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- EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ======================================================================= FIELD HEARING before the TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY of the COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JUNE 12, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-81 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-483 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin BILL FOSTER, Illinois WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio Carolina JUAN VARGAS, California MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania SEAN CASTEN, Illinois YOUNG KIM, California AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts BYRON DONALDS, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RITCHIE TORRES, New York SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MICHAEL LAWLER, New York CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee SAM LICCARDO, California ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan JUAN VARGAS, California, Ranking ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana BRAD SHERMAN, California SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska SEAN CASTEN, Illinois MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana TROY DOWNING, Montana JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon C O N T E N T S ---------- Friday, June 12, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Frank Lucas, Chairman of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from Oklahoma................................... 1 Hon. Juan Vargas, Ranking Member of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from California............................ 2 WITNESSES Mr. Thomas Hoenig, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University..................................... 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Ms. Esther George, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City............................ 10 Prepared Statement........................................... 12 Mr. Gary Kelly, Deputy Chair, Board of Directors, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas................................................. 17 Prepared Statement........................................... 19 Mr. Benjamin Keen, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Oklahoma.................................................... 25 Prepared Statement........................................... 27 EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ---------- Friday, June 12, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Task Force On Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., at Vast, 333 W Sheridan Avenue, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Hon. Frank D. Lucas [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Lucas, Barr, and Vargas. Also present: Representative Davidson. Chairman Lucas. The Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. Today's hearing is entitled, ``Examining the Structure of the Federal Reserve System.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extemporaneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. Chairman Lucas. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LUCAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OKLAHOMA Good morning. To my colleagues and our witnesses, welcome to Oklahoma City. I am grateful to everyone that traveled to join us here today. Today's field hearing of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity is focused on the topic of the structure of the Federal Reserve System. It is fitting for us to be discussing this topic while in the Heartland of the country. One of Oklahoma's first senators, Robert Owen, saw the failures of the first two central banks and knew that part of the reason they were not enduring was because they were not appropriately responsive to the concerns of Americans across the country. That is why as sponsor of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Senator Owen set up the federated system we have today: 12 private reserve banks with district-specific geographic and industrial expertise, overseen by the Board of Governors in Washington, DC. The Reserve Banks act as lender and supervisor of member banks, ensure the safety of our payment system, and inform monetary policy. This public-private partnership we have with our central banks serves as a check against the Federal Government dominating our monetary system. The boards of directors for each of the banks are composed of nine directors: three representing member banks; three representing the public; and three appointed by the Board of Governors with consideration of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor, and consumers. They play an essential role in governing the Federal Reserve Bank and ensuring they represent the districts they serve. Importantly, the 1913 Act also set up the Federal Advisory Council for the Board. It is comprised of one banking representative from each of the districts who bring insight and analysis directly to the Board. The Community Advisory Council also allows for direct representation from community leaders and industry experts to enlighten the Board on economic conditions around the country. By design, each district brings to the table its own perspective. Our country has many different viewpoints, and our central banks should be able to reflect all of them. St. Louis developed an impressive database--Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)--to provide the broader system and the public with the Federal Reserve System's (Fed's) economic data. Dallas provides extensive oil industry expertise. Richmond has a special focus on economic conditions of rural communities. The Kansas City Bank supports the broader system through its expertise in agricultural economics. As someone with a degree in that subject, I know well the unique considerations of raising food and fiber and those economic impacts. Whether it is the inelasticity of demand--and my spouse reminds me never to use that in an open public crowd---- [Laughter.] Chairman Lucas [continuing]. risk management practices or the impact of global markets, equipment leasing, and the weather forecast, all of these issues determine how the economy moves through Farm Country. Monetary policy transmission is different in Oklahoma than it is in New York. That is why it is so important that our farmers and ranchers have a seat at the table when monetary policy decisions are being made. Through rotating voting seats on the Federal Open Market Committee, five Reserve Bank presidents help set the administered rates. The reserve banks act as the conscience of the OMFC. Thank you again for being here for this important discussion, and I yield back. I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. Vargas from California, for 5 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JUAN VARGAS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, let me begin by thanking Chairman Lucas for organizing this hearing and bringing us to Oklahoma City to discuss the importance of the structure of our Federal Reserve System. I would also like to thank the witnesses for taking the time to discuss the issue and lending your expertise to this task force. I would also like to thank, Mr. Chairman, your committee and your staff because they have shown great hospitality to myself and my staff member. I appreciate that very much. So, it is great to be here in the 10th Federal Reserve District. The presence of the Kansas City Fed's branch here in Oklahoma City is reflective of one of the founding principles of our Federal Reserve System. The Fed, the monetary policy broadly, should be responsive to the whole country. The geographic diversity represented helps build the trust and buy- in from the public necessary for our central bank to succeed. The Federal Reserve has been our third attempt at the creation of a central bank. The first Bank of the United States expired in 1811, and the second bank was dismantled in the 1830s, both in large part because of concerns about the concentrated financial power in too few hands. What followed was decades of financial instability, bank panics, monetary chaos, and economic disruption. That ultimately made the case for a new approach. The structure established in 1913--12 regional banks and a board of Governors--was a direct response to those failures, designed to distribute power and perspective across the country. That structure has held for over a century, and today, we have an opportunity to examine how it continues to serve the public. With that historical foundation in mind, it is worth reflecting on what that structure was actually designed to do and why it still matters. The 12 reserve banks are not outposts. Each conducts its own independent economic research, drawing on the local data and local expertise to inform the national monetary policy conversation. That means the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is not relying on a single institution's view of the economy. It is drawing on 12, spanning the energy corridor here in Oklahoma, as was stated by the chairman, the defense and innovation economy as we have in San Diego, and the financial markets of New York. That diversity of perspective is not just good policy, it is itself a form of independence, ensuring the Fed cannot be captured by any single region, industry, or point of view. Making sure voices and experiences from across the country have a seat at the table when the Fed makes monetary policy in Washington is what the current structure was built to do. That lesson, that independence has to be structural, not just aspirational. It is why the founders built the Fed the way they did and why the design has outlasted every political pressure placed on it over the past century. The structure of the Fed is also inseparable from its mission. Congress gave the Federal Reserve two jobs: price stability and maximum employment. That dual mandate was a deliberate choice, a recognition that the central bank's decisions ripple through every corner of the economy, touching the price of groceries, the cost of mortgages, and the availability of jobs for working families. The regional structure supports that mandate by ensuring that policymakers hear from a broad cross-section of the American economy. The regional banks are not just a feature of that structure, they are the guardrail, ensuring that voices of Main Street are part of the conversation before decisions get made, not after. History shows us what is at risk when the independence erodes. In the early 1970s, political pressure on the Fed to keep rates low contributed to a decade of inflation, and that hurt working families across the country, and the painful correction that followed hurt them again. The decentralized structure we are examining today was designed precisely to prevent that kind of outcome, to make sure no single pressure point, political or otherwise, can override the Fed's judgment about what the economy actually needs. That is why the question about the Fed's structure matters and why this hearing is very important. The witnesses here today bring expertise from economics, policy, and financial systems that can help us and the task force clearly think about what is working and what could be strengthened, and what has stood the test of time for good reason. Accountability and independence are not in conflict. Robust transparency and congressional oversight are part of what makes the Fed's independence legitimate in the first place. The goal should be a Federal Reserve that is answerable to the public and insulated from short-term pressures, and the regional structure we are discussing today is central to that achievement. Again, I look forward to the testimony today, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. Today, we welcome the testimony of Mr. Thomas Hoenig, a distinguished senior fellow at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University; Ms. Esther George, the former president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; Mr. Gary Kelly, the deputy chair of the Board of Directors for the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; and Mr. Benjamin Keen, an associate professor of economics at the University of Oklahoma. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here, and each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the record. Mr. Hoenig, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral comments. STATEMENT OF THOMAS HOENIG, DISTINGUISHED SENIOR FELLOW, MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY Mr. Hoenig. Well, thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member Vargas, for the opportunity to talk about the Fed structure and examining the structure of the Federal Reserve today. It is a real privilege on my part, and I appreciate it very much. I would start by just saying, as intended, the Federal Reserve System's structure divides power between a central and regional authorities and between public and private interests. As a former Reserve Bank president myself, it will not surprise you that I am confident that such a system is the most effective, not perfect, framework for assuring diversity of views and better policy outcomes for an economy as complex as that of the United States. This decentralized structure better insulates the institution from short-term political influence while also keeping it ultimately accountable to you, Congress. To argue such a structure is somehow inefficient fails to appreciate its true value. The Nation's regional differences are illustrated in a variety of ways, both simple and complex. One need to only look at the differences in manufacturing activities among regions, average home prices, labor markets, or scope of services to appreciate how economically diverse this Nation is and how such differences can be magnified during times of financial crisis. The fact is that we may be one Nation, but we are, I would say, have large differences and not so united when it comes to perceptions, biases, and the economies themselves. The founders of the Federal Reserve were clearly addressing these differences when they created its decentralized system in 1913. Even then, decades before today's high-speed technology, there was no physical necessity for having separately chartered reserve banks with separate boards of directors. The structure, rather, followed the lessons learned from the two earlier failed experiments in which Congress created a single reserve bank, centralized and monolithic as an institution. In both instances, fear of centralized powers, as you noted, and regional distrust in no small way contributed to their demise. Fast forward to the 20th century. As the United States became a growing economic force, Congress determined it again needed a central bank. This time, however, Congress understood that to provide for a more effective and durable institution, it needed a structure that distributed responsibility and power across the country, not just with a central government or with Wall Street itself. There are 12 separately chartered regional banks operating across the Nation. Each bank has a board of directors who, along with the Board of Governors, share oversight for each bank. These directors have roots that run deep within the communities, which provide vital knowledge regarding their economies, and which enhance public understanding of the Federal Reserve System itself. The regional banks serving next to the Board of Governors serve to keep the system connected with Main Street America. This structure is as important today as it was in 1913, perhaps more so. One need only recount the banking crisis of the 1980s, the tragedy of 9/11, the great financial crisis, coronavirus disease (COVID) to appreciate its advantages of structure. During the great financial crisis, for example, while the Board of Governors and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York focused on liquidity for some of the largest banks, or insurance companies, or broker-dealers, just as importantly, reserve banks in the South, the Midwest, and West were addressing the needs of large regional and thousands of community banks and other financial institutions, which had they failed for lack of liquidity, would have devastated those regional economies and perhaps the Nation overall. Periodically, there are questions appropriately raised regarding whether the Federal Reserve's structure inhibits its efficiency. As a former CEO of a reserve bank, I can say that I worked daily with experienced reserve bank directors from the private sector, CEOs and Chief Operating Officers (COOs) of other reserve banks, constantly reviewing the systems operations, upgrading payments, information technology, and human resource systems, including consolidated operations when it was needed. Another concern I also hear from and raised is whether the decentralized structure creates too many voices speaking on the FOMC policy, creating confusion for markets and the public. I think this concern, however, gives too little credit to the value of debate and transparency and policymaking, or to the benefits of having regional, independent voices in the policy discussion that affects every American citizen. Put most simply, the Federal Reserve System reflects the Nation's Federal structure. To consolidate and centralize it would narrow its perspective, make it more bureaucratic, less responsive to change, and less accountable to the public it serves, and it would not serve the future of the economy well. Thank you very much, sir. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hoenig follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much. Ms. George, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your opening oral remarks, I should say. STATEMENT OF ESTHER GEORGE, FORMER PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY Ms. George. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, and Ranking Member Vargas, and other members of this task force for the invitation to testify on the structure of the Federal Reserve System. Three years ago, I stepped down from my post as president of the Kansas City Fed, having reached mandatory retirement and concluding some 40 years of service to the Federal Reserve. It was an honor to serve the Nation's central bank and to represent a region that includes all or part of seven States, including the State of Oklahoma, and as you noted, home to former Senator Robert Owen, who was one of the architects of the Federal Reserve System. The design of our central bank reflects something that I think is deep and durable in the American character: a wariness of concentrated power and a preference for decentralized institutions. This sentiment influenced Congress to shape the Federal Reserve in a way that would garner the trust and confidence of the American public. So, my comments this morning focus on how the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve System enables it to effectively achieve its broad objectives across three important dimensions: public trust, operational effectiveness, and independent thinking. As Congress deliberated in 1913 how it might approach a third attempt at central banking, it rightly understood that the monolithic structure of the Nation's first two central banks was ill-suited to represent and serve the diverse interests, geographies, and industries that make up the U.S. economy. To that end, Congress settled on a model that would achieve both public accountability and shared control by creating an independent government Agency and 12 regional reserve banks to comprise the Federal Reserve System. The Board of Governors in Washington, DC plays an important oversight role for the entire system, without which a meaningful role for the regional reserve banks would not likely be acceptable to the public. However, to ensure there was appropriate balance and representation, the Federal Reserve Act also called for reserve banks to be located across the country. This decentralized design is not simply about geography. It also provides for private citizens from communities across the Nation to serve as members of the regional banks' boards of directors. These individuals represent broad and varied sectors of our economy, and their expertise contributes meaningfully to operational oversight, budget discipline, and monetary policy deliberations. The Federal Reserve structure also has proven to be valuable in carrying out its operational roles. Whether responding to a crisis, delivering financial services, or supervising banks, a deep understanding of regional interests facilitates effective performance of these duties. Importantly, the reserve banks are designed to understand credit availability issues at the local level as they fulfill their discount window function, and it enables the Federal Reserve to respond quickly in times of stress. For example, we witnessed in 2008 and again in 2020 as Wall Street and global financial markets seized up, problems also developed in other parts of the country that needed to be addressed, including in the Kansas City Fed's region where thousands of communities rely on small and regional banks for credit and other core financial services. Likewise, the reserve banks are able to gauge the local effects of financial market conditions and economic drivers through their delegated role in supervising banks. Their connections to thousands of financial institutions and 50 State banking departments provide essential information about the economic health of small business credit conditions and the impact of broader regulatory issues. Finally, the decentralized structure brings a wide range of perspectives and independent thought to monetary policy deliberations. Policy decisions have broad impact on American households and businesses and benefit from the system's independent research and analysis and public input. While a mosaic of perspectives and input is sometimes messy, the Federal Reserve's deliberative process produces a decision that reflects the majority's consensus view while also making the nature of differing views fully available to the public. Robert Owen might not have imagined that the Federal Reserve System would have proven so durable over the past century amid the economic and political challenges it would face, but I do think he would be pleased to see that the Fed, by design, has continued to honor its deep roots in the economic experience of the American public as it fulfills the mandates assigned to it by Congress. Thank you, and I look forward to this morning's discussion. [The prepared statement of Ms. George follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Mr. Kelly, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF GARY KELLY, DEPUTY CHAIR, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS Mr. Kelly. Thank you. Chairman Lucas, and Ranking Member Vargas, and members of the task force, good morning. Thanks for holding this hearing, and thanks for the opportunity to testify here this morning. I am honored to be the deputy chair of the Dallas Fed. I am even more proud of all the people at the Dallas Fed. Before I joined, I spent my career in the private sector, 4 decades at Southwest Airlines, and that experience has given me a very deep appreciation for the importance of strong institutions, credible governance, and economic stability. So, my core message is that the Federal Reserve's federated structure is one of its greatest strengths. The U.S. did not arrive at this model by accident. Before the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, our country experienced repeated episodes of financial instability, bank failures, panics, and recessions. Congress responded by creating a central bank that combined national oversight with regional representation, ensuring that monetary policy reflects perspectives from across the country and not just Washington or major financial centers. That is where the 12 regional reserve banks play such an important role. At the Dallas Fed, we represent the 11th District, and that includes Texas, Southern New Mexico, and Northern Louisiana. Like other reserve banks, we carry out core responsibilities, such as cash operations, payments, lending, credit risk, and bank supervision, and just as important, we bring regional insight into the national monetary policy process. Our Board reflects a diverse cross-section of industries, including banking, energy, education, telecommunications, real estate, social services, and transportation. The diversity is intentional, and it helps ensure that the information reaching the Federal Reserve reflects the broader economy of our district. We provide oversight and governance of the bank's operations, and we serve as a bridge between the Federal Reserve and the communities that we represent. We review economic conditions, submit recommendations on the discount rate, and provide input ahead of each FOMC meeting. Regional input is strengthened further by branch offices in El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio. In addition to that, we have five advisory councils, and together, they help capture a wide range of economic conditions, from energy markets and border trade to small business activity and community development. Independent research from the Dallas Fed is another key part of the regional model, and our research team analyzes issues such as employment, inflation, energy, and trade, further informing our participation in the FOMC. We stay closely connected to the communities that we serve, and through surveys, roundtables, ongoing dialog with business and civic leaders, we gather firsthand insights about economic conditions on the ground, and this helps ensure that policy decisions are informed not only by data, but by real-world experience, and that connection is crucial. A central bank serves the country best when it listens to the people and the places that make up the economy. The Federal Reserve's regional federated design is not a historical artifact. It is a practical and enduring strength that supports independence, accountability, diversity of thought, and a deeper understanding of the American economy, and I think those qualities are essential. Thank you all very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Professor Keen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN KEEN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA Mr. Keen. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, members of the task force, thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding the structure of the Federal Reserve System. I wanted to speak to you today about something that is rarely discussed in policy debates about the Federal Reserve, and that is what the regional structure of the Federal Reserve does for economists, students, and communities outside of Washington D.C. Early in my career, I worked as a research assistant at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. I later served as a visiting scholar and consultant at the Federal Reserve Banks of St. Louis and Dallas. Those experiences shaped me as an economist in ways that classroom training alone could not have accomplished. I gained direct exposure to real policy questions--questions about inflation, interest rates, financial conditions, and labor markets--as they were being worked through in real time. The Federal Reserve's regional structure does not merely scatter offices across the country, it provides Americans like me who do not live in Washington, DC, with access to our central bank. Consider what a fully centralized Federal Reserve would look like. It would be a single institution that would concentrate central bank research and expertise in one location. Economists at universities across the country--in Oklahoma, in Texas, in Ohio--would have far less opportunity to engage in the intellectual work of the central bank. The Federal Reserve, in turn, would lose the benefits of perspective and research methods from scholars across the country. The regional Federal Reserve banks prevent that from happening. They organize seminars. They host visiting scholars and Ph.D. interns. They compile economic data, and they open avenues for economists outside of Washington to engage with policy-relevant questions. That engagement with policy issues often leads to scholarly research, work that is examined, tested, refined over time, and feeds back into the policy process. The benefits also reach directly into the classroom. At the University of Oklahoma, my Federal Reserve experience enables me to bring institutional knowledge and real-world policy context to students who may never set foot inside a Washington policy institution. Undergraduates in Norman, Oklahoma, can learn not just the theory of monetary policy, but how it is applied in practice. Graduate students gain exposure to the kinds of research questions and modeling challenges that arise inside policy institutions. That is a meaningful educational benefit, and it flows directly from the regional structure of the Federal Reserve. The benefits extend beyond campus. Through public lectures, media interviews, and community conversations, academic economists who have worked with the Federal Reserve can help explain monetary policy to households and businesses in plain terms. Monetary policy affects every community in this country, and the regional structure helps ensure that the people explaining it live, work, and teach in communities throughout the country. A single, centralized Federal Reserve might be simpler and less costly to administer--I acknowledge that--but it would risk something important: the concentration of access, expertise, and perspective in a single location. The regional structure guards against it. It builds a national network of research, education, and public engagement, one that allows ideas to flow outward from the central bank and allows regional perspective and academic insights to flow back in. For those reasons, I believe the regional structure of the Federal Reserve provides substantial value well beyond its formal governance role. It is, in my view, one of the most underappreciated strengths of the current system. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Keen follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Professor. We will now turn to member questions, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning and note to my colleagues. The nature of the subject matter and how far all of you have traveled, be prepared for perhaps a second round of questions, so do not be frantic in your 5 minutes. Let us start with you, Dr. Hoenig, and thank you for sharing your insights with us again. Can you expand on your written testimony; why should having a decentralized system like ours produce better monetary policy outcomes as opposed to a bank concentrated in Washington, DC. or New York City? Mr. Hoenig. Well---- Chairman Lucas. We will just cut to the chase. [Laughter.] Mr. Hoenig. Thank you very much for that. I will tell you that the best way to describe it is, I have sat in many FOMC meetings, and in part of that meeting, you have a go-around of each of the 12 districts, and through that, you learn about what is going on in the region, and as you go around the room, you kind of paint a picture of the U.S. economy on the ground. That is, you are not looking at aggregate data looking backward. You are looking at what is happening today, and it could vary very substantially among those districts. By doing that, you have a better understanding of the economy as you discuss the issues and where the differences are, and from that you can begin to say, well, what can bring a consensus toward a policy decision, or even more importantly, if there are going to be differences in dissents, you understand where the dissent is coming from. So, you really find yourself coming to a better conclusion about what the policy should be, whether you can agree or cannot, and how you can form a policy that all can live with and is in the best interest of the country as a whole. I do not think you can get that if all centered in Washington, looking at aggregate data, looking backward. Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Ms. George, last year, the Kansas City Fed established the Center for Agriculture and the Economy to serve as a central hub for agricultural and research for the Fed. Of course, this was after your retirement, but the 10th District has long served as the expert on agricultural economics. Given the prominent role the industry plays in the district, tell us how the Kansas City Fed and its branches in Oklahoma City, Omaha, and Denver provide an invaluable analysis on the farm economy to the rest of the country. Ms. George. As you noted, the region itself has an outsized proportion of ag influence on its economy compared to the Nation as a whole, and the direction of that economy can flow directly from how interest rates, how inflation, how inputs to that process work. So, the Kansas City Fed has long been part of this large geography that covers the Heartland, invested in understanding how agriculture is faring in this part of the country and has developed data through surveys. We are monitoring ag conditions. We are creating roundtables and I will tell you, as president of the Kansas City Fed, it was not unusual to find me going out and talking directly with producers in Enid, Oklahoma, in Caldwell, Kansas, and places around that region to hear firsthand what was happening in that economy. So, watching the Kansas City Fed create this center, which is now a resource more broadly shared across the country, I think provides valuable insights. They were ones I used at the Federal Open Market Committee table. Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Professor Keen, in the amount of time I have left in this particular round, would you like to provide your thoughts on that as well? Why does proximity matter? How does it benefit future farmers and economists at University of Oklahoma (OU) and Oklahoma State University (OSU) when it comes to agriculture research in their backyard? Mr. Keen. So, I will go back to an experience that I had when I was working on my Ph.D. I was staying in Richmond, Virginia, one summer for a few weeks and was able to go into the Richmond Fed after contacting some people there. It is the opportunity to learn not only the data resources that are available, to have access to all the research tools, but the economists that are there allow for mentoring. They help young economists who are just getting out learn how, really, the system works and how to publish papers and how to conduct research, and it allows them to expand beyond their university. The idea of having a Federal Reserve district in different cities instead of having to go to Washington allows different students in areas throughout the country to be able to experience that, whether it be in St. Louis or in Richmond or any of the districts. Chairman Lucas. Thank you. My time is about to expire. The chair now recognizes the ranking member of our Task Force on Monetary Policy, Mr. Vargas of California, for 5 minutes. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelly, you look the same. [Laughter.] Mr. Vargas. I used to fly Southwest Airlines from San Diego up to Sacramento, and I always would get that little magazine, and you always had that message from the CEO. You look the same. I wish I would have flown Southwest here because I almost did not get on the plane. There were 12 of us. I should not say it, but it was American Airlines since I guess we got to speak the truth here, and there was 12 of us that could not get on the plane, I guess, because of weight issues. It turned out that two of us were Democrats. [Laughter.] Mr. Vargas. So, I came back and the pilot said, ``I guess they could put six more people on.'' I had to tell him, ``Well, I am a Republican.'' [Laughter.] Mr. Vargas. They finally let me on. No, you would not have done that, Mr. Kelly, right? No way. No way, but, again, it is good to see you here in person. I do want to ask this. So, obviously, there have been a couple of failures in the past, and so we are here today with this system. It seems to have held up, it seems to have been quite resilient, but the situation has changed. I mean, we are talking about data talking about information, but information is very different today than it was in 1913. In fact, with the AI revolution that is beginning, I think that is going to be very different once again. What is it in this structure that will allow it to continue to be robust and necessary? Now, I think the system works and I like the way the system works, but I think there is certainly going to be a challenge on issues of efficiency. So, well, wait a minute, do we really have to have this large, inefficient system to get the data that we need when we have AI and we have all these other processes? Would someone like to comment on that? Oh, Ms. George, why do we not go with you first? Ms. George. I was just going to say, certainly, we are going to see changes, and we already have seen changes in the Federal Reserve in thinking about how to take advantage of what technology gives us today but when you talk about the access to information, I think back to how the FOMC works today. You have 19 people around that table, 12 of which are the reserve bank presidents, which are really working off the same national data, but what we are doing is putting context around that data. I think that is going to continue to be an essential part of what accrues trust in this institution, an institution that is setting policies that are touching the lives of every American. People want to know that we are coming at, not just the efficiency of it, but an effective way to characterize what it means on the ground. I think this structure should continue to serve that purpose, even as it looks at itself and finds ways to be more efficient in how it does that. Mr. Vargas. Mr. Hoenig.? Mr. Hoenig. If I could add, I agree fully with that, and I also would point out that we have never really been starved for data. AI will be another form. It also will look back and then try and project forward, but there is no substitute for those who are actually in the economy, who have to make daily decisions, who are affected by data and changes in circumstances, and they bring that together, talk to one another, and then talk to the policymaker. That is the huge advantage that has been constant since 1913 to the present and, I think, will be an advantage for decades to come. It is the human element, the knowledge, the immediacy that makes the difference in terms of policy and confidence in the decisionmaking. Mr. Vargas. Would anyone else like to comment on that? Mr. Kelly, yes, sir. Mr. Kelly. Thank you for your kind comments. I certainly do not feel young any longer---- [Laughter.] Mr. Kelly [continuing]. but thanks for being a customer as well but just starting with the purpose of the Federal Reserve System, it is here to serve the American people. So, I think whatever changes that are contemplated, it needs to maintain that as the North Star. For all the reasons that have already been articulated, I think it is really important to continue to have the federated system. Having said that, the world has definitely changed since 1913. It continues to change. I would argue that is one reason to maintain the basic structure so that it can adapt as opportunities come forward but yes, there is a cost to having a federated system, but there is also a very significant benefit, and those need to be looked at in balance. So, there are opportunities to improve the efficiency of the system, and as a member of the Dallas Board, I can say that work is important, and it is underway, and something that we are very interested in. At the same time, as we all know, change carries a risk, so we just want to make sure that the changes are wise and that they still allow us to maintain our mission, which is to serve the interests of the American people. Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for 5 minutes. Mr. Barr. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your hospitality in the great State of Oklahoma and for welcoming all of us here to celebrate, in the middle of the country, the federated system of the Federal Reserve, and the very unique public-private hybrid approach to the third Central Bank of the United States. Let me start with you, Mr. Hoenig. Since its creation in 1913, of course our country has experienced enormous changes and growth in the economy. Has the Federal Reserve System ever reapportioned in what areas the country each of the 12 reserve banks oversees and serves? Given shifts in population and geographic concentrations, and even changes in the economy, I believe that 12 banks is a creature of the statute. Tell me about the history of reapportionment, and would it be wise to consider reapportionment given population shifts and where the geographic banks currently exist? Mr. Hoenig. Well, as far as changing the boundaries, in that sense, it has gone on. In fact, the 10th District that we are in right now, the Southern part of Oklahoma was in the Dallas district. That was moved to Kansas City so that it was a full State. That happened again in Missouri for that and other districts as well. As far as the location of the offices, the branches and the head offices, they have been constant since they were first formed. I think you can change the boundaries and still get representation. I think the cost of moving headquarters would be very depth, and you would spend a lot of time and effort doing that, and I do not think the change would make improvement. It would merely make a change. So, I think keeping the boundaries, moving them as you need to is fine. Mr. Barr. Is 12 the right number? Mr. Hoenig. You know, what is the right number? The main thing is it is distributed across the country. Whether it is 14 or 9, the most important thing is it has to be enough that it is actually representing a broad base across the country by region, and I think 12 is a good number. Mr. Barr. Does anyone think it would be a good idea for Congress to reconsider the number or the location? Ms. George. Congressman, I have often said that if that were opened again, it could be likely that there would be 50 Federal Reserve banks and not just 12 but I think to Mr. Hoenig's point, remember these headquarters have branch offices, and the commitment to serve a region actually blankets the entire country in terms of how you are touching those various parts. So yes, as the population has shifted, it has raised this question from time to time, but I think, in a meaningful way, has not really deterred the base. Mr. Barr. Let me follow up with a tough question to Ms. George. Legislation has been proposed in our committee over several different terms of Congress in my time in service to consolidate Federal regulatory agencies, and maybe this is a bit of a radical idea, but fold some of the regulatory and supervisory functions of the Fed into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Those proposals have not gone anywhere, but I have always heard the argument from defenders of the Fed that the economic intelligence of having supervisory responsibility over the banking system is very useful for monitoring economic conditions, for financial stability functions of the Fed, and also informing monetary policy. Can you speak to, if Congress ever were to try to streamline and consolidate Federal financial regulatory activities into fewer agencies, what is the importance of keeping that responsibility with the Fed? Ms. George. Yes, this issue has come up, and, of course, each of those agencies has a slightly different focus, whether it is the comptroller of the currency with national banks, whether it is the FDIC as the insurer. When I think about the Federal Reserve's role, it has a unique function in terms of its ability to lend. It is providing liquidity provision through its discount window, and the synergies that come from understanding credit conditions benefit enormously from those connections as a supervisor in that region to be able to know firsthand what is happening. We have seen this in other countries where they have tried to separate that from the central bank and, ultimately, have shifted back to try to keep that. Mr. Barr. Mr. Kelly, my final question in the first round, could you explain the benefits of having the three classes of directors that serve on the boards of directors of each regional reserve bank? Mr. Kelly. I think it really starts with the public-private nature of the whole system where the banks unique in the world are actually owned by the member banks in the district. So, as one of the benefits of being a shareholder of the bank, you get to vote for representation on the Board. So we have class A directors, which are elected by the shareholders from among the community banks. I find it very, very insightful to have three bankers on our Board providing, again, on-the-ground insights. The shareholders of each bank also elect the three Class B directors, which are at large from the district. Once again, it is a very diverse group, and I think we all value and benefit from that. Then finally, I am a Class C director, as I know you know, and we are appointed by the Board of Governors. So, you have a nice mix of independent directors that come to the Board from different sources and have different representation and then the duties in terms of electing presidents and first vice presidents, we avoid a conflict of interest by excluding the A directors from those appointments. So, I think it is new for me, but I think it is a very elegant solution, and I think it works very, very well. Mr. Barr. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired in this round. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for 5 minutes. Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for putting this together, and thanks to everybody for participating in it. It is an honor to get to serve on this committee, and constituents do talk about the Federal Reserve. Now, it is not going to make primetime news normally, but when we talk about the structure, one of the things that people wonder, like, what did we create when we created the Federal Reserve? You talk about it is accountable, but one of the main ways anybody is accountable to Congress is the power of the purse, and the Fed was sort of created as an autonomous entity in a way, and you say ``independent,'' and people wonder, well, how independent? I will recognize executive orders could be unconstitutional as could laws for that matter, but as you guys go down, yes or no, do you believe that the Federal Reserve is accountable to comply with executive orders? Mr. Hoenig. Well, I think, frankly, that the Federal Reserve was created by Congress and is accountable to Congress. Congress can change the laws, can change how it is funded, can change how Presidents---- Mr. Davidson. Right, and I mean, we created the Department of Defense, too, I mean---- Mr. Hoenig. Right. Mr. Davidson [continuing]. in 1947, so---- Mr. Hoenig. Right. Mr. Davidson. But they are clearly subject to executive orders. Mr. Hoenig. Well---- Mr. Davidson. Are you guys subject to executive orders? Mr. Hoenig. Well, we do have an executive order in terms of how bank supervision is carried out today. That, I think, is complied with. I think when Congress created the Federal Reserve, it created it to be independent of political influence. Mr. Davidson. With respect to monetary policy, yes. I am not asking about monetary policy. If the President of the United States issues an executive order that says every bank examination shall include whatever, or in the case here, one of the executive orders that he issued was there will be no central bank digital currency. Through the structure, the Federal Government, Chairman Powell has said, well, we agree that Congress would have to authorize us to do a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC), but you are clearly working on a wholesale CBDC, which from a lot of folks' perspective, is not much of a distinction. On the back end, it still does all the things that a central bank digital currency would do. It is just cosmetically different on the front end, but the President has said there will be no central bank digital currency. So, are the Federal Reserve banks still working on it, as an example? Ms. George, you are really active with FedNow, and some people said that is a precursor to a CBDC, a wholesale system, and payments are part of that, so is that work still underway? Ms. George. So, the Federal Reserve in its role as a payments provider worked on FedNow and did that under the purview of the Board of Governors. In meeting with Congress, I also testified to Congress about what that was doing. I am not aware that the Federal Reserve is working on a central bank digital currency, and will tell you my experience is, they pay careful attention to the direction that public oversight bodies have extended in terms of whether it applies directly to them or whether they will follow the spirit of those things. So, I am not aware that there are any efforts to undermine that direction. Mr. Davidson. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I mean, obviously the Fed has been working on central bank digital currency, both in Boston and New York, and San Francisco is literally hiring people to write code to develop a central bank digital currency. So, hopefully you guys become aware of that because it is work that has been ongoing for quite a long time. When you talk about accountability and autonomy with cash- flow, how do the banks make money? So, if we talk about cost and benefit, what does it cost to run the Fed? How much money? We would know if there was an appropriation to say, well, this is the line item for the Pentagon. We know how much money we give them. How much money does it take to run the Fed in a given year, and how does that flow from say, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet to operations like payments, all the ways that make money, and if somebody wanted to look that up, where would they just go read it? Ms. George. The Federal Reserve provides annually to Congress and makes public on its website through its Monetary Policy Report and through its Annual Report of the Operations of the Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors. You will see the sources of revenue which come off its Open Market Committee portfolio. You will see how it recovers its cost as a payments operator in that space, and last I recalled, it takes about $6 billion to run the Federal Reserve System in total, including the Reserve Bank's support of the Board of Governors. Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. That will be all for this round. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Moore, for 5 minutes. Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and by the way, you are a great host having us here in Oklahoma. It has been a wonderful visit, and I want to thank our witnesses as well. You know, unlike most central banks around the world, the Federal Reserve was intentionally designed as a decentralized system, as has been testified to previously, one that combines the national policymaking with regional representatives. Congress recognized the economic conditions in New York may look different than those, for example, in my home State of North Carolina, or of course, here in Oklahoma. The Federal Reserve System was designed to ensure that monetary policy and banking supervision would be informed not only by data coming out of Washington but also experiences of businesses and consumers from around the country. That regional perspective is particularly important for States like my home State, and I would say probably in most States outside of some of the major banking or policy areas. I can tell you economic conditions facing a manufacturer in rural Western North Carolina, or a small business in Eastern North Carolina, or a family in Charlotte can be very different than things viewed around the country. Mr. Hoenig, you have spent, of course, 2 decades as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and participated in interest rate deliberations through multiple economic cycles. How important is the regional reserve bank structure in ensuring that monetary policy reflects conditions across the entire country rather than primarily the perspectives of Washington? I know everybody sort of touched on this, but how have you seen that, and can you think of examples---- Mr. Hoenig. Sure. Mr. Davidson [continuing]. where that regional perspective probably helped the Board take action that may have been better than if they had just relied on, say, just what was coming out of Washington? Mr. Hoenig. Well, I think there are many examples, but usually, it is most apparent when there is a crisis, and whether it was the agricultural crisis of the 1970s and 1980s-- -- Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm. Mr. Hoenig [continuing]. where this part of the country suffered very significantly relative to others. We at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and Dallas were very much aware of it and involved in it in terms of trying to find solutions. With the great financial crisis, in fact, as solutions were being pursued for liquidity for major corporations, major banks in this country, I was in those meetings in Washington, and one of the things I was able to do was point out that, I am sorry, but the Midwest has some pretty large companies, pretty large banks. Let us make sure these policies or these programs that you are developing for liquidity purposes extend into the Midwest and into these. Had I not been at that table, I am sure there would have been some coverage, but it would not have been anywhere near as detailed or anywhere as thorough as they were by having that input into the process. So, those are just two examples, but you can see it in COVID. You could see it in the terrible periods of the 1980s where the regional banks---- Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm. Mr. Hoenig [continuing]. came forward and found solutions to problems that would have been much more devastating to that region had they not been done. Mr. Davidson. Well, thank you, and, of course, I would submit one of the greatest strengths of the Fed is the ability to gather information from local businesses, banks, and community leaders. Ms. George, let me ask you this: How valuable are the regional advisory councils and business contacts informing policy decisions, and do you also have examples where the information gathered from, say, local companies are different from the traditional economic data that was suggested? Ms. George. So, we do take advantage of drawing resources in. We talked about the boards of directors, but we do have roundtables and advisory councils that allow us to really drill down to more specific sectors of that economy and understand it. When you do that, you begin to appreciate that there can be things at the macro level you might miss, but you will understand and when you go to the Federal Open Market Committee meetings, be able to articulate. For example, in my region, whether it was energy or agriculture, the way the transmission of monetary policy works can feel different---- Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm. Ms. George [continuing]. if you are a farmer with an operating loan, if you are making capital decisions around drilling for energy and so, the expression of those at that table allow you to calibrate how that policy is working across the country. Mr. Davidson. Just as a follow up to that, Ms. George, what benefits would you say that sector-specific expertise brings to monetary policy decisions? Ms. George. Well, I think, again, it begins to fill out for this committee what is a very large and diverse economy in this country. Even as we see various industries grow, there are still thousands of communities in this country---- Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm. Ms. George [continuing]. where those effects can hit harder. Again, I reflect on ag and energy transportation. Transportation is often one of the early warning signs we hear as the economy is turning, and when you are able to pick up anecdotes that say we see a shift in this industry, it matters to the discussion that we have at the FOMC. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. We will now turn to a second round of questions, and I will recognize myself for additional 5 minutes. Turning to you, Mr. Kelly, we know proximity is important, but it is not just about geography. From your experiences at the Dallas Fed, why is it important that the Dallas Board ensures the bank is actually representative of the community it is supposed to serve? How does this happen in a practical way? Mr. Kelly. Well, I think diversity taken in all forms is really helpful. We have a very large country. We have a very complex economy. Just picking up on the previous comments, we have 12 banks that are independent of each other. At the same time, I have been impressed by how they do collaborate. So, each district has its uniqueness. Texas and the 11th District, I believe, produce 60 percent of the oil and gas in the U.S., and so there is a deep expertise that is developed there. But well beyond energy, if you just take current conditions, all the discussion around AI, every Board that I am on is deeply interested and concerned about those opportunities. Having a diversity of voices available to us who are knowledgeable about data centers, knowledgeable about energy, knowledgeable about water and in such a huge emerging issue, is absolutely invaluable. So, we have very broad representation on our Board, on our advisory councils, with our branch offices. It is very rich, and I have found it to be personally very rewarding to have that kind of access. Chairman Lucas. Continuing with you, Mr. Kelly, the Dallas Bank's Energy Survey is widely looked to in order to understand crude oil production and energy conditions. Expand on what you just said. How does the Dallas Board view that responsibility of providing that perspective to the FOMC and to the broader public? Mr. Kelly. I think---- Chairman Lucas. You are a resource for everybody. Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. I think our Board understands very well its duties on the Board, number one, and understands that we do need to have expertise in the areas that are unique for our district, and I think clearly understand how important energy is to our district. So, the Board is extremely supportive. We have energy represented directly on our Board. We have an energy council. I have attended those meetings, and they are very, very, very good. We have major energy companies' headquarters in our district, and oftentimes, those CEOs are part of our councils, so I think it is extremely important. I think the Board is very, very well aware of that and very supportive of that. Chairman Lucas. Ms. George, your testimony emphasized that reserve banks need to have a deep familiarity with community banks, small businesses, and the economic conditions and regulatory issues that affect them. Why do you think that those perspectives allow for a more effective reserve bank, especially in economic crisis times? Ms. George. Well, when you have a deep understanding of what drives the liquidity, the credit quality of these institutions, when you understand where small businesses can often find a gap in their funding, it makes a difference when the Fed then has to respond in a time of crisis to know where is that likely to hit. In 2020, when we began to see the economy experience its freefall, there were banks that were trying to connect with their customers in this community and understanding, from the Federal Reserve's point of view, these were otherwise viable institutions that were trying to meet the needs of a manufacturer. They were trying to meet the needs of the grocery store in their communities, things that were going to be vital to the citizens that lived there. The ability to respond quickly meant that we were hearing from them directly, and we were also able to reach out to them to understand where those needs were, and that, of course, funneled up to the national level as we communicated across the system. Chairman Lucas. My time is about to expire. The chair now recognizes the ranking member of Task Force on Monetary Policy, Mr. Vargas, for an additional 5 minutes. Mr. Vargas. I thank the chairman. Professor Keen, you and I had a discussion offline before this hearing started, and one of the things we spoke about was the potential disruption of AI. Mr. Kelly just mentioned it, but more, I think, focusing on the issue of water and energy, but I think that there is going to be a tremendous disruption, I think, in our economy and maybe even at the Fed because of AI. I like history, and people talk about the issue of the computer and how that disrupted our economy. I think you have to go back further and really look at industrialization. I think that was the great disruption where you saw people coming from the farming communities to the large cities, the disruption that you had there. Would you comment a little bit about that--I will get back to Mr. Kelly on the issue of the energy and water--but the disruption that AI might produce when we talk about data independence of the Fed and all these other things because AI is going to have, I think, an immense impact on our economy, on the way we do things. Mr. Keen. Well, AI presents the possibility of having a large productivity shock to the U.S. economy. It is going to expand the pie, and so we are going to expand gross domestic product (GDP) that solves problems that exist out there. The concern is we are going to dislocate potentially entry-level labor. There is some concern that companies are no longer hiring entry-level labor right now, so these entry-level workers are future CEOs. They are future executives. Mr. Vargas. When you say ``entry-level,'' though, do you mean also white-collar entry-level jobs? Mr. Keen. I am talking about college graduates in particular. Mr. Vargas. Okay. Okay. Mr. Keen. That is who I am talking about. Mr. Vargas. Okay. Mr. Keen. So, there is a concern about that. Now, the question is, how is this going to evolve? I do not think there is a historical precedent. The best that you can go back to is, like you said, with the Industrial Revolution, but we need to be vigilant, and we need to watch this occur. I do not think we need to rush to do something, but we do not need to be waiting to respond. So, I think it is watch very carefully and see how things develop. Mr. Vargas. Mr. Kelly, you were the first one, I believe, that mentioned AI, and you mentioned it within the context of you watch it very carefully with respect to water issues and energy issues because those are the ones that are most salient at the moment but what else do you see in AI that is coming to us? Mr. Kelly. Well, I will start out with an aviation analogy just with the rate of change here. From the Wright brothers until a man on the moon was 66 years, and we have all lived through, over recent decades, massive change, and I think, indeed this is probably going to be the biggest yet. It is here, and it is not coming. It is here. So, the impact on the economy right now is outsized, so I think that is a concern. If it stops the impact on markets, whether it is equity or debt, it is a massive undertaking that is taking place. What I hear from our district are these concerns. I do not know that the Board are---- Mr. Vargas. What about the issue of the independence? So, for example, right now, as you probably know, there is an issue, as there always has been, by the way, the independence of the Fed. We see it, I think, a little more theatrical maybe these days, but there has always been pressure on the Fed to not be independent to drive the rates down. How will this information that is going to be so massive, how will that affect the independence of the Fed in this system? Mr. Kelly. I do not necessarily see that as a challenge to the independence. I do see it, as we were discussing earlier, it is a change. There is an opportunity for efficiencies, and I think whether it is the Fed, or business, or any other entity, we are going to have to embrace that change and make sensible changes and adapt, but I see that as a separate issue from independence. It is, again, serve the American people, do it in the most efficient way possible, manage the risk of change very, very carefully so we do not impair our mission, but I think the independence is important, and I think that should be retained. Mr. Vargas. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the chair of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for an additional 5 minutes. Mr. Barr. Well, thank you very much, and thanks again to our witness' fabulous testimony, great insights. I think all of you all have made a very powerful and persuasive case for retaining the federated system and the diversity of thought, the independence that it brings, the operational effectiveness, and the public trust that it creates. Great. However, as you all know, there are critics of the Federal Reserve, in most recent history, a good example of critics pointing out that the Fed made a major mistake in 2021 underestimating how persistent inflation would become by describing it as transitory, waiting too long to begin raising interest rates, and continuing quantitative easing, purchasing $120 billion per month in Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) all the way through March 2022 when Consumer Price Index (CPI) was almost already at 9 percent. Because of that, I think the critics and Members of Congress, we said, now wait a minute. The Fed delayed tightening, and that ultimately forced the Fed to move much more aggressively in 2022, and we were actually sounding the alarm. I remember an oversight Humphrey Hawkins hearing with Chairman Powell, who I have great respect for, and we said, well, wait a minute. The Chambers of Commerce back in Kentucky are telling us everything is too expensive, and that was a year before tightening began. Was there a failure in the federated system? Why did not that data get back to the Board of Governors sooner? Maybe you were sounding the alarm earlier than the FOMC was able to take action, and they just ignored you. Mr. Hoenig, can you speak to that? Mr. Hoenig. Yes, and in my comments I said it is the best system, it is not perfect, but I will tell you this is where the role of dissent matters. In other periods, for example, myself where I may have had that kind of disagreement, at least I made that argument to the committee, and the committee then had to make a major decision whether to take that and give more weight to it or not. The fact that you have this decentralized system and you can bring these dissents forward does not make it necessarily perfect or that you will get the answer that you wanted as a minority dissenter, but it does bring greater debate to the system. Mistakes will be made; hopefully, fewer mistakes than otherwise would be a mistake without the ability to have independent views voiced strongly in those meetings. Mr. Barr. Well, a quick follow up for anyone. You have made the case for why the current system is a good system. I agree, but what does not work? What reforms should we consider in Congress to the Fed to improve effectiveness? Mr. Hoenig. Can I---- Mr. Barr. Sure. Mr. Hoenig. I will make one quick comment on that. I do think that over time there has always been a tension between the center and the reserve banks and that. I think more and more there is a deferment to the chairman, do not want to dissent unless you absolutely have to. That culture is, I think, weakening the system. I think the boundaries need to be clear. The Board has oversight, reserve banks have independent views, and those views ought to be expressed and voted on without any kind of reservation and I think that is something we need to think about for the future: a strong, independent Reserve Bank System. Mr. Barr. Ms. George, I want to ask you about the discount window function for the reserve banks. As you know, we have been having this in our subcommittee, a big conversation about deposit insurance reform post-Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). What changes can we make along the lines of destigmatizing the discount window to help member banks access the discount window to avoid deposit flight and bank runs? Ms. George. So, the stigma we have seen has been an issue the Fed has dealt with for some time, and I think after the great financial crisis, you recall that there was a requirement from Congress that we disclose publicly those that borrowed from the discount window. I think all of those have contributed to trying to make sure that this is used. There are legitimate reasons that you want that liquidity mechanism to work, and the Federal Reserve I see is working hard on trying to communicate that to the banks it supervises, to the broader banking community. It is essential that they understand there are legitimate reasons to use that discount window, and if Congress has ideas about how to do that, I am sure there would be ways that the Board of Governors and the reserve banks would welcome that. Mr. Barr. Well, thank you for that. I think destigmatizing the discount window is something we really should look at as a policy alternative to increasing assessments with deposit insurance levels, but thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this terrific hearing. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for an additional 5 minutes. Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman, and following Mr. Barr we are certainly there for some of those disagreements on, whether inflation was really going to happen and what the word ``transitory'' really means. You know, in the sense life is but a vapor I guess is not at all transitory. So we are still dealing with that, and you guys are market intelligence, dealing with it. I think it is related to the Fed's balance sheet in the sense that Ms. George, when we were speaking earlier, you said it costs about $6 or $8 billion a year to run the Federal Reserve. When you look at a balance sheet that has been as high as $9 trillion, obviously the interest off of that is substantially more than that, $100 plus, I think about $180 billion or so last year in cash-flow off of that. People say, well, ``Where does all the rest of the money go?'' So, could you talk a little bit about the liability side of the Federal Reserve and the repo markets, and the things that go on there to provide liquidity in the market? What is the function like that, and who operates that, and how do the regional banks work together in that sense? Ms. George. So, you are talking about how the Federal Reserve really is able to set monetary policy, the tools that are available to it as it carries out that function. As you note, coming off of 2008 and 2009, the Fed began to use what then was considered unconventional policy tools, and that was beginning to go in and purchase large-scale asset purchases for its balance sheet. Those purchases were intended both to stabilize market functioning at the time. It was viewed as an opportunity to lower longer-term interest rates because the Fed was buying that. So, this tool has continued, and not without consequences, as I have argued in my own policy statements from time to time. Mr. Davidson. Well, it certainly facilitates inflation, right, because when we fiscally spend the money and you guys put it on your balance sheet instead of it winding up in the rest of the market, where does the money come from for the Fed to grow its balance sheet from, say, $4 trillion to $9 trillion? Ms. George. Well, the Federal Reserve has a unique function by virtue of being the central bank, that it is a creator of money, and that is why it is a discipline, and its accountability to Congress is so important so that the stability of the money supply and of inflation continues to be in its focus. Mr. Davidson. Right. So, you can basically keystroke it into existence and now you got $9 trillion, but the interest that comes off of that is real, and it gets dispersed through the system. So, how does that go out in liabilities? Ms. George. So, the liabilities of the Fed as we see---- Mr. Davidson. Who gets paid? Ms. George. The reserves that the Federal Reserve creates through this system, Congress has now authorized that interest can be paid on those reserves, and that has become a component of how the Federal Reserve's ability to set interest rates is affected. Mr. Davidson. Right. So, for almost the first hundred years of the Federal Reserve, if banks had even required reserves, they had to manage their own balance sheets. Then, I think in 2007 or 2008, the policy became that the Federal Reserve could pay interest on required reserves that you have to keep with the Fed or keep on your balance sheets. You could hold that at the Fed and get interest on that. Now we are paying interest on excess reserves, and the banks put deposits in, but there are also, as funds come off of the money that was kind of keystroked into existence from, say, $4-and-a-half trillion to $9 trillion, they are also collecting interest off of that. Someone is, right? So, when that flows through, that is providing quite a lot of liquidity into the banks, right, to the member banks. Ms. George. To any commercial bank that holds that portfolio. Mr. Davidson. And it is---- Ms. George. Again, the congressional authority to do that was not a Federal Reserve policy, but I think it has allowed the Federal Reserve in this regime of large amounts of reserves to be able to calibrate its Federal funds rate. Mr. Davidson. So, is it safe to say that dynamic has created a massive amount of demand for Federal Reserve master accounts? Ms. George. I am not sure I understand the connection with that. Mr. Davidson. There are a lot of banks, a lot of people that want a master account in the payments world right now. As we are talking about stablecoins, we are talking about digital assets, a custodial bank had to sue because they said we complied, did this, did this, checklist, yes, we did it all, and the statute said, ``shall issue the master account.'' Then the Federal Reserve said, no thanks, we are not going to issue you a master account because you are not really one of us. You are not allowed in the club. So, we are, in fact, trying to create skinny master accounts because at a 4-percent rate, you are double the rate that you are getting for running a hedge fund. So, it is a pretty good amount of cash-flow, and not even all the cash-flow had to come from your own activity. It can be keystroked into existence. So, I think that is one of the things that we want to look at is should we even be paying interest on reserves. In the sense of regulatory framework, how steerable is this essentially autonomous organization, because under Humphrey- Hawkins, the chairman comes and speaks once a year, but we do not have to like the answers, and we do not have appropriations either. So, more to follow, and I yield. Chairman Lucas. The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Moore, for 5 minutes, and would he yield to me for a moment? Mr. Moore. Absolutely. Chairman Lucas. It is starting to sound like maybe the biggest challenge the Federal Reserve System faces is Congress. [Laughter.] Chairman Lucas. I yield back to my colleague. Mr. Moore. Well, I would not argue. You have been there a lot longer than I have, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] Mr. Moore. I am the newest guy sitting up here. [Inaudible.] Mr. Moore. One question that I get when I am back home, no way around it, and I believe that affordability is a legitimate issue around the economy and around the country. I can tell you a lot of the things that we have done in Congress, whether it is the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream (ROAD) to Housing to try to increase housing supply, whether it is a lot of the reg reform to allow more energy to hopefully deal with that, notwithstanding some geopolitical events at the moment. That is probably the issue that I hear about the most. It is certainly not something that happened overnight. Probably 4 years of a lot of spending, right, during and after COVID contributed greatly to that. As the questions have actually come through in the conversation and the very thoughtful responses of our witnesses today, it got me thinking. What are things that the Fed could and should possibly do, and this is open to any of the four that want to take this question, when it comes to helping address, in a macro level, affordability? Mr. Hoenig. I think that affordability is an issue around monetary policy and the discipline monetary policy. So, one of your issues around massive purchases of assets onto the Fed's balance sheet is what it did to asset values and affordability. Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Hoenig. Another is stable prices. If you do not have a disciplined monetary policy, you have price problems, inflationary problems, which is highly, highly regressive. So, to your point, the Fed has, as a system, a responsibility to pursue stable prices. Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Hoenig. When I say, ``stable prices,'' I mean both inflationary and asset inflationary prices. If it fails to do that, then it has made a mistake and it needs to correct that, but that is the key. The other part of it for the central banks and central banks around the world is to know what monetary policy can do successfully and what it cannot do, and it cannot solve every distributional problem in the United States or anywhere else. Mr. Moore. I agree. Ms. George. Ms. George. Yes, I would just add, if you were to listen to the conversations around the Federal Open Market Committee table, this very point often comes through, which is the Federal Reserve's policy tool is really what is often referred to as a blunt tool. Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Ms. George. It affects all parts of the economy. So, when we look at housing, for example, you will see noted that housing prices have risen, and the question is, where is that having an impact on the economy? Are those barriers coming from regulatory issues? Are those barriers coming from consumer incomes not keeping up with the price of things? So, the issues are well articulated. The question is, what is it within the Fed's purview and its appropriate role to affect, and that is where these issues often move beyond what an interest rate is able to do. Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Keen. I will mention, talking about AI---- Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Keen [continuing]. productivity shocks are disinflationary. So, if we have a big productivity shock from artificial intelligence that is going to lower firm cost---- Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Keen [continuing]. firm costs are then eventually going to force them to lower their prices. That creates a disinflationary trend in the economy. So, that is a possibility as something that would help. Mr. Kelly. I do not really have anything to add. It is a blunt tool. I would just reemphasize the mandate for price stability because inflation is insidious and it affects everybody. So, there are byproducts, but more than anything else, I think price stability has to be pursued and that, ultimately, hopefully you have breakthroughs with productivity. No doubt they will come, but in the meantime, we are not hitting our inflation target, and there just needs to be a maniacal focus on hitting that target. Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to yield back. Thank you very much. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I would suggest to my colleagues on the dais, we have had some really good interactions, some really good discussions. If we could have one more round, I would try and focus myself on one question, and then we would let our witnesses go back to their world. Ms. George--and I recognize myself for up to 5 minutes--I wonder if you can enlighten us on the process of building the Beige Book: What community involvement and surveys go into the product so that we can be confident it truly represents the economic conditions around the country? Talk about that for a moment. Ms. George. Yes. The Beige Book has been around for a long time, and its role is really an important one, as we have discussed here, in terms of bringing forward these regional perspectives. So, the Beige Book is released 8 times a year. It typically comes out ahead of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, and it shows across these 12 regions what are the themes coming out of it, how are they contradicting or supporting data that, again, is often backward looking, but it gives a more real-time sense of what these 12 banks are seeing in their regions. That information is really compiled over a 6-to 8-week period in between those meetings, from drawing on the Boards of Director's feedback, going to these surveys that the reserve banks collect, taking anecdotes from the roundtables and advisory committees it has, and really putting them in a document form that can be shared publicly and can be discussed at the FOMC table. What it does for you is really tell you, is it confirming the trends in the more backward-looking data we are seeing? Is it contradicting it? Are we seeing themes that would tell us something about the direction of the economy? So, I think it has been a great expression of what we see coming out of these diverse regions; puts it out in front of the public so they can see that 8 times a year. Chairman Lucas. I would simply conclude my comments by saying that, while the country and the Federal Reserve System have faced many challenges since 1913, there are a couple of historic instances that were dramatic in their impact on my congressional district and my constituents, the Great Depression of the 1930s, which I think we would all agree was a failure not just of the Federal Reserve System, but it was a failure of Congress and fiscal policy that led to that. In the second great experience which I lived through in the early 1980s when we had a twin bust in agriculture and energy, which dramatically impacted this region of the country that took, in some instances, 15 years to come out of, are examples of why these issues matter and matter to my constituents. I think we have learned a great deal both on the side of the table where all of you used to work, but also on my side of the table, but the bottom line remains the banking system and the Federal Reserve System in this country still has to deal with the things that Congress and the executive branch does. You do not create those situations. You have to mitigate those situations, so we have a responsibility ourselves. With that little bit of bemoaning, I will now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Vargas from California, for 5 minutes. Mr. Vargas. Again, I thank the chair and, again, thank you very much for your hospitality and the hospitality of your staff and all the others that have been here. I appreciate it very much. If I were to be asked what did you get out of this hearing, I would probably say that one of the things that I heard in the testimony was that it is important to have this decentralized system because you get a context of the data. So, you could still get the data, but you get a context of having these banks, having people involved throughout the country. I would also call that buy-in. In other words, you get buy-in from these places, so it is not just those coastal elites; not those people that just fly over and do not let us land. That is why, by the way, we are not here. You do not let us land. [Laughter.] Mr. Vargas. Putting that aside, one of the things I guess I would ask is this. Okay, so I get it. It is buy-in, you got the data, but we have talked a little bit about it. You know, it has worked. What has not worked? We touched on it a tiny bit, but what is not working? We heard a little bit about dissent from Mr. Hoenig. You said that the dissent should be a little more vociferous or at least a little more obvious, that you should not just go along to get along, as they say with what the chairman wants, but what else? What else is there that we should look at that maybe is not working? Ms. George. Thank you. Ms. George. Yes, thank you. I think one of the things you want to continue to keep a focus on in this system, and we have talked about it, is this idea that you are balancing an agency in Washington, DC, that plays an important oversight role with 12 banks. As the economy has changed, as technology has allowed these reserve banks to begin to consolidate functions for the purpose of being as efficient as they can, for purposes of delivering the right services to the public, you run the risk of blurring the lines between those important distinctions, between oversight and consolidated functions. I think it will be important, as the economy continues to evolve, to make sure that you are being true to the design of the institution on the ground even as you are trying to find ways to make it efficient, to continue to deliver its functions in a most efficient way. So, that is the hard work that happens within the Federal Reserve System, with the Board of Governors, and I think as Congress monitors are we continuing to get the effectiveness out of this institution, you will want to do that. Mr. Vargas. Well, let me push you a little bit on that because one of the things that I found out as a politician a long time ago is that there is a system, but they say, well, that is the law. Yes, but we get to change the law, and I realized that when I was on the San Diego City Council. Yep, that is the law. Well, it will not be for long. So, in other words, you said this was the way the system was designed, you are following it, but I guess my question was, okay, if you had the opportunity to change the design, not necessarily following the design, you know. The question was brought up, well, should there be more banks? Will there be 50 of them, you know? Ms. George. Yes. Mr. Vargas. If you could change something, in other words, it is not the design that you inherit, but if you could change something because it is not working, what would it be? Ms. George. I think the Federal Reserve is working, and I think as things change, though---- Mr. Vargas. Oh, I agree. I agree. Ms. George [continuing]. I think to your point, it is a fair point and it is one that your body and it is one that I think the institution has to constantly ask about what is going to serve the American public best in this design, assuming that you think it continues to serve. Again, I think it will happen more in the context of do not blur the lines between the Board of Governors' oversight and extending too far in to dictating to the reserve banks, and that the reserve banks, again, be able to have the ability to understand what their operational roles mean there. So, that is what I meant by making sure that those authorities, those lines, those responsibilities continue to be honored even as the world changes and you have to respond to that. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much. Ms. George. Thank you. Mr. Vargas. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, those are my questions. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired, and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr. Mr. Barr. Well, thanks again to our witnesses. Great hearing. Great testimony. Really educational. I really want to thank my colleague from California's line of questioning because that is really what I wanted to follow up on, too, is again, we should be constantly striving to improve upon a system that does work. Again, you all have made a great case for decentralization and a federated system, but let me ask my final question to Mr. Kelly as vice chairman of a reserve bank of the Dallas Fed. What opportunities are there to make enhancements so that Ms. George's concern is addressed, so that maybe we could elevate the status of that dissent, elevate the status of these decentralized reserve banks in the system so that the Board of Governors do not overpower all of the incoming data in real time from the reserve banks? To that end, Mr. Kelly, what opportunities are there for reserve bank directors and even reserve bank branch directors? I say that as someone from Kentucky. We only have one presence of the Fed in Kentucky outside of Cleveland and St. Louis, and that is Louisville. We have a branch bank in Louisville. What opportunities are there for those branch directors to interact with each other, with the Reserve Bank Presidents and the Board of Governors, and would there be utility in holding an annual conference where the entire leadership of the entire system are together so that the Board of Governors and that all-important chairman can have access to all of these people in these branches and out in the country, who are actually there seeing the data and hearing from the participants in the real economy in real time? Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much for that question. I completely agree with what Esther described, the need for the independence, and so I do think that it starts with, first of all, a recognition that is important. The boards have a duty. They have a duty of loyalty, care, good faith, and they need to recognize that is an important thing to exercise, that independence. I completely agree with your point. It does not matter what the entity is, there needs to be a constant view of improvement; learn from past mistakes and try to mitigate them and take advantage of opportunities. Chair Warsh has already made clear there are policies that he would like to review. I think boards welcome that. That perhaps would get back to your earlier question about why were these things missed, if you will. I think continuing to review policies is important, just the opportunity to continue to improve the operations of the banks, make them more efficient, and have better information quicker. There are plenty of opportunities to do all of those things, and, yes, we have got to strive very hard to do that. Tom mentioned this earlier: The ability for 19 people to be able to speak up and speak their mind is critically important. So, despite the fact that mistakes is a human endeavor, we are trying to predict the future, there will be mistakes, but if we do not allow that going forward, then we are almost guaranteed to make more mistakes in the future because we will allow ourselves to devolve into groupthink. The independence of the banks, from the Governors and among the banks, I think, is critically important. Finally, you said getting together. There is a Council of Presidents that I think is very functional. There is also a Council of Chairs among the boards. I am a member of that. So, it is the 12 banks, the chair, and the deputy chair, and there are absolutely opportunities for engagement at that level, and the chairs meet 3 times a year and engage with the Board of Governors. I think there are opportunities to improve that as well, so I completely agree with your urgings. Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson, for 5 minutes. Mr. Davidson. Thanks again, Chairman, and thank you all. You know, earlier we mentioned the Federal Reserve can just create money. They have a unique role in that sense. Everyone else cannot, legally anyway, and one of the things that has changed about the Federal Reserve over time has been payments. You know, cash was king and still is in a business sense, but literally, most payments are not made with cash. Checks and Automated Clearing House (ACH) have come along, and today we are working on faster payments, and FedNow is one of those things, but you look at stablecoins and the future of money really, government involvement, private sector, bank settlement, credit cards, all these things have changed with payments. The enduring thing, though, is no government really gave anyone the right to transact. It predates government. Governments have become a bit nosy. They want to know everything about every transaction just to keep us safe, of course. [Laughter.] Mr. Davidson. That creates a bit of anxiety for a lot of the public because it essentially puts somebody else between you and your money. A lot of people tout that as a feature of things like central bank digital currency because they call it programmable money, and it will give you these great powers with monetary policy, i.e., coercive behavior, which is why people do not want it. They want the payments. So, I guess maybe you could go through and say, where do you see the future of payments, and how is the Federal Reserve adapting to that? Mr. Hoenig. Well, to your point, I think there are legitimate concerns about privacy and payments. It is not something that is outrageous. It is a legitimate concern, and as you develop, whether it is digital currency in the private sector, it still can be traced. So, how are you going to do that, and that is an open question that I think is now being discussed in Congress in terms of the laws around stablecoin and around cryptocurrency and tokens. I hope, not to put it back on you, but I hope Congress defines the rules pretty clearly because I do not think it is the Fed's business defining what the criteria should be. It is the Fed's business to follow what Congress has assigned them. You know, if you look at banking today, it is surrounded in regulations primarily to protect the public, and Congress developed those laws that then became regulations. So, we need to think about it in advance as we apply it to not just the banking industry, but to stablecoin, if we are going to have that, to tokenization. It is there that we have to address it, not after it is approved and not after it has access to the master account and so forth. So, it is a big deal, and I agree with you. It needs to be addressed carefully. Mr. Davidson. Any other thoughts on that with payments? Ms. George. I would just say it is important. Remember, the Fed is trying to ensure broad access, security and safety around those payments, and efficiency in those payments. As the payment system is evolving, the Fed is not trying to dictate where that goes, but to make sure that it fulfills that function because at the end of the day, what you want and obviously what your accountabilities are as Congress is to make sure trust in that money is preserved. Mr. Davidson. Yes. So, if you think about, like, the nature of technology, part of the things that people attribute to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank was the fast flow of information, which led to quick withdrawals. If fractional reserve banking has that vulnerability, a stablecoin does not because it is not fractional. It is fully backed, so some people see that as more sound, but in that environment maybe, Professor, what do you see out there with the future of payments? Mr. Keen. Well, I think that there is always going to be a demand for anonymity in terms of financial payments, at least in some sectors, and that demand is going to be there unless it is legislated away, and I think that would be one thing that I could add. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman, again, for hosting and for everyone that helped put it together. Chairman Lucas. Absolutely. Now we turn to the gentleman of North Carolina, who will have the final word. Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. Just a question, and this is really switching more to the banking supervision side of things. What steps can the Fed take to, through the banking supervision side, allow more access to credit, because that is the other part I hear on the affordability here, access to credit, particularly with small businesses. Anybody want that one? Ms. George. Well, I think when you think about access to credit through the banking system, it is operating under a very sturdy regulatory framework. The Board of Governors has been given that authority along with the comptroller of the currency and the FDIC who try to synthesize that. So, making sure that credit is available is something the Federal Reserve is monitoring, of course. It is checking it through its discount window function, and I think it is examiners on the ground understanding when do credit conditions tighten, when is that an economic phenomena, and when does it have to do more with barriers to access to credit? Mr. Moore. Right. Dr. Keen, you were talking about the AI. I was in a briefing about a week or two ago, and it was AI, but then it got into the whole quantum computing thing, which can be a whole next-level thing in and of itself but the question came about with development of quantum, but also the cryptography and the ability to maintain the security of our system. Is that something that, and on college campuses I am thinking of, that is being discussed that folks are working on? Is there even a discussion about that? Mr. Keen. I think on some college campuses there are. I know that AI courses are---- Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Keen [continuing]. say, mandatory at Purdue University, and other places, it is not. I think that sometimes in university settings, we are more reactive than we should be. We should be proactive. So, I would hope to see more proactive behavior out of universities. We recently had a major data breach in terms of our online systems, and it was not our fault at the university, but it was the vendor. Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm. Mr. Keen. But it still highlights the issues with AI coming forward that security is an issue. Mr. Moore. Anybody else? [No response.] Mr. Moore. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I would like to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. I would like to thank all of my colleagues and professional staff for coming to Oklahoma City today for this important hearing. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than July 17, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] Chairman Lucas. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [all]