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- SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET: COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET: COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 15, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-69 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-154 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS ANN WAGNER, Missouri, Chairman ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York, BRAD SHERMAN, California, Vice Chairman Ranking Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID SCOTT, Georgia PETE SESSIONS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JUAN VARGAS, California BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SEAN CASTEN, Illinois ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts LISA McCLAIN, Michigan CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, April 15, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Ann Wagner, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from Missouri................... 1 Hon. Brad Sherman, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from California................. 2 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 3 WITNESSES Mr. Bryan Smith, Senior Vice President of Complex Investigations and Intelligence, FINRA........................................ 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Ms. Jilenne Gunther, National Director of BankSafe Initiative, AARP........................................................... 23 Prepared Statement........................................... 25 Mr. Matthew Michel, Founder and Managing Partner, InvestorLink Capital Markets, LLC........................................... 39 Prepared Statement........................................... 41 Mr. Andrew Verstein, Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Curricular and Academic Affairs, UCLA School of Law............ 44 Prepared Statement........................................... 46 APPENDIX MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Hon. Frank D. Lucas: Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).................................................... 78 Hon. Andrew R. Garbarino: OTC Markets Group Inc........................................ 81 Hon. Michael Lawler: CFP Board.................................................... 83 LEGISLATION H.R. 2478, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025..... 87 H.R. 6161, the SEC Data Protection Act........................... 100 H.R----, the Honesty in Your Promotions and Endorsements (HYPE) Act of 2026.................................................... 102 SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET: COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS ---------- Wednesday, April 15, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ann Wagner [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Wagner, Lucas, Davidson, Steil, Garbarino, Lawler, Nunn, Downing, Haridopolos, Sherman, Scott, Vargas, Gonzalez, Casten, Lynch, and Bynum. Also present: Representatives Hill and Waters. Chairwoman Wagner. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Capital Markets will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. Today's hearing is entitled, ``Safeguarding Main Street: Combating Fraud and Exploitation in Our Capital Markets.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for inclusion for the record. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANN WAGNER, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. Once again, good morning. I want to start by thanking our witnesses for being here today to discuss this very important topic. This hearing builds on the committee's work to protect American investors from financial fraud. In 2024, investment scams accounted for nearly half of the $12 billion Americans lost to financial exploitation. Representing a 24 percent increase from the previous year. Securities fraud can take many forms from pump-and-dump schemes where scammers use false information to pump up stock prices only to dump their shares and swindle everyday investors to account takeovers where hackers hijacked brokerage accounts and sent assets to untraceable locations. These scams ranked as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI's) fourth most frequently reported cybercrime. Yet, they cause the highest total financial loss to investors. Criminals are targeting our most vulnerable citizens, including seniors and adults with impairments. Today, as we know, on April 15 is tax day, and now that the Working Families Tax Cut ensures that seniors have no tax on Social Security, we need to make sure that they are protected from these scams. The FBI reported that people over the age of 60 lost more money to fraud than any other demographic but these statistics are more than just numbers. They represent real pain for families and businesses across our country. Retirement funds erased, emergency savings gone, and hard-earned investments wiped away in an instant. These threats not only hurt American citizens, but they undermine the integrity of our capital markets as a whole. When bad actors exploit the markets for their own gain, Main Street loses trust that their investments are safe. Unfortunately, new technologies have allowed scammers to proliferate fraud on a larger scale than ever before. Much of which is coordinated across social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps. Criminals can now create websites that look identical to your broker-dealers siphoning away money that you thought was secure. Artificial intelligence opens new frontiers for scams to fake voices and altered videos. With scammers masquerading as loved ones or trusted financial advisers. On top of that, we now have overseas scam centers operating at an industrial scale far from the reach of U.S. law enforcement. We have seen Chinese companies, listed on our stock exchanges, take part in ramp-and-dump schemes, where scammers ramp up stocks priced through bots and fake accounts to then dump their stock at a peek and profit at the expense of the American investor. This is a global problem that calls for a multilevel intergovernmental approach. That is why I am glad regulators and industry stakeholders have made this a top priority, including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Chairman Atkins which has targeted malicious foreign actors through the Commission's cross border task force. Fighting fraud and exploitation is not a partisan issue. It is about protecting Main Street investors who put their trust in our capital markets. Our witnesses today bring deep experience in financial regulation, law enforcement, market mechanics and fraud prevention. I look forward to today's discussion. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 4 minutes for his opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Sherman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I think your opening statement demonstrates why this administration should not have cut the SEC enforcement staff by 20 percent. Two or three things we need to focus on, first are the influencers on social media. Social media platforms need to do a better job of policing the ads that power their companies. Reuters has reported that Meta allegedly projects a nearly 10 percent of its revenue derived from advertisements for scams, banned goods, that include these folks who have a financial interest in the free financial advice they are providing. Second, Congress has recently targeted fraudsters by saying brokers dealers can, under extraordinary circumstances, provide a 15-day hold when the reasonably suspect the inventor is being targeted for fraud. When an investor wants to send--an older male investor wants to send $1 million to a beautiful young woman he has met only online, we have to say, she does not love you, she is not a she. We need to stop the idea of tokenized securities because that kills the consolidated audit trail. You will be able to see that this or that account number seems to be making brilliant trades which you will never know who owns that account and without that, you end up with a perfect methodology for insider trading. Chinese companies often sell not the stock of their company to Americans, but variable interest entities based in the Cayman Islands. Such securities pretend to be common stock in the underlying, well-known Chinese company. These Variable Interest Entities, VIEs, do not belong in index funds, and I am not sure they belong in any portfolio. We need to deal with naked shorting, and I hope the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) will take a stronger view on that. Finally, when it comes to fraud in our capital markets, one need not to the look any further than Trump coin: Pumped to $75.35, dumped down to today's price of $2.80. A particular concern with the fact that it is the President's coin, is it anyone seeking influence with the President, could have bought the coins from his family for $75.35 and then not worried about whether the coins are now worth $2.80, because after all, the purpose was not to make a profit, the purpose was to influence a President. We have a lot of fraud to police here and I look forward to these hearings. Believe it or not will end my statement with 40 seconds left to go. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. A very good start. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chair Wagner and Ranking Member Sherman. I appreciate you having this important hearing. It is something that we are dealing with across all aspects of financial services. As emerging technologies and new digital platforms are rapidly reshaping the financial markets making it increasingly difficult to detect and prevent fraud posing significant risk to investors and I would say bank customers and others across the country. Between 2020 and 2024 since the pandemic, securities and investment fraud offenses have increased 25 percent. In 2024 alone, investors lost almost $6 billion to scams. Those are just the cases that we know about through reporting. Financial scams are becoming increasingly sophisticated ranging from market manipulation, like pump and dump, to digital-age Ponzi schemes and account takeovers. Unfortunately, seniors and retail investors are bearing the heaviest burden. The bad actors behind these schemes come in many forms and the purpose of this hearing is to make sure Congress knows what tools that we can have and we can suggest to be used by our regulators to keep Americans safe and encourage the best behavior by our private sector. I yield back to the chair. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Today, we welcome the testimony of Mr. Bryan Smith, the senior vice president of complex investigations and intelligence at FINRA; Ms. Jilenne Gunther, the national director of the BankSafe Initiative at AARP; Mr. Matthew Michel, the founder and managing partner of InvestorLink Capital Markets; and Professor Andrew Verstein, a professor of law and vice dean for curricular and academic affairs at the UCLA School of Law. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. Mr. Smith, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF BRYAN SMITH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF COMPLEX INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE, FINRA Mr. Smith. Chairman Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss fraud within capital markets and FINRA's role in combating the problem. My comments are informed by my current roll overseeing complex investigations at FINRA, but also my over 20 years at the FBI where I led operations in cyber, financial and organized crime. When it comes to fraud, the bottom line is we have challenges in front of us. FBI internet crime complaint center statistics released just this month, revealed over $20 billion in attempted fraud in 2025, with cyber-enabled fraud accounting for 85 percent of that total. With fraud rising sharply in recent years, it will take a collective approach to combat this evolving threat and to form this work there are a few things to understand. First, the threat is international, with actors and infrastructure widely dispersed. They explain the interconnectedness of the global economy and the ability to access targets 24/7 from across the globe. They are specialized and adept as early adaptors of technology used to achieve their criminal ends. They are adaptable, evolving to bypass individual and company defenses, and evade actions taken by law enforcement. Finally, they operate as a business. No longer is this a small close knit group of individuals in a boiler room. These are organized criminal enterprises, focused on profits and losses where they leverage specific skill sets often outsourced to achieve their criminal goals, through which we call the key services. These include malware in some of delivery system by which to get it onto the network; infrastructure needed to launch and facilitate the attacks; communications to engage with victims and with fellow criminals. Finally, the most important, the financial piece. They need to discreetly transfer money from the victim's wallets to their own. As a self-regulatory organization, focused on investor protection and market integrity, FINRA is uniquely situated to help tackle the fraud challenge, given the expert--rely upon the expertise of our member firms to inform our work, while also equipping them with tools to address fraud. While FINRA plays a key role in protecting capital markets, our jurisdiction is limited. To be effective we must operate within a broader network of regulators, law enforcement authorities and private entities. One example of this collaboration is our recently launched Financial Intelligence Fusion Center, a secure information platform, designed to collect, filter, and disseminate intelligence based in part on member firms sharing real-time threat activity and is already paying dividends. On its first day, three firms shared intelligence about a fraudulent scheme and within 3 hours, FINRA had sent an alert notifying all firms about the issue. The information flowing this instance nearly kept pace with the crime and we know of no firms who are victimized. Collaboration is also important because FINRA has limited jurisdiction and where we cannot act, we work with parties who can. Recent examples include referrals that led to hundreds of millions in seizures by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI, resulting in money returned back to investors. The sharing of threat activity, which led to takedowns of millions of social media accounts being used to facilitate fraud and support a technology company which took town technical infrastructure being used to infiltrate customer accounts. One area of critical concern is the connection between cyber and financial crime. To assist firms and investors in this area, FINRA proactively shares our own intelligence and mitigation techniques with firm, including through our cyber workshops and tabletop exercises. These practical hands-on experiences and exercises bolster firm resiliency against the criminal experts and while fraud impacts every generation, criminals frequently target seniors for their relative wealth to help FINRA focus on investor education, offers a helpline for seniors and their families, trains firms and has rules that help firms identify a trusted contact for clients and permit temporary account holds where fraud is suspected. Investors and broker-dealers are confronting a complex and evolving threat landscape. With fraud expanding amid technological changes and globalization. The solution requires an ecosystem of groups working in concert to address the fraud and FINRA plays a vital role. We also know that as these threats evolve so must we. It is why we remain committed to innovative solutions like the Financial Intelligence Fusion Center (FIFC) and continuous improvement of our regulatory programs. As the committee continues to focus on this issue, we welcome the opportunity to serve as a resource for you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. Mr. Smith. Ms. Gunther, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF JILENNE GUNTHER, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF BANKSAFE INITIATIVE, AARP Ms. Gunther. Good morning, my name is Jilenne Gunther, and I am the national director of AARP's BankSafe initiative. I am really honored to speak with you today on behalf of more than 100 million Americans, age 50 and older. I have spent my career working to prevent fraud, first with victims of crime in Missouri and now running programs nationally at AARP. Congress' work addressing fraud has opened up real opportunities for prevention, including protections that allow financial institutions to act when they train staff and we are seeing the results. AARP's BankSafe program builds on those goals of those laws. We have partnered with more than 1,500 financial institutions, including investment firms, to stop the exploitation before the money leaves the account. The free training we created with the industry, paired with policy adoption has helped prevent more than estimated $560 million from ever being stolen from Americans but this fight is personal. It is in my DNA. My grandfather worked in the financial industry and was a victim. In his 90s, someone was stealing cash from his wallet. My uncle also in industry recognized the red flags and in a move only someone in the industry would think of, he placed a dye pack in my grandfather's wallet, and our family literally caught the thief red handed. Most families are not that lucky, they do not have bankers, they do not have dye packs. That is why I built a program with my father at the very institution my grandfather had worked at, so other families do not have to rely on luck to protect the people they love. Because fraud is not an accident, it is a crime, and it is happening at a devastating scale. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that older adults lose between $7 billion and $62 billion each year. In a blink of an eye, someone can lose their entire retirement savings. The financial industry can be the last line of defense, but only if we give them the authority to act. Right now, we are leaving critical tools on the table. Criminals coordinate across telecom, tech, social media and across the financial system. We do not. We operate in silos. That gap is where fraud succeeds. We need to operate as a connected ecosystem, that means enabling real-time targeted information sharing across institutions and sectors. Fraud does not start at a point of transaction, it starts upstream with a text message, social media post, or an online ad. By the time someone is liquidating their assets, the victim has already been manipulated. If we do want to stop losses, we have to intervene earlier. When we act earlier and act together, we can stop fraud before it turns into a devastating financial loss. We need a coordinated Federal response and under your leadership, you can make that happen. That means empowering the entire financial industry to delay suspicious transactions without the fear of liability. Enabling real-time information sharing about fraud across the entire financial system, not just in securities and requiring social media, tech and telecom platforms to be part of the solution, not hiding places for criminals. Other countries are doing this. In Australia, scam losses dropped 43 percent in 1 quarter after launching a coordinated national response. We can do the same. This is not just about stopping theft; it is about protecting trust. Preventing negative impacts to business and government and preserving independence of Americans later in life. Thank you and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Gunther follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. I thank you, Ms. Gunther. Mr. Michel, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MICHEL, FOUNDER AND MANAGING PARTNER, INVESTORLINK CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC Mr. Michel. Chairman Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Matt Michel, I am the founding and managing partner of InvestorLink Capital Markets. I have spent the better part of my career in the equity capital markets supporting the distribution of over 1,500 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and follow-on offerings representing more than $400 billion in capital raised. This experience has given me an unobstructed view of how capital is formed and distributed in our public markets and how easily those processes can be exploited. In recent years, I have turned my attention to mechanics of that exploitation, specifically ramp-and-dump schemes that target retail investors through social media promotion, online investment clubs and coordinated volume spikes in lower priced securities. As the only witness today focused on market structure and manipulation, I will keep my remarks squarely in that lane. These schemes are not abstract; they take real money from real people. Savings meant for a child's education, a retirement or a first home but the damage extends well beyond the individual investor, our small cap markets run on retail participation. It allows early stage companies to fund growth and mature into durable businesses and that growth is a key driver of wealth creation. It is a virtuous cycle and manipulation breaks it. When fraud erodes confidence in the small cap space, capital dries up, the cost of capital rises and legitimate issuers are shut out of our markets. The result is not just investor harm, it is American innovation stifled in our own markets. Here is the core insight from the front lines. We no longer have a detection problem, we have a response problem. Over the past 18 months private sector tools have demonstrated the ability to generate high confidence, early warning signals on these patterns, often with meaningful lead time before significant investor harm occurs. These capabilities have been developed, validated, and shared with regulators and market participants for review and discussion. The technology exists, but the critical gap is what happens after a warning signal is identified. Our current regulatory and compliance framework is fundamentally reactive, optimized to investigate fraud after the fact. It is not structured to enable proactive intervention, nor is it flexible enough to allow firms to safely adapt new tools and methodologies at the pace of evolving fraud. As a result, firms that seek to act on forward-looking intelligence face uncertainty about when and how they can do so without exposure to second-guessing. There are, however, encouraging developments. FINRA's Financial Intelligence Fusion Center provides a no-cost channel for sharing threat intelligence on rampant dump and investment club schemes. The speed bumps proposed in H.R. 2478 and proposed rule 2166 offer firms a targeted mechanism, a brief delay when there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, paired with notification safeguards. These are constructive steps toward earlier response times without imposing heavy new mandates. A modest amount of regulatory clarity could unlock meaningful progress, particularly around when firms can rely on validated signals to act proactively and with confidence. Principles-based guidance, flexibility across business models and approaches that combine shared intelligence with firm level capabilities would go a long way toward closing the gap between detection and response. I look forward to sharing the advancements the private sector has made in early detection and to discussing the gap between what is now possible and what firms can practically adopt under our current framework. Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Michel follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Michel. Professor Verstein, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF ANDREW VERSTEIN, PROFESSOR OF LAW AND VICE DEAN FOR CURRICULAR AND ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW. Mr. Verstein. Thank you. Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, Subcommittee Chair Wagner and Ranking Member Sherman and the rest of the distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Andrew Verstein, vice dean and professor of law at the UCLA of Law. I am here in my personal capacity and not as a spokesman for UCLA. Today's hearing concerns fraud in our financial markets and I want to address what I consider to be, after my research, the most pressing concern about fraud at the current moment, which is insider trading by individuals in the government. I consider this problem to be significant, but I am not the first one to talk about it. The most famous book on insider trading was written by Henry Manne, a George Mason professor in the 1960s and Manne took the surprising view that insider trading by corporate executives is good. He defended it for 200-some pages, that is not my view, but I point it out because even Manne, who wanted to decriminalize the whole space, drew the line at government insider trading. Even he thought there are really big problems where that logic unravels. Government officials have access to information that they can profit from. They can use information as payoff devices and using the powers of the State they can create the very outcomes they are betting on and when they do things that are not appropriate the accountability mechanisms are reduced because there are no shareholders to vote them out, there are just the voters to vote them out. It undermines trust in both corporate sector and the governmental sector. So Manne drew the line there and if that guy drew the line there, we should take that line very seriously. That is why I am very concerned about recent media reports of suspicious trades in commodity and stock markets. I am troubled by patterns, I will just mention a few, I am sure you have been made aware of the same kinds of stories I have. On March 23, roughly $580 million of crude oil futures were sold in 2-minute window, approximately 15-minutes before the President announced a halt to strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure, and so those were very profitable commodity trades. Another example, in January a previously inactive polymarket account wagered that Venezuelan President Maduro might be deposed or abducted or put out of office, and, of course, he was through a covert military operation and that allowed that trader, who we do not know, to make $34,000 turn into $400,000. Now I cannot tell you that either of these events or other events constitute illegal insider trading nor can I say for sure that they are linked back to the administration. To know any of that, we would need to do investigations into beneficial owners, establish access to nonpublic information, and trace accounts. It is possible that either of these traders were just lucky, or that their access to information was lawful or it was unlawful from other sources besides the administration. Nevertheless, these are trades that bear the hallmarks of illegal insider trading, and ideally, we would be investigating them and whether anyone is investigating is something that this committee should care a great deal about. This leads to my second point. Suspicious trading does far more damage to the public when the public has no confidence it anyone is investigating. Weak enforcement does not merely fail to catch wrongdoers, it invites suspicion that there is trouble everywhere and it raises trading costs and the cost of capital more broadly. Therefore, I am concerned about the erosion of the SEC's capacities in recent days. As you know it is enforcement results recently announced, celebrated the closure of 1,000 matters without action. Whistleblower awards are down 90 percent, staffing down some 20 percent. You know, the consolidated audit trail, a comprehensive surveillance tool only recently deployed is being scaled back. I take that last point very seriously, my research as a scholar involves using publicly available data from the SEC to try to track insider trading. For example, co-authors and I found about $100 billion a year of overvalued stock being sold. You are able to determine that corporate insiders were doing that on the basis of public information, but when we tried to look at whether this went back to the time of Enron and WorldCom, we could not check because the SEC had shredded the relevant information making our research hit a brick wall. When information is deleted or lost, it means that scholars and enforcement officials, to say nothing of journalists and shareholders cannot learn the truth and cannot protect themselves, and they may suspect the worst. So, I am concerned about reduced transparency and reduced capacity at the SEC, and I am concerned about how that will affect all the issues before the committee today. I think that elder fraud is a really big problem, Chinese ramp-and-dump schemes are a problem. Influencer fraud is a big problem and insider trading, corporate and governmental, is a big problem and markets benefit when there is a robust regulator working to enforce on these issues. The United States has the most trusted financial markets in the world, appropriately so, and it is important that we defend it so that we can keep them---- Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Verstein. I thank you for your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Verstein follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you very much, Professor. We will now turn to member questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. The Federal Trade Commission reports that Missourians, my home State, lost over $76 million to investment scams last year, a staggering $24 million increase from 2024. During that same time, the FBI saw a 300 percent increase in victim complaints about ramp-and-dump stock fraud. Investment scams are not new, but the astonishing rise is deeply concerning. Ms. Gunther, what do you attribute this increase to? Ms. Gunther. Thank you, Representative, for the question. It is driven by criminals who are really scaling faster across platforms using artificial intelligence, combine that with the low friction from moving money quickly and then limited ability to intervene at the point of the transaction. What we are seeing also is the greatest wealth transfer that we have seen in history, which is $900 trillion being passed from one generation to another. To really get ahead of this we have got to look upstream where you have got the first point of contact between the criminal and consumer is really key to preventing this. Chairwoman Wagner. Now, how do you see criminals using AI or artificial intelligence to make scams more believable? Ms. Gunther. Yes, so a lot of--they are doing a lot of different things. Gone are the days where you can pinpoint a scam because someone is making a spelling error or a grammar mistake. They are either using AI to write realistic messages. They are cloning people's voices, they are doing deepfake videos of people that they may know. So, it makes those scams feel a lot more credible but also, reduces the chance that consumers are really going to question that interaction and that is why it is so important and critical to really look at upstream with the first point of interaction between the criminal and the potential victim. Chairwoman Wagner. Ms. Gunther, AARP has been a vital partner in endorsing my bill, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act. This legislation grants investment companies the power to pause redemptions for seniors and individuals with impairments when exploitation is suspected. We know that once a fraudulent wire transfer or security redemption is processed, that money is often gone forever, leaving seniors with no path for recovery. Under current law, mutual funds are often forced to process these redemptions within a very strict window, even if they see what I will call real red flags. How does my bill provide that critical breathing room for financial institutions to actually stop the theft for the damage is irreparable? Ms. Gunther. Thank you so much for the question. Really stopping money before it gets lost, before it leaves that account is really critical to preventing exploitation. So, we had Virginia Tech do a random control study within the financial industry, about 200 financial institutions participated. The number one thing in terms of the most effective intervention was when they have the ability to pause a suspicious transaction. That gives both the mutual fund institutions the ability to ask those suspicious--ask questions. Is it suspicious? Take time to investigate it but it also gives that time to the potential victim to slow it down, to get out of that fight-versus-flight that they are experiencing. So it is extremely critical for mutual funds to have this power. Chairwoman Wagner. Financial Exploitation Prevention Act that I have authored and sponsored in other previous Congresses is absolutely vital that we make this into law, especially as we see these terrible increases. Given that so many investment scams originate overseas, it was encouraging to see the SEC announce a creation of its cross-border task force to strengthen the Commission's efforts to identify and combat international fraud. Mr. Smith, can you explain how law enforcement and regulators work together to target bad actors oversees and what barriers exist to doing so? Mr. Smith. Thank you for that question. As I said in my opening statement, this is an international problem, and we have got actors and services that are being leveraged across the globe to defraud American investors and within that ecosystem. If you think about all those key components to it, there is not one entity that has oversight or authority amongst all of those. That is why the more that private sector entities, government, regulators can get together to bridge the gaps between those will help investors---- Chairwoman Wagner. And really just more cooperation, even between countries to hold foreign scammers who are targeting Americans accountable. My time has expired. I will--I did not get to all my questions at all, but I am now pleased to recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes for his questions. Mr. Sherman. The SEC launches effective investigations, somebody sees they are in the cross-hairs, they buy $100 million worth of Trump coin, they--magically the investigation vanishes. Trump is $100 million richer, what could be better than that? Now we have talked a bit about a 15-day delay in someone getting their money. I would point out that when I first met my wife, many people recognized that she was completely out of my league, figured she must think I was wealthy, it worked out. So, not every--I am concerned about the loss of freedom, but 15 days is not too long to wait in extraordinary circumstances. I am concerned about whether this would apply to political organizations. An organization could say, ``Oh, you want to spend money on your campaign to defraud voters or you are fraudulent in thinking you have a chance of winning, we are going to hold your money.'' We have got to make sure, given the politicization and how extreme things are getting in our world of politics that no political organization is prevented from spending its money by a financial institution. Mr. Verstein, there is this idea of having deed by trading, tokenization of our stocks. Of course, exchanges provide transparency regarding the fees, conflicts of interest, access, user segmentation, and most importantly, if on an exchange, you buy $100 million worth of a particular stock 5 minutes before the announcement, there is a decent chance they will figure out who you are. If we were to tokenize our securities, would this not be an open door to those with insider information? Mr. Verstein. Well, it is a technological question, with the current tokens due, and it is a political question of how we feel about that. I think it is really important to have systems and surveillance and accountability, it is important that when you place a stock trade on Charles Schwab, if it looks suspicious, you are going to get a call from your broker, FINRA, or they might call the SEC. That is appropriate, it is appropriate that there is a system of accountability that can trace things and can figure things out. We do not necessarily have to use the same fiber optic cables and same exchanges we have been using for a long time. We could go to new technologies, but it is really important that along the way, we not lose the visibility that we need in order to---- Mr. Sherman. Well, the whole purpose of tokenization is to eliminate the know-your-customer rule. If you that the crypto out of crypto, take the hidden out of crypto, take the hidden out of crypto, it is not crypto anymore. Mr. Verstein. I do think that---- Mr. Sherman. You are saying that if we have tokenization, we need to somehow know your customer for every account? Mr. Verstein. I think we do not want to have a slight of hand where we lose visibility just because we changed technologies. It seems like that could happen with a lot of the--that are happening. Mr. Sherman. I want to focus, okay. Staggeringly, Meta allegedly has projected 10 percent of its revenue is derived from advertisements for scammed, banned goods. International documents suggest they are serving as many as 15 billion high-risk scam ads every day. Ms. Gunther, at what point do we need to recognize that the business models of social media which prioritize ad revenues and traffic over fraud prevention are becoming a real threat to financial stability? Hello. Ms. Gunther. Ms. Gunther. I am sorry, can you repeat the question? Mr. Sherman. Did any other witness hear the question and want to answer? Okay, Ms. Gunther. At what point do we recognize that the business models of social media and telecom companies which prioritize ad revenue and traffic over fraud prevention are becoming a threat to financial stability? Ms. Gunther. Yes, One of the things that we need to do is we need to put guardrails there for social media companies. It is really important to fight things upstream. That was one of the most important things. I think we spent a lot of time focusing on the downstream and we need to be a lot more proactive in preventing this so that the criminals are never contacting that potential victim. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. My time has basically expired. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill of Arkansas, for 5 minutes for questioning. Chairman Hill. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is important that you are having this hearing in the committee and both sides of the aisle are really concerned about this. We have Dan Meuser, who chairs our Oversight Committee, also working on this in various ways and then Andy Barr, who chairs our Financial Institutions Subcommittee, that committee also is looking at this in the banking space. So, I want to thank Sherman and Wagner for moving this topic into the fintech broker dealer space, equally important, overwhelming numbers when you look at the fraud numbers that have been announced. Let me start with you, Mr. Smith. I was a registered person in broker dealer business for three decades, and also in community banking in my career before Congress. Every Wednesday, we met on the phone, our operations people, and we talked about the bad people lurking around Little Rock trying to pass a bad check or make a bad loan or have a fraudulent financial statement. It probably was not condoned by law, but it was condoned by protecting our customers. These kinds of things that we have been talking about today are important, and FINRA, I think, has proposed rule 2166 the so called speed-bump rule that has been referenced here, it would put a temporary 5- day business day hold on suspicious transactions. Can you tell me how you think that would benefit? And is that legal under the SEC's statutory authority for FINRA to have that kind of a hold? Mr. Smith. You hit on two things there. One is the sharing of intelligence. So we do not think we called it that back then, but that is really important, so people understand what we are dealing with, which is why we have implemented some things that we have done at FINRA. Regarding the speed bump rule I will also go back to when I was an agent working investigations and Ponzi schemes and investment frauds. I will tell you anecdotally that in every single one of those instances that if the victim had asked one more question, if they had inquired about what they were going to do with the money, when would they be getting the money back. If they said, I do not understand what is happening here, those Ponzi schemes, those investment frauds would have fallen apart because the bad actor did not have the answer to those questions. When you look at the proposed rule here in this instance, it is a bit of putting that speed bump in place so people can make rational decisions based off the facts and based off real information. If that means that you have an institution coming in and asking that question and getting those hard answers, that is really important and I think it really can help victims and investors. Chairman Hill. Yes, I think it is important, but I do think a lot of customers--I mean, I have seen this firsthand and I have seen it as a Member of Congress. They insist they are right, and they do not need you telling them to get in their business and tell them how to spend their money, and I think that puts broker-dealers and bankers in an awkward position but I think still that rule may, as you say, slow down that rationality. How are you coordinating with State regulators? I know our State Attorney General Tim Griffin, my predecessor here in the House, reported that 73 percent of all Arkansas adults have been the victim of a cyber-related fraud, mostly coming to them probably through the telecommunication system but how are you coordinating with the State regulators, securities regulators and the States' Attorneys General. Mr. Smith. As I have talked about in the opening statement, we have a limited role in our jurisdiction over broker-dealers, but we recognize that the problems that our firms and registered reps of investors and those are also the ones being seen by other entities, which is why we have ongoing engagement with the SEC, and with State regulators. It is critically important that we understand what they are seeing on the ground, because what may be happening in Arkansas may not be seen in Texas and so if we can get intelligence from what is happening there and share it with other individuals, as well as then with our member firms, that builds up some resiliency, with an ecosystem and firms whether they are in Arkansas, Texas, or Washington, can identify this and learn from each other. Chairman Hill. Thank you very much. I appreciate AARP's deep engagement on this topic with your members and your work. I was intrigued to read about your BankSafe curriculum. Can you tell us how you keep it up to date with this just exploding AI- driven attempt at changing the rules of the game every day? Ms. Gunther. Thank you, Representative, for that question. We rely on our 1,500 financial institutions that we work with. We put together advisory groups, so we are always updating our training and our policies and resources. That allows us to act really quickly to address emerging threats like AI-driven scams. It is one of reasons we have been able to save consumers over $560 million on behalf of consumers. One example that we have just recently put into our training is a video testimonial where a criminal cloned---- Chairman Hill. Thank you so much. Expand on that for the record for us and I know members will benefit from your work. I yield back, Chairman. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Waters of California, for 5 minutes of questioning. Ms. Waters. Thank you so very much, Chair Wagner. This subject matter today is entitled, ``Safeguarding Main Street: Combating Fraud and Exploitation in Our Capital Markets.'' Well, you missed the mark. This is too narrowly designed to deal with the issues that the subject matter that you have initiated here does. It does not do that. The Trump family is openly using the office of the Presidency to enrich themselves and their billionaire friends. Using meme coins and other ventures, they have extracted billions of dollars from the American people. At the same time, Trump is raising gas, grocery and housing costs. So, part of the scam against the American people has been to weaken the Securities and Exchange Commission that is the SEC, so that is no longer able to enforce securities laws and protect investors. The SEC has done nothing to address several well- documented crypto frauds and suspicious trades. Oftentimes, the Trump's press conferences and tweets. If we want to address fraud and scams, we need to look no further than 1600 Pennsylvania. Professor Verstein, you are an expert in insider trading and market manipulation. Your testimony highlights how insider trading market manipulation and a weakened SEC can break trust in Americans' financial market. On March 23, roughly $580 million in crude oil futures were sold in a 2-minute window of just 15 minutes before the President announced a halt to strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. On April 7, 16 investors placed approximately $950 million in bets that oil prices would fall just hours before President Trump announced that the United States and Iran had entered an apparent cease-fire agreement. There are yet several other examples of individuals placing abnormal amounts of bets on specific government actions or announcements using the prediction market platform. Please explain how the future of the SEC is to enforce the securities laws and otherwise detect and prevent fraud and can hurt our markets? What should the SEC be doing to enhance confidence in the financial markets? Mr. Verstein. Oh, this goes to the basic building blocks of a successful financial market. Financial markets do not operate spontaneously without any support. They operate if people feel like they are going to get a basically fair shake. In a human sense, ordinary investors do not take their money out from under their mattress if they think they are playing on an unfair field but even sophisticated investors, big cybernetic trading firms, high-frequency trading firms, everybody at the top of the food train too cares about whether they are trading against somebody who is getting secrets from the White House or some government official. People do not play the same way if they think there is no accountability. Trading costs rise, liquidity falls, capital withdraws from markets, and a culture of trust erodes. It is not hypothetical, there are places in the world where the markets fail because an unraveling occurs as people think: Well, I am going to be cheated, so I might as well cheat. Or I should not participate if I am not willing to cheat. Cultures of trust built on foundations of law are really hard to build and they are worth maintaining. I am I concerned that if we make it common knowledge that the SEC is underresourced and unable to do it its part, then people will begin to take for granted that more is permissible and less is safe than we want. Ms. Waters. I mentioned the prediction markets. Do you think that the President knows and is understanding--and is understanding, or participating in some way in the prediction market? Mr. Verstein. I wish I knew. I mean, I am a reader of the newspaper like everybody else. The newspaper stories look pretty suspicious. There are suggestions that the President and those friends of his are doing well in these markets and has bragged about it. I would say the important point is not that I can point the finger and say this was illegal, this was inappropriate, it is that people are led to wonder, these look like suspicious trades, they are consistent with leaks from the White House. They might not be leaks from the White House. We would feel better as ordinary Americans reading the paper if we knew a robust Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a robust SEC, a robust congressional subcommittee all examining these things and then reporting back, Hey, everything is squeaky clean, let me show you, or Hey, we found some problems, but everything else is fine. Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the chair of our Task Force on Monetary Policy, Mr. Lucas of Oklahoma, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair Wagner. I would like to enter into the record this letter from Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association on the work their members are doing on combat-to-combat fraud. Chairwoman Wagner. So ordered. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 78.] Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you to witnesses today for being here and sharing your expertise on a threat that unfortunately continues to persist across the entire country. Mr. Michel, you mentioned in your testimony the prolific use of new and emerging technologies to facilitate fraud and scams. What are the trends you were noticing in the past several years as it relates to the abuse of innovation and technology? Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question, Representative. One of key things that sort of underpins the entire mess is the proliferation of these issuers that list on national exchanges. Once the issuer lists, it is available everywhere and the liquidity that underpins that is global. Furthermore, the use of what I will call industrial AI across encrypted platforms is what makes the speed very hard to get our arms around. So the access to liquidity--the national exchanges at which they trade on, and the ability to promote these things 24 hours a day has decimated the retail investor over the past couple of years. Mr. Lucas. Continuing with you, Mr. Smith, how can Congress streamline efforts across multiple agencies and jurisdictions so that we can have a coordinated approach to combating fraud? Mr. Smith. This is a complicated ecosystem that the adversary is leveraging and so, it takes multiple entities to have a successful resolution to it. Efforts that encourage information sharing, efforts that encourage bringing the right skill to the fight is going to be helpful for investors and for the capital markets. Mr. Lucas. How have agencies specialized in certain aspects of fraud response and how can others benefit from increased collaboration and the lessons learned? Mr. Smith. Yes, so one of the things that our unique position as a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO), we have a subset of this ecosystem that we can see and we can leverage our expertise in that fight, but there are also other entities who have skill sets and authorities. So law enforcement has the ability to seize assets when identified that there is proceeds from criminal activity and the more that we can connect that and enable entities to take action, we have seen some positive results over this last year in the small cap fraud space where DOJ and the FBI seized over $214 million based off of a referral from a firm to us about activity, and then we reached out to the government. Mr. Lucas. Ms. Gunther, we all know the old line about an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Particularly when it comes to financial fraud. What are the most effective mitigation techniques in preventing these crimes before they affect investors? Ms. Gunther. Yes, one of the most important things people can do at the financial institution level is really to put that speed bump in which gives people--it gives the investor the time to think about, Hey, something is going wrong. It also gives the institution the ability to also look at, Hey, we do need an investigation. It is that speed bump that we found in a random control study is the most helpful for both the victim, but also for the institution as well. Mr. Lucas. Thank you and thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Chairlady. I want to address my questions to Mr. Verstein. Am I pronouncing that right? Mr. Verstein. Yes, perfectly. Thank you. Mr. Scott. I think I would like for you to tell us what we can do here in Congress addressing this issue? Now I am trying to do something along with my partner, Congressman Loudermilk, he and I are working on a bill that will address some of these concerns and our bill really is the legislation. It is called the SEC Data Protection Act, alongside, of course, I mentioned with Congressman Loudermilk. We can do something, and we need to know as we move this legislation, what do we need to do, and what we are going to be looking at is the vulnerabilities, the bad actors, and how do they access this information. When you are doing a bill and we want to respond to it, I want to hear from you the experts, what would you like to see in our bill? What must be in there, number one, to address the concerns that you raised? Mr. Verstein. Thank you. Well, I would say there are three things that I would propose that a Member of Congress looking at this area would do. The first is a suite of things to largely reverse the defanging of the SEC. The SEC in the past may not have been perfect but I---- Mr. Scott. You said defanging. Mr. Verstein. What I mean is the reducing of staff, the reducing of the consolidated audit trail. I would say these trends are not good trends for the SEC. It would be better if the SEC had enforcement capacity, funding and surveillance capacity. So that would be the first thing would be to reestablish those parts of the SEC---- Mr. Scott. How bad is that situation, the lack of the talent in there to do this? Our bad actors are outnumbering people that can stop them. Mr. Verstein. I think the situation, as you have heard from the members, witnesses down here, is pretty bad. There is an army of fraudsters out there and so having staff sufficient to deal with elder fraud should not mean you cannot deal with ramp and dump; it should not mean you cannot deal with insider trading. So having enough staff to actually do the work is vital. The second thing would be to make sure that we are taking commonsense prophylactic approaches to government officials trading, I do not think any government official should have a polymarket account. I cannot see any justification for their family members to have one. So we should have stronger rules to prevent, not just insider trading, but the appearance of insider trading or the possibility of it. Then third---- Yes, Congressman did you want to---- Mr. Scott. Yes, now Reuters had an excellent article in here, and I want to share it with you. They highlighted a decline in the SEC's enforcement measures by 20 percent. How do you--excuse my coffee, it probably agreed with me--but how do you address that? I mean, are you aware of that? Mr. Verstein. I am terribly sorry to say the noise from the hallway was so loud, I could not really hear the question. I am sorry to say that. Mr. Scott. Reuters article had highlighted the decline and the SEC's enforcement measures of 20 percent in the latest fiscal year. Mr. Verstein. Yes. Mr. Scott. On top of that, a staffing reduction also--well, they have 18 percent. Mr. Verstein. Yes, Congressman, I am sorry to make you repeat that. Yes, it is true, these staffing cuts are real, they are huge, they are significant, they are worrying to me. It is true that any organization needs to change things from time to time. It is okay for the chairman to reshuffle, but I think it looks like an overcorrection to me. Mr. Scott. Would that be something that you would--I recommend that Congressman Loudermilk and I---- Mr. Verstein. I would recommend that you fund and staff the SEC robustly, and then we can debate which the relative priorities are. I think it needs to be funded. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Scott. Good. Thank you. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on National Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairwoman. To our witnesses, thank you for your work in preparation for this and your testimony and your participation today in today's hearing. A very timely hearing. When you look at safeguarding American citizens against scams, I think there is no real partisanship here and I have been really encouraged by the work I have had with Ranking Member Beatty on confronting that with respect to traditional scams. When you look at some of the scams in the capital markets, there has been a longtime concern that--you have seen a rise of what have historically been known as pump-and-dump scams, where you see something hyped and then there is a rug-pull later. Some of that is allegedly taking place in crypto, and for the longest time, really since 2017 when the initial coin offering market was going on, I started working with colleagues to produce market clarity. Back then, we called it the Token Taxonomy Act, and the SEC has recently put out their own taxonomy. I think that is the goal: is to make a clear, bright- line test for when something is a security and when something is not a security. Mr. Smith, maybe I will start with you. How important is it that we get those clear rules of the road versus regulation by enforcement? Mr. Smith. In my experience, both in law enforcement and here in FINRA, having clarity as to what things are, what the rules are in the road are important, and taxonomy is really important to that. It is why we focused on--you heard me talk about the key services of how the adversary is using cyber-enabled tactics to enable pump-and-dump schemes, to enable business email compromise (BEC), to enable romance fraud and ransomware. That taxonomy that we have used is now pervasive and so everyone understands that those are key areas to address those frauds. As a great example, if we all are focused and we understand what the problem is, then we understand where we fit within it and how we then can address it. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. I think one of the things you see increasingly is, like, cross-border and I think the other thing is, if you look at, particularly with crypto, people are saying, well, does this token really represent real voting rights or real control of a company? But, on the other hand, every Chinese company that is traded in America is effectively a proxy. You do not really control that. What kind of safeguards do we have for cross-border fraud in those cases? Does anyone want to weigh in on that issue? Mr. Smith. Certainly, we have a responsibility in those areas where it is a member firm or a registered rep that is involved in those transactions, and we will take action when we see an issue. Where we have seen instances where we do not have authority, that is when we partner with other entities, like law enforcement, and hand it off to them. Mr. Davidson. So the broker-dealer does have some liability, some risk for their recommendations and their due diligence in that sense, correct, to the SEC? Mr. Smith. They can, yes. Mr. Davidson. Mr. Michel, could you kind of comment on that, when you look at kind of the role and importance of broker-dealers? Maybe also part of the appeal in the market is to get more democratic access to capital. I mean, with only less than 5 percent of the world's population, we have got more than 50 percent of the world's invested capital. Our markets are incredible but a lot of the reach we have wanted to see is to get ordinary Americans to have easier access to this. Mr. Michel. Yes. Mr. Davidson. What is the role of the broker-dealer there, and why is it not just a plain accredited investor and it is my money, I can do what I want? Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question. The broker-dealers are the front lines, and I think FINRA-- I formed a broker-dealer. I ran one. So we consistently hear that messaging. One of the key things that we can do is give them an environment from which they can evolve into the various threats that face them and ultimately the retail investing community. So by having a framework that allows their regulatory posture to kind of meet the threat as it evolves is critical for preserving exactly what you are asking. Mr. Davidson. Yes. Okay. Well, thank you for that. As the tools evolve, I think probably the biggest threat-- and we will surely cover that some--is artificial intelligence. I was encouraged to see Secretary Bessent and Chairman Powell and others talking about Claude as a tool or ongoing roles of these kinds of tools. So Congress really has not kept up with privacy laws, let alone artificial intelligence. What should we be doing, or is an executive order enough? Mr. Michel, have you got a thought on that? Mr. Michel. Again, that is not really my lane of expertise in terms of the policy aspect of this but the phenomenon that you are describing of ramp and dump is certainly observable, and firms need to be able to evolve to protect themselves from that. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. I yield. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the ranking member of our Task Force on Monetary Policy, Mr. Vargas of California, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I appreciate this hearing. I think it has been very good, and I appreciate all the witnesses here today. Professor Verstein, I did hear the conversation between yourself and Mr. Scott, I mean, the cuts at the SEC, having sufficient staff. Could you go into that a little bit further? Because I do think that one of the things that makes the capital markets so robust in our country is the SEC's disclosure and the world class staff that we have there policing this. So could you go into a little bit more depth about that? Because I think that is a problem. Mr. Verstein. Well, I think we should distinguish between ordinary politics of different administrations liking different things out of an office from the nuts-and-bolts issue of what talent is there and how capable you want the capacity of this group to be. The SEC is a hundred-year-old organization with a blue ribbon history, and at its best it is commendable in every way and at its worst makes some mistakes. I think we have seen an overcorrection, though. I think there are really talented people that we have seen---- Mr. Vargas. Overcorrection in the sense of what? Mr. Verstein. Well, I think we had--we have had Republican Administrations with robust enforcement and Democratic Administrations with robust enforcement. There are ways to have robust, talented, well-resourced SECs without axing all the talented people. Mr. Vargas. All right. Thank you. Two things that really jumped out at me today were this, that said that we no longer have a detection problem--Mr. Michel, you said this--now we have a response problem. Then I heard from a few of you that, really, if we could have a brief delay or a pause, that would be really significant. Mr. Smith, first of all, thank you for your service in the FBI. We appreciate that and thank you for your work at FINRA. Could you comment about that? Mr. Smith. Yes. As I talked about, just as a case agent working on these things, very often you would see instances where people just went along. They were embarrassed. They did not want to ask a question. They did not understand something. So putting a speed bump in to get the information that the investor needs can be helpful, because at the end of the day what we want is rational decisions that are made that are not based off of a sense of---- Mr. Vargas. What does that mean? I mean, what does that mean in a practical sense? So you are trying to pull money out of your mutual fund or whatever. What does that mean? If someone is trying to screw you overseas, what does that mean? What does it mean to put a pause in there to ask a question? Mr. Smith. Yes. So in that instance, it would be that the firm is asking the potential victim: How did you get in contact with these individuals? What is it that you are investing in, in this? Oh, this is now a microcap stock that you are investing in, and you have always been in blue chips. So it pauses them and then if there is a trusted contact in the family who can help them through this because the other thing that we have seen with particularly elderly victims is that they have coached them through how to respond and having that trusted contact from a family to help is really beneficial to prevent fraud. Mr. Vargas. Okay. Ms. Gunther, you said that there should--something similar, but there should be no liability. In other words, pause it, stop it a little bit, but no liability of the firm. Could you talk a little bit more about what that means? Ms. Gunther. Yes. So I can talk a little bit about--it is a liability to actually report the financial exploitation. I wanted to key on something that was said earlier about older investors. One of the things that is so important about a trusted contact is we know from psychology somebody needs to be told from by different people that something is amiss before they realize and they get out of that fight-or-flight. That is why the speed bump is really critical, but also that trusted contact who can be one of those three people so they can realize that something is amiss. Mr. Vargas. Okay. I have about a minute left, so what I do want to say is, of course, I agree with the insider trading. I do not think that politicians--anybody--should be able to trade individual stocks or on futures, anything like that. We should have our investments in mutual funds, and that is that. We should not be able to pick winners and losers, because, again, we do get a lot of information. I hope we pass that law. I have always been in favor of that. I have my money in mutual, so I do not pick individual stocks, but we did talk about technology today, and I think that is an important thing, AI and other things. How really can that help here to make sure that we do not have more fraud? Because it also--we heard from Mr. Smith--it also hurts the other way. Technology is also improving the way the thieves rip our money off. Mr. Verstein. That is right. This is part of why I am concerned about the decline of the Consolidated Audit Trail. I think one of the great things that AI lets you do is use the information you have to be more effective, and that is why you want to have good information. So having the SEC has at its fingertips all the personally identified information, all the brokerages, all the transaction history, I understand that it is expensive, but it is valuable. Mr. Vargas. My time is up, and I thank the chair. Thank you. Yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Mr. Steil of Wisconsin, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Chair Wagner. I appreciate you holding today's hearing. Before I begin my questions, I just want to return to a previous colleague's assertion about tokenized securities. In particular, there was an assertion made that it would make it easier for insider traders to trade on nonpublic information if the security was tokenized. That is not true. To be clear, placing a security on a blockchain does not confer any special treatment. It does not alter its regulatory status. It remains a security and must comply with all applicable laws and regulations. I think that is really important to put that back in the record based on the previous assertion that was made. Now I want to dive into my comments. U.S. capital markets are the envy of the world. There is really no second when it comes to U.S. capital markets. They provide families with low-cost ways to save, to build wealth, and they give companies the opportunity to raise capital and create jobs here in the United States of America. Increasingly, a lot of our capital markets are under threats from fraudsters and criminals, and a majority of Americans are encountering scams. The dollar amounts are staggering, in particular with our seniors. The FTC reported it was 16 billion, but if we assume that there is underreporting-- which I think we all agree with--it is significantly higher than that. It is not a partisan issue. It is something we need to be working with broadly to prevent this from occurring. I want to start with you, Mr. Smith, if I can, based on your work with FINRA. In your opening testimony, you were talking about the landscape dominated by international actors who are using technology to exploit jurisdictional gaps across countries and regulators and evade prosecution. I want to dive into that and identify some of the jurisdictional or regulatory gaps that international criminals are leveraging to the detriment of U.S. capital markets and U.S. consumers. Can you comment on some of those jurisdictional and regulatory gaps? Mr. Smith. Certainly. When you are dealing with an adversary that is located across the globe, the rules that they operate under vary. I saw this when I was at the FBI of the law enforcement capabilities who have that. You also see that within the regulatory environment. We have to recognize that a problem in another jurisdiction could very quickly become a problem within our jurisdiction, and so that is where the concept of engagement and partnerships and collaboration is key. We have seen some success in this of bridging some of those gaps where we have done information sharing with our partners in Japan on the small cap fraud space and let them know what we are seeing. They then let us know about new activity with new account fraud and account takeovers involving cyber means which encouraged it, which informed our membership. If we could replicate that---- Mr. Steil. Are there specific jurisdictions that are causing you concern? Mr. Smith. Within the small cap fraud space, that is particularly concerning with us with the issuers that are coming out of China and that is why we have pushed a significant amount of intelligence out about that to firms to let people know what we are seeing in that space. Mr. Steil. So a lot of that is about jurisdictions policing their own jurisdiction. Is that what you are saying---- Mr. Smith. At times, that can be. Mr. Steil [continuing]. in particular as it relates to China? Mr. Smith. At times, yes, it can be. Mr. Steil. Let me jump to you, Ms. Gunther, if I can. Criminals are perpetuating frauds, scams, and becoming increasingly sophisticated. AI can work in two ways, right? They can work to create scams. They can also work to prevent scams. Can you talk about this balance about how we can leverage AI to prevent the scams that are occurring but also the risks that AI is bringing? Ms. Gunther. Yes, absolutely, and thank you for the question. AI is both a tool for good and for evil. One of the ways we really encourage financial institutions to use artificial intelligence, machine learning. It can detect patterns faster to stop this crime, and it is also important to--with artificial intelligence--is then you have got to train someone for that human touchpoint to tell that victim. The other thing is that artificial intelligence can also be used by criminals to scale scams. They are using bots and other things, but it is really critical for financial institutions to use artificial intelligence to recognize those patterns. Mr. Steil. I appreciate all of our witnesses for being here today. Madam Chair, I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back, and I thank him for correcting the record on tokenization. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Casten. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just briefly, I want to correct something Mr. Steil said. It is true that a tokenized security is a security. The SEC has been very clear about that. It is also true that Section 202 and Section 203 of the CLARITY Act says that if you raise a security less than $200 million, you are exempted from those provisions. This Congress, this committee has opened a back door if that CLARITY Act becomes law. I think it is important for us to understand that if we care about fraud, let us not pretend that laws we passed, just because they have not passed the Senate yet, it does not represent the intentions of this committee. Not yours truly, but this committee. I am happy to have this hearing. I am grateful to Chair Wagner for doing this and supporting your efforts and the legislation you have introduced and noticed for this hearing. It is extremely timely. On Monday, I did a--coincidentally, I did not know this hearing was coming--did a roundtable back in the district specifically on senior fraud with seniors and the statistics we are hearing, they just come out in all of these stories. I sat with a credit union who is sitting there saying: We do not actually have the ability legally to prevent a senior from withdrawing their money to put it through, but we try to put practice in. They told this story about going through two levels of escalation within their bank and finally persuading a senior that this Hollywood celebrity who she claimed was her husband and needed money for a home repair was highly unlikely to be her husband because they had never met and was therefore highly unlikely to also need money for a home repair, and they were ultimately able to stop that but they had no legal authority to prevent that. This was just about persuasion, and I am grateful for the work you are doing with BankSafe and others, but the consistent sort of nexus of all this fraud was some combination of social media and crypto ATMs. I guess I just want to start, leaving the tools aside for a minute--and I do not know, Mr. Smith or Mr. Verstein, if either of you want to comment on this. Can you clarify, if I convince you to transfer money to me for fraudulent purposes, what is the statute that I have violated, and what is the penalty if I am found guilty, and who is the enforcement agency that chases that down? Mr. Verstein. I am happy to take a stab at this. I have written about crypto in the securities context, and I have, I think, the only article on crypto in insider trading. Mr. Casten. Okay. I am not even really asking about crypto. I am just saying, like, I show up and I tell you a lie that gets you to give me money. Mr. Verstein. Yes. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act says that if there is a purchase or sale of a security and there is a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with that, that is a fraud and a violation of the 34 Act. So, that is a civil and can be a criminal violation, just like any time your broker misleads you about whether you are sending money to the right person or something. Mr. Casten. Okay, and what if I tell you that I am Matt Damon and you and I are married and I need $10,000 for a home repair and you give it to me? Mr. Verstein. That is part--as long as it is a material misrepresentation---- Mr. Casten. Okay. Mr. Verstein [continuing]. it might be. Mr. Casten. Okay. Now does that same statute apply if I am abetting that crime? So, I connect the mark to the perp, and I get a fee in exchange for that service. Am I also--I do not know. Is that going to RICO? Like, am I also liable in that case? Mr. Verstein. Well, there is RICO, there is aiding and abetting, and there is scheme liability. All three are kinds of theories that float around the underlying violation. Mr. Casten. Okay, and that is a felony? Mr. Verstein. It can be, yes. Absolutely. Mr. Casten. Can you get jail time? Mr. Verstein. You can get--yes. You can get jail time if those things were established. Mr. Casten. Okay. Given what Mr. Sherman and others have raised, the Reuters reporting that Meta, something like 10 percent of their income has come from connecting from these fraudulent scams, could those tools be applied to Meta if a prosecutor wanted to apply them, or is that exempted because of all of our other rules around social media? Mr. Verstein. I am not sure whether it is the social media exemption. My guess would be that would be--that their awareness of these issues would be something we would really look at. We would look at whether there is scienter. If Congress wanted that to be illegal, what Meta is up to, Congress could clearly clarify that it is illegal. Right now, I think it would be an unclear thing whether a court would determine that is a violation of our law. Mr. Casten. So the implication is that Meta could do something potentially and not violate the law and not be subject to penalties that I, as an individual, could not do? Mr. Verstein. I think the--we are in country that is new. We have not had enterprises like Meta for many years, and so-- -- Mr. Casten. I am close on time. Same question for crypto ATMs, because some of these Bitcoin sales in the ATMs are getting 50 percent markups, so they are profiting from monetizing these transactions. Could the law apply to them? Mr. Verstein. I think it ought to be the case that law applies there. I think the law under the Commodity Exchange Act, which is not subject to this committee's jurisdiction, is probably weaker than for securities. Mr. Casten. Okay. Well, we are out of time, but I welcome any thoughts on how we get those regulated in the same way that other criminals are regulated, reward the same behavior, incentivize the same behavior, and if it is a money transfer business, regulate it like one. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Casten. I yield back. Thank you. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, Mr. Garbarino of New York, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this hearing. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. Before I ask questions, I have a request to enter a letter from over-the-counter (OTC) Markets in support of legislation being considered here today into the record. Chairwoman Wagner. Without objection. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 81.] Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. The U.S. securities regulatory framework relies in part on self-regulatory organizations like FINRA which operate under the oversight of the SEC. Unlike purely external regulators, FINRA has continuous access to firm-level data, conducts routine examinations, and enforces compliance standards within broker-dealers. That proximity allows for earlier detection of suspicious activity, faster intervention, and more practical insight into how fraud develops in real world marketing settings. It also positions FINRA as a first line of defense in identifying emerging risks before they escalate. Mr. Smith, how does the SRO model and FINRA's proximity to firms help identify and reduce fraud? Mr. Smith. We are in a very unique position because of the authorities that we have and insight that we have into the markets that others do not and that is an advantage that can be leveraged by investors. It is an advantage that can be leveraged by firms for better protection and then the knowledge and expertise that we can provide to the government entities and regulators of really stitching together expertise and authorities that, individually, none of us have. That is why the model has worked so well for us. We have seen results from that of late of where we have informed entities about threats that are coming their way, and we have been able to reduce and prevent fraud because of what we see that otherwise they would never have seen before. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Just following up on something my colleague Mr. Steil was talking about, recent research from the FINRA Investor Education Foundation highlights that younger investors are increasingly turning to social media platforms for financial information and investment ideas. This shift has exposed them to a growing number of fraud schemes, including influencer- driven promotions, crypto scams, and coordinated pump-and-dump activity. The speed and reach of online content can amplify misinformation and make it more difficult for traditional safeguards to keep pace. These trends raise concerns about investor protection in a rapidly evolving digital environment. Mr. Smith, what is FINRA doing to address this issue? Mr. Smith. It is natural that the younger generation is getting their investment advice from social media because that is where they are and so that is where the bad guys go. One, we try and engage in a lot of investor education, inform individuals, particularly younger individuals, about the risks and about where they are getting information so they can make informed decisions. In addition, we are partnering with technology companies, and in certain instances we have identified fraud that has been occurring on some of their platforms and alerted them to some of the indicators of that, which then they have been able to put a stop to the activity on that platform. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you. Mr. Michel, how have you seen market participants adapt to this trend? Mr. Michel. We are certainly seeing the advent of these-- the proliferation of online platforms--driving liquidity through these names that has ultimately been hyped on these institutional platforms. To the extent that the trading platforms can either disclose to their client that this is ongoing, or if the platforms themselves the Metas of the world can step in with a heavier hand to reduce this, we can kind of make a better--more of a dent in the problem. Mr. Garbarino. Have they been stepping in? Have you seen them step in with a heavier hand? Mr. Michel. Who specifically? Mr. Garbarino. Meta and the---- Mr. Michel. We have not, no. Mr. Garbarino. All right. Thank you. I am going to switch gears here for my last minute. Cyber-enabled threats, including account takeovers, ransomware, and AI-driven impersonation, are increasingly targeting financial institutions, market infrastructure, and retail investors, often by sophisticated and sometimes foreign- based actors who exploit gaps in coordination information. CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, plays an essential role in safeguarding critical infrastructure by facilitating threat intelligence sharing. Mr. Smith, how important is the reauthorization of CISA 2015? It is reauthorized through September 30 but expires after that. How important is the reauthorization to strengthening cybersecurity coordination and protecting U.S. capital markets from increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks? Mr. Smith. Information sharing in the cyber arena is critical to success. We recognize with an ecosystem they are attacking a bunch of different targets. If we can identify IP addresses, we can identify the VPN services that they are using and share that amongst entities, it gives us a chance to actually identify who they are and then the ability to then respond to that. Mr. Garbarino. Would we be less safe if this lapses? Mr. Smith. I cannot speak to the individual legislation on that. I can speak to the just general information sharing is critically important. Mr. Garbarino. All right. Thank you very much. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the ranking member of our Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Mr. Lynch of Massachusetts, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do believe this hearing is very timely. Combating fraud, that is the name of this committee. If we are really interested in combating fraud, I would suggest where we could look. I even have the address: 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. That is fraud central. Frauds ``R'' Us. They should have that sign on the front of the White House as they are doing it over. It is no secret. President Trump has gutted enforcement of the SEC, which is responsible for protecting investors and consumers. He has reduced the staff by 20 percent. His SEC chair, Mr. Atkins, has dropped some of the most notorious cases. He dropped the case against Justin Sun. Justin Sun, just so you remember, he made about $400 million for the Trump family. He also dropped cases against the Winklevoss twins who donated 21 million to a political action committee (PAC) that supported Donald Trump. He would have dropped the case against Changpeng Zhao, the CEO of Binance, but he was a little late, because Changpeng Zhao had already pled guilty to money laundering. He had pled guilty. So what did Trump do? Trump pardoned him. Changpeng Zhao invested $2 billion in Trump's World Liberty Financial, benefiting the family tens of billions of dollars, which--excuse me, tens of millions of dollars--which they netted. As the SEC has retreated, as we have--as the Trump Administration has cut enforcement, dropped the number of cases, they no longer--I think their enforcement actions are down by 30 percent compared to the previous administration--as the SEC retreats from securing America's capital markets, the Trump Administration is fostering a culture of corruption, plain and simple. Since the beginning of the second Trump Administration a disturbing pattern has also evolved in the prediction markets where large trades are placed just hours or minutes leading up to a major announcement by President Trump, which posts massive profits after news of the announcement has broken. The serendipitous timing and scale of those trades would suggest that those placing them had prior knowledge of the White House's intentions, and they raise serious concerns that the President and his associates, knowing that those announcements almost always result in large market swings, are purposely manipulating the markets and sharing confidential government information--which puts our sons and daughters in uniform at risk--in order to enrich themselves, their family, and their friends. I have a select number of cases. I know the ranking member of the full committee has already mentioned some of these but the Trump tariff announcements netted people hundreds of millions of dollars in terms of Trump announcing relaxation of some of those tariffs. One particular investor had placed $51 million in short positions in hours leading up to the post regarding the attacks on Iran and made approximately $170 million in profit after the story broke, after the announcement broke. Suspiciously--this is amazing--this one individual, of the last 16 trades that individual has made, all 16 posted large gains. Like the aforementioned instances, this individual and others who shorted oil prices would appear to have prior knowledge of President Trump's announcements. Why are we not looking at that? Why is the SEC not in the middle of an investigation on that? Mr. Verstein, there is plenty of evidence out there. What should our cops on the beat be doing right now in light of all this evidence? Mr. Verstein. Congressman Lynch, the optics are terrible. The stories that you are citing are in the media. People read them and they wonder why nothing is happening. This is not a court of law. We do not know which incidents were illegal and which were not, which were dumb luck and which were not, but it is really important that the American people and that traders---- Mr. Lynch. Sixteen times in a row, though, that is more than luck. Mr. Verstein. It is very suspicious. Mr. Lynch. Go ahead. Mr. Verstein. We really wish the SEC and the CFTC were looking at these cases and reporting back: Yes, we found wrongdoing in this case; we did not find it in that case. Clearing people's names is also part of the job, but you have got to have robust enforcement in order to do that credibly. Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair reminds members to avoid engaging in personalities or imputing motives of another Member or the President of the United States. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Lawler, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you all for being here today. Ramp-and-dump stock schemes frequently involve small Chinese companies listing on U.S. exchanges. Most use the variable interest entity structure, which gives shareholders interest in an offshore shell company rather than actual equity and rights. Mr. Michel, does the VIE business structure contribute to the rise in ramp-and-dump schemes? Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question. It is certainly tangential to the problem, but we have seen domestic issuers experience this phenomenon as well. So while most have that structure, there are other kinds of complicating factors within these small issuers that make them susceptible to the phenomenon that we witness. Mr. Lawler. Ms. Gunther, the committee continues to hear from families and older Americans who are being targeted by increasingly sophisticated scams, AI-generated impersonations, remote access fraud, and high-pressure social engineering tactics, to drain savings in minutes. Financial institutions are trying to keep pace, but the threat environment is evolving faster than the tools designed to stop it. Your work with AARP's BankSafe initiative gives you a unique vantage point on what actually works on the ground and where the gaps still are. With that in mind, I would like to explore the landscape of solutions and challenges. What do you see as the biggest barrier or challenge facing the financial industry in the fight against exploitation? Ms. Gunther. Thanks so much for the question. One of the largest challenges we see--and you mentioned this--is that there is so much attention--we are really getting--being reactive and not proactive. We are waiting until it gets to the point of transaction. What we really need to do is look at where is it that criminals--what methods are they using to contact consumers. So telecom, social media, those types of things and having faster takedowns so criminals do not even have the ability to contact that consumer. That way, we are staffing off so that we are not having to be so reactive at the financial institution level or even in the law enforcement. Mr. Lawler. With that in mind, I mean, the reality is scammers are exploiting new technologies, new platforms, new psychological tactics at a scale we have not seen before. While banks are investing heavily in fraud prevention, the criminals are adapting just as quickly to get around it. That is why understanding where true innovation is happening and what is actually making a measurable difference is important to this committee. What innovations are showing the most promise in detecting and stopping these scams? Ms. Gunther. Yes. Thanks for the question. We did a study with Virginia Tech to really look at what are the interventions that actually stop the money from leaving the account. About 200 financial institutions participated. The number one thing is when you are able to hold that transaction that gives time to the institution to conduct an investigation. It also gives time for that consumer to slow down, get out of that fight-versus-fear response. Then the other thing that is really helpful is a trusted contact. We know that people have to hear it from three different people before they realize something is amiss. So having a trusted contact at that financial institution that they can call and say, ``Hey, something is amiss, you might want to call your parent,'' is really, really helpful. Also, asking the right questions, training people at the front lines of saying, ``Hey,'' asking, ``Where did you meet this person? What is this for?'' Asking those questions is really, really helpful to get to the end of it of is this suspicious. Mr. Lawler. Mr. Smith, one of the most heartbreaking patterns we hear about in our districts is seniors losing their life savings in a matter of hours, often after a fraudster has coached them through a transaction step by step. Firms can sometimes see the red flags, but by the time anyone intervenes, the money is already gone and almost impossible to recover. FINRA's proposals around temporary holds and trusted contacts are clearly aimed at giving firms more room to act. From where you sit, and based on what Ms. Gunther said, how often do you see situations where a longer hold or earlier intervention would have prevented a senior from losing their savings? Mr. Smith. It is hard to get to quantify that of the prevented fraud and say how many times we have seen that but we certainly see instances where, when firms have the information they need to ask the right questions that slows down that transaction, that people make different decisions than they would when they are being pushed into this by an adversary. Mr. Lawler. Thank you. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzalez, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Gunther, we often say retirement is a three-legged stool: Social Security, personal savings, and pensions or investments but right now that stool is already unstable for millions of Americans. According to recent retirement readiness data, only about 45 percent of Americans feel financially prepared for retirement, and 78 percent are worried about inflation eroding their savings. At the same time, we are seeing an explosion in financial scams. What concerns me is that, for many seniors and near retirees, personal savings are the most vulnerable leg of that stool. It is also the one they have spent decades building and the one that can be wiped out in one swoop. How are these escalating scams undermining retirement solvency for seniors in America and what more can Congress be doing right now to protect that critical leg of our retirement system? Ms. Gunther. Yes. Thank you for the question, Representative. There is a lot that we have done, and there is a lot more to be done. As you mentioned, people are losing--the average, according to the FBI, is $38,000. If it is a known other that is the perpetrator, it is $120,000. That is typically what a 50-year- old has in retirement savings. So in the blink of an eye, they can lose everything. One of the most important things--and I will say it again and again--is that we need to get to the point of where is this criminal contacting the consumer and taking those things down. When they are on social media, when they are advertisements, whether it is telecom, getting at the point of the front of the upstream is really, really critical. Having trusted contacts is another one. Having a speed bump for holding that transaction is also training front line, so they know how to deal with this. People are in a fight versus flight. How do you calm that person down? And we know statistically that one out of two times that frontline worker talks to that consumer, they are able to get them out of that fear bubble, that fight versus flight and actually stop the money before it leaves the account. Mr. Gonzalez. Are we doing enough with communicating to seniors in this country about the risks that are out there? Ms. Gunther. We are doing a tremendous amount in terms of educating consumers. Mr. Gonzalez. How? Ms. Gunther. But we are not doing enough. The fact of the matter is we want to get it before anybody ever communicates with a consumer. Mr. Gonzalez. How are we communicating with them? How are we educating seniors of these scams? Ms. Gunther. There is a variety of different education. So we run AARP's Fraud Watch Network. We do events all over the country really educating people, not only just older adults, but also their children and caregivers. Government agencies are also doing that, but we have to have effective communication. We really do need to go beyond just communicating with the consumer. These are hardworking Americans. They are raising their families. They are working their jobs. They are going home, fixing their houses. They wake up the next day, and they do it all over again. They do not have time to read consumer disclosures, terms and agreements. They deserve to have a government that has a critical role in preventing financial exploitation. Mr. Smith. If I could add, sir, one of the key components in it is that we have got to get to the investors, but we also have to get to the institutions that are having those conversations with them, which is why FINRA has done a lot of work engaging with broker-dealers and reps, leveraging the expertise of AARP, so that we have multiple layers of defense and there is some resiliency. Mr. Gonzalez. Very well. Thank you. My next question is for Mr. Verstein. Mr. Verstein, last year I was proud to lead a provision included in the House version of the CLARITY Act that would direct the Department of Treasury to study and strengthen resources for the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission to better address the misuse of digital assets in money laundering. The urgency of this issue has only grown. Recent FBI reporting shows that Americans lost $11 billion to digital asset fraud last year alone and a staggering 37 percent increase in cyberfraud. While we often think about seniors being targeted, this is not limited to one group. Younger investors--and I think we talked about that earlier--tend to be more willing to take risks and engage in emerging technologies and are increasingly exposed to these schemes as well. Professor Verstein, from your perspective, what additional resources or information-sharing authorities should Congress provide to help Federal regulators and law enforcement to better combat digital asset fraud? And what are the key coordinating gaps between Treasury, the SEC, and the CFTC that need to be addressed? Mr. Verstein. Congressman, I commend you for bringing this issue to the table. The fact is that digital assets are a part of our money laundering and our fraud landscape. Whether or not that is because of intrinsic features to the assets or just because of the marketing that is now associated with them--the razzmatazz of a new thing that attracts a different kind of ignorant person to lose their money on them--they are where the action is. So, we need to be giving the resources to people to focus on these and develop the expertise to coordinate one agency with another. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you and I look forward to continuing this conversation. We are out of time. Thank you, and I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. If I could take a point of personal privilege, I can say that, in our own district, we do have a program called Beat the Cheats, and we go among our senior communities and vulnerable citizens with a full template I am happy to share with you about how for them to avoid it, including a hotline for them to even call. So I would be pleased to share that. Mr. Gonzalez. Yes. I think it is a real education effort that we need to push. Chairwoman Wagner. I could not agree more. So anyway. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nunn, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Nunn. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Wagner, and I appreciate you holding this meeting on fraud. Look, before I begin, I would just like to ask for a show of hands if you or one of your loved ones or someone you know has gotten that call--``There is something urgent, we need to talk to you, you are going to deposit your money here''--only to later find out that you have become a victim of fraud. I see our AARP folks in the background, too, all raising your hands. This is an impact which is outsized. In my home State of Iowa, I briefed this committee last year on the grave threat coming from fraudsters. At that point, $52 million was lost to fraud, and that is just in a farm State like Iowa. Well, Madam Chair, I am sad to say that today that number has jumped to almost $100 million. So in less than 12 months, we have nearly doubled the amount of fraud loss happening on the front lines in a hometown community, but that number should stop us cold in our tracks when we realize who is the target of the types of fraud we are talking about. In Iowa, the average victim was over 60 and lost $9,000 last year. This year, that has quadrupled to a loss of nearly $37,000 per individual. This is catastrophic. It is wiping out a family's wealth, but it is also destroying their future. This is no longer a trend. This is now a real crisis impacting each of us. Behind every one of those dollars is a real person--an Iowa farmer, a Des Moines retiree, an Ankeny small business owner. The worst part about this is those dollars are not being taken by a criminal down the street. In too many cases, they are being actioned by foreign governments. They are being perpetrated by slave labor camps in South Asia, and they are being taken over shores to fund some of the very horrific events that are happening to Americans right here on our own shore. That is why I believe that there are two bills that I have led on that deliver a direct one-two punch to go after our scammers. The first is the Guidelines for User Age-verification and Responsible Dialogue (GUARD) Act. It arms our State and local law enforcement with blockchain tracing technology to follow the money before it disappears offshore so that when you get that phone call and you call the sheriff, their answer is, ``I am sorry, you will have to report it to the FBI.'' The second aspect is the Taskforce for Recognizing and Averting Payment Scams (TRAPS) Act. The TRAPS Act brings together our banks, our telcos, our tech platforms, and our local law enforcement--both at the hometown level all the way up to the Federal level--to be able to really go after this and trap these fraudsters before they proliferate their behavior. Madam Chair, I would offer we cannot wait another year to act on this important legislation. Now, Ms. Gunther, I want to thank you and your team at the AARP for all the work that you have done. You have been a strong supporter of GUARD and TRAPS Act. Do trusted contact designations and report-and-hold authorities give frontline employees at a small Iowa community bank enough authority to stop a transaction before this money disappears, do you believe? Ms. Gunther. Thank you for the question. The trusted contact and report-and-hold authorities are critical tools, but they are not enough on their own. As you mentioned, fraud starts upstream. We have to stop the criminal from contacting the consumer. Efforts like the TRAPS Act are really, really important. We have got to get more on the legislative and law enforcement arena, but we also need to get ahead of this as well. It is essential in the TRAPS Act to have and to create innovative ways and get people to share information so we can stop these scams entirely. Mr. Nunn. I totally agree with you. We should not put all the responsibility on both the individual and the local lender, our banks, our community lenders, to have to do this. Getting upstream is probably the best possible way to get after this comprehensively. Mr. Michel, I am going to turn to you, because when we talk about comprehensively, we recognize that criminals extracted an estimated $16 billion last year through pump-and-dump schemes. As a result, 25 percent of small capital Chinese IPOs show manipulation. At what point does a red flag appear clearest and do we have the authority and the data to act before a retail investor would be impacted by this? Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question. I can really only speak to our platform and how it identifies such things. We launched the platform about 18 months ago, and we have issued 40 alerts where we have captured $15 billion worth of documented harm, a median lead time of 19 days prior to the loss of that. Our work product has also supported multiple SEC Section 12(k) halts of issuers suspected of manipulation. Mr. Nunn. Very good. Mr. Smith, very quickly. My TRAPS Act creates a Treasury- led task force to drive coordination across agencies. Does the information sharing between FINRA and the SEC, FBI, and other State regulators move fast enough to stop these type of ramp up-and-dump schemes, and would the TRAPS Act help? Mr. Smith. I cannot speak to the legislation, but I can speak to the more and faster information sharing that we have, the better off investors will be. Mr. Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. That is exactly what the TRAPS Act does. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back my time. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you for the witnesses for being here. I am going to start off just correcting the record on a point. One of my colleagues made the comment that the CLARITY Act creates a loophole to exempt individuals from complying with securities laws if you raise under a certain amount for a digital commodity project. I just want to, for the record, say that is utterly false. Under the CLARITY Act, the SEC retains jurisdiction over insider disclosures and obligations, such as lock-up requirements on related parties where digital commodities are involved in a capital race. Furthermore, the CLARITY Act reaffirms that the SEC maintains robust anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority. So any claim that the CLARITY Act allows insider trading is unfounded, it is inaccurate, and it is just false. So I just wanted to get that correction out there. In 2024, the FBI reported that the costliest type of scams perpetrated on our elders were investment scams, totaling a staggering $1.8 billion in reported losses. As the former securities regulator for the State of Montana, one of my primary responsibilities was to protect investors from fraud where possible and give victims some restitution. We did a lot of stuff. As the securities regulator for Montana, we set up elder justice councils around the State, had some great success in those. I created, in my office, a financial abuse specialist team that specifically dealt with this type. It was prosecutors, lawyers, folks to help with this. We saw just so much coming through the State, from pig butchering scams to romance scams to using tech to imitate Federal agencies and we see more and more technology coming in to defraud and scam folks. We did a lot of public outreach, a lot of tours, and fraud summits. One of the other things that we did that I am particularly proud of is we had the Lynne Egan Memorial Securities Restitution Fund, which we used to help give relief to folks that were scammed, and that was named after my former deputy securities commissioner, who, unfortunately, we lost a few years ago. I am going to start on my questioning with Ms. Gunther. Can you discuss the important role that State securities regulators play in combating fraud? Ms. Gunther. Yes. They can see local patterns. They can do local enforcements and so they remain a critical piece of the puzzle. Mr. Downing. Thank you. Do you consider State regulators or Federal regulators like the SEC as the primary enforcer of anti-fraud laws? Ms. Gunther. I cannot speak to that, but what I can say is they are a critical part. We need everybody on the ground to fight this. As you mentioned, some of the horrible statistics, we are seeing losses of up to $196 billion total, and that does not even target the people who do not realize that they are a victim. So it is really important to have all government players in this space helping to protect consumers. Mr. Downing. Are there any States that you have in mind that you believe have been particularly effective in combating fraud? Ms. Gunther. What I can say is one of the most effective tools that States can use is the report-and-hold laws. Right now, we have almost all States that have that, but there are a few States that do not, and that is one of the most important things that we found in a study of financial institutions was the number one thing to stop money before it leaves the account. Mr. Downing. Right. Well, I appreciate you saying that because that was something that we have some pretty strong delay-and-report laws in Montana. One of the issues that I ran into as a regulator is the training for folks to actually use those, because the rules there were pretty simple. As long as you had procedures in place and had minimal training, then you could keep yourself out of liability and do that. As most people in this room know, once the money is out the door, it is out the door. If you can actually delay that and take care of it, it is very helpful. So I appreciate that. Moving on. I am going to go to Mr. Smith on here. We know that many scams originating overseas, like pig butchering scams, come from China. How do we hold overseas bad actors accountable when they are not easily subject to our jurisdiction or our justice systems and foreign officials who might not be willing to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement? Mr. Smith. That is where, in our role as an SRO, we have unique insight that others may not have but we also have limits in our authority and our jurisdiction. That is where the power of the engagement and partnerships with other entities, like Federal law enforcement, where they may have a reach in these overseas jurisdictions or they may have partners with other law enforcement that can reach out and put a stop to the activity, is critically important. Mr. Downing. Right. Thank you. I could go on for another 10 minutes, but, unfortunately, I have run out of time. So on that, Madam Chair, I yield. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. I would like to thank our witnesses for their testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. Questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than May 20, 2026. [The information referred to was not submitted prior to printing.] This hearing is now adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]