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[Senate Hearing 119-303] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-303 MADE IN CHINA, PAID BY SENIORS: STOPPING THE SURGE OF INTERNATIONAL SCAMS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ WASHINGTON, DC __________ JANUARY 14, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-22 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 62-924 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland ---------- McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1 Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member......................................................... 2 PANEL OF WITNESSES Nathan Picarsic, Senior Fellow, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 3 Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP, Washington, DC................................................. 5 Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence, Chainalysis, New York, New York................................ 7 Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC................................................. 9 APPENDIX Prepared Witness Statements Nathan Picarsic, Senior Fellow, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 28 Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP, Washington, DC................................................. 34 Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence, Chainalysis, New York, New York................................ 43 Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC................................................. 61 Questions for the Record Kathy Stokes, Senior Director, Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP, Washington, DC................................................. 85 Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Audit Services, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC................................................. 86 Statements for the Record National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys Statement................ 89 Social Security Administration Statement......................... 91 Stop Scams Alliance Statement.................................... 96 ................................................................. MADE IN CHINA, PAID BY SENIORS: STOPPING THE SURGE OF INTERNATIONAL SCAMS ---------- Wednesday, January 14, 2026 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:32 p.m., Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senator Scott, Johnson, Moody, Gillibrand, and Warren. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN The Chairman. The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging will now come to order. Today, we're here to discuss a growing threat to American seniors and our families. The surge of international scams rooted in Communist China and its regional criminal networks. Scams targeting seniors are stealing billions of dollars from hardworking Americans, and we here in Congress have a responsibility to confront them head on. The scope of this problem is staggering. In 2024, older Americans lost more than $4.8 billion to fraud according to the FBI. These are retirees who spend decades working, saving, and planning for their futures, only to have their lives upended by monsters operating criminal networks overseas. As our Committee reports, age of fraud makes clear these are not small-time criminals. These are highly organized transnational enterprises, many of them directed or enabled by the Chinese Communist Party. We know how these groups work. They rely on Chinese platforms, Chinese payment channels, and scam compounds in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and elsewhere, compounds built and staffed by trafficked workers forced to carry out scams, targeting our friends Americans. Not only is this a disgusting display of our national failures to protect human rights, dignity, and security, it's also another way Communist China is undermining our country and targeting the American people. Beijing has allowed this criminal infrastructure to grow and thrive. No matter what you believe; indifference, lack of enforcement, or strategic tolerance, Communist China is the epicenter of the global scam industry that drains American savings and destabilizes families. I decided to make this the first hearing of the year to send a clear message that we will not tolerate any further inaction as the CCP seeks to hurt our seniors in what should be their golden years. Communist China and criminal enterprise network must be stopped. We have common-sense legislation ready to go that would make a real difference in combating scams and holding those responsible accountable. At the end of last year, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I, along with our fellow committee members, Senators Ashley Moody and Mark Kelly, introduced the National Strategy for Combating Scams Act. This bill would finally require a coordinated whole- of-government response to fight fraud, recognizing that after billions upon billions of dollars are being lost every year, it's time we finally get federal, state, and private sector partners together under a unified strategy. I'm also proud that my Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization, or SCAM Act, was passed by the Senate last month. This bill would give the Treasury Department the authority to sanction scam compounds and the criminal networks behind them. Criminals shouldn't be free to hide behind foreign compounds, use Chinese infrastructure, and still access the U.S. financial system. Additionally, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I are also pushing for the GUARD Act. This bill strengthens penalties against criminals who target older Americans, and gives law enforcement more tools to prevent these crimes. These three bills are bipartisan, they're common-sense, and they're designed to protect the American people. It's time we all come together and get this legislation passed so we can stop the bleeding of American dollars to international criminals. Here's the reality: There isn't a person alive who isn't susceptible to Communist China scams. They won't stop unless we do something. We cannot continue to sit idly by as these criminals harm Americans. Now is the time to take action to protect our seniors and every American. I look forward to a productive discussion today with our witnesses, and now I'd like to recognize Ranking Member Gillibrand for opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and thanks for calling today's hearing. Welcome, witnesses. I appreciate you all being here today. In recent years, scams targeting older adults have grown more sophisticated and widespread because of the rise of scam centers. These centers are fueled by the labor of human trafficking victims, new developments in technology, and the use of cryptocurrency. Older Americans everywhere are vulnerable to the rise of these scams, including my own constituents. For example, a senior in Jefferson County, New York, was convinced through a romance scam to withdraw most of his 401(k) funds and transfer the money into cryptocurrency. That is a loss that stings. It can derail retirement plans, pull apart families, and subject seniors to emotional and material harm. Unfortunately, victims can struggle to report scams due to stigma and shame. Some communities may face additional barriers related to language or fear. This hearing focuses on transnational scams that are facilitated by Chinese criminal organizations. It is worth remembering that Asian immigrants, including many Chinese Americans, can be preferred targets for transnational scammers because of a common language and culture, as well as their familial ties to China. We must remember that international scams are worldwide, and this phenomenon requires robust and coordinated prevention, enforcement, and protection efforts. One positive development has taken place in New York. The state's Department of Aging, the Association on Aging in New York, and the Silver Shield Partnership empower older New Yorkers with tools that allow them to instantly perform scam checks via email, text, and online to report scams to the FBI and the FTC in one click. However, there is still much more work to be done. Last year, the Government Accountability Office published a report on federal efforts to combat scams. GAO noted an alarming lack of coordination amongst federal agencies. Based on recommendations from GAO's report, I introduced the National Strategy for Combating Scams Act with Chairman Rick Scott, and Senators Mark Kelly, and Ashley Moody. Our legislation would require the FBI to lead a multi-agency working group to create a national strategy to combat scams. Last July, I introduced the bipartisan Guarding Unprotected Aging Retirees from Deception, or GUARD Act, with Senator Katie Britt and Chairman Scott. The GUARD Act will increase resources for law enforcement to utilize blockchain technology for investigating financial fraud. I appreciate the willingness of my colleagues to work with me on legislation to combat scams, and I look forward to our discussion today. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. I'd like to welcome our expert witnesses who are here to talk about how serious this issue is, and the steps we can take to protect our seniors. First, I'd like to introduce Nathan Picarsic, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defensive Democracies. He's a leading expert on Communist China's global economic and strategic ambitions, with more than a decade of experience analyzing how the CCP weaponizes technology, economic leverage, and military/civil fusion to expand its influence. He was the first Western analyst to document Beijing's China Standards 2035 plan. His insights grounded in primary source research have informed policymakers and appear in major publications including The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, Bloomberg, and CNBC. Thank you for being here. Please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF NATHAN PICARSIC, SENIOR FELLOW, THE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Picarsic. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and committee members, for the opportunity to offer testimony alongside my esteemed co witnesses. As Senator Scott noted, international scams targeting elderly populations in America already account for billions of dollars of harm annually. Chinese-linked operations play an outsized role in executing and supporting these scams, and as testimony, I hope to convey three points. State-backed scam operations support China's broader approach to great power competition. The Chinese government plays a role in the proliferation of international scams and last, there's opportunity for the Federal Government to lead and empower coordination that can disrupt and deter Chinese state-backed scams. International scams are directly relevant to strategic competition. Social cohesion is a pivotal battleground. Defending against external attacks on our vulnerable, including our elderly, is a fundamental requirement for succeeding in long-term peacetime competition. China understands this, and China deliberately positions foment, fissures within American society, and to tease at American vulnerabilities. We know and talk a lot about China's state-backed hacking, industrial espionage, foreign information campaigns. Those create national security risks for the United States by activating a united front that subverts markets captures elites and does the bidding of the Chinese State through obscured and direct channels. The same Chinese campaign also enables the transnational criminal forces that execute and redeem profits from elder scams in the United States. There's growing awareness of China's leading role as evidenced by this hearing, but recognition of the full scope of this threat lags, so too does marshaling a right-sized response, one they impose of the Chinese government for its role and deter attacks on America's elderly moving forward. State-backed scam has emerged from China, just like state- backed industrial espionage efforts. China plays a leading role in scams that originate both in China itself and outside in hotspots across southeast Asia, for example, where scam operations exist and scam compounds operate under Chinese leadership. China's criminal networks are permitted, and at times, abetted by the Chinese State in its ruling Communist Party. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party would much rather see criminal acts perpetrated against foreign targets than against China's own aging population. Accordingly, the Chinese government has allowed China's cottage industry of scam operations, including those to target elder victims to exist and to excel. China's criminal networks offer several fundamental advantages. First, China's criminal networks benefit from advanced technology. Second, China's banking and sector has globalized, allowing China's criminal networks to transfer money across borders, obfuscate the flow of funds, and evade regulatory authorities. Those advantages fuel Chinese criminal underground that is already global. Elder scams is a key revenue source for their broader criminal ecosystem, and Chinese criminal networks lead the way in refining tactics. Pig butchering, for example, has emerged as a term to describe cyber-enabled scams that frequently drain elderly victims of their savings over a sequence of courtship and scamming. The practice of pig butchering and its dehumanizing framing originated in China. The term was first coined in Chinese. The power of the Chinese financial system compounds the threat posed by those Chinese tactics and by the Chinese perpetrators. The problem isn't just that there's an internationalized Chinese banking system. The problem is that the Chinese State makes it nearly impossible to reclaim stolen funds. Victims often have little recourse after funds have been offshore. The systemic nature of China's state-backed scamming amounts to great power stakes. The United States cannot afford to stand by as Chinese criminal networks deplete American social trust and the bank accounts of countless Americans. A whack-a-mole response will not solve this challenge. State-backed scam networks can outfox their targets and the authorities that are invariably playing catch up. To offset this imbalance, the United States needs to erect protections and increase sensing, invest in coordination between local, federal, and private sector forces, and enforce aggressively against Chinese criminal networks in the arms of the Chinese State, including its financial apparatus that support them to be able to send a clear deterrent signal to Beijing. Americans should not be surprised by the Chinese government whatsoever. This is the same international actor that decimated global public health through their negligence with COVID-19, the same actor that hacks the U.S. Government and critical infrastructure that maliciously fuels the fentanyl crisis ravaging America's heartland, and is building a military to challenge the United States and to bully America's allies and partners. This is not a responsible stakeholder. This is an adversary. We should take no pride in treating China with kid gloves, or endlessly hoping that they'll mature into a responsible actor and worse yet, the state-backed scamming that they propel proves that China is an enemy keen to target our vulnerable populations. America needs to respond forcefully to protect our elders, to support our social fabric as well as our chances in long-term competition. Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this hearing and for the work of the Committee to protect America's aging population. The Chairman. Thank you. Next, I'd like to recognize Kathy Stokes, Senior Director of Fraud Prevention within the Fraud Watch Network at AARP. It's nice to see you again. Ms. Stokes is one of the Nation's leading experts on financial exploitation targeting older adults, and she has spent years studying the tactics criminals use, the vulnerabilities they exploit, and the long-term impact fraud has on seniors and their families. This Committee has welcomed AARP several times over the years. I just want to take a second and say thank you for your organization's leadership in this space. Helping educate your members helps millions of Americans stay up to date on the latest fraud trends and saves innumerable amounts of money. Thank you for being here and please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF KATHY STOKES, SENIOR DIRECTOR, FRAUD PREVENTION PROGRAMS, AARP, WASHINGTON, DC Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for inviting me to testify, and I want to express my appreciation to you Ranking Member Gillibrand and all of the Committee members for holding this timely and important hearing. My name is Kathy Stokes, Senior Director of Fraud Prevention Programs, AARP Fraud Watch Network. I'm here on behalf of AARP, and we represent 125 million Americans, aged 50 and older, and their families, and we deeply appreciate your attention to the surge of international scams that are targeting our seniors. Now, fraud is a national crisis but bigger than most of us recognize. The Federal Trade Commission reported $12.8 billion stolen in 2024, but the true cost is far, far higher. They went back to that $12.8 billion and revised it in December to $196 billion leaving our economy in a single year to fraud, $81 billion of that from our Nation's seniors. They robbed victims of savings, of independence and security. Now, the Fraud Watch Network is on the front lines of educating millions of consumers supporting victims and driving systemic change. Our helpline receives 500 calls a day from those reporting scams, to victims seeking help, and we also offer support groups to help victims rebuild their lives. We hear from people like Lori, an oncology account specialist for a pharmaceutical company. A few years ago, she fell in love with a man whom she first met when he reached out to her on LinkedIn to ask for advice about moving to her area. He then spent months carefully grooming her. As her caring and trust deepened, he asked for Lori's help. She ended up loaning him $675,000, nearly all of her savings, including funds from her 401(k) plan and loans and of course, when she finally discovered it was a scam, she was devastated and then, she learned that she'd have to pay $225,000 in federal taxes on the money that was stolen that she no longer has. The massive tax bill forced Lori to file for bankruptcy, and the IRS was first in line for payment. In addition to fraud prevention through education, AARP is leading an effort to change how we talk about and think about fraud victims. Our Words Matter campaign shows that blaming victims deprioritizes fraud as a crime, and we're seeing real movement among consumers, media, industry, policymakers toward understanding that fraud is a crime and it's not the victim's fault. AARP is also proud to be a founder of the National Elder Fraud Coordination Center, which aggregates intelligence related to elder fraud, to support law enforcement and NEFCC recently revived a stalled transnational federal fraud investigation when it was able to identify a network of 24 U.S.-based shell companies receiving victim funds. Indeed, transnational criminal organizations drive the expansion and the funds they amass represent a national security threat. In the sophisticated scam we've already talked about originating in Southeast Asia, these Chinese organized crime rings are using human trafficking for frontline scammers targeting and devastating Americans, forcing many to rely on government safety nets in their retirement. We're pleased to see solutions proposed by Congress, including the introduction of the GUARD Act and the National Strategy for Combating Scams Act by the chair, and ranking member, and other Senators. These bills seek to improve the state and local response to fraud, and better coordinate agency efforts, and ensure law enforcement has the tools needed to combat these crimes. We also advocate for reinstating the personal casualty and theft loss deduction as the tax relief for Victims of Crimes, Scams, and Disasters Act would do. Victims like Lori who end up owing taxes on stolen funds, they no longer end up stuck with a bill that they don't deserve and have no way to pay. Essentially, they're being re-victimized by the Federal Government. There is no single solution and every sector has a role to play. Individuals can certainly take steps to protect themselves and their loved ones. Industry must innovate on fraud controls. Tech companies and telcos must build security into products so they're secure by design and safe by default and the financial services industry must do its part to stop their customers from being defrauded. Addressing fraud does require a whole-of-society response. We can't educate, or engineer, or regulate, or arrest our way out of this crisis alone but altogether, we can disrupt the fraud business model, protect millions of Americans, and safeguard our economy. Thank you for your leadership and commitment to protecting older Americans, and I look forward to your questions. The Chairman. She never met him, right? It was just all online. Ms. Stokes. Well, they had video. Yes. Senator Gillibrand. Oh, he had video chats? Ms. Stokes. Oh, yes. He was no stranger in that sense. Yes. The Chairman. I wonder if it was really him. Ms. Stokes. Oh, it was probably transnational criminal organization and they were using deepfake. The Chairman. Yes. All right. Now, I'd like to recognize and introduce Jacqueline Burns Koven, Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence at Chainalysis. Ms. Koven leads the company's analysis of cyber-enabled crime, including cryptocurrencies, scams, ransomware, and transactional fraud networks targeting victims in the United States. Her work focuses on tracking illicit financial flows, and identifying how overseas criminal organizations, including China-linked networks, move and launder stolen funds through digital assets. She regularly supports U.S. law enforcement policymakers with data-driven insights that help disrupt scam operations that recover stolen funds. Thank you for being here. STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE BURNS KOVEN, HEAD OF CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE, CHAINALYSIS, NEW YORK, NEW YORK Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Special Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the pressing issue of international scams targeting older Americans as an urgent matter of national security. My name is Jacqueline Burns Koven, and I'm the head of Cyber Threat Intelligence for the blockchain data platform Chainalysis where we harness the transparency of blockchain so that banks, businesses, and governments have the data, and investigations, compliance, and security solutions they need for this new digital economy to thrive. We track cryptocurrency used by illicit actors such as those carrying out investment and impersonation scams and provide data on their financial activity to private and public sector customers include, including the Federal Government. Through Chainalysis' unique visibility into the crypto economy and illicit fund flows, we see how seemingly small scam payments from individual victims are pooled and funneled into industrial scale fraud conglomerates. We know that behind these transactions, are real people, often seniors who are being manipulated into sending their life savings through technologies they may not fully understand. These scam syndicates are incredibly well-resourced. According to Chainalysis data, 2025 was a record year for scammers stealing an estimated $17 billion in cryptocurrency. Chinese scam conglomerates are undeniably the global market leaders in fraud, in large part to their abuse of innovations, including crypto and AI, to make their schemes more convincing and scalable. Everything from social media profiles, mass calling and SMS spamming tools, deepfake, and voice cloning, to laundering is available in Chinese language underground marketplaces, and they leverage cryptocurrency as a form of payment. Cryptocurrencies are often the financial rails of choice for scammers for the same reasons legitimate users use them. Transactions are cross-border and instantaneous. I'm here today to emphasize that fraudsters use of cryptocurrency should place them at a fundamental disadvantage given the traceability and feasibility of many of these assets. At Chainalysis, we analyze transaction data from the blockchain networks to provide clear information into scam networks and laundering at a level of transparency that isn't possible in traditional forms of value transfer. Blockchain intelligence should be considered foundational for understanding the fraud problem at both strategic and tactical levels. Law enforcement and regulatory bodies can disrupt these networks, cut them off from the global financial institutions and make it harder for them to profit by targeting illicit entities and networks on the blockchain with sanctions and asset seizure. Blockchain analytics offers unique opportunities to trace proceeds of crime, identify additional victims, and partner with the private sector to disrupt illicit networks and pursue restitution rather than relying on one-off criminal investigations. However, despite this huge potential for disruption, scammers are exploiting the disjointed and reactive nature of how public and private sectors respond to their schemes. This crisis requires a unified and technology-enabled response preventing Americans from engaging with scams altogether, and identifying and dismantling enterprises responsible for perpetrating scams. As such, my recommendations include, first, the creation of a national counter scam strategy, orchestrating a comprehensive response, including centralizing scam reporting, streamlining coordinated action to dismantle scam conglomerates, and return funds to victims in facilitating information sharing between the public and private sectors. Today's scam victims have multiple agencies they can report to, yet, there's no easy mechanism for these agencies to share with each other or the private sector of what whose best positioned to prevent for additional victims. We need a coordinated approach using all levers of government to target the scam ecosystem holistically from the money launderers, to the fishing kit developers, and data brokers. Second, we need to leverage advanced technologies to combat scammers' growing sophistication. Too often, scam victims are turned away from authorities who are ill-equipped to properly assist crypto cases. This challenge also demands a paradigm shift from reactive enforcement to proactive disruption through AI-powered fraud prevention technology to identify scammers before they meet their victims, and empower law enforcement to move decisively upstream and take the fight directly to scammers. Third, we need to provide financial institutions with guidance to help them intervene when customers attempt to send funds to scams. Clear consistent guidelines could help firms navigate when and how they can slow-block, scrutinize scam transactions and what form of friction are appropriate without overreaching. Last, we need to close gaps in AML/CFT standards implementation, especially countries that host services scammers rely on to launder funds defrauded from Americans and in the absence of cooperation, more pressure is needed to disrupt the offshore financial networks and the digital asset services flagrantly abusing laws and regulatory norms. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on this important topic, and continue to be a helpful partner on initiatives by Congress to better protect Americans, especially the most vulnerable. I look forward to your questions. The Chairman. Thank you. Now, I'd like to recognize Ranking Member Gillibrand to introduce the next witness. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to move to introduce Seto Bagdoyan. Mr. Bagdoyan is Director for Audit Services at The Government Accountability Office's Forensic Audits and Investigative Service mission team. Mr. Bagdoyan previously served in a variety of positions at GAO, including as an advisor in GAO's Office of congressional Relations, and as Assistant Director for Homeland Security and Justice. He's also served as an congressional detail with the Senate Finance Committee, and the House Committee on Homeland Security, and in private consultancy positions focusing on political risk and homeland security. Mr. Bagdoyan, you may begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF SETO BAGDOYAN, DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES, FORENSIC AUDITS & INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Bagdoyan. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Senator Johnson. I'm pleased to discuss today GAO's April 2025 report about scams targeting consumers, including older adults and the federal response. Scams are a method of committing fraud by employing deception or manipulation enabled by technology such as AI to achieve financial gain. They involve scammers, often operating from foreign countries, as we've heard today, engaging targeted victims with a type of scam and requesting payment under false purposes. One example highlights the scope and reach of scams and their financial toll on consumers. A 2023 international police operation against online financial crime, including scams, yielded over 3,000 arrests and seizures of $300 million in assets across 34 countries, including the United States. However, the full extent of losses and the risks that underpin them is elusive, since these estimates often are based on under-reported consumer complaints rather than systematic assessments of scam risks and their financial and other implications. In our report, we noted that given the scope, scale, and nature of scams and the risks they pose, the federal response falls short on risk management fundamentals. Especially, it lacks a governmentwide strategy and a lead agency to organize, coordinate, and target multiple activities by individual agencies. Importantly, and this is very important, there is no common definition of what constitutes a scam, and no systematic assessment of scams and the risks they pose to consumers. Accordingly, there's no assurance that the federal response as it is now - is addressing the right risks and the right priorities in the right manner. A government-wide strategy would introduce risk management fundamentals to help ensure that the federal response to a significant, dynamic, and sophisticated risk is integrated, prioritized, targeted, and adaptable. We made 16 recommendations to FBI, FTC, and CFPB, the federal agencies best positioned to lead the federal response. To date, these agencies' responses are mixed. They've agreed with some recommendations and disagreed with, or took no explicit positions on, others. For example, FBI agreed to assume the lead for the governmentwide strategy and outlined related initial steps. However, its disagreement with other recommendations essential for an effective strategy, such as adopting a common definition, is concerning. While we acknowledge agencies' positions on these challenging undertakings, it's imperative for them to implement all recommendations. Otherwise, the governmentwide strategy will ultimately be ineffective. In closing, scams, including those of foreign origin, pose immediate risks of harm to consumers. Accordingly, these risks require a decisive, expeditious federal response. The response is underpinned by adopting a common definition of scams. This serves as the organizing principle for assessing and quantifying the risks posed by scams, and crafting and implementing a governmentwide strategy to counter them, including those of foreign origin. In this regard, legislative actions such as S. 3355 would charge the federal response, and importantly, establish oversight and ensure accountability. Chairman Scott, this concludes my remarks. I welcome the Committee's questions. Thank you. The Chairman. Thanks for coming, and thanks for your testimony. Now, we'll go to the questions. Senator Johnson, if you want to start us off. Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stokes, being the accountant here, you caught my attention when we talked about, is it Lori? She emptied what, her 401(k) account, or whatever, $600,000-and-some? Ms. Stokes. Yes. It was primarily from her 401(k). Senator Johnson. How in the world did she have a greater than $200,000 tax liability? I mean, was it gift tax, or was it, you know, 10 percent early withdrawal from--I mean, I don't understand how the tax penalty could be that high Ms. Stokes. I'm not an accountant, so I don't know. I just know that it was $225,000, and that was what forced her to file Chapter 13. Senator Johnson. I would ask you to go back to Lori. I'd like to get the details because that makes no sense. I mean, if they considered she shouldn't have had to pay anything, I can maybe see a penalty for earlier withdrawal, but that'd be cruel. I mean, she made a loan and she lost her money. If anything, she'd get a tax refund on something like that. It literally makes no sense to me. I'd really appreciate that. Ms. Stokes. Absolutely. Senator Johnson. In a number of testimonies, you have laid out some of these scams, but we didn't really, other than Lori's romantic scam. I'm just asking each of you, what is it? What's the hook? Can you give anybody watching this, you know, be aware when you see this. I'll start with Mr. Picarsic. I mean, what are the two or three most common hooks? I'll just go right down the line. Mr. Picarsic. Yes. I mean, I think the pig butchering, which is similar to the Lori attack sort of confidence scheme, and recurring outreach from an actor that you're unfamiliar with or that is showing some sort of romantic or unprompted solicitation. Senator Johnson. You'd say that the romantic one is kind of Mr. Picarsic. It's really big. Yes. Senator Johnson. Okay. Ms. Stokes, what would you say other than a romantic one? I kind of understand that one. What are some other ones? Because I want people watching this being alert when you see this, when somebody says, you know, like--go ahead. Ms. Stokes. A big one is a tech support scam where you're on your device and you get a popup, and it says that there's a horrible problem with your device, and you have to call the number that they give. You react immediately because you're scared, and you call someone and it's the scammer. It goes from there, and it ends up involving accounts and getting money out of accounts through wires. It's very, very complicated, but to try to echo a little bit of what Nathan said, there are so many scams. Like, let's say, there are 80 scams, and each scam has red flags, like, say 10 red flags. That's 800 things to remember. It's exhausting for educators and for consumers who think that they're not going to be able to help themselves, right? We take it up a level. It's sort of like the stop, drop, and roll for fire but this time, it's about recognizing three things that come with most scams, and that's a contact out of the blue that yields heightened emotion and contains urgency and if we can train on that, we can also train how to take an active pause. Senator Johnson. I would add a fourth. The one that if they ask you to call a number, or if they ask you to click on this site, would that also be---- Ms. Stokes. I'm trying to bring it up to a higher level there, because there's a million of those. Senator Johnson. I mean, that you need to contact them, right? I mean, they need you to do something like open up this link, or. Ms. Stokes. Yes. Click on a link, respond to a call, a phone number. We educate millions of people. I would say education is critical, but we're not educating our way out of this crisis. We need to be doing things to actually stop the scam from getting to the consumer to begin with. Senator Johnson. Right. Ms. Koven? Ms. Burns Koven. Yes. I'll say from our perspective, Chainalysis just published research that found that impersonation scams have increased 1,400 percent in the last year. They're impersonating trusted individuals and entities, law enforcement, a known tech company, a cryptocurrency platform, or financial institution. Those are the hardest to weed out because those are--they are leveraging someone's trust in an entity that already exists. I would absolutely echo Ms. Stokes' comments that the sense of urgency, especially. We're also finding increased payments from scammers in cryptocurrency to bulk SMS tools. They're coming for Americans on every platform that we rely on coming right to our phones and they're buying data lists with names, emails, phone numbers of Americans to target in the hundreds of thousands. Senator Johnson. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan? Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes. Thank you, Senator Johnson. I think my fellow witnesses have covered most of the space here, but I would say investment scams that promise exorbitant returns with little or no risk, such as 1,000 percent. I get them by mail or text almost on a weekly basis. "Send us $1,000, you'll have $1,000,000 by the end of the year." Well, that's great, but you know, it goes into the in the garbage bin. You have to be alert, if that's just too good to be true. Senator Johnson. Okay. Well, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Warren. Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Ranking Member Gillibrand for holding this hearing. You know, falling victim to a scam is devastating for anyone, but it can be especially hard for seniors. When older Americans are taken advantage of, it's important for them to have someone to turn someone who will be on their side, someone who will help out, and that's where the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau comes in. The CFPB is a financial cop on the beat for American consumers since 2011. It has saved over $21 billion for hardworking families, $21 billion, and that's not all it's done. The CFPB has a dedicated office to protect older Americans from financial fraud. It also has a consumer complaint database where people who've been ripped off can report scams and get their money back. Mr. Bagdoyan, the Government Accountability Office, GAO, just conducted a review of federal scam prevention efforts. Can you explain how the CFPB protects Americans from scams, including seniors? Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. As you know from our report, we identified CFPB as one of the three entities that are best positioned to lead the governmentwide strategy that we are advocating for. CFPB has the resident expertise. It has the legislative charge and mission, if you will. It has the experience since the early 2010's, as you noted, so, combined, those things are important. We made five recommendations to CFPB to further its ability to counter scams in coordination, as we mentioned, as part of the governmentwide strategy to create the definition of scams, to gather better data, to analyze data and find out what the real risks are. This is a very dynamic environment, but what it has been doing--I think it does all 11 categories of activities that we identified among the 13 agencies that were in our universe. It is well positioned to react through regulatory actions, through education, advocacy, and analytics. Again, it justifies them being well positioned to---- Senator Warren. Yes. A lot of opportunities there in the way it's structured both to catch the bad guys and to be able to respond---- Mr. Bagdoyan. That's right. Senator Warren [continuing]. and to be able to help people who've been cheated and get their money back for them. One of the points you make, though, is CFPB does not act alone, and that the three principal actors in this area are the CFPB, the FBI, and the FTC. I think I have that right? Mr. Bagdoyan. That's correct. Senator Warren. Three of them working together. I think one of your recommendations was that they should coordinate even more---- Mr. Bagdoyan. Oh, absolutely. Senator Warren [continuing]. in their efforts. Is that right? Would you like to just say a word more about that? Mr. Bagdoyan. Yes, absolutely. That would be one of the key components of a governmentwide strategy. What we found was, of course, the 13 agencies that were working independently, coordinating on an ad hoc basis, but not systematically. That sort of fragmentation really undermines the effectiveness of anything any of these agencies do. Senator Warren. Not enhancing effectiveness, not more efficient when they fragment. Mr. Bagdoyan. That's right. Senator Warren. Based on what you've said here, you'd think that to protect seniors from scams that President Trump should leverage the CFPB. Unfortunately, that is not what he is doing. Instead, he is systematically dismantling the agency, cutting funds, cutting staff, and preventing the agency from doing its job. Mr. Bagdoyan, let me just ask you, does cutting staff, cutting funds, issuing stop-work orders at the CFPB make seniors more safe about the same or less safe? Mr. Bagdoyan. Well, thank you for your question. I'm glad you asked it. It's very timely. As you may know, you submitted a request to us for follow-on work on staffing and organizational restructurings at the agencies. We may identify what kind of impact this would have on agencies' abilities to implement our recommendations, for example, and do a better job of protecting seniors and others against scams. Ranking Member Gillibrand is also a party to that request, and also, Senator Hassan, I believe, has joined recently. We staffed that review this morning. Senator Warren. Oh, good. Mr. Bagdoyan. We'll be starting that in several weeks. By spring, we should have a decent idea what our strategy to pursue that will entail. CFPB is one of the agencies that we will review for impacts any of these restructurings, including staff reductions, diversions, and other things. Thank you for your timely question. Senator Warren. Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the work you're doing. I want to say a very special thank you. Thank you to Senator Gillibrand and to Senator Hassan for joining in this effort. You know, if President Trump really cared about seniors, he would stop these illegal efforts to shut down the CFPB. CFPB is on the front lines trying to protect our seniors, and we need to offer its support so that it can do that important work. Thanks very much. Appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warren. Mr. Picarsic, based on your research, would you say that the Chinese Communist Party is actively benefiting from the billions being stolen from American families? Mr. Picarsic. Yes. They disproportionately flow back into the Chinese banking system, so, yes. The Chairman. All right. If we don't stop this, what's going to happen over the next five years? Are they going to--do you think they'll just continue to get bigger and bigger? Mr. Picarsic. Yes. We've seen exponential scaling over the past couple years that will continue. Worse, still, will be the fact that the cost of capital in the Chinese ecosystem will decrease and funds will flow into criminal enterprises, but also into the other nefarious efforts that the Chinese Communist Party pursues, including modernizing its military, modernizing its ecosystem for abusing other human rights. The Chairman. It's a pretty good profit center for the Chinese. Mr. Picarsic. Absolutely. The Chairman. Yes. Kathy, how much do you think it is now? You think it's almost $200 billion? Ms. Stokes. Yes. That's based on the Federal Trade Commission's own analysis of underreporting. The Chairman. Put that in perspective. We only have about a $28 trillion economy. Ms. Stokes. I can tell you that if it was a Fortune company, it would be Fortune 17 in revenue. The Chairman. It's hard to believe. What do you think is the single biggest failure in our current federal response that allows foreign criminals to keep targeting American seniors? Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Senator, for asking that. I would say there are so many, but I would start with we need a national fraud strategy. We don't have that. We're seeing some good indications of having one, having some success in England and in Australia, and they look to the United States and say, "Okay, who's my counterpart?" We have nobody. We need essentially a fraud czar in the administration coordinating efforts across the many agencies, but also coordinating with a private sector, law enforcement using data-driven means of being able to understand how these crimes individually tie together to get that organized crime connection to make the cases big enough to actually investigate, pursue, and prosecute. The Chairman. Is there any federal agency that has a dedicated group of people doing this? Ms. Stokes. I believe there are, yes. The Chairman. Okay, but they're not coordinated. Ms. Stokes. We could use some better coordination, yes. The Chairman. Okay. Ms. Koven, when y'all track stolen funds from pig butchering and investment scams, where does the money typically flow, and how quickly does it move out of the reach of the individual and law enforcement? Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your question. The funds typically aggregate in consolidation wallets. One victim in Iowa's funds are commingled with a victim in Florida, with a victim from Illinois and we see these smaller payments aggregate in these larger consolidation clusters, which signal the centralized efforts of these scam conglomerates, and then they offboard into Chinese money laundering networks. We see the yuan, which had special measures applied to it by the Federal Government, as well as other successors, guarantee services mostly Chinese language money laundering services. We do see a degree of centralized exchanges in DeFi services that do receive some of the funds. While these movements are pretty rapid, we do have opportunities at these consolidation wallets that hold funds for longer periods of time. One of the challenges is that communication between private sector and public sector, connecting that victim in Illinois to that victim in Florida to see the bigger picture. The beauty of blockchain intelligence is that you're able to unravel that entire picture without filing a single subpoena and working with private sector law enforcement has had stunning successes in seizing funds. Just this year, $15 billion seized from the Prince Group. We've had examples of hundreds of millions seized with the help of cryptocurrency exchanges and stablecoin issuers. There's a lot of potential, but timing is on the line. Timing is at the essence. That's why we advocate for also a preventive strategy moving upstream so that scammers never interact with a human being. The Chairman. When they get the money back, where's the money go? How much of it gets back to a victim? Ms. Burns Koven. That's a long legal process of you have to establish that you were a victim. Thankfully, the blockchain has a very clear trail of where a victim withdrew their funds in order to deposit it into a scam. I think there could be more clarity around that process to streamline it so that victims can be made whole. The Chairman. How central are overseas networks particularly those linked to Communist China and Southeast Asia to the cryptocurrency scams targeting American seniors? Ms. Burns Koven. Yes. There are several data points from the cryptocurrency perspective pointing to China and Southeast Asia. The off ramps where these stolen funds are going are primarily offshore APAC-based services, Chinese money laundering networks where they have mules guarantee services. We're also seeing them reinvest their scam profits into additional AI tools, additional SMS scamming. The Chairman. It's a business model. Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. It is a corporation. It is a well-oiled machine. We also see dips in cryptocurrency scam activity during Chinese public holidays and Chinese New Years, very much in line with China-based actors. The Chairman. When people are working. Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. The Chairman. Okay. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan, in a report, the GAO recommended that the FBI be the lead effort to develop a national strategy on scams. The legislation that Chairman Scott and I introduced, the National Strategy for Combating Scams Act, reflect GAO'S recommendation, and it would require FBI to lead the interagency effort. However, while working on the report, you talked to 13 agencies that engage in efforts to combat scams, including the CFPB and the FTC. Conceivably, one of the other agencies could also lead the effort to develop the national strategy. Can you explain the GAO recommendation that the FBI lead the effort instead of the other agencies like the FTC? Mr. Bagdoyan. Sure. Thank you for your question, Ranking Member Gillibrand. The FBI, on balance, given all the factors that we reviewed, is best positioned to take the lead. They actually volunteered to do that while other agencies basically demurred either explicitly or implicitly. We took that into consideration. We did make 16 recommendations to three agencies, as you know, but we thought that the FBI, has its scope, scale, its investigative capacity, its financial crime section _ which is a key unit within the Bureau to tackle these types of crimes, including scams _ its authorities and its global networks coordinating with other law enforcement. It's a multiplicity of factors that position them well to do this. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Ms. Koven, in furtherance of Senator Scott's question about getting remuneration for the victims because of the blockchain, what tools would be useful in the Federal Government to have to be able to actually recoup some of that money? For example, do we need to augment the capabilities of FinCEN? Do we need to have a special directed unit to do cryptocurrency blockchain investigations for quick return of funding? What recommendations do you have for us to specifically have more tools to use the benefits of the clarity and the transparency of the blockchain, but also to create better oversight and enforcement? Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your question. I can't speak to any specific agency, but I will say in my experience, there definitely needs to be more training and tools using blockchain analytics to be able to see the full spectrum of the crime, and so that we can holistically tackle the scam ecosystem, not just the scammed funds, but the services and infrastructure that are that are supporting and underlying these scams, from AI tech to data brokers. We need to beat them at their own game. We can do that by incorporating AI-enabled fraud prevention strategies. Chainalysis' Alterya, for example, leverages AI to identify scam activity across platforms, payment system domains, social media accounts and blockchains. This enables financial institutions and law enforcement to identify more victims, build a bigger case, identify targets for disruption. Frankly, this also allows this data to be integrated with financial institutions so that they can prevent scammers from even interacting with a human being before they even engage with the scam itself. In addition to recovering funds and restitution, prevention should absolutely be part of the strategy. Senator Gillibrand. We frequently hear about the growing use of AI, including generative AI in scams that target older adults. However, the same technology that helps scammers may also be used to combat these scams, as you said. The Australian telecommunications firm, TPG, recently used AI chatbots to waste the time of scammers. You also discussed in your written testimony how Chainalysis has an AI tool that can help block scams. Can you please discuss further how AI can be used in identifying and blocking scams? Do you foresee any new opportunities for tools to combat scams based on new developments of AI? Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. Thank you for that question. In our recent research, we found that scams leveraging AI are 4.5 times more profitable than scams that don't. We're rapidly approaching a future where virtually all scams will incorporate AI to some extent, which is pretty scary stuff when you think about the numbers they're pulling in today. We do need to fight fire with fire. AI-enabled fraud prevention technologies like Chainalysis' Alterya, it leverages AI to identify scam activities across domain, social media accounts, and blockchains. This can enable financial institutions and blockchain companies to be able to integrate this into their platform so that they can identify mule accounts, victim accounts, and really have a holistic picture of the whole scam supply chain. Furthermore, law enforcement also needs to have this prevention capability and this insight to be able to target their efforts against different components of the scam supply chain. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bagdoyan, the GAO said that the federal agencies aren't really coordinated. How does that impact somebody that's--you know, if they had better coordination, how would it save seniors money? Mr. Bagdoyan. Oh, that's a good question. There might be a way to cross reference approaches by a particular older American who goes to the FBI, because that makes sense to them, when the FTC might be better positioned to help them, or the CFPB for that matter, or some other agency. There isn't a close-knitted approach to doing that, for example. I mean, that is a basic service that should be available. It isn't available. There are some agencies that accept consumer complaints, but they will refer the consumers to their own online educational materials, for example, rather than saying, "Well, thank you for your call, but you should have gone to X." I don't think that's happening. The Chairman. Mr. Picarsic, given your research on CCP, is it fair to say that the Communist China, the party, tolerates or turns a blind eye to these scam compounds because they want to weaken the United States? Mr. Picarsic. That's the most generous interpretation, that they turn a blind eye. I think more nefariously, they actively support and abet whenever they have a chance to. The Chairman. How can you describe the level of coordination between these Chinese criminal networks and Communist China's broader geopolitical goals? Mr. Picarsic. They look to produce profits that can flow back into the Chinese ecosystem. They look to generate the capacity to project misinformation, and to sow dissent, and divide in the societies that they target. That may be the ones where they're operating from and maybe the ones that they're targeting. We see from the layout, the geographic layout, the places that get populated with scam compounds tend to coincide with the places that dot the Belt and Road Initiative that have presence of Chinese international banking operations and all of these work together, perhaps not with smoking guns appearing at every turn, but with a whole host of loaded guns that can be pulled when they need to be. I think the recent case that's been cited of the Prince Group is a telling example of a massive operation that was able to evade scrutiny in Cambodia for a long time. We recently indicted the leader. He was extradited not to the United States, not to our authorities, but to the Chinese. He was able to be extradited to China because the Chinese government is active in courting Cambodian business and political elites. These channels all overlap, and when, and if they're needed to coordinate and work together, they do. The Chairman. If Beijing wanted to shut this stuff down, could they do it? Mr. Picarsic. They absolutely could. For better or worse, they respond only to shows of strength and declarations of the capacity to control escalation dominance. For that reason, I think that American strategy needs to target the international presence of Chinese banks. It's commendable that several pieces of legislation that the Committee's advanced cite IEEPA authorities, those authorities should be invoked and they should be used to target seizure of Chinese banking and Chinese banking leadership assets present in the United States. The Chairman. Based on what you're saying, you would not suggest we ever buy things or do any business with China, is that---- Mr. Picarsic. Absolutely. I think we have a consensus around strategic goods and the national security supply chains. Across the board, American societies depend on Americans working together and American businesses thriving at all levels. If we allow even our most non-strategic assets to be fully offshore to an adversary, we're imposing on ourselves, for no reason, that opportunity cost. It's not just the cost of that sector. It's the opportunity cost of that sector thriving somewhere else and not contributing directly to American society. The Chairman. Kathy, can you talk about you--I know AARP's putting a lot of effort into this. Can you give a success story? Ms. Stokes. Well, we probably talk to about 100,000 people every year through our helpline and we're not in a position-- we're not law enforcement, we're not social workers, but we are able to talk to people in a sort of shame-free zone. We can't get their money back, but we can offer emotional support and we created a fraud support Zoom session, small group Zoom sessions, several years ago. Some of the people that have come through are here with me today. What we do see in the success is that people begin to understand that it wasn't their fault, that they're not alone. They rebuild a sense of self. They build a sense of agency, and then they want to do something about it. We have victims telling their own narratives to law enforcement, to industry, to try to help people understand from that victim impact stance how nefarious these are. The Chairman. Yes. Probably if somebody was a victim, it's probably better opportunity than somebody would listen to them also. Right? Ms. Stokes. Well, we have a YouTube series called Fraud Wars that we just launched at the end of--well, actually, it was last summer. It's like these little 11 or 12 minute very highly produced videos, and it's the first-person narrative. They're very captivating. The Chairman. Ms. Koven, based on your analysis, can you describe the lifecycle of a typical crypto-enabled scam targeting seniors from the first contact to a final launder in the funds? Give us an insight of how it happens. Let's say I'm the victim and you're trying to take advantage of me. Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for the question. We don't often see the full lifecycle. Sometimes, we get information after the scam has already occurred. I can say that we are able to use our analysis to find when a victim makes recurring payments, and we've been able to do analysis on specific scam typologies, separating out pig butchering, versus blackmail, and extortion scams, from other scam typologies to understand which scams elicit recurring payments from a victim so we can see how effective they are in continuing to bleed out victims of their life savings versus ones that are shorter-term. We are seeing a growing number of scam typologies, which I think is really interesting in the conversation of defining what a scam is because these scammers are relentless in capitalizing on new technologies, new flavors of the day. We're seeing different typologies leveraging working from home, for instance, which is a different on chain presence than maybe an impersonation scam, and we see the typical services recurringly used for laundering. The blockchain shines a bright light on these services that continue to operate and process scammed funds. While the special measures on huawan, for example, are very encouraging, as the largest, most prominent service that facilitated scams, there are others there are definitely successors waiting in the wings and know that scammers hedge their bets and are present on multiple different underground forums and guarantee youth platforms to continue their operations. Anything that injects friction in these conversations, injects friction in their laundering, their trust in the different services, and imposes cost on all the key components of the supply chain are welcome and should be part of a national strategy. The Chairman. Is China and Southeast Asia, are they a majority of the scammers? Ms. Burns Koven. I would say it's certainly a model that is highly effective. Not all scams originate from China or Southeast Asia, but it is setting the model for what we fear other jurisdictions, other scammers, other organizations could adopt. The Chairman. Is information sharing helpful? Ms. Burns Koven. Absolutely. I appreciate this Committee's attention on ways we can streamline information sharing. There are so many different entities where a victim can report their scam, but also many don't. The blockchain is effective in highlighting payments of victims that may have not reported. We should use that intelligence to drive our mission to be able to instead of one- off investigations, we grow the amount of funds that are feasible and reduce friction amongst these agencies. Overall, we have to increase a public-private sector information-sharing too. Because a private sector entity, say a financial institution, that files a suspicious activity report about a scam on their platform, the bank next door will never get wind of what was in that scam. They're encountering the same adversaries. Their customers are being targeted by the same adversaries, yet, they cannot share information. Private sector is best positioned to prevent future scam victims. We need that quick information-sharing, and the whole-of-government, as well as whole-society approach. The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Ms. Stokes, can you talk a little bit about the proposal to have local elder justice task forces? What effect do you believe these task forces could have on efforts to combat scams? Ms. Stokes. Thank you, Senator, for the question. I think they're critical. The elder justice task force model allows for coordination among local, state, federal law enforcement, prosecutors, also agencies of adult protective services, things like that. It helps the ability for data to be gathered and assessed to be able to start to see patterns. That's that pattern that we're missing right now because we're not looking at it through an organized crime lens. I have many examples from the San Diego Elder Justice Task Force that they've done some amazing things, very much because they are an elder justice task force, and they are looking at data and being able to understand tying things together and going after big cases. I think it's really important. Senator Gillibrand. What are the biggest barriers for seniors to come forward to report when a scam has happened? What are their barriers for seeking help, and what are the best ways to help them rebuild their lives after a scam? You mentioned the relationships and the communities you're creating throughout AARP. I think that's really terrific. I do think we should, for example, the person that you talked about who lost all that tax money, I could get that tax money back for her. I think we should have lawyers who can make the case that through artifice and fraud, they do not owe taxes. At least she'd get that $200,000 back, so she'd have part of her savings. Maybe even having legal services available for scam victims to get some kind of recuperation. Ms. Stokes. Yes. Thank you, Senator. She's certainly not alone. We have many victims that come through this process, and because the money was taken from a tax deferred retirement plan, they end up owing the taxes because the IRS looks at it as income. Senator Gillibrand. We can probably change that law. Ms. Stokes. We would like to see that changed. There's a bill out there now, as a matter of fact. Senator Gillibrand. Yes. Well, I'll work on that, and I'll also work on your task force bill. Ms. Stokes. Thank you very much. In terms of the barriers for victims, one of the barriers is sort of internal. They're so ashamed, so embarrassed, they think it only happens to them. That comes from a society that has tended to blame victims for the crime that has happened and we've done that for years, and we've allowed ourselves to believe that it's only old people who aren't tech savvy, who may have cognitive issues and so it's sort of a them problem. Now we're starting to understand that it's an all-of-us problem because everybody is being targeted. You don't have to have cognitive decline because of the sophistication of the playbook that the criminals use. We're seeing some change there, and then the other is there's just too many calls to action. You know, you could report it to the FBI, and FTC, and the Social Security Administration, and everything else. We need a single door that consumers can go to, victims can go to, not only to be able to report, but to report it into a law enforcement system where the data are going to be connected to other reports so that we can begin that be better at the organized crime connections there. Also importantly, so many people that report they never hear anything, especially if they report something online. They're expect--they're hoping for a call. We need a system where people are treated with dignity and respect, and that there is some outreach that lets them know what's going on, even if nothing's going on, to make them feel less like it was their fault. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Picarsic, can you talk a little bit about what type of international joint ventures we should be trying to have with our allies? I'm certain it's not just American seniors who are being targeted. I'm sure it's true across the whole globe but I can imagine if we had international coordination with the UK, or some of our EU allies, or Asian or Middle Eastern allies, we could crack some of these criminal networks a lot quicker. Do you have any recommendations for us with regard to coordination of investigations? Mr. Picarsic. Thank you very much for the compelling question. I think it tracks with the way that we've been able to share information, increase early warning, and coordinate action in similar realms of criminal activity, including cyber threats. The way that across our international relationships, we've been able to build multilateral fora and support law enforcement. I think it starts with information-sharing and we have existing fora from cyber, and counterfeit, drug, and counter smuggling activities that can be activated the same way. I think it's a compelling priority, and one that we have infrastructure to pipe the right information through. Senator Gillibrand. Then last, can you just explain why human trafficking is often associated with these types of scams? Mr. Picarsic. Yes. Chairman Scott has mentioned just how profitable and good a business these operations are. Part of their fundamental orientation is that they're leveraging trafficked humans so that they don't even have a payroll. They tend to be populated, again, in these territories where there may be lax oversight and are hotspots for human trafficking. Then there's overlap with the actual people leading compounds and moving money with human trafficking. They're able to take forced labor and employ them in compounds, and also, to shield themselves from any scrutiny from local as well as Chinese authorities. Senator Gillibrand. Terrible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I'm done. The Chairman. Senator Moody. Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and Ranking Member Gillibrand. Such an important topic to all seniors in America, especially my home State of Florida. We are a premier destination state for seniors moving there in retirement. We often call ourselves not just the Sunshine State, but the Silver State and as technology has advanced so rapidly the tools that criminals will use to scam our seniors has multiplied. I realized this very quickly in my background. I served as a federal prosecutor, as attorney general. I understood very quickly that the federal standards sometimes for investigation and prosecution in terms of monetary loss, the bar to reach that becomes so high that we're often, if we're not aggregating smaller amounts to show these larger losses in the aggregate, sometimes those fall through the cracks. It's oftentimes those lower amounts and I say lower only because it's relative to the sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars we might see in one scam compared to if you aggregate, let's say numerous seniors get taken advantage of. It could be their life savings and even when you aggregate that, it could be a lot, but if you don't know that they're related, it might seem not to reach the federal levels of investigation. What I found very quickly, a huge gap in enforcement investigations, prosecutions, bringing criminals to justice, is the inability of states to match sometimes the manpower and coordination at the federal level, the capabilities to go after these people. As Florida's AG, one of the first things I did was put together a cyber fraud enforcement team to start looking at these things to cooperate with the federal officials, but start bringing in experts into the investigation side and the prosecution side because both are so important, and it does require a specified expertise. We saw results immediately, not only in going after those that might have fallen through the cracks, those specific cases but also recovering funds, freezing assets, even cryptocurrency. I think this is so important, and I'm so glad, Chairman Scott, thanks to have these hearings because oftentimes it's foreign nationals that are using this advancing technology to victimize Americans, Floridians, and they're never brought to justice because they're overseas and we become put in a position where we're just trying to prevent, educate and that's so important, but we have to have the teeth to come back and hold these people accountable. I have totally foregone anything I planned to ask, but I would just like to get from you. We did this as kind of it was an initiative in Florida. It is now bearing fruit. It's still in existence. They're freezing funds. They're going after people. In fact, just recently that that same cyber fraud enforcement unit that I started seized $1.5 million connected to an internet-based investment scheme that was perpetuated by a Chinese national. I'm so proud of what we were able to accomplish there. I would like to open this up, with the chairman's permission. If any of you could comment on how I often am very reluctant as an idea to just throw more money at a problem but if the goal is to get more states to start their own cyber fraud enforcement units that can coordinate with the feds, but also begin to bring their own expertise to bear and start these units to help their state, their county and city. If you have a state cyber fraud enforcement unit that can lay over expertise in rural counties and cities that might not have that. It was so effective in Florida and I'm wondering if any of you believe or have recommendations on how we, as a Federal Government, might encourage more state cyber fraud enforcement groups. I saw how effective that was at filling the gap in Florida. Anyone want to chime in on this? Do you have any recommendations, for us as Senators, on how we can make that happen? Ms. Burns Koven. Thank you for your questions, Senator. I'm delighted to hear about some of the successes you've had. That's fantastic. Because you've laid out some vast challenges, right, which is information-sharing, connecting a victim in Florida to the same scam of somebody out of state or even out of the country. Blockchain analytics has been the common language and visibility for so many successes for scam funds recovery, putting crossing that bridge between private and public sector so that a private sector can prevent additional scam victims from falling prey but I think more so we need to make sure state, local, and federal law enforcement, and regulators have the tools and training they need to be able to understand crypto cases. We hear often that victims are turned away because they don't know how to investigate crypto cases, or that the case is too small to meet a threshold, when in reality, that one scam victim sends funds to a multimillion-dollar scam conglomerate where there's a ripe opportunity for intervention and asset seizure. In addition to recovering funds and restitution, we also have to bring the fight to the scammers. We need to focus on prevention, making sure those scammers never interact with a human and we can do that through AI, which Chainalysis' Alterya, for example, leverages AI-enabled fraud prevention to be able to collect scam identifiers from across online infrastructure, from platforms, from payment systems, from domains, to social media. Being able to connect victims but also identify scam infrastructure so that financial institutions and crypto businesses don't even permit that activity on their platform. It also is enabling for law enforcement to better target for disruption, what are the key nodes that are underlying this scam ecosystem. Senator Moody. Thank you. I have to say, my staff told me you would know a lot about that. I appreciate it. Thank you for making them look really good. I wish I could show you. It says right here, "Ask Ms. Burns Koven." Thank you very much and to all of you for being here today. We really appreciate it. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moody. I want to thank everybody for coming today, being and participating. I also want to remind seniors and families watching that the Senate Aging Committee operates a fraud hotline for anyone who believes they may have been targeted or victimized. The number is 1-855-303-9470. Nice, easy number to memorize. If any seniors or any Senators have additional questions for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Thanks, everybody. [Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [all] ======================================================================= APPENDIX ======================================================================= ? ======================================================================= Prepared Witness Statements ======================================================================= ? 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U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International Scams" January 14, 2026 Questions for the Record Kathy Stokes Senator Raphael Warnock Question: According to the Federal Trade Commission, financial fraud was more prevalent in Georgia than in any other state in 2023, with 437 incidents per 100,000 individuals. In 2023, Georgians aged 60 and older reported losses of over $92 million to the Federal Bureau of Information's Internet Crime Complaint Center. To address this issue, I co-introduced S. 2019, the Task Force for Recognizing and Averting Payment Scams Act, which would establish a multi-agency task force to examine fraud trends and lead prevention efforts. Last Congress, I also reintroduced the Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad Actors Act, which would create a new grant program to protect senior investors. How would multi-agency coordination and federal grant programs focused on investigating fraud protect Georgia seniors from financial scams? Response: Multi-agency coordination is critical because today's fraud schemes rarely fall neatly within the jurisdiction of a single agency. Scams targeting older adults often involve online platforms, financial institutions, telecommunications providers, and, in many cases, actors operating across state or national borders. A coordinated task force, such as the one that S. 2019, the TRAPS Act, calls for, would bring together the expertise and authorities of agencies such as the FTC, DOJ, FBI, and state attorneys general to share data in real time, identify emerging scam trends, and respond more quickly when patterns of fraud begin to appear. This kind of coordination helps move the response from being reactive-after money is lost-to preventative, stopping scams before they spread widely in communities like those across Georgia. Federal grant programs, such as contemplated in the 118th Congress' Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad Actors Act or 119th Congress' S. 2544, the GUARD Act, or H.R. 6426, the Stop Scams Against Seniors Act, play a critical role by ensuring that states have the capacity to act on that shared intelligence. Many state and local agencies, including those in Georgia, are on the front lines of protecting seniors but lack the dedicated resources to investigate complex financial fraud cases or to conduct sustained outreach and education efforts. Grant funding can support specialized task forces, investigators, partnerships with financial institutions to flag suspicious transactions, and community-based education programs that help older adults recognize red flags before they become victims. Thank you for your leadership on this issue. We are experiencing a fraud epidemic and it is critical that we work together to prevent seniors from being exploited in the first place, as well as provide the necessary support when fraud does happen. U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International Scams" January 14, 2026 Questions for the Record Seto Bagdoyan Senator Raphael Warnock Question: A recent report from the Government Accountability Office identified the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the federal agencies best positioned to lead a government-wide strategy on anti-scam efforts. As you know, President Trump fired the two Democratic Party members of the five-member FTC in March 2025, and the administration has attempted to eliminate the CFPB. How have these disruptions to the federal workforce affected the capacity of these agencies to combat scams targeting older adults? Response: In April 2025, GAO issued a report (GAO-25-107088) identifying federal efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to scams. We made 16 separate recommendations to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to better prevent, detect, and respond to scams. Specifically, we recommended that the FBI lead a U.S. government effort to develop and implement a governmentwide strategy to counter scams and coordinate related activities. We also made recommendations to CFPB, FTC, and the FBI related to improving, in collaboration with each other, how they collect and report data on scams. Pursuant to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency management is responsible for recruiting, developing, and retaining competent personnel to achieve the agency's objectives. A lack of competent personnel can result in skill gaps, which occur when agencies have an insufficient number of individuals or individuals without the appropriate skills or abilities to successfully perform their work. GAO's 2025 High Risk List notes that skills gaps within agencies impede agencies from cost effectively serving the public and achieving desired results. GAO has also previously issued work on assessing government reorganization efforts (GAO-18-427). As the report notes, strategic workforce planning should occur before any staffing changes to avoid creating skill gaps or other adverse effects that could impair agencies' ability to carry out their missions. GAO has not yet evaluated the impact, if any, of recent administrative and personnel actions at CFPB, FTC, and the FBI. On July 7, 2025, Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Elizabeth Warren-later joined by Senator Maggie Hassan-requested GAO examine the impact of recent administrative and personnel actions on the ability of the federal government to address fraud and scams and implement the recommendations from our April 2025 report. GAO recently staffed this engagement and will commence work very soon. ? ? ======================================================================= Statements for the Record ======================================================================= ? 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