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- HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 11, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-59 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-966 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska, Chairman MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas, Vice EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri, Ranking Chairwoman Member JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan Carolina AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina RITCHIE TORRES, New York ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon TROY DOWNING, Montana C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, February 11, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Mike Flood, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Nebraska................. 1 Hon. Emanuel Cleaver, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Missouri..... 3 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 4 Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from California................ 4 WITNESSES Mr. Michael Bright, CEO, Structured Finance Association (SFA).... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 7 Mr. Robert Broeksmit, President and CEO, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA).............................................. 14 Prepared statement........................................... 16 Dr. Norbert Michel, Vice President and Director, Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives, Cato Institute............ 31 Prepared statement........................................... 33 Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, Director of Housing, Consumer Federation of America (CFA)............................................... 48 Prepared statement........................................... 50 APPENDIX MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Hon. Mike Flood: David Spector entitled, ``A Blueprint for Making Housing More Affordable.''.............................................. 102 American Bankers Association Statement 105 Council of Federal Home Loan Banks and with the support of the 11 Federal HomeLoan Banks (FHLBanks) Statement 109 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Andrew R. Garbarino: Mr. Robert Broeksmit......................................... 111 HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET ---------- Wednesday, February 11, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, Committee on Financial Services Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Flood [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Flood, Rose, Timmons, Fitzgerald, De La Cruz, Downing, Hill, Cleaver, Tlaib, Torres, Garcia, Williams of Georgia, Pettersen, Liccardo, and Waters. Mr. Flood. The Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. This hearing is titled ``Homeownership and the Role of the Secondary Mortgage Market.'' Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE FLOOD, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEBRASKA I would like to thank our witnesses for being with us today, and I very much look forward to an interesting discussion of our secondary mortgage market, and the enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When witnesses refer to the secondary mortgage market during this hearing, please note that they are not referring to direct mortgage lending. In the case of the conforming market, or the market that runs through Freddie and Fannie, they are referring to a chain of interactions between separate actors. Number one, the lender who sells a loan they originated Freddie Mac, or Fannie Mae. Number two, the securitization of that loan into a mortgage-backed security and number three, the investors who purchase those mortgage-backed securities. The private label securitization market works in a similar manner, but with fully private entities working to securitize the mortgage products instead of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The secondary mortgage market works to provide greater liquidity for lenders, and results in greater access to mortgage lending for borrowers. In today's banking regulatory climate, holding a mortgage on a bank's balance sheet can result in significant capital costs. If, instead, the lender sells the mortgage they originate on the secondary market, their balance sheet is comparatively free to originate new loans. This creates an incentive for originators to utilize the secondary mortgage market, rather than hold those loans on their own books. Next, I would like to touch on the origin of the enterprises. Fannie Mae was established back in 1938 under the National Housing Act to provide liquidity in the mortgage market. In 1954, Congress passed the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, which converted Fannie Mae into a public-private mixed ownership corporation. Then in 1968, Fannie Mae became entirely privately owned. Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 as a private company to create competition with Fannie Mae. Around the same time, Ginnie Mae issued the first modern mortgage-backed securities, or MBS. Mortgage-backed securities grew in popularity in the 1980s and became a major tool for both Fannie and Freddie to provide liquidity in the conforming mortgage market. Before the financial crisis in 2008, Fannie and Freddie were private entities. However, when mortgage delinquencies rose sharply in late 2007, the government-sponsored enterprise's (GSE's) large, retained mortgage portfolios exposed them to significant losses in the collapsing housing market. Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which created today's Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and provided the government with the authority to provide further support to the enterprises. Later that same year as the enterprises eroded further, treasury committed up to $100 billion per GSE in exchange for senior preferred stock, warrants for 79.9 percent of the company's common equity, and a dividend. This intervention effectively ended both Fannie and Freddie's status as fully private companies. They now were both entered into what is called a conservatorship. Their board and CEOs were removed, and the government had the ability to closely manage enterprises and conserve their important secondary market function. Freddie and Fannie have remained in conservatorship ever since. My hope with this hearing is that we will provide Members of this subcommittee with an opportunity to coarsely examine two very important topics. Number one, the mechanics of the secondary mortgage market. How does it work. What are the incentives of the relevant actors in the space, and what does this all mean for a perspective home buyer. Number two, the role of Fannie and Freddie in the secondary market, and the policy implications of their ongoing status in conservatorship. Keen observers of this committee may note something unusual about the structure of this hearing. There is no legislation notice to our discussion today. The lack of legislation notice to this hearing was an intentional choice. While there are absolutely important policy issues to be discussed regarding the secondary mortgage market, and GSEs, I felt it was imperative that we begin our subcommittee's work by focusing on the underlying subject matter. With that, I yield my time back. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Cleaver, for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EMANUEL CLEAVER, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI Mr. Cleaver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing will examine homeownership and the role of the secondary mortgage market. Unlike the primary mortgage markets where lenders issue loans directly to borrowers, the secondary market consists of loan originators selling existing mortgage to third parties to replenish their capital. Selling loans in the secondary market provides the liquidity to issue additional mortgages in the primary market. These transactions also distribute mortgage-related risk across the wider financial system. Though largely unknown to most Americans, the secondary mortgage market is the driving force of our housing system. It ensures access to affordable homeownership, and this hearing is an opportunity for this committee to look deeper into the mechanics of the secondary mortgage market. The market depends on public confidence, stability, and adequate oversight by Congress and the administration. The fact that it is unnoticed by the average American means that it is functioning. The hearing also provides an opportunity to assess the responsibilities of secondary market participants and whether they are being filled. I had a great working relationship with the former FHFA director, Sandra Thompson, who I found thoughtful, open to dialog, and unwavering in her commitment to affordable mortgage access. Recently FHFA and the administration's unpredictable announcements have generated great uncertainty. Many of these announcements have been made without supporting analysis, or involvement from Congress. There is now some great uncertainty regarding the long-term prospects of the enterprises, and their impact on capital markets and homeownership. All of this has taken place against the backdrop of one of the most severe housing crises the United States has ever had. I have emphasized that any future framework should ensure the enterprises remain a reliable source of affordable mortgages throughout all markets. To ensure responsible reforms, director--he is not here. I am proud of the committee's thoughtful work in advancing access to housing through the passage of the Housing for the 21st Century Act. That would not have happened without the leadership of Chairman Flood, Chairman Hill, and Ranking Member Waters. I look forward to the hearing from our witnesses as we start examining these issues in the secondary mortgage market. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for opening statement. STATMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Flood. It is indeed, as you both said, homeownership is the cornerstone of the American dream. A well-functioning financial system and access to reasonable mortgage rates are essential to making that dream achievable for more families across our country. The government sponsored enterprises, particularly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, play a crucial role in providing critical liquidity to mortgage originators, and enhancing the mortgage affordability through the operations of the secondary market. While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created to support housing finance, history has shown that poor decisions, inadequate oversight, and unchecked mission creep can impose serious costs for taxpayers and the broader economy. As housing affordability challenges persist nationwide, it is critical that Congress take a wide-eyed view of the role that GSEs play in the current market, and how they are promoting stability, access to credit, and responsible risk management. I thank the chair and look forward to today's panel and yield back. Mr. Flood. The chairman yields back. I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Waters, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. MAXINE WATERS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This hearing will discuss our mortgage market, but it has been more than 1 year into Trump's disastrous administration, and this committee still has not heard from Trump official who oversees $7.6 billion--trillion, trillion dollars of this market. The Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Bill Pulte has been busy. He has been pushing absurd 50-year mortgages, weaponizing Fannie and Freddie, to going after Trump's political enemies, but completely failing to do what he was appointed to do, make housing more affordable for Americans. Our country is facing an affordable housing crisis and needs competent leadership, but Pulte is proving anything but competent. I hope today's witnesses share how Congress can restore the dream of homeownership. Thank you, and I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back. Today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Michael Bright, the CEO of the Structured Finance Association; We welcome Mr. Robert Broeksmit, the president and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association; Dr. Norbert Michel, the vice president and director of the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute and; Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, the director of Housing at the Consumer Federation of America. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. Mr. Bright, we will begin with you. You are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BRIGHT, CEO, STRUCTURED FINANCE ASSOCIATION Mr. Bright. Thank you. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, my name is Michael Bright, and I am the CEO of the Structured Finance Association. Thank you and your staff for inviting me today, and for holding a hearing on such an important topic. I have been engaged in the secondary mortgage market from several angles over the course of my career. For 7 years I traded agency MBS, and the interest rate derivatives necessary to hedge these securities. After the financial crisis, I came to Washington and worked for Senator Bob Corker managing banking and housing policy issues. I then worked at the Milken Institute where we wrote about secondary mortgage market reform. Prior to Structured Finance Association (SFA), I was acting president at Ginnie Mae for 2 years and I have been conducting advocacy on this issue at the Structured Finance Association, or SFA, for the past 7 years. SFA was formed in 2013 with the goal of convening the many diverse institutions involved in securitization, including consumer and commercial lenders, data providers, auto and equipment finance companies, rating agencies, law firms, trustees, banks, and, very importantly, end investors. This structure forces SFA to convene all parties, both those involved with the creation of a fixed-income security, such as a mortgage-backed security, and those who invest in them. Since SFA represents all participants in a transaction, long-term financial stability in the mortgage market, as well as other markets, is a core principle of ours. The American secondary mortgage market is an incredibly complex ecosystem. It extends well beyond Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, which are often the primary focus of policy discussions. These entities do not originate mortgages. They provide credit guarantees that support liquidity and standardization in the market. Operating in tandem with these government-charted agencies, there is a large interconnected series of mortgage-backed securities investors, broker dealers, risk modelers, derivative hedging, prepayment analytic firms, and many more market participants that make up the overall secondary mortgage market apparatus. The investors in American mortgage-backed securities are broad and global. They include insurance companies, 401(k) retirement accounts, banks of all sizes, pension plans, foreign and central banks, the Federal Reserve, and many more. SFA investment members are fiduciaries to their clients. Collectively these varying sources of capital form the foundation of America's ability to have fixed-rate, fully pre- payable mortgages, which currently comprise over 90 percent of all outstanding U.S. household mortgages. When an essential connection between secondary market and individual borrowers is a to-be-announced, known as the TBA market, which allows borrowers to lock in an interest rate before their loan closes. This market extends through the life of the mortgage where servicers and investors must manage entirely complex risk associated with prepayments when rates fall, and extension risk when rates rise. This is an incredibly impressive market that is made possible by FHFA and MBA members, firms in a variety of capacities. SFA not only represents ecosystem for agency MBS, but also the private label security, or PLS market. Since 2008, that market has undergone enormous change. The most important evolution has been to ensure that underwriting practices are safe and sound. At SFA, we say bad loans make bad securities. Good loans make good securities. A lesson from the fact that pre-crisis failures in mortgage underwriting were the primary contributing factor to the collapse of certain bonds. Policy such as the Ability to Repay rule, risk retention, qualified mortgage (QM) definition, oversight of serving standards, and full documentations of loans have all helped to create a PLS market that serves millions of Americans without direct taxpayer risk. There are further regulatory reforms to this market that I will be happy to discuss with you today. In conclusion, thank you, again, for this hearing, and for your attention to this topic. SFA looks forward to working with all of you as you continue to focus on these markets and housing issues in the United States. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bright follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Flood. Mr. Broeksmit, I hope I am saying that right, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF ROBERT BROEKSMIT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you, Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association. My name is Bob Broeksmit, and I serve as Mortgage Bankers Association's (MBA's) president and chief executive officer. I am a certified mortgage banker with more than 40 years of experience in real estate finance. I have held positions in virtually all aspects of the mortgage business, from loan processing and underwriting to secondary marketing and servicing. This extensive experience has given me an up-close perspective on the secondary mortgage marketplace, which is a complex ecosystem where both single-family, and multi-family loans, and assets, such as mortgage servicing rights, are bought and sold. A sizable percentage of newly originated mortgages are sold by lenders, be they depositories, non-banks, or other capital sources, into the secondary market where they are packaged into mortgage-backed securities, or MBS, and sold to investors. Many participants utilize the secondary market, most notably, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, to help make mortgages more--mortgage credit more widely available to borrowers across American by freeing up capital that can be used to issue new mortgages. This process increases liquidity and supports homeownership, and rental activity, by making financing more accessible and affordable. Other players include entities that issue private label securities, or PLS, that our MBS created from pools of mortgage loans. These nongovernment guaranteed loans offer both investment opportunities and associated risks. As a point of emphasis, PLS are financial instruments that are not backed by a government guarantee. Instead, they are created by private entities and typically consist of mortgages that may vary from Fannie and Freddie specific underwriting standards, which means investors may realize higher yields, but bear more credit risk. These loans are typically pulled together in a trust, which then issues securities to investors. The cash flows from the underlying mortgages are then passed through to the investors. Let me now emphasize the sizing of our U.S. real estate and mortgage markets as part of both the domestic and global economies. There is $48 trillion in owner-occupied real estate value, with almost $14 trillion in mortgage debt, leaving almost $34 trillion in home equity. There is another $2.2 trillion in multi-family mortgage debt outstanding, plus associated equity. An annual mortgage origination volume of $2.2 trillion in residential home lending, and another almost $400 billion in multi-family lending. In recent years, market shares of residential origination dollar volumes have averaged roughly 50 percent to the GSEs, 25 percent to banks, 20 percent to Ginnie Mae, which is made up of Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) loans, and 5 percent for PLS. Market shares of multi-family origination dollar volumes have averaged 40 percent to the GSEs, 5 percent to FHA, with the remainder covered by banks, life insurance companies, and commercial mortgage-backed securities. There was an average MBS trading volume of $351 billion per day in 2025. All of these executions have led us to an average U.S. homeownership rate of 65.3 percent, which has held steady, including amongst younger cohorts. The American mortgage market is unique given the degree to which 30-year fixed rate, fully amortized, and pre-payable mortgage loans play such a large role. Our system protects borrowers against increases in interest rates, while providing a long period over which to amortize the loan principal. This allows for more affordable monthly payments that are available under a shorter schedule. The remainder of my written statement describes the key pillars that undergo the secondary market system, a holistic view of that market, balancing market innovation, and the sanctity of existing contracts that support investor activity: The core principles needed should Fannie and Freddie exit their conservatorship status, and both legislative and regulatory recommendations on improving housing affordability. In conclusion, I appreciate this chance to comment on the secondary mortgage market this afternoon. MBA looks forward to continuing to work with this subcommittee, the full Congress, and the administration to serve as a resource while important discussions regarding housing continue to take shape. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Broeksmit follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Flood. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Michel, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF DR. NORBERT MICHEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ALTERNATIVES, CATO INSTITUTE Mr. Michel. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Norbert Michel, vice president and director for the Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute. The views that I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of the Cato Institute. A little more than 8 years ago I testified in front of this committee and started my testimony by pointing out that it had been 10 years since the GSEs Fannie and Freddie had failed and were placed into government conservatorship, but Congress had yet to reform the housing finance market and protect taxpayers. The only meaningful difference in my testimony today is that it has now been about 18 years. By continuing to leave the government-backed duopoly of Fannie and Freddie in place, expanding their reach, or merging them into a monopoly, Congress would again be perpetuating one of the worse parts of the current housing finance system, the same one that imploded in 2008. As I said 8 years ago, Americans deserve better. In the intervening years, many so-called reform proposals have been introduced, and the ones that typically garner the most bipartisan support are those that included an explicit government guarantee for mortgage-backed securities. That mechanism would simply mean that the Federal Government would begin explicitly guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on otherwise private investments, enforcing borrowers to pay for it, all for no real public purpose because there has been no market failure. Still, advocates of these guarantees promote them as necessary for creating a sustainable housing finance system. The truth, though, is that history clearly shows that these guarantees are not necessary to sustain the housing market. During the 5 decades leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States achieved a stable rate of homeownership of approximately 64 percent without explicit guarantees. The only major deviation from that rate was when misguided policies were enacted with the expressed intent of arbitrarily raising the ownership rate to 70 percent by increasing the use of the implicit guarantees. Predictably, that scheme did not work well, and it ended in spectacular failure. There is no doubt that the constant expansion of implied taxpayer guarantees through the GSEs helped to create excessive debt leading to the 2008 crisis. Doubling down by making these guarantees explicit is descended to end at least as poorly. There is also no doubt that the people in the housing finance sector want to receive government guarantees for their business. Who would not? But that desire is not a sufficient reason to provide those guarantees, and the truth, again, is that they are not necessary because robust homeownership was established in the United States long before the government became so heavily involved in the housing market. From 1949 to 1968, the year Fannie was allowed to branch out into purchasing nongovernment insured mortgages, government-backed home loans never accounted for more than an annual share of 6 percent of the market in any given year, yet that homeownership rate then was 64 percent, which is very close to the rate that we have now. There simply is no compelling need from either existing or potential homeowner's perspective for these guarantees. Borrowers and lenders like to take risks because it provides the possibility of a future financial reward. That is what occurs in financial markets every day. Shifting these financial risks onto taxpayers is what increases systemic risks and makes financial crises more likely, and I fear that Congress has forgotten this lesson, even though it was crystal clear in 2008. So for the sake of completeness, shifting financial risks onto taxpayers relieves investors of caring about what is in their portfolio. It creates excessive leverage. It creates overbuilding. It puts upward pressure on home prices, not downward, and possibly to unsustainable levels. It is, therefore, almost inconceivable that Congress would still contemplate repeating this mistake rather than moving as far away from the GSE system as possible. Thank you for your consideration, and I am happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Michel follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Flood. Thank you very much. Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF DR. SHARON CORNELISSEN, DIRECTOR OF HOUSING, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA Ms. Cornelissen. Chairman Flood, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Cleaver, and Ranking Member Waters, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. My name is Sharon Cornelissen, and I am the director of Housing at the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and CFA is one of Nation's leading consumer groups in the country, and we represent around 250 consumer groups across the Nation. So this hearing is about homeownership and the role of the secondary mortgage market but at its core, it is about the question of whether the institutions that Congress created to promote affordable homeownership, namely the GSEs and FHFA, are being deployed for their purpose today, or if that purpose has been undermined over the last year by actions taken by FHFA. Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, and Freddie Mac in 1970, in order to make homeownership more attainable across the Nation. They are our GSEs, which means government-sponsored enterprises, which means that they are unique public-private hybrids. While they before 2008 they were privately capitalized, they also enjoyed significant public subsidies and in exchange, Congress put a public mission in place to make sure that the GSEs reached our markets, including rural markets and underserved urban markets, and also served the mortgage needs of underserved consumers, namely low and moderate income home buyers. It put in place FHFA in 2008, and it gave FHFA two responsibilities. Namely to oversee the safety and the soundness of the GSEs, and prevent against excessive risk- taking and two, to oversee and promote the mission of the GSEs, including by making mortgage credit broadly available. Over the last year, however, we have seen FHFA move away from that mission. There is a lot of examples that I could mention here, but we have seen them reduce the housing goals that have taken away GSE-backed mortgage access from an estimated 177,000 working families in the United States. We have seen significant rollbacks of fair housing, which only made our housing crisis worse for renters and home buyers. We have seen lots of policy proposals back and forth of different ideas, including the 50-year mortgage, affordable mortgages, and conflicting ideas about the future of Fannie and Freddie, these really important institutions to the U.S. economy, which has generated deep uncertainty for industry, for investors, but also for consumers. I think we can all agree here today that homeownership is simply too unaffordable. So in order to tackle that, we need ambitious housing policy, and including housing policy that really leverages the GSEs for all of their potential and what they can do for American homeownership. I will end here on three priorities. First, I just want to establish that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are working really well, and they functioned really well over the last 18 years of conservatorship. We do not need to fix what is not broken. Any planning for the future of Fannie and Freddie, we should be very careful. Congress should be involved, we should prioritize a strong and independent regulator, and we should put consumers first. That means maintaining long-term low mortgage rates, and maintaining broad access to mortgage credit, which is why we put the GSEs in place to begin with. Second, FHFA should actually leverage its actual policy tools to promote affordable mortgage--to promote affordable homeownership. It means reinstating the affordable housing goals as they were before, to really ensure mortgage credit is broadly available for working families, but, also, take its position to actually drive innovation at Fannie and Freddie and innovate mortgage products that make mortgage credit more broadly available. Think about mortgages for manufactured housing, for example, for small-dollar mortgages, or to support mortgage lending by community development financial institutions (CDFIs). Third and finally, I would urge Congress to not forget about the Federal Home Loan Banks. This is another GSE that FHFA regulates, and another GSE that Congress put in place to promote affordable homeownership and access to credit. However, they have also--they have lost their way over the last few decades. Congress currently only requires the Federal Home Loan Banks to devote 10 percent of their net income every year to go to affordable housing programs. If Congress were to raise that minimum from 10 percent to 30 percent, that would mean that in an additional $1.2 billion could go to affordable housing construction and down-payment assistance every year. This additional $1.2 billion would not compromise the safety and soundness of the Federal Home Loan Banks because they have been very profitable over the last few decades, including making $6.4 billion just in 2024. [The prepared statement of Ms. Cornelissen follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Flood. The gentlelady's time has expired. I will now turn to Member questions. I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Mr. Bright and Mr. Broeksmit, I think the benefits of a liquid and stable secondary MBS market are often not noticed by home buyers. What can we point to as the main indicators of a healthy secondary mortgage market, and what benefits do homeowners enjoy when the secondary market is operating well? Mr. Broeksmit. Mr. Chairman, I do not think many people in this room, or in this country, understand what a rarity it is to have 30-year fixed rate pre-payable mortgages available in all parts of the country through all economic cycles and that is precisely what this system permits, and we need to be careful about how we tinker with it given the incredible importance of that feature to our economy. Mr. Bright. I agree. I mean, we are talking about how it has been 18 years since conservatorship and can we do comprehensive reform. That is easy to say from these seats. It is really hard from your seats. Trust me, I have the scars to show for it, so I understand that. To answer your question specifically, it is kind of--the secondary mortgage market is sort of like plumbing and electric wiring behind the wall. So you do not see it. You notice if the water does not work and if the lights do not turn on but since the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie, the lights--as far as getting a fixed-rate mortgage, a pre-payable fixed-rate mortgage, which is a really unique feature that Americans enjoy, the ability to get that at low rates, the lights are on and the water works. So what we are talking about is a political exercise when we talk about structural reform is you are saying, hey, you do not notice all this stuff behind the wall, but let us rip up the wall and take it down, and that gets a little tricky, so-- -- Mr. Flood. Again, I think it is important as we get into this conversation about GSEs, we have this beautiful thing called the 30-year fixed mortgage. They do not have that in South America. They do not have that in every country even in Europe or Central America. We have it here. Not only do we have trillions of dollars coming in capital, we have other countries sending capital into the United States so that somebody in Laredo, Texas, can achieve the American dream. So we have done something right as a country here. Mr. Bright, can you walk through the way MBS is priced by investors? From a very high level, how can we think about how investors weigh prepayment risk and interest rate risk in mortgage-backed securities. Mr. Bright. Thank you. Right now in agency, MBS and Ginnie MBS, you do not have to take into account the credit risk of the underlying borrower. You do in PLS, but the structures allow senior bondholders to not have to worry about that. But in all mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., you take on significant risk as an MBS investor. Again, I do want to stress the point that this MBS investor is a pension plan, it is a 401(k), it is your thrift savings plans (TSPs). This is not people investing their own money. It is retirees and savers. If you make a loan to--you buy a mortgage-backed security at 3\1/2\ percent coupon, and that borrower gets a 4 percent mortgage, that is an example, if interest rates go up, you as a bondholder are probably going to be getting a 3\1/2\ percent coupon for a very, very, very long time, while prevailing market interest rates could be 6 or 7 percent. So you are underwater on that bond. Conversely, if you are an investor and you make a loan with a 5\1/2\ percent coupon, and that is where prevailing mortgage rates are, which is about where they are now, and rates go down, you are going to get prepaid, meaning, you are going to get part back and have to reinvest that at a substantially lower market interest rate. So that is okay. The market knows how to do it. It prices that. Its built an entire---- Mr. Flood. You are doing great, but I have got--I am running out of time here. Mr. Bright. It is impressive is what I am saying. Mr. Flood. There is one thing I want to touch on, and my time is limited, but I worry about banks, community banks, and their connection to Main Street when everything goes to the GSEs. Mr. Broeksmit, can you describe the capital treatment of mortgage servicing assets, both with relation to the risk weights and the effective cap on mortgage servicing asset (MSA), and the effects it has on mortgage originators, particularly small banks? I worry that we are losing our connection between banks and homeowners, and please react to that. Mr. Broeksmit. I will be brief. Basel III needs to be fixed. The service--the risk weight on servicing is 250 percent. It should not be more than 100 percent. That is a complicated way of saying that the capital we require for servicing is 2\1/2\ times higher than it ought to be. We have been working with the prudential regulators on this, it would help banks get back into the servicing business. They have effectively been driven out of it because of these onerous capital requirements. Mr. Flood. Excellent point. I am going to offer for the record an article written by David Spector, Chairman and CEO of PennyMac. It is entitled, ``A Blueprint for Making Housing More Affordable.'' Entered into the record without objection. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 102.] Mr. Flood. With that, I now turn to my colleague on my right, Mr. Cleaver, he is recognized as the ranking member for 5 minutes. Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of my very, very deep respect for the previous head of FHFA, and my ability to work with her, I have become more and more concerned about that role and appreciative of it. The administration continues to evaluate the future of government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and has considered ending their 17-year conservatorship because the GSEs are central participants in a secondary mortgage market: buying, pooling, and then securitizing mortgages. Any transition out of conservatorship could have, I think maybe everyone would agree, broad implications of liquidity, risk, distribution, and housing affordability across the market. Forgive me if I mess it up, Cornelissen, am I close, just-- -- Ms. Cornelissen. Cornelissen. Thank you. Mr. Cleaver. The Congressional Budget Office has noted that the GSE's role in the housing system is so significant that they could warrant systematic designation if released from conservatorship. What would be the material impact on the secondary mortgage and the broader housing finance system, particularly at a time when we are all talking about this historically difficult time for Americans to secure affordable housing? Ms. Cornelissen. Yes, I mean, you do not want to break the secondary mortgage markets. I think we all have the memory of 2008 when Fannie and Freddie risked failing and threatened to drag down the economy but specifically if you end conservatorship without a good plan in place, this will mean the end of the 30-year mortgage as we know it. Right. You may not be able to get a rate locked in before you buy your house, or you may not be able to have that pre-payable feature and refinance your home. Mr. Cleaver. What are the primary drivers of higher mortgage transaction costs, particularly for smaller loans in today's market? Ms. Cornelissen. Excuse me. Mr. Cleaver. No. Anyone. Mr. Broeksmit. I am sorry. I did not hear the question. Mr. Cleaver. What are the primary drivers of higher mortgage transaction costs, particularly for smaller loans in today's market? Mr. Broeksmit. Well, one of the issues with small dollar amounts is that small dollar loan amounts, is that there are certain charges on a mortgage that are fixed-in costs. Let us say the appraisal. Let us say the appraisal is $700. Well, if you are buying a $500,000 house, that may not be that big an obstacle but if you are trying to buy a $40,000 house, that could be a couple percentage of the purchase price. So there are things like that are fixed regardless of the loan amount, and that is really a barrier for small dollar loans. Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Arkansas, the chairman of the full Financial Services Committee, Mr. Hill, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Flood. Again, thanks for this expert panel, and it is very, very good to have your expertise restored and renewed on the subject of the government-sponsored enterprises. Mr. Bright, I want to start with you. We are going to play Fannie and Freddie jeopardy. Let us play--do you want to play for a trillion? Let us play for a trillion dollars. Are the government-sponsored enterprises the GSEs-AreFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are they public companies or private companies? Mr. Bright. Their stocks do trade on the pink sheets. Chairman Hill. So they were public companies, and their stock is still available to purchase on the pink sheets. Is that a fair description? Mr. Bright. That is correct. Chairman Hill. Do they have capital standards set by the U.S. Treasury, by the Federal Government? Mr. Bright. Yes. There is a capital framework that has been in place since 2022. Chairman Hill. Would you say the two enterprises, based on your knowledge about their financial statements, are they undercapitalized against that, or overcapitalized? Mr. Bright. They are definitely--they are not at the requirements of the 2022 proposal by a couple hundred billion. Chairman Hill. By a couple hundred billion? Mr. Bright. About that, yes. Chairman Hill. About $200 billion undercapitalized. Is that maybe a consensus view. Mr. Bright. I think that--I do not want to---- Chairman Hill. So if they are $200 billion undercapitalize, and yet I read periodically on social media that someone thinks that they want to do an Initial Public Offering (IPO), even though you have already established that they are already public companies. What is the largest IPO that you can think of that has gone public in the world? Mr. Bright. Saudi Aramco. Chairman Hill. Saudi Aramco? About how much was that? Mr. Bright. $28 billion-ish. Chairman Hill. Yes. I would say somewhere around $30 billion. That is a big number, but it is not $200 billion. My point is that these are public enterprises. They are in conservatorship by the government for 18 years, that Dr. Michel noted. They are undercapitalized $190 billion. So, before anybody could consider maybe doing something and raising money from the public, are there not some other decisions that we have to take into account? Like would the Treasury Department not have to make a concrete decision about how much money they are still owed from the financial crisis, or not owed, in other words, have a negotiated settlement on that. Mr. Bright. Yes, that would definitely be very important to any prospective new investor in the equity share. Chairman Hill. And the Treasury's warrants, I think they expire in 2028, so there is a clock ticking on that. Is that also right? Mr. Bright. Yes, I believe so. There are probably some mechanisms around that, but, yes, you are right. Chairman Hill. Then the Congress needs to be involved. So, the Congress would have to outline what are the missions, oversight, corporate governance, compensation, rules of the road, that Congress also has a view on leaving the conservatorship. Do you agree that we should have a viewpoint on that? Mr. Bright. One hundred percent, yes. Chairman Hill. Okay. So that is part of the jeopardy today. So we are going to Dr. Michel now because he is a big game-show guy, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Michel, is a 50-year mortgage a good idea? Mr. Michel. I mean; I think that if people want to do that, fine, but---- Chairman Hill. Meaning, if the private sector wanted to offer it. I agree. That is right. Would it be easier to provide secondary market liquidity to that when it is brand-new, or would it have to reach a certain level for there to be appeal? Mr. Bright, do you want to answer that question? Mr. Bright. I am sorry, I---- Chairman Hill. The liquidity, if we did have a 50-year mortgage, how many billions of dollars would it have to exist before it could be packaged with liquidity in the secondary market? Mr. Bright. Hundreds. Lots and it is not TBA deliverable. Chairman Hill. If you wanted to have a portable mortgage, that would be really hard for an existing mortgage that has been sold in the secondary market, would it not? Mr. Bright. That would be a contract violation. Chairman Hill. Yes. So, anyway. It is good to think about important ways to bring down affordability, which is why the chairman and Mr. Cleaver worked so hard on 21st Century Housing because these are concrete ideas that would reduce the cost of housing. Dr. Michel, I will bounce back to you. The Federal Home Loan Banks, or GSE, and I agree with our friend that noted that we should pay close attention to them, there is no about that, and we have an obligation of oversight there. I do not agree that we should take from there low-income housing from 10 percent to 30 percent because I do not think of these organizations as housing agencies. They also are a liquidity to banks using mortgage loans as collateral. Is that right, Dr. Michel? Mr. Michel. That is right. Chairman Hill. So they provide liquidity to banks using one to four family mortgages as a collateral base, but they also do grant programs, is that right, for---- Mr. Michel. A much, much bigger mission in public purpose than it had originally. Chairman Hill. Yes. The housing piece, the low-income housing is incidental to that core piece. This is a great panel, and I think it is wonderful to get a new generation of Members of Congress focused on the government-sponsored enterprises and the complexity of it, and I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from California, Ranking Member Waters, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, before I ask a question, I have a parliamentary inquiry. Is it my understanding that Mr. Ed DeMarco, president of the housing policy council and former FHA director, was supposed to testify today, but no longer is. Since Director Pulte was not invited to testify, I was very much looking forward to hearing from Mr. DeMarco, someone who used to work at the FHA and may be able to give us some answers to our questions about what has been going on there. Mr. Chairman, do you know what happened to Mr. DeMarco. Mr. Flood. The committee will stand at ease pending conference with legal counsel. [Discussion off the record.] Mr. Flood. That request you made is not a valid parliamentary inquiry. Do you have a question about the process today? Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. Mr. Flood. I am sorry, your mic is not on. Sorry. Ms. Waters. I would like to go on with my question now. Mr. Flood. You may resume. Ms. Waters. Is that okay? Thank you. Mr. Flood. We will start your time now. Ms. Waters. I am going to direct this question to Dr. Cornelissen, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Director Pulte has been using his agency as a tool to attack Trump's political enemies while offering plenty of dumb policy proposals, like a 50-year mortgage that would only serve to trap Americans in forever loans. But the FHA has an important, maybe the most important role in our mortgage market. If he were here today, and I will note, again, that the Republicans have not shared any plans to invite him to testify, but if he were here, what are the top three things you would remind him that he and the government- sponsored enterprises would do to help make buying a home more affordable and accessible? Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your questions. I would remind him of the importance of the equitable housing finance plans that he retracted to make credit more broadly available. I would remind him of the importance of the affordable housing goals to truly reach the mission that Congress set for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to also serve the credit needs of low and moderate income families. And I would remind him of the actual fact that the FHFA can direct Fannie and Freddie to truly innovate products, and by innovating secondary mortgage products, make primary products more available, such as home-only loans for manufactured housing, or small dollar mortgages, for example. Ms. Waters. Let me continue. Last year Director Pulte launched a tip line for reporting mortgage fraud activity, then began investigating and referring to the Department of Justice many people who openly disagreed with Trump, and who Trump viewed basically as political enemies. This includes New York Attorney General Latitia James, Federal Reserve Board of Governor Lisa Cook, and more. Even the Government Accountability Office has opened an investigation into Pulte's actions. Several Trump cabinet officials, and apparently even Trump himself, reportedly may have committed mortgage fraud, and yet I do not think Pulte has referred any of these cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ), nor would the American public have any confidence that DOJ would do anything about it. This whole incident allows actually bad actors to go unpunished. No one should forget the widespread mortgage fraud committed by Wall Street that directly contributed to the financial crisis. What do you think about that? Ms. Cornelissen. I think it is inappropriate, and I think it undermines the independence of the regulator. Right. It sort of uses an independent regulator for political ends, so I think it is an inappropriate use of an independent regulator. Ms. Waters. Do you think it would be proper for you to make a request of this committee, the chairman--oh, he just left-- make an inquiry about perhaps forcing the appearance of him here? Ms. Cornelissen. I think that would be appropriate. Ms. Waters. Do you think it would be helpful to this committee? Ms. Cornelissen. I think it would be helpful for this committee, yes. Ms. Waters. Then I would like to impose on you a little bit. We will do our share about trying to get him here, but if you could help us make a request, I would appreciate it very much. Ms. Cornelissen. Will do. Thank you. Ms. Waters. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Rose, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman Flood and thank you, Ranking Member Cleaver, for holding this important hearing. Thanks to our witnesses for your time and being with us today to lend your expertise. In the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch were not innocent bystanders. They were central enablers. They repeatedly stamped complex mortgage-backed securities stuffed with risky loans with the highest possible ratings, helping to pump toxic products into every corner of the financial system, and paving the way for a collapse that devastated homeowners, retirees and taxpayers. Mr. Bright, given that the history of catastrophic failure, given that history of catastrophic failure, and apparent disregard for basic due diligence, why should Congress, or the American people, place any trust today in these same firms to accurately assess risk in the current market for mortgage- backed securities, rather than assuming that these firms will, once again, chase fees at the expense of honesty and prudence? Mr. Bright. Well, the market that buys these securities based on these has learned and evolved quite a bit, and I think that is important. I think that there have been some good reforms on the rating agencies, and on the entire market itself. Back to, if I can repeat sort of a principle that we have from the beginning is that I think the failure of the financial crisis is we had poorly underwritten loans, no-doc loans, low- doc loans, liar loans. Collateral was being underwritten based on the value of the underlying asset, not the borrower's ability to actually repay. I think we have moved a long way since that, so I think that is a very healthy evolution, and lesson learned from the financial crisis. Mr. Rose. I am skeptical. Mr. Michel, what concrete steps should Congress consider to break the dominance of Moody's S&P, and Fitch, firms that helped vaporize trillions in wealth, cost Americans their jobs, homes and savings, and yet walked away with virtually no real accountability, and to encourage new competitors in the credit risk rating business so investors are no longer captive to this closed ratings cartel? Mr. Michel. Well, I mean, you do not want to have regulations that mandate a special sort of designation, that is one thing, because that makes it harder for anybody else to come in and do a rating sort of arrangement but I think that the bigger issue is that you do not want a single or double government-backed entity in the first place. To be a little bit fair to those guys, for the most part, the mortgage-backed securities ratings that they gave actually are not that far off. Mr. Rose. Interesting. Okay. Mr. Bright, if China accelerates mortgage-backed security sales as retaliation for tariffs, or other policies, as some analysts warned, how could, or how would that interact with fed balance sheet runoff, or domestic liquidity shocks to amplify housing market stress? Mr. Bright. Well, if the Chinese central bank were to do something like that it would be--that would be a strategic decision that would be very poor economics for them. They have lots of dollar reserves from trade deficit that we have with them, and they have to invest those reserves in a way. So they would have to put it in something else. I think that would be pretty detrimental to them. It would also be detrimental to us. Mr. Rose. Dr. Michel, if China chose to dump a significant volume of U.S. mortgage-backed securities for geopolitical reasons, how worried would--or should we be that this kind of foreign policy-driven selling could deepen housing market stress for American families and small lenders? Mr. Michel. My flippant answer is that the Federal Reserve (Fed) would just buy it and my serious answer to go with that, though, is that I think that you--what you still end up with is a bunch of effectively treasury securities that are sitting out there, someone is going to buy them, in all seriousness. Mr. Rose. All right. Mr. Broeksmit, from MBA's perspective, what aspects of the current secondary market structure are most important to maintaining broad access to 30-year fixed rate fully amortized payable mortgages? Mr. Broeksmit. Congressman Rose, thanks, again, for your leadership on the Trigger Leads Bill, which is going into effect next month and will help consumers immediately. We think that a level playing field among all types of lenders in accessing the secondary market is a critical part of this. So whether you are a small bank, or a large independent mortgage banker, you should have the same terms available. The terms should be based on the credit of the loan, not on the volume of the loans sold to the GSEs. Mr. Rose. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Tlaib, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Tlaib. Thank you, Mr. Chair. In metro Detroit, the average home owned by one of my black neighbors is worth 45 percent less than an average home owned by one of my white neighbors. Black residence in my community have long complained that appraisers are undervaluing their homes. I am sure you all have heard or seen reports and studies. Under the last administration, FHFA began releasing public appraisal data for the first time, and would you not know it, the appraisal gap between black neighborhoods and white neighborhoods started closing significantly as soon as those reports were made public. However, shamefully this administration--under this administration the FHFA has stopped updating that public and has ended appraisal-bias work, which, again, under Secretary Fudge was a priority for her. Dr. Cornelissen, can you talk briefly about what impact appraisal gap has on households in the broader market, especially appraisal bias that we continue to see, not only in the blackest city in the country, Detroit, but really across the Nation. Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you so much. We have a long-standing racial homeownership gap in this country, and it still stands at 30 percent. Mechanisms, such as appraisal bias, just kind of worsened that homeownership gap, and the wealth gap. Specifically they undermine people's capacity to truly build wealth through homeownership as their assets get valued lower, but it also can make it more difficult for them to get a mortgage or refinance as their mortgage application may be rejected if their appraisal comes in too low. Ms. Tlaib. Another troubling change from FHFA is that they have reduced the number of mortgages Fannie and Freddie are expected to buy serving lower and moderate income families. This is a really big, big decision here. The new enterprise housing goals will mean that over the next 3 years, 177,000 lower, moderate income families will no longer receive mortgages that they otherwise would have gotten access to. So, Doctor, can you talk about the enterprise housing goals and how they support working families and what recent changes will mean? I think for the folks listening, my residents, what is this? Again, the terminologies used in DC. I feel like is intentional so that they will never fully understand how discriminatory the housing market is. Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your question. I feel the same, that there is too many acronyms, but the affordable housing goals, Congress put these in place to make sure that Fannie and Freddie, all the mortgages that they support, that a certain percentage of those mortgages go to underserved communities, and to low and moderate income home buyers, to make sure that they serve all markets. So Congress put this in place, but over the last year, as you said, we have seen the director significantly lower those goals. I just want to emphasize that these are not risky borrowers. These are everyday working families. These include firefighters, realtors, paramedics, all kinds of jobs that sort of fit in that bullet of 80 percent area median income (AMI) or less. Ms. Tlaib. Oh, I know, and it is interesting to see the rent costs go up. They are able to afford that rent, but if they got a mortgage they would actually be paying less than they would in rent in many parts of my neighborhoods. Finally, just last week FHFA announced, they keep making all these announcements, as you know, is ending the fair lending and fair housing enforcement for Fannie Mae. I do not think there are a lot of people talking about this. Again, fair housing enforcement is ending under Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks. This is the part of broader pattern by this administration, as we know, enabling discrimination. We have seen staffing cuts, disruptions in Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) office of fair housing and equal opportunity. I know for a fact they laid off all these civil rights--you know, these attorneys that basically investigate discrimination, they have them at home, getting paid on administrative leave doing nothing. Not enforcing. So the administration has also proposed reforming what they call Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, they keep bringing this up in committee, which would eliminate desperate impact liability. This is huge. Now the FHFA has announced it is repealing the fair lending, fair housing, equitable housing finance plans regulation. Dr. Cornelissen, what are the consequences for many of our residents in underserved communities across the country for FHFA to step back from ensuring compliance with our fair housing, fair lending laws, and specifically women? This is-- women are overwhelmingly getting discriminated against, black women, brown women, but women with children are continuing to, again, people looking the other way, not wanting to lend or rent their homes to. Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your question. I think it is a really important issue to raise, and I just want to start by level-setting that the Fair Housing Act and fair housing protects virtually every consumer, right. There are a lot of protected classes in there. So, it protects you against discrimination based on national origin, on race, whether you are a woman, whether you have kids, based on your disability status. By taking away these protections, they are making our fair and affordable housing crisis even worse, right. It may mean-- -- Mr. Flood. The gentlelady is no longer recognized. Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you. Mr. Flood. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Torres, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mortgage-backed securities represent the most liquid fixed income market in the world, second only to U.S. treasuries. The liquidity of the MBS market stems from confidence, and the confidence stems from the implicit government guarantee, and if there is an erosion of the implicit government guarantee, real or imagined, it could conceivably create a crisis of confidence in the MBS market. Is there a risk that the IPO of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac could compromise the liquidity of the second most liquid market in the world, Mr. Bright? Mr. Bright. Thank you, Congressman. One caveat: We keep using the IPO. I just listened to Fannie's earnings call today. So they do have shareholders and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration and all that stuff. So you are talking about a capital raised through the capital markets. It depends on so many things. I mean, I would advocate for broad, bipartisan congressional oversight of any change that is structural in that market to ensure that does not happen. Thus far, the market has not reacted negatively to these statements, and so I take that as a good sign. The administration is, obviously, very focused on interest rates, and so the market is taking that into account, but I cannot---- Mr. Torres. Can I interject? I think that the starting point should be do no harm. Mr. Bright. Sure. Yes, fair enough. Mr. Torres. So what is the problem that we are attempting to solve here? Like, is this a solution in search of a problem? Mr. Bright. I look forward to seeing the comprehensive proposal. Mr. Torres. Mr. Broeksmit? Mr. Broeksmit. I think that if there were some sort of capital raise and the GSEs remained under a conservatorship, which is a construct we have heard, then I do not think there is much potential damage to the market. I think if there were an exit from conservatorship---- Mr. Torres. A combination of the two. Mr. Broeksmit. Well, or separately. I think they are, frankly, probably on a separate track but an ill-thought-out exit is where the concerns you raise would really come to the floor. Mr. Bright. Could I--or a major change to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) because that is really the undergirding of the market's confidence is that they are not taking on credit risk. Mr. Torres. The U.S. has a $15 trillion mortgage market. The GSEs backstopped the majority of it. If the GSEs are backstopping the majority of the $15 trillion market, does it not stand to reason that the GSE should be designated as systemically important financial institutions, Mr. Bright? Mr. Bright. I told you when we met I love the question. It is an idea that I think has a lot of merit. I would pose it to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). I think they probably fit the Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) bill. People have different opinions about the value of the SIFI tag, but it is not a bad thing to look into. Mr. Torres. It is fair to say if those institutions were to fail, would it create a systemic crisis? Mr. Bright. That is very fair to say. Mr. Torres. Thus making it a systemically important institution, regardless of how we designate it? Mr. Bright. Yes, sir. Mr. Torres. The FHFA directed the GSEs to make a $200 billion purchase of mortgage-backed securities. I feel like if it walks like a duck and sounds like a duck and looks like a duck, it is probably a duck. It is fair to say that a $200 billion purchase of MBS looks a lot like a kind of shadow quantitative easing. Is that a fair assessment? Mr. Bright. In some ways, yes, I see what you are saying because the stated purpose of it was to lower interest rates. They had been buying about 10 to $20 billion a month, and the market has been watching that to pull forward the $200 billion with the stated goal of lowering rates, quantitative easing (QE) had similar objectives, yes. Mr. Torres. Although, in the case of the Fed, QE is typically a response to a crisis. Here we have a $200 billion purchase in the absence---- Mr. Bright. The Fed did it because it was concerned about deflation and attempting to stop a deflationary---- Mr. Torres. Coronavirus disease (COVID), the great financial crisis. Should there be a statutory cap on the amount of de facto quantitative easing that could be undertaken by the FHFA, or is there a cap? Mr. Broeksmit. Yes, there is cap: $225 billion per GSE and the directive from the administration was simply to get much closer to the cap. They were nowhere near it. Mr. Torres. I think you said earlier that bad loans make bad securities. It is like garbage in, garbage out, right, garbage loans. So how would you assess the strength of lending standards since the financial crisis in 2008? Mr. Bright. Definitely much stronger. I think to the extent that any of our members have any concern, we are not calling for a recession. We do not think that is necessarily---- Mr. Torres. You are not calling for a recession? Mr. Bright. I do not think that is likely in the short- term, but I think there is some fraying---- Mr. Torres. I am against a recession, too. Mr. Bright. I am not advocating for a recession. So I am using predictive speech. There is some fraying in subprime sectors of the economy worth watching. Mr. Torres. My time has receded. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Garcia. Well, I am not advocating for a recession either, just for the record but thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all the witnesses for being here this afternoon. Across the country, working families are struggling to keep up with rising housing costs. Between the labor shortage impacted by Trump's immigration crackdown and tariffs that extraordinarily have raised the material cost of building their home has become much more expensive. Builders are scaling back. I see that myself in Houston every time I go home and every time the housing supply shrinks, families end up paying the price with higher rents and higher mortgages. Rather than address the issue that housing finance systems saw unprecedented change, including mass firings and staffing changes, one of these changes was the Federal Housing Finance Agency's rescission of its advisory bulletin on climate-related risk management. The bulletin required government-sponsored enterprises to integrate climate-related risk management framework into its existing risk management program. Dr. Cornelissen, how does climate risk intersect with secondary mortgage markets? Ms. Cornelissen. It very closely intersects. You know, natural disasters are becoming more common, and this is impacting the quality of our housing stock. We have seen a lot of housing stock destroyed in natural disasters, but it is also impacting systemic risk more broadly. If there is a very large disaster, this can bring down home prices and create more risk on the books of the enterprises. Ms. Garcia. Well, we know that climate risk is a significant threat to us in Texas in the secondary mortgage market as rising insurance premiums, driven by hurricane and flood risks, increase mortgage delinquencies, especially for us in Houston. I think we have seen seven major disasters in the last 8 years. I mean, you all see it on the news. That photo that always comes to mind or that image of people on boats going home to home because that is how much water we had, that was in my district, so I am very, very, very cognizant of it. So Doctor, a study done last year by the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank found the delinquency effects are present in both GSE and non-GSE mortgages, implying risk for both the Federal Government and the private sector. Do you believe that climate risk, coupled with soaring reinsurance costs, are ultimately eroding housing stability, particularly for low-income buyers? Ms. Cornelissen. Absolutely. We are seeing growing pressure. I mean, our housing crisis is not just about the cost of a mortgage but also other costs, such as the price of home insurance. So for a lot of lower income homeowners and homebuyers, this is putting a lot of extra pressure on their pocketbooks every month, yes, for sure. Ms. Garcia. So it is a double whammy. Ms. Cornelissen. It is a double whammy, yes, absolutely. Ms. Garcia. It is a double whammy. So as insurance insurers continue to pull out or increased premiums due to climate events, lenders are more likely to pass on risk for properties with high environmental risk, decreasing property values, and ultimately undermining the stability of the secondary mortgage market. Mr. Bright, you wrote in HousingWire in 2022 about the impact that environmental metrics could have on residential mortgage-backed securities. In your opinion, does the mortgage- backed securities market adequately price risks related to insurance costs, especially in States like mine in Texas, Florida, and California, that are impacted the most? Mr. Bright. The end MBS investors, as fiduciaries to their clients, have to take into account all risks, including climate risk and the cost that could impose on loss of property, delinquencies, et cetera. So the large investors, insurance companies, and asset managers who invest in these bonds very much look at that. Ms. Garcia. I know I focused on climate risk today, but there is so much more to discuss, including the role of GSE's market stability and recent policy shifts at the Federal Housing Finance Agency. I hope we can keep up the momentum from this week and continue the important discussion, Mr. Chair, because when we talk about affordability, for many of the people in my district, it is more than just the groceries. It is more than just the gas. It is also utilities. It is also rent. It is the high insurance premiums. It is their mortgage. It is all of the above. Unlike the person in the White House who thinks affordability is a hoax, my district knows it is real. They encounter it every single day. Thank you and thank you to all the witnesses, and I yield back the final 10 seconds of my time. Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Fitzgerald, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Chairman. The secondary mortgage market depends on broad investor confidence that mortgage credit risk is being priced, managed, and distributed responsibly. In the coming weeks, I plan--and I am sure the chairman is aware. We are going to be introducing legislation that would end the conservatorship of Fannie May, Freddie Mac, by codifying many of the reforms that have been accomplished in the past few years. In particular, encouraging more credit risk transfers. Mr. Bright, thanks for being here today. From your perspective, would you agree that with the cap on their investment portfolios, increased capital standards, and the introduction of the credit risk transfers, Freddie and Fannie have become far less risky than prior to the financial crisis and then how can we encourage more credit risk transfers (CRT) further--how could we have that CRT further remove taxpayers risk and better utilize private capital? Mr. Bright. So the answer to your first question, undoubtedly, they are less risky, much lower leverage, much stronger underwriting standards, much more oversight, and, as you point out, the use of CRT as an insurance vehicle to protect against pre-defined losses. How can we encourage more? You mentioned codifying reforms in legislation. I think there are a lot of reforms that have been done administratively that could use codification in legislation and encouragement of them to continue to leverage that as a form of loss protection. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Let me ask you another question. Mr. Bright, one aspect of Fannie and Freddie that has not been addressed is the alarming increase in the conforming loan limits, which allows them to purchase mortgages over $1 million in high cost areas. So what we are trying to do with the bill is tie increases in the loan limits to median income rather than the home price appreciation index, right. I know I am getting into the weeds here but that would, in effect probably put the rates in a different path, and they would increase slower. Can you talk about how this change would bring in probably more capital, more private capital to the mortgage market, as well as the benefits of that, I guess? Mr. Bright. There is quite a bit of private capital on the sideline looking to get into the mortgage market. The PLS market is functioning well, and there is more capital to be deployed there. One regulatory change that I would hope you all would encourage would be the SEC to continue looking at amendments to the Reg AB framework, which has been in place since 2013 and has really limited the ability to have a public issuance market for mortgage-backed securities that are not backed by the taxpayer. My understanding is the SEC is looking into it. I would encourage you to do that as well. Being mindful of time, there is a chart that I think speaks volumes, and it is a graph of home prices and a graph of loan limits and then a graph of income over the last 15 years, and you can see these lines. Home prices and loan limits go up together. Incomes do not. That gap is a problem and is probably contributing to the affordability challenge. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you. Mr. Broeksmit, one core part of the bill that I am working on would establish a utility model framework for Fannie and Freddie. Can you discuss how a utility kind of model, potentially using a return on equity band, could discourage Fannie and Freddie from expanding beyond their, I guess, what you would call their core mission? Mr. Broeksmit. Sure. We think that a model for a post- conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, where their returns are targeted to a range of return on equity would make sense. We want it to be set enough so that there will be interest in people buying their stock and having them be well- run companies but with a cap so that they do not stray away from their chartered mission and get into the primary mortgage market, for instance. Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes. I mean, we are kind of in--that would be uncharted territory, so we are assuming, but you are confident that is what the impact would be. Would you say that? Mr. Broeksmit. Well, we think that Congress' involvement in any ultimate release would put guardrails in terms of what activities they could pursue, which would complement the utility model. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you. I yield back, Chairman. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Colorado, Ms. Pettersen, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It must be fun to run the committee. I miss those days. I welcome everyone. Thanks so much for being here. We know that the skyrocketing housing costs are really fundamentally about the housing supply. We have to build more housing but you all place such a critical role and perspective in making sure that we have a well-functioning secondary mortgage market to ensure that lenders can make loans more affordable. So, I want to first start out with the industry perspective and hear from Mr. Bright and Broeksmit. The secondary market is critical to facilitating homeownership and the stability of our financial system, and I think it is important that any major efforts here should involve Congress and be bipartisan so that they are durable. Do you agree that GSE reform, significant policy changes to the secondary market, or any attempt at releasing Fannie and Freddie from conservatorship should be done in a bipartisan way, working with Congress so we can have a system that is resilient to economic and political conditions? We can start with you, Mr. Bright. Mr. Bright. Yes. I think congressional bipartisan involvement in this issue is critically important. Ms. Pettersen. All right. Can I hear from you, Mr. Broeksmit? Mr. Broeksmit. Yes. Ms. Pettersen. Hey, wow! That was concise. All right. Let us shift to the consumer perspective, and I want to thank Sharon Cornelissen--and I am so sorry. We are all butchering it. We are trying, though. Trump and the FHFA director have pushed several concerning ideas regarding the secondary market, and we have heard a lot about the 50-year mortgage. I am deeply concerned that something like this that might sound good on its face would actually lead people further into debt, and homeowners will not be able to build equity in these products. Would you like to expand further on how this would negatively impact consumers? Ms. Cornelissen. Yes, absolutely. I mean, if you sign up for a 50-year mortgage, your monthly payments may be a little lower. So it may be $50 a month lower, but even in just 10 years of loan, you end up paying $50,000 more, or more in interest payments, right. So it really undermines people's ability to build wealth through homeownership. I also want to point out that the average first-time homebuyer today is 40 years old. So if you sign for a 50-year mortgage, you may still be paying mortgage payments well into your retirement. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you for that. Do you have anything else that you would like to expand on, on what some real solutions are? Ms. Cornelissen. Yes. I mean, I have mentioned this before, but I think really thinking about the actual capacity of Fannie and Freddie to lead the market, they have a lot of capacity to really set standards for the U.S. mortgage market and come up with products that make mortgage finance more broadly available. So, I think a way to really expend shared equity financing, for example, for a nonprofit shared equity product could be a great idea. Helping CDFIs do more mortgage lending and get better access to the secondary market for what are usually kind of unusual products, right. They do not really need the sort of typical Fannie and Freddie loan but helping them get better access to the secondary market. Finally, I mentioned before, but I think there is a lot of bipartisan support here, too, for thinking about ways to expend financing for manufactured housing through a mortgage to help consumers access that housing stock as well. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you for adding to that. Quickly, we are running out of time, but, Mr. Bright, what are some of the top three suggestions for ways that the GSEs can better support access and affordability? Mr. Bright. Fannie has this home ready program I think it is called. It is kind of an interesting program. I would look at that. It involves I think a $2,500 rebate to first-time homebuyers and allows for a very low downpayment. I do not know off the top of my head the uptake on that program, but you already have sort of something that is right there to use. When it comes to affordability, one thing I think is always important to remember--and you know this because you said it-- the secondary market and the interest rates can only affect the demand side really and make it a little bit easier to borrow. It is the supply that I think really needs the most amount of focus, and I think rehabilitation of old homes, building on vacant land, conversion of office buildings as rentals and manufactured housing as well, these are all I think a holistic approach that can help address that. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you so much for that. Maybe we do not have time for a response, but I do not think that tariffs and deporting our workforce is also going to help with rising costs, but thank you all for being here. I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back. The gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today. We have discussed at length today how the GSEs and the secondary mortgage market serve to provide substantial liquidity in the mortgage market and really make it possible for small and midsize lenders to originate mortgages. Yes, it is fair to say that homeownership, which epitomizes the American dream for many, has never been further out of reach. Today, the GSE securitized roughly 40 percent of new mortgage originations and own or guarantee nearly 70 percent in outstanding agency mortgage-backed securities. As a conservative, I prefer as little involvement in the Federal Government in the market as possible, and Congress created these GSEs. I am going to start my questioning with Dr. Michel. It is a two-part question. Is more competition needed in the secondary mortgage market? If so, what can Congress do to lessen the Federal Government's involvement to drive down the cost of lending and borrowing. Mr. Michel. Yes. Revoke the charters. Mr. Downing. Thank you very much. I am going to move on to Mr. Bright. Do you believe the secondary mortgage market is functioning as efficiently as it should be? Mr. Bright. I think it is functioning pretty well. Yes, I do. Mr. Downing. Well, thank you. Is there anything the commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS market, something I have a little bit of experience with, that we should explore for the residential mortgage-backed security space? You know, there are all of these ideas like B-piece buyers for the higher risk tranches, yield maintenance to fees. Is there anything we should be exploring on the CMBS side that would apply here? Mr. Bright. Yes. That is a really interesting question because in the CMBS market, there is risk sharing that is already built in, which is what the PLS market does. If we can get Reg AB changes, then that market can really step in. Mr. Downing. Why do you think other countries have not adopted the GSE model of the United States? Mr. Bright. I mean, homeownership is literally uniquely American as an aspiration. Europeans are a little bit more comfortable, obviously, with renting culturally. There is a covered bond market in Europe that is very heavy. They rely on that. I will point out that the EU is undertaking some very aggressive reforms right now to attempt to jump start their securitization market because they realize that relying solely on giant banks with putting just loans on their balance sheet is not enough to achieve the growth that they want. So they are voting in June on a package of really substantial regulatory reforms to try and jump start their securitization market as well in all asset clauses. Mr. Downing. Thank you. I am going to move back to Dr. Michel. Do you see the U.S. needing the GSEs indefinitely? Mr. Michel. I am sorry. Do I see them---- Mr. Downing. Needing. Do you see the United States needing the GSEs indefinitely? Mr. Michel. No. I mean, I do not think that they needed them in the first place, though. Mr. Downing. So if these disappeared tomorrow, what effect would that have on homeownership? Mr. Michel. In an abrupt fashion like that, that is probably not ideal. However, you have a really hard time to making a logical case that they are necessary. Mr. Downing. Thank you. Mr. Michel. Other people would invest. That is what I am trying to say. Mr. Downing. I appreciate your answer. We have discussed how the GSE's failing to stay within their congressional boundaries contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. How do you think 2008 would have played out differently if the GSEs did not exist? Mr. Michel. Well, I mean, there is a very large percentage, and I do not have the numbers in front of me, but a large chunk of even the private labor market where we know they were buying, they were securitizing with the specific intent of selling some of that stuff to the GSEs. So the whole problem is this is more leverage, right, and that is what you get. If you have more Federal backing, more government backing to cover losses, you are going to get more leverage than you would have otherwise. So you would have had less leverage and less risk. Mr. Downing. Well, thank you for that. I am going to move to Mr. Broeksmit. You know, one reason for the failure of the GSEs in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis was the irresponsible political pressure of trying to put as many people in the home as possible. So in your opinion, what should Congress be considering as we work on housing affordability legislation to ensure we are responsibly increasing homeownership? Mr. Broeksmit. Well, I think there are some immediate steps that could be taken right now in terms of lowering the loan level price adjustments at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that would give lower rates to borrowers tomorrow. I think the mortgage insurance premium at FHA would also do the same thing and lower costs tomorrow and modernizing the credit report requirements would save hundreds of dollars per loan. So I think those are some short-term tangible actions that we could take. Mr. Downing. Right. Well, I thank the panelists again. On that, Mr. Chair, I yield my time. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Flood and Ranking Member Cleaver for holding this very important hearing today because I am hearing about homeownership and the affordability crisis every single day in my district. I represent Georgia's Fifth Congressional District centered in Atlanta where mortgage borrowers know that homes are only getting more expensive, and homeownership less attainable. Yesterday, had I had the opportunity to ask witnesses, I would have asked about the Trump Administration's plan to have Fannie and Freddie sell off stock and unwind the conservatorship relationship, which has protected our housing market since the crash of 2008. I did not get that opportunity so let us have that conversation today to better understand how deregulation of the government-sponsored enterprises will impact the secondary mortgage market and, most importantly, folks trying to buy a home. Dr. Cornelissen, if the GSEs lose their implicit guarantee, how do you anticipate this would impact the secondary mortgage market? Ms. Cornelissen. Well, if they lose their guarantee, investors will demand higher returns on MBS because they perceive more risk. That would drive up mortgage rates and make homeownership even more out of reach for people. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Even more out of reach, which is wild to me when this is not just my district that is facing this crisis, it is across the country. So we should all be concerned about this. Dr. Cornelissen, how does the current secondary mortgage market and the relationship between community banks and GSEs impact housing affordability and consumer protection? Ms. Cornelissen. I mean, at this point all lenders sort of have equal pricing when they want to try to--when they are trying to sell their mortgages to the GSEs, and it is something that MBA has really emphasized as something that needs to be protected in the future, too, for any kind of future plan for the GSEs. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you. To follow up on that, finally, as we see movements toward GSE reform coming from the White House, how should Congress contemplate ingraining protections for borrowers into any change in the relationship between our government and the GSEs? Ms. Cornelissen. I think it is very important that as Congress gets involved, they are thinking about ways to really make sure that FHFA is this sort of well-staffed, independent regulator that we need in order to make sure that the GSEs stay safe and mission focused. So I would urge Congress to definitely focus on FHFA. I also want to mention the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), right. We are talking about the secondary mortgage market, but, ultimately, this is premised on the safety of the primary mortgage markets. So we also need a safe and strong regulator to make sure mortgages are safe. So we need the CFPB as well. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Safe, strong, independent regulator that is actually advocating on behalf of the American people. Because, as I have stated, this is not just an issue in my district in Atlanta back home in Georgia. This is an issue that is nationwide. Our homes are one of the most expensive things that we will ever invest in, in our lifetime: Most people, the most expensive thing that we will invest in. In my district where I work daily to close the racial wealth gap, this is something that is extremely important to me. Thank you to our witnesses today, and I look forward to working with you as we continue to lower the cost of homeownership and make it more attainable for more Americans. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Timmons, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for being with us today. Today's hearing give us an important opportunity to examine the structure and function of the secondary mortgage market and why it has been such a critical part of expanding access to mortgage credit for American families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in that system, and when they operate within clear guardrails, they help sustain a stable and effective housing market. History also reminds us that when the GSEs grow too large or assume excessive risk, taxpayers in the broader financial system can be exposed. Striking the right balance remains a key consideration for policymakers as we look at them. One of the most significant structural changes to the GSE model since 2008 has been credit risk transfer. Before turning to outcomes, it is important to understand what credit risk transfer is and how it functions and how much risk it actually shifts away from the GSEs. Mr. Bright, for members who may not work day-to-day in the mechanics of housing finance, could you explain what credit risk transfer is, when it emerged, and the problem it was intended to address in the aftermath of the financial crisis? Mr. Bright. Yes, thank you. CRT--I am not sure of the exact year, but this is post conservatorship. I want to say maybe 2011. The FHFA director at the time began looking for other ways to safely protect Fannie and Freddie from delinquencies. So credit risk transfer is essentially a security that you sell that has a predetermined definition of when it would pay out. So, for example, you sell a bond. Fannie would sell a bond to a credit investor. They would put money in a pot that Fannie has access. Borrowers in an underlying reference pool go 120 days delinquent. Fannie at that point has to buy the loan out of the mortgage-backed security, put it on its own balance sheet, exposing it to risk but in the CRT transaction, it also can dip into that cash as lost protection for itself. So I think it is a very important part of a series of ways of protecting yourself. It is sort of like--the metaphor I use is--saying do not use CRT, only have equity capital, would kind of be like saying do not buy fire insurance on your house. Just have the value of your house sitting--that much cash sitting in a savings account. Sure, that sounds really nice, but that is really expensive, and you cannot really do it. So you need both. You need money saved in an account, and you need insurance against pre-defined risk. Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. These programs were designed to strengthen the secondary mortgage mark, reduce the GSE's footprint, and promote long- term stability. Recently, however, some observers, including former Freddie Mac CEO Don Layton, have raised concern that the use of CRTs has declined, potentially increasing risk at the GSEs. Mr. Bright, again, drawing on your experience across the industry, do you believe CRT remains an important tool for protecting taxpayers and maintaining a stable secondary mortgage market and are we doing enough to ensure these programs remain efficient and consistent over time? Mr. Bright. I think CRT is an important tool, and I know that Mr. Layton has a lot of personal pride in their development. He is a friend of mine, so I am sure his writing was very good but yes, I think they are an important tool. Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. Finally, I want to ask about GSE cash window. It was originally designed as a safety valve to ensure that community lenders who do not have the scale or resources to access complex securitization markets could still sell loans and continue serving their borrowers. While that role remains important, there are growing concerns that the cash window is being used more broadly than originally intended. Heavy reliance on it can allow lenders to sidestep the pricing discipline and quality checks that exist in the private market. Because individual loans are combined into large pools, weaker underwriting can be harder to identify, and incentives for careful risk management are reduced. This reliance can also leave lenders vulnerable when policies change. For example, the FHFA 2021 volume caps showed how quickly access to the cash window can be limited, cutting off a primary source of liquidity for lenders that have not developed alternative market channels. At the same time, this approach can concentrate more risk on the GSEs' balance sheets and, ultimately, on taxpayers. Mr. Broeksmit, do you believe the GSE cash window has drifted away from its original mission of supporting small lenders and are there steps policymakers or regulators should consider to ensuring it remains a true backstop rather than a primary outlet for risk? Mr. Broeksmit. We think the cash window is a critical part of the way that lenders interact with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac so that they could sell loans one by one rather than securitizing them. We also think there is more Fannie and Freddie need to do to show you and the Congress that there is a level playing field between the cash window and their MBS purchases. Their annual reports to Congress on the G-fees, for instance, need to go into more detail on this to prevent just the kinds of things you cited. Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Oregon, Ms. Bynum, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Bynum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses this afternoon for joining our committee today. It is no secret that homeownership is out of reach for far too many Americans, and I am glad to have the opportunity today to talk about how we can fix that. Part of the problem is mortgages just are not affordable or accessible. Now, as this administration considers whether to release Fannie and Freddie from government control and prepares to potentially pursue public offerings for their shares, the entire mortgage system is at a critical inflexion point. I believe this could have a major impact on the housing market and wider economy, but my question actually is pretty simple: Where should all that money go? Should the administration proceed with this, this would be one of the largest stock offerings in history, raising as much as $30 billion for the Federal Government. If we use this money to plug holes in the Federal budget or give more tax breaks to billionaires, I think we will be making a major mistake. I do not believe we can afford to liquidate our housing finance system while failing to address the shortage of 4 million homes. That keeps homeownership out of reach for Americans all over the country. In my view, this is pretty easy. The money should not deepen inequalities in our country. Instead, it should go to the States where housing development is most urgently needed, and in my home State of Oregon, it is estimated that we need to build 140,000 new homes in the next 4 years just to keep pace with demand. Never mind lowering the cost of housing. I believe we should use these funds to build more affordable housing of all types to get the housing supply where it needs to be. That includes investing in infrastructure like transportation, and clean drinking water, which enables more new builds. The money should also fund demand-side solutions, like offering downpayment assistance to first-time homebuyers, and I think this would make significant progress toward increasing housing affordability in both the short and long- term. Now, I will pause here for just a second just to share--I always share a family story. I have four kids: 24, 21, 17, and 15. After receiving a frantic call from my mother this weekend, she says: ``You all need to fix the tax policy in this country because I have property, and I need to unload it. You all are angry at my generation for not unloading it, but I have to pay for my retirement. I have to pay for my long-term care, and you all are forcing us to keep it.'' Okay. Thanks, mom. So I talked with my husband, and we rekindled the conversation about our estate planning and so every Sunday night, we have a family meeting. So I am preparing the older kids who are away, hey we are going to talk about our estate planning and when I talked with my oldest daughter, the 24- year-old, the first question out of her mouth was: Okay, we are talking about estate planning. Do I get the house? That was the first question. The young people are acutely aware of how out of reach this feels, and I think that is what we are talking about today. My question is--I want to ask Dr. Cornelissen--did I get it right? Ms. Cornelissen. Yes. Ms. Bynum. With the profits that would come from this public offering that were generated by American homeowners paying their mortgages, would it make sense to keep housing dollars in the housing sector rather than paying for, say, tax cuts for the wealthy or letting them go to the Treasury's general fund? Ms. Cornelissen. I think that totally makes sense. This money came from housing, and it should stay in housing. I also think you raised a really important point, that if we want to build 4 million homes over a short--you know, over the next 5 years, we need investments. We need real money to kind of prompt the housing industry into action and to build homes, not just any homes but homes that are affordable for families, too. So I think that is a great idea. Ms. Bynum. Thanks. Mr. Bright, so what do you make of this idea? If the administration is willing to buy up 200 billion in mortgage- backed bonds to bring down mortgage rates, maybe we could be leveraging revenue from a potential public offering to offer as one solution to addressing our Nation's housing crisis? I have 20 seconds left. Mr. Bright. I love the idea of finding revenue to address the housing crisis, absolutely. One caveat: I do not know how that cap really scores because Treasury is selling an ownership stake that comes with warrants with it. So I do not know that it scores as 30 billion as revenue. I just flag that. Ms. Bynum. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back. Now the gentleman from California, Mr. Liccardo, who is also going to be honored by Habitat for Humanity for his work in housing tonight, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Liccardo. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations as well on your award and thank you. I just wanted to note that Congresswoman Bynum's mom also called my office as well. She is a very effective lobbyist, but she is tough. Mr. Broeksmit, I appreciate that your members are deeply engaged in our battle to try to make housing more affordable for homebuyers. I know that there is also an opportunity for us, as we think about expanding housing supply, which I know is at the core of all this, of enabling and empowering homeowners to become home providers. In cities like Vancouver, we see as many as a third of the single family parcels have an ADU, and accessory dwelling unit backyard home, and I saw that opportunity when I was mayor of San Jose, to try to see how we could incentivize folks to build ADUs of their own, working with a private sector, of pre- fabricated modular units that were more affordable. So, we streamlined our permitting and enabled folks to get a permit in a day online, and we were very proud of ourselves as we watched the number of permits a year go from about 15 to more than 800 in just a couple of years. Suddenly, we were seeing that this was a significant source of new housing. As we were patting ourselves on the back for this great success, then we went back and looked at whether or not we were actually getting housing after these permits were getting issued, and anecdotally, about half the homeowners I talked to said, we cannot build because we cannot get financing. Certainly, we have seen studies, for example, Terner Institute, where it indicates that roughly two-thirds of the ADUs that are getting built are really getting built or financed with liquid assets and we know for most homeowners that is just not attainable. So, as we think about those many moderate income homeowners with, perhaps, not nearly enough equity to be able to finance the construction of a backyard home, we are mindful, as we reached out to a lot of lenders, that there are a lot of challenges for lenders and lending in this space--we will go into all of those now--but we certainly heard from many of your members that they had real challenges, and the fact that there is no FHA backing for a second mortgage of this type is particularly challenging. It appears that Fannie and Freddie are largely engaged only in allowing lending for acquisition of a home with an ADU, not for new construction. And so I wanted to ask you about whether you believe there is an opportunity here, if we can get Fannie and Freddie into the game, FHA, to actually empower more homeowners to become home providers to get the financing they need to build ADUs and, perhaps, help them pay their mortgage over the long run? Mr. Bright. I think that more accessory dwelling units are good, and I think there should be ways to finance the construction. I know FHA has made it easier to use the rental income you get from an ADU to qualify for a loan, and we are open to all good ideas on this subject. I know that our people are in touch with you and your people on this topic. Mr. Liccardo. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your partnership. We agree that it is a good thing that they are starting to consider the rental income, but, of course, what we are seeing, for example, in the case of Freddie is you actually have to show proof on an executed lease, which means that it is already built and there is somebody in it. So I appreciate very much we have at least a direction here. I know there has been some concern about whether or not FHA would be healthy enough to be able to backstop this kind of lending with insurance, but I think you note in your written comments, I think on page 13, that the mutual mortgage insurance fund, the reserve ratio is now 11\1/2\ percent, which I think is, roughly, six times the statutory minimum. Is that right? Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you for reading my written testimony. Yes. Mr. Liccardo. Well, I will not go into how exactly I learned that. There are smarter people than me around me. So I like to think as you look at the landscape, we have healthy enough institutions to be able to expand this opportunity. Is that fair to say? Mr. Broeksmit. To expand, I am sorry, what? Mr. Liccardo. Expand this opportunity; that is, to help more homeowners. Mr. Broeksmit. Absolutely, yes. Mr. Liccardo. Well, I appreciate that very much, and I appreciate your organization's partnership with us. I introduced a bill, of course, with my colleague, Andrew Gabarino of New York, a bipartisan bill called the Supporting Upgraded Property Projects and Lending for Yards (SUPPLY) Act, and I look forward to working together and seeing if we can get this over the goal line. Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you. Mr. Liccardo. Thank you. Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. I would like to thank all of our witnesses for your testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than March 18, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]