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- ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS ======================================================================= JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 21, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-45 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-490 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chair Ranking Member Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Nick LaLota, New York Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Brad Knott, North Carolina Analilia Mejia, New Jersey Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas David P. Joyce, Ohio Keighle Joyce, Staff Director Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT Michael Guest, Mississippi, Chairman Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma J. Luis Correa, California, Elijah Crane, Arizona Ranking Member Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas Sheri Biggs, South Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Brad Knott, North Carolina Analilia Mejia, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Al Green, Texas officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex officio) Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois, Morgan Luttrell, Texas Ranking Member Nick LaLota, New York Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex officio) Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Statements The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement: Oral Statement................................................. 1 Prepared Statement............................................. 3 The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement: Oral Statement................................................. 3 Prepared Statement............................................. 5 The Honorable Andrew Ogles, a Representative in Congress From the State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection: Oral Statement................................................. 6 Prepared Statement............................................. 7 The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: Prepared Statement............................................. 8 Witnesses Ms. Cynthia Kaiser, Senior Vice President, Halcyon Ransomware Research Center: Oral Statement................................................. 10 Prepared Statement............................................. 11 Mr. Ari Redbord, Global Head of Policy, TRM Labs: Oral Statement................................................. 16 Prepared Statement............................................. 17 Mr. Joshua M. Bercu, Senior Vice President of Policy, USTelecom-- The Broadband Association: Oral Statement................................................. 31 Prepared Statement............................................. 33 Ms. Megan Stifel, Chief Strategy Officer, Institute for Security and Technology: Oral Statement................................................. 36 Prepared Statement............................................. 38 ONLINE SCAMS, CRYPTO FRAUD, AND DIGITAL EXTORTION: AN EXAMINATION OF HOW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL NETWORKS TARGET AMERICANS ---------- Tuesday, April 21, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement, and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael Guest [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement] presiding. Present from the Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement: Representatives Guest, Correa, Ramirez, Crane, Ogles, Knott, Johnson, and Green. Present from the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection: Representatives Ogles, Magaziner, and Walkinshaw. Mr. Guest. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any point. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine how transnational criminal organizations are increasingly exploiting digital technologies, including cryptocurrency, on- line platforms, artificial intelligence, and global financial networks to conduct fraud, launder illicit proceeds, and target American citizens, businesses, and critical infrastructure. I would like to thank our colleagues from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee for partnering with us for this joint hearing. I would like to now recognize myself for a brief opening statement. Good morning and welcome to the Border Security and Enforcement and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Joint Subcommittee hearing examining how transnational criminal networks are increasingly targeting Americans in the digital world to expand their illicit activities and increase their profits through scams, fraud, and extortion. As technology has evolved and web-based services have crossed traditional borders, cyber-enabled financial crime has risen sharply. Transnational criminal networks, from Mexican drug trafficking organizations to Southeast Asia scam operations are targeting Americans. With an expanding arsenal of digital tools available in the public sphere, we must build and maintain a strong defense against cyber-enabled criminals. Most Americans have encountered some sort of scam enabled by technology. These scams often target our aging and elderly families and constituents, seeking to drain their life savings and retirement plans using emotional, manipulative tactics. In 2025 alone, scammers stole more than $20 billion from Americans. Criminal networks use the digital domain to promote their illicit activities. The challenging nature of tracing cryptocurrency provides a landscape where Mexican drug cartels and other criminal organizations can launder money by converting profits from illegal activities into digital currency, which can be accessed across the world in a matter of seconds. Through this digital marketplace, the Mexican cartels are utilizing Chinese money-laundering networks as a piece of their business models. President Trump issued an Executive Order designating certain terrorists--excuse me, certain cartels and transnational criminal organizations as a foreign terrorist organization, or FTOs. This designation has created opportunities to use new authorities to combat drug cartels and organize criminal organizations. Cyber-enabled crime not only victimizes Americans, but also raises concern for national security interests. Just last week, in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Todd Lyons, the acting director of ICE and Customs Enforcement, spoke about a major Homeland Security investigation involving Chinese Communist Party actors committing gift card fraud and sending proceeds back to military units in China. Digital extortion, which is another form of cyber crime, has serious national security implications. These ransomware attacks often involve foreign actors targeting sensitive industries, such as education, government, and health care databases, holding data or systems hostage and demanding payment for its release. My home State of Mississippi just recently experienced a major ransomware attack and I know that many of my colleagues districts have experienced attacks as well. The severity and increasing frequency of these attacks is deeply concerning. Our critical infrastructure, our data, and our constituents must be protected. Congress must step up to secure our virtual border. President Trump's recent Executive Order identifying cyber-enabled crime as a priority and pushing an offensive approach on combating cyber crime is a positive step, but it must be built upon. Given the role of industry, public-private partnerships are critical to facing these threats head on. It is important that Congress examine how transnational criminal organizations are exploiting digital technology and targeting Americans. Today we have with us experts who will share their insight on this growing issue and provide a valuable discussion on how Congress can work together to combat financial crime. [The statement of Chairman Guest follows:] Statement of Chairman Michael Guest April 21, 2026 Good morning, welcome to the Border Security and Enforcement and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection joint subcommittee hearing examining how transnational criminal networks use on-line scams, crypto fraud, and digital extortion to target Americans. As technology has evolved and web-based services have transcended traditional borders, cyber-enabled financial crime has sharply risen in popularity amongst transnational criminal organizations. With an expanding arsenal of digital tools available in the public sphere, we must maintain a strong defensive posture against cyber-enabled crime. Given the brevity of this topic, the committee has focused the scope of this hearing on on-line scams, cryptocurrency fraud, and digital extortion--three types of cyber-enabled crime that raise concerns for American national security interests. Likely everyone in this room has encountered some sort of scam enabled by the internet. These scams primarily target our aging and elderly families and constituents--seeking to drain their life savings and retirement plans using emotional manipulation tactics. In 2025 alone, scammers stole more than $20 billion from Americans using these scams. This record high comes as a culmination between traditional criminal enterprises and the rapid sophistication of new technology. The challenging nature of tracing cryptocurrency provides a landscape where Mexican drug cartels and other transnational criminal organizations can launder money by converting profits from illegal activities into digital coins which can be accessed from anywhere in the world in a matter of seconds. Logically, groups like cartels enjoy the privacy associated with cryptocurrency as a form of currency that is decentralized from traditional banks with limited oversight. Digital extortion is another form of cyber-enabled crime that has serious national security implications. Also known as ransomware attacks, these crimes often involve foreign actors targeting sensitive industries like education, Government, and health care databases, holding data or systems hostage, and demanding payment for its release. My home State of Mississippi just recently experienced a major ransomware attack first-hand and I know my colleagues' districts have experienced serious attacks as well. Our critical infrastructure, our data, and our constituents must be protected--Congress must step up to secure our virtual footprint from bad actors. Through the Presidents' Executive Orders designating transnational criminal organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the March order prioritizing an offensive approach on combatting cyber crime, the administration has new tools and pathways in place to collaborate, share information, and crack down on cyber-enabled crime. The subcommittees have brought expert witnesses here today to share their insight on this growing issue with the committee and provide valuable suggestions for Congress to support the administration in this effort. Mr. Guest. I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for his opening statement. Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with you. Cyber defense in our country should not be a Democratic or Republican issue, but rather an issue of national importance for all of us. That is the way it has been treated here in this committee, working across the aisle to make sure we protect everybody in our society and all institutions in our society. Let me start out by telling you that I am now a senior and now I get senior discounts. I guess that also comes with an ass-kicking. Recently I was at home looking through my personal email and I got an email from the IRS. Got my attention, looked legit, had the IRS logo, everything on it. It also said, unless you call us today, we will come and seize your assets, including your bank account assets. So, you know, I picked up the telephone number and I called that 888 number. The person on the other side answering the phone call said, get your credit card ready. You have to pay us $20,000 right away. Otherwise, we will be on our way to your house, and they told me where I lived, to pick you up and have you arrested. Pretty interesting conversation, very convincing. I thought to myself, OK, what will some of my other seniors in my district do when they get that telephone call? They called. How much money will they pay? All of us know as seniors that you don't tell your children when you get whacked. You don't tell your children when you get suckered. You just live in peace. The other side of that social democratic bell curve are young children today that are essentially cyber bullied, young ladies who are essentially forced into doing things they shouldn't be doing. Otherwise, those pictures will be released to the world. Middle of that bell curve you have one of my accounting firms in my district who got hacked, ransomware. The head of that firm had a choice: report it, have all of your customers know that you did not have the system in place so they will go to somebody else for services; and No. 2, you will be opened up for civil liability because somebody hacked your system. It is not a good place to be. Mr. Chairman, today I am hoping beyond learning more about what is going on, we can come up with some good solutions that we can work on moving forward. Cyber criminals, transnational organizations are no longer confined by borders. They are sophisticated, organized, leveraging corruption, cutting-edge technology, human trafficking, especially those in China, Southeast Asia. They have built large scamming centers, very sophisticated, targeting our communities in the United States. According to the FBI, cyber-enabled fraud in 2025 led to over $17.6 billion worth of reported losses. Reported losses. Beyond that $20 billion, I bet you there is a lot more out there that will never go reported. Top of that, artificial intelligence, helping these transnational organizations scale their operations and increase their success rates at the expense of our taxpayers and citizens of this country. Highly personalized messages, password cracking tools, deepfakes where you can't tell between what is real and what is not. This is what our citizens are facing on an everyday basis back home. We all know about Colonial Pipeline. We all know about those big incidences that are reporting in the newspaper. But I believe the small firms, the individuals, moms-and-pops back home never report this stuff. When the threats are getting worse, my concern is this administration is failing to respond in many ways. Over the last year-and-a-half, cybersecurity infrastructure at CISA has had a third of its work force cut. Their efforts, CISA, instead of defending us against cyber, their efforts are now redirected toward immigration enforcement and not cybersecurity. The President's fiscal year 2027 proposed additional cuts that threaten, again, the defenses to defend our homeland and Main Street. Same way Homeland Security Investigations, or HIS. Those agents that have been dedicated to combating child exploitation, digital financial crimes, those efforts also redirected toward immigration enforcement. As I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, I hope you can look at these issues objectively, focus on the issues, the challenges that we have not only today, but moving forward, and come up with some good solutions across the board, across the aisle here that we can all work together. Our constituents, our citizens are depending on us. Because at the end of the day a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This chain is about government, private-sector platforms out there, and consumers working together under the leadership of the Federal Government. Mr. Chair, thank you very much. [The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:] Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa April 21, 2026 Today's hearing is an important one. Every single day Americans of all ages and backgrounds are victims of scams and cyber crimes that aim to hurt them or their loved ones. Cyber criminals and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are no longer confined by borders or limited to the number of victims they can target. Everyone is a possible target in their eyes. This topic isn't a Democrat or Republican problem, it's an everyone problem. Cyber criminals target all Americans, including the most vulnerable in our communities. Today's cyber criminals are sophisticated and organized enterprises, leveraging corruption, cutting-edge technology, and human trafficking to generate vast streams of illicit revenue. This comes at our expense. Large, organized criminal gangs, especially in China and Southeast Asia, build large scamming centers to target our community members and critical infrastructure. According to the FBI, cyber-enabled fraud in 2025 led to over $17.6 billion dollars' worth of reported losses. Transnational Criminal Organizations use a variety of schemes to target everyday Americans. Romance and sexploitation scams, fake cryptocurrency investment schemes, and government impersonation communications defraud Americans out of billions each year. We also see artificial intelligence (Al) helping transnational criminal organizations to scale their operations and increase their success rates. They can generate highly personalized phishing messages, deploy sophisticated password-cracking tools, and create convincing deepfakes that blur the line between reality and deception. I bet most of us in this room have been the target of these scams and phishing messages. Cyber criminals also use a wide variety of digital weapons to target the businesses, public services, and daily necessities we rely on. We've seen cyber hackers use ransomware and other tools to conduct data breaches, disrupt hospital operations, delay emergency services, and take down energy grids, threatening the services we rely on every day. No sector is off-limits. Ransomware remains a serious threat to U.S. critical infrastructure. Over 2,100 ransomware incidents targeting critical infrastructure were reported in 2025. Their methods are varied, constantly evolving, and increasingly difficult to detect. The use of digital platforms and underregulated financial instruments allow these criminals to operate with a high degree of anonymity, complicating efforts to track, attribute, and prosecute their crimes. At a time when these threats are growing more sophisticated and pervasive, the Trump administration is failing to respond and is weakening our ability to counter cyber criminals. This administration has strained critical resources dedicated to combating cyber scams and financial fraud. Over the last year-and-a- half, the White House gutted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the name of Government efficiency. Roughly a third of its workforce has been cut, its leadership has been embroiled in controversy, and CISA's funding has been redirected towards immigration enforcement instead of cybersecurity. The President's fiscal year 2027 proposes additional cuts that threaten the very systems and institutional expertise we rely on to protect our citizens from cyber criminals. Similarly, over the past year, Homeland Security Investigations agents dedicated to combating child exploitation and digital financial crimes have been redirected to immigration enforcement, limiting our capacity to fight cyber criminals. The schemes and damage caused by cyber criminals demonstrate that we face a dynamic, well-resourced, and well-organized adversary that DHS must be equipped for and ready to combat. I hope my Republican colleagues join Democrats in calling for the Trump administration to stop cutting personnel at CISA and other cyber agencies, as well as redirecting law enforcement specialized in combatting these crimes, and instead provide the resources needed to help fight these cyber criminals and keep Americans safe from these threats. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and engaging in a productive discussion on how we can meet this challenge head-on. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Correa. I would now like to recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, the gentleman from the great State of Tennessee, Chairman Ogles, to deliver his opening statement. Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the joint hearing, for partnering with my subcommittee to examine what has become one of the most urgent and far-reaching threats to the American people today. The hearing we are convening this morning concerns a problem that touches every community in this country. It affects retirees in Tennessee and Florida, college students in Mississippi and New York, small business owners in the Midwest, veterans, teachers, and families, who do nothing wrong other than answer a phone call, open an email, or respond to what appear to be a trusted message on-line. What they encounter on the other end is not a legitimate contact. It is an organized criminal operation, often run from a fortified compound halfway around the world, designed from the ground up to steal their money, their personal information, and, in many cases, their sense of safety and dignity. I want to be clear about what we are dealing with. What is happening to Americans right now is an industrial-scale criminal campaign coordinated by transnational criminal organizations that operate sophisticated fraud networks spanning multiple continents and targeting millions of victims simultaneously. These operations combine cyber fraud, money laundering, cryptocurrency manipulation, digital extortion, and, in many documented cases, human trafficking and forced labor. The numbers released just weeks ago by the FBI confirm how rapidly this threat is accelerating. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint center received more than 1 million complaints in 2025, the first time that threshold has ever been crossed. Reported losses surpassed $20 billion for the first time, representing a 26 percent increase over the prior year. Americans over the age of 60 reported losing nearly $8 billion, 59 percent increase in a single year. For the first time, the FBI dedicated an entire section of its annual report to the role of artificial intelligence in enabling these crimes, documenting more than 22,000 complaints with AI-related components. Behind these numbers are real people whose lives have been upended. Seniors who lost their retirement savings to a voice- cloned phone call from someone they believed was a grandchild in distress. Young people targeted by a sextortion scheme designed to exploit fear and shame. Small investors lured into fraudulent cryptocurrency platforms through deepfake videos of trusted public figures. Business owners locked out of their own systems by ransomware and forced to choose between paying a ransom to criminals or watching years of work disappear. These networks are deeply connected to organized transnational syndicates, many run by organized crime groups with roots in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been trafficked into scam compounds across Southeast Asia, forced to carry out fraud under the threat of violence and death. Chinese nationals and PRC-linked triads operate the largest compounds. Beijing has been slow to act against the networks that victimize Americans while generating billions along China's periphery. Artificial intelligence is making all of this worse. Criminal organizations are using AI to clone voices, produce deepfake videos, and automate the targeting of millions of victims simultaneously. Ransomware groups are integrating AI into their attack chains to launch attacks faster than defenses can respond. This administration recognized the severity of the threat, and I want to commend President Trump for taking decisive action. On March 6, the President signed an Executive Order on combating cyber crime, fraud, and predatory schemes against American citizens. That order directs the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to conduct a comprehensive review of existing operational and regulatory tools and to develop a coordinated action plan to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations behind these schemes. That is exactly the kind of whole-of- Government approach that this moment demands. The American people deserve a Government that fights for them with the same intensity that these criminal networks use against them. Our witnesses today will help us understand the full scope of this threat and the tools we need to combat it. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you for being here. Yield back. [The statement of Chairman Ogles follows:] Statement of Chairman Andrew Ogles Tuesday, April 21, 2026 Thank you, Chairman Guest, for holding this joint hearing and for partnering with my subcommittee to examine what has become one of the most urgent and far-reaching threats to the American people today. The hearing we are convening this morning concerns a problem that touches every community in this country. It affects retirees in Tennessee and Florida, college students in Mississippi and New York, small business owners in the Midwest, veterans, teachers, and families who do nothing wrong other than answer a phone call, open an email, or respond to what appeared to be a trusted message on-line. What they encounter on the other end is not a legitimate contact. It is an organized criminal operation, often run from a fortified compound halfway around the world, designed from the ground up to steal their money, their personal information, and in many cases their sense of safety and dignity. I want to be clear about what we are dealing with. What is happening to Americans right now is an industrial-scale criminal campaign, coordinated by transnational criminal organizations that operate sophisticated fraud networks spanning multiple continents and targeting millions of victims simultaneously. These operations combine cyber fraud, money laundering, cryptocurrency manipulation, digital extortion, and in many documented cases, human trafficking and forced labor. The numbers released just weeks ago by the FBI confirm how rapidly this threat is accelerating. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center received more than 1 million complaints in 2025, the first time that threshold has ever been crossed. Reported losses surpassed $20 billion for the first time, representing a 26 percent increase over the prior year. Americans over the age of 60 reported losing nearly $8 billion, a 59% increase in a single year. And for the first time, the FBI dedicated an entire section of its annual report to the role of artificial intelligence in enabling these crimes, documenting more than 22,000 complaints with an AI-related component. Behind these numbers are real people whose lives have been upended. Seniors who lost their retirement savings to a voice-cloned phone call from someone they believed was a grandchild in distress. Young people targeted by sextortion schemes designed to exploit fear and shame. Small investors lured into fraudulent cryptocurrency platforms through deepfake videos of trusted public figures. Business owners locked out of their own systems by ransomware and forced to choose between paying a ransom to criminals or watching years of work disappear. These networks are deeply connected to organized transnational syndicates, many run by organized crime groups with roots in the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been trafficked into scam compounds across Southeast Asia, forced to carry out fraud under threat of violence and death. Chinese nationals and PRC-linked triads operate the largest compounds, and Beijing has been slow to act against networks that victimize Americans while generating billions along China's periphery. Artificial intelligence is making all of this worse. Criminal organizations are using AI to clone voices, produce deepfake videos, and automate the targeting of millions of victims simultaneously, and ransomware groups are integrating AI into their attack chains to launch attacks faster than defenses can respond. This administration recognizes the severity of the threat, and I want to commend President Trump for taking decisive action. On March 6, the President signed an Executive Order on Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens. That order directs the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal agencies to conduct a comprehensive review of existing operational and regulatory tools and to develop a coordinated action plan to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations behind these schemes. That is exactly the kind of whole-of-Government approach that this moment demands. The American people deserve a Government that fights for them with the same intensity that these criminal networks use against them. Our witnesses today will help us understand the full scope of this threat and the tools we need to combat it. I look forward to their testimony. Thank you. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Chairman Ogles. I would like other Members of the committee to be reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson April 21, 2026 Today's hearing covers an important topic--the on-going plague of cyber-enabled crimes that victimize Americans every day. Transnational criminal organizations have developed numerous ways to leverage technological advances to steal from Americans and enrich themselves, causing devastating harms to their victims and--at times--threatening our critical infrastructure. Operating out of foreign countries where U.S. law enforcement has limited reach and funded through digital currencies that obscure their identities, these criminal gangs have proven resilient to many efforts to rein them in. Unfortunately, my home State of Mississippi recently experienced a ransomware attack that demonstrated just how devastating these transnational crimes can be. Two months ago, the University of Mississippi Medical Center, the State's only Level 1 trauma center, fell victim to a ransomware attack, forcing doctors and nurses to revert to paper medical records, shutting clinics throughout the State, and canceling surgeries. The ransomware attack threatened patient safety and privacy and cost the hospital millions in lost revenue. Attacks like this one are not just criminal activity--they are national security threats, and preventing them requires coordination across Government and industry. We must continue to build on law enforcement efforts to investigate, prosecute, and sanction the criminals responsible for these incidents, which will require sustained investment in law enforcement agencies and in diplomatic efforts to improve cooperation with other countries on this global challenge. Doing so requires Federal law enforcement to prioritize these real threats to our security, not carrying out the President's personal political agenda. Additionally, we must invest in improving our defenses and educating the public on how to protect themselves from becoming victims of these crimes. It is bizarre that at the same time as ransomware gangs are increasing their attacks on hospitals and other critical infrastructure, the Trump administration chose to force out roughly 1,000 employees at CISA and propose hundreds of millions of dollars in cuts to CISA's budget. Who hears about what just happened at the University of Mississippi Medical Center and thinks ``Let's cut Federal resources for cybersecurity?'' But, that's exactly what the Trump administration has been doing. And now, the President's recent Executive Order on preventing cyber crimes and scams directs CISA to expand efforts to defend State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments from cyber crimes. The President can put out an EO saying whatever he wants to make it look like he is taking action on this problem, but actions speak louder than words. If the President were actually serious about expanding Federal support, he wouldn't have gotten rid of the people responsible for defending us. Mr. Guest. I would now like to formally introduce our panel of witnesses. First, Ms. Cynthia Kaiser is the senior vice president at Halcyon Ransomware Research Center. She previously served as deputy assistant director of the FBI Cyber Division, where she led policy, intelligence, and partnerships to support victims and disrupt cyber adversaries. Second is Mr. Ari Redbord. He is the global head of policy at TRM Labs. Prior to joining TRM Labs, he was senior advisor to the deputy secretary and the under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence at the United States Treasury, where he used sanctions and other regulatory tools to effectively safeguard the financial systems from illicit use by terrorist financiers. Third is Mr. Josh Bercu. He is the senior vice president of policy at USTelecom--The Broadband Association, and also serves as the executive director at Industry Traceback Group, where he works closely with Government agencies to identify and mitigate scams and fraudulent calls. Finally is Ms. Megan Stifel. She is the chief strategy officer at the Institute for Security and Technology. She previously held roles in both the private and public sector, including with the Department of Justice, where she served on details as a policy director for international cyber policy and the National Security Council at the White House. Again, ladies and gentlemen, thank you so much for being with us today. We look forward to hearing your testimony, to having you brief us, so that we can craft policy to better protect our fellow American citizens. I would ask at this time, all of our witnesses if they would please rise to allow me to administer the oath before testimony. If all of our witnesses would please raise their right hand, and if you would please repeat after me. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Guest. Let the record reflect that our witnesses have answered affirmatively. Thank you, and please be seated. I would now like to give each of our witnesses an opportunity to make an opening statement. I recognize Ms. Kaiser for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statement. STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA KAISER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, HALCYON RANSOMWARE RESEARCH CENTER Ms. Kaiser. Thank you. Chairmans, Ranking Members, and Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Cynthia Kaiser. I currently lead the Ransomware Research Center at Halcyon, a cybersecurity company whose mission is to defeat ransomware. Before that, I spent 2 decades at the FBI, and I've given my career to understanding the criminal networks that we're discussing today. I'm here to tell you that what they're doing demands a response that matches the gravity of their crimes. I want to begin with a statement that I believe this committee and every American should hold in mind throughout this hearing. The people committing these crimes are not merely technical actors engaged in financial misconduct. They are predators. They are callous, and they are, in many cases, knowingly endangering and ending human lives. They do not care. As you noted, FBI released its 2025 Internet Crime Report earlier this year. The picture it paints should make every American genuinely, viscerally angry. Angry that cyber criminals are stealing a generation of wealth from our country. Angry that more than 75,000 victims of sexual extortion were caught in a cycle of abuse. Angry that during just one FBI operation, 38 victims were referred for suicide intervention. That's 38 people so devastated by cyber crime that agents feared the victims would take their own lives. Since 2023, ransomware attacks have risen over 20 percent and they're getting faster. Attacks that used to take weeks, now take hours. AI has made it easier for attackers to gain initial access to company networks, and our team's data show that ransomware gangs target small- and medium-sized businesses at nearly 4 times the rate of large organizations. Last year, health care overtook all other critical sectors to become the single most targeted industry for ransomware. Attacks against hospitals and medical facilities nearly doubled from 238 in 2024 to 460 in 2025. That is more than one ransomware attack on American hospital or health system every single day. Make no mistake, this was a business decision. Ransomware actors, who are criminal entrepreneurs as much as they are hackers, have calculated that when lives are on the line, hospitals are more likely to pay. They looked at cancer patients, dialysis patients, newborns and NICUs, and decided these patients were acceptable leverage. Research from the University of Minnesota documented at least 47 deaths attributable to hospital ransomware attacks between 2016 and 2021. That number is almost certainly in the hundreds today. Earlier this year, when Mississippi's only Level 1 trauma center in the State was down for 9 days, we saw that when a hospital is taken off-line, many patients are unable to access critical care. For a heart attack or stroke patient, even 1 hour's delay can mean death or permanent disability. The hackers responsible for these attacks know this. They have simply decided that these deaths are someone else's problem. Our grandparents, our small business owners, our doctors, none of them should live in fear about what someone might be doing on a keyboard thousands of miles away. I fully support the President's Executive Order on cyber crime and the new National Cyber Strategy, which are strong steps toward dismantling transnational criminal organizations. Building on these, the gap between the severity of these crimes and the consequences that follow needs to close. I urge the committee to champion 3 specific authorities to do it. First, the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury could formally evaluate whether terrorism designation authorities under existing law apply to ransomware actors who knowingly and repeatedly target hospitals. The statutory definitions of terrorism fit what these groups do. Designations would unlock sanctions, enhanced intelligence collection, travel restrictions, and real diplomatic consequences for nations harboring these criminals. Our team has already done a lot of work exploring what is legally possible and collaborating with industry partners, and we are happy to share. Second, the Department of Justice should evaluate homicide charges when ransomware attacks on health care facilities cause documented patient deaths. The Executive Order directs the Attorney General to pursue the most serious provable offenses. Felony murder law does not require that a defendant pull a trigger, only that they commit a dangerous felony that results in death. Finally, fully fund and reauthorize the State and local cybersecurity grant program. Cutting this funding would be a gift to ransomware criminals. I've spent my career working alongside extraordinary experts in cyber defense, in government and now at Halcyon. All of us are doing everything we can with the authorities we have. But the worst of the worst, those targeting our hospitals, those who have caused documented deaths, those operating under the protection of hostile foreign governments, need to face consequences that match what they have done. This requires novel implementations of the law and the resources and mandate to do so. These hackers are counting on incremental responses. Working together, let's prove them wrong. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Kaiser follows:] Prepared Statement of Cynthia Kaiser Tuesday, April 21, 2026 i. introduction Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Cynthia Kaiser. I currently serve as senior vice president of the Halcyon Ransomware Research Center, where my team tracks, analyzes, and publishes research on ransomware actors and their impact on American society. Before joining Halcyon, I spent 2 decades at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, most recently as deputy assistant director of the FBI Cyber Division. I have dedicated my career to understanding and dismantling the criminal networks that target our citizens, our institutions, and our way of life. I appear today representing Halcyon, a cybersecurity company whose mission is to defeat ransomware--the most disruptive and dangerous form of cyber crime afflicting America today. I commend this committee for convening this hearing. The President's recent Executive Order 14390 on Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens correctly identifies these threats as top-tier national security concerns and calls for a whole-of-Government response. I am here to reinforce that call, ground it in data, and offer concrete ideas for what more we can and must do. I want to begin with a statement that I believe this committee, and every American, should hold in mind throughout this hearing: the people perpetrating these crimes are not merely technical actors engaged in financial misconduct. They are predators. They are callous. They are, in many cases, knowingly endangering and ending human lives--and they do not care. This committee has the power to ensure that they face serious consequences for the harm they chose. For the harm they have caused. ii. the scale and human cost of cyber crime against americans The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center released its 2025 Internet Crime Report earlier this year. The picture it paints should make every American angry--and I mean genuinely, viscerally angry. Let me walk you through why. In 2025 alone, cyber criminals stole over $20 billion from Americans. That is not a Pentagon budget line or an abstract economic figure--it is a generation worth of wealth: retirement savings wiped out, small businesses destroyed, families left without resources they spent a lifetime building. Over 75,000 Americans were victimized by sextortion schemes last year. During a single FBI operation described in that report, 38 victims were referred to an FBI Victim Specialist for suicide intervention. Thirty-eight people so devastated by cyber crime that agents feared victims would take their own lives. Ransomware is growing in size and in ability. We know that reports to FBI only represent a fraction of attacks and crime against U.S. organizations and citizens. Even so, ransomware attacks reported to the FBI have increased by over 20 percent since 2023. Attacks that used to take weeks, now take just a few hours. AI has made it a lot easier for our adversaries to lie, and they are tricking more and more people into giving them access to company networks. Thousands of U.S. businesses are attacked every year, and private- sector data indicates that ransomware gangs target small and medium- sized businesses 4 times as often as large organizations. The even sharper increase that FBI reported in ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure is especially worrisome. Last year, health care overtook all other critical sectors to become the single most targeted industry for ransomware. Attacks against hospitals and medical facilities nearly doubled, from 238 attacks in 2024 to 460 in 2025. Attacks against critical manufacturing and financial services also hit record highs, each increasing by close to 40 percent. Criminal organizations focused on these sectors because of deliberate strategic choices they made to maximize harm and maximize payment. I want the Members of this committee to sit with that health care number for a moment: 460 ransomware attacks on American hospitals and health systems in a single year. That is more than one attack every single day, targeting the places Americans go when they are most vulnerable--when they are giving birth, receiving cancer treatment, or fighting for their lives in an emergency room. A. These Adversaries Are Making Deliberate Choices to Target the Vulnerable When ransomware gangs shifted their targeting to hospitals, it was not an accident. It was a business decision. Ransomware actors--who are criminal entrepreneurs as much as they are hackers--have calculated that hospitals, facing life-or-death consequences for every minute of downtime, are more likely to pay ransoms than other targets. They are explicitly leveraging the fragility of human health to maximize their profits. Health care was once considered an informal off-limits target even within criminal ransomware communities. That is no longer the case. These actors have looked at children in NICUs, at dialysis patients, at trauma centers serving rural communities where the next nearest hospital is 70 miles away--and they have decided those patients are acceptable collateral damage, even useful leverage. That is more than just recklessness. It is a moral choice. I think we can all agree: it is one of the most reprehensible moral choices a person can make. Research published by the University of Minnesota, linking a database of hospital ransomware attacks to Medicare claims data, found that ransomware attacks on hospitals caused at least 47 deaths between 2016 and 2021. That number is certainly higher today. When a hospital is taken off-line, ambulances are diverted. Labs are shuttered. Surgeries are postponed. For a heart attack or stroke patient, the difference of even 1 hour in receiving treatment can mean death or permanent disability. The hackers responsible for these attacks know this. They are not naive. They have simply decided that these deaths are someone else's problem. If a contractor knowingly tampered with the medical equipment of critically-ill patients to extort money from a hospital, we would not debate what degree of crime had been committed. We would prosecute them to fullest extent of the law. Perpetuating this type of attack on a computer does not change the crime, and it should not change the punishment. iii. ransomware is organized, professional, and without moral constraint I want to address something that I believe is sometimes lost in the technical and policy discussion about cyber crime: the character of the people doing these acts. The most active ransomware groups--Akira, Qilin, INC, Play, and others identified in the FBI's 2025 report--operate like businesses. They have H.R. processes. They have branding. Some have customer service lines for victims trying to negotiate ransom payments. They are organized, professional, and utterly without moral constraint when it comes to the harm they cause. Our grandparents, our small businesses on Main Streets, our doctors--none of them should live in fear about what someone might be doing on a keyboard thousands of miles away. But the current legal and policy response does not consistently reflect that reality. The FBI and its partners are doing extraordinary work with the authorities they have. But the gap between the severity of these crimes and the consequences that follow needs to close. The Halcyon Ransomware Research Center identified 70 new ransomware variants last year alone--on top of 67 identified by FBI the year before. Criminal ransomware ecosystems are adaptive, decentralized, and self-replenishing. Two of last year's new groups, Lynx and Dragonforce, rose within months to become among the highest-volume ransomware operators worldwide. When law enforcement dismantles one group, others fill the void unless we are also raising the cost and risk of entry into this business. We are not doing that sufficiently today. iv. the president's executive order and national cyber strategy: a strong foundation Executive Order 14390, signed March 6, 2026, reflects a welcome and necessary escalation of the Federal Government's commitment to fighting cyber crime. The Order correctly identifies ransomware and cyber- enabled fraud as activities carried out by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)--many of which operate with the willing or tacit support of foreign regimes--and directs a coordinated, whole-of- Government response. Several elements of the Order are particularly significant. The directive to develop an action plan identifying specific TCOs and proposing solutions to prevent, disrupt, investigate, and dismantle them reflects the kind of targeted, intelligence-driven approach that has proven effective against other serious criminal enterprises. The creation of an operational cell within the National Coordination Center to synchronize Federal disruption efforts is a meaningful structural step. And the International Engagement provisions--which direct the Secretary of State to demand enforcement action from nations harboring cyber criminals and to coordinate sanctions, visa restrictions, and trade penalties with allies--address one of the core structural enablers of ransomware: the impunity enjoyed by criminals operating in permissive jurisdictions. The new National Cyber Strategy reinforces this by elevating ransomware and cyber crime to top-tier national security threats and articulating 6 pillars for action. I was particularly encouraged by the Strategy's framing around shaping adversary behavior. The only way to address the societal, business, and technical threats posed by ransomware is to raise costs and inject uncertainty into criminal ecosystems at the same time that we put the technical tools in place to kick them off victim networks and slam the doors behind them. The Executive Order and Strategy together create a strong policy foundation. Now we must build on it. v. using existing authorities in novel ways to stop the worst actors The Federal Government has more tools available than it is currently using at full force against the most dangerous ransomware actors. I want to highlight 3 areas where I believe existing authorities could be applied more aggressively and creatively, and where I urge this committee to provide support and, where necessary, legislative clarification. A. Terrorism Designations for Those Who Target Hospitals and Critical Infrastructure The Federal definition of terrorism under 18 U.S.C. 2331 includes ``violent acts or acts dangerous to human life'' that ``appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.'' Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(b), terrorist activities include ``seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain'' a person ``in order to compel a third person'' to act as a condition for release. When a ransomware gang encrypts a hospital's systems and demands payment under threat of continued system lockout--knowing that patients are being diverted, that dialysis is being delayed, that surgery schedules are being canceled--I believe a serious legal argument exists that this conduct falls within those definitions. At minimum, it merits a formal, deliberate analysis by the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, who collectively hold designation authority under Executive Order 13224. I am not alone in this view. John Riggi, the National Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk at the American Hospital Association, has testified before Congress that ransomware attacks targeting hospitals should be investigated with the same urgency as terrorism. The director-general of the World Health Organization has briefed the U.N. Security Council that these attacks ``at worst . . . cause patient harm and death.'' U.S. and French Ambassadors at that same session emphasized the escalating harm. I want to be direct about what terrorism designations would and would not accomplish. They are not a cure-all. They would not capture every ransomware actor. Nor should they. The deliberative designation process led by the State Department is designed precisely to ensure we act surgically. But for the most egregious actors--those who knowingly and repeatedly target hospitals, who have caused documented patient deaths, who operate at scale against the institutions that keep Americans alive--terrorism designations would unlock a powerful set of additional tools: asset freezing, heightened intelligence community collection authorities, expanded travel restrictions, and significant diplomatic consequences for nations harboring these individuals. We should also begin a national conversation--one I would urge this committee to facilitate--about whether potential gaps in cyber insurance coverage caused by terrorism designation triggers could be addressed through the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act framework when Congress considers reauthorization in 2027. The goal is not to punish victims. It is to ensure that the most dangerous actors in the ransomware ecosystem face consequences proportionate to the harm they cause. B. Murder and Manslaughter Charges Where Attacks Cause Death Under Federal law, the felony murder rule allows a defendant to be charged with first-degree murder when they commit a dangerous felony that results in another person's death, even if they did not cause the death directly. Under New York law, a defendant can be charged with second-degree murder when, ``under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life,'' they ``recklessly engage[] in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby cause[] the death of another person.'' The University of Minnesota study I referenced earlier documented at least 47 deaths attributable to hospital ransomware attacks between 2016 and 2021. As ransomware attacks on health care have nearly doubled since that study's endpoint, the true number of lives lost to this crime is almost certainly in the hundreds. Federal prosecutors should be empowered--and encouraged--to evaluate whether homicide charges are appropriate in cases where ransomware actors targeted hospitals, where deaths resulted, and where the actors demonstrated clear foreknowledge that their actions endangered life. This is not a theoretical exercise. Consider what happened just 2 months ago, on February 19, 2026, when ransomware actors struck the University of Mississippi Medical Center. UMMC is not simply a large hospital. It is the medical backbone of an entire State: Mississippi's only academic medical center, operating 7 hospitals and 35 clinics State-wide, and home to the State's only Level 1 trauma center, only children's hospital, and only organ and bone marrow transplant program. When attackers took down UMMC's network--knocking Epic, its electronic health records system, fully off-line and forcing clinical staff to revert to pen and paper--they did not merely disrupt a business. They degraded the emergency medical capacity of an entire State. Clinics closed across Mississippi. Outpatient surgeries and cancer treatment appointments were canceled. For 9 days, the State's only facility equipped to handle the most severe trauma cases operated under manual downtime procedures, with staff tracking patient care, medications, and orders on paper. Nearby hospitals reported surging emergency department volumes as they stepped in to absorb patients UMMC could not fully serve. As the American Hospital Association's John Riggi noted in response to the attack, disruptions like this are especially dangerous in rural States where the next nearest trauma center may be over 100 miles away. The hackers behind the UMMC attack knew exactly what they were targeting. They contacted the hospital afterward with demands. They understood they had taken down a system that Mississippi patients depend on for survival--and they used that leverage deliberately. Campbell County Health in Wyoming offers another instructive example: its entire hospital network was crippled for over 2 weeks, forcing emergency patients to be transferred across distances of 70 miles for 8 hours while its single emergency department was off-line. The link between these interruptions and patient mortality is documented in the peer-reviewed literature. The Executive Order directs the Attorney General to pursue the ``most serious, provable offenses'' arising from cyber crime. Homicide charges in appropriate cases would be consistent with that directive--and would send a signal to ransomware actors that is long overdue. C. Sanctions and Treasury Authorities Against Ransomware Financial Infrastructure The ransomware economy depends on a financial infrastructure: cryptocurrency exchanges, money-laundering networks, and payment processors that move ransom proceeds across borders. The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control has used sanctions authority to designate ransomware actors and the exchanges that service them. I urge this committee to support the expansion of that program, in alignment with the Executive Order's international engagement provisions. Blockchain tracing by firms like TRM and Chainalysis shows that annual ransomware payments, while down from their 2023 peak, remain at well over $800 million. Disrupting the financial ecosystem that makes ransomware profitable--through expanded sanctions, cooperation with foreign financial intelligence units, and pressure on cryptocurrency infrastructure providers--remains one of the highest-leverage interventions available to the Government. The International Counter Ransomware Initiative, now comprising over 60 nations, provides a ready-made multilateral framework for coordinating these actions. vi. recommendations for this committee I offer the following specific recommendations for this committee's consideration: Direct the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury to formally evaluate and report back to Congress on whether existing terrorism designation authorities under Executive Order 13224 can be applied to ransomware actors who knowingly target hospitals and critical life-safety infrastructure. Request a report from the Department of Justice on the feasibility and appropriateness of pursuing homicide charges in cases where ransomware attacks on health care facilities resulted in documented patient deaths. Encourage the attorney general to issue guidance making clear that cyber-enabled attacks with life-safety consequences will be prosecuted using the most serious applicable charges, consistent with the directive in Executive Order 14390 to pursue the most serious provable offenses. Support the full funding and reauthorization of the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program. State and local governments are disproportionately targeted by ransomware, and they often lack the resources to defend themselves. Governments and government services was the fourth most targeted sector in 2025. Cutting this funding would be a gift to ransomware criminals. Convene a Congressional working group, including representatives from the insurance industry, to evaluate amendments to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ahead of its 2027 reauthorization that would address cyber terrorism, ensuring that terrorism designations for ransomware actors do not inadvertently harm victims who need insurance coverage to recover. Work with the National Security Council to ensure that Federal cybersecurity experts are meaningfully integrated into the terrorism designation review process when ransomware actors targeting health care are under consideration. vii. conclusion The people running ransomware organizations that target American hospitals are not mysterious hackers operating in a moral gray zone. They are criminals who have made deliberate choices. Choices to target the sick, the vulnerable, the elderly, and the newborn, because they have calculated that doing so maximizes their profits. They have no shame about this. They have demonstrated, repeatedly, that they will not stop unless we make stopping necessary. The FBI and its Federal partners are doing everything they can with the authorities they currently have. I know this from the years I spent working alongside those agents. But the worst of the worst--those targeting health care, those who have caused documented deaths, those operating with impunity under the protection of hostile foreign governments--deserve to face consequences that match the gravity of what they have done. The President's Executive Order has given us a mandate. The National Cyber Strategy has given us a framework. This committee has the power to sharpen both, fill the gaps, and send a message to the criminal ecosystem that America is no longer willing to treat ransomware as merely a cost of doing business in the digital age. These hackers are counting on us to respond with incremental measures. I urge you to prove them wrong. I thank the subcommittees for this opportunity and look forward to your questions. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Kaiser, for your opening statement. I now recognize Mr. Redbord for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF ARI REDBORD, GLOBAL HEAD OF POLICY, TRM LABS Mr. Redbord. Chairs Guest and Ogles, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of both subcommittees, today I'm going to talk to you about the greatest threat confronting American families today. My name is Ari Redbord. I am honored to appear before you on behalf of TRM Labs, where we work every day with law enforcement, financial institutions, and national security agencies to detect, investigate, and prevent illicit activity in the digital asset ecosystem and beyond. Before joining TRM, I spent more than a decade as a Federal prosecutor at the U.S. Department of Justice, and later at the U.S.--and later as a U.S. Treasury official confronting terrorist financiers, sanctions evaders, narcotics traffickers, and transnational criminal enterprises. I do not say this lightly. The industrialization of cyber-enabled fraud by transnational criminal organizations is the most pervasive, economically destructive, and dangerous financial crime threat that I have seen in my career. The consequences are immediate and they are personal. A grandmother in Ohio sends her retirement savings to a scammer. A veteran in Texas transfers his home equity to a fake investment platform. A family in North Carolina watches their life savings vanish. This is economic violence at industrial scale. We must respond with all our might, and we must do so together because these are not abstract losses. They are the futures of Americans. The networks taking them are organized, relentless, and scaling faster than our response. The numbers underscore the urgency. TRM's 2026 Crypto Crime Report documented 158 billion in illicit crypto flows in 2025. That's 145 percent increase over 2024. Fraud in scams alone drove 35 billion. With only about 15 percent of victims reporting, true global losses exceed $200 billion. These flows run through one interconnected ecosystem. Pig butchering compounds in Southeast Asia, many staffed by trafficked workers, generate fraud proceeds. Mexican cartels buy fentanyl precursors from Chinese suppliers with cryptocurrency. North Korea stole about 2 billion in cryptocurrency last year to fund weapons proliferation and destabilizing activity. Every one of those streams moves through the same plumbing: Chinese underground banking networks that processed over 103 billion last year alone. Artificial intelligence is accelerating these schemes. Through Chainabuse, TRM's global scam reporting platform, we have documented a more than 500 percent increase in AI-enabled scam activity over the past year. The solution to the criminal abuse of AI is not to ban or stifle the technology. It is to use it and use it wisely. At TRM, we are already building those tools. Every innovation our adversaries turn against American families is one we can turn back against them faster, smarter, and at greater scale. The threat is daunting, but it is also one we can solve and solve together. We know what to do. The White House Executive Order on Combating Cybercrime names this threat for what it is, a national security threat and creates a whole-of-Government mandate. The DOJ's Scam Center Strike Force has exemplified that approach in action. But we live in an age where the private sector holds the data and the public sector holds the authorities. Neither can confront this threat alone. That is exactly what TRM's Beacon Network was built to bridge. Beacon is the largest public-private network for the interdiction of illicit proceeds and the seizure of stolen funds in the digital asset ecosystem, connecting every major cryptocurrency exchange with 70 law enforcement agencies across the United States and allied nations. When a victim reports a scam, Beacon can move actionable intelligence in real time to the exchanges and agents who can interdict and seize back those funds. That is the type of real-time public-private coordination the Executive Order envisions already operating and ready to scale. Congress can codify that framework. Pass a digital assets hold law so exchanges can freeze illicit funds. Empower the private sector through cyber letters of mark or white hat hacking to disrupt criminal infrastructure. Create a victim compensation fund. Give Federal, State, and local law enforcement the tools and training to fight back. We can protect American citizens by leveraging transformative technology for good and we must do it together. The tools exist. The networks like Beacon prove what is possible when the public and private sectors move as one. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Redbord follows:] Prepared Statement of Ari Redbord April 21, 2026 introduction Chairs Guest and Ogles, Ranking Members Correa and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, and distinguished Members of both subcommittees, my name is Ari Redbord. I am honored to appear before you on behalf of TRM Labs, where we work every day with law enforcement, financial institutions, and national security agencies to detect, investigate, and prevent illicit activity in the digital asset ecosystem and beyond. Before joining TRM, I spent more than a decade as a Federal prosecutor at the United States Department of Justice and later served as a senior official at the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. In those roles, I confronted terrorist financiers, sanctions evaders, narcotics trafficking organizations, and transnational criminal enterprises operating across jurisdictions and continents. I do not say this lightly: I have never seen a financial crime threat as pervasive, as economically destructive, or as dangerous to ordinary American families as the one I am here to describe today. I want to begin with something that I think gets lost in the conversation about transnational criminal organizations. We talk about TCOs operating from compounds in Southeast Asia. We talk about Chinese underground banking networks processing hundreds of billions of dollars. We talk about North Korean hackers operating thousands of miles away. All of that is real, and I will address each of those threats in detail. But I want this committee to understand who is actually being harmed. It is a grandmother in Ohio who sent tens of thousands of dollars to someone she believed was her grandson in distress, only to learn it was a scammer exploiting her trust. It is a 40-something in North Carolina who believed she had found both a relationship and an investment opportunity, after months of daily communication, and lost everything he had, including money borrowed from her parents. It is a veteran in Texas who transferred his home equity to what he believed was a legitimate investment platform after weeks of engagement with someone posing as a trusted advisor. It is a family in New York whose life savings were gone in 72 hours, moved across 7 cryptocurrency wallets in 3 countries before they even realized what had happened. These are not victims of some distant financial abstraction. They are our constituents, and the criminal networks that target them are sophisticated, well-resourced, and operating at industrial scale against the American public. We need to get this right--and we need to do it together--because these are not abstract losses, they are life savings, homes, and futures of Americans, and the networks taking them are organized, relentless, and scaling faster than our response. about trm labs TRM Labs is a blockchain intelligence company that works with hundreds of financial institutions, cryptocurrency businesses, and law enforcement and national security agencies worldwide. Our AI-powered platform allows investigators to follow illicit money wherever it moves, tracing cryptocurrency transactions through wallets, exchanges, mixers, and cross-chain bridges to help investigators build investigations and mitigate risk. We also publish original research on crypto crime trends, threat actor behavior, and the evolving intersection of digital assets and national security, including the annual TRM Crypto Crime Report, which serves as a foundational resource for policy makers, law enforcement, and compliance professionals worldwide. I want to be clear about what blockchain intelligence actually provides in the context of the threats before this committee. When a victim of a pig butchering scam sends cryptocurrency to a fraud platform, that transaction is recorded on a public, permanent, immutable ledger. The wallet that received those funds can be traced. The subsequent movement of those funds through additional wallets, exchanges, and obfuscation techniques can be followed with the right tools and training. Unlike cash, which disappears into the financial system anonymously, cryptocurrency leaves a trail. The challenge is not that the evidence does not exist. The challenge is that law enforcement, financial institutions, and policy makers do not always have the tools, the legal authority, or the coordination frameworks to act on that evidence fast enough to matter. the scope of the problem TRM's 2026 Crypto Crime Report documented approximately USD 158 billion in illicit cryptocurrency flows in 2025--a 145 percent increase from USD 64.5 billion in 2024 and the highest level recorded in 5 years. Fraud and scams alone accounted for roughly USD 35 billion in confirmed flows to fraud-linked wallets. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center has documented record losses from cyber-enabled fraud, with investment fraud and romance scams representing the fastest-growing and most devastating categories of victim harm. But those figures capture only what victims report. TRM estimates that only about 15 percent of victims come forward--deterred by shame, skepticism that law enforcement can help, or simple uncertainty about where to turn. When that underreporting gap is factored in, global annual losses from cyber-enabled fraud against individuals likely exceed USD 200 billion. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] But scams are only one category of illicit activity driven by transnational criminal networks. Sanctions evasion, driven largely by Russia-linked activity and the rapid growth of the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5, surged over 400 percent year over year. Cryptocurrency stolen through hacks reached USD 2.87 billion across nearly 150 incidents in 2025, with North Korea responsible for USD 1.92 billion of that total. how transnational criminal organizations operate Pig butchering and scam centers The dominant fraud typology driving the losses I have just described is commonly known as pig butchering, a term originating from the Chinese phrase ``sha zhu pan,'' which describes the practice of ``fattening'' a victim financially before the slaughter. Understanding how these operations actually work is essential to understanding both the scale of the problem and the nature of the policy response required. These operations begin with weeks or months of deliberate, patient relationship-building--conducted over messaging apps, dating platforms, social media, and even text messages sent to wrong numbers--a technique criminals use to establish initial contact. The operator, often working from an organized compound staffed by hundreds of people, establishes genuine emotional connection with the target before any financial matter is raised. Victims describe feeling that they had found a genuine friend, romantic partner, or trusted mentor. Only after that relationship has been cultivated does the operator introduce investment, typically framed as an opportunity being shared out of personal generosity. Victims are shown a professional-appearing trading platform, given access to fabricated account dashboards showing growing returns, and permitted to make small early withdrawals to establish credibility. When the victim has committed the maximum available funds, including frequently borrowed money or retirement savings, the platform disappears. Customer service stops responding. The money is gone. What is critical for this committee to understand is that these operations are not the work of individual grifters. They are organized enterprises operating with the discipline and infrastructure of multinational corporations. The compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos are large physical facilities, some housing thousands of workers. In many documented instances, those workers are themselves victims of human trafficking, recruited with false promises of legitimate technology or hospitality jobs and held under threat of violence, debt bondage, or confiscation of passports. The networks running these compounds are affiliated with Triad- connected organized crime syndicates that have operated in Southeast Asia for decades, and they have brought to cyber fraud the same organizational sophistication they applied to narcotics, gambling, and human trafficking operations. The business model is extraordinarily efficient. Operating costs are low, victim conversion rates are measurable and optimizable, and the proceeds are laundered through established underground banking networks that have moved value across borders for generations. Investigating pig butchering Investigations involving networks of scammers are often complex. TRM's analysis of on-chain transaction data, combined with proprietary source intelligence, has identified several key characteristics of pig butchering scams. Once cryptocurrency reaches a scammer's wallet, it is typically shuffled from wallet-to-wallet in a complex web of transactions between scammers and money launderers (sometimes the same people), with each wallet accumulating funds from additional victims along the way. Funds often move circuitously, making it difficult for investigators to follow the money and to separate victim funds from other tokens. These fund movements consistently include multiple hops through intermediary addresses. Victim funds typically end up reaching a few main exchanges, where they are often swapped for stablecoins before continuing to be cycled through the money laundering network both via the main exchanges and unhosted wallets. TRM data indicates that cryptocurrency wallets that receive victim funds from individual pig butchering scams are also often associated with other scams. Furthermore, in a random sample of addresses to which victims stated they sent funds, over 75 percent exhibited signs of sophisticated on-chain money-laundering activity. The below graph illustrates a typical example of a pig butchering scheme studied by TRM Labs, showing the interconnected networks spanning multiple scams. Each color represents the scammer addresses in 3 different cases. As shown by the connections between the 3 coloured webs, the scammers appear to be operating multiple scams either in succession or in conjunction. In addition, the scammers appear to be relying on the same underlying money-laundering network, with the same addresses appearing in multiple cases. Chinese money-laundering networks The proceeds of pig-butchering operations, narcotics trafficking, and every other major illicit finance stream documented by TRM flow through the same critical infrastructure: Chinese underground banking networks that have become the dominant professional money-laundering system in the world. TRM's Shadow Bankers report documented that Chinese-language escrow and money-laundering networks processed over USD 103 billion in 2025, growing from approximately USD 123 million in 2020. That growth reflects both the explosion of cryptocurrency as a settlement mechanism and the organizational sophistication of the networks operating them. These underground banking systems operate through what are known as mirror exchange arrangements. A broker collects cartel cash in the United States and provides equivalent value through off-record methods to a counterpart in Mexico or elsewhere, keeping dollars in the United States and making value available abroad without any cross-border wire transfer occurring. Cryptocurrency has made these arrangements faster and cheaper. Brokers coordinate through encrypted messaging applications like WeChat and Telegram, using code words and cultural reference points that exploit the language and cultural barriers facing Western law enforcement. Transactions are layered through mixers, cross-chain bridges, privacy coins, and rapid micro-transactions across multiple blockchains to break investigative trails. These networks do not exclusively serve one criminal constituency. They serve Mexican cartels laundering narcotics proceeds, North Korea converting stolen cryptocurrency to usable currency, pig-butchering fraud operators moving victim funds to safety, Russian sanctions evaders moving value outside the traditional financial system, and Iranian actors funding weapons procurement networks. In one documented case that TRM tracked, a Los Angeles-based operation laundered over USD 50 million in Sinaloa Cartel narcotics revenue through Chinese underground bankers using trade-based schemes layered with cryptocurrency transactions. The same brokers who handled that transaction were handling fraud proceeds from Southeast Asian scam operations. The financial infrastructure of transnational crime is not siloed by crime type. It is shared, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing. FinCEN's designation of Huione Group (a Cambodia-based network) as a primary money-laundering concern in 2025 identified that organization as receiving USD 39.6 billion in transaction volume. That single designation illustrates the scale at which these networks operate and the degree to which they have become embedded in the global financial system. Mexican cartels and the Southern Border Over the last few years, the cartels have integrated cryptocurrency into their operations; the connection to the Southern Border is direct and concrete. TRM research on cartel cryptocurrency use documented that of more than 120 Chinese companies supplying precursor chemicals for fentanyl and methamphetamine production, 97 percent were willing to accept cryptocurrency payments. Mexican cartels, including the Sinaloa Cartel and its affiliated networks, are using cryptocurrency to purchase the chemical inputs for fentanyl production from Chinese suppliers to compensate workers and operatives across multiple jurisdictions, and to launder drug proceeds through layered wallet transactions and Chinese underground banking arrangements. [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] These are not isolated transactions. They are systematic. In June 2024, a Department of Justice indictment charged Edgar Joel Martinez- Reyes with leading a network that used trade-based money laundering and cryptocurrency purchases to clean drug proceeds, with law enforcement seizing USD 5 million in cash and significant drug quantities in connection with that case. In January 2024, Martin Mizrahi was convicted of converting bulk narcotics cash into Bitcoin and layering transactions through multiple wallets. OFAC has made its first public identifications of cartel cryptocurrency addresses on the Ethereum blockchain and has sanctioned 17 cryptocurrency addresses linked to fentanyl precursor suppliers. The implication for this committee is that the digital technology question and the border security question are not two separate inquiries. The financial infrastructure enabling fentanyl trafficking into the United States and the financial infrastructure laundering the proceeds of fraud committed against American citizens are substantially the same infrastructure. North Korea: A national security imperative North Korea stole approximately USD 1.92 billion in cryptocurrency in 2025, including the February 2025 hack of Bybit, where USD 1.46 billion was taken in what stands as the largest single cryptocurrency theft in history. The scale of the theft is matched by the speed and sophistication of the laundering that followed. Within days, nearly all stolen Ether was bridged into Bitcoin using decentralized protocols, reflecting what TRM identified as an unprecedented level of operational efficiency. The funds were then funneled through mixers, cross-chain bridges, and decentralized exchanges, creating rapid layers of obfuscation designed to frustrate tracing and delay interdiction. Such rapid layering suggests an expansion of North Korea's laundering infrastructure--likely with greater support from underground networks in China to absorb and process the funds. Indeed, once the initial obfuscation was done, a large portion of the assets sat idle, presumably awaiting liquidation through OTC channels that can handle converting tens of millions without detection. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] This activity reflects a broader evolution in North Korea's laundering playbook. Rather than relying on slower, linear laundering techniques, these actors now move assets through complex, multi-chain transaction paths almost immediately after a hack. The goal is clear: maximize speed, fragment the trail, and position funds for eventual off-ramping. Following the initial laundering phase, a significant portion of the Bitcoin sat idle, likely staged for liquidation through over-the-counter brokers capable of handling large volumes without triggering compliance controls. Those OTC networks are central to the ecosystem. North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank representative Sim Hyon-sop has been linked to coordination with China- and Hong Kong-based brokers who facilitate the conversion of stolen crypto into fiat currency through exchanges and shell companies. These networks provide the critical bridge between illicit on-chain activity and the traditional financial system, enabling the regime to operationalize stolen digital assets at scale. At the same time, Russia-based exchanges have continued to play a key role as downstream laundering venues. Garantex, long associated with illicit finance, rebranded as Grinex within days of an OFAC enforcement action, underscoring how quickly these platforms adapt to sanctions pressure. These exchanges remain preferred destinations for both North Korean and Russian criminal actors, reinforcing the interconnected nature of these illicit financial ecosystems and the challenges of disruption. This is a state-directed financial strategy--not opportunistic crime. The proceeds from these operations directly support North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. A single operation yielding USD 1.46 billion represents a meaningful contribution to a weapons of mass destruction program. Disrupting these flows is therefore not simply a matter of financial crime enforcement--it is a national security imperative, requiring coordinated, whole-of- Government action at the same level of urgency applied to other systemic threats. The Russia-China-North Korea nexus What TRM's data reveals is not a collection of separate criminal threats but an interconnected illicit finance ecosystem in which State sponsors, criminal networks, and technical infrastructure are deeply intertwined. North Korea supplies the hackers and cyber capabilities. Russia provides the criminal marketplace infrastructure and technical tools. China furnishes the financial plumbing through underground banking networks and OTC brokers. Scam center operators in Southeast Asia generate the fraud proceeds that flow through the same networks that launder cartel drug money and North Korean stolen cryptocurrency. The A7 sanctions evasion platform, operated from Russia, processed at least USD 56 billion in 2025. Nearly 95 percent of sanctioned entity inflows used stablecoins, meaning that dollar-denominated digital assets are serving as the reserve currency of the global illicit finance system. Blockchain data tells us this. artificial intelligence as a force multiplier for criminal organizations Artificial intelligence has transformed the operational capabilities of criminal enterprises at a pace that demands the most urgent policy response this committee can deliver. In testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance in July 2025, I described how the early adoption of AI by TCOs from scammers to ransomware gangs, poses a civilization-level threat. Generative AI-enabled scam activity rose 500 percent over the last year, according to data from Chainabuse, TRM's open-source scam reporting platform. Deepfake technology now enables real-time face and voice swapping during live video calls, allowing criminals to impersonate financial professionals, family members, government officials, and even romantic partners with sufficient fidelity to deceive careful, intelligent people. A Hong Kong company lost millions of dollars when employees participated in a board meeting that appeared to include legitimate company executives, all of whom were AI-generated impersonations. Romance scam operators are now deploying AI systems that conduct initial outreach, maintain on-going emotional engagement across dozens of simultaneous victim relationships, and adapt their communication style in real time based on victim responses, all without a human operator being involved in the conversation. AI-generated synthetic identity documents are available on criminal marketplaces for as little as USD 15 per document, enabling fraudsters to open accounts at regulated cryptocurrency exchanges and bypass Know Your Customer (KYC) controls at a scale that manual document forgery could never achieve. AI allows criminal networks to operate multilingual outreach campaigns simultaneously, removing the language barrier that previously limited the geographic reach of individual fraud operations. AI-powered ransomware creates polymorphic malware that evades detection systems by constantly rewriting its own code, and identifies high-value targets based on financial data scraped from public sources. AI's impact is visible not just in outreach and engagement, but also in laundering tactics. AI accelerates the rotation of infrastructure, the creation of synthetic identities, and the spread of fraudulent domains and social media personas, enabling scam networks to iterate rapidly across platforms and choke off investigative visibility before responses can materialize. In practical terms, what once required teams of human actors now often requires only the right prompt engineering and an AI engine capable of consistent execution. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Blockchain data confirms this speed acceleration: average wallet holding periods for scam proceeds have decreased significantly. Funds now move across multiple wallets and chains within 24 to 48 hours of receipt, dramatically narrowing the window for meaningful interdiction and recovery. Fraud, and the laundering of illicit proceeds, has evolved into a coordinated, AI-assisted industry operating at global scale. Our response must reflect that reality. The response to this acceleration in AI cannot be the restriction of AI technology or an attempt to slow innovation. It has to be ensuring that the tools of safety evolve just as quickly as the tools of harm. At TRM, that means pairing advanced AI with human expertise-- using AI to map illicit networks in real time, identify patterns, triage risk, and surface early warning signs, while enabling analysts and investigators to act faster and make more informed decisions. AI brings speed and scale, but it is the human judgment layered on top that turns insight into action and drives effective disruption. These systems operate with guardrails that ensure every action is auditable, every output is traceable, and human analysts remain in the decision-making loop for consequential actions. The private sector has built these capabilities. The question for this committee is whether law enforcement will have the resources, training, and legal authority to deploy them at the speed the threat demands. the executive order: a critical and historic framework On March 6, 2026, President Trump signed an Executive Order on Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens. This order represents the most important Federal policy development on cyber-enabled fraud. Its implementation will determine whether the victims I described at the outset of this testimony see a meaningful change in their protection. The order begins from the correct diagnosis: that transnational criminal organizations are conducting coordinated campaigns of cyber crime, fraud, and predatory schemes against American citizens, that these campaigns are draining American families of their life savings, and that they constitute a national security threat as well as a financial crime problem. That framing matters because it determines which tools are available in response. A financial crime problem is handled by financial regulators and law enforcement. A national security threat commands the full toolkit of American power, including diplomatic pressure, targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, trade consequences, military and intelligence resources, and whole-of-Government coordination. The E.O. creates an operational cell within the National Coordination Center to coordinate Federal efforts to detect, disrupt, dismantle, and deter cyber-enabled criminal activity. It directs the Secretary of State to engage with foreign governments to demand enforcement actions against TCOs operating on their soil. And it explicitly contemplates consequences for nations that tolerate predatory activity targeting American citizens, including targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, trade penalties, and limitation of foreign assistance. The order also directs the Attorney General to submit recommendations for a Victims Restoration Program that would provide restitution to victims of cyber-enabled fraud schemes from funds seized from criminal networks. This provision matters enormously to the people I described at the outset of this testimony. The grandmother who lost her retirement account, the veteran who lost his home equity, the family whose savings were gone in 72 hours--they need to know that law enforcement success means something tangible for them, not just a press release about an indictment. The reason this order is historically significant is not just its content but its accountability structure. For years, the U.S. Government's response to cyber-enabled fraud against Americans was fragmented across dozens of agencies, reactive rather than proactive, and consistently under-resourced relative to the scale of the threat. Scam center operators in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos operated with effective impunity because no single agency had both the authority and the mandate to coordinate a comprehensive response. Every agency involved in this space holds a piece of the puzzle. The FBI handles cyber crime investigations. OFAC handles sanctions designations. DEA handles narcotics trafficking. HSI handles human trafficking and money laundering. The State Department handles foreign policy. FinCEN handles financial intelligence. But without a coordination mandate and a clear accountability chain, those pieces rarely come together into a coherent strategy. The EO creates that accountability. It names responsible officials, sets deadlines, and signals at the highest levels of government that the full tool kit of American power will be brought to bear on the organizations running these schemes. TRM is committed to working with Executive branch agencies and this committee to ensure that the EO has a lasting impact on the victims of these criminal networks. the scam center strike force and law enforcement efforts Beyond the EO, the U.S. Government is responding to the global threat of transnational criminal networks that have industrialized fraud. In November 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice launched the Scam Center Strike Force to coordinate efforts to dismantle these networks, disrupt their infrastructure, and recover stolen funds. What distinguishes the Strike Force is its whole-of-Government approach, bringing together law enforcement, financial regulators, and national security agencies to address a threat that spans jurisdictions and financial systems. In addition, the Strike Force leverages the Beacon Network and other private-sector initiatives in order to bring every resource to bear. The DOJ leads prosecutions and asset seizures, while agencies like the FBI, HSI, DEA, IRS-CI and U.S. Secret Service conduct investigations and blockchain tracing. Treasury components, including OFAC and FinCEN, apply sanctions and financial intelligence tools to target the laundering networks that move illicit proceeds, while the State Department supports international coordination. This integrated model reflects the reality that these fraud networks operate across borders and rely on both crypto and traditional financial rails. More broadly, the initiative signals a shift in how governments are approaching crypto-enabled fraud--treating it as a systemic national security threat that demands sustained, coordinated action across law enforcement, financial, and diplomatic channels. There are also other efforts. Law enforcement agencies and private- sector partners across the United States, Asia, and Europe have launched specialized task forces to respond to pig butchering scams, including Operation Shamrock, the FBI's Operation Level Up, and Europol's European Financial and Economic Crime Centre (EFECC). The Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF), announced in early 2025, represents a whole-of-Government response to transnational criminal organizations operating within the United States. Co-led by the FBI and Homeland Security Investigations, the task force integrates Federal, State, and local law enforcement into a single operational framework designed to identify, target, and dismantle cartels, foreign gangs, human trafficking networks, and financial crime infrastructure. With more than 8,500 Federal agents and analysts working alongside over 440 State and local agencies across all 52 States and territories, the model embeds intelligence, personnel, and operational coordination nationwide to break down silos and enable unified, intelligence-driven action. In just its first year, HSTF has delivered results at scale, including more than 3,200 arrests, over 200,000 pounds of drugs seized, more than 1,000 illegal firearms recovered, and hundreds of coordinated operations in a concentrated enforcement period. Over the last few years, U.S. authorities have seized billions of illicit proceeds from hacks, ransomware groups, scam networks, and other threat actors. For example, in October 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of Cambodian national Chen Zhi, founder and chairman of Prince Holding Group, a multinational conglomerate based in Cambodia. Zhi was charged with wire fraud conspiracy and money-laundering conspiracy for directing Prince Group's operation of forced-labor scam compounds across the country. In a parallel action, the DOJ filed a civil forfeiture complaint for 127,271 bitcoin--valued at more than USD 15 billion--now in the custody of the U.S. Government. The filing marks the largest forfeiture action in U.S. history, underscoring both the scale of the criminal network and the unprecedented reach of law enforcement's response. Concurrently, OFAC is working with the U.K. Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), which sanctioned 146 targets linked to the Prince Group. In addition, FinCEN finalized its Section 311 order against the Huione Group, cutting the organization--and any intermediary bank--off from the U.S. dollar system. At its core, Operation Prince shows how governments are evolving to confront industrial-scale crypto-enabled fraud--aligning prosecutions, financial intelligence, sanctions, and international coordination to disrupt networks, seize assets, and hold leadership accountable. It underscores that tackling transnational scam networks requires a sustained, integrated approach targeting both on-chain activity and the off-chain enablers that allow these ecosystems to scale. While the Prince Group takedown is a significant win for global security, similar networks continue to operate worldwide. beacon network The private sector has built infrastructure that is ready to support the whole-of-Government approach outlined in the Executive Order. TRM's Beacon Network is the first real-time, global intelligence- sharing system for illicit cryptocurrency activity, built in collaboration with leading platforms including Coinbase, Binance, Kraken, PayPal, Ripple, Stripe, Robinhood, Crypto.com, and Zodia Custody. The network connects verified participants across the public and private sectors--including approximately 70 law enforcement agencies worldwide, many within the United States--enabling them to flag illicit wallets and transactions as activity unfolds. By sharing actionable intelligence in real time, Beacon allows investigators and compliance teams to move at the speed of the threat--freezing funds, seizing assets, and disrupting transnational criminal networks before illicit proceeds can be laundered beyond reach. The network operates through 4 steps: verified investigators flag illicit wallet addresses in TRM's system; flagged funds are automatically tracked across the blockchain in real time; when those funds reach a participating exchange or financial institution, Beacon sends an immediate alert; and the institution reviews the risk level and coordinates with law enforcement before processing any withdrawal. The network currently covers approximately 85 percent of centralized cryptocurrency transaction volume, meaning that when scam proceeds hit a major exchange, there is a high probability that a Beacon alert will fire before the criminal can cash out. The Scam Center Strike Force and the HSTF--combined with the E.O., legal authority to compel holds, diplomatic leverage to pressure host nations, and operational access to Beacon's alerting capability--could represent a fundamentally different kind of enforcement infrastructure than anything the U.S. Government has previously fielded against this threat. solutions: what congress can do The Executive Order creates the framework. Congress must now provide the legal authorities, tools, and resources to make that framework operational and durable. Enact a digital assets ``hold law'' Congress should enact a digital assets ``hold law,'' which would create a legal safe harbor allowing cryptocurrency exchanges to temporarily freeze funds linked to suspected illicit activity, pending legal process from law enforcement. The language for such a law exists today in the Senate Banking Committee's draft of the ``Digital Asset Market Clarity Act.'' Traditional banks have had this authority for decades. When a bank compliance officer identifies a suspicious wire transfer, they can place a hold while the matter is reviewed. Cryptocurrency exchanges operating under current law lack that clear authority. Every hour of legal uncertainty is an hour that criminal networks use to move funds to the next wallet and beyond recovery. Closing this gap would transform the speed at which the private sector can act on law enforcement intelligence. Fund and scale real-time intelligence sharing Real-time disruption and interdiction should be codified as a core pillar of U.S. digital asset policy--embedding networks like Beacon into the regulatory framework as a standard capability across the ecosystem. These models demonstrate how the private sector's real-time visibility can be paired with Government authorities to freeze funds, seize assets, and disrupt illicit activity before it scales. The Senate Banking Committee's market structure discussion draft already moves in this direction, emphasizing enhanced public-private coordination and anti-money-laundering obligations as part of a broader effort to address illicit finance risks in digital assets. To operationalize this, Congress should prioritize policies that scale participation and remove friction. That includes dedicated Federal funding to expand real-time intelligence-sharing networks-- especially for smaller platforms that are often targeted as compliance weak points--and a formal legal framework that provides liability protection for firms acting on law enforcement intelligence. Illicit actors deliberately migrate to the edges of the ecosystem; closing those gaps requires both resources and clear rules that enable rapid, coordinated action across platforms and jurisdictions. More broadly, this should be treated as a best practice across the industry. Digital asset firms should be expected to participate in real-time intelligence networks, integrate rapid response capabilities into compliance programs, and act immediately on high-confidence illicit indicators. The future of effective enforcement is not retrospective analysis--it is coordinated, real-time disruption powered by public-private collaboration. Deploy AI investigative capacity at scale across Federal agencies Congress should fund the development and deployment of AI-powered investigative tools across IRS Criminal Investigation, FinCEN, OFAC, the FBI, DEA, Secret Service, HSI, national security, and defense agencies. The criminal networks before this committee are deploying AI autonomously and at scale. Responding with 20th Century investigative tools against 21st Century criminal infrastructure is not a viable strategy. Federal agencies need the funding, the procurement authority, and the legal frameworks to acquire and deploy these capabilities at the speed the threat demands. Explore cyber ``letters of marque'' We live in a moment where the private sector holds much of the critical data and the public sector holds the authorities--but success depends on fusing the two in real time. Effective disruption requires ensuring Government has access to actionable intelligence while enabling trusted private-sector actors to move quickly, within clear legal frameworks, to freeze funds, identify bad actors, and dismantle criminal networks as activity unfolds. That reality should drive a more forward-leaning policy approach: granting narrowly-scoped, Government-authorized authorities for vetted private actors to take targeted action against the technical infrastructure of transnational criminal organizations. There is a strong conceptual foundation for this model. Historically, governments have extended limited authorities to private actors to address threats that outpaced traditional state capacity. In the digital context, this could take the form of what might be called ``cyber letters of marque,'' ``authorized disruption authorities,'' or a structured ``white hat intervention'' framework--mechanisms that allow approved entities, operating under strict oversight and accountability, to intervene in real time to disrupt illicit infrastructure, block transactions, or degrade criminal networks. Today's threat environment--particularly scam center networks that blend state sponsorship, criminal enterprise, and advanced technology-- demands this kind of adaptation. These networks move at machine speed, exploit jurisdictional seams, and leverage both crypto and traditional finance. Matching that threat requires a system where intelligence, authority, and action are aligned--and where public-private collaboration is not just information sharing, but coordinated, real- time disruption. Provide tools and training to State and local law enforcement When a victim of pig butchering walks into a police station, the officer taking the report is often the only law enforcement contact that victim will ever have. That officer needs to know how to capture blockchain identifiers from the transaction confirmations and wallet addresses the victim can provide, how to preserve digital evidence in forms that support subsequent Federal investigation, and how to connect the case to FBI, HSI, or Secret Service task forces with cryptocurrency investigative capability. Too many reports taken today result in no actionable investigation because the front-line officer does not have the training to recognize what they have received. Mandatory blockchain intelligence training and access to tools for Federal, State, and local law enforcement would meaningfully increase the proportion of cases that develop into actionable investigations rather than dead-end reports. Create a victim compensation fund Congress should create a DOJ-administered victim compensation or restoration fund to ensure that victims of cryptocurrency-enabled scams are made whole to the greatest extent possible. In today's threat environment, law enforcement can often trace and seize illicit proceeds, but the speed, scale, and fragmentation of these transactions make it difficult to tie specific recovered funds back to individual victims. A centralized fund would solve this problem by pooling recovered assets and distributing them equitably across victims, ensuring that relief reaches constituents even when precise attribution is not possible. This approach is already contemplated in the Executive Order and should be codified into law. All funds recovered through seizures and forfeitures tied to scam activity should first be directed to victim compensation, with any remaining funds used to administer the program and support continued enforcement efforts. This creates a victim-first model that reflects the realities of modern financial crime while establishing a durable framework for recovery in complex, cross-border cases where traditional restitution mechanisms fall short. conclusion The threat before this committee is real, it is growing, and it is hitting American families with a precision and scale that demands a response equal to the challenge. In my career I have never seen anything like what blockchain intelligence reveals about the operational sophistication and financial resources of the criminal networks I have described today. But I want to leave this committee with something beyond the weight of the problem, because the weight of the problem, while real, is not the whole story. We can follow the money. The blockchain is a public, permanent, immutable ledger, and the tools to read that ledger and identify the actors behind the transactions exist today. The private sector has built intelligence-sharing infrastructure, real-time alerting systems, and AI-powered investigative tools that are already producing results. The Executive Order signed in March creates, for the first time, a whole-of-Government mandate to bring the full toolkit of American power to bear on the organizations running these schemes. What the grandmother in Ohio, the veteran in Texas, and the family in New York need from this committee is the legal authority, resources, and sustained institutional commitment to deploy these capabilities at the speed and scale the threat demands. I am grateful for the attention this joint hearing brings to these issues and welcome your questions. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Redbord. I now recognize Mr. Bercu for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF JOSHUA M. BERCU, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF POLICY, USTELECOM--THE BROADBAND ASSOCIATION Mr. Bercu. Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, Chairman Ogles, and Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your leadership on this critical issue. I'm Josh Bercu, executive director of the industry Traceback Group and a senior VP at USTelecom. USTelecom leads the Traceback Group, which is designated by the FCC as the Consortium for Tracing illegal Calls. I also served on the FTC's Scams Against Older Adults Advisory Group and on Aspen's National Task Force for Fraud and Scam Prevention. The telecom industry has been making progress to protect American consumers from illegal calls. We've deployed tools like call blocking, call authentication, and industry-led traceback, complemented by aggressive enforcement by our Government partners. It used to take law enforcement months to determine who made an illegal call. Now with traceback, we often find those criminals within hours. We work closely with Federal and State law enforcement, routinely tracing calls referred to us, including scams impersonating the Department of Homeland Security, and providing actionable information to support enforcement. We know this works. Raids of illegal calling operations in India led to an 85 percent drop in IRS scam robocalls. FCC and State attorneys general action virtually eliminated an illegal auto warranty campaign. Today, scam robocall volume is 50 percent lower than its peak. The Traceback Group has worked with banks, tech companies, and others to identify the criminals behind these calls and support law enforcement action, including recent information sharing supporting HSI takedowns. Fraudsters have evolved from high volume to higher impact. The most sophisticated operations, as my colleagues have already discussed, are run by organized transnational criminal networks. A decade ago, the dominant illegal calling threat was concentrated in South Asia, especially India. Today, the most consequential development is the rise of industrial-scale scam compounds in Southeast Asia. Mexican drug cartels have built their own illegal calling operations targeting Americans as well. We now face a global fraud-as-a-service marketplace where tools, tactics, and infrastructure are rapidly shared and operationalized. The methods used to bring these schemes onto U.S. networks are evolving as well. We trace calls back to entities posing as U.S.-based providers, sometimes through shell companies, sometimes impersonating U.S. legitimate companies. We see growing instances of calling platforms compromised and used to used to deliver scam calls. SIM boxes are used to generate calls from within the United States, even if the callers themselves are located abroad. To put it simply, criminals have adapted to traceback enforcement by hijacking or deploying domestic infrastructure. These trends underscore the limits of what industry can do on its own. We cannot make arrests or prosecute the criminals even when we identify them. When I testified before Congress last year, I outlined areas where Federal action can make a difference. The administration's March 2026 Executive Order is an important step. It reflects the whole-of-Government approach that this problem demands and treats scams as what they are, crimes. Now the focus must be implementation. There are 3 areas where Congress can help. First, reinforce the E.O. and its enforcement mandate by providing resources to support investigative capacity, prosecution, and cross-border coordination. Prosecutors and investigators must be able to move with urgency and work with willing partners abroad. Our industry, including the Traceback Group, stands ready in support. Second, provide a safe harbor for information sharing for improved fraud prevention and detection. Merging partnerships show real promise in identifying and disrupting scams. A safe harbor could unlock even deeper collaboration. Third, support and scale what works, including proven tools like Traceback. Fraud continues to take a toll on American consumers. We are committed to being a constructive partner in this fight. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bercu follows:] Prepared Statement of Joshua M. Bercu April 21, 2026 i. introduction Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, Chairman Ogles, and Members of the Subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your leadership on this critical issue. Your continued partnership is vital to sustaining the vigilance, innovation, and coordination we need to fight the transnational criminal networks exploiting the American people we all serve. I'm Josh Bercu, executive director of the Industry Traceback Group, or ITG, and senior vice president of policy at USTelecom--The Broadband Association. For over 10 years, USTelecom has led the Traceback Group, which serves as the entity designated by the Federal Communications Commission to trace back suspected unlawful robocalls. I also have served in leadership roles on the Federal Trade Commission's Scams Against Older Adults Advisory Group and the Aspen Institute Financial Services Program's National Task Force for Fraud & Scam Prevention. The telecom industry has been making real and meaningful progress to protect American consumers by confronting illegal calls, including both illegal robocalls and scams. Communications providers have developed and deployed powerful tools and mechanisms like call blocking and labeling, call authentication, and industry-led traceback--all complemented by a strengthened accountability regime at the FCC and aggressive enforcement by Government partners at the Federal and State level. My testimony focuses on the telecom infrastructure that transnational criminal organizations, or TCOs, abuse and misuse to reach American victims and on the industry tools, enforcement partnerships, and policy frameworks we need to disrupt them. The Traceback Group's work sits at an important intersection: we trace the illegal calls that the same criminal networks you are examining today often are behind. The intelligence we develop supports a myriad of Government enforcement actions against these groups and the in-on-the- scheme entities they rely on. From this work, we've seen both what's possible and what's still urgently needed to protect consumers. The bottom line: we have built and deployed the right tools and anti-scam infrastructure. The foundation is strong. Now we need to keep building on it, deepening collaboration across industry sectors and with Government to ensure those tools deliver real accountability for the criminals behind these scams. ii. disrupting scam infrastructure through traceback and enforcement Traceback is one of the tools we have adapted to disrupt call-based scam operations. It used to take law enforcement agencies months to determine who made an illegal call--we now often find those criminals within hours. That speed and scalability allow us to keep pace with today's fast-moving fraud. By rapidly tracing the path of illegal calls back through the network, the Traceback Group helps identify the multiple providers that carry the call and actors enabling or originating fraud. We work closely with Federal and State law enforcement, routinely tracing calls referred to us--including scams impersonating the Department of Homeland Security, IRS, Social Security Administration and other Federal agencies--and providing actionable information to support enforcement. Over the past several years, traceback has contributed to dozens of civil and criminal actions. We also have begun to work with international law enforcement partners. We know the combination of identifying the bad actors responsible, including through traceback, and then holding them accountable works: Raids of illegal calling operations in India led to an 85 percent drop in robocalls impersonating the IRS in 2016, and a similar joint effort by Canadian and Indian authorities in 2018 drove a 77 percent decline in calls impersonating the Canadian Revenue Agency. Enforcement targeting those responsible for unsolicited vacation and time share robocalls led to those calls dropping by half in 2017. FTC enforcement led to a 60 percent decline in unlawful health insurance robocalls in 2019, and FCC and State attorneys general action led to the virtual elimination of the illegal auto warranty robocall campaign between 2021 and 2022. Today, thanks to coordinated action by industry and Government, many of the most disruptive, high-volume scam calls--like those impersonating the IRS or Social Security Administration--no longer reach vulnerable Americans at the same scale. Data from YouMail shows scam robocall volume is about 50 percent lower than at the March 2021 peak. In recent years, industry collaboration has expanded beyond the communications sector and the public sector. The Traceback Group, for example, now works with banks, major tech companies, the hospitality industry, and others to identify the criminals behind illegal calls and feed that information to law enforcement. In one recent instance, some of our data was shared through the National Cyber-Forensics Training Alliance to support takedowns by the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations. These burgeoning partnerships are one of the most promising developments to protect consumers. iii. how criminal networks abuse u.s. telecom infrastructure The progress is real, but so is the evolution of the threat. Today's fraudsters aren't blasting millions of robocalls impersonating the Social Security Administration. They're shifting from high volume to high impact, and the criminal networks behind these schemes are sophisticated, organized, and global. From a telecom perspective, this evolution is defined by how these organized crime groups abuse and misuse U.S. communications infrastructure to reach consumers. A decade ago, the dominant illegal calling threat to U.S. consumers was concentrated in South Asia, principally India and to a lesser degree Pakistan and Bangladesh. Operators ran tech-support, IRS- impersonation, and bank-fraud scripts out of illegal calling operations. That threat persists, but the center of gravity has shifted. As has been well-documented, the most consequential development is the rise of industrial-scale ``scam compounds'' in Southeast Asia, principally in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. In parallel, Mexican drug cartels have built their own illegal calling operation networks targeting American consumers. One important point for Congress' consideration, however, is structural. What was once a regionally-bounded set of criminal enterprises has become a globalized, industrialized fraud-as-a-service marketplace. Criminal fraudsters' toolsets are bought, sold, and shared across these ecosystems. Playbooks, scripts, and even trafficked labor move through Telegram channels, dark-web forums, and overlapping financial infrastructure. The practical consequence is that successful techniques are copied, traded, and operationalized across regions on a time line measured in weeks, not years. While the threat of foreign actors abusing U.S. networks is not new, their tactics are evolving. Increasingly, we trace calls back to entities posing as U.S.-based providers: forming shell LLCs, using disposable domains, and in some cases impersonating real telecom companies--tactics designed to evade know-your-customer requirements and regulatory scrutiny. Beyond this, we see growing instances where legitimate callers and calling platforms--a hospital, a school broadcast service, tools used for get-out-the-vote calls, and more--are compromised and used to deliver scam impersonation calls, leveraging stolen credentials and deployed at scale using AI and automation. At the same time, SIMBoxes add another layer of complexity, enabling scammers to simulate thousands of unique mobile identities and making high-volume activity look like individual callers--and generate calls from within the United States, even if the callers themselves are located abroad. These evolutions are not accidental. Traceback and enforcement have systematically eliminated the low-hanging fruit. Enforcement actions have shut down or driven out the VoIP providers that once turned a blind eye to bad traffic or built their business on bringing it into the country. Gone are the days of blasting millions of calls through permissive internet-based voice providers. Instead, criminals have adapted, hijacking or deploying domestic infrastructure. These trends underscore a central reality: while industry protections are essential and civil enforcement can be highly impactful, they are not sufficient on their own to deter the transnational criminal organizations orchestrating these schemes. iv. turning progress into lasting impact America's telecom providers have been moving aggressively to respond in the face of these evolving threats. But we cannot make arrests or prosecute the criminals--even when we identify them. When I testified before the House Energy & Commerce Committee, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee 9 months ago, I outlined 3 areas where Federal action could make a meaningful difference: establishing a coordinated national anti- scam strategy, enabling greater cross-sector data sharing through a safe harbor, and scaling tools and partnerships that are already delivering results. The administration's March 2026 Executive Order makes important progress on that first priority and advances elements of the others. It reflects exactly the kind of whole-of-Government approach this problem demands and treats scams as what they are: crimes. The E.O. establishes a dedicated operational cell within the National Coordination Center to coordinate Federal efforts to detect, disrupt, dismantle, and deter TCOs explicitly including private-sector engagement. It also directs action to hold foreign governments accountable and to return seized assets to victims. Taken together, it signals that the administration views transnational fraud as a national security priority, not merely a consumer protection matter. The E.O. is exactly what we needed--and it could not have come at a more critical moment. Now the focus must be on ensuring that this momentum translates into sustained impact. There are 3 areas where Congress can help: Resource implementation and sustain pressure on cross-border criminal enforcement.--The E.O. rightly emphasizes enforcement and accountability, particularly for actors operating overseas. Congress can reinforce the E.O. and its mandate by supporting investigative capacity, prosecution, and cross-border coordination. We need prosecutors and investigators fully resourced so that they can move with urgency and work with willing partners abroad. Communications providers, including through the Traceback Group, stand ready in support. Provide a safe harbor for improved fraud prevention and detection.--Emerging partnerships between telecom providers, financial institutions, tech platforms, and other stakeholders are showing real promise in identifying and disrupting scams. A well-scoped safe harbor could unlock even deeper collaboration across the internet ecosystem to accelerate threat detection and better prevent consumer harm. Right now, however, privacy regulation and other legal concerns can inhibit companies from using and, where appropriate, sharing data that could help identify and stop fraud. Support and scale what works, including proven tools like traceback.--As scams evolve, we must double down on proven tools and partnerships that have shown real results. Traceback is one such tool: it can help drive criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement actions, and real-world disruption of scam networks, and increasingly serves as a model of effective cross-sector collaboration. But like many effective solutions, it requires sustained support and legal clarity to remain viable. Congress should reinforce frameworks that work like traceback, ensuring stability for the program and protecting it from efforts designed to undermine the process and its mission. v. conclusion While we've made progress together, fraud continues to take a toll on American consumers. Scam robocalls are down, enforcement actions are up, and industry tools like traceback are evolving with the threat. The administration's March Executive Order represents real momentum toward the kind of coordinated, enforcement-first approach this problem demands, and communications providers are committed to being a constructive partner in its implementation. But the progress in reducing illegal call volume does not mean the threat is gone. Criminal fraudsters are adapting quickly, targeting individuals, impersonating trusted institutions, and operating from beyond what they perceive as the reach of U.S. enforcement. Transnational criminal networks are abusing U.S. telecom infrastructure as one component of a broader, multi-vector attack on American consumers--encompassing crypto fraud, digital extortion, human trafficking, and more. Our next phase of work must focus on converting intelligence into impact--using traceback and cross-sector collaboration not just to detect fraud, but to deter, disrupt, and penalize it, and prevent perpetrators from targeting another victim. Strengthening partnerships--particularly around coordinated criminal enforcement and the legal frameworks that enable deeper collaboration--is one of the most important ways the Federal Government can help turn progress into lasting impact, drive real accountability, and deliver meaningful protection for the American public. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. Mr. Guest. Thank you Mr. Bercu, for your opening statement. I would now like to recognize Ms. Stifel for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statement. STATEMENT OF MEGAN STIFEL, CHIEF STRATEGY OFFICER, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND TECHNOLOGY Ms. Stifel. Chairman Guest, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Correa, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I'm Megan Stifel, the chief strategy officer at the Institute for Security and Technology. We are a 501(c)(3) nonprofit critical action think tank focused on the implications of technology for our national security. In our work on cybersecurity, we address misaligned incentives in the technology ecosystem that leave our critical infrastructure with vulnerable. At IST, I also serve as the executive director of the Ransomware Task Force. I'd like for you to think back to the spring of 2021. Five years ago next week, the Ransomware Task Force released its report with 48 recommendations for a comprehensive anti- ransomware campaign. Two weeks later, the Colonial pipeline was shut down by a Russian ransomware gang, endangering 40 percent of the gasoline supply east of the Mississippi. Government agencies were forced to warn Americans not to put gas in plastic bags as gas lines in some States brought back memories of the 1970's. Since Colonial, we've seen attacks on the meat processor JBS, the L.A. Unified School District, CommonSpirit hospitals, Change Healthcare, CDK Global, and more. Ransomware rose to the level of an urgent national security threat that demanded our attention. Today I'm pleased to report that we are making some progress in the fight against cyber crime. The national security threat posed by ransomware has decreased, thanks in part to the work of this committee. But we cannot rest on our laurels. Criminals are constantly evolving and so must we. Cyber fraud from extortion-based intrusions to business email compromise continues to cost our economy billions each year with significant impacts on small businesses. Nation-state adversaries are leveraging the cyber crime ecosystem to target our critical infrastructure, and rapid advancements in artificial intelligence-enabled cyber tools threaten to erode many of the gains we've made in cybersecurity in the last few years. Recent actions by the administration have emphasized the importance of countering cyber crime. However, challenges with cuts to the Federal work force and funding, as well as organizational upheaval, all threaten to stall this progress. In addition, the administration's strategic approach risks leaning too heavily on disruption at the expense of shoring up our defenses at home. In fact, for the first time we've seen material steps backward when it comes to implementing recommendations from the Ransomware Task Force. This committee in particular should continue its bipartisan oversight of the administration to ensure that CISA is able to carry out its mission in the face of significant cuts to its work force. Beyond the immediate changes needed, we must also look to the future. We will never achieve our strategic goals in cyber space without moving upstream to make systems-level changes. This requires a firm foundation for efforts like the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, or CVE, Program, which helps the entire ecosystem understand and defend against cyber threats and which is coming under increasing pressure from AI- discovered vulnerabilities. It demands more accountability for services like residential proxy networks that are regularly abused by criminals and nation-state adversaries. It requires strengthening relationships among Government agencies and between Government and industry so that they are built on trust and emerge from truly collaborative engagements. Without these system-level changes, we will remain vulnerable. I have several recommendations for the committee. First, the committee should pass legislation authorizing key programs, including the CVE program and the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, to ensure they are not interrupted. Second, Members of the committee should work with your counterparts to pass long-term or permanent extensions of cybersecurity authorities, including the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 and the State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2021. Third, the committee should also strengthen the ability of the private sector and government actors to work together to disrupt cyber threats by authorizing the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, or JCDC, and clarifying lawful defensive measures that private-sector actors can take when countering ransomware or other cyber crime. Finally, I hope this committee will continue to conduct oversight and effective hearings covering topics such as residential proxy networks, the Cyber Response and Recovery Fund, the rise of product security regimes, measures to disincentivize extortion payments, and the effect of AI on vulnerability disclosure. As leaders on inside--excuse me, as leaders in cybersecurity in the House, I also hope you will work closely with other committees on cross-jurisdictional issues, including CISA funding, cyber insurance, expanding the E-Rate program to include cybersecurity, and additional oversight of the SALT typhoon incidents carried out by the People's Republic of China, which target the telecom networks that form the backbone of our everyday communications. Twenty-twenty-six is a decisive moment. We can see the potential opportunities and dangers from AI on the horizon, but there is still time to act. As Americans, what we need more than anything today is leadership. When we move decisively, we can seize the initiative from adversaries and materially change the cyber crime landscape. I hope today's hearing is an opportunity to jumpstart a new wave of bipartisan, effective, and transformative cybersecurity policy. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Stifel follows:] Prepared Statement of Megan Stifel \1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ I would like to thank Nicholas Leiserson and Sophia Mauro for their assistance in the preparation of this testimony. No AI assistance was used in developing this testimony. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- April 21, 2026 Chairman Guest, Chairman Ogles, and Ranking Member Correa, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Megan Stifel, chief strategy officer at the Institute for Security and Technology \2\ and executive director of the Ransomware Task Force.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ https://securityandtechnology.org/. \3\ https://securityandtechnology.org/ransomwaretaskforce/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We are making progress in the fight against cyber crime. The national security threat posed by ransomware has decreased in the 5 years since we launched the Ransomware Task Force, thanks in part to the work of this committee. But we cannot rest on our laurels. Cyber fraud continues to cost our economy billions each year. Nation-state adversaries are leveraging the cyber crime ecosystem to target our critical infrastructure. And rapid advancements in the sophistication of artificial intelligence-enabled cyber tools threaten to erode many of the gains we've made in cybersecurity in the last few years. Congress has a key role to play in consolidating the gains we've made, ensuring that we do not backslide, and preparing for the next iteration of the cyber threat. It is imperative that Congress pass a long-term--or even permanent--reauthorization of the information- sharing authorities in the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. Similarly, Congress must do more to support vulnerable State and local governments, which are not equipped to combat foreign armies or transnational criminal organizations. This committee, in particular, should continue its bipartisan oversight of the administration to ensure that CISA is able to carry out its mission in the face of significant cuts to its workforce. Beyond the immediate changes needed, we must also look to the future. We will never achieve our strategic goals in cyber space without moving upstream to make system-level changes. This requires a firm foundation for efforts like the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Program, which help the entire ecosystem understand and defend against cyber threats. It demands more accountability for services, like residential proxy networks, that are regularly abused by criminals and nation-state adversaries. And achieving our strategic goals in cyber space will never succeed without relationships among Government agencies and between the Government and industry that are built on trust and emerge from truly collaborative engagements. Twenty-twenty-six is a decisive moment. We can see the potential opportunities and dangers from AI on the horizon, but there is still time to act. As Americans, what we need today more than anything is leadership. When we move decisively, we can seize the initiative from adversaries and materially change the cyber crime landscape. I hope today's hearing is an opportunity to jumpstart a new wave of bipartisan, effective, and transformative cybersecurity policy. i. about ist The Institute for Security and Technology (IST) is a 501(c)(3) charitable non-profit critical action think tank focused on the implications of technology for our national security. Home of the Ransomware Task Force, IST's cybersecurity program conducts applied research and policy development to address misaligned incentives in the technology ecosystem that leave critical infrastructure vulnerable. IST's current cybersecurity initiatives include: UnDisruptable27.--Supported by Craig Newmark Philanthropies, UnDisruptable27 \4\ is focused on reducing our reliance on undependable technologies. Created in response to attempts by Chinese army units to hold U.S. critical infrastructure at risk,\5\ UnDisruptable works with hospital communities to ensure the resilience of the water utilities they rely on against cyber attacks. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ https://securityandtechnology.org/undisruptable27/. \5\ https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/committee-activity/ hearings/hearing-notice-the-ccp-cyber-threat-to-the-american-homeland- and-national-security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- K-12 Cyber Defense Coalition.--With stakeholders ranging from chief State school officers to district IT administrators, the K-12 Cyber Defense Coalition \6\ helps to drive State and local collaboration, policy development, and information sharing to defend our Nation's schools from cyber threats. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/announcing-the-k12- cyber-defense-coalition/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Strengthening Information and Communications Technology.-- One of the most effective interventions to improve cybersecurity is to ensure that software is secure by design. IST has published a comprehensive framework to strengthen and improve CISA's CVE Program \7\ and recently published a guide for policy makers comparing international product cybersecurity regulations.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/cve- at-a-crossroads/. \8\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/who-sets-the-rules-the- imminent-gdpr-ification-of-product-cybersecurity/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter Ransomware Initiative Private-Sector Advisory Panel.--The International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI),\9\ created in 2021 and aligned with a Ransomware Task Force recommendation, coordinates efforts to combat ransomware across more than 76 member-states and organizations. IST is an inaugural member of the Private-Sector Advisory Panel, which helps guide CRI activities.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ https://counter-ransomware.org/aboutus. \10\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/ist-contributes-to- icri-for-fourth-year/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- International Ransomware Task Forces.--In partnership with foreign governments and organizations, IST is adapting the Ransomware Task Force model in other countries to help them counter international criminal activity. Brazil recently completed its own task force sprint, and IST is currently working with the government of Mexico to stand up a task force of its own.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/mexico-rtf/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii. the cyber crime threat landscape The cyber crime threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Extortion continues to be a major tactic, albeit one that increasingly involves the confidentiality of data, not just its availability. Criminals' reliance on common infrastructure, like residential proxy networks and certain domain registrars, present opportunities for disruption. Beyond extortion-based attacks, business email compromise causes billions in losses each year. Connections between nation-states and criminals persist. And exponentially-increasing AI capabilities have the potential to upend the landscape as we know it. A. Ransomware: From Encryption to Data Extortion Thanks in part to changes in policy, including the elevation of ransomware to a matter of national security, we have seen significant shifts in the tactics of transnational cyber criminal organizations. Instead of targeting availability of systems or data, criminals are increasingly using extortion tactics to breach the confidentiality of data. To be clear, this is a better outcome for victims--and for our national security. However, the adaptability of these professional criminals, and their continued profitability, continues to pose a significant risk to the United States. In order to understand the shift in cyber criminal tactics, one must start with the definition of ``ransomware.'' According to CISA, ``Ransomware is an ever-evolving form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on them unusable.''\12\ Traditionally, ransomware operators have held data or systems hostage by encrypting them. In exchange for paying a ransom, they provided victims with a decryption key that, in some cases, allows for recovery of data or key system files and returns their information and communications technology to good working order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because traditional ransomware targets the availability of systems and data, it poses a significant threat to critical infrastructure. Ransomware attacks on pipelines or hospitals can force them to shut down, threatening the economy or even human lives. Refusing to pay can extend the time an enterprise is crippled, causing ripple effects throughout society. The good news is that traditional ransomware attacks in the United States are on the decline. Across multiple data sets, we see a similar trend: ``threat actors [are] shifting to exfiltration only without encryption.''\13\ Google Mandiant noted a nearly eightfold increase in the number of data-theft-only extortion incidents they responded to over the past 5 years, and encryption dropped from being present in 39 percent of cases in 2024 to 31 percent in 2025.\14\ In its 2025 ransomware survey, Sophos documented a 5-year low in the number of incidents that resulted in actual encryption of data.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ https://admin.bakerlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/2026- DSIR-Report.pdf. \14\ https://cyberscoop.com/google-threat-intelligence-group- ransomware-report-2026/. \15\ https://assets.sophos.com/X24WTUEQ/at/gspkf9pb6jsvt4hrv2z8kjj/ sophos-state-of-ran- somware-in-enterprise-2025.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The bad news is that criminals are adapting. Double-extortion schemes--once an unusual tactic in which ransomware actors steal data as well as encrypting it and then demand a second payment to keep it from being published--are now de rigeur. Google Mandiant, for instance, found that 77 percent of ransomware incidents in 2025 also involved data theft.\16\ Criminals are also targeting smaller organizations \17\ and shifting focus overseas. Last year, the United Kingdom suffered 2 significant ransomware-related incidents that cost the British economy billions.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ ransomware-ttps-shifting-threat- landscape. \17\ Verizon, for instance, highlighted that ransomware was present in 88% of small and medium businessbreaches versus 39% of the entire sample studied. https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T36/reports/ 2025-dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf. \18\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/a-category-three-cyber- hurricane-classifying-the-jlr-hack/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These trends carry important lessons for policy makers. Cybersecurity technologies, from endpoint detection and response tools to consistent data backups, can effectively prevent ransomware criminals from encrypting large quantities of data or allow for quick recovery if hit by an attack.\19\ Coordinated law enforcement takedowns can significantly disrupt ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems, relegating once-prolific criminal groups to obscurity.\20\ Ransomware payment rates are also falling to record lows, in part because data- exfiltration does not present the same degree of threat to business operations as encryption.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2026/2/3/mass-data-exfiltration- campaigns-lose-their-edge-in-q4-2025. \20\ https://storage.ghost.io/c/af/a0/afa04ee3-414f-4481-8d23- 7e7c146f192e/content/files/2026/03/2025YiR-report.pdf. \21\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2026/2/3/mass-data-exfiltration- campaigns-lose-their-edge-in-q4-2025. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, criminals are agile--and we cannot become complacent. Faced with lower profit margins, we've seen criminal groups implementing intermittent encryption in an attempt to avoid detection mechanisms.\22\ We have also seen them targeting less capable cyber actors, like school systems and hospitals.\23\ This can result in higher human costs, whether in the form of stolen sensitive data or disrupted services. Artificial intelligence tools also have the potential to turbocharge threats, automating significant portions of ransomware workflows.\24\ To keep pace with the evolving threat, policy makers must maintain pressure by facilitating law enforcement takedowns while investing more in critical infrastructure below the security poverty line.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.15133. \23\ Although metrics vary, health care and Government facilities consistently ranked as highly-targeted sectors in 2025. https:// www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf. \24\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ distillation-experimentation-integration-ai-adversarial-use. \25\ https://www.scworld.com/podcast-segment/9082-the-security- poverty-line-part-1-wendy-nather-scw-60. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. The Infrastructure of Cyber Crime: Proxies in Homes, Undisciplined Registrars Cyber crime, particularly ransomware, has been professionalizing for the past decade.\26\ Today, criminal enterprises cater to unique niches within the ransomware kill chain, from delivering initial access to a victim to helping to launder proceeds through cryptocurrency mixers. The growing specialization within the ransomware ecosystem reduces costs for criminals--one of the drivers of continued profits for transnational criminal organizations, even as payment rates continue to drop.\27\ However, as with other complex supply chains, this interplay creates points of friction where disruptions can have significant impact on downstream criminal gangs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/ issue-brief/behind-the-rise-of-ransomware/. \27\ https://www.coveware.com/blog/2025/10/24/insider-threats-loom- while-ransom-payment-rates-plummet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At IST, we have been focusing on 2 specific enablers of ransomware and other cyber crime: residential proxy networks and digital infrastructure service providers. Residential Proxies Residential proxy networks (RPNs), in essence, act as an intermediary to hide the origin of internet traffic, passing messages on behalf of a sender to a receiver and then forwarding along replies.\28\ Unlike other proxy networks, RPNs use home, small office, or mobile devices--and their associated Internet Protocol (IP) addresses--as the middleman in the connection. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ https://spur.us/blog/what-is-a-residential-proxy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fueled by software development kits that come bundled with apps and browser extensions,\29\ as well as pre-configured streaming devices like the Superbox,\30\ RPNs are growing rapidly. While some users of RPNs rely on the networks to preserve their legitimate privacy interests, many others use them to scan and ``scrape'' the internet, attempting to avoid limitations put in place by service providers.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber/alerts/2026/evading- residential-proxy-networks-protecting-your-devices-from-becoming-a- tool-for-criminals. \30\ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2025/11/is-your-android-tv- streaming-box-part-of-a-botnet/. \31\ https://www.cloudflare.com/press/press-releases/2025/ cloudflare-just-changed-how-ai-crawlers-scrape-the-internet-at-large. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Criminals are increasingly taking advantage of the deep and liquid market for these residential IP addresses to hide their attempts to gain access; exert command and control over compromised systems; and exfiltrate stolen data. In the week prior to the takedown of the IPIDEA RPN in January 2026, Google observed 550 different threat actors using that network to cover their tracks.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ disrupting-largest-residential-proxy-network. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recently, RPNs have also been used by criminals to gain initial access into home networks. Through clever routing techniques, criminals can use a single residential proxy node (e.g., a laptop with a browser extension configured to join an RPN) to illuminate a home network and then compromise any vulnerable devices it finds on that network. The Kimwolf botnet enrolled over 2 million devices in a matter of weeks using this technique,\33\ making it one of the fastest growing botnets of all time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/01/the-kimwolf-botnet-is- stalking-your-local-network/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is time for policy makers to take notice.\34\ Because many residential proxy nodes are enrolled through quasi-legal means, such as disclosures buried in license agreements, there are limited paths for law enforcement or service providers to disrupt the networks. Without action, consumers will continue to be unwitting enablers of criminal or nation-state activity targeting critical infrastructure--and in the process, may be putting their own home devices and data at risk. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/the-light-is-blinking- red-its-time-for-policymakers-to-wake-up-to-the-residential-proxy- threat/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Domain Registrars Last December, in partnership with the World Economic Forum, IST published a white paper proposing a systemic defense approach to fight cyber-enabled fraud.\35\ In particular, I want to highlight one of the digital infrastructure services that is regularly being abused by ransomware actors and other cyber criminals: domain registrars. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fighting_Cyber- Enabled_Fraud_2025.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Often described as the internet's phone book, the Domain Name System (DNS) translates domain names (e.g., www.house.gov) into IP addresses.\36\ Governed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),\37\ DNS is one of the fundamental services that allows the internet to function. Its centrality is both a blessing and a curse: it also makes DNS a key avenue for cyber criminals to perpetrate fraud or gain unauthorized access to systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/dns-infographic- 13sep22-en.pdf. \37\ https://www.icann.org/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Malicious cyber actors often register domain names intended to trick users (e.g., by substituting a numeral `1' for a lowercase `l'). The numbers are staggering, with over 8.6 million malicious domains used for intrusions in 2024. At the same time, an ICANN study of a sample set of domains registered by the approximately 3,000 accredited registrars in the system found that a mere 20 registrars were responsible for creating 84 percent of malicious domains.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fighting_Cyber- Enabled_Fraud_2025.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More must be done. Simple actions like limiting the bulk registration of domains to entities with an established reputation and doing basic due diligence to ensure there is an actual entity with a name that resembles a well-established brand could significantly increase the friction for criminals engaged in all manner of nefarious cyber activity. As with other threat vectors, the advent of agentic AI will likely exacerbate the problem, allowing criminals to accelerate malicious domain registration. C. Business Email Compromise Although not a focus of our work at IST, business email compromise (BEC) remains a key tactic for threat actors, causing significant damage to the U.S. economy. Per the FBI's latest Internet Crime Complaint Center Report, in 2025, more than 24,000 BEC incidents resulted in more than $3 billion in losses.\39\ This contrasts with ransomware ($32 million in reported losses) and data extortion ($122 million) over the same time period. Even given the prevalence of under- reporting to the FBI (e.g., one cryptocurrency tracking firm estimated global ransomware payments to be just shy of $1 billion in 2025), BEC is an enormous problem.\40\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf. \40\ This is also borne out in cyber insurance claims data. https:/ /cdn.intelligencebank.com/us/share/- NMXD/aP6w/1413d/original/ Coalition_2025-Cyber-Claims-Report. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- BEC occurs when a criminal gains unauthorized access to a business communications system, most often email.\41\ They then use this access to initiate wire transfers or other fraudulent payments from the business's account to an account that they control. While BEC is generally significantly less lucrative than a successful ransomware attack, it is also less technically complex to carry out.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/ common-frauds-and-scams/business-email-compromise. \42\ https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T36/reports/2025- dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because of the limited scope of unauthorized system access associated with BEC, it generally poses less of a national security risk than ransomware. However, even beyond the economic losses tied to this fraud, there are reasons for policy makers to focus on combatting it specifically. Supply chains for BEC and more sophisticated cyber crimes overlap in a few key areas. Initial access brokers, who opportunistically gain access to organizations through exposed systems or compromised credentials, supply access to both ransomware operators and run-of-the- mill fraudsters.\43\ Actors who create spoofed domains to deploy in phishing schemes can enable all types of cyber crime. Upstream disruption of these actors can undermine BEC. Conversely, taking down BEC crime rings can deprive cyber crime infrastructure providers of a revenue stream. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/actions-to- take-to-defeat-initial-access-brokers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mitigations against BEC can also prove effective in stopping ransomware. For instance, phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) is a key control that can protect against all manner of cyber intrusions.\44\ Policy makers can and should continue to emphasize the full range of consequences for failing to adopt foundational cybersecurity measures, whether encouraging voluntary uptake or implementing interventions, whether subsidies or requirements, to protect our homeland security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ https://www.cyber.gov.au/protect-yourself/securing-your-email/ email-security/preventing-business-email-compromise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. The Nexus Between Nation-States and Cyber Criminals While the focus of this hearing is on transnational criminal organizations, committee Members should also consider the nexus between more traditional nation-state threat actors and the cyber crime ecosystem. When the Nation Is the Criminal The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is widely regarded as the most successful cyber criminal organization in history.\45\ DPRK hackers pioneered widespread deployment of ransomware through the WannaCry attack in 2017.\46\ In 2016, they targeted the SWIFT banking network, making off with tens of millions of dollars (but for a typo, they could have stolen ten times as much).\47\ However, their greatest success has been in the theft of cryptocurrency, where their hacks have brought in billions of dollars.\48\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/10/22/26294780-c396-407d- bb33-88afe988cd96-The _DPRK%E2%80%99s_Violation_and_Evasion_of_UN_Sanctions_through_Cyber_and- _Information_Technology_Worker_Activities_(MSMT_2025_2).pdf. \46\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/north-korean-regime- backed-programmer-charged-conspiracy-conduct-multiple-cyber-attacks- and. \47\ https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-57520169. \48\ https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-hacking-stolen-funds- 2026/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Policy makers should consider the implications of the North Koreans' success, especially as the proliferation of open-source artificial intelligence tools with significant cyber capabilities lurks on the horizon. According to estimates, as much as half of the DPRK's hard currency comes from cyber crime.\49\ While it has taken significant investment--and experience--to build the DPRK's kleptocratic cyber teams, other pariah states could follow in their footsteps, particularly if AI lowers the barrier to entry. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240321001100315. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moonlighting Even when regimes are not directly engaging in cyber theft, the individuals supporting their operations may be. Intelligence operatives from Russia \50\ and China \51\ have been implicated in ``moonlighting'' operations, where they leverage their skills to conduct criminal activities in their spare time. Iranian state cyber operatives have also been linked to ransomware and extortion campaigns.\52\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \50\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/us-charges-russian- fsb-officers-and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and- millions?. \51\ https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/apt41-a-dual- espionage-and-cyber-crime-operation.pdf. \52\ https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/17/politics/us-iran-hackers- warning/index.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Foreign intelligence services also cultivate ties with criminal organizations or use them as buffers to disguise their true identity. Just last month, as part of its retaliatory cyber attacks on the U.S. homeland, the Iranian government used a hacktivist persona to take credit for the intrusions,\53\ one of which knocked a U.S. medical device manufacturer off-line for weeks.\54\ The Department of Justice has alleged ties between the Russian government and the criminal hacktivist group the Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR), which targeted operational technology in the United States and around the world following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.\55\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \53\ https://www.wired.com/story/handala-hacker-group-iran-us- israel-war/. \54\ https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/310764/ 000119312526149607/d112875d8ka.htm. \55\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces- actions-combat-two-russian-state-sponsored-cyber-criminal. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These intersections point to the urgent national security need to crack down on cyber crime in all its forms. When it helps them gain the upper hand, adversaries have drawn--and will continue to draw--on criminal elements, particularly organized groups. Until we take decisive steps to improve our cybersecurity posture, disrupt cyber criminals, and dismantle their safe havens, our risk level will be unacceptably high. Drawing on the Cyber Crime Ecosystem Finally, nation-states regularly take advantage of services offered as part of the broader cyber crime economy. As part of the IPIDEA takedown in January 2026, Google tracked espionage activities and groups from China, Iran, the DPRK, and Russia using the service.\56\ DPRK state-sponsored thieves use cryptocurrency ``mixing'' services that are also core to transnational criminal organizations' attempts to launder their stolen funds.\57\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \56\ https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ disrupting-largest-residential-proxy-network. \57\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1087. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Adversarial nation-states also create demand for initial access through their contracting ecosystems. Individuals at 2 Iranian IT firms were indicted for building botnets on behalf of the government and using them to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on U.S. banks.\58\ In April 2020, a Chinese national working for a PRC cyber contractor infected over 81,000 firewalls using a zero-day exploit. Many of the devices were then infected by ransomware.\59\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/file/834996/dl?inline. \59\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2742. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These cases illustrate the mutualism at play between nation-states and criminal syndicates. Sometimes, government demand creates the conditions for more criminal activity. Other times, criminals develop the business and later sell their wares to governments. In either case, disruptions to transnational criminal organizations have the potential to protect Americans both directly and indirectly: by reducing the victimization of people and organizations, and by reducing the capability and reach of nation-state adversaries. E. Future Threats: Cyber Crime in the Intelligence Age The rapid development of large language models--and their proclivity for certain cybersecurity-related tasks--could significantly alter the cyber crime landscape over the next few years. We note 4 key areas to watch. Analysis.--LLMs are already proving incredibly capable at processing and analyzing large volumes of data quickly. In an example earlier this year, AI appears to have helped sift through an enormous trove of data stolen from the Mexican government, producing more than 2,500 structured intelligence reports.\60\ In addition to changing how criminals target data going forward, attackers have also used AI tools to better monetize existing troves of stolen data.\61\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ https://gambit.security/blog-post/a-single-operator-two-ai- platforms-nine-government-agencies-the-full-technical-report. \61\ https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-countering-misuse- aug-2025. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Automation.--Many aspects of the cyber kill chain are amenable to automation. We are already seeing LLMs generate context-sensitive phishing messages \62\ (or web elements \63\) with the touch of a button. As with other industries, automating repetitive tasks could produce substantial productivity gains. For cyber criminals, this automation could increase their profitability, even if ransomware payment rates continue to decline. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \62\ https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S2590005626000986. \63\ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/real-time-malicious- javascript-through-llms/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Orchestration.--Last November, Anthropic released the first evidence of AI agents orchestrating the majority of a cyber intrusion.\64\ In that particular instance, Anthropic was able to identify and stop the activity. However, the proliferation of agents capable of planning and executing intrusions on their own could cause the barriers to entry into cyber crime to crumble.\65\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ https://www.anthropic.com/news/disrupting-AI-espionage. \65\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ The-Implications-of-Artificial-Intelligence-in-Cybersecurity.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vulnerability Discovery.--AI companies have claimed that releasing the current best-in-class models would be dangerous because of their ability to exponentially accelerate the discovery and exploitation of novel vulnerabilities in code.\66\ Right now, testing programs are underway to explore these capabilities. Should the core claims made by the companies prove true--or should models continue to progress to the point that they become true--the cyber crime landscape would be irrevocably altered. Cybersecurity has long relied on certain core assumptions, such as the difficulty of vulnerability discovery or that there is time between the announcement of a patch and exploitation at scale. The alleged capabilities of these best-in-class models would cause these assumptions to melt away. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Policy makers should bear in mind that even though AI presents new offensive capabilities, it also creates opportunities for defensive applications. Over time, defensive uses of these technologies may end up dominating, driving down cyber crime. At the same time, even if the defensive uses wind up being superior, the tools will need to be distributed broadly, including to critical infrastructure providers and consumers who have not traditionally had access to cutting-edge cybersecurity products, in order for those benefits to be realized. iii. the ransomware task force report at five years Released in April 2021, the Ransomware Task Force (RTF) Report is a seminal document that provides actionable recommendations for combating cyber crime across 4 phases: Deter, Detect, Prepare, and Respond. With participation from across Government, industry, and civil society, RTF outputs have informed U.S. and international policy making and have served as a blueprint for private-sector actors aiming to protect themselves from transnational criminal organizations. As we mark the 5-year anniversary of the release of the RTF report and its 48 recommendations, we have several observations:\67\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \67\ For a full accounting of progress against the RTF recommendations, see: https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/ uploads/2026/04/April-2026-RTF-Progress-Report.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There's been significant progress, but it has slowed. Since our last assessment of progress against the RTF recommendations,\68\ 2 have moved from preliminary action to significant action. Specifically, the insurance industry has seen progress through consortia like CyberAcuView,\69\ which is making it easier to understand claims data in aggregate (Recommendation 2.1.7). The Government also continues to map the ransomware ecosystem, including supporting infrastructure, and is now regularly using this knowledge to inform takedowns and sanction activities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ April-2024-RTF-Progress-Report-Doubling-Down.pdf. \69\ https://cyberacuview.com/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Several recommendations await final action by the Government. Implementation of the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA), championed by many Members of this committee, remains stalled more than 4 years after its passage (Recommendations 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.4).\70\ With a final CIRCIA rule in place, we would have a better operational understanding of the ransomware ecosystem and the ability to more easily offer assistance to victims. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \70\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/13/2026- 02948/cyber-incident-reporting-for-critical-infrastructure-act-circia- rulemaking-town-hall-meetings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For the first time, we've seen backsliding. Since our assessment in April 2024, 2 of our recommendations have moved from significant action back to preliminary action. Notably for this committee, the failure to fund the State and local cyber grant program since its original appropriation lapsed last year leaves governments at significant risk from ransomware and other cyber intrusions (Recommendation 3.4.2).\71\ While this committee has made strides in advancing a long-term reauthorization of the grant program,\72\ without funding, States will remain exposed. The Cyber Response and Recovery Fund, authorized in 2021 in response to RTF recommendations, may also be at risk; the January House-passed Homeland Security appropriations bill would have transferred all of the money from this emergency account to base CISA appropriations (Recommendation 4.1.1).\73\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ https://www.nascio.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/NASCIO- Advocacy-Priorities-2026_a11y_SLCGP.pdf. \72\ https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5078. \73\ https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20260119/ Homeland26_01_xml.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Limitations on ransom payments remain underdeveloped. Of the 4 RTF recommendations where we have seen no action, 3 pertain to pre-ransom payment activities, such as conducting a cost- benefit analysis (Recommendation 4.3.2). The record-low ransom rates may open up space for more conversations on how to limit payments, which are the fuel for the entire ecosystem. However, absent strong leadership from policy makers to act as a catalyst, we are unlikely to see significant progress. On balance, the success of RTF members and partners in implementing recommendations has had a significant impact on the ransomware ecosystem, including driving criminals to pursue alternative, non- encryption-based extortion methods. Key to our approach was starting with a comprehensive strategy that addresses all phases of the challenge and providing clear recommendations to specific actors. We also favored system-level approaches that affect the root causes of cyber crime, rather than trying to treat its symptoms. Finally, we could not have succeeded without deep collaboration with industry. Civil society organizations like IST have a vital role to play as a neutral convener and accelerant to policy engineering projects; however, effectuating real and lasting change requires bringing both government and industry perspectives to the table. iv. federal government headwinds Recent actions by the administration have emphasized the importance of countering cyber crime. However, challenges with the Federal workforce, funding, and organizational upheaval all threaten to limit progress, as does a strategic approach overly focused on disruption. A. Continued Emphasis on Disruption . . . On March 6, the President released the 2026 Cybersecurity Strategy.\74\ Although it lacks specific mention of ransomware, it does highlight the significant challenges cyber crime poses to the U.S. economy and calls for the continued disruption of criminal infrastructure. In tandem with the Strategy's release, the President also signed Executive Order 14390, ``Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens,''\75\ which addresses the damage that cyber crime, including ransomware, is inflicting on U.S. citizens. In particular, EO 14390 focuses on Government efforts to disrupt transnational criminal organizations responsible for cyber crime and fraud. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf. \75\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/ combating-cybercrime-fraud-and-predatory-schemes-against-american- citizens/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As noted in the RTF report (and echoed in Pillar I of the 2026 Cybersecurity Strategy and Pillar II of the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy \76\), disrupting threat actors is an essential component of a comprehensive effort to improve our cybersecurity posture. Disrupting infrastructure raises the costs of crime, while arrests and indictments undermine criminals' faith in each other and in the underground economy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/ 03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- EO 14390 appropriately views disruption through a wide lens that encompasses ``operational, technical, diplomatic, and regulatory'' approaches. The continued prevalence of Russian-speaking ransomware gangs,\77\ for example, speaks to the need for all countries, including the United States, to call on Russia to uphold its commitments to prevent its territory from being used for damaging cyber attacks.\78\ Without sustained diplomatic pressure from the plethora of countries that fall victim to Russian cyber criminals, disruption at the level of individual threat actors will remain challenging. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \77\ https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/crypto-crime-in-russia- ransomware-sanctions-evasion-and-disinformation. \78\ https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/The-UN- norms-of-responsible-state-behaviour-in-cyberspace.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On the operational front, the first 15 months of the administration have seen a steady drumbeat of law enforcement operations targeting cyber criminals and their enabling infrastructure.\79\ The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control has utilized new authorities under the Protecting American Intellectual Property Act to go after exploit brokers selling dangerous offensive cyber tools to criminals.\80\ I look forward to observing implementation of the forthcoming action plan associated with this latest EO, particularly the details on how an operational cell at the National Coordination Center plans to continue increasing the pressure on transnational cyber criminal organizations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \79\ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cracked-and-nulled- marketplaces-disrupted-international-cyber-operation; https:// www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/fbi-disrupts-virtual-money-laundering- service-used-facilitate-criminal-activity; https://www.fbi.gov/contact- us/field-offices/atlanta/news/fbi-atlanta-indonesian-authorities-take- down-global-phishing-network-behind-millions-in-fraud-attempts; https:/ /www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-leads-dismantlement-one-worlds- largest-hacker-forums. \80\ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0404. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. . . . But Without Broader Systemic Interventions I would like to focus on 2 key challenges with the administration's approach to date. First, the resources that our Federal agencies rely on to combat cyber crime have been significantly pared back. And second, the strategic approach does not appear to balance the need to deter individual actors with other systemic steps to make ransomware and cyber-enabled fraud less achievable. Dealing with Federal Cybersecurity Cuts Public reporting indicates CISA has lost one-third of its workforce,\81\ an issue that this committee has raised during oversight hearings.\82\ While the cuts have been pitched as returning CISA to its core mission,\83\ this is clearly not the case in practice. The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, a core mechanism for coordinating cybersecurity policy across government and industry, has yet to restart since being shuttered last March.\84\ What's more, should the Secretary of Homeland Security decide to convene sector- specific advisory committees, coordination will be a challenge given cuts to CISA stakeholder engagement personnel. In an effort to fill some of the gaps left from these cuts, the acting CISA director recently announced a hiring sprint to bring on new talent to help protect the Nation from the many threats arrayed against us. This quick reversal in hiring practices is clear evidence that the original cuts were too deep.\85\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cisa-departures-trump- workforce-purge/749796/. \82\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/oversight-of-the- department-of-homeland-security-cisa-tsa-st/. \83\ https://securityboulevard.com/2025/04/homeland-secretary-noem- vows-to-put-cisa-back-to-focusing-on-its-core-mission/. \84\ https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/critical- infrastructure-partnership-advisory-council-cipac. \85\ https://federalnewsnetwork.com/cybersecurity/2026/03/cisa- eyes-plan-for-more-than-300-new-hires/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cuts to key cyber personnel are not confined to DHS. As discussed in a Senate hearing last year, budget cuts to the FBI's cyber division were expected to reduce personnel by half.\86\ Faced with an 8 percent cut in personnel, the acting commander of USCYBERCOM testified that the effect on the command's ability to carry out its mission would be ``impactful.''\87\ The Government Accountability Office found in a report last September that 22 of the 23 agencies surveyed failed to fully account for their cyber workforce needs, so the full scope of the personnel cuts remains nebulous.\88\ And in the foreign policy arena, the dissolution of significant portions of the State Department's Cyberspace and Digital Policy Bureau,\89\ despite its clear statutory mandate,\90\ also risks delaying decisive action. EO 14390 sets an ambitious schedule for developing an action plan to follow through on its objectives, but it's unclear what personnel from across the interagency will be able to put it together, much less execute against it. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ https://cyberscoop.com/senators-fbi-director-patel-clash-over- cyber-division-personnel-arrests. \87\ https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/after-cuts-to-dods-cyber- workforce-experts-see-short-term-readiness-risks-but-also-opportunity/. \88\ https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107405. \89\ https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/17/cyber-tech-state-ai- 00460679. \90\ 22 USC 2651a. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Funding cuts also threaten progress in the fight against cyber crime. As documented by this committee, the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program proved effective in marshaling resources to help State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments improve their defenses;\91\ yet it has been zeroed out in the administration's budget. Shared cybersecurity services provided at subsidized rates for State and local governments through the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) have also been canceled, leaving States to scramble for protection.\92\ Ironically, both programs would have helped achieve the objective laid out in EO 14390 to ``provide training, technical assistance, and resilience building to support State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners, including to expand defensive capacity, share threat intelligence, and harden SLTT partners' critical infrastructure systems against cyber crime exploitation by TCOs.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \91\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/cybersecurity-is-local-too- assessing-the-state-and-local-cybersecurity-grant-program/. \92\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/ms-isac-loses-federal- funding-cyber-impacts/761367/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The transnational nature of cyber crime makes funding for international cybersecurity capacity-building particularly important, yet programs that aim to bolster international cyber capacity, too, have been cut.\93\ Without investments in foreign partners' cybersecurity programs, the ability of the Secretary of State to, per EO 14390, ``coordinate [U.S.] actions with allies and partners to enhance the consequences of actions taken against nations that tolerate predatory activity'' will be significantly diminished. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \93\ https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/usaid-cuts- demolish-cyber-assistance-to-u-s-allies-and-partners. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, organizational challenges will add further friction to the administration's activities. More than a month after the release of the 2026 Cybersecurity Strategy, there has been no additional information regarding an implementation plan with specific actions for agencies to take to achieve its objectives. There has also been no executive action clarifying the National Cyber Director's role in interagency cybersecurity discussions, raising questions about whether the Director or the National Security Advisor is ultimately responsible for strategic direction. Stepping into the leadership void, the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance eliminating a common cybersecurity form for contractors.\94\ Rather than requiring contractors to fill out a single attestation in order to sell products to the entire Government, OMB now encourages agencies to develop their own policies and forms--in seeming contravention of the strategy's mandate to streamline regulation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \94\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/M-26-05- Adopting-a-Risk-based-Approach-to-Software-and-Hardware-Security.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Striking the Right Balance The administration's focus on disrupting cyber crime is admirable. However, it leans too heavily on ``offensive'' solutions at the expense of system-level ``defensive'' changes that will help to bolster cybersecurity across the Nation. As I wrote in the weeks leading up to the strategy's release: ``A strategy that prioritizes shaping behavior through offensive operations over improving defense would risk exposing critical infrastructure, intellectual property, and U.S. companies to even greater harm. True national security comes not from striking first, but from leveraging innovation to significantly reduce the security gaps available to attackers, empowering industry to take lawful, coordinated actions, and realigning incentives in the marketplace to support secure software and hardware practices.''\95\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \95\ https://nexusconnect.io/articles/imminent-national-cyber- strategy-may-lean-on-offense-at-the-expense-of-defense. At IST, we view cybersecurity challenges, including cyber crime, as primarily a matter of misaligned incentives. In stark contrast to defense of our land, air, and maritime borders, Government neither claims nor aims to have a degree of operational control over the cyber domain to stop all incoming attacks. Instead, in cyber space, Government must also rely on the private-sector actors that operate our networks and maintain our critical infrastructure to ensure our national security. Unfortunately, the market forces that act as operating constraints on businesses often do not align with national security interests. The incentives that dominate technology marketplaces instead drive suppliers to produce and sell technology that prioritizes speed-to- market and features over security, resilience, and reliability. Similarly, for users of technology, markets regularly reward purchasing and operating behaviors that serve to weaken an entity's cybersecurity posture. Aligning incentives so that the private sector, positioned on the proverbial ``front lines,'' goes from being a national security liability to an asset is a considerable challenge. Markets reward behavior detrimental to societal interests for a number of reasons, from the externalization of costs of crime to the lack of empirical examples of large-scale disruptive or destructive cyber attacks that could help participants price risk. This lack of realizable costs is weighed against very clear benefits, such as more agility and lower development and operational costs. However, broad-based efforts to create incentives for cybersecurity behaviors that benefit society as a whole can be very rewarding. Injecting national security considerations into technology markets simultaneously addresses a root cause cybersecurity challenge and creates structures that can adapt as new categories of technological innovation and reliance emerge. Making meaningful progress on incentives creates downstream impact that addresses issues across the technology ecosystem and maximizes the benefits of the effort invested. In our work at IST, we address 3 broad categories of cybersecurity challenge: Critical infrastructure security and resilience.--For schools, water utilities, and hospitals, there is not sufficient funding to support cybersecurity practices to help these organizations withstand threats from transnational criminal organizations or nation-states. As a result, we focus on designing efficient programs (like the Federal Communications Commission's E-Rate cybersecurity pilot \96\) to subsidize necessary cybersecurity investments where they are needed most. Chairman Ogles's PILLAR Act is an excellent example of this kind of intervention. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \96\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ Cybersecurity-Considerations-for-Universal-Service-Fund- Reform_Final.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Designing and deploying secure information and communications technology and services (ICTS).--Addressing ICTS security is inherently high-leverage: preventing one single vulnerability in a product before it is shipped to market can save thousands of entities from having to apply millions of patches. When we invest in security by design,\97\ develop recommendations to prevent misuse of domain registration,\98\ or work to protect the open-source software that underpins so much of our society,\99\ we are applying solutions that actually address the systemic problem, not the proximate cause. Ranking Member Thompson's focus on ensuring the CVE Program thrives \100\ is aligned with this type of intervention. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \97\ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/f5--solarwinds--and-the- lethargy-of-the-far-council. \98\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/ fighting-cyber-enabled-fraud-a-systemic-defense-approach/. \99\ https://securityandtechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/ Castles-Built-on-Sand.pdf. \100\ https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/news/correspondence/ ranking-members-thompson-and-lofgren-request-gao-review-of-cve-and-nvd- federal-cybersecurity-programs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Building public-private partnerships to disrupt malicious cyber actors.--Disruption remains a core pillar of our work. In particular, we examine incentives that will bring government and non-government partners together, as both have the resources necessary, whether authorities, information, or technical acumen, to effectively conduct takedowns. Our international tabletop exercises strengthen relationships that lead to joint-sequenced operations.\101\ This committee's relentless efforts to reauthorize CISA 2015 is another example of this kind of work.\102\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \101\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/cri- tabletop-exercise-after-action-report/. \102\ https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/in-defense-of-defensive- measures-reauthorizing-cybersecurity-information-sharing-activities- that-underpin-u-s-national-cyber-defense/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The administration's focus on disruption is therefore necessary, but not sufficient. I hope that subsequent executive actions will address the broader market incentives that create the conditions for mass exploitation and victimization of Americans. I also hope that the administration reverses cuts and policy changes that make it more difficult to alter these incentives. v. recommendations for congress Congressional leadership has always been essential for advancing cybersecurity policy. Despite the progress we have made in tackling cyber crime, nation-state threat actors have gotten bolder, and AI cyber tools risk upending the landscape entirely. Lapses in authorizations and appropriations also put hard-won advances at risk. This committee should: Authorize key programs to ensure they are not interrupted.-- Several DHS and CISA programs have faced disruption over the past 15 months, in part because they are not explicitly authorized in law. By laying out clear goals and expectations in statute, Congress can put these programs on firmer footing and ensure their future success. Key programs include: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Program.-- CVE records act as the universal identifiers for weaknesses in computer code. This essential program, which is relied on by companies in every sector and worldwide, needs a more effective, multistakeholder governance model and a clear delineation from other programs like the National Institute for Standards and Technology's National Vulnerability Database.\103\ This committee should advance legislation codifying the program in a way that avoids fragmentation (i.e., other countries or entities setting up competing programs). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \103\ https://nvd.nist.gov/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC).--It is essential that non-Federal critical infrastructure owners and operators have mechanisms to offer candid feedback to their U.S. Government partners with respect to cybersecurity and resilience policy. This committee should advance legislation amending Section 9002 of the Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to codify the CISA director's ability to convene critical infrastructure providers, rather than relying on the broad authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Pass long-term (or permanent) extensions of cybersecurity authorities.--This committee has produced effective legislation that has improved the Nation's cybersecurity posture; it should not be allowed to expire. In particular, Congress should reauthorize: The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, which expires on September 30, 2026, and which enables the free flow of cyber threat indicators among the private sector and between the private sector and Government. The State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2021, which expires on September 30, 2026, and which provides assistance to State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments to develop and execute against strategies to improve their cybersecurity. Strengthen the ability of private-sector and Government actors to work together to disrupt cyber threats.--In furtherance of the goals laid out in EO 14390, this committee can take steps to incentivize deeper collaboration through joint sequenced operations and other efforts to degrade cyber threat actors. The committee can achieve this by: Authorizing the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC).--JCDC has yet to live up to the full potential envisioned by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.\104\ Authorization for the JCDC should lay out clear criteria for participation and metrics for success, as well as the types of whole-of-nation plans and campaigns the center should develop. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \104\ https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/making-joint-cyber- defense-collaborative-work. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Directing the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the CISA director, to clarify lawful defensive measures that private-sector actors can take when countering ransomware or other cyber crime.--One key obstacle to a higher tempo of private-sector-enabled takedowns, as identified by the RTF report, is legal ambiguity about which defensive measures are allowed under existing law, including the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. The committee should direct the CISA director to work with industry and the interagency in developing and publishing guidance that clarifies what constitutes a defensive measure. Continue to conduct effective oversight and exploratory hearings.--There are several topics that fall under the committee's jurisdiction that are ripe for additional committee activity, including: Residential proxy networks.--Despite being used by cyber criminals, fraudsters, and even advanced persistent threats, the enrollment of everyday consumer devices into residential proxy networks appears to be legal. In exploring policy solutions to this issue, committee Members may also wish to investigate whether regulations like the Digital Markets Act \105\ are impairing the ability of tech companies to effectively govern their app stores. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cyber Response and Recovery Fund (CRRF).--Created in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law nearly 5 years ago,\106\ the CRRF has still never been used to respond to a significant incident. The committee should conduct rigorous oversight to understand what processes have been put in place to expeditiously employ the CRRF and what policy decisions have been made by the Executive branch that have prevented its use. This is particularly timely, as the CRRF expires in just over 2 years. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \106\ https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The rise of product security regimes.--IST recently published a report highlighting opportunities for international convergence on product cybersecurity regimes, whether voluntary or mandatory.\107\ The report notes that, while few of the regimes are fully implemented today, that will not be the case by the end of next year. Congress should take this opportunity to explore different approaches and how they will affect products sold to U.S. businesses and consumers. Committee Members may also wish to examine how product cybersecurity approaches can map to AI tools. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \107\ https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/report/ comparative-analysis-of-product-cybersecurity/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Measures to disincentivize extortion payments.--With ransomware and related payments on the decline, there is no better time to explore mechanisms to further disincentivize payments--or at least help authorities better track criminals' financial infrastructure when a payment is made. These could include requirements to coordinate with law enforcement or to explore alternatives before paying extortionists.\108\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \108\ For more thoughts on pre-conditions for a ransomware payment ban, https://securityandtechnology.org/virtual-library/memo/roadmap-to- potential-prohibition-of-ransomware-payments/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The effect of AI on vulnerability disclosure.--Over the last 6 months, vulnerability disclosure programs have seen massive increases in the number of reports they receive.\109\ As AI drives the marginal cost of filing a report to zero, this may invalidate core assumptions about vulnerability management, including norms surrounding coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Committee Members may wish to explore the effects of the changing vulnerability disclosure landscape on Federal systems and on operational technology used by critical infrastructure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \109\ https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cve-program-ai- vulnerability-reports-funding/815594/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Work closely with other committees on broader cybersecurity issues.--House rules limit the ability of any one committee to comprehensively address cybersecurity issues. Building on the legacy of leadership from Congressman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, committee Members should provide thought leadership by working with: The Committee on Appropriations, particularly with respect to funding the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program.--Even with its temporarily extended authorization, no funds are currently appropriated to support this program. The Committee on Financial Services, to help accelerate the uptake of cyber insurance, including by exploring different backstop mechanisms to stabilize the market in the event of a systemic incident.\110\--As a market-based way of pricing risk, insurance has the potential to drive positive cybersecurity improvements throughout the economy. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \110\ https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/17/how-a-government- reinsurance-program-can-accelerate-maturation-of-the-cyber-insurance- market/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to support Universal Service Fund reforms to allow schools (and potentially hospitals) to purchase cybersecurity products and services with E-Rate funds.\111\--This work is complementary to this committee's work with SLTT governments. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \111\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/including- cybersecurity-in-the-e-rate-and-rural-healthcare-programs/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Committees on Armed Services; Energy and Commerce; and Intelligence, to address the ``Salt Typhoon'' incidents targeting U.S. telecommunications infrastructure.\112\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \112\ https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/congressional- oversight-on-salt-typhoon-missing-an-opportunity/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is a lot of work for Congress to do, but I have faith that the leaders on this committee will continue to prioritize cybersecurity as an urgent, non-partisan issue at the heart of our national security. At IST, we welcome the opportunity to continue to engage with you and your colleagues to support this crucial work. Thank you again for the invitation to testify. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Ms. Stifel. Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of question questioning. I now recognize myself for questioning. Ms. Kaiser, in your opening statement you mentioned that health care facilities have become the single most targeted within the group. I think the number that I recall you said that in 2025 there were 460 attacks, doubled from the previous year. You mentioned in your written opening statement and you touched a little bit briefly in your oral opening statement about an attack in my home State of Mississippi. Just for the benefit of the other Members of this committee, I want to read a little bit about what is contained there in your opening statement about that attack. You say on February 19, 2026, when ransomware actors struck the University of Mississippi Medical Center, also known as UMMC, that it was not simply a large hospital, but it was the medical backbone of the entire State. It is Mississippi's only academic medical center, operating 7 hospitals, 35 clinics State-wide, and home of the State's only Level 1 trauma center, the State's only children's hospital, and the only organ and bone marrow transplant program. When attackers took down UMMC's network, knocking Epic, its electric health care record system, fully off-line and forcing clinical staff to revert to pen and paper, they did not merely disrupt a business, they degraded the emergency medical capacity of an entire State. Clinics closed across Mississippi, outpatient surgeries and cancer treatment appointments were canceled. For 9 days the State's only facility equipped to handle the most severe trauma cases, operated under manual downtime procedures with staff tracking patients, medication, and orders on paper. You then go on to say the hackers behind the UMMC attack knew exactly what they were targeting. They contacted the hospital afterwards with demands. They understood that they had taken down a system that Mississippi patients depended on for survival. They used that leverage deliberately. Now, Ms. Kaiser, I will tell you that I believe that there are no penalties too severe for individuals who would target our health care system. In your report you--and you also touched on this in your opening statement, you talk about a couple of different things. You talk about using terrorist designations for, for those individuals who would attack hospitals. You talk about individuals being charged with murder or manslaughter if those attacks led to the death of individuals. I think you did say in your opening statement that there had been a number of deaths, 47 that had been documented with old information. We believe now that number to be in the hundreds. So as it relates to the terrorist designation under 18 U.S.C. 2331 and under 8 U.S.C. 1182, do you believe that the Department of Justice currently has the authority to charge under those sections or do you believe that Congress needs to specifically give the Department of Justice that authority? Ms. Kaiser. So the law defines terrorism as acts dangerous to human life intended to coerce a civilian population. I think that encrypting a hospital's systems and demanding ransoms while patients are being diverted meets that definition. But I'm not asking for a designation today. What I'm saying is that we need honest legal analysis toward that looking at the existing law and determining if departments believe it meets those thresholds. I mean, those designations aren't a blunt instrument, they're a scalpel. There's a deliberative process behind that where they only designate the worst of the worst. But I agree completely with you and I want to emphasize what you said, there's no penalty too strong for the individuals that are holding Americans' lives at risk. They're making calculated decisions to target these individuals. That's why Halcyon is actually funding an update to that research I noted to see exactly how we quantify the risk today. Mr. Guest. Are you aware of an example where the Department of Justice has ever used these code sections to seek criminal charges under the definition of terrorists for an attack on a health care system? Ms. Kaiser. I'm not aware of any. But with the new Executive Order, I think that opens a broader spectrum for the Attorney General to look at the most serious provable offenses and determine what weight they can bring to bear. Mr. Guest. One last question. As it relates to murder and manslaughter, as far as Federal felony murder charges, kind-of the same question, do you believe that Congress needs to give the Department of Justice additional authorities to charge under that section or do you believe that they have the current authorities now and we just need to make that on a case-by-case basis? Ms. Kaiser. Clarifying guidance would be helpful, but they likely have the authorities today under the current statutes. Mr. Guest. Thank you. At this time, I yield back and I recognize Mr. Correa for his 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Correa. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kaiser, I am going to follow up on that line of discussion. Do we need clarifying language to redefine or expand the intent of the law to go after some of these individuals? Sounds like the language is there. It just has not been applied in these circumstances. Ms. Kaiser. We've conducted legal analysis and have determined on our end that the language exists as it is now to be able to pursue this. But the process by which they conduct those types of activities is something that needs to be arbitrated across all of the departments. I'll emphasize one specific aspect there. It can be very difficult to prove an exact death at a hospital or medical facility in the middle of an attack. So we can look at Medicare data, Medicaid data, and say there's an excess number of deaths when there's a ransomware attack. But proving that one specific death is harder when you're going to paper and pen, when you don't have electronic records, when you're looking at--when you're in the middle of a crisis. So the way in which a prosecutor needs to approach this certainly needs---- Mr. Correa. Is this akin to the felony murder rule? Ms. Kaiser. Yes. Mr. Correa. Trying to think along those lines. Ms. Kaiser. Exactly. Mr. Correa. Thank you. Very quickly to each and every one of you, is the Federal Government doing enough in its role, a leading role in this area? Ms. Kaiser. Ms. Kaiser. I worked these issues for years at FBI and---- Mr. Correa. We need to step up even more. Ms. Kaiser. They need additional authorities and resources to be able to---- Mr. Correa. The answer is we need to do more. Mr. Redbord. Mr. Redbord. We need more resources. We need newer tools. We need more training---- Mr. Correa. Mr. Bercu. Mr. Redbord [continuing]. Across the Government. Mr. Bercu. We continue to work well with the Federal Government, but more is something that we think continues to need more resources and prioritization. Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel. Ms. Stifel. The acting director of CISA has identified the need to rehire 300 individuals. So I would say, yes, we definitely need additional resources. Mr. Correa. Those 300 were laid off through? Ms. Stifel. There have been significant decreases in staffing across the Federal Government, particularly in the cybersecurity space. We understand that about a third of CISA's work force has left the agency. Mr. Correa. Quick question to each one of you. Ms. Kaiser, what keeps you up at night? Ms. Kaiser. That Americans may not understand how much at risk is and how many lives at risk these criminal groups are holding them at every single day. Mr. Correa. Mr. Redbord. Mr. Redbord. That AI is supercharging the operations of our adversaries and we need to make sure that we're scaling at the same pace they are. Mr. Correa. Mr. Bercu. Mr. Bercu. You know, the daunting amount of work that we all need to put up our sleeves and do together. Mr. Correa. So we are not there yet. Far from it. Mr. Bercu. We're working on it, but yes. Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel. Ms. Stifel. The scope and scale of vulnerabilities across our critical infrastructure, in particular. Thinking also about our State and local entities that have recently had resources removed from their ability to shore up their defenses against cyber attacks. Mr. Correa. Finger pointing is easy to do up here. I think at the end of the day, we just got to step up and say the buck stops here. What is it, Ms. Kaiser, what are your recommendations that we in Congress can do to start fixing these challenges? Ms. Kaiser. Championing the policies that I noted within my opening statement, the terrorism designations, examining that. Examining the felony murder laws, but also ensuring that we are funding the State and local governments that are constantly under attack by these actors. Mr. Correa. State, the locals as well. Mr. Redbord. Mr. Redbord. Empowering the private sector. The Government has the authorities. The private sector has the data. The private sector needs the authorities as well to go after bad actors. Mr. Correa. Strengthen the weakest link in the chain. Mr. Bercu. Mr. Bercu. You know, I agree with my colleagues. There's a lot of work being done in the private sector. There's a lot of innovation, investment, and we need to keep pushing forward with that and partnership with the Government. Mr. Correa. Ms. Stifel. Ms. Stifel. I would say looking to pass long-term or permanent extensions of cybersecurity authorities, including the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 and the State and local Cybersecurity Security Improvement Act of 2021. Mr. Correa. In my last 28 seconds that I have, I would have an ask for you. Five minutes is very short for us to get to specifics, but I would ask each and every one of you to give me in writing later on your 5 top recommendations of what we here in Congress can do to move forward on these issues, not only protecting the future Colonial pipelines, but protecting Main Street. Those are the folks that just have nowhere to turn other than really to suffer in silence. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields. The Chair now recognizes Chairman Ogles for his questioning. Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here. I mean, obviously we are in a new era, a new day when it comes to cyber and cyber attacks, et cetera, primarily driven by AI. That is where I guess I want to start is what--when you look at AI and the tools that are being deployed and how quickly AI is advancing, what can these criminal networks do today that they couldn't do just months ago, Ms. Kaiser? Ms. Kaiser. So we see predominantly adversaries using AI to gain that initial step into--from company networks. What I mean by that, it's easier to lie with AI. It's easier to make convincing emails with malicious links. It's easier to make these deepfakes, these fake videos or fake voice calls that trick companies into letting them on the network. Then it's easier to exploit vulnerabilities or find vulnerabilities that let them on. That being said, what we see today is, is the most benefit is going toward the wannabe cyber actors. Advanced adversaries are integrating AI. They're looking at it in a way in which businesses are today for efficiencies. But there's a world of people who couldn't do attacks yesterday; they can today. Even if they're noisy, even if they're not all that effective, going from 0 percent to 5 percent's a big win for them. What we're going to do is exhaust security teams and cause massive problems in how they develop these tools, how they develop their attacks, where it may render certain types of data or certain companies just unavailable for recovery. Mr. Ogles. Mr. Redbord. Mr. Redbord. There are two really important pieces to this. First, our adversaries are using it at scale. I mentioned a 500 percent increase in AI-enabled fraud and scams. We see ransomware actors using agents as affiliates really for the first time. We're seeing North Korea use it to launder the proceeds of billion-dollar crypto hacks. But the other part that sort of I'm most focused on at TRM, we're working with the Department of Justice, with the Treasury Department, with the FBI, IRS-CI, DEA, Secret Service to provide AI-enabled tools that allow us to move as fast. For me, that's the answer here, right? Bad actors are always early adopters of transformative technology. Think automobiles, end- to-end encrypted messaging apps, crypto, and now AI. We need to move as fast as those bad actors and the tools exist today. Mr. Ogles. Mr. Bercu. Mr. Bercu. Yes, you know, I'd echo a lot of the comments of my colleagues, that they--it really enables improvement of the quality of the scam and really helps that. It makes--you know, more people are able to do the scams that now they have the equipment. But it also increases the kills scale and what we see in the calling side. That said, you know, similarly, our folks are using AI. They've long used machine learning automation. So there's some things like it's easier in the calling networks to detect someone making millions of calls versus someone making 5 really bad ones. So some of our tools actually still work well in an AI world, but we're continuing to evolve as well. Mr. Ogles. Ms. Stifel. Ms. Stifel. AI is making it harder for victims to say no to making a payment. One of the reasons for this is the shift that we've seen in the ransomware ecosystem. Whereas previously ransomware actors encrypted data, meaning that they locked it up, they now take the data and use it to extort victims to force them to make a payment. So when they've copied records, whether it be from a hospital, intellectual property from a Fortune 500 company, or someone's private images, as the Ranking Member described, they're now using AI to analyze that data to be better able to--they, in fact, in many cases know the victim's financial--for example, their financial capacity more than the victims do. They're using that analysis capability to essentially have a response to every blockade that the victim tries to assert, making it harder for the victims to not make the payment and disclosing this information, eventually jeopardizing both the long-term stability of that organization, but also putting our ability as leaders in the global economy and innovators at risk. Mr. Ogles. Thank you, ma'am. Ms. Kaiser, you know, 5 years ago, the Department of Justice made the decision to elevate ransomware investigations to the same priority level as terrorism cases. As we go forward, should it be not just a priority, but actually classified as a terrorist attack when you are targeting critical infrastructure? Ms. Kaiser. There are substantial benefits to what you're talking about. I mean, a designation doesn't just freeze assets, it changes the entire geopolitical equation. In particular, imagine telling a foreign government you have a designated terrorist living in your country. That changes safe haven conversations with these countries that are harboring all of these criminal groups. I think this will really have an effect, especially among the 60 nations who we share a membership with the international counter ransomware initiatives, saying nation-states that tolerate ransomware criminals, they need to feel that pressure. Mr. Ogles. And then real quickly, you know, obviously this is a problem at scale. I mean, prior to my current role, I was CEO of the county, the county executive. We had a regional hospital, you know, in my county. Incredibly vulnerable, right? So what is more practical, making that type of designation and cutting the head off of the snake, so to speak, or trying to equip municipalities across the country? Either is difficult. But we have got to figure this out as we go forward because, again, it is becoming more aggressive. Really quickly, and I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Kaiser. I don't think I can choose. I think you have to have defense and offense to be able to block these attacks at their source. One note I'd make is that when we're equipping municipalities, when we're providing out those funds, we do need to make sure that we're equipping them with the knowledge as well of how to spend that money, how to arbitrate between the various aspects, and ensuring, to your earlier question on AI, we're looking not just at prevention, which is going to be really difficult in the age of AI, but like, how do you detect it quickly. How do you kick them off your network? How do you really make sure you're resilient? Mr. Ogles. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his questioning. Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to my colleagues and to our expert witnesses here. Cyber scams are a tremendous and growing challenge. We see that in my home State of Rhode Island. We know that critical infrastructure is being targeted, water systems, power systems, hospital systems, businesses, organizations. I think the most tragic stories are when seniors are scammed, scammed out of their life savings that they worked their whole lives for and, in some cases, reduced to poverty as a result. So this is something that should be a priority of this Congress. I thank my colleagues for convening this hearing. A few issues that I wanted to call attention to and ask our witnesses about. Mr. Bercu, in your written testimony, you talked about SIM farms, or SIM, I forget what you call it, the phrase you used, but SIM boxes, think this is very important. We had--a few of us had a Classified briefing on the topic not long ago. Could you just explain to all of us once again what these are and why they are so dangerous? Mr. Bercu. Yes, absolutely. So it's where the criminal actors will get prepaid phones, prepaid SIM cards. They can plug it into technology and then they are able to generate from the United States on our networks, calls that really, when the caller may sit, or, you know, text messages and the like, may sit abroad. So it really is an enabler. It's not calls coming in through the--through foreign gateways, they're actually starting in the United States. Mr. Magaziner. Crucially, some of these SIM boxes or SIM farms, you know, can generate thousands of calls, right? Thousands of calls, essentially anonymously, that can be used, you know, with real phone numbers to fraudulently scam people. Is that right? Mr. Bercu. Yes. One of the challenges is it doesn't look like an individual who's making, you know, hundreds of thousands of calls because it's individual numbers, individual SIMs making a handful of calls. But it is something the industry's been working on, how to better identify it with traffic and analytics. Mr. Magaziner. Well, that is what I wanted to ask about. I mean, to any of our witnesses, do you feel that the telecommunications industry is doing enough to identify where these SIM farms are located? Because as I understand it, if thousands and thousands of calls a day are being made from the same building, the same geography, that ought to be something that the companies themselves could, could track and potentially flag for the authorities. Is that not right? Mr. Bercu. So it's something the industry has been working on. There's--you know, it's a complex ecosystem. It's not just customers of the large carriers, it's sometimes their resellers. But it is something that we've been working. We've had a working group with the major carriers that we've been tracing back calls that we identify SIM farms sharing information and figuring out how to do filtering and other things to take them down quicker. Mr. Magaziner. Would anybody else like to weigh in on this? Is there more that the industry could be doing or that we could help the industry do to local locate these SIM farms? All right. Let me ask a related question then. My understanding is that one of the things that these fraudulent numbers are used for is to open fake social media accounts. Right? You can use a fake phone number from a SIM card to open a Facebook account or an X account or whatever. Once it has been identified that an account has been opened with a fraudulent number, why would a social media company keep those accounts active? Am I correct that the big social media companies are still keeping accounts active that they know were created with a fake phone number? That is my understanding. So, you know, I think we have to have a conversation with our industry partners, not just in the telecommunications industry about locating these SIM farms, but also with the email companies, the social media companies. If there is an account, and I think there are millions of them that we know were open fraudulently with fraudulent phone numbers, why are you keeping those accounts active? They are clearly being used for fraud. I just want to ask, I only have a moment left, so I just want to ask all of our witnesses. The CISA work force has been absolutely decimated over the last year. I think close to half of the CISA employees have been eliminated. Does anybody think this is a good idea from a cybersecurity point of view? OK. Second, the administration has approved the sale of advanced Nvidia chips to China, to the Chinese Communist government that is, in many cases, a sponsor of cyber attacks against the United States. Does anybody think allowing the sale of these advanced chips is a good idea? Well, that is something that I think we ought to do something about as a Congress on a bipartisan basis. With that, I will yield. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for his questioning. Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say thank you to you guys for showing up today to help us get a better handle on this issue on on-line scams, crypto fraud, and digital exhortation. I actually had a constituent reach out to me probably about 6 months ago, who had saw an ad on FOX News, and it was for farming equipment, tractors, et cetera, used equipment. He actually ended up making the purchase and never received the product. So he reached out to me. We were able to get in touch with the, you know, Federal agencies who looked into it. Thankfully, the bank worked with this gentleman and helped him get his money back. But then he continued to text me, letting me know that he was still seeing this ad run on FOX News. So a lot of our constituents see something on FOX News or CNN or whatever channel they are watching, and they see that having some integrity to it. We really haven't covered, that I have heard in this hearing, what would you guys advise average Joe American to do? What, you know, operating procedures would you have them look at and avoiding even getting involved in any of these scams? I am going to start with you, Ms. Kaiser. Ms. Kaiser. So when I was at the FBI, one of the teams that I had responsibility for was the Internet Crime Complaint Center, so the group that does the report we talked about today. The question I got a lot is, why do you put out these stats? Like, what do you hope to get out of this? My No. 1 answer was, so that people don't feel alone. Right? That individuals understand that this happens to a large swath of American citizens and that if they should believe--if they believe they have been scammed, if they believe they've been attacked, they should report it to local law enforcement, to the FBI, to the Internet Crime Complaint Center. They should contact their bank right away because oftentimes, and I'll defer to my colleague on some of these money flows, but oftentimes some of that money can be recouped if it's done quickly. Mr. Crane. But before we even get to that point, Ms. Kaiser, where they are attacked, how do they avoid getting attacked in the first place? You know, how do they notice or have their Spidey senses go off that, hey, this doesn't exactly feel right? Does anyone want to help the average Joe American with that one? Ms. Kaiser. So it's incredibly difficult, but what I would note is that if you feel under, like, urgent pressure, it's probably a scam. Take a beat, take a step, call someone in your family, contact and identify ways in which you can verify that company. But it's really when you're put under pressure, oftentimes that's the biggest indicator that something's wrong. Mr. Crane. Go ahead, Mr. Redbord. Mr. Redbord. I would just add, and I think that was, quite frankly, beautifully said. I think what we need is a massive public service campaign at a Federal level across all these different jurisdictions, a ``Just Say No,'' if you will, for scams and fraud. We need people to understand that, to take a beat, as Ms. Kaiser said. At TRM, we run the largest reporting database for fraud and scams in the crypto ecosystem. It's called chainabuse.com. You can go on your phone and look at it right now. It's just open source. It provides victims an opportunity to report so other people are not ultimately scammed down the road. So I think it's a combination of things. You're right that we talk a lot about offense and how to go after these transnational groups, but really defense is a key part of this. I think public service and awareness is absolutely critical here. Mr. Crane. Of all the ways that these scammers can target Americans, whether it's text message, social media, phone calls, emails, of all of those are you seeing these individuals target, you know, specifically or more predominantly through a certain means? Mr. Redbord. You know, it's through a whole host of different types of ways. Just to put a point on it. I think one more thing Ms. Kaiser said is that the FBI has been terrific in this area. It's not only through IC3, but they run a program called Level Up where they're literally doing hand-to-hand combat. They're going to reach out to victims directly, show up at your door and say, hey, don't go ahead and send those funds. Obviously, it's very hard for this to scale, but you marry technology with that type of initiative and, and there's a lot of good work being done out there. Mr. Crane. Absolutely. My office 2 weeks ago had FBI out at events in Payson, Arizona, and Overgaard to help residents identify and look at some of the ways that they could possibly be scammed or defrauded. So I want to say thank you to the FBI for doing that. Mr. Bercu or Ms. Stifel, with my remaining time, do you guys have any suggestions for Americans on how to avoid even getting entangled in any of these fraudulent schemes? Mr. Bercu. Yes, I'd agree with my colleagues, especially to take a beat, but I think, No. 1, is recognize that any of us could be a victim. I mean, I work on these issues and I was under the spell for a few seconds when I got a message that my account was accessed from Russia. So it can happen to any of us. So I think that's why the take a beat is really important. But take advantage of the tools that are out there. There's blocking, labeling, there's other things on the phone side. Use those. [The information from Ms. Stifel follows:] I am writing to provide a formal statement for the record following the hearing held on April 21, 2026. During your questioning, you inquired about specific resources available to help your constituents in Arizona's 2d District identify and defend against increasingly sophisticated on-line frauds. Due to the expiration of your questioning time, I was unable to provide a response. The primary resource I intended to highlight is PauseTake9 (pausetake9.org), a digital awareness initiative that provides a defense mechanism against cyber threats: the 9-second pause. The PauseTake9 platform provides actionable tools designed to disrupt the high-pressure tactics often used by scammers. Key resources available to your constituents include: The 9-Second Rule.--Encourages users to pause for 9 seconds before clicking a link or sharing information, providing the necessary time to recognize phishing attempts and social engineering. Defense Checklists.--Step-by-step guidance on implementing technical safeguards, such as using password managers and setting up passkeys to replace vulnerable passwords. Proactive Protection Tools.--Direct links to official services for freezing credit through major bureaus (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion) to prevent unauthorized accounts. Reporting Support.--Pathways to report fraudulent activity via the FTC and the BBB Scam Tracker, ensuring individual experiences contribute to broader law enforcement efforts. This resource is effective because it focuses on human behavior-- the ``weakest link'' in the cybersecurity chain--and empowers individuals to regain control during high-stress interactions. As the other witnesses noted, these ``active pause'' techniques could be of significant benefit to the residents of your district. Thank you for your leadership on this issue and for the opportunity to supplement the hearing record. Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for her questioning. Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chair and Ranking Member, for this hearing today and for the witnesses, all for being here as well. While the substance of this hearing is certainly very serious, we were back to Republican hearings dripping in unseriousness. I will tell you why. It is laughable that my Republican colleagues are trying to use this time to condemn fraud, extortion, and crime, while, No. 1, supporting the most corrupt, scammy administration in U.S. history; and No. 2, being completely unwilling to conduct oversight or rein in the scammer-in-chief. In preparing for today's hearing, it was noted profit- motivated transnational criminal organizations, they leverage corruption, intimidation, and advanced technologies so they can reach new markets and create income streams. Such organizations defraud U.S. citizens, businesses, and Government agencies while at the same time moving billions of dollars in illegal earnings through global financial systems. Does this sound familiar to anyone else? The House Judiciary Committee Democrats released a report last year that documented how the President has used his office to enrich himself and his family with crypto holdings worth as much as $11.6 billion, an income of more than $800 million from the sale of crypto assets in the first half of 2025 alone, while at the same time dismantling Federal oversight and safeguards that once protected Americans from fraud, from scams, and financial exploitation. Profit-motivated transnational crime, corruption, and scamming, that is how the Trump administration operates. He uses all those tools to reward his loyalists and then to be able to remain in power. Look, while I agree we have to combat corruption, crime, and scams, and it has to be important for us to understand the U.S. economic and national security impact, we also have to understand that combating these threats require adequately resourcing and staffing these Federal agencies, staffing critical infrastructure, and having checks and balances and policy solutions to that make us all more secure. But my colleagues here are unwilling to do any of these things. How? They are decimating CISA, they are abdicating their oversight authority, and they are wasting our time instead of advancing policies that protect working people from today's crooks and con men in office or from buying seats in Congress. Look, my district is so tired of corruption, of self- dealing, and lack of accountability. So I want to get to a quick question here. Ms. Stifel, it is my understanding that in March the White House released President Trump's Cybersecurity Strategy for America. The document was just over 3 pages of substance around about I think 6 pillars. In your professional opinion, is a 6-page document with 3 pages of substance sufficient to describe a comprehensive strategy that for American cybersecurity? Ms. Stifel. The most recently-released strategy does stand in contrast to the 2018 strategy, which laid out a number of key elements that would strengthen the country's cybersecurity posture, including establishing a Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Mrs. Ramirez. Yes, thank you for your response. The reality is, I will say it more directly, it is not because the 2018 strategy was far more comprehensive than what we are seeing today, and it should concern every single Member of these subcommittees. It is because Trump and his cronies around the world are the most dangerous transnational criminal network threatening us right now. They are swindling us, stealing our hard-earned dollars, waging a war in our cities, and committing war crimes abroad, all for private profit. It is not lost on me that Trump signed the legislation establishing CISA, but started attacking it the minute it became an obstruction to his criminal interest. If you ask Republicans, do you want to use the power of Government to end hunger? Nope. Make housing more affordable? Nah. Bring the prices of gas down? No. But if you ask them, do you want to use the power of Government to get rich and trick, cheat, and defraud the American people? Well, what we have seen here is why the response is yes, let's do that. That is despicable. That is not why we were sent to Congress. It is why we have to address the issues of cybersecurity, but we also have to address the issues of corruption in the White House. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Knott, for his questioning. Mr. Knott. To the witnesses, thank you all for being here. This is obviously a very important issue, one that is of great significance to all Americans. Ms. Kaiser, let me just start with you. We have talked a lot about, you know, Government personnel and resources that are in place and so forth. But given the dynamism of this threat, how important is it, not just a staffing component, but also a systems component to address this issue? Is it even possible from a governmental standpoint alone? Ms. Kaiser. In terms of systems, you're talking about the actual networks---- Mr. Knott. Yes. Ms. Kaiser [continuing]. From a governmental system. So within the Government itself, I was lucky enough to be able to be a part of the interagency weekly meetings that talked about, you know, threats to the U.S. Government networks as well as threats to across our critical infrastructure. What I can say is it's the same. Right? The types of targeting that happens to the private sector, happens to the Government. The defenses are the same. It's ensuring that, that you've done basics. Mr. Knott. Right. Ms. Kaiser. But now with AI, right, you have to do more. It's really in that kind-of you have to assume you could be compromised. So what do you do then? How do you kick them off? Mr. Knott. In terms of the threat itself, creating a defense for that threat is obviously going to require a whole lot of flexibility, a lot of creativity. These are adjectives that are not usually reserved for the Government side of things. So I am asking from your standpoint, how can the Government evolve with the threat that seems to change day over day, night after night? Ms. Kaiser. So one aspect is when the Government is looking at reauthorizing and allocating the funds, the cybersecurity grants that Congress has authorized, it's doing so in a really smart way, like identifying the actual needs of the sector or Government agencies that are receiving the funds. It's having a two-way conversation, not a one-way conversation. It's moving fast. It's being able to allocate those funds because in cybersecurity, you know, time equals attacks. Mr. Knott. Yes. Mr. Redbord, I want the same chapter to you. I am very skeptical of that. When you look at the Government bureaucracies, whether it is Federal, State, or local, they are usually clumsy and very wasteful, and that is not the nature of this threat. From your perspective, how can we best align to defend the American people against this type of threat? Mr. Redbord. Thank you for the question. Look, over the last, you know, couple of years, I think we've seen a real willingness from the public sector to be working much more closely with the private sector. Part of this is because we move very, very fast. Whether that means ensuring that the Government has the data they need, we have it, or we can go out and get it and we provide it. So I think the real key here to solving this is working really, really closely together to ensure that the authorities and the data are all there to take on this threat. Mr. Knott. In terms of the ingredients that are needed to match the threat, from your perspective, what types of needs and progressions do we need to be sure that we are supporting in Congress? Mr. Redbord. It's really that--I mean, you and I were both assistant U.S. Attorneys, and I think it's really about the tools. It's that investigators have every single tool they need. When bad actors are leveraging technology, we need to make sure that every investigator has the AI technology, the blockchain intelligence, the things that they need to invest in these cases. Mr. Knott. Well, that is never going to happen from the Government side organically. So with the private-sector side, how can we ensure that we have the necessary environment so that the private sector can develop the tools that will be used to protect Americans? Mr. Redbord. Absolutely. In my opening statement, I mentioned the Beacon Network. Mr. Knott. Yes. Mr. Redbord. It's the largest public-private partnership in this space. It's in large part because the private sector came together and said, hey, we need to stop bad actors in the wake of a North Korea hack from off ramping funds to use for weapons proliferation. So we all came together, reached out to the public sector and said, let's do this together. I think that's a really sharp model for what is possible today. Mr. Knott. In terms of the posture of our country, it seems in many respects, I mean, we have mentioned China, Russia, North Korea, and certainly the Iranian folks, they are all attacking us. It seems to have exceeded law enforcement and moves into more of a national security component. How does that change the posture at all? I will start with you, Ms. Kaiser. Ms. Kaiser. It's absolutely a national security issue. I think that countering cyber threats from wherever they come is when really the national security challenge of our lifetime. You mentioned the nation-states, and one aspect I'd like to highlight here is nation-states, so we've seen Iran, we've seen China, we've seen Russia, we've seen North Korea actually use these cyber criminal tactics, use the same infrastructure, use the same way in which the criminal groups are targeting us to actually conduct attacks on American networks. That's happened in the Iranian conflict right now. So it's really important to look at this all as a connected system and understand that disrupting one component disrupts others. Mr. Redbord. It is the absolutely most important shift in the posture, you know, in recent history, moving from law enforcement to national security. The reality is that wars are now fought in cyber space and across blockchains and we have to leverage every national security piece that we can, offensive and defensive. Mr. Bercu. Yes, I just agree with my colleagues here. Ms. Stifel. I would just add that I think we also, as we're thinking about CISA, is for Congress to authorize the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative. We, as you have reiterated, depend on industry to help strengthen and defend America. We at this point are not on our strongest footing with, among other things, also the lapse of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Panel capability for the Secretary of DHS and the director of CISA to have honest conversations with industry about the range of threats that they're facing and the capabilities they can bring to defeat them. Mr. Knott. Great. Mr. Chairman, yield back. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Johnson, for her questioning. Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. I think this is a very critical and important discussion in our Nation at this time. We have all experienced an extreme increase in spam texts and calls ranging from toll road payments and UPS package fees to solicitations for crypto investments or even romantic relationships. In 2024 alone, Texans reported losing $1.35 billion to scams with the most significant losses reported to those over 60 years old. WFAA, a local news outlet in Dallas, reported that scam reports increased in 2025 by 118 percent, doubling what was reported in 2024. These scams often target vulnerable communities and 3 in 10 Americans who lost money to scams say it has a significant impact on their finances. In one case, a victim lost $47 million causing an entire bank to collapse and hundreds of people to lose their retirement savings. The truth is these sinister operations by profit-motivated transnational criminal organizations are operating at a never- before-seen scale and our Government is not equipped to address it right now. This is a self-inflicted wound thanks to the Trump administration's gutting of CISA whose mission includes identifying and preventing these crimes. I want to echo many of the concerns my colleagues have made and many of you on the panel have made concerning the defunding of CISA and that we need to absolutely invest in a robust CISA if we are going to address this problem. Ms. Stifel, my understanding is that these scams have accelerated in recent years to the proliferation of hundreds of large-scale compounds powered by forced labor across Southeast Asia, particularly in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, as well as the Philippines. In Cambodia, for example, corrupt officials allow scam centers to operate in the open, where scamming now generates $12 billion annually, over half of that country's GDP. Why is international collaboration so critical in addressing these scam centers? How have recent cuts in the reorganization of the State Department put those efforts of collaboration at risk? Ms. Stifel. We are, as the Ranking Member mentioned in his opening statement, only as strong as our weakest link. The examples that you gave are representative of issues that we see as we also explore ransomware, including the willingness of safe havens to harbor criminals and not respond to requests for assistance or to deny--bury their head in the sand. We depend on the whole-of-Government, as my colleagues have mentioned, response to the threats that this country faces that are emanating through information and communications technologies or the internet. That means that we need to have not only a deep bench at CISA, but we also, as you mentioned, need to have a deep bench at State. Among other things, the State Department is now our lead in something called the Counter Ransomware Initiative, which is now in its fourth year with now over 70 countries and organizations participating in it. It is the one place where these governments and multilateral organizations have come together to identify priority, exchange best practices, identify policy objectives, build investigative capacity to counter, in this case, the ransomware threat. But that type of leadership that emanated from the United States, the Counter Ransomware Initiative, is something that the United States started. The State Department has taken on the responsibility to carry the mantle in this administration. We need to continue to show that leadership and we have to do so with a full bench around the interagency, both at State, FBI, CISA, elsewhere. Ms. Johnson. Right. I am very concerned about the diminished bench that we have at this time. This is just to the general panel, what suggestions do you have for this committee to how we can improve collaboration between Department of Homeland Security and the State Department to address this issue? In particular, do you all have any specific recommendations other than what Stifel was just talking about? Mr. Redbord. Well, I would just say over the last, you know, several months, year, we've seen more and more sort-of interagency approach to these issues. It's not going to just be the State Department. It's not going to be just DHS or law enforcement agencies or national security agencies. It's really all coming together. A couple great examples, I think, that exist today, the DOJ started a scam center strike force about 6 months ago. There was a takedown of one of these large scam compounds in Cambodia called Prince Group that involved the largest forfeiture action in U.S. history, about 15 billion of proceeds from this type of illicit activity. There's a model in place, but there's also 10 more, 15 more Prince Groups across Southeast Asia. We have to leverage every authority from offensive cyber to public-private work in order to go after these bad actors. Ms. Johnson. Unfortunately, I am out of time. But Mr. Chairman, thank you for this conversation. I do think responding to scams in this country is one of the most critical things we can be doing, and I applaud the work. Thank you. Mr. Guest. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for his question. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing on an important topic. ``We want the bureaucrats to be traumatically affected. When they wake up in the morning we want them not to want to go to work because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. We want their funding to be shut down. We want to put them in trauma.'' That was Russ Vought, President Trump's OMB director, talking about, among others, the 1,000 Federal workers who worked at CISA were fired, pushed out, or driven out. So while we have an Executive Order, words on paper that says we take this issue seriously, we have a lot of language at the dais today about how important this is, this administration is not taking cybersecurity seriously. Because when you treat the experts who are doing the work, and they are creative, I will talk about that, when you treat the experts that way, you are not taking the issue seriously. I want to just cite some of what you wrote in your written testimony, Ms. Stifel. ``The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, a core mechanism for coordinating cyber policy across Government industry, has yet to restart since being shuttered.'' The Secretary of Homeland Security--if the Secretary of Homeland Security decides ``to convene sector- specific advisory committees, coordination will be a challenge given cuts,'' budget cuts to the FBI's Cyber Division, expected to reduce personnel by half. The acting commander of USCYBERCOM testified that the effect on the command's ability to carry out its mission would be impactful because of budget cuts. We have talked about the State and local cybersecurity grant program, which proved, quoting Ms. Stifel, ``effective in marshaling resources to help State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments improve their defenses, yet it has been zeroed out in the administration's budget. Shared cybersecurity services provided at subsidized rates for State and local governments, especially small rural State and local governments that don't have the resources through the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center, have been canceled, leaving States'' and local governments, especially in rural communities, ``to scramble for protection.'' That is what has happened. Ms. Stifel, one that you didn't, I don't think, note in your written testimony, I apologize, I missed some of what you said, is CISA's Pre-Ransomware Notification Initiative. Can you tell us what that is or perhaps what it was? Ms. Stifel. Thank you. It's a really critical program that currently is not operating to my knowledge. The individual who ran the program is no longer at the agency. The program essentially received indications of warning from industry, in many cases, in part supported by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act and the incentives that that legislation offers to industry, the liability protection it affords, to share information with the Government, the Government can then leverage to defend the homeland. So this program, run by actually basically one individual, would call--receive these tips and call victims who either already had a threat actor in their networks or were known to be soon to be targeted by these threat actors, and gave them notice that they were about to become a victim and in many cases worked with those victims and with their counsel to try and mitigate the risk that this--they knew that they were about to face. Mr. Walkinshaw. Would you describe that work as creative and nimble? Ms. Stifel. Quite. It's also, I think I want to underscore that it is really driven on trust. The ability for this particular individual to notify over 4,000 organizations and prevent them from beginning--from becoming victims and preventing billions of dollars in losses to the economy doesn't come from 3 weeks on the job. It comes from, I think he was at the Department for over a decade. Mr. Walkinshaw. I will put a finer point on it, $9 billion. Nine billion dollars in damages that initiative prevented in large part because of the work, to use the term Director Vought likes to use, of one bureaucrat. I guess we succeeded in making him not want to go to work because he left and that program is no longer functioning. So ransomware is occurring today because this administration drove out the expert, the Federal employee who was helping to prevent it to the tune of $9 billion. We are shooting ourselves in the foot. We have to stop attacking the experts who serve our Nation because we have a political agenda. If this administration doesn't stop doing that, we will continue to lose this cyber war. I yield back. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for his questioning. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the Ranking Member as well. I welcome the witnesses. Mr. Chairman, we understand that cryptocurrency fraud is something that has to be dealt with by way of regulation. Currently, using digital methodologies and unregulated currencies, TCOs can remain anonymous and evade law enforcement, this ability to be pseudonymous. Pseudonymity is a problem. Pseudonymity, it is a problem because we have allowed a system to develop that allows people to transfer unlimited amounts of funds without identifying themselves. Ms. Stifel, how do you propose we regulate such that we can deal with the pseudonymity aspect of the transference of large sums of money, which, by the way, may go to terrorist organizations used for ransom purposes, extortion? How do we deal with that? Ms. Stifel. Congressman, when we established the Ransomware Task Force one of its core recommendations was to ensure that know your customer and anti-money laundering capabilities were required of exchanges that transmit these currencies. In addition, we think that similar due diligence measures can also be taken in other aspects of the ecosystem, for example, in the domain registration space. That would also help us take a more scaled approach to combating a range of illicit activity on- line. Mr. Green. Now, pseudonymity exists and is efficacious because you have peer-to-peer transfer of money, cryptocurrency. In the banking system, you have a central bank, goes to the central bank, then to a person. We still have this problem of peer-to-peer transfers. By the way, we can catch many of the culprits, but it is difficult and some of the culprits get away because of peer-to- peer business. The crypto industry is spending millions upon millions of dollars to make sure Congress has people within it who are going to support the peer-to-peer transfers. They place privacy above the ability to prevent extortion, to prevent avoiding paying taxes on money. This pseudonymity has to be dealt with such that we, as you said, know your customer. But you can't know your customer if you don't have a customer to know. So, again, I am not pressing you. I understand you understand the problem, but the problem is actually bigger than simply saying we would like to regulate when millions upon millions are being spent to buy the best Congress that money can buy to support the crypto industry's insatiable appetite to maintain pseudonymity. I welcome your comment if you have one. Ms. Stifel. The ability to investigate illicit activity is central to the Government's ability to defend the Nation. So I would assert that there's definitely a need to have greater visibility into a range of activity on-line, which is one of the reasons why, in my written testimony, I reiterated the need to reauthorize the Cybersecurity and Information Sharing Act of 2015. Mr. Green. I have 11 seconds. Yes, I read body language quite well. Mr. Redbord. Thank you so much. I spent my career as a prosecutor investigating cases involving bulk cash smuggling and networks of hawalas and shell companies and high-value art. There was no ability to trace those things on an open public ledger. We work very closely with law enforcement today to be able to combat fraud and financial crime in crypto because we actually have the ability to watch every transaction in real time. There's a lot of benefit there. Mr. Green. Thank you. Mr. Redbord. Thank you. Mr. Green. Every transaction is more than just a few thousand transactions. Do you agree? Mr. Redbord. Every transaction is more than a few thousand transactions. I'm so sorry. Mr. Green. You said you have the ability to watch every transaction. Mr. Redbord. Every transaction in real time on an open public ledger where crypto is. Mr. Green. Right, and what I am saying to you that that is an awesome number of transactions. Mr. Redbord. It's an awesome number of transactions. We can now see more transactions in--on blockchains than we can in the traditional world. Mr. Green. In so doing, you have to also not only see them, now you have got to look into each one of them so as to ascertain whether or not this is a part of some illicit trade. Mr. Redbord. Absolutely. We can now do that on blockchains, where you never could do that in the traditional financial system, right, through networks of wire transfers and bulk cash. Now we can see every transaction move on an open public ledger in real time and track and trace to build investigations. Mr. Green. Are you saying that all transactions are on the open public ledger? Mr. Redbord. All transactions on public blockchains, so Bitcoin. Mr. Green. Public blockchain? Mr. Redbord. Public blockchains. Mr. Green. OK. Do you agree that there are blockchains that you are not monitoring? Mr. Redbord. We monitor every blockchain. Mr. Green. Every blockchain in history, every blockchain that exists? Mr. Redbord. When you lose visibility on financial transactions in the cryptocurrency world, it's often because it moves into a cryptocurrency exchange or off the blockchain. Certainly there are privacy tools and we are getting very, very good at being able to track those. Mr. Green. Permit me to ask this as a follow-up. The people who engage in extortion, the people who engage in extortion and succeed with the extortion, explain how they elude the transparency that you are speaking of. Mr. Redbord. It's really become a race. It's a race between law enforcement and bad actors. Bad actors are trying to off- ramp their funds as fast as they can. So a ransom payment is made in Bitcoin, for example. The FBI and others are using tools like TRM to track and trace. But it's this cat-and-mouse game that has always existed. That's why we have to shut down those off ramps. Just real quickly, those off ramps are highly regulated. They're required to have, in the United States today, they're required to have compliance controls on those. Mr. Green. I am in agreement with you. That is why I mentioned the awesome number. Because of the number and the speed at which these transactions take place and the pseudonymity associated with it, it makes it difficult to catch the culprit who is moving quickly before you can get to him. Mr. Redbord. That's why it's so important that law enforcement and regulators have the tools to move as fast as these bad actors. Mr. Green. I agree with you. Mr. Redbord. Thank you. Mr. Green. Thank you. Mr. Guest. The gentleman yields back. I would like to again thank our witnesses for being here. Just to show the frequency of these attacks, as we were here addressing this very important topic, my good friend and the Ranking Member received an email scam just moments ago. So this is another one, as he would say. So this is an on-going issue that we will continue to address. Again, your testimony, your insight into these topics help us as we try to shape policy and try to make sure that we are legislating to protect the American public. In closing, the Members of this committee may have additional questions for the witnesses. We would ask that witnesses respond to any additional questions in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for a period of 10 days. Without any objection, this committee stands adjourned. Thank you again. [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] [all]