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- EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE IN THE TREASURY MARKET [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE IN THE TREASURY MARKET ======================================================================= HEARING before the TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY of the COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 29, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-74 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-469 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin BILL FOSTER, Illinois WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio Carolina JUAN VARGAS, California MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania SEAN CASTEN, Illinois YOUNG KIM, California AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts BYRON DONALDS, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RITCHIE TORRES, New York SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MICHAEL LAWLER, New York CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee SAM LICCARDO, California ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan JUAN VARGAS, California, Ranking ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana BRAD SHERMAN, California SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska SEAN CASTEN, Illinois MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana TROY DOWNING, Montana JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, April 29, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Frank Lucas, Chairman of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from Oklahoma................................... 1 Hon. Juan Vargas, Ranking Member of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from California............................ 2 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman Of The Committee On Financial Services, A U.S. Representative From Arkansas.................. 3 WITNESSES Mr. Kevin McPartland, Head of Research, Market Structure and Technology, Crisil Coalition Greenwich......................... 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Mr. Terrence A. Duffy, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, CME Group.......................................................... 9 Prepared Statement........................................... 11 Mr. Jeff Cranston, Head of Corporate Strategy, Optiver........... 17 Prepared Statement........................................... 19 Professor Yesha Yadav, Milton R. Underwood Chair, Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Vanderbilt University Law School....... 22 Prepared Statement........................................... 24 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Frank D. Lucas Mr. Jeff Cranston............................................ 52 Mr. Kevin McPartland......................................... 54 EXAMINING DERIVATIVES' ROLE IN THE TREASURY MARKET ---------- Wednesday, April 29, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Task Force On Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank D. Lucas [chairman of the task force] presiding. Present: Representatives Lucas, Huizenga, Barr, Fitzgerald, Flood, Downing, Hill, Vargas, Sherman, Casten, and Bynum. Chairman Lucas. The Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. This hearing is entitled ``Examining Derivatives' Role in the Treasury Market.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extemporaneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK LUCAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OKLAHOMA Welcome to today's task force hearing ``Examining Derivatives' Role in the Treasury Market.'' Thank you to our witnesses for providing their invaluable expertise. The Treasury market is the deepest, most liquid, and most important market in the world. Today we are discussing an aspect of the Treasury market that continues to grow in popularity and raises important questions ahead of anticipated market structure changes and capital rulemaking. Part of the depth and liquidity of the Treasury market is driven by trading on swaps, options, and futures on the underlying Treasury. These derivative markets are key to managing risk. They allow market participants to hedge their exposures, create demand for Treasuries, increasing market liquidity, and supporting price discovery and health of the broad Treasury market. A recent paper from the Chicago Federal Reserve (Fed) has pointed out ``enhanced liquidity in the derivatives market strengthens the functioning of the cash market'' and ``the enhanced liquidity supports more stable, lower-cost public financing.'' It is important that Congress continues to support the resilience of the Treasury derivatives market as these instruments are so closely linked to the bedrock of the global financial system. We must especially pay attention now as the industry undergoes a fundamental market structure shift with the looming deadlines for central clearing of cash Treasury and repo in December and next June, respectively. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the leadership of Chairman Atkins, has been responsive to industry comments and proposals to make sure that the transition to mandatory clearing causes no disruptions in the Treasury market. A recent example includes the approval of two additional central counterparties (CCPs), increasing customer choice and competition while reducing concentration risk. Demand for Treasury derivatives is rising and with it demand for cash and for clearing. It is absolutely critical that our capacity for clearing these transactions rises in kind. Last week the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) also granted exemptive relief to allow customer cross-margining for offsetting exposures of cash and future positions for Treasuries. This is a welcome step. To ease the transition to mandatory clearing--and as witness testimony has pointed out--will allow the redeployment of capital back into our Treasury markets. I am hopeful that all this risk-reducing activity will be fully recognized in the capital rules proposed by the bank regulators, as we discussed yesterday in the full committee hearing on this topic. We have substantial data and experience on the benefits of clearing from a risk management and margin efficiency standpoint due to its use in derivatives markets, but getting the transition right to the broader Treasury market will take Congress, the regulators, and the industry working in lockstep together. I look forward to our discussion today and I yield back. I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. Vargas, for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JUAN VARGAS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I would like to thank you for convening this hearing and also all the witnesses that we have here today. Thank you very much for being here today. The Treasury market, now exceeding $30 trillion, serves as the bedrock of our capital markets and the global benchmark for risk-free rates. Keeping it liquid, efficient, and resilient is essential. Derivatives play an important role in making that possible. Through futures, options, and swaps, they support price discovery, enhanced liquidity, and give market participants the tools they need to manage risk, fostering broader participation in the Treasury market, as was stated by the chairman. But with that role comes responsibility and some risks that are worth monitoring carefully. We have seen multiple episodes of significant volatility in the Treasury market in October of 2014, September of 2019, March of 2020, and again in April of last year. The most noteworthy of these was the ``dash for cash,'' if you will, in March of 2020 when the market participants, including hedge funds, were forced to rapidly liquidate their Treasury holdings. The disruption was severe enough that the Federal Reserve deemed it necessary to intervene directly to restore order. It is in everyone's best interest that we work toward minimizing the conditions that led to that kind of volatility, the kind that forced the Fed to take emergency action just to keep the market functioning. One tool that can help is the implementation of the SEC's central clearing rule. As we have previously discussed in this task force, central clearing increases efficiency, improves market plumbing, and lowers counterparty risk. For derivatives in the Treasury market specifically, broader central clearing brings transparency and more standardized risk management. Helping to reduce the fragmentation can amplify stress during volatile periods. As derivatives are increasingly utilized in this market, it is critical that regulators and policymakers have full visibility into these activities. That makes the recent reporting on the Office of Financial Research, or OFR, all the more alarming. The OFR was created specifically to identify risks in our financial system. It is now reportedly facing staff cuts of up to more than 60 percent. To make sure regulators and policymakers can do their jobs, adequate staffing levels at the OFR must be preserved. Finally, no discussion of Treasury market resilience is complete without addressing the importance of an independent central bank. The President has continued his public attacks on both Chairman Powell and Governor Cook, and I appreciate my colleagues who have spoken up in the defense of this essential principle. Central bank independence is not a partisan issue. It is a cornerstone of the market confidence and we must protect it. Again, I look forward to today's testimony, and I thank the chairman and the witnesses. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lucas. The strength of the U.S. Treasury markets depends not just on size, but on its depth, its liquidity, and its resilience. Today we are going to examine how derivative markets support that foundation. These instruments play a critical role in price discovery, risk management, and overall market functioning, and when used effectively, derivatives certainly can enhance liquidity in Treasury markets, ensuring greater stability. We will also review recent developments in the Treasury clearing, including establishment of new clearing platforms. Finally, we will carefully consider how regulatory proposals, such as the new Basel III reproposal could impact clearing costs and market participation. Getting this balance right is essential for maintaining deep, resilient Treasury markets that serve global and U.S. investors, our taxpayers, and the U.S. economy. I look forward to the discussion, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. If I might ask just for a personal moment of privilege. Chairman Lucas. Absolutely. Chairman Hill. I just want to pay tribute to my good friend David Scott from Georgia. You see at the end of our dais on the Democratic side of the aisle a beautiful flower arrangement and memorial on his seat. David was an exceptional person. He chaired our Ag Committee, so he knew the--and he and Mr. Lucas worked together for many, many years. But he always had a smile on his face, he loved this committee, he loved the American economy, he loved baseball. It was just remarkable and such a positive experience to have him on our committee. He voted last week in our markup and then was gone the next day. We love David. I just want to salute him and grateful to the majority and minority staff that have paid tribute to him today. Yield back. Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those very thoughtful, kind, and accurate words. Today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Kevin McPartland, the head of the Research, Market Structure, and Technology at Crisil Coalition Greenwich; Mr. Terry Duffy, chairman and CEO of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Group; Mr. Jeff Cranston, chairman of Corporate Strategy, Optiver; and Professor Yesha Yadav--thank you for being kind to my phonics-- the Milton R. Underwood chair and professor of law and associate dean at Vanderbilt Law School. We thank each of you for taking time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the record. Mr. McPartland, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF KEVIN McPARTLAND, HEAD OF RESEARCH, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY, CRISIL COALITION GREENWICH Mr. McPartland. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, and the members of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, for the opportunity to discuss derivatives in the U.S. Treasury market. Again, my name is Kevin McPartland. I am the head of market structure and technology research at Crisil Coalition Greenwich. The U.S. Treasury market remains one of the deepest and most liquid financial markets in the world. In 2025, the Treasury market saw an average of just over $1 trillion traded each day, up an impressive 60 percent from 2022. While this growth correlates with the increase in debt outstanding over the same period, the uptick in market activity exceeded what debt growth alone would suggest. Market turnover, measured as trading volume to debt outstanding, grew from 3 percent in 2022 to 3.8 percent in 2025, quantifying a true expansion of market activity. The transparency of this critical market has also seen tremendous growth. We have transitioned from weekly volume reports in 2020 that included only primary dealer activity to the current reporting regime that provides public access to daily trading activity by market segment, and the details of nearly every on-the-run U.S. Treasury coupon bond traded each day. This has brought the Treasury market more closely in line with other U.S. securities and with the derivatives markets, ensuring that investors and market participants of all types and sizes have the information they need to make informed decisions. Cyclical factors, such as macroeconomic shifts and recent periods of volatility, contributed to the market's recent growth. However, increased participation, advances in electronic trading, improved access to data, a market structure that encourages innovation, and an increasingly robust derivatives market played an equally important role in the market's recent expansion. U.S. Treasury futures in particular are critical to keeping the Treasury market liquid. In 2025, the average daily traded value of U.S. Treasury futures equated to 93 percent of the value traded in the underlying bond market. They provide an efficient method for investors to manage their exposure, for banks to head positions obtained from trading with their clients, and for speculators to take the other side of those trades in hopes of generating returns while simultaneously providing liquidity to the market. The Treasury bond and derivatives markets are inextricably linked. We see strong futures in swaps markets not as competition for the U.S. Treasury market but as catalysts for ongoing demand and growth. Bond traders and investors look to the futures and swaps markets as a cost-effective method of managing their exposure and the risks in their portfolios. Conversely, derivatives traders must often trade bonds in parallel, whether to hedge or to profit from pricing differences. This interplay between bonds and derivatives ensures that asset prices accurately reflect current market conditions, allowing long-term investors and large corporations to feel confident about their investment decisions and the United States to fund itself at the best possible rate. The addition of a central clearing mandate for some Treasury bonds and repo transactions can serve as a further tailwind for the markets, with the potential to reduce systemic risk while simultaneously standardizing market entry and ongoing participation for market makers and investors alike. However, we must be careful not to disincentivize market participation when implementing this change by making the rules of engagement too onerous or the cost of trading too high. Longer implementation timelines and the recently revised U.S. Basel III Endgame proposal suggest we are headed in the right direction. Banks with more available capital to deploy to market-making activity, better incentives to hold Treasuries on their balance sheets, and greater recognition of cross-product netting are all critical to the market's health and will act as tailwinds to Treasury market participation, liquidity, and resilience. The Treasury market has experienced its fair share of shocks over the past decade, and it is a near certainty that unpredicted market dislocations will cause stress for some market participants in the years to come. As such, we should continue to pay close attention to areas of concentrated risk and leverage. However, the shocks of the past few years have left us with a market that is more resilient than ever. Liquidity providers are better equipped to continue making markets when volatility spikes and users have more access to better market data and electronic trading venue providers can ensure that markets continue to function as expected despite volatility-driven high volumes. This was most recently evidenced in March 2026 when the Treasury market averaged a record $1.4 trillion of bonds traded each day with no evidence of stress in the market's plumbing. With this foundation strongly in place, we look forward to a future that leverages commonsense oversight, new technologies, such as tokenization and stablecoins, and market participants committed to ensuring that the U.S. Treasury market remains liquid, transparent, and efficient. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. McPartland follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Mr. Duffy, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF TERRANCE A. DUFFY, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CME GROUP Mr. Duffy. Thank you, Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, and the distinguished members of the task force. I also want to thank Chairman Hill and Chairman Lucas for recognizing David Scott. He was a friend to many of us in this industry for many years and he is sadly missed. I am Terry Duffy, chairman and chief executive officer of CME Group. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the important role of derivatives in the Treasury market. CME Group services the entire Treasury market ecosystem, providing trading and clearing for derivatives, offering trading in cash Treasuries, and soon launching clearing services for cash Treasury markets. My testimony today focuses on three critical pillars: the vital role of derivatives, updates on the clearing landscape, and the positive implications of the Basel III Endgame reproposal. Derivatives are foundational to the price discovery, liquidity, and functionality of the U.S. Treasury market. Highly liquid Treasury futures allow market participants to secure risk management hedges in customizable sizes without having to source the individual Treasury securities. Critically, open interest in Treasury futures closely monitors volumes in Treasury in cash Treasuries. You just heard from my colleague the futures volume in notional terms represents approximately 93 percent of the cash volume. Two primary links connect the cash and futures markets. First, market makers, including primary dealers, such as banks and others, use Treasury futures to hedge their Treasury inventory. Second, asset managers use Treasury futures to add duration to their portfolios while leveraged funds meet this demand through the Treasury basis trade. The widespread use of Treasury basis trade tightens price alignment between cash bonds and futures, enhances overall market liquidity, and ensures more efficient interest rate pricing for all participants. Estimates show the basis trade-related holdings have increased by $317 billion since the first quarter of 2022, totaling $1 trillion in notional value of Treasury futures today. These interconnected activities demonstrate the enormous importance of the Treasury futures market not only for the market makers and holders of Treasury securities, but also for the citizens of the United States who heavily rely on this market, whether they trade it or not. Treasury futures are a vital point of price discovery and liquidity, enabling participants to manage risk of all sizes. Furthermore, Treasury futures enable a more efficient Treasury market, which in turn lowers the cost for the government to finance its expenditures and is crucial to U.S. financial stability. CME's central clearing services provide approximately $85 billion each and every day in efficiencies to participants in our markets. This includes $27 billion in savings in our interest rate asset class alone, with a growing contribution to those savings from our cross-margining program with the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, or FICC. As the SEC's central clearing requirements for cash Treasuries and repo approach, we are expanding our program, as you heard from the ranking member, with FICC to provide cross- margining access for our end users clients, which the CFTC and SEC recently approved. Cross-margining between swaps, options, futures, and cash, cleared products within CME's clearing solutions, will provide a unique opportunity for managing interest rate risks with maximum risk sensitivity efficiencies. The Basel III Endgame reproposal issued in March 2026 by U.S. banking regulators is a crucial step toward ensuring capital is allocated efficiently and appropriately based on risk. In conclusion, given the critical nature of the U.S. Treasury market, I want to point out a concern I have about the risk of allowing a non-U.S. regulator to oversee any portion of this market. FMX, a U.S. exchange, self-certified last year with the CFTC to trade U.S. Treasury futures cleared by a London-based clearinghouse that is regulated and supervised by the U.K.'s Bank of England. While the clearinghouse is also registered with the CFTC, its dual registration with the U.S. and U.K. does not impact the fact that its ultimate guarantor is the Bank of England. Under U.K. law, the Bank of England's primary mandate is the stability of the British financial system, not the United States system. In the event of a systemic crisis like a massive liquidity crunch in both gilts and/or U.S. Treasuries, the Bank of England is legally obligated to prioritize the gilt market in British pound over all other markets, including the U.S. Treasury market. If the U.K.-based clearinghouse faced a capital shortfall, the Bank of England could use its early resolution authority, which we have seen before, to intervene and haircut or tear up U.S. Treasury contracts. This could trigger a default chain in the United States, spiking borrowing costs for the U.S. Government and destabilizing the U.S. Treasury market. I have been raising this issue for well over a year at the highest levels of government, including the Secretary of Treasury, the Chairman of the SEC, the Chairman of the CFTC, other regulators, and Members of Congress. Allowing the U.K. Government to have this regulatory power over such a critical component of the U.S. Treasury market is a significant risk. I hope this task force will take this very seriously and mandate that U.S. futures be treated the same as cash Treasuries which can be only--and I want to emphasize that--only overseen by a U.S. regulator. Chairman Lucas. Mr. Duffy---- Mr. Duffy. I want to thank you for your time and attention today, and I apologize for going over. [The prepared statement of Mr. Duffy follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Mr. Duffy. Mr. Cranston, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your oral comments. STATEMENT OF JEFF CRANSTON, HEAD OF CORPORATE STRATEGY, OPTIVER Mr. Cranston. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Jeff Cranston and I represent Optiver, a global market maker providing liquidity across all major asset classes, including on-the-run U.S. Treasury securities and Treasury and the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) derivatives. My testimony focuses on how derivatives support Treasury market liquidity and highlights key structural considerations in implementing the SEC's Treasury and repo clearing mandate. The U.S. Treasury market is central to government financing and serves as a global benchmark for safe and liquid assets. Maintaining a resilient and liquid Treasury market is critical to economic stability and the U.S. dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. Derivatives play a central role in supporting liquidity, enabling risk transfer and promoting efficient price discovery in the cash market. Treasury futures, which trade nearly around the clock, are often the first place where economic data or shifts in market sentiment are reflected. Treasury options play an important role in managing volatility by allowing participants to hedge nonlinear risks without needing to transact directly in the underlying cash market. SOFR derivatives, including interest rate swaps, are also an important part of this ecosystem, providing tools to hedge Treasury funding exposures and express views on interest rates and the yield curve. Taken together, these markets form a highly interconnected system where activity across instruments reinforces liquidity and price formation. With respect to the clearing mandate, central clearing provides important benefits, including reduced counterparty credit risk, the ability to net exposures across multiple counter parties, a more structured approach to managing risks and defaults, and provides the opportunity to develop central limit order books that support broad all-to-all participation. As the deadline approaches, market participants are working together to prepare for the transition. Some of the key areas of industry focus include development of clearing access models to support done-away trading where participants can execute with one counterparty and clear with another, as well as margin efficiency with cross-margining helping ensure risk is properly reflected across related positions. Recent approval of customer-level cross-margining between CME Treasury futures and FICC-cleared Treasury positions is a meaningful step forward. Clearing repo transactions adds an additional layer of complexity. Repo involves not just trading but also funding and collateral management. Extending clearing to repo requires infrastructure that works for a broader range of participants, including hedge funds, asset managers, and cash lenders, and ensuring efficient clearing access across these participants remains an important area the market is continuing to address. The introduction of additional clearing agencies, like CME and ICE (Intercontinental Exchange), can support innovation and resilience but also raise potential for market fragmentation. In the interdealer market, if multiple clearing agencies lead to distinct central limit order books, this could have a potentially negative impact on liquidity. The transition to central clearing also raises important questions around clearing capacity. Market participants rely on futures commission merchants and prime brokers to access clearing and finance positions. These institutions, who are primarily large banks, provide the balance sheet and capital required to support client clearing activity. Recent updates to bank capital rules are a positive step and should help ease some constraints. However, as clearing expands, it will be important to monitor whether clearing capacity keeps pace as implementation unfolds alongside prudential rulemaking. In closing, derivatives markets play a central role in supporting Treasury market liquidity. With continued progress toward implementation, central clearing has the opportunity to further strengthen the market. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cranston follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Professor, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your oral testimony. STATEMENT OF YESHA YADAV, MILTON R. UNDERWOOD CHAIR, PROFESSOR OF LAW AND ASSOCIATE DEAN, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL Ms. Yadav. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, members of the committee, thank you so very much for the honor and privilege to come before you today. The U.S. Treasury market is our national superpower, from around $5 trillion outstanding in 2008 to approximately 31- point-something trillion dollars today. This is a market that has helped us to weather an extraordinary slate of events both domestically as well as geopolitically. This is a market that anchors our financial market stability and solvency. It is the uncontested global safe haven. In short, the U.S. Treasury market is the envy of the world. It promises zero default risk, unlimited, maximum liquidity. This is a market whose prices benchmark the prices of pretty much every financial asset around the world. Derivatives are a central part to the U.S. Treasury market success story. Treasury-linked derivatives like futures and swaps ensure that market participants everywhere can hedge their interest rate risks longer term. This is a market that infuses information into Treasuries' prices, helping them fulfill their all-important benchmarking function. This is a market that helps increase liquidity into cash as well as in the repo market. On a good day, derivative examples like the cash basis trade can interlink with the Treasury market to provide liquidity and risk management. As the example of the FICC, CME cross-margining proposals show these interlinkages are only set to deepen and to deepen super-fast but even though Treasuries might be risk free, the markets in which they and related contracts trade are not. Shockingly, the oversight structure for this consolidated market for the Treasury as well as related markets does not provide the holistic oversight to be able to spot the risks and then to be able to coordinate to address them in a timely fashion, meaning that the potential for excess leverage and spillover effects into the Treasury market and its all- important functions are a real and present danger. Members of the task force, I want to make three points here to illustrate that our oversight structure for Treasuries today is broken, inadequate, and dated. First of all, we lack real-time information into the consolidated workings of the Treasury and related markets. Some areas of opacity here are well known. The repo market, the bilateral repo market, is a space where we do not know what kind of exposures have been taken at what scale and by whom. In certain cases, Treasuries can collateralize multiple debts at the same time. Zero haircuts are remarkably common in this market. In 2024, the OFR approved a rule that would increase transparency and reporting in this market, but the state of implementation of that rule remains uncertain. In the secondary market, secondary market reporting in Treasuries remains patchy. In 2017, a rule was passed, but this only applies to Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)-regulated broker-dealers. This means that entities that are not broker-dealers, like hedge funds, are not subject to direct reporting, meaning that we have to understand their workings by looking at regulated broker-dealers and their interactions with hedge funds, sponsoring banks, as well as the platforms on which they are trading. In addition, of course, we have regular well-known problems with swaps reporting. In the case of swaps, for example, there are well-known issues right now with respect to how to deal with ever fixing errors in the swap reporting system, trying to reconcile data across multiple swaps data repositories, trying to report data to the CFTC in a timely way. Second of all, our regulating structure today is just not capable of remedying these gaps. The Treasury market is subject to oversight by 5 separate Federal regulators none of whom have primary authority here. Arrangements need to be put in place in order to allow for information sharing. This is simply not being done in time. Even though we have a cross-margining proposal at present, the CFTC and the SEC do not have data-sharing arrangements. This means that CCPs are very much on the front line of managing risks on this market, but what this means is that for Treasuries they are subject to a specific buying. U.S. clearinghouses rely overwhelmingly on Treasuries as the chosen form of collateral, but when they need this collateral, when they need to liquidate Treasuries, that is the exact moment when Treasuries are likely to be under maximum stress. This means that what we are seeing here is the Treasury plays the role that it does, the complex role that it does, both as an asset that is traded as well as the choices form of collateral in today's marketplace. Members of this task force, our Treasury market is extraordinary, and yet it does not have the institutional oversight structure to help make it as safe as it possibly can be. I would urge this task force to ensure that our Treasury market, our derivatives market can maintain the envy of the world status that they currently have and work to the maximum good of the American people and the American economy. [The prepared statement of Ms. Yadav follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much. The chair would note to the task force members and the panelists that we have begun a series of two votes on the floor. First is a previous question followed by a rule for consideration of a number of bills. I would ask indulgence of the panelists and of the task force members, let us go promptly, vote on the previous question, and as soon as we cast our votes on the rule, return here immediately and we will proceed with our questions. So the committee stands at ease. Pursuant to the order of the chair, the chair declares the committee in recess subject to the call of the chair. The committee stands in recess. [Recess.] Chairman Lucas. The committee will now come to order following our recess. I apologize to our witnesses, but it is a complicated world out on the floor these days. With that, I now turn to members' questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. McPartland, let us begin with you. Would you expand on your testimony? How do derivatives support deeper markets, more efficient price discovery, increased liquidity in the cash market, and reduce bid-ask spreads? What is the connection between Treasury derivatives and lower borrowing costs for taxpayers, the things the folks back home care about? Mr. McPartland. Great. Thank you for that question. A few important points: One, futures markets in particular concentrate trading and liquidity among a few important points on the interest rate curve. So, that brings all of those buyers and sellers together. That is an all-to-all market. It could be investors, retail institutions, banks, market makers, and everybody comes together. Those prices in those markets are a big input to how Treasury dealers then go ahead and price the Treasury bonds they trade. So that is an important input, that deep data on that very broad market. Then I think almost more importantly is hedging, which was already discussed a little bit this morning. The hedging that futures and swaps provide, it does allow dealers and investors to maintain larger positions. If they can be sure that they are properly hedged against unexpected market movements, they are going to be more apt to hold on to those positions even when markets get volatile, which we want. It also allows dealers--futures also allow dealers to quote better prices. Again, if they know that they are hedged against unexpected market dislocations, that will allow them to quote tighter bid-ask spreads because they know if the market moves against them those futures are protecting them, they have that hedge in place. So, even if the market goes against them their downside risk is minimized. All of that put together then ensures the most effective marketplace, that the price you are seeing in the bond market is the price that is based on all of the market inputs, which ultimately then allows the U.S. Government to borrow at the best rate it possibly can. Chairman Lucas. Thank you. Mr. Duffy, we have 8 months until the SEC clearing rule is in effect for cash transactions, and there has been meaningful progress in getting the industry ready for this monumental task. How would you characterize the state of readiness? There are outstanding issues in the inter-affiliate exemption and other exemption self-release applications. How is the transition going from your vantage point? Mr. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think from our position it is going quite well. As you know, this has been a multiyear process as we are trying to get to the end of this year so we can have clearing of these products and to create the efficiencies that I referenced in my earlier remarks. Today, just alone, $25 billion a day in rate savings, and part of that is with FICC, or Fixed Income Clearing Corp. I think the interdealer, some of the trades that are yet to be decided who has to participate and who does not, is really an argument that I think FICC and its clients have to come to a resolution on, but I think economics will dictate that resolution. I think they will get to a final outcome. I am very encouraged that we will move forward with the due date, and people will figure out if the affiliates need to clear those trades or not. Right now, there is an exemption in place for some of the affiliates, but I do believe the benefits will outweigh any exemption. Chairman Lucas. Mr. Cranston, can you discuss how the SEC's clearing rule will improve systematic risk monitoring, will increase transparency through clearing these transactions, and give regulators more insight into the health of the market? Mr. Cranston. Thank you. I think today regulators have good visibility into individual transactions in the cash market, but that data, as was referenced earlier today, is extremely fragmented and does not give regulators a full picture of the complete exposure in the market. So, I think central clearing will obviously help that. It will consolidate that information, provide regulators with more standardized position-level and risk-based data, as well as including margin and exposure information across at the clearinghouse level. I think it will improve monitoring, ensuring what amount of leverage is in the market and what stress could potentially be in the market and I think, while the entire market will not be cleared, it is not a perfect solution, but it certainly is an improvement overall. Chairman Lucas. Mr. Cranston, I am about out of time, but I would like you to respond in writing to the following question. Our derivatives markets are the gold standard and the envy of the world. Portfolio efficiencies and risk management associated with central clearing are certainly part of that. Are you concerned about clearing capacity with the increased demand we expect at the end of the year? My time is expiring, and I look forward to your response in writing. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 52.] With that, I yield back. The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Vargas, for 5 minutes for his questions. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and again, I thank you for this hearing. I want to thank all the witnesses, and, again, apologize to you for our small delay. We had to go vote. Mr. Duffy, you went significantly over your time, and I thought it was a good thing. They did not give you the bum rush that we normally give people here, and I was glad they did not. You spoke very highly of a very beloved Member, one of our colleagues here, that is one. Second, I think you brought up something that is very important there at the end, and I do not know that you had full time that you needed to explain it. Again you spoke, I do not want to say ill of the Bank of England, but you certainly exposed it a little bit. Could you speak a little bit more about that, because I was intrigued with your testimony? Again, I thank the chairman, I am glad he let you go over. I think it was the right thing to do. Mr. Duffy. Appreciate the chairman, appreciate the question, Ranking Member, and again, appreciate your colleague. What I was referring to, just to sum it up, the Bank of England does not have a bankruptcy regime like we do here in the United States. So, the Bank of England is the backstop for all financial products that are cleared through the London Clearing House in London. So the bank of--the London Clearing House is now clearing U.S. foreign debt as the U.S. Treasury market through another entity. Their reason is that they are supposedly dually registered. That means absolutely nothing if the ``you know what'' hits the fan. They have the ability to make decisions unilaterally on the U.S. foreign sovereign debt. That is $30 trillion outstanding of debt. If that was to migrate or if that was to have a problem because of the way they risk manage in the U.K.--I was not speaking ill of my British friends---- Mr. Vargas. Especially since the King---- Mr. Duffy. He is gone, though. He is in New York. We will speak badly now. Anyway, the problem is there is a great example, sir, and I will try to briefly say it. There was a trade called nickel done at the London Metals Exchange and there was a default on the contract, and the way the Bank of England dealt with that default is they absolutely tore up trades and said there is no longer a default. So, that is how they dealt with it. If you were on the proper side of that trade and you were hedging on that side of the trade, you actually lost money because they tore up the winning trade to offset the losers. That is not risk management. Now they want to do that with the U.S. Treasuries. Nobody allows foreign sovereign debt to be cleared outside of their country, except the United States of America, which is unbelievable to say the least, sir. So, that was what I was referring to with the $30 trillion market. If it ever came to that, it would be a biblical disaster for this country. Mr. Vargas. It is a real issue. Mr. Duffy. It is a very big issue. Mr. Vargas. I am glad you brought it up. Again, Mr. Chairman, I am glad you gave the opportunity for Mr. Duffy to talk about that. Okay. I do want to talk about the basis trade. Professor Yadav, following the tariff announcement by the President in April 2025 there was increased discussion about the basis trade and its implications for the Treasury market. Do you mind explaining the fundamentals of how the basis trade works, one, and what are the pros and cons of the basis trade in having hedge funds and others increasingly involved in the Treasury market? Ms. Yadav. Sure. Thank you so much, Ranking Member. It is a great question. If I might just be a professor here and explain this in super basic terms. Now, if you have two essentially similar or the same asset and one asset trades in one market slightly cheaper and more expensively in the other market, I think all of us would buy the cheap asset and then sell it in the more expensive market. Now, in this case the asset is a Treasury bond. What we have is buying the Treasury bond cheap and then selling it in a slightly more premium market, which is the market for futures, delivering that bond in a year or 2 years' time and it is a slightly more premium market. Now, what hedge funds do is take advantage of the difference between the cheap bond today, like the cheap bond, and then the more expensive future short that then they are able to sell into the market. Now, the difference in price tends to be pretty small, so you make money by doing it at high volume. In order to be able to pay for these trades, hedge funds borrow in the repo market. They use the Treasuries as collateral and get the cash and buy these bonds. So, this is on a good day a trade that works super well. It goes in a way that allows the funding to be cheap. They are selling futures to asset managers, like pension funds and insurance companies and others who do not want to buy that bond today. Mr. Vargas. You are going to have to land the plane, Professor. You have got 20 seconds. Ms. Yadav. I am going to land the plane straight away but there are risks in this market. In other words, when the repo financing market becomes tight, then the market can spiral and it is very difficult to control the risk. That is the problem with this market. Mr. Vargas. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the full committee, Mr. Huizenga of Michigan, for 5 minutes. Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry to our witnesses for this kind of day. Welcome to Washington where it is hurry up, wait, get to the floor, wait, get back, wait. We appreciate your time and your effort here. Mr. Duffy, I am going to start with you. You have testified that derivatives lower the government's cost of borrowing. I know that was a little bit of a conversation here. Does that ultimately show up in lower mortgage rates and financing costs for American families? Mr. Duffy. There is no question about it, Congressman. As you know, most of the debt in the United States is based around the 10-year, which is mostly where the mortgages are at, the car loans, and other meaningful commercial or personal loans are being held at. So lowering and making the risk of those products for the individuals who are issuing the debt more cost effective, it allows the consumer to participate at a much lower rate. Without having a futures market, which is basically giving a forward market where the cash market does not have a forward market, it allows the banks and others to hedge that risk in order to--so the consumers can participate at a much higher--a lower level, including student loans and the like. So, it is really important. Mr. Huizenga. So, a liquid, centrally cleared derivatives market helps U.S. finances? Mr. Duffy. There is no question. Mr. Huizenga. Also, our debt situation as well? I mean, is that possibly lowering---- Mr. Duffy. I do not know. It does not help our debt situation, as you know. We are at $39 trillion, probably going to $50 trillion at this pace right now, so I do not think it helps the debt. The one thing I would say that is if in fact the debt continues to rise, as long as we do responsible things in this country, we probably still can have lower--not maybe lower rates than we are at today, but not higher rates either. As long as we continue to do the right things in this country, we are still the envy of the world, especially with our debt markets and the rest of our markets, and we want to keep it that way. Mr. Huizenga. Yes. It is one of the reasons, frankly, that concern for the debt, one of the reasons why I helped found and am now co-chair of the Bipartisan Fiscal Forum, because we have to wrestle this debt to the ground here. Mr. McPartland, southwest Michigan is home to the headquarters, facilities, and even just operations of many major real economy, consumer-facing companies, from brand names in food and auto makers, medical devices, airlines, gas stations-kind of everything is there. When these companies can hedge risk efficiently using derivatives, what does that do to their investment and more likelihood to invest or expand and hire people in my district and in others? Mr. McPartland. Right. I mean, what we want corporations to focus on is building those products and services and making them accessible and as affordable as they can given the input costs. What derivatives allow them to do is focus on that, right, to focus on the product and the consumer and growing, without as much having to worry about fluctuations in whether it be financial markets or agriculture or energy markets. This is arguably--or maybe not arguably--why the derivatives market was created. My colleague will know better than I, but when the derivatives market was created over a hundred years ago really was---- Mr. Huizenga. You are not implying Mr. Duffy was around for that creation. Mr. Duffy. I think he was implying it. Mr. Huizenga. It sounded like it. I do not know. I will let you two work that out. Mr. McPartland. The Congressman's words, not mine. [Laughter.] This really was the basis for the derivatives market, and I think we want that to continue and we want---- Mr. Huizenga. Because people needed a way to smooth out the fluctuations, right? Mr. McPartland. Right. Right. We do not want a producer of children's toys to have to worry too much about interest rate fluctuations and the cost of oil, because they need that to create plastic. We want them to focus on product development and getting that to consumers. Mr. Huizenga. What are the risks to that ability right now? I mean, what is looming out there that could limit that ability to do something? Mr. McPartland. We really want to incentivize banks to participate in these markets, to keep these markets liquid. That is part of what the---- Mr. Huizenga. There is really a difference between hedging that risk and using a derivative versus just out speculating, right? Mr. McPartland. There is, although I think it is always important to note, we need--you need two sides to every trade. So, we need somebody to take the other side. You need somebody with an opposing viewpoint. If everybody is expecting the same outcome, there is not going to be somebody to help you there and that is where--and I know that sort of term ``speculator'' gets demonized, but, like, that is what we need. The market needs the other side of that trade and often speculators play that role. Mr. Huizenga. My experience in talking to a lot of those companies. They are hedging on both sides. So, it is a way to just make--kind of make sure that they can lock in costs. Is that your view too? Mr. McPartland. Yes, absolutely. You need a floor and a ceiling. Nobody knows what is to come next, and so they want to make sure at least they can understand what their future cost might be and they can do that by, again, putting a floor and a ceiling on those costs by using derivatives. Mr. Huizenga. Right. My time is expired. I appreciate your patience and sticking with us all, and great to see you again. So, appreciate your time. Thank you and I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chair, I think it is wise that we are having this hearing. Treasuries are valued at $29.3 trillion but in just 1 day, you can have not only $4 trillion of trades, but you have derivatives, et cetera. This is a market that dwarfs the size of the asset being purchased or sold. There are at least a couple of risks here. One is the huge deficit that we have that creates $29.3 trillion worth of borrowing by the Federal Government. Another is the crypto industry, which has announced that it wishes to displace the dollar's very critical, important role. Professor Yadav, I am concerned that the SEC could grant exemptive relief for crypto companies who want to tokenize Treasury securities without full compliance with existing securities law, looser rules than the broker-dealers and exchanges and clearing agencies have long been subject to. For example, they could create a dollar sign Treasury coin that is supposed to mirror that of a 2-year or 5-year or 10- year T-note or T-bill but, in fact, has no reserves. The coin would not be actually backed by reserves but would claim to be--to mirror the price. This could be freely traded perhaps on foreign platforms or perhaps on unregulated anonymous platforms through the blockchain. Purchasers might believe that they are getting all the stability of a U.S. Government debt instrument when, in fact, they are simply getting a promise from who knows whom. Does this pose a risk to investors and to the securities market? Ms. Yadav. Thank you so much, Representative Sherman. In terms of the SEC's willingness to do something like that, I think it is incredibly important to make sure that our regulatory system for Treasuries is robust. I do not believe that even in the context of normal securities regulation that our system for Treasuries is robust. There are a couple of issues here. One, as Mr. Cranston mentioned, reporting here is not foolproof. We have many, many gaps here. In addition, we have launched a cross-margining relief for CME and FICC, but there is no data sharing between the SEC and the CFTC. So, before we actually start to talk about the fancy things like tokenization or thinking about those issues, we have to get the regulation of Treasuries right, and we are very far away from that at present. Mr. Sherman. Gotcha. The two big disasters involving Treasuries that I am aware of are American International Group (AIG) and Silicon Valley Bank. With Silicon Valley Bank, they sold $11 billion of interest rate swaps, which was basically an insurance company against their portfolio declining in value. So, they sold the fire insurance and then the house burned down. We need to require--and Basel is moving in this direction somewhat--that we recognize for capital purposes the losses that banks have incurred on held-for-sale debt, and, frankly, I think even held-to-maturity debt as well. The other problem we saw was AIG, which had a dozen insurance-regulated subsidiaries, and in spite of management's effort to raid them all, they all survived. Then they had one subsidiary that said it was not in the insurance business; it was in the credit default business. Now, it occurred to me that if I wanted to evade insurance regulation, I would sell you a fire insurance policy but say, ``If your house burns down, I do not write you a check, you can trade your house that does not exist anymore for a basket of Treasuries and call that a credit default swap.'' Do we need to, especially for those who issue derivatives not on an exchange, to require that they be regulated by as insurance companies? Ms. Yadav. Absolutely, as insurance companies. We have a system for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulation. That has to be as robust as possible. One of the things that we are lacking in the OTC market, even after the rules, is good information. For example, information with respect to swaps comes in delayed. There are several issues in relation to that, that continue despite Dodd- Frank being passed in 2010. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Mr. Barr of Kentucky, for 5 minutes. Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing and given the size and scope of U.S. sovereign debts, the liquidity and functionality of our Treasury market is vitally important. Mr. McPartland, let me start with you, and I am going to ask you to just communicate to the American people, to my constituents, kind of a derivatives 101. Can you explain to my constituents and to me what the benefits of--what benefits do financial institutions and the Treasury market itself receive when using central clearing? Mr. McPartland. Sure. Thank you so much. So, think of a derivative contract as the ability to buy or sell anything, but in this case the U.S. Treasury at some point in the future at a specified price. That allows you to know exactly what that price will be. The way that can then get applied is to help to manage the risk in your portfolio of actual bonds. If that price was to move wildly, you are still then able to buy or sell at that price you have pre-defined. Sometimes that goes against you, sometimes that goes for you, but at least you know what to expect, and that is really the core of how the derivatives market works. Because of that, banks now can hold those positions, they can make markets in those positions, because, again, they can quantify their risk, and they can put that capital to work feeling safe. Mr. Barr. Very good. Can you explain how the original or previous Basel III Endgame proposal disadvantaged central clearing? Mr. McPartland. There were a few issues or there are still a few issues. As I said earlier, we want to incentivize banks to hold Treasuries and to make markets. Thankfully, we have seen an uptick in bank holdings of U.S. Treasuries. That is a great advancement and that is what we want. That is what those primary dealers are there for but the previous or existing rules in some ways penalized banks for those holdings. They did not recognize the true risk. So, offsetting the derivatives with the bonds really that neutralizes a lot of that risk. Mr. Barr. Let me ask Mr. Duffy a similar question but a little different. How did the 2023 Michael Barr Basel III Endgame proposal fail to recognize the risk-reducing benefits of derivatives? Mr. Duffy. It is really strange, especially after Dodd- Frank, how they did not take into account how central clearing actually works today through the clearinghouse mechanisms. They were double counting and putting burden--extra burden of charges on the biggest dealers in the world. By recognizing that capital was already accounted for through central clearing, I think they have finally understood that they were asking for twice the amount of capital where they did not need it. That hurts the banks from deploying capital in other parts of our economy. So, I think recognizing that now under the new proposal will alleviate what Michael Barr and others were trying to put forward because what they were doing was trying to put so much capital into the system that it was overkill, to say the least. It was already being accounted for through the clearing mechanisms. Mr. Barr. Is it fair to say that would have by---- Mr. Duffy. It would have destroyed the futures market. Mr. Barr. Which would in turn jeopardize risk management. Mr. Duffy. The cash market, as I said earlier, does not have a forward market associated with it. So, when the gentleman asked about Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) bank, if SVB bank, when they loaned all the money out at 2 percent because they thought the rates were not going higher or they would have hedged that into the futures market, we would not be talking about SVB bank, because they could have hedged that risk in the futures market. They did not do so. Yes, it is critically important that remap of that particular venue is changed now to benefit the participants. Mr. Barr. Well, in the remaining time, any of you all can answer the last question, which is, what changes have been made in this reproposal, this Mickey Bowman reproposal, that will help promote both central clearing? If you want to add, what improvements could be made to that reproposal to continue to enhance the functionality of the derivatives market? Mr. Cranston. Yes. I think, as Mr. Duffy mentioned, I think the reproposal is basically going to allow for additional capacity or at least not prevent capacity from being made available for not only the futures and derivatives market that is already centrally cleared, but also for the demand that we will see from the SEC clearing mandate on both cash and repo. I think to his point as far as some of the other potential enhancements, I think Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) put out some thoughts on that. I think there was a really thoughtful hearing yesterday on that Basel reproposal and what could be improved. I think there is still additional room to recognize those product netting and cross-margining benefits that will further reduce pressure on balance sheet. Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair unfortunately must stand for a brief recess. I appreciate the patience of the panel. There are many moving parts. I will explain it to you. We stand in recess for a few moments. Mr. Flood [presiding]. I call the hearing back to order. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Casten. Thank you very much. You all thought that was going to be a long recess, did you not? So thank you all for coming. I want to start with a little bit about tokenization, building on some of the discussion that Mr. Sherman had. There has been this discussion of tokenization of Treasury markets, and if I am reading the numbers right, it is a tiny little puddle right now. I think there is, like, $2 billion of tokenized Treasury markets. Following up on some of the conversations you and I had privately, Mr. Cranston, I wonder if you could share any concerns that you might have with--we have Treasury markets, we have futures markets, we have swap markets and Treasuries. We now potentially have tokens. These things ostensibly should all be price linked, but they have got different liquidity pools, potentially different market hours. Do you have concerns with some of the fragmentation of those markets that we should be sensitive to even as we--to the extent there is value created by tokenization, let us not slow that down but are there concerns we should be sensitive to in those markets? Mr. Cranston. Sure. Thank you. I think, well, first, just starting with tokenized Treasuries, I think there is a potential use case mainly in the form of providing efficiency and moving collateral throughout the system. As the derivatives market and the cash equities market and other markets start to move toward 23/5, 24/7 trading, the ability to have a flexible way to move collateral on weekends I think is going to be very important and will help promote around-the-clock trading. I think there is a good use case for tokenization of things like Treasuries. I think what we need to be very cautious about, though, is just tokenizing things for the sake of tokenizing them and creating further fragmentation. In the equities market, you already have 20 exchanges on cash and options and also off-venue platforms as well. I think further tokenizing could add additional fragmentation to liquidity and not all of those chains that will be used for tokenization are interoperable. So, I think, yes, there are definitely concerns. I would start with a more cautious approach of focusing on utility of tokenization versus replacing the trading market. Mr. Casten. Okay. You raised equity, so I want to shift to Mr. Duffy. The SEC has been very clear that a tokenized equity is a derivative of an equity product and is therefore SEC jurisdictional. The CLARITY Act that passed this committee says that if you are raising 200 million or less, that a tokenized equity is subject to CFTC jurisdiction. As somebody managing a market that deals with both, should we be concerned about split jurisdiction? Is there any ambiguity as to whether a tokenized equity is actually still subject to SEC jurisdiction, in your mind? Mr. Duffy. Congressman, I believe it should be. I think an equity is an equity. So, whether if it is tokenized or not should be irrelevant in the situation. The question is, is the amount that they are falling below the threshold, that they do not have regulatory obligations to meet below the threshold of 200, 250 million dollars, whatever it is. I have certain concerns with a lot of this stuff because how is it not going to other products, including Treasuries, besides equities? So I do not think that we should be moving things from a regulator just because of the size of it. I would like to see products be regulated because I think good, smart, credible regulation is what is in the best interest of the United States to grow all of its capital markets, including equities, Treasuries, and the like. So I am a bit concerned about that in the CLARITY Act, and I am hopeful that they reevaluate it. As far as the tokenized Treasury market, you have to also remember that 24/7 does not allow unless you pre-fund on a Friday, even if it is tokenized. So to think that we could trade 24/7 on any product is not tokenization is going to help that, you still have to fund it, whether it is tokenized or whether it is cash, because we still rely on the banking system for those dollars because those tokens are tied to the dollar. Mr. Casten. Shifting, and I have to--we have a lot of weird synonyms, but I want to move to gambling or prediction markets or bilateral options. Whatever we want to refer to them all, they are all synonyms. You have now--CME has dipped a toe into that water. If you are offering a bilateral option on an earnings forecast for a publicly traded company, does that also start to feel like a security? Or is that a commodity? I mean, I am very confused on what the CFTC is actually ruling on that---- Mr. Duffy. On predictions? Mr. Casten. Yes. Like, a prediction market that is essentially betting on something that is going to inform the pricing of an equity. Mr. Duffy. Right. So, first of all, we only list certain prediction markets. We have a partner in FanDuel. It was a distribution participation for their clients to trade in our marketplace. We think it is a good, smart thing. They got a little caught off-guard, I believe, as it relates to some of the prediction markets on sports. I think that has to be determined if predictions on sports are gambling or are they swaps? I do not believe that answer has been fully baked, and I think that will end up in the Supreme Court for a decision. I think it is really important that we have that distinction. Mr. Casten. I would love--and I know we are out of time-- but I would welcome your thoughts and maybe we can follow up afterwards---- Mr. Duffy. Happy to. Mr. Casten [continuing]. on the whole self-certification process as well to make sure that---- Mr. Duffy. Totally abused. I appreciate it. Mr. Casten. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back. Mr. Duffy. Thank you. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. The subject of derivatives is exceedingly important to the market overall, and specifically for the State that I represent, Nebraska, which is a very large ag State. A strong futures market ensures that even if there are price swings between when an elevator purchases corn from a producer and when the elevator sells that corn to a feed mill, the elevator can hedge to protect themselves from those price fluctuations. In a commodities market that can fluctuate day to day, derivatives can be used as a tool that provides some much- needed stability. This question is for both Mr. Duffy and Mr. McPartland. What are the downstream effects of a well-functioning futures market that would be visible for an ag producer? Mr. McPartland. As we discussed a bit earlier--and thank you for the question--the founding of the derivatives market was truly to help farmers, and that is still true to this day. You explained it quite well. We need a derivatives market to help those producers, those agriculture producers, to be able to manage that risk, to be able to manage those costs. Markets are impacted by so many factors. The world is getting all the more complicated but to be able to know their prices, to be able to know what they will be able to sell at the harvest time is critical, and that is what the derivatives markets offer. Mr. Duffy. I think it is critically important, sir, that the commercial and producer have the characteristics of the futures contract. Futures contracts were never designed for speculators. Speculators are embraced into futures markets, but they are not made for speculators. They are made for the commercials and producers. That is a critical component. I think we have lost a little bit of our sight going forward on that part. I am a big proponent of speculation in markets because I think it helps create liquidity for the--because if a commercial wants this price and a producer wants that price, we need somebody to fill that in. I think for the great people in Nebraska and for the people in this world that need food that comes out of Nebraska and other great Midwestern States, we need to make sure it is efficient and we need all the ecosystem to work properly. So, I would hope that this Congress would recognize the importance of all the ecosystem that goes into allowing people to risk manage the food that we consume in this country and we ship across the world. So, I think it is massively important, sir. Mr. Flood. One concern right now is the cost of fertilizer. Mr. Duffy, can you speak to what you are seeing in the market with the cost of fertilizer and how it is affecting producers? Mr. Duffy. Absolutely. There are many things that are affecting producers today and users of farm equipment, not only--it is plastics, it is fertilizer. It has all got oil components to it. We have 20 to 30 percent, whatever the number is, coming out of the Strait of Hormuz today that is being impacted. That is going to have--when you have the price of oil escalating, it is going to have an impact on some of these other derivatives of the oil product itself, including fertilizer and plastics and other components. It is concerning. I know that some of the farm communities that I have spoken to are switching to less intensive fertilizer products, such as nitrogen and things of that, to grow their products. I do not think they should have to do that. I think that we need to make sure that oil becomes a component, that they can continue to use the fertilizer to create all the different farm products that they have. Fertilizer is a big deal, and I do not think people are taking that under consideration; what it does as far as the production of our crops. Mr. Flood. Mr. Cranston, ag markets tend to move around discrete events, like the release of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports. How does your company adjust its liquidity provisioning around these moments? Mr. Cranston. Thank you. As a market maker, our primary role is to continue to provide two-way pricing throughout normal market conditions as well as when new information is released to the market. How we basically manage that is, with risk management in mind, we will, ahead of the event or the news information, we will adjust our quoting. We will adjust our position limits and then, as the information is flowing into the market, we will more actively manage our exposures to reduce any potential exposure. I think the other thing that we do is we spend a lot of time and resources in building out our pricing models to ensure that they are prepared for these types of event-driven conditions. Ultimately, again, the goal is to not have liquidity disappear during these events: It is to adapt to the change in the risk environment and continue to support the market. Mr. Flood. I would be remiss if I did not point out the continued efforts of the congressional delegation in Nebraska to increase precision ag research. It speaks to being able to grow more crops, use less water, less chemicals, and be even more productive. We have come a long way since before the railroad, and we have a long way to go to be even more efficient and so that is my mission as a Representative of the great State of Nebraska. With that, I yield back. The committee will take a very short break. Very short. Mr. Downing [presiding]. It was a very short break. Well, first of all, thank you to the witnesses for being here. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Derivatives are an important tool which keeps the U.S. Treasury markets liquid and healthy, and I am glad that prudential regulators have acknowledged that with their new Basel proposal. I am going to start first with Mr. Cranston. We have discussed today how the Basel reproposal alleviates many challenges that were posed by the 2023 proposal for banks' use of derivatives. So, where could the current proposal improve to better support the derivatives market? Mr. Cranston. Thank you. I would first just want to highlight again that the Basel reproposal is a significant step forward for central clearing, for the ability for futures commission merchants (FCMs) and prime brokers to be able to support that increased demand, as well as continue to support the entire derivatives landscape. I think significant progress has been made on that and look forward to continued process of prudential rulemaking. I think an additional area that could have further benefit for derivatives is recognizing the cross-product netting within derivatives as well as the cross-margining aspect and ensuring that those risk-reducing attributes are reflected properly in risk-based capital measures. Mr. Downing. Thank you. I am going to move to Mr. Duffy here. The SEC recently approved the Intercontinental Exchange and Chicago Mercantile Exchange as Treasury clearinghouses. Before, only the Fixed Income Clearing Corporation was an approved clearinghouse. So can you explain why competition in the Treasury clearinghouse space is important? Mr. Duffy. Well, I think competition is important no matter where it is at. In my earlier comments when I was referring to the Treasuries being cleared in another country, I am a big believer that if they were cleared in the United States, I would have no issue, but I just want to have everything on a level playing field. As it relates to clearing of cash Treasuries, my concern has always been I do not want to have to get ready the day the mandate kicks in. I have been prepared to do this for several years now, working with the SEC and my team to put forth an option--I will call it an option, Mr. Chairman--in order to make sure that if, in fact, the FICC is not prepared to do clearing of cash Treasuries, CME will be prepared. Right now, they are a partner of mine. We are extending benefits throughout the system. We want to continue to do so but we will invest to make sure, just in case that does not continue, we will be ready. Mr. Downing. What sort of efficiencies would you expect with this increase in competition? Mr. Duffy. I do not know--the efficiencies are dramatic already. FICC today and CME are about $1.5 billion of margin offsets that we share between our futures products and their cash. We think there will be additional with the add-on of the client efficiencies going forward. Having another clearinghouse replicate exactly what is going on today, I am not sure if there are more efficiencies. I just think it gives users an opportunity to use different platforms, and I think that is important. Mr. Downing. All right. Thank you. I am going to move to Mr. McPartland. In 2023, the SEC adopted rules which mandated that a larger portion of Treasury securities transactions be centrally cleared and me, as a small government conservative I never like to see the word ``mandate.'' Are government mandates, in your opinion, the right approach here? Mr. McPartland. It is a great question. It is important to point out that the Treasury market has evolved organically in a pretty impressive way. So, we have moved from a phone-based market to a very electronic market that, as I pointed out earlier, handles routinely over a trillion dollars a day in transactions. I think that is an incredible step forward for a market that has sort of been allowed to flourish. That said, this clearing mandate, if implemented reasonably and with input of market participants, there are benefits there. We talked about a lot of them today. I think it is just important that we take a commonsense approach and we implement this in line with other markets where we have seen success and we know what works. Mr. Downing. Right, and Dodd-Frank mandated clearing and margin for most swap contracts. Given that swaps can be an effective tool to hedge risk, can these mandates discourage the use of hedging as banks might be hesitant to take an increased cash-flow risk? Mr. McPartland. The process to get to where we are now from back in 2008 was a long one, as I am sure you know. The ultimate rules, I think it is hard to argue that the interest rate swap market is not a better place--or, I should say, it is a better place today than it was before. That said, again, we do not want to go too far. We do not want to discourage hedging, of course---- Mr. Downing. Right. Mr. McPartland [continuing]. but banks will look for the most efficient way to deploy their capital and manage their risk. Mr. Downing. Briefly, what would the Treasury market look like without central clearing? Mr. McPartland. The market does continue to function, as I said, quite well and continues to grow. That said, a lot of the discussion about risk offsets are really, really important, and, we, again, we want to encourage bank participation. There is a cost to mandated clearing. There is no question, but we do hope and expect that ultimately the benefits will outweigh those costs. Mr. Downing. Right. Thank you. I have run out of time here. I just want to say thank you to all the witnesses for their testimony today. I think this has been very productive. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, if you could please respond no later than June 3, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] On that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the task force was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]