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- ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE: ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS [Senate Hearing 119-521] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-521 ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE: ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS ======================================================================= FIELD HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME, AND FISHERIES of the COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 28, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-582 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD, MARITIME, AND FISHERIES DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska, Chairman LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware, ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking JOHN CURTIS, Utah BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii BERNIE MORENO, Ohio GARY PETERS, Michigan TIM SHEEHY, Montana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on February 28, 2026................................ 1 Statement of Senator Sullivan.................................... 1 Article dated December 29, 2025 from The Wall Street Journal entitled, ``China's Push to Master the Arctic Opens an Alarming Shortcut to U.S.'' by Daniel Michaels and Sune Engle Rasmussen............................................ 5 Witnesses Hon. Mike Sfraga, Interim Chancellor, University of Alaska, Fairbanks; former U.S. Arctic Ambassador and former Chair, U.S. Arctic Research Commission..................................... 11 Randy ``Church'' Kee, Director, Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies............................................... 13 General Joe Ralston, USAF (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; former Commander, U.S. European Command; and former Commander; U.S. Alaska Command................................................. 15 Prepared statement........................................... 16 Joy Baker, Port Director, City of Nome, Alaska................... 18 Steve White, Executive Director, The Marine Exchange of Alaska... 20 Prepared statement........................................... 22 ARCTIC SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE IMPERATIVE: ALIGNING U.S. MARITIME INVESTMENTS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS ---------- SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2026 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Maritime, and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Anchorage, AK. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., AKST, at the University of Alaska Anchorage, Hon. Dan Sullivan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senator Sullivan. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA Senator Sullivan. I sincerely hoped that the concerted diplomatic efforts of the U.S. Government with Iran would have borne fruit to avoid conflict. That has not happened. For almost 50 years, the terrorist regime in Iran waged war against the U.S., responsible for wounding and killing thousands of American servicemembers during this time. Thoughts and prayers this morning are first and foremost with our brave military members in the Middle East, who are undertaking very injurious duty. It is my hope that their heroic efforts can bring about an end to the Iran-sponsored violence and terrorism that has plagued the region for almost a half century. One final point. Yesterday I once again called on Senator Schumer and my Senate Democratic colleagues to fully fund the Department of Homeland Security, including our Coast Guard, FEMA, and TSA. That call is more urgent than ever, now that we have the risk of Iran terrorist retaliation across the globe and here in the United States. But we are not focused on those issues, despite their importance this morning. We are focused on security here in Alaska, the Arctic. I want to thank all of you for being here as we examine one of the most consequential national security challenges facing our country, whether the United States is making the right infrastructure and force posture investments to secure our Arctic and North Pacific approaches in an era of great power competition. Let me set the stage. During some of our Nation's most existential crises, like World War II and the Cold War, Alaska played an immensely important role in defending our country. When we won the Cold War something dangerous began to happen. The Pentagon's understanding of the importance of Alaska began to face. Bases closed. Armories shuttered across Western Alaska. Alaska drifted from strategic cornerstone to strategic backwater in the eyes of many in the Pentagon. I saw this national security amnesia about our great state firsthand when I arrived in the Senate in 2015. The Arctic then was considered a strategic backwater. The Obama administration, when I joined the Senate in 2015, announced plans to cut 40,000 active-duty Army forces, including a 5,000 strong 425 at JBER, the only airborne brigade combat team in the entire Asia Pacific. Just a few years later, the Coast Guard announced it had plans to reduce its presence and footprint in Alaska. In countless hearings and meetings and provisions in the National Defense Authorization, putting holds on the confirmation of senior military and civilian officials, and of course, engagements from so many Alaskans in communities throughout our state, who knew our history, and voiced strong opposition against military cuts in our state, we have changed the dynamic. We are now undergoing the largest military buildup and expansion, billions of dollars in investment, in Alaska since World War II. The 425 at JBER has expanded into the Army's 11th Airborne Division, now fully centered in our state. Eielson was not shuttered but is now home to two squadrons of F-35s, and when combined with the two squadrons of F-22s here at JBER, gives Alaska over 100 fifth-generation fighters. No place on the Planet Earth has that kind of fifth-gen combat-coded firepower. Our role as the cornerstone of missile defense, literally protecting the whole country, is expanding significantly, particularly in the interior. A billion-dollar, long-range discrimination radar system finalized, the clear Golden Dome Initiative, which is in the Working Families Tax Cuts Act, has a downpayment of $25 billion. Ted Stevens Center for the Arctic, which I was able to get into an NDAA bill a few years ago, with over 60 dedicated veterans at JBER, has rapidly become one of the world's premier national security think tanks. The infrastructure we need in Alaska to project American power is expanding. The half-a-billion-dollar investment in a brand-new runway at JBER, $400 million to start the building of the deepwater strategic port in Nome, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act $115 million to start reopening the Navy base at Adak, one of the most strategic places in the Indo-Pacific. None of this is including the historic Coast Guard investments we are making in Alaska. But are we doing enough? That is the question this hearing will focus on today. My belief is we are doing a lot, but we need to do more. The Arctic is a strategic front line of the defense of the American homeland. Nowhere is the need for sustained investment clearer than here in Alaska, America's only Arctic state. We are seeing the importance of the Arctic play out in real time, particularly from our near-peer adversaries, China and Russia. Take a look at this chart right here. Russia continues to expand and modernize its Arctic footprint--deepwater ports, airfields, radar systems, and forward operating bases--let alone 54 icebreakers, many of which are nuclear and weaponized. China, despite having no Arctic territory, calls itself a near- Arctic state, and is rapidly expanding its polar capabilities. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Over the past few years, joint Russian and Chinese naval and air operations have occurred off Alaska's coastline with increasing frequency and sophistication. Let's take a look at this chart. By the way, we had a Russian incursion just 10 days ago, so that is a new one. But the very significant and unprecedented element of this chart are the green examples of incursions either into our water or our airspace. The green are joint Russian-Chinese strategic bomber or naval task force operations. That is not happening anywhere else in America. Only in Alaska. And I would like to submit this article for the record. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] December 29, 2025 The Wall Street Journal China's Push to Master the Arctic Opens an Alarming Shortcut to U.S. By Daniel Michaels and Sune Engle Rasmussen Chinese research submarines for the first time traveled thousands of feet beneath the Arctic ice this summer, a technical feat with chilling military and commercial implications for America and its allies. U.S. national-security officials say the Chinese undersea expeditions offer fresh evidence of a growing threat from China in the Arctic region, known as the High North. This year, Chinese military and research vessels have operated around Alaska's Arctic waters in unprecedented numbers, the Dept. of Homeland Security reported in November. For China, mastery of Arctic travel could yield valuable data about the natural resources awaiting below melting ice caps, significantly reduce travel time for commercial shipping and position nuclear-armed submarines closer to potential targets, including the U.S., say Western marine strategists and military officials. ``The Chinese are being more and more aggressive'' across the High North, said U.S. Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the top military leader of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Chinese vessels on research missions often give cover to military purposes, he said. China has declared itself a ``near-Arctic power,'' an informal designation Beijing hopes will place it alongside the U.S. and Russia. China's Foreign Ministry says its activities in the Arctic are reasonable and lawful, ``contributing to the maintenance and promotion of peace, stability, and sustainable development in the region.'' Beijing views future sea routes through the High North as a shortcut for global commerce, a so-called Polar Silk Road. China this summer sent a cargo ship to the Polish port of Gdansk by skirting the North Pole, a route twice as fast as travel times using the Suez Canal. Chinese officials have said they plan to expand trans-Arctic cargo traffic with Russia, particularly imports of liquefied natural gas. During the Cold War, the Arctic marked a front line dividing NATO members and Moscow. Its waters offered Russia gateways to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which the U.S. and its allies closely patrolled until the early 1990s--and are now policing again. Arctic waters provide a military advantage because of the North Pole's proximity to other nations. The U.S. in 1959 sent the world's third nuclear submarine there to pop up from under ice, delivering a potent warning to the Kremlin. Moscow reciprocated in 1962. Today, the two rivals are again dispatching submarines on Arctic exercises. Tensions over the High North, renewed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, are being amplified by China's reach. The U.S. and its allies expect Beijing will be able to send armed submarines to the North Pole within a few years. China already has military-grade surface vessels in the Arctic region while expanding its fleet of ice-breaking ships. The U.S. and allies are training more Arctic troops in response to new dangers. They have beefed up sub-hunting patrols out of Iceland and other locations. President Trump struck a shipbuilding deal with Finland to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet and has pressured Denmark into expanding defenses on and around Greenland. Grynkewich in December put NATO members Denmark, Sweden and Finland under the alliance's Atlantic and Arctic command to bolster the defense of the High North, citing ``the alignment of our adversaries.'' Chinese and Russian military planes last year flew patrols near Alaska for the first time, with Chinese long-range bombers operating from a Russian air base. Such cooperation not only gives China new abilities to strike North America but raises the prospect of a joint attack by America's most powerful adversaries, Air Force Gen. Gregory Guillot, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or Norad, told Congress in April. `Basically warships' China in 2015 updated its national-security law to include defending national interests in polar regions, seeking unfettered access to new sea lanes and resources, said Ryan Martinson, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute. There is much evidence, he said, that China's goal is to conduct naval operations in the Arctic Ocean. Beijing says its commercial and research vessels in Arctic waters are peaceful. That was accurate until recently, according to Rob Bauer, a retired Dutch admiral who served as one of NATO's top military officials until this year. Beijing, in addition to staging joint air patrols with Russia, is now sailing coast guard vessels that resemble frigates near the Alaska coast, he said. ``They're basically warships, but they're painted white,'' Bauer said. Joint patrols with Russian navy ships indicate China's aim is gaining military advantage, he said, not coastal security. When more ice melts along international waterways in the High North, the same shortcuts used by commercial vessels could speed China's navy into the Atlantic, he said. Arctic travel by Beijing's commercial and scientific vessels benefits China's navy by gaining experience and data about a region relatively new to its military leaders. China's policies merge its civilian and military spheres, aiming to strengthen its armed forces through collaboration with universities, research institutions and defense companies. Beijing's polar exploration echoes its military expansion in the South China Sea. China launched research expeditions and published academic papers about the region almost 20 years ago. In 2013, Beijing used what it learned to begin building artificial islands that now hold military air bases, according to intelligence officials from the U.S. and Pacific allies. In the Arctic, the U.S. and NATO worry most about subsea warfare. Submarine navigation relies on detailed knowledge of ocean-floor topography and undersea conditions. China is cataloging the world's oceans to build computer models to guide submarines and help them evade detection, military experts say. ``China doesn't field the world's largest fleet of oceanographic survey ships because they want to save the whales,'' said Hunter Stires, a naval strategist who until this year advised the Secretary of the Navy. ``China aims to take the lead in marine and climate science because understanding the ocean and the climate is a critical enabler to success in naval operations, particularly in anti-submarine warfare.'' U.S. analysts say data China gathered from its Arctic dives north of Alaska and Greenland isn't just about studying climate change, as Beijing's state news agency reports, but also to educate the Chinese navy, which operates relatively noisy submarines that are easily tracked by U.S. forces. Arctic ice impedes airborne submarine detection that works in other oceans. Water temperature layers and changing salinity from melting ice interfere with sonar. Icebergs colliding and the chatter of marine mammals generate sounds that complicate submarine detection. Information gathered on Chinese Arctic voyages enables its scientists to build computer models of undersea conditions, which its navy can later tap to plot routes allowing them to operate more freely in the open sea. China's ultimate aim, said Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo- Pacific Command, is to end ``American undersea dominance,'' he told a conference in Canada in 2024. To help Beijing reach that goal, Paparo said, ``I expect Russia to provide submarine technology.'' Partners of convenience Beijing sells Russia electronics and components for military equipment Moscow needs to wage its war in Ukraine, and ships civilian products restricted by international sanctions over the war. Western military officials believe Russia is repaying China's help, in part, by sharing advanced technologies in space, stealth aircraft and undersea warfare. Russia's nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines, and its agility in deploying them, have kept the country a superpower, despite its economic decline since the breakup of the Soviet Union. China is already mastering other complex naval domains. It now deploys three aircraft carriers, among the most demanding surface warships to build, manage and deploy effectively. Only the U.S. has more. Both Beijing and the U.S. are short of vessels capable of navigating thick Arctic ice compared with Russia, which has more than 40. China last year commissioned its fifth icebreaker. The U.S. has only two such vessels in operation, and Trump is buying more. After years of development, China launched its first domestically built icebreaker in 2019 with Finnish help. Last year, it built and deployed its first domestically designed icebreaker in 10 months, a swift accomplishment noted with worry in Arctic countries. Russia also has advocated for greater Chinese involvement in governance of the High North and invited China to develop infrastructure in Arctic Russia. The two nations created a working group in 2023 to develop northern sea routes. They agreed to coordinate Arctic maritime law-enforcement, initiated by their recent joint patrols. ``China wants to shape rules before they are settled,'' said David Cattler, a former U.S. intelligence officer and NATO Assistant Secretary-General for intelligence and security. ``Early presence shapes future influence.'' China's expanding presence and influence in the Arctic helps Russia now, but it might prove to be a problem for Moscow later, Western military officials said. Since the Cold War, the Arctic has offered Russia a remote sanctuary for much of its nuclear arsenal. Until now, only the U.S. could seriously threaten Russian bases or military assets there. Chinese vessels operating north of Russia could complicate matters for Moscow, especially if the national interests of the two countries diverge and the current ``no-limits partnership'' breaks down. ``Chinese operations in the High North are as direct a challenge to Russia as to any other power,'' Stires said. For now, Western countries are the ones sounding the alarm about China's naval advance in the Arctic. French Adm. Pierre Vandier, who oversees NATO's efforts to prepare for future warfare, sees the possibility of China's navy sailing from the Pacific to the Atlantic over the Arctic, bypassing more easily observed and defended routes through the Suez or Panama canals or around South Africa. ``For all of us, for NATO and the U.S., it means the threat that is in the Pacific is ubiquitous,'' Vandier said in an interview. ``If we have Asian forces in the Atlantic, it would be a huge game-changer. And we need to be prepared for that.'' Senator Sullivan. This is a Wall Street Journal article, written on December 29, about China's push to master the Arctic Ocean, an alarming shortcut to the U.S. This article, in part, said, quote, ``For China, mastery of Arctic travel can yield valuable data about the natural resources awaiting below melting ice caps, significantly reducing travel time for commercial shipping, and positioning nuclear-armed submarines closer to potential targets, including the U.S.'' The Chinese are being more and more aggressive across the High North. U.S. Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, the top leader of NATO, said Chinese vessels on research missions, which we had off the coast of Alaska, literally all summer, last summer, often give cover for military purposes, and that is what we know the Chinese were doing off the coast of our state this past summer. These activities are deliberate. They test our readiness, our response time, and our resolve. The question before us is simple: do we have the posture to deter them? If not, what platforms are required? What if is required? Let me begin with the Navy. Strategic hinge between the Arctic and Indo-Pacific runs through the Aleutian Island chain. This is a slide that depicts where our Navy has been investing, and it is significant. If you look in the central avenue of approach, billions and billions of dollars. But the northern avenue of approach, which is much quicker, where all the activity is in terms of aircraft, in terms of shipping, in terms of undersea cables, has almost nothing in terms of infrastructure. The strategic hinge, as I mentioned, in the Arctic is the Aleutian Islands. Adak sits at that hinge. If you look on this map, again, the $115 million tag, but we were able to get a budget reconciliation bill to reopen Adak. When the Naval Air Facility at Adak was closed in the 1990s, our assumptions about the security environment changed. The geography did not. Forward naval presence at Adak would dramatically reduce transit times into the Bering Sea and Arctic approaches, increase on-station time for surface ships, submarines, and maritime patrol craft, and strengthen anti-submarine warfare surveillance and rapid crisis response. As noted, we were able to get a start of $115 million, forward basing at Adak. It is not about nostalgia for an old base. It is about credible deterrence. Presence prevents crisis. Absence invites testing. We are undertaking an exciting example of rebuilding a military base in our state that is going to involve the private sector, the Aleut Corporation, the State of Alaska, which has already put in $30 million to repave the runways, and all services--Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and the Army. That is happening. Senior-level Pentagon officials have put forward a task force, beyond just the Navy, to reopen this very important base. Just as the Pentagon did not downsize in Alaska's plan, the Coast Guard didn't either. They made sure of that by putting a hold on the confirmation of the Commandant of the Coast Guard when they had plans to reduce their presence in Alaska, and I said, ``Admiral, you need to provide a plan to increase your presence in Alaska, or you will not get confirmed.'' So he did that. We are now expanding, with hundreds of millions of dollars, in so many communities across our great state. Investments in Kodiak, Ketchikan, Seward, Sitka, Valdez, Petersburg. But here is the really exciting thing with regard to the Coast Guard. The Working Families Tax Cuts Act included the largest investment in the Coast Guard in American history, $25 million. As the Chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee, I was honored to write a lot of this. Here is what it entails: 16 new icebreakers, 22 new cutters, 40 new helicopters, $4.5 billion in shore-side infrastructure, $300 million for Juneau to homeport the icebreaker Storis in Alaska, the first icebreaker ever homeported in the state with the ice. Imagine that. This funding is a result of years of sustained advocacy across four administrations, but we are not done. I recently chaired a Coast Guard Subcommittee hearing with the Commandant of the Coast Guard. When I asked about potential for more icebreakers being homeported in Alaska, he responded by saying that the Coast Guard is considering homeporting up to four more icebreakers in our great state. That is exciting. And what else is exciting about the buildup of the Coast Guard, in Alaska it is spurring some of the most exciting economic activity we have seen in years, a boom in shipbuilding and heavy maintenance activity throughout our state, from Kodiak to Seward to Ketchikan. Even Wrangell is now looking at a major shipbuilding operation. This is exciting. Literally hundreds and hundreds of new paying jobs have expanded in our state, with room to grow as we get more ships from the Coast Guard and NOAA. But ships alone are not enough. Without forward logistics hubs, deep-draft ports, maintenance capacity, and operational staging areas, cutters and naval vessels spend too much time transiting from the Lower 48. This is where Nome comes in. The Port of Nome is poised to become the United States first deepwater port in the Arctic, a critical asset for national security, Arctic logistics, and regional economic development. As sea routes become more accessible and vessel traffic through the Bering Strait increases, the absence of a deepwater port north of Dutch Harbor has been a glaring strategic gap for our country, and certainly for our state. Nome will serve as a forward staging hub for the Coast Guard and the Navy, strengthening maritime domain awareness, and improving response times for research and rescue in environmental emergencies. Just take a look. You can see there on what our current NORTHCOM commander and previous NORTHCOM commander have all said about Nome and how important it is. General Guillot, our current NORTHCOM commander, said, ``The presence is the best form of deterrence in the Arctic. The Port of Nome is a game changer for operations in the Arctic.'' Similar, the former NORTHCOM commander, General VanHerck, said, ``An Arctic port north of Anchorage capable of accommodating large naval surface combatants and polar security cutters would provide significant benefits to the maritime homeland defense mission of USNORTHCOM. I would reiterate the need for fuel north of Dutch Harbor, and I fully support the Army Corps of Engineers' plan to build a port at Nome.'' By the way, just take a look at this map. It is something else that is a little frustrating as Alaskans. You see the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. There are big strategic ports everywhere up and down, but not in our state. We do not have anything along the entire western part of Alaska. Well, that is going to change with the Port of Nome. And we are excited about all the work that we have done, Joy and others. We have been able to expedite the feasibility study, and we are going to start building it this summer. I also want to do a shout-out to my staff, my excellent staff. Where is Scott? Scott Leathard, he very brilliantly got in an infrastructure bill that we got through the Senate a cost share change, just for Alaska, from 65/35--that's a 65, the state or local communities pay 35--to 90/10, for all Alaska infrastructure projects. I have got a really great staff. That has saved our state and local communities literally hundreds of millions of dollars, going 90/10 on infrastructure matches, which is just fantastic for Alaska. When we talk about the Arctic we do so in terms of strategic importance, transportation routes, and the wealth of resources in this part of the world. But here is something that is often left out in the debates--the people, how investing in the Arctic could be more transformative for the brilliant people who live in the Arctic, otherwise known as Alaskans. Deepwater port Nome will transform the area. It will support more than 50 surrounding communities, many of them Alaska Native communities facing some of the highest costs of goods in the country. It will lower the cost of goods and services, including for fuel, and provide enormous economic opportunities to the area, including good-paying jobs. Arctic security requires an integrated architecture--the Navy forward presence at Adak, the modernized and expanded Coast Guard icebreaker fleets, deep-draft port infrastructure at Nome and other places. Joint operational integration of air, sea, and surveillance assets across Alaska. The Arctic is growing in global importance--strategically, economically, and militarily. We want to deter aggression, protect American sovereignty, increase our economic opportunities, and maintain stability in the High North. Our infrastructure and force posture must reflect this operational reality. The United States is an arctic nation because of Alaska. It is time our investments fully reflect that fact. One final point. I mentioned that the engagement of Alaskan communities is so important. We, all of us, have made huge differences. The Tiger Team in Fairbanks kept the dial center open. When the 425 was threatened with closure, the colonel in charge of going around the country to hear from communities came back to me after visiting every community in America where they were looking to cut these 40,000 troops. He just walked in my office, shaking his head, saying, ``Senator, I have never seen anything like it. Everywhere I went in Alaska, giant turnout, bands, marching bands, everybody for the troops.'' And that unit, the only place in the country he saw that. We have made a difference. That is why having an official Senate field hearing in Alaska is so important. The idea here is we are bringing the Senate to all of you, so you don't have to travel 5,000 miles to D.C. And finally, it is also an opportunity to showcase our deep knowledge--our deep knowledge--from our own fellow Alaskans. This brings me to the introduction of our witnesses today, five of the world's foremost experts on Arctic national security and infrastructure issues. You saw, in that final slide, all the different articles that are happening with regard to the Arctic, and that is just a sampling. But there is an awakening, and that is good news. But what is really good news is that in our state we have some of the foremost knowledge on these issues. Five of them are here today, with some in the audience, like Mead Treadwell. So I want to welcome our witnesses, and let me quickly introduce each one. Ambassador Mike Sfraga, Interim Chancellor of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, and the Nation's first Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs. Ambassador Sfraga is a three-time Presidential appointee, former Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, a Fulbright Scholar, and a recognized leader in Arctic policy, security, and international affairs, with nearly four decades of experience working on Arctic issues. Welcome, Ambassador. Next we have Major General Randy ``Church'' Kee, U.S. Air Force (retired). He is the Director of the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies. General Kee leads the Department of Defense's newest regional center focused on Arctic security cooperation. He previously served 30 years in the Air Force, culminating his military career as a two-star general and Director of Strategy, Policy, Planning, and Capabilities at U.S. European Command. General, welcome. General Joe Ralston, U.S. Air Force (retired). One of my favorite people in the whole world. Vice Chairman of the Cohen Group, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, probably the coolest guy in the U.S. military, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO Commander, Commander of European Command. Hundreds of combat missions in Vietnam. General Ralston brings decades of senior military leadership experience and deep expertise in trans-Atlantic and global security matters. Next, another favorite of mine, Ms. Joy Baker, Port Director of the City of Nome, Alaska. Joy has more than 34 years of public service with the City of Nome, including serving as Harbor Master, Special Projects Master, and Port Director. She recently returned from retirement--thank you--to help lead the transformational expansion of the Port of Nome into a deep-draft Arctic port, for our Nation's security. And finally, Captain Steve White, Coast Guard Captain Steve White, Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska. Captain White joined the Marine Exchange in 2021, after a 31- year Coast Guard career, where his final assignment was Sector Commander and Captain of the Port for Southeast Alaska. He brings extensive operational and maritime domain awareness experience across Alaska and beyond. To our witnesses, thank you. Thank you for your decades of service, the amount of service to our country here is in the hundreds of years, and I am very much looking forward to each of you delivering your opening statement. You will be recognized for five minutes, and a longer statement can appear in the record if you would like that. So why don't we begin with you, Ambassador Sfraga, for your opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE SFRAGA, INTERIM CHANCELLOR OF UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, FAIRBANKS; FORMER U.S. ARCTIC AMBASSADOR AND FORMER CHAIR, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Chairman Sullivan. Thank you for convening this important hearing. I am Mike Sfraga. I am the Interim Chancellor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. My central message today is Arctic infrastructure and Alaska infrastructure are national security imperatives, as you noted, Senator, and Alaska sits at this nexus of domestic and foreign policy. I think that is often overlooked and should be injected into everything we talk about in terms of Alaska and the new Arctic. National Security, homeland security, economic security, energy security, mineral and resource security, and community security all rely on robust, integrated, well- resourced Arctic infrastructure. A tall order, maybe even more complicated by the Arctic's harsh and changing landscape. Ports, maritime access, icebreakers, communication systems, logistics nodes, research platforms are not simply economic assets. They are the foundation of American presence and sovereignty. These foundational principles are described in the White House's recently published in America's Maritime Action Plan. If there is a focal point for Arctic maritime infrastructure investment I believe it is in the Bering Strait region. Consider the Port of Nome, as you have done, Senator. The Port of Nome is strategically significant because it is the closest U.S. port to the highly transited Bering Strait, and it is being developed to become our Nation's first deep-draft American port. As we look to address the increase in Arctic shipping and increases in coordinated Russian and Chinese military operations in the region, we should reconceptualize the Port of Nome, and I believe we should be thinking about a port complex, co-locating various Federal, state, and local agencies, monitoring vessels, supporting research, and enabling economic development. Aggregating such resources in one location is in our national and state interest, and just like Arctic Legos-- Arctic Legos--it builds on existing infrastructure footprints to leverage missions and relationships and reduce costs while supporting advanced and expanded capabilities. Scientific research and maritime security are mutually reinforcing in the Arctic. Research improves forecasting, mapping, charting, environmental monitoring, and operational awareness, all essential for safe and effective maritime operations. A deeper understanding of the evolving maritime domain strengthens the Coast Guard's ability to operate effectively and safely. Simply put, Arctic research is a foundational pillar of Arctic security. Security in the Arctic begins with presence, presence requires access, access requires infrastructure. Let me leave with eight recommendations, quickly. Number one, I think we should adopt an integrated Arctic infrastructure strategy, ensure Federal investments in ports, icebreakers, communications, and logistics are coordinated across agencies and designed for multi-mission use. Two, prioritize the Bering Strait region. Advance infrastructure development, particularly in Nome, as a strategically integrated maritime hub. I would like for us to reconceptualize the area of the Bering Strait and think about it as the Bering Strait security, economic, and research corridor, and the Nome Port as the Nome Port complex. Three, revitalize Adak Naval Air Station. Strategically located on the Aleutian Islands, as you have indicated, Adak affords the United States an unparalleled air and maritime base from which we can monitor the region, project power, complement existing ports in Alaska, and further build on the long-needed string of ports in America's North. Number four, plan now for long lead time maritime assets. Begin deliberate planning for future icebreaking and shoreside capacity to avoid capability gaps later in this decade. Number five, embed research and domain awareness in infrastructure design. Ensure research capability, charting, communications, and monitoring systems are incorporated into maritime infrastructure planning. Six, sustain whole-of-government coordination. Empower coordinating bodies to ensure Arctic investments are complementary, fiscally responsible, and strategically coherent. Number seven, establish a sequenced Arctic infrastructure roadmap. Align port development, icebreaker recapitalization, communications upgrades, and logistic capabilities and capacity within a unified, multiyear strategy. And finally, number eight, review, and just review, the overlapping yet complementary combatant command structures and mission sets, like USNORTHCOM Norad and U.S. Coast Guard Arctic District and consider, just consider, a joint command structure between USNORTHCOM and the U.S. Coast Guard where the Arctic District maintains responsibility for shoreside activities and duties, yet activities and duties that extend beyond that area, at a distance to be determined, are coordinated between USNORTHCOM and the Arctic District, because of the activities, Senator, you have pointed out. So in conclusion, the political, physical, economic, social, cultural, and security landscapes of the Arctic are rapidly changing. The question is not whether the Arctic will matter to the United States in the near or the long term. It already does. The question before us is whether and how we will make deliberate, strategic, systematic, and sustained investments in Arctic research and infrastructure at the scale necessary to preserve American leadership and presence in the region. Through integrated Arctic infrastructure investments, the United States can ensure a region that is secure, resilient, prosperous, and governed by stability rather than uncertainty. Infrastructure in the Arctic is not merely concrete and steel. It is access. It is presence. It is resilience. It is national security. I thank you very much for this opportunity to testify, Senator. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ambassador. That is excellent. And the good news is we are starting to take off some of those eight recommendations, but we have got a lot more work to do. General Kee, sir, the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF RANDY ``CHURCH'' KEE, DIRECTOR, TED STEVENS CENTER FOR ARCTIC SECURITY STUDIES Mr. Kee. Chairman Sullivan and distinguished panelists, in particular Ambassador Sfraga, General Ralston, Joy, and Steve, thank you for the privilege and opportunity to offer remarks today. It is important to recognize the vital necessity to align U.S. maritime infrastructure investments with national security needs. These are reflections from me. Of course, they are based on years of experience in Arctic security and defense and not necessarily representative within the Pentagon or the Department of War. However, the recently released National Defense Strategy provides the language and suitable framework to address the principal focal points of the priority needs, and they are directly applicable to this hearing. They are, one, defend the homeland; two, deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation; three, increase burden sharing with U.S. allies and partners; and four, supercharge the U.S. defense industrial base. These are directly tieable to Alaska. The NDS clearly states that American interests are under threat throughout the Western Hemisphere, including North American Arctic. Homeland defense is the Department's stated top priority, and deterring China from a position of strength starts with the first island chain, but deterrence should extend across the depth and breadth of the Pacific. Here is where the geography and key training in Alaska is inferred in the NDS. Alaska is the top of the Indo-Pacific, the northwest corner of the American homeland, and deeply connected to the Arctic. As a 30-plus-year veteran of U.S. Air Force service, I am reminded daily of the wisdom of the great General Billy Mitchell, who in essence highlighted Alaska as the most strategic key terrain for the ages. Further, the recently released White House Maritime Action Plan provides a number of policy and programmatic recommendations to revitalize America's lagging capacities in shipbuilding, workforce, protecting the maritime industrial base, and connecting national security interests, to economic security, industrial resilience for maritime communities. These are somewhat connected to your reflections, Ambassador Sfraga. The specific aspects of the Maritime Action Plan rightly key on needed policy actions and are programmatically directly related to the topics of this hearing. I can certainly elaborate on these in the Q&A, sir. Sea Lines of Communication in the U.S. and pan-Arctic region are emerging as strategic arteries of national power, economic stability, and military mobility, and ensuring the freedom of navigation, domain awareness, and credible presence along these routes is central to maintaining strategic stability and securing U.S. national interests in the high latitudes. Infrastructure development and logistical support will determine whether the United States can effectively operate, protect maritime interests, deter adversaries, and uphold sovereignty in this critical region. From a strategic economic vantage, it is soon to be the Bering Strait is going to be as important as the Straits of Malacca. Securing many of America's national interests in the Arctic is increasingly defined by the need for ready Coast Guard and Department of War forces as well as appropriate infrastructure. Competitors and adversaries have invested in ice-capable fleets, port infrastructure and logistic networks, and surveillance systems designed to establish enduring operational reach and create security advantages aligned to their interests. We should carefully consider their example. The United States currently faces infrastructure challenges that constrain operational flexibility. Limited deepwater port capacity in Alaska, sparse logistics staging nodes, communications, positioning, navigation and timing vulnerabilities and insufficient domain awareness infrastructure reduce America's ability to protect U.S. security interests, defend the homeland, and surge capability to and through the Arctic. In a region where distance, extreme climatic conditions, and logistics define an operation's success, infrastructure is strategically viable. In the Arctic, groundwork for future advantage is not laid on the battlefield but in ports, airfields, shipping lanes, comms tables, cables, satellite coverage, and industrial capacity. For the United States this means investment in maritime infrastructure and expeditionary forward basing as active instruments to deterrence and, in sum, resourcing that needs outlined in the White House Maritime Action Plan. Failing to build presence and resilience during peace time, seize initiative in competition, when outcomes can still be influenced at far lower costs and risks than during crisis, where historically winning demands brute force investment in regardless of the price tag. Infrastructure, sir, is the operational enabler, and it is required for mission success. Effective maritime operations depend on four foundational infrastructure pillars: access, sustainment, awareness, and connectivity. This, too, I can build out during the Q&A. Alaska is America's Arctic. Investments made here serve not only local communities but national defense, readiness, and allied cooperation. We are NATO's northwest flank. Infrastructure in Alaska enables homeland defense in the Nation's northern approaches while supporting safety, economic activity, and emergency response. Community safety and national security are actually mutually reinforcing. The Arctic is a strategic maritime center of gravity. Infrastructure is the enabling foundation for security, defense, safety, and cooperation. Without deliberate, sustained investment the United States risks operational disadvantage in a region essential to homeland defense and maritime leadership. As the United States pursues a strategy of peace through strength as an enduring condition of prosperity, in the U.S. Arctic such a strategy can be achieved through a well-prepared and equipped Joint Force, with the infrastructure that enables that Joint Force to deter and dissuade America's adversaries, and if deterrence fails, providing the means to defeat such adversaries with minimum risk. Sir, thank you for the opportunity to present this. I look forward to further Q&A. It is a privilege to be a part of this conversation. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. General Ralston. STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOE RALSTON, UASF (RET.), FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE; FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND; AND FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. ALASKA COMMAND General Ralston. Chairman Sullivan, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. I will make a brief statement and submit the remainder of my remarks for the record. Senator Sullivan. Without objection. General Ralston. I have lived in Anchorage for over 20 years. I had the privilege of serving as Commander of Alaskan Command in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The Arctic is evolving into a highly contested front in our strategic competition with both China and Russia. I want to commend you, Senator, for your continued leadership in drawing attention to this region's significance, both through holding this hearing and for your efforts every day in Congress. Given the growing importance of the Arctic to our national security, the U.S. must invest in infrastructure that supports a credible U.S. presence and strategic deterrence in the Arctic. In my opinion, this requires reopening Naval Air Facility Adak and establishing a deepwater port in Nome. When I was stationed in Alaska I saw firsthand the importance of a robust U.S. presence in the High North. Adak was a crucial operational hub for U.S. forces and a vital forward location for logistics, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1995 BRAC decision to decommission Adak was part of the post-Cold War realignment and was based on the security reality of that era. However, three decades later, strategic realities in the Arctic have shifted considerably. While the number of incidents fluctuates, as you pointed out, the trend is that our principal adversaries increasingly, and more aggressively, seek to test America's strategic resolve in the region. The growing threat posed by China and Russia and the Arctic demands persistent monitoring and a force posture capable of rapid response. Adak would strengthen deterrence by denial. As the westernmost municipality in the U.S.--and Senator, I know you know this, but unfortunately I think many of your colleagues in Washington don't--Adak is 1,100 nautical miles closer to the Taiwan Strait than any of our bases in Hawaii. Accordingly, Adak would also bolster U.S. operational readiness and enhance our military's ability to rapidly deploy forces to respond to any potential conflict in the Pacific. With regard to the Port of Nome, as the American shipping industry is positioned to soon take advantage of new Arctic shipping routes, the Port of Nome can serve as a strategic gateway to the Arctic. However, we cannot properly patrol these areas and protect U.S. commercial interests if our icebreakers are homeported thousands of miles away. For example, in August 2025, several Chinese research vessels were operating north of Utqiagvik. Fortunately, the U.S. icebreaking cutter Healy was nearby and could quickly dispatch to observe the research vessels. If the Healy, homeported in Seattle, was at homeport, it would have taken up to two weeks to get to Arctic waters. The Coast Guard has made significant investments to expand the U.S. fleet of Arctic security cutters. Developing the Port of Nome is a critical opportunity to homeport new icebreakers to ensure our access to the Arctic, as demanded by the new National Defense Strategy. In conclusion, Adak and the Port of Nome are not niche, remote facilities. They are strategic fulcrums that sit at the intersection of the Arctic, North Pacific, and Indo-Pacific operating areas. Arctic security cannot be effectively managed from outside of the region. A permanent presence is required to ensure we have military capability, where we need it, when we need it. It would also extend homeland defenses to the Arctic and to the residents of Alaska, who are increasingly concerned by the unprecedented intrusions of our adversaries in their backyard. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to questions. [The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:] Prepared Statement of General Joseph Ralston (USAF, ret.) Vice Chairman, The Cohen Group Introduction Chairman Sullivan, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing to examine the United States' security infrastructure in the Arctic. I have lived in Anchorage for over 20 years and served as Commander of Alaska Command from 1992 to 1994. Throughout my 38 years of military service, I also had the privilege to serve as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander of U.S. European Command. In light of the growing importance of the Arctic region to our national security, I believe the Nation needs to invest in military infrastructure that can more readily respond to threats. I strongly recommend the Department reopen Naval Air Facility Adak and establish a deep-water port capability in Nome. Together, these assets would help to re-establish a capable and credible U.S. presence in the Arctic that supports strategic deterrence, operational readiness, and enhanced maritime domain awareness. It also is fully consistent with the National Defense Strategy issued last month, which states that the Department ``must guarantee U.S. military and commercial access'' to the Arctic. Naval Air Facility Adak As Commander, Alaska Command, I saw firsthand the importance of a robust U.S. presence in the High North both as a means of projecting power and deterring our adversaries. During the Cold War, Adak served as a crucial operational hub for U.S. forces supporting air defense and anti-submarine missions, as well as providing vital forward location for logistics, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The BRAC-1995 decision to decommission Adak as part of the post-Cold War realignment was based on the security reality of that era. Three decades later, strategic realities in the Arctic have shifted considerably and demand that our Nation act to meet the new reality. The rapid increase in military exercises and coast guard patrols by China and Russia separately and jointly enhance their abilities to project power and challenge U.S. interests in the Arctic. While the number of incidents fluctuates, the trend is that our principal adversaries increasingly and more aggressively seek to test the boundaries of America's strategic resolve. In 2021, PLA Navy ships including a guided missile cruiser and destroyer passed less than 50 miles from the Aleutians, and in 2022 and 2023, larger joint Russian/ Chinese naval patrols did the same. In July 2024, Russian and Chinese nuclear-capable bombers for the first time conducted combined air operations near Alaska. While American and Canadian fighter jets intercepted the bombers, this intrusion, along with the joint naval patrols, reflect a troubling trend and a new geopolitical reality. These expanding intrusions cannot be counteracted by episodic deployments. The growing threat posed by China and Russia demands persistent sensing and monitoring, with a force posture capable of rapid response enabled by enhanced operational infrastructure in forward locations. An operational base at Adak would strengthen deterrence by denial. The strategic value of reasserting a U.S. force presence at Adak is not limited to our interests in the Arctic. These investments would have considerable, and often overlooked, implications for our operational readiness in the Indo-Pacific. Adak is the westernmost municipality in the U.S. and, as Senator Sullivan has pointed out on several occasions, is 1,100 nautical miles closer to the Taiwan Strait than Hawaii. Looking to Europe, Adak is also closer to NATO's northern border with Russia than are Air Combat Command's bases on the U.S. East Coast. Proximity matters. Adak and additional infrastructure along the Aleutian Chain would enhance our military's ability to rapidly deploy forces to respond to any conflict in the Pacific or northern Europe. The immediate threats to our military assets in Guam and Okinawa in the event of open hostilities with China are well documented. Adak could function as a secluded rearguard for both resupply and rearmament. INDOPACOM's recent Northern Edge warfighting exercise, which used Adak as a staging ground, clearly displayed Alaska's ability to support the projection of U.S. military assets into the Indo- Pacific. That potential capability and operational range are key reasons why the INDOPACOM Commander has called for the reopening of Adak. Port of Nome The Port of Nome is a strategic gateway to the Arctic. Infrastructure upgrades will better position it to protect American commercial, scientific, and security interests. The American shipping industry is positioned to soon take advantage of new Arctic shipping routes. We cannot protect and assist American companies in the Arctic if current and future icebreakers are homeported thousands of miles away. China continues to expand its commercial and scientific exploration, which often is cover for military intelligence activities, into the Arctic as northern sea routes become more accessible and present new avenues for movement. In August 2025, five Chinese research vessels were operating in the U.S. Arctic north of Utqiagvik, including over the U.S. Arctic Extended Continental Shelf, which is seabed claimed by the United States. Fortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaking cutter Healy was nearby conducting a patrol and could quickly dispatch to observe two of the research vessels. If the Healy had been near its homeport in Seattle, nearly 2,000 nautical miles away, it could have taken up to two weeks to reach Arctic waters. We cannot adequately monitor and respond to adversarial operations if we cannot quickly deploy required capabilities to the region, especially as new icebreakers join the fleet in the next few years. The Coast Guard has made significant investments for new Arctic Security Cutters through the U.S.-Finland Icebreaker Agreement and the ICE Pact. Developing the Port of Nome is a critical opportunity to homeport the new icebreakers near where they will operate to ensure unfettered and rapid access to support U.S. military and commercial access to the Arctic as demanded by the new National Defense Strategy. Conclusion Adak and the Port of Nome are not niche, remote facilities. They are strategic fulcrums that sit at the intersection of the Arctic, North-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific operating areas. Arctic security cannot be effectively managed from outside of the region. Enhanced permanent presence is required to ensure we have military capability where we need it, when we need it. It also signals a commitment to our allies, partners, and, above all, the residents of Alaska who are increasingly concerned by the unprecedented intrusions of our adversaries in their backyard. Together, Adak and Nome would enhance regional maritime domain awareness and surveillance capabilities while enabling rapid responses to encroaching military and other threatening activities. As a result of Senator Sullivan's ongoing leadership and advocacy on this issue, Congress has already provided a down payment to enhance and modernize our military posture in the Arctic. Congress has appropriated $115 million for the redevelopment of existing Arctic infrastructure to improve the operational capabilities of INDOPACOM and better our homeland defense. The redevelopment of these facilities should take place in close coordination with state and local stakeholders, including Alaska's native communities. Investments in maritime and aviation support infrastructure, to include Adak's existing runways, would help to realize near-term logistics and sustainment benefits by cutting down deployment times, fuel costs, and wear on military assets. Further investments in the Port of Nome will ensure our icebreakers have a homeport that meets our operational requirement to deploy rapidly to the Arctic. Going forward, additional investments to upgrade ISR, command-and-control, and communications capabilities would significantly enhance our readiness in the Arctic. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General. Thank you for your service. I would add, you mentioned a lot of my colleagues don't know it is 1,100 miles closer in terms of Adak from Hawaii. I would say a lot of admirals and generals don't know that either, which is part of our oversight role, as you know, in the Senate. Next we have Ms. Baker. The floor is yours. STATEMENT OF JOY BAKER, PORT DIRECTOR, CITY OF NOME, ALASKA Ms. Baker. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for providing to me this opportunity to testify today on behalf of the City of Nome. My name is Joy Baker, and I serve as the Port Director and Project Manager for the Arctic deep-draft port at Nome. I will be talking today about the importance of the project for Alaska and the Nation. This is an exciting time for the project, and honestly, Senator, without your leadership we would not be where we are today. Before I focus on the importance of the Arctic deep-draft port I would like to quickly put the strategic nature of Nome's location into perspective. Everyone in this room is familiar with General Billy Mitchell's 1935 statement to Congress. I believe that in the future whoever holds Alaska will hold the world. I think it is the most important strategic place in the world. His prediction was validated during World War II, when Alaska and Nome played a critical logistical role to support the lend-lease program and the delivery of military aircraft to the Soviet Union. More than 8,000 aircraft were delivered via the Alaska-Siberia route. Alaska's locational importance continued into the Cold War, and when you visit Nome you can still see the White Alice up on the summit of Anvil Mountain. Today, Nome is proving once again to be vital for U.S. national security. The Arctic deep-draft port project in Nome is designed to serve as the critical refueling and resupply facility in the U.S. Arctic for U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels. Without this vital maritime infrastructure, U.S. national security operations in the Arctic will be constrained, and the U.S. will fall further behind Russia and China, who are operating in the region with increasing persistence. As China and Russia continue to escalate activities in the Arctic, the U.S. must have a physical, shore-side presence to protect the Nation's northwest flank. The solution is the construction of America's deep-draft port. Since 2011, the Alaska congressional delegation, the State of Alaska legislature, the City of Nome, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have collaborated toward achieving development of the Nation's first Arctic deep-draft port. There have been a few bumps along the road, but we are finally moving forward into construction this year. Mr. Chairman, one of the key milestones in this process was the meeting you convened in D.C. three years ago. After hearing that interagency miscommunication could jeopardize the basic functionality of the project, you brought together Army Corps leadership, Navy and Coast Guard technical representatives, and the City of Nome to make sure the design of the project would support national security missions. The focus of that meeting was to get the depth right, minus 40 feet, and we did that, with a basin large enough to accommodate heavy polar security cutters, Navy destroyers and cruisers, national security cutters, and fuel tankers. We walked out of that meeting in agreement on those criteria, and the final design of the project reflects the priorities to support these national security vessels. Now it is time to make good on these commitments and deliver the Arctic maritime infrastructure necessary to support vessel operations in the region. Mr. Chairman, here are my recommendations for the next steps needed to advance U.S. maritime national security interests in the Arctic. Ensure the full construction of the Arctic deep-draft port, as originally designed by the Corps and authorized by Congress. Begin seasonal Coast Guard operations in Nome to establish a U.S. national security presence in the Bering Strait region. Develop shore-side infrastructure and capabilities to support the national security vessel operations. And homeport a new heavy- and medium-class icebreaker in Nome. These steps will send a much-needed strong message to Russia and China that the U.S. is protecting its interests in the Arctic region, and Nome is ready to provide these ships with a place to refuel, reprovision, and help protect our Nation's interests. In conclusion, U.S. national security vessel operations must be supported through strategically placed coastal marine infrastructure adjacent to the Arctic. We need your continued leadership and the steadfast support of the Alaska delegation to see this project through to completion. Construction of Nome's Arctic deep-draft port will strengthen U.S. national security interests throughout the Arctic. I stand by to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Ms. Baker. Captain White. You are batting clean up, but that does not mean you are not very important. STATEMENT OF STEVE WHITE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE MARINE EXCHANGE OF ALASKA Mr. White. Ahoy, Senator. Thanks for the opportunity to be here. And yes, I could probably throw away all these prepared remarks because I think they all just got said by the group, so I am going to go off script a little bit, at great risk. Yes, I have got about 40 years of experience in the maritime, so I am going to shift my comments a little bit to talking about what is happening on the water, and maybe why these groups and these SAGs and all this traffic is here. It was mentioned, all the resources and how rich Alaska is, and the fishing, the mining, the oil, the natural resources. That is why these other folks are coming up here. It is also why it is a transit zone. Our maritime borders here, that route you talked about, you called it the Northern Route, the Great Circle Traffic Route, it is a shorter route from Asia to our western ports. It is full. If we were to look at a picture right now, there are all kinds of ships that are going on, that we just do not think about on a day to day. Alaska is strategically close to some of these actors that are coming through here, that Bering Strait's waterway. And if you can advance a couple of slides, this waterway here is a chokepoint, and when things are going on, like they are in Iran, where we have some shipping chokepoints that affect the world's, really, economy, this is one of the few chokepoints in the world that is going to become more significant. It is not just about water opening up with ice but the traffic that is coming through this Bering Strait is going to increase. You can look at all the routes that come through the Arctic, and they all come by this route right here in Nome. So it is critically important to Russia. Twenty percent of their GDP is coming through the Bering Strait and right through our waters. Our traffic, on the U.S. side, it is to support what we have going on in the U.S.--research, some tourism, fisheries, supporting the communities up there, and of course, the military and the Coast Guard that operates there. So we need to have investments--I guess I am foot-stomping on that--not just in the Coast Guard. It is beyond icebreakers, all these needs, with all this traffic and all these ports, to serve as governance for the fisheries, for research, for protection of our mariners that are out there, is important. And I believe that we are not just bringing icebreakers closer to ice, we are bringing patrol cutters closer to the fight for all these other reasons too. So thank you for your investments in that. The other thing I can't emphasize enough, these ports, and having the right logistics to support the maritime community. I pulled in Adak when I was an ensign. There were swimming pools, McDonald's, fuel, groceries, everything you needed to patrol these waters. And it is just sad. I patrolled in there--I did seven tours in Alaska. I did finish up here. I started there. And when I pulled in the last time we had more people on the ship than we did living in the town, and it was a lot harder to get the Schlitz we needed to keep doing the job. So having some logistics ports where we can do the missions that we need to, to protect the Arctic is very important. And I am going to finish with this. The answer is collaboration. Mr. Sfraga mentioned it, working with research, collaboration between the military and the Coast Guard with the locals. Because the people up here in Alaska, they are the greatest resource. Forget all the oil and the money and the fisheries and all that. Living in seven different places, being stationed in seven different places in Alaska--in fact, I married a commercial fisherman; she helped steal my heart toward this--but I met the fabric of Alaska and the spirit of Alaska that makes it work up here. And that collaboration with people who have the knowledge and the buy-in, who understand how important it is, needs to happen. The military brings a lot of Schlitz, but they change out people a lot. They need to collaborate better with the people who actually live here and have the buy-in to be more effective. That includes the Coast Guard. And I believe this fullheartedly, that public-private partnerships, we can do things faster, we can address these capability gaps by working together. So working with academia and funding to get that knowledge, but it has got to lead to what everybody mentioned here, closing the capabilities gap. We do not just need to do research. We need to do research that builds capacity. Putting in more military up here, more Coast Guard up here, communications infrastructure to close the capacity gap if we are going to govern the Arctic. We are behind. We have seen what the adversaries have done. They have built out the ports. They have built out the capabilities. We need to get on it here. And thank you for all your work to help with the communications equipment up here, help with research. I also chair the AOOS board. I know you were instrumental in getting more funding for the research community up here during a hard time, and all the work you have done with the military and the Coast Guard. I will close by saying that. I don't think I went over. I am looking at my old boss, Admiral Bell, and see if he is giving me a glaring eye yet. Yes, these public-private partnerships and the investment into the military, the Coast Guard, and programs that leverage local knowledge and buy-in should be considered as a quick, expedited way to help close some of these infrastructure, communication gaps that have been mentioned by everybody here. Thank you so much. [The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:] Prepared Statement of Captain Stephen White, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Marine Exchange of Alaska Introduction Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I am honored to testify today on an issue that is both professionally and personally significant to me: the urgent need to align U.S. maritime infrastructure with the rapidly evolving Arctic environment. My name is Steve White and I serve as the Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska a non-profit maritime organization founded in 2001. My testimony today reflects on nearly four decades of experience in the maritime domain-31 years in uniform with the U.S. Coast Guard and the last several years supporting the maritime community. My Coast Guard service took me from the Academy in 1990 to assignments across the contiguous United States, overseas, and includes seven tours in Alaska patrolling, enforcing laws, and coordinating operations in some of the most challenging waters on earth. I have patrolled the U.S.-Russia Maritime Boundary Line, operated along disputed boundaries with Canada, and served as Incident Commander for Operation Arctic Shield. I've chaired international enforcement committees, coordinated operations with Canada, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, and served in several joint military commands. Later, as the Coast Guard Captain of the Port for Southeast Alaska, I learned firsthand the power of public-private partnerships; an approach that has become essential to safe and sustainable Arctic operations. I retired from the service in 2021 and assumed my current role as Executive Director of the non-profit Marine Exchange of Alaska where we provide the Alaska maritime community with the capability to implement agile technological solutions and standards of care to enhance safe efficient, secure and environmentally sound maritime operations. My experiences around the globe have shown me that Arctic waters are far different than other maritime regions. They are environmentally rich but fragile, remote, and subject to extreme cold and heavy sea conditions. Scarce resources make governing this region and responding to marine threats and casualties more challenging than anywhere else in the United States. Enabling safe and efficient Maritime Commerce while ensuring our fisheries, marine mammals and communities remain viable, safe and secure requires a different approach and relies on collaboration between Federal, State, Local, Tribal governments and partnerships with industry. Increased accessibility to Arctic waters introduces increased risk. We need to assess, monitor and manage these risks. This includes ensuring timely and accurate environmental data is available, modernizing systems to both monitor and communicate with mariners as well as increasing our capabilities to respond to emerging threats. Arctic Maritime Traffic: Maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic is rapidly evolving and steadily increasing as Arctic waters become more accessible for transit. At present, most traffic in the region supports scientific research, oil and gas exploration, and the delivery of goods and materials to remote communities. Tourism has also shown consistent growth. Russia relies heavily on the Bering Strait as a critical corridor for transporting resources essential to its economy. Since the start of the war in Ukraine and the decline of European markets for Russian exports, Russia has shifted significant portions of its trade southward through the Bering Strait to reach markets in East Asia, including China. Other nations, recognizing the Arctic's vast natural resources, are increasing their interest and activity in the region as well. In many ways, the Arctic resembles the ``wild west''-characterized by limited governance, expanding exploration and extraction, and competing territorial and economic claims. Military incursions into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by Russia and China, occasionally conducted jointly, have become increasingly common. All of this is unfolding in a region rich in cultural history and home to Indigenous communities that still depend on a subsistence lifestyle to sustain their way of life. Dynamic Operating Environment: The region is experiencing changing weather and ice conditions. Violent storms have rocked the region and the reduction in ice coverage is impacting sea conditions. Fisheries and marine mammals are shifting their behavior. Increased traffic has added more human impact to the region and even created conflicts between different user groups. Peer nations are more present than any time in history. The pace of change has not been matched with an equal amount of resources to govern (communications, procedures and enforcement). U.S. Arctic Ports: As maritime activity increases in the Arctic, the United States will require significantly expanded logistics capacity to support Coast Guard cutters, Navy vessels, research ships, offshore supply vessels, tug operations, small cruise ships, and other traffic operating in the region. Current capabilities at the northernmost U.S. port in Nome will be insufficient to meet these growing demands. Expansion of the Port of Nome represents the most viable option for establishing a Northern Base of operations positioned near the critical Bering Strait maritime chokepoint. Federal investment in dredging and construction of an outer breakwater will strengthen the Nation's ability to take advantage of emerging economic opportunities in the Arctic while fulfilling our responsibility to protect U.S. Arctic waters from unsafe or environmentally harmful maritime activities. The natural deep- water harbor at Port Clarence should also be considered a complementary asset. Any future strategy for the region must be developed collaboratively with the local communities that live and subsist there, ensuring local needs and sovereignty are fully respected. While Adak is remote, it occupies a strategically important location near the westernmost extent of the U.S. Maritime Boundary Line. The port facilities and services have rapidly declined, and the long-term viability of this deep-water port is at risk due to neglect and abandonment. Because of its strategic position, Adak warrants serious consideration for at least a minimum level of maintenance and preservation as a U.S. operational resource. Beyond Icebreaking Capacity: The Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter initiative is essential to protecting U.S. interests in an increasingly accessible Arctic. Today, only a limited number of vessels and aircraft operate in the U.S. Arctic, leaving few assets capable of responding to mariners in distress or enforcing laws and treaties. As Arctic waters open to greater maritime activity, the Coast Guard's responsibilities are expanding rapidly and must be matched with appropriate resources. This need goes far beyond icebreaking. It is about ensuring the United States has the capacity to safeguard its interests, protect its shores, and support the mariners who operate in this emerging frontier. The Coast Guard's force posture must reflect the growing demand for services in this dynamic operational environment. No other region within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone has experienced the level of bold foreign military activity observed in the Arctic. Ensuring adequate presence and capability in this region is therefore not just strategic--it is imperative Technological Solutions: While maritime technology continues to advance rapidly across the nation, Alaska and the broader Arctic remain significantly underserved. The region lacks the basic communications and navigational infrastructure that mariners elsewhere take for granted. These deficiencies directly affect safety, environmental protection, and the United States' ability to govern its northern waters. Terrestrial AIS-A Proven Arctic Solution: The Coast Guard R&D Center, in partnership with the Marine Exchange of Alaska, conducted a five-year project: the Arctic Next Generation Navigational Safety Information System, which demonstrated that AIS transponders can effectively transmit navigational safety and environmental information to vessels in Arctic waters. The Marine Exchange of Alaska currently operates one of the most extensive terrestrial AIS networks in the nation, consisting of more than 134 receivers and 80 transceivers. These terrestrial sites are integrated into the National AIS System to provide near real-time vessel tracking and safety broadcasts. This capability is essential because satellite AIS cannot transmit information back to vessels, and it cannot match the accuracy, refresh rate, or reliability of terrestrial AIS in coastal and high traffic areas. Terrestrial AIS also plays a critical role in identifying AIS spoofing, dark target detection and AIS manipulation through verifying vessel positions within a particular receiver range. Both terrestrial and satellite AIS are indispensable components of maritime domain awareness in the Arctic. VHF Communication: VHF radio remains the standard for maritime communications. Yet shoreside VHF coverage in Alaska is severely limited. The Coast Guard's 33 VHF sites cover only 19 percent of Alaska's coastline and do not extend beyond Cold Bay or north of St. Paul Island. Medium Frequency radio once helped fill these gaps but was disestablished within the last decade. The contiguous U.S. has 100 percent coverage, over lapping for redundancy, and VHF direction finder capability. Recognizing the gaps in Alaska and the risk this creates, the Marine Exchange of Alaska has constructed 25 new VHF transceiver sites over the past three years. These sites extend coverage farther west and north than the Coast Guard's system and have already saved lives by receiving distress calls in areas where no Federal coverage exists. They are used regularly to broadcast critical safety information, both to and from vessels. Additional sites are planned, but the system currently operates without Federal funding or sustained government support, despite its demonstrated value. The Marine Exchange is in conversation with the Coast Guard regarding possibilities to utilize this system to support mariners and Coast Guard operations in and around Alaska/Arctic waters. Collaboration, not Competition: Public-Private partnerships, like the Marine Exchange of Alaska are an effective, efficient and responsive model for addressing technological and governance gaps in the Arctic. These partnerships leverage local knowledge and interest with government resources to meet countless demands in this dynamic environment. There are several examples of how these relationships between the public/ industry, and the government have helped build the extensive system operated by the Marine Exchange of Alaska to serve the national interest and address local concerns. While the challenges we face in the Arctic are significant, the pathway to success is leveraging resources and commitment from those willing to collaborate. This model is a proven path to help the U.S. expedite closing the gap between challenges faced in the Arctic and the technological capabilities to address those challenges. Arctic Watch: Arctic Watch is a real-time Arctic maritime monitoring and safety initiative based in Alaska, created to enhance vessel safety and protect the environment, coastal communities, and wildlife. Operating 24/7, it collects and shares environmental data, vessel locations, and safety alerts across the Bering Strait and the broader Arctic region. Founded by a coalition of organizations and agencies (Including the Marine Exchange of Alaska and its capabilities), Arctic Watch serves as a collaborative platform to address regional challenges. Its real-time data supports both mariners and local communities, while the infrastructure built for the program simultaneously advances U.S. national interests by closing critical capability gaps in the Arctic. Arctic Watch has been widely recognized as an efficient, resource-leveraging model-- one that unites diverse partners to achieve shared goals. As a U.S. initiative, it demonstrates how a focused, purpose-driven program can maximize the strengths of multiple organizations working together to solve common issues and can serve as an example for similar efforts around the world. In Conclusion The Arctic is no longer a distant frontier--it is an active, strategic, and rapidly changing maritime region where the United States must be prepared to lead. The challenges we face there are significant, but they are neither insurmountable nor beyond our reach. What is required is sustained attention, targeted investment, and a willingness to harness the strengths of both government and industry. Modernizing infrastructure, enhancing communications, improving maritime domain awareness, and ensuring adequate operational presence are not abstract goals; they are the essential elements of responsible governance in a region experiencing unprecedented change. The Marine Exchange of Alaska supports this effort and provides technologies and initiatives, such as Arctic Watch, as examples of how collaboration can accelerate capability, reduce risk, and deliver tangible results for mariners, communities, and the Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am willing to answer any questions you may have and pleased to provide additional information to the Subcommittee members and staff at any time. ______ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Captain White. I want to thank all our witnesses. By the way, I also want to thank UAA. This probably is one of the first Senate hearings where there is significant ``swag'' for everybody to see, water, great-looking UAA ties. I am not even sure what this is. OK, coffee beans. So I want to thank the University, in all seriousness. Well, look, I think this was a demonstration. These are our local witnesses who I think demonstrate that they are some of the most knowledgeable people in the whole country, maybe even the whole world, on these important Arctic issues. So let me begin, and I will start with some of our--you know, I can open up these questions to really all the witnesses. But you saw the chart that my team and I keep very close tabs on, and that is just the increasing number of incursions, and the really unprecedented element here is the joint operations between Russia and China. That has not happened. So why don't I start with you, General Kee. Can you talk about, you know, does this pattern, from your perspective, represent temporary signaling effort, or are we witnessing the normalization of sustained great power competition here in the Arctic? I think it is clearly the latter, but you are, again, at the forefront of the Pentagon's most important think tank on the Arctic. What does this signify to you, including--and I do not think we even have it listed--the Chinese up in the Arctic all summer? Let's face it, they were not doing research to save the whales, right? They were spying on us. We know that. And the green slides, which I think are really, really important and very unprecedented. Mr. Kee. The briefest answer, Senator, is you are right. The latter is correct. I will build that out. Over the past several---- Senator Sullivan. Meaning we should anticipate this being the new normal? Mr. Kee. This is the new normal. This is not the preceding. This is the new normal. This pattern is a normalization of sustained great power competition in the Arctic between Beijing and Moscow against the United States and the West. Over the past several years, joint activity between Russia and China in the vicinity of Alaska, including coordinated bomber patrols entering Alaska defense identification zone, or ADIZ for folks in the audience, and their combined naval task groups transiting near the Aleutians has shifted from sporadic demonstrations to increasingly routine operations. What was once episodic signaling tied to specific geopolitical moments now reflects recurring, seasonal patterns of presence. And that distinction, ladies and gentlemen and Senator, distinguished colleagues, truly matters. Classic signaling is typically reactive and bounded. For example, a response to an exercise, a sanction, or a crisis somewhere else, putting pressure in this region as a result. Instead, what we are seeing here is a sustained, operational repetition. Repetition builds familiarity, improves interoperability, and normalizes presence. In sum, this is a shaping operation, from my vantage point. Senator Sullivan. Can I ask, just to interrupt here, and maybe, General Ralston, you can jump in here too. When countries do joint ops, and they are launching--can you go back one slide here--the Anadyr, you see that in Russia, so that is an Air Force base right there under the adversaries, that is where they are launching these strategic bomber operations. So the Chinese are using that Russian airbase as a very close jumping-off point. You see how close that is to Alaska. But General Ralston, you cannot just throw together a joint strategic bomber task force with Russian and Chinese strategic bombers and fighters, or I think even more complex, two summers ago they had a 12-ship strategic naval task force, and then the prior summer before that it was a 7-ship strategic naval task force. You are an Air Force expert but you are also a Combatant Commander, so you understand Navy ops and Air Force ops. How hard is that? How much planning does that take? And again, at the strategic level, those strategic ops probably have to get sign-off from Putin and Xi Jinping. Would you agree with that? Can you just talk a little bit, in your experience, again, going back to the green indicators there on this slide, those are not easy to put together, and they are very unprecedented. They are not doing that on the East Coast. They are not doing that pretty much anywhere else, certainly in America, but around the world. How important is that, and how should we take note of that? General Ralston. Senator, that is a very good question, and let me say upfront, this is not something that you just put together casually. To give you an example, in 1993, I led the first U.S. exercise to Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union. We took the 210th Air Rescue Squadron here from Anchorage, a bunch of troops, two C-5s, helicopters, and we deployed to Russia to do a joint exercise with the Russians. That took months of coordination to do that, and it also took approval from the highest levels of the U.S. Government and the highest levels of the Russian government. Senator Sullivan. Do you think that is the same here? Xi Jinping and Putin are signing off on these ops? General Ralston. No question they do that. And the other thing, why are they doing that? Well, they both have got interests in the Arctic. The shipping routes, potential shipping routes in the future, they are both very interested in that. So yes, there is interest, and it does take strategic cooperation at the highest levels to put exercises like that together. Senator Sullivan. Great. Let me go to the next kind of element of the focus of this hearing. And if we are responding to this, which we must, in my view, and I think most Alaskans and most Americans would agree, there's kind of two different ways to think about it, from a military perspective, that relates to forward infrastructure. And that is during the Cold War we maintained forward infrastructure in places like Adak or Galena or other places in our state. From a deterrence standpoint, how different is it to surge-to-respond, which is kind of what we are doing now? If you can go back one slide there. So you look at where we are launching our Air Force assets--Eielson, JBER primarily-- and you look at the numbers we have on that chart, it is almost 1,000 miles--1,000 miles--to get to our ADIZ, which is where we want to meet the Russians. They are not going 1,000 miles launching from Anadyr. So that takes tanking missions, that takes all kinds of sophisticated logistical operations. But previously our persistent presence forward with regard to infrastructure was in some ways deterrence. So right now I would call this kind of a surge-to-respond model--launching 1,000 miles just to meet these guys--same with our Navy. In fact, they are launching from San Diego. That is like 4,000 miles. But how much more deterrence capability does it give us if we have the forward infrastructure at Nome, at Adak, but in other places? I mentioned a new runway at JBER. A lot of people are not tracking that. I have talked to senior Air Force officials. They say that is going to make JBER probably the most strategic Air Force base on the planet, certainly in the INDOPACOM, by having two major, massive runway capabilities. But for everybody here, because this is a question that is kind of at the heart of the hearing, the infrastructure forward helps us in different ways. Ambassador, do you want to take a first crack at that, and then I will open that up to everybody. And are we missing infrastructure opportunities? I have always talked about the west coast of Alaska as needing a series of ports, not just Nome but other places, as well. There are other communities that are looking, there is Port Clarence, out at Kotzebue, Cape Blossom. There is a whole host of other areas. So can you all talk about that? Mr. Sfraga. Senator, thank you. With your permission, I have a couple of slides. You and I used these slides at the Munich Security Conference just a couple of years ago. Yes, the Pacific slide is a good one. Maybe back one to the North American. This is how I view the Arctic, but also, Senator, I think it is to your point and to, General, your point about being a fulcrum, the state being a fulcrum, and to General Kee's comment about the western flank of NATO. So if you look at this graphic, I think about forward basing, and not just surging, for NATO, for the North American Arctic, to counter the Russian arc, that Russian influence. I see that, and actually North Korea, as well. I think we need to consider their motives and their capabilities, which are just growing each and every day. But on the Pacific side, this is how I see it. And although it is not an arc--it looks more like a teardrop--it kind of gets the point across, I think, where if you actually put base out a Adak, if you build Nome, if you think about a port in Port Clarence or Cape Blossom, and then you think about INDOPACOM's capacity, I am trying to link the two. What is NORTHCOM doing, what is INDOPACOM doing, what is our Coast Guard doing? How do we nest those together, not just to surge but to actually have the presence there. Link it with Guam and Hawaii so that, as I said before, we have an integrated approach to the Arctic. Because this is a Pacific arc. I think that is how the Chinese see it. I think that is how they see the Straits of Malacca. I think that is how they see the South China Sea. I think that is how they see themselves in the Arctic. They do not see themselves, I think, in sort of silos. They see themselves as a global power. They want to be that Blue Ocean Navy, and we need to counter that by having presence, and also working with our friends in Japan and Korea so that we have a robust integration of our capabilities with our allies. But nothing--nothing--takes the place of having in-place capacity, because our adversaries know that in-place means a whole lot more to them and to us than it does to surge. They have a lot more time. And then it would become reactive. We do not want to be reactive. We want to influence the theater. We do not want to be reactive to the theater. Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts on that, for all of our witnesses. Mr. Kee. I have a few suggestions and then I will give the floor to General Ralston. Number one, distances. Adak to Seoul is 2,500 miles. Anchorage to Seoul is 3,800 miles. Honolulu to Seoul is 4,600 miles. Senator Sullivan. I've done this little test with our flag officers in the Pentagon, including four-star admirals and generals. I think probably well over half failed that test. They just don't know. They don't know those numbers. It is really shocking to me how few, very senior military members do not know those numbers, at all. I will give you my sense of it. You go to INDOPACOM. My last billet in the Marine Corps was out at INDOPACOM. Every senior leader in INDOPACOM has a map, a giant map, on his or her wall, and in the middle of it is Hawaii, because that is where INDOPACOM is, and then Alaska is not even on the map. It is just the tiny end of the Aleutian Island chain in the corner of the map. And yet the INDOPACOM commander's forces, which he owns in Alaska, 100 fifth-generation fighters, the 11th Airborne Division, all those forces are closer to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, than Hawaii. But they are looking at Hawaii as the center of the universe, literally on everyone's map, and we are not even on their map. And it is just kind of shocking, because they have no idea that the forces the INDOPACOM commander owns and controls are much closer to what would be the contingencies, if they had to use them. So it is a frustration. It is a huge blind spot for our military. Mr. Kee. They need to be all taught great circle routes matter, and the Earth is fatter in the middle than it is at the top. I will explain that more later if you like, sir. Senator Sullivan. You are the one guy who can do that for the Pentagon more than anybody. Because remember, the Ted Stevens Center is still part of the Department of War, so you are in there, educating these admirals and generals. I think it is very important. Mr. Kee. It is a principal point. We have 3,000 graduates of our programs now, trying to make U.S. and allied security practitioners smarter about this region. Sentinels and pickets. So we need our coastal regions to have the understanding of what is out there. And we need to have pickets, in other words, to be able to demonstrate deterrence to our adversaries that this will defend. When we look at it, what does it actually mean? It means looking at a port complex not just connected via air and sea. We need to think about how you connect surface routes from the rail belt to places like Nome and perhaps the Port Clarence and Nome port complex. It is taking the idea that Adak as a main operating base, for example, but then look at fix operating sites, places like we used to have during the Cold War, like Attu, like King Salmon. So if you look at this aspect of what other areas that would, if we were periodically there, would demonstrate deterrence that this, too, we will defend. The last piece that I would offer is that when we look at the need for such investments, we need to make it Arctic ready. Before going into the Air Force in 1985, I worked with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Alaska District on Adak and Attu as operation places during the Cold War. We were trying to get a lot of renovation done quickly in the latter part of the 1980s, and we did not necessarily make it Arctic proof or Arctic ready. So if you look at Adak today, you have kind of a mess out there, that kind of needs to be picked up and swept up and rebuilt, be built this time Arctic ready, because the infrastructure that was put in during that renovation period was not suited for the conditions where they are building. Respectfully submitted. Senator Sullivan. General, Joy, any other thoughts? General Ralston. Let me just add a couple of points. I won't talk about the Indo-Pacific, but one of the things that people sometimes forget, our F-35s at Eielson are closer to Europe than the same airplanes on the East Coast of the United States. Our F-22s at JBER can be in Europe before the F-22s out of Langley Air Force Base at Virginia. So it is, again, something that FedEx and UPS figured out a long time ago, and that is why they have got major hubs here in Anchorage. They can be anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere in 8 hours. So that is an important piece of our infrastructure. One other point. One of the hats that the Alaskan commander has is the Commander of the Alaska NORAD Region, which is responsible for intercepting the airplanes that come into our ADIZ. That is an enormously complex operation with the infrastructure we have got today. The first thing you have got to do is launch AWACs, and then you have to launch tankers out of Eielson, and then you launch fighters out of either Eielson or JBER. But it takes several hours to get to the places that we need to be to, to intercept those airplanes. So the infrastructure is critically important. Senator Sullivan. Joy, do you have a view on that? Let me ask, I want to go back to a slide that I had brought up. It was the one of the bases across the--that one. So, again, I would like just to comment on that. We have talked about the Northern Route, but here is the challenge. It is kind of a hard slide to read, but the Pentagon is doing a bunch of very significant infrastructure in that central route. Again, some of that makes sense, but some of that, in my view, is way overbuilt. If you look at Guam, which is very strategic, but right now they are talking about $50 billion of infrastructure investment in Guam. I have called that what I think is one of the Pentagon's biggest strategic mistakes, to concentrate so much money and firepower and assets on one small island. So again, I want to just ask, in terms of diversification of our forces and our force posture, particularly more along the Northern Route--which, by the way, historically I was reminded, somebody recently mentioned this to me. If you actually look at the route that the Japanese Naval Task Force took to invade Midway and Pearl Harbor, they went up north, kind of near us, and then they came down toward those islands. So what I have been trying to do with the senior leadership is say you need to diversify your infrastructure force posture in INDOPACOM, again, toward the Northern Route, but also away from such a heavy concentration on Guam. Does anyone have a view on that? General Kee, do you want to comment? Mr. Kee. I do, sir, and I'll yield the floor quickly. Years ago I was a colonel in Joint Staff, as a staffing pogue working global defense posture. At the end of the table was Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye, and we were, at the time, working the discussions about how to reduce the pressure in Okinawa by putting more infrastructure in Guam, just to reduce, essentially, the geopolitical pressure the United States was feeling at the time with Japan. Years later, I was responsible, as the Vice Commander of the 618th Tanker Airlift Control Center at Scott Air Force Base of conducting the surge to Afghanistan. And so there is an evil volcano in Iceland that blew up during this time, that was closing down air routes across the Atlantic to Europe and onwards, to Afghanistan. We went as far north as we could, and we went as far south as we could, and we couldn't get assets to Afghanistan. So one night, in a fit of frustration, I said, ``To hell with it. We're going west,'' and we were going to move the bulk of the force on C-17s via the Great Circle Route to the north, and then take the C-5s and do the central route. We were so much faster moving from the north than through the fat part of the central that we closed the northern portions far in advance. I finally just took assets out of the central portion and rerouted them north in order to close this faster. The central piece is too fat. You can't move forces. It requires so much more fuel and time that you don't have when the crisis is there. Moving north is far faster, and far more efficient, from my vantage point. Senator Sullivan. Great. Other thoughts on that? General? General Ralston. I had one quick thought. Guam is very vulnerable to the ballistic missile threat out of China, so you cannot afford to put all of your assets in one piece there. That is why you need to have a diversified infrastructure. Senator Sullivan. Yes. My concern, if there was ever a conflict with China, and I hope there won't be, but that Guam's runway, the Anderson Air Force Base there, that might be cratered within minutes. And we have a lot of assets, and we are still concentrating forces there. It just seems to be a big, big strategic mistake. Let's go to a topic that I think everybody cares about, which is icebreakers as strategic enablers. And once again, we are finally making progress on both building icebreakers and homeporting them here in Alaska. It is kind of remarkable when you think about it, that the Pentagon, through the history of the United States, without having icebreakers homeported here. Some of you were at the homeporting ceremony for the Coast Guard icebreaker, the Storis, this August, in Juneau. That is going to be homeported in Juneau. We had $300 million in the budget reconciliation bill, the Working Families Tax Cuts Act, to homeport that icebreaker in Juneau. There are a number of icebreakers that are going to be built out as part of that bill, as I mentioned, 16 right now. In the hearing I had recently with the Commandant of the Coast Guard he talked about up to four more. We will see. I think that would be great. But even if it is not four, it still would be very significant. So can I ask all of you, in terms of icebreakers, they certainly do not just do research. They enable military mobility. They enable commercial escorts. They enable freedom of navigation in ice-covered waters. Russia clearly understands this and has invested accordingly. We have a gigantic, what I have termed the icebreaker gap. Russia has, as I mentioned, 54 icebreakers, many of which are nuclear powered. They can run kind of continuously, and they are weaponized. We are finally playing catch-up. But what strategic risks do we incur if we continue to operate with such a small icebreaking fleet, but more importantly, for the purposes of this hearing, our friends in the Coast Guard, what message would you say to them as they are looking at and studying right now where to put some of these new icebreakers. I think it is very exciting that the Commandant said they are looking at up to four more in Alaska. I would love all four. But where would you look at homeporting those, and how important is that? Ms. Baker, I have a feeling I am going to know what your answer is, since you have already testified to it. But this is important. This is a hearing of the Subcommittee in charge of the Coast Guard, and even though we do not have any active-duty Coast Guards we have got Captain White here. But as they are looking at this, the Coast Guard is actively looking at this right now, what to do, where to put them. And the Trump administration, with Finland, with Canada, this icepack, is really moving out to build icebreakers, first in Finland, then in the United States. But give me your thoughts on that. I am assuming everybody here would welcome four more, but also the strategic importance and then where to put them. General Ralston. Let me jump in, and if you will permit me let me tell you a little story that I think is embarrassing to the United States of America, and my good friend, Pete Leathard, I think we are the oldest two guys in the room here, we remember this from 1988. In 1988, there was an event that happened north of then Barrow, Alaska, that got worldwide attention. There were three whales that got trapped in the ice up north of Barrow, and everybody, from the White House around the world, was focused on how in the hell are we going to save these three whales. And this is the heart of the Cold War, 1988. The United States of America had to go to the Soviet Union and beg for an icebreaker to come in and rescue the whales north of Barrow. So that is something I think was an embarrassment to the United States, but it also points out that we need those icebreakers further north than where they are now, further north than Seattle, and further north than Juneau. And that is why I support Nome, but wherever else we can get them to the north. Senator Sullivan. Great. Other thoughts? Ms. Baker, do you want to, for the record? Ms. Baker. For the record, Senator, yes. Nome has, obviously, been pushing for quite some time to homeport an icebreaker or other forward operating maritime Coast Guard assets. We have been working on the shore-side development to help them with seasonal activity of office crew quarters, storage space, something to work as a foundation to build upon the development of a complex that would support a full-time homeported vessel. And we would be thrilled if the--we will take any of the Coast Guard vessels to be full-time homeported, and we would bring out the marching bands for the actual icebreaker. Yes, we could definitely make that happen. And as we have all stated here today, I think it is a crucial and essential component of building out capacity in the Arctic by bringing the Coast Guard assets to the Arctic so that they can work more closely and be refueled, resupplied, and supported for all of their missions. For a very long time now, all of our large, whether it be commercial or military fleet, having to go to Dutch Harbor to refuel has been a problem. And it will continue to be until the 40-foot protected deepwater base is built and we are able to supply those vessels with everything they need to serve their missions without having the distance in travel. Senator Sullivan. Good. So look, I actually do think whether there is going to be an icebreaker homeported in Nome, but I think clearly with the deepwater strategic port, that is going to be able to utilize the Coast Guard icebreakers. But to your point, when we had that final kind of meeting with all the services, the idea that planning the design for the strategic port in Nome is to be able to handle essentially every ship in the Coast Guard and Navy inventory, with the exception of a U.S. aircraft carrier, at Nome. So I think you are going to be able to see, if it is not homeported, deployment there, that we can use Nome as a jumping-off point for not just icebreakers but, as we talked about, national security cutters, destroyers, frigates, all kinds of military hardware that has not had anywhere to go on the West Coast of Alaska. Captain White, do you have a view? You are based in Juneau so you have the first icebreaker that is coming. That was the Coast Guard's decision, when they were looking at it, and now they are looking at other areas in Alaska that could be the potential for homeporting. Any thoughts on that, from your perspective? Mr. White. I think when you talk about--let's go to your Northern Route slide, Senator--I think you should adjust this a little, with all due respect. The one with the Northern Route and the one crossing the Central, Scott. I think you need to move that Northern Route to end in the United States a little more north. That is a much shorter route to getting to the fight. And when I talked about the fight, and you are talking about Coast Guard cutters in particular, I keep hearing icebreaking, when we talk about a real governance, again, enforcement, border protection, fisheries, service to all that maritime traffic that is out there, and increasing in Alaska waters. By moving that Northern Route and having it end not on the West Coast of the United States but having it end in Alaska you really shorten up that line, and you are really putting assets closer to the fight, whatever port. And then, Scott, one more slide, just to Joy's point, my slides, if you go down to the one with all the pictures. In the bottom middle picture, that is the Coast Guard cutter Alex Haley tied up at Nome, just to give everybody a visual of what we are talking about. That is the biggest cutter that has been able to pull in there. And it is tight and it is small in there. But what an asset, to be able to pull any vessel, any kind of response--you are talking search and rescue, oil spill response, enforcement of laws, border security--to be able to pull in there and get the Schlitz you need, again, to get logistics, is that forward operating base model that Church was talking about. You are closer up there. If you had to surge force up here, forces are going to be surged here to address all these concerns, from food security for the locals to changing weather and responding to the disasters we have seen up there, to foreign adversaries. You need to be able to have logistics and ports to operate out of, and right now it is minimally effective and does not match what others have. Senator Sullivan. Great. We have talked a lot about Adak, but I just want to kind of emphasize this. In hearings over the course of the last couple of years--we can go back to that slide that had the two routes--I have had the INDOPACOM commander and the NORTHCOM commander saying how important that is to reopen that base. And again, to General Ralston's point, during the 1990s, when we thought the peace dividend was here to stay and we were not going to have any adversaries, I think that was a very strategic mistake to shut down that base. Many Alaskans know that, but that base was a naval air station, but it also had deepwater access, one of the biggest fuel storage facilities in the world, 22 million gallons, two 8,000-mile runways, a giant hangar, and even a sub base, which, as most people know, that is the one weapon system that the Chinese still fear dramatically, to have something that close. By the way, the Chinese government has been watching the idea of reopening the Adak Navy base, and they really dislike it. So that is, in my view, a very good indication of we are onto something. So my question is, for again, just the panel in general, and particularly those of you who may have served out there or spent time there, restoring logistics, aviation capability, response times, domain awareness in the North Pacific, protecting our fisheries which are under pressure from China and Russia. If you can provide just a little bit more insight, and then if you have any insights on how to go about moving this forward. We were able to get commitment, I was, from the Secretary of War, Secretary Hegseth. I did have to put a hold on the confirmation of the Chief of Naval Operations because they were not responding to me quickly enough. But they have now set up a very high-level task force within the Pentagon, way above the Navy, so it is Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, the private sector is involved, the State of Alaska is involved. I actually think it is an exciting model, to look at building out American infrastructure. It is actually the model, in many ways if people do not know, that was used a lot during World War II. When we built out infrastructure throughout the world it was kind of private sector led, not just the Navy Seebees or the Corps of Engineers. So any other thoughts on Adak that we have not covered? $115 million is not going to build it immediately, but it is a pretty darn good start. And they have a plan, and you can use Adak for testing, for intel. But our goal is to have that as a very important facility here soon, but to be innovative, and I think we are off to a pretty good start. Any thoughts on that? Mr. Sfraga. Senator I have some thoughts. I agree with every reason that we have all stated, why Adak is so important to the United States and our allies. Adak, if you build Adak, Adak becomes, at least to me and many of the people I work with at the University, a key component of Golden Dome. It is an extension, in our mind, of Golden Dome. Here is how. There is a relationship between the Geophysical Institute, Poker Flat, HAARP, our research capacity there, and Alaska Aerospace Corporation. There is an MOU signed between all of us, to work together, because the capacity we have together--Kodiak, Poker--it is phenomenal. The capacity at HAARP, to be able to manipulate the ionosphere, it actually works, and now it is part of the University's portfolio of assets. We believe, researchers believe, that you can detect hypersonics earlier than we currently can now, if you create a hypersonic test range in the Aleutians, by triangulating our current resources--we will need more. There are a lot of other assets that would be needed. But if you were to build Adak out, it becomes a key component, in our mind, of an Aleutian test range for hypersonics, detect them earlier. And that, to me, is a significant deterrence. Senator Sullivan. Great. Mr. Sfraga. That is in discussion now with members of our group. Senator Sullivan. Adak is a key component. Mr. Sfraga. A key component. Senator Sullivan. And hence for America. Mr. Sfraga. Correct. If you put some assets out there that can correspond with the other assets that we have together with Alaska Aerospace, you can then build a hypersonic test range to test the research thesis that you can detect earlier. That is Russia, that is China, and I would also add North Korea to that portfolio of adversaries we need to worry about. And that needs more work, but we talked about that with General George. Thank you for coming to the University and hosting General George. To have a member of the Joint Chiefs on campus was pretty good, and also General Clarke, as well. Just the concept it is public. But that puts Adak in a very different place, in addition to all the other things you have mentioned. Senator Sullivan. By the way, I do not think I am revealing anything, but next week ICEX is happening with, again, senior Navy officials, I think maybe even including the Secretary of the Navy, in Alaska, doing the submarine ice exercises above us, which is also pretty exciting. Anyone else on Adak? Mr. Kee. Very quickly, sir, also on the 15th and 16th of March I will be up on ICEX, as well. Senator Sullivan. Great. Mr. Kee. Connecting with Navy sub labs, and it is all about the partnerships that Captain White mentioned earlier. Ambassador Sfraga and I, and our respective institutions, are triangulating with the Geophysical Institute regarding this discussion he just mentioned about the hypersonics. The aspects about the instrumentation of the Aleutians is critical for this. In looking at the spot for sensing, for example, Cold Bay, Dutch, Adak, Eareckson and Attu, are all locations that could help support, with sensors of this aspect. The other aspect about this, as well, is if you take a look at projecting power and defending our interests into the North Pacific, thinking about leveraging the partnership and the bilateral defense relationship we have with Japan is one other piece to this equation. We can counter what Beijing and Moscow are doing in the North Pacific by thinking jointly with Japan, as an example, to provide the presence, but thinking how it would also burden shift to have some more of the work in the North Pacific region shouldered in partnership with the Japanese. Senator Sullivan. Good. Other thoughts on Adak? I'm going to wrap up here and then we are going to do a couple of things that are a little unconventional in a Senate hearing. Normally we would have a few more Senators so we might take advantage of some of our brilliant attendees. Domain awareness. Captain White, you have a very important role in terms of what you are doing now, but can you talk a little bit about the lack of domain awareness in the Arctic, in the North Pacific, and again how infrastructure can help us build out that. And maybe even describe what that means, domain awareness. Mr. White. Yes. Maritime domain awareness is knowing what is going on out on the water, and it is important when you talk about not just national security but just governing our waters. In order to do domain awareness you need to have the right capabilities out there, and Alaska lacks them, from the rest of the United States, severely. Just knowing what is there. The Coast Guard has built an Army Corps in the Lower 48, a system where they can track boats via satellite and via terrestrial AIS, and real quick, just for the record, terrestrial AIS is needed because it has got a higher refresh rate, it picks up national security things, like if a vessel is spoofing its position it battles against that, if there are dark targets. And it really helps create that full picture. So you need to have satellite and terrestrial to have a system. Senator Sullivan. Just to be clear, we talked about an icebreaker gap, which definitely exists. Do we have a domain awareness gap, relative to the rest of the country? Mr. White. We do, and we have closed it. This might be an example of what everybody has been talking about here, using resources together. The Coast Guard R&D Center and the Marine Exchange of Alaska did a 5-year study, saying how can we get a way of detecting vessels up here in Alaska and communicate with them. They determined that terrestrial AIS would help do that. It would cost millions to build that out for the Coast Guard. They worked through a public-private partnership, and I think there might be a slide on it, Scott, just on the system that's built out. The Coast Guard had nothing up here. We put up 134 AIS receivers for them to close that gap, and that has been incorporated in what is called the National AIS System, to get maritime domain awareness. In addition, these can communicate with vessels, to send information up. We started doing that with VHF comms, VHF comms which are enjoyed by our mariners. Anywhere in the Lower 48 you can pick up the radio and call out and somebody is going to answer from the Coast Guard. Up here in Alaska, about 19 percent of the coast is covered. That means for our fishermen, for the people moving oil, for the people moving mining supplies, they do not have that. That is a massive gap. Thirty-three states in the Coast Guard has it, and we just, in the last two years, put up 25 more. And I will point out that they are in Adak, Dutch Harbor, all the way up north. We just put some in at Kotzebue and at the Red Dog Mine. We were all prepped for the hurricane that was going to hit, or the typhoon, that went a little south. Unfortunately there were no comms there. It was a severe gap. It hindered our response to get to the people who needed help. In the Y-K Yukon Delta we are putting up three of them this summer. But that is an example of how public-private partnership helps national security because it closes maritime domain awareness gap while providing a service to our mariners in Alaska, which really deserve the same that mariners in the Lower 48 have. Senator Sullivan. Good. Let me ask, Ms. Baker, you have done a great job on the Port of Nome. We are talking all about national security, which is very important. But can you also talk a little bit about what the Port of Nome is going to do for economic development, for safety, for the environment, for other things that are a little bit more closer to home, for the region that you have done such a good job of representing? Ms. Baker. Yes. Thank you, Senator. When we worked with the Army Corps to develop the feasibility study one of the major components, as the project was authorized under the Remote and Subsistence Harbors bill, was the generation of extensive jobs with the port expansion to boost the regional economy that has, over the years, severely lacked with the good-paying jobs to support these regional communities as well as Nome. The additional infrastructure will bring those jobs, those maritime jobs, as well as the corresponding jobs on the shore side and in the community, to address those gaps that have been building over the years, across Western Alaska, as well as the increased infrastructure. The expansion of what we call the east side of the port, to add docks for what we call our pedestrian traffic, will increase safety by separating that from the industrial and military traffic on the west side, and in addition to having the ability to stockpile and position oil spill response and search and rescue assets in the region, at this position, so that they are not trying to pull oil spill responses and life safety mission resources from Lower 48 or Lower Alaska in responses to the events that are happening further north of us. The cruise industry has blown open. They are building more ice-strengthened hulls for tourist ships. We are seeing more traffic. At this time we are seeing larger vessels that need to anchor offshore because of their draft. They are bringing more and more people to the Arctic. The resources to respond to any type of an incident just must be positioned closer to where those incidents are going to occur, and the infrastructure that will be developed will help enhance that positioning of those oil spill response assets and resupply and refueling the marine assets that are needed to transport that to the events. Senator Sullivan. Great. And then what about the mining that is going on in the Nome area, as well? Ms. Baker. Resource development, we have been working with Graphite One on the graphite mine for staging their export quantities out in our increased laydown area at the port. They have recently, as of last year, determined that the 40-foot basin is critical in their ability to export their resource for the vessels that they need to bring to Nome to take that resource out for processing. So before they were discussing being able to use the backhaul capacity for the local cargo carriers, but that has since changed, and that is not going to be sufficient to meet the demand. In addition, I did not bring a map but there are a number of natural resource locations and potential sites across the Seward Peninsula that can benefit from the expanded capacity for export of all sorts of those critical minerals, in addition to graphite, to be exported with the expansion of the Port of Nome. Senator Sullivan. Great. Listen, you have been a great panel of witnesses. We are a little bit over an hour and a half in this hearing, so I want to thank everybody. Because I am chairing it and it is a field hearing, we are going to do two things that are a little bit unconventional. But I am chairing it, and we are in Alaska, so we can do that. We have a lot of experts in the audience. I see Mead and others. Maybe just take a few questions from our audience, and then we are going to turn to a press conference with the press that is here, if they have additional questions, and that is going to involve me but also, I think we checked with the press, to have the press conference open to our experts too, if they have any questions for you. So as we wrap it up, again I want to thank our excellent, excellent witnesses. I think it is just a great demonstration. You know, this would be an all-star panel. If we were back in D.C., in front of the whole Commerce Committee, this would be an all-star panel, for the country. And the fact that it is all Alaskan citizens, that all live here, who are all doing great work, it just shows you the depth, in my view, of the expertise that we have in our state, and, as I mentioned earlier, that people care. When the Pentagon was kind of going, hey, Alaska, sorry, you are not important anymore, we knew that was wrong. We knew. We knew it. Collective memory, knowing our history. And we all kind of fought back and said, no, no, no, no, we are not going to go into strategic irrelevance. You generals and admirals need to wake up and figure out, read a map for goodness sakes, and see how important we are. And that is happening. I do think, and I know it is in large measure because of our very well-informed citizenry that made the case to our military leaders in D.C., and helping me and our delegation do that. So, do we have any final thoughts? Mead, have you got one, for the panel? Mr. Treadwell. Yes, thank you, Senator. I really have two questions, one starting with Ambassador Sfraga. When we talk about the Chinese research in the Arctic Ocean, and both of us were chairs of the Arctic Research Commission. We looked for cooperation in research internationally. But was the Central Arctic Fisheries Agreement kind of a gold-plated invitation for the Chinese to come up and do a lot of fishing research in the Central Arctic, and is there anything we should do with that agreement to more moderate that, especially now that we own the ocean bottom in a large part of the Central Arctic, that we have some sense to control. That is my first question. And then, Senator, for the whole panel, I just have read what you got in the Coast Guard Authorization Bill, this year and in recent bills. We have a new security effort in the Bering Sea to look at these, and that will be a CMTS joint effort. Something that we got in 4 years ago, that you helped us get in, and Ambassador Sfraga and I worked on this with you, was a Federal advisory committee on shipping, and Church, you may have some things to report on that. I see your assistant Scott there, and a group of us have worked on raising the standards for oil spill research. So all of these things are going to contribute to more Arctic presence in the Bering Sea, and I was wondering if the panel had comments on those two things, China and the other thing. Senator Sullivan. As the former chairman of the Arctic Research Commission that was a heck of a lot of observations. Mr. Sfraga. He certainly does, and we learn from him all the time. On the issue of China and research, to the Senator's point, four or five research vessels off our coast this last summer, and if you nest the storyline of joint naval operations, joint Coast Guard operations, FSB-PRC Coast Guard operations, it all sums up to they are not just here to innocently, I believe, research the area. I think there is a whole lot else going on, a whole lot else going on. I think that is pretty clear. Senator Sullivan. Proven. Mr. Sfraga. Yes. With regard to their cooperation with the Central Arctic Oceans Fisheries Agreement, I think that at the time when that was built it was also in line with other international postures the U.S. and others had in terms of bringing China into the fold, whether it was the International Monetary Fund or many, many multilateral organizations, with the hope that they would integrate into and be transparent about their work. That is still a hope. I would put a big question mark on that because of the activities that we see off our coast. So they seem to be engaged. The research enterprises seem to be engaged. But one thing we should never forget is there is no separation between civilian use and military use within the PRC. It is one thing, from the Antarctic to the Arctic to the oceans, to all these spaces. Senator Sullivan. By the way, that is a great point, because I think sometimes we mirror image that and we think, oh no, they do not do that. And if our commercial guys are out there, they are not military, so that must be the same with China. And it is a great point, because it is not the same with China. Mr. Treadwell. But Mike, should we use our power of inspection now that we have this undersea, to make sure they are not--I mean, they cannot use the ocean bottom in their research without our permission, now that we own that land, two California's north of our EEZ. And I am just wondering if there is some way to get more visibility on what the Chinese are doing. Mr. Sfraga. Yes, I think we have to. I believe we have to have a far more robust inspection review process. I think hearings like this help, because we are having trouble figuring out our own domain and our own capacities. So I worry about our capacity to do our work and then our capacity to monitor others to ensure that they, too, are doing things the way they should. So yes, I think it needs to be robust across all, like in the Antarctic, where you can have, quote/unquote, ``surprise investigations'' of stations in the Antarctic. It should be, I think, along those lines, as well. Senator Sullivan. Any others? Mr. Kee. I want to hop on this for a second, and two things I would offer. Number one, first of all, Mead is not only, of course, a distinguished former Lieutenant Governor and former chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission but also serves as the Economic Energy Chair at the Stevens Center. I worked a little bit on the Commission myself before coming to start at the Stevens Center, and one piece of this is that during that time I also served at the Arctic Domain Awareness Center at the University of Alaska Anchorage. We did not cover one important piece about domain awareness that I think is important for the record, distinguishing between day-to-day where the traffic on the surface and the air are cooperative versus when they are not. How do we capture domain awareness for dark targets is a critical piece of the equation that we did not address. The second piece is when the crisis happens, connectivity day-to-day that we rely on may not be available. Just a few days ago I was with the 11th Airborne up in JPMRC, at a military exercise with the 11th Airborne on the interior. It is an exercise, and these folks are using technology we have available today, a lot of the folks are maintaining battlefield awareness in this exercise with Starshield. That is fine with day-to-day, but when we are in a contested environment, how reliable are these. And these technologies we have become reliant on in day-to-day. When the crisis goes on I am sure that connectivity is not going to be as reliant, or it may be susceptible to just spoofing. So to Mead's point, though, when you look at the aspects of the shipping and increasing of economic opportunity through essentially the Transpolar Route, because if you look at the routes today between the Northwest Passage, right now, of course, it is pretty frozen over. It has a min draft of about 33 feet. The Northern Sea Routes have a draft of about 38 feet. You are looking at the Transpolar Route as the only one that has an unlimited draft. You are seeing a lot of newer vessels that are moving in, with a 50- to 60-foot draft, putting essentially the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route pretty much out of business. Transpolar is going to matter. Mead Treadwell put together an effort a number of years ago called Qilak, looking at the aspects and authorizations and thinking about how you have a St. Lawrence Seaway of the Transpolar Route, not for today but as it is coming as we are getting to a diminishing ice environment. We at the Stevens Center are hosting a workshop on the 13th and 14th of April called the Arctic-Pacific Security Dialogue, one of our regional security dialogues, workshops focused on addressing thorny problems. How do we look at Arctic shipping and the shortfalls and limitations that are coming when we look at taking advantage and getting ahead of the ball, or perhaps skate to where the puck is going to be, in trying to figure this problem out. So I am looking forward, if folks are interested in that, come take a look with me later. We can get you an invite. Senator Sullivan. Great. Any other thoughts on that. Captain? Mr. White. Yes. We are looking at Arctic shipping right now. We have got a live watch. There is a program called Arctic Watch, created by Alaskans, using technology. And I want to say something about all these ships operating. They are assets to our country. We are putting sensors on them. We just put a sensor, a camera, on the Sikuliaq that operates up in the Arctic, so you can see everywhere it goes. It is down in the Antarctic right now. You can go on a webpage and you can look and see everything that vessel is seeing as it operates. We are putting sensors on boats and working with local communities to gather information and bring it to a fusion center, and it is for industry, it is for managing that maritime transportation system, but it is totally beneficial to national security. So it addresses that whole spectrum of issues. And that is how we have got to continue to work together. That program, Arctic Watch, is also working with locals in the communities to gather information and have a fusion center. And it might be stuff that is relevant to Customs or the Coast Guard or DoD, or it might be stuff that, hey, this is important for managing our ports and our maritime safety and logistics up there. But we need to work together if we are going to close this gap. Senator Sullivan. Any other questions from the audience? Mr. Leathard. I was up there and saved the whales, and the ship that came in and sliced through that 15-foot wall of ice, like butter, was a cargo ship, an icebreaking cargo ship from the Soviet Union. That is how far behind we have fallen behind. Senator Sullivan. Well, we are making progress. Listen, I want to thank the panel again. I want to thank our audience. Two hours, that is a long hearing, but I think it is very important. So I think now we are going to just turn to, I think we have some press here. The whole idea was to do a little bit of a press conference. [Whereupon, at 1:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [all]