EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Committee on Financial Services House June 12, 2026

Witnesses (4)

  • Mr. Thomas Hoenig, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University
  • Ms. Esther George, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
  • Mr. Gary Kelly, Deputy Chair, Board of Directors, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
  • Mr. Benjamin Keen, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Oklahoma

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE
 OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

=======================================================================

 FIELD HEARING

 before the

 TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY,
 TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE,
 AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

 of the

 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 JUNE 12, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-81

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 www.govinfo.gov

 ______
 

 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-483 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026

 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
 Chairman Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin BILL FOSTER, Illinois
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
 Carolina JUAN VARGAS, California
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
YOUNG KIM, California AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
BYRON DONALDS, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RITCHIE TORRES, New York
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee SAM LICCARDO, California
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
TIM MOORE, North Carolina

 Ben Johnson, Staff Director

 ------ 

 TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE,
 AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

 FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan JUAN VARGAS, California, Ranking 
ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
TROY DOWNING, Montana JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon

 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Friday, June 12, 2026

 OPENING STATEMENTS

 Page
Hon. Frank Lucas, Chairman of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, 
 Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. 
 Representative from Oklahoma................................... 1
Hon. Juan Vargas, Ranking Member of the Task Force on Monetary 
 Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a 
 U.S. Representative from California............................ 2

 WITNESSES

Mr. Thomas Hoenig, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Mercatus Center 
 at George Mason University..................................... 4
 Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Ms. Esther George, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, 
 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City............................ 10
 Prepared Statement........................................... 12
Mr. Gary Kelly, Deputy Chair, Board of Directors, Federal Reserve 
 Bank of Dallas................................................. 17
 Prepared Statement........................................... 19
Mr. Benjamin Keen, Associate Professor of Economics, University 
 of Oklahoma.................................................... 25
 Prepared Statement........................................... 27

 
 EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE
 OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

 ---------- 

 Friday, June 12, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Task Force On Monetary
 Policy, Treasury Market Resilience,
 and Economic Prosperity,
 Committee on Financial Services,
 Washington, DC.

 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., at 
Vast, 333 W Sheridan Avenue, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Hon. 
Frank D. Lucas [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Lucas, Barr, and Vargas.
 Also present: Representative Davidson.
 Chairman Lucas. The Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury 
Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity will come to order.
 Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time.
 Today's hearing is entitled, ``Examining the Structure of 
the Federal Reserve System.''
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
within which to submit extemporaneous materials to the chair 
for inclusion in the record.
 Chairman Lucas. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for an 
opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LUCAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK 
 FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND 
 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OKLAHOMA

 Good morning. To my colleagues and our witnesses, welcome 
to Oklahoma City. I am grateful to everyone that traveled to 
join us here today. Today's field hearing of the Task Force on 
Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic 
Prosperity is focused on the topic of the structure of the 
Federal Reserve System. It is fitting for us to be discussing 
this topic while in the Heartland of the country. One of 
Oklahoma's first senators, Robert Owen, saw the failures of the 
first two central banks and knew that part of the reason they 
were not enduring was because they were not appropriately 
responsive to the concerns of Americans across the country. 
That is why as sponsor of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 
Senator Owen set up the federated system we have today: 12 
private reserve banks with district-specific geographic and 
industrial expertise, overseen by the Board of Governors in 
Washington, DC.
 The Reserve Banks act as lender and supervisor of member 
banks, ensure the safety of our payment system, and inform 
monetary policy. This public-private partnership we have with 
our central banks serves as a check against the Federal 
Government dominating our monetary system. The boards of 
directors for each of the banks are composed of nine directors: 
three representing member banks; three representing the public; 
and three appointed by the Board of Governors with 
consideration of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, 
labor, and consumers. They play an essential role in governing 
the Federal Reserve Bank and ensuring they represent the 
districts they serve.
 Importantly, the 1913 Act also set up the Federal Advisory 
Council for the Board. It is comprised of one banking 
representative from each of the districts who bring insight and 
analysis directly to the Board. The Community Advisory Council 
also allows for direct representation from community leaders 
and industry experts to enlighten the Board on economic 
conditions around the country. By design, each district brings 
to the table its own perspective. Our country has many 
different viewpoints, and our central banks should be able to 
reflect all of them.
 St. Louis developed an impressive database--Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED)--to provide the broader system and the 
public with the Federal Reserve System's (Fed's) economic data. 
Dallas provides extensive oil industry expertise. Richmond has 
a special focus on economic conditions of rural communities. 
The Kansas City Bank supports the broader system through its 
expertise in agricultural economics. As someone with a degree 
in that subject, I know well the unique considerations of 
raising food and fiber and those economic impacts.
 Whether it is the inelasticity of demand--and my spouse 
reminds me never to use that in an open public crowd----
 [Laughter.]
 Chairman Lucas [continuing]. risk management practices or 
the impact of global markets, equipment leasing, and the 
weather forecast, all of these issues determine how the economy 
moves through Farm Country. Monetary policy transmission is 
different in Oklahoma than it is in New York. That is why it is 
so important that our farmers and ranchers have a seat at the 
table when monetary policy decisions are being made. Through 
rotating voting seats on the Federal Open Market Committee, 
five Reserve Bank presidents help set the administered rates. 
The reserve banks act as the conscience of the OMFC.
 Thank you again for being here for this important 
discussion, and I yield back.
 I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. 
Vargas from California, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JUAN VARGAS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND 
 ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

 Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, let me begin by 
thanking Chairman Lucas for organizing this hearing and 
bringing us to Oklahoma City to discuss the importance of the 
structure of our Federal Reserve System. I would also like to 
thank the witnesses for taking the time to discuss the issue 
and lending your expertise to this task force. I would also 
like to thank, Mr. Chairman, your committee and your staff 
because they have shown great hospitality to myself and my 
staff member. I appreciate that very much.
 So, it is great to be here in the 10th Federal Reserve 
District. The presence of the Kansas City Fed's branch here in 
Oklahoma City is reflective of one of the founding principles 
of our Federal Reserve System. The Fed, the monetary policy 
broadly, should be responsive to the whole country. The 
geographic diversity represented helps build the trust and buy-
in from the public necessary for our central bank to succeed. 
The Federal Reserve has been our third attempt at the creation 
of a central bank. The first Bank of the United States expired 
in 1811, and the second bank was dismantled in the 1830s, both 
in large part because of concerns about the concentrated 
financial power in too few hands. What followed was decades of 
financial instability, bank panics, monetary chaos, and 
economic disruption. That ultimately made the case for a new 
approach.
 The structure established in 1913--12 regional banks and a 
board of Governors--was a direct response to those failures, 
designed to distribute power and perspective across the 
country. That structure has held for over a century, and today, 
we have an opportunity to examine how it continues to serve the 
public. With that historical foundation in mind, it is worth 
reflecting on what that structure was actually designed to do 
and why it still matters.
 The 12 reserve banks are not outposts. Each conducts its 
own independent economic research, drawing on the local data 
and local expertise to inform the national monetary policy 
conversation. That means the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) is not relying on a single institution's view of the 
economy. It is drawing on 12, spanning the energy corridor here 
in Oklahoma, as was stated by the chairman, the defense and 
innovation economy as we have in San Diego, and the financial 
markets of New York. That diversity of perspective is not just 
good policy, it is itself a form of independence, ensuring the 
Fed cannot be captured by any single region, industry, or point 
of view. Making sure voices and experiences from across the 
country have a seat at the table when the Fed makes monetary 
policy in Washington is what the current structure was built to 
do. That lesson, that independence has to be structural, not 
just aspirational. It is why the founders built the Fed the way 
they did and why the design has outlasted every political 
pressure placed on it over the past century.
 The structure of the Fed is also inseparable from its 
mission. Congress gave the Federal Reserve two jobs: price 
stability and maximum employment. That dual mandate was a 
deliberate choice, a recognition that the central bank's 
decisions ripple through every corner of the economy, touching 
the price of groceries, the cost of mortgages, and the 
availability of jobs for working families. The regional 
structure supports that mandate by ensuring that policymakers 
hear from a broad cross-section of the American economy. The 
regional banks are not just a feature of that structure, they 
are the guardrail, ensuring that voices of Main Street are part 
of the conversation before decisions get made, not after.
 History shows us what is at risk when the independence 
erodes. In the early 1970s, political pressure on the Fed to 
keep rates low contributed to a decade of inflation, and that 
hurt working families across the country, and the painful 
correction that followed hurt them again. The decentralized 
structure we are examining today was designed precisely to 
prevent that kind of outcome, to make sure no single pressure 
point, political or otherwise, can override the Fed's judgment 
about what the economy actually needs. That is why the question 
about the Fed's structure matters and why this hearing is very 
important.
 The witnesses here today bring expertise from economics, 
policy, and financial systems that can help us and the task 
force clearly think about what is working and what could be 
strengthened, and what has stood the test of time for good 
reason. Accountability and independence are not in conflict. 
Robust transparency and congressional oversight are part of 
what makes the Fed's independence legitimate in the first 
place. The goal should be a Federal Reserve that is answerable 
to the public and insulated from short-term pressures, and the 
regional structure we are discussing today is central to that 
achievement.
 Again, I look forward to the testimony today, and I yield 
back, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. Today, we 
welcome the testimony of Mr. Thomas Hoenig, a distinguished 
senior fellow at the Mercatus Center of George Mason 
University; Ms. Esther George, the former president and CEO of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City; Mr. Gary Kelly, the 
deputy chair of the Board of Directors for the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas; and Mr. Benjamin Keen, an associate professor 
of economics at the University of Oklahoma. We thank each of 
you for taking the time to be here, and each of you will be 
recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your 
testimony.
 Without objection, your written statements will be made a 
part of the record.
 Mr. Hoenig, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
oral comments.

 STATEMENT OF THOMAS HOENIG, DISTINGUISHED SENIOR FELLOW, 
 MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

 Mr. Hoenig. Well, thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking 
Member Vargas, for the opportunity to talk about the Fed 
structure and examining the structure of the Federal Reserve 
today. It is a real privilege on my part, and I appreciate it 
very much.
 I would start by just saying, as intended, the Federal 
Reserve System's structure divides power between a central and 
regional authorities and between public and private interests. 
As a former Reserve Bank president myself, it will not surprise 
you that I am confident that such a system is the most 
effective, not perfect, framework for assuring diversity of 
views and better policy outcomes for an economy as complex as 
that of the United States. This decentralized structure better 
insulates the institution from short-term political influence 
while also keeping it ultimately accountable to you, Congress. 
To argue such a structure is somehow inefficient fails to 
appreciate its true value.
 The Nation's regional differences are illustrated in a 
variety of ways, both simple and complex. One need to only look 
at the differences in manufacturing activities among regions, 
average home prices, labor markets, or scope of services to 
appreciate how economically diverse this Nation is and how such 
differences can be magnified during times of financial crisis. 
The fact is that we may be one Nation, but we are, I would say, 
have large differences and not so united when it comes to 
perceptions, biases, and the economies themselves.
 The founders of the Federal Reserve were clearly addressing 
these differences when they created its decentralized system in 
1913. Even then, decades before today's high-speed technology, 
there was no physical necessity for having separately chartered 
reserve banks with separate boards of directors. The structure, 
rather, followed the lessons learned from the two earlier 
failed experiments in which Congress created a single reserve 
bank, centralized and monolithic as an institution. In both 
instances, fear of centralized powers, as you noted, and 
regional distrust in no small way contributed to their demise.
 Fast forward to the 20th century. As the United States 
became a growing economic force, Congress determined it again 
needed a central bank. This time, however, Congress understood 
that to provide for a more effective and durable institution, 
it needed a structure that distributed responsibility and power 
across the country, not just with a central government or with 
Wall Street itself. There are 12 separately chartered regional 
banks operating across the Nation. Each bank has a board of 
directors who, along with the Board of Governors, share 
oversight for each bank. These directors have roots that run 
deep within the communities, which provide vital knowledge 
regarding their economies, and which enhance public 
understanding of the Federal Reserve System itself. The 
regional banks serving next to the Board of Governors serve to 
keep the system connected with Main Street America. This 
structure is as important today as it was in 1913, perhaps more 
so.
 One need only recount the banking crisis of the 1980s, the 
tragedy of 9/11, the great financial crisis, coronavirus 
disease (COVID) to appreciate its advantages of structure. 
During the great financial crisis, for example, while the Board 
of Governors and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York focused 
on liquidity for some of the largest banks, or insurance 
companies, or broker-dealers, just as importantly, reserve 
banks in the South, the Midwest, and West were addressing the 
needs of large regional and thousands of community banks and 
other financial institutions, which had they failed for lack of 
liquidity, would have devastated those regional economies and 
perhaps the Nation overall.
 Periodically, there are questions appropriately raised 
regarding whether the Federal Reserve's structure inhibits its 
efficiency. As a former CEO of a reserve bank, I can say that I 
worked daily with experienced reserve bank directors from the 
private sector, CEOs and Chief Operating Officers (COOs) of 
other reserve banks, constantly reviewing the systems 
operations, upgrading payments, information technology, and 
human resource systems, including consolidated operations when 
it was needed.
 Another concern I also hear from and raised is whether the 
decentralized structure creates too many voices speaking on the 
FOMC policy, creating confusion for markets and the public. I 
think this concern, however, gives too little credit to the 
value of debate and transparency and policymaking, or to the 
benefits of having regional, independent voices in the policy 
discussion that affects every American citizen.
 Put most simply, the Federal Reserve System reflects the 
Nation's Federal structure. To consolidate and centralize it 
would narrow its perspective, make it more bureaucratic, less 
responsive to change, and less accountable to the public it 
serves, and it would not serve the future of the economy well. 
Thank you very much, sir.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Hoenig follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much. Ms. George, you are 
now recognized for 5 minutes for your opening oral remarks, I 
should say.

 STATEMENT OF ESTHER GEORGE, FORMER PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY

 Ms. George. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, and Ranking Member 
Vargas, and other members of this task force for the invitation 
to testify on the structure of the Federal Reserve System.
 Three years ago, I stepped down from my post as president 
of the Kansas City Fed, having reached mandatory retirement and 
concluding some 40 years of service to the Federal Reserve. It 
was an honor to serve the Nation's central bank and to 
represent a region that includes all or part of seven States, 
including the State of Oklahoma, and as you noted, home to 
former Senator Robert Owen, who was one of the architects of 
the Federal Reserve System.
 The design of our central bank reflects something that I 
think is deep and durable in the American character: a wariness 
of concentrated power and a preference for decentralized 
institutions. This sentiment influenced Congress to shape the 
Federal Reserve in a way that would garner the trust and 
confidence of the American public. So, my comments this morning 
focus on how the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve 
System enables it to effectively achieve its broad objectives 
across three important dimensions: public trust, operational 
effectiveness, and independent thinking.
 As Congress deliberated in 1913 how it might approach a 
third attempt at central banking, it rightly understood that 
the monolithic structure of the Nation's first two central 
banks was ill-suited to represent and serve the diverse 
interests, geographies, and industries that make up the U.S. 
economy. To that end, Congress settled on a model that would 
achieve both public accountability and shared control by 
creating an independent government Agency and 12 regional 
reserve banks to comprise the Federal Reserve System. The Board 
of Governors in Washington, DC plays an important oversight 
role for the entire system, without which a meaningful role for 
the regional reserve banks would not likely be acceptable to 
the public.
 However, to ensure there was appropriate balance and 
representation, the Federal Reserve Act also called for reserve 
banks to be located across the country. This decentralized 
design is not simply about geography. It also provides for 
private citizens from communities across the Nation to serve as 
members of the regional banks' boards of directors. These 
individuals represent broad and varied sectors of our economy, 
and their expertise contributes meaningfully to operational 
oversight, budget discipline, and monetary policy 
deliberations. The Federal Reserve structure also has proven to 
be valuable in carrying out its operational roles. Whether 
responding to a crisis, delivering financial services, or 
supervising banks, a deep understanding of regional interests 
facilitates effective performance of these duties.
 Importantly, the reserve banks are designed to understand 
credit availability issues at the local level as they fulfill 
their discount window function, and it enables the Federal 
Reserve to respond quickly in times of stress. For example, we 
witnessed in 2008 and again in 2020 as Wall Street and global 
financial markets seized up, problems also developed in other 
parts of the country that needed to be addressed, including in 
the Kansas City Fed's region where thousands of communities 
rely on small and regional banks for credit and other core 
financial services. Likewise, the reserve banks are able to 
gauge the local effects of financial market conditions and 
economic drivers through their delegated role in supervising 
banks. Their connections to thousands of financial institutions 
and 50 State banking departments provide essential information 
about the economic health of small business credit conditions 
and the impact of broader regulatory issues.
 Finally, the decentralized structure brings a wide range of 
perspectives and independent thought to monetary policy 
deliberations. Policy decisions have broad impact on American 
households and businesses and benefit from the system's 
independent research and analysis and public input. While a 
mosaic of perspectives and input is sometimes messy, the 
Federal Reserve's deliberative process produces a decision that 
reflects the majority's consensus view while also making the 
nature of differing views fully available to the public.
 Robert Owen might not have imagined that the Federal 
Reserve System would have proven so durable over the past 
century amid the economic and political challenges it would 
face, but I do think he would be pleased to see that the Fed, 
by design, has continued to honor its deep roots in the 
economic experience of the American public as it fulfills the 
mandates assigned to it by Congress. Thank you, and I look 
forward to this morning's discussion.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. George follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Mr. Kelly, you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF GARY KELLY, DEPUTY CHAIR, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS

 Mr. Kelly. Thank you. Chairman Lucas, and Ranking Member 
Vargas, and members of the task force, good morning. Thanks for 
holding this hearing, and thanks for the opportunity to testify 
here this morning. I am honored to be the deputy chair of the 
Dallas Fed. I am even more proud of all the people at the 
Dallas Fed. Before I joined, I spent my career in the private 
sector, 4 decades at Southwest Airlines, and that experience 
has given me a very deep appreciation for the importance of 
strong institutions, credible governance, and economic 
stability.
 So, my core message is that the Federal Reserve's federated 
structure is one of its greatest strengths. The U.S. did not 
arrive at this model by accident. Before the creation of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913, our country experienced repeated 
episodes of financial instability, bank failures, panics, and 
recessions. Congress responded by creating a central bank that 
combined national oversight with regional representation, 
ensuring that monetary policy reflects perspectives from across 
the country and not just Washington or major financial centers. 
That is where the 12 regional reserve banks play such an 
important role.
 At the Dallas Fed, we represent the 11th District, and that 
includes Texas, Southern New Mexico, and Northern Louisiana. 
Like other reserve banks, we carry out core responsibilities, 
such as cash operations, payments, lending, credit risk, and 
bank supervision, and just as important, we bring regional 
insight into the national monetary policy process. Our Board 
reflects a diverse cross-section of industries, including 
banking, energy, education, telecommunications, real estate, 
social services, and transportation. The diversity is 
intentional, and it helps ensure that the information reaching 
the Federal Reserve reflects the broader economy of our 
district.
 We provide oversight and governance of the bank's 
operations, and we serve as a bridge between the Federal 
Reserve and the communities that we represent. We review 
economic conditions, submit recommendations on the discount 
rate, and provide input ahead of each FOMC meeting. Regional 
input is strengthened further by branch offices in El Paso, 
Houston, and San Antonio. In addition to that, we have five 
advisory councils, and together, they help capture a wide range 
of economic conditions, from energy markets and border trade to 
small business activity and community development. Independent 
research from the Dallas Fed is another key part of the 
regional model, and our research team analyzes issues such as 
employment, inflation, energy, and trade, further informing our 
participation in the FOMC.
 We stay closely connected to the communities that we serve, 
and through surveys, roundtables, ongoing dialog with business 
and civic leaders, we gather firsthand insights about economic 
conditions on the ground, and this helps ensure that policy 
decisions are informed not only by data, but by real-world 
experience, and that connection is crucial. A central bank 
serves the country best when it listens to the people and the 
places that make up the economy.
 The Federal Reserve's regional federated design is not a 
historical artifact. It is a practical and enduring strength 
that supports independence, accountability, diversity of 
thought, and a deeper understanding of the American economy, 
and I think those qualities are essential. Thank you all very 
much.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Professor Keen, you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN KEEN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, 
 UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

 Mr. Keen. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, members of 
the task force, thank you for the opportunity to testify today 
regarding the structure of the Federal Reserve System. I wanted 
to speak to you today about something that is rarely discussed 
in policy debates about the Federal Reserve, and that is what 
the regional structure of the Federal Reserve does for 
economists, students, and communities outside of Washington 
D.C.
 Early in my career, I worked as a research assistant at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. I later served as a visiting 
scholar and consultant at the Federal Reserve Banks of St. 
Louis and Dallas. Those experiences shaped me as an economist 
in ways that classroom training alone could not have 
accomplished. I gained direct exposure to real policy 
questions--questions about inflation, interest rates, financial 
conditions, and labor markets--as they were being worked 
through in real time. The Federal Reserve's regional structure 
does not merely scatter offices across the country, it provides 
Americans like me who do not live in Washington, DC, with 
access to our central bank.
 Consider what a fully centralized Federal Reserve would 
look like. It would be a single institution that would 
concentrate central bank research and expertise in one 
location. Economists at universities across the country--in 
Oklahoma, in Texas, in Ohio--would have far less opportunity to 
engage in the intellectual work of the central bank. The 
Federal Reserve, in turn, would lose the benefits of 
perspective and research methods from scholars across the 
country. The regional Federal Reserve banks prevent that from 
happening. They organize seminars. They host visiting scholars 
and Ph.D. interns. They compile economic data, and they open 
avenues for economists outside of Washington to engage with 
policy-relevant questions. That engagement with policy issues 
often leads to scholarly research, work that is examined, 
tested, refined over time, and feeds back into the policy 
process.
 The benefits also reach directly into the classroom. At the 
University of Oklahoma, my Federal Reserve experience enables 
me to bring institutional knowledge and real-world policy 
context to students who may never set foot inside a Washington 
policy institution. Undergraduates in Norman, Oklahoma, can 
learn not just the theory of monetary policy, but how it is 
applied in practice. Graduate students gain exposure to the 
kinds of research questions and modeling challenges that arise 
inside policy institutions. That is a meaningful educational 
benefit, and it flows directly from the regional structure of 
the Federal Reserve.
 The benefits extend beyond campus. Through public lectures, 
media interviews, and community conversations, academic 
economists who have worked with the Federal Reserve can help 
explain monetary policy to households and businesses in plain 
terms. Monetary policy affects every community in this country, 
and the regional structure helps ensure that the people 
explaining it live, work, and teach in communities throughout 
the country. A single, centralized Federal Reserve might be 
simpler and less costly to administer--I acknowledge that--but 
it would risk something important: the concentration of access, 
expertise, and perspective in a single location. The regional 
structure guards against it. It builds a national network of 
research, education, and public engagement, one that allows 
ideas to flow outward from the central bank and allows regional 
perspective and academic insights to flow back in.
 For those reasons, I believe the regional structure of the 
Federal Reserve provides substantial value well beyond its 
formal governance role. It is, in my view, one of the most 
underappreciated strengths of the current system. Thank you for 
the opportunity to testify, and I welcome your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Keen follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Professor. We will now turn to 
member questions, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for 
questioning and note to my colleagues. The nature of the 
subject matter and how far all of you have traveled, be 
prepared for perhaps a second round of questions, so do not be 
frantic in your 5 minutes.
 Let us start with you, Dr. Hoenig, and thank you for 
sharing your insights with us again. Can you expand on your 
written testimony; why should having a decentralized system 
like ours produce better monetary policy outcomes as opposed to 
a bank concentrated in Washington, DC. or New York City?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well----
 Chairman Lucas. We will just cut to the chase.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Hoenig. Thank you very much for that. I will tell you 
that the best way to describe it is, I have sat in many FOMC 
meetings, and in part of that meeting, you have a go-around of 
each of the 12 districts, and through that, you learn about 
what is going on in the region, and as you go around the room, 
you kind of paint a picture of the U.S. economy on the ground. 
That is, you are not looking at aggregate data looking 
backward. You are looking at what is happening today, and it 
could vary very substantially among those districts. By doing 
that, you have a better understanding of the economy as you 
discuss the issues and where the differences are, and from that 
you can begin to say, well, what can bring a consensus toward a 
policy decision, or even more importantly, if there are going 
to be differences in dissents, you understand where the dissent 
is coming from.
 So, you really find yourself coming to a better conclusion 
about what the policy should be, whether you can agree or 
cannot, and how you can form a policy that all can live with 
and is in the best interest of the country as a whole. I do not 
think you can get that if all centered in Washington, looking 
at aggregate data, looking backward.
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Ms. George, last year, the 
Kansas City Fed established the Center for Agriculture and the 
Economy to serve as a central hub for agricultural and research 
for the Fed. Of course, this was after your retirement, but the 
10th District has long served as the expert on agricultural 
economics. Given the prominent role the industry plays in the 
district, tell us how the Kansas City Fed and its branches in 
Oklahoma City, Omaha, and Denver provide an invaluable analysis 
on the farm economy to the rest of the country.
 Ms. George. As you noted, the region itself has an outsized 
proportion of ag influence on its economy compared to the 
Nation as a whole, and the direction of that economy can flow 
directly from how interest rates, how inflation, how inputs to 
that process work. So, the Kansas City Fed has long been part 
of this large geography that covers the Heartland, invested in 
understanding how agriculture is faring in this part of the 
country and has developed data through surveys. We are 
monitoring ag conditions. We are creating roundtables and I 
will tell you, as president of the Kansas City Fed, it was not 
unusual to find me going out and talking directly with 
producers in Enid, Oklahoma, in Caldwell, Kansas, and places 
around that region to hear firsthand what was happening in that 
economy.
 So, watching the Kansas City Fed create this center, which 
is now a resource more broadly shared across the country, I 
think provides valuable insights. They were ones I used at the 
Federal Open Market Committee table.
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Professor Keen, in the amount of 
time I have left in this particular round, would you like to 
provide your thoughts on that as well? Why does proximity 
matter? How does it benefit future farmers and economists at 
University of Oklahoma (OU) and Oklahoma State University (OSU) 
when it comes to agriculture research in their backyard?
 Mr. Keen. So, I will go back to an experience that I had 
when I was working on my Ph.D. I was staying in Richmond, 
Virginia, one summer for a few weeks and was able to go into 
the Richmond Fed after contacting some people there. It is the 
opportunity to learn not only the data resources that are 
available, to have access to all the research tools, but the 
economists that are there allow for mentoring. They help young 
economists who are just getting out learn how, really, the 
system works and how to publish papers and how to conduct 
research, and it allows them to expand beyond their university. 
The idea of having a Federal Reserve district in different 
cities instead of having to go to Washington allows different 
students in areas throughout the country to be able to 
experience that, whether it be in St. Louis or in Richmond or 
any of the districts.
 Chairman Lucas. Thank you. My time is about to expire. The 
chair now recognizes the ranking member of our Task Force on 
Monetary Policy, Mr. Vargas of California, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kelly, 
you look the same.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Vargas. I used to fly Southwest Airlines from San Diego 
up to Sacramento, and I always would get that little magazine, 
and you always had that message from the CEO. You look the 
same. I wish I would have flown Southwest here because I almost 
did not get on the plane. There were 12 of us. I should not say 
it, but it was American Airlines since I guess we got to speak 
the truth here, and there was 12 of us that could not get on 
the plane, I guess, because of weight issues. It turned out 
that two of us were Democrats.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Vargas. So, I came back and the pilot said, ``I guess 
they could put six more people on.'' I had to tell him, ``Well, 
I am a Republican.''
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Vargas. They finally let me on. No, you would not have 
done that, Mr. Kelly, right? No way. No way, but, again, it is 
good to see you here in person.
 I do want to ask this. So, obviously, there have been a 
couple of failures in the past, and so we are here today with 
this system. It seems to have held up, it seems to have been 
quite resilient, but the situation has changed. I mean, we are 
talking about data talking about information, but information 
is very different today than it was in 1913. In fact, with the 
AI revolution that is beginning, I think that is going to be 
very different once again. What is it in this structure that 
will allow it to continue to be robust and necessary?
 Now, I think the system works and I like the way the system 
works, but I think there is certainly going to be a challenge 
on issues of efficiency. So, well, wait a minute, do we really 
have to have this large, inefficient system to get the data 
that we need when we have AI and we have all these other 
processes? Would someone like to comment on that? Oh, Ms. 
George, why do we not go with you first?
 Ms. George. I was just going to say, certainly, we are 
going to see changes, and we already have seen changes in the 
Federal Reserve in thinking about how to take advantage of what 
technology gives us today but when you talk about the access to 
information, I think back to how the FOMC works today. You have 
19 people around that table, 12 of which are the reserve bank 
presidents, which are really working off the same national 
data, but what we are doing is putting context around that 
data. I think that is going to continue to be an essential part 
of what accrues trust in this institution, an institution that 
is setting policies that are touching the lives of every 
American.
 People want to know that we are coming at, not just the 
efficiency of it, but an effective way to characterize what it 
means on the ground. I think this structure should continue to 
serve that purpose, even as it looks at itself and finds ways 
to be more efficient in how it does that.
 Mr. Vargas. Mr. Hoenig.?
 Mr. Hoenig. If I could add, I agree fully with that, and I 
also would point out that we have never really been starved for 
data. AI will be another form. It also will look back and then 
try and project forward, but there is no substitute for those 
who are actually in the economy, who have to make daily 
decisions, who are affected by data and changes in 
circumstances, and they bring that together, talk to one 
another, and then talk to the policymaker. That is the huge 
advantage that has been constant since 1913 to the present and, 
I think, will be an advantage for decades to come. It is the 
human element, the knowledge, the immediacy that makes the 
difference in terms of policy and confidence in the 
decisionmaking.
 Mr. Vargas. Would anyone else like to comment on that? Mr. 
Kelly, yes, sir.
 Mr. Kelly. Thank you for your kind comments. I certainly do 
not feel young any longer----
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Kelly [continuing]. but thanks for being a customer as 
well but just starting with the purpose of the Federal Reserve 
System, it is here to serve the American people. So, I think 
whatever changes that are contemplated, it needs to maintain 
that as the North Star. For all the reasons that have already 
been articulated, I think it is really important to continue to 
have the federated system. Having said that, the world has 
definitely changed since 1913. It continues to change. I would 
argue that is one reason to maintain the basic structure so 
that it can adapt as opportunities come forward but yes, there 
is a cost to having a federated system, but there is also a 
very significant benefit, and those need to be looked at in 
balance.
 So, there are opportunities to improve the efficiency of 
the system, and as a member of the Dallas Board, I can say that 
work is important, and it is underway, and something that we 
are very interested in. At the same time, as we all know, 
change carries a risk, so we just want to make sure that the 
changes are wise and that they still allow us to maintain our 
mission, which is to serve the interests of the American 
people.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
now recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Barr. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, thank you for 
your hospitality in the great State of Oklahoma and for 
welcoming all of us here to celebrate, in the middle of the 
country, the federated system of the Federal Reserve, and the 
very unique public-private hybrid approach to the third Central 
Bank of the United States.
 Let me start with you, Mr. Hoenig. Since its creation in 
1913, of course our country has experienced enormous changes 
and growth in the economy. Has the Federal Reserve System ever 
reapportioned in what areas the country each of the 12 reserve 
banks oversees and serves? Given shifts in population and 
geographic concentrations, and even changes in the economy, I 
believe that 12 banks is a creature of the statute. Tell me 
about the history of reapportionment, and would it be wise to 
consider reapportionment given population shifts and where the 
geographic banks currently exist?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well, as far as changing the boundaries, in 
that sense, it has gone on. In fact, the 10th District that we 
are in right now, the Southern part of Oklahoma was in the 
Dallas district. That was moved to Kansas City so that it was a 
full State. That happened again in Missouri for that and other 
districts as well. As far as the location of the offices, the 
branches and the head offices, they have been constant since 
they were first formed. I think you can change the boundaries 
and still get representation. I think the cost of moving 
headquarters would be very depth, and you would spend a lot of 
time and effort doing that, and I do not think the change would 
make improvement. It would merely make a change. So, I think 
keeping the boundaries, moving them as you need to is fine.
 Mr. Barr. Is 12 the right number?
 Mr. Hoenig. You know, what is the right number? The main 
thing is it is distributed across the country. Whether it is 14 
or 9, the most important thing is it has to be enough that it 
is actually representing a broad base across the country by 
region, and I think 12 is a good number.
 Mr. Barr. Does anyone think it would be a good idea for 
Congress to reconsider the number or the location?
 Ms. George. Congressman, I have often said that if that 
were opened again, it could be likely that there would be 50 
Federal Reserve banks and not just 12 but I think to Mr. 
Hoenig's point, remember these headquarters have branch 
offices, and the commitment to serve a region actually blankets 
the entire country in terms of how you are touching those 
various parts. So yes, as the population has shifted, it has 
raised this question from time to time, but I think, in a 
meaningful way, has not really deterred the base.
 Mr. Barr. Let me follow up with a tough question to Ms. 
George. Legislation has been proposed in our committee over 
several different terms of Congress in my time in service to 
consolidate Federal regulatory agencies, and maybe this is a 
bit of a radical idea, but fold some of the regulatory and 
supervisory functions of the Fed into the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Those proposals have not gone 
anywhere, but I have always heard the argument from defenders 
of the Fed that the economic intelligence of having supervisory 
responsibility over the banking system is very useful for 
monitoring economic conditions, for financial stability 
functions of the Fed, and also informing monetary policy. Can 
you speak to, if Congress ever were to try to streamline and 
consolidate Federal financial regulatory activities into fewer 
agencies, what is the importance of keeping that responsibility 
with the Fed?
 Ms. George. Yes, this issue has come up, and, of course, 
each of those agencies has a slightly different focus, whether 
it is the comptroller of the currency with national banks, 
whether it is the FDIC as the insurer. When I think about the 
Federal Reserve's role, it has a unique function in terms of 
its ability to lend. It is providing liquidity provision 
through its discount window, and the synergies that come from 
understanding credit conditions benefit enormously from those 
connections as a supervisor in that region to be able to know 
firsthand what is happening. We have seen this in other 
countries where they have tried to separate that from the 
central bank and, ultimately, have shifted back to try to keep 
that.
 Mr. Barr. Mr. Kelly, my final question in the first round, 
could you explain the benefits of having the three classes of 
directors that serve on the boards of directors of each 
regional reserve bank?
 Mr. Kelly. I think it really starts with the public-private 
nature of the whole system where the banks unique in the world 
are actually owned by the member banks in the district. So, as 
one of the benefits of being a shareholder of the bank, you get 
to vote for representation on the Board. So we have class A 
directors, which are elected by the shareholders from among the 
community banks. I find it very, very insightful to have three 
bankers on our Board providing, again, on-the-ground insights. 
The shareholders of each bank also elect the three Class B 
directors, which are at large from the district. Once again, it 
is a very diverse group, and I think we all value and benefit 
from that. Then finally, I am a Class C director, as I know you 
know, and we are appointed by the Board of Governors.
 So, you have a nice mix of independent directors that come 
to the Board from different sources and have different 
representation and then the duties in terms of electing 
presidents and first vice presidents, we avoid a conflict of 
interest by excluding the A directors from those appointments. 
So, I think it is new for me, but I think it is a very elegant 
solution, and I think it works very, very well.
 Mr. Barr. Thank you.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired in this 
round. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for putting this 
together, and thanks to everybody for participating in it. It 
is an honor to get to serve on this committee, and constituents 
do talk about the Federal Reserve. Now, it is not going to make 
primetime news normally, but when we talk about the structure, 
one of the things that people wonder, like, what did we create 
when we created the Federal Reserve? You talk about it is 
accountable, but one of the main ways anybody is accountable to 
Congress is the power of the purse, and the Fed was sort of 
created as an autonomous entity in a way, and you say 
``independent,'' and people wonder, well, how independent?
 I will recognize executive orders could be unconstitutional 
as could laws for that matter, but as you guys go down, yes or 
no, do you believe that the Federal Reserve is accountable to 
comply with executive orders?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well, I think, frankly, that the Federal 
Reserve was created by Congress and is accountable to Congress. 
Congress can change the laws, can change how it is funded, can 
change how Presidents----
 Mr. Davidson. Right, and I mean, we created the Department 
of Defense, too, I mean----
 Mr. Hoenig. Right.
 Mr. Davidson [continuing]. in 1947, so----
 Mr. Hoenig. Right.
 Mr. Davidson. But they are clearly subject to executive 
orders.
 Mr. Hoenig. Well----
 Mr. Davidson. Are you guys subject to executive orders?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well, we do have an executive order in terms of 
how bank supervision is carried out today. That, I think, is 
complied with. I think when Congress created the Federal 
Reserve, it created it to be independent of political 
influence.
 Mr. Davidson. With respect to monetary policy, yes. I am 
not asking about monetary policy. If the President of the 
United States issues an executive order that says every bank 
examination shall include whatever, or in the case here, one of 
the executive orders that he issued was there will be no 
central bank digital currency. Through the structure, the 
Federal Government, Chairman Powell has said, well, we agree 
that Congress would have to authorize us to do a retail central 
bank digital currency (CBDC), but you are clearly working on a 
wholesale CBDC, which from a lot of folks' perspective, is not 
much of a distinction. On the back end, it still does all the 
things that a central bank digital currency would do. It is 
just cosmetically different on the front end, but the President 
has said there will be no central bank digital currency. So, 
are the Federal Reserve banks still working on it, as an 
example?
 Ms. George, you are really active with FedNow, and some 
people said that is a precursor to a CBDC, a wholesale system, 
and payments are part of that, so is that work still underway?
 Ms. George. So, the Federal Reserve in its role as a 
payments provider worked on FedNow and did that under the 
purview of the Board of Governors. In meeting with Congress, I 
also testified to Congress about what that was doing. I am not 
aware that the Federal Reserve is working on a central bank 
digital currency, and will tell you my experience is, they pay 
careful attention to the direction that public oversight bodies 
have extended in terms of whether it applies directly to them 
or whether they will follow the spirit of those things. So, I 
am not aware that there are any efforts to undermine that 
direction.
 Mr. Davidson. Okay. Well, thank you for that. I mean, 
obviously the Fed has been working on central bank digital 
currency, both in Boston and New York, and San Francisco is 
literally hiring people to write code to develop a central bank 
digital currency. So, hopefully you guys become aware of that 
because it is work that has been ongoing for quite a long time.
 When you talk about accountability and autonomy with cash-
flow, how do the banks make money? So, if we talk about cost 
and benefit, what does it cost to run the Fed? How much money? 
We would know if there was an appropriation to say, well, this 
is the line item for the Pentagon. We know how much money we 
give them. How much money does it take to run the Fed in a 
given year, and how does that flow from say, the Federal 
Reserve's balance sheet to operations like payments, all the 
ways that make money, and if somebody wanted to look that up, 
where would they just go read it?
 Ms. George. The Federal Reserve provides annually to 
Congress and makes public on its website through its Monetary 
Policy Report and through its Annual Report of the Operations 
of the Reserve Banks and the Board of Governors. You will see 
the sources of revenue which come off its Open Market Committee 
portfolio. You will see how it recovers its cost as a payments 
operator in that space, and last I recalled, it takes about $6 
billion to run the Federal Reserve System in total, including 
the Reserve Bank's support of the Board of Governors.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you for that. That will be all for this 
round.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Moore, 
for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and by the way, you are 
a great host having us here in Oklahoma. It has been a 
wonderful visit, and I want to thank our witnesses as well.
 You know, unlike most central banks around the world, the 
Federal Reserve was intentionally designed as a decentralized 
system, as has been testified to previously, one that combines 
the national policymaking with regional representatives. 
Congress recognized the economic conditions in New York may 
look different than those, for example, in my home State of 
North Carolina, or of course, here in Oklahoma. The Federal 
Reserve System was designed to ensure that monetary policy and 
banking supervision would be informed not only by data coming 
out of Washington but also experiences of businesses and 
consumers from around the country. That regional perspective is 
particularly important for States like my home State, and I 
would say probably in most States outside of some of the major 
banking or policy areas. I can tell you economic conditions 
facing a manufacturer in rural Western North Carolina, or a 
small business in Eastern North Carolina, or a family in 
Charlotte can be very different than things viewed around the 
country.
 Mr. Hoenig, you have spent, of course, 2 decades as 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and 
participated in interest rate deliberations through multiple 
economic cycles. How important is the regional reserve bank 
structure in ensuring that monetary policy reflects conditions 
across the entire country rather than primarily the 
perspectives of Washington? I know everybody sort of touched on 
this, but how have you seen that, and can you think of 
examples----
 Mr. Hoenig. Sure.
 Mr. Davidson [continuing]. where that regional perspective 
probably helped the Board take action that may have been better 
than if they had just relied on, say, just what was coming out 
of Washington?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well, I think there are many examples, but 
usually, it is most apparent when there is a crisis, and 
whether it was the agricultural crisis of the 1970s and 1980s--
--
 Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Hoenig [continuing]. where this part of the country 
suffered very significantly relative to others. We at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and Dallas were very much 
aware of it and involved in it in terms of trying to find 
solutions. With the great financial crisis, in fact, as 
solutions were being pursued for liquidity for major 
corporations, major banks in this country, I was in those 
meetings in Washington, and one of the things I was able to do 
was point out that, I am sorry, but the Midwest has some pretty 
large companies, pretty large banks. Let us make sure these 
policies or these programs that you are developing for 
liquidity purposes extend into the Midwest and into these. Had 
I not been at that table, I am sure there would have been some 
coverage, but it would not have been anywhere near as detailed 
or anywhere as thorough as they were by having that input into 
the process.
 So, those are just two examples, but you can see it in 
COVID. You could see it in the terrible periods of the 1980s 
where the regional banks----
 Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Hoenig [continuing]. came forward and found solutions 
to problems that would have been much more devastating to that 
region had they not been done.
 Mr. Davidson. Well, thank you, and, of course, I would 
submit one of the greatest strengths of the Fed is the ability 
to gather information from local businesses, banks, and 
community leaders. Ms. George, let me ask you this: How 
valuable are the regional advisory councils and business 
contacts informing policy decisions, and do you also have 
examples where the information gathered from, say, local 
companies are different from the traditional economic data that 
was suggested?
 Ms. George. So, we do take advantage of drawing resources 
in. We talked about the boards of directors, but we do have 
roundtables and advisory councils that allow us to really drill 
down to more specific sectors of that economy and understand 
it. When you do that, you begin to appreciate that there can be 
things at the macro level you might miss, but you will 
understand and when you go to the Federal Open Market Committee 
meetings, be able to articulate. For example, in my region, 
whether it was energy or agriculture, the way the transmission 
of monetary policy works can feel different----
 Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm.
 Ms. George [continuing]. if you are a farmer with an 
operating loan, if you are making capital decisions around 
drilling for energy and so, the expression of those at that 
table allow you to calibrate how that policy is working across 
the country.
 Mr. Davidson. Just as a follow up to that, Ms. George, what 
benefits would you say that sector-specific expertise brings to 
monetary policy decisions?
 Ms. George. Well, I think, again, it begins to fill out for 
this committee what is a very large and diverse economy in this 
country. Even as we see various industries grow, there are 
still thousands of communities in this country----
 Mr. Davidson. Mm-hmm.
 Ms. George [continuing]. where those effects can hit 
harder. Again, I reflect on ag and energy transportation. 
Transportation is often one of the early warning signs we hear 
as the economy is turning, and when you are able to pick up 
anecdotes that say we see a shift in this industry, it matters 
to the discussion that we have at the FOMC.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back, 
Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. We will 
now turn to a second round of questions, and I will recognize 
myself for additional 5 minutes.
 Turning to you, Mr. Kelly, we know proximity is important, 
but it is not just about geography. From your experiences at 
the Dallas Fed, why is it important that the Dallas Board 
ensures the bank is actually representative of the community it 
is supposed to serve? How does this happen in a practical way?
 Mr. Kelly. Well, I think diversity taken in all forms is 
really helpful. We have a very large country. We have a very 
complex economy. Just picking up on the previous comments, we 
have 12 banks that are independent of each other. At the same 
time, I have been impressed by how they do collaborate. So, 
each district has its uniqueness. Texas and the 11th District, 
I believe, produce 60 percent of the oil and gas in the U.S., 
and so there is a deep expertise that is developed there. But 
well beyond energy, if you just take current conditions, all 
the discussion around AI, every Board that I am on is deeply 
interested and concerned about those opportunities. Having a 
diversity of voices available to us who are knowledgeable about 
data centers, knowledgeable about energy, knowledgeable about 
water and in such a huge emerging issue, is absolutely 
invaluable.
 So, we have very broad representation on our Board, on our 
advisory councils, with our branch offices. It is very rich, 
and I have found it to be personally very rewarding to have 
that kind of access.
 Chairman Lucas. Continuing with you, Mr. Kelly, the Dallas 
Bank's Energy Survey is widely looked to in order to understand 
crude oil production and energy conditions. Expand on what you 
just said. How does the Dallas Board view that responsibility 
of providing that perspective to the FOMC and to the broader 
public?
 Mr. Kelly. I think----
 Chairman Lucas. You are a resource for everybody.
 Mr. Kelly. Yes, sir. I think our Board understands very 
well its duties on the Board, number one, and understands that 
we do need to have expertise in the areas that are unique for 
our district, and I think clearly understand how important 
energy is to our district. So, the Board is extremely 
supportive. We have energy represented directly on our Board. 
We have an energy council. I have attended those meetings, and 
they are very, very, very good. We have major energy companies' 
headquarters in our district, and oftentimes, those CEOs are 
part of our councils, so I think it is extremely important. I 
think the Board is very, very well aware of that and very 
supportive of that.
 Chairman Lucas. Ms. George, your testimony emphasized that 
reserve banks need to have a deep familiarity with community 
banks, small businesses, and the economic conditions and 
regulatory issues that affect them. Why do you think that those 
perspectives allow for a more effective reserve bank, 
especially in economic crisis times?
 Ms. George. Well, when you have a deep understanding of 
what drives the liquidity, the credit quality of these 
institutions, when you understand where small businesses can 
often find a gap in their funding, it makes a difference when 
the Fed then has to respond in a time of crisis to know where 
is that likely to hit.
 In 2020, when we began to see the economy experience its 
freefall, there were banks that were trying to connect with 
their customers in this community and understanding, from the 
Federal Reserve's point of view, these were otherwise viable 
institutions that were trying to meet the needs of a 
manufacturer. They were trying to meet the needs of the grocery 
store in their communities, things that were going to be vital 
to the citizens that lived there. The ability to respond 
quickly meant that we were hearing from them directly, and we 
were also able to reach out to them to understand where those 
needs were, and that, of course, funneled up to the national 
level as we communicated across the system.
 Chairman Lucas. My time is about to expire. The chair now 
recognizes the ranking member of Task Force on Monetary Policy, 
Mr. Vargas, for an additional 5 minutes.
 Mr. Vargas. I thank the chairman. Professor Keen, you and I 
had a discussion offline before this hearing started, and one 
of the things we spoke about was the potential disruption of 
AI. Mr. Kelly just mentioned it, but more, I think, focusing on 
the issue of water and energy, but I think that there is going 
to be a tremendous disruption, I think, in our economy and 
maybe even at the Fed because of AI. I like history, and people 
talk about the issue of the computer and how that disrupted our 
economy. I think you have to go back further and really look at 
industrialization. I think that was the great disruption where 
you saw people coming from the farming communities to the large 
cities, the disruption that you had there.
 Would you comment a little bit about that--I will get back 
to Mr. Kelly on the issue of the energy and water--but the 
disruption that AI might produce when we talk about data 
independence of the Fed and all these other things because AI 
is going to have, I think, an immense impact on our economy, on 
the way we do things.
 Mr. Keen. Well, AI presents the possibility of having a 
large productivity shock to the U.S. economy. It is going to 
expand the pie, and so we are going to expand gross domestic 
product (GDP) that solves problems that exist out there. The 
concern is we are going to dislocate potentially entry-level 
labor. There is some concern that companies are no longer 
hiring entry-level labor right now, so these entry-level 
workers are future CEOs. They are future executives.
 Mr. Vargas. When you say ``entry-level,'' though, do you 
mean also white-collar entry-level jobs?
 Mr. Keen. I am talking about college graduates in 
particular.
 Mr. Vargas. Okay. Okay.
 Mr. Keen. That is who I am talking about.
 Mr. Vargas. Okay.
 Mr. Keen. So, there is a concern about that. Now, the 
question is, how is this going to evolve? I do not think there 
is a historical precedent. The best that you can go back to is, 
like you said, with the Industrial Revolution, but we need to 
be vigilant, and we need to watch this occur. I do not think we 
need to rush to do something, but we do not need to be waiting 
to respond. So, I think it is watch very carefully and see how 
things develop.
 Mr. Vargas. Mr. Kelly, you were the first one, I believe, 
that mentioned AI, and you mentioned it within the context of 
you watch it very carefully with respect to water issues and 
energy issues because those are the ones that are most salient 
at the moment but what else do you see in AI that is coming to 
us?
 Mr. Kelly. Well, I will start out with an aviation analogy 
just with the rate of change here. From the Wright brothers 
until a man on the moon was 66 years, and we have all lived 
through, over recent decades, massive change, and I think, 
indeed this is probably going to be the biggest yet. It is 
here, and it is not coming. It is here. So, the impact on the 
economy right now is outsized, so I think that is a concern. If 
it stops the impact on markets, whether it is equity or debt, 
it is a massive undertaking that is taking place. What I hear 
from our district are these concerns. I do not know that the 
Board are----
 Mr. Vargas. What about the issue of the independence? So, 
for example, right now, as you probably know, there is an 
issue, as there always has been, by the way, the independence 
of the Fed. We see it, I think, a little more theatrical maybe 
these days, but there has always been pressure on the Fed to 
not be independent to drive the rates down. How will this 
information that is going to be so massive, how will that 
affect the independence of the Fed in this system?
 Mr. Kelly. I do not necessarily see that as a challenge to 
the independence. I do see it, as we were discussing earlier, 
it is a change. There is an opportunity for efficiencies, and I 
think whether it is the Fed, or business, or any other entity, 
we are going to have to embrace that change and make sensible 
changes and adapt, but I see that as a separate issue from 
independence. It is, again, serve the American people, do it in 
the most efficient way possible, manage the risk of change 
very, very carefully so we do not impair our mission, but I 
think the independence is important, and I think that should be 
retained.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you. I yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
now recognizes the chair of the Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for an additional 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Barr. Well, thank you very much, and thanks again to 
our witness' fabulous testimony, great insights. I think all of 
you all have made a very powerful and persuasive case for 
retaining the federated system and the diversity of thought, 
the independence that it brings, the operational effectiveness, 
and the public trust that it creates. Great. However, as you 
all know, there are critics of the Federal Reserve, in most 
recent history, a good example of critics pointing out that the 
Fed made a major mistake in 2021 underestimating how persistent 
inflation would become by describing it as transitory, waiting 
too long to begin raising interest rates, and continuing 
quantitative easing, purchasing $120 billion per month in 
Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) all the way 
through March 2022 when Consumer Price Index (CPI) was almost 
already at 9 percent. Because of that, I think the critics and 
Members of Congress, we said, now wait a minute. The Fed 
delayed tightening, and that ultimately forced the Fed to move 
much more aggressively in 2022, and we were actually sounding 
the alarm.
 I remember an oversight Humphrey Hawkins hearing with 
Chairman Powell, who I have great respect for, and we said, 
well, wait a minute. The Chambers of Commerce back in Kentucky 
are telling us everything is too expensive, and that was a year 
before tightening began. Was there a failure in the federated 
system? Why did not that data get back to the Board of 
Governors sooner? Maybe you were sounding the alarm earlier 
than the FOMC was able to take action, and they just ignored 
you. Mr. Hoenig, can you speak to that?
 Mr. Hoenig. Yes, and in my comments I said it is the best 
system, it is not perfect, but I will tell you this is where 
the role of dissent matters. In other periods, for example, 
myself where I may have had that kind of disagreement, at least 
I made that argument to the committee, and the committee then 
had to make a major decision whether to take that and give more 
weight to it or not. The fact that you have this decentralized 
system and you can bring these dissents forward does not make 
it necessarily perfect or that you will get the answer that you 
wanted as a minority dissenter, but it does bring greater 
debate to the system. Mistakes will be made; hopefully, fewer 
mistakes than otherwise would be a mistake without the ability 
to have independent views voiced strongly in those meetings.
 Mr. Barr. Well, a quick follow up for anyone. You have made 
the case for why the current system is a good system. I agree, 
but what does not work? What reforms should we consider in 
Congress to the Fed to improve effectiveness?
 Mr. Hoenig. Can I----
 Mr. Barr. Sure.
 Mr. Hoenig. I will make one quick comment on that. I do 
think that over time there has always been a tension between 
the center and the reserve banks and that. I think more and 
more there is a deferment to the chairman, do not want to 
dissent unless you absolutely have to. That culture is, I 
think, weakening the system. I think the boundaries need to be 
clear. The Board has oversight, reserve banks have independent 
views, and those views ought to be expressed and voted on 
without any kind of reservation and I think that is something 
we need to think about for the future: a strong, independent 
Reserve Bank System.
 Mr. Barr. Ms. George, I want to ask you about the discount 
window function for the reserve banks. As you know, we have 
been having this in our subcommittee, a big conversation about 
deposit insurance reform post-Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). What 
changes can we make along the lines of destigmatizing the 
discount window to help member banks access the discount window 
to avoid deposit flight and bank runs?
 Ms. George. So, the stigma we have seen has been an issue 
the Fed has dealt with for some time, and I think after the 
great financial crisis, you recall that there was a requirement 
from Congress that we disclose publicly those that borrowed 
from the discount window. I think all of those have contributed 
to trying to make sure that this is used. There are legitimate 
reasons that you want that liquidity mechanism to work, and the 
Federal Reserve I see is working hard on trying to communicate 
that to the banks it supervises, to the broader banking 
community. It is essential that they understand there are 
legitimate reasons to use that discount window, and if Congress 
has ideas about how to do that, I am sure there would be ways 
that the Board of Governors and the reserve banks would welcome 
that.
 Mr. Barr. Well, thank you for that. I think destigmatizing 
the discount window is something we really should look at as a 
policy alternative to increasing assessments with deposit 
insurance levels, but thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this 
terrific hearing. I yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair 
now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on National 
Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for an additional 5 minutes.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman, and following Mr. Barr 
we are certainly there for some of those disagreements on, 
whether inflation was really going to happen and what the word 
``transitory'' really means. You know, in the sense life is but 
a vapor I guess is not at all transitory. So we are still 
dealing with that, and you guys are market intelligence, 
dealing with it. I think it is related to the Fed's balance 
sheet in the sense that Ms. George, when we were speaking 
earlier, you said it costs about $6 or $8 billion a year to run 
the Federal Reserve. When you look at a balance sheet that has 
been as high as $9 trillion, obviously the interest off of that 
is substantially more than that, $100 plus, I think about $180 
billion or so last year in cash-flow off of that. People say, 
well, ``Where does all the rest of the money go?''
 So, could you talk a little bit about the liability side of 
the Federal Reserve and the repo markets, and the things that 
go on there to provide liquidity in the market? What is the 
function like that, and who operates that, and how do the 
regional banks work together in that sense?
 Ms. George. So, you are talking about how the Federal 
Reserve really is able to set monetary policy, the tools that 
are available to it as it carries out that function. As you 
note, coming off of 2008 and 2009, the Fed began to use what 
then was considered unconventional policy tools, and that was 
beginning to go in and purchase large-scale asset purchases for 
its balance sheet. Those purchases were intended both to 
stabilize market functioning at the time. It was viewed as an 
opportunity to lower longer-term interest rates because the Fed 
was buying that. So, this tool has continued, and not without 
consequences, as I have argued in my own policy statements from 
time to time.
 Mr. Davidson. Well, it certainly facilitates inflation, 
right, because when we fiscally spend the money and you guys 
put it on your balance sheet instead of it winding up in the 
rest of the market, where does the money come from for the Fed 
to grow its balance sheet from, say, $4 trillion to $9 
trillion?
 Ms. George. Well, the Federal Reserve has a unique function 
by virtue of being the central bank, that it is a creator of 
money, and that is why it is a discipline, and its 
accountability to Congress is so important so that the 
stability of the money supply and of inflation continues to be 
in its focus.
 Mr. Davidson. Right. So, you can basically keystroke it 
into existence and now you got $9 trillion, but the interest 
that comes off of that is real, and it gets dispersed through 
the system. So, how does that go out in liabilities?
 Ms. George. So, the liabilities of the Fed as we see----
 Mr. Davidson. Who gets paid?
 Ms. George. The reserves that the Federal Reserve creates 
through this system, Congress has now authorized that interest 
can be paid on those reserves, and that has become a component 
of how the Federal Reserve's ability to set interest rates is 
affected.
 Mr. Davidson. Right. So, for almost the first hundred years 
of the Federal Reserve, if banks had even required reserves, 
they had to manage their own balance sheets. Then, I think in 
2007 or 2008, the policy became that the Federal Reserve could 
pay interest on required reserves that you have to keep with 
the Fed or keep on your balance sheets. You could hold that at 
the Fed and get interest on that. Now we are paying interest on 
excess reserves, and the banks put deposits in, but there are 
also, as funds come off of the money that was kind of 
keystroked into existence from, say, $4-and-a-half trillion to 
$9 trillion, they are also collecting interest off of that. 
Someone is, right? So, when that flows through, that is 
providing quite a lot of liquidity into the banks, right, to 
the member banks.
 Ms. George. To any commercial bank that holds that 
portfolio.
 Mr. Davidson. And it is----
 Ms. George. Again, the congressional authority to do that 
was not a Federal Reserve policy, but I think it has allowed 
the Federal Reserve in this regime of large amounts of reserves 
to be able to calibrate its Federal funds rate.
 Mr. Davidson. So, is it safe to say that dynamic has 
created a massive amount of demand for Federal Reserve master 
accounts?
 Ms. George. I am not sure I understand the connection with 
that.
 Mr. Davidson. There are a lot of banks, a lot of people 
that want a master account in the payments world right now. As 
we are talking about stablecoins, we are talking about digital 
assets, a custodial bank had to sue because they said we 
complied, did this, did this, checklist, yes, we did it all, 
and the statute said, ``shall issue the master account.'' Then 
the Federal Reserve said, no thanks, we are not going to issue 
you a master account because you are not really one of us. You 
are not allowed in the club. So, we are, in fact, trying to 
create skinny master accounts because at a 4-percent rate, you 
are double the rate that you are getting for running a hedge 
fund. So, it is a pretty good amount of cash-flow, and not even 
all the cash-flow had to come from your own activity. It can be 
keystroked into existence.
 So, I think that is one of the things that we want to look 
at is should we even be paying interest on reserves. In the 
sense of regulatory framework, how steerable is this 
essentially autonomous organization, because under Humphrey-
Hawkins, the chairman comes and speaks once a year, but we do 
not have to like the answers, and we do not have appropriations 
either. So, more to follow, and I yield.
 Chairman Lucas. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 
North Carolina, Mr. Moore, for 5 minutes, and would he yield to 
me for a moment?
 Mr. Moore. Absolutely.
 Chairman Lucas. It is starting to sound like maybe the 
biggest challenge the Federal Reserve System faces is Congress.
 [Laughter.]
 Chairman Lucas. I yield back to my colleague.
 Mr. Moore. Well, I would not argue. You have been there a 
lot longer than I have, Mr. Chairman.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Moore. I am the newest guy sitting up here.
 [Inaudible.]
 Mr. Moore. One question that I get when I am back home, no 
way around it, and I believe that affordability is a legitimate 
issue around the economy and around the country. I can tell you 
a lot of the things that we have done in Congress, whether it 
is the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream (ROAD) to 
Housing to try to increase housing supply, whether it is a lot 
of the reg reform to allow more energy to hopefully deal with 
that, notwithstanding some geopolitical events at the moment. 
That is probably the issue that I hear about the most. It is 
certainly not something that happened overnight. Probably 4 
years of a lot of spending, right, during and after COVID 
contributed greatly to that.
 As the questions have actually come through in the 
conversation and the very thoughtful responses of our witnesses 
today, it got me thinking. What are things that the Fed could 
and should possibly do, and this is open to any of the four 
that want to take this question, when it comes to helping 
address, in a macro level, affordability?
 Mr. Hoenig. I think that affordability is an issue around 
monetary policy and the discipline monetary policy. So, one of 
your issues around massive purchases of assets onto the Fed's 
balance sheet is what it did to asset values and affordability.
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Hoenig. Another is stable prices. If you do not have a 
disciplined monetary policy, you have price problems, 
inflationary problems, which is highly, highly regressive. So, 
to your point, the Fed has, as a system, a responsibility to 
pursue stable prices.
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Hoenig. When I say, ``stable prices,'' I mean both 
inflationary and asset inflationary prices. If it fails to do 
that, then it has made a mistake and it needs to correct that, 
but that is the key. The other part of it for the central banks 
and central banks around the world is to know what monetary 
policy can do successfully and what it cannot do, and it cannot 
solve every distributional problem in the United States or 
anywhere else.
 Mr. Moore. I agree. Ms. George.
 Ms. George. Yes, I would just add, if you were to listen to 
the conversations around the Federal Open Market Committee 
table, this very point often comes through, which is the 
Federal Reserve's policy tool is really what is often referred 
to as a blunt tool.
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Ms. George. It affects all parts of the economy. So, when 
we look at housing, for example, you will see noted that 
housing prices have risen, and the question is, where is that 
having an impact on the economy? Are those barriers coming from 
regulatory issues? Are those barriers coming from consumer 
incomes not keeping up with the price of things? So, the issues 
are well articulated. The question is, what is it within the 
Fed's purview and its appropriate role to affect, and that is 
where these issues often move beyond what an interest rate is 
able to do.
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Keen. I will mention, talking about AI----
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Keen [continuing]. productivity shocks are 
disinflationary. So, if we have a big productivity shock from 
artificial intelligence that is going to lower firm cost----
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Keen [continuing]. firm costs are then eventually going 
to force them to lower their prices. That creates a 
disinflationary trend in the economy. So, that is a possibility 
as something that would help.
 Mr. Kelly. I do not really have anything to add. It is a 
blunt tool. I would just reemphasize the mandate for price 
stability because inflation is insidious and it affects 
everybody. So, there are byproducts, but more than anything 
else, I think price stability has to be pursued and that, 
ultimately, hopefully you have breakthroughs with productivity. 
No doubt they will come, but in the meantime, we are not 
hitting our inflation target, and there just needs to be a 
maniacal focus on hitting that target.
 Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. Those are my questions, Mr. 
Chairman. I am glad to yield back. Thank you very much.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I would suggest 
to my colleagues on the dais, we have had some really good 
interactions, some really good discussions. If we could have 
one more round, I would try and focus myself on one question, 
and then we would let our witnesses go back to their world.
 Ms. George--and I recognize myself for up to 5 minutes--I 
wonder if you can enlighten us on the process of building the 
Beige Book: What community involvement and surveys go into the 
product so that we can be confident it truly represents the 
economic conditions around the country? Talk about that for a 
moment.
 Ms. George. Yes. The Beige Book has been around for a long 
time, and its role is really an important one, as we have 
discussed here, in terms of bringing forward these regional 
perspectives.
 So, the Beige Book is released 8 times a year. It typically 
comes out ahead of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, and 
it shows across these 12 regions what are the themes coming out 
of it, how are they contradicting or supporting data that, 
again, is often backward looking, but it gives a more real-time 
sense of what these 12 banks are seeing in their regions. That 
information is really compiled over a 6-to 8-week period in 
between those meetings, from drawing on the Boards of 
Director's feedback, going to these surveys that the reserve 
banks collect, taking anecdotes from the roundtables and 
advisory committees it has, and really putting them in a 
document form that can be shared publicly and can be discussed 
at the FOMC table.
 What it does for you is really tell you, is it confirming 
the trends in the more backward-looking data we are seeing? Is 
it contradicting it? Are we seeing themes that would tell us 
something about the direction of the economy? So, I think it 
has been a great expression of what we see coming out of these 
diverse regions; puts it out in front of the public so they can 
see that 8 times a year.
 Chairman Lucas. I would simply conclude my comments by 
saying that, while the country and the Federal Reserve System 
have faced many challenges since 1913, there are a couple of 
historic instances that were dramatic in their impact on my 
congressional district and my constituents, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which I think we would all agree was a 
failure not just of the Federal Reserve System, but it was a 
failure of Congress and fiscal policy that led to that. In the 
second great experience which I lived through in the early 
1980s when we had a twin bust in agriculture and energy, which 
dramatically impacted this region of the country that took, in 
some instances, 15 years to come out of, are examples of why 
these issues matter and matter to my constituents.
 I think we have learned a great deal both on the side of 
the table where all of you used to work, but also on my side of 
the table, but the bottom line remains the banking system and 
the Federal Reserve System in this country still has to deal 
with the things that Congress and the executive branch does. 
You do not create those situations. You have to mitigate those 
situations, so we have a responsibility ourselves. With that 
little bit of bemoaning, I will now yield to the ranking 
member, Mr. Vargas from California, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Vargas. Again, I thank the chair and, again, thank you 
very much for your hospitality and the hospitality of your 
staff and all the others that have been here. I appreciate it 
very much.
 If I were to be asked what did you get out of this hearing, 
I would probably say that one of the things that I heard in the 
testimony was that it is important to have this decentralized 
system because you get a context of the data. So, you could 
still get the data, but you get a context of having these 
banks, having people involved throughout the country. I would 
also call that buy-in. In other words, you get buy-in from 
these places, so it is not just those coastal elites; not those 
people that just fly over and do not let us land. That is why, 
by the way, we are not here. You do not let us land.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Vargas. Putting that aside, one of the things I guess I 
would ask is this. Okay, so I get it. It is buy-in, you got the 
data, but we have talked a little bit about it. You know, it 
has worked. What has not worked? We touched on it a tiny bit, 
but what is not working? We heard a little bit about dissent 
from Mr. Hoenig. You said that the dissent should be a little 
more vociferous or at least a little more obvious, that you 
should not just go along to get along, as they say with what 
the chairman wants, but what else? What else is there that we 
should look at that maybe is not working? Ms. George. Thank 
you.
 Ms. George. Yes, thank you. I think one of the things you 
want to continue to keep a focus on in this system, and we have 
talked about it, is this idea that you are balancing an agency 
in Washington, DC, that plays an important oversight role with 
12 banks. As the economy has changed, as technology has allowed 
these reserve banks to begin to consolidate functions for the 
purpose of being as efficient as they can, for purposes of 
delivering the right services to the public, you run the risk 
of blurring the lines between those important distinctions, 
between oversight and consolidated functions. I think it will 
be important, as the economy continues to evolve, to make sure 
that you are being true to the design of the institution on the 
ground even as you are trying to find ways to make it 
efficient, to continue to deliver its functions in a most 
efficient way.
 So, that is the hard work that happens within the Federal 
Reserve System, with the Board of Governors, and I think as 
Congress monitors are we continuing to get the effectiveness 
out of this institution, you will want to do that.
 Mr. Vargas. Well, let me push you a little bit on that 
because one of the things that I found out as a politician a 
long time ago is that there is a system, but they say, well, 
that is the law. Yes, but we get to change the law, and I 
realized that when I was on the San Diego City Council. Yep, 
that is the law. Well, it will not be for long. So, in other 
words, you said this was the way the system was designed, you 
are following it, but I guess my question was, okay, if you had 
the opportunity to change the design, not necessarily following 
the design, you know. The question was brought up, well, should 
there be more banks? Will there be 50 of them, you know?
 Ms. George. Yes.
 Mr. Vargas. If you could change something, in other words, 
it is not the design that you inherit, but if you could change 
something because it is not working, what would it be?
 Ms. George. I think the Federal Reserve is working, and I 
think as things change, though----
 Mr. Vargas. Oh, I agree. I agree.
 Ms. George [continuing]. I think to your point, it is a 
fair point and it is one that your body and it is one that I 
think the institution has to constantly ask about what is going 
to serve the American public best in this design, assuming that 
you think it continues to serve. Again, I think it will happen 
more in the context of do not blur the lines between the Board 
of Governors' oversight and extending too far in to dictating 
to the reserve banks, and that the reserve banks, again, be 
able to have the ability to understand what their operational 
roles mean there. So, that is what I meant by making sure that 
those authorities, those lines, those responsibilities continue 
to be honored even as the world changes and you have to respond 
to that.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much.
 Ms. George. Thank you.
 Mr. Vargas. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, those are my 
questions.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired, and the 
chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr.
 Mr. Barr. Well, thanks again to our witnesses. Great 
hearing. Great testimony. Really educational. I really want to 
thank my colleague from California's line of questioning 
because that is really what I wanted to follow up on, too, is 
again, we should be constantly striving to improve upon a 
system that does work. Again, you all have made a great case 
for decentralization and a federated system, but let me ask my 
final question to Mr. Kelly as vice chairman of a reserve bank 
of the Dallas Fed. What opportunities are there to make 
enhancements so that Ms. George's concern is addressed, so that 
maybe we could elevate the status of that dissent, elevate the 
status of these decentralized reserve banks in the system so 
that the Board of Governors do not overpower all of the 
incoming data in real time from the reserve banks?
 To that end, Mr. Kelly, what opportunities are there for 
reserve bank directors and even reserve bank branch directors? 
I say that as someone from Kentucky. We only have one presence 
of the Fed in Kentucky outside of Cleveland and St. Louis, and 
that is Louisville. We have a branch bank in Louisville. What 
opportunities are there for those branch directors to interact 
with each other, with the Reserve Bank Presidents and the Board 
of Governors, and would there be utility in holding an annual 
conference where the entire leadership of the entire system are 
together so that the Board of Governors and that all-important 
chairman can have access to all of these people in these 
branches and out in the country, who are actually there seeing 
the data and hearing from the participants in the real economy 
in real time?
 Mr. Kelly. Thank you very much for that question. I 
completely agree with what Esther described, the need for the 
independence, and so I do think that it starts with, first of 
all, a recognition that is important. The boards have a duty. 
They have a duty of loyalty, care, good faith, and they need to 
recognize that is an important thing to exercise, that 
independence. I completely agree with your point. It does not 
matter what the entity is, there needs to be a constant view of 
improvement; learn from past mistakes and try to mitigate them 
and take advantage of opportunities.
 Chair Warsh has already made clear there are policies that 
he would like to review. I think boards welcome that. That 
perhaps would get back to your earlier question about why were 
these things missed, if you will. I think continuing to review 
policies is important, just the opportunity to continue to 
improve the operations of the banks, make them more efficient, 
and have better information quicker. There are plenty of 
opportunities to do all of those things, and, yes, we have got 
to strive very hard to do that.
 Tom mentioned this earlier: The ability for 19 people to be 
able to speak up and speak their mind is critically important. 
So, despite the fact that mistakes is a human endeavor, we are 
trying to predict the future, there will be mistakes, but if we 
do not allow that going forward, then we are almost guaranteed 
to make more mistakes in the future because we will allow 
ourselves to devolve into groupthink. The independence of the 
banks, from the Governors and among the banks, I think, is 
critically important.
 Finally, you said getting together. There is a Council of 
Presidents that I think is very functional. There is also a 
Council of Chairs among the boards. I am a member of that. So, 
it is the 12 banks, the chair, and the deputy chair, and there 
are absolutely opportunities for engagement at that level, and 
the chairs meet 3 times a year and engage with the Board of 
Governors. I think there are opportunities to improve that as 
well, so I completely agree with your urgings.
 Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson, for 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Davidson. Thanks again, Chairman, and thank you all. 
You know, earlier we mentioned the Federal Reserve can just 
create money. They have a unique role in that sense. Everyone 
else cannot, legally anyway, and one of the things that has 
changed about the Federal Reserve over time has been payments. 
You know, cash was king and still is in a business sense, but 
literally, most payments are not made with cash. Checks and 
Automated Clearing House (ACH) have come along, and today we 
are working on faster payments, and FedNow is one of those 
things, but you look at stablecoins and the future of money 
really, government involvement, private sector, bank 
settlement, credit cards, all these things have changed with 
payments.
 The enduring thing, though, is no government really gave 
anyone the right to transact. It predates government. 
Governments have become a bit nosy. They want to know 
everything about every transaction just to keep us safe, of 
course.
 [Laughter.]
 Mr. Davidson. That creates a bit of anxiety for a lot of 
the public because it essentially puts somebody else between 
you and your money. A lot of people tout that as a feature of 
things like central bank digital currency because they call it 
programmable money, and it will give you these great powers 
with monetary policy, i.e., coercive behavior, which is why 
people do not want it. They want the payments. So, I guess 
maybe you could go through and say, where do you see the future 
of payments, and how is the Federal Reserve adapting to that?
 Mr. Hoenig. Well, to your point, I think there are 
legitimate concerns about privacy and payments. It is not 
something that is outrageous. It is a legitimate concern, and 
as you develop, whether it is digital currency in the private 
sector, it still can be traced. So, how are you going to do 
that, and that is an open question that I think is now being 
discussed in Congress in terms of the laws around stablecoin 
and around cryptocurrency and tokens. I hope, not to put it 
back on you, but I hope Congress defines the rules pretty 
clearly because I do not think it is the Fed's business 
defining what the criteria should be. It is the Fed's business 
to follow what Congress has assigned them.
 You know, if you look at banking today, it is surrounded in 
regulations primarily to protect the public, and Congress 
developed those laws that then became regulations. So, we need 
to think about it in advance as we apply it to not just the 
banking industry, but to stablecoin, if we are going to have 
that, to tokenization. It is there that we have to address it, 
not after it is approved and not after it has access to the 
master account and so forth. So, it is a big deal, and I agree 
with you. It needs to be addressed carefully.
 Mr. Davidson. Any other thoughts on that with payments?
 Ms. George. I would just say it is important. Remember, the 
Fed is trying to ensure broad access, security and safety 
around those payments, and efficiency in those payments. As the 
payment system is evolving, the Fed is not trying to dictate 
where that goes, but to make sure that it fulfills that 
function because at the end of the day, what you want and 
obviously what your accountabilities are as Congress is to make 
sure trust in that money is preserved.
 Mr. Davidson. Yes. So, if you think about, like, the nature 
of technology, part of the things that people attribute to the 
collapse of Silicon Valley Bank was the fast flow of 
information, which led to quick withdrawals. If fractional 
reserve banking has that vulnerability, a stablecoin does not 
because it is not fractional. It is fully backed, so some 
people see that as more sound, but in that environment maybe, 
Professor, what do you see out there with the future of 
payments?
 Mr. Keen. Well, I think that there is always going to be a 
demand for anonymity in terms of financial payments, at least 
in some sectors, and that demand is going to be there unless it 
is legislated away, and I think that would be one thing that I 
could add.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Thanks, Chairman, again, for 
hosting and for everyone that helped put it together.
 Chairman Lucas. Absolutely. Now we turn to the gentleman of 
North Carolina, who will have the final word.
 Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir. Just a question, and this is 
really switching more to the banking supervision side of 
things. What steps can the Fed take to, through the banking 
supervision side, allow more access to credit, because that is 
the other part I hear on the affordability here, access to 
credit, particularly with small businesses. Anybody want that 
one?
 Ms. George. Well, I think when you think about access to 
credit through the banking system, it is operating under a very 
sturdy regulatory framework. The Board of Governors has been 
given that authority along with the comptroller of the currency 
and the FDIC who try to synthesize that. So, making sure that 
credit is available is something the Federal Reserve is 
monitoring, of course. It is checking it through its discount 
window function, and I think it is examiners on the ground 
understanding when do credit conditions tighten, when is that 
an economic phenomena, and when does it have to do more with 
barriers to access to credit?
 Mr. Moore. Right. Dr. Keen, you were talking about the AI. 
I was in a briefing about a week or two ago, and it was AI, but 
then it got into the whole quantum computing thing, which can 
be a whole next-level thing in and of itself but the question 
came about with development of quantum, but also the 
cryptography and the ability to maintain the security of our 
system. Is that something that, and on college campuses I am 
thinking of, that is being discussed that folks are working on? 
Is there even a discussion about that?
 Mr. Keen. I think on some college campuses there are. I 
know that AI courses are----
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Keen [continuing]. say, mandatory at Purdue University, 
and other places, it is not. I think that sometimes in 
university settings, we are more reactive than we should be. We 
should be proactive. So, I would hope to see more proactive 
behavior out of universities. We recently had a major data 
breach in terms of our online systems, and it was not our fault 
at the university, but it was the vendor.
 Mr. Moore. Mm-hmm.
 Mr. Keen. But it still highlights the issues with AI coming 
forward that security is an issue.
 Mr. Moore. Anybody else?
 [No response.]
 Mr. Moore. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you.
 Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I would like to 
thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. I would like to 
thank all of my colleagues and professional staff for coming to 
Oklahoma City today for this important hearing.
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the 
chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for 
their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than July 
17, 2026.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

 Chairman Lucas. This hearing is adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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