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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 119-44] U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 __________ HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ HEARING HELD MARCH 18, 2026 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLIISHING OFFICE 64-533 WASHINGTON : 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------- SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS RONNY JACKSON, Texas, Chairman AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado TRENT KELLY, Mississippi WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts NANCY MACE, South Carolina JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas SARA JACOBS, California CORY MILLS, Florida PATRICK RYAN, New York DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR., PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina California ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona DEREK TRAN, California Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member Austin Richards, Research Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- Page STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Crow, Hon. Jason, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 2 Jackson, Hon. Ronny, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1 WITNESSES Anderson, Derrick M., Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.......................... 4 Bradley, Admiral Frank M., USN Commander, United States Special Operations Command............................................. 6 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Jackson, Hon. Ronny.......................................... 25 Joint statement of Anderson, Derrick M.; together with Bradley, Admiral Frank M................................... 28 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mr. Scott.................................................... 49 Mr. Kelly.................................................... 51 Dr. Jackson.................................................. 51 . U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027 ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2026. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ronny Jackson [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RONNY JACKSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS Dr. Jackson. All right. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered. Today we will hear from our witnesses on U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command on Challenges and Resource Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027. The op tempo for special operations continues to put demands on the force even with the major force drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan almost five years ago. Recent consolidation and downsizing of forces in Syria and Iraq bring only minor relief as our Special Operations forces continue counterterrorism efforts against violent extremist organizations, military proxies, and non-state actors in both of those countries as well as an increase of op tempo on the continent of Africa, ongoing operations in the Western Hemisphere and now requirements related to the ongoing operations supporting the fight in Iran. Special operators have adapted to meet the challenges in an evolving landscape of great power competition in every corner of the globe while continuing to aggressively attack violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal networks, all in an effort to protect the homeland. Our adversaries are using cutting-edge technology, economic incentives, and illicit activities to attempt to gain footholds in every geographic combatant command's area of responsibility. And the battlefield has become increasingly contested and denied by the proliferation of peer adversary capabilities and malign influence, all while our crisis response force has been called upon repeatedly over the past few years to execute exquisite, challenging missions that only they can conduct. Special Operations continue to be one of our most valuable tools in our toolbox, used to showcase our dominance, to impose costs on our adversaries, to re-establish deterrence, and to provide the nation with a position of advantage should deterrence fail. We ask a lot of our Special Operations forces, and the demands both on and for them will only continue to grow. It is critical we provide these elite operators and all that support them with the resources that they need. I was disappointed in the fiscal year 2026 budget submission for SOCOM (Special Operations Command) from the Department of War. This committee worked diligently with SOCOM to provide critically needed resources to fill the gaps from over a decade of stagnant flat budgets through the reconciliation process only to have been--have the department submit a budget with a reduction to SOCOM, making the budget a wash and still flat. SOCOM's purchasing power has been reduced by 14 percent since 2019 despite increasing demand for support worldwide. I am, however, optimistic about President Trump's direction to include a significant increase in the fiscal year 2027 defense budget and what this will mean for SOCOM in the future. I look forward to reviewing the budget and putting SOCOM on a path that increases to get them to a steady state of at least $20 billion annually in the budget. We look forward to hearing how Congress can best support SOCOM such that you can continue to provide the high return on investment the nation requires while simultaneously modernizing for the challenges of the future. Our witnesses today are the leaders in the Special Operations community. I want to welcome the Honorable Derrick Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of Secretary of War, and Admiral Frank Bradley, a commander of the United States Special Operations Command. In the interest of time, I am going to ask you to keep--the witnesses to keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less so we have sufficient time for questions and answers. I think you may have a combined opening statement and if so, then make it 10 or 15 minutes. With that, let me thank our witnesses again for appearing here before us today and for your time. And I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks he might have. [The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JASON CROW, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman Jackson, and to all the witnesses today. And for the record, we are not short. These chairs are just very big. I want to get that out there. In previous years, we have opened this hearing by acknowledging how dynamic the global security environment is. And I just want to say the state that is dynamic right now would be a massive understatement. The U.S. is facing an increasingly turbulent global world order trained by accelerating strategic competition among major powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, and multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications. The bar to access advanced technology like AI (Artificial Intelligence), drones, and complex cyber tools has never been lower, allowing non-state actors and violent extremist organizations to punch above their weight, enabling them to destabilize countries and negatively influence our partners and our allies. And those are just the things we know to be true today. Who knows what challenges tomorrow will bring? The challenges and threats of today and tomorrow demand the full attention of this administration and the Department of Defense. I urge them to specially consider how we support the unique capabilities of the Special Forces community who are called upon to assistant combatant and functional commands in their campaigns at a rapidly increasing tempo. For more than 20 years, the Special Forces community has served as the primary tool in the fight against terrorism in countering violent extremist organizations. That was the mission required of us in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, a mission that I carried out as an Army Ranger. And while we still need to maintain that capability and not lose sight of those hard-won gains, we must also prepare to face future challenges. One, how is the Special Operations community postured to support this effort? Two, do they have the right training, manning, equipping, institutional support, funding, and professional military education system? Another crucial question for this committee to address is SOCOM's budget, which has been relatively flat over the past decade. I share the chairman's concerns in this regard given the tremendous amount of strain and resourcing that has been placed on your command. It simply has not kept pace with inflation, resulting in a 14 percent reduction in buying power since 2019, although SOCOM's requirements have certainly not diminished, as we have pointed out. Despite the stagnation, there has been a 35 percent increase in combatant command demand for Special Operations capabilities. So in a rapidly changing threat environment, a Special Operator is one of the country's greatest advantages and remains so today. It is our job to ensure we continue to hone and support this highly capable and agile force, including resourcing critical gaps in SOCOM funding. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how they are prepared to do this, what is needed for deterrence, and how we are going to meet this increasing challenge of skyrocketing demand while diminishing resourcing for our capabilities. So Assistant Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I want to thank both of you and your teams, not just for this hearing, but the engagements that have led up to this, the briefings that you have given to both the chairman and I. It is actually very refreshing in this environment, the amount of engagement and collaboration and information that you provided through your command. You are setting the standard in my opinion with the Department of Defense. So we look forward to that continuing. And with that, I yield back. Dr. Jackson. Thank you. We will now hear from our witnesses. Once this is done, we are going to move into the question-and-answer session. And immediately following one round of questions, which won't take long since many of our members weren't able to make it today. We will reconvene for the classified session, which will take place in Rayburn 2337. Please be advised that we may have to break in the middle for votes on the floor. We will wait and see. And I understand you both have statements to give. So, I will start with Secretary Anderson, and we will begin with you. You are recognized for five minutes. OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DERRICK M. ANDERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify in the global posture of our nation's Special Operations Forces. I am honored to testify alongside Admiral Mitch Bradley, commander of the United States Special Operations Command. I would also like to take a moment to recognize the dedicated professionals from the SO/LIC (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) team who are here with us today. Mr. Randy Harvey, who leads the Secretariats strategy, forces, and integration portfolio and Ms. Cara Teeter, who leads the Secretariats capability, resources and analysis portfolio. The SO/LIC team, together with their U.S. SOCOM counterparts, bring invaluable expertise, leadership and insight as we advocate on behalf of the SOF (Special Operations Forces) enterprise, our service members and their families. People are the foundation of SOF, the end of the Joint Force. They are our competitive advantage against our adversaries. We are thankful for those who have volunteered to serve, those currently in harm's way, and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including the 13 service members we have lost during ongoing operations. We honor their lives and legacy. We will never forget their sacrifice in defense of our country. Today's security environment is defined by simultaneity, convergence, and speed. State adversaries, terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across domains and regions. To answer these challenges, the national defense strategy marks a fundamental shift, directing the Department of War to implement a flexible, realistic approach to protect America's interest. The purpose built for this era, SOF provides capability and optionality, comprising only 3 percent of the Joint Force and less than 2 percent of the Department's budget, roughly equivalent to the procurement cost of a single aircraft carrier, SOF delivers outsized strategic value. SOF provides senior leaders with scalable, tailorable, asymmetric options across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. Leveraging persistent global presence, generational relationships, and unique authorities, SOF shapes the operating environment, strengthens partners, and imposes costs on our adversaries. Every major operation has a SOF component to it. Operations like Southern Spear, Rough Rider, Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury have demonstrated our nation's prowess and commitment to confront our adversaries wherever they may be. From the Western Hemisphere across the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, Africa, Europe and beyond, SOF has been decisive in defending the homeland, deterring China, and enabling our partners and allies. Should deterrence fail, SOF is postured with the Joint Force to prevail on high end conflict. SOF also creates opportunities across all domains, buy down risk, and service path finders for the Department. With our culture of rapid adaptation and agile problem solving, SOF accelerates the adoption of disruptive technologies, seeding investments in unmanned and autonomous systems, counter-UxS (Counter-Unmanned Systems), cyber and electronic warfare, and rapidly delivering tools to warfighters at the point of need. In accordance with the law and congressional guidance, of which we are immensely grateful, the department has taken decisive and concrete steps to institutionalize SO/LIC's oversight and advocacy role and strengthen the governance of the SOF enterprise. Over the last year and a half, we have transformed the Secretariat for Special Operations to provide direct civilian oversight across organized, trained, and equipment responsibilities. Not to duplicate or disrupt the operational execution of U.S. SOCOM, but to support, sustain, and strengthen. This transformation moves us beyond the old advisory construct to a true exercise of authority, direction, and control through an analytical, disciplined, data driven, and strategically sound approach. While the maturation of these initiatives is ongoing, these foundational changes fulfill congressional intent and provide the oversight mechanisms needed to shape force structure, guide budgetary and planning processes, and forge the future of SOF. The optionality that SOF delivers requires resourcing and investments. To maintain our competitive edge, SOF needs sustained partnership, predictable resourcing, and continued modernization. We greatly appreciate the support from this committee. I commit to continued collaboration with Congress and to make full use of my position in the Department and alongside the services to ensure SOF remains resources, ready, relevant, and accountable, and to ensure they can meet today's mission while transforming for tomorrow's challenges. I am honored to lead the SOF enterprise and invite you to visit our Special Operators and their families across the globe to see firsthand the great work they do and the challenges they face. Our service members and their families represent the finest that America has to offer and that is something we, as a nation, should be proud of. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Bradley, you are now recognized, and we have plenty of time. OPENING STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND Admiral Bradley. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the men and women of the United States Special Operations Command. I am honored to testify here today with Assistant Secretary of War for a Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict, the Honorable Derrick Anderson. In SOCOM, we rely upon the SO/LIC oversight support and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions. I am also joined today by the SOCOM Command Sergeant Major A.J. Krogman, who exemplifies the professionalism, the leadership, and the backbone of our non-commissioned officer corps, the greatest in the world. On behalf of our entire community, I want to thank you for your enduring support. And to any of our nation's finest who are listening to this today and considering a life of service in uniform, I want you to know that we are looking for critical thinkers who can fight and creative makers who can solve the hardest problems. And if you are one of those people, then it is you that we are looking for. Distinguished members of this committee, we meet at a crucial moment. As you have said, today's security environment is defined by state adversaries, terrorist organizations, and criminal networks that are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active across every domain. Our national defense strategy highlights the potential of simultaneity as a central problem and your SOF is the key component of its prescription. Today's environment rewards forces that can operate persistently and decisively, often below the threshold of armed conflict generating irregular effects by, through, and with our allies and partners in order to produce a full effect that is much greater than the sum of its parts. Your Special Operations Forces provide that capability comprising just 3 percent of the Joint Force and 2 percent of the budget as has been stated, your SOF enables and delivers an outsized strategic return by providing our nation's leaders with scalable, tailorable, and those asymmetric options that come across the spectrum of competition conflict. Our purpose is our mission. This means we are laser focused on maintaining the readiness required to protect the homeland, to deter aggression from our pacing challenge, China, and to enable true burden sharing by enabling and empowering the growing capacity of our allies and partners. But that mission is not accomplished by technology and equipment alone. It is executed by the most decisive advantage that we have, our people, empowered by a culture of meritocracy, supported by critical programs that you have helped manifest, like the Preservation of the Force and Family. The health of your SOF formation is strong, and it is getting stronger. To ensure that these exceptional men and women can succeed in the complex of environments of tomorrow, increasingly encroaching upon today, we are making transformation our imperative. We must adapt faster than our adversaries. We must be able to project force through the most dangerous environments. And we must evolve to leverage the ubiquitous information environment that presents both a challenge and an opportunity. We must evolve our force design, accelerate the capability development, and strengthen our partnerships to the services and allies to stay ahead of emerging threats. As the Department's lead for experimentation and autonomy, we are not just adapting, we are driving change. We are working with the services to incorporate next generation capabilities, systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable, consistent with the law of war. The goal is to deliver these tools with the element of surprise from unwarned access and placement at scale, ensuring our forces maintain a decisive advantage against any adversary. You see, SOF defends the homeland by dismantling threats far from our shores, disaggregating terrorist networks. We deter aggression by strengthening the resilience of our alliance, illuminating and exposing adversary and malign behavior that preys upon our partners and allies. However, our ability to accomplish this is not guaranteed. It requires accelerated modernization and your continued partnership. Predictable resourcing for our program's modernization is a strategic necessity. SOF was purpose built for this era of competition. And we can provide an indispensable, asymmetric advantage for the Joint Force and the nation. And with your continued support, we will meet today's missions while transforming to ensure that we are ready for the challenges of tomorrow. Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Admiral. And with that, we will start with the questioning. And I will begin with my question. Admiral Bradley, I know you have only been in command for a little over five months now, and I suspect you are most likely still assessing various aspects of the command. But what would you say the top three challenges are this fiscal year to sustain your three SOF lines of effort, which are win people and transform, and what do we need to do here in Congress to help you succeed in that? Admiral Bradley. Chairman, thank you. Our first priority is always to maintain readiness for the current threats that are out there. Crisis response is that top priority for us, being able to respond agilely to wherever it might present. And, of course, the demands on that, as has been mentioned, have been 300 percent increase over these last five years. That pace continues. You will remember a year ago when General Fenton was testifying, and I here supporting him, as we were telling the story. That pace of growing usage but diminishing resources was causing us to have to eat into our modernization budget to be able to cash load those current operations. That is still the case. And so today, the modernization priorities that I would tell you are very similar to those from a year ago. Number one, to be able to project force into increasingly contested environments where our adversaries are opposing threats against us. Number two really is to take advantage of the fact that there is this ubiquitous information environment, ubiquitous technical surveillance that is out there. Many people see it as a threat. It certainly is. But it is also an advantage, an opportunity that we could leverage. The cyber and the virtual domain are critical maneuver spaces that we must take advantage of. Of course, another aspect of the rapidly evolving changing character of warfare is the emergence of abundant lethal autonomy. And yes, that is a threat that we have to contend with, but it is also one that we can leverage. So that is also an area that we will looking to prioritize modernization. And finally, although this is the foundation, and as Secretary Anderson alluded to directly, our people must continue to be our foundation, ensuring they are trained, ready, supported, and educated for the future. Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Admiral, and we will work to get you additional resources. Because, you know, one thing I have learned on being on his committee, the short period of time that I have been the chair and a little bit prior to that, is that we absolutely in this particular community cannot eat into research and development testing, evaluation, and modernization efforts because that will quickly affect your ability to fight in the months and years to come. So we will take that seriously. Secretary Anderson, you have been in the seat a few months less than Admiral Bradley. And I am sure you are still assessing your priorities as well. SOCOM's budget, as we mentioned, has been relatively flat for the past decade. And in the combined written statement that was submitted, you state the SOCOM comprises only 3 percent of the Joint Force and less than 2 percent of the Department's budget, delivering ``an outsized strategic value''. I personally believe SOCOM's budget needs to increase to a steady state of at least $20 billion a year. How are you using your secretary-like position to advocate for a higher budget for SOCOM? What do you think the future budget looks like for SOCOM? And how do you quantify this outsized strategic value in your budget submission? Secretary Anderson. Mr. Chairman, I first want to start off by thanking the committee for those 907 authorities and the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) a few years ago that gave us that service-like ability. What I can tell you is within the Department, having that service-like ability allows us to work with the other military departments hand-in-hand, specifically when we talk about the resources not only that we are being provided, but the other services are being provided and gives us an opportunity to go from service to service, from chief to chief, and have those conversations about modernizations and where we might be overlapping or where we can combine forces. So I think that 907 capability and authorities that you gave us gets us in the room with the other services. As far as echoing what Admiral Bradley spoke about and our modernization, as we continue to modernize, we see that technology typically, and I have heard various different ranges, but, you know, technology ends up being obsolete within six months. So our operators that are operating on the ground not only utilizing the technology that they have internal to the Department, but also training by, with, and through our partners and the technology they have. That is an absolutely other critical part of this in ensuring that, you know, we are staying up to speed with technology. So that investment, as Admiral Bradley said, is absolutely crucial. And then one of the other priorities I just would like to highlight, Mr. Chairman, is the POTFF program, the Preservation of the Force and Family. That investment that you made in the SOF community absolutely increases our readiness and allows us to take care of our soldiers and sailors and airmen. I am happy to get into more detail on that. Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. I have one last question here, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Section 863 of the fiscal year 2026 NDAA required the establishment of the SOCOM urgent innovative technologies and capabilities initiative with funding that was allocated in the 2025 Budget Reconciliation Act. When do you expect to begin implementing this requirement and how does it nest with SOCOM's transformation imperative? Admiral Bradley. Chairman, I will start and just say that the appreciation for that investment and for the recognition of the agility with which SOCOM already operates. So in many ways, those capabilities inside the SOCOM unique acquisition process give us unity of command to be able to both see a requirement, to identify it, articulate it, move resources to be able to execute against it, field it, and get it out in a very rapid manner to be able to test and evaluate whether it is credible for the combat situations it might have to face. The authority given in 863 and the resources to be able to allow that to happen makes us able to execute that more quickly. As we look to the other initiatives that have come both from this chamber, from the Senate, and from the President, all in acquisition reform, the SPEED (Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery) Act, the FoRGED (Fostering Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense) Act, all of those are really looking to take advantage of some of the pathways that SOCOM and SO/LIC have been able to chart over the years and then extrapolate them out across the broader joint force. And so the leadership that Secretary Anderson is talking about inside the Pentagon at the Secretariat level is a critical part to be able to harness some of that new authority that you have given us and be able to help the other services to be able to use it in the same way. Secretary Anderson. Mr. Chairman, echoing what Admiral Bradley said, the one thing I would make a point of is when we talk about the military department and department relationships, Admiral Bradley and I are 100 percent working with the other departments not only to give our lessons learned to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force so that their acquisitions processes get better, but also learn where we can get better. There are certainly some lessons learned that we can get from the services. But we will continue to work with you and this committee to keep you up to date on how we are exercising that authority. Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. And as you know, the focus of the NDAA this last year was to reform acquisition and procurement that process altogether. This money was intended knowing that SOCOM was already good at that, better than most in the military. You already had some area of expertise in there. But to refine that process so that it could then be used as an example for other, you know, other areas in the military so that they could kind of mimic what was going on in a lessons learned kind of way. So I hope we get that done, and I hope it turns out to be really successful and everybody learns a lot from it. Thank you. I appreciate it. With that, Mr. Crow, I recognize you. Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. I wanted to begin on something that I think that Special Operations Forces are uniquely equipped and trained to do and that is working with civilian populations, building trust. You are known as force multipliers. And the genesis of that is you know better than anybody is that you work with those local populations. You build public sentiment, public trust, and you build foreign forces. And a part of that is this understanding--and, you know, and I worked in the community--this understanding that you are going to do everything possible to protect global forces, that built in the mission planning process is protecting civilians, reducing civilian casualties. Because nothing sets back years sometimes of trust building and relationship building than an errant strike, than killing civilians, right? It is not just inefficient and immoral and unlawful in certain circumstances, but it actually makes it harder for us to do our mission, which is why, you know, this committee and Congress in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA required DOD (Department of Defense) to develop a comprehensive policy for preventing civilian harm, which it did. In the fiscal year 2023 NDAA, I helped create a civilian protection center of excellence because I learned that you can actually accomplish the tactical element of a mission but then lose the end game if the people that you are fighting with and working with actually don't trust you and support you. Those efforts have been slashed in the last year, 80 percent of the CPCoE (Civilian Protection Center of Excellence) and the resources have been cut. The personnel that have been embedded in the combatant commands have been largely taken away. And it seems like a terrible missed opportunity but also a strategic error to not equip our operators and our forces with the tools they need to comprehensively address our adversaries and build a trust in our alliances. In that vein, Secretary Anderson on February 28, there was a girls' elementary school in Iran that was struck. Public reports say that 175 civilians, many of them children, were reportedly killed or wounded in that strike. It is my understanding that there has been a preliminary investigation and that you might be aware of that. Is that preliminary investigation complete and was there a 15-6 that came out of that? Secretary Anderson. Congressman, first to answer your second question first, currently the incident is being investigated by CENTCOM (Central Command). I wouldn't want to get ahead of the investigation. And in the closed setting, I am happy to give you some of the dates and details as how that has progressed. But it is currently being investigated. What I can say is that the investigating officer is a general officer outside of the CENTCOM chain of command. So there will be an unbiased, impartial investigation that is conducted. And Congressman, to your point, to be very clear, you are absolutely right. There is no strategic benefit for the United States or for the department in civilian harm. And that is what makes us different and separate from our adversaries. We continue to have a center of excellence, a civilian harm center of excellence, and continue with those reports. But I think you bring up a good point is what we have done within the command structure if you look at from when a SOF operator's training at the ground level all the way through a general officer, now they are taking civilian harm and ensuring that it is mitigated throughout the entire process. And I think that has shown a world of compliance to culture. And I think that is where we have been heading. And, again, I am happy to have more conversations and discuss some of those things in the closed setting. Mr. Crow. I appreciate that. And I appreciate you saying the strategic importance of this. And I don't doubt in any way that you are committed to that because I know that you have lived this, and you understand it. It is obviously a part of what you do down range. Can you clarify--and this isn't a got you. I am just honestly asking the question. So there has not been a preliminary investigation that has been completed? The initial investigation by CENTCOM is still underway? Secretary Anderson. No, Congressman, as you are well aware with the civilian harm mitigation, there will be an initial investigation to determine whether or not a 15-6 should be opened. Mr. Crow. And that has been completed. Secretary Anderson. Correct. Mr. Crow. And now there is a 15-6. Secretary Anderson. And there is a 15-6 open that is going to be a full investigation, Congressman. And you have my commitment as we have in the past, once that investigation is complete and finalized, that we will make sure that we are available. Mr. Crow. 15-6 is the one that is underway? Secretary Anderson. Correct, correct. Mr. Crow. And the preliminary investigation, did he determine that U.S. Armed Forces carried out the strikes on the elementary school? Secretary Anderson. I have not seen it, Congressman. Again, I am happy to have a conversation in closed. Right now, I have the fact that a 15-6, a full-on 15-6, has been investigated. Mr. Crow. But you haven't seen the results of the preliminary investigation? Secretary Anderson. I have not, Congressman. Mr. Crow. Have you, Admiral Bradley? Admiral Bradley. No, sir, I haven't yet. Mr. Crow. I wanted to go to one of your comments about lethal autonomous drones, right? It is happening. Our adversaries are doing it. There has been a lot of debate about the morality, the legality of taking a human outside of the kill chain and making that decision ourselves. You had mentioned, Admiral Bradley, you said lethal autonomous authority is happening. We need to leverage that ourselves. What did you mean by that? Are you saying that there has been a decision within the administration that we will allow lethal autonomous authority with drones? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I believe we employ lethal capability that has an amount of autonomy in it every day. Any of our IR (infrared) guiding missiles has an amount of that baked into it. Mr. Crow. Can I drill down on that? Is there, just sitting here today, is there a human in the kill chain? Admiral Bradley. There is always a human in the kill chain. Mr. Crow. And is there a debate about taking a human out of the kill chain? Admiral Bradley. I do not believe there is. Mr. Crow. What do you personally believe? Admiral Bradley. That the law of armed conflict and the law of war requires a human to be the decider about where and how lethal--any lethal force should be delivered, no matter the vessel of that lethal force. It should be a human that is making that decision. Mr. Crow. I am very relieved to hear you say that. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back. Dr. Jackson. Thank you. Mr. Scott, you are recognized for five minutes. Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I too have the concerns about the budget constraints and what it is doing to modernization. I want to get to the proposed 3,000 billet reduction in forces. And Secretary Anderson, I understand it is predominantly intelligence analysts, logistical staff, and psychological operations that you intend to make the--that the reductions will come from. Is that correct? Secretary Anderson. Congressman, that is correct. Mr. Scott. I want to ask, in the psychological operations, does that include what we would refer to as information warfare? Secretary Anderson. Well, Congressman, I would say that there is information operations. There is psychological operations. And I am happy, again, to talk a little bit more in detail on the closed session. But we are doing a revamp within the special operations, specifically in USASOC (United States Army Special Operations Command) to ensure we have those capabilities readily available. Mr. Scott. I think it would be a good use of time for our military to study how effective the Russians have been on the continent of Africa with information warfare and how effective they have been in getting the French kicked off of the continent. And it has created significant challenges for us in that continent. And I just--I want to make sure that part of today's warfare is not ignored because we have to embrace it. We can see what they are doing and know what they are doing and yet we have not been countering it at an effective rate and speed matters with that. So sticking with Africa, Russia, Africa Corps now, Wagner Group--it used to be Wagner Group, China, they are both expanding their security roles in Africa. What specific risk does this create for the U.S. national security, for our need for critical minerals, and our ability to operate in Africa? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I can take that as a-- Mr. Scott. Okay. Admiral Bradley. --start point and sort of fall back on the previous question as well. I think one of the critical things in the information space that we have to do, and it gets specifically to your point about critical minerals and other threats on the African continent, is lever the high ground in information operations. That is the truth. And in almost every case, our adversaries are leveraging their positions for malign influence against the population's interest. And merely what we can do to be most effective is tell the truth and highlight that. So in Africa, that is clearly the case. And, again, I don't want to get ahead of General Dag Anderson, the AFRICOM (Africa Command) commander who, of course, owns the strategy and understands this far better than any of us, but we provide support to him through these forces to help him to do just that. Mr. Scott. I think it would be a good use of tax dollars for us to get some actual footage, as you said, telling the truth of what China is doing with the harvesting of fish in exclusive economic zones off of the continent of Africa and show the citizens of that continent just how their natural resources, their food supply, is being pillaged by the Chinese. And I think the Chinese would be much less welcome by the people of the continent if they knew just how much of their food supply was being stolen by China. So sticking to Africa, we lost the key access point in Niger, Admiral. What has that done to the operational impact, your ability to conduct counterterrorism missions in Africa? How has this impacted SOF's ability with regard to speed in a crisis response? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, West Africa has been a particularly volatile region over the last several years and a number of countries that have changed leadership. In particularly in the case of Niger, as several of the others, I would tell you that our SOF generational longstanding relationships with the professional military to military forces there have helped us to maintain some contact in these troubling times. And in fact, we hope that as things evolve and those governments stabilize and new diplomatic connections can be made, they can be levered to help us maintain indications and awareness of threats that might be there and ultimately to help them to police their own problems. Mr. Scott. Those relationships matter. I agree with you. They are stills strong at the mil to mil level. And I hope we are able to leverage them to get back into Niger in 101 and 201. I also want to advocate for the Echo programs on the continent of Africa. And I know, Secretary, if I am not mistaken, you were a Green Beret? Secretary Anderson. That is correct, sir. Mr. Scott. But I very much believe in the ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha) and the Echo programs and hope that we will find the funds to continue to expand them on that continent. With that, I yield back. Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Mr. Tran, you are recognized for five minutes. Mr. Tran. Thank you so much, Chairman. Welcome, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Thanks for being here. Admiral Bradley, the Department has emphasized that adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran are increasingly operating through proxies, criminal networks, and influence campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict. How central are Special Operations Forces to countering those activities? And do you believe SOCOM currently has the authorities and resources required to compete effectively in that space? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. In fact, I would refer back to those generational partnerships and relationships that we build around the planet. Today, there are more than 6,500 SOF operators and enablers deployed around and in 80 different countries. And every one of those building and sustaining those relationships. To your point about the influence operations that our adversaries are conducting, in most cases those are designed to prey upon our allies and our partners to be able to use that malign behavior to be able to gain unwarned access and leverage. Our ability to be able to illuminate that malign behavior and then to pass it and make our partners aware of it, many times through diplomatic channels but sometimes directly, mil to mil, security service to security service, is a critical way to be able to help undermine our adversary's actions. Mr. Tran. I appreciate that. Admiral Bradley. And to your question about authorities, I would just reckon back to the 127 programs. A critical capability to us to be able to do that. And we do believe those authorities are robust and appreciated. Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. Let me ask you this. SOCOM represents only about 3 percent of the Joint Force, yet combatant commanders continue to request support from Special Operation forces across nearly every theater. Does demand for Special Operation forces currently exceed sustainable levels? And also what risk does that create for readiness and retention within the forces? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. I would say it-- well, to affirm, they are asking for more than we have to offer every year since I have been paying attention to that. This last year was about 70 different asks that we could not satisfy. We are able to sustain because we only do the things that we were able to sustain. That said, because of the work that both of these chambers have done, really since 2006 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review), we have the ability to sustain the level of force and commitment that we are at today. The budget reduction or the buying power reduction over the last five to six years, has limited our ability to be able to modernize. And that is really the critical determiner for the future. With the few resources we have that are in higher and higher demand to be able to make them more useful, we need to modernize them for the future. Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. To either of the witnesses, and you both may answer, looking five to ten years ahead, what do you believe is the greatest risk facing the Special Operation enterprise and what is the one area where congressional support would have the greatest impact on SOCOM's ability to succeed. Admiral Bradley. I will take a first stab at it. If you would have asked me that question ten years ago, I would have defined the most dangerous crisis of the future probably being an Iran or an Iranian surrogate or proxy force threatening freedom of navigation in and around the Middle East. And so that most dangerous crisis ten years ago, is the most likely crisis that we face today. I would anticipate that along those same lines, the ability to project force into increasingly contested environments where U.S. national interests are threatened is the characterization of the next most dangerous crisis. That is why we have made our ability to do that our top modernization priority. If you look at the operation conducted under Absolute Resolve into Venezuela, I would argue the most sophisticated integrated interagency Joint Force raid ever conducted. You get a peek into the modernization pathway that the Joint Force is on. And it is that ability. Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. Mr. Secretary, can I get your take? Secretary Anderson. Yes, Congressman. What I would say, Admiral Bradley alluded to this earlier, when we talk about the different threats that are across the world, those relationships that we have maintained not just for years but for decades are how we build that value proposition that SOF brings to the table. Specifically highlighting, and you asked, Congressman, what are one of the things Congress, continued support for those 127 programs are absolutely essential to ensuring that we maintain that value proposition. The one ODA or one SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) team is able to accomplish is absolutely astronomical for the Joint Force so. And then lastly, again, Admiral Bradley hit it on the head, was our modernization efforts, ensuring that we utilize autonomy and AI to efficiently conduct staffing, all of those things, that allow us to focus on operational needs. Mr. Tran. Thanks, Secretary, I yield back. Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Tran. Mr. Luttrell, you are recognized for five minutes. Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Bradley, thank you for coming today and thank everyone in the room for your service and continued service. Admiral Bradley, MILCON (Military Construction) funding for construction projects is about $509 million, one of which is a SOF human performance training center. What is that? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, that is one of our integrated facilities where we are able to bring together the preservation of the Force and Family Program to be able to provide synchronized and integrated care for our operators either returning from service from an injury or who are enhancing their performance to be able to go out on the next missions to be able to provide that continuity of care. Mr. Luttrell. Is it a NICoE (National Intrepid Center of Excellence) like institute? Admiral Bradley. No, Congressman. There are a number of those in each one of our major force concentration centers that give us the ability to really permeate the care from the POTFF program down to the lowest level possible. Mr. Luttrell. There is more than one? I only see one in Delaware. I don't know how they ended up winning it. I think Texas would have been a better spot to hang it. But we can talk about it later. Admiral Bradley. Yes, Congressman. Actually, I am not aware of the one in Delaware. But those centers, we increment through the budget to be able to give each of our force concentrations a component of tech capability. Mr. Luttrell. What is the--I hate to put you on the spot with this one, Admiral, but what does that look like? I spent my entire post-military career trying to find the best--I don't want to say pipeline--but training mechanism for the brain and the body combined? Our Special Operations Forces, we demand the boat teams. You have to go faster. It has to be there quicker. It is a rugged ride. I don't know a boat operator that retired that can stand up straight. Most of them don't have their kidneys anymore and everything is wrong with them, but we push them harder, and we push them faster. SDVs (SEAL Delivery Vehicle), how deep can you dive, how long can you go? How cold can you sustain--how cold can it be and you can sustain yourself to be mission capable? We keep going and we keep going and we keep going. Our operators are carrying heavier ruck sacks because we keep throwing technology on top of them and it just weighs more than anything. Push harder, push faster. And we don't ever--I am not wire brushing you, sir. This is the time that I get to vent. Thank you. But we do not, we do not take the time in my personal opinion to take care of you from start to finish, baseline assessment to the time that you quit--retire. Excuse me. I actually never say quit. Okay? And when we have these performance facilities that we are popping up, I want to know what is in it because I don't need a six pack and a bag of Cheetos. I mean, the Special Operators of the United States of America is the most amazing asset. And I think we are--we have not done our best to take care of them because--and everyone in this room that is wearing a uniform right now needs to listen to what I am saying to you. Because when you do leave and you fall into that deep, dark black hole because you are not here anymore and you are alone, I think there is something we can do to catch your trajectory to change that because it is lonely out there. And I am trying to deal with that in the VA (Veterans Affairs). But if we can help inside the DOD, inside the community, inside of our house, that is a win. Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I absolutely agree with you. And I suspect you probably dropped a half an inch of height in your time in the Teams. Mr. Luttrell. That is why I am shorter than my brother because I kept getting in the boat. Admiral Bradley. Just like most of us. And it is exactly that aim of community that these centers in the POTFF program is allowing us to develop. So I will just give you--I will take you on a small tour of what one of them looks like. Mr. Luttrell. Thank you. Admiral Bradley. Where a team of either SEALS or ODA or Raiders or our Air Force Special Tactics folks would come in in the morning to begin to work their PT (physical training) regimen for that day. In that same facility would be those who are injured but can't work out with their teammates anymore that are going through rehab or going through care to be able to get back up on its feet. But they are in the same facility. So there is still that strong sense of community. If they can't go through rehab or maybe at the backside of the physical rehab, they check into the performance enhancement section where cognitive and performance psychologists help them to train their cognitive abilities to be smarter and to have better reaction time, all still inside that same facility so there is still the jab and then going back and forth to their teammates. They are still part of the team. If some of those individuals in that performance enhancement, cognitive enhancement with the performance sites, find that they have care that needs to be attended to by a clinical site, there is no shame there. There is no stigma. They are now in a warm handoff through a door to a clinical site to be able to get the care that they need. We have seen that in many cases this holistic care--and it is very much modeled after the lessons from the various NICoE facilities and many others that are templated around the world, has been able to reduce the stigma to the point where some 50 percent of our formations in some cases are making use of our behavioral health specialists now. I think that is one of the most important and the most telling statistics that we have got of the success of the program that POTFF has been able to fund for us. But it is not just that. The reduction and the return time for our operators who were injured back to full duty, 75 percent reduction in that time. Seventy percent reduction in the amount of time that it takes for somebody to get access to first care. In most cases it is less than two days. In many cases, it is same day. And then the thing that really makes all of this hum, I think best, is the permeating nature of what we have been able to do. We have been able to put our sites, or our behavioral health specialists, our chaplains and our corpsmen down at the 05 level in almost every formation to be able to give a name to face recognition of the caregivers to the operators so that there is immediate access and you know the case history of the operators and the enablers that are being helped. Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Luttrell. Mr. Hamadeh, you are recognized for five minutes. Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I think you guys make an incredible team. So I would just encourage you to continue building that relationship. Admiral Bradley, I know you have talked about irregular triad before, Cyber, Special Operations, and Space. Could you for this committee and for the public just describe what that is? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. I talk about it generally when we are talking about the ubiquitous technical surveillance or ubiquitous information. It might be useful to just start there and say what in the world is that? Well, we probably all know that more and more of the world spends more and more of its time in the virtual domain. You only have to look at your screen time indicator on your cell phones to be able to recognize that that is in fact the case. And it is true that that time that you spend making more of your information available to the world is a vulnerability to you. It is a boon for our adversaries. But it is also an advantage for us, looking at our adversaries who adhere and fall into that same trap. And so that reality, that is the ubiquitous information environment. In order to take advantage of that, and we do through publicly available information, commercially acquirable information, and when appropriate, authorized and within legal bounds, clandestinely accessible information, we can know incredibly more about both our adversaries and the societies within which those adversaries are operating that will allow us to be far more precise and far more lethal in our operations when they are required and far more effective in those operations. But in order to do that, we need to merge those three disciplines that you just described in that new triad. The cyber capability, of course, to maneuver in the virtual domain to be able to access and gain access to all that information. In almost every case, that information transits through a space segment between one part of the globe and the other, being able to intersect that or to be able to lever that, to control it, to have freedom to maneuver there is critical. And then finally, you mentioned your SOF placement and access around the globe in over 80 countries since 6,500 operators who have relationships that force multiply out to thousands, even more, give us the ability to both lever our physical placement and access with the virtual placement and access that our CYBERCOM and NSA teammates have through the space segment to be able to lever all of that to our national interest. That is really what we are talking about when we discuss the Space-SOF-Cyber triad. Mr. Hamadeh. Right. And given the Army's cutting 3,000 Special Operation positions, would this impede trying to implement this irregular triad? Admiral Bradley. Congressman, any reduction, of course, has to be adjusted and most of those billets that are being adjusted and moved out are in the intelligence communications and logistics disciplines. And we completely understand why and how they are doing that because frankly the services recognize that they need to build the same kind of capability that SOF has leveraged to be able to manifest this. But it does come at a cost. We are adjusting and working with the services on how we might lever their augmentation from other fielded formations to make up for it, but it is an adjustment. Mr. Hamadeh. Okay. And Mr. Secretary, you know, with social media and AI rising right now, and we know that this is a 24/7 information warfare. We can just look at the most recent example with Iran right now. A lot of Americans don't know what is real. They don't know what is fake. What changes from Congress would help improve how we run overseas influence campaigns with the speed of this modern warfare that we are in? Secretary Anderson. Thank you, Congressman. I am probably going to sound like a broken record. But when we, and Admiral Bradley, talk about modernization, that is truly what it comes from. And when Congressman Scott was mentioning the information operations world, we are trying to build information operation warriors, individuals that are specifically honed in on the information environment. And we have done some internal looking at ourselves to see if we are structured the right way, specifically not just within our ODAs and our SEAL teams and our Raiders, but specifically within our information operation spectrum. So we have been working. And as you are well aware, Congressman, a majority of those service members preside in the Army. But we have worked with the United States Army Special Operations command and looking at what that future looks like. Because as we talk about modernization, autonomy, AI, all of those other things, our information warriors, our cyber warriors, are at a different type of level than say I or Admiral Bradley. So we need to make sure we are structured properly and we are absolutely moving forward with that, Congressman. Mr. Hamadeh. And especially, you know, with Iran cutting off 90 percent of the internet access. I think it is important that we don't also lose sight in the most basics, leaflet drops, you know, we used to always do back in the day. And with that I yield back. Dr. Jackson. Thank you. And I would just like to say here as we close, I want to say, Mr. Secretary, thank you. Admiral, thank you. Thank you for what you do. Thank you for your leadership. Thank you for your time today. Thanks to all of the members here in the audience today that are in uniform. Thank you for your service to our country. We really appreciate it. I think the general consensus here, and, you know, I talked to all the members here on both sides of the aisle frequently about this. I think we all agree that you are not resourced properly for what you are asked to do. And so I think that is going to be a continuing effort on our part to make sure that we get things done, that we get you the resources, and we get you the authorities and the 127 echoes and things of that nature. We are going to work hard to make sure that we are supporting what you do and what you are asked to do. And with that, Mr. Crow, do you have any closing remarks? Mr. Crow. I will skip so we can get down to the SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility). Dr. Jackson. Okay. With that, we are going to adjourn the open portion of the hearing here. We are going to move to Rayburn 2337 for the classified session, and we are adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X March 18, 2026 ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD March 18, 2026 ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAIABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING March 18, 2026 ======================================================================= RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT Mr. Scott. How is USSOCOM currently supporting resistance operating concept (ROC) development, unconventional warfare (UW) planning, and pre-crisis preparation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Are these efforts episodic and rotational, or do we have persistent, theater- aligned SOF elements dedicated to Baltic resistance preparation? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Are there current statutory or policy constraints that limit your ability to conduct pre-positioning, training, or network development in the Baltics? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM integrate with EUCOM's operational plans to ensure that SOF-enabled resistance in the Baltics is synchronized with conventional force operations in the opening phase of a conflict? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What is the current level of persistent SOF presence in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Do you believe the current posture is sufficient to build enduring resistance networks, or would increased forward presence or authorities materially improve deterrence? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Would you characterize Baltic SOF units as among the most capable and motivated partner forces in NATO? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What additional training, equipment, or authorities would most improve the ability of Baltic SOF and resistance forces to conduct unconventional warfare under occupation conditions? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What is the current scope of USSOCOM engagement with Moldovan special operations or internal security forces? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What specific capability gaps-training, equipment, or intelligence-are most urgent in Moldova today? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. How does Moldova factor into broader SOF campaign plans for Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What specific statutory or policy limitations currently constrain USSOCOM's ability to operate effectively in Moldova? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What is the single most important capability we could provide Moldova in the next 12 months that would most increase deterrence? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. If Congress provided additional authorities or funding in the FY27 NDAA, what exactly would you do differently in Moldova? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. How would you characterize the capability, professionalism, and combat readiness of Romanian Special Operations Forces? To what extent are U.S. and Romanian SOF integrated in training, planning, and potential operational execution? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Are there any legal, policy, or resource barriers currently limiting deeper SOF integration with Romania? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Do current authorities under Title 10 adequately enable USSOCOM to build Romanian SOF capacity at the pace required by the threat environment? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Would expanded train-and-equip or irregular warfare authorities improve your ability to operate with Romanian forces? If so, how? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Are there funding or programmatic limitations that are slowing progress in building a more capable U.S.-Romania SOF partnership? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Does Romania have sufficient capability to support maritime irregular warfare, and if not, where are the key gaps? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Based on your military experience and without deferring to anyone else, would you agree that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have set a new standard in modern warfare for adaptability, resilience, and battlefield innovation? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Ukrainian forces have shown an ability to innovate rapidly under resource constraints-particularly in integrating drones, targeting, and decentralized operations. What lessons from their performance are most applicable to SOF? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Is Moldova currently prioritized appropriately within SOCOM's global campaign plans, or is it under-resourced relative to the threat? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Based on your observations and engagements with Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, how would you assess their overall combat effectiveness, adaptability, and professionalism in large-scale combat operations against a near-peer adversary like Russia? Would you agree that Ukrainian SOF today represent one of the most combat- experienced and battle-tested special operations forces in the world? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have demonstrated remarkable innovation in areas such as unmanned systems employment, deep strike operations, and integrated information warfare. Can you describe specific examples where Ukrainian SOF have outperformed expectations or rewritten traditional SOF doctrine? Would you assess that Ukrainian SOF innovation-particularly in low-cost, high-impact drone operations-is ahead of where U.S. SOF doctrine was prior to this conflict? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. To what extent have Ukrainian SOF operations-such as strikes in Crimea or against high-value targets-achieved strategic- level effects disproportionate to their size and resources? Is it fair to say that Ukrainian SOF have demonstrated how relatively small units can impose outsized costs on a larger conventional force? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. How effectively have Ukrainian SOF integrated with conventional Ukrainian forces to enable targeting, deep fires, and operational maneuver? Do you view Ukrainian SOF as a model for how SOF should be integrated into large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have operated under constant artillery, missile, cyber, and electronic warfare threats. What does their performance tell us about the importance of mental resilience, decentralized leadership, and mission command in modern warfare? Would you agree that Ukrainian SOF have validated the enduring importance of SOF culture and training over technology alone? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have consistently forced Russia to divert resources to defend rear areas, logistics nodes, and critical infrastructure. How significant has this been in terms of imposing operational and strategic costs on Russian forces? Would you agree that Ukrainian SOF have played a key role in shaping the battlefield beyond the front lines? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. What are the top lessons U.S. Special Operations Command has learned from Ukrainian SOF regarding operating in denied environments, leveraging commercial technologies, and conducting persistent irregular warfare alongside conventional conflict? Are there any authorities, resources, or institutional changes that Congress should consider to ensure U.S. SOF can replicate or exceed these capabilities? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Based on your observations, how do Ukrainian SOF compare to Russian special operations forces in terms of effectiveness, initiative, and battlefield impact? Would you agree that Ukrainian SOF have consistently demonstrated a qualitative advantage over their Russian counterparts? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Scott. Despite years of continuous combat, Ukrainian SOF remain highly effective. What factors have enabled their sustainment, recruitment, and continued combat performance? Does this suggest that national will and unit cohesion are decisive advantages in special operations warfare? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY Mr. Kelly. Are there policy or approval processes that limit the speed or effectiveness of SOF information operations today, and are there areas where Congress could help ensure these capabilities are better integrated into our broader competition strategy? Mr. Anderson. Information operations (IO) encompass numerous distinct technical and cognitive capabilities and disciplines that are generally not exclusive to Special Operations Forces (SOF). Individual capabilities of a more sensitive nature, whether due to the political- military risk of employment or the need for technical protection of systems, are governed by separate, necessary review and approval processes. To deconflict activities and foster unity of effort, the Department integrates competition-focused IO activities within broader campaign plans and coordinates with the Department of State and interagency partners prior to execution. The Department maintains the flexibility to approve and delegate time-sensitive information operations where appropriate, particularly during crises and conflicts. At this time, the Department does not require additional congressional support or legislative action to drive the internal integration of these capabilities into the broader competition strategy. Mr. Kelly. As the National Defense Strategy shifts toward great power competition, how is SOCOM adapting its capabilities and operational approach to compete with near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Mr. Kelly. From your perspective, are there mission areas where demand for SOF exceeds available capacity, and how does SOCOM prioritize those requests across competing theaters? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON Dr. Jackson. Irregular warfare is a significant and poorly understood problem facing the United States both here in the homeland and abroad. Congress has put a lot of time, effort, and resources into providing the authority, and appropriations for the Department to develop and operationalize irregular concepts worldwide. How has the Department used the Irregular Warfare Center to further these objectives and what are your plans for further employing their capabilities? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Dr. Jackson. Admiral Bradley, in your confirmation hearing, you mentioned the importance of operational security, especially in contested environments, and the need for SOF to be able to plan and conduct a mission with the element of surprise. You noted that the ability to operate within the ever-evolving ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) environment is a challenge and a critical component of mission success. How is SOCOM addressing this issue? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] Dr. Jackson. Admiral, the committee has been tracking the development of the Special Operations Forces Mission Command data layer as a key enabler for data sharing and decision-making across the force. Could you provide an update on the status and progress of implementing the Mission Command data layer across Special Operations Forces? In particular, I'm interested in a detailed accounting of funds expended for the effort, whether the capability is operationally deployed across the enterprise-including its availability on classified and unclassified networks-and the extent to which operators can access, share, and visualize data in operational environments. Additionally, how fully have SOF joint function activities been integrated into the data layer, and what technical, organizational, or resourcing challenges remain that could limit full implementation across the force? Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the subcommittee files.] [all]