U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND - CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

House National Security Committee House March 18, 2026

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[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 
 [H.A.S.C. No. 119-44]

 U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

 AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND

 RESOURCE PRIORITIES FOR

 FISCAL YEAR 2027

 __________

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 FIRST SESSION

 __________

 HEARING HELD

 MARCH 18, 2026

 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
 
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLIISHING OFFICE
64-533 WASHINGTON : 2026
-------------------------------------------------------------------

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

 RONNY JACKSON, Texas, Chairman

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JASON CROW, Colorado
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas SARA JACOBS, California
CORY MILLS, Florida PATRICK RYAN, New York
DERRICK VAN ORDEN, Wisconsin GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, JR., 
PAT HARRIGAN, North Carolina California
ABRAHAM J. HAMADEH, Arizona DEREK TRAN, California

 Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
 Will T. Johnson, Professional Staff Member
 Austin Richards, Research Assistant
 
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page

 STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Crow, Hon. Jason, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking Member, 
 Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 2
Jackson, Hon. Ronny, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 
 Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1

 WITNESSES

Anderson, Derrick M., Assistant Secretary of War for Special 
 Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.......................... 4
Bradley, Admiral Frank M., USN Commander, United States Special 
 Operations Command............................................. 6

 APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

 Jackson, Hon. Ronny.......................................... 25
 Joint statement of Anderson, Derrick M.; together with 
 Bradley, Admiral Frank M................................... 28

Documents Submitted for the Record:

 [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

 [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

 Mr. Scott.................................................... 49
 Mr. Kelly.................................................... 51
 Dr. Jackson.................................................. 51

. 
 U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE 
 PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2027

 ---------- 

 House of Representatives,
 Committee on Armed Services,
 Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
 Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2026.
 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:31 p.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ronny Jackson 
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RONNY JACKSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
 OPERATIONS

 Dr. Jackson. All right. Good afternoon. This subcommittee 
will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chair be 
authorized to declare a recess at any time. Without objection, 
so ordered.
 Today we will hear from our witnesses on U.S. Special 
Operations Forces and Command on Challenges and Resource 
Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027.
 The op tempo for special operations continues to put 
demands on the force even with the major force drawdowns from 
Iraq and Afghanistan almost five years ago. Recent 
consolidation and downsizing of forces in Syria and Iraq bring 
only minor relief as our Special Operations forces continue 
counterterrorism efforts against violent extremist 
organizations, military proxies, and non-state actors in both 
of those countries as well as an increase of op tempo on the 
continent of Africa, ongoing operations in the Western 
Hemisphere and now requirements related to the ongoing 
operations supporting the fight in Iran.
 Special operators have adapted to meet the challenges in an 
evolving landscape of great power competition in every corner 
of the globe while continuing to aggressively attack violent 
extremist organizations and transnational criminal networks, 
all in an effort to protect the homeland.
 Our adversaries are using cutting-edge technology, economic 
incentives, and illicit activities to attempt to gain footholds 
in every geographic combatant command's area of responsibility. 
And the battlefield has become increasingly contested and 
denied by the proliferation of peer adversary capabilities and 
malign influence, all while our crisis response force has been 
called upon repeatedly over the past few years to execute 
exquisite, challenging missions that only they can conduct.
 Special Operations continue to be one of our most valuable 
tools in our toolbox, used to showcase our dominance, to impose 
costs on our adversaries, to re-establish deterrence, and to 
provide the nation with a position of advantage should 
deterrence fail.
 We ask a lot of our Special Operations forces, and the 
demands both on and for them will only continue to grow. It is 
critical we provide these elite operators and all that support 
them with the resources that they need.
 I was disappointed in the fiscal year 2026 budget 
submission for SOCOM (Special Operations Command) from the 
Department of War. This committee worked diligently with SOCOM 
to provide critically needed resources to fill the gaps from 
over a decade of stagnant flat budgets through the 
reconciliation process only to have been--have the department 
submit a budget with a reduction to SOCOM, making the budget a 
wash and still flat.
 SOCOM's purchasing power has been reduced by 14 percent 
since 2019 despite increasing demand for support worldwide. I 
am, however, optimistic about President Trump's direction to 
include a significant increase in the fiscal year 2027 defense 
budget and what this will mean for SOCOM in the future.
 I look forward to reviewing the budget and putting SOCOM on 
a path that increases to get them to a steady state of at least 
$20 billion annually in the budget.
 We look forward to hearing how Congress can best support 
SOCOM such that you can continue to provide the high return on 
investment the nation requires while simultaneously modernizing 
for the challenges of the future.
 Our witnesses today are the leaders in the Special 
Operations community. I want to welcome the Honorable Derrick 
Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of Secretary of War, and 
Admiral Frank Bradley, a commander of the United States Special 
Operations Command.
 In the interest of time, I am going to ask you to keep--the 
witnesses to keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less 
so we have sufficient time for questions and answers. I think 
you may have a combined opening statement and if so, then make 
it 10 or 15 minutes.
 With that, let me thank our witnesses again for appearing 
here before us today and for your time. And I now recognize 
Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks he might have.
 [The prepared statement of Dr. Jackson can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JASON CROW, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 COLORADO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

 Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman Jackson, and to all the 
witnesses today. And for the record, we are not short. These 
chairs are just very big. I want to get that out there.
 In previous years, we have opened this hearing by 
acknowledging how dynamic the global security environment is. 
And I just want to say the state that is dynamic right now 
would be a massive understatement.
 The U.S. is facing an increasingly turbulent global world 
order trained by accelerating strategic competition among major 
powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational 
challenges, and multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching 
implications.
 The bar to access advanced technology like AI (Artificial 
Intelligence), drones, and complex cyber tools has never been 
lower, allowing non-state actors and violent extremist 
organizations to punch above their weight, enabling them to 
destabilize countries and negatively influence our partners and 
our allies.
 And those are just the things we know to be true today. Who 
knows what challenges tomorrow will bring? The challenges and 
threats of today and tomorrow demand the full attention of this 
administration and the Department of Defense.
 I urge them to specially consider how we support the unique 
capabilities of the Special Forces community who are called 
upon to assistant combatant and functional commands in their 
campaigns at a rapidly increasing tempo.
 For more than 20 years, the Special Forces community has 
served as the primary tool in the fight against terrorism in 
countering violent extremist organizations. That was the 
mission required of us in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, a 
mission that I carried out as an Army Ranger.
 And while we still need to maintain that capability and not 
lose sight of those hard-won gains, we must also prepare to 
face future challenges.
 One, how is the Special Operations community postured to 
support this effort? Two, do they have the right training, 
manning, equipping, institutional support, funding, and 
professional military education system?
 Another crucial question for this committee to address is 
SOCOM's budget, which has been relatively flat over the past 
decade. I share the chairman's concerns in this regard given 
the tremendous amount of strain and resourcing that has been 
placed on your command. It simply has not kept pace with 
inflation, resulting in a 14 percent reduction in buying power 
since 2019, although SOCOM's requirements have certainly not 
diminished, as we have pointed out.
 Despite the stagnation, there has been a 35 percent 
increase in combatant command demand for Special Operations 
capabilities. So in a rapidly changing threat environment, a 
Special Operator is one of the country's greatest advantages 
and remains so today. It is our job to ensure we continue to 
hone and support this highly capable and agile force, including 
resourcing critical gaps in SOCOM funding.
 So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how 
they are prepared to do this, what is needed for deterrence, 
and how we are going to meet this increasing challenge of 
skyrocketing demand while diminishing resourcing for our 
capabilities.
 So Assistant Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I want 
to thank both of you and your teams, not just for this hearing, 
but the engagements that have led up to this, the briefings 
that you have given to both the chairman and I.
 It is actually very refreshing in this environment, the 
amount of engagement and collaboration and information that you 
provided through your command. You are setting the standard in 
my opinion with the Department of Defense. So we look forward 
to that continuing.
 And with that, I yield back.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
 We will now hear from our witnesses. Once this is done, we 
are going to move into the question-and-answer session. And 
immediately following one round of questions, which won't take 
long since many of our members weren't able to make it today. 
We will reconvene for the classified session, which will take 
place in Rayburn 2337.
 Please be advised that we may have to break in the middle 
for votes on the floor. We will wait and see. And I understand 
you both have statements to give. So, I will start with 
Secretary Anderson, and we will begin with you. You are 
recognized for five minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DERRICK M. ANDERSON, ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF WAR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY 
 CONFLICT

 Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member 
Crow, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to testify in the global posture of our 
nation's Special Operations Forces.
 I am honored to testify alongside Admiral Mitch Bradley, 
commander of the United States Special Operations Command. I 
would also like to take a moment to recognize the dedicated 
professionals from the SO/LIC (Special Operations/Low Intensity 
Conflict) team who are here with us today.
 Mr. Randy Harvey, who leads the Secretariats strategy, 
forces, and integration portfolio and Ms. Cara Teeter, who 
leads the Secretariats capability, resources and analysis 
portfolio.
 The SO/LIC team, together with their U.S. SOCOM 
counterparts, bring invaluable expertise, leadership and 
insight as we advocate on behalf of the SOF (Special Operations 
Forces) enterprise, our service members and their families.
 People are the foundation of SOF, the end of the Joint 
Force. They are our competitive advantage against our 
adversaries. We are thankful for those who have volunteered to 
serve, those currently in harm's way, and those who have made 
the ultimate sacrifice, including the 13 service members we 
have lost during ongoing operations. We honor their lives and 
legacy. We will never forget their sacrifice in defense of our 
country.
 Today's security environment is defined by simultaneity, 
convergence, and speed. State adversaries, terrorist 
organizations and transnational criminal networks are 
increasingly aligned, technologically enabled, and active 
across domains and regions.
 To answer these challenges, the national defense strategy 
marks a fundamental shift, directing the Department of War to 
implement a flexible, realistic approach to protect America's 
interest.
 The purpose built for this era, SOF provides capability and 
optionality, comprising only 3 percent of the Joint Force and 
less than 2 percent of the Department's budget, roughly 
equivalent to the procurement cost of a single aircraft 
carrier, SOF delivers outsized strategic value.
 SOF provides senior leaders with scalable, tailorable, 
asymmetric options across the full spectrum of competition and 
conflict. Leveraging persistent global presence, generational 
relationships, and unique authorities, SOF shapes the operating 
environment, strengthens partners, and imposes costs on our 
adversaries.
 Every major operation has a SOF component to it. Operations 
like Southern Spear, Rough Rider, Midnight Hammer, Absolute 
Resolve, and Epic Fury have demonstrated our nation's prowess 
and commitment to confront our adversaries wherever they may 
be.
 From the Western Hemisphere across the Indo-Pacific to the 
Middle East, Africa, Europe and beyond, SOF has been decisive 
in defending the homeland, deterring China, and enabling our 
partners and allies. Should deterrence fail, SOF is postured 
with the Joint Force to prevail on high end conflict.
 SOF also creates opportunities across all domains, buy down 
risk, and service path finders for the Department. With our 
culture of rapid adaptation and agile problem solving, SOF 
accelerates the adoption of disruptive technologies, seeding 
investments in unmanned and autonomous systems, counter-UxS 
(Counter-Unmanned Systems), cyber and electronic warfare, and 
rapidly delivering tools to warfighters at the point of need.
 In accordance with the law and congressional guidance, of 
which we are immensely grateful, the department has taken 
decisive and concrete steps to institutionalize SO/LIC's 
oversight and advocacy role and strengthen the governance of 
the SOF enterprise.
 Over the last year and a half, we have transformed the 
Secretariat for Special Operations to provide direct civilian 
oversight across organized, trained, and equipment 
responsibilities. Not to duplicate or disrupt the operational 
execution of U.S. SOCOM, but to support, sustain, and 
strengthen.
 This transformation moves us beyond the old advisory 
construct to a true exercise of authority, direction, and 
control through an analytical, disciplined, data driven, and 
strategically sound approach.
 While the maturation of these initiatives is ongoing, these 
foundational changes fulfill congressional intent and provide 
the oversight mechanisms needed to shape force structure, guide 
budgetary and planning processes, and forge the future of SOF.
 The optionality that SOF delivers requires resourcing and 
investments. To maintain our competitive edge, SOF needs 
sustained partnership, predictable resourcing, and continued 
modernization.
 We greatly appreciate the support from this committee. I 
commit to continued collaboration with Congress and to make 
full use of my position in the Department and alongside the 
services to ensure SOF remains resources, ready, relevant, and 
accountable, and to ensure they can meet today's mission while 
transforming for tomorrow's challenges.
 I am honored to lead the SOF enterprise and invite you to 
visit our Special Operators and their families across the globe 
to see firsthand the great work they do and the challenges they 
face. Our service members and their families represent the 
finest that America has to offer and that is something we, as a 
nation, should be proud of.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Secretary Anderson and Admiral 
Bradley can be found in the Appendix on page 28.]
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Admiral Bradley, you 
are now recognized, and we have plenty of time.

OPENING STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FRANK M. BRADLEY, USN, COMMANDER, 
 UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

 Admiral Bradley. Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this 
opportunity to represent the men and women of the United States 
Special Operations Command.
 I am honored to testify here today with Assistant Secretary 
of War for a Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict, the 
Honorable Derrick Anderson. In SOCOM, we rely upon the SO/LIC 
oversight support and advocacy to succeed in all of our global 
missions.
 I am also joined today by the SOCOM Command Sergeant Major 
A.J. Krogman, who exemplifies the professionalism, the 
leadership, and the backbone of our non-commissioned officer 
corps, the greatest in the world.
 On behalf of our entire community, I want to thank you for 
your enduring support. And to any of our nation's finest who 
are listening to this today and considering a life of service 
in uniform, I want you to know that we are looking for critical 
thinkers who can fight and creative makers who can solve the 
hardest problems. And if you are one of those people, then it 
is you that we are looking for.
 Distinguished members of this committee, we meet at a 
crucial moment. As you have said, today's security environment 
is defined by state adversaries, terrorist organizations, and 
criminal networks that are increasingly aligned, 
technologically enabled, and active across every domain. Our 
national defense strategy highlights the potential of 
simultaneity as a central problem and your SOF is the key 
component of its prescription.
 Today's environment rewards forces that can operate 
persistently and decisively, often below the threshold of armed 
conflict generating irregular effects by, through, and with our 
allies and partners in order to produce a full effect that is 
much greater than the sum of its parts.
 Your Special Operations Forces provide that capability 
comprising just 3 percent of the Joint Force and 2 percent of 
the budget as has been stated, your SOF enables and delivers an 
outsized strategic return by providing our nation's leaders 
with scalable, tailorable, and those asymmetric options that 
come across the spectrum of competition conflict.
 Our purpose is our mission. This means we are laser focused 
on maintaining the readiness required to protect the homeland, 
to deter aggression from our pacing challenge, China, and to 
enable true burden sharing by enabling and empowering the 
growing capacity of our allies and partners.
 But that mission is not accomplished by technology and 
equipment alone. It is executed by the most decisive advantage 
that we have, our people, empowered by a culture of 
meritocracy, supported by critical programs that you have 
helped manifest, like the Preservation of the Force and Family. 
The health of your SOF formation is strong, and it is getting 
stronger.
 To ensure that these exceptional men and women can succeed 
in the complex of environments of tomorrow, increasingly 
encroaching upon today, we are making transformation our 
imperative. We must adapt faster than our adversaries. We must 
be able to project force through the most dangerous 
environments. And we must evolve to leverage the ubiquitous 
information environment that presents both a challenge and an 
opportunity.
 We must evolve our force design, accelerate the capability 
development, and strengthen our partnerships to the services 
and allies to stay ahead of emerging threats.
 As the Department's lead for experimentation and autonomy, 
we are not just adapting, we are driving change. We are working 
with the services to incorporate next generation capabilities, 
systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable, consistent 
with the law of war.
 The goal is to deliver these tools with the element of 
surprise from unwarned access and placement at scale, ensuring 
our forces maintain a decisive advantage against any adversary.
 You see, SOF defends the homeland by dismantling threats 
far from our shores, disaggregating terrorist networks. We 
deter aggression by strengthening the resilience of our 
alliance, illuminating and exposing adversary and malign 
behavior that preys upon our partners and allies.
 However, our ability to accomplish this is not guaranteed. 
It requires accelerated modernization and your continued 
partnership. Predictable resourcing for our program's 
modernization is a strategic necessity.
 SOF was purpose built for this era of competition. And we 
can provide an indispensable, asymmetric advantage for the 
Joint Force and the nation. And with your continued support, we 
will meet today's missions while transforming to ensure that we 
are ready for the challenges of tomorrow.
 Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Admiral Bradley and Secretary 
Anderson can be found in the Appendix on page 28.]
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Admiral. And with that, we will 
start with the questioning. And I will begin with my question.
 Admiral Bradley, I know you have only been in command for a 
little over five months now, and I suspect you are most likely 
still assessing various aspects of the command. But what would 
you say the top three challenges are this fiscal year to 
sustain your three SOF lines of effort, which are win people 
and transform, and what do we need to do here in Congress to 
help you succeed in that?
 Admiral Bradley. Chairman, thank you. Our first priority is 
always to maintain readiness for the current threats that are 
out there. Crisis response is that top priority for us, being 
able to respond agilely to wherever it might present. And, of 
course, the demands on that, as has been mentioned, have been 
300 percent increase over these last five years. That pace 
continues.
 You will remember a year ago when General Fenton was 
testifying, and I here supporting him, as we were telling the 
story. That pace of growing usage but diminishing resources was 
causing us to have to eat into our modernization budget to be 
able to cash load those current operations. That is still the 
case.
 And so today, the modernization priorities that I would 
tell you are very similar to those from a year ago. Number one, 
to be able to project force into increasingly contested 
environments where our adversaries are opposing threats against 
us.
 Number two really is to take advantage of the fact that 
there is this ubiquitous information environment, ubiquitous 
technical surveillance that is out there. Many people see it as 
a threat. It certainly is. But it is also an advantage, an 
opportunity that we could leverage. The cyber and the virtual 
domain are critical maneuver spaces that we must take advantage 
of.
 Of course, another aspect of the rapidly evolving changing 
character of warfare is the emergence of abundant lethal 
autonomy. And yes, that is a threat that we have to contend 
with, but it is also one that we can leverage. So that is also 
an area that we will looking to prioritize modernization.
 And finally, although this is the foundation, and as 
Secretary Anderson alluded to directly, our people must 
continue to be our foundation, ensuring they are trained, 
ready, supported, and educated for the future.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Admiral, and we will work to get 
you additional resources. Because, you know, one thing I have 
learned on being on his committee, the short period of time 
that I have been the chair and a little bit prior to that, is 
that we absolutely in this particular community cannot eat into 
research and development testing, evaluation, and modernization 
efforts because that will quickly affect your ability to fight 
in the months and years to come. So we will take that 
seriously.
 Secretary Anderson, you have been in the seat a few months 
less than Admiral Bradley. And I am sure you are still 
assessing your priorities as well. SOCOM's budget, as we 
mentioned, has been relatively flat for the past decade. And in 
the combined written statement that was submitted, you state 
the SOCOM comprises only 3 percent of the Joint Force and less 
than 2 percent of the Department's budget, delivering ``an 
outsized strategic value''.
 I personally believe SOCOM's budget needs to increase to a 
steady state of at least $20 billion a year. How are you using 
your secretary-like position to advocate for a higher budget 
for SOCOM? What do you think the future budget looks like for 
SOCOM? And how do you quantify this outsized strategic value in 
your budget submission?
 Secretary Anderson. Mr. Chairman, I first want to start off 
by thanking the committee for those 907 authorities and the 
NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) a few years ago that 
gave us that service-like ability.
 What I can tell you is within the Department, having that 
service-like ability allows us to work with the other military 
departments hand-in-hand, specifically when we talk about the 
resources not only that we are being provided, but the other 
services are being provided and gives us an opportunity to go 
from service to service, from chief to chief, and have those 
conversations about modernizations and where we might be 
overlapping or where we can combine forces. So I think that 907 
capability and authorities that you gave us gets us in the room 
with the other services.
 As far as echoing what Admiral Bradley spoke about and our 
modernization, as we continue to modernize, we see that 
technology typically, and I have heard various different 
ranges, but, you know, technology ends up being obsolete within 
six months.
 So our operators that are operating on the ground not only 
utilizing the technology that they have internal to the 
Department, but also training by, with, and through our 
partners and the technology they have. That is an absolutely 
other critical part of this in ensuring that, you know, we are 
staying up to speed with technology. So that investment, as 
Admiral Bradley said, is absolutely crucial.
 And then one of the other priorities I just would like to 
highlight, Mr. Chairman, is the POTFF program, the Preservation 
of the Force and Family. That investment that you made in the 
SOF community absolutely increases our readiness and allows us 
to take care of our soldiers and sailors and airmen. I am happy 
to get into more detail on that.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. I have one last 
question here, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Section 
863 of the fiscal year 2026 NDAA required the establishment of 
the SOCOM urgent innovative technologies and capabilities 
initiative with funding that was allocated in the 2025 Budget 
Reconciliation Act.
 When do you expect to begin implementing this requirement 
and how does it nest with SOCOM's transformation imperative?
 Admiral Bradley. Chairman, I will start and just say that 
the appreciation for that investment and for the recognition of 
the agility with which SOCOM already operates. So in many ways, 
those capabilities inside the SOCOM unique acquisition process 
give us unity of command to be able to both see a requirement, 
to identify it, articulate it, move resources to be able to 
execute against it, field it, and get it out in a very rapid 
manner to be able to test and evaluate whether it is credible 
for the combat situations it might have to face.
 The authority given in 863 and the resources to be able to 
allow that to happen makes us able to execute that more 
quickly.
 As we look to the other initiatives that have come both 
from this chamber, from the Senate, and from the President, all 
in acquisition reform, the SPEED (Streamlining Procurement for 
Effective Execution and Delivery) Act, the FoRGED (Fostering 
Reform and Government Efficiency in Defense) Act, all of those 
are really looking to take advantage of some of the pathways 
that SOCOM and SO/LIC have been able to chart over the years 
and then extrapolate them out across the broader joint force.
 And so the leadership that Secretary Anderson is talking 
about inside the Pentagon at the Secretariat level is a 
critical part to be able to harness some of that new authority 
that you have given us and be able to help the other services 
to be able to use it in the same way.
 Secretary Anderson. Mr. Chairman, echoing what Admiral 
Bradley said, the one thing I would make a point of is when we 
talk about the military department and department 
relationships, Admiral Bradley and I are 100 percent working 
with the other departments not only to give our lessons learned 
to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force so that their acquisitions 
processes get better, but also learn where we can get better.
 There are certainly some lessons learned that we can get 
from the services. But we will continue to work with you and 
this committee to keep you up to date on how we are exercising 
that authority.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. And as you know, 
the focus of the NDAA this last year was to reform acquisition 
and procurement that process altogether. This money was 
intended knowing that SOCOM was already good at that, better 
than most in the military.
 You already had some area of expertise in there. But to 
refine that process so that it could then be used as an example 
for other, you know, other areas in the military so that they 
could kind of mimic what was going on in a lessons learned kind 
of way.
 So I hope we get that done, and I hope it turns out to be 
really successful and everybody learns a lot from it. Thank 
you. I appreciate it.
 With that, Mr. Crow, I recognize you.
 Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. I wanted to begin on 
something that I think that Special Operations Forces are 
uniquely equipped and trained to do and that is working with 
civilian populations, building trust.
 You are known as force multipliers. And the genesis of that 
is you know better than anybody is that you work with those 
local populations. You build public sentiment, public trust, 
and you build foreign forces.
 And a part of that is this understanding--and, you know, 
and I worked in the community--this understanding that you are 
going to do everything possible to protect global forces, that 
built in the mission planning process is protecting civilians, 
reducing civilian casualties. Because nothing sets back years 
sometimes of trust building and relationship building than an 
errant strike, than killing civilians, right?
 It is not just inefficient and immoral and unlawful in 
certain circumstances, but it actually makes it harder for us 
to do our mission, which is why, you know, this committee and 
Congress in the fiscal year 2019 NDAA required DOD (Department 
of Defense) to develop a comprehensive policy for preventing 
civilian harm, which it did.
 In the fiscal year 2023 NDAA, I helped create a civilian 
protection center of excellence because I learned that you can 
actually accomplish the tactical element of a mission but then 
lose the end game if the people that you are fighting with and 
working with actually don't trust you and support you.
 Those efforts have been slashed in the last year, 80 
percent of the CPCoE (Civilian Protection Center of Excellence) 
and the resources have been cut. The personnel that have been 
embedded in the combatant commands have been largely taken 
away. And it seems like a terrible missed opportunity but also 
a strategic error to not equip our operators and our forces 
with the tools they need to comprehensively address our 
adversaries and build a trust in our alliances.
 In that vein, Secretary Anderson on February 28, there was 
a girls' elementary school in Iran that was struck. Public 
reports say that 175 civilians, many of them children, were 
reportedly killed or wounded in that strike. It is my 
understanding that there has been a preliminary investigation 
and that you might be aware of that.
 Is that preliminary investigation complete and was there a 
15-6 that came out of that?
 Secretary Anderson. Congressman, first to answer your 
second question first, currently the incident is being 
investigated by CENTCOM (Central Command). I wouldn't want to 
get ahead of the investigation. And in the closed setting, I am 
happy to give you some of the dates and details as how that has 
progressed.
 But it is currently being investigated. What I can say is 
that the investigating officer is a general officer outside of 
the CENTCOM chain of command. So there will be an unbiased, 
impartial investigation that is conducted.
 And Congressman, to your point, to be very clear, you are 
absolutely right. There is no strategic benefit for the United 
States or for the department in civilian harm. And that is what 
makes us different and separate from our adversaries.
 We continue to have a center of excellence, a civilian harm 
center of excellence, and continue with those reports. But I 
think you bring up a good point is what we have done within the 
command structure if you look at from when a SOF operator's 
training at the ground level all the way through a general 
officer, now they are taking civilian harm and ensuring that it 
is mitigated throughout the entire process.
 And I think that has shown a world of compliance to 
culture. And I think that is where we have been heading. And, 
again, I am happy to have more conversations and discuss some 
of those things in the closed setting.
 Mr. Crow. I appreciate that. And I appreciate you saying 
the strategic importance of this. And I don't doubt in any way 
that you are committed to that because I know that you have 
lived this, and you understand it. It is obviously a part of 
what you do down range.
 Can you clarify--and this isn't a got you. I am just 
honestly asking the question. So there has not been a 
preliminary investigation that has been completed? The initial 
investigation by CENTCOM is still underway?
 Secretary Anderson. No, Congressman, as you are well aware 
with the civilian harm mitigation, there will be an initial 
investigation to determine whether or not a 15-6 should be 
opened.
 Mr. Crow. And that has been completed.
 Secretary Anderson. Correct.
 Mr. Crow. And now there is a 15-6.
 Secretary Anderson. And there is a 15-6 open that is going 
to be a full investigation, Congressman.
 And you have my commitment as we have in the past, once 
that investigation is complete and finalized, that we will make 
sure that we are available.
 Mr. Crow. 15-6 is the one that is underway?
 Secretary Anderson. Correct, correct.
 Mr. Crow. And the preliminary investigation, did he 
determine that U.S. Armed Forces carried out the strikes on the 
elementary school?
 Secretary Anderson. I have not seen it, Congressman. Again, 
I am happy to have a conversation in closed. Right now, I have 
the fact that a 15-6, a full-on 15-6, has been investigated.
 Mr. Crow. But you haven't seen the results of the 
preliminary investigation?
 Secretary Anderson. I have not, Congressman.
 Mr. Crow. Have you, Admiral Bradley?
 Admiral Bradley. No, sir, I haven't yet.
 Mr. Crow. I wanted to go to one of your comments about 
lethal autonomous drones, right? It is happening. Our 
adversaries are doing it. There has been a lot of debate about 
the morality, the legality of taking a human outside of the 
kill chain and making that decision ourselves.
 You had mentioned, Admiral Bradley, you said lethal 
autonomous authority is happening. We need to leverage that 
ourselves. What did you mean by that? Are you saying that there 
has been a decision within the administration that we will 
allow lethal autonomous authority with drones?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I believe we employ lethal 
capability that has an amount of autonomy in it every day. Any 
of our IR (infrared) guiding missiles has an amount of that 
baked into it.
 Mr. Crow. Can I drill down on that? Is there, just sitting 
here today, is there a human in the kill chain?
 Admiral Bradley. There is always a human in the kill chain.
 Mr. Crow. And is there a debate about taking a human out of 
the kill chain?
 Admiral Bradley. I do not believe there is.
 Mr. Crow. What do you personally believe?
 Admiral Bradley. That the law of armed conflict and the law 
of war requires a human to be the decider about where and how 
lethal--any lethal force should be delivered, no matter the 
vessel of that lethal force. It should be a human that is 
making that decision.
 Mr. Crow. I am very relieved to hear you say that. Thank 
you.
 Chairman, I yield back.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you.
 Mr. Scott, you are recognized for five minutes.
 Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. I too have the concerns 
about the budget constraints and what it is doing to 
modernization. I want to get to the proposed 3,000 billet 
reduction in forces. And Secretary Anderson, I understand it is 
predominantly intelligence analysts, logistical staff, and 
psychological operations that you intend to make the--that the 
reductions will come from. Is that correct?
 Secretary Anderson. Congressman, that is correct.
 Mr. Scott. I want to ask, in the psychological operations, 
does that include what we would refer to as information 
warfare?
 Secretary Anderson. Well, Congressman, I would say that 
there is information operations. There is psychological 
operations. And I am happy, again, to talk a little bit more in 
detail on the closed session. But we are doing a revamp within 
the special operations, specifically in USASOC (United States 
Army Special Operations Command) to ensure we have those 
capabilities readily available.
 Mr. Scott. I think it would be a good use of time for our 
military to study how effective the Russians have been on the 
continent of Africa with information warfare and how effective 
they have been in getting the French kicked off of the 
continent. And it has created significant challenges for us in 
that continent.
 And I just--I want to make sure that part of today's 
warfare is not ignored because we have to embrace it. We can 
see what they are doing and know what they are doing and yet we 
have not been countering it at an effective rate and speed 
matters with that.
 So sticking with Africa, Russia, Africa Corps now, Wagner 
Group--it used to be Wagner Group, China, they are both 
expanding their security roles in Africa. What specific risk 
does this create for the U.S. national security, for our need 
for critical minerals, and our ability to operate in Africa?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I can take that as a--
 Mr. Scott. Okay.
 Admiral Bradley. --start point and sort of fall back on the 
previous question as well.
 I think one of the critical things in the information space 
that we have to do, and it gets specifically to your point 
about critical minerals and other threats on the African 
continent, is lever the high ground in information operations. 
That is the truth. And in almost every case, our adversaries 
are leveraging their positions for malign influence against the 
population's interest.
 And merely what we can do to be most effective is tell the 
truth and highlight that. So in Africa, that is clearly the 
case. And, again, I don't want to get ahead of General Dag 
Anderson, the AFRICOM (Africa Command) commander who, of 
course, owns the strategy and understands this far better than 
any of us, but we provide support to him through these forces 
to help him to do just that.
 Mr. Scott. I think it would be a good use of tax dollars 
for us to get some actual footage, as you said, telling the 
truth of what China is doing with the harvesting of fish in 
exclusive economic zones off of the continent of Africa and 
show the citizens of that continent just how their natural 
resources, their food supply, is being pillaged by the Chinese. 
And I think the Chinese would be much less welcome by the 
people of the continent if they knew just how much of their 
food supply was being stolen by China.
 So sticking to Africa, we lost the key access point in 
Niger, Admiral. What has that done to the operational impact, 
your ability to conduct counterterrorism missions in Africa? 
How has this impacted SOF's ability with regard to speed in a 
crisis response?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, West Africa has been a 
particularly volatile region over the last several years and a 
number of countries that have changed leadership. In 
particularly in the case of Niger, as several of the others, I 
would tell you that our SOF generational longstanding 
relationships with the professional military to military forces 
there have helped us to maintain some contact in these 
troubling times.
 And in fact, we hope that as things evolve and those 
governments stabilize and new diplomatic connections can be 
made, they can be levered to help us maintain indications and 
awareness of threats that might be there and ultimately to help 
them to police their own problems.
 Mr. Scott. Those relationships matter. I agree with you. 
They are stills strong at the mil to mil level. And I hope we 
are able to leverage them to get back into Niger in 101 and 
201.
 I also want to advocate for the Echo programs on the 
continent of Africa. And I know, Secretary, if I am not 
mistaken, you were a Green Beret?
 Secretary Anderson. That is correct, sir.
 Mr. Scott. But I very much believe in the ODA (Operational 
Detachment Alpha) and the Echo programs and hope that we will 
find the funds to continue to expand them on that continent. 
With that, I yield back.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
 Mr. Tran, you are recognized for five minutes.
 Mr. Tran. Thank you so much, Chairman. Welcome, Admiral 
Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Thanks for being here.
 Admiral Bradley, the Department has emphasized that 
adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran are increasingly 
operating through proxies, criminal networks, and influence 
campaigns below the threshold of armed conflict.
 How central are Special Operations Forces to countering 
those activities? And do you believe SOCOM currently has the 
authorities and resources required to compete effectively in 
that space?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. In fact, I would 
refer back to those generational partnerships and relationships 
that we build around the planet. Today, there are more than 
6,500 SOF operators and enablers deployed around and in 80 
different countries. And every one of those building and 
sustaining those relationships.
 To your point about the influence operations that our 
adversaries are conducting, in most cases those are designed to 
prey upon our allies and our partners to be able to use that 
malign behavior to be able to gain unwarned access and 
leverage.
 Our ability to be able to illuminate that malign behavior 
and then to pass it and make our partners aware of it, many 
times through diplomatic channels but sometimes directly, mil 
to mil, security service to security service, is a critical way 
to be able to help undermine our adversary's actions.
 Mr. Tran. I appreciate that.
 Admiral Bradley. And to your question about authorities, I 
would just reckon back to the 127 programs. A critical 
capability to us to be able to do that. And we do believe those 
authorities are robust and appreciated.
 Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. Let me ask you this. SOCOM 
represents only about 3 percent of the Joint Force, yet 
combatant commanders continue to request support from Special 
Operation forces across nearly every theater.
 Does demand for Special Operation forces currently exceed 
sustainable levels? And also what risk does that create for 
readiness and retention within the forces?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. I would say it--
well, to affirm, they are asking for more than we have to offer 
every year since I have been paying attention to that. This 
last year was about 70 different asks that we could not 
satisfy.
 We are able to sustain because we only do the things that 
we were able to sustain. That said, because of the work that 
both of these chambers have done, really since 2006 QDR 
(Quadrennial Defense Review), we have the ability to sustain 
the level of force and commitment that we are at today.
 The budget reduction or the buying power reduction over the 
last five to six years, has limited our ability to be able to 
modernize. And that is really the critical determiner for the 
future. With the few resources we have that are in higher and 
higher demand to be able to make them more useful, we need to 
modernize them for the future.
 Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. To either of the witnesses, and 
you both may answer, looking five to ten years ahead, what do 
you believe is the greatest risk facing the Special Operation 
enterprise and what is the one area where congressional support 
would have the greatest impact on SOCOM's ability to succeed.
 Admiral Bradley. I will take a first stab at it. If you 
would have asked me that question ten years ago, I would have 
defined the most dangerous crisis of the future probably being 
an Iran or an Iranian surrogate or proxy force threatening 
freedom of navigation in and around the Middle East. And so 
that most dangerous crisis ten years ago, is the most likely 
crisis that we face today.
 I would anticipate that along those same lines, the ability 
to project force into increasingly contested environments where 
U.S. national interests are threatened is the characterization 
of the next most dangerous crisis. That is why we have made our 
ability to do that our top modernization priority.
 If you look at the operation conducted under Absolute 
Resolve into Venezuela, I would argue the most sophisticated 
integrated interagency Joint Force raid ever conducted. You get 
a peek into the modernization pathway that the Joint Force is 
on. And it is that ability.
 Mr. Tran. Thanks, Admiral. Mr. Secretary, can I get your 
take?
 Secretary Anderson. Yes, Congressman. What I would say, 
Admiral Bradley alluded to this earlier, when we talk about the 
different threats that are across the world, those 
relationships that we have maintained not just for years but 
for decades are how we build that value proposition that SOF 
brings to the table.
 Specifically highlighting, and you asked, Congressman, what 
are one of the things Congress, continued support for those 127 
programs are absolutely essential to ensuring that we maintain 
that value proposition. The one ODA or one SEAL (Sea, Air, and 
Land) team is able to accomplish is absolutely astronomical for 
the Joint Force so.
 And then lastly, again, Admiral Bradley hit it on the head, 
was our modernization efforts, ensuring that we utilize 
autonomy and AI to efficiently conduct staffing, all of those 
things, that allow us to focus on operational needs.
 Mr. Tran. Thanks, Secretary, I yield back.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Tran.
 Mr. Luttrell, you are recognized for five minutes.
 Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
Admiral Bradley, thank you for coming today and thank everyone 
in the room for your service and continued service.
 Admiral Bradley, MILCON (Military Construction) funding for 
construction projects is about $509 million, one of which is a 
SOF human performance training center. What is that?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, that is one of our integrated 
facilities where we are able to bring together the preservation 
of the Force and Family Program to be able to provide 
synchronized and integrated care for our operators either 
returning from service from an injury or who are enhancing 
their performance to be able to go out on the next missions to 
be able to provide that continuity of care.
 Mr. Luttrell. Is it a NICoE (National Intrepid Center of 
Excellence) like institute?
 Admiral Bradley. No, Congressman. There are a number of 
those in each one of our major force concentration centers that 
give us the ability to really permeate the care from the POTFF 
program down to the lowest level possible.
 Mr. Luttrell. There is more than one? I only see one in 
Delaware. I don't know how they ended up winning it. I think 
Texas would have been a better spot to hang it. But we can talk 
about it later.
 Admiral Bradley. Yes, Congressman. Actually, I am not aware 
of the one in Delaware. But those centers, we increment through 
the budget to be able to give each of our force concentrations 
a component of tech capability.
 Mr. Luttrell. What is the--I hate to put you on the spot 
with this one, Admiral, but what does that look like? I spent 
my entire post-military career trying to find the best--I don't 
want to say pipeline--but training mechanism for the brain and 
the body combined?
 Our Special Operations Forces, we demand the boat teams. 
You have to go faster. It has to be there quicker. It is a 
rugged ride. I don't know a boat operator that retired that can 
stand up straight. Most of them don't have their kidneys 
anymore and everything is wrong with them, but we push them 
harder, and we push them faster.
 SDVs (SEAL Delivery Vehicle), how deep can you dive, how 
long can you go? How cold can you sustain--how cold can it be 
and you can sustain yourself to be mission capable? We keep 
going and we keep going and we keep going. Our operators are 
carrying heavier ruck sacks because we keep throwing technology 
on top of them and it just weighs more than anything. Push 
harder, push faster. And we don't ever--I am not wire brushing 
you, sir. This is the time that I get to vent. Thank you.
 But we do not, we do not take the time in my personal 
opinion to take care of you from start to finish, baseline 
assessment to the time that you quit--retire. Excuse me. I 
actually never say quit. Okay?
 And when we have these performance facilities that we are 
popping up, I want to know what is in it because I don't need a 
six pack and a bag of Cheetos. I mean, the Special Operators of 
the United States of America is the most amazing asset.
 And I think we are--we have not done our best to take care 
of them because--and everyone in this room that is wearing a 
uniform right now needs to listen to what I am saying to you. 
Because when you do leave and you fall into that deep, dark 
black hole because you are not here anymore and you are alone, 
I think there is something we can do to catch your trajectory 
to change that because it is lonely out there.
 And I am trying to deal with that in the VA (Veterans 
Affairs). But if we can help inside the DOD, inside the 
community, inside of our house, that is a win.
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, I absolutely agree with you. 
And I suspect you probably dropped a half an inch of height in 
your time in the Teams.
 Mr. Luttrell. That is why I am shorter than my brother 
because I kept getting in the boat.
 Admiral Bradley. Just like most of us. And it is exactly 
that aim of community that these centers in the POTFF program 
is allowing us to develop.
 So I will just give you--I will take you on a small tour of 
what one of them looks like.
 Mr. Luttrell. Thank you.
 Admiral Bradley. Where a team of either SEALS or ODA or 
Raiders or our Air Force Special Tactics folks would come in in 
the morning to begin to work their PT (physical training) 
regimen for that day. In that same facility would be those who 
are injured but can't work out with their teammates anymore 
that are going through rehab or going through care to be able 
to get back up on its feet. But they are in the same facility. 
So there is still that strong sense of community.
 If they can't go through rehab or maybe at the backside of 
the physical rehab, they check into the performance enhancement 
section where cognitive and performance psychologists help them 
to train their cognitive abilities to be smarter and to have 
better reaction time, all still inside that same facility so 
there is still the jab and then going back and forth to their 
teammates. They are still part of the team.
 If some of those individuals in that performance 
enhancement, cognitive enhancement with the performance sites, 
find that they have care that needs to be attended to by a 
clinical site, there is no shame there. There is no stigma. 
They are now in a warm handoff through a door to a clinical 
site to be able to get the care that they need.
 We have seen that in many cases this holistic care--and it 
is very much modeled after the lessons from the various NICoE 
facilities and many others that are templated around the world, 
has been able to reduce the stigma to the point where some 50 
percent of our formations in some cases are making use of our 
behavioral health specialists now.
 I think that is one of the most important and the most 
telling statistics that we have got of the success of the 
program that POTFF has been able to fund for us.
 But it is not just that. The reduction and the return time 
for our operators who were injured back to full duty, 75 
percent reduction in that time. Seventy percent reduction in 
the amount of time that it takes for somebody to get access to 
first care. In most cases it is less than two days. In many 
cases, it is same day.
 And then the thing that really makes all of this hum, I 
think best, is the permeating nature of what we have been able 
to do. We have been able to put our sites, or our behavioral 
health specialists, our chaplains and our corpsmen down at the 
05 level in almost every formation to be able to give a name to 
face recognition of the caregivers to the operators so that 
there is immediate access and you know the case history of the 
operators and the enablers that are being helped.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Luttrell.
 Mr. Hamadeh, you are recognized for five minutes.
 Mr. Hamadeh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, 
Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I think you guys make 
an incredible team. So I would just encourage you to continue 
building that relationship.
 Admiral Bradley, I know you have talked about irregular 
triad before, Cyber, Special Operations, and Space. Could you 
for this committee and for the public just describe what that 
is?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, thank you. I talk about it 
generally when we are talking about the ubiquitous technical 
surveillance or ubiquitous information. It might be useful to 
just start there and say what in the world is that?
 Well, we probably all know that more and more of the world 
spends more and more of its time in the virtual domain. You 
only have to look at your screen time indicator on your cell 
phones to be able to recognize that that is in fact the case. 
And it is true that that time that you spend making more of 
your information available to the world is a vulnerability to 
you. It is a boon for our adversaries. But it is also an 
advantage for us, looking at our adversaries who adhere and 
fall into that same trap.
 And so that reality, that is the ubiquitous information 
environment. In order to take advantage of that, and we do 
through publicly available information, commercially acquirable 
information, and when appropriate, authorized and within legal 
bounds, clandestinely accessible information, we can know 
incredibly more about both our adversaries and the societies 
within which those adversaries are operating that will allow us 
to be far more precise and far more lethal in our operations 
when they are required and far more effective in those 
operations.
 But in order to do that, we need to merge those three 
disciplines that you just described in that new triad. The 
cyber capability, of course, to maneuver in the virtual domain 
to be able to access and gain access to all that information.
 In almost every case, that information transits through a 
space segment between one part of the globe and the other, 
being able to intersect that or to be able to lever that, to 
control it, to have freedom to maneuver there is critical.
 And then finally, you mentioned your SOF placement and 
access around the globe in over 80 countries since 6,500 
operators who have relationships that force multiply out to 
thousands, even more, give us the ability to both lever our 
physical placement and access with the virtual placement and 
access that our CYBERCOM and NSA teammates have through the 
space segment to be able to lever all of that to our national 
interest. That is really what we are talking about when we 
discuss the Space-SOF-Cyber triad.
 Mr. Hamadeh. Right. And given the Army's cutting 3,000 
Special Operation positions, would this impede trying to 
implement this irregular triad?
 Admiral Bradley. Congressman, any reduction, of course, has 
to be adjusted and most of those billets that are being 
adjusted and moved out are in the intelligence communications 
and logistics disciplines.
 And we completely understand why and how they are doing 
that because frankly the services recognize that they need to 
build the same kind of capability that SOF has leveraged to be 
able to manifest this. But it does come at a cost.
 We are adjusting and working with the services on how we 
might lever their augmentation from other fielded formations to 
make up for it, but it is an adjustment.
 Mr. Hamadeh. Okay. And Mr. Secretary, you know, with social 
media and AI rising right now, and we know that this is a 24/7 
information warfare. We can just look at the most recent 
example with Iran right now. A lot of Americans don't know what 
is real. They don't know what is fake.
 What changes from Congress would help improve how we run 
overseas influence campaigns with the speed of this modern 
warfare that we are in?
 Secretary Anderson. Thank you, Congressman. I am probably 
going to sound like a broken record. But when we, and Admiral 
Bradley, talk about modernization, that is truly what it comes 
from. And when Congressman Scott was mentioning the information 
operations world, we are trying to build information operation 
warriors, individuals that are specifically honed in on the 
information environment.
 And we have done some internal looking at ourselves to see 
if we are structured the right way, specifically not just 
within our ODAs and our SEAL teams and our Raiders, but 
specifically within our information operation spectrum.
 So we have been working. And as you are well aware, 
Congressman, a majority of those service members preside in the 
Army. But we have worked with the United States Army Special 
Operations command and looking at what that future looks like. 
Because as we talk about modernization, autonomy, AI, all of 
those other things, our information warriors, our cyber 
warriors, are at a different type of level than say I or 
Admiral Bradley.
 So we need to make sure we are structured properly and we 
are absolutely moving forward with that, Congressman.
 Mr. Hamadeh. And especially, you know, with Iran cutting 
off 90 percent of the internet access. I think it is important 
that we don't also lose sight in the most basics, leaflet 
drops, you know, we used to always do back in the day.
 And with that I yield back.
 Dr. Jackson. Thank you. And I would just like to say here 
as we close, I want to say, Mr. Secretary, thank you. Admiral, 
thank you. Thank you for what you do. Thank you for your 
leadership. Thank you for your time today. Thanks to all of the 
members here in the audience today that are in uniform. Thank 
you for your service to our country. We really appreciate it.
 I think the general consensus here, and, you know, I talked 
to all the members here on both sides of the aisle frequently 
about this. I think we all agree that you are not resourced 
properly for what you are asked to do. And so I think that is 
going to be a continuing effort on our part to make sure that 
we get things done, that we get you the resources, and we get 
you the authorities and the 127 echoes and things of that 
nature. We are going to work hard to make sure that we are 
supporting what you do and what you are asked to do.
 And with that, Mr. Crow, do you have any closing remarks?
 Mr. Crow. I will skip so we can get down to the SCIF 
(Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility).
 Dr. Jackson. Okay. With that, we are going to adjourn the 
open portion of the hearing here. We are going to move to 
Rayburn 2337 for the classified session, and we are adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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 A P P E N D I X

 March 18, 2026

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 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

 March 18, 2026

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAIABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

 March 18, 2026

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 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

 Mr. Scott. How is USSOCOM currently supporting resistance operating 
concept (ROC) development, unconventional warfare (UW) planning, and 
pre-crisis preparation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Are these 
efforts episodic and rotational, or do we have persistent, theater-
aligned SOF elements dedicated to Baltic resistance preparation?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Are there current statutory or policy constraints that 
limit your ability to conduct pre-positioning, training, or network 
development in the Baltics?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. How does USSOCOM integrate with EUCOM's operational 
plans to ensure that SOF-enabled resistance in the Baltics is 
synchronized with conventional force operations in the opening phase of 
a conflict?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What is the current level of persistent SOF presence in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Do you believe the current posture is 
sufficient to build enduring resistance networks, or would increased 
forward presence or authorities materially improve deterrence?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Would you characterize Baltic SOF units as among the 
most capable and motivated partner forces in NATO?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What additional training, equipment, or authorities 
would most improve the ability of Baltic SOF and resistance forces to 
conduct unconventional warfare under occupation conditions?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What is the current scope of USSOCOM engagement with 
Moldovan special operations or internal security forces?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What specific capability gaps-training, equipment, or 
intelligence-are most urgent in Moldova today?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. How does Moldova factor into broader SOF campaign plans 
for Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What specific statutory or policy limitations currently 
constrain USSOCOM's ability to operate effectively in Moldova?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What is the single most important capability we could 
provide Moldova in the next 12 months that would most increase 
deterrence?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. If Congress provided additional authorities or funding 
in the FY27 NDAA, what exactly would you do differently in Moldova?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. How would you characterize the capability, 
professionalism, and combat readiness of Romanian Special Operations 
Forces? To what extent are U.S. and Romanian SOF integrated in 
training, planning, and potential operational execution?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Are there any legal, policy, or resource barriers 
currently limiting deeper SOF integration with Romania?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Do current authorities under Title 10 adequately enable 
USSOCOM to build Romanian SOF capacity at the pace required by the 
threat environment?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Would expanded train-and-equip or irregular warfare 
authorities improve your ability to operate with Romanian forces? If 
so, how?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Are there funding or programmatic limitations that are 
slowing progress in building a more capable U.S.-Romania SOF 
partnership?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Does Romania have sufficient capability to support 
maritime irregular warfare, and if not, where are the key gaps?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Based on your military experience and without deferring 
to anyone else, would you agree that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have 
set a new standard in modern warfare for adaptability, resilience, and 
battlefield innovation?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Ukrainian forces have shown an ability to innovate 
rapidly under resource constraints-particularly in integrating drones, 
targeting, and decentralized operations. What lessons from their 
performance are most applicable to SOF?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Is Moldova currently prioritized appropriately within 
SOCOM's global campaign plans, or is it under-resourced relative to the 
threat?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Based on your observations and engagements with 
Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, how would you assess their overall 
combat effectiveness, adaptability, and professionalism in large-scale 
combat operations against a near-peer adversary like Russia? Would you 
agree that Ukrainian SOF today represent one of the most combat-
experienced and battle-tested special operations forces in the world?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have demonstrated remarkable innovation in 
areas such as unmanned systems employment, deep strike operations, and 
integrated information warfare. Can you describe specific examples 
where Ukrainian SOF have outperformed expectations or rewritten 
traditional SOF doctrine? Would you assess that Ukrainian SOF 
innovation-particularly in low-cost, high-impact drone operations-is 
ahead of where U.S. SOF doctrine was prior to this conflict?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. To what extent have Ukrainian SOF operations-such as 
strikes in Crimea or against high-value targets-achieved strategic-
level effects disproportionate to their size and resources? Is it fair 
to say that Ukrainian SOF have demonstrated how relatively small units 
can impose outsized costs on a larger conventional force?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. How effectively have Ukrainian SOF integrated with 
conventional Ukrainian forces to enable targeting, deep fires, and 
operational maneuver? Do you view Ukrainian SOF as a model for how SOF 
should be integrated into large-scale combat operations against a peer 
adversary?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have operated under constant artillery, 
missile, cyber, and electronic warfare threats. What does their 
performance tell us about the importance of mental resilience, 
decentralized leadership, and mission command in modern warfare? Would 
you agree that Ukrainian SOF have validated the enduring importance of 
SOF culture and training over technology alone?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Ukrainian SOF have consistently forced Russia to divert 
resources to defend rear areas, logistics nodes, and critical 
infrastructure. How significant has this been in terms of imposing 
operational and strategic costs on Russian forces? Would you agree that 
Ukrainian SOF have played a key role in shaping the battlefield beyond 
the front lines?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. What are the top lessons U.S. Special Operations Command 
has learned from Ukrainian SOF regarding operating in denied 
environments, leveraging commercial technologies, and conducting 
persistent irregular warfare alongside conventional conflict? Are there 
any authorities, resources, or institutional changes that Congress 
should consider to ensure U.S. SOF can replicate or exceed these 
capabilities?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Based on your observations, how do Ukrainian SOF compare 
to Russian special operations forces in terms of effectiveness, 
initiative, and battlefield impact? Would you agree that Ukrainian SOF 
have consistently demonstrated a qualitative advantage over their 
Russian counterparts?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Scott. Despite years of continuous combat, Ukrainian SOF remain 
highly effective. What factors have enabled their sustainment, 
recruitment, and continued combat performance? Does this suggest that 
national will and unit cohesion are decisive advantages in special 
operations warfare?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 ______
 
 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
 Mr. Kelly. Are there policy or approval processes that limit the 
speed or effectiveness of SOF information operations today, and are 
there areas where Congress could help ensure these capabilities are 
better integrated into our broader competition strategy?
 Mr. Anderson. Information operations (IO) encompass numerous 
distinct technical and cognitive capabilities and disciplines that are 
generally not exclusive to Special Operations Forces (SOF). Individual 
capabilities of a more sensitive nature, whether due to the political-
military risk of employment or the need for technical protection of 
systems, are governed by separate, necessary review and approval 
processes. To deconflict activities and foster unity of effort, the 
Department integrates competition-focused IO activities within broader 
campaign plans and coordinates with the Department of State and 
interagency partners prior to execution. The Department maintains the 
flexibility to approve and delegate time-sensitive information 
operations where appropriate, particularly during crises and conflicts. 
At this time, the Department does not require additional congressional 
support or legislative action to drive the internal integration of 
these capabilities into the broader competition strategy.
 Mr. Kelly. As the National Defense Strategy shifts toward great 
power competition, how is SOCOM adapting its capabilities and 
operational approach to compete with near-peer adversaries such as 
China and Russia?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Mr. Kelly. From your perspective, are there mission areas where 
demand for SOF exceeds available capacity, and how does SOCOM 
prioritize those requests across competing theaters?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 ______
 
 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
 Dr. Jackson. Irregular warfare is a significant and poorly 
understood problem facing the United States both here in the homeland 
and abroad. Congress has put a lot of time, effort, and resources into 
providing the authority, and appropriations for the Department to 
develop and operationalize irregular concepts worldwide. How has the 
Department used the Irregular Warfare Center to further these 
objectives and what are your plans for further employing their 
capabilities?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Dr. Jackson. Admiral Bradley, in your confirmation hearing, you 
mentioned the importance of operational security, especially in 
contested environments, and the need for SOF to be able to plan and 
conduct a mission with the element of surprise. You noted that the 
ability to operate within the ever-evolving ubiquitous technical 
surveillance (UTS) environment is a challenge and a critical component 
of mission success. How is SOCOM addressing this issue?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]
 Dr. Jackson. Admiral, the committee has been tracking the 
development of the Special Operations Forces Mission Command data layer 
as a key enabler for data sharing and decision-making across the force. 
Could you provide an update on the status and progress of implementing 
the Mission Command data layer across Special Operations Forces? In 
particular, I'm interested in a detailed accounting of funds expended 
for the effort, whether the capability is operationally deployed across 
the enterprise-including its availability on classified and 
unclassified networks-and the extent to which operators can access, 
share, and visualize data in operational environments. Additionally, 
how fully have SOF joint function activities been integrated into the 
data layer, and what technical, organizational, or resourcing 
challenges remain that could limit full implementation across the 
force?
 Admiral Bradley. [The information referred to is classified and is 
retained in the subcommittee files.]

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