EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE IN THE TREASURY MARKET

House Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee House April 29, 2026

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[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE
 IN THE TREASURY MARKET

=======================================================================

 HEARING

 before the

 TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY,
 TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE,
 AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

 of the

 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 APRIL 29, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-74

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 www.govinfo.gov

 ______
 

 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-469 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026

 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
 Chairman Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin BILL FOSTER, Illinois
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
 Carolina JUAN VARGAS, California
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
YOUNG KIM, California AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
BYRON DONALDS, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RITCHIE TORRES, New York
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee SAM LICCARDO, California
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
TIM MOORE, North Carolina

 Ben Johnson, Staff Director

 ------ 

 TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE,
 AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

 FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan JUAN VARGAS, California, Ranking 
ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
TROY DOWNING, Montana JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon

 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, April 29, 2026
 OPENING STATEMENTS

 Page
Hon. Frank Lucas, Chairman of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, 
 Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. 
 Representative from Oklahoma................................... 1
Hon. Juan Vargas, Ranking Member of the Task Force on Monetary 
 Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a 
 U.S. Representative from California............................ 2

 STATEMENTS

Hon. French Hill, Chairman Of The Committee On Financial 
 Services, A U.S. Representative From Arkansas.................. 3

 WITNESSES

Mr. Kevin McPartland, Head of Research, Market Structure and 
 Technology, Crisil Coalition Greenwich......................... 4
 Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Mr. Terrence A. Duffy, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, CME 
 Group.......................................................... 9
 Prepared Statement........................................... 11
Mr. Jeff Cranston, Head of Corporate Strategy, Optiver........... 17
 Prepared Statement........................................... 19
Professor Yesha Yadav, Milton R. Underwood Chair, Professor of 
 Law and Associate Dean, Vanderbilt University Law School....... 22
 Prepared Statement........................................... 24

 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Written responses to questions for the record from Representative 
 Frank D. Lucas
 Mr. Jeff Cranston............................................ 52
 Mr. Kevin McPartland......................................... 54

 
 EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE IN THE TREASURY MARKET

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, April 29, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Task Force On Monetary
 Policy, Treasury Market Resilience,
 and Economic Prosperity,
 Committee on Financial Services,
 Washington, DC.

 The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank D. Lucas 
[chairman of the task force] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Lucas, Huizenga, Barr, Fitzgerald, 
Flood, Downing, Hill, Vargas, Sherman, Casten, and Bynum.
 Chairman Lucas. The Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury 
Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity will come to order.
 Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time.
 This hearing is entitled ``Examining Derivatives' Role in 
the Treasury Market.''
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
within which to submit extemporaneous materials to the chair 
for inclusion in the record.
 I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LUCAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK 
 FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND 
 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OKLAHOMA

 Welcome to today's task force hearing ``Examining 
Derivatives' Role in the Treasury Market.'' Thank you to our 
witnesses for providing their invaluable expertise.
 The Treasury market is the deepest, most liquid, and most 
important market in the world. Today we are discussing an 
aspect of the Treasury market that continues to grow in 
popularity and raises important questions ahead of anticipated 
market structure changes and capital rulemaking.
 Part of the depth and liquidity of the Treasury market is 
driven by trading on swaps, options, and futures on the 
underlying Treasury. These derivative markets are key to 
managing risk. They allow market participants to hedge their 
exposures, create demand for Treasuries, increasing market 
liquidity, and supporting price discovery and health of the 
broad Treasury market.
 A recent paper from the Chicago Federal Reserve (Fed) has 
pointed out ``enhanced liquidity in the derivatives market 
strengthens the functioning of the cash market'' and ``the 
enhanced liquidity supports more stable, lower-cost public 
financing.''
 It is important that Congress continues to support the 
resilience of the Treasury derivatives market as these 
instruments are so closely linked to the bedrock of the global 
financial system.
 We must especially pay attention now as the industry 
undergoes a fundamental market structure shift with the looming 
deadlines for central clearing of cash Treasury and repo in 
December and next June, respectively.
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the 
leadership of Chairman Atkins, has been responsive to industry 
comments and proposals to make sure that the transition to 
mandatory clearing causes no disruptions in the Treasury 
market.
 A recent example includes the approval of two additional 
central counterparties (CCPs), increasing customer choice and 
competition while reducing concentration risk.
 Demand for Treasury derivatives is rising and with it 
demand for cash and for clearing. It is absolutely critical 
that our capacity for clearing these transactions rises in 
kind.
 Last week the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) also granted exemptive relief to allow 
customer cross-margining for offsetting exposures of cash and 
future positions for Treasuries.
 This is a welcome step. To ease the transition to mandatory 
clearing--and as witness testimony has pointed out--will allow 
the redeployment of capital back into our Treasury markets.
 I am hopeful that all this risk-reducing activity will be 
fully recognized in the capital rules proposed by the bank 
regulators, as we discussed yesterday in the full committee 
hearing on this topic.
 We have substantial data and experience on the benefits of 
clearing from a risk management and margin efficiency 
standpoint due to its use in derivatives markets, but getting 
the transition right to the broader Treasury market will take 
Congress, the regulators, and the industry working in lockstep 
together.
 I look forward to our discussion today and I yield back.
 I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. 
Vargas, for 4 minutes for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JUAN VARGAS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND 
 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

 Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I 
would like to thank you for convening this hearing and also all 
the witnesses that we have here today.
 Thank you very much for being here today.
 The Treasury market, now exceeding $30 trillion, serves as 
the bedrock of our capital markets and the global benchmark for 
risk-free rates. Keeping it liquid, efficient, and resilient is 
essential.
 Derivatives play an important role in making that possible. 
Through futures, options, and swaps, they support price 
discovery, enhanced liquidity, and give market participants the 
tools they need to manage risk, fostering broader participation 
in the Treasury market, as was stated by the chairman.
 But with that role comes responsibility and some risks that 
are worth monitoring carefully. We have seen multiple episodes 
of significant volatility in the Treasury market in October of 
2014, September of 2019, March of 2020, and again in April of 
last year.
 The most noteworthy of these was the ``dash for cash,'' if 
you will, in March of 2020 when the market participants, 
including hedge funds, were forced to rapidly liquidate their 
Treasury holdings. The disruption was severe enough that the 
Federal Reserve deemed it necessary to intervene directly to 
restore order.
 It is in everyone's best interest that we work toward 
minimizing the conditions that led to that kind of volatility, 
the kind that forced the Fed to take emergency action just to 
keep the market functioning.
 One tool that can help is the implementation of the SEC's 
central clearing rule. As we have previously discussed in this 
task force, central clearing increases efficiency, improves 
market plumbing, and lowers counterparty risk.
 For derivatives in the Treasury market specifically, 
broader central clearing brings transparency and more 
standardized risk management. Helping to reduce the 
fragmentation can amplify stress during volatile periods.
 As derivatives are increasingly utilized in this market, it 
is critical that regulators and policymakers have full 
visibility into these activities. That makes the recent 
reporting on the Office of Financial Research, or OFR, all the 
more alarming.
 The OFR was created specifically to identify risks in our 
financial system. It is now reportedly facing staff cuts of up 
to more than 60 percent.
 To make sure regulators and policymakers can do their jobs, 
adequate staffing levels at the OFR must be preserved.
 Finally, no discussion of Treasury market resilience is 
complete without addressing the importance of an independent 
central bank.
 The President has continued his public attacks on both 
Chairman Powell and Governor Cook, and I appreciate my 
colleagues who have spoken up in the defense of this essential 
principle.
 Central bank independence is not a partisan issue. It is a 
cornerstone of the market confidence and we must protect it.
 Again, I look forward to today's testimony, and I thank the 
chairman and the witnesses.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
 I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 
Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
 FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS

 Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lucas.
 The strength of the U.S. Treasury markets depends not just 
on size, but on its depth, its liquidity, and its resilience. 
Today we are going to examine how derivative markets support 
that foundation.
 These instruments play a critical role in price discovery, 
risk management, and overall market functioning, and when used 
effectively, derivatives certainly can enhance liquidity in 
Treasury markets, ensuring greater stability.
 We will also review recent developments in the Treasury 
clearing, including establishment of new clearing platforms.
 Finally, we will carefully consider how regulatory 
proposals, such as the new Basel III reproposal could impact 
clearing costs and market participation.
 Getting this balance right is essential for maintaining 
deep, resilient Treasury markets that serve global and U.S. 
investors, our taxpayers, and the U.S. economy.
 I look forward to the discussion, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
 If I might ask just for a personal moment of privilege.
 Chairman Lucas. Absolutely.
 Chairman Hill. I just want to pay tribute to my good friend 
David Scott from Georgia. You see at the end of our dais on the 
Democratic side of the aisle a beautiful flower arrangement and 
memorial on his seat.
 David was an exceptional person. He chaired our Ag 
Committee, so he knew the--and he and Mr. Lucas worked together 
for many, many years.
 But he always had a smile on his face, he loved this 
committee, he loved the American economy, he loved baseball. It 
was just remarkable and such a positive experience to have him 
on our committee.
 He voted last week in our markup and then was gone the next 
day.
 We love David. I just want to salute him and grateful to 
the majority and minority staff that have paid tribute to him 
today.
 Yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those very 
thoughtful, kind, and accurate words.
 Today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Kevin McPartland, the 
head of the Research, Market Structure, and Technology at 
Crisil Coalition Greenwich; Mr. Terry Duffy, chairman and CEO 
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group; Mr. Jeff 
Cranston, chairman of Corporate Strategy, Optiver; and 
Professor Yesha Yadav--thank you for being kind to my phonics--
the Milton R. Underwood chair and professor of law and 
associate dean at Vanderbilt Law School.
 We thank each of you for taking time to be here. Each of 
you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral 
presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written 
statements will be made a part of the record.
 Mr. McPartland, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for 
your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF KEVIN McPARTLAND, HEAD OF RESEARCH, MARKET 
 STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY, CRISIL COALITION GREENWICH

 Mr. McPartland. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Hill, 
Ranking Member Waters, and the members of the Task Force on 
Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic 
Prosperity, for the opportunity to discuss derivatives in the 
U.S. Treasury market.
 Again, my name is Kevin McPartland. I am the head of market 
structure and technology research at Crisil Coalition 
Greenwich.
 The U.S. Treasury market remains one of the deepest and 
most liquid financial markets in the world. In 2025, the 
Treasury market saw an average of just over $1 trillion traded 
each day, up an impressive 60 percent from 2022.
 While this growth correlates with the increase in debt 
outstanding over the same period, the uptick in market activity 
exceeded what debt growth alone would suggest. Market turnover, 
measured as trading volume to debt outstanding, grew from 3 
percent in 2022 to 3.8 percent in 2025, quantifying a true 
expansion of market activity.
 The transparency of this critical market has also seen 
tremendous growth. We have transitioned from weekly volume 
reports in 2020 that included only primary dealer activity to 
the current reporting regime that provides public access to 
daily trading activity by market segment, and the details of 
nearly every on-the-run U.S. Treasury coupon bond traded each 
day.
 This has brought the Treasury market more closely in line 
with other U.S. securities and with the derivatives markets, 
ensuring that investors and market participants of all types 
and sizes have the information they need to make informed 
decisions.
 Cyclical factors, such as macroeconomic shifts and recent 
periods of volatility, contributed to the market's recent 
growth. However, increased participation, advances in 
electronic trading, improved access to data, a market structure 
that encourages innovation, and an increasingly robust 
derivatives market played an equally important role in the 
market's recent expansion.
 U.S. Treasury futures in particular are critical to keeping 
the Treasury market liquid. In 2025, the average daily traded 
value of U.S. Treasury futures equated to 93 percent of the 
value traded in the underlying bond market. They provide an 
efficient method for investors to manage their exposure, for 
banks to head positions obtained from trading with their 
clients, and for speculators to take the other side of those 
trades in hopes of generating returns while simultaneously 
providing liquidity to the market.
 The Treasury bond and derivatives markets are inextricably 
linked. We see strong futures in swaps markets not as 
competition for the U.S. Treasury market but as catalysts for 
ongoing demand and growth.
 Bond traders and investors look to the futures and swaps 
markets as a cost-effective method of managing their exposure 
and the risks in their portfolios.
 Conversely, derivatives traders must often trade bonds in 
parallel, whether to hedge or to profit from pricing 
differences.
 This interplay between bonds and derivatives ensures that 
asset prices accurately reflect current market conditions, 
allowing long-term investors and large corporations to feel 
confident about their investment decisions and the United 
States to fund itself at the best possible rate.
 The addition of a central clearing mandate for some 
Treasury bonds and repo transactions can serve as a further 
tailwind for the markets, with the potential to reduce systemic 
risk while simultaneously standardizing market entry and 
ongoing participation for market makers and investors alike.
 However, we must be careful not to disincentivize market 
participation when implementing this change by making the rules 
of engagement too onerous or the cost of trading too high.
 Longer implementation timelines and the recently revised 
U.S. Basel III Endgame proposal suggest we are headed in the 
right direction. Banks with more available capital to deploy to 
market-making activity, better incentives to hold Treasuries on 
their balance sheets, and greater recognition of cross-product 
netting are all critical to the market's health and will act as 
tailwinds to Treasury market participation, liquidity, and 
resilience.
 The Treasury market has experienced its fair share of 
shocks over the past decade, and it is a near certainty that 
unpredicted market dislocations will cause stress for some 
market participants in the years to come. As such, we should 
continue to pay close attention to areas of concentrated risk 
and leverage.
 However, the shocks of the past few years have left us with 
a market that is more resilient than ever. Liquidity providers 
are better equipped to continue making markets when volatility 
spikes and users have more access to better market data and 
electronic trading venue providers can ensure that markets 
continue to function as expected despite volatility-driven high 
volumes.
 This was most recently evidenced in March 2026 when the 
Treasury market averaged a record $1.4 trillion of bonds traded 
each day with no evidence of stress in the market's plumbing.
 With this foundation strongly in place, we look forward to 
a future that leverages commonsense oversight, new 
technologies, such as tokenization and stablecoins, and market 
participants committed to ensuring that the U.S. Treasury 
market remains liquid, transparent, and efficient.
 Thank you very much.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. McPartland follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you.
 Mr. Duffy, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF TERRANCE A. DUFFY, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
 OFFICER, CME GROUP

 Mr. Duffy. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member 
Vargas, and the distinguished members of the task force.
 I also want to thank Chairman Hill and Chairman Lucas for 
recognizing David Scott. He was a friend to many of us in this 
industry for many years and he is sadly missed.
 I am Terry Duffy, chairman and chief executive officer of 
CME Group. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you to discuss the important role of derivatives in the 
Treasury market.
 CME Group services the entire Treasury market ecosystem, 
providing trading and clearing for derivatives, offering 
trading in cash Treasuries, and soon launching clearing 
services for cash Treasury markets.
 My testimony today focuses on three critical pillars: the 
vital role of derivatives, updates on the clearing landscape, 
and the positive implications of the Basel III Endgame 
reproposal.
 Derivatives are foundational to the price discovery, 
liquidity, and functionality of the U.S. Treasury market. 
Highly liquid Treasury futures allow market participants to 
secure risk management hedges in customizable sizes without 
having to source the individual Treasury securities.
 Critically, open interest in Treasury futures closely 
monitors volumes in Treasury in cash Treasuries. You just heard 
from my colleague the futures volume in notional terms 
represents approximately 93 percent of the cash volume.
 Two primary links connect the cash and futures markets. 
First, market makers, including primary dealers, such as banks 
and others, use Treasury futures to hedge their Treasury 
inventory.
 Second, asset managers use Treasury futures to add duration 
to their portfolios while leveraged funds meet this demand 
through the Treasury basis trade.
 The widespread use of Treasury basis trade tightens price 
alignment between cash bonds and futures, enhances overall 
market liquidity, and ensures more efficient interest rate 
pricing for all participants.
 Estimates show the basis trade-related holdings have 
increased by $317 billion since the first quarter of 2022, 
totaling $1 trillion in notional value of Treasury futures 
today.
 These interconnected activities demonstrate the enormous 
importance of the Treasury futures market not only for the 
market makers and holders of Treasury securities, but also for 
the citizens of the United States who heavily rely on this 
market, whether they trade it or not. Treasury futures are a 
vital point of price discovery and liquidity, enabling 
participants to manage risk of all sizes.
 Furthermore, Treasury futures enable a more efficient 
Treasury market, which in turn lowers the cost for the 
government to finance its expenditures and is crucial to U.S. 
financial stability.
 CME's central clearing services provide approximately $85 
billion each and every day in efficiencies to participants in 
our markets. This includes $27 billion in savings in our 
interest rate asset class alone, with a growing contribution to 
those savings from our cross-margining program with the Fixed 
Income Clearing Corporation, or FICC.
 As the SEC's central clearing requirements for cash 
Treasuries and repo approach, we are expanding our program, as 
you heard from the ranking member, with FICC to provide cross-
margining access for our end users clients, which the CFTC and 
SEC recently approved.
 Cross-margining between swaps, options, futures, and cash, 
cleared products within CME's clearing solutions, will provide 
a unique opportunity for managing interest rate risks with 
maximum risk sensitivity efficiencies.
 The Basel III Endgame reproposal issued in March 2026 by 
U.S. banking regulators is a crucial step toward ensuring 
capital is allocated efficiently and appropriately based on 
risk.
 In conclusion, given the critical nature of the U.S. 
Treasury market, I want to point out a concern I have about the 
risk of allowing a non-U.S. regulator to oversee any portion of 
this market.
 FMX, a U.S. exchange, self-certified last year with the 
CFTC to trade U.S. Treasury futures cleared by a London-based 
clearinghouse that is regulated and supervised by the U.K.'s 
Bank of England. While the clearinghouse is also registered 
with the CFTC, its dual registration with the U.S. and U.K. 
does not impact the fact that its ultimate guarantor is the 
Bank of England.
 Under U.K. law, the Bank of England's primary mandate is 
the stability of the British financial system, not the United 
States system. In the event of a systemic crisis like a massive 
liquidity crunch in both gilts and/or U.S. Treasuries, the Bank 
of England is legally obligated to prioritize the gilt market 
in British pound over all other markets, including the U.S. 
Treasury market.
 If the U.K.-based clearinghouse faced a capital shortfall, 
the Bank of England could use its early resolution authority, 
which we have seen before, to intervene and haircut or tear up 
U.S. Treasury contracts. This could trigger a default chain in 
the United States, spiking borrowing costs for the U.S. 
Government and destabilizing the U.S. Treasury market.
 I have been raising this issue for well over a year at the 
highest levels of government, including the Secretary of 
Treasury, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, 
other regulators, and Members of Congress.
 Allowing the U.K. Government to have this regulatory power 
over such a critical component of the U.S. Treasury market is a 
significant risk. I hope this task force will take this very 
seriously and mandate that U.S. futures be treated the same as 
cash Treasuries which can be only--and I want to emphasize 
that--only overseen by a U.S. regulator.
 Chairman Lucas. Mr. Duffy----
 Mr. Duffy. I want to thank you for your time and attention 
today, and I apologize for going over.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Duffy follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Duffy.
 Mr. Cranston, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral comments.

STATEMENT OF JEFF CRANSTON, HEAD OF CORPORATE STRATEGY, OPTIVER

 Mr. Cranston. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
 My name is Jeff Cranston and I represent Optiver, a global 
market maker providing liquidity across all major asset 
classes, including on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities and 
Treasury and the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) 
derivatives.
 My testimony focuses on how derivatives support Treasury 
market liquidity and highlights key structural considerations 
in implementing the SEC's Treasury and repo clearing mandate.
 The U.S. Treasury market is central to government financing 
and serves as a global benchmark for safe and liquid assets. 
Maintaining a resilient and liquid Treasury market is critical 
to economic stability and the U.S. dollar's role as the world's 
reserve currency.
 Derivatives play a central role in supporting liquidity, 
enabling risk transfer and promoting efficient price discovery 
in the cash market. Treasury futures, which trade nearly around 
the clock, are often the first place where economic data or 
shifts in market sentiment are reflected. Treasury options play 
an important role in managing volatility by allowing 
participants to hedge nonlinear risks without needing to 
transact directly in the underlying cash market.
 SOFR derivatives, including interest rate swaps, are also 
an important part of this ecosystem, providing tools to hedge 
Treasury funding exposures and express views on interest rates 
and the yield curve.
 Taken together, these markets form a highly interconnected 
system where activity across instruments reinforces liquidity 
and price formation.
 With respect to the clearing mandate, central clearing 
provides important benefits, including reduced counterparty 
credit risk, the ability to net exposures across multiple 
counter parties, a more structured approach to managing risks 
and defaults, and provides the opportunity to develop central 
limit order books that support broad all-to-all participation.
 As the deadline approaches, market participants are working 
together to prepare for the transition. Some of the key areas 
of industry focus include development of clearing access models 
to support done-away trading where participants can execute 
with one counterparty and clear with another, as well as margin 
efficiency with cross-margining helping ensure risk is properly 
reflected across related positions.
 Recent approval of customer-level cross-margining between 
CME Treasury futures and FICC-cleared Treasury positions is a 
meaningful step forward.
 Clearing repo transactions adds an additional layer of 
complexity. Repo involves not just trading but also funding and 
collateral management.
 Extending clearing to repo requires infrastructure that 
works for a broader range of participants, including hedge 
funds, asset managers, and cash lenders, and ensuring efficient 
clearing access across these participants remains an important 
area the market is continuing to address.
 The introduction of additional clearing agencies, like CME 
and ICE (Intercontinental Exchange), can support innovation and 
resilience but also raise potential for market fragmentation. 
In the interdealer market, if multiple clearing agencies lead 
to distinct central limit order books, this could have a 
potentially negative impact on liquidity.
 The transition to central clearing also raises important 
questions around clearing capacity. Market participants rely on 
futures commission merchants and prime brokers to access 
clearing and finance positions. These institutions, who are 
primarily large banks, provide the balance sheet and capital 
required to support client clearing activity.
 Recent updates to bank capital rules are a positive step 
and should help ease some constraints. However, as clearing 
expands, it will be important to monitor whether clearing 
capacity keeps pace as implementation unfolds alongside 
prudential rulemaking.
 In closing, derivatives markets play a central role in 
supporting Treasury market liquidity. With continued progress 
toward implementation, central clearing has the opportunity to 
further strengthen the market.
 Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Cranston follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you.
 Professor, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your oral 
testimony.

STATEMENT OF YESHA YADAV, MILTON R. UNDERWOOD CHAIR, PROFESSOR 
 OF LAW AND ASSOCIATE DEAN, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

 Ms. Yadav. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, members 
of the committee, thank you so very much for the honor and 
privilege to come before you today.
 The U.S. Treasury market is our national superpower, from 
around $5 trillion outstanding in 2008 to approximately 31-
point-something trillion dollars today. This is a market that 
has helped us to weather an extraordinary slate of events both 
domestically as well as geopolitically.
 This is a market that anchors our financial market 
stability and solvency. It is the uncontested global safe 
haven.
 In short, the U.S. Treasury market is the envy of the 
world. It promises zero default risk, unlimited, maximum 
liquidity. This is a market whose prices benchmark the prices 
of pretty much every financial asset around the world.
 Derivatives are a central part to the U.S. Treasury market 
success story. Treasury-linked derivatives like futures and 
swaps ensure that market participants everywhere can hedge 
their interest rate risks longer term. This is a market that 
infuses information into Treasuries' prices, helping them 
fulfill their all-important benchmarking function. This is a 
market that helps increase liquidity into cash as well as in 
the repo market.
 On a good day, derivative examples like the cash basis 
trade can interlink with the Treasury market to provide 
liquidity and risk management. As the example of the FICC, CME 
cross-margining proposals show these interlinkages are only set 
to deepen and to deepen super-fast but even though Treasuries 
might be risk free, the markets in which they and related 
contracts trade are not.
 Shockingly, the oversight structure for this consolidated 
market for the Treasury as well as related markets does not 
provide the holistic oversight to be able to spot the risks and 
then to be able to coordinate to address them in a timely 
fashion, meaning that the potential for excess leverage and 
spillover effects into the Treasury market and its all-
important functions are a real and present danger.
 Members of the task force, I want to make three points here 
to illustrate that our oversight structure for Treasuries today 
is broken, inadequate, and dated.
 First of all, we lack real-time information into the 
consolidated workings of the Treasury and related markets. Some 
areas of opacity here are well known. The repo market, the 
bilateral repo market, is a space where we do not know what 
kind of exposures have been taken at what scale and by whom.
 In certain cases, Treasuries can collateralize multiple 
debts at the same time. Zero haircuts are remarkably common in 
this market.
 In 2024, the OFR approved a rule that would increase 
transparency and reporting in this market, but the state of 
implementation of that rule remains uncertain.
 In the secondary market, secondary market reporting in 
Treasuries remains patchy. In 2017, a rule was passed, but this 
only applies to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA)-regulated broker-dealers. This means that entities that 
are not broker-dealers, like hedge funds, are not subject to 
direct reporting, meaning that we have to understand their 
workings by looking at regulated broker-dealers and their 
interactions with hedge funds, sponsoring banks, as well as the 
platforms on which they are trading.
 In addition, of course, we have regular well-known problems 
with swaps reporting. In the case of swaps, for example, there 
are well-known issues right now with respect to how to deal 
with ever fixing errors in the swap reporting system, trying to 
reconcile data across multiple swaps data repositories, trying 
to report data to the CFTC in a timely way.
 Second of all, our regulating structure today is just not 
capable of remedying these gaps. The Treasury market is subject 
to oversight by 5 separate Federal regulators none of whom have 
primary authority here.
 Arrangements need to be put in place in order to allow for 
information sharing. This is simply not being done in time.
 Even though we have a cross-margining proposal at present, 
the CFTC and the SEC do not have data-sharing arrangements. 
This means that CCPs are very much on the front line of 
managing risks on this market, but what this means is that for 
Treasuries they are subject to a specific buying.
 U.S. clearinghouses rely overwhelmingly on Treasuries as 
the chosen form of collateral, but when they need this 
collateral, when they need to liquidate Treasuries, that is the 
exact moment when Treasuries are likely to be under maximum 
stress.
 This means that what we are seeing here is the Treasury 
plays the role that it does, the complex role that it does, 
both as an asset that is traded as well as the choices form of 
collateral in today's marketplace.
 Members of this task force, our Treasury market is 
extraordinary, and yet it does not have the institutional 
oversight structure to help make it as safe as it possibly can 
be. I would urge this task force to ensure that our Treasury 
market, our derivatives market can maintain the envy of the 
world status that they currently have and work to the maximum 
good of the American people and the American economy.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Yadav follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much.
 The chair would note to the task force members and the 
panelists that we have begun a series of two votes on the 
floor. First is a previous question followed by a rule for 
consideration of a number of bills.
 I would ask indulgence of the panelists and of the task 
force members, let us go promptly, vote on the previous 
question, and as soon as we cast our votes on the rule, return 
here immediately and we will proceed with our questions.
 So the committee stands at ease.
 Pursuant to the order of the chair, the chair declares the 
committee in recess subject to the call of the chair.
 The committee stands in recess.
 [Recess.]
 Chairman Lucas. The committee will now come to order 
following our recess.
 I apologize to our witnesses, but it is a complicated world 
out on the floor these days.
 With that, I now turn to members' questions, and I 
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
 Mr. McPartland, let us begin with you.
 Would you expand on your testimony? How do derivatives 
support deeper markets, more efficient price discovery, 
increased liquidity in the cash market, and reduce bid-ask 
spreads?
 What is the connection between Treasury derivatives and 
lower borrowing costs for taxpayers, the things the folks back 
home care about?
 Mr. McPartland. Great. Thank you for that question.
 A few important points: One, futures markets in particular 
concentrate trading and liquidity among a few important points 
on the interest rate curve. So, that brings all of those buyers 
and sellers together. That is an all-to-all market. It could be 
investors, retail institutions, banks, market makers, and 
everybody comes together.
 Those prices in those markets are a big input to how 
Treasury dealers then go ahead and price the Treasury bonds 
they trade. So that is an important input, that deep data on 
that very broad market.
 Then I think almost more importantly is hedging, which was 
already discussed a little bit this morning.
 The hedging that futures and swaps provide, it does allow 
dealers and investors to maintain larger positions. If they can 
be sure that they are properly hedged against unexpected market 
movements, they are going to be more apt to hold on to those 
positions even when markets get volatile, which we want.
 It also allows dealers--futures also allow dealers to quote 
better prices. Again, if they know that they are hedged against 
unexpected market dislocations, that will allow them to quote 
tighter bid-ask spreads because they know if the market moves 
against them those futures are protecting them, they have that 
hedge in place. So, even if the market goes against them their 
downside risk is minimized.
 All of that put together then ensures the most effective 
marketplace, that the price you are seeing in the bond market 
is the price that is based on all of the market inputs, which 
ultimately then allows the U.S. Government to borrow at the 
best rate it possibly can.
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you.
 Mr. Duffy, we have 8 months until the SEC clearing rule is 
in effect for cash transactions, and there has been meaningful 
progress in getting the industry ready for this monumental 
task.
 How would you characterize the state of readiness? There 
are outstanding issues in the inter-affiliate exemption and 
other exemption self-release applications. How is the 
transition going from your vantage point?
 Mr. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 I think from our position it is going quite well. As you 
know, this has been a multiyear process as we are trying to get 
to the end of this year so we can have clearing of these 
products and to create the efficiencies that I referenced in my 
earlier remarks.
 Today, just alone, $25 billion a day in rate savings, and 
part of that is with FICC, or Fixed Income Clearing Corp.
 I think the interdealer, some of the trades that are yet to 
be decided who has to participate and who does not, is really 
an argument that I think FICC and its clients have to come to a 
resolution on, but I think economics will dictate that 
resolution. I think they will get to a final outcome.
 I am very encouraged that we will move forward with the due 
date, and people will figure out if the affiliates need to 
clear those trades or not. Right now, there is an exemption in 
place for some of the affiliates, but I do believe the benefits 
will outweigh any exemption.
 Chairman Lucas. Mr. Cranston, can you discuss how the SEC's 
clearing rule will improve systematic risk monitoring, will 
increase transparency through clearing these transactions, and 
give regulators more insight into the health of the market?
 Mr. Cranston. Thank you.
 I think today regulators have good visibility into 
individual transactions in the cash market, but that data, as 
was referenced earlier today, is extremely fragmented and does 
not give regulators a full picture of the complete exposure in 
the market.
 So, I think central clearing will obviously help that. It 
will consolidate that information, provide regulators with more 
standardized position-level and risk-based data, as well as 
including margin and exposure information across at the 
clearinghouse level.
 I think it will improve monitoring, ensuring what amount of 
leverage is in the market and what stress could potentially be 
in the market and I think, while the entire market will not be 
cleared, it is not a perfect solution, but it certainly is an 
improvement overall.
 Chairman Lucas. Mr. Cranston, I am about out of time, but I 
would like you to respond in writing to the following question.
 Our derivatives markets are the gold standard and the envy 
of the world. Portfolio efficiencies and risk management 
associated with central clearing are certainly part of that. 
Are you concerned about clearing capacity with the increased 
demand we expect at the end of the year?
 My time is expiring, and I look forward to your response in 
writing.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix 
on page 52.]

 With that, I yield back.
 The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Vargas, 
for 5 minutes for his questions.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and again, I 
thank you for this hearing.
 I want to thank all the witnesses, and, again, apologize to 
you for our small delay. We had to go vote.
 Mr. Duffy, you went significantly over your time, and I 
thought it was a good thing. They did not give you the bum rush 
that we normally give people here, and I was glad they did not. 
You spoke very highly of a very beloved Member, one of our 
colleagues here, that is one.
 Second, I think you brought up something that is very 
important there at the end, and I do not know that you had full 
time that you needed to explain it. Again you spoke, I do not 
want to say ill of the Bank of England, but you certainly 
exposed it a little bit.
 Could you speak a little bit more about that, because I was 
intrigued with your testimony? Again, I thank the chairman, I 
am glad he let you go over. I think it was the right thing to 
do.
 Mr. Duffy. Appreciate the chairman, appreciate the 
question, Ranking Member, and again, appreciate your colleague.
 What I was referring to, just to sum it up, the Bank of 
England does not have a bankruptcy regime like we do here in 
the United States. So, the Bank of England is the backstop for 
all financial products that are cleared through the London 
Clearing House in London.
 So the bank of--the London Clearing House is now clearing 
U.S. foreign debt as the U.S. Treasury market through another 
entity. Their reason is that they are supposedly dually 
registered. That means absolutely nothing if the ``you know 
what'' hits the fan. They have the ability to make decisions 
unilaterally on the U.S. foreign sovereign debt. That is $30 
trillion outstanding of debt.
 If that was to migrate or if that was to have a problem 
because of the way they risk manage in the U.K.--I was not 
speaking ill of my British friends----
 Mr. Vargas. Especially since the King----
 Mr. Duffy. He is gone, though. He is in New York. We will 
speak badly now.
 Anyway, the problem is there is a great example, sir, and I 
will try to briefly say it.
 There was a trade called nickel done at the London Metals 
Exchange and there was a default on the contract, and the way 
the Bank of England dealt with that default is they absolutely 
tore up trades and said there is no longer a default.
 So, that is how they dealt with it. If you were on the 
proper side of that trade and you were hedging on that side of 
the trade, you actually lost money because they tore up the 
winning trade to offset the losers. That is not risk 
management.
 Now they want to do that with the U.S. Treasuries. Nobody 
allows foreign sovereign debt to be cleared outside of their 
country, except the United States of America, which is 
unbelievable to say the least, sir. So, that was what I was 
referring to with the $30 trillion market. If it ever came to 
that, it would be a biblical disaster for this country.
 Mr. Vargas. It is a real issue.
 Mr. Duffy. It is a very big issue.
 Mr. Vargas. I am glad you brought it up.
 Again, Mr. Chairman, I am glad you gave the opportunity for 
Mr. Duffy to talk about that.
 Okay. I do want to talk about the basis trade.
 Professor Yadav, following the tariff announcement by the 
President in April 2025 there was increased discussion about 
the basis trade and its implications for the Treasury market.
 Do you mind explaining the fundamentals of how the basis 
trade works, one, and what are the pros and cons of the basis 
trade in having hedge funds and others increasingly involved in 
the Treasury market?
 Ms. Yadav. Sure. Thank you so much, Ranking Member. It is a 
great question.
 If I might just be a professor here and explain this in 
super basic terms.
 Now, if you have two essentially similar or the same asset 
and one asset trades in one market slightly cheaper and more 
expensively in the other market, I think all of us would buy 
the cheap asset and then sell it in the more expensive market.
 Now, in this case the asset is a Treasury bond. What we 
have is buying the Treasury bond cheap and then selling it in a 
slightly more premium market, which is the market for futures, 
delivering that bond in a year or 2 years' time and it is a 
slightly more premium market.
 Now, what hedge funds do is take advantage of the 
difference between the cheap bond today, like the cheap bond, 
and then the more expensive future short that then they are 
able to sell into the market.
 Now, the difference in price tends to be pretty small, so 
you make money by doing it at high volume. In order to be able 
to pay for these trades, hedge funds borrow in the repo market. 
They use the Treasuries as collateral and get the cash and buy 
these bonds.
 So, this is on a good day a trade that works super well. It 
goes in a way that allows the funding to be cheap. They are 
selling futures to asset managers, like pension funds and 
insurance companies and others who do not want to buy that bond 
today.
 Mr. Vargas. You are going to have to land the plane, 
Professor. You have got 20 seconds.
 Ms. Yadav. I am going to land the plane straight away but 
there are risks in this market. In other words, when the repo 
financing market becomes tight, then the market can spiral and 
it is very difficult to control the risk. That is the problem 
with this market.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time is expired.
 The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the full 
committee, Mr. Huizenga of Michigan, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Sorry to our witnesses for this kind of day. Welcome to 
Washington where it is hurry up, wait, get to the floor, wait, 
get back, wait. We appreciate your time and your effort here.
 Mr. Duffy, I am going to start with you. You have testified 
that derivatives lower the government's cost of borrowing. I 
know that was a little bit of a conversation here. Does that 
ultimately show up in lower mortgage rates and financing costs 
for American families?
 Mr. Duffy. There is no question about it, Congressman. As 
you know, most of the debt in the United States is based around 
the 10-year, which is mostly where the mortgages are at, the 
car loans, and other meaningful commercial or personal loans 
are being held at.
 So lowering and making the risk of those products for the 
individuals who are issuing the debt more cost effective, it 
allows the consumer to participate at a much lower rate.
 Without having a futures market, which is basically giving 
a forward market where the cash market does not have a forward 
market, it allows the banks and others to hedge that risk in 
order to--so the consumers can participate at a much higher--a 
lower level, including student loans and the like. So, it is 
really important.
 Mr. Huizenga. So, a liquid, centrally cleared derivatives 
market helps U.S. finances?
 Mr. Duffy. There is no question.
 Mr. Huizenga. Also, our debt situation as well? I mean, is 
that possibly lowering----
 Mr. Duffy. I do not know. It does not help our debt 
situation, as you know. We are at $39 trillion, probably going 
to $50 trillion at this pace right now, so I do not think it 
helps the debt.
 The one thing I would say that is if in fact the debt 
continues to rise, as long as we do responsible things in this 
country, we probably still can have lower--not maybe lower 
rates than we are at today, but not higher rates either.
 As long as we continue to do the right things in this 
country, we are still the envy of the world, especially with 
our debt markets and the rest of our markets, and we want to 
keep it that way.
 Mr. Huizenga. Yes. It is one of the reasons, frankly, that 
concern for the debt, one of the reasons why I helped found and 
am now co-chair of the Bipartisan Fiscal Forum, because we have 
to wrestle this debt to the ground here.
 Mr. McPartland, southwest Michigan is home to the 
headquarters, facilities, and even just operations of many 
major real economy, consumer-facing companies, from brand names 
in food and auto makers, medical devices, airlines, gas 
stations-kind of everything is there.
 When these companies can hedge risk efficiently using 
derivatives, what does that do to their investment and more 
likelihood to invest or expand and hire people in my district 
and in others?
 Mr. McPartland. Right. I mean, what we want corporations to 
focus on is building those products and services and making 
them accessible and as affordable as they can given the input 
costs.
 What derivatives allow them to do is focus on that, right, 
to focus on the product and the consumer and growing, without 
as much having to worry about fluctuations in whether it be 
financial markets or agriculture or energy markets.
 This is arguably--or maybe not arguably--why the 
derivatives market was created. My colleague will know better 
than I, but when the derivatives market was created over a 
hundred years ago really was----
 Mr. Huizenga. You are not implying Mr. Duffy was around for 
that creation.
 Mr. Duffy. I think he was implying it.
 Mr. Huizenga. It sounded like it. I do not know. I will let 
you two work that out.
 Mr. McPartland. The Congressman's words, not mine.
 [Laughter.]
 This really was the basis for the derivatives market, and I 
think we want that to continue and we want----
 Mr. Huizenga. Because people needed a way to smooth out the 
fluctuations, right?
 Mr. McPartland. Right. Right. We do not want a producer of 
children's toys to have to worry too much about interest rate 
fluctuations and the cost of oil, because they need that to 
create plastic. We want them to focus on product development 
and getting that to consumers.
 Mr. Huizenga. What are the risks to that ability right now? 
I mean, what is looming out there that could limit that ability 
to do something?
 Mr. McPartland. We really want to incentivize banks to 
participate in these markets, to keep these markets liquid. 
That is part of what the----
 Mr. Huizenga. There is really a difference between hedging 
that risk and using a derivative versus just out speculating, 
right?
 Mr. McPartland. There is, although I think it is always 
important to note, we need--you need two sides to every trade. 
So, we need somebody to take the other side. You need somebody 
with an opposing viewpoint.
 If everybody is expecting the same outcome, there is not 
going to be somebody to help you there and that is where--and I 
know that sort of term ``speculator'' gets demonized, but, 
like, that is what we need. The market needs the other side of 
that trade and often speculators play that role.
 Mr. Huizenga. My experience in talking to a lot of those 
companies. They are hedging on both sides. So, it is a way to 
just make--kind of make sure that they can lock in costs. Is 
that your view too?
 Mr. McPartland. Yes, absolutely. You need a floor and a 
ceiling. Nobody knows what is to come next, and so they want to 
make sure at least they can understand what their future cost 
might be and they can do that by, again, putting a floor and a 
ceiling on those costs by using derivatives.
 Mr. Huizenga. Right. My time is expired.
 I appreciate your patience and sticking with us all, and 
great to see you again. So, appreciate your time.
 Thank you and I yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Sherman, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chair, I think it is wise that we are 
having this hearing. Treasuries are valued at $29.3 trillion 
but in just 1 day, you can have not only $4 trillion of trades, 
but you have derivatives, et cetera. This is a market that 
dwarfs the size of the asset being purchased or sold.
 There are at least a couple of risks here. One is the huge 
deficit that we have that creates $29.3 trillion worth of 
borrowing by the Federal Government. Another is the crypto 
industry, which has announced that it wishes to displace the 
dollar's very critical, important role.
 Professor Yadav, I am concerned that the SEC could grant 
exemptive relief for crypto companies who want to tokenize 
Treasury securities without full compliance with existing 
securities law, looser rules than the broker-dealers and 
exchanges and clearing agencies have long been subject to.
 For example, they could create a dollar sign Treasury coin 
that is supposed to mirror that of a 2-year or 5-year or 10-
year T-note or T-bill but, in fact, has no reserves. The coin 
would not be actually backed by reserves but would claim to 
be--to mirror the price.
 This could be freely traded perhaps on foreign platforms or 
perhaps on unregulated anonymous platforms through the 
blockchain.
 Purchasers might believe that they are getting all the 
stability of a U.S. Government debt instrument when, in fact, 
they are simply getting a promise from who knows whom.
 Does this pose a risk to investors and to the securities 
market?
 Ms. Yadav. Thank you so much, Representative Sherman.
 In terms of the SEC's willingness to do something like 
that, I think it is incredibly important to make sure that our 
regulatory system for Treasuries is robust. I do not believe 
that even in the context of normal securities regulation that 
our system for Treasuries is robust.
 There are a couple of issues here. One, as Mr. Cranston 
mentioned, reporting here is not foolproof. We have many, many 
gaps here.
 In addition, we have launched a cross-margining relief for 
CME and FICC, but there is no data sharing between the SEC and 
the CFTC.
 So, before we actually start to talk about the fancy things 
like tokenization or thinking about those issues, we have to 
get the regulation of Treasuries right, and we are very far 
away from that at present.
 Mr. Sherman. Gotcha.
 The two big disasters involving Treasuries that I am aware 
of are American International Group (AIG) and Silicon Valley 
Bank. With Silicon Valley Bank, they sold $11 billion of 
interest rate swaps, which was basically an insurance company 
against their portfolio declining in value. So, they sold the 
fire insurance and then the house burned down.
 We need to require--and Basel is moving in this direction 
somewhat--that we recognize for capital purposes the losses 
that banks have incurred on held-for-sale debt, and, frankly, I 
think even held-to-maturity debt as well.
 The other problem we saw was AIG, which had a dozen 
insurance-regulated subsidiaries, and in spite of management's 
effort to raid them all, they all survived. Then they had one 
subsidiary that said it was not in the insurance business; it 
was in the credit default business.
 Now, it occurred to me that if I wanted to evade insurance 
regulation, I would sell you a fire insurance policy but say, 
``If your house burns down, I do not write you a check, you can 
trade your house that does not exist anymore for a basket of 
Treasuries and call that a credit default swap.''
 Do we need to, especially for those who issue derivatives 
not on an exchange, to require that they be regulated by as 
insurance companies?
 Ms. Yadav. Absolutely, as insurance companies. We have a 
system for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulation. That 
has to be as robust as possible.
 One of the things that we are lacking in the OTC market, 
even after the rules, is good information. For example, 
information with respect to swaps comes in delayed. There are 
several issues in relation to that, that continue despite Dodd-
Frank being passed in 2010.
 Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time is expired.
 The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on 
Financial Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this 
important hearing and given the size and scope of U.S. 
sovereign debts, the liquidity and functionality of our 
Treasury market is vitally important.
 Mr. McPartland, let me start with you, and I am going to 
ask you to just communicate to the American people, to my 
constituents, kind of a derivatives 101.
 Can you explain to my constituents and to me what the 
benefits of--what benefits do financial institutions and the 
Treasury market itself receive when using central clearing?
 Mr. McPartland. Sure. Thank you so much.
 So, think of a derivative contract as the ability to buy or 
sell anything, but in this case the U.S. Treasury at some point 
in the future at a specified price. That allows you to know 
exactly what that price will be.
 The way that can then get applied is to help to manage the 
risk in your portfolio of actual bonds. If that price was to 
move wildly, you are still then able to buy or sell at that 
price you have pre-defined.
 Sometimes that goes against you, sometimes that goes for 
you, but at least you know what to expect, and that is really 
the core of how the derivatives market works.
 Because of that, banks now can hold those positions, they 
can make markets in those positions, because, again, they can 
quantify their risk, and they can put that capital to work 
feeling safe.
 Mr. Barr. Very good. Can you explain how the original or 
previous Basel III Endgame proposal disadvantaged central 
clearing?
 Mr. McPartland. There were a few issues or there are still 
a few issues.
 As I said earlier, we want to incentivize banks to hold 
Treasuries and to make markets. Thankfully, we have seen an 
uptick in bank holdings of U.S. Treasuries. That is a great 
advancement and that is what we want. That is what those 
primary dealers are there for but the previous or existing 
rules in some ways penalized banks for those holdings. They did 
not recognize the true risk. So, offsetting the derivatives 
with the bonds really that neutralizes a lot of that risk.
 Mr. Barr. Let me ask Mr. Duffy a similar question but a 
little different.
 How did the 2023 Michael Barr Basel III Endgame proposal 
fail to recognize the risk-reducing benefits of derivatives?
 Mr. Duffy. It is really strange, especially after Dodd-
Frank, how they did not take into account how central clearing 
actually works today through the clearinghouse mechanisms. They 
were double counting and putting burden--extra burden of 
charges on the biggest dealers in the world.
 By recognizing that capital was already accounted for 
through central clearing, I think they have finally understood 
that they were asking for twice the amount of capital where 
they did not need it. That hurts the banks from deploying 
capital in other parts of our economy.
 So, I think recognizing that now under the new proposal 
will alleviate what Michael Barr and others were trying to put 
forward because what they were doing was trying to put so much 
capital into the system that it was overkill, to say the least. 
It was already being accounted for through the clearing 
mechanisms.
 Mr. Barr. Is it fair to say that would have by----
 Mr. Duffy. It would have destroyed the futures market.
 Mr. Barr. Which would in turn jeopardize risk management.
 Mr. Duffy. The cash market, as I said earlier, does not 
have a forward market associated with it.
 So, when the gentleman asked about Silicon Valley Bank 
(SVB) bank, if SVB bank, when they loaned all the money out at 
2 percent because they thought the rates were not going higher 
or they would have hedged that into the futures market, we 
would not be talking about SVB bank, because they could have 
hedged that risk in the futures market. They did not do so.
 Yes, it is critically important that remap of that 
particular venue is changed now to benefit the participants.
 Mr. Barr. Well, in the remaining time, any of you all can 
answer the last question, which is, what changes have been made 
in this reproposal, this Mickey Bowman reproposal, that will 
help promote both central clearing?
 If you want to add, what improvements could be made to that 
reproposal to continue to enhance the functionality of the 
derivatives market?
 Mr. Cranston. Yes. I think, as Mr. Duffy mentioned, I think 
the reproposal is basically going to allow for additional 
capacity or at least not prevent capacity from being made 
available for not only the futures and derivatives market that 
is already centrally cleared, but also for the demand that we 
will see from the SEC clearing mandate on both cash and repo.
 I think to his point as far as some of the other potential 
enhancements, I think Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) put out some thoughts on that. I think 
there was a really thoughtful hearing yesterday on that Basel 
reproposal and what could be improved.
 I think there is still additional room to recognize those 
product netting and cross-margining benefits that will further 
reduce pressure on balance sheet.
 Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair unfortunately must stand for a brief recess. I 
appreciate the patience of the panel. There are many moving 
parts. I will explain it to you.
 We stand in recess for a few moments.
 Mr. Flood [presiding]. I call the hearing back to order.
 The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Casten. Thank you very much.
 You all thought that was going to be a long recess, did you 
not?
 So thank you all for coming.
 I want to start with a little bit about tokenization, 
building on some of the discussion that Mr. Sherman had.
 There has been this discussion of tokenization of Treasury 
markets, and if I am reading the numbers right, it is a tiny 
little puddle right now. I think there is, like, $2 billion of 
tokenized Treasury markets.
 Following up on some of the conversations you and I had 
privately, Mr. Cranston, I wonder if you could share any 
concerns that you might have with--we have Treasury markets, we 
have futures markets, we have swap markets and Treasuries. We 
now potentially have tokens. These things ostensibly should all 
be price linked, but they have got different liquidity pools, 
potentially different market hours.
 Do you have concerns with some of the fragmentation of 
those markets that we should be sensitive to even as we--to the 
extent there is value created by tokenization, let us not slow 
that down but are there concerns we should be sensitive to in 
those markets?
 Mr. Cranston. Sure. Thank you.
 I think, well, first, just starting with tokenized 
Treasuries, I think there is a potential use case mainly in the 
form of providing efficiency and moving collateral throughout 
the system.
 As the derivatives market and the cash equities market and 
other markets start to move toward 23/5, 24/7 trading, the 
ability to have a flexible way to move collateral on weekends I 
think is going to be very important and will help promote 
around-the-clock trading. I think there is a good use case for 
tokenization of things like Treasuries.
 I think what we need to be very cautious about, though, is 
just tokenizing things for the sake of tokenizing them and 
creating further fragmentation.
 In the equities market, you already have 20 exchanges on 
cash and options and also off-venue platforms as well. I think 
further tokenizing could add additional fragmentation to 
liquidity and not all of those chains that will be used for 
tokenization are interoperable.
 So, I think, yes, there are definitely concerns. I would 
start with a more cautious approach of focusing on utility of 
tokenization versus replacing the trading market.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. You raised equity, so I want to shift to 
Mr. Duffy.
 The SEC has been very clear that a tokenized equity is a 
derivative of an equity product and is therefore SEC 
jurisdictional. The CLARITY Act that passed this committee says 
that if you are raising 200 million or less, that a tokenized 
equity is subject to CFTC jurisdiction.
 As somebody managing a market that deals with both, should 
we be concerned about split jurisdiction? Is there any 
ambiguity as to whether a tokenized equity is actually still 
subject to SEC jurisdiction, in your mind?
 Mr. Duffy. Congressman, I believe it should be. I think an 
equity is an equity. So, whether if it is tokenized or not 
should be irrelevant in the situation.
 The question is, is the amount that they are falling below 
the threshold, that they do not have regulatory obligations to 
meet below the threshold of 200, 250 million dollars, whatever 
it is.
 I have certain concerns with a lot of this stuff because 
how is it not going to other products, including Treasuries, 
besides equities?
 So I do not think that we should be moving things from a 
regulator just because of the size of it. I would like to see 
products be regulated because I think good, smart, credible 
regulation is what is in the best interest of the United States 
to grow all of its capital markets, including equities, 
Treasuries, and the like.
 So I am a bit concerned about that in the CLARITY Act, and 
I am hopeful that they reevaluate it.
 As far as the tokenized Treasury market, you have to also 
remember that 24/7 does not allow unless you pre-fund on a 
Friday, even if it is tokenized.
 So to think that we could trade 24/7 on any product is not 
tokenization is going to help that, you still have to fund it, 
whether it is tokenized or whether it is cash, because we still 
rely on the banking system for those dollars because those 
tokens are tied to the dollar.
 Mr. Casten. Shifting, and I have to--we have a lot of weird 
synonyms, but I want to move to gambling or prediction markets 
or bilateral options. Whatever we want to refer to them all, 
they are all synonyms.
 You have now--CME has dipped a toe into that water. If you 
are offering a bilateral option on an earnings forecast for a 
publicly traded company, does that also start to feel like a 
security? Or is that a commodity? I mean, I am very confused on 
what the CFTC is actually ruling on that----
 Mr. Duffy. On predictions?
 Mr. Casten. Yes. Like, a prediction market that is 
essentially betting on something that is going to inform the 
pricing of an equity.
 Mr. Duffy. Right. So, first of all, we only list certain 
prediction markets. We have a partner in FanDuel. It was a 
distribution participation for their clients to trade in our 
marketplace. We think it is a good, smart thing.
 They got a little caught off-guard, I believe, as it 
relates to some of the prediction markets on sports. I think 
that has to be determined if predictions on sports are gambling 
or are they swaps?
 I do not believe that answer has been fully baked, and I 
think that will end up in the Supreme Court for a decision. I 
think it is really important that we have that distinction.
 Mr. Casten. I would love--and I know we are out of time--
but I would welcome your thoughts and maybe we can follow up 
afterwards----
 Mr. Duffy. Happy to.
 Mr. Casten [continuing]. on the whole self-certification 
process as well to make sure that----
 Mr. Duffy. Totally abused. I appreciate it.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. Thank you very much.
 I yield back.
 Mr. Duffy. Thank you.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning.
 The subject of derivatives is exceedingly important to the 
market overall, and specifically for the State that I 
represent, Nebraska, which is a very large ag State.
 A strong futures market ensures that even if there are 
price swings between when an elevator purchases corn from a 
producer and when the elevator sells that corn to a feed mill, 
the elevator can hedge to protect themselves from those price 
fluctuations.
 In a commodities market that can fluctuate day to day, 
derivatives can be used as a tool that provides some much-
needed stability.
 This question is for both Mr. Duffy and Mr. McPartland.
 What are the downstream effects of a well-functioning 
futures market that would be visible for an ag producer?
 Mr. McPartland. As we discussed a bit earlier--and thank 
you for the question--the founding of the derivatives market 
was truly to help farmers, and that is still true to this day.
 You explained it quite well. We need a derivatives market 
to help those producers, those agriculture producers, to be 
able to manage that risk, to be able to manage those costs.
 Markets are impacted by so many factors. The world is 
getting all the more complicated but to be able to know their 
prices, to be able to know what they will be able to sell at 
the harvest time is critical, and that is what the derivatives 
markets offer.
 Mr. Duffy. I think it is critically important, sir, that 
the commercial and producer have the characteristics of the 
futures contract.
 Futures contracts were never designed for speculators. 
Speculators are embraced into futures markets, but they are not 
made for speculators. They are made for the commercials and 
producers. That is a critical component. I think we have lost a 
little bit of our sight going forward on that part.
 I am a big proponent of speculation in markets because I 
think it helps create liquidity for the--because if a 
commercial wants this price and a producer wants that price, we 
need somebody to fill that in.
 I think for the great people in Nebraska and for the people 
in this world that need food that comes out of Nebraska and 
other great Midwestern States, we need to make sure it is 
efficient and we need all the ecosystem to work properly.
 So, I would hope that this Congress would recognize the 
importance of all the ecosystem that goes into allowing people 
to risk manage the food that we consume in this country and we 
ship across the world. So, I think it is massively important, 
sir.
 Mr. Flood. One concern right now is the cost of fertilizer.
 Mr. Duffy, can you speak to what you are seeing in the 
market with the cost of fertilizer and how it is affecting 
producers?
 Mr. Duffy. Absolutely. There are many things that are 
affecting producers today and users of farm equipment, not 
only--it is plastics, it is fertilizer. It has all got oil 
components to it. We have 20 to 30 percent, whatever the number 
is, coming out of the Strait of Hormuz today that is being 
impacted.
 That is going to have--when you have the price of oil 
escalating, it is going to have an impact on some of these 
other derivatives of the oil product itself, including 
fertilizer and plastics and other components.
 It is concerning. I know that some of the farm communities 
that I have spoken to are switching to less intensive 
fertilizer products, such as nitrogen and things of that, to 
grow their products.
 I do not think they should have to do that. I think that we 
need to make sure that oil becomes a component, that they can 
continue to use the fertilizer to create all the different farm 
products that they have.
 Fertilizer is a big deal, and I do not think people are 
taking that under consideration; what it does as far as the 
production of our crops.
 Mr. Flood. Mr. Cranston, ag markets tend to move around 
discrete events, like the release of U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) reports. How does your company adjust its 
liquidity provisioning around these moments?
 Mr. Cranston. Thank you.
 As a market maker, our primary role is to continue to 
provide two-way pricing throughout normal market conditions as 
well as when new information is released to the market.
 How we basically manage that is, with risk management in 
mind, we will, ahead of the event or the news information, we 
will adjust our quoting. We will adjust our position limits and 
then, as the information is flowing into the market, we will 
more actively manage our exposures to reduce any potential 
exposure.
 I think the other thing that we do is we spend a lot of 
time and resources in building out our pricing models to ensure 
that they are prepared for these types of event-driven 
conditions. Ultimately, again, the goal is to not have 
liquidity disappear during these events: It is to adapt to the 
change in the risk environment and continue to support the 
market.
 Mr. Flood. I would be remiss if I did not point out the 
continued efforts of the congressional delegation in Nebraska 
to increase precision ag research. It speaks to being able to 
grow more crops, use less water, less chemicals, and be even 
more productive.
 We have come a long way since before the railroad, and we 
have a long way to go to be even more efficient and so that is 
my mission as a Representative of the great State of Nebraska.
 With that, I yield back. The committee will take a very 
short break. Very short.
 Mr. Downing [presiding]. It was a very short break.
 Well, first of all, thank you to the witnesses for being 
here.
 I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Derivatives are an important tool which keeps the U.S. 
Treasury markets liquid and healthy, and I am glad that 
prudential regulators have acknowledged that with their new 
Basel proposal.
 I am going to start first with Mr. Cranston.
 We have discussed today how the Basel reproposal alleviates 
many challenges that were posed by the 2023 proposal for banks' 
use of derivatives. So, where could the current proposal 
improve to better support the derivatives market?
 Mr. Cranston. Thank you.
 I would first just want to highlight again that the Basel 
reproposal is a significant step forward for central clearing, 
for the ability for futures commission merchants (FCMs) and 
prime brokers to be able to support that increased demand, as 
well as continue to support the entire derivatives landscape.
 I think significant progress has been made on that and look 
forward to continued process of prudential rulemaking.
 I think an additional area that could have further benefit 
for derivatives is recognizing the cross-product netting within 
derivatives as well as the cross-margining aspect and ensuring 
that those risk-reducing attributes are reflected properly in 
risk-based capital measures.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you.
 I am going to move to Mr. Duffy here.
 The SEC recently approved the Intercontinental Exchange and 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange as Treasury clearinghouses. Before, 
only the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation was an approved 
clearinghouse.
 So can you explain why competition in the Treasury 
clearinghouse space is important?
 Mr. Duffy. Well, I think competition is important no matter 
where it is at. In my earlier comments when I was referring to 
the Treasuries being cleared in another country, I am a big 
believer that if they were cleared in the United States, I 
would have no issue, but I just want to have everything on a 
level playing field.
 As it relates to clearing of cash Treasuries, my concern 
has always been I do not want to have to get ready the day the 
mandate kicks in. I have been prepared to do this for several 
years now, working with the SEC and my team to put forth an 
option--I will call it an option, Mr. Chairman--in order to 
make sure that if, in fact, the FICC is not prepared to do 
clearing of cash Treasuries, CME will be prepared.
 Right now, they are a partner of mine. We are extending 
benefits throughout the system. We want to continue to do so 
but we will invest to make sure, just in case that does not 
continue, we will be ready.
 Mr. Downing. What sort of efficiencies would you expect 
with this increase in competition?
 Mr. Duffy. I do not know--the efficiencies are dramatic 
already. FICC today and CME are about $1.5 billion of margin 
offsets that we share between our futures products and their 
cash. We think there will be additional with the add-on of the 
client efficiencies going forward.
 Having another clearinghouse replicate exactly what is 
going on today, I am not sure if there are more efficiencies. I 
just think it gives users an opportunity to use different 
platforms, and I think that is important.
 Mr. Downing. All right. Thank you.
 I am going to move to Mr. McPartland.
 In 2023, the SEC adopted rules which mandated that a larger 
portion of Treasury securities transactions be centrally 
cleared and me, as a small government conservative I never like 
to see the word ``mandate.''
 Are government mandates, in your opinion, the right 
approach here?
 Mr. McPartland. It is a great question. It is important to 
point out that the Treasury market has evolved organically in a 
pretty impressive way. So, we have moved from a phone-based 
market to a very electronic market that, as I pointed out 
earlier, handles routinely over a trillion dollars a day in 
transactions. I think that is an incredible step forward for a 
market that has sort of been allowed to flourish.
 That said, this clearing mandate, if implemented reasonably 
and with input of market participants, there are benefits 
there. We talked about a lot of them today.
 I think it is just important that we take a commonsense 
approach and we implement this in line with other markets where 
we have seen success and we know what works.
 Mr. Downing. Right, and Dodd-Frank mandated clearing and 
margin for most swap contracts.
 Given that swaps can be an effective tool to hedge risk, 
can these mandates discourage the use of hedging as banks might 
be hesitant to take an increased cash-flow risk?
 Mr. McPartland. The process to get to where we are now from 
back in 2008 was a long one, as I am sure you know. The 
ultimate rules, I think it is hard to argue that the interest 
rate swap market is not a better place--or, I should say, it is 
a better place today than it was before.
 That said, again, we do not want to go too far. We do not 
want to discourage hedging, of course----
 Mr. Downing. Right.
 Mr. McPartland [continuing]. but banks will look for the 
most efficient way to deploy their capital and manage their 
risk.
 Mr. Downing. Briefly, what would the Treasury market look 
like without central clearing?
 Mr. McPartland. The market does continue to function, as I 
said, quite well and continues to grow. That said, a lot of the 
discussion about risk offsets are really, really important, 
and, we, again, we want to encourage bank participation.
 There is a cost to mandated clearing. There is no question, 
but we do hope and expect that ultimately the benefits will 
outweigh those costs.
 Mr. Downing. Right. Thank you.
 I have run out of time here. I just want to say thank you 
to all the witnesses for their testimony today. I think this 
has been very productive.
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the 
chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for 
their response.
 Witnesses, if you could please respond no later than June 
3, 2026.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

 On that, this hearing is adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the task force was adjourned.]

 
 

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