. And they also operate their own ramp tower to monitor aircraft and ground vehicle traffic in areas that FAA air traffic control is not charged with monitoring. Their actions reflect the proactive safety approach we need and set the standard others should follow. In the past year alone, we have also witnessed a near mid-air collision between two airliners in Nashville and a high-altitude drone encounter on approach at San Diego. Just this past weekend, a pilot at Boston Logan airport took evasive action during landing to avoid another aircraft on an intersecting runway. These accidents and close calls show that our technology, procedures, and training have not kept pace with today's risks. We also must address the integration of drones and advanced air mobility operators into low-altitude airspace as those operations scale up. And we need multiple layers of redundancy and protection to ensure the highest levels of safety. Recently, a drone operator had to suddenly change course to avoid a hot air balloon that was not sending out an electronic signal in busy controlled airspace--yet both actors were following FAA regulations. Even when operators are following the rules, our collective approach to safety and mitigating risk must evolve. We are joined today by four aviation safety partners. From the Air Line Pilots Association, Captain Ambrosi represents the pilots who work hard to keep passengers safe each day. Captain Ambrosi understands how cockpit technology affects performance. He emphasizes the need for integrated ADS-B In to improve safety and situational awareness and states his support for the bipartisan ROTOR Act that Sen. Cruz and I passed the Senate last year, which includes the strong ADS-B In requirements we need to avoid near- misses. From Airlines for America, Governor Chris Sununu speaks for carriers and how they choose how to invest in safety technology, training, and Safety Management Systems. I plan to ask you, Gov. Sununu, why it's so important for military operators to follow the same rules in the national airspace system as commercial operators. From the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, James Viola represents the companies' designing general aviation aircraft and avionics. I look forward to asking you, Mr. Viola, about the importance of creating a stronger agency-wide SMS at the FAA as manufacturers and airlines have had to adopt mandatory SMS themselves. Lastly, from the American Association of Airport Executives, Todd Hauptli speaks for airports operating in communities nationwide responsible for safe surface operations. Mr. Hauptli--the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law's $25 billion dollars in aviation investments and the $4 billion dollars per year for the Airport Improvement Program have strengthened airport safety--full stop. I am interested in hearing why AAAE thinks these investments should be extended, especially when airport needs for safety projects under the Airport Improvement Program are roughly $13.5 billion dollars each year. I am looking for specific, time-bound commitments from everyone here on deploying safety technologies, strengthening training and staffing, improving data-sharing, and closing gaps these events have exposed. To the families of those lost, and to every traveler who depends on this system, you deserve more than explanations of near misses. You deserve a plan to ensure they do not become tragedies. I look forward to this discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell, thank you for joining us. Thank you, to you, and to Senator Cruz, Chairman Cruz, and you for your support and your attendance to see the value in your subcommittee's work on aviation. We are honored that you are here. It is my usual practice to ask the witnesses if they said anything they wish they hadn't, or that they would like to correct. And/or something that we missed that you wish you would have had the opportunity to say. Anybody want to add anything to the knowledge base of the members of this committee? Mr. Viola. Well, as part of the Manufacturing Association, you know, when I talked about ADS-B In, certainly in favor of it, there are going to be some difficult solutions for some of the aircraft out there. So that is something we would like to work closely with the staff as we get these final bills in place. Senator Moran. We are good. Thank you all for being here. Thanks for your testimony. I would join my colleagues in the remembrance of those who are represented here by family members, and those who have lost loved ones. In particular remembrance for me is the January 29th. Departure from Wichita, Kansas, and the 67 lives that were lost, to all families, in all circumstances, we express our condolences and sympathies and recommit ourselves to doing the things that are necessary, that your efforts on their behalf, are rewarded with fewer, and ultimately no accidents and no deaths. That is the goal of this subcommittee and certainly the efforts that I have as its chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. Senators will have until the close of business on June the 30th to submit questions for the record. The witnesses will have until the close of business on July the 14th to respond to those questions. I originally thought it said July the 4th--July the 14th, to respond. So what that means is that said members of our committee may submit written questions to you and then you have until that date to provide us with your answers. This concludes today's hearing. And we stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X Prepared Statement of Doug Woehler, Director of Business Development and Federal Programs, ADB SAFEGATE Subcommittee Chair Moran, Subcommittee Ranking Member Duckworth, Committee Chair Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of ADB SAFEGATE, thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony for the record regarding the urgent need to mitigate aircraft collision risk on the ground and in the air. ADB SAFEGATE is a leading provider of intelligent airport technologies designed to improve safety, efficiency, sustainability, and operational resilience across the airfield, apron, and tower environment. Our portfolio includes airfield ground lighting, power and control systems, visual docking guidance systems, apron management, tower automation, weather systems, and digital airside solutions that support safer and more predictable aircraft movements. ADB SAFEGATE employs 326 individuals in the United States, including at our corporate headquarters in Gahanna, Ohio, and at our Sacramento, California facility. Globally, ADB SAFEGATE has more than 1,500 employees and serves over 3,000 airports in over 175 countries. Today, we provide equipment and services to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, Chicago O'Hare International Airport, George Bush Intercontinental Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Manhattan Regional Airport, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Chicago Midway International Airport, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport, among others. We are one of the largest providers of airfield infrastructure in the world, including our suite of technologies for airfield ground navigation and tower equipment. We appreciate the Subcommittee's focus on recent close calls, runway incursions, surface conflicts, and broader system vulnerabilities, and we welcome the opportunity to offer a technological and operational perspective on practical steps that can improve safety outcomes. As this Committee and the aviation system at large looks to enhance and modernize air travel, it is critical that you look not only to the skies but also to the ground. We need to move aircraft safely and efficiently at every point in travel, from taxi to takeoff, landing, and gate docking. We must also ensure that, even when passengers are not involved, our airports remain safe and readily navigable, with transiting aircraft and service vehicles alike safely operating on the tarmac. About ADB SAFEGATE As the leading provider of intelligent airport technologies, ADB SAFEGATE has been an innovator in creating a high quality, safer, and brighter future for one hundred years. Over the years, we've grown our knowledge of lighting and docking into experts in tower, apron, airfield, and service. Our long commitment to the aviation sector demonstrates our continued passion for helping our customers improve their airport and airline performance. In the United States, ADB SAFEGATE products are found at airports and airfields around the country. We provide technologies such as airport lighting control and monitoring systems (ALCMS), airfield power solutions, and runway and taxiway lights at airports large and small. How Modern Airside Technology Can Reduce Near Misses The scale of the challenge in the United States is well-documented. The FAA recorded 1,758 runway incursions in Fiscal Year 2024, including multiple Category A and B events--the most serious classifications, where a collision was narrowly avoided. Surface incidents have increased year-over-year, following overall air traffic growth post- pandemic. These are not anomalies. They are symptoms of an airfield environment where the information available to pilots and vehicle operators has not kept pace with the complexity of modern airport operations. Near-misses and collision incidents on the ground at airports are complex and often result from multiple failures, but providing more information to vehicle operators is a key element to broadly reducing the risk of an incident. Modern airports, even the smallest ones, are complex environments, with fast-moving aircraft alongside ground vehicles traversing a network of intersecting rights-of-way. While ultimately, human error will always remain a safety risk, that risk can be reduced by ensuring that vehicle operators are equipped with clear, unambiguous, and sufficiently detailed information to make the right decisions when navigating the airfield. Congress and the FAA have taken meaningful steps towards addressing the risks inherent to ground movement at airports. The Runway Status Light (RWSL) program has gone a long way towards providing protection at one of the most critical areas on the airfield, and we strongly support the continued sustainment and expansion of that program. RWSL is comprised of Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) and Takeoff Hold Lights (THLs), which provide direct visual alerts to aircraft on runways and taxiways without the need for input from Air Traffic Controllers. We also support the expansion of technologies and protocols investigated as part of the Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP). The Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) program provides the opportunity to invest in the next generation of technologies to complement and enhance the capabilities already available. As examples of the improvements in safety and efficiency that could be yielded with new technologies, we have highlighted solutions ADB SAFEGATE offers. Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting Advanced airfield lighting systems, such as Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting, convey visual, contextual information to provide navigational guidance for both aircraft and ground vehicles on the tarmac. Follow-the-Greens (FtG)--real-time, center-line guidance using intelligent green taxiway lighting. Benefits include: Safety: Unambiguous, dynamic routing cuts pilot/ controller error; estimated 100+ runway-incursion risk events eliminated annually Capacity: Shorter taxi times, lower runway occupancy Efficiency: Less engine-on time Follow-the-Greens is a simple but powerful implementation that reduces ground vehicle and aircraft navigational errors using intelligent right-of-way guidance to show exactly where they must go. The unambiguous, dynamic routing provided by FtG ensures that clear and direct information is being given to the pilot of a given vehicle. Since the system is automated and works in tandem with Air Traffic Control-given directions, it reduces the burden placed on Air Traffic Controllers, requiring fewer controller communications while maintaining safety across the movement area. The benefits extend, too, to non-movement areas, where service vehicles and other non-aircraft transportation can be safely routed around moving aircraft. FtG enhances the efficiency of airport operations by getting aircraft where they're going faster, while increasing the safety of the system overall. In Europe, major hub airports, including Munich, Frankfurt, Zurich, Paris, and Amsterdam, joined SESAR-led validation programs for FtG, showing up to 16 percent shorter taxi times (over 30 percent in low visibility) and a 20-25 percent cut in controller pilot communications.\1\ This technology is already in use outside of Europe, as well: Abu Dhabi, Beijing Daxing and Incheon airports run fully- integrated FtG systems. In the United States, the New Terminal One at John F. Kennedy International Airport is set to be the first showcase of FtG, though other major hubs have expressed interest in a FtG system. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Second SEAC Validation Follow-the-Greens Validation VP759. SESAR European Airport Consortium, 2017. https:// transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/eb22e987-bec1-4ab9-b0 20-8080d42b99fa_en?filename=SEAC_FollowtheGreens_Project_Results.pdf Adaptive Lights (ADAL)--LED fixtures that can change color (green V red /yellow V red) under automated or manual control. ADAL extends FtG by enabling any fixture to turn red on command --------------------------------------------------------------------------- or during a detected conflict. Features include: Conflict stop bars anywhere on taxiways Dynamic taxiway closures and reroutes Pushback ``stop-go'' indications Vehicle warning lights on aprons Adaptive Lights, or ADAL, are a complementary technology to FtG that enables fixtures to change colors, increasing the amount of contextual information relayed to vehicle operators. Augmenting the centerline guidance of FtG, ADAL enables rich context through color changes to yellow and red. With lighting alone, vehicle operators can be told to slow down or stop, be alerted to right-of-way closures, and, critically, warned of conflicts with other vehicles. The first U.S. implementation of ADAL will be at the New Terminal One at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. The New Terminal One at JFK represents a critical proof of concept for the U.S. market. The lessons learned from that deployment--in installation, integration with existing FAA systems, and operational validation--will be documented and transferable to other major hub airports. We estimate that a standardised deployment framework, developed in parallel with the JFK implementation, could accelerate adoption at additional airports by 18 to 24 months. Individually, these systems are capable tools that have been shown to reduce collision risks and improve the efficiency of air travel. Together, and when deployed alongside existing safety solutions like Runway Status Lights and runway incursion prevention systems, they add a new layer of protection against potential collision incidents. These technologies are broadly enabled by ICAO-defined Level 4 Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). Level 4 A- SMGCS encompasses the sensor-fused surveillance and guidance automation that allow for the dynamic routing and traffic management of FtG and ADAL. Despite the demonstrated benefits of these systems in international deployments, the United States has been slower to adopt advanced surface movement technologies. This is not a failure of innovation--it is a consequence of regulatory frameworks and advisory circular standards that have not kept pace with available technology, compounded by constrained Airport Improvement Program funding for airfield infrastructure upgrades. The recommendations outlined below are designed specifically to close that gap. Recommendations for Congress and the FAA The Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) initiative is a major step forward for American aviation, and it is crucial that the program also improves the safety of ground movement at U.S. airports. With recent near-miss incidents and tragic collisions, it has never been clearer that safety in the skies must be paired with safety on the ground. The benefits of Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting are amplified in the current operational environment. The FAA faces a well- documented Air Traffic Controller staffing shortage, with the agency reporting it is operating at roughly 54 percent of its targeted controller workforce at some of its busiest facilities, such as New York TRACON. Systems that reduce the volume of controller-to-pilot communications--as FtG has demonstrated, by 20 to 25 percent in European deployments--directly relieve pressure on an already strained workforce. Investing in surface automation is not merely a technology decision; it is a workforce sustainability decision. Additional actions can be taken by both Congress and the FAA to enable and expedite the deployment of safety technologies like Follow- the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting at airports nationwide: Expansion of Existing Programs: ADB SAFEGATE strongly supports the expedited expansion of the RWSL program, which is already operational at 20 airports throughout the United States. ADB SAFEGATE also supports the continued implementation of solutions explored by the Runway Incursion Reduction Program, and urges efforts to accelerate the evaluation of the RIPSA project at San Antonio Airport (SAT), and to expand the project to other airports fitting the program's ``Right-Size- Right-Site'' criteria. Implementation of Level 4 Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS): The FAA should, with Congressional support, incorporate technology standards meeting ICAO A-SMGCS Level 4 functionality as a component of the BNATCS program to achieve enhanced surface movement and controller safety net functionality. Standards Modernization: The FAA should issue targeted updates to Advisory Circulars 150/5345-10H, -46F, -53D, and - 54B to enable the easier deployment of smart LED fixtures and associated infrastructure at airports. Pilot Programs: The FAA, with Congressional support, should launch a pilot program for FtG and ADAL systems at selected U.S. airports to measure the technologies' impact on key performance indicators such as safety, capacity, and sustainability. Funding: Congress must ensure that the FAA is sufficiently resourced to acquire and install advanced safety systems in movement areas at airports, and to fund Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants for those technologies. Conclusion To tackle the ongoing risk of collisions at airports, vehicle operators, whether they be service vehicle drivers or aircraft pilots, must be equipped with sufficient information at the right time and with maximum fidelity. At the same time, the burden to the Nation's Air Traffic Controllers must be accounted for. Solutions that provide this information without adding to the workload of controllers are available that have been shown in evaluation and real-world use to enhance safety and improve efficiency for airport movement. While no system can ever fully eliminate risk, the rich, contextual information provided to vehicle operators by Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting can substantially reduce the threat of collisions, without requiring Air Traffic Controllers to take on yet another system--and, all the while, getting travelers and aircraft where they're going, faster. ADB SAFEGATE encourages Congress to continue to support the FAA's BNATCS program, and to work with the FAA to undertake the necessary standards modernization to enable the broader deployment of these solutions. The United States has long led the world in aviation safety. Maintaining that leadership requires honest acknowledgement that ground movement safety has not advanced at the same pace as airspace management. The technologies exist. The international validation data exists. What is needed now is the regulatory will, the funding commitment, and the implementation framework to bring these solutions to American airports at scale. ADB SAFEGATE stands ready to support that effort--not as a vendor seeking a contract, but as a partner that has spent a century making airports safer. ADB SAFEGATE is ready to be a partner to both the FAA and Congress as efforts continue to modernize the Nation's air transportation system. We are happy to provide expertise and material support, and to assist in the work ahead, as we have for decades. Thank you for this opportunity. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to Chris Sununu Military Accountability in the National Airspace System. Over the past year, there have been multiple close calls between commercial and military aircraft operating near major airports. These include an Army Black Hawk entering the approach path of a United Airlines flight near John Wayne Airport, a Delta flight receiving a TCAS alert involving an Air Force T-38 near DCA in March 2025, and a SkyWest flight narrowly avoiding a B-52 near Minot, North Dakota last June. These incidents raise significant concerns about consistence in operational standards across the National Airspace System (NAS). Aviation safety depends on uniform adherence to rules, and the FAA must serve as a strong, independent regulator that holds all users of the airspace to the same high standards. At the same time, proposals have emerged that would grant the military sole discretion over the use of ADS-B equipment, potentially limiting the FAA's ability to enforce baseline safety requirements. Question 1. Why is it important that military operators, particularly in high-density airspace like the National Capital Region, are held to the same operational and equipment standards as commercial aviation? Answer. Safety in shared airspace depends on every operator being subject to a common set of operating rules. In high-density environments such as the National Capital Region, commercial aircraft, helicopters, military aircraft and other users often operate in close proximity. A4A believes that outside narrowly-defined sensitive national security missions, military operators should meet the same operational and equipage requirements as other operators in the airspace. Question 2. In A4A's view, what risks arise if certain operators are permitted to deviate from requirements such as ADS-B usage in shared civilian airspace? Answer. Deviations from surveillance requirements create unnecessary situational awareness gaps for pilots, controllers and collision-avoidance systems. Question 3. What additional steps should the FAA take to ensure full compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations by military aircraft operating in domestic airspace when not engaged in active combat or sensitive missions? Answer. A4A would encourage the Committee to make sure the FAA continues to strengthen coordination with the Department of Defense/War to improve and maintain transparency, documentation and review of any narrowly defined surveillance deviations. As a general governance principle, the FAA should also be encouraged to do periodic audits to assess risk, while also enhancing safety data sharing agreements for the integration of NAS-level safety management systems risk detection, such as airspace conflicts, loss of separation events and surveillance- related issues. Question 4. Do you believe the FAA currently has sufficient authority to enforce safety requirements across all airspace users, including the military? If not, what changes are needed? Answer. From a commercial operator perspective, we believe FAA has sufficient, broad and clear legal authority over Part 121 operations in the national airspace system. On the question of FAA's sufficient legal authority over military operations, we would defer to the subject matter expertise of Congress and the administration to determine adequacy. Question 5. In your view, what lessons should be drawn from recent near-miss incidents, and how should those lessons inform future policy or regulatory changes? Answer. The U.S. aviation system is extremely safe, but recent events demonstrate that vigilance is necessary. More formal coordination communications frameworks are needed between the FAA and the Department of War/Defense. The lessons learned are that practical solutions are needed to close known gaps in surveillance and communications, review procedures in complex airspace, strategically use safety data to assess risk and ensure all operators understand and comply with a unified set of operational requirements. Question 6. What specific actions would A4A recommend to restore confidence that all aircraft, including military, are operating under a unified and enforceable safety framework? Answer. Safety in shared airspace depends on every operator being subject to a common set of operating rules. A4A believes that outside narrowly-defined sensitive national security missions, military operators should meet the same operational and equipage requirements as other operators in the airspace. System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational demands. The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction depends on decisive and sustained action. Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins? Answer. A4A members maintain robust safety management systems (SMS), recurrent training, fatigue programs and data-sharing processes to identify and mitigate operational risk. The most urgent workforce issue, however, is the FAA's controller staffing shortage. Congress and FAA should sustain controller hiring and training, modernize scheduling and fatigue mitigation, protect the FAA safety workforce from disruptions and provide stable funding for technology that enhances situational awareness and reduces controller workload. Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes? Answer. As noted in A4A testimony, SMS provides a structured, organization-wide framework for managing safety risk through clearly defined policies, formal safety assurance processes and a strong safety culture. By integrating data from voluntary reporting programs, operational performance metrics and safety analyses, SMS enables air carriers to prioritize resources, address emerging risks before they escalate and continuously monitor the effectiveness of mitigations. That work is supported by programs such as the U.S. Aviation Safety Team (USAST), which includes the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA). These programs, together with broader SMS, help airlines to proactively identify and reduce risk. Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and facilities? How can those barriers be addressed? Answer. All A4A carriers have robust and mature SMS that are built and maintained to fit that carrier's specific fleet, network, workforce, risk profile and operating environment. Across all operators and facilities, our industry maintains a commitment to learn from every incident, report and piece of safety data. While not a barrier per se, the challenge is that safety is not static. It requires constant watchfulness, investment and continued evolution. Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to prevent recurrence? Answer. As noted in our testimony, airlines capture lessons through safety reporting systems, flight data analysis, ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, SMS processes and participation in voluntary government-industry data- sharing programs. Notably, having voluntary reporting programs that protect and de-identify safety information to show possible trends identified by one operator or facility can inform risk mitigation across the system before recurrence. These programs are key to not only maintaining safety but providing a predictive tool for the entire system. Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the operating environment, particularly in complex airspace Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations take to accelerate their adoption? Answer. Mature near-term technologies include surface awareness and alerting tools, enhanced airport moving maps, electronic flight deck displays, improved ADS-B-based traffic information, data comm and tower/controller decision-support tools. A4A supports accelerating deployment where the safety case is clear, implementation is coordinated with operators, and certification pathways allow proven technologies to move from demonstration to operational use without unnecessary delay. Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, and how can they be addressed without compromising safety? Answer. A4A defers to FAA and the manufacturing community for more expertise in certification challenges and timelines. In general, obstacles can always include needed resources, workforce challenges and other competing certification priorities. Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common operating picture for both pilots and controllers? Answer. Interoperability requires common data standards, reliable real-time surveillance, secure data exchange and coordinated deployment between aircraft equipage and FAA ground systems. Many of these facets would be best served by funding and implementing the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) that would upgrade nearly every component of the air traffic control system. Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, particularly for smaller operators? Answer. It is important to note that not all operator or aircraft fleet models are the same, and the ability of air carriers to utilize these technologies in the future is heavily dependent on factors outside the control of the air carrier, in particular, access to FAA- certified solutions. While many tools hold promise, there must be an appropriate amount of time to allow equipment to be designed, manufactured and installed in a normal maintenance cycle. A4A looks forward to continued work with the Committee and other parts of the aviation sector on solutions that can improve safety for all system users. Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States to enhance near-term safety? Answer. The FAA should be encouraged to evaluate international experience with surface movement guidance, runway incursion alerting, electronic conspicuity, and enhanced controller decision-support tools. The key is not simply importing a technology but determining whether it can be integrated safely into U.S. procedures, aircraft and ATC equipage, airport layouts and controller workflows. Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence prioritization decisions? Answer. While each individual air carrier may take a tailored approach to their respective operations and fleets, as a generalization, carriers evaluate investments based on demonstrated safety benefits, operational reliability, implementation challenges, training and fleet complexity. Across the entire aviation ecosystem, technologies that reduce collision risk, improve surface safety, enhance controller capacity or address known high-risk airspace are certainly priorities. Importance of Airspace Safety Reviews. As of March 2026, at least 38 near mid-air collisions have been reported at Class B, C, and D airports across the country, according to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System. These incidents suggest a broader pattern of elevated risk in some of the Nation's busiest and most complex airspaces. In response, legislation I introduced last June, along with the bipartisan ROTOR Act, would require the FAA to conduct comprehensive airspace safety reviews at all commercial airports. These reviews are intended to better identify and mitigate risks to passenger operations by examining factors such as high volumes of mixed aircraft traffic, frequent TCAS alerts, the proximity of helicopter routes to commercial flight paths, and increasingly complex arrival and departure procedures. They would also provide a systematic way to identify operational conflicts, procedural gaps, and other underlying risks, enabling the FAA to take more proactive, data-driven steps to strengthen safety across the national airspace system. Question 1. Why is it important for the FAA to conduct comprehensive airspace safety reviews not only at DCA, but across all airports serving commercial passenger traffic nationwide? Answer. DCA is obviously an urgent example, but those underlying safety issues are not unique to one airport. Commercial passenger flights operate in complex environments across the entire country each with its own operations footprint and complex mix of users. Comprehensive reviews at all locations would help FAA identify risks and needed mitigations to the benefit of all users and locations in the NAS. Question 2. Do you agree that these reviews--particularly at Class C and Class D airports--will help identify and address longstanding safety risks at airports such as John Wayne Airport and Hollywood Burbank Airport, as well as at smaller or less scrutinized facilities? Answer. Yes. Class C and D airports can present significant safety complexity, especially when underlying a high-volume operations Class B airspace. Comprehensive reviews can identify recurring conflicts involving helicopter routes, training activity, terrain constraints and commercial flight paths and can help ensure that mitigation is based on well-analyzed data. Question 3. What specific safety risks or operational conflicts are most likely to be uncovered through these reviews, and how should the FAA prioritize addressing them? Answer. Each review will likely reveal localized nuances that uncover or better define through data trends in conflicts between helicopter or training routes and commercial arrival/departure paths, irregular frequency TCAS events, confusing procedures and other gaps in surveillance coverage or communications. FAA should prioritize hazards with the highest consequence and recurrence potential, especially those affecting operations in terminal airspace and on the ground. Question 4. How can data sources like ASRS, TCAS alerts, and operational incident reports be better integrated to support these assessments? Answer. FAA, to the extent practicable and feasible, should be encouraged and empowered through investment to integrate ASRS, TCAS alerts, ATC operational reports, radar and ADS-B data, runway safety data, airline safety reports and incident investigations, among others, into a common and comprehensive risk-review process. The more FAA can identify patterns across datasets, protect voluntary reporting and identify specific corrective actions, the safer our system will be. Question 5. Are there any airspace design or procedural changes, such as adjustments to helicopter routes or arrival/departure flows, that you believe should be prioritized based on current trends? Answer. Comprehensive safety reviews will better identify which airspace design or procedural changes should be prioritized based on actual risk. Air carriers look forward to working with the Committee and FAA to evaluate those findings and prioritize changes that improve safety in shared airspace. Question 6. How frequently should these airspace safety reviews be conducted to remain effective as traffic patterns and technologies evolve? Answer. While A4A does not have a specific frequency recommendation, best practices would dictate that reviews follow a regular, risk-based cycle, with more frequent reviews for complex or high-risk airspace. Technology in High Density Low Altitude Airspace. As you know, the FAA has proposed a regulatory framework for beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drone operations, as directed by this Committee in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. While this proposal represents a step toward integrating uncrewed aircraft systems into the national airspace, there are concerns that it may not go far enough to ensure safety. Specifically, the proposal does not consistently require drones to have the capability to detect and avoid aircraft who are not broadcasting their position across many operating environments, including suburban areas where drone activity is already expanding and expected to grow significantly. This raises questions about whether the framework fully accounts for the realities of shared airspace, particularly from the perspective of crewed aviation operators who rely on see-and-avoid principles and layered safety protections. Question 1. From your perspective, do you believe the FAA's proposed BVLOS rule adequately protects against the risk of midair collisions between drones and crewed aircraft? Answer. A4A supports safe and efficient integration of all new entrants, including drones. It is important that the final BVLOS framework provides assurances that drones can reliably remain well clear of crewed aircraft and it should not shift risks to crewed aviation. Question 2. If not, what specific changes should the FAA make in the final rule to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed aircraft, particularly those that are not broadcasting their position? Answer. Again, A4A supports safe and efficient integration of all new entrants, including drones. For BVLOS, FAA should require performance-based detect-and-avoid capabilities that account for both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft, particularly near airports and other areas where crewed operations are likely. The final rule should include clear performance standards, testing and validation requirements, operational limitations and accountability for maintaining separation. Question 3. How significant is the risk posed by non-cooperative aircraft in high density airspace? Answer. A4A member airlines operating in high-density controlled airspace are typically equipped, identified, communicating with ATC and visible through ATC surveillance systems. A4A supports safe and efficient integration of drones and any other new entrants. Any risk brought by BVLOS operations at scale increases the importance of reliable detection, surveillance and separation standards that are implemented safely and efficiently and do not have a detrimental or adverse safety impact on other users in the system, in particular commercial air carriers. Question 4. Should detect-and-avoid capabilities be required universally for BVLOS operations or tailored based on airspace type and operational risk? Answer. Detect-and-avoid should be required wherever BVLOS operations could encounter crewed aircraft. Question 5. How can the FAA ensure that drone operators maintain an equivalent level of safety to that expected in crewed aviation? Answer. Much like what is done for crewed aviation, the FAA should require drone operators to demonstrate safety through validated detect- and-avoid performance, command-and-control reliability, operator training, maintenance standards, data reporting and incident accountability, among others. While equivalent safety does not necessarily mean identical rules, it should require that new entrants meet a level of risk control comparable to what the public expects from commercial crewed aviation. Question 6. How can the FAA balance enabling innovation in the drone sector while maintaining the high safety standards expected in the national airspace? Answer. As it is for A4A members, the burden should remain on drone operators and service providers to demonstrate that their operations will not increase risk to passengers, crews or other airspace users. Safety, not balance, should be the determining factor, and the focus should be on safe and efficient integration. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to Chris Sununu Increase in Drone Conflicts with Commercial Air Travel Drones are prohibited from flying around airports; however, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) receives more than 100 reports of sightings a month. Last week, a United Airlines pilot reported nearly colliding with a drone as the aircraft was on approach at Newark Liberty International Airport. On Monday, June 29, the pilot of JetBlue Flight 948 reported striking a drone at approximately 3,000 feet in altitude while on final approach. Question 1. Given the increased reporting of drone interactions with commercial aircraft, what actions are A4A taking to support air carriers? Answer. A4A is working with its member carriers, FAA, airports and security partners to identify and communicate drone-related risks near commercial operations. Our focus is on timely reporting, consistent response protocols, improved detection and mitigation capabilities around airports, and policies that ensure drone operators--not airline passengers and crews--bear responsibility for safely integrating into the NAS. Question 2. What Federal action does A4A believe is needed to keep commercial air travel safe with the increased presence of drones in the national airspace system (NAS)? Answer. Federal action should include strong drone detection and mitigation capabilities around airports, clear remote identification and accountability requirements, reliable BVLOS detect-and-avoid standards, FAA enforcement tools, and sustained coordination among airports, air carriers and Federal stakeholders, including the FAA, TSA, DHS, DOJ. The priority must be preventing unauthorized or unsafe drone activity from disrupting or endangering commercial passenger operations. Emergency Medical Kits and Sec. 368 Since 1986, FAA regulations have mandated all domestic passenger airplanes with a flight attendant have an emergency medical kit (EMK) containing medications and devices onboard. Aircraft EMKs are critical during in-flight emergency medical situations and are required to contain equipment and medicines like a stethoscope, aspirin, antihistamine tablets, CPR masks, and other items. The 2018 FAA Reauthorization required FAA evaluate regulations regarding emergency medical equipment on passenger aircraft. Yet, FAA still fails to require that key medications and medical equipment be included in EMKs. In the 2024 FAA Reauthorization, I championed a provision that would require FAA to review required contents of passenger aircraft EMKs and relevant training for crew members at least once every five years. Question 1. Certain air carriers applied for exemptions with the FAA to operate without the five required medications in onboard EMKs, including epinephrine vials used to treat anaphylaxis. Please provide a list of A4A air carrier members that are operating under these exemptions and/or applied for such exemptions. Answer. A4A does not maintain a definitive list of individual member carriers operating under or seeking these types of exemptions. Multiple factors can drive these types of requests, including medication shortages and supply chain challenges. A4A looks forward to continued work with you on this issue, but carrier-specific exemption status would be better confirmed through the FAA, which would maintain and regulate that activity. ______ Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to Chris Sununu Infrastructure Upgrades The 2024 FAA Reauthorization set a foundation for the modernization of our airspace. The urgency of this task has hit home many times, including in Colorado last year during the communications outage at the Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center. The FAA has proposed its $32 billion Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) to transition copper networks to fiber and satellite. Airlines for America's members are on the front lines of this transition. Question 1. Mr. Sununu, how can Congress and the FAA best coordinate with airlines to ensure that these massive infrastructure overhauls do not compromise safety? Answer. Congress and FAA should engage airlines continuously in the planning, testing, sequencing and transition of ATC modernization projects. It is also important that Congress provide the funding predictability and stability necessary to carry out such a large and complex project. The Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) is strongly supported by an unprecedented, industry-wide ``Modern Skies Coalition.'' We are thankful for Congress's $12.5 billion down payment toward air traffic control modernization, and we continue to advocate in support of additional funding of at least $19 billion to completely build a new ATC system. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to Todd Hauptli System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational demands. The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction depends on decisive and sustained action. Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins? Answer. As you know, air traffic controllers operating at airports across the country or at relevant ATC facilities work directly for the Federal Aviation Administration or for its contractors at airports participating in the FAA Contract Tower Program. Most other workers at airports work for entities that operate at the airport rather than for the airport operator directly, including airlines and their contractors, concessionaires, and other service providers. As it relates to airport workers directly employed by airport operators, workforce development and employee wellness are a priority. The competition to attract and retain talent--whether it be maintenance workers, skilled technicians, airport operations experts, administrative staff, or front-office executives--is fierce, and many airports have worked aggressively to establish a strong pipeline of available workers and to create an environment in which employee concerns and workspace challenges are quickly addressed. The specific approaches taken by individual airports related to workforce capacity and fatigue varies. Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes? Answer. As it relates to airport employees, the specific answer will vary based on the practices of the specific airport at which the employee works. For example, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport currently utilizes AI-based tools to solicit regular feedback from employees on fatigue and other human factors, which allows the airport to identify and proactively address trends that could have an impact on safety. As noted during the hearing, AAAE provides a wide range of training to airports of all sizes across the country. We integrate fatigue awareness and management into specific operational programs, including Safety Management Systems (SMS) training and the International Aviation Snow Academy, which covers fatigue risk matrices for winter operations. We constantly evaluate our training programs and look for opportunities to address workforce issues, including fatigue mitigation, for the benefit of our airport members and their employees. Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and facilities? How can those barriers be addressed? Answer. In 2023, the FAA issued a rule requiring certain Part 139 certificated airports to implement Safety Management Systems over a five-year period. A core component of these systems is safety risk management (SRM). As part of SRM, airport operators are required to establish a systemic process for identifying operational safety hazards, analyzing the level of risk associated with each of those hazards, and mitigating the risk of the identified hazards. The value of SMS is enabling airport operators to identify safety risks and appropriate mitigation measures that are unique and tailored to their operating environment. The SRM process avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes that no two airports face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures that limited financial resources are allocated where they will have the greatest impact on improving safety. The implementation of SMS at individual airports is in its early stages. At this point, the signs are positive that implementation will be consistent across all operators and facilities and without unnecessary barriers. As part of the SMS implementation process for airports, one major gap identified is the inability of FAA air traffic control facilities, air carriers, and other operators to confidently and efficiently share hazard data collected through their SMS programs with airport operators. As public entities, airport operators are generally subject to open records laws and must disclose safety data to the public upon request. These laws, while well intended, stymie safety by inhibiting the data disclosures and collaboration among entities that are needed to address issues before they arise. Given that reality, we urge the committee and Congress to protect safety data that FAA and other stakeholders share with airports from public disclosure under open records laws. Allowing data sharing among stakeholders without fear of retribution is critical to ensuring the highest levels of safety. Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to prevent recurrence? Answer. N/A Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the operating environment, particularly in complex airspace Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations take to accelerate their adoption? Answer. AAAE recognizes the value of technology and surface safety surveillance tools to enhance safety, including FAA's deployment of Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems--currently in place at 44 airports. While ASDE-X and ASSC have been effective, the industry needed more cost-effective solutions that could be quickly implemented, especially for smaller airports. Congress recognized the importance of surface surveillance in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Under section 347, FAA was directed to identify and deploy systems that may provide or improve surface surveillance at airports needing such capabilities. We appreciate the work that FAA has done thus far to implement section 347 and deploy Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) systems as part of the Brand New Air Traffic Control System. The agency has installed the SAI systems at approximately 90 airports to date, and we understand that plans are in place to eventually reach 220 airports. These systems promise to enhance safety in the airport environment and mitigate near misses through improved situational awareness. Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, and how can they be addressed without compromising safety? Answer. FAA is in the process of deploying additional surface safety surveillance systems at airports as noted. We are unaware of any specific regulatory or certification obstacles relating to the ongoing deployment of these systems. Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common operating picture for both pilots and controllers? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, particularly for smaller operators? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States to enhance near-term safety? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence prioritization decisions? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Importance of Airspace Safety Reviews. As of March 2026, at least 38 near mid-air collisions have been reported at Class B, C, and D airports across the country, according to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System. These incidents suggest a broader pattern of elevated risk in some of the Nation's busiest and most complex airspaces. In response, legislation I introduced last June, along with the bipartisan ROTOR Act, would require the FAA to conduct comprehensive airspace safety reviews at all commercial airports. These reviews are intended to better identify and mitigate risks to passenger operations by examining factors such as high volumes of mixed aircraft traffic, frequent TCAS alerts, the proximity of helicopter routes to commercial flight paths, and increasingly complex arrival and departure procedures. They would also provide a systematic way to identify operational conflicts, procedural gaps, and other underlying risks, enabling the FAA to take more proactive, data-driven steps to strengthen safety across the national airspace system. Question 1. Why is it important for the FAA to conduct comprehensive airspace safety reviews not only at DCA, but across all airports serving commercial passenger traffic nationwide? Answer. FAA has been given exclusive authority to regulate and ensure the safe and efficient use of the National Airspace System. The specifics of airspace design, utilization, and operations are beyond the scope of AAAE's core expertise representing airport executives and operators. However, we generally agree that additional situational awareness in airspace across the country is beneficial in identifying potential risks and conflicts. Question 2. Do you agree that these reviews--particularly at Class C and Class D airports--will help identify and address longstanding safety risks at airports such as John Wayne Airport and Hollywood Burbank Airport, as well as at smaller or less scrutinized facilities? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 3. What specific safety risks or operational conflicts are most likely to be uncovered through these reviews, and how should the FAA prioritize addressing them? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 4. How can data sources like ASRS, TCAS alerts, and operational incident reports be better integrated to support these assessments? Answer This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 5. Are there any airspace design or procedural changes, such as adjustments to helicopter routes or arrival/departure flows, that you believe should be prioritized based on current trends? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Question 6. How frequently should these airspace safety reviews be conducted to remain effective as traffic patterns and technologies evolve? Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise. Extending Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Programs to Advance Airport Safety. The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) has described the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law a ``historic investment'' in airport infrastructure, providing $25 billion over five years for projects ranging from runway safety enhancements, terminal improvements, radar upgrades, and sustainment of air traffic control towers. More recently, the law provided the FAA with an additional $970 million in discretionary funding, supporting 133 projects at 129 airports through FY 2026. In May, many of my colleagues joined me in urging Senate appropriators to extend these critical programs We warned that ``reducing funding available for transportation programs by treating BIL as a one-time infusion will increase costs, cost us American jobs, and set our country back.'' Question 1. In AAAE's view, how has the $25 billion investment in airports from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law improved safety at U.S. airports, particularly in reducing the risk of close calls? Do you believe Congress should extend these programs, and how would continued IIJA funding further strengthen aviation safety? Answer. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) has provided billions of dollars in critical funding in recent years that has allowed airports to fund thousands of critical projects across the country, including many that enhance safety. While those funds have been helpful, demand has far exceeded available resources. For the Airport Terminal Program (ATP) and the FAA Contract Tower (FTC) Competitive Grant Program, airports submitted more than 3,560 applications requesting more than $48.1 billion in funding, nearly 10 times the $5 billion made available for those programs over five years. Extending IIJA funding would allow airports to tackle the tens of billions of dollars in projects that were left unaddressed because of existing funding constraints. When the three IIJA programs expire at the end of FY26, airports will face a $4 billion annual funding cliff, exacerbating the gap between airport needs and available funding. Considering the overwhelming airport infrastructure needs and the current lack of Federal and local funding options, we believe strongly that Congress should extend IIJA program funding well into the future. Doing so would help airports enhance aviation safety and efficiency significantly. We remain grateful to the committee for the steadfast support of airport infrastructure investment. Extending IIJA airport funding would ensure that airports are able to make progress on critical projects that will help airports enhance aviation safety, efficiency, and passenger convenience. Question 2. What risks do airports face if these programs expire at the end of the Fiscal Year, and what specific safety funding gaps would emerge as a result? Answer. Safety continues to be a primary focus of infrastructure investment at airports. Many airports and their facilities were built decades ago and require significant, constant investment to meet current standards. Runway rehabilitation/resurfacing and taxiway and apron pavement rehabilitation are among the most common, necessary, and expensive investments, requiring billions of dollars annually across the airport system. With traffic levels increasing and with operations becoming ever more complex, the FAA and airports are paying increased attention to runway and taxiway geometry, including taxiway/runway connections, intersections, and hot spots. Reconfiguring an airfield designed with limited operations when propeller-driven aircraft were prevalent to meet the needs of today's high-performing aircraft and traffic levels is neither easy nor inexpensive. Airfield lighting, signage, and runway/taxiway/apron pavement marking improvements are also a focus area for airports. Airfield pavement markings and lighting have been likened to lane markings, streetlights, and traffic signals on our roadways. They provide important visual information and generate awareness, particularly at night or in low visibility conditions. Upgrading facilities and infrastructure to enhance safety on or near runways remains a top priority for airports and the FAA. Considerable progress has been made in recent years through the FAA Runway Incursion Mitigation Program and other initiatives. Unfortunately, there is not an endless stream of Federal dollars available for airports to meet all worthy projects to enhance safety, increase capacity, or meet other critical needs at airports. The gap between airport needs and available resources--through AIP, IIJA, local Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) and other sources--is growing. The PFC has been stagnant for a quarter century, last adjusted in 2000. The IIJA has provided a critical source of funding that airports have used successfully over the past five Fiscal Years to address safety projects and other infrastructure needs, but demand has far exceeded available resources. As noted in my previous answer, for the IIJA's Airport Terminal Program and the FAA Contract Tower Competitive Grant Program, airports submitted over 3,560 applications requesting more than $48.1 billion in funding, nearly 10 times the $5 billion made available over five years. If the three IIJA programs are not extended, airports will lose $4 billion annually that could be used to address critical safety upgrades and infrastructure needs throughout the airport environment. Question 3. Which types of safety projects, such as runway reconfigurations, surface detection technologies, or tower upgrades have delivered the most measurable safety benefits so far? Answer. These types of projects are all important to improving safety at airports, and each will provide a different level of benefit depending on the unique situation at a particular airport. As noted, the SMS process is an effective foundational tool for helping to ensure that limited Federal resources are targeted to their most beneficial use. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to Todd Hauptli Airport Improvements to Reduce Close Calls Question 1. What are the most significant airport-level contributors to close calls? Answer. The contributing factors to close calls can vary depending on the unique circumstances at the airport where they occur, including human factors, airport configuration, weather conditions, emergency operations, and traffic mix, among others. Mitigating close calls and enhancing safety more broadly relies on addressing the people (training and human factors), processes (Safety Management Systems), and technology and infrastructure in operation throughout the airport environment. We believe there are opportunities to enhance the consistency and effectiveness of training for those who operate in airport movement areas; to facilitate more effective sharing of SMS data between FAA and industry and among industry partners to identify and address potential safety concerns; and to boost Federal investments in critical technology and infrastructure upgrades. Question 2. How is AAAE coordinating with FAA to ensure that airports with the highest rates of close calls receive targeted support? Answer. AAAE is a member of the FAA's Runway Safety Council and engages regularly and coordinates with FAA on a wide range of safety- enhancing initiatives. We have supported the FAA on implementation of many programs aimed at improving surface safety, including deployment of surface surveillance tools and the Runway Incursion Mitigation Program. The RIM Program uses runway incursion data to highlight the highest priority airports where targeted funding and modifications to airfield geometry are needed. Similarly, FAA conducted a risk assessment to prioritize the airports where the agency should deploy Surface Awareness Initiative systems over a four-year period. For any initiative, we support FAA engaging in the appropriate risk assessment to inform where to prioritize limited funding and maximize the impact on improving safety. Question 3. What metrics should Congress require FAA to use when prioritizing safety interventions? Answer. AAAE has supported the FAA closely tracking and logging geospatial data associated runway incursion events across the airport system. This location data allows airport operators, in coordination with the FAA, to identify potential hot spots or areas of concern with airfield configurations and mitigate them accordingly. We encourage Congress and the committee to continue requiring that the FAA track the location of these incursions. Need for Sustained Funding As part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Airport Infrastructure Grant (AIG) program received $14.5 billion over five years, beginning in Fiscal Year 2022. Congress authorized these AIG funds to support projects to improve runways, taxiways, safety, sustainability, terminals, airport transit connections and roadways. Question 1. What steps are airports taking to improve real-time situational awareness for both air traffic controllers and pilots, such as enhanced lighting, signage, or surface-tracking systems? Answer. Airfield lighting, signage, and runway/taxiway/apron pavement marking improvements are a focus area for airports. Airfield pavement markings and lighting have been likened to lane markings, streetlights, and traffic signals on our roadways. They provide important visual information and generate awareness, particularly at night or in low visibility conditions. Airports continue to prioritize investments in these areas. Question 2. What barriers remain to widespread adoption of these tools and systems to enhance real-time situational awareness for controllers and pilots? Answer. Resource constraints remain a challenge. As it relates to surface safety surveillance tools, AAAE recognizes the value of this technology, including FAA's deployment of Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), and ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems, and Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) systems. Consistent with the SMS process and in consultation with FAA, we understand that airports with surface surveillance tools (ASDE-X, ASSC, or SAI) are evaluating the installation of vehicle movement area transmitters (VMATs) to improve situational awareness. It is important to note that these devices are not yet widely deployable at all airports across the country given where FAA is in the process of rolling out surface surveillance systems; the need for driver and controller training; supply chain and bandwidth concerns; and the lack of available resources to procure, install, program, test, and maintain the technology. Airports differ significantly in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, runway configurations, weather and low-visibility operations, hot spots, construction activity, and vehicle access needs. Given this complexity and the growing disconnect between available resources and airport investment needs for safety projects, capacity enhancements, terminal upgrades, and other critical projects, airports must have the ability through SMS and other assessments to evaluate and prioritize technology deployment and safety investments to ensure that each dollar goes toward its highest and best safety purpose. Question 3. How did airports invest IIJA AIG program funding to help mitigate risk factors that contribute to close calls and runway incursions? Answer. As noted, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act has provided billions of dollars in critical funding that has allowed airports to fund thousands of critical projects across the country, including many that enhance safety. The Federal Aviation Administration would be in a better position to highlight for the committee the specifics of the numerous projects that have been undertaken nationwide. In general terms, these funds have helped support runway and taxiway rehabilitation, airfield lighting and signage upgrades, and countless other related projects aimed at improving runway safety. Question 4. What additional authorities or funding is necessary for airports to mitigate hazards that contribute to close calls and runway incursions? Answer. The biggest impediment facing airports is funding constraints. Upgrading facilities and infrastructure to enhance safety on or near runways remains a top priority for airports and the FAA. Unfortunately, there is not an endless stream of Federal dollars available for these and other worthy projects to enhance safety, increase capacity, or meet other critical needs at airports. The Airport Improvement Program remains the primary Federal resource for many of these investments, but AIP is significantly oversubscribed. Proposals to expand AIP-eligibility, while beneficial in some instances, risks further diluting AIP and diverting scarce resources from existing projects, including potential safety upgrades. The FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) for 2025-2029 identifies $67.5 billion in needs over the next five years-- or $13.5 billion annually--for AIP and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act-eligible projects, more than three times the $4 billion that is provided on an annual basis for AIP. Airports Council International- North America (ACI-NA) estimates that annual funding needs for U.S. airports exceeds $173.9 billion over the same period or $35 billion annually when factoring in other important infrastructure projects that are not eligible for Federal funding. The gap between airport needs and available resources--through AIP, IIJA, and local PFCs--is growing. The PFC has been stagnant for a quarter century, last adjusted in 2000. The IIJA has provided a critical source of funding that airports have used successfully over the past five Fiscal Years to address safety projects and other infrastructure needs, but demand has far exceeded available resources. For the IIJA's Airport Terminal Program and the FAA Contract Tower Competitive Grant Program, airports submitted over 3,560 applications requesting more than $48.1 billion in funding, nearly 10 times the $5 billion made available over five years. With the three IIJA programs set to expire at the end of FY26, airports face a $4 billion annual funding cliff, exacerbating the gap between airport needs and available funding. While airports are making progress in addressing the highest priority safety projects and immediate needs, including runway and taxiway rehabilitation, runway safety areas and other critical projects; many face a growing challenge in meeting other safety priorities and imperatives, including capacity enhancement, terminal upgrades, and numerous other projects that can better serve the traveling public and facilitate commerce. Surface Transportation Connectivity to Airports As demand for air travel expands, better ground transportation connections will be critical. Enplanements at American airports are expected to grow from nearly 945 million in 2023 to 1.4 billion in 2040 and 1.7 billion in 2050. An estimated $19.3 billion is needed to improve access to and from our airports over the next five years alone. That is why Senator Blackburn and I introduced the bipartisan, bicameral Don't Miss Your Flight Act, which would create an incentive to invest in surface transportation improvements into and out of public airports. Question 1. Based on AAAE's work with airports across our country, how important is it to connect public airports to surface transportation? Answer. Connections between public airports and surface transportation are critical. That is why AAAE is a strong supporter of the ``Don't Miss Your Flight Act.'' We are eager to work with you, Senator Duckworth, to advance this important legislation that would benefit millions of flyers every year. Question 2. Do you agree that we need to invest in improved surface transportation connections to airports to keep up with growing airline passenger demand? Answer. AAAE fully agrees that continued investment in improved surface transportation connections to airports is critical to meeting growing passenger demand. AAAE believes that enactment of the ``Don't Miss Your Flight Act'' would be a tremendous boost in accomplishing that goal, and we are strong proponents for its enactment. Essential Air Service The Essential Air Service (EAS) program is a vital lifeline for our small and rural communities. For a small Federal investment, EAS ensures that these communities are connected to the national economy, protecting jobs, commerce and healthcare access. Without EAS, small communities across rural America would face economic decline. Question 1. Do you agree that Congress must protect EAS funding for the more than 170 airports across the U.S. that rely on the EAS program to maintain service? Answer. Yes. AAAE fully supports EAS and has requested full funding for the program in FY27. Question 2. What value does the EAS program provide to rural communities and our broader national interests? What is at risk if funding for EAS is not increased? Answer. EAS ensures connectivity to the NAS for many communities across the country. A lack of funding would effectively limit connectivity for those communities. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to Todd Hauptli Ground Safety Airports manage large fleets of ground vehicles. These vehicles must operate in the same ground space as aircraft with limited ground visibility, creating the perfect conditions for potentially dangerous interactions. Question 1. Mr. Hauptli, can you explain what members of the committee can learn from data that is obtained through vehicle monitoring technology? Answer. In general, data of this nature could be utilized to evaluate trends, use patterns, and other information that could be helpful in proactively addressing potential risks. Question 2. Mr. Hauptli, how can Safety Management Systems identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents or runway incursions? Answer. Safety is a core focus and function of airports, consistent with their public nature and public mission. While that has been the case for decades, the broad implementation of Safety Management Systems allows airports to more effectively identify and mitigate systemic risk, including those related to close calls, runway incursions, and other safety hazards. Airport operators are using SMS to proactively identify and mitigate safety risks at their facilities. In 2023, the FAA issued a rule requiring certain Part 139 certificated airports to implement an SMS over a five-year period. A core component of these systems is safety risk management. As part of SRM, airport operators are required to establish a systemic process for identifying operational safety hazards, analyzing the level of risk associated with each of those hazards, and mitigating the risk of the identified hazards. The tremendous value of SMS is enabling airport operators to identify safety risks and appropriate mitigation measures that are unique and tailored to their operating environment. Individuals with access to the airside are trained on how to report hazards, ensuring facility-specific risks are readily understood. Airport operators closely evaluate this data and implement corrective actions designed to mitigate the highest-risk hazards, such as additional training, new signage, or targeted infrastructure modifications. The SRM process avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes that no two airports face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures that limited financial resources are allocated where they will have the greatest impact on improving safety. ______ Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to James A. Viola Question 1. In Alaska, aircraft routinely operate at low altitudes for medevac, public safety, tourism, critical infrastructure support, and to access remote communities, often in areas with limited ADS-B ground-based coverage. As UAS operations integrate into this same low- altitude airspace, what technology exists today, or is being developed by industry, to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed aircraft both equipped with and without ADS-B in those environments? Answer. ADS-B equipage on piloted aircraft is one component of addressing safety, but not the complete system. It is essential that UAS aircraft and their operators invest in Detect And Avoid (DAA) technologies that addresses the risks introduced by aircraft being operated without a pilot onboard and in the context of the regulatory framework that has existed since the 1940s for see-and-avoid responsibilities. The FAA has released initial guidance for DAA systems which GAMA welcomes. The FAA has also supported work with several GAMA members to further flesh out DAA system requirements. This is very positive and we continue to encourage the agency to do this work both for the unique airspace and operational environment in Alaska, but also to advance UAS integration in the continental United States. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to James A. Viola FAA Management System & Accountability. Aviation manufacturers represented by GAMA have been required to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) since the 2020 Aircraft Certification Reform Act. However, recent events have raised concerns about the FAA's own safety oversight and internal risk management. The NTSB's investigation into the 2024 Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 incident identified significant gaps in FAA oversight of manufacturers. Additionally, the NTSB found that in the three years leading up to the DCA collision, there were more than 15,000 close-proximity incidents between commercial aircraft and helicopters, data the FAA failed to act on. These examples point to a broader concern, the FAA's ability to monitor and manage its own safety performance may be inadequate without clear direction from Congress and stronger internal accountability mechanisms. Taken together, these incidents underscore the need to strengthen FAA safety management processes, improve safety culture, and ensure the agency can proactively identify and mitigate risks. Question 1. My SMS bill would establish an independent panel of safety experts to evaluate the FAA's approach to safety management and risk oversight, with the goal of creating a more integrated and effective agency-wide SMS. Do you believe this panel would improve the FAA's ability to identify and address safety risks? Answer. GAMA is a strong proponent of Safety Management Systems and pleased to support the FAA SMS Compliance Review Act of 2026 and agrees the panel would complement FAA's efforts to identify and address safety risks internally and externally. Question 2. How important is it for the FAA to implement a comprehensive, agency-wide SMS to ensure it is held to the same safety standards as the industry it regulates? Answer. GAMA agrees and supports implementation of an agency-wide SMS for the FAA that will ensure the agency is held to the same standards as the entities it regulates. We also believe that creating this safety culture will yield better safety outcomes for the agency, its partners, and the flying public. Question 3. From your perspective, what are the most significant gaps in the FAA's current safety management and oversight framework? Answer. The FAA must ensure that the agency leverages all data available to the agency for both its internal SMS and the on-going oversight being conducted for compliance across 14 CFR. The FAA does not have a shortage of data sources, but the agency needs to make appropriate investment to integrate the data--where appropriate and not restricted by statute--and providing access to the specific and overall data in a manner beneficial to staff and leadership levels. Question 4. How can the FAA improve its ability to act on safety data, such as trends seen in near miss incidents, before they result in accidents? Answer. First, the FAA should monitor safety trends, but must ensure that the monitoring of safety data is a shared responsibility between the regulator conducting oversight and the regulated party specifically and more broadly the industry stakeholders that can impact change. Near miss incidents should be monitored, but these are only a component of the safety focus areas that may warrant attention. While near-miss incidents have recently been in the press and were the cause of the most recent major airline accident in 2025, the agency must be data-driven when prioritizing the agency resources for safety. Placing long-term focus on the priorities that are risks for the U.S. National Airspace System is how both maintaining and improving aviation safety is best managed by the regulator and by industry. Question 5. What role should industry stakeholders, including manufacturers and operators, play in strengthening the FAA's SMS and overall safety culture? Answer. Both manufacturers and operators have their own Safety Management Systems as established by 14 CFR Part 5. Manufacturers will work to advance and manage safety based on their SMS. Similarly, managing safety will be done by way of an SMS by operators. The FAA's challenge is both its SMS as the operational entity and Air Navigation Service Provider of the NAS and also to utilize the SMS to inform aggregate safety areas of concern when conducting oversight and establishing priorities. The industry--operator and manufacturer--SMS should have a mechanism by which safety findings are provided to the FAA at the aggregate level and vice versa the FAA should ensure that the national safety priorities that the agency is monitoring by way of its SMS are provided to the regulated parties as an input into both operators and manufacturer SMS to inform their process and safety management activities. Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the operating environment, particularly in complex airspace. Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations take to accelerate their adoption? Answer. There is not a shortage of currently available technologies in use today and also several in various stages of research and development (R&D) and standards development. GAMA's view is from the airborne equipage side more so than ground-based solutions that do address these safety risks. Today's general aviation aircraft are equipped with Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) both TCAS II and TCAS I as well as Traffic Awareness System (TAS) that have addressed airborne collision risks for decades. Each provide a traffic picture to the pilot with different types information provided to the pilot based on their operation. Additionally, approximately 150,000 general aviation aircraft are currently equipped with installed ADS-B IN technologies that have ADS-B IN applications that address runway safety, including surface alerting or the more simple awareness. The FAA has also long allowed for the display of own-ship position on both installed and portable Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) displays that show the pilot aircraft in context of other aircraft traffic and location on the runway to reduce the risk of errors being made by the pilot. We see this investment made by our members and by our customers--the aircraft operators--being a success story. To get expanded equipage with these existing technologies beyond the 75 plus percent of the fleet that have ADS-B IN installed today, as an example, the FAA serves a critical role in allowing for the standards development, adoption of the standards in certification documents and the associated guidance, and providing an effective and predictable certification process that enables bringing these technologies to the market and into the fleet where the airborne equipage can improve safety. Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, and how can they be addressed without compromising safety? Answer. As articulated in my written testimony, there are four main areas that can be obstacles to the implementation of safety enhancing technology. They are: Certification: If the FAA does not have the focus, resources, workforce capacity, and technological expertise to provide appropriate oversight and approval, it may inhibit safety enhancements from reaching the marketplace in a timely manner. Modernization of FAA certification processes to keep pace with innovation enables safety through new products and technologies and is critical given the current state of innovation and other regulatory demands that are increasing. Standards Development and Validation: Another important component to developing and certifying safety enhancing equipment is FAA participation and collaboration with industry and global standards bodies to achieve technical consensus for new products and technologies. The FAA must remain an active partner with standards bodies, other regulators, and industry partners to help promote harmonization of standards for products in the global marketplace. Product Availability and Supply Chain: Like other industries that are complex, the aviation sector has experienced challenges associated with its supply chain. First, FAA certification of safety enhancement is followed by production approval of the product and individual parts and equipment. As such, if there is a supply chain impediment with a part it can impact the ability of 10 the broader safety enhancement getting to the marketplace. Second, aviation supply chain and operations are international, so broader domestic or international trade policies can potentially impact or constrain the marketplace. Installation and Maintenance Capacity: Installation of equipment is the final step in this process. Aircraft are routinely serviced and inspected to ensure safety and airworthiness. Today, many of GAMA's member companies who work in the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) space share that they are nearing or at capacity with existing work. Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common operating picture for both pilots and controllers? Answer. We are today in an environment where the aircraft, especially general aviation aircraft, may have a better situational awareness picture than air traffic controllers providing separation services. This is true for ADS-B IN, but also weather information. There are some of these datasets that are enabled for pilots in the cockpit such as the current uplink of transponder-only aircraft targets to the cockpit using the Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) services and the ADS-B surveillance network also providing Flight Information Services Broadcast (FIS-B) with weather and other operational information to pilots. When the ADS-B program was scoped by the FAA in the early 2000s, the agency made a commitment to aviation safety and the general aviation industry specifically to provide these services as a benefit to aircraft owners acquiring ADS-B OUT equipment. We've seen this investment in the FAA's infrastructure materialize into safety improvements that are not seen outside the United States. Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, particularly for smaller operators? Answer. GAMA strongly believes that any equipage requirements implemented by Congress must underscore the importance of solutions like EFBs and portable devices which can provide flexibility and utility while maintaining safety. Any policy effort in this area must reflect the reality of general aviation's leadership in ADS-B Out and ADS-B In equipage over the past dozen plus years. For context, the FAA's ADS-B Out equipage rebate program, implemented prior to the 2020 mandate coming into effect, provided an incentive for installation that was coordinated with the MRO community and avionics providers to effectively manage parts supply and maintenance capacity. This example serves as a model but also highlights the need for collaboration amongst government and industry to enable safety solutions to reach the cockpit. Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States to enhance near-term safety? Answer. GAMA has an international membership with manufacturers in both the United States and in Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom and avionics and technologies are developed and certificated within each of those jurisdictions. But, all our members are working along similar technology roadmaps and the establishment of technology standards is one where the United States and the FAA specifically is a leader. Several of the technologies that are in operation today in the general aviation fleet are also specifically U.S.-unique capabilities that have not necessarily been adopted at the same rate by our operators customers in foreign markets. Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence prioritization decisions? Answer. The United States--unlike other countries--has primarily advanced technology introduction in the flight deck without regulatory mandates. This is a component of the U.S. regulatory system where the same constraints on advancing regulations do not necessarily exist outside the country. What we do see is that technologies that do provide benefits are also adopted by aircraft owners without the FAA advancing a mandate, but simply enabling the certification and installation of the technology through enabling rules and policies. While the FAA advance a surveillance mandate in the 2010s for a next generation transponder, the so called ADS-B OUT system, the FAA has not mandated any changes for communication or navigation airborne equipage, and yet, the United States fleet has adoption and use of both Controlled Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) and Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) in the fleet at significantly higher rates than what we see elsewhere. If there is a case for the new equipment from a benefits side that outweighs the investment cost, we do see investments being made. This is why we have over 6,283 general and business aviation airplanes equipped to participate in the FAA ground CPDLC services because of operational benefits and the FAA has not advanced any regulatory mandate and--of those--4,619 general and business aviation airplanes use the FAA's enroute CPDLC services. We have more airplanes in our segment of the aviation partaking in these operations than our airline colleagues simply because the cost-benefit makes sense. The story is the same for navigation where equipage with Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) capable navigation receivers is the standard since the early 2000s and have enabled access to large and rural airports across the United States for close to 200,000 aircraft. Our community has also adopted Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) airborne equipment on over 4,000 business jets which provides for safety and operational benefits since the FAA introduced its enabling rule in 14 CFR 91.176. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to James A. Viola Tariffs The aerospace manufacturing industry has been a success story for American trade. In 2024, the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry had a net positive export trade balance of $104 billion. However, the Trump administration's chaotic rollout and haphazard trade wars severely hurt the economy and introduced an enormous amount of uncertainty to American manufacturing. Question 1. In general, how does increasing the costs of aviation manufacturing inputs ultimately benefit or harm consumers? Answer. While general aviation manufacturers continue to deliver product into the global marketplace, uncertainty from trade policy has caused some volatility. The most recent GAMA Shipment and Billings Report provides context on impacts. Question 2. How have President Trump's tariffs on materials--such as aluminum and steel--impacted the general aviation manufacturing industry? Answer. Aviation manufacturing depends on certainty to enable product to reach a marketplace which is global in nature. Proposed or implemented tariffs on materials, despite the current/prior zero-tariff environment, have the potential to impact the supply chain and imports. GAMA continues to advocate for a zero-tariff regime with policymakers and the administration. Question 3. In what ways has the trade war impacted the competitiveness of American general aviation aircraft exports? Answer. GAMA's 2025 Shipment Report highlights deliveries to the global marketplace and illustrate relative stability. Workforce Readiness As I emphasized in my opening statement, the aviation workforce must be at the center of the conversation around new technologies. How is GAMA supporting workforce readiness--especially considering rapid technology upgrades--for mechanics, pilots and avionics technicians? Answer. GAMA is proud to support workforce development efforts in collaboration with our member companies. The most prominent effort is our Aviation Design Challenge which promotes Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) education through aviation curriculum and a virtual fly-off in high schools across the United States. Over 70 high school teams, representing 31 states, entered the 2026 GAMA Aviation Design Challenge. During the first portion of the challenge, teams used complimentary ``Fly to Learn'' curriculum to learn the principles of flight and airplane design. During the second portion of the competition, teams applied their knowledge to modify the design of an airplane and complete a fly-off mission using X-Plane software. The 2026 winners, from Milton Georgia, had the opportunity to experience general aviation manufacturing firsthand at Cubcrafters in Yakima, Washington. Redbird Flight Simulations has also generously provided a two-day STEM Lab Camp for a team in the competition. More information can be found at Fly to Learn. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to Captain Jason Ambrosi Implementation of ADS-B In Addressing Runway Safety. As air traffic continues to grow and airport operations become more complex, the risk of runway collision will also increase. Runway operations remain one of the highest-risk phases of flight in the United States. In April 2024, a JetBlue flight was cleared for takeoff and nearly collided with a Southwest Airlines flight cleared to cross the same runway at DCA. Incidents like this highlight the need to strengthen efforts to prevent runway safety events, alongside implementing NTSB's recommended reforms related to the DCA crash. The ROTOR Act takes both approaches. The ROTOR Act ADS-B In standard would provide pilots with enhanced situational awareness and timely traffic alerts to help prevent collisions on the airport surface and in the air. Question 1. In your view, how important is it that the commercial fleet is equipped with ADS-B In enabled cockpit alerting runway safety technologies--known as SURF-IA--as included under the ROTOR Act's ADS-B In standard--to avoid serious runway safety incidents? Answer. It is essential that the entire airline fleet have ADS-B In enabled flight deck technologies for both airborne and airport surface safety applications. Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Surface with Indications and Alerts, provides direct surface safety alerts to the flight crew. The ADS-B In surface safety application both ``indicates'' to pilots' safety-relevant traffic and provides alerts to facilitate pilots' immediate awareness and response to a potential collision hazard. Much like the ``airborne'' benefits of ADS-B In that have been discussed at length, the ROTOR Act's requirements for ADS-B In surface applications will provide flight crews increased awareness of what's happening around them at the airport by identifying the runway and taxiway traffic status under normal operational conditions and alerting pilots to any abnormal traffic conditions that will enable them to take evasive action. Question 2. Do you believe ADS-B In applications like this could help prevent another incident like the one at LaGuardia Airport from happening again? If yes, please explain why. Answer. While this accident is still an open NTSB investigation, there is no question that this additional life-saving technology could have been deployed to either prevent or mitigate this accident. The preliminary NTSB report determined that the ARFF vehicle involved in the accident at LaGuardia did not have an ADS-B transmitter that would have allowed it to be depicted as a vehicle to ATC. Although the FAA recently announced plans to equip all FAA-owned surface vehicles with ADS-B transmitters, there are no FAA requirements to equip all ground vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up to airports to voluntarily install them. The Immediacy of ADS-B Integration into Commercial Fleet. The NTSB recommended for the 18th time in February that the FAA require ADS-B In configured with audible alerting in response to the DCA mid-air collision. In their final investigation report, the NTSB covered multiple forms of ADS-B In enabled technologies to enhance situational awareness for pilots. However, some industry stakeholders have continued to cite lengthy implementation timelines for ADS-B In and the challenges of integrating a fully capable flightdeck technology suite across the commercial fleet--despite FAA data showing widespread equipage. Question 1. Why are so many ALPA pilots you represent calling for integrated ADS-B In capabilities on the flight deck? Answer. Integrated ADS-B In safety applications have substantial benefits compared to alternative technologies under consideration, including earlier and faster adoption, superior alerting and situational awareness capabilities in both the terminal and enroute environments, reduced human factors complications, and safety applications for surface operations. ADS-B In has long been recommended by the NTSB and is a proven technology in use. Manufacturers have successfully developed or are in the process of developing fully integrated systems for commercial aircraft, retrofits for several transport category aircraft types, including MHI regional jet aircraft, and low-cost options for other segments of the aviation industry. Question 2. How do you respond to those who argue that no integrated ADS-B In solutions exist today and that it would take at least a decade to implement them across the commercial fleet? Answer. As previously stated, manufacturers have successfully developed or are in the process of developing fully integrated systems for commercial aircraft, retrofit kits for regional jet aircraft, and low-cost options for other segments of the aviation industry. Question 3. Considering that TCAS/ACAS provides only reactive alerts and does not offer the kind of continuous, wide-area situational awareness that integrated ADS-B In/CDTI can deliver, do you believe the FAA's current position, as stated by Administrator Bedford to wait for congressional direction, adequately addresses known safety gaps? Or do you believe it risks leaving pilots without critical forward-looking traffic awareness needed to prevent future incidents? Answer. Given that TCAS/ACAS is fundamentally designed to be reactive to an imminent collision, versus the far greater lead time ADS-B In/CDTI can provide, waiting on Congress rather than mandating integration leaves a known, documented safety gap in place. Without a mandate to equip, pilots will continue flying without the continuous, forward-looking situational awareness that integrated ADS-B In offers. Relying instead exclusively on TCAS's late, narrow alerts is the limitation identified as a contributing factor in the PSA fatal collision. This is ultimately a policy judgment about who requires the mandate (FAA vs. Congress) rather than a factual dispute about the safety benefit itself. If recent news reports are accurate, that the FAA is considering initiating an ADS-B In rulemaking without waiting for congressional direction, it would be critical that any FAA proposal results in an integrated ADS-B In implementation, as specified in the ROTOR Act. Question 4. How does integrating ADS-B In traffic directly into the pilot's primary instrument scan via a certified CDTI change pilot behavior compared to relying on intermittent TCAS advisories or head- down devices like Electronic Flight Bags? What are the human factors risks of keeping critical traffic awareness within or outside of the normal scan? Answer. A certified, integrated CDTI puts traffic awareness and visual alerting inside the pilot's normal instrument scan, so it's continuously available and visible without competing for attention. Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs)/tablets require pilots to look down and away from the flight path and primary displays to a separate device that's often used for other tasks. The human factors risk is that anything outside the primary instrument cluster scan gets deprioritized under high workload--as seen when the Black Hawk crew that collided with PSA flight 5342 stopped monitoring their tablets during a demanding low-level flight, meaning traffic information is not available in the critical moments when collision risk is highest. Question 5. In dense terminal environments like Washington National's Class B airspace, where multiple aircraft are maneuvering simultaneously, how does early situational awareness from ADS-B In change pilot and controller outcomes compared to relying on TCAS alerts and ATC instruction alone? Answer. Early ADS-B In situational awareness and associated alerts, shift the safety architecture from a single reactive layer (TCAS's last-second warning) toward genuine, sustained situational awareness. This will allow the pilot to see the same congested picture that the controller is managing and can independently recognize and avoid a developing conflict well before ATC instruction or a TCAS-generated alert. Question 6. The NTSB has stated that portable devices are not a substitute for integrated avionics. From a certification and reliability standpoint, what risks arise when pilots depend on non- integrated ADS-B displays instead of certified, panel-mounted CDTI systems? Answer. A portable or EFB-based implementation strips away the certification standards, guaranteed alerting integration, and physical accessibility that make the technology dependable when it matters most. The risk of using a portable or non-integrated display is that anything outside the primary scan gets deprioritized under high workload. Question 7. The NTSB has now issued multiple recommendations over many years calling for wider adoption of ADS-B In with alerting. What does it say about the current safety framework that the same recommendation must be repeated 18 times before action is taken? Answer. The repetition doesn't reflect a weakness in the NTSB's analysis or its recommendations. The NTSB's role is to identify the risks and hazards as part of its investigations and make recommendations to the appropriate agency responsible for implementing the recommendations. That is a key piece of the NTSB's independent authority. It is then incumbent upon the responsible agency to review, assess, and implement the recommendations. In this case, it does demonstrate a need for the responsible agency to have better processes in place to address these recommendations. Question 8. Do you believe that TCAS/ACAS is fundamentally a last line of defense, while integrated ADS-B In represents an earlier preventative layer, and that failing to require both leaves a known gap in the safety system? Answer. Yes, TCAS/ACAS is not obsolete and ADS-B In alone is not sufficient. No single layer is infallible, TCAS still serves as a critical backstop for scenarios where the earlier layer fails (equipment malfunction, an unequipped intruder aircraft, a pilot who misses the ATC initiated alert). Relying on the last-line-of-defense layer alone, without requiring the earlier flight-deck based preventative layer that's been technically available and repeatedly recommended, leaves the system without the redundancy that layered safety design is supposed to provide. This understanding of the layered collision avoidance benefits of integrated ADS-B In is consistent with how the NTSB has characterized the gap, and it is consistent with what the PSA accident data itself shows: TCAS operated as designed still was not enough. System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational demands. The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction depends on decisive and sustained action. Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins? Answer. ALPA supports extending the maximum controller hiring requirement in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and increasing such requirements in future years. Without sustainable hiring, training, and staffing, the FAA will struggle to maintain the current capacity and safety of the system, much less modernizing or expanding it for new users. Congress should fund ATC modernization with staffing and training capacity built in as a required component--not just hardware and software line items. Treat controller staffing adequacy as a codified requirement (not a discretionary budget line), the same way the accident involving Colgan Air flight 3407 led to codified pilot qualification and rest-rule reform. Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes? Answer. Without a legislative mandate requiring the FAA to define success metrics, complete the fatigue-safety research already identified as missing, and report results transparently and collaboratively with labor and industry stakeholders, we have no way to truly understand the success of these interventions. Congress should require the agency to build that capability rather than accept good intentions as a substitute for evidence. Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and facilities? How can those barriers be addressed? Answer. Safety Management System (SMS) processes and procedures work as intended only when they function as genuine collaboration between the organization, labor, and regulator. Frontline reporting only works if controllers trust that their input will influence the operation. In addition, ALPA needs to have full voting-member status on FAA Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Safety Risk Management Panels rather than delegated to serve as a subject matter expert. Congress needs to fully fund and accelerate FAA SMS rollout agency wide and ensure sustained front-line worker staffing so that SMS reviews are not the first casualty of an overstretched workforce. Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to prevent recurrence? Answer. On a recurring basis airline management, pilots, and an FAA representative review all voluntarily submitted Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports to determine how to proactively address any identified safety risks. This is deliberately structured as non- punitive, and the reports are de-identified specifically so that near- misses get reported and analyzed. Safety programs like the U.S. Aviation Safety Team (AST) and Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) identify emerging trends, analyze risk, and develop voluntary safety enhancements to address risk. ASIAS aggregates de-identified safety data across multiple carriers so that an individual carrier can benchmark their safety metrics against the industry, and U.S. AST uses the safety intelligence derived from the aggregated voluntary data to drive coordinated, industry-level safety interventions rather than each airline learning the same lesson independently. Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the operating environment, particularly in complex airspace. Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations take to accelerate their adoption? Answer. Across commercial and general aviation, the technologies ready for near-term deployment (expanded use) are already in the field or on the market: ASDE-X/ASSC and Runway Status Lights (proven but limited to a handful of airports), the FAA's Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) system (deploying now but alerting logic needs to be added), Approach Runway Verification (ARV) (already at 77 towers, targeting 500+), a mature vendor ecosystem of aircraft-based surface alerting tools (Boeing/Honeywell RAAS, Airbus ROPS, Collins Airport Surface Awareness, SURF-IA/SURF-A, etc.), and ADS-B In, including regional-jet retrofit kits. What's not near-term ready is ACAS-Xa (rulemaking unlikely to be complete before 2031-2035), and fully alerting capabilities included in SAI. To accelerate adoption, Congress needs to pass the integrated ADS-B In aspects of the ROTOR Act that includes mandates with firm timelines; add alerting to SAI, require ADS-B transmitters on airport ground vehicles, and speed up ARV rollout. Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, and how can they be addressed without compromising safety? Answer. The core obstacle is not technical; it is a regulatory choice. There are no mandates to install or activate surface systems on commercial aircraft. Similarly, on ground vehicles, there are no FAA requirements to equip ground vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up to airports to voluntarily install them. Congress needs to mandate action. Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common operating picture for both pilots and controllers? Answer. Pilots, controllers, and even ground vehicle operators are often working from different, non-synchronized pictures of the same airport and airspace landscape. True interoperability requires three things aligned simultaneously; universal mandated data transmission (closing military/vehicle gaps); consistent processing of that data into alerts to the pilots, controllers and vehicle operators (common alerting); and air traffic control modernization that integrates domestic, terminal, surface, and oceanic environments as one system. Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, particularly for smaller operators? Answer. NTSB can recommend equipage support programs, but has no authority to fund or mandate them, and the FAA has historically been slow to convert ``available and beneficial'' technology into ``funded and required'' technology even at the commercial level. It is incumbent upon the FAA to act and ensure that these technologies are required. An alternative method of compliance should be provided for aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of less than 12,500 pounds when operated under 14 CFR Part 91. The use of portable ADS-B receivers, EFBs, or panel mounted displays provided the installation or use does not adversely affect other required avionics or the airworthiness of the aircraft, should be considered. In addition, all vehicles operating on the airport movement area should be required to be equipped with transponders. Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States to enhance near-term safety? Answer. ALPA demands safety no matter where our pilots fly. Mandating fully integrated ADS-B In ensures U.S. crews have the best available situational awareness tool in every operating environment, domestic or international, rather than leaving that capability optional or dependent on which aircraft or route a pilot happens to be assigned. Where other countries' airspace and equipage standards fall short of what our pilots rely on domestically, that's exactly why ADS-B In equipage and space-based ADS-B, already integrated internationally, need to be fully leveraged by U.S. carriers and the FAA, so our crews aren't operating with a degraded picture simply because they have left U.S. airspace.'' ADS-B Out mandates are now in effect in more than 30 countries and Flight Information Regions worldwide. This includes all EU member states and non-EU Single European Sky participants and most countries in Central America and the Caribbean. Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence prioritization decisions? Answer. ALPA acknowledges cost as a real constraint (e.g., RWSL installation is a major undertaking, extensive and expensive, and ALPA has called for new or existing Federal grant programs to fund and facilitate deployment). The distinction is that ALPA wants cost treated as a funding problem to solve, not a threshold that determines whether deployment of safety systems happens at all. When a documented safety gap exists, cost should not function as a veto, only as an implementation-planning variable. ALPA consistently prioritizes technologies tied directly to documented accident causation. Integrated ADS-B In gets top billing precisely because NTSB simulations show it would have provided earlier alerts in the DCA collision, and because the LaGuardia accident traced directly to a missing ADS-B transmitter on a ground vehicle. Technologies without that direct accident linkage (e.g., efficiency-focused automation upgrades) are treated as lower priority, even when they're technically mature. Surface safety systems need to be installed at all airports as soon as possible, given the urgency of the current situation, and in anticipation of exponential traffic growth, if we are going to prevent near misses as well as accidents, the cost- benefit decision-making process must be reconsidered to aggressively pursue these safety advancements. Technology in High Density Low Altitude Airspace. As you know, the FAA has proposed a regulatory framework for beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drone operations, as directed by this Committee in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. While this proposal represents a step toward integrating uncrewed aircraft systems into the national airspace, there are concerns that it may not go far enough to ensure safety. Specifically, the proposal does not consistently require drones to have the capability to detect and avoid aircraft who are not broadcasting their position across many operating environments, including suburban areas where drone activity is already expanding and expected to grow significantly. This raises questions about whether the framework fully accounts for the realities of shared airspace, particularly from the perspective of crewed aviation operators who rely on see-and-avoid principles and layered safety protections. Question 1. From your perspective, do you believe the FAA's proposed BVLOS rule adequately protects against the risk of midair collisions between drones and crewed aircraft? Answer. ALPA, for more than a decade, has been very concerned about the collision hazard associated with UAS operations. The FAA should not implement any rule or exemption to transfer collision avoidance to manned/crewed aircraft through the application of a DAA standard or allow the aircraft manufacturer or aircraft operator to ``self- declare'' the capability or compliance to a given ACAS/Detect and Avoid (DAA) standard. This technical capability must be validated by the FAA during aircraft certification processes before operational approval is granted. The proposed BVLOS rule that the FAA released, at best does the bare minimum, and stands behind a wall that shelters itself behind proprietary information as a means of accepted compliance when it comes to protections against mid-air collisions between drones and crewed aircraft. Question 2. If not, what specific changes should the FAA make in the final rule to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed aircraft, particularly those that are not broadcasting their position? Answer. BVLOS UAS operations should not be authorized in controlled airspace (i.e., Class B, C, D, and E airspace) until safety data has been proven and shown as acceptable. This also means that there should not be operations in, around, or near airports. The FAA should also explicitly state to accept/recognize technical standards developed by RTCA Special Committee 228 for DAA DO-365C, Ground Based DAA (GBDAA DO- 381), and Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS sXu) DO-396, as the minimum standards for detect and avoid operations for all UAS or other terms used to describe aircraft that do not have a pilot onboard the aircraft. These technical standards require the aircraft to be capable of detecting and avoiding both cooperative and non-cooperative, crewed, and uncrewed aircraft. Question 3. How significant is the risk posed by non-cooperative aircraft in high density airspace? Answer. The risk is substantial; in the past couple of years, we have seen unplanned airspace closures near commercial airports from the fear that non-cooperative drones may collide with manned aircraft on a departure or approach. Whether the drone is nefarious or clueless, the risk is great, and there are countless incidents that go unreported. It is the responsibility of the FAA to diligently protect air carrier operations from the introduction of any new risks. Large commercial aircraft are particularly vulnerable on approach and departure at lower altitudes when maneuverability may be constrained. ALPA remains concerned about the dangers of collision or engine ingestion of drones, particularly on approach and departure, as well as the security threats posed by unauthorized drones. Question 4. Should detect-and-avoid capabilities be required universally for BVLOS operations or tailored based on airspace type and operational risk? Answer. ALPA would like to see the requirement for all BVLOS Operations to be equipped with a collision avoidance system (capability) that can detect all aircraft and not be limited to detecting and avoiding ``cooperative'' (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) or Traffic Awareness Beacon System (TABS) equipped aircraft only). Question 5. How can the FAA ensure that drone operators maintain an equivalent level of safety to that expected in crewed aviation? Answer. The sharing of safety data and transparency to the FAA is essential to ensuring the safety of the NAS. The FAA needs to share this data with the industry to allow safety risk assessment analysis regarding operations and to put in place operational changes or mitigations to ensure operators of drones continually improve and adjust to the safety standard that the NAS has in place. The proposed rule is less stringent than those operators who receive a Part 107 license. The FAA needs to establish that remote pilots, especially those in this proposed rule, are held to the same safety standard and equivalent level of pilot training and certification as manned commercial pilots. The FAA disregarded the development of a remote pilot licensing framework for BVLOS. To ensure an equivalent level of safety, pilot training and certification must be established. Question 6. How can the FAA balance enabling innovation in the drone sector while maintaining the high safety standards expected in the national airspace? Answer. The FAA needs to maintain strong oversight and scrutinize each UAS operation, including each aircraft's technical capabilities, to ensure safety and reliability. The FAA needs to continue evaluating and reevaluating operations and their respective technologies. The FAA needs to conduct safety risk assessments to ensure an equivalent level of safety is met. Allowing UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS is not a one-size-fits-all blanket method; operators will need to be held accountable, and FAA oversight of those granted operations needs to be thoroughly assessed. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to Captain Jason Ambrosi Forty years ago, pilots and air traffic managers operated with less accurate forecasts and guidance on weather hazards such as turbulence, icing and deicing, and wind shear. In the years since, the United States has become known as the global leader in aviation weather services primarily due to the federally-funded aviation weather research program at the FAA, which has supported critical research and technology development at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). Question 1. How have these advances in aviation weather forecasts changed the safety and capacity of the U.S. aviation system? Could today's volume of air traffic be safely and efficiently accommodated without these improved forecasts? Answer 1(a). NCAR is a highly effective research institution that has consistently translated atmospheric science into operational aviation-centric safety and efficiency gains within the NAS. Since the introduction of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) and the Low-Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS)--systems pioneered through NCAR research in the 1980s--there have been no windshear-related accidents involving commercial airliners at equipped airports. This record alone represents a profound safety achievement. Beginning in the early 1990s, during the focus of aviation weather work at NCAR, scientists and engineers began to investigate a variety of hazardous weather conditions that impact the safety of aircraft operations in-flight and in the terminal area. Over the past three decades, Product Development Teams have conducted research and development efforts aimed at improving the detection, diagnosis, and forecasting of aviation weather, including convective weather, turbulence, icing, and winter weather, as well as ceiling and visibility for both domestic and oceanic/remote regions. Vital to the work of these teams has been an effort to improve basic atmospheric measurements, such as snowfall and turbulence, and to enhance the ability of radars and surface-based measurements to more accurately capture atmospheric conditions for pilots and air traffic control managers. NCAR also developed the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) standard, adopted as the global standard of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for automated, objective turbulence reporting. EDR is widely used by pilots across multiple platforms to enhance situational awareness and mitigate turbulence risk. Importantly, EDR data also enhances NCAR-developed forecast models that support tactical and strategic turbulence guidance systems such as the Graphical Turbulence Guidance products. As turbulence remains the leading cause of injuries and accidents in commercial air carrier operations, these capabilities provide the observational foundation and forecast context needed to reduce injury risk and support operational decision-making. The safety dividends from this work are substantial and continue to grow. Beyond safety, NCAR has played a pivotal role in improving NAS efficiency, particularly during adverse weather conditions. Its research on Liquid Water Equivalent (LWE) significantly improved the FAA's understanding of freezing precipitation hazards across diverse airfield environments. This work directly enabled more precise deicing and anti-icing decision-making, while maintaining safety margins. Answer 1(b). No. Research has proven that stability of the NAS would be greatly diminished without these improved safety capabilities and forecasting efforts. Maintaining continuity of this work supports demonstrated safety gains, helps sustain NAS capacity and safety during high-impact weather, and reduces transition risk as aviation weather capabilities evolve to meet the FAA strategic objectives. Question 2. What economic efficiencies have resulted for aviation from these improved forecasts, and how would their loss impact the aviation sector? Answer. These improvements to aviation weather forecasting and atmospheric prediction, have collectively created substantial economic efficiencies across the aviation industry by increasing safety and by reducing uncertainty in flight planning and air carrier operations. Aviation is highly sensitive to weather conditions, so even incremental forecast improvements can produce significant cost savings across airlines, airports, air navigation service providers, and cargo operators throughout today's supply chain as they rely on schedule predictability. Some key efficiencies due to these improved forecasts include reduced fuel consumption, fewer delays and cancellations, lower maintenance and equipment costs, and improved safety with economic benefits. Avoiding weather-related events prevents costly accidents, investigations, aircraft damage, and injuries. More accurate wind, turbulence, and weather forecasts allow airlines to optimize routes and altitudes, reducing unnecessary deviations, operational disruptions, and excess fuel loading. Better prediction of severe weather enables proactive scheduling, crew planning, gate allocation, and efficient air traffic flow management. A safer industry is a more efficient industry. The loss or degradation of these forecasting capabilities would likely create cascading impacts throughout the aviation sector and increase costs exponentially. Economically, these effects compound rapidly because aviation functions as an interconnected network. Studies conducted by meteorological and aviation organizations have repeatedly estimated that weather-related disruptions cost the global aviation system billions of dollars annually. ______ Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to Captain Jason Ambrosi Importance of Air Traffic Control Workforce The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a January 2026 report that noted the number of air traffic controllers in the U.S. has declined by about 6 percent in the last decade. At the same time, there has been a 10 percent increase in the number of flights that rely on the air traffic control system. As a result, there have been severe and chronic staffing shortages at critical facilities. Question 1. How would achieving a fully staffed air traffic control workforce change the safety environment for pilots, particularly in terms of reducing controller fatigue, improving communication clarity, and preventing time-critical misinterpretations? Answer. A fully staffed controller workforce would change the safety environment for pilots in three ways. First, it would reduce the mandatory overtime and extended work weeks that understaffed facilities currently require, which is a documented fatigue risk factor. Second, it would ease per-controller workload in complex, high-density airspace, directly addressing 'high workload' and 'communication errors', which are factors that ALPA has identified as underlying causes of recent close calls. Third, and often overlooked, full staffing is what allows the FAA to train its workforce on the modernization technology. To maintain full staffing levels, the FAA will need to hire controllers above full staffing levels to ensure that staffing and attrition rates eventually align as controllers leave the workforce. Further, Congress should pass a bill that protects controller pay during government shutdowns, which may have contributed to some extent, to a 6 percent decline over the last decade. Question 2. Should implementing long-term solutions to end a dangerous status quo of a chronically understaffed and overworked air traffic control workforce be the number one priority and form the foundational pillar of any effort to build a so-called ``Brand New'' air traffic control system? Answer. Yes, long-term solutions are needed as part of the overall plan to address ATC staffing. A brand-new ATC system built on new automation platforms is only as good as the controllers that are trained and available to run it. Technology deployment is less beneficial if insufficient staffing remains an issue. Automation tools should not be used to resolve understaffing and will not produce a safer system. Staffing must be treated as a fully funded, non-negotiable component running in parallel with the technology rollout, because it's the one piece of the system with a fixed, multi-year lead time that no amount of later funding urgency can compress. Question 3. If Congress expanded the number of FAA Academies to operate additional primary training facilities in strategic locations to strengthen training and education capabilities and capacity, while maximizing recruitment and retention; along with providing upfront capital funding to academic institutions to enable the massive expansion of FAA enhanced Collegiate Training Initiative schools-- similar to the U.S. Armed Forces using a combination of service academies and a wide range of Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs at schools across the country to recruit, educate and train the next generation of military officers--what would be the short-term and long- term benefits to strengthening our Nation's air traffic control system? Answer. Expanding FAA Academies to multiple regional locations, paired with upfront capital funding for Enhanced CTI schools, directly attacks the bottleneck GAO\1\ identified. Since a single centralized academy restricts how many candidates can move through the pipeline at once. Short term, expanding the pipeline would provide a steady flow of controller trainees through college-embedded training programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ GAO-26-107320, Air Traffic Control Workforce: FAA Should Establish Goals and Better Assess Its Hiring Processes --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the long term, a distributed network, modeled on the military service-academy-plus-ROTC approach, builds a more resilient pipeline that is not vulnerable to a single training facility's disruption (as shutdowns and COVID-19 proved it currently is). However, this does not solve the separate medical-clearance and security-screening bottlenecks GAO also documented. Question 4. We often hear that the new ATC technologies will vastly improve situational awareness. But pilots consistently say the technology will only be as safe as the culture behind it. This warning is validated by the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the DCA midair collision, which found that despite FAA acquiring a time-based flow management (TBFM) system at the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)--and despite FAA training TRACON personnel on operating the newly procured TBFM system--FAA management failed to fully implement the TBFM system at the Potomac TRACON. What specific cultural reforms does ALPA believe must be in place at FAA before, or alongside, system modernization to ensure the technology is effectively implemented and operationalized? Answer. The NTSB investigation documented that the FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO) had gaps in its Safety Management System (SMS) and deficiencies in their organizational safety culture that contributed to the accident. The NTSB recommended that the Department of Transportation convene an independent panel and conduct a comprehensive review of ATO's safety culture. ALPA notes that the Office of Inspector General at the Department of Transportation recently announced this safety culture review. Safety is a shared responsibility. When different stakeholders join forces, they promote a broader safety culture that is well informed of risk from multiple perspectives. We must have frontline worker inclusion (not just technology or headcount) as a culture-strengthening mechanism. The goal of SMS is to proactively identify active failures and inadequate mitigations so that risks can be contained while preventive measures can be adopted or reinforced. The NTSB's finding revealed that safety-relevant proposals from the field failed to reach FAA decision-makers. The most successful SMS programs incorporate a collaborative effort between the organization, labor, regulator, and equipment manufacturers. If a functioning SMS had been operating as designed at Potomac TRACON, a controller-submitted safety report and accompanying risk mitigation proposal is precisely the kind of input a SMS review is supposed to elevate to leadership. ALPA, as well as all stakeholders outside the FAA, should be granted full voting member status on all applicable Safety Risk Management Panels rather than limited to a subject matter expert role with no formal vote in the outcome. This will ensure that the operational expertise and safety judgment of the pilots who fly the line carry the same weight as other stakeholders in every risk determination that affects the flight deck. Question 5. As we prepare to integrate new tools, procedures and automation into the NAS, what is the danger of FAA relying on technical upgrades without fully confronting cultural complacency, leadership inconsistencies and burnout among frontline personnel? Answer. The danger is that an organization with unaddressed cultural complacency, inconsistent leadership follow-through, and a fatigued, understaffed workforce will leave the NAS with the appearance of modernization without the corresponding gain in actual safety margin, and place unwarranted trust in systems that are not being operated as designed. If an organization's safety culture does not confront cultural complacency, adding more sophisticated tools just adds more surface area for that cultural gap to hide in. Complex automation platforms cannot be meaningfully integrated into daily operations unless the culture actively demands full operational use, not just procurement success. ALPA's expectation is that the renamed and reconstituted National Airspace System Advisory Committee (NAC) carries forward that same collaborative environment as in the past, not just the acronym. The original NAC is a genuine model for how technology and culture problems can be solved together rather than separately. It forced continuous, structured collaboration between FAA, labor, industry, and other stakeholders on modernization decisions, rather than leaving those decisions to unilateral agency discretion. 1,500-Hour Rule With a rise in close calls coming out of the pandemic, the first major U.S. commercial aviation crash in over a decade, an overworked and understaffed air traffic controller workforce and antiquated air traffic control infrastructure and equipment, our pilots are our last line of defense. It is important now more than ever to continue to ensure that our pilots are the best trained pilots in the world. Please explain why aviation safety demands that Congress protect the 1,500-hour rule--a safety improvement that followed the Colgan tragedy--from any efforts to weaken it? Answer. The First Officer Qualification rule was not a precautionary measure. It was a direct legislative response to four fatal accidents where inexperience and inadequate training were identified as root causes. In all three of the earlier accidents (Pinnacle 3701, Corporate Airlines 5966, Comair 5191), the NTSB noted among its probable causes that the crews had deviated from standard operating procedures, and the final catalyst, Colgan Air Flight 3407, involved crewmembers' failure to adhere to certain standard procedures and their failure to properly monitor the operation during a critical phase of flight, with the NTSB explicitly highlighting the need for better pilot training. This is not a rule addressing a hypothetical risk, it is a rule written in direct response to a proven causal pathway between inexperience and fatal outcomes. During the 20-year period before the new regulation was enacted, the public witnessed nearly 1,100 fatalities related to U.S. airline accidents. Conversely, during the years between the introduction of the new rule in 2010 and 2024, the related fatality rate dropped by 99.8 percent. Simply put, the first officer qualifications rule has saved lives. ALPA continues to strongly support the requirements for an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP)/Restricted ATP certificate and associated hourly flight minimums ALPA will strongly oppose any efforts to weaken the First Officer Qualifications rules. [all]