ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS

Committee on Homeland Security · Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement House April 21, 2026

Witnesses (4)

  • Ms. Cynthia Kaiser, Senior Vice President, Halcyon Ransomware Research Center:
  • Mr. Ari Redbord, Global Head of Policy, TRM Labs:
  • Mr. Joshua M. Bercu, Senior Vice President of Policy, USTelecom-- The Broadband Association:
  • Ms. Megan Stifel, Chief Strategy Officer, Institute for Security and Technology:

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS

[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL 
 EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW 
 TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS 
 TARGET AMERICANS
=======================================================================

 JOINT HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 BORDER SECURITY
 AND ENFORCEMENT

 AND THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
 PROTECTION

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 APRIL 21, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-45

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-490 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================

 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

 Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
 Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Nick LaLota, New York Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking 
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Brad Knott, North Carolina Analilia Mejia, New Jersey
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
David P. Joyce, Ohio
 Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
 Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
 Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
 
 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT

 Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma J. Luis Correa, California, 
Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Brad Knott, North Carolina Analilia Mejia, New Jersey
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Al Green, Texas
 officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
 (ex officio)
 Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
 Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

 Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois, 
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Ranking Member
Nick LaLota, New York Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
 officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
 (ex officio)
 Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
 Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page

 Statements

The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From 
 the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border 
 Security and Enforcement:
 Oral Statement................................................. 1
 Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From 
 the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
 Border Security and Enforcement:
 Oral Statement................................................. 3
 Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Andrew Ogles, a Representative in Congress From the 
 State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity 
 and Infrastructure Protection:
 Oral Statement................................................. 6
 Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
 From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
 Homeland Security:
 Prepared Statement............................................. 8

 Witnesses

Ms. Cynthia Kaiser, Senior Vice President, Halcyon Ransomware 
 Research Center:
 Oral Statement................................................. 10
 Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Ari Redbord, Global Head of Policy, TRM Labs:
 Oral Statement................................................. 16
 Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Joshua M. Bercu, Senior Vice President of Policy, USTelecom--
 The Broadband Association:
 Oral Statement................................................. 31
 Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Ms. Megan Stifel, Chief Strategy Officer, Institute for Security 
 and Technology:
 Oral Statement................................................. 36
 Prepared Statement............................................. 38

 
 ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF 
 HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS

 ---------- 

 Tuesday, April 21, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Committee on Homeland Security,
 Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement, and the
 Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and 
 Infrastructure Protection,
 Washington, DC.
 The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., 
in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael Guest 
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border Security and 
Enforcement] presiding.
 Present from the Subcommittee on Border Security and 
Enforcement: Representatives Guest, Correa, Ramirez, Crane, 
Ogles, Knott, Johnson, and Green.
 Present from the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection: Representatives Ogles, Magaziner, 
and Walkinshaw.
 Mr. Guest. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Border Security and Enforcement will come to order. Without 
objection, the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any 
point.
 The purpose of today's hearing is to examine how 
transnational criminal organizations are increasingly 
exploiting digital technologies, including cryptocurrency, on-
line platforms, artificial intelligence, and global financial 
networks to conduct fraud, launder illicit proceeds, and target 
American citizens, businesses, and critical infrastructure. I 
would like to thank our colleagues from the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee for partnering with us 
for this joint hearing.
 I would like to now recognize myself for a brief opening 
statement.
 Good morning and welcome to the Border Security and 
Enforcement and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection 
Joint Subcommittee hearing examining how transnational criminal 
networks are increasingly targeting Americans in the digital 
world to expand their illicit activities and increase their 
profits through scams, fraud, and extortion. As technology has 
evolved and web-based services have crossed traditional 
borders, cyber-enabled financial crime has risen sharply. 
Transnational criminal networks, from Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations to Southeast Asia scam operations are targeting 
Americans. With an expanding arsenal of digital tools available 
in the public sphere, we must build and maintain a strong 
defense against cyber-enabled criminals.
 Most Americans have encountered some sort of scam enabled 
by technology. These scams often target our aging and elderly 
families and constituents, seeking to drain their life savings 
and retirement plans using emotional, manipulative tactics. In 
2025 alone, scammers stole more than $20 billion from 
Americans.
 Criminal networks use the digital domain to promote their 
illicit activities. The challenging nature of tracing 
cryptocurrency provides a landscape where Mexican drug cartels 
and other criminal organizations can launder money by 
converting profits from illegal activities into digital 
currency, which can be accessed across the world in a matter of 
seconds. Through this digital marketplace, the Mexican cartels 
are utilizing Chinese money-laundering networks as a piece of 
their business models. President Trump issued an Executive 
Order designating certain terrorists--excuse me, certain 
cartels and transnational criminal organizations as a foreign 
terrorist organization, or FTOs. This designation has created 
opportunities to use new authorities to combat drug cartels and 
organize criminal organizations.
 Cyber-enabled crime not only victimizes Americans, but also 
raises concern for national security interests. Just last week, 
in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, 
Todd Lyons, the acting director of ICE and Customs Enforcement, 
spoke about a major Homeland Security investigation involving 
Chinese Communist Party actors committing gift card fraud and 
sending proceeds back to military units in China.
 Digital extortion, which is another form of cyber crime, 
has serious national security implications. These ransomware 
attacks often involve foreign actors targeting sensitive 
industries, such as education, government, and health care 
databases, holding data or systems hostage and demanding 
payment for its release. My home State of Mississippi just 
recently experienced a major ransomware attack and I know that 
many of my colleagues districts have experienced attacks as 
well.
 The severity and increasing frequency of these attacks is 
deeply concerning. Our critical infrastructure, our data, and 
our constituents must be protected. Congress must step up to 
secure our virtual border. President Trump's recent Executive 
Order identifying cyber-enabled crime as a priority and pushing 
an offensive approach on combating cyber crime is a positive 
step, but it must be built upon. Given the role of industry, 
public-private partnerships are critical to facing these 
threats head on.
 It is important that Congress examine how transnational 
criminal organizations are exploiting digital technology and 
targeting Americans. Today we have with us experts who will 
share their insight on this growing issue and provide a 
valuable discussion on how Congress can work together to combat 
financial crime.
 [The statement of Chairman Guest follows:]
 Statement of Chairman Michael Guest
 April 21, 2026
 Good morning, welcome to the Border Security and Enforcement and 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection joint subcommittee hearing 
examining how transnational criminal networks use on-line scams, crypto 
fraud, and digital extortion to target Americans.
 As technology has evolved and web-based services have transcended 
traditional borders, cyber-enabled financial crime has sharply risen in 
popularity amongst transnational criminal organizations. With an 
expanding arsenal of digital tools available in the public sphere, we 
must maintain a strong defensive posture against cyber-enabled crime.
 Given the brevity of this topic, the committee has focused the 
scope of this hearing on on-line scams, cryptocurrency fraud, and 
digital extortion--three types of cyber-enabled crime that raise 
concerns for American national security interests.
 Likely everyone in this room has encountered some sort of scam 
enabled by the internet. These scams primarily target our aging and 
elderly families and constituents--seeking to drain their life savings 
and retirement plans using emotional manipulation tactics. In 2025 
alone, scammers stole more than $20 billion from Americans using these 
scams. This record high comes as a culmination between traditional 
criminal enterprises and the rapid sophistication of new technology.
 The challenging nature of tracing cryptocurrency provides a 
landscape where Mexican drug cartels and other transnational criminal 
organizations can launder money by converting profits from illegal 
activities into digital coins which can be accessed from anywhere in 
the world in a matter of seconds. Logically, groups like cartels enjoy 
the privacy associated with cryptocurrency as a form of currency that 
is decentralized from traditional banks with limited oversight.
 Digital extortion is another form of cyber-enabled crime that has 
serious national security implications. Also known as ransomware 
attacks, these crimes often involve foreign actors targeting sensitive 
industries like education, Government, and health care databases, 
holding data or systems hostage, and demanding payment for its release. 
My home State of Mississippi just recently experienced a major 
ransomware attack first-hand and I know my colleagues' districts have 
experienced serious attacks as well.
 Our critical infrastructure, our data, and our constituents must be 
protected--Congress must step up to secure our virtual footprint from 
bad actors. Through the Presidents' Executive Orders designating 
transnational criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
and the March order prioritizing an offensive approach on combatting 
cyber crime, the administration has new tools and pathways in place to 
collaborate, share information, and crack down on cyber-enabled crime.
 The subcommittees have brought expert witnesses here today to share 
their insight on this growing issue with the committee and provide 
valuable suggestions for Congress to support the administration in this 
effort.

 Mr. Guest. I would now like to recognize the Ranking 
Member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for his 
opening statement.
 Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with you. 
Cyber defense in our country should not be a Democratic or 
Republican issue, but rather an issue of national importance 
for all of us. That is the way it has been treated here in this 
committee, working across the aisle to make sure we protect 
everybody in our society and all institutions in our society.
 Let me start out by telling you that I am now a senior and 
now I get senior discounts. I guess that also comes with an 
ass-kicking. Recently I was at home looking through my personal 
email and I got an email from the IRS. Got my attention, looked 
legit, had the IRS logo, everything on it. It also said, unless 
you call us today, we will come and seize your assets, 
including your bank account assets. So, you know, I picked up 
the telephone number and I called that 888 number. The person 
on the other side answering the phone call said, get your 
credit card ready. You have to pay us $20,000 right away. 
Otherwise, we will be on our way to your house, and they told 
me where I lived, to pick you up and have you arrested.
 Pretty interesting conversation, very convincing. I thought 
to myself, OK, what will some of my other seniors in my 
district do when they get that telephone call? They called. How 
much money will they pay?
 All of us know as seniors that you don't tell your children 
when you get whacked. You don't tell your children when you get 
suckered. You just live in peace.
 The other side of that social democratic bell curve are 
young children today that are essentially cyber bullied, young 
ladies who are essentially forced into doing things they 
shouldn't be doing. Otherwise, those pictures will be released 
to the world. Middle of that bell curve you have one of my 
accounting firms in my district who got hacked, ransomware. The 
head of that firm had a choice: report it, have all of your 
customers know that you did not have the system in place so 
they will go to somebody else for services; and No. 2, you will 
be opened up for civil liability because somebody hacked your 
system. It is not a good place to be.
 Mr. Chairman, today I am hoping beyond learning more about 
what is going on, we can come up with some good solutions that 
we can work on moving forward.
 Cyber criminals, transnational organizations are no longer 
confined by borders. They are sophisticated, organized, 
leveraging corruption, cutting-edge technology, human 
trafficking, especially those in China, Southeast Asia. They 
have built large scamming centers, very sophisticated, 
targeting our communities in the United States. According to 
the FBI, cyber-enabled fraud in 2025 led to over $17.6 billion 
worth of reported losses. Reported losses. Beyond that $20 
billion, I bet you there is a lot more out there that will 
never go reported.
 Top of that, artificial intelligence, helping these 
transnational organizations scale their operations and increase 
their success rates at the expense of our taxpayers and 
citizens of this country. Highly personalized messages, 
password cracking tools, deepfakes where you can't tell between 
what is real and what is not. This is what our citizens are 
facing on an everyday basis back home.
 We all know about Colonial Pipeline. We all know about 
those big incidences that are reporting in the newspaper. But I 
believe the small firms, the individuals, moms-and-pops back 
home never report this stuff. When the threats are getting 
worse, my concern is this administration is failing to respond 
in many ways.
 Over the last year-and-a-half, cybersecurity infrastructure 
at CISA has had a third of its work force cut. Their efforts, 
CISA, instead of defending us against cyber, their efforts are 
now redirected toward immigration enforcement and not 
cybersecurity. The President's fiscal year 2027 proposed 
additional cuts that threaten, again, the defenses to defend 
our homeland and Main Street.
 Same way Homeland Security Investigations, or HIS. Those 
agents that have been dedicated to combating child 
exploitation, digital financial crimes, those efforts also 
redirected toward immigration enforcement.
 As I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, I hope you can look at 
these issues objectively, focus on the issues, the challenges 
that we have not only today, but moving forward, and come up 
with some good solutions across the board, across the aisle 
here that we can all work together. Our constituents, our 
citizens are depending on us. Because at the end of the day a 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This chain is 
about government, private-sector platforms out there, and 
consumers working together under the leadership of the Federal 
Government.
 Mr. Chair, thank you very much.
 [The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:]
 Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa
 April 21, 2026
 Today's hearing is an important one. Every single day Americans of 
all ages and backgrounds are victims of scams and cyber crimes that aim 
to hurt them or their loved ones. Cyber criminals and transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) are no longer confined by borders or 
limited to the number of victims they can target. Everyone is a 
possible target in their eyes. This topic isn't a Democrat or 
Republican problem, it's an everyone problem. Cyber criminals target 
all Americans, including the most vulnerable in our communities.
 Today's cyber criminals are sophisticated and organized 
enterprises, leveraging corruption, cutting-edge technology, and human 
trafficking to generate vast streams of illicit revenue. This comes at 
our expense. Large, organized criminal gangs, especially in China and 
Southeast Asia, build large scamming centers to target our community 
members and critical infrastructure.
 According to the FBI, cyber-enabled fraud in 2025 led to over $17.6 
billion dollars' worth of reported losses. Transnational Criminal 
Organizations use a variety of schemes to target everyday Americans. 
Romance and sexploitation scams, fake cryptocurrency investment 
schemes, and government impersonation communications defraud Americans 
out of billions each year. We also see artificial intelligence (Al) 
helping transnational criminal organizations to scale their operations 
and increase their success rates.
 They can generate highly personalized phishing messages, deploy 
sophisticated password-cracking tools, and create convincing deepfakes 
that blur the line between reality and deception. I bet most of us in 
this room have been the target of these scams and phishing messages. 
Cyber criminals also use a wide variety of digital weapons to target 
the businesses, public services, and daily necessities we rely on.
 We've seen cyber hackers use ransomware and other tools to conduct 
data breaches, disrupt hospital operations, delay emergency services, 
and take down energy grids, threatening the services we rely on every 
day. No sector is off-limits. Ransomware remains a serious threat to 
U.S. critical infrastructure. Over 2,100 ransomware incidents targeting 
critical infrastructure were reported in 2025.
 Their methods are varied, constantly evolving, and increasingly 
difficult to detect. The use of digital platforms and underregulated 
financial instruments allow these criminals to operate with a high 
degree of anonymity, complicating efforts to track, attribute, and 
prosecute their crimes. At a time when these threats are growing more 
sophisticated and pervasive, the Trump administration is failing to 
respond and is weakening our ability to counter cyber criminals.
 This administration has strained critical resources dedicated to 
combating cyber scams and financial fraud. Over the last year-and-a-
half, the White House gutted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA) in the name of Government efficiency. Roughly a 
third of its workforce has been cut, its leadership has been embroiled 
in controversy, and CISA's funding has been redirected towards 
immigration enforcement instead of cybersecurity. The President's 
fiscal year 2027 proposes additional cuts that threaten the very 
systems and institutional expertise we rely on to protect our citizens 
from cyber criminals. Similarly, over the past year, Homeland Security 
Investigations agents dedicated to combating child exploitation and 
digital financial crimes have been redirected to immigration 
enforcement, limiting our capacity to fight cyber criminals.
 The schemes and damage caused by cyber criminals demonstrate that 
we face a dynamic, well-resourced, and well-organized adversary that 
DHS must be equipped for and ready to combat. I hope my Republican 
colleagues join Democrats in calling for the Trump administration to 
stop cutting personnel at CISA and other cyber agencies, as well as 
redirecting law enforcement specialized in combatting these crimes, and 
instead provide the resources needed to help fight these cyber 
criminals and keep Americans safe from these threats.
 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and engaging in a 
productive discussion on how we can meet this challenge head-on.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Correa.
 I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, 
the gentleman from the great State of Tennessee, Chairman 
Ogles, to deliver his opening statement.
 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the joint 
hearing, for partnering with my subcommittee to examine what 
has become one of the most urgent and far-reaching threats to 
the American people today.
 The hearing we are convening this morning concerns a 
problem that touches every community in this country. It 
affects retirees in Tennessee and Florida, college students in 
Mississippi and New York, small business owners in the Midwest, 
veterans, teachers, and families, who do nothing wrong other 
than answer a phone call, open an email, or respond to what 
appear to be a trusted message on-line. What they encounter on 
the other end is not a legitimate contact. It is an organized 
criminal operation, often run from a fortified compound halfway 
around the world, designed from the ground up to steal their 
money, their personal information, and, in many cases, their 
sense of safety and dignity.
 I want to be clear about what we are dealing with. What is 
happening to Americans right now is an industrial-scale 
criminal campaign coordinated by transnational criminal 
organizations that operate sophisticated fraud networks 
spanning multiple continents and targeting millions of victims 
simultaneously. These operations combine cyber fraud, money 
laundering, cryptocurrency manipulation, digital extortion, 
and, in many documented cases, human trafficking and forced 
labor.
 The numbers released just weeks ago by the FBI confirm how 
rapidly this threat is accelerating. The FBI's Internet Crime 
Complaint center received more than 1 million complaints in 
2025, the first time that threshold has ever been crossed. 
Reported losses surpassed $20 billion for the first time, 
representing a 26 percent increase over the prior year. 
Americans over the age of 60 reported losing nearly $8 billion, 
59 percent increase in a single year. For the first time, the 
FBI dedicated an entire section of its annual report to the 
role of artificial intelligence in enabling these crimes, 
documenting more than 22,000 complaints with AI-related 
components.
 Behind these numbers are real people whose lives have been 
upended. Seniors who lost their retirement savings to a voice-
cloned phone call from someone they believed was a grandchild 
in distress. Young people targeted by a sextortion scheme 
designed to exploit fear and shame. Small investors lured into 
fraudulent cryptocurrency platforms through deepfake videos of 
trusted public figures. Business owners locked out of their own 
systems by ransomware and forced to choose between paying a 
ransom to criminals or watching years of work disappear.
 These networks are deeply connected to organized 
transnational syndicates, many run by organized crime groups 
with roots in the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been 
trafficked into scam compounds across Southeast Asia, forced to 
carry out fraud under the threat of violence and death. Chinese 
nationals and PRC-linked triads operate the largest compounds. 
Beijing has been slow to act against the networks that 
victimize Americans while generating billions along China's 
periphery.
 Artificial intelligence is making all of this worse. 
Criminal organizations are using AI to clone voices, produce 
deepfake videos, and automate the targeting of millions of 
victims simultaneously. Ransomware groups are integrating AI 
into their attack chains to launch attacks faster than defenses 
can respond.
 This administration recognized the severity of the threat, 
and I want to commend President Trump for taking decisive 
action. On March 6, the President signed an Executive Order on 
combating cyber crime, fraud, and predatory schemes against 
American citizens. That order directs the Department of 
Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to conduct a 
comprehensive review of existing operational and regulatory 
tools and to develop a coordinated action plan to identify, 
disrupt, and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations 
behind these schemes. That is exactly the kind of whole-of-
Government approach that this moment demands. The American 
people deserve a Government that fights for them with the same 
intensity that these criminal networks use against them.
 Our witnesses today will help us understand the full scope 
of this threat and the tools we need to combat it. I look 
forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here.
 Yield back.
 [The statement of Chairman Ogles follows:]
 Statement of Chairman Andrew Ogles
 Tuesday, April 21, 2026
 Thank you, Chairman Guest, for holding this joint hearing and for 
partnering with my subcommittee to examine what has become one of the 
most urgent and far-reaching threats to the American people today.
 The hearing we are convening this morning concerns a problem that 
touches every community in this country. It affects retirees in 
Tennessee and Florida, college students in Mississippi and New York, 
small business owners in the Midwest, veterans, teachers, and families 
who do nothing wrong other than answer a phone call, open an email, or 
respond to what appeared to be a trusted message on-line. What they 
encounter on the other end is not a legitimate contact. It is an 
organized criminal operation, often run from a fortified compound 
halfway around the world, designed from the ground up to steal their 
money, their personal information, and in many cases their sense of 
safety and dignity.
 I want to be clear about what we are dealing with. What is 
happening to Americans right now is an industrial-scale criminal 
campaign, coordinated by transnational criminal organizations that 
operate sophisticated fraud networks spanning multiple continents and 
targeting millions of victims simultaneously. These operations combine 
cyber fraud, money laundering, cryptocurrency manipulation, digital 
extortion, and in many documented cases, human trafficking and forced 
labor.
 The numbers released just weeks ago by the FBI confirm how rapidly 
this threat is accelerating. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center 
received more than 1 million complaints in 2025, the first time that 
threshold has ever been crossed. Reported losses surpassed $20 billion 
for the first time, representing a 26 percent increase over the prior 
year. Americans over the age of 60 reported losing nearly $8 billion, a 
59% increase in a single year. And for the first time, the FBI 
dedicated an entire section of its annual report to the role of 
artificial intelligence in enabling these crimes, documenting more than 
22,000 complaints with an AI-related component.
 Behind these numbers are real people whose lives have been upended. 
Seniors who lost their retirement savings to a voice-cloned phone call 
from someone they believed was a grandchild in distress. Young people 
targeted by sextortion schemes designed to exploit fear and shame. 
Small investors lured into fraudulent cryptocurrency platforms through 
deepfake videos of trusted public figures. Business owners locked out 
of their own systems by ransomware and forced to choose between paying 
a ransom to criminals or watching years of work disappear.
 These networks are deeply connected to organized transnational 
syndicates, many run by organized crime groups with roots in the 
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have been trafficked into scam compounds across 
Southeast Asia, forced to carry out fraud under threat of violence and 
death. Chinese nationals and PRC-linked triads operate the largest 
compounds, and Beijing has been slow to act against networks that 
victimize Americans while generating billions along China's periphery.
 Artificial intelligence is making all of this worse. Criminal 
organizations are using AI to clone voices, produce deepfake videos, 
and automate the targeting of millions of victims simultaneously, and 
ransomware groups are integrating AI into their attack chains to launch 
attacks faster than defenses can respond.
 This administration recognizes the severity of the threat, and I 
want to commend President Trump for taking decisive action. On March 6, 
the President signed an Executive Order on Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, 
and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens. That order directs the 
Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to conduct a 
comprehensive review of existing operational and regulatory tools and 
to develop a coordinated action plan to identify, disrupt, and 
dismantle the transnational criminal organizations behind these 
schemes. That is exactly the kind of whole-of-Government approach that 
this moment demands.
 The American people deserve a Government that fights for them with 
the same intensity that these criminal networks use against them.
 Our witnesses today will help us understand the full scope of this 
threat and the tools we need to combat it. I look forward to their 
testimony.
 Thank you.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you, Chairman Ogles.
 I would like other Members of the committee to be reminded 
that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
 [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
 April 21, 2026
 Today's hearing covers an important topic--the on-going plague of 
cyber-enabled crimes that victimize Americans every day. Transnational 
criminal organizations have developed numerous ways to leverage 
technological advances to steal from Americans and enrich themselves, 
causing devastating harms to their victims and--at times--threatening 
our critical infrastructure.
 Operating out of foreign countries where U.S. law enforcement has 
limited reach and funded through digital currencies that obscure their 
identities, these criminal gangs have proven resilient to many efforts 
to rein them in. Unfortunately, my home State of Mississippi recently 
experienced a ransomware attack that demonstrated just how devastating 
these transnational crimes can be.
 Two months ago, the University of Mississippi Medical Center, the 
State's only Level 1 trauma center, fell victim to a ransomware attack, 
forcing doctors and nurses to revert to paper medical records, shutting 
clinics throughout the State, and canceling surgeries. The ransomware 
attack threatened patient safety and privacy and cost the hospital 
millions in lost revenue. Attacks like this one are not just criminal 
activity--they are national security threats, and preventing them 
requires coordination across Government and industry.
 We must continue to build on law enforcement efforts to 
investigate, prosecute, and sanction the criminals responsible for 
these incidents, which will require sustained investment in law 
enforcement agencies and in diplomatic efforts to improve cooperation 
with other countries on this global challenge. Doing so requires 
Federal law enforcement to prioritize these real threats to our 
security, not carrying out the President's personal political agenda. 
Additionally, we must invest in improving our defenses and educating 
the public on how to protect themselves from becoming victims of these 
crimes.
 It is bizarre that at the same time as ransomware gangs are 
increasing their attacks on hospitals and other critical 
infrastructure, the Trump administration chose to force out roughly 
1,000 employees at CISA and propose hundreds of millions of dollars in 
cuts to CISA's budget. Who hears about what just happened at the 
University of Mississippi Medical Center and thinks ``Let's cut Federal 
resources for cybersecurity?'' But, that's exactly what the Trump 
administration has been doing. And now, the President's recent 
Executive Order on preventing cyber crimes and scams directs CISA to 
expand efforts to defend State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
governments from cyber crimes.
 The President can put out an EO saying whatever he wants to make it 
look like he is taking action on this problem, but actions speak louder 
than words. If the President were actually serious about expanding 
Federal support, he wouldn't have gotten rid of the people responsible 
for defending us.

 Mr. Guest. I would now like to formally introduce our panel 
of witnesses.
 First, Ms. Cynthia Kaiser is the senior vice president at 
Halcyon Ransomware Research Center. She previously served as 
deputy assistant director of the FBI Cyber Division, where she 
led policy, intelligence, and partnerships to support victims 
and disrupt cyber adversaries.
 Second is Mr. Ari Redbord. He is the global head of policy 
at TRM Labs. Prior to joining TRM Labs, he was senior advisor 
to the deputy secretary and the under secretary for terrorism 
and financial intelligence at the United States Treasury, where 
he used sanctions and other regulatory tools to effectively 
safeguard the financial systems from illicit use by terrorist 
financiers.
 Third is Mr. Josh Bercu. He is the senior vice president of 
policy at USTelecom--The Broadband Association, and also serves 
as the executive director at Industry Traceback Group, where he 
works closely with Government agencies to identify and mitigate 
scams and fraudulent calls.
 Finally is Ms. Megan Stifel. She is the chief strategy 
officer at the Institute for Security and Technology. She 
previously held roles in both the private and public sector, 
including with the Department of Justice, where she served on 
details as a policy director for international cyber policy and 
the National Security Council at the White House.
 Again, ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for being 
with us today. We look forward to hearing your testimony, to 
having you brief us, so that we can craft policy to better 
protect our fellow American citizens.
 I would ask at this time, all of our witnesses if they 
would please rise to allow me to administer the oath before 
testimony. If all of our witnesses would please raise their 
right hand, and if you would please repeat after me.
 [Witnesses sworn.]
 Mr. Guest. Let the record reflect that our witnesses have 
answered affirmatively. Thank you, and please be seated.
 I would now like to give each of our witnesses an 
opportunity to make an opening statement.
 I recognize Ms. Kaiser for 5 minutes to summarize her 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA KAISER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, HALCYON 
 RANSOMWARE RESEARCH CENTER

 Ms. Kaiser. Thank you. Chairmans, Ranking Members, and 
Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today. My name is Cynthia Kaiser. I currently 
lead the Ransomware Research Center at Halcyon, a cybersecurity 
company whose mission is to defeat ransomware. Before that, I 
spent 2 decades at the FBI, and I've given my career to 
understanding the criminal networks that we're discussing 
today. I'm here to tell you that what they're doing demands a 
response that matches the gravity of their crimes.
 I want to begin with a statement that I believe this 
committee and every American should hold in mind throughout 
this hearing. The people committing these crimes are not merely 
technical actors engaged in financial misconduct. They are 
predators. They are callous, and they are, in many cases, 
knowingly endangering and ending human lives. They do not care.
 As you noted, FBI released its 2025 Internet Crime Report 
earlier this year. The picture it paints should make every 
American genuinely, viscerally angry. Angry that cyber 
criminals are stealing a generation of wealth from our country. 
Angry that more than 75,000 victims of sexual extortion were 
caught in a cycle of abuse. Angry that during just one FBI 
operation, 38 victims were referred for suicide intervention. 
That's 38 people so devastated by cyber crime that agents 
feared the victims would take their own lives.
 Since 2023, ransomware attacks have risen over 20 percent 
and they're getting faster. Attacks that used to take weeks, 
now take hours. AI has made it easier for attackers to gain 
initial access to company networks, and our team's data show 
that ransomware gangs target small- and medium-sized businesses 
at nearly 4 times the rate of large organizations.
 Last year, health care overtook all other critical sectors 
to become the single most targeted industry for ransomware. 
Attacks against hospitals and medical facilities nearly doubled 
from 238 in 2024 to 460 in 2025. That is more than one 
ransomware attack on American hospital or health system every 
single day.
 Make no mistake, this was a business decision. Ransomware 
actors, who are criminal entrepreneurs as much as they are 
hackers, have calculated that when lives are on the line, 
hospitals are more likely to pay. They looked at cancer 
patients, dialysis patients, newborns and NICUs, and decided 
these patients were acceptable leverage. Research from the 
University of Minnesota documented at least 47 deaths 
attributable to hospital ransomware attacks between 2016 and 
2021. That number is almost certainly in the hundreds today.
 Earlier this year, when Mississippi's only Level 1 trauma 
center in the State was down for 9 days, we saw that when a 
hospital is taken off-line, many patients are unable to access 
critical care. For a heart attack or stroke patient, even 1 
hour's delay can mean death or permanent disability. The 
hackers responsible for these attacks know this. They have 
simply decided that these deaths are someone else's problem.
 Our grandparents, our small business owners, our doctors, 
none of them should live in fear about what someone might be 
doing on a keyboard thousands of miles away. I fully support 
the President's Executive Order on cyber crime and the new 
National Cyber Strategy, which are strong steps toward 
dismantling transnational criminal organizations. Building on 
these, the gap between the severity of these crimes and the 
consequences that follow needs to close.
 I urge the committee to champion 3 specific authorities to 
do it. First, the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury 
could formally evaluate whether terrorism designation 
authorities under existing law apply to ransomware actors who 
knowingly and repeatedly target hospitals. The statutory 
definitions of terrorism fit what these groups do. Designations 
would unlock sanctions, enhanced intelligence collection, 
travel restrictions, and real diplomatic consequences for 
nations harboring these criminals. Our team has already done a 
lot of work exploring what is legally possible and 
collaborating with industry partners, and we are happy to 
share.
 Second, the Department of Justice should evaluate homicide 
charges when ransomware attacks on health care facilities cause 
documented patient deaths. The Executive Order directs the 
Attorney General to pursue the most serious provable offenses. 
Felony murder law does not require that a defendant pull a 
trigger, only that they commit a dangerous felony that results 
in death.
 Finally, fully fund and reauthorize the State and local 
cybersecurity grant program. Cutting this funding would be a 
gift to ransomware criminals.
 I've spent my career working alongside extraordinary 
experts in cyber defense, in government and now at Halcyon. All 
of us are doing everything we can with the authorities we have. 
But the worst of the worst, those targeting our hospitals, 
those who have caused documented deaths, those operating under 
the protection of hostile foreign governments, need to face 
consequences that match what they have done. This requires 
novel implementations of the law and the resources and mandate 
to do so. These hackers are counting on incremental responses. 
Working together, let's prove them wrong.
 Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Ms. Kaiser follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Cynthia Kaiser
 Tuesday, April 21, 2026
 i. introduction
 Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the 
Subcommittees: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. My name is Cynthia Kaiser. I currently serve as senior vice 
president of the Halcyon Ransomware Research Center, where my team 
tracks, analyzes, and publishes research on ransomware actors and their 
impact on American society. Before joining Halcyon, I spent 2 decades 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, most recently as deputy 
assistant director of the FBI Cyber Division. I have dedicated my 
career to understanding and dismantling the criminal networks that 
target our citizens, our institutions, and our way of life.
 I appear today representing Halcyon, a cybersecurity company whose 
mission is to defeat ransomware--the most disruptive and dangerous form 
of cyber crime afflicting America today. I commend this committee for 
convening this hearing. The President's recent Executive Order 14390 on 
Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American 
Citizens correctly identifies these threats as top-tier national 
security concerns and calls for a whole-of-Government response. I am 
here to reinforce that call, ground it in data, and offer concrete 
ideas for what more we can and must do.
 I want to begin with a statement that I believe this committee, and 
every American, should hold in mind throughout this hearing: the people 
perpetrating these crimes are not merely technical actors engaged in 
financial misconduct. They are predators. They are callous. They are, 
in many cases, knowingly endangering and ending human lives--and they 
do not care. This committee has the power to ensure that they face 
serious consequences for the harm they chose. For the harm they have 
caused.
 ii. the scale and human cost of cyber crime against americans
 The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center released its 2025 
Internet Crime Report earlier this year. The picture it paints should 
make every American angry--and I mean genuinely, viscerally angry. Let 
me walk you through why.
 In 2025 alone, cyber criminals stole over $20 billion from 
Americans. That is not a Pentagon budget line or an abstract economic 
figure--it is a generation worth of wealth: retirement savings wiped 
out, small businesses destroyed, families left without resources they 
spent a lifetime building. Over 75,000 Americans were victimized by 
sextortion schemes last year. During a single FBI operation described 
in that report, 38 victims were referred to an FBI Victim Specialist 
for suicide intervention. Thirty-eight people so devastated by cyber 
crime that agents feared victims would take their own lives.
 Ransomware is growing in size and in ability. We know that reports 
to FBI only represent a fraction of attacks and crime against U.S. 
organizations and citizens. Even so, ransomware attacks reported to the 
FBI have increased by over 20 percent since 2023.
 Attacks that used to take weeks, now take just a few hours. AI has 
made it a lot easier for our adversaries to lie, and they are tricking 
more and more people into giving them access to company networks. 
Thousands of U.S. businesses are attacked every year, and private-
sector data indicates that ransomware gangs target small and medium-
sized businesses 4 times as often as large organizations.
 The even sharper increase that FBI reported in ransomware attacks 
against critical infrastructure is especially worrisome. Last year, 
health care overtook all other critical sectors to become the single 
most targeted industry for ransomware. Attacks against hospitals and 
medical facilities nearly doubled, from 238 attacks in 2024 to 460 in 
2025. Attacks against critical manufacturing and financial services 
also hit record highs, each increasing by close to 40 percent. Criminal 
organizations focused on these sectors because of deliberate strategic 
choices they made to maximize harm and maximize payment.
 I want the Members of this committee to sit with that health care 
number for a moment: 460 ransomware attacks on American hospitals and 
health systems in a single year. That is more than one attack every 
single day, targeting the places Americans go when they are most 
vulnerable--when they are giving birth, receiving cancer treatment, or 
fighting for their lives in an emergency room.
A. These Adversaries Are Making Deliberate Choices to Target the 
 Vulnerable
 When ransomware gangs shifted their targeting to hospitals, it was 
not an accident. It was a business decision. Ransomware actors--who are 
criminal entrepreneurs as much as they are hackers--have calculated 
that hospitals, facing life-or-death consequences for every minute of 
downtime, are more likely to pay ransoms than other targets. They are 
explicitly leveraging the fragility of human health to maximize their 
profits.
 Health care was once considered an informal off-limits target even 
within criminal ransomware communities. That is no longer the case. 
These actors have looked at children in NICUs, at dialysis patients, at 
trauma centers serving rural communities where the next nearest 
hospital is 70 miles away--and they have decided those patients are 
acceptable collateral damage, even useful leverage. That is more than 
just recklessness. It is a moral choice. I think we can all agree: it 
is one of the most reprehensible moral choices a person can make.
 Research published by the University of Minnesota, linking a 
database of hospital ransomware attacks to Medicare claims data, found 
that ransomware attacks on hospitals caused at least 47 deaths between 
2016 and 2021. That number is certainly higher today. When a hospital 
is taken off-line, ambulances are diverted. Labs are shuttered. 
Surgeries are postponed. For a heart attack or stroke patient, the 
difference of even 1 hour in receiving treatment can mean death or 
permanent disability. The hackers responsible for these attacks know 
this. They are not naive. They have simply decided that these deaths 
are someone else's problem.
 If a contractor knowingly tampered with the medical equipment of 
critically-ill patients to extort money from a hospital, we would not 
debate what degree of crime had been committed. We would prosecute them 
to fullest extent of the law. Perpetuating this type of attack on a 
computer does not change the crime, and it should not change the 
punishment.
 iii. ransomware is organized, professional, and without moral 
 constraint
 I want to address something that I believe is sometimes lost in the 
technical and policy discussion about cyber crime: the character of the 
people doing these acts.
 The most active ransomware groups--Akira, Qilin, INC, Play, and 
others identified in the FBI's 2025 report--operate like businesses. 
They have H.R. processes. They have branding. Some have customer 
service lines for victims trying to negotiate ransom payments. They are 
organized, professional, and utterly without moral constraint when it 
comes to the harm they cause.
 Our grandparents, our small businesses on Main Streets, our 
doctors--none of them should live in fear about what someone might be 
doing on a keyboard thousands of miles away.
 But the current legal and policy response does not consistently 
reflect that reality. The FBI and its partners are doing extraordinary 
work with the authorities they have. But the gap between the severity 
of these crimes and the consequences that follow needs to close.
 The Halcyon Ransomware Research Center identified 70 new ransomware 
variants last year alone--on top of 67 identified by FBI the year 
before. Criminal ransomware ecosystems are adaptive, decentralized, and 
self-replenishing. Two of last year's new groups, Lynx and Dragonforce, 
rose within months to become among the highest-volume ransomware 
operators worldwide. When law enforcement dismantles one group, others 
fill the void unless we are also raising the cost and risk of entry 
into this business. We are not doing that sufficiently today.
 iv. the president's executive order and national cyber strategy: a 
 strong foundation
 Executive Order 14390, signed March 6, 2026, reflects a welcome and 
necessary escalation of the Federal Government's commitment to fighting 
cyber crime. The Order correctly identifies ransomware and cyber-
enabled fraud as activities carried out by Transnational Criminal 
Organizations (TCOs)--many of which operate with the willing or tacit 
support of foreign regimes--and directs a coordinated, whole-of-
Government response.
 Several elements of the Order are particularly significant. The 
directive to develop an action plan identifying specific TCOs and 
proposing solutions to prevent, disrupt, investigate, and dismantle 
them reflects the kind of targeted, intelligence-driven approach that 
has proven effective against other serious criminal enterprises. The 
creation of an operational cell within the National Coordination Center 
to synchronize Federal disruption efforts is a meaningful structural 
step. And the International Engagement provisions--which direct the 
Secretary of State to demand enforcement action from nations harboring 
cyber criminals and to coordinate sanctions, visa restrictions, and 
trade penalties with allies--address one of the core structural 
enablers of ransomware: the impunity enjoyed by criminals operating in 
permissive jurisdictions.
 The new National Cyber Strategy reinforces this by elevating 
ransomware and cyber crime to top-tier national security threats and 
articulating 6 pillars for action. I was particularly encouraged by the 
Strategy's framing around shaping adversary behavior. The only way to 
address the societal, business, and technical threats posed by 
ransomware is to raise costs and inject uncertainty into criminal 
ecosystems at the same time that we put the technical tools in place to 
kick them off victim networks and slam the doors behind them.
 The Executive Order and Strategy together create a strong policy 
foundation. Now we must build on it.
 v. using existing authorities in novel ways to stop the worst actors
 The Federal Government has more tools available than it is 
currently using at full force against the most dangerous ransomware 
actors. I want to highlight 3 areas where I believe existing 
authorities could be applied more aggressively and creatively, and 
where I urge this committee to provide support and, where necessary, 
legislative clarification.
A. Terrorism Designations for Those Who Target Hospitals and Critical 
 Infrastructure
 The Federal definition of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. 2331 includes 
``violent acts or acts dangerous to human life'' that ``appear to be 
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.'' Under 8 
U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(b), terrorist activities include ``seizing or 
detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain'' a 
person ``in order to compel a third person'' to act as a condition for 
release.
 When a ransomware gang encrypts a hospital's systems and demands 
payment under threat of continued system lockout--knowing that patients 
are being diverted, that dialysis is being delayed, that surgery 
schedules are being canceled--I believe a serious legal argument exists 
that this conduct falls within those definitions. At minimum, it merits 
a formal, deliberate analysis by the Departments of State, Justice, and 
Treasury, who collectively hold designation authority under Executive 
Order 13224.
 I am not alone in this view. John Riggi, the National Advisor for 
Cybersecurity and Risk at the American Hospital Association, has 
testified before Congress that ransomware attacks targeting hospitals 
should be investigated with the same urgency as terrorism. The 
director-general of the World Health Organization has briefed the U.N. 
Security Council that these attacks ``at worst . . . cause patient harm 
and death.'' U.S. and French Ambassadors at that same session 
emphasized the escalating harm.
 I want to be direct about what terrorism designations would and 
would not accomplish. They are not a cure-all. They would not capture 
every ransomware actor. Nor should they. The deliberative designation 
process led by the State Department is designed precisely to ensure we 
act surgically. But for the most egregious actors--those who knowingly 
and repeatedly target hospitals, who have caused documented patient 
deaths, who operate at scale against the institutions that keep 
Americans alive--terrorism designations would unlock a powerful set of 
additional tools: asset freezing, heightened intelligence community 
collection authorities, expanded travel restrictions, and significant 
diplomatic consequences for nations harboring these individuals.
 We should also begin a national conversation--one I would urge this 
committee to facilitate--about whether potential gaps in cyber 
insurance coverage caused by terrorism designation triggers could be 
addressed through the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act framework when 
Congress considers reauthorization in 2027. The goal is not to punish 
victims. It is to ensure that the most dangerous actors in the 
ransomware ecosystem face consequences proportionate to the harm they 
cause.
B. Murder and Manslaughter Charges Where Attacks Cause Death
 Under Federal law, the felony murder rule allows a defendant to be 
charged with first-degree murder when they commit a dangerous felony 
that results in another person's death, even if they did not cause the 
death directly. Under New York law, a defendant can be charged with 
second-degree murder when, ``under circumstances evincing a depraved 
indifference to human life,'' they ``recklessly engage[] in conduct 
which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby 
cause[] the death of another person.''
 The University of Minnesota study I referenced earlier documented 
at least 47 deaths attributable to hospital ransomware attacks between 
2016 and 2021. As ransomware attacks on health care have nearly doubled 
since that study's endpoint, the true number of lives lost to this 
crime is almost certainly in the hundreds. Federal prosecutors should 
be empowered--and encouraged--to evaluate whether homicide charges are 
appropriate in cases where ransomware actors targeted hospitals, where 
deaths resulted, and where the actors demonstrated clear foreknowledge 
that their actions endangered life.
 This is not a theoretical exercise. Consider what happened just 2 
months ago, on February 19, 2026, when ransomware actors struck the 
University of Mississippi Medical Center. UMMC is not simply a large 
hospital. It is the medical backbone of an entire State: Mississippi's 
only academic medical center, operating 7 hospitals and 35 clinics 
State-wide, and home to the State's only Level 1 trauma center, only 
children's hospital, and only organ and bone marrow transplant program. 
When attackers took down UMMC's network--knocking Epic, its electronic 
health records system, fully off-line and forcing clinical staff to 
revert to pen and paper--they did not merely disrupt a business. They 
degraded the emergency medical capacity of an entire State. Clinics 
closed across Mississippi. Outpatient surgeries and cancer treatment 
appointments were canceled. For 9 days, the State's only facility 
equipped to handle the most severe trauma cases operated under manual 
downtime procedures, with staff tracking patient care, medications, and 
orders on paper. Nearby hospitals reported surging emergency department 
volumes as they stepped in to absorb patients UMMC could not fully 
serve.
 As the American Hospital Association's John Riggi noted in response 
to the attack, disruptions like this are especially dangerous in rural 
States where the next nearest trauma center may be over 100 miles away. 
The hackers behind the UMMC attack knew exactly what they were 
targeting. They contacted the hospital afterward with demands. They 
understood they had taken down a system that Mississippi patients 
depend on for survival--and they used that leverage deliberately.
 Campbell County Health in Wyoming offers another instructive 
example: its entire hospital network was crippled for over 2 weeks, 
forcing emergency patients to be transferred across distances of 70 
miles for 8 hours while its single emergency department was off-line. 
The link between these interruptions and patient mortality is 
documented in the peer-reviewed literature. The Executive Order directs 
the Attorney General to pursue the ``most serious, provable offenses'' 
arising from cyber crime. Homicide charges in appropriate cases would 
be consistent with that directive--and would send a signal to 
ransomware actors that is long overdue.
C. Sanctions and Treasury Authorities Against Ransomware Financial 
 Infrastructure
 The ransomware economy depends on a financial infrastructure: 
cryptocurrency exchanges, money-laundering networks, and payment 
processors that move ransom proceeds across borders. The Treasury 
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control has used sanctions 
authority to designate ransomware actors and the exchanges that service 
them. I urge this committee to support the expansion of that program, 
in alignment with the Executive Order's international engagement 
provisions.
 Blockchain tracing by firms like TRM and Chainalysis shows that 
annual ransomware payments, while down from their 2023 peak, remain at 
well over $800 million. Disrupting the financial ecosystem that makes 
ransomware profitable--through expanded sanctions, cooperation with 
foreign financial intelligence units, and pressure on cryptocurrency 
infrastructure providers--remains one of the highest-leverage 
interventions available to the Government. The International Counter 
Ransomware Initiative, now comprising over 60 nations, provides a 
ready-made multilateral framework for coordinating these actions.
 vi. recommendations for this committee
 I offer the following specific recommendations for this committee's 
consideration:
 Direct the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury to 
 formally evaluate and report back to Congress on whether 
 existing terrorism designation authorities under Executive 
 Order 13224 can be applied to ransomware actors who knowingly 
 target hospitals and critical life-safety infrastructure.
 Request a report from the Department of Justice on the 
 feasibility and appropriateness of pursuing homicide charges in 
 cases where ransomware attacks on health care facilities 
 resulted in documented patient deaths.
 Encourage the attorney general to issue guidance making 
 clear that cyber-enabled attacks with life-safety consequences 
 will be prosecuted using the most serious applicable charges, 
 consistent with the directive in Executive Order 14390 to 
 pursue the most serious provable offenses.
 Support the full funding and reauthorization of the State 
 and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. State and local 
 governments are disproportionately targeted by ransomware, and 
 they often lack the resources to defend themselves. Governments 
 and government services was the fourth most targeted sector in 
 2025. Cutting this funding would be a gift to ransomware 
 criminals.
 Convene a Congressional working group, including 
 representatives from the insurance industry, to evaluate 
 amendments to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ahead of its 
 2027 reauthorization that would address cyber terrorism, 
 ensuring that terrorism designations for ransomware actors do 
 not inadvertently harm victims who need insurance coverage to 
 recover.
 Work with the National Security Council to ensure that 
 Federal cybersecurity experts are meaningfully integrated into 
 the terrorism designation review process when ransomware actors 
 targeting health care are under consideration.
 vii. conclusion
 The people running ransomware organizations that target American 
hospitals are not mysterious hackers operating in a moral gray zone. 
They are criminals who have made deliberate choices. Choices to target 
the sick, the vulnerable, the elderly, and the newborn, because they 
have calculated that doing so maximizes their profits. They have no 
shame about this. They have demonstrated, repeatedly, that they will 
not stop unless we make stopping necessary.
 The FBI and its Federal partners are doing everything they can with 
the authorities they currently have. I know this from the years I spent 
working alongside those agents. But the worst of the worst--those 
targeting health care, those who have caused documented deaths, those 
operating with impunity under the protection of hostile foreign 
governments--deserve to face consequences that match the gravity of 
what they have done.
 The President's Executive Order has given us a mandate. The 
National Cyber Strategy has given us a framework. This committee has 
the power to sharpen both, fill the gaps, and send a message to the 
criminal ecosystem that America is no longer willing to treat 
ransomware as merely a cost of doing business in the digital age.
 These hackers are counting on us to respond with incremental 
measures. I urge you to prove them wrong.
 I thank the subcommittees for this opportunity and look forward to 
your questions.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Kaiser, for your opening 
statement.
 I now recognize Mr. Redbord for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF ARI REDBORD, GLOBAL HEAD OF POLICY, TRM LABS

 Mr. Redbord. Chairs Guest and Ogles, Ranking Member Correa, 
and distinguished Members of both subcommittees, today I'm 
going to talk to you about the greatest threat confronting 
American families today. My name is Ari Redbord. I am honored 
to appear before you on behalf of TRM Labs, where we work every 
day with law enforcement, financial institutions, and national 
security agencies to detect, investigate, and prevent illicit 
activity in the digital asset ecosystem and beyond.
 Before joining TRM, I spent more than a decade as a Federal 
prosecutor at the U.S. Department of Justice, and later at the 
U.S.--and later as a U.S. Treasury official confronting 
terrorist financiers, sanctions evaders, narcotics traffickers, 
and transnational criminal enterprises. I do not say this 
lightly. The industrialization of cyber-enabled fraud by 
transnational criminal organizations is the most pervasive, 
economically destructive, and dangerous financial crime threat 
that I have seen in my career.
 The consequences are immediate and they are personal. A 
grandmother in Ohio sends her retirement savings to a scammer. 
A veteran in Texas transfers his home equity to a fake 
investment platform. A family in North Carolina watches their 
life savings vanish. This is economic violence at industrial 
scale. We must respond with all our might, and we must do so 
together because these are not abstract losses. They are the 
futures of Americans. The networks taking them are organized, 
relentless, and scaling faster than our response.
 The numbers underscore the urgency. TRM's 2026 Crypto Crime 
Report documented 158 billion in illicit crypto flows in 2025. 
That's 145 percent increase over 2024. Fraud in scams alone 
drove 35 billion. With only about 15 percent of victims 
reporting, true global losses exceed $200 billion.
 These flows run through one interconnected ecosystem. Pig 
butchering compounds in Southeast Asia, many staffed by 
trafficked workers, generate fraud proceeds. Mexican cartels 
buy fentanyl precursors from Chinese suppliers with 
cryptocurrency. North Korea stole about 2 billion in 
cryptocurrency last year to fund weapons proliferation and 
destabilizing activity. Every one of those streams moves 
through the same plumbing: Chinese underground banking networks 
that processed over 103 billion last year alone.
 Artificial intelligence is accelerating these schemes. 
Through Chainabuse, TRM's global scam reporting platform, we 
have documented a more than 500 percent increase in AI-enabled 
scam activity over the past year. The solution to the criminal 
abuse of AI is not to ban or stifle the technology. It is to 
use it and use it wisely. At TRM, we are already building those 
tools. Every innovation our adversaries turn against American 
families is one we can turn back against them faster, smarter, 
and at greater scale.
 The threat is daunting, but it is also one we can solve and 
solve together. We know what to do. The White House Executive 
Order on Combating Cybercrime names this threat for what it is, 
a national security threat and creates a whole-of-Government 
mandate. The DOJ's Scam Center Strike Force has exemplified 
that approach in action. But we live in an age where the 
private sector holds the data and the public sector holds the 
authorities. Neither can confront this threat alone. That is 
exactly what TRM's Beacon Network was built to bridge.
 Beacon is the largest public-private network for the 
interdiction of illicit proceeds and the seizure of stolen 
funds in the digital asset ecosystem, connecting every major 
cryptocurrency exchange with 70 law enforcement agencies across 
the United States and allied nations. When a victim reports a 
scam, Beacon can move actionable intelligence in real time to 
the exchanges and agents who can interdict and seize back those 
funds. That is the type of real-time public-private 
coordination the Executive Order envisions already operating 
and ready to scale.
 Congress can codify that framework. Pass a digital assets 
hold law so exchanges can freeze illicit funds. Empower the 
private sector through cyber letters of mark or white hat 
hacking to disrupt criminal infrastructure. Create a victim 
compensation fund. Give Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement the tools and training to fight back.
 We can protect American citizens by leveraging 
transformative technology for good and we must do it together. 
The tools exist. The networks like Beacon prove what is 
possible when the public and private sectors move as one.
 Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Redbord follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Ari Redbord
 April 21, 2026
 introduction
 Chairs Guest and Ogles, Ranking Members Correa and the Ranking 
Member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Protection, and distinguished Members of both subcommittees, my name is 
Ari Redbord. I am honored to appear before you on behalf of TRM Labs, 
where we work every day with law enforcement, financial institutions, 
and national security agencies to detect, investigate, and prevent 
illicit activity in the digital asset ecosystem and beyond.
 Before joining TRM, I spent more than a decade as a Federal 
prosecutor at the United States Department of Justice and later served 
as a senior official at the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. In those roles, I confronted 
terrorist financiers, sanctions evaders, narcotics trafficking 
organizations, and transnational criminal enterprises operating across 
jurisdictions and continents.
 I do not say this lightly: I have never seen a financial crime 
threat as pervasive, as economically destructive, or as dangerous to 
ordinary American families as the one I am here to describe today.
 I want to begin with something that I think gets lost in the 
conversation about transnational criminal organizations. We talk about 
TCOs operating from compounds in Southeast Asia. We talk about Chinese 
underground banking networks processing hundreds of billions of 
dollars. We talk about North Korean hackers operating thousands of 
miles away.
 All of that is real, and I will address each of those threats in 
detail.
 But I want this committee to understand who is actually being 
harmed. It is a grandmother in Ohio who sent tens of thousands of 
dollars to someone she believed was her grandson in distress, only to 
learn it was a scammer exploiting her trust. It is a 40-something in 
North Carolina who believed she had found both a relationship and an 
investment opportunity, after months of daily communication, and lost 
everything he had, including money borrowed from her parents. It is a 
veteran in Texas who transferred his home equity to what he believed 
was a legitimate investment platform after weeks of engagement with 
someone posing as a trusted advisor. It is a family in New York whose 
life savings were gone in 72 hours, moved across 7 cryptocurrency 
wallets in 3 countries before they even realized what had happened.
 These are not victims of some distant financial abstraction. They 
are our constituents, and the criminal networks that target them are 
sophisticated, well-resourced, and operating at industrial scale 
against the American public.
 We need to get this right--and we need to do it together--because 
these are not abstract losses, they are life savings, homes, and 
futures of Americans, and the networks taking them are organized, 
relentless, and scaling faster than our response.
 about trm labs
 TRM Labs is a blockchain intelligence company that works with 
hundreds of financial institutions, cryptocurrency businesses, and law 
enforcement and national security agencies worldwide. Our AI-powered 
platform allows investigators to follow illicit money wherever it 
moves, tracing cryptocurrency transactions through wallets, exchanges, 
mixers, and cross-chain bridges to help investigators build 
investigations and mitigate risk.
 We also publish original research on crypto crime trends, threat 
actor behavior, and the evolving intersection of digital assets and 
national security, including the annual TRM Crypto Crime Report, which 
serves as a foundational resource for policy makers, law enforcement, 
and compliance professionals worldwide.
 I want to be clear about what blockchain intelligence actually 
provides in the context of the threats before this committee. When a 
victim of a pig butchering scam sends cryptocurrency to a fraud 
platform, that transaction is recorded on a public, permanent, 
immutable ledger.
 The wallet that received those funds can be traced. The subsequent 
movement of those funds through additional wallets, exchanges, and 
obfuscation techniques can be followed with the right tools and 
training. Unlike cash, which disappears into the financial system 
anonymously, cryptocurrency leaves a trail. The challenge is not that 
the evidence does not exist. The challenge is that law enforcement, 
financial institutions, and policy makers do not always have the tools, 
the legal authority, or the coordination frameworks to act on that 
evidence fast enough to matter.
 the scope of the problem
 TRM's 2026 Crypto Crime Report documented approximately USD 158 
billion in illicit cryptocurrency flows in 2025--a 145 percent increase 
from USD 64.5 billion in 2024 and the highest level recorded in 5 
years. Fraud and scams alone accounted for roughly USD 35 billion in 
confirmed flows to fraud-linked wallets.
 The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center has documented record 
losses from cyber-enabled fraud, with investment fraud and romance 
scams representing the fastest-growing and most devastating categories 
of victim harm. But those figures capture only what victims report. TRM 
estimates that only about 15 percent of victims come forward--deterred 
by shame, skepticism that law enforcement can help, or simple 
uncertainty about where to turn. When that underreporting gap is 
factored in, global annual losses from cyber-enabled fraud against 
individuals likely exceed USD 200 billion.
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 But scams are only one category of illicit activity driven by 
transnational criminal networks. Sanctions evasion, driven largely by 
Russia-linked activity and the rapid growth of the ruble-pegged 
stablecoin A7A5, surged over 400 percent year over year. Cryptocurrency 
stolen through hacks reached USD 2.87 billion across nearly 150 
incidents in 2025, with North Korea responsible for USD 1.92 billion of 
that total.
 how transnational criminal organizations operate
Pig butchering and scam centers
 The dominant fraud typology driving the losses I have just 
described is commonly known as pig butchering, a term originating from 
the Chinese phrase ``sha zhu pan,'' which describes the practice of 
``fattening'' a victim financially before the slaughter. Understanding 
how these operations actually work is essential to understanding both 
the scale of the problem and the nature of the policy response 
required.
 These operations begin with weeks or months of deliberate, patient 
relationship-building--conducted over messaging apps, dating platforms, 
social media, and even text messages sent to wrong numbers--a technique 
criminals use to establish initial contact. The operator, often working 
from an organized compound staffed by hundreds of people, establishes 
genuine emotional connection with the target before any financial 
matter is raised. Victims describe feeling that they had found a 
genuine friend, romantic partner, or trusted mentor.
 Only after that relationship has been cultivated does the operator 
introduce investment, typically framed as an opportunity being shared 
out of personal generosity. Victims are shown a professional-appearing 
trading platform, given access to fabricated account dashboards showing 
growing returns, and permitted to make small early withdrawals to 
establish credibility. When the victim has committed the maximum 
available funds, including frequently borrowed money or retirement 
savings, the platform disappears. Customer service stops responding. 
The money is gone.
 What is critical for this committee to understand is that these 
operations are not the work of individual grifters. They are organized 
enterprises operating with the discipline and infrastructure of 
multinational corporations.
 The compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are large physical 
facilities, some housing thousands of workers. In many documented 
instances, those workers are themselves victims of human trafficking, 
recruited with false promises of legitimate technology or hospitality 
jobs and held under threat of violence, debt bondage, or confiscation 
of passports.
 The networks running these compounds are affiliated with Triad-
connected organized crime syndicates that have operated in Southeast 
Asia for decades, and they have brought to cyber fraud the same 
organizational sophistication they applied to narcotics, gambling, and 
human trafficking operations. The business model is extraordinarily 
efficient. Operating costs are low, victim conversion rates are 
measurable and optimizable, and the proceeds are laundered through 
established underground banking networks that have moved value across 
borders for generations.
Investigating pig butchering
 Investigations involving networks of scammers are often complex. 
TRM's analysis of on-chain transaction data, combined with proprietary 
source intelligence, has identified several key characteristics of pig 
butchering scams.
 Once cryptocurrency reaches a scammer's wallet, it is typically 
shuffled from wallet-to-wallet in a complex web of transactions between 
scammers and money launderers (sometimes the same people), with each 
wallet accumulating funds from additional victims along the way. Funds 
often move circuitously, making it difficult for investigators to 
follow the money and to separate victim funds from other tokens. These 
fund movements consistently include multiple hops through intermediary 
addresses.
 Victim funds typically end up reaching a few main exchanges, where 
they are often swapped for stablecoins before continuing to be cycled 
through the money laundering network both via the main exchanges and 
unhosted wallets.
 TRM data indicates that cryptocurrency wallets that receive victim 
funds from individual pig butchering scams are also often associated 
with other scams. Furthermore, in a random sample of addresses to which 
victims stated they sent funds, over 75 percent exhibited signs of 
sophisticated on-chain money-laundering activity.
 The below graph illustrates a typical example of a pig butchering 
scheme studied by TRM Labs, showing the interconnected networks 
spanning multiple scams. Each color represents the scammer addresses in 
3 different cases. As shown by the connections between the 3 coloured 
webs, the scammers appear to be operating multiple scams either in 
succession or in conjunction. In addition, the scammers appear to be 
relying on the same underlying money-laundering network, with the same 
addresses appearing in multiple cases.

Chinese money-laundering networks
 The proceeds of pig-butchering operations, narcotics trafficking, 
and every other major illicit finance stream documented by TRM flow 
through the same critical infrastructure: Chinese underground banking 
networks that have become the dominant professional money-laundering 
system in the world.
 TRM's Shadow Bankers report documented that Chinese-language escrow 
and money-laundering networks processed over USD 103 billion in 2025, 
growing from approximately USD 123 million in 2020. That growth 
reflects both the explosion of cryptocurrency as a settlement mechanism 
and the organizational sophistication of the networks operating them.
 These underground banking systems operate through what are known as 
mirror exchange arrangements. A broker collects cartel cash in the 
United States and provides equivalent value through off-record methods 
to a counterpart in Mexico or elsewhere, keeping dollars in the United 
States and making value available abroad without any cross-border wire 
transfer occurring. Cryptocurrency has made these arrangements faster 
and cheaper.
 Brokers coordinate through encrypted messaging applications like 
WeChat and Telegram, using code words and cultural reference points 
that exploit the language and cultural barriers facing Western law 
enforcement. Transactions are layered through mixers, cross-chain 
bridges, privacy coins, and rapid micro-transactions across multiple 
blockchains to break investigative trails.
 These networks do not exclusively serve one criminal constituency. 
They serve Mexican cartels laundering narcotics proceeds, North Korea 
converting stolen cryptocurrency to usable currency, pig-butchering 
fraud operators moving victim funds to safety, Russian sanctions 
evaders moving value outside the traditional financial system, and 
Iranian actors funding weapons procurement networks.
 In one documented case that TRM tracked, a Los Angeles-based 
operation laundered over USD 50 million in Sinaloa Cartel narcotics 
revenue through Chinese underground bankers using trade-based schemes 
layered with cryptocurrency transactions. The same brokers who handled 
that transaction were handling fraud proceeds from Southeast Asian scam 
operations. The financial infrastructure of transnational crime is not 
siloed by crime type. It is shared, interconnected, and mutually 
reinforcing.
 FinCEN's designation of Huione Group (a Cambodia-based network) as 
a primary money-laundering concern in 2025 identified that organization 
as receiving USD 39.6 billion in transaction volume. That single 
designation illustrates the scale at which these networks operate and 
the degree to which they have become embedded in the global financial 
system.
Mexican cartels and the Southern Border
 Over the last few years, the cartels have integrated cryptocurrency 
into their operations; the connection to the Southern Border is direct 
and concrete. TRM research on cartel cryptocurrency use documented that 
of more than 120 Chinese companies supplying precursor chemicals for 
fentanyl and methamphetamine production, 97 percent were willing to 
accept cryptocurrency payments.
 Mexican cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel and its affiliated 
networks, are using cryptocurrency to purchase the chemical inputs for 
fentanyl production from Chinese suppliers to compensate workers and 
operatives across multiple jurisdictions, and to launder drug proceeds 
through layered wallet transactions and Chinese underground banking 
arrangements.
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 These are not isolated transactions. They are systematic. In June 
2024, a Department of Justice indictment charged Edgar Joel Martinez-
Reyes with leading a network that used trade-based money laundering and 
cryptocurrency purchases to clean drug proceeds, with law enforcement 
seizing USD 5 million in cash and significant drug quantities in 
connection with that case. In January 2024, Martin Mizrahi was 
convicted of converting bulk narcotics cash into Bitcoin and layering 
transactions through multiple wallets.
 OFAC has made its first public identifications of cartel 
cryptocurrency addresses on the Ethereum blockchain and has sanctioned 
17 cryptocurrency addresses linked to fentanyl precursor suppliers.
 The implication for this committee is that the digital technology 
question and the border security question are not two separate 
inquiries. The financial infrastructure enabling fentanyl trafficking 
into the United States and the financial infrastructure laundering the 
proceeds of fraud committed against American citizens are substantially 
the same infrastructure.
North Korea: A national security imperative
 North Korea stole approximately USD 1.92 billion in cryptocurrency 
in 2025, including the February 2025 hack of Bybit, where USD 1.46 
billion was taken in what stands as the largest single cryptocurrency 
theft in history.
 The scale of the theft is matched by the speed and sophistication 
of the laundering that followed. Within days, nearly all stolen Ether 
was bridged into Bitcoin using decentralized protocols, reflecting what 
TRM identified as an unprecedented level of operational efficiency. The 
funds were then funneled through mixers, cross-chain bridges, and 
decentralized exchanges, creating rapid layers of obfuscation designed 
to frustrate tracing and delay interdiction.
 Such rapid layering suggests an expansion of North Korea's 
laundering infrastructure--likely with greater support from underground 
networks in China to absorb and process the funds. Indeed, once the 
initial obfuscation was done, a large portion of the assets sat idle, 
presumably awaiting liquidation through OTC channels that can handle 
converting tens of millions without detection.
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 This activity reflects a broader evolution in North Korea's 
laundering playbook. Rather than relying on slower, linear laundering 
techniques, these actors now move assets through complex, multi-chain 
transaction paths almost immediately after a hack. The goal is clear: 
maximize speed, fragment the trail, and position funds for eventual 
off-ramping. Following the initial laundering phase, a significant 
portion of the Bitcoin sat idle, likely staged for liquidation through 
over-the-counter brokers capable of handling large volumes without 
triggering compliance controls.
 Those OTC networks are central to the ecosystem. North Korea's 
Foreign Trade Bank representative Sim Hyon-sop has been linked to 
coordination with China- and Hong Kong-based brokers who facilitate the 
conversion of stolen crypto into fiat currency through exchanges and 
shell companies. These networks provide the critical bridge between 
illicit on-chain activity and the traditional financial system, 
enabling the regime to operationalize stolen digital assets at scale.
 At the same time, Russia-based exchanges have continued to play a 
key role as downstream laundering venues. Garantex, long associated 
with illicit finance, rebranded as Grinex within days of an OFAC 
enforcement action, underscoring how quickly these platforms adapt to 
sanctions pressure. These exchanges remain preferred destinations for 
both North Korean and Russian criminal actors, reinforcing the 
interconnected nature of these illicit financial ecosystems and the 
challenges of disruption.
 This is a state-directed financial strategy--not opportunistic 
crime. The proceeds from these operations directly support North 
Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. A single operation 
yielding USD 1.46 billion represents a meaningful contribution to a 
weapons of mass destruction program. Disrupting these flows is 
therefore not simply a matter of financial crime enforcement--it is a 
national security imperative, requiring coordinated, whole-of-
Government action at the same level of urgency applied to other 
systemic threats.
The Russia-China-North Korea nexus
 What TRM's data reveals is not a collection of separate criminal 
threats but an interconnected illicit finance ecosystem in which State 
sponsors, criminal networks, and technical infrastructure are deeply 
intertwined. North Korea supplies the hackers and cyber capabilities. 
Russia provides the criminal marketplace infrastructure and technical 
tools. China furnishes the financial plumbing through underground 
banking networks and OTC brokers. Scam center operators in Southeast 
Asia generate the fraud proceeds that flow through the same networks 
that launder cartel drug money and North Korean stolen cryptocurrency.
 The A7 sanctions evasion platform, operated from Russia, processed 
at least USD 56 billion in 2025. Nearly 95 percent of sanctioned entity 
inflows used stablecoins, meaning that dollar-denominated digital 
assets are serving as the reserve currency of the global illicit 
finance system. Blockchain data tells us this.
 artificial intelligence as a force multiplier for criminal 
 organizations
 Artificial intelligence has transformed the operational 
capabilities of criminal enterprises at a pace that demands the most 
urgent policy response this committee can deliver.
 In testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and 
Federal Government Surveillance in July 2025, I described how the early 
adoption of AI by TCOs from scammers to ransomware gangs, poses a 
civilization-level threat.
 Generative AI-enabled scam activity rose 500 percent over the last 
year, according to data from Chainabuse, TRM's open-source scam 
reporting platform. Deepfake technology now enables real-time face and 
voice swapping during live video calls, allowing criminals to 
impersonate financial professionals, family members, government 
officials, and even romantic partners with sufficient fidelity to 
deceive careful, intelligent people.
 A Hong Kong company lost millions of dollars when employees 
participated in a board meeting that appeared to include legitimate 
company executives, all of whom were AI-generated impersonations. 
Romance scam operators are now deploying AI systems that conduct 
initial outreach, maintain on-going emotional engagement across dozens 
of simultaneous victim relationships, and adapt their communication 
style in real time based on victim responses, all without a human 
operator being involved in the conversation.
 AI-generated synthetic identity documents are available on criminal 
marketplaces for as little as USD 15 per document, enabling fraudsters 
to open accounts at regulated cryptocurrency exchanges and bypass Know 
Your Customer (KYC) controls at a scale that manual document forgery 
could never achieve. AI allows criminal networks to operate 
multilingual outreach campaigns simultaneously, removing the language 
barrier that previously limited the geographic reach of individual 
fraud operations. AI-powered ransomware creates polymorphic malware 
that evades detection systems by constantly rewriting its own code, and 
identifies high-value targets based on financial data scraped from 
public sources.
 AI's impact is visible not just in outreach and engagement, but 
also in laundering tactics. AI accelerates the rotation of 
infrastructure, the creation of synthetic identities, and the spread of 
fraudulent domains and social media personas, enabling scam networks to 
iterate rapidly across platforms and choke off investigative visibility 
before responses can materialize. In practical terms, what once 
required teams of human actors now often requires only the right prompt 
engineering and an AI engine capable of consistent execution.
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 Blockchain data confirms this speed acceleration: average wallet 
holding periods for scam proceeds have decreased significantly. Funds 
now move across multiple wallets and chains within 24 to 48 hours of 
receipt, dramatically narrowing the window for meaningful interdiction 
and recovery.
 Fraud, and the laundering of illicit proceeds, has evolved into a 
coordinated, AI-assisted industry operating at global scale.
 Our response must reflect that reality.
 The response to this acceleration in AI cannot be the restriction 
of AI technology or an attempt to slow innovation. It has to be 
ensuring that the tools of safety evolve just as quickly as the tools 
of harm. At TRM, that means pairing advanced AI with human expertise--
using AI to map illicit networks in real time, identify patterns, 
triage risk, and surface early warning signs, while enabling analysts 
and investigators to act faster and make more informed decisions. AI 
brings speed and scale, but it is the human judgment layered on top 
that turns insight into action and drives effective disruption.
 These systems operate with guardrails that ensure every action is 
auditable, every output is traceable, and human analysts remain in the 
decision-making loop for consequential actions. The private sector has 
built these capabilities. The question for this committee is whether 
law enforcement will have the resources, training, and legal authority 
to deploy them at the speed the threat demands.
 the executive order: a critical and historic framework
 On March 6, 2026, President Trump signed an Executive Order on 
Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American 
Citizens. This order represents the most important Federal policy 
development on cyber-enabled fraud. Its implementation will determine 
whether the victims I described at the outset of this testimony see a 
meaningful change in their protection.
 The order begins from the correct diagnosis: that transnational 
criminal organizations are conducting coordinated campaigns of cyber 
crime, fraud, and predatory schemes against American citizens, that 
these campaigns are draining American families of their life savings, 
and that they constitute a national security threat as well as a 
financial crime problem.
 That framing matters because it determines which tools are 
available in response. A financial crime problem is handled by 
financial regulators and law enforcement. A national security threat 
commands the full toolkit of American power, including diplomatic 
pressure, targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, trade consequences, 
military and intelligence resources, and whole-of-Government 
coordination.
 The E.O. creates an operational cell within the National 
Coordination Center to coordinate Federal efforts to detect, disrupt, 
dismantle, and deter cyber-enabled criminal activity. It directs the 
Secretary of State to engage with foreign governments to demand 
enforcement actions against TCOs operating on their soil. And it 
explicitly contemplates consequences for nations that tolerate 
predatory activity targeting American citizens, including targeted 
sanctions, visa restrictions, trade penalties, and limitation of 
foreign assistance.
 The order also directs the Attorney General to submit 
recommendations for a Victims Restoration Program that would provide 
restitution to victims of cyber-enabled fraud schemes from funds seized 
from criminal networks. This provision matters enormously to the people 
I described at the outset of this testimony. The grandmother who lost 
her retirement account, the veteran who lost his home equity, the 
family whose savings were gone in 72 hours--they need to know that law 
enforcement success means something tangible for them, not just a press 
release about an indictment.
 The reason this order is historically significant is not just its 
content but its accountability structure. For years, the U.S. 
Government's response to cyber-enabled fraud against Americans was 
fragmented across dozens of agencies, reactive rather than proactive, 
and consistently under-resourced relative to the scale of the threat.
 Scam center operators in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos operated with 
effective impunity because no single agency had both the authority and 
the mandate to coordinate a comprehensive response. Every agency 
involved in this space holds a piece of the puzzle. The FBI handles 
cyber crime investigations. OFAC handles sanctions designations. DEA 
handles narcotics trafficking. HSI handles human trafficking and money 
laundering. The State Department handles foreign policy. FinCEN handles 
financial intelligence. But without a coordination mandate and a clear 
accountability chain, those pieces rarely come together into a coherent 
strategy.
 The EO creates that accountability. It names responsible officials, 
sets deadlines, and signals at the highest levels of government that 
the full tool kit of American power will be brought to bear on the 
organizations running these schemes. TRM is committed to working with 
Executive branch agencies and this committee to ensure that the EO has 
a lasting impact on the victims of these criminal networks.
 the scam center strike force and law enforcement efforts
 Beyond the EO, the U.S. Government is responding to the global 
threat of transnational criminal networks that have industrialized 
fraud. In November 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice launched the 
Scam Center Strike Force to coordinate efforts to dismantle these 
networks, disrupt their infrastructure, and recover stolen funds.
 What distinguishes the Strike Force is its whole-of-Government 
approach, bringing together law enforcement, financial regulators, and 
national security agencies to address a threat that spans jurisdictions 
and financial systems. In addition, the Strike Force leverages the 
Beacon Network and other private-sector initiatives in order to bring 
every resource to bear.
 The DOJ leads prosecutions and asset seizures, while agencies like 
the FBI, HSI, DEA, IRS-CI and U.S. Secret Service conduct 
investigations and blockchain tracing. Treasury components, including 
OFAC and FinCEN, apply sanctions and financial intelligence tools to 
target the laundering networks that move illicit proceeds, while the 
State Department supports international coordination. This integrated 
model reflects the reality that these fraud networks operate across 
borders and rely on both crypto and traditional financial rails.
 More broadly, the initiative signals a shift in how governments are 
approaching crypto-enabled fraud--treating it as a systemic national 
security threat that demands sustained, coordinated action across law 
enforcement, financial, and diplomatic channels.
 There are also other efforts. Law enforcement agencies and private-
sector partners across the United States, Asia, and Europe have 
launched specialized task forces to respond to pig butchering scams, 
including Operation Shamrock, the FBI's Operation Level Up, and 
Europol's European Financial and Economic Crime Centre (EFECC).
 The Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF), announced in early 2025, 
represents a whole-of-Government response to transnational criminal 
organizations operating within the United States. Co-led by the FBI and 
Homeland Security Investigations, the task force integrates Federal, 
State, and local law enforcement into a single operational framework 
designed to identify, target, and dismantle cartels, foreign gangs, 
human trafficking networks, and financial crime infrastructure. With 
more than 8,500 Federal agents and analysts working alongside over 440 
State and local agencies across all 52 States and territories, the 
model embeds intelligence, personnel, and operational coordination 
nationwide to break down silos and enable unified, intelligence-driven 
action.
 In just its first year, HSTF has delivered results at scale, 
including more than 3,200 arrests, over 200,000 pounds of drugs seized, 
more than 1,000 illegal firearms recovered, and hundreds of coordinated 
operations in a concentrated enforcement period.
 Over the last few years, U.S. authorities have seized billions of 
illicit proceeds from hacks, ransomware groups, scam networks, and 
other threat actors. For example, in October 2025, the U.S. Department 
of Justice announced the indictment of Cambodian national Chen Zhi, 
founder and chairman of Prince Holding Group, a multinational 
conglomerate based in Cambodia. Zhi was charged with wire fraud 
conspiracy and money-laundering conspiracy for directing Prince Group's 
operation of forced-labor scam compounds across the country.
 In a parallel action, the DOJ filed a civil forfeiture complaint 
for 127,271 bitcoin--valued at more than USD 15 billion--now in the 
custody of the U.S. Government. The filing marks the largest forfeiture 
action in U.S. history, underscoring both the scale of the criminal 
network and the unprecedented reach of law enforcement's response.
 Concurrently, OFAC is working with the U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth, 
and Development Office (FCDO), which sanctioned 146 targets linked to 
the Prince Group. In addition, FinCEN finalized its Section 311 order 
against the Huione Group, cutting the organization--and any 
intermediary bank--off from the U.S. dollar system.
 At its core, Operation Prince shows how governments are evolving to 
confront industrial-scale crypto-enabled fraud--aligning prosecutions, 
financial intelligence, sanctions, and international coordination to 
disrupt networks, seize assets, and hold leadership accountable. It 
underscores that tackling transnational scam networks requires a 
sustained, integrated approach targeting both on-chain activity and the 
off-chain enablers that allow these ecosystems to scale.

 While the Prince Group takedown is a significant win for global 
security, similar networks continue to operate worldwide.
 beacon network
 The private sector has built infrastructure that is ready to 
support the whole-of-Government approach outlined in the Executive 
Order.
 TRM's Beacon Network is the first real-time, global intelligence-
sharing system for illicit cryptocurrency activity, built in 
collaboration with leading platforms including Coinbase, Binance, 
Kraken, PayPal, Ripple, Stripe, Robinhood, Crypto.com, and Zodia 
Custody. The network connects verified participants across the public 
and private sectors--including approximately 70 law enforcement 
agencies worldwide, many within the United States--enabling them to 
flag illicit wallets and transactions as activity unfolds. By sharing 
actionable intelligence in real time, Beacon allows investigators and 
compliance teams to move at the speed of the threat--freezing funds, 
seizing assets, and disrupting transnational criminal networks before 
illicit proceeds can be laundered beyond reach.
 The network operates through 4 steps: verified investigators flag 
illicit wallet addresses in TRM's system; flagged funds are 
automatically tracked across the blockchain in real time; when those 
funds reach a participating exchange or financial institution, Beacon 
sends an immediate alert; and the institution reviews the risk level 
and coordinates with law enforcement before processing any withdrawal.
 The network currently covers approximately 85 percent of 
centralized cryptocurrency transaction volume, meaning that when scam 
proceeds hit a major exchange, there is a high probability that a 
Beacon alert will fire before the criminal can cash out.
 The Scam Center Strike Force and the HSTF--combined with the E.O., 
legal authority to compel holds, diplomatic leverage to pressure host 
nations, and operational access to Beacon's alerting capability--could 
represent a fundamentally different kind of enforcement infrastructure 
than anything the U.S. Government has previously fielded against this 
threat.
 solutions: what congress can do
 The Executive Order creates the framework. Congress must now 
provide the legal authorities, tools, and resources to make that 
framework operational and durable.
Enact a digital assets ``hold law''
 Congress should enact a digital assets ``hold law,'' which would 
create a legal safe harbor allowing cryptocurrency exchanges to 
temporarily freeze funds linked to suspected illicit activity, pending 
legal process from law enforcement. The language for such a law exists 
today in the Senate Banking Committee's draft of the ``Digital Asset 
Market Clarity Act.''
 Traditional banks have had this authority for decades. When a bank 
compliance officer identifies a suspicious wire transfer, they can 
place a hold while the matter is reviewed. Cryptocurrency exchanges 
operating under current law lack that clear authority. Every hour of 
legal uncertainty is an hour that criminal networks use to move funds 
to the next wallet and beyond recovery. Closing this gap would 
transform the speed at which the private sector can act on law 
enforcement intelligence.
Fund and scale real-time intelligence sharing
 Real-time disruption and interdiction should be codified as a core 
pillar of U.S. digital asset policy--embedding networks like Beacon 
into the regulatory framework as a standard capability across the 
ecosystem.
 These models demonstrate how the private sector's real-time 
visibility can be paired with Government authorities to freeze funds, 
seize assets, and disrupt illicit activity before it scales. The Senate 
Banking Committee's market structure discussion draft already moves in 
this direction, emphasizing enhanced public-private coordination and 
anti-money-laundering obligations as part of a broader effort to 
address illicit finance risks in digital assets.
 To operationalize this, Congress should prioritize policies that 
scale participation and remove friction. That includes dedicated 
Federal funding to expand real-time intelligence-sharing networks--
especially for smaller platforms that are often targeted as compliance 
weak points--and a formal legal framework that provides liability 
protection for firms acting on law enforcement intelligence. Illicit 
actors deliberately migrate to the edges of the ecosystem; closing 
those gaps requires both resources and clear rules that enable rapid, 
coordinated action across platforms and jurisdictions.
 More broadly, this should be treated as a best practice across the 
industry. Digital asset firms should be expected to participate in 
real-time intelligence networks, integrate rapid response capabilities 
into compliance programs, and act immediately on high-confidence 
illicit indicators. The future of effective enforcement is not 
retrospective analysis--it is coordinated, real-time disruption powered 
by public-private collaboration.
Deploy AI investigative capacity at scale across Federal agencies
 Congress should fund the development and deployment of AI-powered 
investigative tools across IRS Criminal Investigation, FinCEN, OFAC, 
the FBI, DEA, Secret Service, HSI, national security, and defense 
agencies. The criminal networks before this committee are deploying AI 
autonomously and at scale. Responding with 20th Century investigative 
tools against 21st Century criminal infrastructure is not a viable 
strategy. Federal agencies need the funding, the procurement authority, 
and the legal frameworks to acquire and deploy these capabilities at 
the speed the threat demands.
Explore cyber ``letters of marque''
 We live in a moment where the private sector holds much of the 
critical data and the public sector holds the authorities--but success 
depends on fusing the two in real time.
 Effective disruption requires ensuring Government has access to 
actionable intelligence while enabling trusted private-sector actors to 
move quickly, within clear legal frameworks, to freeze funds, identify 
bad actors, and dismantle criminal networks as activity unfolds. That 
reality should drive a more forward-leaning policy approach: granting 
narrowly-scoped, Government-authorized authorities for vetted private 
actors to take targeted action against the technical infrastructure of 
transnational criminal organizations.
 There is a strong conceptual foundation for this model. 
Historically, governments have extended limited authorities to private 
actors to address threats that outpaced traditional state capacity. In 
the digital context, this could take the form of what might be called 
``cyber letters of marque,'' ``authorized disruption authorities,'' or 
a structured ``white hat intervention'' framework--mechanisms that 
allow approved entities, operating under strict oversight and 
accountability, to intervene in real time to disrupt illicit 
infrastructure, block transactions, or degrade criminal networks.
 Today's threat environment--particularly scam center networks that 
blend state sponsorship, criminal enterprise, and advanced technology--
demands this kind of adaptation. These networks move at machine speed, 
exploit jurisdictional seams, and leverage both crypto and traditional 
finance. Matching that threat requires a system where intelligence, 
authority, and action are aligned--and where public-private 
collaboration is not just information sharing, but coordinated, real-
time disruption.
Provide tools and training to State and local law enforcement
 When a victim of pig butchering walks into a police station, the 
officer taking the report is often the only law enforcement contact 
that victim will ever have. That officer needs to know how to capture 
blockchain identifiers from the transaction confirmations and wallet 
addresses the victim can provide, how to preserve digital evidence in 
forms that support subsequent Federal investigation, and how to connect 
the case to FBI, HSI, or Secret Service task forces with cryptocurrency 
investigative capability. Too many reports taken today result in no 
actionable investigation because the front-line officer does not have 
the training to recognize what they have received.
 Mandatory blockchain intelligence training and access to tools for 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement would meaningfully increase 
the proportion of cases that develop into actionable investigations 
rather than dead-end reports.
Create a victim compensation fund
 Congress should create a DOJ-administered victim compensation or 
restoration fund to ensure that victims of cryptocurrency-enabled scams 
are made whole to the greatest extent possible. In today's threat 
environment, law enforcement can often trace and seize illicit 
proceeds, but the speed, scale, and fragmentation of these transactions 
make it difficult to tie specific recovered funds back to individual 
victims. A centralized fund would solve this problem by pooling 
recovered assets and distributing them equitably across victims, 
ensuring that relief reaches constituents even when precise attribution 
is not possible.
 This approach is already contemplated in the Executive Order and 
should be codified into law. All funds recovered through seizures and 
forfeitures tied to scam activity should first be directed to victim 
compensation, with any remaining funds used to administer the program 
and support continued enforcement efforts. This creates a victim-first 
model that reflects the realities of modern financial crime while 
establishing a durable framework for recovery in complex, cross-border 
cases where traditional restitution mechanisms fall short.
 conclusion
 The threat before this committee is real, it is growing, and it is 
hitting American families with a precision and scale that demands a 
response equal to the challenge. In my career I have never seen 
anything like what blockchain intelligence reveals about the 
operational sophistication and financial resources of the criminal 
networks I have described today. But I want to leave this committee 
with something beyond the weight of the problem, because the weight of 
the problem, while real, is not the whole story.
 We can follow the money. The blockchain is a public, permanent, 
immutable ledger, and the tools to read that ledger and identify the 
actors behind the transactions exist today. The private sector has 
built intelligence-sharing infrastructure, real-time alerting systems, 
and AI-powered investigative tools that are already producing results.
 The Executive Order signed in March creates, for the first time, a 
whole-of-Government mandate to bring the full toolkit of American power 
to bear on the organizations running these schemes. What the 
grandmother in Ohio, the veteran in Texas, and the family in New York 
need from this committee is the legal authority, resources, and 
sustained institutional commitment to deploy these capabilities at the 
speed and scale the threat demands. I am grateful for the attention 
this joint hearing brings to these issues and welcome your questions.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Redbord.
 I now recognize Mr. Bercu for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF JOSHUA M. BERCU, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF POLICY, 
 USTELECOM--THE BROADBAND ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Bercu. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, Chairman 
Ogles, and Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today and for your leadership on this 
critical issue. I'm Josh Bercu, executive director of the 
industry Traceback Group and a senior VP at USTelecom. 
USTelecom leads the Traceback Group, which is designated by the 
FCC as the Consortium for Tracing illegal Calls. I also served 
on the FTC's Scams Against Older Adults Advisory Group and on 
Aspen's National Task Force for Fraud and Scam Prevention.
 The telecom industry has been making progress to protect 
American consumers from illegal calls. We've deployed tools 
like call blocking, call authentication, and industry-led 
traceback, complemented by aggressive enforcement by our 
Government partners. It used to take law enforcement months to 
determine who made an illegal call. Now with traceback, we 
often find those criminals within hours. We work closely with 
Federal and State law enforcement, routinely tracing calls 
referred to us, including scams impersonating the Department of 
Homeland Security, and providing actionable information to 
support enforcement.
 We know this works. Raids of illegal calling operations in 
India led to an 85 percent drop in IRS scam robocalls. FCC and 
State attorneys general action virtually eliminated an illegal 
auto warranty campaign. Today, scam robocall volume is 50 
percent lower than its peak. The Traceback Group has worked 
with banks, tech companies, and others to identify the 
criminals behind these calls and support law enforcement 
action, including recent information sharing supporting HSI 
takedowns.
 Fraudsters have evolved from high volume to higher impact. 
The most sophisticated operations, as my colleagues have 
already discussed, are run by organized transnational criminal 
networks. A decade ago, the dominant illegal calling threat was 
concentrated in South Asia, especially India. Today, the most 
consequential development is the rise of industrial-scale scam 
compounds in Southeast Asia. Mexican drug cartels have built 
their own illegal calling operations targeting Americans as 
well. We now face a global fraud-as-a-service marketplace where 
tools, tactics, and infrastructure are rapidly shared and 
operationalized.
 The methods used to bring these schemes onto U.S. networks 
are evolving as well. We trace calls back to entities posing as 
U.S.-based providers, sometimes through shell companies, 
sometimes impersonating U.S. legitimate companies. We see 
growing instances of calling platforms compromised and used to 
used to deliver scam calls. SIM boxes are used to generate 
calls from within the United States, even if the callers 
themselves are located abroad.
 To put it simply, criminals have adapted to traceback 
enforcement by hijacking or deploying domestic infrastructure. 
These trends underscore the limits of what industry can do on 
its own. We cannot make arrests or prosecute the criminals even 
when we identify them.
 When I testified before Congress last year, I outlined 
areas where Federal action can make a difference. The 
administration's March 2026 Executive Order is an important 
step. It reflects the whole-of-Government approach that this 
problem demands and treats scams as what they are, crimes. Now 
the focus must be implementation. There are 3 areas where 
Congress can help.
 First, reinforce the E.O. and its enforcement mandate by 
providing resources to support investigative capacity, 
prosecution, and cross-border coordination. Prosecutors and 
investigators must be able to move with urgency and work with 
willing partners abroad. Our industry, including the Traceback 
Group, stands ready in support.
 Second, provide a safe harbor for information sharing for 
improved fraud prevention and detection. Merging partnerships 
show real promise in identifying and disrupting scams. A safe 
harbor could unlock even deeper collaboration.
 Third, support and scale what works, including proven tools 
like Traceback. Fraud continues to take a toll on American 
consumers. We are committed to being a constructive partner in 
this fight.
 Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Bercu follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Joshua M. Bercu
 April 21, 2026
 i. introduction
 Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Guest, 
Ranking Member Correa, Chairman Ogles, and Members of the 
Subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for 
your leadership on this critical issue. Your continued partnership is 
vital to sustaining the vigilance, innovation, and coordination we need 
to fight the transnational criminal networks exploiting the American 
people we all serve.
 I'm Josh Bercu, executive director of the Industry Traceback Group, 
or ITG, and senior vice president of policy at USTelecom--The Broadband 
Association. For over 10 years, USTelecom has led the Traceback Group, 
which serves as the entity designated by the Federal Communications 
Commission to trace back suspected unlawful robocalls. I also have 
served in leadership roles on the Federal Trade Commission's Scams 
Against Older Adults Advisory Group and the Aspen Institute Financial 
Services Program's National Task Force for Fraud & Scam Prevention.
 The telecom industry has been making real and meaningful progress 
to protect American consumers by confronting illegal calls, including 
both illegal robocalls and scams. Communications providers have 
developed and deployed powerful tools and mechanisms like call blocking 
and labeling, call authentication, and industry-led traceback--all 
complemented by a strengthened accountability regime at the FCC and 
aggressive enforcement by Government partners at the Federal and State 
level.
 My testimony focuses on the telecom infrastructure that 
transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, abuse and misuse to 
reach American victims and on the industry tools, enforcement 
partnerships, and policy frameworks we need to disrupt them. The 
Traceback Group's work sits at an important intersection: we trace the 
illegal calls that the same criminal networks you are examining today 
often are behind. The intelligence we develop supports a myriad of 
Government enforcement actions against these groups and the in-on-the-
scheme entities they rely on.
 From this work, we've seen both what's possible and what's still 
urgently needed to protect consumers. The bottom line: we have built 
and deployed the right tools and anti-scam infrastructure. The 
foundation is strong. Now we need to keep building on it, deepening 
collaboration across industry sectors and with Government to ensure 
those tools deliver real accountability for the criminals behind these 
scams.
 ii. disrupting scam infrastructure through traceback and enforcement
 Traceback is one of the tools we have adapted to disrupt call-based 
scam operations. It used to take law enforcement agencies months to 
determine who made an illegal call--we now often find those criminals 
within hours. That speed and scalability allow us to keep pace with 
today's fast-moving fraud.
 By rapidly tracing the path of illegal calls back through the 
network, the Traceback Group helps identify the multiple providers that 
carry the call and actors enabling or originating fraud. We work 
closely with Federal and State law enforcement, routinely tracing calls 
referred to us--including scams impersonating the Department of 
Homeland Security, IRS, Social Security Administration and other 
Federal agencies--and providing actionable information to support 
enforcement. Over the past several years, traceback has contributed to 
dozens of civil and criminal actions. We also have begun to work with 
international law enforcement partners.
 We know the combination of identifying the bad actors responsible, 
including through traceback, and then holding them accountable works:
 Raids of illegal calling operations in India led to an 85 
 percent drop in robocalls impersonating the IRS in 2016, and a 
 similar joint effort by Canadian and Indian authorities in 2018 
 drove a 77 percent decline in calls impersonating the Canadian 
 Revenue Agency.
 Enforcement targeting those responsible for unsolicited 
 vacation and time share robocalls led to those calls dropping 
 by half in 2017.
 FTC enforcement led to a 60 percent decline in unlawful 
 health insurance robocalls in 2019, and FCC and State attorneys 
 general action led to the virtual elimination of the illegal 
 auto warranty robocall campaign between 2021 and 2022.
 Today, thanks to coordinated action by industry and Government, 
many of the most disruptive, high-volume scam calls--like those 
impersonating the IRS or Social Security Administration--no longer 
reach vulnerable Americans at the same scale. Data from YouMail shows 
scam robocall volume is about 50 percent lower than at the March 2021 
peak.
 In recent years, industry collaboration has expanded beyond the 
communications sector and the public sector. The Traceback Group, for 
example, now works with banks, major tech companies, the hospitality 
industry, and others to identify the criminals behind illegal calls and 
feed that information to law enforcement. In one recent instance, some 
of our data was shared through the National Cyber-Forensics Training 
Alliance to support takedowns by the Department of Homeland Security's 
Homeland Security Investigations. These burgeoning partnerships are one 
of the most promising developments to protect consumers.
 iii. how criminal networks abuse u.s. telecom infrastructure
 The progress is real, but so is the evolution of the threat. 
Today's fraudsters aren't blasting millions of robocalls impersonating 
the Social Security Administration. They're shifting from high volume 
to high impact, and the criminal networks behind these schemes are 
sophisticated, organized, and global. From a telecom perspective, this 
evolution is defined by how these organized crime groups abuse and 
misuse U.S. communications infrastructure to reach consumers.
 A decade ago, the dominant illegal calling threat to U.S. consumers 
was concentrated in South Asia, principally India and to a lesser 
degree Pakistan and Bangladesh. Operators ran tech-support, IRS-
impersonation, and bank-fraud scripts out of illegal calling 
operations. That threat persists, but the center of gravity has 
shifted. As has been well-documented, the most consequential 
development is the rise of industrial-scale ``scam compounds'' in 
Southeast Asia, principally in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. In 
parallel, Mexican drug cartels have built their own illegal calling 
operation networks targeting American consumers.
 One important point for Congress' consideration, however, is 
structural. What was once a regionally-bounded set of criminal 
enterprises has become a globalized, industrialized fraud-as-a-service 
marketplace. Criminal fraudsters' toolsets are bought, sold, and shared 
across these ecosystems. Playbooks, scripts, and even trafficked labor 
move through Telegram channels, dark-web forums, and overlapping 
financial infrastructure. The practical consequence is that successful 
techniques are copied, traded, and operationalized across regions on a 
time line measured in weeks, not years.
 While the threat of foreign actors abusing U.S. networks is not 
new, their tactics are evolving. Increasingly, we trace calls back to 
entities posing as U.S.-based providers: forming shell LLCs, using 
disposable domains, and in some cases impersonating real telecom 
companies--tactics designed to evade know-your-customer requirements 
and regulatory scrutiny. Beyond this, we see growing instances where 
legitimate callers and calling platforms--a hospital, a school 
broadcast service, tools used for get-out-the-vote calls, and more--are 
compromised and used to deliver scam impersonation calls, leveraging 
stolen credentials and deployed at scale using AI and automation. At 
the same time, SIMBoxes add another layer of complexity, enabling 
scammers to simulate thousands of unique mobile identities and making 
high-volume activity look like individual callers--and generate calls 
from within the United States, even if the callers themselves are 
located abroad.
 These evolutions are not accidental. Traceback and enforcement have 
systematically eliminated the low-hanging fruit. Enforcement actions 
have shut down or driven out the VoIP providers that once turned a 
blind eye to bad traffic or built their business on bringing it into 
the country. Gone are the days of blasting millions of calls through 
permissive internet-based voice providers. Instead, criminals have 
adapted, hijacking or deploying domestic infrastructure.
 These trends underscore a central reality: while industry 
protections are essential and civil enforcement can be highly 
impactful, they are not sufficient on their own to deter the 
transnational criminal organizations orchestrating these schemes.
 iv. turning progress into lasting impact
 America's telecom providers have been moving aggressively to 
respond in the face of these evolving threats. But we cannot make 
arrests or prosecute the criminals--even when we identify them.
 When I testified before the House Energy & Commerce Committee, 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee 9 months ago, I outlined 3 areas where Federal action could 
make a meaningful difference: establishing a coordinated national anti-
scam strategy, enabling greater cross-sector data sharing through a 
safe harbor, and scaling tools and partnerships that are already 
delivering results.
 The administration's March 2026 Executive Order makes important 
progress on that first priority and advances elements of the others. It 
reflects exactly the kind of whole-of-Government approach this problem 
demands and treats scams as what they are: crimes.
 The E.O. establishes a dedicated operational cell within the 
National Coordination Center to coordinate Federal efforts to detect, 
disrupt, dismantle, and deter TCOs explicitly including private-sector 
engagement. It also directs action to hold foreign governments 
accountable and to return seized assets to victims. Taken together, it 
signals that the administration views transnational fraud as a national 
security priority, not merely a consumer protection matter.
 The E.O. is exactly what we needed--and it could not have come at a 
more critical moment. Now the focus must be on ensuring that this 
momentum translates into sustained impact.
 There are 3 areas where Congress can help:
 Resource implementation and sustain pressure on cross-border 
 criminal enforcement.--The E.O. rightly emphasizes enforcement 
 and accountability, particularly for actors operating overseas. 
 Congress can reinforce the E.O. and its mandate by supporting 
 investigative capacity, prosecution, and cross-border 
 coordination. We need prosecutors and investigators fully 
 resourced so that they can move with urgency and work with 
 willing partners abroad. Communications providers, including 
 through the Traceback Group, stand ready in support.
 Provide a safe harbor for improved fraud prevention and 
 detection.--Emerging partnerships between telecom providers, 
 financial institutions, tech platforms, and other stakeholders 
 are showing real promise in identifying and disrupting scams. A 
 well-scoped safe harbor could unlock even deeper collaboration 
 across the internet ecosystem to accelerate threat detection 
 and better prevent consumer harm. Right now, however, privacy 
 regulation and other legal concerns can inhibit companies from 
 using and, where appropriate, sharing data that could help 
 identify and stop fraud.
 Support and scale what works, including proven tools like 
 traceback.--As scams evolve, we must double down on proven 
 tools and partnerships that have shown real results. Traceback 
 is one such tool: it can help drive criminal prosecutions, 
 civil enforcement actions, and real-world disruption of scam 
 networks, and increasingly serves as a model of effective 
 cross-sector collaboration. But like many effective solutions, 
 it requires sustained support and legal clarity to remain 
 viable. Congress should reinforce frameworks that work like 
 traceback, ensuring stability for the program and protecting it 
 from efforts designed to undermine the process and its mission.
 v. conclusion
 While we've made progress together, fraud continues to take a toll 
on American consumers. Scam robocalls are down, enforcement actions are 
up, and industry tools like traceback are evolving with the threat. The 
administration's March Executive Order represents real momentum toward 
the kind of coordinated, enforcement-first approach this problem 
demands, and communications providers are committed to being a 
constructive partner in its implementation.
 But the progress in reducing illegal call volume does not mean the 
threat is gone. Criminal fraudsters are adapting quickly, targeting 
individuals, impersonating trusted institutions, and operating from 
beyond what they perceive as the reach of U.S. enforcement. 
Transnational criminal networks are abusing U.S. telecom infrastructure 
as one component of a broader, multi-vector attack on American 
consumers--encompassing crypto fraud, digital extortion, human 
trafficking, and more.
 Our next phase of work must focus on converting intelligence into 
impact--using traceback and cross-sector collaboration not just to 
detect fraud, but to deter, disrupt, and penalize it, and prevent 
perpetrators from targeting another victim.
 Strengthening partnerships--particularly around coordinated 
criminal enforcement and the legal frameworks that enable deeper 
collaboration--is one of the most important ways the Federal Government 
can help turn progress into lasting impact, drive real accountability, 
and deliver meaningful protection for the American public.
 Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you Mr. Bercu, for your opening statement.
 I would now like to recognize Ms. Stifel for 5 minutes to 
summarize her opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF MEGAN STIFEL, CHIEF STRATEGY OFFICER, INSTITUTE 
 FOR SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY

 Ms. Stifel. Chairman Guest, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member 
Correa, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I'm 
Megan Stifel, the chief strategy officer at the Institute for 
Security and Technology. We are a 501(c)(3) nonprofit critical 
action think tank focused on the implications of technology for 
our national security. In our work on cybersecurity, we address 
misaligned incentives in the technology ecosystem that leave 
our critical infrastructure with vulnerable. At IST, I also 
serve as the executive director of the Ransomware Task Force.
 I'd like for you to think back to the spring of 2021. Five 
years ago next week, the Ransomware Task Force released its 
report with 48 recommendations for a comprehensive anti-
ransomware campaign. Two weeks later, the Colonial pipeline was 
shut down by a Russian ransomware gang, endangering 40 percent 
of the gasoline supply east of the Mississippi. Government 
agencies were forced to warn Americans not to put gas in 
plastic bags as gas lines in some States brought back memories 
of the 1970's.
 Since Colonial, we've seen attacks on the meat processor 
JBS, the L.A. Unified School District, CommonSpirit hospitals, 
Change Healthcare, CDK Global, and more. Ransomware rose to the 
level of an urgent national security threat that demanded our 
attention.
 Today I'm pleased to report that we are making some 
progress in the fight against cyber crime. The national 
security threat posed by ransomware has decreased, thanks in 
part to the work of this committee. But we cannot rest on our 
laurels. Criminals are constantly evolving and so must we. 
Cyber fraud from extortion-based intrusions to business email 
compromise continues to cost our economy billions each year 
with significant impacts on small businesses.
 Nation-state adversaries are leveraging the cyber crime 
ecosystem to target our critical infrastructure, and rapid 
advancements in artificial intelligence-enabled cyber tools 
threaten to erode many of the gains we've made in cybersecurity 
in the last few years. Recent actions by the administration 
have emphasized the importance of countering cyber crime. 
However, challenges with cuts to the Federal work force and 
funding, as well as organizational upheaval, all threaten to 
stall this progress.
 In addition, the administration's strategic approach risks 
leaning too heavily on disruption at the expense of shoring up 
our defenses at home. In fact, for the first time we've seen 
material steps backward when it comes to implementing 
recommendations from the Ransomware Task Force.
 This committee in particular should continue its bipartisan 
oversight of the administration to ensure that CISA is able to 
carry out its mission in the face of significant cuts to its 
work force. Beyond the immediate changes needed, we must also 
look to the future. We will never achieve our strategic goals 
in cyber space without moving upstream to make systems-level 
changes. This requires a firm foundation for efforts like the 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, or CVE, Program, which 
helps the entire ecosystem understand and defend against cyber 
threats and which is coming under increasing pressure from AI-
discovered vulnerabilities. It demands more accountability for 
services like residential proxy networks that are regularly 
abused by criminals and nation-state adversaries. It requires 
strengthening relationships among Government agencies and 
between Government and industry so that they are built on trust 
and emerge from truly collaborative engagements.
 Without these system-level changes, we will remain 
vulnerable. I have several recommendations for the committee.
 First, the committee should pass legislation authorizing 
key programs, including the CVE program and the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, to ensure they are 
not interrupted.
 Second, Members of the committee should work with your 
counterparts to pass long-term or permanent extensions of 
cybersecurity authorities, including the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 and the State and Local 
Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2021.
 Third, the committee should also strengthen the ability of 
the private sector and government actors to work together to 
disrupt cyber threats by authorizing the Joint Cyber Defense 
Collaborative, or JCDC, and clarifying lawful defensive 
measures that private-sector actors can take when countering 
ransomware or other cyber crime.
 Finally, I hope this committee will continue to conduct 
oversight and effective hearings covering topics such as 
residential proxy networks, the Cyber Response and Recovery 
Fund, the rise of product security regimes, measures to 
disincentivize extortion payments, and the effect of AI on 
vulnerability disclosure.
 As leaders on inside--excuse me, as leaders in 
cybersecurity in the House, I also hope you will work closely 
with other committees on cross-jurisdictional issues, including 
CISA funding, cyber insurance, expanding the E-Rate program to 
include cybersecurity, and additional oversight of the SALT 
typhoon incidents carried out by the People's Republic of 
China, which target the telecom networks that form the backbone 
of our everyday communications.
 Twenty-twenty-six is a decisive moment. We can see the 
potential opportunities and dangers from AI on the horizon, but 
there is still time to act. As Americans, what we need more 
than anything today is leadership. When we move decisively, we 
can seize the initiative from adversaries and materially change 
the cyber crime landscape. I hope today's hearing is an 
opportunity to jumpstart a new wave of bipartisan, effective, 
and transformative cybersecurity policy.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward 
to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Ms. Stifel follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Megan Stifel \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ I would like to thank Nicholas Leiserson and Sophia Mauro for 
their assistance in the preparation of this testimony. No AI assistance 
was used in developing this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 April 21, 2026
 Chairman Guest, Chairman Ogles, and Ranking Member Correa, thank 
you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Megan Stifel, chief 
strategy officer at the Institute for Security and Technology \2\ and 
executive director of the Ransomware Task Force.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ https://securityandtechnology.org/.
 \3\ https://securityandtechnology.org/ransomwaretaskforce/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 We are making progress in the fight against cyber crime. The 
national security threat posed by ransomware has decreased in the 5 
years since we launched the Ransomware Task Force, thanks in part to 
the work of this committee. But we cannot rest on our laurels. Cyber 
fraud continues to cost our economy billions each year. Nation-state 
adversaries are leveraging the cyber crime ecosystem to target our 
critical infrastructure. And rapid advancements in the sophistication 
of artificial intelligence-enabled cyber tools threaten to erode many 
of the gains we've made in cybersecurity in the last few years.
 Congress has a key role to play in consolidating the gains we've 
made, ensuring that we do not backslide, and preparing for the next 
iteration of the cyber threat. It is imperative that Congress pass a 
long-term--or even permanent--reauthorization of the information-
sharing authorities in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 
2015. Similarly, Congress must do more to support vulnerable State and 
local governments, which are not equipped to combat foreign armies or 
transnational criminal organizations. This committee, in particular, 
should continue its bipartisan oversight of the administration to 
ensure that CISA is able to carry out its mission in the face of 
significant cuts to its workforce.
 Beyond the immediate changes needed, we must also look to the 
future. We will never achieve our strategic goals in cyber space 
without moving upstream to make system-level changes. This requires a 
firm foundation for efforts like the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) Program, which help the entire ecosystem understand and 
defend against cyber threats. It demands more accountability for 
services, like residential proxy networks, that are regularly abused by 
criminals and nation-state adversaries. And achieving our strategic 
goals in cyber space will never succeed without relationships among 
Government agencies and between the Government and industry that are 
built on trust and emerge from truly collaborative engagements.
 Twenty-twenty-six is a decisive moment. We can see the potential 
opportunities and dangers from AI on the horizon, but there is still 
time to act. As Americans, what we need today more than anything is 
leadership. When we move decisively, we can seize the initiative from 
adversaries and materially change the cyber crime landscape. I hope 
today's hearing is an opportunity to jumpstart a new wave of 
bipartisan, effective, and transformative cybersecurity policy.
 i. about ist
 The Institute for Security and Technology (IST) is a 501(c)(3) 
charitable non-profit critical action think tank focused on the 
implications of technology for our national security. Home of the 
Ransomware Task Force, IST's cybersecurity program conducts applied 
research and policy development to address misaligned incentives in the 
technology ecosystem that leave critical infrastructure vulnerable. 
IST's current cybersecurity initiatives include:
 UnDisruptable27.--Supported by Craig Newmark Philanthropies, 
 UnDisruptable27 \4\ is focused on reducing our reliance on 
 undependable technologies. Created in response to attempts by 
 Chinese army units to hold U.S. critical infrastructure at 
 risk,\5\ UnDisruptable works with hospital communities to 
 ensure the resilience of the water utilities they rely on 
 against cyber attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ https://securityandtechnology.org/undisruptable27/.
 \5\ https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/committee-activity/
hearings/hearing-notice-the-ccp-cyber-threat-to-the-american-homeland-
and-national-security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 K-12 Cyber Defense Coalition.--With stakeholders ranging 
 from chief State school officers to district IT administrators, 
 the K-12 Cyber Defense Coalition \6\ helps to drive State and 
 local collaboration, policy development, and information 
 sharing to defend our Nation's schools from cyber threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/announcing-the-k12-
cyber-defense-coalition/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Strengthening Information and Communications Technology.--
 One of the most effective interventions to improve 
 cybersecurity is to ensure that software is secure by design. 
 IST has published a comprehensive framework to strengthen and 
 improve CISA's CVE Program \7\ and recently published a guide 
 for policy makers comparing international product cybersecurity 
 regulations.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/cve-
at-a-crossroads/.
 \8\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/who-sets-the-rules-the-
imminent-gdpr-ification-of-product-cybersecurity/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Counter Ransomware Initiative Private-Sector Advisory 
 Panel.--The International Counter Ransomware Initiative 
 (CRI),\9\ created in 2021 and aligned with a Ransomware Task 
 Force recommendation, coordinates efforts to combat ransomware 
 across more than 76 member-states and organizations. IST is an 
 inaugural member of the Private-Sector Advisory Panel, which 
 helps guide CRI activities.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ https://counter-ransomware.org/aboutus.
 \10\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/ist-contributes-to-
icri-for-fourth-year/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 International Ransomware Task Forces.--In partnership with 
 foreign governments and organizations, IST is adapting the 
 Ransomware Task Force model in other countries to help them 
 counter international criminal activity. Brazil recently 
 completed its own task force sprint, and IST is currently 
 working with the government of Mexico to stand up a task force 
 of its own.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/mexico-rtf/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ii. the cyber crime threat landscape
 The cyber crime threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Extortion 
continues to be a major tactic, albeit one that increasingly involves 
the confidentiality of data, not just its availability. Criminals' 
reliance on common infrastructure, like residential proxy networks and 
certain domain registrars, present opportunities for disruption. Beyond 
extortion-based attacks, business email compromise causes billions in 
losses each year. Connections between nation-states and criminals 
persist. And exponentially-increasing AI capabilities have the 
potential to upend the landscape as we know it.
A. Ransomware: From Encryption to Data Extortion
 Thanks in part to changes in policy, including the elevation of 
ransomware to a matter of national security, we have seen significant 
shifts in the tactics of transnational cyber criminal organizations. 
Instead of targeting availability of systems or data, criminals are 
increasingly using extortion tactics to breach the confidentiality of 
data. To be clear, this is a better outcome for victims--and for our 
national security. However, the adaptability of these professional 
criminals, and their continued profitability, continues to pose a 
significant risk to the United States.
 In order to understand the shift in cyber criminal tactics, one 
must start with the definition of ``ransomware.'' According to CISA, 
``Ransomware is an ever-evolving form of malware designed to encrypt 
files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on 
them unusable.''\12\ Traditionally, ransomware operators have held data 
or systems hostage by encrypting them. In exchange for paying a ransom, 
they provided victims with a decryption key that, in some cases, allows 
for recovery of data or key system files and returns their information 
and communications technology to good working order.
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 \12\ https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware.
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 Because traditional ransomware targets the availability of systems 
and data, it poses a significant threat to critical infrastructure. 
Ransomware attacks on pipelines or hospitals can force them to shut 
down, threatening the economy or even human lives. Refusing to pay can 
extend the time an enterprise is crippled, causing ripple effects 
throughout society.
 The good news is that traditional ransomware attacks in the United 
States are on the decline. Across multiple data sets, we see a similar 
trend: ``threat actors [are] shifting to exfiltration only without 
encryption.''\13\ Google Mandiant noted a nearly eightfold increase in 
the number of data-theft-only extortion incidents they responded to 
over the past 5 years, and encryption dropped from being present in 39 
percent of cases in 2024 to 31 percent in 2025.\14\ In its 2025 
ransomware survey, Sophos documented a 5-year low in the number of 
incidents that resulted in actual encryption of data.\15\
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 \13\ https://admin.bakerlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026-
DSIR-Report.pdf.
 \14\ https://cyberscoop.com/google-threat-intelligence-group-
ransomware-report-2026/.
 \15\ https://assets.sophos.com/X24WTUEQ/at/gspkf9pb6jsvt4hrv2z8kjj/
sophos-state-of-ran- somware-in-enterprise-2025.pdf.
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 The bad news is that criminals are adapting. Double-extortion 
schemes--once an unusual tactic in which ransomware actors steal data 
as well as encrypting it and then demand a second payment to keep it 
from being published--are now de rigeur. Google Mandiant, for instance, 
found that 77 percent of ransomware incidents in 2025 also involved 
data theft.\16\ Criminals are also targeting smaller organizations \17\ 
and shifting focus overseas. Last year, the United Kingdom suffered 2 
significant ransomware-related incidents that cost the British economy 
billions.\18\
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 \16\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/
ransomware-ttps-shifting-threat- landscape.
 \17\ Verizon, for instance, highlighted that ransomware was present 
in 88% of small and medium businessbreaches versus 39% of the entire 
sample studied. https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T36/reports/
2025-dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf.
 \18\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/a-category-three-cyber-
hurricane-classifying-the-jlr-hack/.
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 These trends carry important lessons for policy makers. 
Cybersecurity technologies, from endpoint detection and response tools 
to consistent data backups, can effectively prevent ransomware 
criminals from encrypting large quantities of data or allow for quick 
recovery if hit by an attack.\19\ Coordinated law enforcement takedowns 
can significantly disrupt ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems, 
relegating once-prolific criminal groups to obscurity.\20\ Ransomware 
payment rates are also falling to record lows, in part because data-
exfiltration does not present the same degree of threat to business 
operations as encryption.\21\
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 \19\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2026/2/3/mass-data-exfiltration-
campaigns-lose-their-edge-in-q4-2025.
 \20\ https://storage.ghost.io/c/af/a0/afa04ee3-414f-4481-8d23-
7e7c146f192e/content/files/2026/03/2025YiR-report.pdf.
 \21\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2026/2/3/mass-data-exfiltration-
campaigns-lose-their-edge-in-q4-2025.
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 However, criminals are agile--and we cannot become complacent. 
Faced with lower profit margins, we've seen criminal groups 
implementing intermittent encryption in an attempt to avoid detection 
mechanisms.\22\ We have also seen them targeting less capable cyber 
actors, like school systems and hospitals.\23\ This can result in 
higher human costs, whether in the form of stolen sensitive data or 
disrupted services. Artificial intelligence tools also have the 
potential to turbocharge threats, automating significant portions of 
ransomware workflows.\24\ To keep pace with the evolving threat, policy 
makers must maintain pressure by facilitating law enforcement takedowns 
while investing more in critical infrastructure below the security 
poverty line.\25\
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 \22\ https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.15133.
 \23\ Although metrics vary, health care and Government facilities 
consistently ranked as highly-targeted sectors in 2025. https://
www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf.
 \24\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/
distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use.
 \25\ https://www.scworld.com/podcast-segment/9082-the-security-
poverty-line-part-1-wendy-nather-scw-60.
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B. The Infrastructure of Cyber Crime: Proxies in Homes, Undisciplined 
 Registrars
 Cyber crime, particularly ransomware, has been professionalizing 
for the past decade.\26\ Today, criminal enterprises cater to unique 
niches within the ransomware kill chain, from delivering initial access 
to a victim to helping to launder proceeds through cryptocurrency 
mixers. The growing specialization within the ransomware ecosystem 
reduces costs for criminals--one of the drivers of continued profits 
for transnational criminal organizations, even as payment rates 
continue to drop.\27\ However, as with other complex supply chains, 
this interplay creates points of friction where disruptions can have 
significant impact on downstream criminal gangs.
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 \26\ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/
issue-brief/behind-the-rise-of-ransomware/.
 \27\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2025/10/24/insider-threats-loom-
while-ransom-payment-rates-plummet.
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 At IST, we have been focusing on 2 specific enablers of ransomware 
and other cyber crime: residential proxy networks and digital 
infrastructure service providers.
 Residential Proxies
 Residential proxy networks (RPNs), in essence, act as an 
intermediary to hide the origin of internet traffic, passing messages 
on behalf of a sender to a receiver and then forwarding along 
replies.\28\ Unlike other proxy networks, RPNs use home, small office, 
or mobile devices--and their associated Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses--as the middleman in the connection.
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 \28\ https://spur.us/blog/what-is-a-residential-proxy.
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 Fueled by software development kits that come bundled with apps and 
browser extensions,\29\ as well as pre-configured streaming devices 
like the Superbox,\30\ RPNs are growing rapidly. While some users of 
RPNs rely on the networks to preserve their legitimate privacy 
interests, many others use them to scan and ``scrape'' the internet, 
attempting to avoid limitations put in place by service providers.\31\
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 \29\ https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/evading-
residential-proxy-networks-protecting-your-devices-from-becoming-a-
tool-for-criminals.
 \30\ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/11/is-your-android-tv-
streaming-box-part-of-a-botnet/.
 \31\ https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2025/
cloudflare-just-changed-how-ai-crawlers-scrape-the-internet-at-large.
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 Criminals are increasingly taking advantage of the deep and liquid 
market for these residential IP addresses to hide their attempts to 
gain access; exert command and control over compromised systems; and 
exfiltrate stolen data. In the week prior to the takedown of the IPIDEA 
RPN in January 2026, Google observed 550 different threat actors using 
that network to cover their tracks.\32\
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 \32\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/
disrupting-largest-residential-proxy-network.
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 Recently, RPNs have also been used by criminals to gain initial 
access into home networks. Through clever routing techniques, criminals 
can use a single residential proxy node (e.g., a laptop with a browser 
extension configured to join an RPN) to illuminate a home network and 
then compromise any vulnerable devices it finds on that network. The 
Kimwolf botnet enrolled over 2 million devices in a matter of weeks 
using this technique,\33\ making it one of the fastest growing botnets 
of all time.
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 \33\ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/01/the-kimwolf-botnet-is-
stalking-your-local-network/.
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 It is time for policy makers to take notice.\34\ Because many 
residential proxy nodes are enrolled through quasi-legal means, such as 
disclosures buried in license agreements, there are limited paths for 
law enforcement or service providers to disrupt the networks. Without 
action, consumers will continue to be unwitting enablers of criminal or 
nation-state activity targeting critical infrastructure--and in the 
process, may be putting their own home devices and data at risk.
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 \34\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/the-light-is-blinking-
red-its-time-for-policymakers-to-wake-up-to-the-residential-proxy-
threat/.
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 Domain Registrars
 Last December, in partnership with the World Economic Forum, IST 
published a white paper proposing a systemic defense approach to fight 
cyber-enabled fraud.\35\ In particular, I want to highlight one of the 
digital infrastructure services that is regularly being abused by 
ransomware actors and other cyber criminals: domain registrars.
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 \35\ https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fighting_Cyber- 
Enabled_Fraud_2025.pdf.
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 Often described as the internet's phone book, the Domain Name 
System (DNS) translates domain names (e.g., www.house.gov) into IP 
addresses.\36\ Governed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN),\37\ DNS is one of the fundamental services that 
allows the internet to function. Its centrality is both a blessing and 
a curse: it also makes DNS a key avenue for cyber criminals to 
perpetrate fraud or gain unauthorized access to systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \36\ https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/dns-infographic-
13sep22-en.pdf.
 \37\ https://www.icann.org/.
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 Malicious cyber actors often register domain names intended to 
trick users (e.g., by substituting a numeral `1' for a lowercase `l'). 
The numbers are staggering, with over 8.6 million malicious domains 
used for intrusions in 2024. At the same time, an ICANN study of a 
sample set of domains registered by the approximately 3,000 accredited 
registrars in the system found that a mere 20 registrars were 
responsible for creating 84 percent of malicious domains.\38\
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 \38\ https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fighting_Cyber-
Enabled_Fraud_2025.pdf.
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 More must be done. Simple actions like limiting the bulk 
registration of domains to entities with an established reputation and 
doing basic due diligence to ensure there is an actual entity with a 
name that resembles a well-established brand could significantly 
increase the friction for criminals engaged in all manner of nefarious 
cyber activity. As with other threat vectors, the advent of agentic AI 
will likely exacerbate the problem, allowing criminals to accelerate 
malicious domain registration.
C. Business Email Compromise
 Although not a focus of our work at IST, business email compromise 
(BEC) remains a key tactic for threat actors, causing significant 
damage to the U.S. economy. Per the FBI's latest Internet Crime 
Complaint Center Report, in 2025, more than 24,000 BEC incidents 
resulted in more than $3 billion in losses.\39\ This contrasts with 
ransomware ($32 million in reported losses) and data extortion ($122 
million) over the same time period. Even given the prevalence of under-
reporting to the FBI (e.g., one cryptocurrency tracking firm estimated 
global ransomware payments to be just shy of $1 billion in 2025), BEC 
is an enormous problem.\40\
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 \39\ https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf.
 \40\ This is also borne out in cyber insurance claims data. https:/
/cdn.intelligencebank.com/us/share/- NMXD/aP6w/1413d/original/
Coalition_2025-Cyber-Claims-Report.
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 BEC occurs when a criminal gains unauthorized access to a business 
communications system, most often email.\41\ They then use this access 
to initiate wire transfers or other fraudulent payments from the 
business's account to an account that they control. While BEC is 
generally significantly less lucrative than a successful ransomware 
attack, it is also less technically complex to carry out.\42\
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 \41\ https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/
common-frauds-and-scams/business-email-compromise.
 \42\ https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T36/reports/2025-
dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf.
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 Because of the limited scope of unauthorized system access 
associated with BEC, it generally poses less of a national security 
risk than ransomware. However, even beyond the economic losses tied to 
this fraud, there are reasons for policy makers to focus on combatting 
it specifically.
 Supply chains for BEC and more sophisticated cyber crimes overlap 
in a few key areas. Initial access brokers, who opportunistically gain 
access to organizations through exposed systems or compromised 
credentials, supply access to both ransomware operators and run-of-the-
mill fraudsters.\43\ Actors who create spoofed domains to deploy in 
phishing schemes can enable all types of cyber crime. Upstream 
disruption of these actors can undermine BEC. Conversely, taking down 
BEC crime rings can deprive cyber crime infrastructure providers of a 
revenue stream.
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 \43\ https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/actions-to-
take-to-defeat-initial-access-brokers.
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 Mitigations against BEC can also prove effective in stopping 
ransomware. For instance, phishing-resistant multi-factor 
authentication (MFA) is a key control that can protect against all 
manner of cyber intrusions.\44\ Policy makers can and should continue 
to emphasize the full range of consequences for failing to adopt 
foundational cybersecurity measures, whether encouraging voluntary 
uptake or implementing interventions, whether subsidies or 
requirements, to protect our homeland security.
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 \44\ https://www.cyber.gov.au/protect-yourself/securing-your-email/
email-security/preventing-business-email-compromise.
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D. The Nexus Between Nation-States and Cyber Criminals
 While the focus of this hearing is on transnational criminal 
organizations, committee Members should also consider the nexus between 
more traditional nation-state threat actors and the cyber crime 
ecosystem.
 When the Nation Is the Criminal
 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is widely regarded 
as the most successful cyber criminal organization in history.\45\ DPRK 
hackers pioneered widespread deployment of ransomware through the 
WannaCry attack in 2017.\46\ In 2016, they targeted the SWIFT banking 
network, making off with tens of millions of dollars (but for a typo, 
they could have stolen ten times as much).\47\ However, their greatest 
success has been in the theft of cryptocurrency, where their hacks have 
brought in billions of dollars.\48\
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 \45\ https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/10/22/26294780-c396-407d-
bb33-88afe988cd96-The 
_DPRK%E2%80%99s_Violation_and_Evasion_of_UN_Sanctions_through_Cyber_and-
 _Information_Technology_Worker_Activities_(MSMT_2025_2).pdf.
 \46\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/north-korean-regime-
backed-programmer-charged-conspiracy-conduct-multiple-cyber-attacks-
and.
 \47\ https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-57520169.
 \48\ https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-hacking-stolen-funds-
2026/.
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 Policy makers should consider the implications of the North 
Koreans' success, especially as the proliferation of open-source 
artificial intelligence tools with significant cyber capabilities lurks 
on the horizon. According to estimates, as much as half of the DPRK's 
hard currency comes from cyber crime.\49\ While it has taken 
significant investment--and experience--to build the DPRK's 
kleptocratic cyber teams, other pariah states could follow in their 
footsteps, particularly if AI lowers the barrier to entry.
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 \49\ https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240321001100315.
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 Moonlighting
 Even when regimes are not directly engaging in cyber theft, the 
individuals supporting their operations may be. Intelligence operatives 
from Russia \50\ and China \51\ have been implicated in 
``moonlighting'' operations, where they leverage their skills to 
conduct criminal activities in their spare time. Iranian state cyber 
operatives have also been linked to ransomware and extortion 
campaigns.\52\
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 \50\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-
fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-
millions?.
 \51\ https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt41-a-dual-
espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation.pdf.
 \52\ https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/17/politics/us-iran-hackers-
warning/index.html.
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 Foreign intelligence services also cultivate ties with criminal 
organizations or use them as buffers to disguise their true identity. 
Just last month, as part of its retaliatory cyber attacks on the U.S. 
homeland, the Iranian government used a hacktivist persona to take 
credit for the intrusions,\53\ one of which knocked a U.S. medical 
device manufacturer off-line for weeks.\54\ The Department of Justice 
has alleged ties between the Russian government and the criminal 
hacktivist group the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), which targeted 
operational technology in the United States and around the world 
following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.\55\
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 \53\ https://www.wired.com/story/handala-hacker-group-iran-us-
israel-war/.
 \54\ https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/310764/
000119312526149607/d112875d8ka.htm.
 \55\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-
actions-combat-two-russian-state-sponsored-cyber-criminal.
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 These intersections point to the urgent national security need to 
crack down on cyber crime in all its forms. When it helps them gain the 
upper hand, adversaries have drawn--and will continue to draw--on 
criminal elements, particularly organized groups. Until we take 
decisive steps to improve our cybersecurity posture, disrupt cyber 
criminals, and dismantle their safe havens, our risk level will be 
unacceptably high.
 Drawing on the Cyber Crime Ecosystem
 Finally, nation-states regularly take advantage of services offered 
as part of the broader cyber crime economy. As part of the IPIDEA 
takedown in January 2026, Google tracked espionage activities and 
groups from China, Iran, the DPRK, and Russia using the service.\56\ 
DPRK state-sponsored thieves use cryptocurrency ``mixing'' services 
that are also core to transnational criminal organizations' attempts to 
launder their stolen funds.\57\
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 \56\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/
disrupting-largest-residential-proxy-network.
 \57\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1087.
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 Adversarial nation-states also create demand for initial access 
through their contracting ecosystems. Individuals at 2 Iranian IT firms 
were indicted for building botnets on behalf of the government and 
using them to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on 
U.S. banks.\58\ In April 2020, a Chinese national working for a PRC 
cyber contractor infected over 81,000 firewalls using a zero-day 
exploit. Many of the devices were then infected by ransomware.\59\
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 \58\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/file/834996/dl?inline.
 \59\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2742.
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 These cases illustrate the mutualism at play between nation-states 
and criminal syndicates. Sometimes, government demand creates the 
conditions for more criminal activity. Other times, criminals develop 
the business and later sell their wares to governments. In either case, 
disruptions to transnational criminal organizations have the potential 
to protect Americans both directly and indirectly: by reducing the 
victimization of people and organizations, and by reducing the 
capability and reach of nation-state adversaries.
E. Future Threats: Cyber Crime in the Intelligence Age
 The rapid development of large language models--and their 
proclivity for certain cybersecurity-related tasks--could significantly 
alter the cyber crime landscape over the next few years. We note 4 key 
areas to watch.
 Analysis.--LLMs are already proving incredibly capable at 
 processing and analyzing large volumes of data quickly. In an 
 example earlier this year, AI appears to have helped sift 
 through an enormous trove of data stolen from the Mexican 
 government, producing more than 2,500 structured intelligence 
 reports.\60\ In addition to changing how criminals target data 
 going forward, attackers have also used AI tools to better 
 monetize existing troves of stolen data.\61\
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 \60\ https://gambit.security/blog-post/a-single-operator-two-ai-
platforms-nine-government-agencies-the-full-technical-report.
 \61\ https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-countering-misuse-
aug-2025.
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 Automation.--Many aspects of the cyber kill chain are 
 amenable to automation. We are already seeing LLMs generate 
 context-sensitive phishing messages \62\ (or web elements \63\) 
 with the touch of a button. As with other industries, 
 automating repetitive tasks could produce substantial 
 productivity gains. For cyber criminals, this automation could 
 increase their profitability, even if ransomware payment rates 
 continue to decline.
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 \62\ https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S2590005626000986.
 \63\ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/real-time-malicious-
javascript-through-llms/.
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 Orchestration.--Last November, Anthropic released the first 
 evidence of AI agents orchestrating the majority of a cyber 
 intrusion.\64\ In that particular instance, Anthropic was able 
 to identify and stop the activity. However, the proliferation 
 of agents capable of planning and executing intrusions on their 
 own could cause the barriers to entry into cyber crime to 
 crumble.\65\
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 \64\ https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage.
 \65\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/
The-Implications-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-Cybersecurity.pdf.
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 Vulnerability Discovery.--AI companies have claimed that 
 releasing the current best-in-class models would be dangerous 
 because of their ability to exponentially accelerate the 
 discovery and exploitation of novel vulnerabilities in 
 code.\66\ Right now, testing programs are underway to explore 
 these capabilities. Should the core claims made by the 
 companies prove true--or should models continue to progress to 
 the point that they become true--the cyber crime landscape 
 would be irrevocably altered. Cybersecurity has long relied on 
 certain core assumptions, such as the difficulty of 
 vulnerability discovery or that there is time between the 
 announcement of a patch and exploitation at scale. The alleged 
 capabilities of these best-in-class models would cause these 
 assumptions to melt away.
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 \66\ https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing.
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 Policy makers should bear in mind that even though AI presents new 
offensive capabilities, it also creates opportunities for defensive 
applications. Over time, defensive uses of these technologies may end 
up dominating, driving down cyber crime. At the same time, even if the 
defensive uses wind up being superior, the tools will need to be 
distributed broadly, including to critical infrastructure providers and 
consumers who have not traditionally had access to cutting-edge 
cybersecurity products, in order for those benefits to be realized.
 iii. the ransomware task force report at five years

 Released in April 2021, the Ransomware Task Force (RTF) Report is a 
seminal document that provides actionable recommendations for combating 
cyber crime across 4 phases: Deter, Detect, Prepare, and Respond. With 
participation from across Government, industry, and civil society, RTF 
outputs have informed U.S. and international policy making and have 
served as a blueprint for private-sector actors aiming to protect 
themselves from transnational criminal organizations.
 As we mark the 5-year anniversary of the release of the RTF report 
and its 48 recommendations, we have several observations:\67\
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 \67\ For a full accounting of progress against the RTF 
recommendations, see: https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/
uploads/2026/04/April-2026-RTF-Progress-Report.pdf.
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 There's been significant progress, but it has slowed. Since 
 our last assessment of progress against the RTF 
 recommendations,\68\ 2 have moved from preliminary action to 
 significant action. Specifically, the insurance industry has 
 seen progress through consortia like CyberAcuView,\69\ which is 
 making it easier to understand claims data in aggregate 
 (Recommendation 2.1.7). The Government also continues to map 
 the ransomware ecosystem, including supporting infrastructure, 
 and is now regularly using this knowledge to inform takedowns 
 and sanction activities.
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 \68\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/
April-2024-RTF-Progress-Report-Doubling-Down.pdf.
 \69\ https://cyberacuview.com/.
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 Several recommendations await final action by the 
 Government. Implementation of the Cyber Incident Reporting for 
 Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), championed by many 
 Members of this committee, remains stalled more than 4 years 
 after its passage (Recommendations 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 
 4.2.4).\70\ With a final CIRCIA rule in place, we would have a 
 better operational understanding of the ransomware ecosystem 
 and the ability to more easily offer assistance to victims.
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 \70\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/13/2026-
02948/cyber-incident-reporting-for-critical-infrastructure-act-circia-
rulemaking-town-hall-meetings.
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 For the first time, we've seen backsliding. Since our 
 assessment in April 2024, 2 of our recommendations have moved 
 from significant action back to preliminary action. Notably for 
 this committee, the failure to fund the State and local cyber 
 grant program since its original appropriation lapsed last year 
 leaves governments at significant risk from ransomware and 
 other cyber intrusions (Recommendation 3.4.2).\71\ While this 
 committee has made strides in advancing a long-term 
 reauthorization of the grant program,\72\ without funding, 
 States will remain exposed. The Cyber Response and Recovery 
 Fund, authorized in 2021 in response to RTF recommendations, 
 may also be at risk; the January House-passed Homeland Security 
 appropriations bill would have transferred all of the money 
 from this emergency account to base CISA appropriations 
 (Recommendation 4.1.1).\73\
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 \71\ https://www.nascio.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/NASCIO-
Advocacy-Priorities-2026_a11y_SLCGP.pdf.
 \72\ https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5078.
 \73\ https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20260119/
Homeland26_01_xml.pdf.
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 Limitations on ransom payments remain underdeveloped. Of the 
 4 RTF recommendations where we have seen no action, 3 pertain 
 to pre-ransom payment activities, such as conducting a cost-
 benefit analysis (Recommendation 4.3.2). The record-low ransom 
 rates may open up space for more conversations on how to limit 
 payments, which are the fuel for the entire ecosystem. However, 
 absent strong leadership from policy makers to act as a 
 catalyst, we are unlikely to see significant progress.
 On balance, the success of RTF members and partners in implementing 
recommendations has had a significant impact on the ransomware 
ecosystem, including driving criminals to pursue alternative, non-
encryption-based extortion methods. Key to our approach was starting 
with a comprehensive strategy that addresses all phases of the 
challenge and providing clear recommendations to specific actors. We 
also favored system-level approaches that affect the root causes of 
cyber crime, rather than trying to treat its symptoms. Finally, we 
could not have succeeded without deep collaboration with industry. 
Civil society organizations like IST have a vital role to play as a 
neutral convener and accelerant to policy engineering projects; 
however, effectuating real and lasting change requires bringing both 
government and industry perspectives to the table.

 iv. federal government headwinds
 Recent actions by the administration have emphasized the importance 
of countering cyber crime. However, challenges with the Federal 
workforce, funding, and organizational upheaval all threaten to limit 
progress, as does a strategic approach overly focused on disruption.
A. Continued Emphasis on Disruption . . . 
 On March 6, the President released the 2026 Cybersecurity 
Strategy.\74\ Although it lacks specific mention of ransomware, it does 
highlight the significant challenges cyber crime poses to the U.S. 
economy and calls for the continued disruption of criminal 
infrastructure. In tandem with the Strategy's release, the President 
also signed Executive Order 14390, ``Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and 
Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens,''\75\ which addresses the 
damage that cyber crime, including ransomware, is inflicting on U.S. 
citizens. In particular, EO 14390 focuses on Government efforts to 
disrupt transnational criminal organizations responsible for cyber 
crime and fraud.
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 \74\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/
president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf.
 \75\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/
combating-cybercrime-fraud-and-predatory-schemes-against-american-
citizens/.
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 As noted in the RTF report (and echoed in Pillar I of the 2026 
Cybersecurity Strategy and Pillar II of the 2023 National Cybersecurity 
Strategy \76\), disrupting threat actors is an essential component of a 
comprehensive effort to improve our cybersecurity posture. Disrupting 
infrastructure raises the costs of crime, while arrests and indictments 
undermine criminals' faith in each other and in the underground 
economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \76\ https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/
03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf.
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 EO 14390 appropriately views disruption through a wide lens that 
encompasses ``operational, technical, diplomatic, and regulatory'' 
approaches. The continued prevalence of Russian-speaking ransomware 
gangs,\77\ for example, speaks to the need for all countries, including 
the United States, to call on Russia to uphold its commitments to 
prevent its territory from being used for damaging cyber attacks.\78\ 
Without sustained diplomatic pressure from the plethora of countries 
that fall victim to Russian cyber criminals, disruption at the level of 
individual threat actors will remain challenging.
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 \77\ https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/crypto-crime-in-russia-
ransomware-sanctions-evasion-and-disinformation.
 \78\ https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/The-UN-
norms-of-responsible-state-behaviour-in-cyberspace.pdf.
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 On the operational front, the first 15 months of the administration 
have seen a steady drumbeat of law enforcement operations targeting 
cyber criminals and their enabling infrastructure.\79\ The Department 
of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control has utilized new 
authorities under the Protecting American Intellectual Property Act to 
go after exploit brokers selling dangerous offensive cyber tools to 
criminals.\80\ I look forward to observing implementation of the 
forthcoming action plan associated with this latest EO, particularly 
the details on how an operational cell at the National Coordination 
Center plans to continue increasing the pressure on transnational cyber 
criminal organizations.
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 \79\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cracked-and-nulled-
marketplaces-disrupted-international-cyber-operation; https://
www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/fbi-disrupts-virtual-money-laundering-
service-used-facilitate-criminal-activity; https://www.fbi.gov/contact-
us/field-offices/atlanta/news/fbi-atlanta-indonesian-authorities-take-
down-global-phishing-network-behind-millions-in-fraud-attempts; https:/
/www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-leads-dismantlement-one-worlds-
largest-hacker-forums.
 \80\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0404.
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B. . . . But Without Broader Systemic Interventions
 I would like to focus on 2 key challenges with the administration's 
approach to date. First, the resources that our Federal agencies rely 
on to combat cyber crime have been significantly pared back. And 
second, the strategic approach does not appear to balance the need to 
deter individual actors with other systemic steps to make ransomware 
and cyber-enabled fraud less achievable.
 Dealing with Federal Cybersecurity Cuts
 Public reporting indicates CISA has lost one-third of its 
workforce,\81\ an issue that this committee has raised during oversight 
hearings.\82\ While the cuts have been pitched as returning CISA to its 
core mission,\83\ this is clearly not the case in practice. The 
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, a core mechanism 
for coordinating cybersecurity policy across government and industry, 
has yet to restart since being shuttered last March.\84\ What's more, 
should the Secretary of Homeland Security decide to convene sector-
specific advisory committees, coordination will be a challenge given 
cuts to CISA stakeholder engagement personnel. In an effort to fill 
some of the gaps left from these cuts, the acting CISA director 
recently announced a hiring sprint to bring on new talent to help 
protect the Nation from the many threats arrayed against us. This quick 
reversal in hiring practices is clear evidence that the original cuts 
were too deep.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \81\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cisa-departures-trump-
workforce-purge/749796/.
 \82\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/oversight-of-the-
department-of-homeland-security-cisa-tsa-st/.
 \83\ https://securityboulevard.com/2025/04/homeland-secretary-noem-
vows-to-put-cisa-back-to-focusing-on-its-core-mission/.
 \84\ https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/critical-
infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council-cipac.
 \85\ https://federalnewsnetwork.com/cybersecurity/2026/03/cisa-
eyes-plan-for-more-than-300-new-hires/.
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 Cuts to key cyber personnel are not confined to DHS. As discussed 
in a Senate hearing last year, budget cuts to the FBI's cyber division 
were expected to reduce personnel by half.\86\ Faced with an 8 percent 
cut in personnel, the acting commander of USCYBERCOM testified that the 
effect on the command's ability to carry out its mission would be 
``impactful.''\87\ The Government Accountability Office found in a 
report last September that 22 of the 23 agencies surveyed failed to 
fully account for their cyber workforce needs, so the full scope of the 
personnel cuts remains nebulous.\88\ And in the foreign policy arena, 
the dissolution of significant portions of the State Department's 
Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau,\89\ despite its clear statutory 
mandate,\90\ also risks delaying decisive action. EO 14390 sets an 
ambitious schedule for developing an action plan to follow through on 
its objectives, but it's unclear what personnel from across the 
interagency will be able to put it together, much less execute against 
it.
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 \86\ https://cyberscoop.com/senators-fbi-director-patel-clash-over-
cyber-division-personnel-arrests.
 \87\ https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/after-cuts-to-dods-cyber-
workforce-experts-see-short-term-readiness-risks-but-also-opportunity/.
 \88\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107405.
 \89\ https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/17/cyber-tech-state-ai-
00460679.
 \90\ 22 USC 2651a.
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 Funding cuts also threaten progress in the fight against cyber 
crime. As documented by this committee, the State and Local 
Cybersecurity Grant Program proved effective in marshaling resources to 
help State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments improve their 
defenses;\91\ yet it has been zeroed out in the administration's 
budget. Shared cybersecurity services provided at subsidized rates for 
State and local governments through the Multi-State Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) have also been canceled, leaving States 
to scramble for protection.\92\ Ironically, both programs would have 
helped achieve the objective laid out in EO 14390 to ``provide 
training, technical assistance, and resilience building to support 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners, including to 
expand defensive capacity, share threat intelligence, and harden SLTT 
partners' critical infrastructure systems against cyber crime 
exploitation by TCOs.''
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 \91\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/cybersecurity-is-local-too-
assessing-the-state-and-local-cybersecurity-grant-program/.
 \92\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/ms-isac-loses-federal-
funding-cyber-impacts/761367/.
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 The transnational nature of cyber crime makes funding for 
international cybersecurity capacity-building particularly important, 
yet programs that aim to bolster international cyber capacity, too, 
have been cut.\93\ Without investments in foreign partners' 
cybersecurity programs, the ability of the Secretary of State to, per 
EO 14390, ``coordinate [U.S.] actions with allies and partners to 
enhance the consequences of actions taken against nations that tolerate 
predatory activity'' will be significantly diminished.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \93\ https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/usaid-cuts-
demolish-cyber-assistance-to-u-s-allies-and-partners.
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 Finally, organizational challenges will add further friction to the 
administration's activities. More than a month after the release of the 
2026 Cybersecurity Strategy, there has been no additional information 
regarding an implementation plan with specific actions for agencies to 
take to achieve its objectives. There has also been no executive action 
clarifying the National Cyber Director's role in interagency 
cybersecurity discussions, raising questions about whether the Director 
or the National Security Advisor is ultimately responsible for 
strategic direction.
 Stepping into the leadership void, the director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance eliminating a common 
cybersecurity form for contractors.\94\ Rather than requiring 
contractors to fill out a single attestation in order to sell products 
to the entire Government, OMB now encourages agencies to develop their 
own policies and forms--in seeming contravention of the strategy's 
mandate to streamline regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \94\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/M-26-05-
Adopting-a-Risk-based-Approach-to-Software-and-Hardware-Security.pdf.
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 Striking the Right Balance
 The administration's focus on disrupting cyber crime is admirable. 
However, it leans too heavily on ``offensive'' solutions at the expense 
of system-level ``defensive'' changes that will help to bolster 
cybersecurity across the Nation. As I wrote in the weeks leading up to 
the strategy's release:

``A strategy that prioritizes shaping behavior through offensive 
operations over improving defense would risk exposing critical 
infrastructure, intellectual property, and U.S. companies to even 
greater harm. True national security comes not from striking first, but 
from leveraging innovation to significantly reduce the security gaps 
available to attackers, empowering industry to take lawful, coordinated 
actions, and realigning incentives in the marketplace to support secure 
software and hardware practices.''\95\
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 \95\ https://nexusconnect.io/articles/imminent-national-cyber-
strategy-may-lean-on-offense-at-the-expense-of-defense.

 At IST, we view cybersecurity challenges, including cyber crime, as 
primarily a matter of misaligned incentives. In stark contrast to 
defense of our land, air, and maritime borders, Government neither 
claims nor aims to have a degree of operational control over the cyber 
domain to stop all incoming attacks. Instead, in cyber space, 
Government must also rely on the private-sector actors that operate our 
networks and maintain our critical infrastructure to ensure our 
national security. Unfortunately, the market forces that act as 
operating constraints on businesses often do not align with national 
security interests.
 The incentives that dominate technology marketplaces instead drive 
suppliers to produce and sell technology that prioritizes speed-to-
market and features over security, resilience, and reliability. 
Similarly, for users of technology, markets regularly reward purchasing 
and operating behaviors that serve to weaken an entity's cybersecurity 
posture.
 Aligning incentives so that the private sector, positioned on the 
proverbial ``front lines,'' goes from being a national security 
liability to an asset is a considerable challenge. Markets reward 
behavior detrimental to societal interests for a number of reasons, 
from the externalization of costs of crime to the lack of empirical 
examples of large-scale disruptive or destructive cyber attacks that 
could help participants price risk. This lack of realizable costs is 
weighed against very clear benefits, such as more agility and lower 
development and operational costs.
 However, broad-based efforts to create incentives for cybersecurity 
behaviors that benefit society as a whole can be very rewarding. 
Injecting national security considerations into technology markets 
simultaneously addresses a root cause cybersecurity challenge and 
creates structures that can adapt as new categories of technological 
innovation and reliance emerge. Making meaningful progress on 
incentives creates downstream impact that addresses issues across the 
technology ecosystem and maximizes the benefits of the effort invested.
 In our work at IST, we address 3 broad categories of cybersecurity 
challenge:
 Critical infrastructure security and resilience.--For 
 schools, water utilities, and hospitals, there is not 
 sufficient funding to support cybersecurity practices to help 
 these organizations withstand threats from transnational 
 criminal organizations or nation-states. As a result, we focus 
 on designing efficient programs (like the Federal 
 Communications Commission's E-Rate cybersecurity pilot \96\) to 
 subsidize necessary cybersecurity investments where they are 
 needed most. Chairman Ogles's PILLAR Act is an excellent 
 example of this kind of intervention.
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 \96\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/
Cybersecurity-Considerations-for-Universal-Service-Fund-
Reform_Final.pdf.
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 Designing and deploying secure information and 
 communications technology and services (ICTS).--Addressing ICTS 
 security is inherently high-leverage: preventing one single 
 vulnerability in a product before it is shipped to market can 
 save thousands of entities from having to apply millions of 
 patches. When we invest in security by design,\97\ develop 
 recommendations to prevent misuse of domain registration,\98\ 
 or work to protect the open-source software that underpins so 
 much of our society,\99\ we are applying solutions that 
 actually address the systemic problem, not the proximate cause. 
 Ranking Member Thompson's focus on ensuring the CVE Program 
 thrives \100\ is aligned with this type of intervention.
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 \97\ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/f5--solarwinds--and-the-
lethargy-of-the-far-council.
 \98\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/
fighting-cyber-enabled-fraud-a-systemic-defense-approach/.
 \99\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/
Castles-Built-on-Sand.pdf.
 \100\ https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/news/correspondence/
ranking-members-thompson-and-lofgren-request-gao-review-of-cve-and-nvd-
federal-cybersecurity-programs.
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 Building public-private partnerships to disrupt malicious 
 cyber actors.--Disruption remains a core pillar of our work. In 
 particular, we examine incentives that will bring government 
 and non-government partners together, as both have the 
 resources necessary, whether authorities, information, or 
 technical acumen, to effectively conduct takedowns. Our 
 international tabletop exercises strengthen relationships that 
 lead to joint-sequenced operations.\101\ This committee's 
 relentless efforts to reauthorize CISA 2015 is another example 
 of this kind of work.\102\
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 \101\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/cri-
tabletop-exercise-after-action-report/.
 \102\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/in-defense-of-defensive-
measures-reauthorizing-cybersecurity-information-sharing-activities-
that-underpin-u-s-national-cyber-defense/.
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 The administration's focus on disruption is therefore necessary, 
but not sufficient. I hope that subsequent executive actions will 
address the broader market incentives that create the conditions for 
mass exploitation and victimization of Americans. I also hope that the 
administration reverses cuts and policy changes that make it more 
difficult to alter these incentives.
 v. recommendations for congress
 Congressional leadership has always been essential for advancing 
cybersecurity policy. Despite the progress we have made in tackling 
cyber crime, nation-state threat actors have gotten bolder, and AI 
cyber tools risk upending the landscape entirely. Lapses in 
authorizations and appropriations also put hard-won advances at risk. 
This committee should:
 Authorize key programs to ensure they are not interrupted.--
 Several DHS and CISA programs have faced disruption over the 
 past 15 months, in part because they are not explicitly 
 authorized in law. By laying out clear goals and expectations 
 in statute, Congress can put these programs on firmer footing 
 and ensure their future success. Key programs include:
 The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Program.--
 CVE records act as the universal identifiers for weaknesses 
 in computer code. This essential program, which is relied 
 on by companies in every sector and worldwide, needs a more 
 effective, multistakeholder governance model and a clear 
 delineation from other programs like the National Institute 
 for Standards and Technology's National Vulnerability 
 Database.\103\ This committee should advance legislation 
 codifying the program in a way that avoids fragmentation 
 (i.e., other countries or entities setting up competing 
 programs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \103\ https://nvd.nist.gov/.
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 The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 
 (CIPAC).--It is essential that non-Federal critical 
 infrastructure owners and operators have mechanisms to 
 offer candid feedback to their U.S. Government partners 
 with respect to cybersecurity and resilience policy. This 
 committee should advance legislation amending Section 9002 
 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act 
 to codify the CISA director's ability to convene critical 
 infrastructure providers, rather than relying on the broad 
 authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
 Pass long-term (or permanent) extensions of cybersecurity 
 authorities.--This committee has produced effective legislation 
 that has improved the Nation's cybersecurity posture; it should 
 not be allowed to expire. In particular, Congress should 
 reauthorize:
 The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, which 
 expires on September 30, 2026, and which enables the free 
 flow of cyber threat indicators among the private sector 
 and between the private sector and Government.
 The State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2021, 
 which expires on September 30, 2026, and which provides 
 assistance to State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
 governments to develop and execute against strategies to 
 improve their cybersecurity.
 Strengthen the ability of private-sector and Government 
 actors to work together to disrupt cyber threats.--In 
 furtherance of the goals laid out in EO 14390, this committee 
 can take steps to incentivize deeper collaboration through 
 joint sequenced operations and other efforts to degrade cyber 
 threat actors. The committee can achieve this by:
 Authorizing the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative 
 (JCDC).--JCDC has yet to live up to the full potential 
 envisioned by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.\104\ 
 Authorization for the JCDC should lay out clear criteria 
 for participation and metrics for success, as well as the 
 types of whole-of-nation plans and campaigns the center 
 should develop.
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 \104\ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/making-joint-cyber-
defense-collaborative-work.
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 Directing the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting 
 through the CISA director, to clarify lawful defensive 
 measures that private-sector actors can take when 
 countering ransomware or other cyber crime.--One key 
 obstacle to a higher tempo of private-sector-enabled 
 takedowns, as identified by the RTF report, is legal 
 ambiguity about which defensive measures are allowed under 
 existing law, including the Cybersecurity Information 
 Sharing Act of 2015. The committee should direct the CISA 
 director to work with industry and the interagency in 
 developing and publishing guidance that clarifies what 
 constitutes a defensive measure.
 Continue to conduct effective oversight and exploratory 
 hearings.--There are several topics that fall under the 
 committee's jurisdiction that are ripe for additional committee 
 activity, including:
 Residential proxy networks.--Despite being used by cyber 
 criminals, fraudsters, and even advanced persistent 
 threats, the enrollment of everyday consumer devices into 
 residential proxy networks appears to be legal. In 
 exploring policy solutions to this issue, committee Members 
 may also wish to investigate whether regulations like the 
 Digital Markets Act \105\ are impairing the ability of tech 
 companies to effectively govern their app stores.
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 \105\ https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en.
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 The Cyber Response and Recovery Fund (CRRF).--Created in 
 the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law nearly 5 years ago,\106\ 
 the CRRF has still never been used to respond to a 
 significant incident. The committee should conduct rigorous 
 oversight to understand what processes have been put in 
 place to expeditiously employ the CRRF and what policy 
 decisions have been made by the Executive branch that have 
 prevented its use. This is particularly timely, as the CRRF 
 expires in just over 2 years.
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 \106\ https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf.
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 The rise of product security regimes.--IST recently 
 published a report highlighting opportunities for 
 international convergence on product cybersecurity regimes, 
 whether voluntary or mandatory.\107\ The report notes that, 
 while few of the regimes are fully implemented today, that 
 will not be the case by the end of next year. Congress 
 should take this opportunity to explore different 
 approaches and how they will affect products sold to U.S. 
 businesses and consumers. Committee Members may also wish 
 to examine how product cybersecurity approaches can map to 
 AI tools.
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 \107\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/
comparative-analysis-of-product-cybersecurity/.
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 Measures to disincentivize extortion payments.--With 
 ransomware and related payments on the decline, there is no 
 better time to explore mechanisms to further disincentivize 
 payments--or at least help authorities better track 
 criminals' financial infrastructure when a payment is made. 
 These could include requirements to coordinate with law 
 enforcement or to explore alternatives before paying 
 extortionists.\108\
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 \108\ For more thoughts on pre-conditions for a ransomware payment 
ban, https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/memo/roadmap-to-
potential-prohibition-of-ransomware-payments/.
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 The effect of AI on vulnerability disclosure.--Over the 
 last 6 months, vulnerability disclosure programs have seen 
 massive increases in the number of reports they 
 receive.\109\ As AI drives the marginal cost of filing a 
 report to zero, this may invalidate core assumptions about 
 vulnerability management, including norms surrounding 
 coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Committee Members may 
 wish to explore the effects of the changing vulnerability 
 disclosure landscape on Federal systems and on operational 
 technology used by critical infrastructure.
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 \109\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cve-program-ai-
vulnerability-reports-funding/815594/.
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 Work closely with other committees on broader cybersecurity 
 issues.--House rules limit the ability of any one committee to 
 comprehensively address cybersecurity issues. Building on the 
 legacy of leadership from Congressman McCaul and Ranking Member 
 Thompson, committee Members should provide thought leadership 
 by working with:
 The Committee on Appropriations, particularly with respect 
 to funding the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant 
 Program.--Even with its temporarily extended authorization, 
 no funds are currently appropriated to support this 
 program.
 The Committee on Financial Services, to help accelerate 
 the uptake of cyber insurance, including by exploring 
 different backstop mechanisms to stabilize the market in 
 the event of a systemic incident.\110\--As a market-based 
 way of pricing risk, insurance has the potential to drive 
 positive cybersecurity improvements throughout the economy.
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 \110\ https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/17/how-a-government-
reinsurance-program-can-accelerate-maturation-of-the-cyber-insurance-
market/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to support Universal 
 Service Fund reforms to allow schools (and potentially 
 hospitals) to purchase cybersecurity products and services 
 with E-Rate funds.\111\--This work is complementary to this 
 committee's work with SLTT governments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \111\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/including-
cybersecurity-in-the-e-rate-and-rural-healthcare-programs/.
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 The Committees on Armed Services; Energy and Commerce; and 
 Intelligence, to address the ``Salt Typhoon'' incidents 
 targeting U.S. telecommunications infrastructure.\112\
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 \112\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/congressional-
oversight-on-salt-typhoon-missing-an-opportunity/.
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 There is a lot of work for Congress to do, but I have faith that 
the leaders on this committee will continue to prioritize cybersecurity 
as an urgent, non-partisan issue at the heart of our national security. 
At IST, we welcome the opportunity to continue to engage with you and 
your colleagues to support this crucial work. Thank you again for the 
invitation to testify.

 Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Stifel.
 Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for 
their 5 minutes of question questioning.
 I now recognize myself for questioning.
 Ms. Kaiser, in your opening statement you mentioned that 
health care facilities have become the single most targeted 
within the group. I think the number that I recall you said 
that in 2025 there were 460 attacks, doubled from the previous 
year. You mentioned in your written opening statement and you 
touched a little bit briefly in your oral opening statement 
about an attack in my home State of Mississippi. Just for the 
benefit of the other Members of this committee, I want to read 
a little bit about what is contained there in your opening 
statement about that attack.
 You say on February 19, 2026, when ransomware actors struck 
the University of Mississippi Medical Center, also known as 
UMMC, that it was not simply a large hospital, but it was the 
medical backbone of the entire State. It is Mississippi's only 
academic medical center, operating 7 hospitals, 35 clinics 
State-wide, and home of the State's only Level 1 trauma center, 
the State's only children's hospital, and the only organ and 
bone marrow transplant program.
 When attackers took down UMMC's network, knocking Epic, its 
electric health care record system, fully off-line and forcing 
clinical staff to revert to pen and paper, they did not merely 
disrupt a business, they degraded the emergency medical 
capacity of an entire State. Clinics closed across Mississippi, 
outpatient surgeries and cancer treatment appointments were 
canceled. For 9 days the State's only facility equipped to 
handle the most severe trauma cases, operated under manual 
downtime procedures with staff tracking patients, medication, 
and orders on paper.
 You then go on to say the hackers behind the UMMC attack 
knew exactly what they were targeting. They contacted the 
hospital afterwards with demands. They understood that they had 
taken down a system that Mississippi patients depended on for 
survival. They used that leverage deliberately.
 Now, Ms. Kaiser, I will tell you that I believe that there 
are no penalties too severe for individuals who would target 
our health care system. In your report you--and you also 
touched on this in your opening statement, you talk about a 
couple of different things. You talk about using terrorist 
designations for, for those individuals who would attack 
hospitals. You talk about individuals being charged with murder 
or manslaughter if those attacks led to the death of 
individuals. I think you did say in your opening statement that 
there had been a number of deaths, 47 that had been documented 
with old information. We believe now that number to be in the 
hundreds.
 So as it relates to the terrorist designation under 18 
U.S.C. 2331 and under 8 U.S.C. 1182, do you believe that the 
Department of Justice currently has the authority to charge 
under those sections or do you believe that Congress needs to 
specifically give the Department of Justice that authority?
 Ms. Kaiser. So the law defines terrorism as acts dangerous 
to human life intended to coerce a civilian population. I think 
that encrypting a hospital's systems and demanding ransoms 
while patients are being diverted meets that definition. But 
I'm not asking for a designation today. What I'm saying is that 
we need honest legal analysis toward that looking at the 
existing law and determining if departments believe it meets 
those thresholds. I mean, those designations aren't a blunt 
instrument, they're a scalpel. There's a deliberative process 
behind that where they only designate the worst of the worst.
 But I agree completely with you and I want to emphasize 
what you said, there's no penalty too strong for the 
individuals that are holding Americans' lives at risk. They're 
making calculated decisions to target these individuals. That's 
why Halcyon is actually funding an update to that research I 
noted to see exactly how we quantify the risk today.
 Mr. Guest. Are you aware of an example where the Department 
of Justice has ever used these code sections to seek criminal 
charges under the definition of terrorists for an attack on a 
health care system?
 Ms. Kaiser. I'm not aware of any. But with the new 
Executive Order, I think that opens a broader spectrum for the 
Attorney General to look at the most serious provable offenses 
and determine what weight they can bring to bear.
 Mr. Guest. One last question. As it relates to murder and 
manslaughter, as far as Federal felony murder charges, kind-of 
the same question, do you believe that Congress needs to give 
the Department of Justice additional authorities to charge 
under that section or do you believe that they have the current 
authorities now and we just need to make that on a case-by-case 
basis?
 Ms. Kaiser. Clarifying guidance would be helpful, but they 
likely have the authorities today under the current statutes.
 Mr. Guest. Thank you.
 At this time, I yield back and I recognize Mr. Correa for 
his 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Correa. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
 Ms. Kaiser, I am going to follow up on that line of 
discussion. Do we need clarifying language to redefine or 
expand the intent of the law to go after some of these 
individuals? Sounds like the language is there. It just has not 
been applied in these circumstances.
 Ms. Kaiser. We've conducted legal analysis and have 
determined on our end that the language exists as it is now to 
be able to pursue this. But the process by which they conduct 
those types of activities is something that needs to be 
arbitrated across all of the departments.
 I'll emphasize one specific aspect there. It can be very 
difficult to prove an exact death at a hospital or medical 
facility in the middle of an attack. So we can look at Medicare 
data, Medicaid data, and say there's an excess number of deaths 
when there's a ransomware attack. But proving that one specific 
death is harder when you're going to paper and pen, when you 
don't have electronic records, when you're looking at--when 
you're in the middle of a crisis. So the way in which a 
prosecutor needs to approach this certainly needs----
 Mr. Correa. Is this akin to the felony murder rule?
 Ms. Kaiser. Yes.
 Mr. Correa. Trying to think along those lines.
 Ms. Kaiser. Exactly.
 Mr. Correa. Thank you.
 Very quickly to each and every one of you, is the Federal 
Government doing enough in its role, a leading role in this 
area? Ms. Kaiser.
 Ms. Kaiser. I worked these issues for years at FBI and----
 Mr. Correa. We need to step up even more.
 Ms. Kaiser. They need additional authorities and resources 
to be able to----
 Mr. Correa. The answer is we need to do more.
 Mr. Redbord.
 Mr. Redbord. We need more resources. We need newer tools. 
We need more training----
 Mr. Correa. Mr. Bercu.
 Mr. Redbord [continuing]. Across the Government.
 Mr. Bercu. We continue to work well with the Federal 
Government, but more is something that we think continues to 
need more resources and prioritization.
 Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel.
 Ms. Stifel. The acting director of CISA has identified the 
need to rehire 300 individuals. So I would say, yes, we 
definitely need additional resources.
 Mr. Correa. Those 300 were laid off through?
 Ms. Stifel. There have been significant decreases in 
staffing across the Federal Government, particularly in the 
cybersecurity space. We understand that about a third of CISA's 
work force has left the agency.
 Mr. Correa. Quick question to each one of you. Ms. Kaiser, 
what keeps you up at night?
 Ms. Kaiser. That Americans may not understand how much at 
risk is and how many lives at risk these criminal groups are 
holding them at every single day.
 Mr. Correa. Mr. Redbord.
 Mr. Redbord. That AI is supercharging the operations of our 
adversaries and we need to make sure that we're scaling at the 
same pace they are.
 Mr. Correa. Mr. Bercu.
 Mr. Bercu. You know, the daunting amount of work that we 
all need to put up our sleeves and do together.
 Mr. Correa. So we are not there yet. Far from it.
 Mr. Bercu. We're working on it, but yes.
 Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel.
 Ms. Stifel. The scope and scale of vulnerabilities across 
our critical infrastructure, in particular. Thinking also about 
our State and local entities that have recently had resources 
removed from their ability to shore up their defenses against 
cyber attacks.
 Mr. Correa. Finger pointing is easy to do up here. I think 
at the end of the day, we just got to step up and say the buck 
stops here. What is it, Ms. Kaiser, what are your 
recommendations that we in Congress can do to start fixing 
these challenges?
 Ms. Kaiser. Championing the policies that I noted within my 
opening statement, the terrorism designations, examining that. 
Examining the felony murder laws, but also ensuring that we are 
funding the State and local governments that are constantly 
under attack by these actors.
 Mr. Correa. State, the locals as well.
 Mr. Redbord.
 Mr. Redbord. Empowering the private sector. The Government 
has the authorities. The private sector has the data. The 
private sector needs the authorities as well to go after bad 
actors.
 Mr. Correa. Strengthen the weakest link in the chain.
 Mr. Bercu.
 Mr. Bercu. You know, I agree with my colleagues. There's a 
lot of work being done in the private sector. There's a lot of 
innovation, investment, and we need to keep pushing forward 
with that and partnership with the Government.
 Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel.
 Ms. Stifel. I would say looking to pass long-term or 
permanent extensions of cybersecurity authorities, including 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 and the State 
and local Cybersecurity Security Improvement Act of 2021.
 Mr. Correa. In my last 28 seconds that I have, I would have 
an ask for you. Five minutes is very short for us to get to 
specifics, but I would ask each and every one of you to give me 
in writing later on your 5 top recommendations of what we here 
in Congress can do to move forward on these issues, not only 
protecting the future Colonial pipelines, but protecting Main 
Street. Those are the folks that just have nowhere to turn 
other than really to suffer in silence.
 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields.
 The Chair now recognizes Chairman Ogles for his 
questioning.
 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here. I mean, obviously we are in a new 
era, a new day when it comes to cyber and cyber attacks, et 
cetera, primarily driven by AI. That is where I guess I want to 
start is what--when you look at AI and the tools that are being 
deployed and how quickly AI is advancing, what can these 
criminal networks do today that they couldn't do just months 
ago, Ms. Kaiser?
 Ms. Kaiser. So we see predominantly adversaries using AI to 
gain that initial step into--from company networks. What I mean 
by that, it's easier to lie with AI. It's easier to make 
convincing emails with malicious links. It's easier to make 
these deepfakes, these fake videos or fake voice calls that 
trick companies into letting them on the network. Then it's 
easier to exploit vulnerabilities or find vulnerabilities that 
let them on.
 That being said, what we see today is, is the most benefit 
is going toward the wannabe cyber actors. Advanced adversaries 
are integrating AI. They're looking at it in a way in which 
businesses are today for efficiencies. But there's a world of 
people who couldn't do attacks yesterday; they can today. Even 
if they're noisy, even if they're not all that effective, going 
from 0 percent to 5 percent's a big win for them. What we're 
going to do is exhaust security teams and cause massive 
problems in how they develop these tools, how they develop 
their attacks, where it may render certain types of data or 
certain companies just unavailable for recovery.
 Mr. Ogles. Mr. Redbord.
 Mr. Redbord. There are two really important pieces to this. 
First, our adversaries are using it at scale. I mentioned a 500 
percent increase in AI-enabled fraud and scams. We see 
ransomware actors using agents as affiliates really for the 
first time. We're seeing North Korea use it to launder the 
proceeds of billion-dollar crypto hacks.
 But the other part that sort of I'm most focused on at TRM, 
we're working with the Department of Justice, with the Treasury 
Department, with the FBI, IRS-CI, DEA, Secret Service to 
provide AI-enabled tools that allow us to move as fast. For me, 
that's the answer here, right? Bad actors are always early 
adopters of transformative technology. Think automobiles, end-
to-end encrypted messaging apps, crypto, and now AI. We need to 
move as fast as those bad actors and the tools exist today.
 Mr. Ogles. Mr. Bercu.
 Mr. Bercu. Yes, you know, I'd echo a lot of the comments of 
my colleagues, that they--it really enables improvement of the 
quality of the scam and really helps that. It makes--you know, 
more people are able to do the scams that now they have the 
equipment. But it also increases the kills scale and what we 
see in the calling side.
 That said, you know, similarly, our folks are using AI. 
They've long used machine learning automation. So there's some 
things like it's easier in the calling networks to detect 
someone making millions of calls versus someone making 5 really 
bad ones. So some of our tools actually still work well in an 
AI world, but we're continuing to evolve as well.
 Mr. Ogles. Ms. Stifel.
 Ms. Stifel. AI is making it harder for victims to say no to 
making a payment. One of the reasons for this is the shift that 
we've seen in the ransomware ecosystem. Whereas previously 
ransomware actors encrypted data, meaning that they locked it 
up, they now take the data and use it to extort victims to 
force them to make a payment. So when they've copied records, 
whether it be from a hospital, intellectual property from a 
Fortune 500 company, or someone's private images, as the 
Ranking Member described, they're now using AI to analyze that 
data to be better able to--they, in fact, in many cases know 
the victim's financial--for example, their financial capacity 
more than the victims do. They're using that analysis 
capability to essentially have a response to every blockade 
that the victim tries to assert, making it harder for the 
victims to not make the payment and disclosing this 
information, eventually jeopardizing both the long-term 
stability of that organization, but also putting our ability as 
leaders in the global economy and innovators at risk.
 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, ma'am.
 Ms. Kaiser, you know, 5 years ago, the Department of 
Justice made the decision to elevate ransomware investigations 
to the same priority level as terrorism cases. As we go 
forward, should it be not just a priority, but actually 
classified as a terrorist attack when you are targeting 
critical infrastructure?
 Ms. Kaiser. There are substantial benefits to what you're 
talking about. I mean, a designation doesn't just freeze 
assets, it changes the entire geopolitical equation. In 
particular, imagine telling a foreign government you have a 
designated terrorist living in your country. That changes safe 
haven conversations with these countries that are harboring all 
of these criminal groups. I think this will really have an 
effect, especially among the 60 nations who we share a 
membership with the international counter ransomware 
initiatives, saying nation-states that tolerate ransomware 
criminals, they need to feel that pressure.
 Mr. Ogles. And then real quickly, you know, obviously this 
is a problem at scale. I mean, prior to my current role, I was 
CEO of the county, the county executive. We had a regional 
hospital, you know, in my county. Incredibly vulnerable, right? 
So what is more practical, making that type of designation and 
cutting the head off of the snake, so to speak, or trying to 
equip municipalities across the country? Either is difficult. 
But we have got to figure this out as we go forward because, 
again, it is becoming more aggressive.
 Really quickly, and I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
 Ms. Kaiser. I don't think I can choose. I think you have to 
have defense and offense to be able to block these attacks at 
their source. One note I'd make is that when we're equipping 
municipalities, when we're providing out those funds, we do 
need to make sure that we're equipping them with the knowledge 
as well of how to spend that money, how to arbitrate between 
the various aspects, and ensuring, to your earlier question on 
AI, we're looking not just at prevention, which is going to be 
really difficult in the age of AI, but like, how do you detect 
it quickly. How do you kick them off your network? How do you 
really make sure you're resilient?
 Mr. Ogles. Thank you.
 I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
 The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, 
Mr. Magaziner, for his questioning.
 Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my 
colleagues and to our expert witnesses here.
 Cyber scams are a tremendous and growing challenge. We see 
that in my home State of Rhode Island. We know that critical 
infrastructure is being targeted, water systems, power systems, 
hospital systems, businesses, organizations. I think the most 
tragic stories are when seniors are scammed, scammed out of 
their life savings that they worked their whole lives for and, 
in some cases, reduced to poverty as a result. So this is 
something that should be a priority of this Congress. I thank 
my colleagues for convening this hearing.
 A few issues that I wanted to call attention to and ask our 
witnesses about. Mr. Bercu, in your written testimony, you 
talked about SIM farms, or SIM, I forget what you call it, the 
phrase you used, but SIM boxes, think this is very important. 
We had--a few of us had a Classified briefing on the topic not 
long ago. Could you just explain to all of us once again what 
these are and why they are so dangerous?
 Mr. Bercu. Yes, absolutely. So it's where the criminal 
actors will get prepaid phones, prepaid SIM cards. They can 
plug it into technology and then they are able to generate from 
the United States on our networks, calls that really, when the 
caller may sit, or, you know, text messages and the like, may 
sit abroad. So it really is an enabler. It's not calls coming 
in through the--through foreign gateways, they're actually 
starting in the United States.
 Mr. Magaziner. Crucially, some of these SIM boxes or SIM 
farms, you know, can generate thousands of calls, right? 
Thousands of calls, essentially anonymously, that can be used, 
you know, with real phone numbers to fraudulently scam people. 
Is that right?
 Mr. Bercu. Yes. One of the challenges is it doesn't look 
like an individual who's making, you know, hundreds of 
thousands of calls because it's individual numbers, individual 
SIMs making a handful of calls. But it is something the 
industry's been working on, how to better identify it with 
traffic and analytics.
 Mr. Magaziner. Well, that is what I wanted to ask about. I 
mean, to any of our witnesses, do you feel that the 
telecommunications industry is doing enough to identify where 
these SIM farms are located? Because as I understand it, if 
thousands and thousands of calls a day are being made from the 
same building, the same geography, that ought to be something 
that the companies themselves could, could track and 
potentially flag for the authorities. Is that not right?
 Mr. Bercu. So it's something the industry has been working 
on. There's--you know, it's a complex ecosystem. It's not just 
customers of the large carriers, it's sometimes their 
resellers. But it is something that we've been working. We've 
had a working group with the major carriers that we've been 
tracing back calls that we identify SIM farms sharing 
information and figuring out how to do filtering and other 
things to take them down quicker.
 Mr. Magaziner. Would anybody else like to weigh in on this? 
Is there more that the industry could be doing or that we could 
help the industry do to local locate these SIM farms?
 All right. Let me ask a related question then. My 
understanding is that one of the things that these fraudulent 
numbers are used for is to open fake social media accounts. 
Right? You can use a fake phone number from a SIM card to open 
a Facebook account or an X account or whatever. Once it has 
been identified that an account has been opened with a 
fraudulent number, why would a social media company keep those 
accounts active? Am I correct that the big social media 
companies are still keeping accounts active that they know were 
created with a fake phone number? That is my understanding.
 So, you know, I think we have to have a conversation with 
our industry partners, not just in the telecommunications 
industry about locating these SIM farms, but also with the 
email companies, the social media companies. If there is an 
account, and I think there are millions of them that we know 
were open fraudulently with fraudulent phone numbers, why are 
you keeping those accounts active? They are clearly being used 
for fraud.
 I just want to ask, I only have a moment left, so I just 
want to ask all of our witnesses. The CISA work force has been 
absolutely decimated over the last year. I think close to half 
of the CISA employees have been eliminated. Does anybody think 
this is a good idea from a cybersecurity point of view? OK.
 Second, the administration has approved the sale of 
advanced Nvidia chips to China, to the Chinese Communist 
government that is, in many cases, a sponsor of cyber attacks 
against the United States. Does anybody think allowing the sale 
of these advanced chips is a good idea?
 Well, that is something that I think we ought to do 
something about as a Congress on a bipartisan basis.
 With that, I will yield.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Crane, for his questioning.
 Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thank you 
to you guys for showing up today to help us get a better handle 
on this issue on on-line scams, crypto fraud, and digital 
exhortation.
 I actually had a constituent reach out to me probably about 
6 months ago, who had saw an ad on FOX News, and it was for 
farming equipment, tractors, et cetera, used equipment. He 
actually ended up making the purchase and never received the 
product. So he reached out to me. We were able to get in touch 
with the, you know, Federal agencies who looked into it. 
Thankfully, the bank worked with this gentleman and helped him 
get his money back. But then he continued to text me, letting 
me know that he was still seeing this ad run on FOX News. So a 
lot of our constituents see something on FOX News or CNN or 
whatever channel they are watching, and they see that having 
some integrity to it.
 We really haven't covered, that I have heard in this 
hearing, what would you guys advise average Joe American to do? 
What, you know, operating procedures would you have them look 
at and avoiding even getting involved in any of these scams?
 I am going to start with you, Ms. Kaiser.
 Ms. Kaiser. So when I was at the FBI, one of the teams that 
I had responsibility for was the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center, so the group that does the report we talked about 
today. The question I got a lot is, why do you put out these 
stats? Like, what do you hope to get out of this? My No. 1 
answer was, so that people don't feel alone. Right? That 
individuals understand that this happens to a large swath of 
American citizens and that if they should believe--if they 
believe they have been scammed, if they believe they've been 
attacked, they should report it to local law enforcement, to 
the FBI, to the Internet Crime Complaint Center. They should 
contact their bank right away because oftentimes, and I'll 
defer to my colleague on some of these money flows, but 
oftentimes some of that money can be recouped if it's done 
quickly.
 Mr. Crane. But before we even get to that point, Ms. 
Kaiser, where they are attacked, how do they avoid getting 
attacked in the first place? You know, how do they notice or 
have their Spidey senses go off that, hey, this doesn't exactly 
feel right? Does anyone want to help the average Joe American 
with that one?
 Ms. Kaiser. So it's incredibly difficult, but what I would 
note is that if you feel under, like, urgent pressure, it's 
probably a scam. Take a beat, take a step, call someone in your 
family, contact and identify ways in which you can verify that 
company. But it's really when you're put under pressure, 
oftentimes that's the biggest indicator that something's wrong.
 Mr. Crane. Go ahead, Mr. Redbord.
 Mr. Redbord. I would just add, and I think that was, quite 
frankly, beautifully said. I think what we need is a massive 
public service campaign at a Federal level across all these 
different jurisdictions, a ``Just Say No,'' if you will, for 
scams and fraud. We need people to understand that, to take a 
beat, as Ms. Kaiser said.
 At TRM, we run the largest reporting database for fraud and 
scams in the crypto ecosystem. It's called chainabuse.com. You 
can go on your phone and look at it right now. It's just open 
source. It provides victims an opportunity to report so other 
people are not ultimately scammed down the road.
 So I think it's a combination of things. You're right that 
we talk a lot about offense and how to go after these 
transnational groups, but really defense is a key part of this. 
I think public service and awareness is absolutely critical 
here.
 Mr. Crane. Of all the ways that these scammers can target 
Americans, whether it's text message, social media, phone 
calls, emails, of all of those are you seeing these individuals 
target, you know, specifically or more predominantly through a 
certain means?
 Mr. Redbord. You know, it's through a whole host of 
different types of ways. Just to put a point on it. I think one 
more thing Ms. Kaiser said is that the FBI has been terrific in 
this area. It's not only through IC3, but they run a program 
called Level Up where they're literally doing hand-to-hand 
combat. They're going to reach out to victims directly, show up 
at your door and say, hey, don't go ahead and send those funds. 
Obviously, it's very hard for this to scale, but you marry 
technology with that type of initiative and, and there's a lot 
of good work being done out there.
 Mr. Crane. Absolutely. My office 2 weeks ago had FBI out at 
events in Payson, Arizona, and Overgaard to help residents 
identify and look at some of the ways that they could possibly 
be scammed or defrauded. So I want to say thank you to the FBI 
for doing that.
 Mr. Bercu or Ms. Stifel, with my remaining time, do you 
guys have any suggestions for Americans on how to avoid even 
getting entangled in any of these fraudulent schemes?
 Mr. Bercu. Yes, I'd agree with my colleagues, especially to 
take a beat, but I think, No. 1, is recognize that any of us 
could be a victim. I mean, I work on these issues and I was 
under the spell for a few seconds when I got a message that my 
account was accessed from Russia. So it can happen to any of 
us. So I think that's why the take a beat is really important.
 But take advantage of the tools that are out there. There's 
blocking, labeling, there's other things on the phone side. Use 
those.
 [The information from Ms. Stifel follows:]

 I am writing to provide a formal statement for the record following 
the hearing held on April 21, 2026. During your questioning, you 
inquired about specific resources available to help your constituents 
in Arizona's 2d District identify and defend against increasingly 
sophisticated on-line frauds. Due to the expiration of your questioning 
time, I was unable to provide a response.
 The primary resource I intended to highlight is PauseTake9 
(pausetake9.org), a digital awareness initiative that provides a 
defense mechanism against cyber threats: the 9-second pause.
 The PauseTake9 platform provides actionable tools designed to 
disrupt the high-pressure tactics often used by scammers. Key resources 
available to your constituents include:
 The 9-Second Rule.--Encourages users to pause for 9 seconds 
 before clicking a link or sharing information, providing the 
 necessary time to recognize phishing attempts and social 
 engineering.
 Defense Checklists.--Step-by-step guidance on implementing 
 technical safeguards, such as using password managers and 
 setting up passkeys to replace vulnerable passwords.
 Proactive Protection Tools.--Direct links to official 
 services for freezing credit through major bureaus (Equifax, 
 Experian, and TransUnion) to prevent unauthorized accounts.
 Reporting Support.--Pathways to report fraudulent activity 
 via the FTC and the BBB Scam Tracker, ensuring individual 
 experiences contribute to broader law enforcement efforts.
 This resource is effective because it focuses on human behavior--
the ``weakest link'' in the cybersecurity chain--and empowers 
individuals to regain control during high-stress interactions. As the 
other witnesses noted, these ``active pause'' techniques could be of 
significant benefit to the residents of your district.
 Thank you for your leadership on this issue and for the opportunity 
to supplement the hearing record.

 Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. 
Ramirez, for her questioning.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chair and Ranking Member, for this 
hearing today and for the witnesses, all for being here as 
well.
 While the substance of this hearing is certainly very 
serious, we were back to Republican hearings dripping in 
unseriousness. I will tell you why. It is laughable that my 
Republican colleagues are trying to use this time to condemn 
fraud, extortion, and crime, while, No. 1, supporting the most 
corrupt, scammy administration in U.S. history; and No. 2, 
being completely unwilling to conduct oversight or rein in the 
scammer-in-chief.
 In preparing for today's hearing, it was noted profit-
motivated transnational criminal organizations, they leverage 
corruption, intimidation, and advanced technologies so they can 
reach new markets and create income streams. Such organizations 
defraud U.S. citizens, businesses, and Government agencies 
while at the same time moving billions of dollars in illegal 
earnings through global financial systems. Does this sound 
familiar to anyone else?
 The House Judiciary Committee Democrats released a report 
last year that documented how the President has used his office 
to enrich himself and his family with crypto holdings worth as 
much as $11.6 billion, an income of more than $800 million from 
the sale of crypto assets in the first half of 2025 alone, 
while at the same time dismantling Federal oversight and 
safeguards that once protected Americans from fraud, from 
scams, and financial exploitation.
 Profit-motivated transnational crime, corruption, and 
scamming, that is how the Trump administration operates. He 
uses all those tools to reward his loyalists and then to be 
able to remain in power.
 Look, while I agree we have to combat corruption, crime, 
and scams, and it has to be important for us to understand the 
U.S. economic and national security impact, we also have to 
understand that combating these threats require adequately 
resourcing and staffing these Federal agencies, staffing 
critical infrastructure, and having checks and balances and 
policy solutions to that make us all more secure. But my 
colleagues here are unwilling to do any of these things. How? 
They are decimating CISA, they are abdicating their oversight 
authority, and they are wasting our time instead of advancing 
policies that protect working people from today's crooks and 
con men in office or from buying seats in Congress.
 Look, my district is so tired of corruption, of self-
dealing, and lack of accountability. So I want to get to a 
quick question here. Ms. Stifel, it is my understanding that in 
March the White House released President Trump's Cybersecurity 
Strategy for America. The document was just over 3 pages of 
substance around about I think 6 pillars. In your professional 
opinion, is a 6-page document with 3 pages of substance 
sufficient to describe a comprehensive strategy that for 
American cybersecurity?
 Ms. Stifel. The most recently-released strategy does stand 
in contrast to the 2018 strategy, which laid out a number of 
key elements that would strengthen the country's cybersecurity 
posture, including establishing a Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Yes, thank you for your response. The reality 
is, I will say it more directly, it is not because the 2018 
strategy was far more comprehensive than what we are seeing 
today, and it should concern every single Member of these 
subcommittees. It is because Trump and his cronies around the 
world are the most dangerous transnational criminal network 
threatening us right now. They are swindling us, stealing our 
hard-earned dollars, waging a war in our cities, and committing 
war crimes abroad, all for private profit. It is not lost on me 
that Trump signed the legislation establishing CISA, but 
started attacking it the minute it became an obstruction to his 
criminal interest.
 If you ask Republicans, do you want to use the power of 
Government to end hunger? Nope. Make housing more affordable? 
Nah. Bring the prices of gas down? No. But if you ask them, do 
you want to use the power of Government to get rich and trick, 
cheat, and defraud the American people? Well, what we have seen 
here is why the response is yes, let's do that. That is 
despicable. That is not why we were sent to Congress. It is why 
we have to address the issues of cybersecurity, but we also 
have to address the issues of corruption in the White House.
 With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
 Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Knott, for his questioning.
 Mr. Knott. To the witnesses, thank you all for being here. 
This is obviously a very important issue, one that is of great 
significance to all Americans.
 Ms. Kaiser, let me just start with you. We have talked a 
lot about, you know, Government personnel and resources that 
are in place and so forth. But given the dynamism of this 
threat, how important is it, not just a staffing component, but 
also a systems component to address this issue? Is it even 
possible from a governmental standpoint alone?
 Ms. Kaiser. In terms of systems, you're talking about the 
actual networks----
 Mr. Knott. Yes.
 Ms. Kaiser [continuing]. From a governmental system. So 
within the Government itself, I was lucky enough to be able to 
be a part of the interagency weekly meetings that talked about, 
you know, threats to the U.S. Government networks as well as 
threats to across our critical infrastructure. What I can say 
is it's the same. Right? The types of targeting that happens to 
the private sector, happens to the Government. The defenses are 
the same. It's ensuring that, that you've done basics.
 Mr. Knott. Right.
 Ms. Kaiser. But now with AI, right, you have to do more. 
It's really in that kind-of you have to assume you could be 
compromised. So what do you do then? How do you kick them off?
 Mr. Knott. In terms of the threat itself, creating a 
defense for that threat is obviously going to require a whole 
lot of flexibility, a lot of creativity. These are adjectives 
that are not usually reserved for the Government side of 
things. So I am asking from your standpoint, how can the 
Government evolve with the threat that seems to change day over 
day, night after night?
 Ms. Kaiser. So one aspect is when the Government is looking 
at reauthorizing and allocating the funds, the cybersecurity 
grants that Congress has authorized, it's doing so in a really 
smart way, like identifying the actual needs of the sector or 
Government agencies that are receiving the funds. It's having a 
two-way conversation, not a one-way conversation. It's moving 
fast. It's being able to allocate those funds because in 
cybersecurity, you know, time equals attacks.
 Mr. Knott. Yes. Mr. Redbord, I want the same chapter to 
you. I am very skeptical of that. When you look at the 
Government bureaucracies, whether it is Federal, State, or 
local, they are usually clumsy and very wasteful, and that is 
not the nature of this threat. From your perspective, how can 
we best align to defend the American people against this type 
of threat?
 Mr. Redbord. Thank you for the question. Look, over the 
last, you know, couple of years, I think we've seen a real 
willingness from the public sector to be working much more 
closely with the private sector. Part of this is because we 
move very, very fast. Whether that means ensuring that the 
Government has the data they need, we have it, or we can go out 
and get it and we provide it. So I think the real key here to 
solving this is working really, really closely together to 
ensure that the authorities and the data are all there to take 
on this threat.
 Mr. Knott. In terms of the ingredients that are needed to 
match the threat, from your perspective, what types of needs 
and progressions do we need to be sure that we are supporting 
in Congress?
 Mr. Redbord. It's really that--I mean, you and I were both 
assistant U.S. Attorneys, and I think it's really about the 
tools. It's that investigators have every single tool they 
need. When bad actors are leveraging technology, we need to 
make sure that every investigator has the AI technology, the 
blockchain intelligence, the things that they need to invest in 
these cases.
 Mr. Knott. Well, that is never going to happen from the 
Government side organically. So with the private-sector side, 
how can we ensure that we have the necessary environment so 
that the private sector can develop the tools that will be used 
to protect Americans?
 Mr. Redbord. Absolutely. In my opening statement, I 
mentioned the Beacon Network.
 Mr. Knott. Yes.
 Mr. Redbord. It's the largest public-private partnership in 
this space. It's in large part because the private sector came 
together and said, hey, we need to stop bad actors in the wake 
of a North Korea hack from off ramping funds to use for weapons 
proliferation. So we all came together, reached out to the 
public sector and said, let's do this together. I think that's 
a really sharp model for what is possible today.
 Mr. Knott. In terms of the posture of our country, it seems 
in many respects, I mean, we have mentioned China, Russia, 
North Korea, and certainly the Iranian folks, they are all 
attacking us. It seems to have exceeded law enforcement and 
moves into more of a national security component. How does that 
change the posture at all?
 I will start with you, Ms. Kaiser.
 Ms. Kaiser. It's absolutely a national security issue. I 
think that countering cyber threats from wherever they come is 
when really the national security challenge of our lifetime.
 You mentioned the nation-states, and one aspect I'd like to 
highlight here is nation-states, so we've seen Iran, we've seen 
China, we've seen Russia, we've seen North Korea actually use 
these cyber criminal tactics, use the same infrastructure, use 
the same way in which the criminal groups are targeting us to 
actually conduct attacks on American networks. That's happened 
in the Iranian conflict right now. So it's really important to 
look at this all as a connected system and understand that 
disrupting one component disrupts others.
 Mr. Redbord. It is the absolutely most important shift in 
the posture, you know, in recent history, moving from law 
enforcement to national security. The reality is that wars are 
now fought in cyber space and across blockchains and we have to 
leverage every national security piece that we can, offensive 
and defensive.
 Mr. Bercu. Yes, I just agree with my colleagues here.
 Ms. Stifel. I would just add that I think we also, as we're 
thinking about CISA, is for Congress to authorize the Joint 
Cyber Defense Collaborative. We, as you have reiterated, depend 
on industry to help strengthen and defend America. We at this 
point are not on our strongest footing with, among other 
things, also the lapse of the Critical Infrastructure 
Partnership Advisory Panel capability for the Secretary of DHS 
and the director of CISA to have honest conversations with 
industry about the range of threats that they're facing and the 
capabilities they can bring to defeat them.
 Mr. Knott. Great. Mr. Chairman, yield back.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 
Johnson, for her questioning.
 Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 
being here. I think this is a very critical and important 
discussion in our Nation at this time.
 We have all experienced an extreme increase in spam texts 
and calls ranging from toll road payments and UPS package fees 
to solicitations for crypto investments or even romantic 
relationships. In 2024 alone, Texans reported losing $1.35 
billion to scams with the most significant losses reported to 
those over 60 years old. WFAA, a local news outlet in Dallas, 
reported that scam reports increased in 2025 by 118 percent, 
doubling what was reported in 2024.
 These scams often target vulnerable communities and 3 in 10 
Americans who lost money to scams say it has a significant 
impact on their finances. In one case, a victim lost $47 
million causing an entire bank to collapse and hundreds of 
people to lose their retirement savings.
 The truth is these sinister operations by profit-motivated 
transnational criminal organizations are operating at a never-
before-seen scale and our Government is not equipped to address 
it right now. This is a self-inflicted wound thanks to the 
Trump administration's gutting of CISA whose mission includes 
identifying and preventing these crimes. I want to echo many of 
the concerns my colleagues have made and many of you on the 
panel have made concerning the defunding of CISA and that we 
need to absolutely invest in a robust CISA if we are going to 
address this problem.
 Ms. Stifel, my understanding is that these scams have 
accelerated in recent years to the proliferation of hundreds of 
large-scale compounds powered by forced labor across Southeast 
Asia, particularly in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, as well as the 
Philippines. In Cambodia, for example, corrupt officials allow 
scam centers to operate in the open, where scamming now 
generates $12 billion annually, over half of that country's 
GDP.
 Why is international collaboration so critical in 
addressing these scam centers? How have recent cuts in the 
reorganization of the State Department put those efforts of 
collaboration at risk?
 Ms. Stifel. We are, as the Ranking Member mentioned in his 
opening statement, only as strong as our weakest link. The 
examples that you gave are representative of issues that we see 
as we also explore ransomware, including the willingness of 
safe havens to harbor criminals and not respond to requests for 
assistance or to deny--bury their head in the sand.
 We depend on the whole-of-Government, as my colleagues have 
mentioned, response to the threats that this country faces that 
are emanating through information and communications 
technologies or the internet. That means that we need to have 
not only a deep bench at CISA, but we also, as you mentioned, 
need to have a deep bench at State.
 Among other things, the State Department is now our lead in 
something called the Counter Ransomware Initiative, which is 
now in its fourth year with now over 70 countries and 
organizations participating in it. It is the one place where 
these governments and multilateral organizations have come 
together to identify priority, exchange best practices, 
identify policy objectives, build investigative capacity to 
counter, in this case, the ransomware threat. But that type of 
leadership that emanated from the United States, the Counter 
Ransomware Initiative, is something that the United States 
started. The State Department has taken on the responsibility 
to carry the mantle in this administration. We need to continue 
to show that leadership and we have to do so with a full bench 
around the interagency, both at State, FBI, CISA, elsewhere.
 Ms. Johnson. Right. I am very concerned about the 
diminished bench that we have at this time.
 This is just to the general panel, what suggestions do you 
have for this committee to how we can improve collaboration 
between Department of Homeland Security and the State 
Department to address this issue? In particular, do you all 
have any specific recommendations other than what Stifel was 
just talking about?
 Mr. Redbord. Well, I would just say over the last, you 
know, several months, year, we've seen more and more sort-of 
interagency approach to these issues. It's not going to just be 
the State Department. It's not going to be just DHS or law 
enforcement agencies or national security agencies. It's really 
all coming together.
 A couple great examples, I think, that exist today, the DOJ 
started a scam center strike force about 6 months ago. There 
was a takedown of one of these large scam compounds in Cambodia 
called Prince Group that involved the largest forfeiture action 
in U.S. history, about 15 billion of proceeds from this type of 
illicit activity. There's a model in place, but there's also 10 
more, 15 more Prince Groups across Southeast Asia. We have to 
leverage every authority from offensive cyber to public-private 
work in order to go after these bad actors.
 Ms. Johnson. Unfortunately, I am out of time.
 But Mr. Chairman, thank you for this conversation. I do 
think responding to scams in this country is one of the most 
critical things we can be doing, and I applaud the work. Thank 
you.
 Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Walkinshaw, for his question.
 Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing on an important topic.
 ``We want the bureaucrats to be traumatically affected. 
When they wake up in the morning we want them not to want to go 
to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. 
We want their funding to be shut down. We want to put them in 
trauma.'' That was Russ Vought, President Trump's OMB director, 
talking about, among others, the 1,000 Federal workers who 
worked at CISA were fired, pushed out, or driven out.
 So while we have an Executive Order, words on paper that 
says we take this issue seriously, we have a lot of language at 
the dais today about how important this is, this administration 
is not taking cybersecurity seriously. Because when you treat 
the experts who are doing the work, and they are creative, I 
will talk about that, when you treat the experts that way, you 
are not taking the issue seriously.
 I want to just cite some of what you wrote in your written 
testimony, Ms. Stifel. ``The Critical Infrastructure 
Partnership Advisory Council, a core mechanism for coordinating 
cyber policy across Government industry, has yet to restart 
since being shuttered.'' The Secretary of Homeland Security--if 
the Secretary of Homeland Security decides ``to convene sector-
specific advisory committees, coordination will be a challenge 
given cuts,'' budget cuts to the FBI's Cyber Division, expected 
to reduce personnel by half. The acting commander of USCYBERCOM 
testified that the effect on the command's ability to carry out 
its mission would be impactful because of budget cuts.
 We have talked about the State and local cybersecurity 
grant program, which proved, quoting Ms. Stifel, ``effective in 
marshaling resources to help State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial governments improve their defenses, yet it has been 
zeroed out in the administration's budget. Shared cybersecurity 
services provided at subsidized rates for State and local 
governments, especially small rural State and local governments 
that don't have the resources through the Multi-State 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, have been canceled, 
leaving States'' and local governments, especially in rural 
communities, ``to scramble for protection.'' That is what has 
happened.
 Ms. Stifel, one that you didn't, I don't think, note in 
your written testimony, I apologize, I missed some of what you 
said, is CISA's Pre-Ransomware Notification Initiative. Can you 
tell us what that is or perhaps what it was?
 Ms. Stifel. Thank you. It's a really critical program that 
currently is not operating to my knowledge. The individual who 
ran the program is no longer at the agency. The program 
essentially received indications of warning from industry, in 
many cases, in part supported by the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act and the incentives that that legislation offers to 
industry, the liability protection it affords, to share 
information with the Government, the Government can then 
leverage to defend the homeland.
 So this program, run by actually basically one individual, 
would call--receive these tips and call victims who either 
already had a threat actor in their networks or were known to 
be soon to be targeted by these threat actors, and gave them 
notice that they were about to become a victim and in many 
cases worked with those victims and with their counsel to try 
and mitigate the risk that this--they knew that they were about 
to face.
 Mr. Walkinshaw. Would you describe that work as creative 
and nimble?
 Ms. Stifel. Quite. It's also, I think I want to underscore 
that it is really driven on trust. The ability for this 
particular individual to notify over 4,000 organizations and 
prevent them from beginning--from becoming victims and 
preventing billions of dollars in losses to the economy doesn't 
come from 3 weeks on the job. It comes from, I think he was at 
the Department for over a decade.
 Mr. Walkinshaw. I will put a finer point on it, $9 billion. 
Nine billion dollars in damages that initiative prevented in 
large part because of the work, to use the term Director Vought 
likes to use, of one bureaucrat. I guess we succeeded in making 
him not want to go to work because he left and that program is 
no longer functioning. So ransomware is occurring today because 
this administration drove out the expert, the Federal employee 
who was helping to prevent it to the tune of $9 billion.
 We are shooting ourselves in the foot. We have to stop 
attacking the experts who serve our Nation because we have a 
political agenda. If this administration doesn't stop doing 
that, we will continue to lose this cyber war.
 I yield back.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
 The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Green, for his questioning.
 Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the Ranking 
Member as well. I welcome the witnesses.
 Mr. Chairman, we understand that cryptocurrency fraud is 
something that has to be dealt with by way of regulation. 
Currently, using digital methodologies and unregulated 
currencies, TCOs can remain anonymous and evade law 
enforcement, this ability to be pseudonymous. Pseudonymity is a 
problem. Pseudonymity, it is a problem because we have allowed 
a system to develop that allows people to transfer unlimited 
amounts of funds without identifying themselves.
 Ms. Stifel, how do you propose we regulate such that we can 
deal with the pseudonymity aspect of the transference of large 
sums of money, which, by the way, may go to terrorist 
organizations used for ransom purposes, extortion? How do we 
deal with that?
 Ms. Stifel. Congressman, when we established the Ransomware 
Task Force one of its core recommendations was to ensure that 
know your customer and anti-money laundering capabilities were 
required of exchanges that transmit these currencies. In 
addition, we think that similar due diligence measures can also 
be taken in other aspects of the ecosystem, for example, in the 
domain registration space. That would also help us take a more 
scaled approach to combating a range of illicit activity on-
line.
 Mr. Green. Now, pseudonymity exists and is efficacious 
because you have peer-to-peer transfer of money, 
cryptocurrency. In the banking system, you have a central bank, 
goes to the central bank, then to a person. We still have this 
problem of peer-to-peer transfers.
 By the way, we can catch many of the culprits, but it is 
difficult and some of the culprits get away because of peer-to-
peer business. The crypto industry is spending millions upon 
millions of dollars to make sure Congress has people within it 
who are going to support the peer-to-peer transfers. They place 
privacy above the ability to prevent extortion, to prevent 
avoiding paying taxes on money. This pseudonymity has to be 
dealt with such that we, as you said, know your customer. But 
you can't know your customer if you don't have a customer to 
know.
 So, again, I am not pressing you. I understand you 
understand the problem, but the problem is actually bigger than 
simply saying we would like to regulate when millions upon 
millions are being spent to buy the best Congress that money 
can buy to support the crypto industry's insatiable appetite to 
maintain pseudonymity.
 I welcome your comment if you have one.
 Ms. Stifel. The ability to investigate illicit activity is 
central to the Government's ability to defend the Nation. So I 
would assert that there's definitely a need to have greater 
visibility into a range of activity on-line, which is one of 
the reasons why, in my written testimony, I reiterated the need 
to reauthorize the Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Act of 
2015.
 Mr. Green. I have 11 seconds. Yes, I read body language 
quite well.
 Mr. Redbord. Thank you so much. I spent my career as a 
prosecutor investigating cases involving bulk cash smuggling 
and networks of hawalas and shell companies and high-value art. 
There was no ability to trace those things on an open public 
ledger. We work very closely with law enforcement today to be 
able to combat fraud and financial crime in crypto because we 
actually have the ability to watch every transaction in real 
time. There's a lot of benefit there.
 Mr. Green. Thank you.
 Mr. Redbord. Thank you.
 Mr. Green. Every transaction is more than just a few 
thousand transactions. Do you agree?
 Mr. Redbord. Every transaction is more than a few thousand 
transactions. I'm so sorry.
 Mr. Green. You said you have the ability to watch every 
transaction.
 Mr. Redbord. Every transaction in real time on an open 
public ledger where crypto is.
 Mr. Green. Right, and what I am saying to you that that is 
an awesome number of transactions.
 Mr. Redbord. It's an awesome number of transactions. We can 
now see more transactions in--on blockchains than we can in the 
traditional world.
 Mr. Green. In so doing, you have to also not only see them, 
now you have got to look into each one of them so as to 
ascertain whether or not this is a part of some illicit trade.
 Mr. Redbord. Absolutely. We can now do that on blockchains, 
where you never could do that in the traditional financial 
system, right, through networks of wire transfers and bulk 
cash. Now we can see every transaction move on an open public 
ledger in real time and track and trace to build 
investigations.
 Mr. Green. Are you saying that all transactions are on the 
open public ledger?
 Mr. Redbord. All transactions on public blockchains, so 
Bitcoin.
 Mr. Green. Public blockchain?
 Mr. Redbord. Public blockchains.
 Mr. Green. OK. Do you agree that there are blockchains that 
you are not monitoring?
 Mr. Redbord. We monitor every blockchain.
 Mr. Green. Every blockchain in history, every blockchain 
that exists?
 Mr. Redbord. When you lose visibility on financial 
transactions in the cryptocurrency world, it's often because it 
moves into a cryptocurrency exchange or off the blockchain. 
Certainly there are privacy tools and we are getting very, very 
good at being able to track those.
 Mr. Green. Permit me to ask this as a follow-up. The people 
who engage in extortion, the people who engage in extortion and 
succeed with the extortion, explain how they elude the 
transparency that you are speaking of.
 Mr. Redbord. It's really become a race. It's a race between 
law enforcement and bad actors. Bad actors are trying to off-
ramp their funds as fast as they can. So a ransom payment is 
made in Bitcoin, for example. The FBI and others are using 
tools like TRM to track and trace. But it's this cat-and-mouse 
game that has always existed. That's why we have to shut down 
those off ramps.
 Just real quickly, those off ramps are highly regulated. 
They're required to have, in the United States today, they're 
required to have compliance controls on those.
 Mr. Green. I am in agreement with you. That is why I 
mentioned the awesome number. Because of the number and the 
speed at which these transactions take place and the 
pseudonymity associated with it, it makes it difficult to catch 
the culprit who is moving quickly before you can get to him.
 Mr. Redbord. That's why it's so important that law 
enforcement and regulators have the tools to move as fast as 
these bad actors.
 Mr. Green. I agree with you.
 Mr. Redbord. Thank you.
 Mr. Green. Thank you.
 Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back.
 I would like to again thank our witnesses for being here. 
Just to show the frequency of these attacks, as we were here 
addressing this very important topic, my good friend and the 
Ranking Member received an email scam just moments ago. So this 
is another one, as he would say. So this is an on-going issue 
that we will continue to address. Again, your testimony, your 
insight into these topics help us as we try to shape policy and 
try to make sure that we are legislating to protect the 
American public.
 In closing, the Members of this committee may have 
additional questions for the witnesses. We would ask that 
witnesses respond to any additional questions in writing. 
Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be 
held open for a period of 10 days.
 Without any objection, this committee stands adjourned. 
Thank you again.
 [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]

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