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- THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS: EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS: EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 5, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-61 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-968 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS ANN WAGNER, Missouri, Chairman ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York, BRAD SHERMAN, California, Vice Chairman Ranking Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID SCOTT, Georgia PETE SESSIONS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JUAN VARGAS, California BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SEAN CASTEN, Illinois ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts LISA McCLAIN, Michigan CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida C O N T E N T S ---------- Thursday, March 5, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Andrew R. Garbarino, Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from New York........... 1 Hon. Brad Sherman, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from California................. 2 WITNESSES Mr. Onnig Dombalagian, Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law......................................................... 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 6 Ms. Valerie Mirko, Partner and Leader of Securities Regulation and Litigation, Armstrong Teasdale LLP......................... 14 Prepared Statement........................................... 16 Mr. Mike Nicholas, Chief Executive Officer, Bond Dealers of America (BDA).................................................. 20 Prepared Statement........................................... 22 Ms. Jennifer Shaw, Executive Director, Public Investors Advocate Bar Association (PIABA)........................................ 26 Prepared Statement........................................... 28 APPENDIX MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Hon. Troy Downing: letter from SIFMA............................................ 162 Hon. Maxine Waters: GFOA Letter to MSRB dated November 10, 2025.................. 167 The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)........... 171 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Written responses to questions for the record from Mr. Onnig Dombalagian Representative Marlin Stutzman............................... 175 Written responses to questions for the record from Ms. Valerie Mirko Representative Bryan Steil................................... 182 Representative Troy Downing.................................. 184 LEGISLATION H.R. 2689, the Restoring Accountability in Market Supervision (RAMS) Act..................................................... 186 H.R.------, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require fines collected for violations of the rules of the Municipal Rulemaking Board to be deposited into the Treasury... 188 H.R.------, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to clarify the composition of the membership of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board.................................... 190 THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS: EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB ---------- Thursday, March 5, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ann Wagner [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Wagner, Garbarino, Sessions, Davidson, Steil, Stutzman, Lawler, Ogles, McClain, Downing, Haridopolos, Sherman, Meeks, Vargas, Gonzalez, Casten, and Bynum. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW R. GARBARINO, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK Mr. Garbarino [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. Today's hearing is titled, ``The Role of Self-Regulatory Organizations in the U.S. Markets, Examining FINRA, and the MSRB.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days in which to submit extra materials to the chair for inclusion on the record. I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. Good afternoon. I want to thank our witnesses, and all those in attendance for joining us today. This hearing continues the subcommittee's work in examining the infrastructure of our regulatory system, not just as--not just the agencies Congress directly created, but the private bodies Congress empowered to act alongside them. Self-regulatory organizations, or SROs, were never meant to be a shortcut around accountability. They were meant to be an improvement to it. The idea was straightforward, the people closest to the market and who understand its risks and its participants are best positioned to set the standards that govern it. Government alone cannot write rules nuanced enough to reach into every corner of business practice and professional ethics. Industry, given the right structure and oversight, can-- that is the bargain Congress struck when it created the framework for SROs in 1938, but a bargain requires both sides to hold up their end. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) today regulates approximately 3,500 firms, and 620,000 brokers. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) writes the rules for $4 trillion in municipal securities market. These are not minor organizations. They sit at the center of how American capital markets function. The decisions they make about what rules apply, how they are enforced, and who bears the cost have real consequences for businesses of every size, and the investors they serve. With such broad authority, Congress has a duty to periodically ensure these organizations are still serving their original purpose. FINRA's budget has grown to $1.5 billion funded by the firms it regulates without congressional or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight. While regulatory fees drive this operation, FINRA also collects fines to fund strategic initiatives subject to its own board's approval. That funding model, and what it incentivizes, is a legitimate question for this subcommittee. So is governance. When public members outnumber industry practitioners on FINRA's board, it is worth asking whether the organization still reflects the industry-led model Congress envisioned, or if it has drifted toward something that carries government authority without government accountability. The MSRB presents its own concerns. Since Congress expanded its mandate in 2010, the number of registered municipal advisors has fallen by nearly 40 percent. These are not large institutions with compliance departments and legal teams. The majority have five or fewer employees. Whether the regulatory framework is proportionate to what Congress envisioned is a question worth asking. To their credit, both organizations have recently undertaken efforts to modernize their own practices, and that is a constructive sign, but self-examination has limits. It is Congress' responsibility, not the SROs, to determine whether the framework itself remains sound. I want to be clear, this hearing is not an argument against self-regulation. The model properly structured and properly overseen remains sound. The question is whether FINRA and the MSRB still resemble what Congress authorized, or rather, they have become something Congress never intended. Today's witnesses bring precisely the range of expertise this question demands, and I look forward to a substantive discussion about what reforms, if any, are needed to ensure these organizations remain true to their statutory purpose. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Sherman. I think the policy issue before us is whether the SRO should be folded into the SEC. I am a very faithful agnostic on that issue. I do not know. On the one hand, any political scientist would tell you that government authority and power should be vested in the government, and, ultimately, accountable to the American people through the electoral process. Now, I realize the SEC is not an office for which you run, but you are--those on the SEC, particularly its chair, are appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The SROs are several steps away from that, and no political scientist would embrace that as a good model. On the other hand, if it is not broke, do not fix it. We have plenty to do in this committee, and if it is working well, let us go on to look at something that is working not so well. I would say that in looking at the SROs and folding things in, we should not just look at FINRA and the MSRB, we should look at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Now, there are technical distinctions, but in all cases, you have a nongovernmental entity that does the work of government that is--and that work is to set what the standards are, what the regulations are, what the laws are you have to follow, and enforcing them, and all of those organizations are engaged in that process. Now, it is wonderful to have these witnesses, but I look forward to having the executives of the SROs, and perhaps PCAOB and FASB come before this subcommittee. I always prefer the witnesses that are actually doing the job. One thing I am not an agnostic on, and that is, if the SEC absorbs any of these organizations, it has to absorb the revenue source of the organization. You cannot transfer a lot of responsibility to the SEC and say, ``Do it out of your existing budget,'' especially when we see the SEC has cut its staff by almost 15 percent, its enforcement staff by 20 percent. There has not been a decline in the number of people trying to fleece investors. It is a shame that the SEC's enforcement budget has been cut, and it should not be cut further by assigning new responsibilities under the existing budget. I know that one of the areas that is important is the effect on short selling and making sure that short-selling is not naked, and that those who sell short have arranged to borrow the relevant securities. I think short-selling does play an important role in our capital markets, but there are clearly some problems with it, particularly when it is done naked. We see that investors have a searchable--well, there is a list in BrokerCheck where you can check an individual firm to see whether it has been restricted, but there is no published list of those. You have to go hit and miss one after the other and there is a strong argument that the entire list should be published. Any enterprising journalist could do it by just putting in the name of each organization saying is Adams on the list, is Arthur on the list, and go through the alphabet. So this list ought to, I believe, to be published, and I will yield back. Mr. Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. Today, we welcome the testimony of Professor Onnig Dombalagian. Did I do well on that one? All right. Great. A professor of law to Tulane University School of Law; Ms. Valerie Mirko, partner and leader of Securities Regulation and Litigation Practice at Armstrong Teasdale; Mr. Mike Nicholas, the CEO of Bond Dealers of America; and Ms. Jennifer Shaw, the executive director of Public Investors Advocate Bar Association. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. Professor Dombalagian, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF ONNIG DOMBALAGIAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, TULANE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you, Chair Garbarino, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the role of self-regulatory organizations in U.S. capital markets, and specifically the efficiency and accountability of FINRA. My name is Onnig Dombalagian, and I am a professor of law at Tulane University School of Law. Since leaving the SEC to join the academy, I have studied and written about the legal and regulatory structure of securities markets, with particular attention to the role of SROs. I have also had the privilege of serving two terms as a nonindustry member of FINRA's national adjudicatory counsel, and over two decades as an arbitrator for FINRA's dispute resolution services. I am honored to appear before you, and I would like to commend the subcommittee for its continued oversight of FINRA's significant role in regulating the securities industry. I am, of course, speaking in my personal capacity, and not on behalf of Tulane University, or the law school. In the Maloney Act of 1938, Congress established a regulatory regime for the registration of national securities associations, for brokers that were not members of a national securities exchange. The NASD, the National Association of Securities Dealers, FINRA's forerunner, is the only association to have registered under Section 15A of the Exchange Act. The mandate of national securities exchanges has evolved over the decades as the NASD has amassed greater responsibility for business conduct regulation in the brokerage industry. The Securities Act amendments of 1975 consolidated that authority among SROs, the transition to automated trading, and the wave of exchange demutualization in the late 1990s and 2000s exacerbated conflicts of interest, which required NASD and the New York Stock Exchange to spin off their regulatory arms, and today, the member regulation functions of the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD have been merged into FINRA, which serves as the principle authority for upholding just and equitable principle of trade in the securities industry. The Exchange Act's model for securities industry self- regulation is grounded in certain core principles, which continue to resonate today. These include the industry's familiarity with securities market operations, its reputational interest in upholding principles of trade, and, of course, the ability to shift the financial burden of regulation to the industry through membership fees and other revenue sources. In recent years, both industry and academic commentators have questioned FINRA's effectiveness and accountability, and in some cases, the constitutionality of its rulemaking and disciplinary activities. Others conversely criticize unmanaged conflicts of interest in FINRA's governance, and sometimes excessive lenity in its rulemaking and disciplinary activity. But perhaps the most frequent criticism, invade and respect FINRA, is the structural shift away from market-driven regulation, which we associate with SROs, to consolidated business conduct oversight, and the perception of the bureaucratization of FINRA. FINRA has undertaken initiatives to modernize its rules in response to these and other criticisms from its members in the public, and this subcommittee has entertained broader proposals that would structurally alter the Exchange Act's self- regulatory framework. These proposals naturally entail tradeoffs between ensuring the accountability of SROs to the public and accommodating the operational flexibility and adaptability of the securities industry. While I share many of the reservations and appreciate many of the proposals that have been brought before Congress, and other bodies, I strongly believe in the unique synthesis of regulatory and industry expertise that enables our self- regulatory framework to identify and expeditiously respond to market developments. More specifically, the interaction between the SEC, a politically accountable government agency, and FINRA, a self- regulatory body organized as a membership association, is a time-tested way of setting and enforcing norms within the industry. I also acknowledge there is a compelling interest in ensuring that FINRA is transparent and accountable to both the industry and the public with respect to its regulatory program, its senior management, the collection and use of fee revenues and other moneys, and its corporate governance practices. In my testimony I outline concrete steps Congress could take in the short term to reinforce FINRA's effectiveness within the current self-regulatory paradigm, such as addressing the asymmetry between the display of disciplinary history of broker-dealers and other financial services providers, in reforming the dispute resolution framework, particularly in the context of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and also thinking about strategies for enhancing the robustness of the SEC's rule review process. For example, by revisiting the timetables for the approval or disapproval of FINRA rules. Mr. Chair, and Mr. Ranking Member, I commend the subcommittee's efforts to examine the efficiency of the self- regulatory framework. In this spirit, I believe that our system of self-regulation in the securities industry can continue to serve investors, market participants, and the public interest. I appreciate your attention and look forward to your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Dombalagian follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Ms. Mirko, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF VALERIE MIRKO, PARTNER AND LEADER OF SECURITIES REGULATION AND LITIGATION PRACTICE, ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP Ms. Mirko. Thank you. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and contribute to the important work of this subcommittee. I am pleased to be here to discuss the role of SROs in the U.S. markets with a focus on FINRA and the MSRB. The U.S. capital markets are the best in the world. Part of the reason that they thrive is because of the thoughtful and smart regulation inherent to the U.S. securities regulatory framework. My point of view is informed by 20-plus years in the legal industry, including over a dozen years as a securities defense attorney in private practice, as well as several years working with regulators and on regulatory coordination. I am a partner at Armstrong Teasdale, and leader of the firm's securities regulation and litigation practice. In my day-to-day, I represent broker-dealers, investment advisors, and public companies subject to SEC investigations and other regulatory initiatives. I also represent broker-dealers subject to FINRA investigations. In addition to representing public companies and industry firms, at times I also represent their executives when subject to regulatory scrutiny. Prior to Armstrong Teasdale, I also spent several years as a partner at the global law firm of Baker McKenzie, and before that, as general counsel of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Earlier in my career I worked at two broker-dealers. The importance of the broker-dealer industry in maintaining the health and vibrance of the U.S. capital markets relies on the SRO model, which, in turn, must be subject to government oversight. Through the SRO model, broker-dealers collectively assume responsibility for regulation of the industry, while also maintaining investor trust in the markets. The SRO model, however, also relies on delegated authority by the government. Therefore, it is important that the SEC adequately supervise SROs, and ensure that they operate with fairness, transparency, and neutrality. My written testimony includes several recommendations to address fairness and fundamental due process concerns with respect to FINRA's enforcement program, its rulemaking process, dispute resolution forum, and overall governance. Congress also has a responsibility to ensure that investor trust remains by overseeing regulators generally and evaluating the efficacy of SROs specifically. Therefore, reviewing the SEC's oversight of SROs, and here FINRA and the MSRB, is important, particularly to review whether these regulators are functioning consistently with their delegated authority, and according to basic principles of fairness. It is important to note that in the context of FINRA oversight, the organization is entering the second year of its FINRA Forward initiative, with a stated goal of modernizing its rule book, and enhancing compliance tools, while also strengthening fraud protections. This initiative has already resulted in greater transparency of long-standing FINRA operations. In this context, however, there is a role for Congress to play to make legislative changes to the overall framework. In my written testimony, I include 10 recommendations for Congress to consider implementing to strengthen the oversight of SROs. These recommendations are organized around five broad categories: improving SEC and board oversight of SRO governance; addressing fairness and due process concerns of SROs; eliminating SRO inefficiencies and duplication; increasing fairness and efficiencies in the rulemaking process; correcting the weaknesses in FINRA's arbitration process. Smart right-size regulation is essential to ensure that U.S. markets remain fair, resilient and efficient. My goal with these recommendations is to preserve the strengths and robustness of our capital markets, so they continue to serve as a source of financial stability and opportunity for all Americans. I welcome and look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Mirko follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Mr. Nicholas, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF MIKE NICHOLAS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BOND DEALERS OF AMERICA Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Chair Garbarino, Ranking Member Sherman, and other members of the subcommittee. I am Mike Nicholas, CEO of the Bond Dealers of America. BDA is the only industry organization in the country that solely focuses on the U.S. bond markets. Member firms underwrite and trade across all bond market segments, and with an office presence in almost every State in the country. Our $50 trillion U.S. bond market is a national asset, financing the Treasury, Federal agencies, corporations, State and local governments, and home buyers, while providing safe liquid investments for institutions and individuals. BDA's mission is to promote better, more efficient bond markets for investors and issuers alike. We take that mission seriously, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify. First let me say that BDA strongly supports FINRA and the MSRB remaining independent self-regulatory organizations. The SRO model when functioning properly brings market expertise and operational flexibility that government agencies alone cannot replicate. Both SROs operate under SEC oversight, and we would urge this subcommittee to ensure that oversight is active and rigorous. The question before the subcommittee is not whether we need SROs, but whether they are performing their roles with the appropriate regard for cost, market structure, transparency and efficiency. Turning to FINRA, when genuinely encouraged by the launch of FINRA Forward, a comprehensive initiative to modernize rules, reduce unnecessary burdens, and strengthen member firm compliance. This is the kind of rigorous self-examination an effective SROs should undertake. We also commend FINRA and MSRB for reversing their 1-minute bond trade reporting proposals, even after SEC approval, a demonstration of exactly the independent judgment the SRO model requires. But encouragement must be paired with candor. FINRA Forward is a commitment, not yet a result, and we urge the subcommittee to monitor whether it produces genuine rule changes. One example, FINRA's ongoing review of its modern workplace framework, including remote supervision under Rule 3110 presents an important opportunity to modernize oversight. Supervision has changed drastically since Rule 3110 was established. Work habits have evolved since the pandemic; bond dealers use technology much more than proximity to supervise their traders and others. Supervision rules should reflect this reality. We also continue to raise concerns about the depth of fixed income expertise among FINRA examiners, a gap that can waste dealer resources, and produce inconsistent examination outcomes. We, again, flag the structural and equity of Dodd- Frank's requirement that FINRA collect fees from municipal securities dealers to fund Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB), whose work benefits issuers and investors far more than it does dealers. Congress should revisit that provision. On the MSRB, we acknowledge the new rate card fee structure as a constructive step toward transparency, but we have concerns about governance and resource management that have persisted for years and demand attention from this subcommittee. Regarding the MSRB's annual budget, nearly 60 percent of the MSRB spending goes not to market regulation, but to technology and infrastructure. Broker-dealers fund the majority of the MSRB's budget, almost 80 percent in 2025, through underwriting, transaction and technology fees. On governance, the MSRB board includes seats, including this year's vice-chair, for nondealer municipal advisors, firms that advise issuers, but do not underwrite or trade. We do not object to municipal advisors having representation, in fact, we encourage it, but as a group, municipal advisors contribute only a small fraction of total MSRB fee revenue, 6 percent in 2025, while broker-dealers paid the vast majority. That imbalance between fee contribution and board influence is a structural problem that has persisted and been unaddressed for years. Congress should revisit the Dodd-Frank provision governing MSRB board composition with this imbalance squarely in view. More broadly, both MSRB and FINRA have majority public boards, which can dilute the market expertise embedded in their governance. We urge Congress and the subcommittee to reconsider whether that balance is serving the markets well. To conclude, let me reemphasize that both FINRA and the MSRB are worth preserving as independent SROs, but their independence must be matched with accountability. This subcommittee working with the SEC has an important role to play in ensuring both organizations meet the standard the markets require. We appreciate the opportunity to assist in that work, and we welcome any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Nicholas follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much, Mr. Nicholas. Ms. Shaw, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF JENNIFER SHAW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC INVESTORS ADVOCATE BAR ASSOCIATION (PIABA) Ms. Shaw. Thank you for inviting me to be here on behalf of the Public Investors Advocate Bar Association where I serve as the executive director. Previously, I spent the majority of my legal practice as an enforcement attorney for the people of Oklahoma. PIABA's members represent Main Street investors and retirees who have been the victim of fraud, bad advice, or other investment misconduct. Our members know first-hand the devastation that results when a retiree or other investor loses their nest egg. We also meet with FINRA, the SEC, and State regulators to try to help put in place rules to protect investors from unscrupulous advisors. Today, I want to talk about FINRA. FINRA's slogan is, Protecting investors, ensuring market integrity. While PIABA believes that FINRA plays a necessary role as a regulator, we also believe they are in need of reform. Recently FINRA started their FINRA Forward initiative, which PIABA believes moves investor protection backward to a time long before the 2008 financial crisis. These are some of the initiatives that we feel will harm investors: allowing brokerage firms to supervise by Zoom, as opposed to an office visit where they can touch and see the broker files; rolling back supervision of investment advisors, which would leave investors holding the bag if the advisor sells them a Ponzi scheme. From PIABA's perspective, not only does it appear that FINRA is weakening the protection for investors on the front end, but it is also now attempting to stack the deck against investors and retirees who attempt to hold their brokers accountability for their bad or fraudulent advice. When investors sign up to invest retirement savings with a financial advisor, they are forced into FINRA's industry-run private justice system. Since the financial crisis, FINRA has taken some small steps to make this industry-run forum fairer for investors who have been defrauded. However, with its recent action, just Monday of this week, FINRA announced its intention to consider a rollback of investor protections to the 1980s, to a time before the financial crisis, the dot-com bust, or even Black Monday. FINRA's 70-page notice of potential rule changes would trample investor rights in the mandatory FINRA arbitration forum. These changes would impact real people, your neighbors, your siblings, your friends. I want to discuss to the real people impacted by FINRA and the potential changes to investor protection. Let us start with Marilyn. She is a blind widow from Alabama in her 80s who lost 80 percent of her lifesavings due to her financial advisor selling her a complex and risky product. Despite the long odds of recovery in FINRA's private justice system, Marilyn was awarded her losses and $60,000 in damages to punish her advisor and his firm. Under FINRA's new rules, this advisor would go unpunished. Indeed, FINRA's proposal would remove the ability to punish brokers and their firms for outrageous behavior, even when State law would allow for these damages. Kathy from Florida lost her lifesavings due a broker's mismanagement. She has been forced back to work as a cashier in a grocery store. As of yesterday, she had a bank balance of $212.75 and is terrified she is going to lose her home. She is waiting on the justice of FINRA's arbitration forum, but at least she had an ability to have her case heard from a panel of arbitrators. FINRA Forward's new real would make it easier to throw out cases like Kathy before the hearing, and FINRA Forward would change who decides these cases eliminating arbitrators that can relate to investors and be fair. While FINRA's forced arbitration forum does do a few things well, like requiring disclosure of awards against bad brokers, and providing a private justice system that is less expensive than others, it still needs reform. Only three out of 10 investors win their financial arbitration hearings. The work process is not easy. The investor must realize they have been scammed, find an attorney to handle their case, hire the attorney, pay the expert arbitration fees, and then prevail on the forum that is stacked against them. Then after all of these steps, a shocking $0.37 on every $1.00 awarded in 2024 remains unpaid because the firms are engaging in financial trickery. This has a real impact to Main Street investors. Take the Crows, an elderly couple in their 70s from rural Illinois who worked as a farmer and a librarian and lost most of their retirement as a result of securities fraud. The Crows went through 3 years of FINRA arbitration and were fortunate to win an award. However, they have not been paid a penny. FINRA is aware of solutions to the unpaid award issue, such as insurance and investor recovery pools, but instead of protecting investors, FINRA gave $50 million back to Wall Street firms. PIABA wants FINRA to do its job, return to its important and necessary role of investor protection, and protect the integrity of the markets. Thank you for this opportunity, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Shaw follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much, Ms. Shaw. We will now turn to member questions. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Again, thank you all for being here today. For the first 35 years after Congress created the municipal securities rulemaking board, there was no statutory requirement that a majority of the board be made up of public members. That changed in 2010 when Dodd-Frank required that a majority of the MSRB's board come from the public sector. Legislation today, the MSRB Reform Act would revisit that requirement and change the board's composition. Mr. Nicholas, would this legislation represent a return to Congress' original approach to MSRB governance? Mr. Nicholas. Well, Chair Garbarino, we think it would be a step in the right direction. The original, as you may know, MSRB board in 2010 was five, five and five: five public, five bank, five securities firms. That changed under Dodd-Frank in 2010. We think it is important to have public members on the board. No doubt about it. Being a public member-controlled board we think is a misstep. We do not think it serves the markets as well as having experts in the marketplace, and that includes municipal advisors but experts in the marketplace, being in the majority of the MSRB board, there is some valuable expertise that is missing when the board is dominated by public members, and we think it would be a step in the right direction. Mr. Garbarino. So you agree it would be a positive--the impact would be positive? Mr. Nicholas. The impact of switching to an industry- controlled board we think would be positive for everyone, including individual investors. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Professor Dombalagian, in a paper from last year you said, I quote, While FINRA policy's violations of Federal securities laws by its members, much of its enforcement activity entails promoting compliance with standards of trade. Requiring the SEC to take over and force such business conduct rules may be unnecessarily costly. Could you provide examples of standards of trade, and elaborate on the unnecessary costs the SEC would face through enforcing such standards? Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. Certainly, the SEC has tried this before. There used to be a program called the SEC program--the SEC only program where the SEC would regulate broker-dealers who were not members of an SRO. One of the difficulties that the SEC ran into is articulating ethical principles through the kind of rulemaking process and public adjudication that we associate with SEC enforcement. For example, the canonical rule 2010, members must observe just and equitable principals of trade picks up pretty much every FINRA violation, including violations that are not--or ethical conduct that is not necessarily picked up by a specific rule, things like cheating on exams, or forgery of documents. For the SEC to have to articulate through a rulemaking process, and then enforce either before an administrative law judge (ALJ), to the extent that process continues, or in Federal court, what it means to act in an unethical manner would probably consume enforcement resources, generate case law that limits the flexibility of the SEC to tailor ethical principles to the industry, and so forth. I think you can look at other examples. For example, excessive markups. The SEC has tried to police markups under 10b-5 under its anti-fraud authority. That, again, is limited by the fact that you have to share scienter, whereas, you know, FINRA is able, through its markup rule, to regulate the size of the markup without necessarily inquiring into the mental State of the firm that is charging the markup. I think these are some examples of rules that are better adjudicated through an industry forum, rather than by the SEC. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. FINRA and the MSRB exercise significant enforcement authority that can end careers and reshape firms, yet they are not article 2 agencies subject to the same procedural safeguards as other regulators. When Congress delegates a course of authority, legitimacy depends on fair and transparent process. Professor, where does the current disciplinary and investigative framework fall short of the procedural protections Congress should expect from an entity exercising delegated governmental power? Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you. Since 1975, this has been an issue. I think the Securities Act amendments of 1975 were specifically intended to address due process considerations regarding how SROs conducted both rulemaking and the disciplinary activities. So, we have the many APA processes of section 19, as well as the SEC review of disciplinary actions. I think today, a lot of what I think the SEC and FINRA should be focused on is the interplay between the FINRA appellate process, or the FINRA review process, and then the SEC process. There are brokers, for example, who may be subject to FINRA sanctions who either require---- Mr. Garbarino. Professor, I am sorry. I am out of time, and I know the chairwoman would want me to keep a tight ship going today, and I will ask you for that response in writing. I now recognize the ranking member for the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes. Mr. Sherman. Even if FINRA remains independent of the SEC, we could adopt an approach that we have already done for PCAOB where FINRA, all the board members are selected by the SEC. This would be consistent with principles of democracy that governmental power should be vested in those appointed by governmental officials. Why would we not want the SEC to appoint all the members of the FINRA board? Does anybody have a reason not to? Mr. Nicholas. Ranking Member Sherman, I will weigh in. The BDA's largest concern about whether you roll FINRA or the MSRB into the SEC is you immediately politicize regulation. FINRA is not a political body. MSRB is not a political body. The SEC is. Mr. Sherman. Look. Everybody--most of the members of this board go--this committee go back to their districts and say, ``I am not a politician.'' Nobody is a political body. Everybody is a political body but again, the question was not whether to roll FINRA into the SEC, but rather to have it structured like the PCAOB. Does anybody have a comment on that? Ms. Shaw? Ms. Shaw. Yes. I think that is the only way that we will get fairness within FINRA. It has shown that even its public members are not truly public. They have interest with the industry, and I think that this should be something that is considered by this committee. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Ms. Mirko. I would like to provide my point of view. Mr. Sherman. Next question. Robert Cook made $3.8 million back in 2003. Does anybody know what he made subsequent to that, or is that secret? You guys are knowledgeable of what-- Okay. Ms. Shaw, is there--is it a good idea for Robert Cook to make some undisclosed amount, presumably more than $3.8 million? Ms. Shaw. PIABA would not be able to truly comment on the salaries of any of the FINRA employees. However, we would just emphasize that the money should go to help investors on their unpaid awards, and for investor protection, that should be their priority. Mr. Sherman. Now, you mention these unpaid awards, is that because the defendant in the matter is bankrupt, or for some other reason, they are able to escape enforcement? Ms. Shaw. There are many other reasons that they are able to escape enforcement, or they just change entities, open another entity, and still are in the business. Mr. Sherman. So the entity that you have the claim against is allegedly bankrupt, but the same people are somewhere else, and FINRA then allows those people to continue? Ms. Shaw. Yes, they do. Mr. Sherman. And no one posts a bond in order to work under FINRA's jurisdiction so that if you are unable to--you know, if you disappear, the bond company has to pay? Ms. Shaw. No, sir. Mr. Sherman. Hmm. Does FINRA suggest to FINRA members, you have got 21 of them over there, is anybody pushing for a system that would make sure that anybody--that people get paid? Do you have any supporters over there? Ms. Shaw. We have some supporters. We have had frequent conversations with FINRA on getting an investor recovery pool, or insurance. However, that has not gone any further than our conversations. Mr. Sherman. Okay. We have got FINRA with this BrokerCheck where if you put in the name, you can check, but you cannot just browse all the names. Ms. Shaw, should FINRA go further and put on its website an up-to-date list of the names of high- risk firms, as well as the names of those newly formed firms that employ 20 percent or more brokers from previously twice designated high-risk firms? Ms. Shaw. I think it would be a good step to go further. Disclosure is always further for the investing public. However, I think you should take it a step further and make sure to educate investors. Most investors probably could not find FINRA, could not find FINRA BrokerCheck online to check their financial professional. We need to do more on the front end to get to---- Mr. Sherman. ChatGPT will get them there fairly soon. I ask ChatGPT, How do I know my broker is on the up-and-up? They may learn about a FINRA that they previously had never heard of. Okay. I do want to emphasize how important it is that if the SEC swallows FINRA, or MSRB, it has got to swallow the revenue sources. The last is, is there anybody here who thinks that the amount of money that we spend carrying out the functions of these two organizations is excessive and that we could do it with less staff? Raise your hand if we should cut the staff doing the jobs of FINRA. No hands went up, and my time is up. Thank you. Mr. Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sessions, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Sessions. Chairman, thank you very much and I welcome each of you to the hearing today. It is pretty easy to show up in front of Members of Congress and hear us, perhaps, act like we know what is going on at FINRA or the SEC. You are professionals that see a lot more viewpoint than we do but I would offer some feedback that I am interested in yours, and that is that I find that there is too cozy of a relationship in decisionmaking between the two bodies, that they kind of wink at each other, or hit shoulders with each other; Hey, you do this, I will do that. I will cover your base; you cover my base. Oh, I do not want to make a decision, let us take it to a State regulatory agency. Let us get out of this, it may have been too hard. Oh, but let us tell the State regulatory agency what we expect them to do, even though we had it for 2 or 3 years and could not forthrightly move forward. Now, that sounds like it is something that happens on a regular basis. I do not mean to imply that. I mean to imply it does happen, and perhaps only a few times. What would be your take off my conversation that I had, any of you? Mr. Dombalagian. I mean, certainly FINRA is obligated by statute to be accountable to the SEC. It is a self-regulatory body, it is responsible to its membership, but it has to follow Federal securities law. So there has to be a relationship between the SEC and FINRA that is productive, that takes the form of a dialog over what the regulatory scheme is for---- Mr. Sessions. I am talking about really unprofessional. I am talking about buddy-buddy to where we will play off each other, and the person--the SEC is there for shareholder value, and yet, over time all of this tends to go away if there is an unprofessional relationship between these two bodies. That is what I am trying to get at. Not the regular relationship. Mr. Dombalagian. The SEC is a politically accountable body, the chair is appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and we will find out with the Supreme Court evolving jurisprudence whether there will be additional scriptures on how the SEC is governed. I think it is partly the responsibility of the SEC to---- Mr. Sessions. Okay. Thank you. Does somebody have some insight about whether my conversation with you is correct or not, or maybe it is just a by-product of one or two or five people saying this, it is not indicative? I get this top-level thing. I am talking about the conversation that I had with you, I am asking, talk me out of, or into, what I made as a statement. If I could please have someone address it from that perspective. Ms. Mirko. My perception of the relationship between regulators is that regulatory coordination is inordinately important in order to not have duplication, in order to have efficient enforcement. I think your point about a Federal regulator telling a State regulator what to do does not resonate with me at all. Every regulator is ultimately--every State regulator is ultimately a sovereign. I do think there is a lot of good regulatory coordination between the SEC, FINRA, and the States, and I experienced it first-hand in my 8 years at NASA. I am now in private practice, and have been for several years, and I continue to see a high level of professionalism from the staff, particularly when they do need to interact with each other, and with other regulators. Mr. Sessions. Thank you. Thank you for addressing the question the way I asked it. Anyone else? Ms. Shaw. I would like to agree with Ms. Mirko. As far as regulation, I was a State regulator for almost 20 years, FINRA, the SEC, and States do work well together, and that is essential to keep all three of those bodies. However, I would say that FINRA should at least be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements in their correspondence between the SEC. I think it would just make it clearer and the markets safer for investors. Mr. Sessions. Thank you. All I can do is point out the facts of the case, if things were held for 5 years, threats were provided back and forth, the regulator failed to respond back for years, and then passed it to a State, and that State was very demeaning in their ability to effectively wish to know more about it and simply became punitive. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and thank you for your feedback, I appreciate it. I yield back my time. Mr. Stutzman [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Casten. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Mr. Nicholas, I want to pick your brain a little bit and get a little bit into the weeds of municipal bond markets given where you sit, and the MSRB's role. We have got about $4 trillion in municipal bonds, maybe 40 percent of that is owned by institutional investors. The American Society of Civil Engineers says we need to invest about $7\1/2\ trillion in infrastructure over the next decade, so presumably that is filtering into those markets as well, and not the only source of need that is coming into those markets. As I look at, and I want to warn you, I do not want to make you politically uncomfortable, but we might end up there, I do not know if you are familiar with Jack Handey, one of our Nation's greatest philosophers, wrote deep thoughts on Saturday Night Live, one of my favorite of his lines is, ``I would rather be rich than stupid,'' and because we have so politicized climate risk, I really worry that we now have our hand in the sand in these municipal bond markets. So with a $4 trillion market, Paradise California fires in 2018 cost $8.4 billion of property loss; Hurricane Sandy, $3.1 billion of property loss; the Los Angeles wildfires last year, $250 billion in property loss. All of these things lead to selloffs tell me if you disagree, but falling tax base and loss of property value is really bad for municipal bond markets, you agree? Mr. Nicholas. I do agree, and it sounds to me, Congressman, that the point is the value of the municipal bond markets, and the potential of municipal bond markets to rebuild much of the infrastructure in the country. Mr. Casten. Well, but even before that, and I guess what I am--what I struggle with is that bond markets and the pricing agencies and all the robustness that goes into their works, to the extent that we can quantify risks and identify those risks, we have seen a surge of State agencies, and indeed, a lot of my colleagues across the aisle who have said we should not even ask those questions because to ask about climate financial risk, to ask investors who would like to inflate themselves from climate financial risk is somehow woke, and therefore, we cannot ask the questions. I guess my first question is, do you feel like the bond rating agencies, the MSRB, are able to get that data in this political environment so that we can appropriately price those bonds, and appropriately sell them to people who would like to be exposed or not exposed to those risks? Mr. Nicholas. Yes, Congressman, I think a lot of progress has been made in that respect. You see over the past few years, more focus on climate risk and the impact to--ultimately to markets and to investors, and I think you--we work very closely with State and local groups, as one example, who I know are focused on climate risk and the impact to the municipal bond market at large. We work with a number of academics that are also focused on this. Mr. Casten. I am not asking about you as an individual because you look at the macro data, Breckinridge Capital Advisors had this report that only 30 percent of their bond offerings mention climate change. BlackRock said that municipal issuers in Miami could lose up to 4\1/2\ percent of gross domestic product (GDP) , which got me crunching math. The total property value in Florida is about three times Florida GDP. Six of the seven most uninsured counties in the country are in Florida. Miami being No. 1. How do we get that data? I mean, I do not think any of us want to be in a place where the State of Florida goes bankrupt, but--again, because I would rather be rich than stupid, right, but how does the industry get that data when these big players like Breckinridge, like BlackRock, and, indeed, like our own financial regulators are saying, Well, I am not even going to ask those questions anymore. Mr. Nicholas. This does not turn on. Can you hear me? I go back to one of the original policies, that if it is not broken--let us not fix what is not broken. Right. SRO, in particular, which is not broken, but more can be done. Right. I think that your questions go to the oversight of the MSRB. Right and the SEC's oversight of the MSRB. Maybe more should be done with there. Mr. Casten. Okay. I mean, for what it is worth, I think S&P Global agrees with you, they said that we need more transparency and issuers, climate exposures, given the illiquidity and long duration of those bonds. I remind everybody, 40 percent of those investors are retail. These are all the people we represent, particularly people who depend on fixed income who are exposed. So I hope we can do that, and I hope we can focus on being rich instead of stupid. I yield back. Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks to our witnesses. I appreciate your written testimony and your time here today. Professor Dombalagian, my apologies if I did not get that exactly right, FINRA exercises regulatory authority over thousands of firms, yet it is not subject to the Administrative Procedures Act, FOIA, or direct congressional appropriations. So members of this committee have had similar concerns about the structure of the Federal Reserve, for example, so should we have the same concerns about FINRA? What concerns should we have? Mr. Dombalagian. I mean, certainly if you want to encourage FINRA as an industry association to gather the views of its members, to be able to develop policy to then put in the form of rules for public debate, I think there is a certain measure of forthrightness that would be lost if FINRA were subject to FOIA rules. That being said, the SEC has plenty of authority under Section 15A to think about what the structure of National Securities Associations should look like, and what kind of transparency and what kind of accountability should be built into the registration of entities like FINRA. I think it would be worthwhile, just as the SEC has done with for-profit stock exchanges, for example, to think about whether there need to be rules governing the fair governance, governing the transparency of SRO. So the SEC has done that in the context of for-profit exchanges. The SEC has the power to do it in the context of FINRA. I think it would be a worthwhile conversation to see how the SEC could use its power to improve transparency and accountability. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. If you have further thoughts, I look forward to those as well. Frankly, the other witnesses, if you have thoughts on that topic, I would love your feedback as well sometime. Ms. Mirko, FINRA has warned about pump-and-dump schemes involving crypto and small cap securities, in particular. Are existing surveillance tools sufficient to address these risks, particularly in markets that operate 24/7 across multiple platforms? I mean a lot of the kind of, quote, meme coins out there, that has been the one way that the SEC kind of has not gone after things. In fact, when I created the Token Taxonomy Act in 2018, we kind of wanted to get after the things that looked a lot like pump-and-dump scams so that the people that were trying to build more functional models were not tainted with this kind of reputation risk. Ms. Mirko. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. Your question is ultimately perennial. Even though you are speaking to recent technologies and recent schemes, it is ultimately about fighting fraud, which is something that I think we can all agree on, and that is also something that industry firms are highly aware of and monitor for as well. In terms of the existing surveillance tools you are asking about, the traditional tools are still in use, and they have been supplemental in recent years with AI revolutionizing what we now know of as fraud surveillance. Historically, FINRA has taken an approach to surveillance that involves evaluation, further iteration, and then further evaluation. AI has added an accelerant to that. I will also add, while your question was about FINRA, industry firms have very robust surveillance programs as well, which have been further supercharged through the use of artificial intelligence. Ultimately, this, however, is an area that could be very well subject to further study by the SEC and its capacity in overseeing FINRA. The sufficiency of surveillance tools that FINRA is using is ultimately something the SEC can and should have oversight over and should be asking questions about. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Let me just follow up on that and say, you look at the 2026 annual regulatory oversight report notes that broker-dealers involved in crypto assets, must take additional diligence, and lays out all kinds of specifics. Why is not materiality adequate? Are there some extra criteria that involves crypto firms, or is it just the same standard of materiality, but they, of course, have different things that would be material? Ms. Mirko. That is an excellent question, Congressman, but ultimately it really comes down to the work of this committee, and, in particular, Chairman Hill, and what you have done to advance the Clarity Act to implement laws addressing digital assets. Mr. Davidson. So passing that would be good? Ms. Mirko. Yes. Of course, the Senate is also considering legislation to clarify market structure that we hope, and we hope to see it ultimately enacted. In the interim, while we are waiting for this, there is still ultimately a complexity to getting regulation correct for digital assets as an asset class. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. If you have other thoughts, my time has expired, and I appreciate your testimony, and everyone else's. I yield back. Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on Digital Assets, Financial Technology, and Artificial Intelligence, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for today's hearing. I appreciate our witnesses, and your written testimony. I want to start with you if I can, Mr. Nicholas. Congress tasked the MSRB with both industry rulemaking in creating a data repository, a significant part of the board's budget and staff time are devoted solely to the technology development side of that ledger, it appears. Some have raised concerns that MSRB looks a little bit more like a tech company than a regulator. So, understanding your background, does the MSRB's technology platforms provide a meaningful benefit to its members, or does it drive the cost too high, and is that taking up too much time in the budget and the staff time under your opinion? Mr. Nicholas. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman. I think we unequivocally think that too much of the budget is dedicated to technology. We think it is about 60 percent of the $50 million annual budget at the MSRB. One issue that we continue to have is it is hard to determine how much direct benefit there is from, say, the Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) website at the MSRB because we just cannot get usage data from the MSRB on EMMA. There is no doubt that should be a serious area for this subcommittee to look at in terms of reform of the MSRB structure. We do not think the MSRB is too astray from their original mission, which also included providing data, market data back in 1975. Mr. Steil. Why would they not provide the usage data? Mr. Nicholas. Well, that is a good question. I will try to get you an answer to that. We are still working on that. Mr. Steil. I mean, should they just make it publicly available and just say, Here is our usage data? Mr. Nicholas. They should make it publicly available. Mr. Steil. Allow, not only themselves, but others to do a cost-benefit analysis. Mr. Nicholas. Yes, sir. Mr. Steil. I appreciate that commentary. I will jump over to you, if I can, Ms. Mirko. In your written testimony, you wrote about how the pace of technological development in SEC rulemaking can render some of FINRA's rule books cluttered, a little bit out of date, which you suggested has led FINRA to become overly reliant on regulatory notices, FAQs, and responses to interpret questions. Obviously those types of communications, they are easier to publish, but of course, they do not carry the same weight as rules do. So, I am kind of looking at that balance between regulatory notices, FAQs, but ultimately, substantive rules as technology are moving quickly. Can you provide an example of an area where the regulatory clarity might have been hindered by this dynamic, or comment more broadly and, in particular, how do you think that balance should be struck at the agency? Ms. Mirko. Congressman, that is an important question, and I think you are referring to recommendation eight of my written testimony, where I recommend to reviewing delegated authority for rule approval, and the process for rule approval. Specifically, I recommend that the SEC has final approval over economically or systemically important rules, whereas other rules that are being adjusted for inflation can be approved through a simple notice process to the division of trading and markets. Congress should require that the SEC expand the scope of rules to--actually, let me back up. Currently only a limited scope of rules can be filed with the commission for immediate effectiveness. Congress should require that the SEC expand the scope of rules to include inflation adjustments and technical changes related to recordkeeping and document delivery preferences. Further, Congress should require final rule approval by a majority of commissioners, rather than the division of trading and markets. But this brings me to answer specifically your question, while the division of trading and markets provides important and valuable technical expertise, oversight of significant rule changes should lie with congressionally approved commissioners to ensure proper oversight of rulemaking. This also ties into the necessity for review of all outdated regulatory notices and rules, as well as having a cost benefit analysis framework in place, which is recommendation nine. Mr. Steil. But with the--sorry. I will just jump in here really quick because we are going to run out of time. Ms. Mirko. Sure. Mr. Steil. But with the speed that some of this technology is evolving, there is definitely a role for FAQs and other aspects. How do you think---- Ms. Mirko. There is. Mr. Steil. Do you think we are appropriately striking the balance between true rulemaking with the weight that it carries in a more simplified FAQs or other means? Ms. Mirko. This is really about it being essential for FINRA to review all currently issued guidance still in effect and update or retract guidance no longer applicable. Mr. Steil. We are going to be--we are going to be out of time. If you or if others on the panel want to write--have comments in writing, I would appreciate it. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. Hoosiers understand that the Federal Government has become increasingly bloated and unaccountable. President Trump is restoring that accountability, but I think it is also important for Congress to examine the self-regulatory organizations. Just because they are not government agencies does not mean that they should be unaccountable and opaque to the industries they regulate and the American people. I would like to come to you, Ms. Mirko, first to talk about FINRA's budget. FINRA's budget last year was over $1.5 billion. How does that compare to the SEC, and would you say a budget of that size is justified? Ms. Mirko. Congressman, one of my recommendations is specifically for greater transparency around the FINRA budget to answer exactly that question. Mr. Stutzman. Okay. FINRA also collects fines to cover its strategic initiatives subject to its board approval. Could that funding mechanism create a potential conflict of interest? Ms. Mirko. You know, and that is a question I think about a lot, especially as conflicts of interest are so inherent to how the industry operates because of the importance of mitigating conflicts of interest, disclosing them, managing them. I do think current--I do believe, currently, FINRA's oversight structure--which I am providing recommendations for improvement--but, importantly, as the professor mentioned next to me, these conflicts of interest have existed throughout the existence of SROs and they have been managed. They are not new. The question is, how can we make the SEC's oversight of FINRA even more robust in order to further manage these conflicts. Mr. Stutzman. All right. Thank you. Professor Dombalagian, I would like to come to you and talk about just accountability. It seems to me that FINRA walks like a government regulator, talks like a government regulator, but lacks many of the accountability measures that true regulators like the SEC have. That is not just me saying that. Even Chairman Atkins has previously emphasized the importance of increasing due process and transparency at FINRA just like at the SEC. Would you say that FINRA is more or less accountable to the public than the SEC? Mr. Dombalagian. I would say that FINRA does not take your life, liberty, and property. All FINRA does is revoke your license to participate in the securities industry. That can have devastating consequences for people whose livelihood depends on it, but FINRA is not, in that sense, accountable to the public in the way the SEC is--which does have those powers--and other governmental bodies that do have those powers. Congress' response to this problem in the 1970s was to build an accountability process through the mini-Administrative Procedure Act and Section 19 of the Exchange Act to make sure that, when FINRA adopts rules, there is a notice-and-comment process. Congress has modified that process to a certain degree to facilitate the adoption of certain rules. It also adopted rules for the review of disciplinary decisions to make sure that they were done in a fair and equitable manner. Again, we can--one can discuss whether or not the interface between the SEC and FINRA is adequate to manage some of the consequences of that process, but the rules exist and they can be developed. In terms of accountability to the public, again, FINRA is a membership organization that interfaces with the SEC, which is a government agency. The SEC has the authority to regulate FINRA. The SEC is politically accountable. FINRA's job is to come up with, as Mr. Nicholas was saying, technocratic solutions to the problems that are facing our capital markets. I think what makes FINRA unique is the fact that you have this combination of public and private expertise to develop rules that the SEC can give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down or rewrite with its authority--with its authority under the Exchange Act. Mr. Stutzman. Just to follow up on that, do you think it is accurate to call FINRA a self-regulatory organization when the industry being regulated lacks a majority of say in its governance? Mr. Dombalagian. This is an interesting question, and I appreciate it. Part of, I think, the reason that FINRA and other SROs adopted this structure was in part because of the move overall in corporate governance to try to introduce more independent and disinterested directors on boards. I guess the question is what do we think of as the role of a public director? Is the role of the public director to be an antagonist to the industry members on the board? I can say, having been a nonindustry member of FINRA's National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), I mean, I did not view my role as antagonistic. I viewed my role as bringing a different perspective of problems or questions from those who are in the industry. I do not profess to know more about the industry than the folks who are in it, but I think the combination of expertise on a public--on a board that consists of public and industry members can generate better outcomes than a purely industry board or a purely public board. Mr. Stutzman. All right. Thank you. My time has expired. I want to now go to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Lawler, who is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Nicholas, in my view, transparency and stakeholder engagement are key to a successful SRO. My understanding is that there are nearly 160 industry members and 35 nonindustry members who participate in FINRA's advisory and regional committees. This makes sense to me to ensure the important regulatory work stays focused on the investor protection while being informed by the expertise and experience of those impacted. Mr. Nicholas, given your experience interacting with FINRA, could you explain what FINRA's advisory committees are and whether you think they are helpful and add value to FINRA's work? Mr. Nicholas. Well, thank you, Congressman. Basically, the advisory committees are--help advise decisionmaking and FINRA rulemaking at FINRA specific to markets. One example would be a--as an example--would be a corporate bond advisory committee advising FINRA's rules and regs related to the corporate bond market. We think advisory committees are additive to the overall process at FINRA. It is important to remember, though, they are not the decisionmakers at FINRA. So they can advise all they want, but the ultimate--the ultimate decisionmakers of FINRA are--is the board of directors, which we just talked about is not--you know, is a public-dominated, controlled board of directors. That is the issue that I think we have with the advisory committees. They are fine, and I can give you lots of examples of working with advisory committees and--where the industry was stonewalled for up to 2 years on issues, and then we were able to take it to the SEC and ultimately to the board at FINRA and get resolution. Mr. Lawler. Thank you. Mr. Dombalagian, the SRO framework Congress created in 1934 reflected a very different marketplace, one with slower trading, fewer products, and far less automation. Today's markets operate at a scale and at a speed that would have been unimaginable at that time. That raises a fundamental question about whether the statutory foundation for SROs still fits the modern environment, or whether Congress needs to revisit the model. Do you believe the SRO framework that was created in 1934 when markets were far simpler--do you believe that they--the statutory mandate Congress created nearly a century ago still fits the complexity, speed, and scale of today's capital markets? Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. I agree. Markets have changed, and I think the SRO framework has evolved. Along with it, we certainly have the demutualization of the stock exchanges. So, to the extent that there are questions about market-driven self-regulation, sort of the transformation of securities markets from floor trading to automation basically eliminated a lot of the need to regulate for brokerage and replaced it with code. In turn, the SRO framework has evolved to allow exchanges to compete more aggressively, not only with one another but also with alternative trading systems and other proprietary systems that are not regulated to stock exchanges. The result of that has been that the business conduct regulatory work has migrated to FINRA. In many ways, we can look at the current framework--we can look at the historical framework in the Exchange Act and see how--through a process of rulemaking, through a process of reviewing individualized exchange applications--we have moved much of the business conduct regulation to FINRA so that the stock markets can compete as you have discussed. Again, the negative--the consequence of that is that the business conduct regulation is now concentrated in FINRA and the problem I think we are all struggling with is, having freed the exchanges to be able to compete with one another, have we now created a structure where FINRA is the sole business conduct regulator? Does it make sense for that structure to exist? I think it is difficult to imagine somebody wanting to compete with FINRA in the provision of business conduct services. It has got to be funded by membership fees. It has to heavily subsidize dispute resolution. It is a conversation worth having but I think your insight is correct, and I think the SEC has done its job in trying to think through how the framework should evolve to meet that concern. Mr. Lawler. Ms. Mirko, Dodd-Frank requires the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the SEC's oversight of FINRA every 3 years. Can you explain how this report could be improved? Ms. Mirko. I am glad you asked this question. As our time is almost up, I would point you to recommendation six of my written testimony, and particularly add a review of FINRA enforcement within the GAO oversight report requirements. Mr. Lawler. Great. Thank you. Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, the chair of the Republican Conference, Mrs. McClain. She is recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1938, the NASD was created--the NASD created a self- regulatory body to oversee stockbrokers under SEC supervision-- I think that is important, under SEC supervision--not a full- scale national regulator. Now called FINRA, the so-called self- regulatory organization, has grown far beyond that original role. Today, FINRA staff, not industry members, write binding rules, investigates people, brings enforcement cases, holds hearings, issues large fines, and can permanently end someone's career. Yet, FINRA is not subject to the same transparency laws as Federal agencies. Its meetings are not fully open. Its records are not fully public. Now, if an organization exercises government-level power, it should have government-level accountability. So it is time to ask whether those powers should sit directly under the SEC, where oversight, transparency, and responsibility to the American people are clear. This is not a partisan concern. I actually agree with Ranking Member Waters, who stated that FINRA lets broker misconduct go unchecked, permits board members' conflicts of interest, and lacks any cap on executive compensation. In fact, ironically, last year, FINRA's CEO, Mr. Cook, made $3.6 million. If that power looks like government power, why does it not come with government transparency, right? I think the real question here is, is it a government agency? Is FINRA an SRO and do you not think they should declare and we should treat them as such? Because how it is operating right now conveniently, right, is when it is convenient to be a government agency, they are a government agency. When it is convenient not, well, it is not. So, Ms. Mirko, FINRA started as a licensing agency. I have been in the business for 35 years prior to this, and when I started, it was educational. It was like my continuing education (CE) credits; my licensing was up to date. I am curious, at what point did it make that transformation into an enforcement agency? Ms. Mirko. I think some of the answers go back to Professor Dombalagian's testimony when you talked about how the enforcement functions of the exchanges because of conflicts of interest had to be moved into FINRA. So, I think you would be better to answer. Mrs. McClain. Conflicts of whose interest? Ms. Mirko. I will let you answer. Mr. Dombalagian. I did not hear your question. Sorry. Mrs. McClain. Conflicts of whose interest? So, really, is FINRA a government agency? Is it an SRO? Who is it accountable to? Where is the transparency? Mr. Dombalagian. I think when we--I appreciate the question, and this is a sentiment I hear very often. Small firms regularly make this point that FINRA---- Mrs. McClain. It is not small firms. It is big firms. Mr. Dombalagian. No, I know. No. I mean, I am saying small firms, mid-sized firms, large firms all make this point. I think I would parse it in this way. When we say that FINRA is a quasi-governmental agency, are we saying they have the power, again, to be able to put people in jail? No. We are talking about---- Mrs. McClain. They do have the power to collect fines. They do have the power to levy fines. Mr. Dombalagian. Only for--against individuals in the securities industry. FINRA's power---- Mrs. McClain. Okay, but my point is correct. They do have the power. So, am I wrong? FINRA cannot collect fees and they cannot levy fines? That is great. I mean, if that is the case, I am rolling. Mr. Dombalagian. If somebody chooses to walk away from the industry, FINRA does not have the power to go to State court and---- Mrs. McClain. Okay, but I am not asking about somebody who walks away from the industry. Mr. Dombalagian. But I am saying---- Mrs. McClain. I am asking a question. It is really, really simply put, right? Because if it looks like a duck and it acts like a duck and it quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck. Yet, FINRA does not get to do that. Mr. Dombalagian. Yes. FINRA has to do--yes. Mrs. McClain. So, it does have power to levy fines. Am I right or wrong on that? Mr. Dombalagian. FINRA has the power to levy fines---- Mrs. McClain. Okay. So I am correct. Mr. Dombalagian [continuing]. against individuals who want to retain their securities license. Mrs. McClain. Just checking. Well, in order to practice-- that is a great answer--in order to practice in the securities industry. Mr. Dombalagian. Yes, and that is a decision Congress has made. Congress, in the Exchange Act, required every broker- dealer who wants to---- Mrs. McClain. You are right. Mr. Dombalagian [continuing]. conduct a public business to be---- Mrs. McClain. You are 100 percent right, but you are dodging my question. Mr. Dombalagian. I am trying to answer it. Mrs. McClain. Okay. When did FINRA get this regulatory power, enforcement power? When did it go from an educational arm to a regulatory arm and an enforcement arm? Mr. Dombalagian. Exchanges have always had the power to discipline their members. It is the only way to make a floor brokerage system work is to punish people who do not play by the rules. Self-regulatory organizations such as FINRA--the NASD, back in the day, as you said--they did not need to be able to punish people because, if you still look at section 15 cap A, lower case E--oh, sorry. Chairwoman Wagner [presiding]. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Mrs. McClain. Thank you. Chairwoman Wagner. I ask you to finish your response in writing. Thank you. I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. I apologize, as chair of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, for being a little bit late, but I serve on the Intelligence Committee, and I have been in some very important briefings on recent developments in Iran and the Middle East. I want to thank Mr. Garbarino and other members who have opening--been opening and carrying on this hearing, and I look forward to the rest of the discussion. Now on with it. A recurring concern from smaller broker-dealers and municipal advisors is that enforcement by self-regulatory organizations, or SROs, can feel punitive rather than corrective. If the S in SRO reflects industry stewardship, incentives within the system should encourage compliance outcomes, not simply deterrence through enforcement. Mr. Nicholas, what do you see driving that perception today, and what targeted reforms would best realign the system toward compliance rather than deterrence by enforcement? Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Chair Wagner. Yes. I would start by saying that it is--there is an extreme regulatory burden placed on the industry, whether you are a large bulge bracket firm or a smaller firm headquartered in Missouri and many of those smaller firms frankly do not have the resources to manage some of the demands placed by, in this scenario, FINRA, and thus, it can feel like what we have heard for decades: A gotcha mentality, right? So, when the regulator--the regulator is there to regulate. They are there to find problems. Thus, it is gotcha. There is very little flexibility--less now than there were 10, 20 years ago--there was 10, 20 years ago--on the--on any flexibility from the--we hear this all the time--flexibility from the regulator toward what we call foot faults, a minor--a minor problem, a minor fault, a trade reporting delay, et cetera-- that did not harm the client in any material way, but there is a considerable fine levied by FINRA because of it. We agree with that. We agree that it can be punitive at times, certainly very demanding, more felt by the smaller BDs, obviously, than the large broker-dealers and banks, and it is-- we think it plays right into the role of this subcommittee and the SEC in terms of oversight and transparency, ensuring that FINRA meets their mission, that they are not inadvertently driving small firms out of the business because of overregulation. Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. I have got limited time here. The SEC Division of Enforcement recently released an updated enforcement manual which underscores the Commission's ongoing commitment to fairness, transparency, and efficiency in the investigations conducted by the division. On Monday, Bill St. Louis, FINRA's executive vice president and head of enforcement, released a blog post that announced, and I quote, While it will take more time, we expect to publish an enforcement manual. Ms. Mirko, how important is it that FINRA follows the SEC's approach and publishes an enforcement manual of their own? Ms. Mirko. Well, Chair Wagner, thank you for your question and it is very important that FINRA publishes this enforcement manual. The SEC's enforcement manual has been available publicly for going on 20 years. Chairwoman Wagner. How long? Ms. Mirko. Going on 20 years. It was around 2008---- Chairwoman Wagner. And FINRA does not have one? Ms. Mirko. FINRA's will become available publicly from what we heard on Monday, which I think is a welcome change. I also think this goes back to the importance of the SEC's oversight over FINRA here. Now that we will likely have--we expect to have both the SEC and the FINRA enforcement manual both made available publicly, there is a greater--there is a continued importance for coordination and alignment as well. So we will be able to see, once the FINRA enforcement manual is available, if they do indeed align and provide comment on it. I think that is a healthy development, and I look forward to it. Chairwoman Wagner. FINRA's ability to bring enforcement cases against its members gives it enormous power. However, unlike the SEC, FINRA's enforcement proceedings are not bound by a statute of limitations. Professor Dombalagian--I think I have got it right, so sorry if not--should FINRA's disciplinary action be held to a statute of limitations like that of other Federal regulators? Mr. Dombalagian. So, the challenge is that FINRA's sanctions are supposed to be remedial. If somebody committed fraud 20 years ago, should they be allowed to stay in the industry today, right? I think this is the question. If it is a question of licensure, FINRA always has to have the jurisdiction to be able to revisit that. That being said, there is significant SEC jurisprudence in this area that considers the fairness of FINRA proceedings, which FINRA observes. This includes the retention of records, the availability and reliability of witnesses and those act as practical constraints, much like the doctrine of latches. Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. My time has expired. We look forward to the manual. I look forward to some statute of limitations, too, and some equal resolution of this. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Haridopolos, for 5 minutes. Mr. Haridopolos. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to build on the questions from Congresswoman McClain, if I could. Ms. Mirko, the D.C. Circuit's decision, Alpine Securities v. FINRA, addresses FINRA's authority and oversight. What did the court decide, and what act should Congress take from that ruling when considering SRO reform? Ms. Mirko. Congressman, I am so glad you asked this question because it ties into directly--it ties directly into recommendation three of my written testimony, which builds indeed on the court case, whereby I recommend that the Exchange Act be amended to require SEC review before every FINRA bar or expulsion decision becomes effective. Fundamentally, Alpine is about the ability to bar and expulse. The Supreme Court did not review it. It is making its way through the court system. So, importantly, what we should focus on now is how to make sure that every bar or expulsion decision is reviewed or approved by the SEC, and that requires an amendment by Congress to the Exchange Act. By requiring the SEC's review of these bars, individuals would receive the benefit of an additional and necessary layer of government oversight, helping to better safeguard Fifth Amendment rights and this is both individuals and firms. The reality is that today, if a firm is subject to a bar or an expulsion, there is a process through which they can request SEC review. Individuals do not have that. So there needs to be an equalizing of those two things, and Congress should indeed amend the Exchange Act in order to have that put into place. The other thing that I really wanted to note on this front is--there is always the question of, Well, what if it is an emergency? What if something needs to move quickly? SEC review could take a while. So, I really wanted to note that as part of my recommendation, I added an additional layer of investor protection recourse in the event of egregious misconduct. This would allow for FINRA to ask for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction--but this is the important part-- through an appointed Article III judge. The goal here is that either the SEC or--in the instance of a more emergent matter--a court and an Article III judge make the decision on whether a bar or expulsion should happen. Mr. Haridopolos. Thank you. Professor, I want to ask you what specific reforms should Congress consider to improving FINRA and the MSRB while preserving the benefits of industry participation in regulation? Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. I think the general theme here is more transparency, more disclosure, and more accountability. My sense is that the best way to do this is through the existing structure of the Exchange Act. Much as the SEC has required for-profit exchanges to change their business model, change their governance, improve transparency, particularly with respect to the use of fines and their allocation for budgetary purposes. The SEC has demonstrated it has the ability to do this. Whether by individual application or whether by rulemaking, I think the SEC is in a position to do the same thing with FINRA. I think the job of this committee and the job of Congress is to hold the SEC's feet to the fire and make sure that it does its job. Mr. Haridopolos. With that, Madam Chair, I will yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, for 5 minutes for questioning. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for being here. I am really glad that we are having this hearing examining the roles of FINRA and MSRB, and I know it has been a long time since this committee has done so. A little background. Back in my days, when I was in this business and was a FINRA member, some things became really obvious to me and some things were difficult. What I saw at the time--and obviously, I do take it with a grain of salt because it was my company that was being examined--but when we would have examiners come in, it was often very heavy-handed, and it really led me to run for office to be the regulator. I ended up running for office. I was the securities regulator for the State of Montana for 4 years because my goal there was--first of all, I saw my job as protect--being there to protect investors. You know, that was my primary job: Be there to protect investors but I also saw an opportunity to partner with industry and figure out how we could make it easier for business to do business while we were still hitting that prime objective of making sure that we are protecting investors. Actually, it is interesting. As a regulator, I have written a few letters to then Gary Gensler at the time saying our job is to protect investors. Let us make sure we both stay in our lanes. But anyway, long story short, FINRA is obviously a very powerful SRO. It is the primary regulator for broker-dealers. While FINRA is a regulator, its operations are funded through membership fees rather than congressional appropriations. FINRA is also not required to testify before Congress like other regulators. Ms. Mirko, I am going to start with you. What changes should be made to ensure there is proper congressional oversight over FINRA? Ms. Mirko. Congressman, thank you for your question. The root of your question is really delegated authority and how-- how is the authority that Congress has delegated to the SEC and that the SEC further delegates to FINRA--how is that all overseen correctly? So, first and foremost, Congress needs to ensure strong oversight of FINRA by the SEC. That is a core component of my written testimony. There are different ways to bolster that oversight. So, for example, I have included recommendations to strengthen the oversight by requiring an SEC chair or SEC commissioner be on the FINRA board, be on an SRO board. We discussed earlier, Congressman, amending the GAO oversight report to include additional functions of FINRA. That is another tool that already exists that could be improved. Mr. Downing. Do you believe that FINRA should be subject to something similar to the Administrative Procedure Act in its rulemaking? Ms. Mirko. I am glad you asked this question, Congressman, because this is another question that goes to the root of what delegated authority means. First and foremost, FINRA rulemaking has two phases: It has the reg notice phase, and then FINRA has to--after taking in comments and information from stakeholders--submit a--submit the rule proposal to the SEC. So, fundamentally, the second portion of the FINRA rulemaking process is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it is part of the SEC's rulemaking authority. Now, I know that sounds very layered, and I care about efficiency, but this layering is exactly how the current framework is ensuring that all rulemaking includes input from every stakeholder at each step. Again, going back to delegated authority, there is an inherent layering to the system because Congress delegated authority to the SEC when--and the SEC, in turn, is delegated to SROs. Here, we are talking about FINRA. So FINRA is already, when it comes to its rulemaking, subject to the APA. Mr. Downing. All right. Thank you. And before I forget, Madam Chair, I request unanimous consent to submit this letter from SIFMA for the record. Chairwoman Wagner. So ordered. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 162.] Mr. Downing. Mr. Nicholas, I am going to move on to you. The Exchange Act generally requires broker-dealers to be members of a registered national securities association. To date, FINRA is the only one. So my question: Would market participants be better served by more competition in the SRO space, and if so, what can Congress do to help incentivize that competition? Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Congressman. You know, I think---- Chairwoman Wagner. Mic. Oh, is it broken? Mr. Nicholas. I will speak up. Thank you, Congressman. Our focus, I think, should--the focus of this subcommittee and the SEC should be on accountability. We are not supportive of multiple layers of SRO regulation in the marketplace. All kinds of logistical problems can result from that, harmonization issues, fragmentation issues. So we are not supportive of multiple SROs at this point. We are supportive of taking what we think on some level works and making it better and doing better oversight and transparency. Mr. Downing. Right. Well, thank you for your answer. And, on that, Madam Chair, I yield. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired, and he yields back. I see no more witnesses, and I would like to thank all of our--or I see no more questioners, I should say--but I would like to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than April 9, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] This hearing is now adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]