IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES TO PROTECT AMERICA'S WATER INFRASTRUCTURE

Senate Public Works Committee Senate February 4, 2026

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[Senate Hearing 119-397]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-397

 IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY
 CHALLENGES TO PROTECT AMERICA'S WATER 
 INFRASTRUCTURE

=======================================================================

 HEARING

 before the

 COMMITTEE ON
 ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION
 __________

 FEBRUARY 4, 2026
 __________
 

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 
 
 
 
 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 
 ______
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

63-622 WASHINGTON : 2026 

 
 
 
 

 COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia, Chairman
 SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island, Ranking Member

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK KELLY, Arizona
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ALEX PADILLA, California
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas ANGELA D. ALSOBROOKS, Maryland
JON HUSTED, Ohio

 Adam Tomlinson, Republican Staff Director
 Dan Dudis, Democratic Staff Director
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page

 FEBRUARY 4, 2026
 OPENING STATEMENTS

Capito, Hon. Shelley Moore, U.S. Senator from the State of West 
 Virginia....................................................... 1
Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode 
 Island......................................................... 3

 WITNESSES

Simonton, D. Scott, PE, PhD, Fellow, Marshall University 
 Institute for Cyber Security................................... 4
 Prepared statement........................................... 7
 Responses to additional questions from:
 Senator Whitehouse and Senator Cramer.................... 16
 Senator Blunt Rochester.................................. 17
Odermann, Matt, Executive Board Member, North Dakota Rural Water 
 Systems Association............................................ 19
 Prepared statement........................................... 22
 Responses to additional questions from Senator Whitehouse and 
 Senator Cramer............................................. 33
Dewhirst, Scott, Deputy General Manager, Engineering and 
 Technology, Fairfax Water, on behalf of Association of 
 Metropolitan Water Agencies.................................... 35
 Prepared statement........................................... 38
 Responses to additional questions from:
 Senator Whitehouse and Senator Cramer.................... 47
 Senator Blunt Rochester.................................. 48

 
 IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING CYBERSECURITY
 CHALLENGES TO PROTECT AMERICA'S WATER 
 INFRASTRUCTURE

 ---------- 

 WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2026

 U.S. Senate,
 Committee on Environment and Public Works,
 Washington, DC.
 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 
562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Shelley Moore Capito 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
 Present: Senators Capito, Whitehouse, Cramer, Ricketts, 
Husted, Markey, Schiff, Blunt Rochester.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

 Senator Capito. Good morning, everyone. It is nice and 
bright and sunny outside, so that is good. We will check on the 
snow removal later, and see, and the ice removal. Good morning, 
and welcome to today's hearing.
 Today, we will examine the challenges facing drinking water 
and wastewater systems to install, implement and maintain 
adequate cybersecurity, as well as try to identify 
opportunities to address these challenges through new 
legislation.
 First, I want to thank our excellent panel of witnesses for 
making the trip to D.C. and to share their perspectives on this 
important topic. Your work to enhance the resilience of our 
water and wastewater systems is incredibly important to 
Americans' health and daily lives.
 There are approximately--this number is stunning, really--
170,000 water and wastewater utilities across the Country. 
These utilities fill a vital role in ensuring that communities 
across the Country have access to safe and reliable water and 
sanitation services.
 I know in the audience we have several of our water system 
utility folks here. I will shout out to my fellow West 
Virginians.
 Accessible and reliable water and wastewater services are 
essential to protect public health and provide fundamental 
services to our constituents. These services can also be a 
foundational basis for a strong economy and a strong America.
 Of the important role our water systems play in our 
Country, they are unfortunately a target for bad actors. Over 
the last several years, we have seen a broad trend of entities 
linked to our geopolitical adversaries, such as Iran, China, 
Russia, using cyberattacks to target our critical water 
infrastructure.
 Cyberattacks on water utilities may take various forms. For 
example, ransomware attacks can compromise business or customer 
information. Attackers can also gain access and then manipulate 
a system's operational technology, disrupting the treatment or 
distribution of water or altering the levels of chemicals to 
potentially dangerous amounts.
 Either way, a successful attack that disrupts safe and 
reliable water or sanitation services or exposes sensitive 
customer data could be debilitating for impacted communities. 
These threats must be acknowledged and challenged, particularly 
as technological advances, such as AI, increase the speed and 
efficiency of these attacks.
 The rise in cyberattacks is occurring at the same time as 
our water and wastewater systems deploy new digital control 
technologies--I have seen some of them myself, systems that 
allow utilities to operate more effectively and effectively.
 As we look to upgrade and modernize our water systems in 
the face of these threats, it is more urgent for our utilities, 
Federal agencies and water sector and cybersecurity experts to 
work together to increase that system resiliency.
 Increasing water system resiliency requires us to take a 
clear-eyed look at the many challenges and shortcomings that 
our utilities are facing. Legacy systems are difficult to 
maintain and update. Workforce shortages limit in-house 
expertise, and fulfilling basic cybersecurity hygiene practices 
requires consistent monitoring and communication.
 For instance, in 2024 the Environmental Protection Agency 
identified instances where some water systems utilized a single 
login for all their employees, failed to change default 
passwords, or did not curtail the ability of former employees 
to access the systems.
 While we work to improve the resiliency of our critical 
infrastructure from cyberattacks, solutions to address 
cybersecurity must be deliberate and tailored to reflect the 
challenges faced by utilities of different sizes and locations. 
A one-size-fits-all mandate from the Federal Government will 
likely be overly burdensome and unworkable, particularly for 
our smaller systems, and can hinder utilities' ability to take 
achievable steps toward meaningful progress.
 Water and wastewater systems across our Nation are already 
grappling with how to prioritize limited resources while 
meeting Federal and State requirements under the Clean Water 
Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. Costly requirements can 
distract from the core mission of providing safe, reliable and 
affordable services to the American people.
 In addressing these cyber challenges, we must strike the 
right balance between the role of Federal agencies and 
empowering local utilities to address their challenges and 
improve their cybersecurity at their own facilities. Due to the 
constantly evolving technological environment that we live in, 
addressing this challenge will require innovative solutions 
that enable utilities to adapt and respond to quickly changing 
circumstances.
 Building and maintaining resilience against cyber threats 
is not a one-and-done event; it is ongoing and ever-evolving. 
We should not rely on one specific technological advancement as 
the silver bullet solution or have blinders on when it comes to 
envisioning or preparing to address potential threats.
 I look forward to the discussion today, learning how we can 
be better partners with our water utilities to identify 
cybersecurity threats and provide a flexible toolkit going 
forward.
 I now recognize Ranking Member Whitehouse for his opening 
statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

 Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chair Capito, for convening 
us on another important topic. Thank you to our witnesses for 
being here.
 Cybercrime and cyberwarfare are realities of the 21st 
century, and have been for quite a while. Back in 2010, I 
started the Intelligence Committee's Cyber Task Force, where we 
spent 6 months investigating cybersecurity threats to our 
Country.
 The water sector has modestly improved information sharing 
and coordination between the EPA and the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency. Non-profits and water sector 
trade groups have increased public awareness of cyberthreats. 
This, however, is insufficient.
 Meanwhile, foreign bad actors continue to enhance their 
capabilities and evolve the nature of their attacks. State-
sponsored and state-aligned bad actors linked to countries like 
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have been increasingly 
relentless in their attacks on American facilities. They have 
stolen sensitive information, scrambled networks, extorted 
ransoms and disrupted sectors ranging from health care to, as 
we hear about today, drinking water.
 There are nearly 170,000 water systems across our Country. 
As these systems modernize, they incorporate technology that is 
more efficient, yet more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. According 
to GAO, many of these facilities have already faced digital 
breaches, but without more incident reports, it is impossible 
to know the full scale of the threat they face.
 Since 2023, Russian, Iranian, and Chinese hackers have 
successfully attacked small municipal water systems in Texas, 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, and have tested the security 
capabilities of countless other systems. They are always 
probing.
 Over the past 6 years, Rhode Island municipal facilities, 
one of them a large wastewater utility, have experienced at 
least six cyber-attacks, collectively resulting in hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in losses.
 These are just the incidents that have been reported. All 
water utilities without adequate security are at risk 
regardless of size. While none of the previous attacks on the 
water sector have caused major service disruptions, they all 
cost time and money. The cyber-attack that incapacitated even 
one major water facility would not only be disastrous for the 
people affected, it would spread fear across the Country.
 According to an EPA survey, less than 25 percent of our 
water and wastewater utilities perform annual cyber risk 
assessments. Less than one in four. Just imagine the 
consequences of a coordinated nationwide hit. Clearly, we are 
not ready.
 The Trump administration has forced out thousands of 
Federal cybersecurity experts, cut funding to research and 
readiness cyber programs, and crippled our relationships with 
key international intelligence partners. We need to strengthen 
our national cybersecurity capabilities, not weaken them. Water 
utilities need more knowledge sharing, not less.
 We can change that. Even when water utilities understand 
the risk and solutions, updating cybersecurity measures is 
often deferred in favor of maintaining service levels to their 
ratepayers. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, we must 
repair and replace outdated infrastructure, while also updating 
and maintaining our cybersecurity defenses. This is not either-
or.
 To start addressing our Nation's massive water 
infrastructure investment deficit, the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act provided more than $50 billion, with 
some expanded eligibility for cybersecurity projects. This was 
a good start, but not enough.
 I look forward to discussing how this committee can expand 
EPA's current authority and can help update physical and 
digital infrastructure across the Country to keep water safe, 
available, and affordable.
 Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
 Senator Capito. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse.
 We will now turn to our witnesses. I am very excited to 
welcome our first witness this morning. Dr. Scott Simonton is a 
fellow at Marshall University's Institute for Cybersecurity, 
and is a Professor at the Department of Mechanical and 
Industrial Engineering.
 Marshall's Institute for Cybersecurity is working on 
several projects with water utilities in West Virginia. We are 
so excited to have the Marshall Institute for Cybersecurity at 
Marshall University. I look forward to learning more about the 
institute's work today.
 With Dr. Simonton is his wife, Molly Simonton. Thank you, 
Molly, for coming; and his son, Nathanaiel, who is, I just 
learned, a freshman here at George Washington University. He is 
on an ROTC scholarship. Thank you for your service now and what 
it will be in the future.
 We also have Alex Donathon with us here, who is the 
Executive Director of the Marshall Institute for Cybersecurity 
for Critical Infrastructure. Thank you for being here. Dr. 
James Lanham, who is also with the Cyber Institute, and a 
professor and good friend from Marshall University.
 With that, I will turn it over to you, Dr. Simonton, and 
welcome.

 STATEMENT OF D. SCOTT SIMONTON, PE, PHD, FELLOW, MARSHALL 
 UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE FOR CYBER SECURITY

 Mr. Simonton. Good morning, and thank you, Chairman Capito, 
Ranking Member Whitehouse, members of the committee. Thanks for 
the opportunity to speak with you today.
 As Chairman Capito mentioned, I am Scott Simonton. I am a 
civil and environmental engineer, a professional engineer 
registered in West Virginia, Kentucky and Mississippi, a 
veteran and a fellow in the Institute for Cyber Security at 
Marshall University and a professor in our College of 
Engineering.
 My work places me between cybersecurity professionals and 
infrastructure operators. I am helping translate cyber threats 
into real world engineering and public safety consequences so 
both sides can act on these risks.
 For more than 30 years, I worked with water systems across 
Idaho, West Virginia, Central Appalachia, on environmental 
management, infrastructure modernization, and now 
cybersecurity. I want to offer a practical view from a region 
where small systems are essential lifelines and very resource-
constrained.
 West Virginia has several hundred community water systems, 
and over 75 percent serve fewer than 3,300 people. These are 
small, rural systems, often with one or two operators who 
handle everything: treatment, distribution, reporting, and now 
digital oversight.
 Even the smallest systems are now relying on SCADA, PLCs, 
internet connected monitoring and control systems, but they 
typically lack dedicated IT or cybersecurity staff. As outlined 
in our written testimony, the vulnerabilities are common and 
well documented. These include exposed remote access 
interfaces, default and shared PLC credentials, flat networks 
that connect business and operational systems, and legacy 
vendor-managed equipment that cannot be easily patched.
 These issues show up consistently, but not because 
operators lack commitment, but they lack capacity to deal with 
some of these issues.
 Under the Safe Drinking Water Act as amended by America's 
Water Infrastructure Act, systems serving more than 3,300 
people must completely risk and resilience assessments and 
emergency response plans that include cybersecurity. In West 
Virginia, most of the systems fall below that population 
threshold. They face the same cybersecurity threats as the 
large utilities, but they do not have the mandate, the staffing 
or the structure that those larger utilities have to deal with 
cybersecurity risks.
 We leave or we are left with a very significant gap in that 
modern monitoring and control systems have reached even the 
smallest utilities, but these cybersecurity requirements have 
not.
 At Marshall's Institute for Cyber Security, we are working 
directly with operators, utilities, and State partners to close 
that gap, turning Federal guidance into real operational 
improvements. We have three examples that illustrate this. 
Currently, Marshall ICS has helped prepared 14 National Guard 
cyber units that have since been deployed on real world cyber 
missions. This expands the region's ability to assess and 
secure infrastructure, including water systems. It provides it 
where that local expertise is needed.
 In the town of Ansted, West Virginia, ICS is guiding the 
town through its transition from paper-based processes to 
modern digital systems that support billing, payroll, and a new 
wastewater treatment facility. Our work includes vendor 
governance, IT/OT separation, secure remote access, and staff 
training. This provides a scalable model to rural communities, 
we feel.
 In the Huntington water system, ICS is conducting onsite OT 
assessments in advance of a major upgrade to a digitally 
controlled ultraviolet treatment system. Working alongside 
operators and National Guard cyber units, we help ensure 
cybersecurity is integrated into the system design, not added 
after the fact.
 These engagements demonstrate what works: practical, 
repeatable assistance delivered where operators actually work. 
Long-term resilience is going to depend on people. Marshall has 
developed and is developing stackable micro-credentials in the 
water sector for cybersecurity designed specifically for 
working operators that cannot leave their systems to attend 
extended training.
 These programs teach secure remote access, segmentation, 
vendor oversight, and incident response. These are skills that 
reduce risk immediately.
 From our field work, what we think is needed is pretty 
clear. One, we need targeted support for basic cyber hygiene. 
That includes multi-factor authentication, segmentation, secure 
remote access, and logging.
 No. 2 would be a circuit rider style cybersecurity program 
for rural utilities, modeled after USDA's technical assistance 
program.
 No. 3 would be incentives for small systems to adopt those 
Safe Drinking Water Act requirements, even though they fall 
below the population threshold. Support from more university 
partnerships. Convert Federal guidance into applied 
improvements, and it is exactly what Marshall is currently 
doing statewide.
 The operators who run America's small water systems are 
dedicated professionals who keep communities safe every day. 
With the right partnerships between utilities, National Guard 
cyber units, Federal agencies, and universities like Marshall, 
we can make small and rural systems some of the most cyber-
resilient in the Nation.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 
your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Simonton follows:]
 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Senator Capito. Thank you.
 Before we go to the next witness, let me just ask you, OT 
stands for?
 Mr. Simonton. Operational technology.
 Senator Capito. Okay.
 Mr. Simonton. Versus information technology.
 Senator Capito. Right. Okay. Thank you.
 I am going to turn to Senator Cramer to introduce our next 
witness.
 Senator Cramer. Thank you, Chairman Capito, Ranking Member 
Whitehouse, for holding this very important and timely hearing.
 It is a pleasure for me to introduce a fellow North 
Dakotan, Matt Odermann. He is here today in his capacity as an 
executive board member of the North Dakota Rural Water Systems 
Association. He has a big fan base there in the back, I 
noticed. They are all here for the same reason as the West 
Virginians are here.
 Matt brings more than a decade of experience in 
cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection, with a 
strong understanding of the unique challenges facing rural 
water systems. Matt serves as a cybersecurity supervisor at 
Minnkota Power Cooperative. Minnkota is a regional generation 
and transmission co-op with a number of distribution co-ops in 
the upper midwest, where he leads efforts to secure that IT and 
OT environment across a multi-state utility footprint.
 He has extensive experience in the rural water sector, 
serving as a board member of the All Seasons Rural Water Users 
District, and as past president of the North Dakota Rural Water 
Association.
 I am not sure what you do in your spare time, Matt, and I 
am not sure who all pays you. It is impressive; you are a great 
servant. He is also a member of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency Water and Wastewater Sector 
Coordinating Council.
 He will provide valuable insight for today's discussion on 
cybersecurity challenges facing water systems, and importantly, 
offer the rural system perspective on these challenges.
 Thank you for sharing your knowledge with us today, Matt.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. Mr. Odermann, you are 
recognized.

 STATEMENT OF MATT ODERMANN, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER, NORTH 
 DAKOTA RURAL WATER SYSTEMS ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Odermann. Good morning, Chairman Capito, Ranking Member 
Whitehouse, Senator Cramer, and members of the committee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue.
 My name is Matt Odermann, and I hail from the great State 
of North Dakota, where I do serve as past president of the 
North Dakota Rural Water Systems Association. North Dakota's 
rural water system has 282 members, serving 97 percent of the 
State's population.
 I am especially proud to be a long-term board member of a 
small water system, All Seasons Rural Water District. I am here 
today on behalf of National Rural Water Association, which 
represents 31,000 small and rural water utilities across the 
Country.
 NRWA provides a diverse range of services to its members, 
including training, disaster planning, and relief in several 
affected technical assistance programs. Additionally, I 
represent the NRWA on CISA's Water and Wastewater Sector 
Coordinating Council. In that role, I participated in a 
cybersecurity task force focused on developing a practical plan 
of action to help the sector advance its cybersecurity posture.
 For more than 20 years, I have worked in IT and 
cybersecurity roles across critical infrastructure sectors. I 
currently serve as a cybersecurity supervisor for an electric 
generation and transmission cooperative. I have seen first-hand 
the cybersecurity challenges that play out in a converged IT/OT 
environment.
 The vast majority of water and wastewater systems in this 
Country serve communities of 10,000 people or less. We have the 
same responsibility as large water utilities to deliver safe 
drinking water every second of every day.
 The difference for us, though, is scale. Small systems 
operate with limited staff, limited revenue and limited 
technical capacity. Most do not have in-house cybersecurity 
personnel.
 In rural America, cybersecurity is not a question of 
indifference, it is a question of capacity. The threats are 
real, but so is the progress. Cybersecurity awareness in the 
water sector is growing, largely through trusted, non-
regulatory partners like NRWA, State rural water associations 
and the WaterISAC group.
 Through these efforts, we are seeing a cultural shift. More 
and more rural water systems are moving to an understanding 
that cyber risk is part of operating a modern utility. At the 
same time, how Federal security efforts are delivered matters 
just as much as what is required.
 From the sector's perspective, the EPA is first and 
foremost a regulator. When cybersecurity became part of the 
sanitary surveys, many utilities felt that they were being 
asked to self-report cyber weaknesses to an enforcement agency. 
That created confusion and concern.
 For example, water system operators reporting an outdated 
firewall in an effort to be transparent worried it might lead 
to some sort of enforcement action. Even when intentions were 
not meant to be punitive, the regulatory power dynamic shapes 
how those actions are received.
 Long-term improvements are built on collaboration and 
trusted technical assistance, not fear of violations.
 There is also a cultural gap. When cybersecurity is framed 
as compliance or abstract IT risk, it feels disconnected. 
However, when it is framed as protecting pumps, SCADA systems, 
and the ability to keep water flowing 24-7, operators 
understand that.
 That translation layer is critical. Organizations like 
NRWA, State rural water associations and others play a key role 
in bridging that gap.
 Based on my experience, I offer the five following 
principles. First, lead with assistance, not enforcement. 
Adoption is stronger when cybersecurity is delivered as 
support, not primarily as a compliance obligation.
 Second, fund any mandate. Cybersecurity requires hardware, 
software, training, and staff time. For small systems, even a 
few thousand dollars can be a barrier.
 Third, focus on foundational controls. Many systems 
struggle more with phishing, weak passwords, and legacy 
equipment rather than nation-state threats.
 Fourth, rely on established, trusted partners. Guidance 
delivered through organizations utilities already rely on is 
more likely to be implemented.
 Fifth, recognize diversity. A system serving 800 people and 
2 employees cannot be treated the same as a large utility.
 In conclusion, protecting small systems must be a national 
security priority. With the right balance of partnership, 
practical guidance, and resources, we can strengthen 
cybersecurity across America's water infrastructure, not 
through fear, but through collaboration and resilience.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Odermann follows:]
 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Senator Capito. Thank you very much.
 Finally, we are going to hear from Scott Dewhirst. Thank 
you for coming. Mr. Dewhirst is the Deputy General Manager of 
Engineering and Technology for Fairfax Water. He is testifying 
on behalf of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 
this morning.
 He has held various leadership roles for utilities in 
Tacoma, Washington and Newport News, Virginia. You have been 
all over the place there, that is good.
 Mr. Dewhirst, welcome. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 
Thank you for coming.

 STATEMENT OF SCOTT DEWHIRST, DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, 
 ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, FAIRFAX WATER, ON BEHALF OF 
 ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES

 Mr. Dewhirst. Thank you. Chairman Capito, Ranking Member 
Whitehouse, Senator Cramer, and members of the committee, thank 
you for the opportunity to testify before you today to testify. 
My name is Scott Dewhirst, and I am the Deputy General Manager 
of Engineering and Technology at Fairfax Water, over 
engineering and technology.
 I am here today on behalf of the Association of 
Metropolitan Water Agencies, otherwise known as AMWA, an 
organization that represents the large publicly owned drinking 
water systems across the Country.
 I also serve on the board of managers of WaterISAC, the 
water information sharing and analysis center, which is the 
water sector's dedicated information sharing hub for cyber, 
physical, and natural threats.
 Cybersecurity in the water sector is a growing issue that 
grows more urgent by the day. Drinking water systems represent 
an attractive target for cyber adversaries. There have been 
insufficient Federal resources dedicated to this topic.
 A successful cyberattack on a water utility would not only 
threaten water quality and public health, but would also 
undermine public confidence in the safety and reliability of 
drinking water. Cyberthreats have become more frequent, more 
sophisticated, and more damaging. Addressing them requires 
sustained investment in people, technology and planning.
 According to WaterISAC's most recent cyber incident survey, 
about 14 percent of responding water systems reported 
experiencing at least one cyber incident during the quarter, up 
from 11.5 percent during the same period in the last year. As a 
large public water system, Fairfax Water employs a dedicated 
cybersecurity staff. Incident response plans and the ability to 
leverage resources offered by Federal and sector sponsors, 
including the EPA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, otherwise known as CISA, and WaterISAC.
 However, Fairfax Water is not typical in terms of its 
robust cyber capabilities. Of the Nation's roughly 50,000 
community water systems, many lack the personnel or financial 
resources needed to utilize Federal guidance, assess risks, or 
implement recommended actions.
 There are many ways to meaningfully strengthen 
cybersecurity across the water sector, including by increasing 
resources for risk mitigation response, authorizing targeted 
grant funding for cyber resilience, ensuring that State and 
local governments are well resourced, and mapping out 
implementable minimum Federal cybersecurity standards.
 It is critical that existing resources like WaterISAC are 
well funded and being utilized across the industry. WaterISAC 
lays a unique role in the sector's cybersecurity preparedness 
by actively monitoring cyber threats and vulnerabilities 
affecting water utilities. It also provides guidance on risk 
mitigation tools, best practices, and response actions that 
contribute to an all hazards resiliency posture.
 Despite its critical role, WaterISAC receives no State or 
Federal grant funding and faces challenges in connecting with 
the thousands of water systems across the Country. My written 
testimony cites legislation that could help expand access to 
this wonderful resource.
 Congress should also recognize that cybersecurity must 
compete for water systems' attention with more high profile 
needs, like infrastructure upkeep, compliance with regulatory 
mandates, and keeping bills affordable for ratepayers.
 To help water systems invest in cyber defenses, in 2021 
Congress authorized EPA's Mid-Size and Large Drinking Water 
System Infrastructure Resilience and Sustainability program, 
and a compatible program for clean water agencies. The programs 
offer grant funding for cybersecurity enhancements.
 However, these programs have received minimal funding. 
Congress should commit to providing adequate funding to help 
water systems meaningfully invest in the software upgrades, 
security personnel and enhanced threat detection and monitoring 
procedures.
 Finally, while guidance and tools provided by EPA and CISA 
are valuable, there are currently no statutory Federal 
cybersecurity requirements for water systems, making these best 
practices optional and leaving less resourced utilities wholly 
unprepared for a cyber incident.
 AMWA recognizes the danger in making Federal regulations 
overly burdensome, complicated or prescriptive, especially in a 
rapidly evolving threat environment. At the same time, some 
level of Federal guidance would help ensure that all water 
systems are taking appropriate steps to protect against cyber 
threats.
 One proposal I believe warrants further consideration is 
establishment of a water risk and resiliency organization, or 
WRRO, that would be comprised of cyber experts and drinking 
water and wastewater system operators. This WRRO would develop, 
recommend and oversee cybersecurity guidelines for drinking and 
wastewater systems, tailored to their size and risk profiles.
 Based on the model of the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation, otherwise known as NERC, and the 
energy sector, this organization would work in partnership with 
the EPA to ensure that water systems of all sizes secure 
themselves against cyber threats while avoiding the unworkable 
one-size-fits-all mandates.
 While it is clear there is much more work to be done to 
strengthen our water systems' cyber posture, AMWA stands ready 
to work with you toward meaningful solutions.
 On behalf of AMWA, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today. I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Dewhirst follows:]
 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Senator Capito. Thank you. Very good.
 You came right in at the zero zero mark. That is very 
precise, I will tell you.
 We are going to start the question portion. I will begin 
with Dr. Simonton.
 You highlighted, obviously, what Marshall University's 
Institute for Cyber Security is presently partnership with 
Ansted, which is just to frame it for the audience, a very 
small area. The Huntington water system, which, I do not even 
know if it would be a medium size, but I would put it in that 
category, not large large like Fairfax, but large, larger.
 I was interested to hear, and I heard this from the rural 
water utilities folks that came in to see me yesterday from 
West Virginia, the circuit rider, cybersecurity circuit rider 
idea through the Department of Ag. If you could frame out just 
briefly how valuable circuit riders are in general for physical 
infrastructure for the smaller systems, and then how somebody 
dedicated fully to cyber, would you see it as a dedicated 
cyber, would that be the best, or somebody who has that 
enhanced credentialing that could do both on the existing 
program?
 Mr. Simonton. Thank you for that question.
 As far as the circuit rider is concerned, the university is 
already able or we are moving toward supplying both students to 
do these things for the utilities or others that do not have 
that in-house capacity. Of course also with our National Guard 
units that we are training, not just in water cyber, but in 
infrastructure security in general.
 I would see or we would see these circuit riders as 
dedicated certainly to cybersecurity, because that is the need 
within the utilities.
 Senator Capito. They could fill a day with that.
 Mr. Simonton. They could fill a day with that, absolutely. 
They provide that expertise. They basically become consultants 
to the various utilities that provide the expertise that they 
do not already have. That is how we would see those circuit 
riders or that ability to provide that capability that the 
utilities do not currently have.
 Senator Capito. Let's say at Marshall, since you are 
dealing with this, cybersecurity for critical infrastructure as 
a general rule, would it be, and I said in my statement it can 
not be a one-size-fits-all. Would it be a parameters thing 
where you could then have, technical assistance is what all 
three of you have said would really need, you are not expecting 
the one and two and three person utility to be able to meet 
this challenge on their own, they have to have assistance.
 Would it be like a framework for smaller systems that could 
then sort of be a plug-and-play type of thing?
 Mr. Simonton. That is what we are trying to develop, is 
this scalable plug-and-play framework. Every system, of course, 
is going to be different. The needs are going to be very 
similar. They are going to have similar systems, they are going 
to have very similar threats, they are going to have very 
similar needs.
 We are developing this framework that can apply not just to 
water utilities, but across infrastructure. Again, it is 
providing that in-house expertise.
 Senator Capito. All right, good, thank you.
 Mr. Odermann, we are talking about rural water systems 
here, and the unique challenges of the systems in rural areas. 
We all know that if you can get into one system, a lot of times 
that can lead you to another system. There are vulnerabilities.
 You said how many different systems do you have in North 
Dakota?
 Mr. Odermann. There are 282 members of the Association.
 Senator Capito. Yes, that is a lot of people.
 Mr. Odermann. It is 97 percent of the State, so it is 
significant.
 Senator Capito. How do you see that in terms of being able 
to serve where you are in North Dakota?
 Mr. Odermann. The circuit rider program?
 Senator Capito. Yes.
 Mr. Odermann. The circuit rider program is single-handedly 
the most successful built-up program that I see in our State. 
It is mature, it is well-documented, the deliverables and 
administrative stuff is set up already. Those trusted 
relationships between those systems and the State association 
are built.
 If we were able to spin up a technical circuit rider for 
cybersecurity, I imagine the uptake on that would be 
significant.
 Senator Capito. Thank you.
 I want to talk about the work force challenges. This is 
something I have been interested in, and several bills in the 
past have put in some availabilities for work force development 
as our aging, as I see in West Virginia when I visit utilities, 
our general managers, who are all utility kind of, they do 
everything, from fixing the leaky pipes to running the system 
to doing the billing, everything, trying to get young people 
interested in this as a career is, I think, difficult.
 I think the cyber aspect of it might have a little bit of a 
bump of more of the modernization of the systems, and you would 
be using all kinds of skill sets here.
 I know one of our water systems in the audience has used 
like an apprenticeship type thing, where you would start in 
high school, coming to the utility, not even really thinking it 
is something you want to do, but make a little bit of money. 
The next thing you know, they are full-time employees working.
 Have you had any experience with that, Mr. Dewhirst?
 Mr. Dewhirst. At Fairfax Water, we do take a pretty 
aggressive approach with summer internships. I think what 
people do not understand, it takes many different types of 
skill sets and different types of jobs to run a water utility.
 This gives students a chance to really see what is 
involved, even in the cyber space, even in the technology 
space.
 Senator Capito. Yes.
 Mr. Dewhirst. Laboratory, whatever it may be.
 We think that is a great approach to getting people 
introduced to the industry and to have a long term career.
 Senator Capito. Okay. Senator Whitehouse?
 Senator Whitehouse. Dr. Simonton, I am pretty sure I 
remember driving West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Richard 
Neely to Marshall University to give a speech when I clerked 
for him years ago. If memory serves, I have actually been on 
your campus. He was a very distinguished and lively person. 
Fair description?
 Senator Capito. That is an understatement.
 [Laughter.]
 Senator Whitehouse. Welcome, and thank you to Marshall 
University for your work on climate change. Your research, 
Sustainability Day, or Awareness Day in the sustainability 
department, the climate change advocacy work you have done with 
Citizens Climate Lobby, the Armstead Lab's work on Appalachian 
Climate Resilience, Dr. Cartwright's work on young people's 
understanding of climate, you guys have done a lot of good 
work, and I am grateful to you.
 Mr. Dewhirst, you mentioned the NERC model. What is the 
NERC model, and why might it work for water utilities as 
opposed to electric utilities?
 Mr. Dewhirst. From my former experience in Tacoma, where we 
were a shared utility, water and power utility, I got to see 
NERC somewhat in action.
 Senator Whitehouse. I was a utility regulator back in the 
day, so I am interested.
 Mr. Dewhirst. Okay. NERC is set up to where, my experience 
has been where you have a mix of operators of the system as 
well as cyber experts that collaborate to develop standards and 
levels of compliance for different risks associated with each 
utility. I think a model like that is worth a conversation to 
understand how we can make that work for all the different 
sized systems across the Country.
 I think what it does, it allows not, it does not prescribe 
things, it is more of an outcome-based approach. It also gives 
risk-based challenges, risk-based requirements, so a system 
that has more impact or more connectivity, if you will, across 
the space would have higher standards and expectations that one 
that is a little bit more isolated.
 Yet it is very important to establish baseline standards 
for everyone. It also will work its way across the entire 
sector, no matter what the size would be. I think that is an 
important concept that we need to think, so we are not leaving 
anybody behind, but we are growing together and collaborating 
on what is the best approach.
 One more aspect I will bring up is it gives us a chance to 
be nimble. As you have heard in all your comments this morning, 
your opening statements, these threats are evolving, they 
change quickly. We have AI, which just came out 3 years ago and 
now we are talking about it all the time.
 It allows us to move quickly and not have to wait up on 
another congressional action to change a law or a standard, we 
can actually move more nimbly into other ways to address 
threats as they are coming up.
 Senator Whitehouse. When I was first working on cyber, and 
we were trying to do a big bipartisan cyber reform bill, which 
actually got pretty close, Senators Kyle and Graham and McCain 
and Thune were all working with me on that, we nearly got it 
done. We were trying to figure out what were the best ways to 
have American businesses step up their cyber defenses in this 
continually evolving environment, where if you set up our, if 
you have to go back and re-legislate that bar when things have 
changed, you have wasted everybody's time.
 One of the things that we were looking at was to require 
cyber insurance, so that if you had sort of general liability 
insurance, you would have to carve out a cyber insurance 
defined sort of rider or element, so it did not get buried in 
the overall thing. That would then focus the insurance 
industry, year by year as policies were renewed, in trying to 
look at how vulnerable you were, and in particular with respect 
to liability, whether you had met the prevailing standard of 
adequate defense, so that even if something did go wrong, you 
at least had the defense that you had done every reasonable 
thing that could be expected of you.
 It is a lot to ask of all of you in 1 minute and 30 
seconds, but I would be grateful if you would take a moment 
after the hearing is over and think about what role requiring 
insurance, requiring a rider, requiring some specific aspect of 
the policy might have in terms of being that spur that 
continually drives forward and requires both the insurance side 
and the utility side to take a look at where they are on all of 
this.
 Is the question clear enough? Okay, my time is up, so I 
will let that go. I do look forward to hearing your written 
responses about that and figuring out whether there is an 
insurance element to this that can help solve the problem. 
Thanks.
 Senator Capito. All right. Senator Cramer?
 Senator Cramer. Well, given Senator Whitehouse's time 
running out, I am intrigued. I think, Mr. Odermann, in your 
statement, your five points, by the way, were great. I could 
not get past the first one because it struck me. It made so 
much sense, as a former regulator recovering, myself.
 You said provide assistance, not enforcement. Then I hear 
Senator Whitehouse talk about insurance. As I am listening to 
him for the first time talk about this, I am thinking to 
myself, okay, that is maybe a better regulatory system than a 
government agency, right? There is a market aspect to that.
 Maybe, since he did not have the time to listen, if you 
could start maybe to chime in on his point, and this point of 
not enforcement, but assistance.
 Senator Whitehouse. You can add Senator Cramer to your QFR 
response to me. Thank you.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Odermann. I think Senator Whitehouse was listening in 
to some of my conversations yesterday.
 Senator Whitehouse. I am not that good.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Odermann. The fiduciary responsibility of being on a 
board, you typically look at, how do we cover our risks? Cyber 
insurance definitely is part of that. That is definitely 
driving some organizations to strengthen their cyber defenses.
 If you are a higher risk, you pay higher insurance 
premiums. If you desire more coverage, they are going to 
investigate you a little bit more or make sure that, hey, is 
this somebody we can actually cover or not.
 The point about cyber insurance driving some of the changes 
is happening already. As far as dictating that in law or 
regulation, I am not sure how that would play out. It is 
definitely moving the ball on the front lines.
 Senator Cramer. You all have alluded to, obviously, or been 
rather emphatic about the ability to collaborate, coordinate, 
particularly in rural, probably some of the big municipalities 
provide a little assistance. We have heard this, in all my 
years in Congress, when it comes to rural water systems, 
probably more than any other thing, please just, even technical 
support.
 This is a little bit different, because when you think 
about 282, as Senator Capito sort of gasped about, 282 members, 
that is a lot of members. One thing I know about your members, 
like most North Dakotans, is while they like to collaborate and 
partner, they also protect their sovereignty and autonomy, 
maybe, even in some cases. Maybe give me a best practice that 
has worked for each of you as a way to just give us a little 
guidance. We will start with Mr. Dewhirst.
 Mr. Dewhirst. I think that we as a large system example, we 
want to work together with everyone. I think we engage with our 
colleagues across the State in Virginia, for instance, and 
share ideas and share best practices.
 I think the WaterISAC, I think that is a great example 
where we can all collaborate together. I think if we can bring 
awareness to incidents as they occur and that becomes a central 
clearinghouse for everyone in the Country, it gives us a way to 
manage those threats and make sure people, large, small, it 
does not matter where you are in the Country, is aware of those 
threats, and they can take mitigation steps to correct that.
 I think WaterISAC is a great tool to kind of weave through 
all of us to give us those standards and protections. Thanks.
 Mr. Obermann. Definitely using trusted partners that 
already have those relationships built out. That is State 
primacy agencies, and State associations have a footprint in 
every community in North Dakota, for example. They know those 
circuit riders by name, probably have their cell phone. They 
probably know their kids' names and things like that. That is a 
very trusted relationship.
 What does not work is a 15-page bulletin information 
disclosure. That does not land with an operator in a small 
system. Definitely the trusted partners is where it works the 
best.
 Mr. Simonton. I would add, first of all, Senator 
Whitehouse, I knew Richard Neely personally and have very 
cherished memories of spending time in his office.
 I could also address it as a former regulator in West 
Virginia and in Idaho, as a consulting engineer that dealt with 
regulatory agencies. For the most part, especially at the State 
level, I have found the agencies to be really valuable partners 
and very helpful in trying to, regardless of the regulated 
community, help them comply with regulations and not always 
wielding the stick, but actually providing what can become a 
very trusted resource for these utilities, for example, in this 
space.
 That can be part of it, and not just the punitive part of 
the regulatory agencies, but I find them to be actually very 
helpful most of the time.
 Senator Capito. Senator Blunt Rochester?
 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Chair Capito, and 
Ranking Member Whitehouse. Thank you so much to the panelists 
for being here today.
 For me, this hearing on cybersecurity and our Nation's 
water and wastewater infrastructure is both critical and 
timely. According to reports, and these are public reports, one 
is even from my region, the Delaware Currents, there is a quote 
that, once a hacker gets into a water system, they could 
potentially turn pumps and motors on and off, alter chemical 
levels in drinking water to dangerous levels, and even plant 
software bombs that could disrupt the water system later.
 That same report went on to say that there are risks 
associated with poor cyber hygiene, as you mentioned, to States 
and also that cyber attackers come in many forms, from 
disgruntled former employees to nation states like China, Iran, 
South Korea and Russia.
 To be clear, this is the kind of stuff that could keep you 
up at night. I do not know if it keeps you all up at night, you 
are all shaking your heads. One of the things that I thought 
about, when you add onto it in this moment, is extreme weather. 
That is another whole risk.
 I want to start with you, Dr. Simonton. I come from a State 
that is urban, suburban, rural and coastal. We also have many 
small towns.
 I am curious, do water utilities account for extreme 
weather events when thinking about cyberattacks? What 
additional steps are needed?
 Mr. Simonton. Thank you for that question, Senator. I think 
that we have been blessed in this Country with infrastructure 
that works. People do not give it a whole lot of thought, 
because when they turn their tap on, they get clean water.
 We are seeing, whether it is chemical spills, extreme 
weather events, that our infrastructure is fragile. We get 
these messages on occasion, when there are these disruptions.
 I think across the industry, and certainly, I can speak 
just across civil and environmental engineering in general, we 
are certainly starting to take extreme weather events into 
account in design and maintenance and certainly that is going 
to apply to cyber systems within these utilities and therefore 
cybersecurity becomes an issue.
 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you for that answer.
 The Midsize and Large Drinking Water Systems infrastructure 
program, which is run by EPA, is one of the few Federal grant 
programs that helps water systems reduce cybersecurity threats. 
Unfortunately, the program has never been funded near its 
authorized level of $50 million, and is set to expire in Fiscal 
Year 2026.
 Last month, my Republican colleague, Senator Curtis, and I 
introduced the Water Infrastructure Resilience and 
Sustainability Act to reauthorize this critical program.
 Mr. Dewhirst, thank you for mentioning our bill in your 
written testimony. Why is reauthorizing this program so 
important right now and how utilities use the program's 
resources to strengthen cybersecurity protections?
 Mr. Dewhirst. First of all, thank you for the question, and 
thank you for your sponsorship, and Senator Curtis, of that 
bill. I would just alert; that bill has such a wide range of 
uses it can be used for. Cyber is one of them for sure.
 It allows a lot of the basic stuff that needs to be done on 
the cyber front to be done, whether it is doing a simple 
assessment about where your vulnerabilities are located, 
employing some software tactics, multi-factor authentication, 
segmenting your network, other types of things, like firewall 
additions, those sorts of things. It is there for everyone to 
partake in.
 I will echo your comments that it has not been funded to 
the level that it should. Even thought it is authorized, it has 
not been appropriated. I think any improvement in that front 
would be appreciated by all of us sitting at this table here, 
because I think it also does touch all the systems of all sizes 
in various ways.
 We would very much strongly echo your sentiments to fund it 
appropriately.
 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you.
 Mr. Odermann, you are shaking your head. I want to give you 
an opportunity to respond.
 Mr. Odermann. He nailed it. The only thing with some grant 
applications for smaller systems is it can be an administrative 
workload that they just simply do not have the capability to--
--
 Senator Blunt Rochester. It is back to the capacity.
 Mr. Odermann. Yes. Again, that is where a circuit rider 
concept could assist in those types of applications and 
management.
 Senator Blunt Rochester. Thank you. Also, Dr. Simonton, 
when you talked about the stackable water credentials, I think 
that is so important too. As a former personnel director for 
the State of Delaware, understanding that when you do not have 
that capacity, it might be only two people or three people that 
are working in these small places. Making sure that we have 
those.
 The other question--my time has expired, but I will submit 
for the record questions on the use of AI tools and AI agents. 
This is something that is really important to me. I have a 
couple of other questions for the record as well.
 Thank you, Madam Chairman, for this incredibly important 
and timely hearing. I yield back.
 Senator Capito. Thank you.
 Senator Ricketts?
 Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Chairman Capito, and Ranking 
Member Whitehouse, for holding this important hearing today, 
and thank you to our witnesses for coming and sharing your 
perspective on what we can do to better secure our water 
systems against the cybersecurity challenges that we face in 
our world.
 In Nebraska, our water and wastewater utilities manage and 
protect our State's groundwater, they provide critical services 
to Nebraskans, and we have talked about how it impacts the 
States where you are from.
 The security is increasingly at risk from foreign 
adversaries seeking to undermine critical infrastructure, and 
threaten public safety through cyber attacks on our water 
systems.
 Communist China has actively been involved in targeting 
wastewater systems, critical infrastructure in every community 
across the U.S. In 2024, the EPA OIG found that nearly 100 
drinking water systems serving 26.6 million people had critical 
or high risk cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
 This includes open internet portals, default passwords, 
unpatched systems. These vulnerabilities leave utilities 
exposed to cyber criminals and foreign adversaries.
 It is important that rural water systems have the tools, 
resources, and technical support necessary to defend against 
these cyber and foreign threats. Yet many small and rural 
communities face significant barriers in accessing these tools 
and resources.
 Just yesterday I met with the Nebraska Rural Water 
Association who shared some of these challenges, such as the 
staffing shortages we have discussed and reduced technical 
capacity. To protect our water systems, our food supply, and 
ultimately our national security, we must ensure rural 
communities are equipped to build and maintain resilient water 
infrastructure.
 In West Point, Nebraska, they are doing just that. They 
have upgraded their system to a cloud-based management 
platform. These platforms allow water utilities to monitor and 
manage infrastructure for many locations and house data in a 
secure location.
 Mr. Odermann, what do you think the relative advantages of 
moving water operations to a more advanced automated program, 
like the cloud, versus what they have historically been at?
 Mr. Odermann. There are definitive advantages to that 
model. Scalability, there is long-term cost savings. Typically 
you are not having to house as much technology equipment in-
house.
 You get baked in security practices. They are not going to 
let you do certain things on the cloud platform without 
following certain guidelines and standards.
 Then to speak to the weather thing, it is geolocation 
diversity with where your data is stored, so you have some 
disaster recovery advantages as well.
 The one negative would be, it takes a different technical 
setup and configuration to manage cloud services. That is a 
little less limited than the traditional client-server setup.
 Then also you are dependent on an internet connection. If 
you are somewhere without an internet connection, you are 
stuck.
 There is definitely a model that would work there.
 Senator Ricketts. One of the other things we have heard is 
that with modern systems, you have to upgrade them more often. 
Is that what your experience is in North Dakota as well?
 Mr. Obermann. Yes, updates are all-consuming of my life 
right now. That is what keeps me up at night.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Obermann. Yes, it is a challenge, and again, that is 
where these smaller systems just do not have the capacity to 
manage all those IT and OT assets. Giving them technical 
assistance to align with a trust vendor that meets standards 
would be an avenue for them.
 Senator Ricketts. Great. Thank you.
 Dr. Simonton, I was mentioning some of the cyber-attacks, 
some of the things that can leave us open and vulnerable. What 
documentation do we have on attempted attacks against water 
infrastructure? What do we know about the sources or the actors 
behind these attacks?
 Mr. Simonton. I do not know that I can really speak to 
that, Senator, because so much of what happens, I mean, as you 
probably well know, the United States suffers a mind-boggling 
number of attacks every day. How many of those are directed 
specifically at the water sector, I could not answer that.
 Senator Ricketts. Would it be helpful then if we were 
trying to do more documentation specifically on our water 
systems and wastewater systems to be able to know how much is 
that being targeted versus, say, hospitals, which have 
typically been very high profile when they get attacks, and 
they have a ransomware attack, you know, because everybody at 
the hospital can not get treatment, right?
 Mr. Simonton. Absolutely. What we are seeing across the 
board in infrastructure, and what we are doing at Marshall 
University, is not just focused on water cybersecurity, which 
is what we are talking about today, and really where we started 
to build the framework, but we are already working in health 
care, finance, transportation, specifically aviation, because 
all of these areas of infrastructure are coming under more and 
more attack. With automation, of course, more and more 
vulnerabilities.
 Senator Ricketts. I will note that there are members of the 
Nebraska Rural Water Association in the audience today. Thank 
you very much for your help.
 With that, Chairman, I will turn it back over to you.
 Senator Capito. Senator Husted?
 Senator Husted. Thank you, Chairman Capito, and a lot of 
great questions and comments. I appreciate it.
 Actually, when I was Lieutenant Governor in Ohio, worked in 
cybersecurity issues with local governments all the time. They 
were quite common, attempts at local government. I am just 
curious if any of you would just like to put in context how 
common a rural water system, how often a rural water system 
will receive an attempted cyberattack?
 Mr. Obermann. Everybody is looking at me.
 [Laughter.]
 Senator Husted. I was going to let you choose.
 Mr. Obermann. I would say that it happens probably daily. 
Whether there is impact from these cyber attacks----
 Senator Husted. You mean attempted attacks?
 Mr. Obermann. Attempted attacks, it could be just a 
phishing email or a port scan of their device and nothing 
really occurs. I do know that we have had some in North Dakota 
that have risen to where it has been passed on to the State and 
local information center to investigate and provide some 
technical assistance on investigating what happened there.
 A true number----
 Senator Husted. It happens daily?
 Mr. Obermann. I would say daily, yes.
 Senator Husted. Senator Ricketts made a very good point 
about migrating your systems to a cloud-based system, because 
that, in almost every case I know of, is a preferable way to 
manage it. Would you agree with that?
 Mr. Obermann. There are definite advantages, like I said. 
Personally, what I like the most about that----
 Senator Husted. That is the advice you would give somebody?
 Mr. Obermann. Yes.
 Senator Husted. It is just general advice. I also have 
learned in the past that it is, despite the training, despite 
the systems and all that, it is usually a human error that 
leads to this. That is the training, that is the awareness. I 
see all your heads nodding. Please feel free to speak up on 
that, if any of you want to make a point about the importance 
of that.
 Mr. Simonton. In developing our micro credentials, we have 
worked closely with water utilities, especially small water 
utilities. They do kind of throw their hands up on when it 
comes to the cybersecurity aspect, they know that they are 
vulnerable, but they know what they do not know. They know that 
they need the training, they need the expertise to help at 
least from an awareness standpoint.
 The industry is quite aware of the need for training, and I 
think that is what is important.
 Mr. Dewhirst. I would just echo that again. I think the 
phishing campaigns that are out there are becoming more 
sophisticated. That is a simple email. We all get a thousand 
emails a day, sometimes. You are scrolling through, and you can 
actually hit the wrong button and automatically go to a link 
that could cause a lot of problems, a lot of harm.
 Senator Husted. Do not click on links.
 Mr. Dewhirst. Again, it takes that culture, it takes that 
awareness, it takes people to take a minute to think about it 
before they do it, and oftentimes you are in such a hurry to 
get things done you do not do that.
 Senator Husted. Where are rural water systems, I mean, do 
you think they know that? Do you think they are aware of that? 
Then I want to add, and then what should they do if there is a 
breach? What is it that they are supposed to do? What is the 
first thing that they are supposed to do?
 Mr. Obermann. First, yes, I think generally they are aware 
that there is phishing attacks and things of that nature. The 
first thing they should do if they are under attack is reach 
out to that trusted resource. For most people in North Dakota, 
that would be probably their membership's or their system's IT 
group that they work with.
 After that would be North Dakota SLIC, which is State and 
Local Information Center and so on and so forth. Hopefully, 
that State and Local Information Center can direct them into 
the resources that they need.
 Mr. Dewhirst. I think one thing, if I could, the utilities 
really pride ourselves on being prepared and having a plan. I 
think one of the most important things for every utility, 
whatever size, is to have a cyber response plan, so you know 
what to do, you know what to do if and when it happens. When 
you are ill-prepared, to think clearly in that moment, so to 
know what you need to do and address that is something we 
should all be aware of and have on our ready.
 Senator Husted. Yes. is there a Federal agency that you 
would inform, and if so, who?
 Mr. Dewhirst. CISA would be the obvious choice. I again 
want to echo my comments earlier about WaterISAC and how I 
think it could play a critical role in connecting utilities, so 
that when incidents occur, no matter where they are, they can 
be brought to light and shared with others across the Country 
in a very expeditious way, so we can guard against that 
happening somewhere else for the same vulnerability.
 Senator Husted. Yes. Well, I will just close, I know my 
time is running out. From my research, most of the attacks come 
from North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. They do not come 
from Ukraine or Israel. I just want to note that.
 Thank you, Madam Chair.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. Senator Schiff?
 Senator Schiff. Thank you, Madam Chair, for calling this 
hearing on such an important but often overlooked topic. I 
share many of the concerns I think you have about making sure 
our water and wastewater systems are protected from 
cyberattacks. This is a critical issue at the nexus of water 
affordability, environmental quality and national security.
 I have been working on a bill to provide EPA with more 
tools to address the issue and provide water systems with the 
resources they need to properly fortify their cyber systems, 
without impacting the water and sewage bills paid by American 
households. I am hopeful that this committee can work together 
to work on addressing this problem.
 I have a couple of questions, and I offer to anyone on the 
panel who would like to weigh in, how prevalent do we believe 
the ransomware attacks are? I know that particularly in 
corporate America, there is reluctance to notify the Bureau or 
anyone else when there is a cyberattack, for fear of it 
becoming public and reputational harm.
 Do we have any sense of how often water systems are under 
ransomware attacks?
 Mr. Obermann. I do not think we have a clear understanding 
of what it is, but ransomware attacks are definitely more 
prevalent than nation-state attacks. Nation-state, or nation 
sponsored threats tend to just lie in wait. They try and 
exfiltrate data. Where ransomware is more of a criminal 
mindset, where we are going to try to leverage and get some 
money out of these people.
 It is devastating to members. I know in North Dakota, there 
have been a few hospital systems that have suffered ransomware 
attacks. It has been particularly hard for them. They have had 
to get short-term financing just to bridge through, to get 
their billing reenabled.
 It is a very serious thing.
 Senator Schiff. I remember a hospital in my district, this 
was probably eight or 10 years ago, and this was quiet compared 
to today, locked up all the hospitals data. The hospital went 
to the FBI and said, what do we do?
 They were demanding, I think, $17,000 in cryptocurrency. 
The FBI said, do you want your data back? They said, we need 
our data. The FBI said, then pay them.
 I am sure they would not demand $17,000 anymore. There is 
no requirement that water systems report when they are the 
victims of cyberattacks. Do we really just not have much of a 
sense at all of how often it happens?
 Mr. Dewhirst. I will just say again, WaterISAC tries to be 
that central repository. We are aware of some, but they are 
usually anonymized, so we do not single out, we do not say a 
certain city or county or whatever. We try to make it just, 
hey, make awareness that this ransomware attack did occur. Here 
is the avenue by which they accessed their system. Make sure 
you address this vulnerability.
 That is how I think we can grow together and learn 
together, is by that central repository.
 Senator Schiff. How many are you notified by, say, within 
the last year?
 Mr. Dewhirst. Of ransomware attacks?
 Senator Schiff. Yes.
 Mr. Dewhirst. I do not think that many. I mean, like a 
handful. For the water specific, I think it is water specific, 
is what you are asking.
 Senator Schiff. Yes.
 Mr. Dewhirst. Yes.
 Senator Schiff. Some of the destructive attacks that we 
have become aware of have targeted smaller water systems in 
kind of random locations. Do we think it is just because they 
were targets of opportunity, that is, that foreign malign 
actors, Iran, whoever, are simply looking to punish the United 
States, and they have identified, hey, this water system is 
using dated software or whatever? Is that what we think is 
going on with the kind of strange target selection?
 Mr. Simonton. I believe that what is happening is they are 
attacking many systems all at one time, and looking for those 
vulnerabilities. Some of those systems will provide those 
vulnerabilities. I think that it is a widely cast net, and then 
just the unlucky few are actually getting hit.
 Senator Schiff. Is the net cast by a spear phishing email 
that is sort of blasted out? Or how do they cast the net?
 Mr. Obermann. It can be. In my current occupation, we see 
that weekly, that spear phishing campaign. Generally speaking, 
when it comes to OT networks and IT networks that are live on 
the internet, that is through like a random port scan. They are 
just scanning a whole list and they get returned values of, 
yes, this port is open. I am going to see if we can go further 
here.
 Senator Schiff. That kind of search is done not just of 
water agencies, it is kind of a broad search for someone using 
an unpatched software?
 Mr. Obermann. Yes. There is really no way to tell, like 
from a port scan, if it is a small water system or a large 
utility. It is just a wide net. As soon as they see that that 
port or that service is open, they dig further and see if they 
can exploit the vulnerability.
 Senator Schiff. Last question. The major infiltrations, 
like the Chinese Salt Typhoon, do we know whether we are having 
any success in excising that stocking horse? I do not know 
whether that may be beyond the scope of what we can discuss in 
this hearing. How much do we know about what may be lying in 
wait?
 Mr. Obermann. I will do my best to answer this question. 
That is a very serious concern in the cybersecurity community.
 Have we made headway? I think there is a little bit more 
information sharing coming down from like FBI InfraGard on some 
of those things. We get that information faster through the 
information sharing and analysis centers, like WaterISAC and 
ISAC and the like.
 That information does get to us faster. Whether it is acted 
on, I do not know if I can provide any details on that. It is 
definitely a concern.
 Senator Schiff. Thank you, Madam Chair.
 Senator Capito. Thank you.
 Senator Markey?
 Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much.
 Mr. Dewhirst, your testimony outlines recommended 
legislative solutions to address the cybersecurity challenges 
facing the water sector, including my bill, the Water 
Intelligence Security and Cyber Threat Protection Act. I was 
proud to develop that legislation with the Association of 
Metropolitan Water Agencies. Boston Water and Sewer played a 
central role in establishing the Water Sharing and Analysis 
Center, which is known as WaterISAC.
 Water infrastructure cybersecurity is a point of pride in 
our State. In fact, in 2024, Boston Water and Sewer experienced 
a ransomware attack that WaterISAC successfully assisted them 
in navigating, avoiding widespread damage to our system.
 Mr. Dewhirst, are there any other organizations that 
compare with WaterISAC in terms of services and real-time 
assistance to water utilities?
 Mr. Dewhirst. Yes, thank you for the question, and thank 
you for your support of that bill. I think that is a wonderful 
avenue for us, all utilities, to take advantage of and to 
really make WaterISAC an important pillar in our response to 
cybersecurity threats.
 I would say, many utilities have to have third party 
assistance at the ready. We have contracts that are typically a 
zero retainer contract with different firms to be ready to 
respond to a cyber incident should that occur.
 I think WaterISAC can provide some initial support and some 
initial guidance, if something were to occur. I go back to the 
need to have a plan, a cyber plan in place, and it is a 
response plan in place, to know how to behave as soon as that 
happens.
 Senator Markey. Right now, there are no other organizations 
that are comparable?
 Mr. Dewhirst. Not that I am really aware of. I will defer 
to others.
 Senator Markey. It is clear that if we want to support our 
water systems in dealing with cyber threats, we need to support 
this water cybersecurity organization.
 Mr. Dewhirst, do you agree that the primary barrier for 
water utilities to access these vital cybersecurity services is 
simply funding?
 Mr. Dewhirst. I think it is funding, and also I think time. 
I think we have heard up here a lot with the rural systems. 
They have a lot of things they are doing. They do not have 
dedicated staff for certain things. I think that is an aspect.
 I think WaterISAC can hopefully----
 Senator Markey. Is funding the principal reason?
 Mr. Dewhirst. Funding is a big deal. We are trying to 
establish that.
 Senator Markey. Vision without funding is an hallucination, 
right?
 Mr. Dewhirst. Absolutely. We need money.
 Senator Markey. Without funding, how are you going to get 
it done?
 Mr. Dewhirst. We need funding. Yes.
 Senator Markey. Thank you. That is why I introduced my 
legislation, which would provide the funding to water utilities 
to access the cybersecurity services offered by WaterISAC. I 
look forward to working with my colleagues on that.
 The reason I am really apprehensive about this is that 
there was a cyber incident called Stuxnet back in 2010. It 
really drew a lot of attention to this entire area. The CIA and 
the national security apparatus of the United States came to me 
as the chairman of the Energy Subcommittee to ask me if I would 
pass legislation that would mandate that electric utilities in 
America upgrade their cybersecurity.
 I took my counterpart, Fred Upton, the Ranking Member on 
the committee, we went down, we got the top secret briefing, we 
could see how dangerous it was. We brought all the other 
members down to get the secret briefing. They were terrified at 
the fact that the Iranians and the North Koreans and the 
Russians and the Chinese were all attacking our electric grid 
system every single day, trying to find vulnerabilities, 
getting ready for the moment when they could do it.
 Again, Thomas Alva Edison would recognize our electric 
system in terms of the level of protections that are built in.
 We had a piece of legislation, we drafted it, we passed it 
on a bipartisan basis. What happened was it came over here to 
the Senate, this wonderful institution that I now serve in. 
Senator Kyle from Arizona got lobbied by his electric utility, 
and they did not want to spend the money, even though Fort 
Huachuca in Arizona is on the public grid, making it easy 
access into that incredibly important military facility in our 
Country. It died over here, in the Senate. It has died year 
after year, even though we passed it unanimously in the House. 
The electric utilities did not want to spend the money.
 It is a game of cat and mouse, right? The cat, all of these 
incredibly powerful, super-sophisticated cyber giants around 
the world, and the mouse is our electric grid and our water 
systems. They are unprotected. They still have not had the 
upgrade in the cybersecurity protections which they need, 
waiting for the eventual, inevitable, inexorable, successful 
catastrophic attack.
 It is just time for us to get real about this issue. It is 
only now 100 times worse because of AI in terms of the 
sophistication of the technology which can be used. It is time 
for us to put a mandate in place, and the funding that 
accompanies that, so that all of these vulnerable 
infrastructure systems are able to protect themselves against 
the attack which is coming. The only question is, are we going 
to protect against it?
 Thank you, Madam Chair.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. We do not have any further 
questions, and I would like to thank the witnesses.
 Yes, Senator Whitehouse?
 Senator Whitehouse. I just wanted to make one brief point--
--
 Senator Capito. Of course.
 Senator Whitehouse [continuing]. about the distinction 
between nation State cyberattacks and ones that are done more 
by criminal organizations. Just to be clear, that there is not 
really a very clear dividing line between the two.
 It is quite apparent that Russia, while it may engage in 
some specific cyberattacks on its own account through the FSB 
and other official organs of Putin's thug-oligarch government, 
also supports, encourages and funds all sorts of organizations 
that are driving hacks out of Moldova or out of Lithuania or 
out of wherever.
 While those are not purely nation State attacks, they are 
subsidized and authorized, and they are constantly probing for 
weaknesses, so that while they may get a hit at putting the 
target's equipment into a lockbox and extracting ransom, they 
are also providing information to Russia about where 
vulnerabilities are, so that when they want to move as a nation 
State to attack our resources, they can do so.
 Maybe even light up these other groups to go and do it on 
their behalf, so they can keep a veneer of deniability, the say 
way that Putin is keeping a veneer of deniability of the 
destruction of infrastructure through the Baltic by pretending 
that these ships that are dragging their anchors through cables 
and disrupting them are somehow not anything that he has 
anything to do with.
 I just want to make sure that in the record of this 
proceeding, it is quite clear that the difference between a 
direct nation State cyberattack and this sort of grey zone of 
nation State supported semi-deniable partly kind of just 
gangster and criminal behavior stuff is not that clear.
 Senator Capito. Right. Yes, I would like to make an 
additional point. As somebody who lives in a community who lost 
their water source through a chemical spill for many weeks, 
there are a couple of things beyond what happens to the 
destruction of the system. It becomes a very emotional 
response, and it can really grow, because you begin to lose 
trust.
 Your authorities, the health authorities and otherwise, 
unless they are crystal clear, and we have gone through this 
with the CDC, because they were not in this case, begin to take 
on a greater role. They have to be prepared for this, too, 
whether it is a cyberattack or chemical spill or whatever.
 If you are able to infiltrate successfully a cyberattack on 
one of your smaller systems, there might be people that would 
say, oh, well, that only serves 2,500 people, that does not 
really matter. What matters is the lack of trust and the 
cascading effect that it has in every rural community of, this 
could be me, and how do I know?
 That is why I think at every level, that we need to make 
sure that the protections that we afford the larger systems are 
the same protections that we can provide for the smaller 
systems.
 I was also thinking, if, let us say, you have the same IT 
person or something, they get into a small system in Ansted and 
then maybe that same IT system does Fayetteville, and then, is 
there a way in? Then you are into a bigger system, because you 
are into the whole IT system. It is no longer Ansted, who has, 
I do not know, 600, 700 people, and they are into a bigger 
thing.
 I think there is a lot more connectivity here, and a lot 
more emotional part of protecting our rural water systems than 
we really got into today. I would identify also a gap. I think 
we need better data on how many attacks, because nobody really 
had the answer to that question. I think, how many, where are 
they occurring, how they occurred, that is always going to be 
good for best practices to try to prevent.
 Those are my little commentaries. I would like to thank all 
the rural water people who are in the audience today for 
coming.
 Senators who wish to submit written questions, and we did 
hear at least from Senator Whitehouse and Senator Blunt 
Rochester, they are going to want to submit questions, and 
maybe Senator Ricketts. They have until 5 p.m. on Wednesday, 
February 18th to submit their questions. The witness responses 
to these questions are back to the committee no later than 5 
p.m. on Wednesday, March the 4th, and will be submitted for the 
record.
 With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you all very 
much. It was very interesting.
 [Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
 

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