CLOSE CALLS: IMPROVING SAFETY ACROSS THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

Senate Commerce Committee Senate June 23, 2026

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[Senate Hearing 119-524]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-524

 CLOSE CALLS: IMPROVING SAFETY ACROSS THE 
 NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

=======================================================================

 HEARING

 before the

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, 
 AND INNOVATION

 of the

 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION
 __________

 JUNE 23, 2026
 __________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 
 
 
 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
 
 ______
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-617 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
 
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware

 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
 
 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, SPACE, AND INNOVATION

JERRY MORAN, Kansas, Chairman TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
TED BUDD, North Carolina JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ANDY KIM, New Jersey
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia

 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page
Hearing held on June 23, 2026.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Moran....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Duckworth................................... 2
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 29
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 31
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 33
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 40
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 48
 Prepared statement........................................... 51

 Witnesses

Governor Christopher T. Sununu, President and Chief Executive 
 Officer, Airlines for America.................................. 5
 Prepared statement........................................... 6
Todd Hauptli, President and Chief Executive Officer, American 
 Association of Airport Executives.............................. 8
 Prepared statement........................................... 10
James A. Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, General 
 Aviation Manufacturers Association............................. 13
 Prepared statement........................................... 14
Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association.... 19
 Prepared statement........................................... 21

 Appendix

Doug Woehler, Director of Business Development and Federal 
 Programs, ADB SAFEGATE, prepared statement..................... 55
Response to written questions submitted to Chris Sununu by:
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 58
 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 63
 Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 64
Response to written questions submitted to Todd Hauptli by:
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 64
 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 68
 Hon. John Hickenlooper....................................... 70
Response to written question submitted to James A. Viola by:
 Hon. Dan Sullivan............................................ 71
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 71
 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 74
Response to written questions submitted to Captain Jason Ambrosi 
 by:
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 75
 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 81
 Hon. Tammy Duckworth......................................... 82

 
 CLOSE CALLS: IMPROVING SAFETY ACROSS THE 
 NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM

 ---------- 

 TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 2026

 Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation, 
 U.S. Senate,
 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
 Washington, DC.
 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Jerry Moran, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
 Present: Senators Moran [presiding], Cruz, Sheehy, Capito, 
Cantwell, Duckworth, Rosen, and Hickenlooper.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MORAN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

 Senator Moran. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for your 
presence this morning. Thank you to our witnesses for joining 
us.
 And Duckworth, it has been good to work with you, and 
bringing this subcommittee's hearing to fruition. And I now 
call that subcommittee to order.
 Our hearing is titled, ``Close Calls: Improving Safety 
Across the National Airspace System''.
 We have with us today Governor Sununu, Governor Chris 
Sununu, President CEO of the Airlines for America; Todd 
Hauptli, the President and CEO of American Association Airport 
Executives; James Viola, President CEO of General Aviation 
Manufacturers Association; and Jason Ambrosi, President of the 
Air Line Pilots Association.
 Thank you for your commitment to maintaining the safest air 
system in the world. This subcommittee, and certainly I as its 
Chairman, the safety of our aviation system is our highest 
priority. United States has built a remarkable safety record 
through decades of collaboration, innovation and commitment to 
learning from mistakes, but we certainly should not be 
complacent.
 Today's hearing reflects a growing concern shared by 
industry, government, and traveling public regarding numerous 
close calls we have seen in recent years across the Nation. 
Just this past weekend, at the Boston Logan International 
Airport, a Delta Airlines flight was forced to abort its 
landing and execute a go-around after an aircraft departed from 
an intersecting runway. While the flight landed safely and no 
one was injured, the incident serves, again, as a reminder of 
why continued vigilance and safety improvements across the 
National Airspace System remain essential.
 These incidents have occurred in a variety of different 
environments and different circumstances. These close calls did 
not become tragedies because of safety professionals, pilots, 
air traffic controllers, and airport personnel responded to the 
dangers, and our safety system worked. But regardless of that 
outcome, they still remain a warning call for, and a reminder 
that our aviation system is fragile and that we must act, FAA, 
the private sector, Congress should act, and always 
responsible, before a tragedy occurs.
 Today, we will evaluate the trends we are seeing across the 
system, whether current training programs are sufficient, if 
aviation professionals have the tools and resources they need, 
and whether we are utilizing all available technologies. We 
will also review the steps that can be taken by Congress, by 
the FAA, and industry to reduce risk and improve safety.
 The challenges facing our aviation system are not limited 
to a single issue, they include runway incursions, surface 
safety incidents, increasing operational complexity, workforce 
shortages, controller staffing concerns, aging infrastructure, 
and the need for technologies' modernization. Addressing these 
challenges require a systemwide approach and a commitment to 
continuous improvement.
 As we consider how to strengthen safety across the system, 
we should also evaluate how new technologies can help identify 
risks early. Recent reporting highlighted FAA's efforts to 
evaluate how artificial intelligence could assist with air 
traffic management, reduce congestion, and support operational 
decisionmaking. While these tools are not intended to replace 
and cannot replace the judgment of aviation personnel, they may 
offer new ways to identify emerging risks, improve situational 
awareness, and increase the safety of our air system.
 In the coming months, coming weeks really, I intend to 
introduce the Runway Safety Awareness and Focused Effective 
Training and Technology Act, of course, it turns into some set 
of letters, the Runway Safety Act. This legislation would focus 
on improving airport driver training, and supporting 
technologies to reduce runway incursions, and other safety--
surface safety incidents.
 Close calls should not simply be viewed as warnings, they 
are critical opportunities to strengthen the system, procedures 
and technologies that keep the flying public safe.
 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the 
trends they are seeing, the lessons that can be learned from 
recent close calls, and how Congress can partner with industry 
to make certain the United States maintains a high standard of 
aviation safety. Again, I thank our witnesses for your presence 
here today.
 And I recognize the Senator from Illinois, Senator 
Duckworth.

 STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY DUCKWORTH, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Moran, 
I want to thank you so much for your continued work, and there 
is no question as to your dedication to aviation safety. Thank 
you for bringing together this panel of industry experts for a 
very critical conversation about an issue that should concern 
every American, the alarming rise in close calls in the 
National Airspace System.
 In November 2023, I chaired a committee hearing on this 
very topic. National Transportation Safety Board Chair, 
Jennifer Homendy, warned that, and I quote, ``The concerning 
uptick in such incidents is a clear warning sign that the U.S. 
aviation system is sharply strained. We cannot wait until a 
fatal accident forces action. We must act before there is 
tragedy''.
 That warning has only grown more urgent. Today marks 510 
days since an Army Black Hawk helicopter collided midair with 
Flight 5342 over the Potomac, a tragedy that robbed families of 
the chance to ever see their loved ones again.
 67 people lost their lives. And we have four of those 
families here today. I thank you for your continuing dedication 
to turning your grief and loss into improving the air traffic 
control system for the rest of us.
 Last month when Administrator Bedford testified before this 
committee, I pressed him to commit to implementing the NTSB's 
recommendations stemming from the DCA mid-air collision.
 And I asked the same of this panel that is here today. We 
must learn from this catastrophe and from the hundreds of 
warning signs we see in close calls that happen every single 
year. While this is a hearing on close calls, I want to 
acknowledge tragedies that took place in the last two weeks.
 My heart goes out to the families of the 12 individuals 
that lost their lives in Butler, Missouri, when a single engine 
turboprop plane crashed in the field and caught on fire. And to 
the families of the eight people who were fatally injured when 
a B-52 crashed shortly after takeoff on Edwards Air Force Base. 
Our aviation system safety depends on layers of redundancy, 
when multiple layers begin to fray, the entire system becomes 
vulnerable.
 And in May, at Newark Liberty International Airport, United 
Flight 169 struck the light pole on final approach. The light 
pole then flew into a tractor trailer that was traveling 
southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike. I always knew that New 
Jersey Turnpike was dangerous, but, holy cow. Senator Kim is 
not here, but he would probably respond to that. The incident 
put 221 passengers, 11 crew members, and countless travelers at 
risk. Luckily, the truck driver only sustained minor injuries.
 And just this past Saturday, as the Chairman has mentioned, 
around 11:30 a.m., Delta Airlines Flight 2351 was on approach 
at Boston Logan International Airport, air traffic control 
cleared American Airlines flight 3161 to take off moments 
before Delta Flight 2351 was about to touch down on an 
intersecting runway. The crew of the Delta flight spotted the 
American Boeing 737, and executed a go-around to avoid a 
collision, saving the lives of the 129 passengers and six crew 
members on board.
 These close calls remind us of the tight margins for the 
calculations made by pilots and air traffic controllers. In far 
too many of these incidents, the difference between a close 
call and a deadly disaster has come down to a single highly 
trained and professional individual taking emergency action. We 
have been fortunate to have experienced pilots and air traffic 
controllers who prevent disaster, and we must continue to 
invest in those pilots and air traffic controllers.
 That is why I fought to protect the 1500-Hour Rule to 
ensure that pilots have the training necessary to make split-
second decisions that save lives. The 1500-Hour Rule that came 
out of the Colgan air tragedy must be maintained. The safety of 
our skies would not be possible without the dedicated air 
traffic controllers, who are too often overworked, 
understaffed, and forced to use antiquated equipment.
 While I anticipate today's conversation will focus on the 
equipment that is needed to keep our skies safe, the workforce 
must be part of that conversation. The workforce is critical to 
that conversation. While new equipment is necessary, many of 
these issues that threaten aviation safety are far harder to 
tackle than replacing wires. Like rewiring the culture of 
complacency at the FAA, addressing the dire mental health 
issues that pilots and air traffic controllers too often 
experience, and building a robust aviation workforce.
 An effective modernization of the National Airspace System 
requires sustained focus and dedicated funding. And I can't 
believe that we are sitting here today, almost a year after the 
one big, beautiful bill that provided only a third of the 
funding required to modernize the air traffic control system. 
In fact, our President seems far more interested in spending 
$300 billion to reconstruct Iran, instead of spending a 
fraction of that, around $50 billion, to build an air traffic 
control infrastructure that would secure the safety of our 
skies.
 Think about that. He would rather spend $300 billion 
repairing Iran because of his war of choice, than actually 
investing in our air traffic control system, which we have said 
is critically in dire need of that investment. You know, that 
is in addition to the billions that the President jammed 
through Congress in his massive spending bill, and the millions 
in taxpayer dollars he has wasted on his pet projects, like his 
Marie Antoinette ballroom.
 Republicans may control both Chambers of Congress and the 
White House, but there is bipartisan agreement that we must 
strengthen the safety of the NAS. We must remain steadfast 
because real progress requires every stakeholder, industry, 
labor, regulators, policymakers on both sides of the aisle who 
are dedicated to this, we must work together. We frankly have 
no other choice.
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth, thank you very much.
 I would now like to introduce our witnesses. Our first 
witness is Governor Chris Sununu, the President and CEO of 
Airlines for America, which represents the country's major 
carriers and cargo companies. Mr. Sununu is the former Governor 
of New Hampshire and the longest-serving Republican Governor in 
nearly a century.
 Our second witness is James Viola, President and CEO of 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association. In his role, Mr. 
Viola represents the interest of over 140 airframes, avionic 
engine and component manufacturers.
 Our third witness is Todd Hauptli, President and CEO of the 
American Association of Airport Executives. Mr. Hauptli 
represents the interests of airport employees ranging from the 
C-suite, to the terminal, and airfield.
 And our final witness is Captain Jason Ambrosi, President 
of the Airlines Pilots Association. In his role, Mr. Ambrosi 
advocates for more than 75,000 pilots, serving as the 
spokesperson and leader for the organization, he advocates for 
pilot safety, and sustainable aviation industry.
 Governor Sununu, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR CHRISTOPHER T. SUNUNU,

 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

 AIRLINES FOR AMERICA

 Governor Sununu. Well, thank you very much. Sir, good 
morning, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, Members of 
the Aviation Subcommittee. My name is Chris Sununu serving as 
President and CEO of Airlines for America.
 So thank you for inviting us, and on behalf of Airlines for 
America, and our members, we appreciate the opportunity to 
participate in this review of recent near misses and the work 
needed to further strengthen what is the safest aviation system 
in the world.
 Let us begin, obviously, by taking a moment to recognize 
the lives of those that have been lost and those affected in 
the recent accidents and to thank all those first responders 
who risk their lives in those situations. These moments are a 
somber reminder that aviation safety demands constant 
vigilance.
 I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of the Federal 
Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety 
Board, led by FAA administrator Bryan Bedford, and NTSB Chair, 
Jennifer Homendy. Their drive toward aviation safety and 
dedication to this critical mission is foundational to its 
success.
 U.S. commercial aviation remains extraordinarily safe and 
that record has been built through decades of disciplined 
collaboration among airlines, manufacturers, airports, pilots, 
flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers, and traffic 
controllers. Our industry is defined by its people and their 
commitment to learn from every incident. Airlines utilize data-
driven, non-punitive, and highly collaborative safety programs 
to identify precursors and implement mitigations before harm 
occurs.
 Central to this approach are our air carrier Safety 
Management Systems, known as SMSes which institutionalize 
proactive hazard identification, risk assessment, and 
continuous improvement across operations. SMSes provide a 
structured organization-wide framework for managing safety risk 
through clearly defined policies, formal processes, and a 
strong safety culture, by integrating data from voluntary 
reporting programs, operational performance metrics, safety 
analysis, it is these SMSes that enables air carriers to 
prioritize their resources, address those emerging risks, and 
continuously monitor mitigation effectiveness.
 In addition, this cultural bedrock of safety, airlines 
utilize technology to combat challenges both in the air and on 
the airport surfaces. Technologies that reduce the likelihood 
of mid-air collisions by providing traffic and resolution 
advisories that direct pilots to maintain or increase 
separation. Those are a core safety component for our air 
carriers. Ground-based technologies that improve controller 
awareness, and reduce runway incursion risks are also integral 
in reducing those incidents and accidents.
 We always say aviation safety is a journey, it is not a 
destination. And while industry stakeholders and regulators 
continue their efforts to identify, assess, and mitigate 
systematic risk, there is also a key role for Congress to play. 
Most importantly, Congress must support the people, the 
infrastructure, and the operational stability that the National 
Airspace System requires.
 This includes supporting policies that promote the 
sustained hiring, training, and retention of safety--critical 
aviation workers. A modern safety system requires enough 
certified controllers, enough instructors, and enough training 
capacity to support the system safely and efficiently. Congress 
should absolutely build upon its $12.5 billion downpayment 
toward air traffic control modernization with the next round of 
funding, to ensure that technology gaps that have been ignored 
for the past 30 years finally get addressed.
 Air traffic modernization is one of the few policies that 
does enjoy bipartisan, bicameral support, as well as the 
support of nearly--the 60-member Modern Skies Coalition, 
consisting of stakeholder organizations across the entire 
industry.
 If I had an eighth page, I would read it to you.
 In closing, it is really all about making sure that the 
policies going forward are applicable, and timely, and making 
sure that we are not delaying anymore, whether it is in 
funding, whether it is in technology for operational safety, or 
making the investments in the most important part of the 
system, which is the people. We have the safest aviation system 
in the world, and that is something to be very proud of, but it 
also comes with the responsibility of maintaining that, and 
living that journey every single day.
 Thank you very much.
 [The prepared statement of Governor Sununu follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Christopher T. Sununu, President and Chief 
 Executive Officer (CEO), Airlines for America
 Good afternoon, Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth and 
members of the Subcommittee. My name is Chris Sununu, and I am the 
President and CEO of Airlines for America (A4A). Thank you for inviting 
me here today, and on behalf of all our A4A members\1\, I appreciate 
the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's examination of 
recent near misses and the continued work we can all do to further 
strengthen the safest aviation system in the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ A4A is the trade association for the leading U.S. airlines, 
both passenger and cargo carriers. Members of the association are 
Alaska Airlines; American Airlines; Atlas Air; Delta Air Lines; FedEx; 
JetBlue Airways; Southwest Airlines; United Airlines; and UPS. Air 
Canada is an associate member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Remembrance and Vigilance. I would be remiss not to take a moment 
to honor the lives of those lost and those affected in recent accidents 
and to thank all of the first responders who risk their lives reacting 
to these events. Safety is so interwoven in every facet of our 
operations and culture that when these rare moments of tragedy occur, 
they are somber reminders that aviation safety demands constant 
vigilance. Our thoughts are with those lost and the families left 
behind.
 Our industry is not defined by our response to tragedy alone, but 
by its commitment to learn from every incident, report and piece of 
safety data. Recent events such as the fatal runway collision at 
LaGuardia (March 2026) and a string of near misses at John F. Kennedy 
International Airport (May 2026), Newark Liberty International Airport 
(March 2026), Nashville International Airport (April 2026), along with 
multiple commercial crew reports of helicopter conflicts underscores 
that safety is not static, and it requires constant watchfulness, 
investment and continued evolution.
 In many cases these incidents are not the result of a single 
failure, but they reflect system complexity, with multiple layers of 
people, procedures and technology that must work together flawlessly. 
In several instances the multiple safety layers worked exactly as 
designed, onboard collision avoidance systems issued alerts, and pilots 
responded decisively to avoid tragedy. However, the system performing 
as intended should not be confused with a system beyond improvement. 
Our industry recognizes a clear obligation to identify root causes and 
conduct rigorous, forensic reviews that strengthen resilience. Every 
incident, regardless of its complexity, is an opportunity--and a 
responsibility--to learn. When any layer exhibits signs of stress, 
whether localized or systemic, it demands a deliberate and appropriate 
response. We must methodically strengthen the system, capturing every 
insight to ensure we are not just responding to incidents but 
preventing them entirely.
 Commercial Aviation Safety Commitment and Framework. U.S. 
commercial aviation remains extraordinarily safe, and that record was 
built through decades of disciplined collaboration among airlines, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), manufacturers, airports, pilots, 
flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers and air traffic controllers. 
As noted above, the system is safer today because the aviation 
community does not wait for accidents to reveal risk. Instead, our 
industry uses data-driven, non-punitive and highly collaborative safety 
programs to identify precursors and implement mitigations before harm 
occurs. Central to this approach are air carrier Safety Management 
Systems (SMS), which institutionalize proactive hazard identification, 
risk assessment and continuous improvement across operations.
 SMS provide a structured, organization-wide framework for managing 
safety risk through clearly defined policies, formal safety assurance 
processes and a strong safety culture. By integrating data from 
voluntary reporting programs, operational performance metrics and 
safety analyses, SMS enables air carriers to prioritize resources, 
address emerging risks before they escalate and continuously monitor 
the effectiveness of mitigations.
 That work is supported by programs such as the U.S. Aviation Safety 
Team (USAST) which includes the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), the Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA). These programs, together with broader SMS, help airlines to 
proactively identify and reduce risk.
 Addressing Close Calls. Near misses and close calls pose challenges 
both in the air and on the airport surface. Pragmatic adoption of new 
technology will play a key role in improving our system both in the air 
and on the ground.
 In flight, air carriers operate with established collision-
avoidance systems that are independent of ground-based air traffic 
control. The Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) is a set of 
onboard safety systems that includes Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) II and newer ACAS X variants that are designed to reduce the 
likelihood of midair collisions by providing traffic advisories and, 
when needed, resolution advisories that direct pilots to maintain or 
increase separation. These capabilities are a core safety component for 
air carriers.
 Additional tools under discussion across the aviation community, 
including broader use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance--Broadcast In 
(ADS-B In) and related cockpit traffic-display capabilities, may 
further enhance situational awareness in certain operating 
environments. However, these technologies should be evaluated carefully 
with attention to certification requirements, integration with existing 
avionics and supply chain challenges, among others.
 It is important to note that not all aircraft fleet models are the 
same, and the ability for air carriers to utilize these technologies in 
the future is heavily dependent on factors outside the control of the 
air carrier, in particular, access to an FAA-certified solution. While 
these tools hold promise, there must be an appropriate amount of time 
to allow equipment to be designed, manufactured and installed in a 
normal maintenance cycle. A4A looks forward to continued work with the 
Committee on these solutions that can improve safety for all system 
users.
 On the airport surface, FAA has deployed or is expanding tools such 
as Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), Airport 
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), the Surface Awareness 
Initiative, and Runway Incursion Devices to improve controller 
awareness and reduce runway incursion risk. In the wake of the LGA 
accident, the FAA has also increased focus on the use of vehicle 
movement area transmitters and runway warning systems to improve 
airfield safety. These investments are important for improved timely 
surveillance, clear communication, and situational awareness for both 
controllers and vehicle operators. A4A supports these efforts.
 Recommendations. Congress can play a critical role in reducing risk 
by supporting the people, infrastructure and operational stability that 
the National Airspace System (NAS) requires. While indirect to the 
specific incidents, Congress can provide predictability and stability 
through strategic investment for the foundational components necessary 
to not only maintain our system but also grow and improve the 
operational capabilities of the NAS while also improving safety through 
risk mitigation and durability. Specifically--

 Air Traffic Controller Staffing. Continued attention to air 
 traffic controller staffing and training is essential. FAA's 
 2026-2028 Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan underscores the 
 importance of sustaining hiring, training and retention to 
 rebuild staffing levels over time. A modern, resilient safety 
 system requires enough certified controllers, enough 
 instructors and enough training capacity to support the system 
 safely and efficiently.

 Build the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS). 
 A4A, as part of an unprecedented, industry-wide ``Modern Skies 
 Coalition'' strongly supported Congress's $12.5 billion 
 downpayment toward air traffic control modernization, and we 
 continue to advocate in support of additional funding of at 
 least $19 billion to completely build a new air traffic control 
 system.

 Appropriations Regular Order. It is extremely important that 
 Congress avoids disruption and prioritizes returning to regular 
 order in the annual appropriations process, particularly when 
 it comes to the funding for the FAA and the Transportation 
 Security Administration (TSA) which provide monopoly services 
 to the traveling public and aviation industry.

 Ensure the Traveling Public Is Not Harmed by Another 
 Government Shutdown. Short of regaining regular order in the 
 appropriations process, in any future shutdown instance, 
 institute a governance and funding system that will provide 
 stable and predictable funding to avoid future shutdown impacts 
 on the traveling public. Travelers have paid for these 
 services, and they should not be impacted by governmental 
 policy differences that are unrelated to the operation of the 
 aviation system.

 A4A is grateful for the work that has been done on controller 
staffing and ATC modernization but emphasizes near-term gains should 
not overshadow the long-term commitment and hard work necessary to 
fulfill the vision of a modernized ATC system.
 Conclusion. A4A appreciates the Committee's sustained attention to 
aviation safety and focus on measures to produce meaningful safety 
gains across the entire system. The U.S. has built a commercial 
aviation safety record that is second to none, and that record has 
evolved through decades of collaboration across the entire aviation 
ecosystem. Airlines do not compete on safety. Instead, we share 
information, we learn from mistakes and close calls and we work 
continuously to strengthen every layer of protection in the system. We 
welcome these discussions.
 Let me end with a clear and unequivocal point: The U.S. aviation 
system remains the safest in the world. Congress can, and should, 
optimize our safety capabilities through dedicated and sustained 
commitment to both the foundational workforce and technology components 
of the system. While risk can never be entirely eliminated, a stable, 
well-resourced system enables us to continuously reduce and manage risk 
across the system--strengthening safety for all users and the traveling 
public.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

 Senator Moran. A better close than if you had a piece of 
paper.
 Governor Sununu. Thank you.
 Senator Moran. Well done.
 Mr. Hauptli, while I didn't introduce you in that order, 
Mr. Hauptli, you are now recognized.

 STATEMENT OF TODD HAUPTLI,

 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES

 Mr. Hauptli. Thank you. And thank you for the invitation. 
It is always an honor to be before the Committee, and thank you 
for your continued focus on aviation safety.
 Recent tragedies and incidents reinforce that we can never 
become complacent, take safety for granted, or lose our shared 
resolve to mitigate risks. To successfully mitigate risk and 
enhance safety, I believe we need to focus on process, people, 
and technology.
 Three points this morning: One, process. Safety management 
systems are an effective framework for identifying, analyzing, 
and mitigating hazards and risks. Airports, airlines, tenants, 
and the FAA utilize SMS to identify local risks and to tailor 
mitigation efforts to unique airport-specific circumstances. 
While the broad implementation of SMS across industry and 
government is enhancing safety, we need to strengthen FAA and 
industry coordination and data-sharing as my written testimony 
describes in more detail.
 Point two, people. There are opportunities to enhance 
safety on or near runways by addressing human factors, 
including more consistent initial and recurrent training. All 
workers who operate on airport movement areas, including 
runways, are required by the Federal Government to undergo 
extensive driver training, which often involves classroom or 
computer-based training, written tests, supervised driving, 
practical exams, and annual recurrent training.
 AAAE has decades of experience training airport workers. In 
the past year alone, we have delivered more than 67,000 
movement area driver training courses and nearly 430,000 non-
movement driver-training courses at 325 airports. And we are 
deploying AI capabilities to provide enhanced recurrent 
training that recognizes individual learning habits and adjusts 
accordingly to promote improved learning retention and training 
results.
 And while effective training tools are available and 
improving, we believe more can be done. Specifically, we 
support the establishment of a taskforce at FAA to develop 
recommendations on how to improve the consistency of movement 
area driver training and basic skills nationwide while 
preserving flexibility to address airport-specific conditions.
 We appreciate the conversations that we have had with you 
and your staff, Chairman Moran, and look forward to working 
with you to develop legislation in this area, recognizing its 
promise in improving runway safety at airports across the 
country.
 Point three, technology. Increased investments in 
technology and facilities to modernize the ATC system are 
producing real enhancements to safety and efficiency that we 
can build on in the years ahead to the benefit of travelers for 
generations to come. In the airport environment surface 
surveillance tools are expected to be in place at more than 200 
airports in the months ahead. These systems promise to enhance 
safety and mitigate near misses and can be bolstered with the 
installation of vehicle movement area transmitters where 
possible.
 Airports differ in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, runway 
configuration, weather and low visibility operations, 
construction activity and vehicle access needs. And they must 
have the ability, through SMS and other assessments, to 
evaluate and prioritize technology deployment and safety 
investments to effectively target each dollar toward its 
highest and best safety purpose.
 Current airport resource limitations are real and growing. 
AIP is overs subscribed by a factor of three. PFCs have not 
been adjusted by for more than a quarter of a century. Billions 
of dollars in annual IIJI investments are expiring, and some in 
Congress are contemplating limits on the ability of airport 
operators to utilize technology to charge users for their use 
of airport facilities.
 We need to address those challenges recognizing that they 
impact the ability of airports to fund safety projects and 
other critical improvements.
 Thank you.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Hauptli follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Todd Hauptli, President and CEO, 
 American Association of Airport Executives
 Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today's 
important hearing on close calls and improving safety across the 
national airspace system (NAS). While tens of thousands of commercial, 
general aviation, cargo, and military flights are completed 
successfully in the United States each day, recent tragedies and 
incidents reinforce that we can never become complacent, take safety 
for granted, or lose our shared resolve to mitigate risks.
 Your continued focus on safety--along with Chairman Cruz, Ranking 
Member Cantwell, and the members of the committee--and your efforts to 
enhance aviation safety and invest in critical infrastructure on the 
ground and in the air are having a demonstrable benefit for the 
traveling public and all Americans. As public entities with a public 
safety mission, airports are grateful for your leadership and 
dedication, and we are committed to continuing our work with the 
committee, our industry partners, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) to address safety concerns on or near runways.
 Personally, it is always an honor to appear before the Commerce 
Committee and the Aviation Subcommittee on behalf of the American 
Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), the world's largest 
professional organization representing the individuals who work at 
public-use commercial and general aviation airports. AAAE's more than 
12,000 members represent 950 airports as well as hundreds of companies 
and organizations that support the airport industry. In addition to 
advocating on behalf of our members, AAAE has a rich heritage of 
providing safety-related training and professional development 
opportunities for airport and aviation workers that we believe are 
relevant to today's hearing.
 While the focus of my testimony is primarily on those areas for 
which airports have responsibility, I want to note the importance of 
collaboration, cooperation, and communication among airport operators 
and our government and industry partners. Our nation's airspace and 
airport operating environments are exceedingly complex and unique, 
which adds to the challenge we face and limits the effectiveness of 
one-size-fits-all solutions. Safety requires constant vigilance, 
attention, and appropriate action by all who operate in the dynamic 
airport environment.
 Specifically, our efforts to successfully mitigate risk and enhance 
safety require us to constantly evaluate and enhance the processes, 
people, and technology at work in the airport environment.
Safety Management Systems--Effective Framework for Risk Management
 Safety is a core focus and function of airports, consistent with 
their public nature and public mission. While that has been the case 
for decades, the broad implementation of Safety Management Systems 
(SMS) allows airports to more effectively identify and mitigate 
systemic risk, including those related to close calls, runway 
incursions, and other safety hazards.
 Airport operators are using SMS to proactively identify and 
mitigate safety risks at their facilities. In 2023, the FAA issued a 
rule requiring certain Part 139 certificated airports to implement an 
SMS over a five-year period. A core component of these systems is 
safety risk management (SRM). As part of SRM, airport operators are 
required to establish a systemic process for (a) identifying 
operational safety hazards, (b) analyzing the level of risk associated 
with each of those hazards, and (c) mitigating the risk of the 
identified hazards.
 The tremendous value of SMS is enabling airport operators to 
identify safety risks and appropriate mitigation measures that are 
unique and tailored to their operating environment. Individuals with 
access to the airside are trained on how to report hazards, ensuring 
facility-specific risks are readily understood. Airport operators 
closely evaluate this data and implement corrective actions designed to 
mitigate the highest-risk hazards, such as additional training, new 
signage, or targeted infrastructure modifications. The SRM process 
avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes that no two airports 
face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures that limited 
financial resources are allocated where they will have the greatest 
impact on improving safety.
 In addition to identifying risks and implementing mitigation 
measures, Part 139 certificated airports falling within the purview of 
the rule must also adopt safety policies, promote and encourage safety 
across the organization, and maintain processes to ensure that any 
mitigation measures remain effective over time and the system is 
functioning properly. Together, these important SMS components help 
cultivate a safety culture and ensure continuous safety improvements.
 It is important to emphasize the role of airport SMS relative to 
FAA's and other stakeholders' SMS frameworks. Commercial airlines are 
governed by their own SMS requirements, and the FAA leverages its 
internal SMS program to guide decision-making on a wide range of 
operational and safety issues. This means that several different 
organizations may be utilizing distinct risk management processes 
simultaneously at a single airport. If a risk is identified by the FAA, 
an airport operator, or an airline, one or more of these organizations 
may need to implement mitigation measures, depending on which entity 
holds the operational capability to address that risk. The overlapping 
nature of these programs highlights a shared responsibility for risk 
management and the need for effective collaboration.
 As part of the SMS implementation process for airports, one major 
gap identified is the inability of FAA air traffic control facilities, 
air carriers, and other operators to confidently and efficiently share 
hazard data collected through their SMS programs with airport 
operators. As public entities, airport operators are generally subject 
to open records laws (commonly known as freedom of information laws) 
and must disclose safety data to the public upon request. These laws, 
while well intended, stymie safety by inhibiting the data disclosures 
and collaboration among entities that are needed to address issues 
before they arise.
 Given that reality, we urge the committee and Congress to protect 
safety data that FAA and other stakeholders share with airports from 
public disclosure under open records laws. Allowing data sharing among 
stakeholders without fear of retribution is critical to ensuring the 
highest levels of safety.
Worker Training--Opportunities for Enhanced Safety
 While establishing and maintaining an SMS is critical to enhancing 
aviation safety on or near runways, addressing human factors, including 
effective initial and recurrent training, are equally important.
 Notably, many workers at airports--and all workers that operate on 
airport movement areas--are required by the Federal government to 
undergo extensive training and to demonstrate appropriate proficiency.
 In most instances, employees receive required training as part of 
their onboarding and in conjunction with the badging process, which all 
employees must undergo before working in secure areas of an airport, 
including the critical air operations area (AOA). Many airports require 
classroom or computer-based training, written tests, supervised 
driving, practical exams, annual recurrent training, and enforcement 
measures.
 For more than three decades, AAAE has played an important role in 
providing training to airports and their employees, tailoring options 
to meet the unique needs and budgets of individual airports. AAAE's 
Digicast system provides on-demand, web-based video training on safety, 
operations, maintenance, security, firefighting, customer service, 
human resources, and other topics. Digicast educates aviation employees 
about the complex airport work environment, promoting safe and 
efficient operations, and supporting airport compliance with federally 
mandated training.
 AAAE also provides customized, computer-based training for more 
than 125 individual airports through Interactive Employee Training 
(IET). AAAE's IET allows airports to report training results in real-
time to allow for necessary adjustments and upgrades. Training courses 
and interactive exams are tailored to each airport operation and offer 
an easy method to deliver recurrent training. The system reduces paper 
recordkeeping and errors.
 Notably, AAAE has partnered with Blank Slate--a leading provider of 
Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based training to the U.S. military and 
other leading institutions--to deploy enhanced recurrent training that 
recognizes individual learning habits and adjusts accordingly to 
promote improved learning retention and training results.
 IET courses cover the full range of airport operations and training 
needs, including Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) and sterile 
area security at both commercial service and general aviation airports; 
active shooter situations; Americans with Disabilities (ADA) training; 
customer service; fuel handling safety; insider threats; public vehicle 
inspection; airport terminal evacuation; cybersecurity; and human 
trafficking awareness, among others.
 With regard to airfield safety, the IET includes movement and non-
movement area driver training courses, which review FAA Part 139 
airport certification requirements for driving on those respective 
areas of the airfield. The courses review proper vehicle safety, 
definitions and causes of incidents, prevention of accidents and runway 
incursions, how to communicate with the tower, and review all movement 
area and non-movement area marking, lighting, and signage.
 Currently, 325 airports use IET and Digicast to deliver and track 
successful completion of FAA Part 139 movement and non-movement area 
driver training courses. Since 2025, AAAE's IET and Digicast systems 
have delivered more than 67,000 movement area driver training courses 
and nearly 430,000 non-movement area driver training courses.
 The IET also provides SMS training, which gives employees and 
tenants an overview of the airport's SMS plan. It highlights the 
airport's safety culture, clarifies a badge holder's reporting 
responsibilities, reviews tools that support the airport's SMS plan, 
and gives examples a badge holder can follow to demonstrate compliance.
 While AAAE is proud of our heritage in providing training to 
airport workers and constantly seeking to build upon our training 
platforms, including with the deployment of AI capabilities, we support 
an examination and review of FAA's requirements for initial and 
recurrent training to determine effective ways to improve the 
consistency of airside driver training programs.
 Specifically, we recommend the establishment of a task force at FAA 
to develop recommendations on how to improve the consistency of 
movement-area driver training and basic skills nationwide while 
preserving flexibility to address airport-specific conditions and 
factors. We appreciate the conversations we have had with you and your 
staff, Chairman Moran, and look forward to working with you to develop 
legislation in this area, recognizing its promise in improving runway 
safety at airports across the country.
Technology and Infrastructure Investment
 Consistent with your efforts to enhance aviation safety, we also 
appreciate the leadership of the committee in advancing investments to 
modernize the Nation's air traffic control system, which are producing 
meaningful results that we hope to build on in the years ahead to the 
benefit of travelers for generations to come. Continued investments in 
technology and facility upgrades--including new tower construction--
will pay huge dividends with enhanced safety and improved efficiency 
throughout the NAS.
 AAAE recognizes the value of technology and surface safety 
surveillance tools to enhance safety, including FAA's deployment of 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and ADS-B Airport 
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems at 44 airports. While 
ASDE-X and ASSC have been effective, the industry needed more cost-
effective solutions that could be quickly implemented, especially for 
smaller airports. Congress recognized the importance of surface 
surveillance in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Under section 347, 
FAA was directed to identify and deploy systems that may provide or 
improve surface surveillance at airports needing such capabilities.
 We appreciate the work that FAA has done thus far to implement 
section 347 and deploy Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) systems as 
part of the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS). The agency 
has installed the SAI systems at approximately 90 airports to date, and 
we understand that plans are in place to eventually reach 220 airports. 
These systems promise to enhance safety in the airport environment and 
mitigate near misses through improved situational awareness.
 Consistent with the SMS process and in consultation with FAA, we 
understand that airports with surface surveillance tools (ASDE-X, ASSC, 
or SAI) are evaluating the installation of vehicle movement area 
transmitters (VMATs) to improve situational awareness.
 It is important to note that these devices are not yet widely 
deployable at all airports across the country given where FAA is in the 
process of rolling out surface surveillance systems; the need for 
driver and controller training; supply chain and bandwidth concerns; 
and the lack of available resources to procure, install, program, test, 
and maintain the technology.
 Airports differ significantly in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, 
runway configurations, weather and low-visibility operations, hot 
spots, construction activity, and vehicle access needs. Given this 
complexity and the growing disconnect between available resources and 
airport investment needs for safety projects, capacity enhancements, 
terminal upgrades, and other critical projects, airports must have the 
ability through SMS and other assessments to evaluate and prioritize 
technology deployment and safety investments to ensure that each dollar 
goes toward its highest and best safety purpose.
 While we hope to see an increase in Airport Improvement Program 
(AIP) funding, a long-overdue adjustment to the Federal cap on local 
passenger facility charges (PFCs), and an extension of expiring 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) programs in the months 
ahead, airports currently face a growing list of worthy projects and a 
shrinking pool of resources to pay for them. Airports are meeting their 
immediate, highest priority safety needs, but their ability to work 
their way further down a growing list of important projects is limited.
 Finally, I would like to thank Senators Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Jeff 
Merkley (D-OR), Steve Daines (R-MT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) for 
introducing S. 3929, the Air Traffic Situational Awareness Enhancement 
Act. This important safety bill authorizes funds to pay for the 
acquisition, installation, and operation of Airborne Position Reference 
Tools (APRTs) at contract towers that lack Standard Terminal Automation 
Replacement Systems (STARS). This long overdue equipment upgrade will 
allow controllers to use situational awareness displays to keep track 
of nearby aircraft and avoid potential accidents in line with the focus 
of today's hearing.
 Thank you again for the invitation to appear before you on behalf 
of AAAE, and thank you for your continued leadership.

 Senator Moran. Mr. Viola, welcome.

 STATEMENT OF JAMES A. VIOLA,

 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

 GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Viola. Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 
testify and for holding today's hearing.
 I am proud to represent General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association, better known as GAMA. GAMA is an international 
trade association representing more than 130 companies across 
the General Aviation manufacturing and services sectors. Our 
members include the world's largest manufacturers of General 
Aviation airplanes, rotorcraft, advanced air mobility, powered 
lift aircraft, engines, avionics, components and related 
technology. GAMA members are also providers of maintenance and 
repair services, fixed-base operations, pilot and maintenance 
training, and aircraft management companies.
 In the U.S., our industry supports $339 billion in economic 
output, and 1.3 million jobs nationwide. I personally have a 
comprehensive aviation background. I flew Black Hawks in the 
Army's 82nd Airborne, and Chinooks in the 160th Special 
Operations Aviation Regiment, and later served at the FAA 
overseeing pilot certification and General Aviation safety.
 Just this weekend, I flew both an OH-6 Loach Helicopter and 
a Grumman Tiger airplane. I hold an air transport ratings for 
both categories and I am a flight instructor with 8,000 hours.
 I, again, offer my condolences to the families affected by 
the tragic accident at Reagan National last January. That 
tragedy reminds us all to keep strengthening aviation safety 
culture. GAMA applauds the commitment and leadership of this 
body to respond to the tragic accident. GAMA values the work 
being done to foster technologies developed by aviation 
manufacturers to advance safety and operational improvements. 
GAMA is also proud to be serving on the Committee of the Modern 
Skies Coalition which is supporting the modernization of our 
air traffic control system.
 GAMA is focused on helping foster aviation safety, and we 
support many key initiatives including the implementation of 
SMS, the Safety Management Systems and the work of the GAJSC, 
or the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee. It is a public-
private partnership with the FAA that has helped reduce fatal 
accident rates for issues like controlled flight into terrain 
through better situation awareness technology.
 The numbers for General Aviation show real progress. The 
General Aviation fatal accident rate has improved from 1.12 per 
100,000 flight hours a dozen years ago, to an FAA preliminary 
estimate of 0.58 last year. That progress comes from the safer 
aircraft, better pilot training standards, and technology 
adoption such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
systems, better known as ADS-B.
 As of the beginning of this year, over 171,000 aircrafts 
are now equipped with ADS-B Out, which transmits the aircraft's 
position and flight information. And the vast majority of those 
operators have voluntarily installed ADS-B In to see other 
traffic. Electronic flight packs provide these safety benefits 
to aircraft without installed displays, giving pilots traffic, 
weather, and terrain awareness on a tablet.
 General Aviation Manufacturers continue to innovate and 
provide solutions that improve runway and taxiway safety, and 
give pilots three-dimensional views of traffic, terrain, and 
weather in the cockpit.
 Next-generation collision avoidance systems are being 
layered on top of ADS-B to give pilots even earlier warnings of 
nearby traffic and obstacles. These technologies are real. Many 
are available today and this is proof that our industry is 
investing in safety solutions.
 I do, however, want to highlight that making progress in 
safety involves the entire aviation ecosystem. New safety 
technology only reaches cockpits if the FAA has the resources 
and the workforce to certify promptly, if FAA and global 
regulators harmonize the standards, if the supply chain can 
deliver parts, and if our maintenance and repair shops already 
near capacity can install it.
 I thank this subcommittee for its leadership and commitment 
to enhance aviation safety. Your sustained attention and your 
willingness to work with industry on solutions makes a real 
difference in how quickly these technologies can reach pilots 
and passengers.
 GAMA stands ready to be a resource on technology 
certification and safety policy as you continue this important 
work.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify. And I welcome 
your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Viola follows:]

 Prepared Statement of James A. Viola, President and CEO, General 
 Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA)
 Chairman Moran, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members of the 
Subcommittee on Aviation, Space, and Innovation, on behalf of the 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), thank you for 
inviting me to testify on how aviation safety can be enhanced through 
technology in the air and on the ground. The general aviation sector is 
a leader in safety innovation, and I am privileged to represent general 
aviation manufacturers and maintenance providers who are at the 
forefront of these efforts to prevent close calls and safety incidents. 
While I firmly believe flying is safe, recent events have justifiably 
raised the public's concern, and GAMA appreciates the subcommittee's 
focus on this topic.
 I have an extensive background in aviation that is relevant to the 
conversation about improving aviation safety including addressing 
recent close call incidents. My career began with the United States 
Army, with much of my military flying done in the 82nd Airborne 
Division and in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. My 
final military assignment was as Division Chief for Army Aviation, 
Current Operations in the Pentagon. After my military career, I served 
at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a Senior Executive in 
the position of acting Deputy Associate Administrator of Aviation 
Safety, and Director of General Aviation Safety Assurance. In this 
role, I was responsible for maintaining consistency and standardization 
in the application of safety oversight activities for the general 
aviation community.
 I am also strong proponent of general aviation and a frequent user 
of its products as a pilot in the U.S. airspace. I fly an R-44 Robinson 
Helicopter and an AG-5B Tiger airplane. I also hold airline transport 
pilot ratings for helicopters and airplanes and am a dual-rated 
certificated flight instructor, having flown more than 80 make and 
models of aircraft. I have accumulated over 8,000 flight hours, which 
includes 1,100 hours with night-vision goggles.
 I was appointed the President and CEO of GAMA in 2025. GAMA is an 
international trade association representing more than 130 companies 
across the general aviation manufacturing and services sectors. Its 
members include the world's leading manufacturers of general aviation 
airplanes, rotorcraft, advanced air mobility powered-lift aircraft, 
engines, avionics, components, and related technologies. GAMA members 
are also providers of maintenance and repair services, fixed-based 
operations, pilot and maintenance training, and aircraft management 
companies. In the U.S., general aviation supports $339 billion in total 
economic output annually and 1.3 million total jobs\1\. General 
aviation contributes to the economies of all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia, with GAMA companies having facilities in 49 states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Contribution of General Aviation to the U.S. Economy, PwC, 
February 2025
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Aviation and a Multi-Faceted Approach to Safety and Culture
 Given my experience in the military, at the FAA, and as a general 
aviation pilot of both fixed-wing airplanes and rotorcraft, I want to 
again express my condolences to the families of those affected by the 
tragic accident at the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in 
January of 2025 as well as others impacted by recent accidents and 
incidents. These events are a reminder that we all must strive for a 
stronger aviation safety culture and better outcomes. This includes 
building on past efforts and prioritizing the ongoing work of 
government and private entities that collaborate to improve aviation 
safety.
 GAMA applauds the commitment and leadership of the Senate to 
respond to the tragic accident at the Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport last year. GAMA values the work being done to foster 
technologies developed by aviation manufacturers to advance safety and 
operational improvements. As the Senate and House continue their work 
on their response, GAMA stands ready to be a resource on technology 
developments, certification, and related issues to further progress 
important aviation safety initiatives.
 GAMA is focused on helping foster aviation safety and I would like 
to highlight several of our initiatives in this area. GAMA and our 
members continue to support the development and implementation of 
Safety Management Systems (SMS) for manufacturers. A mature SMS is a 
significant contributor to a positive culture that drives a continuous 
focus on safety. Ahead of the May 2027 deadline for implementation of 
an SMS for production and type certificate holders,\2\ manufacturers 
have made meaningful progress implementing SMS, building upon voluntary 
SMS initiatives that our industry has undertaken over the past few 
decades to meet international obligations. Our members have approached 
building an SMS with a spirit of collaboration, including with 
operators, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and suppliers, 
learning from challenges and sharing how to continuously evolve a 
positive safety culture. We appreciate the work of this Committee in 
supporting these efforts, including for the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ Aircraft Certification Safety and Accountability Act (P.L. 
116-260)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GAMA is also a longstanding leader, along with industry colleagues, 
of the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC).\3\ This is a 
public-private partnership, in collaboration with the FAA, that since 
1997 has sought to reduce the general aviation accident rate and 
improve aviation safety through data analysis and identification of 
systemic issues. We also support similar work under the United States 
Helicopter Safety Team (USHST)\4\, a companion effort between industry 
and the FAA focused on reducing the rate of rotorcraft accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ GAJSC.org
 \4\ USHST.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 An early initiative under the GAJSC was to facilitate policies for 
providing improved situational awareness to general aviation pilots. 
Work in the late 1990s placed focus on the FAA facilitating digital 
display equipment installation, specifically to provide terrain data to 
pilots to prevent Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).\5\ Providing 
pilots with the ability to see the terrain in which they operate 
around, as well as obstacles, using installed displays and portable 
devices has resulted in a reduction in the CFIT fatal accident rate in 
general aviation operations by approximately 80 percent. This is 
without the FAA taking any regulatory action but instead enabling use 
of installed and portable equipment in general aviation operations. The 
GAJSC and USHST have continued to make progress on issues like pilot 
medical fitness, maintenance practices, risks associated with 
accidental flight into instrument meteorological conditions (UIMC), and 
midair collision risks (MAC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \5\ General Aviation (GA) Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) 
Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) Final Report

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Figure: GAJSC safety dashboard by CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy 
Classification for U.S. fatal accidents showing rate of CFIT fatal 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accidents.

 GAMA also works with our member companies to facilitate and support 
conferences that advance safety and technology adoption. For example, 
last week my staff and I were privileged to help facilitate and attend 
the annual FAA and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
International Aviation Safety Conference where regulators and industry 
met collaboratively to discuss and advance aviation manufacturing and 
safety. The conference agenda focused on certification and validation 
of aircraft and systems, including how to manage equipage approvals 
across U.S. and foreign states of design to address mandates such as 
for new datalink communications, 25-hour cockpit voice recorders, and 
radio altimeter systems. The conference also discussed work over the 
past decade to equip aircraft with Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) Out across U.S. domestic airspace and in foreign 
jurisdictions and Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting System (ROAAS) 
to learn lessons that can guide future work, as well as establishing 
appropriate level of involvement, and utilization of bilateral 
partners, especially amongst the four leading States of Design: Brazil, 
Canada, the European Union, and the United States.
 In the wake of the accident at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport, the aviation industry collectively came together to form the 
Modern Skies Coalition\6\. GAMA is a proud Steering Committee member 
along with others assembled here today. These stakeholders, including 
airlines, operators, manufacturers, labor unions, and airports are 
working collectively and collaboratively to support increased aviation 
safety through air traffic system modernization. We remain a strong 
proponent of the coalition's efforts to support targeted investments in 
critical aviation technologies and infrastructure which will provide 
certainty for the aviation sector in the near and long-term. GAMA and 
its members thank policymakers for their past support of this 
initiative and continue to urge congressional focus to support further 
investments for the entire aviation sector and flying public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ Modern Skies Coalition
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Aviation Safety Status Today
 There are many factors that play into general aviation statistics 
on safety, culture, and operations that merit being highlighted. First, 
general aviation aircraft are well-equipped with safety enhancing 
technology thanks to a strong array of products in the marketplace 
today. The U.S. general aviation and on-demand Part 135 accident rate 
has improved over the past dozen years from 1.12 fatal accidents per 
100,000 hours of flight time to 2025 when the FAA preliminary estimate 
of 0.58 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flight time. The U.S. 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will provide the official 
update for last year in the next few months.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ FAA on-demand Part 135 and general aviation survey
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The improvements in safety have not come from one initiative, but 
from newer and safer aircraft being introduced into the fleet, the 
introduction of risk management into primary flight training through 
the deployment of new Airmen Certification Standards (ACS), and the 
continued investment in new technologies, including the mandate for 
ADS-B Out equipage and enabling improved situational awareness in the 
cockpit.
 As of January 1, 2026, over 171,000 aircraft have been equipped 
with ADS-B Out equipment with approximately 160,000 of those aircraft 
being in the general aviation fleet.\8\ This is important because ADS-B 
Out enables the use of ADS-B In application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \8\ AC 20-165B--Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance--Broadcast OUT Systems
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 FAA statistics on ADS-B In equipage show that somewhere between 
143,170 and 158,358 general aviation aircraft leverage this solution 
through installed equipment.\9\ This includes aircraft that receive 
ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft or transmitted from the ground 
to receive ADS-B In on either the 1090 MHz or 978 MHz spectrum link, or 
both.\10\ Basically, of those aircraft that are equipped with installed 
ADS-B Out for operation in certain airspace, the vast number also made 
the independent choice to equip with ADS-B In to take advantage of the 
safety benefits from seeing other traffic. Additionally, many also 
chose to leverage FAA's uplinked Flight Information Services Broadcast 
(FIS-B) data using the ADS-B surveillance ground infrastructure to 
provide weather and other safety information
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys | Federal 
Aviation Administration
 \10\ ibid
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Notably, these statistics do not reflect the other general aviation 
aircraft that access ADS-B in situational awareness applications via 
electronic flight bags (EFBs) also referred to as portable devices. 
Widely used by general aviation pilots both by those with installed 
ADS-B In displays and those without an installed display system, EFBs 
and portable devices are used for a variety of situational awareness 
and other purposes including access to navigational charts, checklists, 
operations manuals, weather, and for algorithmic functions like weight 
and balance, performance, and fuel calculations, as well as terrain 
information and other traffic.\11\ They can be portable, attached to a 
mounting device, or have a receiver installed on the aircraft which 
transmits the uplinked data, such as ADS-B Out, to the tablet using 
Bluetooth or other capability.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ AC 91-78A--Use of Electronic Flight Bags
 \12\ ibid
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 While the statistics and technologies highlighted illustrate an 
array of solutions found in the general aviation marketplace, there are 
some unique challenges for specific aircraft in their quest to utilize 
and derive the overall safety benefit from everyone having ADS-B In. 
This underscores the importance of solutions like EFBs and portable 
devices which can provide flexibility and utility while maintaining 
safety. Any policy effort in this area must reflect the reality of 
general aviation's leadership in ADS-B Out and ADS-B In equipage over 
the past dozen plus years.
 We are also starting to hear conversations about ``electronic 
conspicuity'' (EC) and its potential role in the U.S. National Airspace 
System (NAS). The ``EC'' term describes a broad umbrella of 
technologies, but most are rooted in ADS-B and the capabilities brought 
to the aviation industry by making aircraft more electronically 
conspicuous, hence the term. The initial focus has been on how to use a 
portable ADS-B Out solution for aircraft that cannot practically 
install ADS-B Out equipment, such as those without electrical systems 
or where the installation simply is not practical. Congress directed 
the focus on this work in Sec. 810 and 906 of the 2024 FAA 
Reauthorization Act and we are eagerly looking forward to the release 
of the reports called for in the law.
 These initial efforts have grown and now encompass efforts 
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to explore the 
use of EC for drone integration. The FAA has advanced a proposal as 
well as the Part 108 Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rulemaking 
project. Additionally, foreign aviation regulators including Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom are fleshing out 
what EC will mean to them, sometimes based on ADS-B and the protected 
aviation spectrum while others are using cell phone technologies and 
unprotected spectrum.
 For GAMA, EC may serve a role to improve see-and-avoid between 
pilots of manned aircraft. More work will be needed to flesh out the 
potential role of EC for purposes of UAS integration, including 
establishing a certification threshold appropriate for an application 
that is more complex than what was originally envisioned for ADS-B Out 
and ADS-B In technologies.
An Illustration of Technology in General Aviation
 Numerous general aviation ADS-B In applications exist today. FAA--
working with industry--has enabled several applications focused on 
enhancing situational awareness of the pilots including cockpit display 
of traffic information (CDTI) and related applications for airborne 
operations as well as those that improve surface and runway safety 
using GPS and ADS-B Out generated data.
 The safety benefits they yield are important to aviation safety and 
traffic management in the air and on the ground and in many cases build 
off the data and situational awareness provided by ADS-B. This includes 
applications that further runway and taxiway safety, situational 
awareness and collision avoidance, and improved delivery of clearances.
 Other technologies are also provided by these avionics system 
vendors to facilitate the reduction of runway incursions, runway 
excursions, avoiding other aircraft while airborne, and providing 
pilots with an improved weather picture. And, of course, they also make 
traditional collision avoidance systems such as TCAS I, and TCAS II as 
well as Traffic Awareness Systems, technologies still in wide use 
across the fleet today and complemented by ADS-B Out and In systems as 
well as next generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) 
technologies.
 These initiatives focus on many different areas from:

 1) Precise enroute spacing yielding better airspace management;

 2) 3-dimensional depictions of traffic obstacles, terrain, and 
 flight plan overlay during challenging weather as an aid to 
 pilots; and

 3) Runway technologies increasing flight crew awareness and 
 providing alerts during taxi, takeoff, and landing helps to 
 address runway incursions caused by nearby airborne aircraft, 
 aircraft on the ground, and ground vehicles.

 We are also looking for more effective communication between 
controllers and pilots at more airports in the aviation system. Mobile 
clearance technology builds on work at 78 larger airports that now have 
the capacity via a terminal data link to provide pre-departure 
clearances on installed systems. While installed systems have been 
embraced in the general aviation fleet with close to 6,300 general 
aviation airplanes and business jets\13\ having voluntarily upgraded 
their aircraft with this capability to utilize these services at the 78 
airports over the past half-a-dozen years, as of last week. The mobile 
clearance program shows how this same capability can be brought to 
portable devices and using over-the-air Internet to facilitate similar 
functions for the NAS and the larger general aviation fleet.
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 \13\ FAA Data Communications Implementation Team (DCIT) Briefing
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 This technology enables clearances to be delivered digitally, 
instead of via voice communication, reducing read back and hear back 
errors. These advancements enable safer and more efficient traffic 
management in a more consistent and precise manner, and we appreciate 
the partnership of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association 
(NATCA) with this work. We appreciate the support of the U.S. Congress 
in supporting this program (Section 614) in the recent FAA 
reauthorization and we have high hopes for this program and its 
expansion.
Challenges with Innovation Reaching the General Aviation Marketplace
 Furthermore, this discussion on new technology underscores how 
critical FAA certification and its work with other regulatory 
authorities plays in the adoption of technology and safety into the 
general aviation cockpit. Simply put, if the FAA does not have the 
focus, resources, workforce capacity, and technological expertise to 
provide appropriate oversight and approval, it may inhibit safety 
enhancements from reaching the marketplace in a timely manner. 
Modernization of FAA certification processes to keep pace with 
innovation enables safety through new products and technologies and is 
critical given the current state of innovation and other regulatory 
demands that are increasing. Additionally, depending in the policy path 
chosen, certifying and equipping aircraft with new airborne 
technologies will take time, making it essential that the direction 
that the United States will take, especially if there are changes 
needed to aircraft and their systems, is known years prior to any 
requirement entering into effect.
 Another important component to developing and certifying safety 
enhancing equipment is FAA participation and collaboration with 
industry and global standards bodies to achieve technical consensus for 
new products and technologies. Development of these standards takes 
considerable effort and can vary based on the complexity of the subject 
matter. In addition, like FAA policy and guidance, these standards must 
be routinely reviewed and amended to keep pace with change. For this 
reason, continuous engagement by both industry and FAA in standards 
development for certification is a key component of getting critical 
safety technologies into the general aviation cockpit. The FAA must 
remain an active partner with standards bodies, other regulators, and 
industry partners to help promote harmonization of standards for 
products in the global marketplace.
 Once a new safety technology has met the appropriate standards and 
is certified by the FAA, product availability moves to the forefront. 
Like other industries that are complex, the aviation sector has 
experienced challenges associated with its supply chain. First, FAA 
certification of safety enhancement is followed by production approval 
of the product and individual parts and equipment. As such, if there is 
a supply chain impediment with a part it can impact the ability of the 
broader safety enhancement getting to the marketplace. Second, aviation 
supply chain and operations are international, so broader domestic or 
international trade policies can potentially impact or constrain the 
marketplace.
 Installation of equipment is the final step in this process. 
Aircraft are routinely serviced and inspected to ensure safety and 
airworthiness. Today, many of GAMA's member companies who work in the 
maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) space share that they are 
nearing or at capacity with existing work. For this reason, any 
additional mandatory or voluntary equipage requirements put forward by 
policymakers or regulators will necessitate coordination and 
facilitation with the MRO community to be implemented effectively. As 
an example, the FAA's ADS-B Out equipage rebate program\14\ that 
provided an incentive for installation was coordinated with the MRO 
community and avionics providers to effectively manage parts supply and 
maintenance capacity. Moving forward, this example serves as a model 
but also highlights the need for collaboration amongst government and 
industry to enable safety solutions to reach the cockpit.
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 \14\ FAA ADS-B Out Rebate Program for General Aviation
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Conclusion
 On behalf of GAMA and its membership, I am hopeful that the safety 
efforts on behalf of our industry, the overview of general aviation 
adoption, and the examples of current technologies and challenges are 
beneficial to understanding how our sector is working to address close 
calls and improve safety. This includes continued collaboration and 
engagement with regulators, technical experts, policymakers, and 
industry on both a domestic and international basis to build upon and 
advance the solutions highlighted. General aviation manufacturers and 
maintenance providers will also continue to design, certify, and 
install new safety technologies that aim to address the challenges we 
collectively all desire to address. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today and I look forward to elaborating on these topics and 
addressing any questions you may have.

 Senator Moran. Thank you very much. Captain Ambrosi, 
welcome.

 STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, 
 AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you. Good morning, Chair Moran, 
Ranking Member Duckworth, and Members of this Subcommittee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify and present the 
perspective of the 80,000 commercial airline pilots of the 
Airline Pilots Association International.
 My name is Jason Ambrosi, and I am a current and qualified 
767 Captain at Delta Airlines, and President of ALPA since 
2023.
 As I speak before this committee today, my thoughts are 
with my Union brothers, we have lost to two tragic collisions 
in the past 16 months. Captain Antoine Forest and First Officer 
Mackenzie Gunther who lost their lives in the ground collision 
at LaGuardia in March of this year, and Captain Jonathan 
Campos, and Honorary Captain Samuel Lilley and the 65 others 
who died in the mid-air collision in DCA in January 2025.
 The unfortunate truth in aviation is that we make the most 
progress on safety only after lives have already been lost. 
Yes, we honor the lives of those lost by strengthening aviation 
safety, but I can assure you we would all rather have our Union 
brothers flying the line with us. And I know their families 
would certainly rather have them in their lives rather than 
honoring their legacy.
 ALPA is calling for urgent action with the full knowledge 
that technologies that could have prevented these accidents 
exist and are readily available right now. I commend the quick 
work of this committee and the leaders in the Senate who 
drafted and passed the ROTOR Act which seeks to close the gaps 
in the aviation safety net that allowed the Potomac mid-air 
collision, and similar accidents to happen. Your collective 
urgency matched the gravity of the moment.
 The mid-air collision exposed a safety gap, the lack of an 
integrated ADS-B In mandate, without it, pilots are forced to 
rely on last-second warning systems, like TCAS, that offered 
limited alerting time, insufficient call-out information, and 
are suppressed near the ground, like in the airport 
environment. Pilots are the safest when we are aware of and can 
avoid threats.
 Of particular importance for this hearing, the ROTOR Act 
also has substantial benefits for surface safety, including 
runway incursions. The Legislation's performance standards 
require integrated capabilities for pilots on the airport 
surface. This would include adopting the use of ADS-B In 
applications for direct runway safety-relevant traffic, and 
runway alerts to flight crew on cockpit display of traffic 
information.
 Much like the airborne benefits of ADS-B In that have been 
discussed at length, ROTOR's surface applications will give 
flight crews better awareness of what is happening around them 
at the airport. These tools identify the runway traffic status 
under normal operational conditions, alert pilots to any 
abnormal traffic conditions, and enable them to take evasive 
action.
 There are other critical technologies and systems that we 
must implement and support to reduce the risk of close calls 
and accidents. In the airport environment, we must invest in 
systems that could prevent collisions similar to the accident 
at LaGuardia earlier this year.
 While the NTSB continues that investigation, it is clear 
from other close calls that we need to do more to protect 
against runway incursions with surface technologies like 
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability. In addition to 
emerging technologies, the FAA must continue to support 
existing tools like runway status lights, and Airport 
Surveillance Detection Equipment, Model X.
 ALPA proudly stands with the administration's support--and 
supports the administration's commitment to modernize air 
traffic control, and urges further investment to bring this 
plan to reality in order to maintain safe airspace for existing 
users as well as new entrants.
 95 years ago, ALPA was founded by pilots who refused to 
accept that dying on the job was simply a part of flying. We 
fought for the very standards that today help make aviation the 
safest mode of transportation. Maintaining this safety record 
is knowing that, when not to accept good enough. Two fatal 
accidents in months tell us good enough is no longer good 
enough.
 This is the time for action, not the time to give in to 
special interests fighting progress. We cannot stall. We cannot 
water down the safety advancements of the ROTOR Act. We must 
keep moving forward. We owe it to the 67 lives lost in the 
Potomac mid-air collision, and every life lost in aviation 
accidents, to continue the fight for safety.
 The time to act on aviation safety is now and I commend 
this committee's dedication to make our system safer. Thank 
you.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Ambrosi follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Captain Jason Ambrosi, President, 
 Air Line Pilots Association, International
 On behalf of the nearly 80,000 pilots represented by the Air Line 
Pilots Association, International (ALPA), I want to thank you for 
inviting me to testify for this timely hearing: ``Close Calls: 
Improving Safety Across the National Airspace System.'' My name is 
Jason Ambrosi, and I am a current and qualified international captain 
on the Boeing 767 at Delta Air Lines and serve as the president of 
ALPA. ALPA is the largest pilot union as well as the largest non-
governmental aviation safety organization in the world, with a history 
of safety advocacy spanning more than 90 years.
 Over the last several decades, the collective efforts of industry, 
labor, and government, alongside advances in technology and legislative 
and regulatory intervention, have helped create the aviation industry's 
strong safety record. The industry remains safe for both passenger 
travel and cargo operations, particularly in commercial 14 CFR Part 121 
operations. However, advancements in safety are never guaranteed, and 
complacency is often the biggest threat to the aviation system. Too 
frequently, tragedies are the forcing event for necessary change and 
long overdue improvements to safety.
 Unfortunately, commercial aviation has seen two fatal accidents 
since I last testified before this Committee: the 2025 Potomac River 
midair collision between PSA Flight 5342 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk 
helicopter, and the 2026 LaGuardia ground collision involving Air 
Canada Flight 8646 operated by Jazz and a Port Authority Aircraft 
Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) truck. ALPA pilots were killed aboard 
both aircraft, in addition to the many lives lost on PSA Flight 5342 
and those injured at LaGuardia. There is no question that additional 
life-saving technology could have been deployed to either prevent or 
mitigate each accident. ALPA remains steadfast in our commitment to 
work with this Committee, including implementing the ROTOR Act's core 
requirements, to ensure the lives lost in these preventable accidents 
are not in vain and to establish the highest standards for safety.
 This includes, first and foremost, requiring the installation and 
operation of fully integrated ADS-B In situational awareness technology 
in the flight deck and the closure of ADS-B Out loopholes for military 
aircraft in shared airspace. It also means continued deployment and 
installation of additional surface awareness safety systems, 
comprehensive air traffic control modernization, improved analysis of 
existing safety data, and continued cooperation between industry 
stakeholders and regulators.
 Prior to the PSA and Air Canada fatal accidents, the U.S. aviation 
system experienced a record level of safety, as the number of 
fatalities associated with U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased more 
than one-third over the last decade. This success stemmed from decades 
of industry-wide work and commitment to collaboration, data collection 
and analysis, hazard identification and mitigation, and technological 
advancements. However, just as the last major legislative action to 
improve aviation safety was borne from the tragedy of the Colgan Air 
Flight 3407 accident and the Boeing 737 MAX accidents, continued 
advancements in safety must be made in response to these recent fatal 
accidents.
The Safety System
 At the airline level, Safety Management Systems (SMS) are used to 
identify, address, and reduce organizational and systemic risks. The 
goal of SMS is to identify active failures and inadequate mitigations 
so that hazards can be contained while preventive measures can be 
adopted or reinforced. SMS adds value to an organization's safety 
structure by identifying hazards and mitigating risks before they 
develop into full accidents. The systems are complex and require 
assessments of human factors and their relation to other workplace 
components. The most successful SMS incorporate a collaborative effort 
between the organization, labor, regulator, and manufacturers to build 
a robust and diverse SMS team.
 One of the foundational activities in SMS is the use of voluntary 
safety programs, where pilots and other front-line workers can 
anonymously raise safety concerns through an aviation safety action 
program (ASAP) report. Airlines with a healthy and positive safety 
culture will receive a significant volume of reports. On a recurring 
basis the airline management, pilots, and an FAA representative review 
all reports to determine what lessons can be learned and how to address 
any identified safety risks. It is this continuous evaluation of new 
risks and hazards that is core to safety management systems.
 The system is at work at the airport level, too, where 
collaboration between air traffic controllers, pilots, airport 
leadership, the FAA, and other stakeholders takes place regularly. At 
each airport with an operating air traffic control tower, Runway Safety 
Action Teams (RSAT) review operational issues, concerns, and risks. 
These meetings are FAA-led, and ALPA participates as a partner. 
Airports with commercial airline services are now implementing SMS 
programs following the FAA's Final Rule on Airport Safety Management 
Systems promulgated in 2023. We believe that requiring certain airport 
certificate holders to develop, implement, maintain, and adhere to an 
airport SMS will further increase airport safety.
Close Calls: Actions & Technological Solution
 The last hearing in this Committee on close call events focused on 
the rebound in air traffic following the COVID-19 pandemic, including a 
massive retraining event for pilots who were shuffled between fleets 
and aircraft types to accommodate carrier growth. While the 
reallocation of labor and substantial hiring growth for pilots has 
subsided, the tension of close call events, and now fatal accidents, 
serve as a warning for our National Airspace System (NAS). Most of 
these incidents and accidents are centered in and around the airport 
operating environment and can be precipitated by various underlying 
factors, including degraded situational awareness, high workload, 
unfamiliar settings or procedures, reduced visibility, communication 
errors, and insufficient technological standardization. ALPA is 
concerned with the close calls in the airport and terminal 
environments, especially in complex airspace, where FAA air traffic 
controllers manage the movement of aircraft and other surface vehicles. 
The following steps, at a minimum, must be taken:

 Surface safety systems need to be installed at all airports 
 as soon as possible, regardless of the costs, given the urgency 
 of the current situation. For more than two decades, the 
 Airport Surveillance Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) was 
 deemed suitable for widespread deployment. ASDE-X relies on 
 surface radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
 (ADS-B) to provide air traffic controllers with the ability to 
 monitor the movements of aircraft and ground vehicles that are 
 equipped with position transmitting devices. The system 
 includes visual and auditory alerts to warn controllers of 
 potential runway incursions and collision hazards. ASDE-X is 
 only installed at 35 airports around the country. Similarly, 
 ASSC Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC), which is 
 installed at only nine airports, is the next generation of 
 surface surveillance system that was developed as part of the 
 FAA's NextGen modernization program. ASSC can transmit surface 
 traffic information to not only the controller's tower display. 
 The preliminary NTSB report determined the ARFF truck involved 
 in the March 22 accident at LaGuardia did not have an ADS-B 
 transmitter that would have allowed it to be depicted as a 
 vehicle on these systems. Although the FAA recently announced 
 plans to equip all of the FAA surface vehicles with ADS-B 
 transmitters, there are no FAA requirements to equip ground 
 vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up to airports to 
 voluntarily install them. This is a policy choice rather than a 
 standard. ALPA was pleased the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 
 included guidance to the FAA to ensure that legacy surface 
 safety systems, including the ASDE-X system, remain fully 
 operational, but we strongly urge the Committee to eliminate 
 whatever barriers the FAA identifies to rapidly expand surface 
 surveillance to all airports with an air traffic control tower, 
 and ALPA fully supports ongoing efforts by FAA to deploy 
 commercially available technology as part of the Surface 
 Awareness Initiative. However, the FAA's SAI system does not 
 have alerting features. ALPA strongly urges Congress to require 
 the FAA to modify the SAI requirements to include alerts.

 Another important legacy tool is the Runway Status Lights 
 (RWSL) system, which requires the ASDE-X or ASSC system to be 
 installed as a prerequisite. Embedded in the pavement of 
 runways and taxiways, the lights automatically turn red when 
 other traffic makes it dangerous to enter, cross, or begin 
 takeoff to alert pilots and vehicle operators to stop when 
 runways are not safe. The lights provide direct, immediate 
 alerts and require no input from controllers. Runway Status 
 Lights are operational at 20 airports across the U.S. There is 
 a critical need for expanding Runway Status Lights to more 
 airports and to more runways. While the cost is high, if we are 
 going to prevent near misses as well as accidents, the cost-
 benefit decision-making process must be reconsidered to 
 aggressively pursue these safety advancements, and new or 
 existing Federal grant programs should be utilized to fund and 
 facilitate deployment at more airports.
Air Traffic Control Modernization
 Technological and infrastructure improvements are required to 
efficiently manage current NAS operations, and our Nation's aging air 
traffic control system is in dire need of comprehensive modernization. 
Outdated telecommunications infrastructure, dilapidated facilities, 
aging radars, and obsolescent computer systems used by controllers must 
be replaced. ALPA supports the Administration's efforts to establish a 
``Brand New Air Traffic Control System'' and believes that additional 
resources from Congress are needed for additional upgrades including a 
new common automation platform for controllers, additional air traffic 
control and airport infrastructure improvements to provide safe and 
efficient gate to gate operations for both passenger and cargo 
operations, as well as widespread upgrades or replacement for aging air 
traffic control towers and other facilities. Modernization must 
continue to outpace demand from the wide variety of existing aviation 
users, as well as new entrants into the NAS. The future of air 
transportation will bring a combination of commercial air carriers, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, general aviation, advanced air mobility, and 
commercial space flight. The NAS of the future will involve a wider and 
more complex variety of operations that our air traffic control 
infrastructure must manage safely and efficiently. ALPA was pleased to 
see that the FAA has renewed the charter for the National Airspace 
System Advisory Committee (NAC) and solicit nominations. For many 
years, the NAC has served as a consensus-based Federal Advisory 
Committee providing recommendations to the FAA on ATC system 
modernization priorities, policies, and strategies.
 Improving the system-wide controller staffing shortage, as this 
Committee sought to do in the 2024 FAA bill, is necessary to safely and 
efficiently meet all the operational requirements of the NAS. It is 
especially important to have the personnel necessary to research, 
develop, deploy, and then train the existing workforce on new 
processes, technology, and modernization initiatives. Without 
sustainable hiring, training, and staffing, the FAA will struggle to 
maintain the current capacity and safety of the system, much less 
modernize or expand it for new users. ALPA would support extending the 
maximum controller hiring requirement in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2024 and increasing such requirements in future years as the FAA 
Academy expands its capacity and additional Collegiate Training 
Initiative schools are certified.
 ATC modernization is necessary to support the integration of new 
types of aircraft such as eVTOL and UAS. It is anticipated that large 
volumes of small UAS (sUAS) will operate in airspace at altitudes that 
are generally considered to be ``below the NAS.'' The low altitude sUAS 
operations will need some form of assistance to ensure safe separation 
to avoid collisions with manned aircraft, other sUAS, terrain, and 
obstacles. Certain foundational decisions need to be made about the 
role of the FAA in offering low-altitude separation services. ALPA 
recommends that the air navigation services at low altitude be provided 
by the same service provider of all other airspace in the NAS. In other 
words, the FAA should be providing separation and surveillance 
services. This ensures consistent application of safety risk mitigation 
policies and procedures.
ROTOR Act
 While all aviation stakeholders claim to prioritize safety above 
all other issues, the fact remains that two preventable fatal 
commercial aviation accidents have occurred in this country in the last 
two years, resulting in the deaths of 69 people. Legislative and 
regulatory intervention is necessary to close these safety gaps. As 
this Committee knows, on Jan. 29, 2025, a Sikorsky UH-60L helicopter 
operated by the U.S. Army collided with PSA Airlines Flight 5342 
approximately 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport, fatally injuring the two pilots, ALPA members Captain John 
Campos and Honorary Captain Samuel Lilley, two flight attendants, 60 
passengers aboard the airplane, and all 3 crew members aboard the 
helicopter.
 The ensuing NTSB investigation identified limitations in the 
traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, 
which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the 
flight crews, as a contributing factor. The tragic midair collision 
exposed a specific safety gap: the lack of an integrated ADS-B In 
mandate forces pilots to rely on near-imminent collision avoidance 
technologies, like TCAS, that offer limited alerting time, insufficient 
call-out information, and are inhibited in the airport environment. I 
want to thank Chair Cruz and Ranking Member Cantwell, as well as Chair 
Moran and Ranking Member Duckworth, for quickly responding to the 
tragedy, working with ALPA and other stakeholders, and passing the 
ROTOR Act.
 Collision avoidance technologies like TCAS provide protection 
through two layers: a resolution advisory (RA) that tells a pilot to 
climb, descend, or take action and a traffic advisory (TA) that 
provides a preliminary aural warning--approximately 19 seconds prior to 
collision in the case of the DCA accident--of nearby traffic. These two 
layers of protection are insufficient, particularly in a low-altitude, 
congested, high-workload environment like the approach performed by the 
PSA Flight 5342 crew to DCA runway 33.
 Section 4 of the ROTOR Act fixes these deficiencies through its 
integrated ADS-B In mandate with clear performance requirements that 
significantly increase the length of alerting time for pilots in both 
the air and surface environments, provide directional traffic symbols 
on a display, and generate aural alerts indicating the clock position, 
relative altitude, range, and vertical tendency of nearby traffic. 
Collectively, these standards and the ROTOR Act's firm implementation 
timeline will ensure pilots have optimal situational awareness and the 
ability to more quickly identify potential intruder aircraft and take 
evasive action. Such standards would likely have saved 67 lives last 
January, and ALPA stands firm that any final aviation safety 
legislation must incorporate these life-saving provisions.
 The ROTOR Act's carefully crafted requirements for integrated ADS-B 
In safety applications with clear performance standards have 
substantial benefits compared to alternative technologies under 
consideration, including quicker adoption, superior alerting and 
situational awareness capabilities in both the terminal and en route 
environments, reduced human factors complications, and safety 
applications for surface operations. ADS-B In has long been recommended 
by the NTSB, is a proven technology in use, and has the benefit of 
significantly quicker adoption to save lives. Manufacturers have 
successfully developed fully integrated systems for commercial 
aircraft, retrofits for several aircraft types, including MHI RJ's 
announcement of retrofit kits for regional jet aircraft, and low-cost 
options for general aviation.
 Some stakeholders have pointed to other emerging technologies, such 
as ACAS-Xa, as a possible solution. Unlike ADS-B In, ACAS-Xa is 
currently inhibited at low altitudes in the airport environment, does 
not require directional traffic symbols and the same advanced audio 
alerts as ADS-B In for pilot notification, and provides less alerting 
time compared to ADS-B In situational awareness technology. Even if 
such modifications to ACAS-Xa are possible, the existing ACAS-Xa 
standards would need to be revised, including altitude inhibition, and 
approved before the FAA can complete the rulemaking process to 
implement ACAS-Xa. Completion of the rulemaking process, avionics 
certification, production, and installation of this new technology is 
highly unlikely by 2031, and the House-passed ALERT Act allows the FAA 
to extend the rulemaking portion of the process until 2035. To be 
clear, ACAS-Xa represents an improvement over TCAS and provides another 
layer of safety, but it does not include the enhancements that leverage 
ADS-B In capabilities, which are specifically designed to improve 
pilots' broader situational awareness. Simulations conducted by the 
NTSB show that if PSA Flight 5342 had been equipped with the expanded 
suite of ADS-B In safety capabilities, the pilots would have received 
visual and aural alerts considerably earlier than ACAS-Xa.
 In terms of the specifics of ADS-B In standards, some suggest 
alternatives to the ROTOR Act's integrated ADS-B In requirement, 
including the voluntary adoption of electronic flight bags or tablets, 
for commercial aircraft operations. This is a mistake and will limit 
ADS-B In's safety-enhancing capabilities and even create new risks 
associated with human factors issues. The intent of the ROTOR 
integration language is to ensure that the ADS-B In capability is 
installed in the flight deck so that it is integrated with the existing 
panel-mounted displays, flight deck audio controls, panel-mounted 
moving maps, and audio and visual alerting capabilities of the 
aircraft. This allows pilots to multitask and make use of ADS-B In 
within the crew's primary field of view without losing situational 
awareness or creating risks from too much cognitive load or 
distraction. In contrast, an electronic flight bag or a tablet will 
simply provide a data feed to an iPad/flight bag that is mounted 
somewhere in the flight deck, likely in a poor location, or on the 
pilot's leg. Pilots will then use an ``ADS-B In app'' that would allow 
access to an ADS-B In display but only when not using their iPad for 
some other purpose. This could create conflict in how ADS-B In comports 
with other iPad needs by a pilot and whether using ADS-B In would take 
focus from other functions of the pilot that must be monitored 
simultaneously. As such, it could create field of vision issues, as 
pilots must physically tilt their heads down toward their lap to see a 
flight bag display rather than view the display while also being able 
to see outward. The absence of integration could result in audio or 
visual alerts potentially not being heard. During the NTSB 
investigation, the U.S. Army Aviation Brigade pilots told investigators 
that ``they did not monitor the tablets when flying low-level on the DC 
helicopter routes because the flying task was too demanding.'' ADS-B In 
can only be valuable for commercial operations if it is appropriately 
integrated into the flight deck to allow the pilot to make use of it 
while performing the other functions of their job. Inappropriate use or 
placement could create separate, contradictory safety problems.
 The ROTOR Act also has substantial benefits for runway safety, 
including runway incursions. The legislation's performance standards 
require integrated capabilities for pilots on the airport surface, 
which would include adopting the use of ADS-B In applications for 
example, Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Surface with 
Indications and Alerts, or ``SURF-IA.'' SURF-IA provides direct runway 
safety relevant traffic and runway alerts to flight crew on cockpit 
display of traffic information (CDTI). The ADS-B In surface safety 
application both ``indicates'' to pilots safety-relevant traffic and 
provides alerts to facilitate pilots' immediate awareness and response 
to a potential collision hazard. Much like the ``airborne'' benefits of 
ADS-B In that have been discussed at length, the ROTOR's surface 
applications will give flight crews better awareness of what's 
happening around them at the airport by identifying the runway traffic 
status under normal operational conditions and alert pilots to any 
abnormal traffic condition and enable them to take evasive action.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Source: NTSB

 The ROTOR Act will also improve the airspace and prevent close 
calls, particularly at airports with high-density, mixed traffic 
operations, by properly regulating military aircraft. The ROTOR Act 
requires all aircraft that are required to be equipped with ADS-B Out 
to be equipped with safety-enhancing ADS-B In, including military 
aircraft. ROTOR preserves national security interests through ongoing 
exemptions for fighters, bombers, and other special mission aircraft so 
they don't have to have ADS-B equipment or broadcast their location via 
ADS-B Out. The legislation also provides statutory requirements for 
ASD-B Out transmission requirements nationwide to vastly improve 
aviation safety by ensuring civilian aircraft can see military 
aircraft. The ALERT Act's approach, while commendable, provides the 
military with too much discretion, including the sole authority of 
whether and how to equip with ADS-B In. Further, the ALERT Act relies 
on discretionary agency authority related to how helicopters broadcast 
their position with ADS-B Out and simply establishes ``procedures'' for 
ADS-B Out that are, again, subject to the discretion of the U.S 
military. Given the NTSB's identification of a failure of traffic 
awareness and collision alerting systems for military aircraft and the 
military's policies of keeping ADS-B Out off, the ROTOR Act provides 
the appropriate balance between safety and security for the Nation's 
civilian and military operations.
 Closing
 Much as the safety system improvements that created a safer airline 
industry over the last 10 years did not come about by happenstance, the 
failures and problems we have today require action. Recent accidents 
and the proliferation of near-miss incidents require Congressional and 
regulatory action, continued collaboration among aviation stakeholders, 
the immediate deployment of
 necessary runway, surface, and flight deck technologies, and the 
greater use of data, to identify hazards and mitigate risk before an 
accident can occur. ALPA reiterates our call for Congress to enact the 
key provisions of the ROTOR Act, make additional investments to 
modernize the air traffic control system, and ensure that pilots have 
the necessary technology to keep the flying public safe.
 Thank you for your commitment to aviation safety and for inviting 
me to testify today.

 Senator Moran. Let me start my questions on this issue of 
ADS-B In. And Mr. Hauptli, even you, in your testimony I think, 
I tried to find it in the written testimony and couldn't, but 
you were somewhat subtle in your suggestion that there is an 
avoidance of technologies which may result in less fees being 
collected by airports. Mr. Viola, you talked about alternatives 
and the bag.
 And Captain, you were direct in your support for ADS-B In. 
What is the controversy among the interested parties that needs 
to be resolved so Congress can more quickly move forward with 
the passage of the ROTOR Act? What is it that is the difficult 
circumstance that keeps this from happening, beyond just the 
House has a bill and the Senate has a bill? How do you see it? 
Mr. Viola?
 Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. I am glad to start. 
I think there is no question that ADS-B In is something that 
even when I was at a forum and I asked the probably 500 people 
in the audience, how many people voluntarily equipped, and the 
numbers were probably around 90 percent. So that is something 
we are doing. We know we all need it. I think everybody here 
agrees that ADS-B In could have avoided the accident here in 
D.C., for sure if people had the equipment on and were 
operating it properly, as you are trying to do with the bill. 
So we certainly support ADS-B In.
 Senator Moran. Anything else, Captain?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. I will be direct. I don't know why 
anybody would be opposed to this. It is a readily available 
technology, as Jim just said, that many General Aviation 
airplanes, even the aviation airplane I flew, have this 
technology. But yet I don't have it on the flight deck of our 
airliners. So this is ready, readily available, it is proven, 
it has been an NTSB recommendation for almost 20 years to have 
ADS-B In. So I don't know why anybody would be opposed to it.
 Senator Moran. Mr. Hauptli, would you be less subtle, and 
remind me of why this might be an issue for some?
 Mr. Hauptli. Sure, Senator. Thank you for the question. The 
House version of the legislation contains a provision not in 
the Senate version that airports are very concerned with. It is 
Section 105 of the House Bill. And that would preclude airports 
from their ability to use ADS-B for fee collection purposes. We 
think it is an important tool, a technology tool for airports 
to be able to use that for fee collection so that we can make 
sure that we have got appropriate safety projects going on at 
airports.
 And we don't think that turning off that technology, as 
some pilots have threatened to do in air, we don't think that--
to avoid having to pay those fees, those small landing fees, we 
don't think that is good for safety. That was what I was 
referencing, Senator.
 Senator Moran. And those are fees that are already required 
to be paid?
 Mr. Hauptli. Yes, sir.
 Senator Moran. Small airports, let me focus on that coming 
from where I come from, these near misses are a challenge 
everywhere, small airports aren't exempt, and unlike larger 
airports, many of those airports lack radar in the most basic 
situational awareness tools. Regional airlines have shared with 
me numerous examples of close calls between regional aircraft 
and general aviation aircraft at non-towered airports.
 Mr. Hauptli, maybe this is, again, a question for you. What 
steps need to be taken to make sure that all aircrafts are 
utilizing safety procedures?
 Mr. Hauptli. Sure. A couple of things, Senator. One, ATC 
modernization, writ large, is beneficial for the system, large 
airports, small airports, towered airports, non-towered 
airports. Two, commend the FAA for the widespread deployment of 
surface awareness initiative systems. There are 90 in place 
with plans to put 220 in place, including Wichita as an 
example. That is definitely helping with greater situational 
awareness at these airports.
 And then the third point I would raise, if Senator Sheehy--
I will raise it anyway--if Senator Sheehy was still here, I 
would give him a shout out for his legislation that would 
require situational awareness displays at contract towers that 
do not have the STARS platform in place.
 I think that is something important that Congress can and 
should do to help some of these airports that you are talking 
about, at some of these smaller facilities. Senator, you are a 
big proponent of the contract tower program. We appreciate 
that. And this is one more area of support that we think would 
be beneficial.
 Senator Moran. Thank you. Mr. Viola, General Aviation 
operators share airspace with commercial airlines, military 
aircraft, and other users every day. From GAMA's perspective, 
what safety challenges are unique to General Aviation community 
and how do they intersect with the broader airspace safety 
concerns?
 Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. The General 
Aviation aircraft are such a wide range of aircraft to include, 
you know, aircraft without electrical systems at the lower end 
with the Experimental Aircraft Association. And so being able 
to have one size that fits all is very difficult to do with 
mandates. And so as part of that, you know, having the 
flexibility to make sure that we have the performance base that 
you are after, which is, that see and avoid of the ADS-B Out, 
ADS-B In, and having the technology on board that helps keep 
the aircraft separated is key to General Aviation. So that 
flexibility of not being able to mandate was one, one side.
 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. As a General Aviation pilot 
who paid more for my 2006 F-150 than I did my 1958 Comanche, I 
hear you. And in fact, maybe there is some sort of sliding fee 
scale we can put in for those airport fees that maybe reflects 
what we do with ground vehicles where we charge trucking higher 
fees than, you know, somebody driving my mom mobile, my 
minivan.
 Captain Ambrosi, in 2023, you told this committee that it 
is clear, and I am quoting you, ``It is clear the system is 
under strain and we need to aggressively pursue solutions to 
stop these events''. In that same hearing, you highlighted the 
importance of surface safety systems like ADS-B, like Airport 
Service Detection Equipment, Model X, or ASDE-X.
 On March 22 of 2026, the CRJ-900 operating as Air Canada 
Flight 8646 collided with an aircraft rescue and firefighting 
vehicle while landing at LaGuardia Airport. The captain and 
first officer were fatally injured. The NTSB preliminary report 
found that the ASDE-X system did not generate an aural or 
visual alert on the displays in the ATC tower to warn 
controllers of the potential runway conflict, because the fire 
truck did not have a transponder. It is not just the aircraft, 
but the fire truck, the ground equipment on the airport did not 
have a transponder.
 And ASDE-X is installed at 35 airports around the country, 
including Chicago Midway O'Hare, and LaGuardia. But without 
transponders on the vehicles, the ASDE-X system could not 
provide an alert to controllers.
 Captain Ambrosi, with proper transponder equipage, the very 
safety system you advocated for in 2023 could have made a 
difference for those two pilots. Today's committee hearing is a 
reminder of how, too often those critical warning calls have 
gone unanswered. Captain Ambrosi, do you believe that listening 
to the recommendation of pilots will increase safety standards 
throughout the National Airspace System? Should be an easy 
question.
 Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. Well, thank you for the question. 
Absolutely.
 Senator Duckworth. A softball.
 Mr. Ambrosi. We are out there every day.
 Senator Duckworth. It is an underhand. I am not even going 
over----
 Mr. Ambrosi. We are out there every day. Out there every 
day.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. So could you please explain 
why pilots need integrated alerting technologies today? And you 
talked about ADS-B In, especially given workload demands when 
navigating high-density operations and why alternatives to 
integrated systems like electronic flight bags are not 
sufficient. And I think this is important for you to make this 
distinction, because there are those who are pushing for 
alternative systems, which are not sufficient, in my opinion. 
But could you give us your expert professional input?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely. As a fellow pilot, you understand 
that.
 Senator Duckworth. I flew way lower and slower than you. 
But go ahead.
 Mr. Ambrosi. That is where most of this is what we are 
talking about right now----
 Senator Duckworth. This is true.
 Mr. Ambrosi.--are these near misses. So first, back to the, 
you know, FAA is asking that--or mandating transponders on 
these ground vehicles, and they should go to everywhere, that 
should be there, so that when we get these tools like ADS-B In 
or the ASDE-X, that it does give us that alert.
 But specific to the ADS-B In technology on our integrated 
displays versus yet just another app on an iPad, let us think 
about the situation, the tragic situation, the Potomac, if it 
was on our integrated displays, it would have given us warning, 
given us more time, and it would be in our field of vision 
while those pilots were conducting that maneuver near the 
ground.
 If it is on an iPad over here, I have to look over here and 
not focus on what is going on in front of me, as well as I have 
a lot of other apps and things that I need to have on that 
iPad. I have my charts. I have my weather. Our flight plans now 
save trees. It is all on the--it is all on this one device. So 
now I am fumbling through apps trying to find like collision 
avoidance technology while I should be, heads up, looking 
forward.
 So in an integrated display where it can't be off, it can't 
be in--the app not open, it can't not hear the alarm or the 
alert, is essential. That is why we are so focused on making 
sure that it is integrated into our flight deck displays.
 Senator Duckworth. And that is what the electronic flight 
bag systems and some of these other alternative proposals that 
have been put forward are? They are not fully integrated, 
correct?
 Mr. Ambrosi. That is correct. It would be basically one 
more app, an eighth app, per se, on our iPad, or our flight 
bag.
 Senator Duckworth. And I do want to note that the pilot on 
the flight controls of Black Hawk of the flight 5342 tragedy, 
did have an iPad, did have the information, but it was strapped 
to her leg, and was not wired into her headset. So she never 
got the alerts. And then she was flying goggles, which means 
you look, I mean, your field of view is even further reduced in 
that situation. Thank you.
 Mr. Ambrosi. Yes.
 Senator Moran. Senator from West Virginia.

 STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

 Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. It 
is an important topic. I just have a kind of off-the-wall kind 
of question that I would like to ask each one of you, if you 
could be as honest as you possibly feel comfortable with. I 
have a feeling there is a lot more near misses, or near-tragic 
instances than what is formally reported. Are you each 
satisfied with the data, the formal data that we see in front 
of us? And do you believe it is collected properly so that we 
have the full scale understanding of what is happening and what 
could possibly happen?
 And I will start with you, Mr. Sununu.
 Governor Sununu. The data is absolutely there, but there 
are many more, thousands of more of near misses than are 
probably out there in the public in that, you know, get the 
headlines. There are hundreds of them every single day.
 Senator Capito. OK.
 Mr. Hauptli. OK. Senator, we have a concern, and that is 
information sharing between pilots, air traffic controllers, 
airports. Airports aren't getting all the information we would 
like to get. And part of that reason is because airports are 
subject to open record laws and FOIA requests, and so there is 
a reluctance from time to time from other parties to share that 
important safety information with our members for fear that it 
will be published publicly. So there is an important issue 
there for Congress to address.
 Senator Capito. All right. Mr. Viola.
 Mr. Viola. I think the close calls have benefited from 
aircraft being equipped with ADS-B and having that additional 
information. And as we are learning with the data that is being 
put into the system, I think it is helping us as we are doing 
this mitigation, as we are holding this hearing today, that we 
are moving in the right direction. To get as much data as 
possible, and then how do we implement it to continue to 
increase the safety in the system?
 Senator Capito. Thank you. Captain Ambrosi. Captain?
 Mr. Ambrosi. There can always be more data.
 Senator Capito. OK.
 Mr. Ambrosi. We appreciate your initiative in the FAA Bill 
to get more voluntary safety reporting data available. So 
getting more data and more reports, not just from pilots or air 
traffic controllers, but from other people involved in the 
aviation ecosystem is essential. And then, as has been--as it 
addressed, is the actual sharing and working through that 
information.
 So go back a little bit in the way-back machine, the CAST, 
or Commercial Aviation Safety Team, was very good about 
digesting this data. That has seemed to fall off a little bit. 
So we would urge in this process to make sure that there is 
more, you know, again, de-identified, but get that data 
together so we can address that.
 Senator Capito. So there is a sense of agreement here, that 
more data, better data, and there probably are gaps in the 
data. So we may be looking at a larger problem. But the good 
news is all of you have brought solutions here, and we are 
working toward solutions.
 I want to talk about a near miss with the West Virginia 
plane, actually. And I just met the pilot yesterday, 
coincidentally, Derek Long, was flying from Charleston, West 
Virginia into Teterboro on a company plane, and as he was 
flying, the TCAS system alerted the pilot to descend 
immediately. I am sure you are familiar with this accident. It 
was well publicized. I understand it is still under 
investigation. But I did want to commend the pilot, Derek Long, 
for his quick thinking and saving many lives that day.
 I think we have covered things that--but in an instance 
like that where it is more, Teterboro, I think, is known as 
more of a General Aviation, high-end General Aviation airport. 
Is there anything else that you have left out of here that 
might have helped in that particular accident from what you are 
aware of?
 Does anybody have anything? Yes, Captain.
 Mr. Ambrosi. I will echo that having ADS-B In technology 
would have given more warning. TCAS is great, it is a last line 
of defense product, but having more time for the pilot to see, 
be aware of it, would make it less of a close call.
 Senator Capito. Mr. Sununu, you obviously have the larger 
airlines within your realm. And we hear so much about AI, AI, 
AI, to the point where we are wondering where this is going. 
Where does AI go to help with this system and help prevent us 
accidents? Do you see a future for that? Or is that something 
you guys are----
 Governor Sununu. AI can be an amazing tool. There is no 
question about it. But at the end of the day, it is all about 
the people, right, that are behind the tool and the analytics 
used.
 Senator Capito. Mm-hmm.
 Governor Sununu. So we see AI being integral in flight 
planning, things of that nature, warning systems, potentially, 
but you have to have the training and the people behind it, 
which is why our effort is always about whether it is air 
traffic controllers, pilot training, whatever it might take so 
that that tool is being properly utilized. But it is a tool. It 
is not a solution.
 Senator Capito. Right. Yes. Well, I mean, I think the 
captain stated it when he started talking about the iPad off to 
the left side of the pilot or the right side of the pilot, if 
you have ever flown into Charleston, West Virginia, you don't 
want the pilot's eyes anywhere but right on the runway. And 
many of our regional and smaller airports, and larger airports, 
are exactly like that.
 So I applaud your efforts and thank you all for being here 
today. Thank you.
 Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper, I am going to put 
bipartisanship above my well-being, and recognize you before I 
recognize the Chairman of the Full Committee. Senator 
Hickenlooper.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

 Senator Hickenlooper. I will make it up to both of you. 
Thank you. I would like to ask each of you just quickly, across 
the board, I actually lost an old close friend to an accident, 
a small plane accident in Colorado not too long ago, and I know 
for the family, it is very frustrating that they are not going 
to get a full evaluation of what caused the accident, what the 
circumstances--the causes were for one to two years. That is 
pretty standard.
 Does that satisfy you guys? In this modern world? Does it 
really take that long to get all the witnesses and everyone 
together to get the information, and then make an assessment, 
and then speak about it? Governor?
 Governor Sununu. I would say this. I can't speak for the 
NTSB, which is obviously, you know, in charge of doing a lot of 
these investigations. I will say I think Jennifer Homendy has 
done a fantastic job trying to keep up with a backlog, and give 
themselves, you know, a limited time line to meet those 
frustrations, to meet those issues that have been hanging out 
there. So I do commend her and her staff.
 But again, I can't speak for her, but you know, more 
staffing, more expertise in the area of the NTSB would always 
be helpful to take care of that backlog.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Todd?
 Mr. Hauptli. Senator, I understand the impulse behind that. 
It is a litigious society that we live in, and I suspect that 
fear of litigation ends up being part of the time it costs to 
get those answers.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Almost as if, if enough time goes by 
that somehow that risk diminishes. I am not sure where the 
logic comes from, but anyway, thank you.
 Mr. Viola. Thank you for that question. And GAMA, we are 
supportive of the NTSB also being funded and properly staffed 
to carry out that intent of Congress, in less than those 24 
months, or ideally sooner, or as soon as possible. And also, I 
would like to mention that the GAMA membership, the 
manufacturers track every incident and accident, and they are 
part of that workforce that goes out there to the accident 
scene to make sure that we can try to prevent these accidents 
and incidents in the future.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Great.
 Mr. Ambrosi. Sorry for your loss, Senator. It is a fine 
line, right, because we want faster information in this 
society, but you also want it right. We need to make sure that 
the information we get is right. So as the Governor said, I 
can't speak for the NTSB, more funding, more of all of the 
above to help them do it, but making sure that at the end of 
the day, they get it right, so we really know what happened, 
and why it happened is essential.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Great. Well, I appreciate that from 
all of you, and I realize you can't directly impact this, but 
it is frustrating. And I think it has been one to two years for 
as long as I can remember, certainly the five and a half years 
I have been here. So if that time-frame is always the same, 
then that means that the staff is working at the same 
consistent rate. So hire some consultants, whatever, get caught 
up, and then start getting it done in 6 months would be a 
suggestion.
 Captain Ambrosi, as a pilot, you understand--well, all of 
you understand, but you perhaps understand best the value of 
accurate aviation weather forecasting in terms of maintaining 
safety at all times. Meteorologists at the center weather 
service units around the country provide up-to-date 
information, up-to-the-moment information to aircraft 
controllers, to pilots. And these meteorologists use 
capabilities developed by the National Science Foundation, 
National Center for Atmospheric Research, or NCAR, which of 
course is based in Colorado.
 And NCAR scientists have been working with the FAA to 
develop systems that identify turbulence, and this is very 
small amounts of turbulence. We have all seen those reports, 
where out of nowhere people are thrown against the ceiling. The 
prediction of hazardous in-flight icing conditions, runway 
hazards due to heavy rain, microbursts that can surprise an 
aircraft at any time, and looking--doing a better job of 
predicting wind closer to the ground.
 So I guess I would want to ask, what is your sense, your 
perspective, as a pilot who understands this, about the 
importance and priority of accurate weather prediction for 
pilots? And how do you--how do you utilize forecasts and 
weather reports in your job, and what happens to air safety if 
funding cuts result in less accurate weather prediction?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. It 
is absolutely essential that we have the tools we need to do 
our job the safest, and weather is certainly an example of 
that. We have, whether it is strategic, looking at the weather 
ahead of time and making a plan to verify, or whether it is 
tactical, because we encounter that turbulence you are talking 
about, and now we have to make a decision.
 So tools have come a long way in recent--or this iPad we 
have been talking about a little while ago that is over here, 
has turbulence forecasting models, and it can tell us, hey, let 
us change our altitude at this point of our flight to try to 
avoid turbulence to the extent possible. But again, having that 
information presented to us is essential so we can make our 
decisions.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Right, I look at it--I am out of 
time, but I look at it, you know, a hundred years ago we still 
used leeches as part of a medical treatment because we just 
understood so little. I feel we are the same place with 
weather, and that we--this is not the time to roll back our 
applications of resources and technology to get better weather 
forecasting. I think we are right on the edge of really 
beginning to understand it more thoroughly.
 Anyway, thank you all for being here, and for your efforts 
to keep our skies safe.
 Senator Moran. Senator Hickenlooper, thank you.
 I am pleased to recognize the Chairman of the Full 
Committee, Senator Cruz.

 STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

 Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of 
the witnesses for being here. I want to first express my 
condolences to the families of the victims of plane crash 
during the skydiving trip in Missouri, and also to the families 
of the victims of the B-52 test flight in California. That 
flight that went down was named the Spirit of Aggieland, and 
many in the Texas A&M community are grieving, grieving the loss 
of those individuals.
 I likewise want to express my deep condolences to the loved 
ones of Josh Baer, an Austinite and an entrepreneur who 
tragically died in the plane crash in Laredo just last week. I 
knew Josh for many years. And he was here in D.C. meeting with 
my staff just a week before he crashed. As chairman of this 
committee, I will be paying close attention to the FAA and the 
NTSB's investigations into the crash, and to upholding the 
highest aviation standards.
 Captain Ambrosi, earlier this month, I met with pilots from 
Texas, all of whom were vigorous champions for requiring ADS-B 
In. Just this weekend, two commercial airliners came within 300 
feet of colliding in Boston. It is clear to me that better 
situational awareness tools should be deployed in cockpits like 
what is required in the ROTOR Act. In your judgment, how 
valuable would it be for pilots equipped with integrated ADS-B 
In to have real-time visibility of both other aircraft and 
ground vehicles operating on taxiways and your runways?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Sir, thank you for your question. Thank you 
for your leadership on ROTOR. It has been great to partner with 
you on that. It is essential. We need it. It is technology that 
is readily available. The NTSB is saying we should have it 
since 2008. You know, why don't we have it? So I completely 
agree. No sense taking more time. Let us get it. Let us get it 
now, and prevent a couple of tragedies.
 Senator Cruz. Yes. Thank you for ALPA's hard work on it. I 
think it is critical safety--a critical safety measure. Had it 
been the law, we would have prevented the crash over DCA, and 
67 souls would still be with us.
 Mr. Viola, in your judgment, does the mandate in the ROTOR 
Act put an unreasonable burden on General Aviation?
 Mr. Viola. General Aviation certainly has some--you know, 
some unique requirements, but ADS-B In is what we need to do to 
increase the safety in the airspace. And as you said, and as 
Captain Ambrosi said, that accident in January probably would 
not have happened if we had ADS-B In in both aircrafts.
 Senator Cruz. So I appreciate your saying that, and saying 
that on the record that the resistance in the House of 
Representatives, one of the main arguments, is that it is 
somehow an excessive burden on General Aviation. And your 
testimony to the contrary is it is helpful. I think the House's 
position was driven by that, and also driven by very 
significant misinformation from the Pentagon. And I have had, I 
think the Washington term is, frank and candid conversations 
with the Secretary on that topic.
 Mr. Viola. With the safety--I would like to just follow up 
with the safety continuum of what--the aircrafts are actually 
using that technology, that is where in General Aviation, you 
know, what Captain Ambrosi has in his aircraft into what that 
aircraft would know electrical system can put in theirs. And 
that is where we need the FAA and the flexibility to make sure 
we have the same ability. You know, it is based on what kind of 
safety you are looking for. It is absolute safety, but the 
safety continuum of being able to get it installed in that 
aircraft, that is where we need the work to get done with the 
FAA.
 Senator Cruz. Terrific. That is helpful. Let us turn to a 
different topic, which is mixed-use airspace at non-towered 
airports, which remains a high-risk area for runway incursions 
and near misses, as these airports have no control tower to 
manage and direct traffic. Pilots landing at these airports are 
then expected to talk to one another over the radio to manage 
the flow of the traffic at an airport. This has led to numerous 
instances of miscommunication between General Aviation aircraft 
and regional carriers.
 Governor Sununu, what inherent risk does this operation 
pose to the airspace when pilots are expected to both 
communicate with other pilots and to land their aircraft 
without guidance from ATC?
 Governor Sununu. So just to be clear, our operators on the 
commercial side almost always land at towered sites. But in 
those cases, a couple things to realize, number one, our pilots 
are trained, but it definitely increases the risk. It puts all 
the risk on that flight crew to make sure that they are 
maintaining that visual separation. So yes, it is a higher-risk 
operation without a doubt, and other technology solutions that 
can be implemented without a doubt.
 Senator Cruz. Thank you.
 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Governor Sununu, as you know, the FAA is currently working 
on the development of the Strategic Management of Airspace 
Routing Trajectories, otherwise known as SMART--and it is a 
very long name just to get a great acronym--system, to predict 
airspace conditions and optimize the National Airspace System. 
And the SMART system will propose scheduled changes to air 
carriers to help deconflict the airspace along with providing 
controllers predictive analytics, something that I think is 
very positive.
 Effective rollout of SMART will require the support of all 
air carriers. Governor Sununu, how is FAA engaging with 
carriers on the development of the SMART system?
 Governor Sununu. I will say this. I think the FAA is taking 
steps I have not seen before in a really positive way in terms 
of engaging with, not just the carriers, but subject matter 
experts in all aspects of aviation. It could be the 
manufacturers themselves. They have asked some of our carriers 
to provide subject matter experts in a variety of different 
disciplines, to come in even before a contractor was proposed, 
when they just were kind of looking at this as an idea.
 What were the barriers? Where does the system break down? 
What can we do and not do? And maybe how to separate out the 
project into various phases so we can collect kind of the 
short-term wins and deal with more of the longer-term issues 
down the road. So I don't mean to say this in a derogatory 
manner, but it is not just a bureaucratic process with a bunch 
of folks behind the scenes. It is a process that Bryan Bedford 
and the FAA really has engaged the private sector.
 Senator Duckworth. So it is good that they are engaging all 
these stakeholders.
 Governor Sununu. Very positive, yes.
 Senator Duckworth. Wonderful. The FAA is also, I 
understand, developing a Common Automation Platform, the CAP, 
to streamline how controllers receive and share flight data.
 Governor Sununu, given A4A's involvement in the development 
of SMART system and how important the stakeholders' input is, 
which I agree with you, could you speak to the importance of 
involving stakeholders, specifically air traffic controllers, 
in the development of CAP and any system to manage the 
airspace?
 Governor Sununu. Yes.
 Senator Duckworth. Does the air traffic controller person 
then need to do this?
 Governor Sununu. Absolutely. So you know, one of the--I go 
back to the Modern Skies Coalition that was put together, this 
is 60 different organizations, it is everyone from the pilots, 
to the manufacturers, to the carriers themselves, making sure 
that everyone has a voice in that. Because everyone has a 
different piece of that responsibility. Everyone has a voice 
when it comes to the Common Automation Platform opportunities.
 I will say that while a lot of the Common Automation 
Platform, issues have been discussed without the second round 
of funding, or at least another round of significant funding, 
for air traffic control modernization. Right now it is still an 
idea, and not a lot of significant portion of the first $12.5 
billion was allocated to Common Automation Platform. Just a 
little bit to kind of get it started.
 The real opportunity is in that next round. And our biggest 
fear is that if that next round of funding doesn't happen, 
given the speed that the FAA has performed so far, we feel very 
confident that making sure that those dollars come in in that 
next round, that is how you really achieve both bringing in the 
industry and making sure we get something real for the NAS.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I couldn't agree with you 
more on the importance of dedicating that funding, but also the 
importance of having the air traffic controllers be part of the 
development of the system. And then, you know, as you said, you 
know firsthand the importance of involving stakeholders in 
decisions about safety technology. Do you also believe that 
listening to the recommendations of pilots will increase safety 
standards throughout the National Airspace System? Pilots are a 
part of this?
 Governor Sununu. Pilots are more than part of it, right, 
they are right in the middle of it. So absolutely. You know, 
the fact that there is this non-punitive system, I mean, I am 
taking a little bit of a step back, that allows pilots, or 
flight crews, or folks in a tower to be able to report without 
the punitive aspects of it, to do it in an anonymous way or 
unidentifiable way, has allowed that information, that data to 
flow, you know, very freely.
 But that is a great example of why the pilots, the air 
traffic controllers, the flight crews, the management systems 
back--especially on the commercial side, all that data has to 
be readily available. But they have to talk to them. They have 
to integrate them. They have to bring their voices to the 
table.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. And, you know, Captain 
Ambrosi testified in front of this very committee, 3 years ago, 
about the importance of ASDE-X. And today, we heard from him 
again about the critical need to provide pilots with alerting 
technology, especially ADS-B In, and you have emphasized that. 
The NTSB has actually urged FAA to require ADS-B In at least 18 
times over the last 20 years. And frankly, I don't think we can 
wait to equip aircraft with technology pilots desperately need. 
Will A4A listen to pilots and commit to ensuring its members 
equip fleets with ADS-B In to advance the safety of our 
national airspace?
 Governor Sununu. So we love the concept of ADS-B In, but a 
couple pieces here. Number one, it should be all across the 
board, right. It shouldn't just be one crew, or one piece of 
equipment, or excluding all these loopholes that have existed 
for many years. Close the loopholes. Enough is enough. 
Everybody. If we are going to participate, all the blips have 
to be accounted for in the airspace.
 The second, and I think it is a very significant piece is, 
there isn't a certified solution for a lot of pieces of 
equipment currently out there. And to go through design, 
certification, manufacturing, and then finally start getting it 
implemented on all the equipment out there, that isn't months 
or even a couple years, that is many, many years.
 So one of our frustrations is the certification process 
does take so long, and it is not there right now. So are we 
going to wait three, five, 6 years to get--even after a mandate 
comes--to actually get it potentially implemented, because the 
technology, even if you started today, would take so long to 
get it in every piece of equipment out there.
 So are there other shorter-term solutions out there? Are 
there other technologies? We are kind of technology agnostic, 
we would love to see something in the cockpits, we would love 
to see it sooner than later. But we just want everyone to 
appreciate the time to design, certify, manufacture, and 
implement is quite a breadth. And why should we wait, right, 
why should we have such a gap?
 Senator Duckworth. But you are not saying--but you are not 
saying that alternative equipment provides the same level of 
safety, right? You are just saying that if you are going to 
have ADS-B In, have it in for everybody across the board, 
everybody should have ADS-B In?
 Governor Sununu. I am saying--well, what I am saying is it 
is better to have something than nothing in the short term 
while we build to a stronger solution. You know, that is a--
that is a positive thing.
 Senator Duckworth. But you are not opposing a mandate for--
--
 Governor Sununu. Yes.
 Senator Duckworth.--everybody to have ADS-B In?
 Governor Sununu. As long as it is there for everyone and 
everyone appreciates the time line. If you say it has to be 
done, and it has to be done in 3 years, that is physically not 
possible. So that is our frustration. We would love to see it 
done. But again, the design, implementation, manufacturing, 
supply chain issues. We have talked to the manufacturers, you 
know, the supply chain, being with the military, being with 
competing with all the other aspects of what is going on in 
aviation, that itself is going to hold things up.
 So we just don't want to see no solution while we wait for 
a solution, the more permanent, maybe even a better solution, 7 
years down the road. We would love to see something implemented 
across the board sooner than later.
 Senator Duckworth. But I would not--would it be correct to 
say that you are not saying let us do these alternatives, which 
Captain Ambrosi has said is not sufficient, instead of ADS-B 
In, you are just saying, you want something----
 Governor Sununu. Let us do them both.
 Senator Duckworth.--while you support----
 Governor Sununu. Right. We are agnostic.
 Senator Duckworth. You will support both?
 Governor Sununu. I think doing both wouldn't be the worst 
idea in the world, because we know that something is 
potentially in there before the extensive time line of getting 
the firmest and the best. And by the way, if I may? By the time 
you get the next technology in, seven, 8 years down the road in 
the entire fleet, we could have even a better technology. So 
let us just be fairly technology agnostic and make sure we are 
always trying for the best.
 Senator Duckworth. OK. I just want to make clear that the 
pilots at the heart of the operation are asking that air 
carriers equip aircraft with ADS-B In, and that you don't 
resist that. And at a time when every month seems to bring a 
new chilling runway incursion, a near miss, or collision, I 
urge you and the air carriers you represent, to listen to 
pilots, and do your part to ensure the safety of the National 
Airspace System, which I think you care deeply about.
 Governor Sununu. Of course.
 Senator Duckworth. But I just don't want costs to come 
before safety----
 Governor Sununu. Oh. No.
 Senator Duckworth.--when it comes to a system like ADS-B 
In. Your pilots are asking for it?
 Governor Sununu. Yes. Cost has never been an issue. No.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you.
 Senator Moran. Senator Rosen, I am going to go to you in 
just a moment. I want to follow up on this point that Senator 
Duckworth was making. And then I have got a few e got a few 
questions, and we will try to conclude this hearing, unless 
others appear in the interim.
 There is an issue out there with certification and 
manufacturing, and maybe Mr. Viola can talk about 
manufacturing, its capabilities, if there was a mandate, if the 
ROTOR Act became law today, I don't exactly know what the date 
in which it is required for ADS-B In to be included?
 Mr. Viola. Anyone?
 Senator Moran. Anyone. So can you manufacture the necessary 
equipment just to equip the current and growing fleet, Mr. 
Viola?
 Mr. Viola. So thank you for that question. So as in my 
written testimony as well as the oral, I think I said it would 
be a challenge to do everything and have it done by that time. 
Certainly sporty, I think is what my staff has told me, for 
meeting those time lines. That is why I think as we are trying 
to--as you are working on this, if we do some more 
collaboration as, what we can do today, what we can do 
tomorrow, and what the long-range answer is, as well as that it 
is performance-based.
 So you are not identifying a certain type of technology, 
but you are longing to, as a flight instructor, I fly around 
with this because this is my ADS-B In. I get it on my iPhone. I 
get the audio alert, and I won't fly an aircraft that doesn't 
have ADS-B In, because of the safety that is involved.
 Senator Moran. And as the Governor indicates, I mean there 
is another issue, it is the FAA and certification.
 Mr. Viola. Yes.
 Senator Moran. My impression is that that process, in and 
of itself, at the FAA is time-consuming, and time-consuming is 
months now--it is more than months, it is years, and huge 
challenges.
 Mr. Ambrosi, what is your response to these, I guess, 
practical or impractical circumstances that are out there?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Well, we have talked to the major aircraft 
manufacturers and they have told us they are comfortable with 
the time line. They have told us that, for example, 787s, they 
can just push a software update and have it tomorrow. That you 
know----
 Senator Moran. That is my impression from conversations 
with Boeing, except the concern about certification. Those 
tools----
 Mr. Ambrosi. Well, the FAA--are ones that already certified 
on that airplane?
 Senator Moran. OK.
 Mr. Ambrosi. People today could buy that as an option, but 
instead, if this law passes, it is now a safety requirement, so 
they will turn it on for them, basically. So it is available. 
Does every airplane have a solution available today? I think we 
have time to--by 2031, to find a path there. If we don't have a 
deadline, it will never happen, because we know how things work 
around here. Because if there is no deadline, if we get to 
December 2031 and it is not done, look, we just kicked 
secondary barriers.
 We are at 25 years from 9/11, and the FAA gave another 
extension on putting secondary barriers on a flight deck. Not 
related to our discussion today, but when they ask for 
extensions, they seem to get it.
 Senator Moran. You know, any on the panel have knowledge of 
what is the capability of the FAA, regardless of the passage of 
the ROTOR Act, to require the implementation of the ROTOR Act 
provisions as it relates to ADS-B In?
 Do you know, Captain?
 Mr. Ambrosi. I am going to restate the question to make 
sure I got it right.
 Senator Moran. OK.
 Mr. Ambrosi. Does the FAA intend on pushing forward with 
ADS-B In mandate regardless?
 Senator Moran. It wasn't ``intend'', but could they, are 
they capable of doing that if they wanted to?
 Mr. Ambrosi. They could.
 Senator Moran. That is my belief as well.
 Mr. Ambrosi. They could, but I don't believe they would 
without a mandate from Congress.
 Senator Moran. And I think that is what we heard in our 
last hearing from the FAA Administrator, that this was not 
going to be done on the FAA's own volition. Anybody have 
anything to add to that aspect of this?
 Mr. Viola. I would say that almost every aircraft coming 
off the production line today probably has ADS-B In. They know 
that it is the right thing to do, and that has been coming off 
the line that way, just as Jason said here, with the 777, is 
that General Aviation aircraft that are being produced today 
have ADS-B In integrated.
 Governor Sununu. If I may? The only other piece I would add 
to that is, look, I think the FAA is working as fast as they 
can on certification. It takes years to certify a seat, a seat 
configuration on a plane, it takes them years to get through 
that, and it is more of a personnel, my understanding, at 
least, it is not a lack of trying. They are working as hard as 
they possibly can, but with all the different pieces of an 
airplane and all the aspects that have to get certified, there 
is a backlog there that needs to be addressed.
 Senator Moran. I read in some publication, Governor, that 
the airlines, broadly, were interested in upgrading their seats 
on aircraft to induce, encourage additional high-end travelers 
by providing more comfort, and the barrier to doing so was the 
amount of time it would take for the FAA to certify new seats.
 Governor Sununu. That is right.
 Senator Moran. And then I started down the path of trying 
to figure out how we get around that problem. Not that I am one 
of those passengers, but it was not the part that caught my 
attention. The part that caught my attention is that 
certification on a seat would take years to change the seats on 
an airplane.
 Governor Sununu. That is right.
 Senator Moran. Senator Rosen.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

 Senator Rosen. Well, thank you, Chair Moran, Ranking Member 
Duckworth, this is such an important topic and such an 
important committee. And I want to thank all the witnesses for 
being here today and for everything that you do.
 I want to talk about runway incursion technology because at 
large international airports, like Harry Reid International 
Airport in Las Vegas, hundreds of airport vehicles operate on 
the airfield every day in close proximity to active runways and 
taxiways. According to the FAA, 20 percent of runway incursions 
in 2023 involved surface vehicles or pedestrians.
 So Mr. Hauptli, what role does real-time vehicle monitoring 
and other data-driven safety technologies play in helping 
airports reduce this risk of runway incursions and other 
surface safety incidents?
 Mr. Hauptli. Senator, thank you for the question. It plays 
an absolutely critical role. At Las Vegas, they have ASDE-X, 
which gives that surface surveillance capability and the 
automated response, and the automated alerts. Critically 
important, that is one of the 35 airports that has that ASDE-X 
technology in the United States. So absolutely critical.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I guess it just adds, like, to 
all these other things. What are the safety measures? I want to 
talk a little bit more and I am going to talk and ask, again 
Mr. Hauptli, and to Governor Sununu, a little bit about the 
impact of customs and border protection on our airports and on 
our economy. Give you something to think about.
 So like many who care about air travel, I was outraged by 
DHS Secretary Mullin's recent threat to remove U.S. customs and 
border protection officers from airports and places the 
administration deems are not following its immigration agenda. 
It is not only illegal and counterproductive, but also 
unnecessary. Not only does every international passenger who 
boards a flight to the U.S. pass through a pre-departure 
screening, but nearly all of them must go through some type of 
verification process or application.
 And moreover, international tourism, it has already 
steadily declined due to this administration's policies. I am 
gravely concerned that this would further impact international 
travel at a time when we need to be expanding tourism into this 
country. It is critical for our economy, top economic driver in 
every state in this Nation and in our country, as you know.
 So Mr. Hauptli, I will ask you first, can you describe what 
losing CBP officers at some of our Nation's largest and busiest 
gateway airports, probably on our coasts, right, at those 
international hubs, what would they do, number one, to the 
daily operations of those airports? And what would 
international travel look like?
 And then I will follow up with you, Governor.
 Mr. Hauptli. I am going to use more words, but the first 
word I will use is ``chaos''.
 [Laughter.]
 Senator Rosen. I am not surprised about that.
 Mr. Hauptli. When this proposal, or whatever you would like 
to call it, thought bubble was out there, the first thing we 
did was wrote a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
talking about the very concerns that you raised, Senator. 
Concerns, we were initially very concerned that there was going 
to be some sense of immediacy that could negatively impact the 
World Cup celebrations that is occurring in the United States.
 Thankfully, that has not occurred. I haven't heard as much 
about this proposal recently. It seems to have quieted down. I 
am thankful for that. But if it were to be put in place, it 
would have a devastating impact on commercial air travel, and 
on the ability of people to come in to the United States and be 
processed appropriately.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. So, Governor Sununu, I am going 
to ask you a few things because, particularly as a former 
Governor, you know about the economics of a state and what 
tourism, and business travel, and all of that depends on. So 
what are your concerns if the proposal is enacted? Of course, I 
am going to ask you, what is the economic impact to the airline 
industry? But more broadly, like I said, tourism--business 
travel, tourism, top economic driver in every state in this 
country. What do you think the impact to our entire economy is 
in the United States?
 Governor Sununu. It would be huge, without a doubt. Let us 
take the case of Newark, that was kind of the most recent 
example where, as Todd said, more of a thought bubble there. 
What we were able to do is provide a lot of data. Everything 
from the incoming travel, travelers coming just to Newark, or I 
should say through Newark, tens of thousands a day on the 
international side, most of which don't live in Newark, right, 
they are just part of the larger----
 Senator Rosen. Right, they are not only hurting that state.
 Governor Sununu. No, no.
 Senator Rosen. Those are gateways to the rest of the 
country.
 Governor Sununu. Very little impact to actual, Newark. In 
fact, I think the most common traveler that flies 
internationally through Newark ends up in Florida, or in our 
heartland of America.
 Senator Rosen. I hope they end up in Las Vegas.
 [Laughter.]
 Governor Sununu. Who doesn't end up in Las Vegas, Senator, 
at some point? But no, so we made it very clear about the fact 
that the majority, I think it is about 60 percent of 
international travelers coming back into Newark are American 
citizens. So it is not--it has a disproportionate effect upon 
American citizens. And then the commerce aspect, nearly $100 
million of international commerce through FedEx, UPS, Atlas, 
these folks are flying into Newark, into that port every single 
day. The number one product, pharmaceuticals and medical 
equipment that is coming through.
 So the fact that every day, tens of millions of dollars of 
highly needed products, if you will, that again, that get 
dispersed across America would be affected. So it isn't minor. 
It is extremely major. It doesn't really affect Newark, it 
affects everybody else across America. And again, given a place 
like Newark, it is such a central hub, specifically for the 
East Coast, and products coming in through Europe, travelers 
coming in through Europe, I think chaos is the right word. And 
it is chaos on day one. And then, if I may?
 Senator Rosen. Mm-hmm.
 Governor Sununu. What is the exit strategy there, right, at 
what point do we--is it back to normal? I think that was our 
other bigger concern. Is this a 2-day exercise? Could this go 
on as a political battle for a long time? I do want to take the 
opportunity and say, Secretary Mullin was very open, sat down 
with our CEOs, took in the data. Obviously, you know, they made 
their decision, or at the time made the decision for Newark and 
understands, I think, the implications.
 But to your point, yes, the implications are very real and 
very severe. And like anything, we just always hope that 
anything that is political in nature doesn't bring in the 
airlines, and the airspace, and the American traveler, whether 
it be shutdowns, or closing ports, or things of that nature. It 
never really seems to be about us, but everyone at this table, 
and all the industries that we represent are massively affected 
by it.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one 
more question?
 Senator Moran. You may.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. It is about drones. You know, 
airports and runways are increasingly operating, of course, in 
more congested environments. We have seen it. This was like my 
first question. So how do we better manage mixed-use airspace? 
For example, in World Cup games, we have already seen DHS need 
to address the drone incursions. Obviously, it is a growing 
concern for a number of airports, including Harry Reid 
International Airport. It is right by Allegiant Stadium, soon 
to be by other stadiums and so many hotel rooms.
 And it is my understanding that both DHS and DOD have been 
developing counter-UAS technologies to dissuade, prevent, or 
destroy drones that are inappropriately in certain airspaces. 
And so I know that, Chairman, they want to close out the 
Committee, but what I want to ask, and what I would ask for all 
the witnesses, with your permission: Is how do we better manage 
those mixed-use airspaces to avoid collisions, particularly 
over sporting events, concerts, these one-time events that 
happen, and everyone is trying to get that video?
 Senator Moran. That's fine, go ahead.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that. But you know, 
the proliferation of UASes, it is not going to stop, and it is 
not just about the danger of it there is just--well, it is all 
about the danger of it, we think it is fun for the pictures, 
but not fun if they are bad actors.
 So I guess we will start with you, Governor. And we will 
just go down the line.
 Governor Sununu. Integrating UAS safety regulation into all 
aspects of our, whether it is through the FAA or other modes 
and other regulatory frameworks that manage the national 
airspace is absolutely integral. There can't be any loopholes. 
They are just as much of a--as we call a blip, whether it is a 
commercial airline, a private jet, or UAS, they all present a 
risk and therefore have to be fully integrated as soon as 
possible.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Hauptli.
 Mr. Hauptli. I would just add on to what the Governor said. 
In the case of airports, there is also a concern about the 
counter UAS. Some airports would be interested in having that 
command and control authority, and other airports believe that 
that is a Federal responsibility. And that is an issue that 
still needs to be resolved.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Mr. Viola.
 Mr. Viola. Thank you very much for the question. So as far 
as the, you have participating and non-participating. On the 
participating side, certainly to detect and avoid technologies 
that are there. And as mentioned, we want that full integration 
of the airspace so that not only do--we know what is there, 
they know what is there. And again, we are sharing all that 
data that we think the technology is there to fly safely.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. And Captain?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Yes. From the pilot's perspective, you know, 
we welcome this new technology, all these new entrants, but we 
have to proceed with caution because as you add more to the 
airspace, it is more congested. We need to make sure that the 
average passenger that buys an airline ticket that expects to 
be completely safe on their destination to Las Vegas doesn't 
know all these drones may be around or what have you.
 Senator Rosen. That is right.
 Mr. Ambrosi. We need--we have a responsibility as an 
industry to make sure that they are integrated safely. 
Absolutely.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 I appreciate all of you. So many questions. Thank you for 
your work.
 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
indulgence. I just have a couple more questions.
 In May 2025, less than 4 months after the DCA crash, 
another Army helicopter incident forced two commercial flights 
to abort landings at DCA. It was reported that the dedicated 
direct access line connecting the Pentagon Tower with the DCA 
Tower had not worked since 2022. Included in the 2027 NDAA, in 
Section 342, is a provision I secured directing the Department 
of Defense to conduct a risk assessment of its air traffic 
control systems and develop a modernization plan aligned with 
the Department of Transportation and FAA's brand-new air 
traffic control system.
 The Fiscal Year 2027 NDAA includes a whopping $1.5 trillion 
in funding for national defense. Think about that. The proposal 
for our national defense budget is $1.5 trillion. If you 
include the supplemental that the President is requesting for 
his war of choice in Iran, that amount is going to be 
equivalent to the defense budget of every other nation on earth 
combined. We will have the same size defense budget in our 
Nation as that of every other nation on earth combined, and yet 
we can't spend $48 billion on our air traffic control system. 
It is absolutely ludicrous.
 Governor, do you believe that the Department of Defense 
should modernize its air traffic control system aligned with 
USDOT and FAA's modernization initiative? And how would an 
improved DoD-ATC system impact commercial air carriers in 
shared airspace?
 Governor Sununu. A hundred percent, no loopholes, 
especially around commercial airports. So the fact that there 
are loopholes that exist, they take advantage of it and there 
are questions around it and puts every--puts the entire system 
at risk.
 Senator Duckworth. Right. What they did was, especially in 
this system here, at the National Airspace System was that they 
took a loophole and made it SOP, and so instead of just only 
turning off their transponder, their ADS-B Out, occasionally 
when they had, you know, a high-profile VIP on board and they 
needed to have maintained security, they actually--it just 
became the norm for every flight. I agree with you. We need to 
close those loopholes.
 Governor, what would be the impact of DOD also using a 
fraction of its more than trillion-dollar budget to ensure 
military aircraft are equipped with and using ADS-B Out?
 Governor Sununu. It would be a game changer. It would be a 
game changer not just for the commercial aircraft coming in, I 
think it would be a game changer for the Military pilots. What 
Military pilot doesn't--wants to fly around an airport and not 
know, and think that the incoming aircraft doesn't know where 
they are? So I understand it might be a top-down SOP that is 
coming, but I can't imagine being a Military pilot flying 
around a busy airport saying: Gee, I hope nobody can see me. 
Makes no sense at all.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I love the way you put that.
 Mr. Chairman, can you indulge me with one last question?
 Senator Moran. Yes.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you Mr. Chairman. We are really 
good friends and so, yes, he indulges me all the time. I 
promise 1 day when I am chair I will indulge you.
 [Laughter.]
 Senator Duckworth. To close out, I have one final question 
for all the witnesses here today. What is one commitment that 
you can make to this committee today to prevent close calls and 
increase the safety of the National Airspace System? I will 
start with you Governor.
 Governor Sununu. Again, I think speaking for all the 
carriers, we are ready to implement technologies, make sure 
they are certified, move that process along as fast as we can, 
whether it is ADS-B In, or the next technology down the road, 
or a quicker technology that can be implemented. Maybe it is 
not as good, but at least it could be something that can be put 
in. We want to make sure it is there and work with the FAA to 
make sure that the certified process and the manufacturers can 
meet the demands of whatever the mandate might come.
 Senator Duckworth. But you are not going to oppose or push 
back against ADS-B Out?
 Governor Sununu. Oh, no. Oh, gosh, no. No, no. We want all 
the technology we can. I don't know any pilot--again, I don't 
know any pilot who doesn't want every single piece of 
technology they can to make the airspace safer on behalf of 
their customers.
 Senator Duckworth. OK. I just wanted to clarify. Thank you. 
Mr. Hauptli.
 Mr. Hauptli. Thank you. For the airports, I think the focus 
on initial and recurrent training and enhancing that training 
and incorporating AI to make that training more robust and 
safer.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Mr. Viola?
 Mr. Viola. Thank you very much for that question. Certainly 
from GAMA's perspective, you know, modernizing the 
certification and validation systems, and possibly streamlining 
a special certification or less than certification for the 
safety enhancing equipment to get on board as soon as possible.
 Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you, Senator. You have my commitment to 
not take my foot off the gas on the ROTOR Act and the ADS-B In 
mandate to prevent another tragedy like happened in DCA and 
LaGuardia. So we are doubling down, and we are with you on 
that.
 Senator Duckworth. The 1500-Hour Rule?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Well that is there too. We have got a lot of 
things in our cart, but the alligator closest to the boat right 
now is getting support for this ADS-B In integrated in our 
displays.
 Senator Duckworth. Thank you. Any closing statement?
 Senator Moran. OK. Do you want to give it? I am going to 
ask a couple questions, but do you want to give your closing 
statement now?
 Senator Duckworth. Go ahead. No, no, no, I will wait. I 
will wait.
 Senator Moran. A few questions that I want to follow up 
with. Visual separation, following the FAA's March 18, 2026 
decision to suspend the use of visual separation between 
helicopters and airlines near major airports, that occurred 
after the January 29th collision, there was a reported close 
call on March 24, 2026, in Southern California involving a 
United Airlines Boeing 737 and a U.S. Army Black Hawk 
helicopter.
 What is the status--maybe this is a question for you, 
Captain--what is the status of the enforcement of visual 
separation, suspension?
 Mr. Ambrosi. My understanding is the rule is being 
enforced, not boots on the ground, it would be--it probably 
would be a good question for our brothers and sisters at the 
Air Traffic Controllers Association to find out what the latest 
status on that is. But in any event having an integrated ADS-B 
would have given those pilots in that situation more warning 
and more time, so they didn't have to get to that last line of 
defense, which was a TCAS resolution advisory.
 Senator Moran. Captain you were on--you are on message 
and--well, it strikes me that the FAA announces, and it is only 
a few short period of time and still it is apparently not--has 
not been implemented, not being followed. A better question for 
the FAA, you are right.
 Mr. Hauptli, the FAA reported over 1,600 runway incursions 
last Fiscal Year, and over 800 runway incursions reported 
already this Fiscal Year. What specific changes in airport 
operations are needed to further reduce the collisions and 
enhance overall aviation safety? And maybe we are back to ADS-B 
In again, but are there other things?
 Mr. Hauptli. Sure, Senator. Thank you. A couple of things. 
Technology integrations, one, enhanced training, and as I 
indicated earlier in my testimony, better communication among 
all the parties. Airports would really benefit from access to 
information that some of the other elements in the aviation 
ecosystem have but are reluctant to share with airports because 
of this issue that I raised earlier about the Freedom of 
Information Act.
 Senator Moran. You know, Mr. Hauptli, that I am in the 
process of developing the bill I mentioned in my opening 
statement, the Runway Safety Act that would establish a 
taskforce to evaluate airport driver training and support 
deployment of technologies that improve situational awareness 
for ground vehicle operators.
 From your perspective of an airport operator--from your 
perspective of airport operators, where do you see the greatest 
gaps in driver training and surface safety today, how would 
legislation--what legislation can we utilize to reduce the 
incursions and improve that surface safety?
 Mr. Hauptli. Yes, Senator. First of all, thank you for 
working on that legislation. We look forward to working with 
you on that. We believe that the initial training and the 
recurrent training could benefit from a good scrub on that. We 
also believe that the task force would be a great place, to a 
convening place for folks to talk about the integration of AI 
and enhanced training to try and deliver a better product for 
the American people.
 Senator Moran. Thank you for that. Senator Cantwell is on 
her way, so I am going to utilize my opportunity to filibuster, 
it is for her arrival.
 Governor Sununu, FAA staffing challenges, particularly 
among air traffic controllers, seem still to be a concern. What 
do you--what can you tell us about staffing shortages affecting 
airline operations and safety margins, especially high-volume 
airports?
 Governor Sununu. I will give you a quick example. There was 
a close call, a near miss, actually, earlier this year, and 
there was one air traffic controller in the tower in charge of 
both landings, and takeoffs from parallel runways, all at the 
same time. Yes, that is just--that is a recipe for a 
significant problem, unfortunately.
 So staffing is absolutely critical. The people aspect of 
this equation is absolutely critical. So making sure that we 
are encouraging, it is not just hiring more, encouraging more 
people that want to enter the air traffic control space, that 
want to enter the national aviation--the National Airspace 
System.
 I would be remiss if I didn't take the opportunity and 
remind folks, look, when you have two Government shutdowns and 
you very nationally, on the front page, tell people we are not 
paying air traffic controllers for six consecutive weeks, there 
is nothing, how do you encourage a young person to want to 
become an air traffic controller? Right, God bless them for 
entering the field knowing that that is, not just a risk every 
few years, or something like that but we have literally done 
it, at least with air traffic controllers, and/or at least with 
TSA agents, twice in one year. So that is a huge discouragement 
in itself.
 The new Air Traffic Control Modernization Bill, the fact 
that there is money and it is being deployed for new training 
centers, and new simulators, and all that sort of thing, is 
great. We feel very--we have seen a lot of this technology it 
is being implemented already, that is very exciting stuff to 
make sure that folks are getting the training time. And another 
issue was always the time you had to sit in the seat in the 
towers. And that was hard, right, to make sure that that the 
trainee had time in front of the screen, that often delayed how 
long it took for someone to become a fully certified air 
traffic controller.
 So it is not just the people, it is, I think, encouraging 
the opportunities that are there. I mean, they get paid, 
especially in air traffic controls, they get paid good money. 
it is not just a job, it is a career. It is amazing skills. We 
should be encouraging that, not discouraging it as much as 
possible. And making sure the technologies are there to get 
them fully certified and in those seats to back up, you know, 
all their brothers and sisters that are landing planes, you 
know, short staffed as is.
 Senator Moran. I would indicate my view which is while they 
are sometimes worthwhile causes that we seem to shut down 
Government over, they are never more--we are never gaining any 
been more benefit than what the damage has done by the 
shutdown. So you can have your cause, and you are willing to 
fight in a way that demonstrates how forceful you want to be in 
shutting down Government, but the consequences of the shutdown 
always outweigh, the detriment always outweighs, and it is 
particularly true when it comes to TSA and air traffic control.
 And so I hope we are able to avoid that consequence--that 
occurrence this year as we try to work our appropriations bills 
through.
 My final question. I Chair an Appropriation subcommittee 
that has the funding responsibilities for the National Weather 
Service, and I fly frequently, nearly every week, every week of 
the year, and weather seems to be more of a problem and 
challenge than it used to. But maybe that is just the annoyance 
of it that has built. But tell me how the National Weather 
Service plays this.
 Maybe you, Captain, or you uh Todd--Mr. Hauptli. The 
weather that we get from the National Weather Service, which is 
sometimes seen as a place that should be less funded, is there 
value to aviation safety in the work that the National Weather 
Service does?
 Mr. Ambrosi. Sure, I will take that. As the guy up there in 
the air where the weather is, we absolutely need accurate and 
reliable weather data, whether reporting, everything that we 
need to you know it seems like more of a problem today, one of 
those reasons is more aircraft, right.
 40 years ago when we are flying across the country in our 
727, there was less airplanes in the sky. So going around that 
thunderstorm, or line of weather was a lot easier. Well, now 
our brothers and sisters in air traffic control are trying to 
get maybe a thousand airplanes around the same weather going 
across the country, so it makes it more difficult. But having 
accurate weather is essential to what we do.
 Senator Moran. Anything else?
 Mr. Hauptli. I would just briefly add, Senator, that if 
Senator Hickenlooper were still here, I would say that he asked 
the question about the weather service. I have a sneaking 
suspicion, partly, because in Denver, you get all four seasons 
in 1 day, and you get that in the Denver airport.
 Senator Moran. Before they moved east across Kansas.
 [Laughter.]
 Senator Moran. That is true. We have a National Weather 
Service Station in Goodland, Kansas, the first community that 
is on the Kansas side of the border. And we are working hard to 
make sure that it is accurately--I am sorry--adequately funded 
because it has the consequence of everything that comes across 
those mountains headed east.
 Do you want to do your closing statement before I call on 
Senator Cantwell?
 Senator Duckworth. If she doesn't mind. Thank you. I have 
to run to another meeting. So thank you for the indulgence of 
both the Ranking Member of the Full Committee, as well as 
Chairman Moran.
 Thank you to all our witnesses here today for this critical 
conversation on aviation safety. As I have said before, it 
should not take a tragic accident to tell us that action is 
needed and we must act now. I reiterate my commitment to the 
families of those who have lost loved ones, that I will 
continue to pursue all available avenues to enact robust 
aviation safety legislation, and ensure that investment in the 
ATC system prioritizes our air traffic controllers and their 
ability to execute their core mission of safety.
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
 Senator Moran. Senator Duckworth, thank you. Thank you for 
your cooperation in today's hearing.
 We are pleased to be joined now by the Vice Chairman, the 
Ranking Member of the Full Committee. Senator Cantwell, you are 
recognized.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

 Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Senator Moran. Thank you 
to you and Senator Duckworth for conducting this hearing this 
morning, and for your continued interest in pushing aviation 
safety. Appreciate both of you.
 And I will enter a longer statement for the record, but I 
wanted to, since I know we have been going for a while here, I 
do want to recognize that we have family members here from the 
DCA air crash accident. Really appreciate their continued focus 
on aviation safety.
 But also want to focus on the announcement yesterday of the 
FAA's award on a contract for Strategic Management Airspace 
Routing Trajectories, the SMART platform, which is designed to 
use data to optimize flight schedules to prevent congestion and 
delays. So while, you know, much news has been made over the 
Delta and America Airlines flights at Logan Airport this past 
weekend, and the investigation is ongoing, to me, obviously 
this has been a year when we have had many, many serious close 
calls, obviously the fatality accident here in DCA as well.
 So I wanted to ask you Captain Ambrosi, what capacity do 
you see I mean to me there is efficiency tools, and it is great 
to have efficiency tools, and the FAA needs to implement 
targeted initiatives to prevent runway incursions, and address 
risks in the airport environment, but is this SMART system 
going to give us all that we need when we are seeing these 
increased rates of close calls on runway incursions?
 Mr. Ambrosi. And specifically, thank you for your question, 
Senator. And first thank you for your leadership on ROTOR, and 
pushing forward for aviation safety. As far as the SMART system 
goes, we all want something that help efficiency, flying more 
passengers is a good thing, getting more people to their 
destination every day safely is essential.
 But there is no silver bullet. AI can't replace the 
decisionmaking of a human. Any AI or any program like that 
should still--any decision made should rely on an air traffic 
controller, or in the pilots, and the people that are out there 
on the front line, and it can't be a replacement for safety 
initiatives like the initiatives in the ROTOR Act because it 
certainly is not going to suddenly say, yes, do this and we 
won't have any more runway incursions. That is just not going 
to happen.
 Senator Cantwell. Well, I just wanted--I am not saying that 
that is what the FAA is saying, per se, but I am just pointing 
out that this announcement coinciding with this hearing, I just 
wanted to make sure that we are making this fine point because 
that doesn't do anything for the air traffic controller sitting 
in looking at what are possible incursion conflicts on planes 
landing and what is on the runway; is that correct?
 Mr. Ambrosi. That is correct. Again, the future of surface 
traffic avoidance is ADS-B In through SURF IA Initiatives, and 
things like that. And you know, through the ROTOR, we are 
trying to get ADS-B In, on the flight deck displays right now. 
So you know, that sounds like a good complement for the future 
because that technology is going to be needed anyway.
 Senator Cantwell. Right, and so how do you think we get 
that message out? I am not saying somebody is trying to confuse 
us, but it is confusing. And so the point is, it is not a 
substitute for the ROTOR Act. It is not a substitute to fixing 
air traffic controller staffing. It is not a substitute for 
this near-miss technology that is needed both in the sky and on 
the ground. So how do you suggest we----
 Mr. Ambrosi. You have our commitment to continue keeping 
our foot on the gas to make sure that message is loud and 
clear, along with yours.
 Senator Cantwell. So do you think that would be better for 
the consuming public to understand this as almost like a list 
of improvements that need to be made so that the whole system 
continues to function as necessary? I mean, I have a belief 
that what is affecting us now, particularly now, is that these 
2018/2019 levels, succeeding them. So we had COVID, and we then 
returned and are growing past that. My belief is that our 
system is showing that it is at capacity, beyond capacity in 
this context of--like the level of--but you know I am from 
Seattle right now, and Seattle is just building, building, and 
booming, booming, booming, so maybe that is a Seattle feeling 
that we have.
 But to me, I think this is the type of inventory we need 
the FAA to do and then tell us a list of infrastructure that 
solve the problems that we are seeing now, because the 
incidents we just saw in Boston is just another reminder; is it 
not?
 Governor Sununu. It is. it is an all-the-above approach, 
right. You know, proud to be with these gentlemen here, where 
we are all part of the Modern Skies Coalition and saying, we 
have to fix ATC, we need to get it modernized, we need to spend 
the money. There has been a lot of discussion here today about 
allocating more resources to get air traffic control right. 
That needs to happen, but not at the expense of other important 
things like, you know, Collision Avoidance Technology on our 
aircraft, on the ground, everything else. We can't grow the 
system if we don't modernize the system.
 Senator Cantwell. Well, I would appreciate it from the 
Pilots Association, if there was a list like this of 
infrastructure investment that you think is necessary to return 
us to the safety standard, that would be great.
 Governor Sununu, why is it important that military 
operators are--be held to the same accountability as everyone 
else in the national airspace? And as A4As view that more could 
be done to better enforce Federal aviation regulations applying 
to military operations?
 Governor Sununu. Yes, absolutely. I mean, I will reference 
a little bit what I spoke with Senator Duckworth about. Every, 
as I would call it, blip in the air is a risk, right? Whether 
it is an unmanned vehicle, whether it is Military, whether it 
is General Aviation, or whether it is a commercial jet, that 
there is a risk for collision there. So why, even the Military 
would want their own pilots flying around an airport and not 
telling anybody where they are, is beyond me.
 You have to close those loopholes. If you are in an active 
military operation overseas, of course, you don't want to tell 
people where they are. That is not what is happening around 
DCA. That is not what is happening around Seattle. It is not 
what is happening around any of our commercial airports here in 
in the U.S.
 So it does nothing but help the system to make sure that 
every piece of equipment in the air is accounted for, and from 
a technology standpoint so that the system is--I mean the 
National Aviation System is effectively a telecommunication 
system, at its core, right, well what is the point of that if 
someone isn't listening or someone isn't talking. So the 
technology needs to be there, it needs to be certified, and it 
needs to be turned on.
 Senator Cantwell. Well, I think in the era of digitization, 
we are saying that you can digitize. And one of the issues--the 
reason why I became acutely interested, let us just say, is 
when a worker stole a plane at Sea-Tac and was able to get it 
up in the air. And so when you think about the ground 
operations, you would like to know where everything is at every 
moment. And that is what technology can do for you.
 In that case, the air traffic controller should have 
realized that that plane was not even supposed to be moving, 
let alone--I don't know. I can't remember now the details 
whether they actually cleared him, or they were yelling at the 
time that he took off, to stop. But the details are that is 
what we need. That is what we can what we can do at this point. 
We can know where every piece of equipment is on the ground and 
we can have alert systems that basically help air traffic 
controllers, but we aren't--we need that technology, and so we 
need that. And we need the ROTOR Act, so.
 Governor Sununu. That is right.
 Senator Cantwell. So if anybody else has anything to say 
about those priorities. Mr. Viola or Mr. Hauptli? No--yes?
 Mr. Viola. Yes, I think, well said, that all the above, 
anything we can do to increase safety, and knowing where the 
other vehicles are, where the other aircrafts are, are 
certainly accepted. So anything we can do again with the ADS-B 
In, we are in favor of.
 Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, 
we all--as this committee has to work very closely with our 
House colleagues and get that over the goal line. So thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
 [The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and to our 
witnesses, thank you for your testimony. Today's hearing is another 
call to action to address the serious close calls we have witnessed in 
our aviation system that remains under strain. From the beginning, this 
committee has pursued system-wide reforms to address aviation safety 
risks and to raise safety standards nationwide.
 This continued mission requires the collective collaboration and 
urgency of everyone here today to enact change.
 This morning, I also want to acknowledge those lost in last week's 
B-52 aircraft accident at Edwards Air Force Base in California.
 The flight was part of ongoing testing and evaluation work, 
including efforts to expand our understanding of aircraft performance, 
systems behavior, and flight conditions to support stronger safety 
enhancements for the future. Our thoughts are with the families of the 
service members and Boeing employees we lost in this tragic accident.
 In the safest aviation system in the world, we are seeing too many 
events that are simply unacceptable, namely the mid-air collision near 
DCA that took 67 lives. On March 22, Air Canada Flight 8646 struck an 
aircraft rescue vehicle while landing at LaGuardia Airport. The NTSB 
found the airport's ASDE-X system--a runway and taxiway collision 
warning system--did not alert controllers because unequipped ground 
vehicles could not be reliably tracked.
 At a major U.S. airport, that gap in technology and procedure is 
indefensible.
 The Port of Seattle in my home state of Washington is not waiting 
for another incident to occur. The Port is equipping all its ground 
vehicles at Seattle Tacoma International Airport with ADS-B Out 
transponders, despite no Federal mandate.
 And they also operate their own ramp tower to monitor aircraft and 
ground vehicle traffic in areas that FAA air traffic control is not 
charged with monitoring.
 Their actions reflect the proactive safety approach we need and set 
the standard others should follow.
 In the past year alone, we have also witnessed a near mid-air 
collision between two airliners in Nashville and a high-altitude drone 
encounter on approach at San Diego.
 Just this past weekend, a pilot at Boston Logan airport took 
evasive action during landing to avoid another aircraft on an 
intersecting runway. These accidents and close calls show that our 
technology, procedures, and training have not kept pace with today's 
risks.
 We also must address the integration of drones and advanced air 
mobility operators into low-altitude airspace as those operations scale 
up. And we need multiple layers of redundancy and protection to ensure 
the highest levels of safety.
 Recently, a drone operator had to suddenly change course to avoid a 
hot air balloon that was not sending out an electronic signal in busy 
controlled airspace--yet both actors were following FAA regulations.
 Even when operators are following the rules, our collective 
approach to safety and mitigating risk must evolve.
 We are joined today by four aviation safety partners. From the Air 
Line Pilots Association, Captain Ambrosi represents the pilots who work 
hard to keep passengers safe each day.
 Captain Ambrosi understands how cockpit technology affects 
performance. He emphasizes the need for integrated ADS-B In to improve 
safety and situational awareness and states his support for the 
bipartisan ROTOR Act that Sen. Cruz and I passed the Senate last year, 
which includes the strong ADS-B In requirements we need to avoid near-
misses.
 From Airlines for America, Governor Chris Sununu speaks for 
carriers and how they choose how to invest in safety technology, 
training, and Safety Management Systems.
 I plan to ask you, Gov. Sununu, why it's so important for military 
operators to follow the same rules in the national airspace system as 
commercial operators.
 From the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, James Viola 
represents the companies' designing general aviation aircraft and 
avionics.
 I look forward to asking you, Mr. Viola, about the importance of 
creating a stronger agency-wide SMS at the FAA as manufacturers and 
airlines have had to adopt mandatory SMS themselves.
 Lastly, from the American Association of Airport Executives, Todd 
Hauptli speaks for airports operating in communities nationwide 
responsible for safe surface operations.
 Mr. Hauptli--the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law's $25 billion 
dollars in aviation investments and the $4 billion dollars per year for 
the Airport Improvement Program have strengthened airport safety--full 
stop.
 I am interested in hearing why AAAE thinks these investments should 
be extended, especially when airport needs for safety projects under 
the Airport Improvement Program are roughly $13.5 billion dollars each 
year.
 I am looking for specific, time-bound commitments from everyone 
here on deploying safety technologies, strengthening training and 
staffing, improving data-sharing, and closing gaps these events have 
exposed.
 To the families of those lost, and to every traveler who depends on 
this system, you deserve more than explanations of near misses. You 
deserve a plan to ensure they do not become tragedies. I look forward 
to this discussion.
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 Senator Moran. Senator Cantwell, thank you for joining us. 
Thank you, to you, and to Senator Cruz, Chairman Cruz, and you 
for your support and your attendance to see the value in your 
subcommittee's work on aviation. We are honored that you are 
here.
 It is my usual practice to ask the witnesses if they said 
anything they wish they hadn't, or that they would like to 
correct. And/or something that we missed that you wish you 
would have had the opportunity to say. Anybody want to add 
anything to the knowledge base of the members of this 
committee?
 Mr. Viola. Well, as part of the Manufacturing Association, 
you know, when I talked about ADS-B In, certainly in favor of 
it, there are going to be some difficult solutions for some of 
the aircraft out there. So that is something we would like to 
work closely with the staff as we get these final bills in 
place.
 Senator Moran. We are good. Thank you all for being here. 
Thanks for your testimony.
 I would join my colleagues in the remembrance of those who 
are represented here by family members, and those who have lost 
loved ones. In particular remembrance for me is the January 
29th. Departure from Wichita, Kansas, and the 67 lives that 
were lost, to all families, in all circumstances, we express 
our condolences and sympathies and recommit ourselves to doing 
the things that are necessary, that your efforts on their 
behalf, are rewarded with fewer, and ultimately no accidents 
and no deaths. That is the goal of this subcommittee and 
certainly the efforts that I have as its chairman.
 Thank you to our witnesses. Senators will have until the 
close of business on June the 30th to submit questions for the 
record. The witnesses will have until the close of business on 
July the 14th to respond to those questions. I originally 
thought it said July the 4th--July the 14th, to respond. So 
what that means is that said members of our committee may 
submit written questions to you and then you have until that 
date to provide us with your answers.
 This concludes today's hearing. And we stand adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

 A P P E N D I X

 Prepared Statement of Doug Woehler, Director of Business Development 
 and Federal Programs, ADB SAFEGATE
 Subcommittee Chair Moran, Subcommittee Ranking Member Duckworth, 
Committee Chair Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:

 On behalf of ADB SAFEGATE, thank you for the opportunity to submit 
this testimony for the record regarding the urgent need to mitigate 
aircraft collision risk on the ground and in the air. ADB SAFEGATE is a 
leading provider of intelligent airport technologies designed to 
improve safety,
 efficiency, sustainability, and operational resilience across the 
airfield, apron, and tower environment. Our portfolio includes airfield 
ground lighting, power and control systems, visual docking guidance 
systems, apron management, tower automation, weather systems, and 
digital airside solutions that support safer and more predictable 
aircraft movements.
 ADB SAFEGATE employs 326 individuals in the United States, 
including at our corporate headquarters in Gahanna, Ohio, and at our 
Sacramento, California facility. Globally, ADB SAFEGATE has more than 
1,500 employees and serves over 3,000 airports in over 175 countries. 
Today, we provide equipment and services to Dallas Fort Worth 
International Airport, Chicago O'Hare International Airport, George 
Bush Intercontinental Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 
Airport, Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Manhattan 
Regional Airport, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Chicago 
Midway International Airport, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and 
Los Angeles International Airport, among others. We are one of the 
largest providers of airfield infrastructure in the world, including 
our suite of technologies for airfield ground navigation and tower 
equipment.
 We appreciate the Subcommittee's focus on recent close calls, 
runway incursions, surface conflicts, and broader system 
vulnerabilities, and we welcome the opportunity to offer a 
technological and operational perspective on practical steps that can 
improve safety outcomes. As this Committee and the aviation system at 
large looks to enhance and modernize air travel, it is critical that 
you look not only to the skies but also to the ground. We need to move 
aircraft safely and efficiently at every point in travel, from taxi to 
takeoff, landing, and gate docking. We must also ensure that, even when 
passengers are not involved, our airports remain safe and readily 
navigable, with transiting aircraft and service vehicles alike safely 
operating on the tarmac.
About ADB SAFEGATE
 As the leading provider of intelligent airport technologies, ADB 
SAFEGATE has been an innovator in creating a high quality, safer, and 
brighter future for one hundred years. Over the years, we've grown our 
knowledge of lighting and docking into experts in tower, apron, 
airfield, and service. Our long commitment to the aviation sector 
demonstrates our continued passion for helping our customers improve 
their airport and airline performance. In the United States, ADB 
SAFEGATE products are found at airports and airfields around the 
country. We provide technologies such as airport lighting control and 
monitoring systems (ALCMS), airfield power solutions, and runway and 
taxiway lights at airports large and small.
How Modern Airside Technology Can Reduce Near Misses
 The scale of the challenge in the United States is well-documented. 
The FAA recorded 1,758 runway incursions in Fiscal Year 2024, including 
multiple Category A and B events--the most serious classifications, 
where a collision was narrowly avoided. Surface incidents have 
increased year-over-year, following overall air traffic growth post-
pandemic. These are not anomalies. They are symptoms of an airfield 
environment where the information available to pilots and vehicle 
operators has not kept pace with the complexity of modern airport 
operations.
 Near-misses and collision incidents on the ground at airports are 
complex and often result from multiple failures, but providing more 
information to vehicle operators is a key element to broadly reducing 
the risk of an incident. Modern airports, even the smallest ones, are 
complex environments, with fast-moving aircraft alongside ground 
vehicles traversing a network of intersecting rights-of-way. While 
ultimately, human error will always remain a safety risk, that risk can 
be reduced by ensuring that vehicle operators are equipped with clear, 
unambiguous, and sufficiently detailed information to make the right 
decisions when navigating the airfield.
 Congress and the FAA have taken meaningful steps towards addressing 
the risks inherent to ground movement at airports. The Runway Status 
Light (RWSL) program has gone a long way towards providing protection 
at one of the most critical areas on the airfield, and we strongly 
support the continued sustainment and expansion of that program. RWSL 
is comprised of Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) and Takeoff Hold Lights 
(THLs), which provide direct visual alerts to aircraft on runways and 
taxiways without the need for input from Air Traffic Controllers. We 
also support the expansion of technologies and protocols investigated 
as part of the Runway Incursion Reduction Program (RIRP). The Brand New 
Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) program provides the opportunity to 
invest in the next generation of technologies to complement and enhance 
the capabilities already available.
 As examples of the improvements in safety and efficiency that could 
be yielded with new technologies, we have highlighted solutions ADB 
SAFEGATE offers.
Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting
 Advanced airfield lighting systems, such as Follow-the-Greens and 
Adaptive Lighting, convey visual, contextual information to provide 
navigational guidance for both aircraft and ground vehicles on the 
tarmac.

 Follow-the-Greens (FtG)--real-time, center-line guidance 
 using intelligent green taxiway lighting. Benefits include:

 Safety: Unambiguous, dynamic routing cuts pilot/
 controller error; estimated 100+ runway-incursion risk 
 events eliminated annually

 Capacity: Shorter taxi times, lower runway occupancy

 Efficiency: Less engine-on time

 Follow-the-Greens is a simple but powerful implementation that 
reduces ground vehicle and aircraft navigational errors using 
intelligent right-of-way guidance to show exactly where they must go. 
The unambiguous, dynamic routing provided by FtG ensures that clear and 
direct information is being given to the pilot of a given vehicle. 
Since the system is automated and works in tandem with Air Traffic 
Control-given directions, it reduces the burden placed on Air Traffic 
Controllers, requiring fewer controller communications while 
maintaining safety across the movement area. The benefits extend, too, 
to non-movement areas, where service vehicles and other non-aircraft 
transportation can be safely routed around moving aircraft.
 FtG enhances the efficiency of airport operations by getting 
aircraft where they're going faster, while increasing the safety of the 
system overall. In Europe, major hub airports, including Munich, 
Frankfurt, Zurich, Paris, and Amsterdam, joined SESAR-led validation 
programs for FtG, showing up to 16 percent shorter taxi times (over 30 
percent in low visibility) and a 20-25 percent cut in controller pilot 
communications.\1\ This technology is already in use outside of Europe, 
as well: Abu Dhabi, Beijing Daxing and Incheon airports run fully-
integrated FtG systems. In the United States, the New Terminal One at 
John F. Kennedy International Airport is set to be the first showcase 
of FtG, though other major hubs have expressed interest in a FtG 
system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Second SEAC Validation Follow-the-Greens Validation VP759. 
SESAR European Airport Consortium, 2017. https://
transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/eb22e987-bec1-4ab9-b0
20-8080d42b99fa_en?filename=SEAC_FollowtheGreens_Project_Results.pdf

 Adaptive Lights (ADAL)--LED fixtures that can change color 
 (green V red /yellow V red) under automated or manual control. 
 ADAL extends FtG by enabling any fixture to turn red on command 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 or during a detected conflict. Features include:

 Conflict stop bars anywhere on taxiways

 Dynamic taxiway closures and reroutes

 Pushback ``stop-go'' indications

 Vehicle warning lights on aprons

 Adaptive Lights, or ADAL, are a complementary technology to FtG 
that enables fixtures to change colors, increasing the amount of 
contextual information relayed to vehicle operators. Augmenting the 
centerline guidance of FtG, ADAL enables rich context through color 
changes to yellow and red. With lighting alone, vehicle operators can 
be told to slow down or stop, be alerted to right-of-way closures, and, 
critically, warned of conflicts with other vehicles.
 The first U.S. implementation of ADAL will be at the New Terminal 
One at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. The New 
Terminal One at JFK represents a critical proof of concept for the U.S. 
market. The lessons learned from that deployment--in installation, 
integration with existing FAA systems, and operational validation--will 
be documented and transferable to other major hub airports. We estimate 
that a standardised deployment framework, developed in parallel with 
the JFK implementation, could accelerate adoption at additional 
airports by 18 to 24 months.
 Individually, these systems are capable tools that have been shown 
to reduce collision risks and improve the efficiency of air travel. 
Together, and when deployed alongside existing safety solutions like 
Runway Status Lights and runway incursion prevention systems, they add 
a new layer of protection against potential collision incidents. These 
technologies are broadly enabled by ICAO-defined Level 4 Advanced 
Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). Level 4 A-
SMGCS encompasses the sensor-fused surveillance and guidance automation 
that allow for the dynamic routing and traffic management of FtG and 
ADAL.
 Despite the demonstrated benefits of these systems in international 
deployments, the United States has been slower to adopt advanced 
surface movement technologies. This is not a failure of innovation--it 
is a consequence of regulatory frameworks and advisory circular 
standards that have not kept pace with available technology, compounded 
by constrained Airport Improvement Program funding for airfield 
infrastructure upgrades. The recommendations outlined below are 
designed specifically to close that gap.
Recommendations for Congress and the FAA
 The Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) initiative is a 
major step forward for American aviation, and it is crucial that the 
program also improves the safety of ground movement at U.S. airports. 
With recent near-miss incidents and tragic collisions, it has never 
been clearer that safety in the skies must be paired with safety on the 
ground.
 The benefits of Follow-the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting are 
amplified in the current operational environment. The FAA faces a well-
documented Air Traffic Controller staffing shortage, with the agency 
reporting it is operating at roughly 54 percent of its targeted 
controller workforce at some of its busiest facilities, such as New 
York TRACON. Systems that reduce the volume of controller-to-pilot 
communications--as FtG has demonstrated, by 20 to 25 percent in 
European deployments--directly relieve pressure on an already strained 
workforce. Investing in surface automation is not merely a technology 
decision; it is a workforce sustainability decision.
 Additional actions can be taken by both Congress and the FAA to 
enable and expedite the deployment of safety technologies like Follow-
the-Greens and Adaptive Lighting at airports nationwide:

 Expansion of Existing Programs: ADB SAFEGATE strongly 
 supports the expedited expansion of the RWSL program, which is 
 already operational at 20 airports throughout the United 
 States. ADB SAFEGATE also supports the continued implementation 
 of solutions explored by the Runway Incursion Reduction 
 Program, and urges efforts to accelerate the evaluation of the 
 RIPSA project at San Antonio Airport (SAT), and to expand the 
 project to other airports fitting the program's ``Right-Size-
 Right-Site'' criteria.

 Implementation of Level 4 Advanced Surface Movement Guidance 
 and Control Systems (A-SMGCS): The FAA should, with 
 Congressional support, incorporate technology standards meeting 
 ICAO A-SMGCS Level 4 functionality as a component of the BNATCS 
 program to achieve enhanced surface movement and controller 
 safety net functionality.

 Standards Modernization: The FAA should issue targeted 
 updates to Advisory Circulars 150/5345-10H, -46F, -53D, and -
 54B to enable the easier deployment of smart LED fixtures and 
 associated infrastructure at airports.

 Pilot Programs: The FAA, with Congressional support, should 
 launch a pilot program for FtG and ADAL systems at selected 
 U.S. airports to measure the technologies' impact on key 
 performance indicators such as safety, capacity, and 
 sustainability.

 Funding: Congress must ensure that the FAA is sufficiently 
 resourced to acquire and install advanced safety systems in 
 movement areas at airports, and to fund Airport Improvement 
 Program (AIP) grants for those technologies.
Conclusion
 To tackle the ongoing risk of collisions at airports, vehicle 
operators, whether they be service vehicle drivers or aircraft pilots, 
must be equipped with sufficient information at the right time and with 
maximum fidelity. At the same time, the burden to the Nation's Air 
Traffic Controllers must be accounted for. Solutions that provide this 
information without adding to the workload of controllers are available 
that have been shown in evaluation and real-world use to enhance safety 
and improve efficiency for airport movement.
 While no system can ever fully eliminate risk, the rich, contextual 
information provided to vehicle operators by Follow-the-Greens and 
Adaptive Lighting can substantially reduce the threat of collisions, 
without requiring Air Traffic Controllers to take on yet another 
system--and, all the while, getting travelers and aircraft where 
they're going, faster. ADB SAFEGATE encourages Congress to continue to 
support the FAA's BNATCS program, and to work with the FAA to undertake 
the necessary standards modernization to enable the broader deployment 
of these solutions.
 The United States has long led the world in aviation safety. 
Maintaining that leadership requires honest acknowledgement that ground 
movement safety has not advanced at the same pace as airspace 
management. The technologies exist. The international validation data 
exists. What is needed now is the regulatory will, the funding 
commitment, and the implementation framework to bring these solutions 
to American airports at scale. ADB SAFEGATE stands ready to support 
that effort--not as a vendor seeking a contract, but as a partner that 
has spent a century making airports safer.
 ADB SAFEGATE is ready to be a partner to both the FAA and Congress 
as efforts continue to modernize the Nation's air transportation 
system. We are happy to provide expertise and material support, and to 
assist in the work ahead, as we have for decades. Thank you for this 
opportunity.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Chris Sununu
 Military Accountability in the National Airspace System. Over the 
past year, there have been multiple close calls between commercial and 
military aircraft operating near major airports.
 These include an Army Black Hawk entering the approach path of a 
United Airlines flight near John Wayne Airport, a Delta flight 
receiving a TCAS alert involving an Air Force T-38 near DCA in March 
2025, and a SkyWest flight narrowly avoiding a B-52 near Minot, North 
Dakota last June.
 These incidents raise significant concerns about consistence in 
operational standards across the National Airspace System (NAS). 
Aviation safety depends on uniform adherence to rules, and the FAA must 
serve as a strong, independent regulator that holds all users of the 
airspace to the same high standards. At the same time, proposals have 
emerged that would grant the military sole discretion over the use of 
ADS-B equipment, potentially limiting the FAA's ability to enforce 
baseline safety requirements.

 Question 1. Why is it important that military operators, 
particularly in high-density airspace like the National Capital Region, 
are held to the same operational and equipment standards as commercial 
aviation?
 Answer. Safety in shared airspace depends on every operator being 
subject to a common set of operating rules. In high-density 
environments such as the National Capital Region, commercial aircraft, 
helicopters, military aircraft and other users often operate in close 
proximity. A4A believes that outside narrowly-defined sensitive 
national security missions, military operators should meet the same 
operational and equipage requirements as other operators in the 
airspace.

 Question 2. In A4A's view, what risks arise if certain operators 
are permitted to deviate from requirements such as ADS-B usage in 
shared civilian airspace?
 Answer. Deviations from surveillance requirements create 
unnecessary situational awareness gaps for pilots, controllers and 
collision-avoidance systems.

 Question 3. What additional steps should the FAA take to ensure 
full compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations by military aircraft 
operating in domestic airspace when not engaged in active combat or 
sensitive missions?
 Answer. A4A would encourage the Committee to make sure the FAA 
continues to strengthen coordination with the Department of Defense/War 
to improve and maintain transparency, documentation and review of any 
narrowly defined surveillance deviations. As a general governance 
principle, the FAA should also be encouraged to do periodic audits to 
assess risk, while also enhancing safety data sharing agreements for 
the integration of NAS-level safety management systems risk detection, 
such as airspace conflicts, loss of separation events and surveillance-
related issues.

 Question 4. Do you believe the FAA currently has sufficient 
authority to enforce safety requirements across all airspace users, 
including the military? If not, what changes are needed?
 Answer. From a commercial operator perspective, we believe FAA has 
sufficient, broad and clear legal authority over Part 121 operations in 
the national airspace system. On the question of FAA's sufficient legal 
authority over military operations, we would defer to the subject 
matter expertise of Congress and the administration to determine 
adequacy.

 Question 5. In your view, what lessons should be drawn from recent 
near-miss incidents, and how should those lessons inform future policy 
or regulatory changes?
 Answer. The U.S. aviation system is extremely safe, but recent 
events demonstrate that vigilance is necessary. More formal 
coordination communications frameworks are needed between the FAA and 
the Department of War/Defense. The lessons learned are that practical 
solutions are needed to close known gaps in surveillance and 
communications, review procedures in complex airspace, strategically 
use safety data to assess risk and ensure all operators understand and 
comply with a unified set of operational requirements.

 Question 6. What specific actions would A4A recommend to restore 
confidence that all aircraft, including military, are operating under a 
unified and enforceable safety framework?
 Answer. Safety in shared airspace depends on every operator being 
subject to a common set of operating rules. A4A believes that outside 
narrowly-defined sensitive national security missions, military 
operators should meet the same operational and equipage requirements as 
other operators in the airspace.

 System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce 
Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious 
runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. 
Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, 
underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the 
United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the 
world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early 
warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that 
existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational 
demands.
 The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, 
convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, 
including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven 
implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these 
issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction 
depends on decisive and sustained action.

 Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly 
identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you 
currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near 
term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed 
to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins?
 Answer. A4A members maintain robust safety management systems 
(SMS), recurrent training, fatigue programs and data-sharing processes 
to identify and mitigate operational risk. The most urgent workforce 
issue, however, is the FAA's controller staffing shortage. Congress and 
FAA should sustain controller hiring and training, modernize scheduling 
and fatigue mitigation, protect the FAA safety workforce from 
disruptions and provide stable funding for technology that enhances 
situational awareness and reduces controller workload.

 Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions 
including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation 
programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes?
 Answer. As noted in A4A testimony, SMS provides a structured, 
organization-wide framework for managing safety risk through clearly 
defined policies, formal safety assurance processes and a strong safety 
culture. By integrating data from voluntary reporting programs, 
operational performance metrics and safety analyses, SMS enables air 
carriers to prioritize resources, address emerging risks before they 
escalate and continuously monitor the effectiveness of mitigations.
 That work is supported by programs such as the U.S. Aviation Safety 
Team (USAST), which includes the Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
(CAST), Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), the 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operational Quality 
Assurance (FOQA). These programs, together with broader SMS, help 
airlines to proactively identify and reduce risk.

 Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent 
implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and 
facilities? How can those barriers be addressed?
 Answer. All A4A carriers have robust and mature SMS that are built 
and maintained to fit that carrier's specific fleet, network, 
workforce, risk profile and operating environment. Across all operators 
and facilities, our industry maintains a commitment to learn from every 
incident, report and piece of safety data. While not a barrier per se, 
the challenge is that safety is not static. It requires constant 
watchfulness, investment and continued evolution.

 Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned 
from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to 
prevent recurrence?
 Answer. As noted in our testimony, airlines capture lessons through 
safety reporting systems, flight data analysis, ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, SMS 
processes and participation in voluntary government-industry data-
sharing programs. Notably, having voluntary reporting programs that 
protect and de-identify safety information to show possible trends 
identified by one operator or facility can inform risk mitigation 
across the system before recurrence. These programs are key to not only 
maintaining safety but providing a predictive tool for the entire 
system.

 Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the 
past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and 
cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting 
systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, 
primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened 
situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier 
and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. 
General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools 
can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have 
emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not 
yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven 
equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and 
ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that 
slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers 
are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the 
operating environment, particularly in complex airspace

 Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which 
technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, 
or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment 
within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations 
take to accelerate their adoption?
 Answer. Mature near-term technologies include surface awareness and 
alerting tools, enhanced airport moving maps, electronic flight deck 
displays, improved ADS-B-based traffic information, data comm and 
tower/controller decision-support tools. A4A supports accelerating 
deployment where the safety case is clear, implementation is 
coordinated with operators, and certification pathways allow proven 
technologies to move from demonstration to operational use without 
unnecessary delay.

 Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification 
obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, 
and how can they be addressed without compromising safety?
 Answer. A4A defers to FAA and the manufacturing community for more 
expertise in certification challenges and timelines. In general, 
obstacles can always include needed resources, workforce challenges and 
other competing certification priorities.

 Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and 
air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common 
operating picture for both pilots and controllers?
 Answer. Interoperability requires common data standards, reliable 
real-time surveillance, secure data exchange and coordinated deployment 
between aircraft equipage and FAA ground systems. Many of these facets 
would be best served by funding and implementing the Brand New Air 
Traffic Control System (BNATCS) that would upgrade nearly every 
component of the air traffic control system.

 Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close 
the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, 
particularly for smaller operators?
 Answer. It is important to note that not all operator or aircraft 
fleet models are the same, and the ability of air carriers to utilize 
these technologies in the future is heavily dependent on factors 
outside the control of the air carrier, in particular, access to FAA-
certified solutions. While many tools hold promise, there must be an 
appropriate amount of time to allow equipment to be designed, 
manufactured and installed in a normal maintenance cycle. A4A looks 
forward to continued work with the Committee and other parts of the 
aviation sector on solutions that can improve safety for all system 
users.

 Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use 
internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States 
to enhance near-term safety?
 Answer. The FAA should be encouraged to evaluate international 
experience with surface movement guidance, runway incursion alerting, 
electronic conspicuity, and enhanced controller decision-support tools. 
The key is not simply importing a technology but determining whether it 
can be integrated safely into U.S. procedures, aircraft and ATC 
equipage, airport layouts and controller workflows.

 Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of 
deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence 
prioritization decisions?
 Answer. While each individual air carrier may take a tailored 
approach to their respective operations and fleets, as a 
generalization, carriers evaluate investments based on demonstrated 
safety benefits, operational reliability, implementation challenges, 
training and fleet complexity. Across the entire aviation ecosystem, 
technologies that reduce collision risk, improve surface safety, 
enhance controller capacity or address known high-risk airspace are 
certainly priorities.

 Importance of Airspace Safety Reviews. As of March 2026, at least 
38 near mid-air collisions have been reported at Class B, C, and D 
airports across the country, according to NASA's Aviation Safety 
Reporting System. These incidents suggest a broader pattern of elevated 
risk in some of the Nation's busiest and most complex airspaces.
 In response, legislation I introduced last June, along with the 
bipartisan ROTOR Act, would require the FAA to conduct comprehensive 
airspace safety reviews at all commercial airports. These reviews are 
intended to better identify and mitigate risks to passenger operations 
by examining factors such as high volumes of mixed aircraft traffic, 
frequent TCAS alerts, the proximity of helicopter routes to commercial 
flight paths, and increasingly complex arrival and departure 
procedures. They would also provide a systematic way to identify 
operational conflicts, procedural gaps, and other underlying risks, 
enabling the FAA to take more proactive, data-driven steps to 
strengthen safety across the national airspace system.

 Question 1. Why is it important for the FAA to conduct 
comprehensive airspace safety reviews not only at DCA, but across all 
airports serving commercial passenger traffic nationwide?
 Answer. DCA is obviously an urgent example, but those underlying 
safety issues are not unique to one airport. Commercial passenger 
flights operate in complex environments across the entire country each 
with its own operations footprint and complex mix of users. 
Comprehensive reviews at all locations would help FAA identify risks 
and needed mitigations to the benefit of all users and locations in the 
NAS.

 Question 2. Do you agree that these reviews--particularly at Class 
C and Class D airports--will help identify and address longstanding 
safety risks at airports such as John Wayne Airport and Hollywood 
Burbank Airport, as well as at smaller or less scrutinized facilities?
 Answer. Yes. Class C and D airports can present significant safety 
complexity, especially when underlying a high-volume operations Class B 
airspace. Comprehensive reviews can identify recurring conflicts 
involving helicopter routes, training activity, terrain constraints and 
commercial flight paths and can help ensure that mitigation is based on 
well-analyzed data.

 Question 3. What specific safety risks or operational conflicts are 
most likely to be uncovered through these reviews, and how should the 
FAA prioritize addressing them?
 Answer. Each review will likely reveal localized nuances that 
uncover or better define through data trends in conflicts between 
helicopter or training routes and commercial arrival/departure paths, 
irregular frequency TCAS events, confusing procedures and other gaps in 
surveillance coverage or communications. FAA should prioritize hazards 
with the highest consequence and recurrence potential, especially those 
affecting operations in terminal airspace and on the ground.

 Question 4. How can data sources like ASRS, TCAS alerts, and 
operational incident reports be better integrated to support these 
assessments?
 Answer. FAA, to the extent practicable and feasible, should be 
encouraged and empowered through investment to integrate ASRS, TCAS 
alerts, ATC operational reports, radar and ADS-B data, runway safety 
data, airline safety reports and incident investigations, among others, 
into a common and comprehensive risk-review process. The more FAA can 
identify patterns across datasets, protect voluntary reporting and 
identify specific corrective actions, the safer our system will be.

 Question 5. Are there any airspace design or procedural changes, 
such as adjustments to helicopter routes or arrival/departure flows, 
that you believe should be prioritized based on current trends?
 Answer. Comprehensive safety reviews will better identify which 
airspace design or procedural changes should be prioritized based on 
actual risk. Air carriers look forward to working with the Committee 
and FAA to evaluate those findings and prioritize changes that improve 
safety in shared airspace.

 Question 6. How frequently should these airspace safety reviews be 
conducted to remain effective as traffic patterns and technologies 
evolve?
 Answer. While A4A does not have a specific frequency 
recommendation, best practices would dictate that reviews follow a 
regular, risk-based cycle, with more frequent reviews for complex or 
high-risk airspace.

 Technology in High Density Low Altitude Airspace. As you know, the 
FAA has proposed a regulatory framework for beyond visual line of sight 
(BVLOS) drone operations, as directed by this Committee in the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2024. While this proposal represents a step 
toward integrating uncrewed aircraft systems into the national 
airspace, there are concerns that it may not go far enough to ensure 
safety.
 Specifically, the proposal does not consistently require drones to 
have the capability to detect and avoid aircraft who are not 
broadcasting their position across many operating environments, 
including suburban areas where drone activity is already expanding and 
expected to grow significantly. This raises questions about whether the 
framework fully accounts for the realities of shared airspace, 
particularly from the perspective of crewed aviation operators who rely 
on see-and-avoid principles and layered safety protections.

 Question 1. From your perspective, do you believe the FAA's 
proposed BVLOS rule adequately protects against the risk of midair 
collisions between drones and crewed aircraft?
 Answer. A4A supports safe and efficient integration of all new 
entrants, including drones. It is important that the final BVLOS 
framework provides assurances that drones can reliably remain well 
clear of crewed aircraft and it should not shift risks to crewed 
aviation.

 Question 2. If not, what specific changes should the FAA make in 
the final rule to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed 
aircraft, particularly those that are not broadcasting their position?
 Answer. Again, A4A supports safe and efficient integration of all 
new entrants, including drones. For BVLOS, FAA should require 
performance-based detect-and-avoid capabilities that account for both 
cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft, particularly near airports 
and other areas where crewed operations are likely. The final rule 
should include clear performance standards, testing and validation 
requirements, operational limitations and accountability for 
maintaining separation.

 Question 3. How significant is the risk posed by non-cooperative 
aircraft in high density airspace?
 Answer. A4A member airlines operating in high-density controlled 
airspace are typically equipped, identified, communicating with ATC and 
visible through ATC surveillance systems. A4A supports safe and 
efficient integration of drones and any other new entrants. Any risk 
brought by BVLOS operations at scale increases the importance of 
reliable detection, surveillance and separation standards that are 
implemented safely and efficiently and do not have a detrimental or 
adverse safety impact on other users in the system, in particular 
commercial air carriers.

 Question 4. Should detect-and-avoid capabilities be required 
universally for BVLOS operations or tailored based on airspace type and 
operational risk?
 Answer. Detect-and-avoid should be required wherever BVLOS 
operations could encounter crewed aircraft.

 Question 5. How can the FAA ensure that drone operators maintain an 
equivalent level of safety to that expected in crewed aviation?
 Answer. Much like what is done for crewed aviation, the FAA should 
require drone operators to demonstrate safety through validated detect-
and-avoid performance, command-and-control reliability, operator 
training, maintenance standards, data reporting and incident 
accountability, among others. While equivalent safety does not 
necessarily mean identical rules, it should require that new entrants 
meet a level of risk control comparable to what the public expects from 
commercial crewed aviation.

 Question 6. How can the FAA balance enabling innovation in the 
drone sector while maintaining the high safety standards expected in 
the national airspace?
 Answer. As it is for A4A members, the burden should remain on drone 
operators and service providers to demonstrate that their operations 
will not increase risk to passengers, crews or other airspace users. 
Safety, not balance, should be the determining factor, and the focus 
should be on safe and efficient integration.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to 
 Chris Sununu
Increase in Drone Conflicts with Commercial Air Travel
 Drones are prohibited from flying around airports; however, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) receives more than 100 reports of 
sightings a month. Last week, a United Airlines pilot reported nearly 
colliding with a drone as the aircraft was on approach at Newark 
Liberty International Airport. On Monday, June 29, the pilot of JetBlue 
Flight 948 reported striking a drone at approximately 3,000 feet in 
altitude while on final approach.

 Question 1. Given the increased reporting of drone interactions 
with commercial aircraft, what actions are A4A taking to support air 
carriers?
 Answer. A4A is working with its member carriers, FAA, airports and 
security partners to identify and communicate drone-related risks near 
commercial operations. Our focus is on timely reporting, consistent 
response protocols, improved detection and mitigation capabilities 
around airports, and policies that ensure drone operators--not airline 
passengers and crews--bear responsibility for safely integrating into 
the NAS.

 Question 2. What Federal action does A4A believe is needed to keep 
commercial air travel safe with the increased presence of drones in the 
national airspace system (NAS)?
 Answer. Federal action should include strong drone detection and 
mitigation capabilities around airports, clear remote identification 
and accountability requirements, reliable BVLOS detect-and-avoid 
standards, FAA enforcement tools, and sustained coordination among 
airports, air carriers and Federal stakeholders, including the FAA, 
TSA, DHS, DOJ. The priority must be preventing unauthorized or unsafe 
drone activity from disrupting or endangering commercial passenger 
operations.
Emergency Medical Kits and Sec. 368
 Since 1986, FAA regulations have mandated all domestic passenger 
airplanes with a flight attendant have an emergency medical kit (EMK) 
containing medications and devices onboard. Aircraft EMKs are critical 
during in-flight emergency medical situations and are required to 
contain equipment and medicines like a stethoscope, aspirin, 
antihistamine tablets, CPR masks, and other items.
 The 2018 FAA Reauthorization required FAA evaluate regulations 
regarding emergency medical equipment on passenger aircraft. Yet, FAA 
still fails to require that key medications and medical equipment be 
included in EMKs. In the 2024 FAA Reauthorization, I championed a 
provision that would require FAA to review required contents of 
passenger aircraft EMKs and relevant training for crew members at least 
once every five years.

 Question 1. Certain air carriers applied for exemptions with the 
FAA to operate without the five required medications in onboard EMKs, 
including epinephrine vials used to treat anaphylaxis. Please provide a 
list of A4A air carrier members that are operating under these 
exemptions and/or applied for such exemptions.
 Answer. A4A does not maintain a definitive list of individual 
member carriers operating under or seeking these types of exemptions. 
Multiple factors can drive these types of requests, including 
medication shortages and supply chain challenges. A4A looks forward to 
continued work with you on this issue, but carrier-specific exemption 
status would be better confirmed through the FAA, which would maintain 
and regulate that activity.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to 
 Chris Sununu
Infrastructure Upgrades
 The 2024 FAA Reauthorization set a foundation for the modernization 
of our airspace. The urgency of this task has hit home many times, 
including in Colorado last year during the communications outage at the 
Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center.
 The FAA has proposed its $32 billion Brand New Air Traffic Control 
System (BNATCS) to transition copper networks to fiber and satellite. 
Airlines for America's members are on the front lines of this 
transition.

 Question 1. Mr. Sununu, how can Congress and the FAA best 
coordinate with airlines to ensure that these massive infrastructure 
overhauls do not compromise safety?
 Answer. Congress and FAA should engage airlines continuously in the 
planning, testing, sequencing and transition of ATC modernization 
projects.
 It is also important that Congress provide the funding 
predictability and stability necessary to carry out such a large and 
complex project. The Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) is 
strongly supported by an unprecedented, industry-wide ``Modern Skies 
Coalition.'' We are thankful for Congress's $12.5 billion down payment 
toward air traffic control modernization, and we continue to advocate 
in support of additional funding of at least $19 billion to completely 
build a new ATC system.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Todd Hauptli
 System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce 
Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious 
runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. 
Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, 
underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the 
United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the 
world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early 
warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that 
existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational 
demands.
 The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, 
convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, 
including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven 
implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these 
issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction 
depends on decisive and sustained action.

 Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly 
identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you 
currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near 
term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed 
to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins?
 Answer. As you know, air traffic controllers operating at airports 
across the country or at relevant ATC facilities work directly for the 
Federal Aviation Administration or for its contractors at airports 
participating in the FAA Contract Tower Program. Most other workers at 
airports work for entities that operate at the airport rather than for 
the airport operator directly, including airlines and their 
contractors, concessionaires, and other service providers.
 As it relates to airport workers directly employed by airport 
operators, workforce development and employee wellness are a priority. 
The competition to attract and retain talent--whether it be maintenance 
workers, skilled technicians, airport operations experts, 
administrative staff, or front-office executives--is fierce, and many 
airports have worked aggressively to establish a strong pipeline of 
available workers and to create an environment in which employee 
concerns and workspace challenges are quickly addressed. The specific 
approaches taken by individual airports related to workforce capacity 
and fatigue varies.

 Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions 
including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation 
programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes?
 Answer. As it relates to airport employees, the specific answer 
will vary based on the practices of the specific airport at which the 
employee works. For example, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport 
currently utilizes AI-based tools to solicit regular feedback from 
employees on fatigue and other human factors, which allows the airport 
to identify and proactively address trends that could have an impact on 
safety.
 As noted during the hearing, AAAE provides a wide range of training 
to airports of all sizes across the country. We integrate fatigue 
awareness and management into specific operational programs, including 
Safety Management Systems (SMS) training and the International Aviation 
Snow Academy, which covers fatigue risk matrices for winter operations. 
We constantly evaluate our training programs and look for opportunities 
to address workforce issues, including fatigue mitigation, for the 
benefit of our airport members and their employees.

 Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent 
implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and 
facilities? How can those barriers be addressed?
 Answer. In 2023, the FAA issued a rule requiring certain Part 139 
certificated airports to implement Safety Management Systems over a 
five-year period. A core component of these systems is safety risk 
management (SRM). As part of SRM, airport operators are required to 
establish a systemic process for identifying operational safety 
hazards, analyzing the level of risk associated with each of those 
hazards, and mitigating the risk of the identified hazards. The value 
of SMS is enabling airport operators to identify safety risks and 
appropriate mitigation measures that are unique and tailored to their 
operating environment.
 The SRM process avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes 
that no two airports face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures 
that limited financial resources are allocated where they will have the 
greatest impact on improving safety.
 The implementation of SMS at individual airports is in its early 
stages. At this point, the signs are positive that implementation will 
be consistent across all operators and facilities and without 
unnecessary barriers.
 As part of the SMS implementation process for airports, one major 
gap identified is the inability of FAA air traffic control facilities, 
air carriers, and other operators to confidently and efficiently share 
hazard data collected through their SMS programs with airport 
operators. As public entities, airport operators are generally subject 
to open records laws and must disclose safety data to the public upon 
request. These laws, while well intended, stymie safety by inhibiting 
the data disclosures and collaboration among entities that are needed 
to address issues before they arise.
 Given that reality, we urge the committee and Congress to protect 
safety data that FAA and other stakeholders share with airports from 
public disclosure under open records laws. Allowing data sharing among 
stakeholders without fear of retribution is critical to ensuring the 
highest levels of safety.

 Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned 
from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to 
prevent recurrence?
 Answer. N/A

 Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the 
past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and 
cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting 
systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, 
primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened 
situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier 
and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. 
General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools 
can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have 
emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not 
yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven 
equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and 
ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that 
slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers 
are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the 
operating environment, particularly in complex airspace

 Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which 
technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, 
or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment 
within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations 
take to accelerate their adoption?
 Answer. AAAE recognizes the value of technology and surface safety 
surveillance tools to enhance safety, including FAA's deployment of 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) and ADS-B Airport 
Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) systems--currently in place at 
44 airports.
 While ASDE-X and ASSC have been effective, the industry needed more 
cost-effective solutions that could be quickly implemented, especially 
for smaller airports. Congress recognized the importance of surface 
surveillance in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Under section 347, 
FAA was directed to identify and deploy systems that may provide or 
improve surface surveillance at airports needing such capabilities.
 We appreciate the work that FAA has done thus far to implement 
section 347 and deploy Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) systems as 
part of the Brand New Air Traffic Control System. The agency has 
installed the SAI systems at approximately 90 airports to date, and we 
understand that plans are in place to eventually reach 220 airports. 
These systems promise to enhance safety in the airport environment and 
mitigate near misses through improved situational awareness.

 Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification 
obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, 
and how can they be addressed without compromising safety?
 Answer. FAA is in the process of deploying additional surface 
safety surveillance systems at airports as noted. We are unaware of any 
specific regulatory or certification obstacles relating to the ongoing 
deployment of these systems.

 Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and 
air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common 
operating picture for both pilots and controllers?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close 
the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, 
particularly for smaller operators?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use 
internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States 
to enhance near-term safety?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of 
deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence 
prioritization decisions?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Importance of Airspace Safety Reviews. As of March 2026, at least 
38 near mid-air collisions have been reported at Class B, C, and D 
airports across the country, according to NASA's Aviation Safety 
Reporting System. These incidents suggest a broader pattern of elevated 
risk in some of the Nation's busiest and most complex airspaces.
 In response, legislation I introduced last June, along with the 
bipartisan ROTOR Act, would require the FAA to conduct comprehensive 
airspace safety reviews at all commercial airports. These reviews are 
intended to better identify and mitigate risks to passenger operations 
by examining factors such as high volumes of mixed aircraft traffic, 
frequent TCAS alerts, the proximity of helicopter routes to commercial 
flight paths, and increasingly complex arrival and departure 
procedures. They would also provide a systematic way to identify 
operational conflicts, procedural gaps, and other underlying risks, 
enabling the FAA to take more proactive, data-driven steps to 
strengthen safety across the national airspace system.

 Question 1. Why is it important for the FAA to conduct 
comprehensive airspace safety reviews not only at DCA, but across all 
airports serving commercial passenger traffic nationwide?
 Answer. FAA has been given exclusive authority to regulate and 
ensure the safe and efficient use of the National Airspace System. The 
specifics of airspace design, utilization, and operations are beyond 
the scope of AAAE's core expertise representing airport executives and 
operators. However, we generally agree that additional situational 
awareness in airspace across the country is beneficial in identifying 
potential risks and conflicts.

 Question 2. Do you agree that these reviews--particularly at Class 
C and Class D airports--will help identify and address longstanding 
safety risks at airports such as John Wayne Airport and Hollywood 
Burbank Airport, as well as at smaller or less scrutinized facilities?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 3. What specific safety risks or operational conflicts are 
most likely to be uncovered through these reviews, and how should the 
FAA prioritize addressing them?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 4. How can data sources like ASRS, TCAS alerts, and 
operational incident reports be better integrated to support these 
assessments?
 Answer This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 5. Are there any airspace design or procedural changes, 
such as adjustments to helicopter routes or arrival/departure flows, 
that you believe should be prioritized based on current trends?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Question 6. How frequently should these airspace safety reviews be 
conducted to remain effective as traffic patterns and technologies 
evolve?
 Answer. This question is beyond AAAE's core area of expertise.

 Extending Bipartisan Infrastructure Law Programs to Advance Airport 
Safety. The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) has 
described the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Law a ``historic 
investment'' in airport infrastructure, providing $25 billion over five 
years for projects ranging from runway safety enhancements, terminal 
improvements, radar upgrades, and sustainment of air traffic control 
towers. More recently, the law provided the FAA with an additional $970 
million in discretionary funding, supporting 133 projects at 129 
airports through FY 2026. In May, many of my colleagues joined me in 
urging Senate appropriators to extend these critical programs We warned 
that ``reducing funding available for transportation programs by 
treating BIL as a one-time infusion will increase costs, cost us 
American jobs, and set our country back.''

 Question 1. In AAAE's view, how has the $25 billion investment in 
airports from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law improved safety at U.S. 
airports, particularly in reducing the risk of close calls? Do you 
believe Congress should extend these programs, and how would continued 
IIJA funding further strengthen aviation safety?
 Answer. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) has 
provided billions of dollars in critical funding in recent years that 
has allowed airports to fund thousands of critical projects across the 
country, including many that enhance safety. While those funds have 
been helpful, demand has far exceeded available resources. For the 
Airport Terminal Program (ATP) and the FAA Contract Tower (FTC) 
Competitive Grant Program, airports submitted more than 3,560 
applications requesting more than $48.1 billion in funding, nearly 10 
times the $5 billion made available for those programs over five years.
 Extending IIJA funding would allow airports to tackle the tens of 
billions of dollars in projects that were left unaddressed because of 
existing funding constraints.
 When the three IIJA programs expire at the end of FY26, airports 
will face a $4 billion annual funding cliff, exacerbating the gap 
between airport needs and available funding. Considering the 
overwhelming airport infrastructure needs and the current lack of 
Federal and local funding options, we believe strongly that Congress 
should extend IIJA program funding well into the future. Doing so would 
help airports enhance aviation safety and efficiency significantly.
 We remain grateful to the committee for the steadfast support of 
airport infrastructure investment. Extending IIJA airport funding would 
ensure that airports are able to make progress on critical projects 
that will help airports enhance aviation safety, efficiency, and 
passenger convenience.

 Question 2. What risks do airports face if these programs expire at 
the end of the Fiscal Year, and what specific safety funding gaps would 
emerge as a result?
 Answer. Safety continues to be a primary focus of infrastructure 
investment at airports. Many airports and their facilities were built 
decades ago and require significant, constant investment to meet 
current standards. Runway rehabilitation/resurfacing and taxiway and 
apron pavement rehabilitation are among the most common, necessary, and 
expensive investments, requiring billions of dollars annually across 
the airport system.
 With traffic levels increasing and with operations becoming ever 
more complex, the FAA and airports are paying increased attention to 
runway and taxiway geometry, including taxiway/runway connections, 
intersections, and hot spots. Reconfiguring an airfield designed with 
limited operations when propeller-driven aircraft were prevalent to 
meet the needs of today's high-performing aircraft and traffic levels 
is neither easy nor inexpensive.
 Airfield lighting, signage, and runway/taxiway/apron pavement 
marking improvements are also a focus area for airports. Airfield 
pavement markings and lighting have been likened to lane markings, 
streetlights, and traffic signals on our roadways. They provide 
important visual information and generate awareness, particularly at 
night or in low visibility conditions.
 Upgrading facilities and infrastructure to enhance safety on or 
near runways remains a top priority for airports and the FAA. 
Considerable progress has been made in recent years through the FAA 
Runway Incursion Mitigation Program and other initiatives.
 Unfortunately, there is not an endless stream of Federal dollars 
available for airports to meet all worthy projects to enhance safety, 
increase capacity, or meet other critical needs at airports. The gap 
between airport needs and available resources--through AIP, IIJA, local 
Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) and other sources--is growing. The 
PFC has been stagnant for a quarter century, last adjusted in 2000. The 
IIJA has provided a critical source of funding that airports have used 
successfully over the past five Fiscal Years to address safety projects 
and other infrastructure needs, but demand has far exceeded available 
resources.
 As noted in my previous answer, for the IIJA's Airport Terminal 
Program and the FAA Contract Tower Competitive Grant Program, airports 
submitted over 3,560 applications requesting more than $48.1 billion in 
funding, nearly 10 times the $5 billion made available over five years.
 If the three IIJA programs are not extended, airports will lose $4 
billion annually that could be used to address critical safety upgrades 
and infrastructure needs throughout the airport environment.

 Question 3. Which types of safety projects, such as runway 
reconfigurations, surface detection technologies, or tower upgrades 
have delivered the most measurable safety benefits so far?
 Answer. These types of projects are all important to improving 
safety at airports, and each will provide a different level of benefit 
depending on the unique situation at a particular airport. As noted, 
the SMS process is an effective foundational tool for helping to ensure 
that limited Federal resources are targeted to their most beneficial 
use.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to 
 Todd Hauptli
Airport Improvements to Reduce Close Calls
 Question 1. What are the most significant airport-level 
contributors to close calls?
 Answer. The contributing factors to close calls can vary depending 
on the unique circumstances at the airport where they occur, including 
human factors, airport configuration, weather conditions, emergency 
operations, and traffic mix, among others. Mitigating close calls and 
enhancing safety more broadly relies on addressing the people (training 
and human factors), processes (Safety Management Systems), and 
technology and infrastructure in operation throughout the airport 
environment.
 We believe there are opportunities to enhance the consistency and 
effectiveness of training for those who operate in airport movement 
areas; to facilitate more effective sharing of SMS data between FAA and 
industry and among industry partners to identify and address potential 
safety concerns; and to boost Federal investments in critical 
technology and infrastructure upgrades.

 Question 2. How is AAAE coordinating with FAA to ensure that 
airports with the highest rates of close calls receive targeted 
support?
 Answer. AAAE is a member of the FAA's Runway Safety Council and 
engages regularly and coordinates with FAA on a wide range of safety-
enhancing initiatives. We have supported the FAA on implementation of 
many programs aimed at improving surface safety, including deployment 
of surface surveillance tools and the Runway Incursion Mitigation 
Program. The RIM Program uses runway incursion data to highlight the 
highest priority airports where targeted funding and modifications to 
airfield geometry are needed. Similarly, FAA conducted a risk 
assessment to prioritize the airports where the agency should deploy 
Surface Awareness Initiative systems over a four-year period. For any 
initiative, we support FAA engaging in the appropriate risk assessment 
to inform where to prioritize limited funding and maximize the impact 
on improving safety.

 Question 3. What metrics should Congress require FAA to use when 
prioritizing safety interventions?
 Answer. AAAE has supported the FAA closely tracking and logging 
geospatial data associated runway incursion events across the airport 
system. This location data allows airport operators, in coordination 
with the FAA, to identify potential hot spots or areas of concern with 
airfield configurations and mitigate them accordingly. We encourage 
Congress and the committee to continue requiring that the FAA track the 
location of these incursions.
Need for Sustained Funding
 As part of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the 
Airport Infrastructure Grant (AIG) program received $14.5 billion over 
five years, beginning in Fiscal Year 2022. Congress authorized these 
AIG funds to support projects to improve runways, taxiways, safety, 
sustainability, terminals, airport transit connections and roadways.
 Question 1. What steps are airports taking to improve real-time 
situational awareness for both air traffic controllers and pilots, such 
as enhanced lighting, signage, or surface-tracking systems?
 Answer. Airfield lighting, signage, and runway/taxiway/apron 
pavement marking improvements are a focus area for airports. Airfield 
pavement markings and lighting have been likened to lane markings, 
streetlights, and traffic signals on our roadways. They provide 
important visual information and generate awareness, particularly at 
night or in low visibility conditions.
 Airports continue to prioritize investments in these areas.

 Question 2. What barriers remain to widespread adoption of these 
tools and systems to enhance real-time situational awareness for 
controllers and pilots?
 Answer. Resource constraints remain a challenge. As it relates to 
surface safety surveillance tools, AAAE recognizes the value of this 
technology, including FAA's deployment of Airport Surface Detection 
Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X), and ADS-B Airport Surface Surveillance 
Capability (ASSC) systems, and Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI) 
systems.
 Consistent with the SMS process and in consultation with FAA, we 
understand that airports with surface surveillance tools (ASDE-X, ASSC, 
or SAI) are evaluating the installation of vehicle movement area 
transmitters (VMATs) to improve situational awareness.
 It is important to note that these devices are not yet widely 
deployable at all airports across the country given where FAA is in the 
process of rolling out surface surveillance systems; the need for 
driver and controller training; supply chain and bandwidth concerns; 
and the lack of available resources to procure, install, program, test, 
and maintain the technology.
 Airports differ significantly in layout, traffic mix, tower hours, 
runway configurations, weather and low-visibility operations, hot 
spots, construction activity, and vehicle access needs. Given this 
complexity and the growing disconnect between available resources and 
airport investment needs for safety projects, capacity enhancements, 
terminal upgrades, and other critical projects, airports must have the 
ability through SMS and other assessments to evaluate and prioritize 
technology deployment and safety investments to ensure that each dollar 
goes toward its highest and best safety purpose.

 Question 3. How did airports invest IIJA AIG program funding to 
help mitigate risk factors that contribute to close calls and runway 
incursions?
 Answer. As noted, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act has 
provided billions of dollars in critical funding that has allowed 
airports to fund thousands of critical projects across the country, 
including many that enhance safety. The Federal Aviation Administration 
would be in a better position to highlight for the committee the 
specifics of the numerous projects that have been undertaken 
nationwide. In general terms, these funds have helped support runway 
and taxiway rehabilitation, airfield lighting and signage upgrades, and 
countless other related projects aimed at improving runway safety.

 Question 4. What additional authorities or funding is necessary for 
airports to mitigate hazards that contribute to close calls and runway 
incursions?
 Answer. The biggest impediment facing airports is funding 
constraints. Upgrading facilities and infrastructure to enhance safety 
on or near runways remains a top priority for airports and the FAA. 
Unfortunately, there is not an endless stream of Federal dollars 
available for these and other worthy projects to enhance safety, 
increase capacity, or meet other critical needs at airports.
 The Airport Improvement Program remains the primary Federal 
resource for many of these investments, but AIP is significantly 
oversubscribed. Proposals to expand AIP-eligibility, while beneficial 
in some instances, risks further diluting AIP and diverting scarce 
resources from existing projects, including potential safety upgrades.
 The FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) for 
2025-2029 identifies $67.5 billion in needs over the next five years--
or $13.5 billion annually--for AIP and Infrastructure Investment and 
Jobs Act-eligible projects, more than three times the $4 billion that 
is provided on an annual basis for AIP. Airports Council International-
North America (ACI-NA) estimates that annual funding needs for U.S. 
airports exceeds $173.9 billion over the same period or $35 billion 
annually when factoring in other important infrastructure projects that 
are not eligible for Federal funding.
 The gap between airport needs and available resources--through AIP, 
IIJA, and local PFCs--is growing. The PFC has been stagnant for a 
quarter century, last adjusted in 2000. The IIJA has provided a 
critical source of funding that airports have used successfully over 
the past five Fiscal Years to address safety projects and other 
infrastructure needs, but demand has far exceeded available resources.
 For the IIJA's Airport Terminal Program and the FAA Contract Tower 
Competitive Grant Program, airports submitted over 3,560 applications 
requesting more than $48.1 billion in funding, nearly 10 times the $5 
billion made available over five years. With the three IIJA programs 
set to expire at the end of FY26, airports face a $4 billion annual 
funding cliff, exacerbating the gap between airport needs and available 
funding.
 While airports are making progress in addressing the highest 
priority safety projects and immediate needs, including runway and 
taxiway rehabilitation, runway safety areas and other critical 
projects; many face a growing challenge in meeting other safety 
priorities and imperatives, including capacity enhancement, terminal 
upgrades, and numerous other projects that can better serve the 
traveling public and facilitate commerce.
Surface Transportation Connectivity to Airports
 As demand for air travel expands, better ground transportation 
connections will be critical. Enplanements at American airports are 
expected to grow from nearly 945 million in 2023 to 1.4 billion in 2040 
and 1.7 billion in 2050. An estimated $19.3 billion is needed to 
improve access to and from our airports over the next five years alone.
 That is why Senator Blackburn and I introduced the bipartisan, 
bicameral Don't Miss Your Flight Act, which would create an incentive 
to invest in surface transportation improvements into and out of public 
airports.

 Question 1. Based on AAAE's work with airports across our country, 
how important is it to connect public airports to surface 
transportation?
 Answer. Connections between public airports and surface 
transportation are critical. That is why AAAE is a strong supporter of 
the ``Don't Miss Your Flight Act.'' We are eager to work with you, 
Senator Duckworth, to advance this important legislation that would 
benefit millions of flyers every year.
 Question 2. Do you agree that we need to invest in improved surface 
transportation connections to airports to keep up with growing airline 
passenger demand?
 Answer. AAAE fully agrees that continued investment in improved 
surface transportation connections to airports is critical to meeting 
growing passenger demand. AAAE believes that enactment of the ``Don't 
Miss Your Flight Act'' would be a tremendous boost in accomplishing 
that goal, and we are strong proponents for its enactment.
Essential Air Service
 The Essential Air Service (EAS) program is a vital lifeline for our 
small and rural communities. For a small Federal investment, EAS 
ensures that these communities are connected to the national economy, 
protecting jobs, commerce and healthcare access. Without EAS, small 
communities across rural America would face economic decline.

 Question 1. Do you agree that Congress must protect EAS funding for 
the more than 170 airports across the U.S. that rely on the EAS program 
to maintain service?
 Answer. Yes. AAAE fully supports EAS and has requested full funding 
for the program in FY27.

 Question 2. What value does the EAS program provide to rural 
communities and our broader national interests? What is at risk if 
funding for EAS is not increased?
 Answer. EAS ensures connectivity to the NAS for many communities 
across the country. A lack of funding would effectively limit 
connectivity for those communities.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hickenlooper to 
 Todd Hauptli
Ground Safety
 Airports manage large fleets of ground vehicles. These vehicles 
must operate in the same ground space as aircraft with limited ground 
visibility, creating the perfect conditions for potentially dangerous 
interactions.

 Question 1. Mr. Hauptli, can you explain what members of the 
committee can learn from data that is obtained through vehicle 
monitoring technology?
 Answer. In general, data of this nature could be utilized to 
evaluate trends, use patterns, and other information that could be 
helpful in proactively addressing potential risks.

 Question 2. Mr. Hauptli, how can Safety Management Systems identify 
and mitigate risks before they result in accidents or runway 
incursions?
 Answer. Safety is a core focus and function of airports, consistent 
with their public nature and public mission. While that has been the 
case for decades, the broad implementation of Safety Management Systems 
allows airports to more effectively identify and mitigate systemic 
risk, including those related to close calls, runway incursions, and 
other safety hazards.
 Airport operators are using SMS to proactively identify and 
mitigate safety risks at their facilities. In 2023, the FAA issued a 
rule requiring certain Part 139 certificated airports to implement an 
SMS over a five-year period. A core component of these systems is 
safety risk management. As part of SRM, airport operators are required 
to establish a systemic process for identifying operational safety 
hazards, analyzing the level of risk associated with each of those 
hazards, and mitigating the risk of the identified hazards.
 The tremendous value of SMS is enabling airport operators to 
identify safety risks and appropriate mitigation measures that are 
unique and tailored to their operating environment. Individuals with 
access to the airside are trained on how to report hazards, ensuring 
facility-specific risks are readily understood. Airport operators 
closely evaluate this data and implement corrective actions designed to 
mitigate the highest-risk hazards, such as additional training, new 
signage, or targeted infrastructure modifications. The SRM process 
avoids a one-size-fits-all approach, recognizes that no two airports 
face the same set of hazards or risks, and ensures that limited 
financial resources are allocated where they will have the greatest 
impact on improving safety.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Dan Sullivan to 
 James A. Viola
 Question 1. In Alaska, aircraft routinely operate at low altitudes 
for medevac, public safety, tourism, critical infrastructure support, 
and to access remote communities, often in areas with limited ADS-B 
ground-based coverage. As UAS operations integrate into this same low-
altitude airspace, what technology exists today, or is being developed 
by industry, to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed 
aircraft both equipped with and without ADS-B in those environments?
 Answer. ADS-B equipage on piloted aircraft is one component of 
addressing safety, but not the complete system. It is essential that 
UAS aircraft and their operators invest in Detect And Avoid (DAA) 
technologies that addresses the risks introduced by aircraft being 
operated without a pilot onboard and in the context of the regulatory 
framework that has existed since the 1940s for see-and-avoid 
responsibilities. The FAA has released initial guidance for DAA systems 
which GAMA welcomes. The FAA has also supported work with several GAMA 
members to further flesh out DAA system requirements. This is very 
positive and we continue to encourage the agency to do this work both 
for the unique airspace and operational environment in Alaska, but also 
to advance UAS integration in the continental United States.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 James A. Viola
 FAA Management System & Accountability. Aviation manufacturers 
represented by GAMA have been required to implement Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) since the 2020 Aircraft Certification Reform Act. 
However, recent events have raised concerns about the FAA's own safety 
oversight and internal risk management.
 The NTSB's investigation into the 2024 Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 
incident identified significant gaps in FAA oversight of manufacturers. 
Additionally, the NTSB found that in the three years leading up to the 
DCA collision, there were more than 15,000 close-proximity incidents 
between commercial aircraft and helicopters, data the FAA failed to act 
on.
 These examples point to a broader concern, the FAA's ability to 
monitor and manage its own safety performance may be inadequate without 
clear direction from Congress and stronger internal accountability 
mechanisms. Taken together, these incidents underscore the need to 
strengthen FAA safety management processes, improve safety culture, and 
ensure the agency can proactively identify and mitigate risks.

 Question 1. My SMS bill would establish an independent panel of 
safety experts to evaluate the FAA's approach to safety management and 
risk oversight, with the goal of creating a more integrated and 
effective agency-wide SMS. Do you believe this panel would improve the 
FAA's ability to identify and address safety risks?
 Answer. GAMA is a strong proponent of Safety Management Systems and 
pleased to support the FAA SMS Compliance Review Act of 2026 and agrees 
the panel would complement FAA's efforts to identify and address safety 
risks internally and externally.

 Question 2. How important is it for the FAA to implement a 
comprehensive, agency-wide SMS to ensure it is held to the same safety 
standards as the industry it regulates?
 Answer. GAMA agrees and supports implementation of an agency-wide 
SMS for the FAA that will ensure the agency is held to the same 
standards as the entities it regulates. We also believe that creating 
this safety culture will yield better safety outcomes for the agency, 
its partners, and the flying public.

 Question 3. From your perspective, what are the most significant 
gaps in the FAA's current safety management and oversight framework?
 Answer. The FAA must ensure that the agency leverages all data 
available to the agency for both its internal SMS and the on-going 
oversight being conducted for compliance across 14 CFR. The FAA does 
not have a shortage of data sources, but the agency needs to make 
appropriate investment to integrate the data--where appropriate and not 
restricted by statute--and providing access to the specific and overall 
data in a manner beneficial to staff and leadership levels.

 Question 4. How can the FAA improve its ability to act on safety 
data, such as trends seen in near miss incidents, before they result in 
accidents?
 Answer. First, the FAA should monitor safety trends, but must 
ensure that the monitoring of safety data is a shared responsibility 
between the regulator conducting oversight and the regulated party 
specifically and more broadly the industry stakeholders that can impact 
change. Near miss incidents should be monitored, but these are only a 
component of the safety focus areas that may warrant attention. While 
near-miss incidents have recently been in the press and were the cause 
of the most recent major airline accident in 2025, the agency must be 
data-driven when prioritizing the agency resources for safety. Placing 
long-term focus on the priorities that are risks for the U.S. National 
Airspace System is how both maintaining and improving aviation safety 
is best managed by the regulator and by industry.

 Question 5. What role should industry stakeholders, including 
manufacturers and operators, play in strengthening the FAA's SMS and 
overall safety culture?
 Answer. Both manufacturers and operators have their own Safety 
Management Systems as established by 14 CFR Part 5. Manufacturers will 
work to advance and manage safety based on their SMS. Similarly, 
managing safety will be done by way of an SMS by operators. The FAA's 
challenge is both its SMS as the operational entity and Air Navigation 
Service Provider of the NAS and also to utilize the SMS to inform 
aggregate safety areas of concern when conducting oversight and 
establishing priorities. The industry--operator and manufacturer--SMS 
should have a mechanism by which safety findings are provided to the 
FAA at the aggregate level and vice versa the FAA should ensure that 
the national safety priorities that the agency is monitoring by way of 
its SMS are provided to the regulated parties as an input into both 
operators and manufacturer SMS to inform their process and safety 
management activities.

 Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the 
past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and 
cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting 
systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, 
primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened 
situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier 
and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. 
General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools 
can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have 
emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not 
yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven 
equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and 
ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that 
slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers 
are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the 
operating environment, particularly in complex airspace.

 Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which 
technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, 
or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment 
within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations 
take to accelerate their adoption?
 Answer. There is not a shortage of currently available technologies 
in use today and also several in various stages of research and 
development (R&D) and standards development. GAMA's view is from the 
airborne equipage side more so than ground-based solutions that do 
address these safety risks. Today's general aviation aircraft are 
equipped with Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) both TCAS II 
and TCAS I as well as Traffic Awareness System (TAS) that have 
addressed airborne collision risks for decades. Each provide a traffic 
picture to the pilot with different types information provided to the 
pilot based on their operation. Additionally, approximately 150,000 
general aviation aircraft are currently equipped with installed ADS-B 
IN technologies that have ADS-B IN applications that address runway 
safety, including surface alerting or the more simple awareness. The 
FAA has also long allowed for the display of own-ship position on both 
installed and portable Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) displays that show 
the pilot aircraft in context of other aircraft traffic and location on 
the runway to reduce the risk of errors being made by the pilot. We see 
this investment made by our members and by our customers--the aircraft 
operators--being a success story. To get expanded equipage with these 
existing technologies beyond the 75 plus percent of the fleet that have 
ADS-B IN installed today, as an example, the FAA serves a critical role 
in allowing for the standards development, adoption of the standards in 
certification documents and the associated guidance, and providing an 
effective and predictable certification process that enables bringing 
these technologies to the market and into the fleet where the airborne 
equipage can improve safety.

 Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification 
obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, 
and how can they be addressed without compromising safety?
 Answer. As articulated in my written testimony, there are four main 
areas that can be obstacles to the implementation of safety enhancing 
technology. They are:

 Certification: If the FAA does not have the focus, resources, 
workforce capacity, and technological expertise to provide appropriate 
oversight and approval, it may inhibit safety enhancements from 
reaching the marketplace in a timely manner. Modernization of FAA 
certification processes to keep pace with innovation enables safety 
through new products and technologies and is critical given the current 
state of innovation and other regulatory demands that are increasing.
 Standards Development and Validation: Another important component 
to developing and certifying safety enhancing equipment is FAA 
participation and collaboration with industry and global standards 
bodies to achieve technical consensus for new products and 
technologies. The FAA must remain an active partner with standards 
bodies, other regulators, and industry partners to help promote 
harmonization of standards for products in the global marketplace.
 Product Availability and Supply Chain: Like other industries that 
are complex, the aviation sector has experienced challenges associated 
with its supply chain. First, FAA certification of safety enhancement 
is followed by production approval of the product and individual parts 
and equipment. As such, if there is a supply chain impediment with a 
part it can impact the ability of 10 the broader safety enhancement 
getting to the marketplace. Second, aviation supply chain and 
operations are international, so broader domestic or international 
trade policies can potentially impact or constrain the marketplace.
 Installation and Maintenance Capacity: Installation of equipment is 
the final step in this process. Aircraft are routinely serviced and 
inspected to ensure safety and airworthiness. Today, many of GAMA's 
member companies who work in the maintenance, repair, and overhaul 
(MRO) space share that they are nearing or at capacity with existing 
work.

 Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and 
air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common 
operating picture for both pilots and controllers?
 Answer. We are today in an environment where the aircraft, 
especially general aviation aircraft, may have a better situational 
awareness picture than air traffic controllers providing separation 
services. This is true for ADS-B IN, but also weather information. 
There are some of these datasets that are enabled for pilots in the 
cockpit such as the current uplink of transponder-only aircraft targets 
to the cockpit using the Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) 
services and the ADS-B surveillance network also providing Flight 
Information Services Broadcast (FIS-B) with weather and other 
operational information to pilots. When the ADS-B program was scoped by 
the FAA in the early 2000s, the agency made a commitment to aviation 
safety and the general aviation industry specifically to provide these 
services as a benefit to aircraft owners acquiring ADS-B OUT equipment. 
We've seen this investment in the FAA's infrastructure materialize into 
safety improvements that are not seen outside the United States.

 Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close 
the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, 
particularly for smaller operators?
 Answer. GAMA strongly believes that any equipage requirements 
implemented by Congress must underscore the importance of solutions 
like EFBs and portable devices which can provide flexibility and 
utility while maintaining safety. Any policy effort in this area must 
reflect the reality of general aviation's leadership in ADS-B Out and 
ADS-B In equipage over the past dozen plus years.
 For context, the FAA's ADS-B Out equipage rebate program, 
implemented prior to the 2020 mandate coming into effect, provided an 
incentive for installation that was coordinated with the MRO community 
and avionics providers to effectively manage parts supply and 
maintenance capacity. This example serves as a model but also 
highlights the need for collaboration amongst government and industry 
to enable safety solutions to reach the cockpit.

 Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use 
internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States 
to enhance near-term safety?
 Answer. GAMA has an international membership with manufacturers in 
both the United States and in Brazil, Canada, the European Union, and 
the United Kingdom and avionics and technologies are developed and 
certificated within each of those jurisdictions. But, all our members 
are working along similar technology roadmaps and the establishment of 
technology standards is one where the United States and the FAA 
specifically is a leader. Several of the technologies that are in 
operation today in the general aviation fleet are also specifically 
U.S.-unique capabilities that have not necessarily been adopted at the 
same rate by our operators customers in foreign markets.

 Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of 
deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence 
prioritization decisions?
 Answer. The United States--unlike other countries--has primarily 
advanced technology introduction in the flight deck without regulatory 
mandates. This is a component of the U.S. regulatory system where the 
same constraints on advancing regulations do not necessarily exist 
outside the country. What we do see is that technologies that do 
provide benefits are also adopted by aircraft owners without the FAA 
advancing a mandate, but simply enabling the certification and 
installation of the technology through enabling rules and policies. 
While the FAA advance a surveillance mandate in the 2010s for a next 
generation transponder, the so called ADS-B OUT system, the FAA has not 
mandated any changes for communication or navigation airborne equipage, 
and yet, the United States fleet has adoption and use of both 
Controlled Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) and Performance-Based 
Navigation (PBN) in the fleet at significantly higher rates than what 
we see elsewhere. If there is a case for the new equipment from a 
benefits side that outweighs the investment cost, we do see investments 
being made. This is why we have over 6,283 general and business 
aviation airplanes equipped to participate in the FAA ground CPDLC 
services because of operational benefits and the FAA has not advanced 
any regulatory mandate and--of those--4,619 general and business 
aviation airplanes use the FAA's enroute CPDLC services. We have more 
airplanes in our segment of the aviation partaking in these operations 
than our airline colleagues simply because the cost-benefit makes 
sense. The story is the same for navigation where equipage with Wide 
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) capable navigation receivers is the 
standard since the early 2000s and have enabled access to large and 
rural airports across the United States for close to 200,000 aircraft. 
Our community has also adopted Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) 
airborne equipment on over 4,000 business jets which provides for 
safety and operational benefits since the FAA introduced its enabling 
rule in 14 CFR 91.176.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to 
 James A. Viola
Tariffs
 The aerospace manufacturing industry has been a success story for 
American trade. In 2024, the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry had 
a net positive export trade balance of $104 billion.
 However, the Trump administration's chaotic rollout and haphazard 
trade wars severely hurt the economy and introduced an enormous amount 
of uncertainty to American manufacturing.

 Question 1. In general, how does increasing the costs of aviation 
manufacturing inputs ultimately benefit or harm consumers?
 Answer. While general aviation manufacturers continue to deliver 
product into the global marketplace, uncertainty from trade policy has 
caused some volatility. The most recent GAMA Shipment and Billings 
Report provides context on impacts.

 Question 2. How have President Trump's tariffs on materials--such 
as aluminum and steel--impacted the general aviation manufacturing 
industry?
 Answer. Aviation manufacturing depends on certainty to enable 
product to reach a marketplace which is global in nature. Proposed or 
implemented tariffs on materials, despite the current/prior zero-tariff 
environment, have the potential to impact the supply chain and imports. 
GAMA continues to advocate for a zero-tariff regime with policymakers 
and the administration.

 Question 3. In what ways has the trade war impacted the 
competitiveness of American general aviation aircraft exports?
 Answer. GAMA's 2025 Shipment Report highlights deliveries to the 
global marketplace and illustrate relative stability.
Workforce Readiness
 As I emphasized in my opening statement, the aviation workforce 
must be at the center of the conversation around new technologies.
 How is GAMA supporting workforce readiness--especially considering 
rapid technology upgrades--for mechanics, pilots and avionics 
technicians?
 Answer. GAMA is proud to support workforce development efforts in 
collaboration with our member companies. The most prominent effort is 
our Aviation Design Challenge which promotes Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) education through aviation 
curriculum and a virtual fly-off in high schools across the United 
States.
 Over 70 high school teams, representing 31 states, entered the 2026 
GAMA Aviation Design Challenge. During the first portion of the 
challenge, teams used complimentary ``Fly to Learn'' curriculum to 
learn the principles of flight and airplane design. During the second 
portion of the competition, teams applied their knowledge to modify the 
design of an airplane and complete a fly-off mission using X-Plane 
software. The 2026 winners, from Milton Georgia, had the opportunity to 
experience general aviation manufacturing firsthand at Cubcrafters in 
Yakima, Washington. Redbird Flight Simulations has also generously 
provided a two-day STEM Lab Camp for a team in the competition. More 
information can be found at Fly to Learn.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Captain Jason Ambrosi
 Implementation of ADS-B In Addressing Runway Safety. As air traffic 
continues to grow and airport operations become more complex, the risk 
of runway collision will also increase. Runway operations remain one of 
the highest-risk phases of flight in the United States. In April 2024, 
a JetBlue flight was cleared for takeoff and nearly collided with a 
Southwest Airlines flight cleared to cross the same runway at DCA. 
Incidents like this highlight the need to strengthen efforts to prevent 
runway safety events, alongside implementing NTSB's recommended reforms 
related to the DCA crash. The ROTOR Act takes both approaches. The 
ROTOR Act ADS-B In standard would provide pilots with enhanced 
situational awareness and timely traffic alerts to help prevent 
collisions on the airport surface and in the air.

 Question 1. In your view, how important is it that the commercial 
fleet is equipped with ADS-B In enabled cockpit alerting runway safety 
technologies--known as SURF-IA--as included under the ROTOR Act's ADS-B 
In standard--to avoid serious runway safety incidents?
 Answer. It is essential that the entire airline fleet have ADS-B In 
enabled flight deck technologies for both airborne and airport surface 
safety applications. Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the 
Surface with Indications and Alerts, provides direct surface safety 
alerts to the flight crew. The ADS-B In surface safety application both 
``indicates'' to pilots' safety-relevant traffic and provides alerts to 
facilitate pilots' immediate awareness and response to a potential 
collision hazard. Much like the ``airborne'' benefits of ADS-B In that 
have been discussed at length, the ROTOR Act's requirements for ADS-B 
In surface applications will provide flight crews increased awareness 
of what's happening around them at the airport by identifying the 
runway and taxiway traffic status under normal operational conditions 
and alerting pilots to any abnormal traffic conditions that will enable 
them to take evasive action.

 Question 2. Do you believe ADS-B In applications like this could 
help prevent another incident like the one at LaGuardia Airport from 
happening again? If yes, please explain why.
 Answer. While this accident is still an open NTSB investigation, 
there is no question that this additional life-saving technology could 
have been deployed to either prevent or mitigate this accident. The 
preliminary NTSB report determined that the ARFF vehicle involved in 
the accident at LaGuardia did not have an ADS-B transmitter that would 
have allowed it to be depicted as a vehicle to ATC. Although the FAA 
recently announced plans to equip all FAA-owned surface vehicles with 
ADS-B transmitters, there are no FAA requirements to equip all ground 
vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up to airports to voluntarily 
install them.

 The Immediacy of ADS-B Integration into Commercial Fleet. The NTSB 
recommended for the 18th time in February that the FAA require ADS-B In 
configured with audible alerting in response to the DCA mid-air 
collision. In their final investigation report, the NTSB covered 
multiple forms of ADS-B In enabled technologies to enhance situational 
awareness for pilots. However, some industry stakeholders have 
continued to cite lengthy implementation timelines for ADS-B In and the 
challenges of integrating a fully capable flightdeck technology suite 
across the commercial fleet--despite FAA data showing widespread 
equipage.

 Question 1. Why are so many ALPA pilots you represent calling for 
integrated ADS-B In capabilities on the flight deck?
 Answer. Integrated ADS-B In safety applications have substantial 
benefits compared to alternative technologies under consideration, 
including earlier and faster adoption, superior alerting and 
situational awareness capabilities in both the terminal and enroute 
environments, reduced human factors complications, and safety 
applications for surface operations. ADS-B In has long been recommended 
by the NTSB and is a proven technology in use. Manufacturers have 
successfully developed or are in the process of developing fully 
integrated systems for commercial aircraft, retrofits for several 
transport category aircraft types, including MHI regional jet aircraft, 
and low-cost options for other segments of the aviation industry.

 Question 2. How do you respond to those who argue that no 
integrated ADS-B In solutions exist today and that it would take at 
least a decade to implement them across the commercial fleet?
 Answer. As previously stated, manufacturers have successfully 
developed or are in the process of developing fully integrated systems 
for commercial aircraft, retrofit kits for regional jet aircraft, and 
low-cost options for other segments of the aviation industry.

 Question 3. Considering that TCAS/ACAS provides only reactive 
alerts and does not offer the kind of continuous, wide-area situational 
awareness that integrated ADS-B In/CDTI can deliver, do you believe the 
FAA's current position, as stated by Administrator Bedford to wait for 
congressional direction, adequately addresses known safety gaps? Or do 
you believe it risks leaving pilots without critical forward-looking 
traffic awareness needed to prevent future incidents?
 Answer. Given that TCAS/ACAS is fundamentally designed to be 
reactive to an imminent collision, versus the far greater lead time 
ADS-B In/CDTI can provide, waiting on Congress rather than mandating 
integration leaves a known, documented safety gap in place. Without a 
mandate to equip, pilots will continue flying without the continuous, 
forward-looking situational awareness that integrated ADS-B In offers.
 Relying instead exclusively on TCAS's late, narrow alerts is the 
limitation identified as a contributing factor in the PSA fatal 
collision. This is ultimately a policy judgment about who requires the 
mandate (FAA vs. Congress) rather than a factual dispute about the 
safety benefit itself. If recent news reports are accurate, that the 
FAA is considering initiating an ADS-B In rulemaking without waiting 
for congressional direction, it would be critical that any FAA proposal 
results in an integrated ADS-B In implementation, as specified in the 
ROTOR Act.

 Question 4. How does integrating ADS-B In traffic directly into the 
pilot's primary instrument scan via a certified CDTI change pilot 
behavior compared to relying on intermittent TCAS advisories or head-
down devices like Electronic Flight Bags? What are the human factors 
risks of keeping critical traffic awareness within or outside of the 
normal scan?
 Answer. A certified, integrated CDTI puts traffic awareness and 
visual alerting inside the pilot's normal instrument scan, so it's 
continuously available and visible without competing for attention. 
Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs)/tablets require pilots to look down and 
away from the flight path and primary displays to a separate device 
that's often used for other tasks. The human factors risk is that 
anything outside the primary instrument cluster scan gets deprioritized 
under high workload--as seen when the Black Hawk crew that collided 
with PSA flight 5342 stopped monitoring their tablets during a 
demanding low-level flight, meaning traffic information is not 
available in the critical moments when collision risk is highest.

 Question 5. In dense terminal environments like Washington 
National's Class B airspace, where multiple aircraft are maneuvering 
simultaneously, how does early situational awareness from ADS-B In 
change pilot and controller outcomes compared to relying on TCAS alerts 
and ATC instruction alone?
 Answer. Early ADS-B In situational awareness and associated alerts, 
shift the safety architecture from a single reactive layer (TCAS's 
last-second warning) toward genuine, sustained situational awareness. 
This will allow the pilot to see the same congested picture that the 
controller is managing and can independently recognize and avoid a 
developing conflict well before ATC instruction or a TCAS-generated 
alert.

 Question 6. The NTSB has stated that portable devices are not a 
substitute for integrated avionics. From a certification and 
reliability standpoint, what risks arise when pilots depend on non-
integrated ADS-B displays instead of certified, panel-mounted CDTI 
systems?
 Answer. A portable or EFB-based implementation strips away the 
certification standards, guaranteed alerting integration, and physical 
accessibility that make the technology dependable when it matters most. 
The risk of using a portable or non-integrated display is that anything 
outside the primary scan gets deprioritized under high workload.

 Question 7. The NTSB has now issued multiple recommendations over 
many years calling for wider adoption of ADS-B In with alerting. What 
does it say about the current safety framework that the same 
recommendation must be repeated 18 times before action is taken?
 Answer. The repetition doesn't reflect a weakness in the NTSB's 
analysis or its recommendations. The NTSB's role is to identify the 
risks and hazards as part of its investigations and make 
recommendations to the appropriate agency responsible for implementing 
the recommendations. That is a key piece of the NTSB's independent 
authority. It is then incumbent upon the responsible agency to review, 
assess, and implement the recommendations. In this case, it does 
demonstrate a need for the responsible agency to have better processes 
in place to address these recommendations.

 Question 8. Do you believe that TCAS/ACAS is fundamentally a last 
line of defense, while integrated ADS-B In represents an earlier 
preventative layer, and that failing to require both leaves a known gap 
in the safety system?
 Answer. Yes, TCAS/ACAS is not obsolete and ADS-B In alone is not 
sufficient. No single layer is infallible, TCAS still serves as a 
critical backstop for scenarios where the earlier layer fails 
(equipment malfunction, an unequipped intruder aircraft, a pilot who 
misses the ATC initiated alert). Relying on the last-line-of-defense 
layer alone, without requiring the earlier flight-deck based 
preventative layer that's been technically available and repeatedly 
recommended, leaves the system without the redundancy that layered 
safety design is supposed to provide. This understanding of the layered 
collision avoidance benefits of integrated ADS-B In is consistent with 
how the NTSB has characterized the gap, and it is consistent with what 
the PSA accident data itself shows: TCAS operated as designed still was 
not enough.

 System-Wide Warnings: Close Calls as Indicators of FAA Workforce 
Strain. In recent months, there has been a concerning rise in serious 
runway incursions and near miss incidents across the aviation system. 
Many of these events were avoided by mere seconds or minimal distance, 
underscoring how close they came to becoming catastrophic. While the 
United States maintains one of the safest aviation systems in the 
world, these incidents are not acceptable. Rather, they serve as early 
warning signs that elements of the system are under strain and that 
existing safeguards may not be keeping pace with current operational 
demands.
 The FAA and industry stakeholders have acknowledged these risks, 
convened safety summits and identified key contributing factors, 
including workforce shortages, controller fatigue, and uneven 
implementation of Safety Management Systems. Recognition of these 
issues is an important first step, but meaningful risk reduction 
depends on decisive and sustained action.

 Question 1. Staffing shortages and fatigue are repeatedly 
identified as system-wide concerns. What specific actions are you 
currently taking to address workforce capacity and fatigue in the near 
term? Additionally, what legislative or regulatory changes are needed 
to ensure these issues do not continue to erode safety margins?
 Answer. ALPA supports extending the maximum controller hiring 
requirement in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and increasing such 
requirements in future years.
 Without sustainable hiring, training, and staffing, the FAA will 
struggle to maintain the current capacity and safety of the system, 
much less modernizing or expanding it for new users.
 Congress should fund ATC modernization with staffing and training 
capacity built in as a required component--not just hardware and 
software line items. Treat controller staffing adequacy as a codified 
requirement (not a discretionary budget line), the same way the 
accident involving Colgan Air flight 3407 led to codified pilot 
qualification and rest-rule reform.

 Question 2. How are you measuring whether recent interventions 
including hiring initiatives, scheduling changes, or fatigue mitigation 
programs are tangibly improving safety outcomes?
 Answer. Without a legislative mandate requiring the FAA to define 
success metrics, complete the fatigue-safety research already 
identified as missing, and report results transparently and 
collaboratively with labor and industry stakeholders, we have no way to 
truly understand the success of these interventions. Congress should 
require the agency to build that capability rather than accept good 
intentions as a substitute for evidence.

 Question 3. In your opinion, what barriers prevent the consistent 
implementation of Safety Management Systems across all operators and 
facilities? How can those barriers be addressed?
 Answer. Safety Management System (SMS) processes and procedures 
work as intended only when they function as genuine collaboration 
between the organization, labor, and regulator. Frontline reporting 
only works if controllers trust that their input will influence the 
operation. In addition, ALPA needs to have full voting-member status on 
FAA Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Safety Risk Management Panels rather 
than delegated to serve as a subject matter expert. Congress needs to 
fully fund and accelerate FAA SMS rollout agency wide and ensure 
sustained front-line worker staffing so that SMS reviews are not the 
first casualty of an overstretched workforce.

 Question 4. From an airline perspective, how are lessons learned 
from recent near-miss incidents systematically captured and shared to 
prevent recurrence?
 Answer. On a recurring basis airline management, pilots, and an FAA 
representative review all voluntarily submitted Aviation Safety Action 
Program (ASAP) reports to determine how to proactively address any 
identified safety risks. This is deliberately structured as non-
punitive, and the reports are de-identified specifically so that near-
misses get reported and analyzed.
 Safety programs like the U.S. Aviation Safety Team (AST) and 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) identify 
emerging trends, analyze risk, and develop voluntary safety 
enhancements to address risk. ASIAS aggregates de-identified safety 
data across multiple carriers so that an individual carrier can 
benchmark their safety metrics against the industry, and U.S. AST uses 
the safety intelligence derived from the aggregated voluntary data to 
drive coordinated, industry-level safety interventions rather than each 
airline learning the same lesson independently.

 Near Term Technology Solutions in the National Air Space. Over the 
past decade we have seen progress driven by advanced avionics and 
cockpit technologies including improved moving maps, traffic alerting 
systems, and synthetic vision that have helped reduce accidents, 
primarily in civil aviation. These innovations have strengthened 
situational awareness and, in many cases, provided pilots with earlier 
and clearer warnings that help prevent accidents before they escalate. 
General aviation has often led the way in demonstrating how these tools 
can make a meaningful difference. At the same time, many have 
emphasized that the full safety benefits of these technologies are not 
yet realized. Industry panels have repeatedly highlighted uneven 
equipage across fleets, gaps in integration between airborne and 
ground-based systems, and barriers to certification and deployment that 
slow the adoption of proven tools. As a result, pilots and controllers 
are not always operating with shared, real-time understanding of the 
operating environment, particularly in complex airspace.

 Question 1. Across both commercial and general aviation, which 
technologies such as runway awareness systems, surface alerting tools, 
or enhanced traffic displays are mature enough for near-term deployment 
within the next one to five years? What actions can your organizations 
take to accelerate their adoption?
 Answer. Across commercial and general aviation, the technologies 
ready for near-term deployment (expanded use) are already in the field 
or on the market: ASDE-X/ASSC and Runway Status Lights (proven but 
limited to a handful of airports), the FAA's Surface Awareness 
Initiative (SAI) system (deploying now but alerting logic needs to be 
added), Approach Runway Verification (ARV) (already at 77 towers, 
targeting 500+), a mature vendor ecosystem of aircraft-based surface 
alerting tools (Boeing/Honeywell RAAS, Airbus ROPS, Collins Airport 
Surface Awareness, SURF-IA/SURF-A, etc.), and ADS-B In, including 
regional-jet retrofit kits. What's not near-term ready is ACAS-Xa 
(rulemaking unlikely to be complete before 2031-2035), and fully 
alerting capabilities included in SAI.
 To accelerate adoption, Congress needs to pass the integrated ADS-B 
In aspects of the ROTOR Act that includes mandates with firm timelines; 
add alerting to SAI, require ADS-B transmitters on airport ground 
vehicles, and speed up ARV rollout.

 Question 2. What are the primary regulatory or certification 
obstacles that continue to delay the deployment of these technologies, 
and how can they be addressed without compromising safety?
 Answer. The core obstacle is not technical; it is a regulatory 
choice. There are no mandates to install or activate surface systems on 
commercial aircraft. Similarly, on ground vehicles, there are no FAA 
requirements to equip ground vehicles with transmitters, leaving it up 
to airports to voluntarily install them. Congress needs to mandate 
action.

 Question 3. How can interoperability between airborne systems and 
air traffic control infrastructure be improved to ensure a common 
operating picture for both pilots and controllers?
 Answer. Pilots, controllers, and even ground vehicle operators are 
often working from different, non-synchronized pictures of the same 
airport and airspace landscape. True interoperability requires three 
things aligned simultaneously; universal mandated data transmission 
(closing military/vehicle gaps); consistent processing of that data 
into alerts to the pilots, controllers and vehicle operators (common 
alerting); and air traffic control modernization that integrates 
domestic, terminal, surface, and oceanic environments as one system.

 Question 4. What incentives or policy mechanisms could help close 
the equipage gap across different segments of the aviation community, 
particularly for smaller operators?
 Answer. NTSB can recommend equipage support programs, but has no 
authority to fund or mandate them, and the FAA has historically been 
slow to convert ``available and beneficial'' technology into ``funded 
and required'' technology even at the commercial level. It is incumbent 
upon the FAA to act and ensure that these technologies are required.
 An alternative method of compliance should be provided for aircraft 
with a maximum certificated takeoff weight of less than 12,500 pounds 
when operated under 14 CFR Part 91. The use of portable ADS-B 
receivers, EFBs, or panel mounted displays provided the installation or 
use does not adversely affect other required avionics or the 
airworthiness of the aircraft, should be considered.
 In addition, all vehicles operating on the airport movement area 
should be required to be equipped with transponders.

 Question 5. Are there specific technologies already in use 
internationally that could be more rapidly adopted in the United States 
to enhance near-term safety?
 Answer. ALPA demands safety no matter where our pilots fly. 
Mandating fully integrated ADS-B In ensures U.S. crews have the best 
available situational awareness tool in every operating environment, 
domestic or international, rather than leaving that capability optional 
or dependent on which aircraft or route a pilot happens to be assigned. 
Where other countries' airspace and equipage standards fall short of 
what our pilots rely on domestically, that's exactly why ADS-B In 
equipage and space-based ADS-B, already integrated internationally, 
need to be fully leveraged by U.S. carriers and the FAA, so our crews 
aren't operating with a degraded picture simply because they have left 
U.S. airspace.'' ADS-B Out mandates are now in effect in more than 30 
countries and Flight Information Regions worldwide. This includes all 
EU member states and non-EU Single European Sky participants and most 
countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

 Question 6. How do you evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoffs of 
deploying these technologies at scale, and what factors influence 
prioritization decisions?
 Answer. ALPA acknowledges cost as a real constraint (e.g., RWSL 
installation is a major undertaking, extensive and expensive, and ALPA 
has called for new or existing Federal grant programs to fund and 
facilitate deployment). The distinction is that ALPA wants cost treated 
as a funding problem to solve, not a threshold that determines whether 
deployment of safety systems happens at all. When a documented safety 
gap exists, cost should not function as a veto, only as an 
implementation-planning variable.
 ALPA consistently prioritizes technologies tied directly to 
documented accident causation. Integrated ADS-B In gets top billing 
precisely because NTSB simulations show it would have provided earlier 
alerts in the DCA collision, and because the LaGuardia accident traced 
directly to a missing ADS-B transmitter on a ground vehicle.
 Technologies without that direct accident linkage (e.g., 
efficiency-focused automation upgrades) are treated as lower priority, 
even when they're technically mature. Surface safety systems need to be 
installed at all airports as soon as possible, given the urgency of the 
current situation, and in anticipation of exponential traffic growth, 
if we are going to prevent near misses as well as accidents, the cost-
benefit decision-making process must be reconsidered to aggressively 
pursue these safety advancements.

 Technology in High Density Low Altitude Airspace. As you know, the 
FAA has proposed a regulatory framework for beyond visual line of sight 
(BVLOS) drone operations, as directed by this Committee in the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2024. While this proposal represents a step 
toward integrating uncrewed aircraft systems into the national 
airspace, there are concerns that it may not go far enough to ensure 
safety.
 Specifically, the proposal does not consistently require drones to 
have the capability to detect and avoid aircraft who are not 
broadcasting their position across many operating environments, 
including suburban areas where drone activity is already expanding and 
expected to grow significantly. This raises questions about whether the 
framework fully accounts for the realities of shared airspace, 
particularly from the perspective of crewed aviation operators who rely 
on see-and-avoid principles and layered safety protections.

 Question 1. From your perspective, do you believe the FAA's 
proposed BVLOS rule adequately protects against the risk of midair 
collisions between drones and crewed aircraft?
 Answer. ALPA, for more than a decade, has been very concerned about 
the collision hazard associated with UAS operations. The FAA should not 
implement any rule or exemption to transfer collision avoidance to 
manned/crewed aircraft through the application of a DAA standard or 
allow the aircraft manufacturer or aircraft operator to ``self-
declare'' the capability or compliance to a given ACAS/Detect and Avoid 
(DAA) standard. This technical capability must be validated by the FAA 
during aircraft certification processes before operational approval is 
granted. The proposed BVLOS rule that the FAA released, at best does 
the bare minimum, and stands behind a wall that shelters itself behind 
proprietary information as a means of accepted compliance when it comes 
to protections against mid-air collisions between drones and crewed 
aircraft.

 Question 2. If not, what specific changes should the FAA make in 
the final rule to ensure drones can reliably detect and avoid crewed 
aircraft, particularly those that are not broadcasting their position?
 Answer. BVLOS UAS operations should not be authorized in controlled 
airspace (i.e., Class B, C, D, and E airspace) until safety data has 
been proven and shown as acceptable. This also means that there should 
not be operations in, around, or near airports. The FAA should also 
explicitly state to accept/recognize technical standards developed by 
RTCA Special Committee 228 for DAA DO-365C, Ground Based DAA (GBDAA DO-
381), and Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS sXu) DO-396, as the 
minimum standards for detect and avoid operations for all UAS or other 
terms used to describe aircraft that do not have a pilot onboard the 
aircraft. These technical standards require the aircraft to be capable 
of detecting and avoiding both cooperative and non-cooperative, crewed, 
and uncrewed aircraft.

 Question 3. How significant is the risk posed by non-cooperative 
aircraft in high density airspace?
 Answer. The risk is substantial; in the past couple of years, we 
have seen unplanned airspace closures near commercial airports from the 
fear that non-cooperative drones may collide with manned aircraft on a 
departure or approach. Whether the drone is nefarious or clueless, the 
risk is great, and there are countless incidents that go unreported. It 
is the responsibility of the FAA to diligently protect air carrier 
operations from the introduction of any new risks. Large commercial 
aircraft are particularly vulnerable on approach and departure at lower 
altitudes when maneuverability may be constrained. ALPA remains 
concerned about the dangers of collision or engine ingestion of drones, 
particularly on approach and departure, as well as the security threats 
posed by unauthorized drones.

 Question 4. Should detect-and-avoid capabilities be required 
universally for BVLOS operations or tailored based on airspace type and 
operational risk?
 Answer. ALPA would like to see the requirement for all BVLOS 
Operations to be equipped with a collision avoidance system 
(capability) that can detect all aircraft and not be limited to 
detecting and avoiding ``cooperative'' (Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) or Traffic Awareness Beacon System 
(TABS) equipped aircraft only).

 Question 5. How can the FAA ensure that drone operators maintain an 
equivalent level of safety to that expected in crewed aviation?
 Answer. The sharing of safety data and transparency to the FAA is 
essential to ensuring the safety of the NAS. The FAA needs to share 
this data with the industry to allow safety risk assessment analysis 
regarding operations and to put in place operational changes or 
mitigations to ensure operators of drones continually improve and 
adjust to the safety standard that the NAS has in place.
 The proposed rule is less stringent than those operators who 
receive a Part 107 license. The FAA needs to establish that remote 
pilots, especially those in this proposed rule, are held to the same 
safety standard and equivalent level of pilot training and 
certification as manned commercial pilots. The FAA disregarded the 
development of a remote pilot licensing framework for BVLOS. To ensure 
an equivalent level of safety, pilot training and certification must be 
established.

 Question 6. How can the FAA balance enabling innovation in the 
drone sector while maintaining the high safety standards expected in 
the national airspace?
 Answer. The FAA needs to maintain strong oversight and scrutinize 
each UAS operation, including each aircraft's technical capabilities, 
to ensure safety and reliability. The FAA needs to continue evaluating 
and reevaluating operations and their respective technologies. The FAA 
needs to conduct safety risk assessments to ensure an equivalent level 
of safety is met. Allowing UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS is not a 
one-size-fits-all blanket method; operators will need to be held 
accountable, and FAA oversight of those granted operations needs to be 
thoroughly assessed.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
 Captain Jason Ambrosi
 Forty years ago, pilots and air traffic managers operated with less 
accurate forecasts and guidance on weather hazards such as turbulence, 
icing and deicing, and wind shear. In the years since, the United 
States has become known as the global leader in aviation weather 
services primarily due to the federally-funded aviation weather 
research program at the FAA, which has supported critical research and 
technology development at the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR).
 Question 1. How have these advances in aviation weather forecasts 
changed the safety and capacity of the U.S. aviation system? Could 
today's volume of air traffic be safely and efficiently accommodated 
without these improved forecasts?
 Answer 1(a). NCAR is a highly effective research institution that 
has consistently translated atmospheric science into operational 
aviation-centric safety and efficiency gains within the NAS. Since the 
introduction of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) and the Low-Level 
Windshear Alert System (LLWAS)--systems pioneered through NCAR research 
in the 1980s--there have been no windshear-related accidents involving 
commercial airliners at equipped airports. This record alone represents 
a profound safety achievement.
 Beginning in the early 1990s, during the focus of aviation weather 
work at NCAR, scientists and engineers began to investigate a variety 
of hazardous weather conditions that impact the safety of aircraft 
operations in-flight and in the terminal area. Over the past three 
decades, Product Development Teams have conducted research and 
development efforts aimed at improving the detection, diagnosis, and 
forecasting of aviation weather, including convective weather, 
turbulence, icing, and winter weather, as well as ceiling and 
visibility for both domestic and oceanic/remote regions. Vital to the 
work of these teams has been an effort to improve basic atmospheric 
measurements, such as snowfall and turbulence, and to enhance the 
ability of radars and surface-based measurements to more accurately 
capture atmospheric conditions for pilots and air traffic control 
managers.
 NCAR also developed the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) standard, 
adopted as the global standard of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) for automated, objective turbulence reporting. EDR 
is widely used by pilots across multiple platforms to enhance 
situational awareness and mitigate turbulence risk. Importantly, EDR 
data also enhances NCAR-developed forecast models that support tactical 
and strategic turbulence guidance systems such as the Graphical 
Turbulence Guidance products. As turbulence remains the leading cause 
of injuries and accidents in commercial air carrier operations, these 
capabilities provide the observational foundation and forecast context 
needed to reduce injury risk and support operational decision-making. 
The safety dividends from this work are substantial and continue to 
grow.
 Beyond safety, NCAR has played a pivotal role in improving NAS 
efficiency, particularly during adverse weather conditions. Its 
research on Liquid Water Equivalent (LWE) significantly improved the 
FAA's understanding of freezing precipitation hazards across diverse 
airfield environments. This work directly enabled more precise deicing 
and anti-icing decision-making, while maintaining safety margins.
 Answer 1(b). No. Research has proven that stability of the NAS 
would be greatly diminished without these improved safety capabilities 
and forecasting efforts. Maintaining continuity of this work supports 
demonstrated safety gains, helps sustain NAS capacity and safety during 
high-impact weather, and reduces transition risk as aviation weather 
capabilities evolve to meet the FAA strategic objectives.

 Question 2. What economic efficiencies have resulted for aviation 
from these improved forecasts, and how would their loss impact the 
aviation sector?
 Answer. These improvements to aviation weather forecasting and 
atmospheric prediction, have collectively created substantial economic 
efficiencies across the aviation industry by increasing safety and by 
reducing uncertainty in flight planning and air carrier operations. 
Aviation is highly sensitive to weather conditions, so even incremental 
forecast improvements can produce significant cost savings across 
airlines, airports, air navigation service providers, and cargo 
operators throughout today's supply chain as they rely on schedule 
predictability.
 Some key efficiencies due to these improved forecasts include 
reduced fuel consumption, fewer delays and cancellations, lower 
maintenance and equipment costs, and improved safety with economic 
benefits. Avoiding weather-related events prevents costly accidents, 
investigations, aircraft damage, and injuries.
 More accurate wind, turbulence, and weather forecasts allow 
airlines to optimize routes and altitudes, reducing unnecessary 
deviations, operational disruptions, and excess fuel loading. Better 
prediction of severe weather enables proactive scheduling, crew 
planning, gate allocation, and efficient air traffic flow management. A 
safer industry is a more efficient industry.
 The loss or degradation of these forecasting capabilities would 
likely create cascading impacts throughout the aviation sector and 
increase costs exponentially. Economically, these effects compound 
rapidly because aviation functions as an interconnected network. 
Studies conducted by meteorological and aviation organizations have 
repeatedly estimated that weather-related disruptions cost the global 
aviation system billions of dollars annually.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Duckworth to 
 Captain Jason Ambrosi
Importance of Air Traffic Control Workforce
 The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a January 2026 
report that noted the number of air traffic controllers in the U.S. has 
declined by about 6 percent in the last decade. At the same time, there 
has been a 10 percent increase in the number of flights that rely on 
the air traffic control system. As a result, there have been severe and 
chronic staffing shortages at critical facilities.

 Question 1. How would achieving a fully staffed air traffic control 
workforce change the safety environment for pilots, particularly in 
terms of reducing controller fatigue, improving communication clarity, 
and preventing time-critical misinterpretations?
 Answer. A fully staffed controller workforce would change the 
safety environment for pilots in three ways. First, it would reduce the 
mandatory overtime and extended work weeks that understaffed facilities 
currently require, which is a documented fatigue risk factor. Second, 
it would ease per-controller workload in complex, high-density 
airspace, directly addressing 'high workload' and 'communication 
errors', which are factors that ALPA has identified as underlying 
causes of recent close calls. Third, and often overlooked, full 
staffing is what allows the FAA to train its workforce on the 
modernization technology.
 To maintain full staffing levels, the FAA will need to hire 
controllers above full staffing levels to ensure that staffing and 
attrition rates eventually align as controllers leave the workforce. 
Further, Congress should pass a bill that protects controller pay 
during government shutdowns, which may have contributed to some extent, 
to a 6 percent decline over the last decade.

 Question 2. Should implementing long-term solutions to end a 
dangerous status quo of a chronically understaffed and overworked air 
traffic control workforce be the number one priority and form the 
foundational pillar of any effort to build a so-called ``Brand New'' 
air traffic control system?
 Answer. Yes, long-term solutions are needed as part of the overall 
plan to address ATC staffing. A brand-new ATC system built on new 
automation platforms is only as good as the controllers that are 
trained and available to run it.
 Technology deployment is less beneficial if insufficient staffing 
remains an issue. Automation tools should not be used to resolve 
understaffing and will not produce a safer system. Staffing must be 
treated as a fully funded, non-negotiable component running in parallel 
with the technology rollout, because it's the one piece of the system 
with a fixed, multi-year lead time that no amount of later funding 
urgency can compress.

 Question 3. If Congress expanded the number of FAA Academies to 
operate additional primary training facilities in strategic locations 
to strengthen training and education capabilities and capacity, while 
maximizing recruitment and retention; along with providing upfront 
capital funding to academic institutions to enable the massive 
expansion of FAA enhanced Collegiate Training Initiative schools--
similar to the U.S. Armed Forces using a combination of service 
academies and a wide range of Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs 
at schools across the country to recruit, educate and train the next 
generation of military officers--what would be the short-term and long-
term benefits to strengthening our Nation's air traffic control system?
 Answer. Expanding FAA Academies to multiple regional locations, 
paired with upfront capital funding for Enhanced CTI schools, directly 
attacks the bottleneck GAO\1\ identified. Since a single centralized 
academy restricts how many candidates can move through the pipeline at 
once. Short term, expanding the pipeline would provide a steady flow of 
controller trainees through college-embedded training programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ GAO-26-107320, Air Traffic Control Workforce: FAA Should 
Establish Goals and Better Assess Its Hiring Processes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In the long term, a distributed network, modeled on the military 
service-academy-plus-ROTC approach, builds a more resilient pipeline 
that is not vulnerable to a single training facility's disruption (as 
shutdowns and COVID-19 proved it currently is).
 However, this does not solve the separate medical-clearance and 
security-screening bottlenecks GAO also documented.

 Question 4. We often hear that the new ATC technologies will vastly 
improve situational awareness. But pilots consistently say the 
technology will only be as safe as the culture behind it.
 This warning is validated by the findings of the National 
Transportation Safety Board investigation into the DCA midair 
collision, which found that despite FAA acquiring a time-based flow 
management (TBFM) system at the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar 
Approach Control (TRACON)--and despite FAA training TRACON personnel on 
operating the newly procured TBFM system--FAA management failed to 
fully implement the TBFM system at the Potomac TRACON.
 What specific cultural reforms does ALPA believe must be in place 
at FAA before, or alongside, system modernization to ensure the 
technology is effectively implemented and operationalized?
 Answer. The NTSB investigation documented that the FAA's Air 
Traffic Organization (ATO) had gaps in its Safety Management System 
(SMS) and deficiencies in their organizational safety culture that 
contributed to the accident. The NTSB recommended that the Department 
of Transportation convene an independent panel and conduct a 
comprehensive review of ATO's safety culture. ALPA notes that the 
Office of Inspector General at the Department of Transportation 
recently announced this safety culture review.
 Safety is a shared responsibility. When different stakeholders join 
forces, they promote a broader safety culture that is well informed of 
risk from multiple perspectives. We must have frontline worker 
inclusion (not just technology or headcount) as a culture-strengthening 
mechanism. The goal of SMS is to proactively identify active failures 
and inadequate mitigations so that risks can be contained while 
preventive measures can be adopted or reinforced.
 The NTSB's finding revealed that safety-relevant proposals from the 
field failed to reach FAA decision-makers. The most successful SMS 
programs incorporate a collaborative effort between the organization, 
labor, regulator, and equipment manufacturers. If a functioning SMS had 
been operating as designed at Potomac TRACON, a controller-submitted 
safety report and accompanying risk mitigation proposal is precisely 
the kind of input a SMS review is supposed to elevate to leadership.
 ALPA, as well as all stakeholders outside the FAA, should be 
granted full voting member status on all applicable Safety Risk 
Management Panels rather than limited to a subject matter expert role 
with no formal vote in the outcome. This will ensure that the 
operational expertise and safety judgment of the pilots who fly the 
line carry the same weight as other stakeholders in every risk 
determination that affects the flight deck.

 Question 5. As we prepare to integrate new tools, procedures and 
automation into the NAS, what is the danger of FAA relying on technical 
upgrades without fully confronting cultural complacency, leadership 
inconsistencies and burnout among frontline personnel?
 Answer. The danger is that an organization with unaddressed 
cultural complacency, inconsistent leadership follow-through, and a 
fatigued, understaffed workforce will leave the NAS with the appearance 
of modernization without the corresponding gain in actual safety 
margin, and place unwarranted trust in systems that are not being 
operated as designed.
 If an organization's safety culture does not confront cultural 
complacency, adding more sophisticated tools just adds more surface 
area for that cultural gap to hide in. Complex automation platforms 
cannot be meaningfully integrated into daily operations unless the 
culture actively demands full operational use, not just procurement 
success.
 ALPA's expectation is that the renamed and reconstituted National 
Airspace System Advisory Committee (NAC) carries forward that same 
collaborative environment as in the past, not just the acronym. The 
original NAC is a genuine model for how technology and culture problems 
can be solved together rather than separately. It forced continuous, 
structured collaboration between FAA, labor, industry, and other 
stakeholders on modernization decisions, rather than leaving those 
decisions to unilateral agency discretion.
1,500-Hour Rule
 With a rise in close calls coming out of the pandemic, the first 
major U.S. commercial aviation crash in over a decade, an overworked 
and understaffed air traffic controller workforce and antiquated air 
traffic control infrastructure and equipment, our pilots are our last 
line of defense. It is important now more than ever to continue to 
ensure that our pilots are the best trained pilots in the world.
 Please explain why aviation safety demands that Congress protect 
the 1,500-hour rule--a safety improvement that followed the Colgan 
tragedy--from any efforts to weaken it?
 Answer. The First Officer Qualification rule was not a 
precautionary measure. It was a direct legislative response to four 
fatal accidents where inexperience and inadequate training were 
identified as root causes. In all three of the earlier accidents 
(Pinnacle 3701, Corporate Airlines 5966, Comair 5191), the NTSB noted 
among its probable causes that the crews had deviated from standard 
operating procedures, and the final catalyst, Colgan Air Flight 3407, 
involved crewmembers' failure to adhere to certain standard procedures 
and their failure to properly monitor the operation during a critical 
phase of flight, with the NTSB explicitly highlighting the need for 
better pilot training. This is not a rule addressing a hypothetical 
risk, it is a rule written in direct response to a proven causal 
pathway between inexperience and fatal outcomes. During the 20-year 
period before the new regulation was enacted, the public witnessed 
nearly 1,100 fatalities related to U.S. airline accidents. Conversely, 
during the years between the introduction of the new rule in 2010 and 
2024, the related fatality rate dropped by 99.8 percent. Simply put, 
the first officer qualifications rule has saved lives. ALPA continues 
to strongly support the requirements for an Airline Transport Pilot 
(ATP)/Restricted ATP certificate and associated hourly flight minimums 
ALPA will strongly oppose any efforts to weaken the First Officer 
Qualifications rules.

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