THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS: EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB

House Banking, Currency, and Housing Committee House March 5, 2026

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[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY
 ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS:
 EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 MARCH 5, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-61

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 www.govinfo.gov
 
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-968 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
======================================================================= 
 
 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
 Chairman Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois
 Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
TIM MOORE, North Carolina

 Ben Johnson, Staff Director

 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

 ANN WAGNER, Missouri, Chairman

ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York, BRAD SHERMAN, California, 
 Vice Chairman Ranking Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
PETE SESSIONS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JUAN VARGAS, California
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Thursday, March 5, 2026
 OPENING STATEMENTS

 Page
Hon. Andrew R. Garbarino, Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
 Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from New York........... 1
Hon. Brad Sherman, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Capital 
 Markets, a U.S. Representative from California................. 2

 WITNESSES

Mr. Onnig Dombalagian, Professor of Law, Tulane University School 
 of Law......................................................... 4
 Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Ms. Valerie Mirko, Partner and Leader of Securities Regulation 
 and Litigation, Armstrong Teasdale LLP......................... 14
 Prepared Statement........................................... 16
Mr. Mike Nicholas, Chief Executive Officer, Bond Dealers of 
 America (BDA).................................................. 20
 Prepared Statement........................................... 22
Ms. Jennifer Shaw, Executive Director, Public Investors Advocate 
 Bar Association (PIABA)........................................ 26
 Prepared Statement........................................... 28

 APPENDIX

 MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Hon. Troy Downing:
 letter from SIFMA............................................ 162
Hon. Maxine Waters:
 GFOA Letter to MSRB dated November 10, 2025.................. 167
 The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA)........... 171

 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Written responses to questions for the record from Mr. Onnig 
 Dombalagian
 Representative Marlin Stutzman............................... 175
Written responses to questions for the record from Ms. Valerie 
 Mirko
 Representative Bryan Steil................................... 182
 Representative Troy Downing.................................. 184

 LEGISLATION

H.R. 2689, the Restoring Accountability in Market Supervision 
 (RAMS) Act..................................................... 186
H.R.------, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 to require fines collected for violations of the rules of the 
 Municipal Rulemaking Board to be deposited into the Treasury... 188
H.R.------, a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 to clarify the composition of the membership of the Municipal 
 Securities Rulemaking Board.................................... 190

 
 THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY
 ORGANIZATIONS IN U.S. MARKETS:
 EXAMINING FINRA AND THE MSRB

 ---------- 

 Thursday, March 5, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
 Committee on Financial Services,
 Washington, DC.

 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ann Wagner 
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Wagner, Garbarino, Sessions, 
Davidson, Steil, Stutzman, Lawler, Ogles, McClain, Downing, 
Haridopolos, Sherman, Meeks, Vargas, Gonzalez, Casten, and 
Bynum.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW R. GARBARINO, VICE CHAIRMAN OF 
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 NEW YORK

 Mr. Garbarino [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to 
order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time.
 Today's hearing is titled, ``The Role of Self-Regulatory 
Organizations in the U.S. Markets, Examining FINRA, and the 
MSRB.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative 
days in which to submit extra materials to the chair for 
inclusion on the record.
 I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening 
statement.
 Good afternoon. I want to thank our witnesses, and all 
those in attendance for joining us today. This hearing 
continues the subcommittee's work in examining the 
infrastructure of our regulatory system, not just as--not just 
the agencies Congress directly created, but the private bodies 
Congress empowered to act alongside them.
 Self-regulatory organizations, or SROs, were never meant to 
be a shortcut around accountability. They were meant to be an 
improvement to it. The idea was straightforward, the people 
closest to the market and who understand its risks and its 
participants are best positioned to set the standards that 
govern it. Government alone cannot write rules nuanced enough 
to reach into every corner of business practice and 
professional ethics.
 Industry, given the right structure and oversight, can--
that is the bargain Congress struck when it created the 
framework for SROs in 1938, but a bargain requires both sides 
to hold up their end.
 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) today 
regulates approximately 3,500 firms, and 620,000 brokers. The 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) writes the rules 
for $4 trillion in municipal securities market. These are not 
minor organizations. They sit at the center of how American 
capital markets function. The decisions they make about what 
rules apply, how they are enforced, and who bears the cost have 
real consequences for businesses of every size, and the 
investors they serve.
 With such broad authority, Congress has a duty to 
periodically ensure these organizations are still serving their 
original purpose. FINRA's budget has grown to $1.5 billion 
funded by the firms it regulates without congressional or 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight. While 
regulatory fees drive this operation, FINRA also collects fines 
to fund strategic initiatives subject to its own board's 
approval. That funding model, and what it incentivizes, is a 
legitimate question for this subcommittee.
 So is governance. When public members outnumber industry 
practitioners on FINRA's board, it is worth asking whether the 
organization still reflects the industry-led model Congress 
envisioned, or if it has drifted toward something that carries 
government authority without government accountability.
 The MSRB presents its own concerns. Since Congress expanded 
its mandate in 2010, the number of registered municipal 
advisors has fallen by nearly 40 percent. These are not large 
institutions with compliance departments and legal teams. The 
majority have five or fewer employees. Whether the regulatory 
framework is proportionate to what Congress envisioned is a 
question worth asking.
 To their credit, both organizations have recently 
undertaken efforts to modernize their own practices, and that 
is a constructive sign, but self-examination has limits. It is 
Congress' responsibility, not the SROs, to determine whether 
the framework itself remains sound.
 I want to be clear, this hearing is not an argument against 
self-regulation. The model properly structured and properly 
overseen remains sound. The question is whether FINRA and the 
MSRB still resemble what Congress authorized, or rather, they 
have become something Congress never intended.
 Today's witnesses bring precisely the range of expertise 
this question demands, and I look forward to a substantive 
discussion about what reforms, if any, are needed to ensure 
these organizations remain true to their statutory purpose.
 I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. 
Sherman, for 4 minutes for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 CALIFORNIA

 Mr. Sherman. I think the policy issue before us is whether 
the SRO should be folded into the SEC. I am a very faithful 
agnostic on that issue. I do not know.
 On the one hand, any political scientist would tell you 
that government authority and power should be vested in the 
government, and, ultimately, accountable to the American people 
through the electoral process.
 Now, I realize the SEC is not an office for which you run, 
but you are--those on the SEC, particularly its chair, are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress. The SROs 
are several steps away from that, and no political scientist 
would embrace that as a good model.
 On the other hand, if it is not broke, do not fix it. We 
have plenty to do in this committee, and if it is working well, 
let us go on to look at something that is working not so well.
 I would say that in looking at the SROs and folding things 
in, we should not just look at FINRA and the MSRB, we should 
look at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Now, there 
are technical distinctions, but in all cases, you have a 
nongovernmental entity that does the work of government that 
is--and that work is to set what the standards are, what the 
regulations are, what the laws are you have to follow, and 
enforcing them, and all of those organizations are engaged in 
that process.
 Now, it is wonderful to have these witnesses, but I look 
forward to having the executives of the SROs, and perhaps PCAOB 
and FASB come before this subcommittee. I always prefer the 
witnesses that are actually doing the job.
 One thing I am not an agnostic on, and that is, if the SEC 
absorbs any of these organizations, it has to absorb the 
revenue source of the organization. You cannot transfer a lot 
of responsibility to the SEC and say, ``Do it out of your 
existing budget,'' especially when we see the SEC has cut its 
staff by almost 15 percent, its enforcement staff by 20 
percent. There has not been a decline in the number of people 
trying to fleece investors. It is a shame that the SEC's 
enforcement budget has been cut, and it should not be cut 
further by assigning new responsibilities under the existing 
budget.
 I know that one of the areas that is important is the 
effect on short selling and making sure that short-selling is 
not naked, and that those who sell short have arranged to 
borrow the relevant securities. I think short-selling does play 
an important role in our capital markets, but there are clearly 
some problems with it, particularly when it is done naked.
 We see that investors have a searchable--well, there is a 
list in BrokerCheck where you can check an individual firm to 
see whether it has been restricted, but there is no published 
list of those. You have to go hit and miss one after the other 
and there is a strong argument that the entire list should be 
published. Any enterprising journalist could do it by just 
putting in the name of each organization saying is Adams on the 
list, is Arthur on the list, and go through the alphabet. So 
this list ought to, I believe, to be published, and I will 
yield back.
 Mr. Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. Today, we welcome 
the testimony of Professor Onnig Dombalagian. Did I do well on 
that one? All right. Great. A professor of law to Tulane 
University School of Law; Ms. Valerie Mirko, partner and leader 
of Securities Regulation and Litigation Practice at Armstrong 
Teasdale; Mr. Mike Nicholas, the CEO of Bond Dealers of 
America; and Ms. Jennifer Shaw, the executive director of 
Public Investors Advocate Bar Association.
 We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each 
of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral 
presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written 
statements will be made part of the record. Professor 
Dombalagian, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral 
remarks.

 STATEMENT OF ONNIG DOMBALAGIAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, TULANE 
 UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

 Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you, Chair Garbarino, Ranking Member 
Sherman, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today on the role of self-regulatory 
organizations in U.S. capital markets, and specifically the 
efficiency and accountability of FINRA.
 My name is Onnig Dombalagian, and I am a professor of law 
at Tulane University School of Law.
 Since leaving the SEC to join the academy, I have studied 
and written about the legal and regulatory structure of 
securities markets, with particular attention to the role of 
SROs. I have also had the privilege of serving two terms as a 
nonindustry member of FINRA's national adjudicatory counsel, 
and over two decades as an arbitrator for FINRA's dispute 
resolution services.
 I am honored to appear before you, and I would like to 
commend the subcommittee for its continued oversight of FINRA's 
significant role in regulating the securities industry. I am, 
of course, speaking in my personal capacity, and not on behalf 
of Tulane University, or the law school.
 In the Maloney Act of 1938, Congress established a 
regulatory regime for the registration of national securities 
associations, for brokers that were not members of a national 
securities exchange. The NASD, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, FINRA's forerunner, is the only association 
to have registered under Section 15A of the Exchange Act.
 The mandate of national securities exchanges has evolved 
over the decades as the NASD has amassed greater responsibility 
for business conduct regulation in the brokerage industry.
 The Securities Act amendments of 1975 consolidated that 
authority among SROs, the transition to automated trading, and 
the wave of exchange demutualization in the late 1990s and 
2000s exacerbated conflicts of interest, which required NASD 
and the New York Stock Exchange to spin off their regulatory 
arms, and today, the member regulation functions of the New 
York Stock Exchange and the NASD have been merged into FINRA, 
which serves as the principle authority for upholding just and 
equitable principle of trade in the securities industry.
 The Exchange Act's model for securities industry self-
regulation is grounded in certain core principles, which 
continue to resonate today. These include the industry's 
familiarity with securities market operations, its reputational 
interest in upholding principles of trade, and, of course, the 
ability to shift the financial burden of regulation to the 
industry through membership fees and other revenue sources.
 In recent years, both industry and academic commentators 
have questioned FINRA's effectiveness and accountability, and 
in some cases, the constitutionality of its rulemaking and 
disciplinary activities. Others conversely criticize unmanaged 
conflicts of interest in FINRA's governance, and sometimes 
excessive lenity in its rulemaking and disciplinary activity.
 But perhaps the most frequent criticism, invade and respect 
FINRA, is the structural shift away from market-driven 
regulation, which we associate with SROs, to consolidated 
business conduct oversight, and the perception of the 
bureaucratization of FINRA.
 FINRA has undertaken initiatives to modernize its rules in 
response to these and other criticisms from its members in the 
public, and this subcommittee has entertained broader proposals 
that would structurally alter the Exchange Act's self-
regulatory framework. These proposals naturally entail 
tradeoffs between ensuring the accountability of SROs to the 
public and accommodating the operational flexibility and 
adaptability of the securities industry.
 While I share many of the reservations and appreciate many 
of the proposals that have been brought before Congress, and 
other bodies, I strongly believe in the unique synthesis of 
regulatory and industry expertise that enables our self-
regulatory framework to identify and expeditiously respond to 
market developments.
 More specifically, the interaction between the SEC, a 
politically accountable government agency, and FINRA, a self-
regulatory body organized as a membership association, is a 
time-tested way of setting and enforcing norms within the 
industry.
 I also acknowledge there is a compelling interest in 
ensuring that FINRA is transparent and accountable to both the 
industry and the public with respect to its regulatory program, 
its senior management, the collection and use of fee revenues 
and other moneys, and its corporate governance practices.
 In my testimony I outline concrete steps Congress could 
take in the short term to reinforce FINRA's effectiveness 
within the current self-regulatory paradigm, such as addressing 
the asymmetry between the display of disciplinary history of 
broker-dealers and other financial services providers, in 
reforming the dispute resolution framework, particularly in the 
context of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and also 
thinking about strategies for enhancing the robustness of the 
SEC's rule review process. For example, by revisiting the 
timetables for the approval or disapproval of FINRA rules.
 Mr. Chair, and Mr. Ranking Member, I commend the 
subcommittee's efforts to examine the efficiency of the self-
regulatory framework. In this spirit, I believe that our system 
of self-regulation in the securities industry can continue to 
serve investors, market participants, and the public interest. 
I appreciate your attention and look forward to your questions. 
Thank you.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Dombalagian follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
 
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Ms. Mirko, you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF VALERIE MIRKO, PARTNER AND LEADER OF SECURITIES 
 REGULATION AND LITIGATION PRACTICE, ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP

 Ms. Mirko. Thank you. Distinguished members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before 
you today, and contribute to the important work of this 
subcommittee. I am pleased to be here to discuss the role of 
SROs in the U.S. markets with a focus on FINRA and the MSRB.
 The U.S. capital markets are the best in the world. Part of 
the reason that they thrive is because of the thoughtful and 
smart regulation inherent to the U.S. securities regulatory 
framework. My point of view is informed by 20-plus years in the 
legal industry, including over a dozen years as a securities 
defense attorney in private practice, as well as several years 
working with regulators and on regulatory coordination.
 I am a partner at Armstrong Teasdale, and leader of the 
firm's securities regulation and litigation practice. In my 
day-to-day, I represent broker-dealers, investment advisors, 
and public companies subject to SEC investigations and other 
regulatory initiatives. I also represent broker-dealers subject 
to FINRA investigations.
 In addition to representing public companies and industry 
firms, at times I also represent their executives when subject 
to regulatory scrutiny.
 Prior to Armstrong Teasdale, I also spent several years as 
a partner at the global law firm of Baker McKenzie, and before 
that, as general counsel of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). Earlier in my career I worked at two 
broker-dealers.
 The importance of the broker-dealer industry in maintaining 
the health and vibrance of the U.S. capital markets relies on 
the SRO model, which, in turn, must be subject to government 
oversight. Through the SRO model, broker-dealers collectively 
assume responsibility for regulation of the industry, while 
also maintaining investor trust in the markets.
 The SRO model, however, also relies on delegated authority 
by the government. Therefore, it is important that the SEC 
adequately supervise SROs, and ensure that they operate with 
fairness, transparency, and neutrality.
 My written testimony includes several recommendations to 
address fairness and fundamental due process concerns with 
respect to FINRA's enforcement program, its rulemaking process, 
dispute resolution forum, and overall governance.
 Congress also has a responsibility to ensure that investor 
trust remains by overseeing regulators generally and evaluating 
the efficacy of SROs specifically. Therefore, reviewing the 
SEC's oversight of SROs, and here FINRA and the MSRB, is 
important, particularly to review whether these regulators are 
functioning consistently with their delegated authority, and 
according to basic principles of fairness.
 It is important to note that in the context of FINRA 
oversight, the organization is entering the second year of its 
FINRA Forward initiative, with a stated goal of modernizing its 
rule book, and enhancing compliance tools, while also 
strengthening fraud protections. This initiative has already 
resulted in greater transparency of long-standing FINRA 
operations.
 In this context, however, there is a role for Congress to 
play to make legislative changes to the overall framework. In 
my written testimony, I include 10 recommendations for Congress 
to consider implementing to strengthen the oversight of SROs. 
These recommendations are organized around five broad 
categories: improving SEC and board oversight of SRO 
governance; addressing fairness and due process concerns of 
SROs; eliminating SRO inefficiencies and duplication; 
increasing fairness and efficiencies in the rulemaking process; 
correcting the weaknesses in FINRA's arbitration process.
 Smart right-size regulation is essential to ensure that 
U.S. markets remain fair, resilient and efficient. My goal with 
these recommendations is to preserve the strengths and 
robustness of our capital markets, so they continue to serve as 
a source of financial stability and opportunity for all 
Americans. I welcome and look forward to your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Mirko follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Mr. Nicholas, you are 
now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF MIKE NICHOLAS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BOND 
 DEALERS OF AMERICA

 Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Chair Garbarino, Ranking Member 
Sherman, and other members of the subcommittee. I am Mike 
Nicholas, CEO of the Bond Dealers of America. BDA is the only 
industry organization in the country that solely focuses on the 
U.S. bond markets. Member firms underwrite and trade across all 
bond market segments, and with an office presence in almost 
every State in the country.
 Our $50 trillion U.S. bond market is a national asset, 
financing the Treasury, Federal agencies, corporations, State 
and local governments, and home buyers, while providing safe 
liquid investments for institutions and individuals.
 BDA's mission is to promote better, more efficient bond 
markets for investors and issuers alike. We take that mission 
seriously, and we appreciate the opportunity to testify.
 First let me say that BDA strongly supports FINRA and the 
MSRB remaining independent self-regulatory organizations. The 
SRO model when functioning properly brings market expertise and 
operational flexibility that government agencies alone cannot 
replicate. Both SROs operate under SEC oversight, and we would 
urge this subcommittee to ensure that oversight is active and 
rigorous.
 The question before the subcommittee is not whether we need 
SROs, but whether they are performing their roles with the 
appropriate regard for cost, market structure, transparency and 
efficiency.
 Turning to FINRA, when genuinely encouraged by the launch 
of FINRA Forward, a comprehensive initiative to modernize 
rules, reduce unnecessary burdens, and strengthen member firm 
compliance. This is the kind of rigorous self-examination an 
effective SROs should undertake.
 We also commend FINRA and MSRB for reversing their 1-minute 
bond trade reporting proposals, even after SEC approval, a 
demonstration of exactly the independent judgment the SRO model 
requires.
 But encouragement must be paired with candor. FINRA Forward 
is a commitment, not yet a result, and we urge the subcommittee 
to monitor whether it produces genuine rule changes.
 One example, FINRA's ongoing review of its modern workplace 
framework, including remote supervision under Rule 3110 
presents an important opportunity to modernize oversight. 
Supervision has changed drastically since Rule 3110 was 
established. Work habits have evolved since the pandemic; bond 
dealers use technology much more than proximity to supervise 
their traders and others. Supervision rules should reflect this 
reality.
 We also continue to raise concerns about the depth of fixed 
income expertise among FINRA examiners, a gap that can waste 
dealer resources, and produce inconsistent examination 
outcomes. We, again, flag the structural and equity of Dodd-
Frank's requirement that FINRA collect fees from municipal 
securities dealers to fund Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board (GASB), whose work benefits issuers and investors far 
more than it does dealers. Congress should revisit that 
provision.
 On the MSRB, we acknowledge the new rate card fee structure 
as a constructive step toward transparency, but we have 
concerns about governance and resource management that have 
persisted for years and demand attention from this 
subcommittee.
 Regarding the MSRB's annual budget, nearly 60 percent of 
the MSRB spending goes not to market regulation, but to 
technology and infrastructure. Broker-dealers fund the majority 
of the MSRB's budget, almost 80 percent in 2025, through 
underwriting, transaction and technology fees.
 On governance, the MSRB board includes seats, including 
this year's vice-chair, for nondealer municipal advisors, firms 
that advise issuers, but do not underwrite or trade. We do not 
object to municipal advisors having representation, in fact, we 
encourage it, but as a group, municipal advisors contribute 
only a small fraction of total MSRB fee revenue, 6 percent in 
2025, while broker-dealers paid the vast majority. That 
imbalance between fee contribution and board influence is a 
structural problem that has persisted and been unaddressed for 
years. Congress should revisit the Dodd-Frank provision 
governing MSRB board composition with this imbalance squarely 
in view.
 More broadly, both MSRB and FINRA have majority public 
boards, which can dilute the market expertise embedded in their 
governance. We urge Congress and the subcommittee to reconsider 
whether that balance is serving the markets well.
 To conclude, let me reemphasize that both FINRA and the 
MSRB are worth preserving as independent SROs, but their 
independence must be matched with accountability. This 
subcommittee working with the SEC has an important role to play 
in ensuring both organizations meet the standard the markets 
require. We appreciate the opportunity to assist in that work, 
and we welcome any questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Nicholas follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much, Mr. Nicholas. Ms. Shaw, 
you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF JENNIFER SHAW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC 
 INVESTORS ADVOCATE BAR ASSOCIATION (PIABA)

 Ms. Shaw. Thank you for inviting me to be here on behalf of 
the Public Investors Advocate Bar Association where I serve as 
the executive director.
 Previously, I spent the majority of my legal practice as an 
enforcement attorney for the people of Oklahoma. PIABA's 
members represent Main Street investors and retirees who have 
been the victim of fraud, bad advice, or other investment 
misconduct. Our members know first-hand the devastation that 
results when a retiree or other investor loses their nest egg. 
We also meet with FINRA, the SEC, and State regulators to try 
to help put in place rules to protect investors from 
unscrupulous advisors.
 Today, I want to talk about FINRA. FINRA's slogan is, 
Protecting investors, ensuring market integrity. While PIABA 
believes that FINRA plays a necessary role as a regulator, we 
also believe they are in need of reform.
 Recently FINRA started their FINRA Forward initiative, 
which PIABA believes moves investor protection backward to a 
time long before the 2008 financial crisis. These are some of 
the initiatives that we feel will harm investors: allowing 
brokerage firms to supervise by Zoom, as opposed to an office 
visit where they can touch and see the broker files; rolling 
back supervision of investment advisors, which would leave 
investors holding the bag if the advisor sells them a Ponzi 
scheme.
 From PIABA's perspective, not only does it appear that 
FINRA is weakening the protection for investors on the front 
end, but it is also now attempting to stack the deck against 
investors and retirees who attempt to hold their brokers 
accountability for their bad or fraudulent advice.
 When investors sign up to invest retirement savings with a 
financial advisor, they are forced into FINRA's industry-run 
private justice system. Since the financial crisis, FINRA has 
taken some small steps to make this industry-run forum fairer 
for investors who have been defrauded. However, with its recent 
action, just Monday of this week, FINRA announced its intention 
to consider a rollback of investor protections to the 1980s, to 
a time before the financial crisis, the dot-com bust, or even 
Black Monday.
 FINRA's 70-page notice of potential rule changes would 
trample investor rights in the mandatory FINRA arbitration 
forum. These changes would impact real people, your neighbors, 
your siblings, your friends.
 I want to discuss to the real people impacted by FINRA and 
the potential changes to investor protection. Let us start with 
Marilyn. She is a blind widow from Alabama in her 80s who lost 
80 percent of her lifesavings due to her financial advisor 
selling her a complex and risky product. Despite the long odds 
of recovery in FINRA's private justice system, Marilyn was 
awarded her losses and $60,000 in damages to punish her advisor 
and his firm. Under FINRA's new rules, this advisor would go 
unpunished.
 Indeed, FINRA's proposal would remove the ability to punish 
brokers and their firms for outrageous behavior, even when 
State law would allow for these damages.
 Kathy from Florida lost her lifesavings due a broker's 
mismanagement. She has been forced back to work as a cashier in 
a grocery store. As of yesterday, she had a bank balance of 
$212.75 and is terrified she is going to lose her home. She is 
waiting on the justice of FINRA's arbitration forum, but at 
least she had an ability to have her case heard from a panel of 
arbitrators.
 FINRA Forward's new real would make it easier to throw out 
cases like Kathy before the hearing, and FINRA Forward would 
change who decides these cases eliminating arbitrators that can 
relate to investors and be fair.
 While FINRA's forced arbitration forum does do a few things 
well, like requiring disclosure of awards against bad brokers, 
and providing a private justice system that is less expensive 
than others, it still needs reform.
 Only three out of 10 investors win their financial 
arbitration hearings. The work process is not easy. The 
investor must realize they have been scammed, find an attorney 
to handle their case, hire the attorney, pay the expert 
arbitration fees, and then prevail on the forum that is stacked 
against them. Then after all of these steps, a shocking $0.37 
on every $1.00 awarded in 2024 remains unpaid because the firms 
are engaging in financial trickery. This has a real impact to 
Main Street investors.
 Take the Crows, an elderly couple in their 70s from rural 
Illinois who worked as a farmer and a librarian and lost most 
of their retirement as a result of securities fraud. The Crows 
went through 3 years of FINRA arbitration and were fortunate to 
win an award. However, they have not been paid a penny. FINRA 
is aware of solutions to the unpaid award issue, such as 
insurance and investor recovery pools, but instead of 
protecting investors, FINRA gave $50 million back to Wall 
Street firms.
 PIABA wants FINRA to do its job, return to its important 
and necessary role of investor protection, and protect the 
integrity of the markets. Thank you for this opportunity, and I 
look forward to your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Shaw follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much, Ms. Shaw. We will now 
turn to member questions. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes 
for questioning.
 Again, thank you all for being here today. For the first 35 
years after Congress created the municipal securities 
rulemaking board, there was no statutory requirement that a 
majority of the board be made up of public members. That 
changed in 2010 when Dodd-Frank required that a majority of the 
MSRB's board come from the public sector. Legislation today, 
the MSRB Reform Act would revisit that requirement and change 
the board's composition.
 Mr. Nicholas, would this legislation represent a return to 
Congress' original approach to MSRB governance?
 Mr. Nicholas. Well, Chair Garbarino, we think it would be a 
step in the right direction. The original, as you may know, 
MSRB board in 2010 was five, five and five: five public, five 
bank, five securities firms. That changed under Dodd-Frank in 
2010. We think it is important to have public members on the 
board. No doubt about it. Being a public member-controlled 
board we think is a misstep. We do not think it serves the 
markets as well as having experts in the marketplace, and that 
includes municipal advisors but experts in the marketplace, 
being in the majority of the MSRB board, there is some valuable 
expertise that is missing when the board is dominated by public 
members, and we think it would be a step in the right 
direction.
 Mr. Garbarino. So you agree it would be a positive--the 
impact would be positive?
 Mr. Nicholas. The impact of switching to an industry-
controlled board we think would be positive for everyone, 
including individual investors.
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. Professor Dombalagian, 
in a paper from last year you said, I quote, While FINRA 
policy's violations of Federal securities laws by its members, 
much of its enforcement activity entails promoting compliance 
with standards of trade. Requiring the SEC to take over and 
force such business conduct rules may be unnecessarily costly.
 Could you provide examples of standards of trade, and 
elaborate on the unnecessary costs the SEC would face through 
enforcing such standards?
 Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. Certainly, 
the SEC has tried this before. There used to be a program 
called the SEC program--the SEC only program where the SEC 
would regulate broker-dealers who were not members of an SRO. 
One of the difficulties that the SEC ran into is articulating 
ethical principles through the kind of rulemaking process and 
public adjudication that we associate with SEC enforcement. For 
example, the canonical rule 2010, members must observe just and 
equitable principals of trade picks up pretty much every FINRA 
violation, including violations that are not--or ethical 
conduct that is not necessarily picked up by a specific rule, 
things like cheating on exams, or forgery of documents.
 For the SEC to have to articulate through a rulemaking 
process, and then enforce either before an administrative law 
judge (ALJ), to the extent that process continues, or in 
Federal court, what it means to act in an unethical manner 
would probably consume enforcement resources, generate case law 
that limits the flexibility of the SEC to tailor ethical 
principles to the industry, and so forth.
 I think you can look at other examples. For example, 
excessive markups. The SEC has tried to police markups under 
10b-5 under its anti-fraud authority. That, again, is limited 
by the fact that you have to share scienter, whereas, you know, 
FINRA is able, through its markup rule, to regulate the size of 
the markup without necessarily inquiring into the mental State 
of the firm that is charging the markup.
 I think these are some examples of rules that are better 
adjudicated through an industry forum, rather than by the SEC.
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much. FINRA and the MSRB 
exercise significant enforcement authority that can end careers 
and reshape firms, yet they are not article 2 agencies subject 
to the same procedural safeguards as other regulators. When 
Congress delegates a course of authority, legitimacy depends on 
fair and transparent process.
 Professor, where does the current disciplinary and 
investigative framework fall short of the procedural 
protections Congress should expect from an entity exercising 
delegated governmental power?
 Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you. Since 1975, this has been an 
issue. I think the Securities Act amendments of 1975 were 
specifically intended to address due process considerations 
regarding how SROs conducted both rulemaking and the 
disciplinary activities. So, we have the many APA processes of 
section 19, as well as the SEC review of disciplinary actions.
 I think today, a lot of what I think the SEC and FINRA 
should be focused on is the interplay between the FINRA 
appellate process, or the FINRA review process, and then the 
SEC process. There are brokers, for example, who may be subject 
to FINRA sanctions who either require----
 Mr. Garbarino. Professor, I am sorry. I am out of time, and 
I know the chairwoman would want me to keep a tight ship going 
today, and I will ask you for that response in writing.
 I now recognize the ranking member for the subcommittee, 
Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Sherman. Even if FINRA remains independent of the SEC, 
we could adopt an approach that we have already done for PCAOB 
where FINRA, all the board members are selected by the SEC. 
This would be consistent with principles of democracy that 
governmental power should be vested in those appointed by 
governmental officials.
 Why would we not want the SEC to appoint all the members of 
the FINRA board? Does anybody have a reason not to?
 Mr. Nicholas. Ranking Member Sherman, I will weigh in. The 
BDA's largest concern about whether you roll FINRA or the MSRB 
into the SEC is you immediately politicize regulation. FINRA is 
not a political body. MSRB is not a political body. The SEC is.
 Mr. Sherman. Look. Everybody--most of the members of this 
board go--this committee go back to their districts and say, 
``I am not a politician.'' Nobody is a political body. 
Everybody is a political body but again, the question was not 
whether to roll FINRA into the SEC, but rather to have it 
structured like the PCAOB. Does anybody have a comment on that? 
Ms. Shaw?
 Ms. Shaw. Yes. I think that is the only way that we will 
get fairness within FINRA. It has shown that even its public 
members are not truly public. They have interest with the 
industry, and I think that this should be something that is 
considered by this committee.
 Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
 Ms. Mirko. I would like to provide my point of view.
 Mr. Sherman. Next question. Robert Cook made $3.8 million 
back in 2003. Does anybody know what he made subsequent to 
that, or is that secret? You guys are knowledgeable of what--
Okay. Ms. Shaw, is there--is it a good idea for Robert Cook to 
make some undisclosed amount, presumably more than $3.8 
million?
 Ms. Shaw. PIABA would not be able to truly comment on the 
salaries of any of the FINRA employees. However, we would just 
emphasize that the money should go to help investors on their 
unpaid awards, and for investor protection, that should be 
their priority.
 Mr. Sherman. Now, you mention these unpaid awards, is that 
because the defendant in the matter is bankrupt, or for some 
other reason, they are able to escape enforcement?
 Ms. Shaw. There are many other reasons that they are able 
to escape enforcement, or they just change entities, open 
another entity, and still are in the business.
 Mr. Sherman. So the entity that you have the claim against 
is allegedly bankrupt, but the same people are somewhere else, 
and FINRA then allows those people to continue?
 Ms. Shaw. Yes, they do.
 Mr. Sherman. And no one posts a bond in order to work under 
FINRA's jurisdiction so that if you are unable to--you know, if 
you disappear, the bond company has to pay?
 Ms. Shaw. No, sir.
 Mr. Sherman. Hmm. Does FINRA suggest to FINRA members, you 
have got 21 of them over there, is anybody pushing for a system 
that would make sure that anybody--that people get paid? Do you 
have any supporters over there?
 Ms. Shaw. We have some supporters. We have had frequent 
conversations with FINRA on getting an investor recovery pool, 
or insurance. However, that has not gone any further than our 
conversations.
 Mr. Sherman. Okay. We have got FINRA with this BrokerCheck 
where if you put in the name, you can check, but you cannot 
just browse all the names. Ms. Shaw, should FINRA go further 
and put on its website an up-to-date list of the names of high-
risk firms, as well as the names of those newly formed firms 
that employ 20 percent or more brokers from previously twice 
designated high-risk firms?
 Ms. Shaw. I think it would be a good step to go further. 
Disclosure is always further for the investing public. However, 
I think you should take it a step further and make sure to 
educate investors. Most investors probably could not find 
FINRA, could not find FINRA BrokerCheck online to check their 
financial professional. We need to do more on the front end to 
get to----
 Mr. Sherman. ChatGPT will get them there fairly soon. I ask 
ChatGPT, How do I know my broker is on the up-and-up? They may 
learn about a FINRA that they previously had never heard of.
 Okay. I do want to emphasize how important it is that if 
the SEC swallows FINRA, or MSRB, it has got to swallow the 
revenue sources. The last is, is there anybody here who thinks 
that the amount of money that we spend carrying out the 
functions of these two organizations is excessive and that we 
could do it with less staff? Raise your hand if we should cut 
the staff doing the jobs of FINRA. No hands went up, and my 
time is up. Thank you.
 Mr. Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 
from Texas, Mr. Sessions, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Sessions. Chairman, thank you very much and I welcome 
each of you to the hearing today. It is pretty easy to show up 
in front of Members of Congress and hear us, perhaps, act like 
we know what is going on at FINRA or the SEC. You are 
professionals that see a lot more viewpoint than we do but I 
would offer some feedback that I am interested in yours, and 
that is that I find that there is too cozy of a relationship in 
decisionmaking between the two bodies, that they kind of wink 
at each other, or hit shoulders with each other; Hey, you do 
this, I will do that. I will cover your base; you cover my 
base. Oh, I do not want to make a decision, let us take it to a 
State regulatory agency. Let us get out of this, it may have 
been too hard. Oh, but let us tell the State regulatory agency 
what we expect them to do, even though we had it for 2 or 3 
years and could not forthrightly move forward.
 Now, that sounds like it is something that happens on a 
regular basis. I do not mean to imply that. I mean to imply it 
does happen, and perhaps only a few times. What would be your 
take off my conversation that I had, any of you?
 Mr. Dombalagian. I mean, certainly FINRA is obligated by 
statute to be accountable to the SEC. It is a self-regulatory 
body, it is responsible to its membership, but it has to follow 
Federal securities law. So there has to be a relationship 
between the SEC and FINRA that is productive, that takes the 
form of a dialog over what the regulatory scheme is for----
 Mr. Sessions. I am talking about really unprofessional. I 
am talking about buddy-buddy to where we will play off each 
other, and the person--the SEC is there for shareholder value, 
and yet, over time all of this tends to go away if there is an 
unprofessional relationship between these two bodies. That is 
what I am trying to get at. Not the regular relationship.
 Mr. Dombalagian. The SEC is a politically accountable body, 
the chair is appointed by the President, confirmed by the 
Senate, and we will find out with the Supreme Court evolving 
jurisprudence whether there will be additional scriptures on 
how the SEC is governed. I think it is partly the 
responsibility of the SEC to----
 Mr. Sessions. Okay. Thank you. Does somebody have some 
insight about whether my conversation with you is correct or 
not, or maybe it is just a by-product of one or two or five 
people saying this, it is not indicative? I get this top-level 
thing. I am talking about the conversation that I had with you, 
I am asking, talk me out of, or into, what I made as a 
statement. If I could please have someone address it from that 
perspective.
 Ms. Mirko. My perception of the relationship between 
regulators is that regulatory coordination is inordinately 
important in order to not have duplication, in order to have 
efficient enforcement. I think your point about a Federal 
regulator telling a State regulator what to do does not 
resonate with me at all. Every regulator is ultimately--every 
State regulator is ultimately a sovereign. I do think there is 
a lot of good regulatory coordination between the SEC, FINRA, 
and the States, and I experienced it first-hand in my 8 years 
at NASA.
 I am now in private practice, and have been for several 
years, and I continue to see a high level of professionalism 
from the staff, particularly when they do need to interact with 
each other, and with other regulators.
 Mr. Sessions. Thank you. Thank you for addressing the 
question the way I asked it. Anyone else?
 Ms. Shaw. I would like to agree with Ms. Mirko. As far as 
regulation, I was a State regulator for almost 20 years, FINRA, 
the SEC, and States do work well together, and that is 
essential to keep all three of those bodies. However, I would 
say that FINRA should at least be subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) requirements in their correspondence 
between the SEC. I think it would just make it clearer and the 
markets safer for investors.
 Mr. Sessions. Thank you. All I can do is point out the 
facts of the case, if things were held for 5 years, threats 
were provided back and forth, the regulator failed to respond 
back for years, and then passed it to a State, and that State 
was very demeaning in their ability to effectively wish to know 
more about it and simply became punitive. Mr. Chairman, I 
appreciate it and thank you for your feedback, I appreciate it. 
I yield back my time.
 Mr. Stutzman [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The 
gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, is now recognized for 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Casten. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Mr. 
Nicholas, I want to pick your brain a little bit and get a 
little bit into the weeds of municipal bond markets given where 
you sit, and the MSRB's role. We have got about $4 trillion in 
municipal bonds, maybe 40 percent of that is owned by 
institutional investors. The American Society of Civil 
Engineers says we need to invest about $7\1/2\ trillion in 
infrastructure over the next decade, so presumably that is 
filtering into those markets as well, and not the only source 
of need that is coming into those markets.
 As I look at, and I want to warn you, I do not want to make 
you politically uncomfortable, but we might end up there, I do 
not know if you are familiar with Jack Handey, one of our 
Nation's greatest philosophers, wrote deep thoughts on Saturday 
Night Live, one of my favorite of his lines is, ``I would 
rather be rich than stupid,'' and because we have so 
politicized climate risk, I really worry that we now have our 
hand in the sand in these municipal bond markets. So with a $4 
trillion market, Paradise California fires in 2018 cost $8.4 
billion of property loss; Hurricane Sandy, $3.1 billion of 
property loss; the Los Angeles wildfires last year, $250 
billion in property loss. All of these things lead to selloffs 
tell me if you disagree, but falling tax base and loss of 
property value is really bad for municipal bond markets, you 
agree?
 Mr. Nicholas. I do agree, and it sounds to me, Congressman, 
that the point is the value of the municipal bond markets, and 
the potential of municipal bond markets to rebuild much of the 
infrastructure in the country.
 Mr. Casten. Well, but even before that, and I guess what I 
am--what I struggle with is that bond markets and the pricing 
agencies and all the robustness that goes into their works, to 
the extent that we can quantify risks and identify those risks, 
we have seen a surge of State agencies, and indeed, a lot of my 
colleagues across the aisle who have said we should not even 
ask those questions because to ask about climate financial 
risk, to ask investors who would like to inflate themselves 
from climate financial risk is somehow woke, and therefore, we 
cannot ask the questions.
 I guess my first question is, do you feel like the bond 
rating agencies, the MSRB, are able to get that data in this 
political environment so that we can appropriately price those 
bonds, and appropriately sell them to people who would like to 
be exposed or not exposed to those risks?
 Mr. Nicholas. Yes, Congressman, I think a lot of progress 
has been made in that respect. You see over the past few years, 
more focus on climate risk and the impact to--ultimately to 
markets and to investors, and I think you--we work very closely 
with State and local groups, as one example, who I know are 
focused on climate risk and the impact to the municipal bond 
market at large. We work with a number of academics that are 
also focused on this.
 Mr. Casten. I am not asking about you as an individual 
because you look at the macro data, Breckinridge Capital 
Advisors had this report that only 30 percent of their bond 
offerings mention climate change. BlackRock said that municipal 
issuers in Miami could lose up to 4\1/2\ percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) , which got me crunching math. The total 
property value in Florida is about three times Florida GDP. Six 
of the seven most uninsured counties in the country are in 
Florida. Miami being No. 1. How do we get that data? I mean, I 
do not think any of us want to be in a place where the State of 
Florida goes bankrupt, but--again, because I would rather be 
rich than stupid, right, but how does the industry get that 
data when these big players like Breckinridge, like BlackRock, 
and, indeed, like our own financial regulators are saying, 
Well, I am not even going to ask those questions anymore.
 Mr. Nicholas. This does not turn on. Can you hear me? I go 
back to one of the original policies, that if it is not 
broken--let us not fix what is not broken. Right. SRO, in 
particular, which is not broken, but more can be done. Right. I 
think that your questions go to the oversight of the MSRB. 
Right and the SEC's oversight of the MSRB. Maybe more should be 
done with there.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. I mean, for what it is worth, I think S&P 
Global agrees with you, they said that we need more 
transparency and issuers, climate exposures, given the 
illiquidity and long duration of those bonds. I remind 
everybody, 40 percent of those investors are retail. These are 
all the people we represent, particularly people who depend on 
fixed income who are exposed. So I hope we can do that, and I 
hope we can focus on being rich instead of stupid. I yield 
back.
 Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Ohio, Mr. Davidson, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on 
National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial 
Institutions, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman. Thanks to our witnesses. 
I appreciate your written testimony and your time here today.
 Professor Dombalagian, my apologies if I did not get that 
exactly right, FINRA exercises regulatory authority over 
thousands of firms, yet it is not subject to the Administrative 
Procedures Act, FOIA, or direct congressional appropriations. 
So members of this committee have had similar concerns about 
the structure of the Federal Reserve, for example, so should we 
have the same concerns about FINRA? What concerns should we 
have?
 Mr. Dombalagian. I mean, certainly if you want to encourage 
FINRA as an industry association to gather the views of its 
members, to be able to develop policy to then put in the form 
of rules for public debate, I think there is a certain measure 
of forthrightness that would be lost if FINRA were subject to 
FOIA rules. That being said, the SEC has plenty of authority 
under Section 15A to think about what the structure of National 
Securities Associations should look like, and what kind of 
transparency and what kind of accountability should be built 
into the registration of entities like FINRA. I think it would 
be worthwhile, just as the SEC has done with for-profit stock 
exchanges, for example, to think about whether there need to be 
rules governing the fair governance, governing the transparency 
of SRO.
 So the SEC has done that in the context of for-profit 
exchanges. The SEC has the power to do it in the context of 
FINRA. I think it would be a worthwhile conversation to see how 
the SEC could use its power to improve transparency and 
accountability.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. If you have further thoughts, I 
look forward to those as well. Frankly, the other witnesses, if 
you have thoughts on that topic, I would love your feedback as 
well sometime.
 Ms. Mirko, FINRA has warned about pump-and-dump schemes 
involving crypto and small cap securities, in particular. Are 
existing surveillance tools sufficient to address these risks, 
particularly in markets that operate 24/7 across multiple 
platforms? I mean a lot of the kind of, quote, meme coins out 
there, that has been the one way that the SEC kind of has not 
gone after things. In fact, when I created the Token Taxonomy 
Act in 2018, we kind of wanted to get after the things that 
looked a lot like pump-and-dump scams so that the people that 
were trying to build more functional models were not tainted 
with this kind of reputation risk.
 Ms. Mirko. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. Your 
question is ultimately perennial. Even though you are speaking 
to recent technologies and recent schemes, it is ultimately 
about fighting fraud, which is something that I think we can 
all agree on, and that is also something that industry firms 
are highly aware of and monitor for as well.
 In terms of the existing surveillance tools you are asking 
about, the traditional tools are still in use, and they have 
been supplemental in recent years with AI revolutionizing what 
we now know of as fraud surveillance.
 Historically, FINRA has taken an approach to surveillance 
that involves evaluation, further iteration, and then further 
evaluation. AI has added an accelerant to that.
 I will also add, while your question was about FINRA, 
industry firms have very robust surveillance programs as well, 
which have been further supercharged through the use of 
artificial intelligence.
 Ultimately, this, however, is an area that could be very 
well subject to further study by the SEC and its capacity in 
overseeing FINRA. The sufficiency of surveillance tools that 
FINRA is using is ultimately something the SEC can and should 
have oversight over and should be asking questions about.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. Let me just follow up on that and 
say, you look at the 2026 annual regulatory oversight report 
notes that broker-dealers involved in crypto assets, must take 
additional diligence, and lays out all kinds of specifics. Why 
is not materiality adequate? Are there some extra criteria that 
involves crypto firms, or is it just the same standard of 
materiality, but they, of course, have different things that 
would be material?
 Ms. Mirko. That is an excellent question, Congressman, but 
ultimately it really comes down to the work of this committee, 
and, in particular, Chairman Hill, and what you have done to 
advance the Clarity Act to implement laws addressing digital 
assets.
 Mr. Davidson. So passing that would be good?
 Ms. Mirko. Yes. Of course, the Senate is also considering 
legislation to clarify market structure that we hope, and we 
hope to see it ultimately enacted. In the interim, while we are 
waiting for this, there is still ultimately a complexity to 
getting regulation correct for digital assets as an asset 
class.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. If you have other thoughts, my 
time has expired, and I appreciate your testimony, and everyone 
else's. I yield back.
 Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, who is the chair of the Subcommittee on 
Digital Assets, Financial Technology, and Artificial 
Intelligence, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for 
today's hearing. I appreciate our witnesses, and your written 
testimony.
 I want to start with you if I can, Mr. Nicholas. Congress 
tasked the MSRB with both industry rulemaking in creating a 
data repository, a significant part of the board's budget and 
staff time are devoted solely to the technology development 
side of that ledger, it appears. Some have raised concerns that 
MSRB looks a little bit more like a tech company than a 
regulator. So, understanding your background, does the MSRB's 
technology platforms provide a meaningful benefit to its 
members, or does it drive the cost too high, and is that taking 
up too much time in the budget and the staff time under your 
opinion?
 Mr. Nicholas. Well, thank you for the question, 
Congressman. I think we unequivocally think that too much of 
the budget is dedicated to technology. We think it is about 60 
percent of the $50 million annual budget at the MSRB.
 One issue that we continue to have is it is hard to 
determine how much direct benefit there is from, say, the 
Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) website at the MSRB 
because we just cannot get usage data from the MSRB on EMMA.
 There is no doubt that should be a serious area for this 
subcommittee to look at in terms of reform of the MSRB 
structure. We do not think the MSRB is too astray from their 
original mission, which also included providing data, market 
data back in 1975.
 Mr. Steil. Why would they not provide the usage data?
 Mr. Nicholas. Well, that is a good question. I will try to 
get you an answer to that. We are still working on that.
 Mr. Steil. I mean, should they just make it publicly 
available and just say, Here is our usage data?
 Mr. Nicholas. They should make it publicly available.
 Mr. Steil. Allow, not only themselves, but others to do a 
cost-benefit analysis.
 Mr. Nicholas. Yes, sir.
 Mr. Steil. I appreciate that commentary. I will jump over 
to you, if I can, Ms. Mirko. In your written testimony, you 
wrote about how the pace of technological development in SEC 
rulemaking can render some of FINRA's rule books cluttered, a 
little bit out of date, which you suggested has led FINRA to 
become overly reliant on regulatory notices, FAQs, and 
responses to interpret questions. Obviously those types of 
communications, they are easier to publish, but of course, they 
do not carry the same weight as rules do.
 So, I am kind of looking at that balance between regulatory 
notices, FAQs, but ultimately, substantive rules as technology 
are moving quickly. Can you provide an example of an area where 
the regulatory clarity might have been hindered by this 
dynamic, or comment more broadly and, in particular, how do you 
think that balance should be struck at the agency?
 Ms. Mirko. Congressman, that is an important question, and 
I think you are referring to recommendation eight of my written 
testimony, where I recommend to reviewing delegated authority 
for rule approval, and the process for rule approval. 
Specifically, I recommend that the SEC has final approval over 
economically or systemically important rules, whereas other 
rules that are being adjusted for inflation can be approved 
through a simple notice process to the division of trading and 
markets.
 Congress should require that the SEC expand the scope of 
rules to--actually, let me back up. Currently only a limited 
scope of rules can be filed with the commission for immediate 
effectiveness. Congress should require that the SEC expand the 
scope of rules to include inflation adjustments and technical 
changes related to recordkeeping and document delivery 
preferences.
 Further, Congress should require final rule approval by a 
majority of commissioners, rather than the division of trading 
and markets.
 But this brings me to answer specifically your question, 
while the division of trading and markets provides important 
and valuable technical expertise, oversight of significant rule 
changes should lie with congressionally approved commissioners 
to ensure proper oversight of rulemaking.
 This also ties into the necessity for review of all 
outdated regulatory notices and rules, as well as having a cost 
benefit analysis framework in place, which is recommendation 
nine.
 Mr. Steil. But with the--sorry. I will just jump in here 
really quick because we are going to run out of time.
 Ms. Mirko. Sure.
 Mr. Steil. But with the speed that some of this technology 
is evolving, there is definitely a role for FAQs and other 
aspects. How do you think----
 Ms. Mirko. There is.
 Mr. Steil. Do you think we are appropriately striking the 
balance between true rulemaking with the weight that it carries 
in a more simplified FAQs or other means?
 Ms. Mirko. This is really about it being essential for 
FINRA to review all currently issued guidance still in effect 
and update or retract guidance no longer applicable.
 Mr. Steil. We are going to be--we are going to be out of 
time. If you or if others on the panel want to write--have 
comments in writing, I would appreciate it.
 I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back.
 I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
 Hoosiers understand that the Federal Government has become 
increasingly bloated and unaccountable. President Trump is 
restoring that accountability, but I think it is also important 
for Congress to examine the self-regulatory organizations. Just 
because they are not government agencies does not mean that 
they should be unaccountable and opaque to the industries they 
regulate and the American people.
 I would like to come to you, Ms. Mirko, first to talk about 
FINRA's budget. FINRA's budget last year was over $1.5 billion. 
How does that compare to the SEC, and would you say a budget of 
that size is justified?
 Ms. Mirko. Congressman, one of my recommendations is 
specifically for greater transparency around the FINRA budget 
to answer exactly that question.
 Mr. Stutzman. Okay. FINRA also collects fines to cover its 
strategic initiatives subject to its board approval. Could that 
funding mechanism create a potential conflict of interest?
 Ms. Mirko. You know, and that is a question I think about a 
lot, especially as conflicts of interest are so inherent to how 
the industry operates because of the importance of mitigating 
conflicts of interest, disclosing them, managing them.
 I do think current--I do believe, currently, FINRA's 
oversight structure--which I am providing recommendations for 
improvement--but, importantly, as the professor mentioned next 
to me, these conflicts of interest have existed throughout the 
existence of SROs and they have been managed. They are not new. 
The question is, how can we make the SEC's oversight of FINRA 
even more robust in order to further manage these conflicts.
 Mr. Stutzman. All right. Thank you.
 Professor Dombalagian, I would like to come to you and talk 
about just accountability. It seems to me that FINRA walks like 
a government regulator, talks like a government regulator, but 
lacks many of the accountability measures that true regulators 
like the SEC have. That is not just me saying that. Even 
Chairman Atkins has previously emphasized the importance of 
increasing due process and transparency at FINRA just like at 
the SEC.
 Would you say that FINRA is more or less accountable to the 
public than the SEC?
 Mr. Dombalagian. I would say that FINRA does not take your 
life, liberty, and property. All FINRA does is revoke your 
license to participate in the securities industry. That can 
have devastating consequences for people whose livelihood 
depends on it, but FINRA is not, in that sense, accountable to 
the public in the way the SEC is--which does have those 
powers--and other governmental bodies that do have those 
powers.
 Congress' response to this problem in the 1970s was to 
build an accountability process through the mini-Administrative 
Procedure Act and Section 19 of the Exchange Act to make sure 
that, when FINRA adopts rules, there is a notice-and-comment 
process. Congress has modified that process to a certain degree 
to facilitate the adoption of certain rules. It also adopted 
rules for the review of disciplinary decisions to make sure 
that they were done in a fair and equitable manner. Again, we 
can--one can discuss whether or not the interface between the 
SEC and FINRA is adequate to manage some of the consequences of 
that process, but the rules exist and they can be developed.
 In terms of accountability to the public, again, FINRA is a 
membership organization that interfaces with the SEC, which is 
a government agency. The SEC has the authority to regulate 
FINRA. The SEC is politically accountable. FINRA's job is to 
come up with, as Mr. Nicholas was saying, technocratic 
solutions to the problems that are facing our capital markets.
 I think what makes FINRA unique is the fact that you have 
this combination of public and private expertise to develop 
rules that the SEC can give a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down or 
rewrite with its authority--with its authority under the 
Exchange Act.
 Mr. Stutzman. Just to follow up on that, do you think it is 
accurate to call FINRA a self-regulatory organization when the 
industry being regulated lacks a majority of say in its 
governance?
 Mr. Dombalagian. This is an interesting question, and I 
appreciate it. Part of, I think, the reason that FINRA and 
other SROs adopted this structure was in part because of the 
move overall in corporate governance to try to introduce more 
independent and disinterested directors on boards.
 I guess the question is what do we think of as the role of 
a public director? Is the role of the public director to be an 
antagonist to the industry members on the board? I can say, 
having been a nonindustry member of FINRA's National 
Adjudicatory Council (NAC), I mean, I did not view my role as 
antagonistic. I viewed my role as bringing a different 
perspective of problems or questions from those who are in the 
industry.
 I do not profess to know more about the industry than the 
folks who are in it, but I think the combination of expertise 
on a public--on a board that consists of public and industry 
members can generate better outcomes than a purely industry 
board or a purely public board.
 Mr. Stutzman. All right. Thank you. My time has expired.
 I want to now go to the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Lawler, who is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Nicholas, in my view, transparency and stakeholder 
engagement are key to a successful SRO. My understanding is 
that there are nearly 160 industry members and 35 nonindustry 
members who participate in FINRA's advisory and regional 
committees. This makes sense to me to ensure the important 
regulatory work stays focused on the investor protection while 
being informed by the expertise and experience of those 
impacted.
 Mr. Nicholas, given your experience interacting with FINRA, 
could you explain what FINRA's advisory committees are and 
whether you think they are helpful and add value to FINRA's 
work?
 Mr. Nicholas. Well, thank you, Congressman. Basically, the 
advisory committees are--help advise decisionmaking and FINRA 
rulemaking at FINRA specific to markets. One example would be 
a--as an example--would be a corporate bond advisory committee 
advising FINRA's rules and regs related to the corporate bond 
market.
 We think advisory committees are additive to the overall 
process at FINRA. It is important to remember, though, they are 
not the decisionmakers at FINRA. So they can advise all they 
want, but the ultimate--the ultimate decisionmakers of FINRA 
are--is the board of directors, which we just talked about is 
not--you know, is a public-dominated, controlled board of 
directors.
 That is the issue that I think we have with the advisory 
committees. They are fine, and I can give you lots of examples 
of working with advisory committees and--where the industry was 
stonewalled for up to 2 years on issues, and then we were able 
to take it to the SEC and ultimately to the board at FINRA and 
get resolution.
 Mr. Lawler. Thank you.
 Mr. Dombalagian, the SRO framework Congress created in 1934 
reflected a very different marketplace, one with slower 
trading, fewer products, and far less automation. Today's 
markets operate at a scale and at a speed that would have been 
unimaginable at that time. That raises a fundamental question 
about whether the statutory foundation for SROs still fits the 
modern environment, or whether Congress needs to revisit the 
model.
 Do you believe the SRO framework that was created in 1934 
when markets were far simpler--do you believe that they--the 
statutory mandate Congress created nearly a century ago still 
fits the complexity, speed, and scale of today's capital 
markets?
 Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. I agree. 
Markets have changed, and I think the SRO framework has 
evolved. Along with it, we certainly have the demutualization 
of the stock exchanges. So, to the extent that there are 
questions about market-driven self-regulation, sort of the 
transformation of securities markets from floor trading to 
automation basically eliminated a lot of the need to regulate 
for brokerage and replaced it with code.
 In turn, the SRO framework has evolved to allow exchanges 
to compete more aggressively, not only with one another but 
also with alternative trading systems and other proprietary 
systems that are not regulated to stock exchanges. The result 
of that has been that the business conduct regulatory work has 
migrated to FINRA.
 In many ways, we can look at the current framework--we can 
look at the historical framework in the Exchange Act and see 
how--through a process of rulemaking, through a process of 
reviewing individualized exchange applications--we have moved 
much of the business conduct regulation to FINRA so that the 
stock markets can compete as you have discussed.
 Again, the negative--the consequence of that is that the 
business conduct regulation is now concentrated in FINRA and 
the problem I think we are all struggling with is, having freed 
the exchanges to be able to compete with one another, have we 
now created a structure where FINRA is the sole business 
conduct regulator? Does it make sense for that structure to 
exist?
 I think it is difficult to imagine somebody wanting to 
compete with FINRA in the provision of business conduct 
services. It has got to be funded by membership fees. It has to 
heavily subsidize dispute resolution. It is a conversation 
worth having but I think your insight is correct, and I think 
the SEC has done its job in trying to think through how the 
framework should evolve to meet that concern.
 Mr. Lawler. Ms. Mirko, Dodd-Frank requires the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to review the SEC's oversight of 
FINRA every 3 years. Can you explain how this report could be 
improved?
 Ms. Mirko. I am glad you asked this question. As our time 
is almost up, I would point you to recommendation six of my 
written testimony, and particularly add a review of FINRA 
enforcement within the GAO oversight report requirements.
 Mr. Lawler. Great. Thank you.
 Mr. Stutzman. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, the 
chair of the Republican Conference, Mrs. McClain. She is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 In 1938, the NASD was created--the NASD created a self-
regulatory body to oversee stockbrokers under SEC supervision--
I think that is important, under SEC supervision--not a full-
scale national regulator. Now called FINRA, the so-called self-
regulatory organization, has grown far beyond that original 
role.
 Today, FINRA staff, not industry members, write binding 
rules, investigates people, brings enforcement cases, holds 
hearings, issues large fines, and can permanently end someone's 
career. Yet, FINRA is not subject to the same transparency laws 
as Federal agencies. Its meetings are not fully open. Its 
records are not fully public. Now, if an organization exercises 
government-level power, it should have government-level 
accountability. So it is time to ask whether those powers 
should sit directly under the SEC, where oversight, 
transparency, and responsibility to the American people are 
clear.
 This is not a partisan concern. I actually agree with 
Ranking Member Waters, who stated that FINRA lets broker 
misconduct go unchecked, permits board members' conflicts of 
interest, and lacks any cap on executive compensation. In fact, 
ironically, last year, FINRA's CEO, Mr. Cook, made $3.6 
million. If that power looks like government power, why does it 
not come with government transparency, right?
 I think the real question here is, is it a government 
agency? Is FINRA an SRO and do you not think they should 
declare and we should treat them as such? Because how it is 
operating right now conveniently, right, is when it is 
convenient to be a government agency, they are a government 
agency. When it is convenient not, well, it is not.
 So, Ms. Mirko, FINRA started as a licensing agency. I have 
been in the business for 35 years prior to this, and when I 
started, it was educational. It was like my continuing 
education (CE) credits; my licensing was up to date. I am 
curious, at what point did it make that transformation into an 
enforcement agency?
 Ms. Mirko. I think some of the answers go back to Professor 
Dombalagian's testimony when you talked about how the 
enforcement functions of the exchanges because of conflicts of 
interest had to be moved into FINRA. So, I think you would be 
better to answer.
 Mrs. McClain. Conflicts of whose interest?
 Ms. Mirko. I will let you answer.
 Mr. Dombalagian. I did not hear your question. Sorry.
 Mrs. McClain. Conflicts of whose interest? So, really, is 
FINRA a government agency? Is it an SRO? Who is it accountable 
to? Where is the transparency?
 Mr. Dombalagian. I think when we--I appreciate the 
question, and this is a sentiment I hear very often. Small 
firms regularly make this point that FINRA----
 Mrs. McClain. It is not small firms. It is big firms.
 Mr. Dombalagian. No, I know. No. I mean, I am saying small 
firms, mid-sized firms, large firms all make this point. I 
think I would parse it in this way. When we say that FINRA is a 
quasi-governmental agency, are we saying they have the power, 
again, to be able to put people in jail? No. We are talking 
about----
 Mrs. McClain. They do have the power to collect fines. They 
do have the power to levy fines.
 Mr. Dombalagian. Only for--against individuals in the 
securities industry. FINRA's power----
 Mrs. McClain. Okay, but my point is correct. They do have 
the power. So, am I wrong? FINRA cannot collect fees and they 
cannot levy fines? That is great. I mean, if that is the case, 
I am rolling.
 Mr. Dombalagian. If somebody chooses to walk away from the 
industry, FINRA does not have the power to go to State court 
and----
 Mrs. McClain. Okay, but I am not asking about somebody who 
walks away from the industry.
 Mr. Dombalagian. But I am saying----
 Mrs. McClain. I am asking a question. It is really, really 
simply put, right? Because if it looks like a duck and it acts 
like a duck and it quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck. 
Yet, FINRA does not get to do that.
 Mr. Dombalagian. Yes. FINRA has to do--yes.
 Mrs. McClain. So, it does have power to levy fines. Am I 
right or wrong on that?
 Mr. Dombalagian. FINRA has the power to levy fines----
 Mrs. McClain. Okay. So I am correct.
 Mr. Dombalagian [continuing]. against individuals who want 
to retain their securities license.
 Mrs. McClain. Just checking. Well, in order to practice--
that is a great answer--in order to practice in the securities 
industry.
 Mr. Dombalagian. Yes, and that is a decision Congress has 
made. Congress, in the Exchange Act, required every broker-
dealer who wants to----
 Mrs. McClain. You are right.
 Mr. Dombalagian [continuing]. conduct a public business to 
be----
 Mrs. McClain. You are 100 percent right, but you are 
dodging my question.
 Mr. Dombalagian. I am trying to answer it.
 Mrs. McClain. Okay. When did FINRA get this regulatory 
power, enforcement power? When did it go from an educational 
arm to a regulatory arm and an enforcement arm?
 Mr. Dombalagian. Exchanges have always had the power to 
discipline their members. It is the only way to make a floor 
brokerage system work is to punish people who do not play by 
the rules. Self-regulatory organizations such as FINRA--the 
NASD, back in the day, as you said--they did not need to be 
able to punish people because, if you still look at section 15 
cap A, lower case E--oh, sorry.
 Chairwoman Wagner [presiding]. The gentlewoman's time has 
expired.
 Mrs. McClain. Thank you.
 Chairwoman Wagner. I ask you to finish your response in 
writing. Thank you.
 I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. I 
apologize, as chair of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, for 
being a little bit late, but I serve on the Intelligence 
Committee, and I have been in some very important briefings on 
recent developments in Iran and the Middle East.
 I want to thank Mr. Garbarino and other members who have 
opening--been opening and carrying on this hearing, and I look 
forward to the rest of the discussion. Now on with it.
 A recurring concern from smaller broker-dealers and 
municipal advisors is that enforcement by self-regulatory 
organizations, or SROs, can feel punitive rather than 
corrective. If the S in SRO reflects industry stewardship, 
incentives within the system should encourage compliance 
outcomes, not simply deterrence through enforcement.
 Mr. Nicholas, what do you see driving that perception 
today, and what targeted reforms would best realign the system 
toward compliance rather than deterrence by enforcement?
 Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Chair Wagner. Yes. I would start 
by saying that it is--there is an extreme regulatory burden 
placed on the industry, whether you are a large bulge bracket 
firm or a smaller firm headquartered in Missouri and many of 
those smaller firms frankly do not have the resources to manage 
some of the demands placed by, in this scenario, FINRA, and 
thus, it can feel like what we have heard for decades: A gotcha 
mentality, right?
 So, when the regulator--the regulator is there to regulate. 
They are there to find problems. Thus, it is gotcha. There is 
very little flexibility--less now than there were 10, 20 years 
ago--there was 10, 20 years ago--on the--on any flexibility 
from the--we hear this all the time--flexibility from the 
regulator toward what we call foot faults, a minor--a minor 
problem, a minor fault, a trade reporting delay, et cetera--
that did not harm the client in any material way, but there is 
a considerable fine levied by FINRA because of it.
 We agree with that. We agree that it can be punitive at 
times, certainly very demanding, more felt by the smaller BDs, 
obviously, than the large broker-dealers and banks, and it is--
we think it plays right into the role of this subcommittee and 
the SEC in terms of oversight and transparency, ensuring that 
FINRA meets their mission, that they are not inadvertently 
driving small firms out of the business because of 
overregulation.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. I have got limited time here.
 The SEC Division of Enforcement recently released an 
updated enforcement manual which underscores the Commission's 
ongoing commitment to fairness, transparency, and efficiency in 
the investigations conducted by the division. On Monday, Bill 
St. Louis, FINRA's executive vice president and head of 
enforcement, released a blog post that announced, and I quote, 
While it will take more time, we expect to publish an 
enforcement manual.
 Ms. Mirko, how important is it that FINRA follows the SEC's 
approach and publishes an enforcement manual of their own?
 Ms. Mirko. Well, Chair Wagner, thank you for your question 
and it is very important that FINRA publishes this enforcement 
manual. The SEC's enforcement manual has been available 
publicly for going on 20 years.
 Chairwoman Wagner. How long?
 Ms. Mirko. Going on 20 years. It was around 2008----
 Chairwoman Wagner. And FINRA does not have one?
 Ms. Mirko. FINRA's will become available publicly from what 
we heard on Monday, which I think is a welcome change.
 I also think this goes back to the importance of the SEC's 
oversight over FINRA here. Now that we will likely have--we 
expect to have both the SEC and the FINRA enforcement manual 
both made available publicly, there is a greater--there is a 
continued importance for coordination and alignment as well.
 So we will be able to see, once the FINRA enforcement 
manual is available, if they do indeed align and provide 
comment on it. I think that is a healthy development, and I 
look forward to it.
 Chairwoman Wagner. FINRA's ability to bring enforcement 
cases against its members gives it enormous power. However, 
unlike the SEC, FINRA's enforcement proceedings are not bound 
by a statute of limitations.
 Professor Dombalagian--I think I have got it right, so 
sorry if not--should FINRA's disciplinary action be held to a 
statute of limitations like that of other Federal regulators?
 Mr. Dombalagian. So, the challenge is that FINRA's 
sanctions are supposed to be remedial. If somebody committed 
fraud 20 years ago, should they be allowed to stay in the 
industry today, right? I think this is the question. If it is a 
question of licensure, FINRA always has to have the 
jurisdiction to be able to revisit that.
 That being said, there is significant SEC jurisprudence in 
this area that considers the fairness of FINRA proceedings, 
which FINRA observes. This includes the retention of records, 
the availability and reliability of witnesses and those act as 
practical constraints, much like the doctrine of latches.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. My time has expired. We look 
forward to the manual. I look forward to some statute of 
limitations, too, and some equal resolution of this.
 I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Haridopolos, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Haridopolos. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to build on 
the questions from Congresswoman McClain, if I could.
 Ms. Mirko, the D.C. Circuit's decision, Alpine Securities 
v. FINRA, addresses FINRA's authority and oversight. What did 
the court decide, and what act should Congress take from that 
ruling when considering SRO reform?
 Ms. Mirko. Congressman, I am so glad you asked this 
question because it ties into directly--it ties directly into 
recommendation three of my written testimony, which builds 
indeed on the court case, whereby I recommend that the Exchange 
Act be amended to require SEC review before every FINRA bar or 
expulsion decision becomes effective.
 Fundamentally, Alpine is about the ability to bar and 
expulse. The Supreme Court did not review it. It is making its 
way through the court system. So, importantly, what we should 
focus on now is how to make sure that every bar or expulsion 
decision is reviewed or approved by the SEC, and that requires 
an amendment by Congress to the Exchange Act.
 By requiring the SEC's review of these bars, individuals 
would receive the benefit of an additional and necessary layer 
of government oversight, helping to better safeguard Fifth 
Amendment rights and this is both individuals and firms.
 The reality is that today, if a firm is subject to a bar or 
an expulsion, there is a process through which they can request 
SEC review. Individuals do not have that. So there needs to be 
an equalizing of those two things, and Congress should indeed 
amend the Exchange Act in order to have that put into place.
 The other thing that I really wanted to note on this front 
is--there is always the question of, Well, what if it is an 
emergency? What if something needs to move quickly? SEC review 
could take a while. So, I really wanted to note that as part of 
my recommendation, I added an additional layer of investor 
protection recourse in the event of egregious misconduct. This 
would allow for FINRA to ask for a temporary restraining order 
or preliminary injunction--but this is the important part--
through an appointed Article III judge.
 The goal here is that either the SEC or--in the instance of 
a more emergent matter--a court and an Article III judge make 
the decision on whether a bar or expulsion should happen.
 Mr. Haridopolos. Thank you.
 Professor, I want to ask you what specific reforms should 
Congress consider to improving FINRA and the MSRB while 
preserving the benefits of industry participation in 
regulation?
 Mr. Dombalagian. Thank you for your question. I think the 
general theme here is more transparency, more disclosure, and 
more accountability. My sense is that the best way to do this 
is through the existing structure of the Exchange Act. Much as 
the SEC has required for-profit exchanges to change their 
business model, change their governance, improve transparency, 
particularly with respect to the use of fines and their 
allocation for budgetary purposes. The SEC has demonstrated it 
has the ability to do this. Whether by individual application 
or whether by rulemaking, I think the SEC is in a position to 
do the same thing with FINRA.
 I think the job of this committee and the job of Congress 
is to hold the SEC's feet to the fire and make sure that it 
does its job.
 Mr. Haridopolos. With that, Madam Chair, I will yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 I now recognize the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, 
for 5 minutes for questioning.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you all for 
being here. I am really glad that we are having this hearing 
examining the roles of FINRA and MSRB, and I know it has been a 
long time since this committee has done so.
 A little background. Back in my days, when I was in this 
business and was a FINRA member, some things became really 
obvious to me and some things were difficult. What I saw at the 
time--and obviously, I do take it with a grain of salt because 
it was my company that was being examined--but when we would 
have examiners come in, it was often very heavy-handed, and it 
really led me to run for office to be the regulator.
 I ended up running for office. I was the securities 
regulator for the State of Montana for 4 years because my goal 
there was--first of all, I saw my job as protect--being there 
to protect investors. You know, that was my primary job: Be 
there to protect investors but I also saw an opportunity to 
partner with industry and figure out how we could make it 
easier for business to do business while we were still hitting 
that prime objective of making sure that we are protecting 
investors.
 Actually, it is interesting. As a regulator, I have written 
a few letters to then Gary Gensler at the time saying our job 
is to protect investors. Let us make sure we both stay in our 
lanes.
 But anyway, long story short, FINRA is obviously a very 
powerful SRO. It is the primary regulator for broker-dealers. 
While FINRA is a regulator, its operations are funded through 
membership fees rather than congressional appropriations. FINRA 
is also not required to testify before Congress like other 
regulators.
 Ms. Mirko, I am going to start with you. What changes 
should be made to ensure there is proper congressional 
oversight over FINRA?
 Ms. Mirko. Congressman, thank you for your question. The 
root of your question is really delegated authority and how--
how is the authority that Congress has delegated to the SEC and 
that the SEC further delegates to FINRA--how is that all 
overseen correctly?
 So, first and foremost, Congress needs to ensure strong 
oversight of FINRA by the SEC. That is a core component of my 
written testimony. There are different ways to bolster that 
oversight.
 So, for example, I have included recommendations to 
strengthen the oversight by requiring an SEC chair or SEC 
commissioner be on the FINRA board, be on an SRO board. We 
discussed earlier, Congressman, amending the GAO oversight 
report to include additional functions of FINRA. That is 
another tool that already exists that could be improved.
 Mr. Downing. Do you believe that FINRA should be subject to 
something similar to the Administrative Procedure Act in its 
rulemaking?
 Ms. Mirko. I am glad you asked this question, Congressman, 
because this is another question that goes to the root of what 
delegated authority means.
 First and foremost, FINRA rulemaking has two phases: It has 
the reg notice phase, and then FINRA has to--after taking in 
comments and information from stakeholders--submit a--submit 
the rule proposal to the SEC. So, fundamentally, the second 
portion of the FINRA rulemaking process is subject to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it is part of the 
SEC's rulemaking authority.
 Now, I know that sounds very layered, and I care about 
efficiency, but this layering is exactly how the current 
framework is ensuring that all rulemaking includes input from 
every stakeholder at each step. Again, going back to delegated 
authority, there is an inherent layering to the system because 
Congress delegated authority to the SEC when--and the SEC, in 
turn, is delegated to SROs. Here, we are talking about FINRA. 
So FINRA is already, when it comes to its rulemaking, subject 
to the APA.
 Mr. Downing. All right. Thank you.
 And before I forget, Madam Chair, I request unanimous 
consent to submit this letter from SIFMA for the record.
 Chairwoman Wagner. So ordered.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix 
on page 162.]

 Mr. Downing. Mr. Nicholas, I am going to move on to you. 
The Exchange Act generally requires broker-dealers to be 
members of a registered national securities association. To 
date, FINRA is the only one.
 So my question: Would market participants be better served 
by more competition in the SRO space, and if so, what can 
Congress do to help incentivize that competition?
 Mr. Nicholas. Thank you, Congressman. You know, I think----
 Chairwoman Wagner. Mic. Oh, is it broken?
 Mr. Nicholas. I will speak up.
 Thank you, Congressman. Our focus, I think, should--the 
focus of this subcommittee and the SEC should be on 
accountability. We are not supportive of multiple layers of SRO 
regulation in the marketplace. All kinds of logistical problems 
can result from that, harmonization issues, fragmentation 
issues. So we are not supportive of multiple SROs at this 
point. We are supportive of taking what we think on some level 
works and making it better and doing better oversight and 
transparency.
 Mr. Downing. Right. Well, thank you for your answer.
 And, on that, Madam Chair, I yield.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired, and he 
yields back.
 I see no more witnesses, and I would like to thank all of 
our--or I see no more questioners, I should say--but I would 
like to thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today.
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the 
chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for 
their response.
 Witnesses, please respond no later than April 9, 2026.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

 This hearing is now adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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