HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET

House February 11, 2026

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET

[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE 
 SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 FEBRUARY 11, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-59

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 www.govinfo.gov
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-966 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
 
 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
 Chairman Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois
 Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
TIM MOORE, North Carolina

 Ben Johnson, Staff Director

 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE

 MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska, Chairman

MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas, Vice EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri, Ranking 
 Chairwoman Member
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
 Carolina AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina RITCHIE TORRES, New York
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
TROY DOWNING, Montana
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, February 11, 2026
 OPENING STATEMENTS

 Page
Hon. Mike Flood, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and 
 Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Nebraska................. 1
Hon. Emanuel Cleaver, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 
 Housing and Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Missouri..... 3

 STATEMENTS

Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial 
 Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 4
Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial 
 Services, a U.S. Representative from California................ 4

 WITNESSES

Mr. Michael Bright, CEO, Structured Finance Association (SFA).... 5
 Prepared statement........................................... 7
Mr. Robert Broeksmit, President and CEO, Mortgage Bankers 
 Association (MBA).............................................. 14
 Prepared statement........................................... 16
Dr. Norbert Michel, Vice President and Director, Center for 
 Monetary and Financial Alternatives, Cato Institute............ 31
 Prepared statement........................................... 33
Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, Director of Housing, Consumer Federation 
 of America (CFA)............................................... 48
 Prepared statement........................................... 50

 APPENDIX

 MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Hon. Mike Flood:
 David Spector entitled, ``A Blueprint for Making Housing More 
 Affordable.''.............................................. 102
American Bankers Association Statement 105
Council of Federal Home Loan Banks and with the support of the 11 
 Federal HomeLoan Banks (FHLBanks) Statement 109

 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Written responses to questions for the record from Representative 
 Andrew R. Garbarino:
 Mr. Robert Broeksmit......................................... 111

 
 HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, February 11, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance,
 Committee on Financial Services
 Washington, DC.

 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Flood 
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Flood, Rose, Timmons, Fitzgerald, 
De La Cruz, Downing, Hill, Cleaver, Tlaib, Torres, Garcia, 
Williams of Georgia, Pettersen, Liccardo, and Waters.
 Mr. Flood. The Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance will 
come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to 
declare a recess of the committee at any time.
 This hearing is titled ``Homeownership and the Role of the 
Secondary Mortgage Market.''
 Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days 
within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for 
inclusion in the record.
 I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening 
statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE FLOOD, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE 
 FROM NEBRASKA

 I would like to thank our witnesses for being with us 
today, and I very much look forward to an interesting 
discussion of our secondary mortgage market, and the 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 When witnesses refer to the secondary mortgage market 
during this hearing, please note that they are not referring to 
direct mortgage lending. In the case of the conforming market, 
or the market that runs through Freddie and Fannie, they are 
referring to a chain of interactions between separate actors.
 Number one, the lender who sells a loan they originated 
Freddie Mac, or Fannie Mae.
 Number two, the securitization of that loan into a 
mortgage-backed security and number three, the investors who 
purchase those mortgage-backed securities.
 The private label securitization market works in a similar 
manner, but with fully private entities working to securitize 
the mortgage products instead of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
 The secondary mortgage market works to provide greater 
liquidity for lenders, and results in greater access to 
mortgage lending for borrowers. In today's banking regulatory 
climate, holding a mortgage on a bank's balance sheet can 
result in significant capital costs. If, instead, the lender 
sells the mortgage they originate on the secondary market, 
their balance sheet is comparatively free to originate new 
loans. This creates an incentive for originators to utilize the 
secondary mortgage market, rather than hold those loans on 
their own books.
 Next, I would like to touch on the origin of the 
enterprises. Fannie Mae was established back in 1938 under the 
National Housing Act to provide liquidity in the mortgage 
market. In 1954, Congress passed the Federal National Mortgage 
Association Charter Act, which converted Fannie Mae into a 
public-private mixed ownership corporation. Then in 1968, 
Fannie Mae became entirely privately owned.
 Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 as a private 
company to create competition with Fannie Mae.
 Around the same time, Ginnie Mae issued the first modern 
mortgage-backed securities, or MBS. Mortgage-backed securities 
grew in popularity in the 1980s and became a major tool for 
both Fannie and Freddie to provide liquidity in the conforming 
mortgage market.
 Before the financial crisis in 2008, Fannie and Freddie 
were private entities. However, when mortgage delinquencies 
rose sharply in late 2007, the government-sponsored 
enterprise's (GSE's) large, retained mortgage portfolios 
exposed them to significant losses in the collapsing housing 
market. Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008, which created today's Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), and provided the government with the authority to 
provide further support to the enterprises.
 Later that same year as the enterprises eroded further, 
treasury committed up to $100 billion per GSE in exchange for 
senior preferred stock, warrants for 79.9 percent of the 
company's common equity, and a dividend. This intervention 
effectively ended both Fannie and Freddie's status as fully 
private companies. They now were both entered into what is 
called a conservatorship.
 Their board and CEOs were removed, and the government had 
the ability to closely manage enterprises and conserve their 
important secondary market function. Freddie and Fannie have 
remained in conservatorship ever since.
 My hope with this hearing is that we will provide Members 
of this subcommittee with an opportunity to coarsely examine 
two very important topics. Number one, the mechanics of the 
secondary mortgage market. How does it work. What are the 
incentives of the relevant actors in the space, and what does 
this all mean for a perspective home buyer.
 Number two, the role of Fannie and Freddie in the secondary 
market, and the policy implications of their ongoing status in 
conservatorship.
 Keen observers of this committee may note something unusual 
about the structure of this hearing. There is no legislation 
notice to our discussion today. The lack of legislation notice 
to this hearing was an intentional choice. While there are 
absolutely important policy issues to be discussed regarding 
the secondary mortgage market, and GSEs, I felt it was 
imperative that we begin our subcommittee's work by focusing on 
the underlying subject matter.
 With that, I yield my time back. I now recognize the 
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Cleaver, for 4 minutes 
for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EMANUEL CLEAVER, RANKING MEMBER OF 
 THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. 
 REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI

 Mr. Cleaver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Today's 
hearing will examine homeownership and the role of the 
secondary mortgage market. Unlike the primary mortgage markets 
where lenders issue loans directly to borrowers, the secondary 
market consists of loan originators selling existing mortgage 
to third parties to replenish their capital.
 Selling loans in the secondary market provides the 
liquidity to issue additional mortgages in the primary market. 
These transactions also distribute mortgage-related risk across 
the wider financial system.
 Though largely unknown to most Americans, the secondary 
mortgage market is the driving force of our housing system. It 
ensures access to affordable homeownership, and this hearing is 
an opportunity for this committee to look deeper into the 
mechanics of the secondary mortgage market.
 The market depends on public confidence, stability, and 
adequate oversight by Congress and the administration. The fact 
that it is unnoticed by the average American means that it is 
functioning.
 The hearing also provides an opportunity to assess the 
responsibilities of secondary market participants and whether 
they are being filled.
 I had a great working relationship with the former FHFA 
director, Sandra Thompson, who I found thoughtful, open to 
dialog, and unwavering in her commitment to affordable mortgage 
access.
 Recently FHFA and the administration's unpredictable 
announcements have generated great uncertainty. Many of these 
announcements have been made without supporting analysis, or 
involvement from Congress. There is now some great uncertainty 
regarding the long-term prospects of the enterprises, and their 
impact on capital markets and homeownership. All of this has 
taken place against the backdrop of one of the most severe 
housing crises the United States has ever had. I have 
emphasized that any future framework should ensure the 
enterprises remain a reliable source of affordable mortgages 
throughout all markets.
 To ensure responsible reforms, director--he is not here. I 
am proud of the committee's thoughtful work in advancing access 
to housing through the passage of the Housing for the 21st 
Century Act. That would not have happened without the 
leadership of Chairman Flood, Chairman Hill, and Ranking Member 
Waters.
 I look forward to the hearing from our witnesses as we 
start examining these issues in the secondary mortgage market. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the 
chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for 
opening statement.

 STATMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
 FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS

 Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Flood. It is indeed, as 
you both said, homeownership is the cornerstone of the American 
dream. A well-functioning financial system and access to 
reasonable mortgage rates are essential to making that dream 
achievable for more families across our country.
 The government sponsored enterprises, particularly Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, play a crucial role in providing critical 
liquidity to mortgage originators, and enhancing the mortgage 
affordability through the operations of the secondary market.
 While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created to support 
housing finance, history has shown that poor decisions, 
inadequate oversight, and unchecked mission creep can impose 
serious costs for taxpayers and the broader economy.
 As housing affordability challenges persist nationwide, it 
is critical that Congress take a wide-eyed view of the role 
that GSEs play in the current market, and how they are 
promoting stability, access to credit, and responsible risk 
management.
 I thank the chair and look forward to today's panel and 
yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The chairman yields back. I now recognize the 
ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Waters, for 1 minute 
for an opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MAXINE WATERS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 CALIFORNIA

 Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This hearing 
will discuss our mortgage market, but it has been more than 1 
year into Trump's disastrous administration, and this committee 
still has not heard from Trump official who oversees $7.6 
billion--trillion, trillion dollars of this market.
 The Federal Housing Finance Agency Director Bill Pulte has 
been busy. He has been pushing absurd 50-year mortgages, 
weaponizing Fannie and Freddie, to going after Trump's 
political enemies, but completely failing to do what he was 
appointed to do, make housing more affordable for Americans.
 Our country is facing an affordable housing crisis and 
needs competent leadership, but Pulte is proving anything but 
competent. I hope today's witnesses share how Congress can 
restore the dream of homeownership. Thank you, and I yield 
back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back. Today we welcome the 
testimony of Mr. Michael Bright, the CEO of the Structured 
Finance Association; We welcome Mr. Robert Broeksmit, the 
president and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association; Dr. 
Norbert Michel, the vice president and director of the Center 
for Monetary and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute 
and; Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, the director of Housing at the 
Consumer Federation of America.
 We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each 
of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral 
presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written 
statements will be made part of the record.
 Mr. Bright, we will begin with you. You are now recognized 
for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BRIGHT, CEO, STRUCTURED FINANCE 
 ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Bright. Thank you. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member 
Cleaver, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, my name is 
Michael Bright, and I am the CEO of the Structured Finance 
Association. Thank you and your staff for inviting me today, 
and for holding a hearing on such an important topic.
 I have been engaged in the secondary mortgage market from 
several angles over the course of my career. For 7 years I 
traded agency MBS, and the interest rate derivatives necessary 
to hedge these securities. After the financial crisis, I came 
to Washington and worked for Senator Bob Corker managing 
banking and housing policy issues.
 I then worked at the Milken Institute where we wrote about 
secondary mortgage market reform.
 Prior to Structured Finance Association (SFA), I was acting 
president at Ginnie Mae for 2 years and I have been conducting 
advocacy on this issue at the Structured Finance Association, 
or SFA, for the past 7 years.
 SFA was formed in 2013 with the goal of convening the many 
diverse institutions involved in securitization, including 
consumer and commercial lenders, data providers, auto and 
equipment finance companies, rating agencies, law firms, 
trustees, banks, and, very importantly, end investors.
 This structure forces SFA to convene all parties, both 
those involved with the creation of a fixed-income security, 
such as a mortgage-backed security, and those who invest in 
them. Since SFA represents all participants in a transaction, 
long-term financial stability in the mortgage market, as well 
as other markets, is a core principle of ours.
 The American secondary mortgage market is an incredibly 
complex ecosystem. It extends well beyond Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac and Ginnie Mae, which are often the primary focus of policy 
discussions. These entities do not originate mortgages. They 
provide credit guarantees that support liquidity and 
standardization in the market. Operating in tandem with these 
government-charted agencies, there is a large interconnected 
series of mortgage-backed securities investors, broker dealers, 
risk modelers, derivative hedging, prepayment analytic firms, 
and many more market participants that make up the overall 
secondary mortgage market apparatus.
 The investors in American mortgage-backed securities are 
broad and global. They include insurance companies, 401(k) 
retirement accounts, banks of all sizes, pension plans, foreign 
and central banks, the Federal Reserve, and many more.
 SFA investment members are fiduciaries to their clients. 
Collectively these varying sources of capital form the 
foundation of America's ability to have fixed-rate, fully pre-
payable mortgages, which currently comprise over 90 percent of 
all outstanding U.S. household mortgages.
 When an essential connection between secondary market and 
individual borrowers is a to-be-announced, known as the TBA 
market, which allows borrowers to lock in an interest rate 
before their loan closes. This market extends through the life 
of the mortgage where servicers and investors must manage 
entirely complex risk associated with prepayments when rates 
fall, and extension risk when rates rise. This is an incredibly 
impressive market that is made possible by FHFA and MBA 
members, firms in a variety of capacities.
 SFA not only represents ecosystem for agency MBS, but also 
the private label security, or PLS market. Since 2008, that 
market has undergone enormous change. The most important 
evolution has been to ensure that underwriting practices are 
safe and sound.
 At SFA, we say bad loans make bad securities. Good loans 
make good securities. A lesson from the fact that pre-crisis 
failures in mortgage underwriting were the primary contributing 
factor to the collapse of certain bonds. Policy such as the 
Ability to Repay rule, risk retention, qualified mortgage (QM) 
definition, oversight of serving standards, and full 
documentations of loans have all helped to create a PLS market 
that serves millions of Americans without direct taxpayer risk. 
There are further regulatory reforms to this market that I will 
be happy to discuss with you today.
 In conclusion, thank you, again, for this hearing, and for 
your attention to this topic. SFA looks forward to working with 
all of you as you continue to focus on these markets and 
housing issues in the United States. Thank you.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Bright follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
 
 Mr. Flood. Mr. Broeksmit, I hope I am saying that right, 
you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF ROBERT BROEKSMIT, PRESIDENT AND CEO, MORTGAGE 
 BANKERS ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you, Chairman Flood, Ranking Member 
Cleaver, Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters and Members of 
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before you today on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association.
 My name is Bob Broeksmit, and I serve as Mortgage Bankers 
Association's (MBA's) president and chief executive officer. I 
am a certified mortgage banker with more than 40 years of 
experience in real estate finance. I have held positions in 
virtually all aspects of the mortgage business, from loan 
processing and underwriting to secondary marketing and 
servicing.
 This extensive experience has given me an up-close 
perspective on the secondary mortgage marketplace, which is a 
complex ecosystem where both single-family, and multi-family 
loans, and assets, such as mortgage servicing rights, are 
bought and sold. A sizable percentage of newly originated 
mortgages are sold by lenders, be they depositories, non-banks, 
or other capital sources, into the secondary market where they 
are packaged into mortgage-backed securities, or MBS, and sold 
to investors.
 Many participants utilize the secondary market, most 
notably, Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, to help make 
mortgages more--mortgage credit more widely available to 
borrowers across American by freeing up capital that can be 
used to issue new mortgages. This process increases liquidity 
and supports homeownership, and rental activity, by making 
financing more accessible and affordable.
 Other players include entities that issue private label 
securities, or PLS, that our MBS created from pools of mortgage 
loans. These nongovernment guaranteed loans offer both 
investment opportunities and associated risks.
 As a point of emphasis, PLS are financial instruments that 
are not backed by a government guarantee. Instead, they are 
created by private entities and typically consist of mortgages 
that may vary from Fannie and Freddie specific underwriting 
standards, which means investors may realize higher yields, but 
bear more credit risk.
 These loans are typically pulled together in a trust, which 
then issues securities to investors. The cash flows from the 
underlying mortgages are then passed through to the investors.
 Let me now emphasize the sizing of our U.S. real estate and 
mortgage markets as part of both the domestic and global 
economies. There is $48 trillion in owner-occupied real estate 
value, with almost $14 trillion in mortgage debt, leaving 
almost $34 trillion in home equity.
 There is another $2.2 trillion in multi-family mortgage 
debt outstanding, plus associated equity. An annual mortgage 
origination volume of $2.2 trillion in residential home 
lending, and another almost $400 billion in multi-family 
lending.
 In recent years, market shares of residential origination 
dollar volumes have averaged roughly 50 percent to the GSEs, 25 
percent to banks, 20 percent to Ginnie Mae, which is made up of 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Department of Veterans 
Affairs (VA) and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
loans, and 5 percent for PLS.
 Market shares of multi-family origination dollar volumes 
have averaged 40 percent to the GSEs, 5 percent to FHA, with 
the remainder covered by banks, life insurance companies, and 
commercial mortgage-backed securities. There was an average MBS 
trading volume of $351 billion per day in 2025. All of these 
executions have led us to an average U.S. homeownership rate of 
65.3 percent, which has held steady, including amongst younger 
cohorts.
 The American mortgage market is unique given the degree to 
which 30-year fixed rate, fully amortized, and pre-payable 
mortgage loans play such a large role. Our system protects 
borrowers against increases in interest rates, while providing 
a long period over which to amortize the loan principal. This 
allows for more affordable monthly payments that are available 
under a shorter schedule.
 The remainder of my written statement describes the key 
pillars that undergo the secondary market system, a holistic 
view of that market, balancing market innovation, and the 
sanctity of existing contracts that support investor activity: 
The core principles needed should Fannie and Freddie exit their 
conservatorship status, and both legislative and regulatory 
recommendations on improving housing affordability.
 In conclusion, I appreciate this chance to comment on the 
secondary mortgage market this afternoon. MBA looks forward to 
continuing to work with this subcommittee, the full Congress, 
and the administration to serve as a resource while important 
discussions regarding housing continue to take shape. I look 
forward to answering any questions you may have.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Broeksmit follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Flood. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Michel, you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF DR. NORBERT MICHEL, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR, 
 CENTER FOR MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ALTERNATIVES, CATO INSTITUTE

 Mr. Michel. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, 
Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Waters, Members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Norbert 
Michel, vice president and director for the Center for Monetary 
and Financial Alternatives at the Cato Institute. The views 
that I express in this testimony are my own and should not be 
construed as representing any official position of the Cato 
Institute.
 A little more than 8 years ago I testified in front of this 
committee and started my testimony by pointing out that it had 
been 10 years since the GSEs Fannie and Freddie had failed and 
were placed into government conservatorship, but Congress had 
yet to reform the housing finance market and protect taxpayers. 
The only meaningful difference in my testimony today is that it 
has now been about 18 years.
 By continuing to leave the government-backed duopoly of 
Fannie and Freddie in place, expanding their reach, or merging 
them into a monopoly, Congress would again be perpetuating one 
of the worse parts of the current housing finance system, the 
same one that imploded in 2008.
 As I said 8 years ago, Americans deserve better. In the 
intervening years, many so-called reform proposals have been 
introduced, and the ones that typically garner the most 
bipartisan support are those that included an explicit 
government guarantee for mortgage-backed securities. That 
mechanism would simply mean that the Federal Government would 
begin explicitly guaranteeing the principal and interest 
payments on otherwise private investments, enforcing borrowers 
to pay for it, all for no real public purpose because there has 
been no market failure.
 Still, advocates of these guarantees promote them as 
necessary for creating a sustainable housing finance system. 
The truth, though, is that history clearly shows that these 
guarantees are not necessary to sustain the housing market.
 During the 5 decades leading up to the 2008 financial 
crisis, the United States achieved a stable rate of 
homeownership of approximately 64 percent without explicit 
guarantees. The only major deviation from that rate was when 
misguided policies were enacted with the expressed intent of 
arbitrarily raising the ownership rate to 70 percent by 
increasing the use of the implicit guarantees.
 Predictably, that scheme did not work well, and it ended in 
spectacular failure. There is no doubt that the constant 
expansion of implied taxpayer guarantees through the GSEs 
helped to create excessive debt leading to the 2008 crisis. 
Doubling down by making these guarantees explicit is descended 
to end at least as poorly.
 There is also no doubt that the people in the housing 
finance sector want to receive government guarantees for their 
business. Who would not? But that desire is not a sufficient 
reason to provide those guarantees, and the truth, again, is 
that they are not necessary because robust homeownership was 
established in the United States long before the government 
became so heavily involved in the housing market.
 From 1949 to 1968, the year Fannie was allowed to branch 
out into purchasing nongovernment insured mortgages, 
government-backed home loans never accounted for more than an 
annual share of 6 percent of the market in any given year, yet 
that homeownership rate then was 64 percent, which is very 
close to the rate that we have now.
 There simply is no compelling need from either existing or 
potential homeowner's perspective for these guarantees. 
Borrowers and lenders like to take risks because it provides 
the possibility of a future financial reward. That is what 
occurs in financial markets every day.
 Shifting these financial risks onto taxpayers is what 
increases systemic risks and makes financial crises more 
likely, and I fear that Congress has forgotten this lesson, 
even though it was crystal clear in 2008.
 So for the sake of completeness, shifting financial risks 
onto taxpayers relieves investors of caring about what is in 
their portfolio. It creates excessive leverage. It creates 
overbuilding. It puts upward pressure on home prices, not 
downward, and possibly to unsustainable levels. It is, 
therefore, almost inconceivable that Congress would still 
contemplate repeating this mistake rather than moving as far 
away from the GSE system as possible.
 Thank you for your consideration, and I am happy to answer 
any questions you may have.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Michel follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Flood. Thank you very much. Dr. Sharon Cornelissen, you 
are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks.

 STATEMENT OF DR. SHARON CORNELISSEN, DIRECTOR OF HOUSING, 
 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA

 Ms. Cornelissen. Chairman Flood, Chairman Hill, Ranking 
Member Cleaver, and Ranking Member Waters, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify here today. My name is Sharon 
Cornelissen, and I am the director of Housing at the Consumer 
Federation of America (CFA) and CFA is one of Nation's leading 
consumer groups in the country, and we represent around 250 
consumer groups across the Nation.
 So this hearing is about homeownership and the role of the 
secondary mortgage market but at its core, it is about the 
question of whether the institutions that Congress created to 
promote affordable homeownership, namely the GSEs and FHFA, are 
being deployed for their purpose today, or if that purpose has 
been undermined over the last year by actions taken by FHFA.
 Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, and Freddie Mac in 
1970, in order to make homeownership more attainable across the 
Nation. They are our GSEs, which means government-sponsored 
enterprises, which means that they are unique public-private 
hybrids. While they before 2008 they were privately 
capitalized, they also enjoyed significant public subsidies and 
in exchange, Congress put a public mission in place to make 
sure that the GSEs reached our markets, including rural markets 
and underserved urban markets, and also served the mortgage 
needs of underserved consumers, namely low and moderate income 
home buyers.
 It put in place FHFA in 2008, and it gave FHFA two 
responsibilities. Namely to oversee the safety and the 
soundness of the GSEs, and prevent against excessive risk-
taking and two, to oversee and promote the mission of the GSEs, 
including by making mortgage credit broadly available.
 Over the last year, however, we have seen FHFA move away 
from that mission. There is a lot of examples that I could 
mention here, but we have seen them reduce the housing goals 
that have taken away GSE-backed mortgage access from an 
estimated 177,000 working families in the United States.
 We have seen significant rollbacks of fair housing, which 
only made our housing crisis worse for renters and home buyers. 
We have seen lots of policy proposals back and forth of 
different ideas, including the 50-year mortgage, affordable 
mortgages, and conflicting ideas about the future of Fannie and 
Freddie, these really important institutions to the U.S. 
economy, which has generated deep uncertainty for industry, for 
investors, but also for consumers.
 I think we can all agree here today that homeownership is 
simply too unaffordable. So in order to tackle that, we need 
ambitious housing policy, and including housing policy that 
really leverages the GSEs for all of their potential and what 
they can do for American homeownership.
 I will end here on three priorities. First, I just want to 
establish that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are working really 
well, and they functioned really well over the last 18 years of 
conservatorship. We do not need to fix what is not broken. Any 
planning for the future of Fannie and Freddie, we should be 
very careful.
 Congress should be involved, we should prioritize a strong 
and independent regulator, and we should put consumers first. 
That means maintaining long-term low mortgage rates, and 
maintaining broad access to mortgage credit, which is why we 
put the GSEs in place to begin with.
 Second, FHFA should actually leverage its actual policy 
tools to promote affordable mortgage--to promote affordable 
homeownership. It means reinstating the affordable housing 
goals as they were before, to really ensure mortgage credit is 
broadly available for working families, but, also, take its 
position to actually drive innovation at Fannie and Freddie and 
innovate mortgage products that make mortgage credit more 
broadly available.
 Think about mortgages for manufactured housing, for 
example, for small-dollar mortgages, or to support mortgage 
lending by community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs).
 Third and finally, I would urge Congress to not forget 
about the Federal Home Loan Banks. This is another GSE that 
FHFA regulates, and another GSE that Congress put in place to 
promote affordable homeownership and access to credit. However, 
they have also--they have lost their way over the last few 
decades.
 Congress currently only requires the Federal Home Loan 
Banks to devote 10 percent of their net income every year to go 
to affordable housing programs. If Congress were to raise that 
minimum from 10 percent to 30 percent, that would mean that in 
an additional $1.2 billion could go to affordable housing 
construction and down-payment assistance every year.
 This additional $1.2 billion would not compromise the 
safety and soundness of the Federal Home Loan Banks because 
they have been very profitable over the last few decades, 
including making $6.4 billion just in 2024.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Cornelissen follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Mr. Flood. The gentlelady's time has expired. I will now 
turn to Member questions. I recognize myself for 5 minutes for 
questioning.
 Mr. Bright and Mr. Broeksmit, I think the benefits of a 
liquid and stable secondary MBS market are often not noticed by 
home buyers. What can we point to as the main indicators of a 
healthy secondary mortgage market, and what benefits do 
homeowners enjoy when the secondary market is operating well?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Mr. Chairman, I do not think many people in 
this room, or in this country, understand what a rarity it is 
to have 30-year fixed rate pre-payable mortgages available in 
all parts of the country through all economic cycles and that 
is precisely what this system permits, and we need to be 
careful about how we tinker with it given the incredible 
importance of that feature to our economy.
 Mr. Bright. I agree. I mean, we are talking about how it 
has been 18 years since conservatorship and can we do 
comprehensive reform. That is easy to say from these seats. It 
is really hard from your seats. Trust me, I have the scars to 
show for it, so I understand that.
 To answer your question specifically, it is kind of--the 
secondary mortgage market is sort of like plumbing and electric 
wiring behind the wall. So you do not see it. You notice if the 
water does not work and if the lights do not turn on but since 
the conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie, the lights--as far 
as getting a fixed-rate mortgage, a pre-payable fixed-rate 
mortgage, which is a really unique feature that Americans 
enjoy, the ability to get that at low rates, the lights are on 
and the water works.
 So what we are talking about is a political exercise when 
we talk about structural reform is you are saying, hey, you do 
not notice all this stuff behind the wall, but let us rip up 
the wall and take it down, and that gets a little tricky, so--
--
 Mr. Flood. Again, I think it is important as we get into 
this conversation about GSEs, we have this beautiful thing 
called the 30-year fixed mortgage. They do not have that in 
South America. They do not have that in every country even in 
Europe or Central America. We have it here.
 Not only do we have trillions of dollars coming in capital, 
we have other countries sending capital into the United States 
so that somebody in Laredo, Texas, can achieve the American 
dream. So we have done something right as a country here.
 Mr. Bright, can you walk through the way MBS is priced by 
investors? From a very high level, how can we think about how 
investors weigh prepayment risk and interest rate risk in 
mortgage-backed securities.
 Mr. Bright. Thank you. Right now in agency, MBS and Ginnie 
MBS, you do not have to take into account the credit risk of 
the underlying borrower. You do in PLS, but the structures 
allow senior bondholders to not have to worry about that.
 But in all mortgage-backed securities in the U.S., you take 
on significant risk as an MBS investor. Again, I do want to 
stress the point that this MBS investor is a pension plan, it 
is a 401(k), it is your thrift savings plans (TSPs). This is 
not people investing their own money. It is retirees and 
savers.
 If you make a loan to--you buy a mortgage-backed security 
at 3\1/2\ percent coupon, and that borrower gets a 4 percent 
mortgage, that is an example, if interest rates go up, you as a 
bondholder are probably going to be getting a 3\1/2\ percent 
coupon for a very, very, very long time, while prevailing 
market interest rates could be 6 or 7 percent. So you are 
underwater on that bond.
 Conversely, if you are an investor and you make a loan with 
a 5\1/2\ percent coupon, and that is where prevailing mortgage 
rates are, which is about where they are now, and rates go 
down, you are going to get prepaid, meaning, you are going to 
get part back and have to reinvest that at a substantially 
lower market interest rate. So that is okay. The market knows 
how to do it. It prices that. Its built an entire----
 Mr. Flood. You are doing great, but I have got--I am 
running out of time here.
 Mr. Bright. It is impressive is what I am saying.
 Mr. Flood. There is one thing I want to touch on, and my 
time is limited, but I worry about banks, community banks, and 
their connection to Main Street when everything goes to the 
GSEs.
 Mr. Broeksmit, can you describe the capital treatment of 
mortgage servicing assets, both with relation to the risk 
weights and the effective cap on mortgage servicing asset 
(MSA), and the effects it has on mortgage originators, 
particularly small banks? I worry that we are losing our 
connection between banks and homeowners, and please react to 
that.
 Mr. Broeksmit. I will be brief. Basel III needs to be 
fixed. The service--the risk weight on servicing is 250 
percent. It should not be more than 100 percent. That is a 
complicated way of saying that the capital we require for 
servicing is 2\1/2\ times higher than it ought to be. We have 
been working with the prudential regulators on this, it would 
help banks get back into the servicing business. They have 
effectively been driven out of it because of these onerous 
capital requirements.
 Mr. Flood. Excellent point.
 I am going to offer for the record an article written by 
David Spector, Chairman and CEO of PennyMac. It is entitled, 
``A Blueprint for Making Housing More Affordable.''
 Entered into the record without objection.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix 
on page 102.]

 Mr. Flood. With that, I now turn to my colleague on my 
right, Mr. Cleaver, he is recognized as the ranking member for 
5 minutes.
 Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of my very, 
very deep respect for the previous head of FHFA, and my ability 
to work with her, I have become more and more concerned about 
that role and appreciative of it.
 The administration continues to evaluate the future of 
government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and has considered ending their 17-year conservatorship 
because the GSEs are central participants in a secondary 
mortgage market: buying, pooling, and then securitizing 
mortgages. Any transition out of conservatorship could have, I 
think maybe everyone would agree, broad implications of 
liquidity, risk, distribution, and housing affordability across 
the market.
 Forgive me if I mess it up, Cornelissen, am I close, just--
--
 Ms. Cornelissen. Cornelissen. Thank you.
 Mr. Cleaver. The Congressional Budget Office has noted that 
the GSE's role in the housing system is so significant that 
they could warrant systematic designation if released from 
conservatorship.
 What would be the material impact on the secondary mortgage 
and the broader housing finance system, particularly at a time 
when we are all talking about this historically difficult time 
for Americans to secure affordable housing?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Yes, I mean, you do not want to break the 
secondary mortgage markets. I think we all have the memory of 
2008 when Fannie and Freddie risked failing and threatened to 
drag down the economy but specifically if you end 
conservatorship without a good plan in place, this will mean 
the end of the 30-year mortgage as we know it. Right. You may 
not be able to get a rate locked in before you buy your house, 
or you may not be able to have that pre-payable feature and 
refinance your home.
 Mr. Cleaver. What are the primary drivers of higher 
mortgage transaction costs, particularly for smaller loans in 
today's market?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Excuse me.
 Mr. Cleaver. No. Anyone.
 Mr. Broeksmit. I am sorry. I did not hear the question.
 Mr. Cleaver. What are the primary drivers of higher 
mortgage transaction costs, particularly for smaller loans in 
today's market?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Well, one of the issues with small dollar 
amounts is that small dollar loan amounts, is that there are 
certain charges on a mortgage that are fixed-in costs. Let us 
say the appraisal. Let us say the appraisal is $700. Well, if 
you are buying a $500,000 house, that may not be that big an 
obstacle but if you are trying to buy a $40,000 house, that 
could be a couple percentage of the purchase price. So there 
are things like that are fixed regardless of the loan amount, 
and that is really a barrier for small dollar loans.
 Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Arkansas, the chairman of the full Financial Services 
Committee, Mr. Hill, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Flood. Again, thanks for 
this expert panel, and it is very, very good to have your 
expertise restored and renewed on the subject of the 
government-sponsored enterprises.
 Mr. Bright, I want to start with you. We are going to play 
Fannie and Freddie jeopardy. Let us play--do you want to play 
for a trillion? Let us play for a trillion dollars.
 Are the government-sponsored enterprises the GSEs-AreFannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, are they public companies or private 
companies?
 Mr. Bright. Their stocks do trade on the pink sheets.
 Chairman Hill. So they were public companies, and their 
stock is still available to purchase on the pink sheets. Is 
that a fair description?
 Mr. Bright. That is correct.
 Chairman Hill. Do they have capital standards set by the 
U.S. Treasury, by the Federal Government?
 Mr. Bright. Yes. There is a capital framework that has been 
in place since 2022.
 Chairman Hill. Would you say the two enterprises, based on 
your knowledge about their financial statements, are they 
undercapitalized against that, or overcapitalized?
 Mr. Bright. They are definitely--they are not at the 
requirements of the 2022 proposal by a couple hundred billion.
 Chairman Hill. By a couple hundred billion?
 Mr. Bright. About that, yes.
 Chairman Hill. About $200 billion undercapitalized. Is that 
maybe a consensus view.
 Mr. Bright. I think that--I do not want to----
 Chairman Hill. So if they are $200 billion undercapitalize, 
and yet I read periodically on social media that someone thinks 
that they want to do an Initial Public Offering (IPO), even 
though you have already established that they are already 
public companies. What is the largest IPO that you can think of 
that has gone public in the world?
 Mr. Bright. Saudi Aramco.
 Chairman Hill. Saudi Aramco? About how much was that?
 Mr. Bright. $28 billion-ish.
 Chairman Hill. Yes. I would say somewhere around $30 
billion. That is a big number, but it is not $200 billion.
 My point is that these are public enterprises. They are in 
conservatorship by the government for 18 years, that Dr. Michel 
noted. They are undercapitalized $190 billion. So, before 
anybody could consider maybe doing something and raising money 
from the public, are there not some other decisions that we 
have to take into account?
 Like would the Treasury Department not have to make a 
concrete decision about how much money they are still owed from 
the financial crisis, or not owed, in other words, have a 
negotiated settlement on that.
 Mr. Bright. Yes, that would definitely be very important to 
any prospective new investor in the equity share.
 Chairman Hill. And the Treasury's warrants, I think they 
expire in 2028, so there is a clock ticking on that. Is that 
also right?
 Mr. Bright. Yes, I believe so. There are probably some 
mechanisms around that, but, yes, you are right.
 Chairman Hill. Then the Congress needs to be involved. So, 
the Congress would have to outline what are the missions, 
oversight, corporate governance, compensation, rules of the 
road, that Congress also has a view on leaving the 
conservatorship. Do you agree that we should have a viewpoint 
on that?
 Mr. Bright. One hundred percent, yes.
 Chairman Hill. Okay. So that is part of the jeopardy today. 
So we are going to Dr. Michel now because he is a big game-show 
guy, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Michel, is a 50-year mortgage a good 
idea?
 Mr. Michel. I mean; I think that if people want to do that, 
fine, but----
 Chairman Hill. Meaning, if the private sector wanted to 
offer it. I agree. That is right. Would it be easier to provide 
secondary market liquidity to that when it is brand-new, or 
would it have to reach a certain level for there to be appeal? 
Mr. Bright, do you want to answer that question?
 Mr. Bright. I am sorry, I----
 Chairman Hill. The liquidity, if we did have a 50-year 
mortgage, how many billions of dollars would it have to exist 
before it could be packaged with liquidity in the secondary 
market?
 Mr. Bright. Hundreds. Lots and it is not TBA deliverable.
 Chairman Hill. If you wanted to have a portable mortgage, 
that would be really hard for an existing mortgage that has 
been sold in the secondary market, would it not?
 Mr. Bright. That would be a contract violation.
 Chairman Hill. Yes. So, anyway. It is good to think about 
important ways to bring down affordability, which is why the 
chairman and Mr. Cleaver worked so hard on 21st Century Housing 
because these are concrete ideas that would reduce the cost of 
housing.
 Dr. Michel, I will bounce back to you. The Federal Home 
Loan Banks, or GSE, and I agree with our friend that noted that 
we should pay close attention to them, there is no about that, 
and we have an obligation of oversight there. I do not agree 
that we should take from there low-income housing from 10 
percent to 30 percent because I do not think of these 
organizations as housing agencies. They also are a liquidity to 
banks using mortgage loans as collateral. Is that right, Dr. 
Michel?
 Mr. Michel. That is right.
 Chairman Hill. So they provide liquidity to banks using one 
to four family mortgages as a collateral base, but they also do 
grant programs, is that right, for----
 Mr. Michel. A much, much bigger mission in public purpose 
than it had originally.
 Chairman Hill. Yes. The housing piece, the low-income 
housing is incidental to that core piece.
 This is a great panel, and I think it is wonderful to get a 
new generation of Members of Congress focused on the 
government-sponsored enterprises and the complexity of it, and 
I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from 
California, Ranking Member Waters, is now recognized for 5 
minutes.
 Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, before I ask a question, I have a 
parliamentary inquiry. Is it my understanding that Mr. Ed 
DeMarco, president of the housing policy council and former FHA 
director, was supposed to testify today, but no longer is. 
Since Director Pulte was not invited to testify, I was very 
much looking forward to hearing from Mr. DeMarco, someone who 
used to work at the FHA and may be able to give us some answers 
to our questions about what has been going on there. Mr. 
Chairman, do you know what happened to Mr. DeMarco.
 Mr. Flood. The committee will stand at ease pending 
conference with legal counsel.
 [Discussion off the record.]
 Mr. Flood. That request you made is not a valid 
parliamentary inquiry. Do you have a question about the process 
today?
 Ms. Waters. Thank you very much.
 Mr. Flood. I am sorry, your mic is not on. Sorry.
 Ms. Waters. I would like to go on with my question now.
 Mr. Flood. You may resume.
 Ms. Waters. Is that okay? Thank you.
 Mr. Flood. We will start your time now.
 Ms. Waters. I am going to direct this question to Dr. 
Cornelissen, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Director Pulte 
has been using his agency as a tool to attack Trump's political 
enemies while offering plenty of dumb policy proposals, like a 
50-year mortgage that would only serve to trap Americans in 
forever loans.
 But the FHA has an important, maybe the most important role 
in our mortgage market. If he were here today, and I will note, 
again, that the Republicans have not shared any plans to invite 
him to testify, but if he were here, what are the top three 
things you would remind him that he and the government-
sponsored enterprises would do to help make buying a home more 
affordable and accessible?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your questions. I would 
remind him of the importance of the equitable housing finance 
plans that he retracted to make credit more broadly available.
 I would remind him of the importance of the affordable 
housing goals to truly reach the mission that Congress set for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to also serve the credit needs of 
low and moderate income families.
 And I would remind him of the actual fact that the FHFA can 
direct Fannie and Freddie to truly innovate products, and by 
innovating secondary mortgage products, make primary products 
more available, such as home-only loans for manufactured 
housing, or small dollar mortgages, for example.
 Ms. Waters. Let me continue. Last year Director Pulte 
launched a tip line for reporting mortgage fraud activity, then 
began investigating and referring to the Department of Justice 
many people who openly disagreed with Trump, and who Trump 
viewed basically as political enemies. This includes New York 
Attorney General Latitia James, Federal Reserve Board of 
Governor Lisa Cook, and more.
 Even the Government Accountability Office has opened an 
investigation into Pulte's actions. Several Trump cabinet 
officials, and apparently even Trump himself, reportedly may 
have committed mortgage fraud, and yet I do not think Pulte has 
referred any of these cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
nor would the American public have any confidence that DOJ 
would do anything about it.
 This whole incident allows actually bad actors to go 
unpunished. No one should forget the widespread mortgage fraud 
committed by Wall Street that directly contributed to the 
financial crisis. What do you think about that?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I think it is inappropriate, and I think 
it undermines the independence of the regulator. Right. It sort 
of uses an independent regulator for political ends, so I think 
it is an inappropriate use of an independent regulator.
 Ms. Waters. Do you think it would be proper for you to make 
a request of this committee, the chairman--oh, he just left--
make an inquiry about perhaps forcing the appearance of him 
here?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I think that would be appropriate.
 Ms. Waters. Do you think it would be helpful to this 
committee?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I think it would be helpful for this 
committee, yes.
 Ms. Waters. Then I would like to impose on you a little 
bit. We will do our share about trying to get him here, but if 
you could help us make a request, I would appreciate it very 
much.
 Ms. Cornelissen. Will do. Thank you.
 Ms. Waters. Thank you. I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back. The gentleman from 
Tennessee, Mr. Rose, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman Flood and thank you, Ranking 
Member Cleaver, for holding this important hearing. Thanks to 
our witnesses for your time and being with us today to lend 
your expertise.
 In the run up to the 2008 financial crisis, Moody's, 
Standard and Poor's and Fitch were not innocent bystanders. 
They were central enablers. They repeatedly stamped complex 
mortgage-backed securities stuffed with risky loans with the 
highest possible ratings, helping to pump toxic products into 
every corner of the financial system, and paving the way for a 
collapse that devastated homeowners, retirees and taxpayers.
 Mr. Bright, given that the history of catastrophic failure, 
given that history of catastrophic failure, and apparent 
disregard for basic due diligence, why should Congress, or the 
American people, place any trust today in these same firms to 
accurately assess risk in the current market for mortgage-
backed securities, rather than assuming that these firms will, 
once again, chase fees at the expense of honesty and prudence?
 Mr. Bright. Well, the market that buys these securities 
based on these has learned and evolved quite a bit, and I think 
that is important. I think that there have been some good 
reforms on the rating agencies, and on the entire market 
itself.
 Back to, if I can repeat sort of a principle that we have 
from the beginning is that I think the failure of the financial 
crisis is we had poorly underwritten loans, no-doc loans, low-
doc loans, liar loans. Collateral was being underwritten based 
on the value of the underlying asset, not the borrower's 
ability to actually repay. I think we have moved a long way 
since that, so I think that is a very healthy evolution, and 
lesson learned from the financial crisis.
 Mr. Rose. I am skeptical. Mr. Michel, what concrete steps 
should Congress consider to break the dominance of Moody's S&P, 
and Fitch, firms that helped vaporize trillions in wealth, cost 
Americans their jobs, homes and savings, and yet walked away 
with virtually no real accountability, and to encourage new 
competitors in the credit risk rating business so investors are 
no longer captive to this closed ratings cartel?
 Mr. Michel. Well, I mean, you do not want to have 
regulations that mandate a special sort of designation, that is 
one thing, because that makes it harder for anybody else to 
come in and do a rating sort of arrangement but I think that 
the bigger issue is that you do not want a single or double 
government-backed entity in the first place.
 To be a little bit fair to those guys, for the most part, 
the mortgage-backed securities ratings that they gave actually 
are not that far off.
 Mr. Rose. Interesting. Okay. Mr. Bright, if China 
accelerates mortgage-backed security sales as retaliation for 
tariffs, or other policies, as some analysts warned, how could, 
or how would that interact with fed balance sheet runoff, or 
domestic liquidity shocks to amplify housing market stress?
 Mr. Bright. Well, if the Chinese central bank were to do 
something like that it would be--that would be a strategic 
decision that would be very poor economics for them. They have 
lots of dollar reserves from trade deficit that we have with 
them, and they have to invest those reserves in a way. So they 
would have to put it in something else. I think that would be 
pretty detrimental to them. It would also be detrimental to us.
 Mr. Rose. Dr. Michel, if China chose to dump a significant 
volume of U.S. mortgage-backed securities for geopolitical 
reasons, how worried would--or should we be that this kind of 
foreign policy-driven selling could deepen housing market 
stress for American families and small lenders?
 Mr. Michel. My flippant answer is that the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) would just buy it and my serious answer to go with that, 
though, is that I think that you--what you still end up with is 
a bunch of effectively treasury securities that are sitting out 
there, someone is going to buy them, in all seriousness.
 Mr. Rose. All right. Mr. Broeksmit, from MBA's perspective, 
what aspects of the current secondary market structure are most 
important to maintaining broad access to 30-year fixed rate 
fully amortized payable mortgages?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Congressman Rose, thanks, again, for your 
leadership on the Trigger Leads Bill, which is going into 
effect next month and will help consumers immediately.
 We think that a level playing field among all types of 
lenders in accessing the secondary market is a critical part of 
this. So whether you are a small bank, or a large independent 
mortgage banker, you should have the same terms available. The 
terms should be based on the credit of the loan, not on the 
volume of the loans sold to the GSEs.
 Mr. Rose. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from 
Michigan, Ms. Tlaib, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Ms. Tlaib. Thank you, Mr. Chair. In metro Detroit, the 
average home owned by one of my black neighbors is worth 45 
percent less than an average home owned by one of my white 
neighbors. Black residence in my community have long complained 
that appraisers are undervaluing their homes. I am sure you all 
have heard or seen reports and studies.
 Under the last administration, FHFA began releasing public 
appraisal data for the first time, and would you not know it, 
the appraisal gap between black neighborhoods and white 
neighborhoods started closing significantly as soon as those 
reports were made public.
 However, shamefully this administration--under this 
administration the FHFA has stopped updating that public and 
has ended appraisal-bias work, which, again, under Secretary 
Fudge was a priority for her.
 Dr. Cornelissen, can you talk briefly about what impact 
appraisal gap has on households in the broader market, 
especially appraisal bias that we continue to see, not only in 
the blackest city in the country, Detroit, but really across 
the Nation.
 Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you so much. We have a long-standing 
racial homeownership gap in this country, and it still stands 
at 30 percent. Mechanisms, such as appraisal bias, just kind of 
worsened that homeownership gap, and the wealth gap. 
Specifically they undermine people's capacity to truly build 
wealth through homeownership as their assets get valued lower, 
but it also can make it more difficult for them to get a 
mortgage or refinance as their mortgage application may be 
rejected if their appraisal comes in too low.
 Ms. Tlaib. Another troubling change from FHFA is that they 
have reduced the number of mortgages Fannie and Freddie are 
expected to buy serving lower and moderate income families. 
This is a really big, big decision here.
 The new enterprise housing goals will mean that over the 
next 3 years, 177,000 lower, moderate income families will no 
longer receive mortgages that they otherwise would have gotten 
access to.
 So, Doctor, can you talk about the enterprise housing goals 
and how they support working families and what recent changes 
will mean? I think for the folks listening, my residents, what 
is this? Again, the terminologies used in DC. I feel like is 
intentional so that they will never fully understand how 
discriminatory the housing market is.
 Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your question. I feel the 
same, that there is too many acronyms, but the affordable 
housing goals, Congress put these in place to make sure that 
Fannie and Freddie, all the mortgages that they support, that a 
certain percentage of those mortgages go to underserved 
communities, and to low and moderate income home buyers, to 
make sure that they serve all markets.
 So Congress put this in place, but over the last year, as 
you said, we have seen the director significantly lower those 
goals. I just want to emphasize that these are not risky 
borrowers. These are everyday working families. These include 
firefighters, realtors, paramedics, all kinds of jobs that sort 
of fit in that bullet of 80 percent area median income (AMI) or 
less.
 Ms. Tlaib. Oh, I know, and it is interesting to see the 
rent costs go up. They are able to afford that rent, but if 
they got a mortgage they would actually be paying less than 
they would in rent in many parts of my neighborhoods.
 Finally, just last week FHFA announced, they keep making 
all these announcements, as you know, is ending the fair 
lending and fair housing enforcement for Fannie Mae. I do not 
think there are a lot of people talking about this. Again, fair 
housing enforcement is ending under Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and Federal Home Loan Banks.
 This is the part of broader pattern by this administration, 
as we know, enabling discrimination. We have seen staffing 
cuts, disruptions in Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) 
office of fair housing and equal opportunity. I know for a fact 
they laid off all these civil rights--you know, these attorneys 
that basically investigate discrimination, they have them at 
home, getting paid on administrative leave doing nothing. Not 
enforcing.
 So the administration has also proposed reforming what they 
call Regulation B of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, they 
keep bringing this up in committee, which would eliminate 
desperate impact liability. This is huge.
 Now the FHFA has announced it is repealing the fair 
lending, fair housing, equitable housing finance plans 
regulation.
 Dr. Cornelissen, what are the consequences for many of our 
residents in underserved communities across the country for 
FHFA to step back from ensuring compliance with our fair 
housing, fair lending laws, and specifically women? This is--
women are overwhelmingly getting discriminated against, black 
women, brown women, but women with children are continuing to, 
again, people looking the other way, not wanting to lend or 
rent their homes to.
 Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you for your question. I think it is 
a really important issue to raise, and I just want to start by 
level-setting that the Fair Housing Act and fair housing 
protects virtually every consumer, right. There are a lot of 
protected classes in there. So, it protects you against 
discrimination based on national origin, on race, whether you 
are a woman, whether you have kids, based on your disability 
status.
 By taking away these protections, they are making our fair 
and affordable housing crisis even worse, right. It may mean--
--
 Mr. Flood. The gentlelady is no longer recognized.
 Ms. Cornelissen. Thank you.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Torres, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
 Mortgage-backed securities represent the most liquid fixed 
income market in the world, second only to U.S. treasuries. The 
liquidity of the MBS market stems from confidence, and the 
confidence stems from the implicit government guarantee, and if 
there is an erosion of the implicit government guarantee, real 
or imagined, it could conceivably create a crisis of confidence 
in the MBS market.
 Is there a risk that the IPO of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
could compromise the liquidity of the second most liquid market 
in the world, Mr. Bright?
 Mr. Bright. Thank you, Congressman.
 One caveat: We keep using the IPO. I just listened to 
Fannie's earnings call today. So they do have shareholders and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration and 
all that stuff. So you are talking about a capital raised 
through the capital markets. It depends on so many things. I 
mean, I would advocate for broad, bipartisan congressional 
oversight of any change that is structural in that market to 
ensure that does not happen.
 Thus far, the market has not reacted negatively to these 
statements, and so I take that as a good sign. The 
administration is, obviously, very focused on interest rates, 
and so the market is taking that into account, but I cannot----
 Mr. Torres. Can I interject? I think that the starting 
point should be do no harm.
 Mr. Bright. Sure. Yes, fair enough.
 Mr. Torres. So what is the problem that we are attempting 
to solve here? Like, is this a solution in search of a problem?
 Mr. Bright. I look forward to seeing the comprehensive 
proposal.
 Mr. Torres. Mr. Broeksmit?
 Mr. Broeksmit. I think that if there were some sort of 
capital raise and the GSEs remained under a conservatorship, 
which is a construct we have heard, then I do not think there 
is much potential damage to the market. I think if there were 
an exit from conservatorship----
 Mr. Torres. A combination of the two.
 Mr. Broeksmit. Well, or separately. I think they are, 
frankly, probably on a separate track but an ill-thought-out 
exit is where the concerns you raise would really come to the 
floor.
 Mr. Bright. Could I--or a major change to the Preferred 
Stock Purchase Agreements (PSPAs) because that is really the 
undergirding of the market's confidence is that they are not 
taking on credit risk.
 Mr. Torres. The U.S. has a $15 trillion mortgage market. 
The GSEs backstopped the majority of it. If the GSEs are 
backstopping the majority of the $15 trillion market, does it 
not stand to reason that the GSE should be designated as 
systemically important financial institutions, Mr. Bright?
 Mr. Bright. I told you when we met I love the question. It 
is an idea that I think has a lot of merit. I would pose it to 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). I think they 
probably fit the Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFI) bill. People have different opinions about the value of 
the SIFI tag, but it is not a bad thing to look into.
 Mr. Torres. It is fair to say if those institutions were to 
fail, would it create a systemic crisis?
 Mr. Bright. That is very fair to say.
 Mr. Torres. Thus making it a systemically important 
institution, regardless of how we designate it?
 Mr. Bright. Yes, sir.
 Mr. Torres. The FHFA directed the GSEs to make a $200 
billion purchase of mortgage-backed securities. I feel like if 
it walks like a duck and sounds like a duck and looks like a 
duck, it is probably a duck. It is fair to say that a $200 
billion purchase of MBS looks a lot like a kind of shadow 
quantitative easing. Is that a fair assessment?
 Mr. Bright. In some ways, yes, I see what you are saying 
because the stated purpose of it was to lower interest rates.
 They had been buying about 10 to $20 billion a month, and 
the market has been watching that to pull forward the $200 
billion with the stated goal of lowering rates, quantitative 
easing (QE) had similar objectives, yes.
 Mr. Torres. Although, in the case of the Fed, QE is 
typically a response to a crisis. Here we have a $200 billion 
purchase in the absence----
 Mr. Bright. The Fed did it because it was concerned about 
deflation and attempting to stop a deflationary----
 Mr. Torres. Coronavirus disease (COVID), the great 
financial crisis.
 Should there be a statutory cap on the amount of de facto 
quantitative easing that could be undertaken by the FHFA, or is 
there a cap?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Yes, there is cap: $225 billion per GSE and 
the directive from the administration was simply to get much 
closer to the cap. They were nowhere near it.
 Mr. Torres. I think you said earlier that bad loans make 
bad securities. It is like garbage in, garbage out, right, 
garbage loans. So how would you assess the strength of lending 
standards since the financial crisis in 2008?
 Mr. Bright. Definitely much stronger. I think to the extent 
that any of our members have any concern, we are not calling 
for a recession. We do not think that is necessarily----
 Mr. Torres. You are not calling for a recession?
 Mr. Bright. I do not think that is likely in the short-
term, but I think there is some fraying----
 Mr. Torres. I am against a recession, too.
 Mr. Bright. I am not advocating for a recession. So I am 
using predictive speech.
 There is some fraying in subprime sectors of the economy 
worth watching.
 Mr. Torres. My time has receded.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
 Ms. Garcia. Well, I am not advocating for a recession 
either, just for the record but thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank 
you to all the witnesses for being here this afternoon.
 Across the country, working families are struggling to keep 
up with rising housing costs. Between the labor shortage 
impacted by Trump's immigration crackdown and tariffs that 
extraordinarily have raised the material cost of building their 
home has become much more expensive. Builders are scaling back. 
I see that myself in Houston every time I go home and every 
time the housing supply shrinks, families end up paying the 
price with higher rents and higher mortgages.
 Rather than address the issue that housing finance systems 
saw unprecedented change, including mass firings and staffing 
changes, one of these changes was the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency's rescission of its advisory bulletin on climate-related 
risk management. The bulletin required government-sponsored 
enterprises to integrate climate-related risk management 
framework into its existing risk management program.
 Dr. Cornelissen, how does climate risk intersect with 
secondary mortgage markets?
 Ms. Cornelissen. It very closely intersects. You know, 
natural disasters are becoming more common, and this is 
impacting the quality of our housing stock. We have seen a lot 
of housing stock destroyed in natural disasters, but it is also 
impacting systemic risk more broadly. If there is a very large 
disaster, this can bring down home prices and create more risk 
on the books of the enterprises.
 Ms. Garcia. Well, we know that climate risk is a 
significant threat to us in Texas in the secondary mortgage 
market as rising insurance premiums, driven by hurricane and 
flood risks, increase mortgage delinquencies, especially for us 
in Houston.
 I think we have seen seven major disasters in the last 8 
years. I mean, you all see it on the news. That photo that 
always comes to mind or that image of people on boats going 
home to home because that is how much water we had, that was in 
my district, so I am very, very, very cognizant of it.
 So Doctor, a study done last year by the Dallas Federal 
Reserve Bank found the delinquency effects are present in both 
GSE and non-GSE mortgages, implying risk for both the Federal 
Government and the private sector. Do you believe that climate 
risk, coupled with soaring reinsurance costs, are ultimately 
eroding housing stability, particularly for low-income buyers?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Absolutely. We are seeing growing 
pressure. I mean, our housing crisis is not just about the cost 
of a mortgage but also other costs, such as the price of home 
insurance. So for a lot of lower income homeowners and 
homebuyers, this is putting a lot of extra pressure on their 
pocketbooks every month, yes, for sure.
 Ms. Garcia. So it is a double whammy.
 Ms. Cornelissen. It is a double whammy, yes, absolutely.
 Ms. Garcia. It is a double whammy.
 So as insurance insurers continue to pull out or increased 
premiums due to climate events, lenders are more likely to pass 
on risk for properties with high environmental risk, decreasing 
property values, and ultimately undermining the stability of 
the secondary mortgage market.
 Mr. Bright, you wrote in HousingWire in 2022 about the 
impact that environmental metrics could have on residential 
mortgage-backed securities. In your opinion, does the mortgage-
backed securities market adequately price risks related to 
insurance costs, especially in States like mine in Texas, 
Florida, and California, that are impacted the most?
 Mr. Bright. The end MBS investors, as fiduciaries to their 
clients, have to take into account all risks, including climate 
risk and the cost that could impose on loss of property, 
delinquencies, et cetera. So the large investors, insurance 
companies, and asset managers who invest in these bonds very 
much look at that.
 Ms. Garcia. I know I focused on climate risk today, but 
there is so much more to discuss, including the role of GSE's 
market stability and recent policy shifts at the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. I hope we can keep up the momentum from 
this week and continue the important discussion, Mr. Chair, 
because when we talk about affordability, for many of the 
people in my district, it is more than just the groceries. It 
is more than just the gas. It is also utilities. It is also 
rent. It is the high insurance premiums. It is their mortgage. 
It is all of the above.
 Unlike the person in the White House who thinks 
affordability is a hoax, my district knows it is real. They 
encounter it every single day.
 Thank you and thank you to all the witnesses, and I yield 
back the final 10 seconds of my time.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back.
 The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Fitzgerald, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Chairman.
 The secondary mortgage market depends on broad investor 
confidence that mortgage credit risk is being priced, managed, 
and distributed responsibly.
 In the coming weeks, I plan--and I am sure the chairman is 
aware. We are going to be introducing legislation that would 
end the conservatorship of Fannie May, Freddie Mac, by 
codifying many of the reforms that have been accomplished in 
the past few years. In particular, encouraging more credit risk 
transfers.
 Mr. Bright, thanks for being here today. From your 
perspective, would you agree that with the cap on their 
investment portfolios, increased capital standards, and the 
introduction of the credit risk transfers, Freddie and Fannie 
have become far less risky than prior to the financial crisis 
and then how can we encourage more credit risk transfers (CRT) 
further--how could we have that CRT further remove taxpayers 
risk and better utilize private capital?
 Mr. Bright. So the answer to your first question, 
undoubtedly, they are less risky, much lower leverage, much 
stronger underwriting standards, much more oversight, and, as 
you point out, the use of CRT as an insurance vehicle to 
protect against pre-defined losses.
 How can we encourage more? You mentioned codifying reforms 
in legislation. I think there are a lot of reforms that have 
been done administratively that could use codification in 
legislation and encouragement of them to continue to leverage 
that as a form of loss protection.
 Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good.
 Let me ask you another question. Mr. Bright, one aspect of 
Fannie and Freddie that has not been addressed is the alarming 
increase in the conforming loan limits, which allows them to 
purchase mortgages over $1 million in high cost areas. So what 
we are trying to do with the bill is tie increases in the loan 
limits to median income rather than the home price appreciation 
index, right. I know I am getting into the weeds here but that 
would, in effect probably put the rates in a different path, 
and they would increase slower.
 Can you talk about how this change would bring in probably 
more capital, more private capital to the mortgage market, as 
well as the benefits of that, I guess?
 Mr. Bright. There is quite a bit of private capital on the 
sideline looking to get into the mortgage market. The PLS 
market is functioning well, and there is more capital to be 
deployed there.
 One regulatory change that I would hope you all would 
encourage would be the SEC to continue looking at amendments to 
the Reg AB framework, which has been in place since 2013 and 
has really limited the ability to have a public issuance market 
for mortgage-backed securities that are not backed by the 
taxpayer. My understanding is the SEC is looking into it. I 
would encourage you to do that as well.
 Being mindful of time, there is a chart that I think speaks 
volumes, and it is a graph of home prices and a graph of loan 
limits and then a graph of income over the last 15 years, and 
you can see these lines. Home prices and loan limits go up 
together. Incomes do not. That gap is a problem and is probably 
contributing to the affordability challenge.
 Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you.
 Mr. Broeksmit, one core part of the bill that I am working 
on would establish a utility model framework for Fannie and 
Freddie. Can you discuss how a utility kind of model, 
potentially using a return on equity band, could discourage 
Fannie and Freddie from expanding beyond their, I guess, what 
you would call their core mission?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Sure. We think that a model for a post-
conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, where their 
returns are targeted to a range of return on equity would make 
sense. We want it to be set enough so that there will be 
interest in people buying their stock and having them be well-
run companies but with a cap so that they do not stray away 
from their chartered mission and get into the primary mortgage 
market, for instance.
 Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes. I mean, we are kind of in--that would 
be uncharted territory, so we are assuming, but you are 
confident that is what the impact would be. Would you say that?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Well, we think that Congress' involvement in 
any ultimate release would put guardrails in terms of what 
activities they could pursue, which would complement the 
utility model.
 Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you.
 I yield back, Chairman.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 The gentlewoman from Colorado, Ms. Pettersen, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Ms. Pettersen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It must be fun to 
run the committee. I miss those days.
 I welcome everyone. Thanks so much for being here.
 We know that the skyrocketing housing costs are really 
fundamentally about the housing supply. We have to build more 
housing but you all place such a critical role and perspective 
in making sure that we have a well-functioning secondary 
mortgage market to ensure that lenders can make loans more 
affordable. So, I want to first start out with the industry 
perspective and hear from Mr. Bright and Broeksmit.
 The secondary market is critical to facilitating 
homeownership and the stability of our financial system, and I 
think it is important that any major efforts here should 
involve Congress and be bipartisan so that they are durable. Do 
you agree that GSE reform, significant policy changes to the 
secondary market, or any attempt at releasing Fannie and 
Freddie from conservatorship should be done in a bipartisan 
way, working with Congress so we can have a system that is 
resilient to economic and political conditions?
 We can start with you, Mr. Bright.
 Mr. Bright. Yes. I think congressional bipartisan 
involvement in this issue is critically important.
 Ms. Pettersen. All right.
 Can I hear from you, Mr. Broeksmit?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Yes.
 Ms. Pettersen. Hey, wow! That was concise.
 All right. Let us shift to the consumer perspective, and I 
want to thank Sharon Cornelissen--and I am so sorry. We are all 
butchering it. We are trying, though.
 Trump and the FHFA director have pushed several concerning 
ideas regarding the secondary market, and we have heard a lot 
about the 50-year mortgage. I am deeply concerned that 
something like this that might sound good on its face would 
actually lead people further into debt, and homeowners will not 
be able to build equity in these products.
 Would you like to expand further on how this would 
negatively impact consumers?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Yes, absolutely. I mean, if you sign up 
for a 50-year mortgage, your monthly payments may be a little 
lower. So it may be $50 a month lower, but even in just 10 
years of loan, you end up paying $50,000 more, or more in 
interest payments, right. So it really undermines people's 
ability to build wealth through homeownership.
 I also want to point out that the average first-time 
homebuyer today is 40 years old. So if you sign for a 50-year 
mortgage, you may still be paying mortgage payments well into 
your retirement.
 Ms. Pettersen. Thank you for that.
 Do you have anything else that you would like to expand on, 
on what some real solutions are?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Yes. I mean, I have mentioned this before, 
but I think really thinking about the actual capacity of Fannie 
and Freddie to lead the market, they have a lot of capacity to 
really set standards for the U.S. mortgage market and come up 
with products that make mortgage finance more broadly 
available.
 So, I think a way to really expend shared equity financing, 
for example, for a nonprofit shared equity product could be a 
great idea. Helping CDFIs do more mortgage lending and get 
better access to the secondary market for what are usually kind 
of unusual products, right. They do not really need the sort of 
typical Fannie and Freddie loan but helping them get better 
access to the secondary market.
 Finally, I mentioned before, but I think there is a lot of 
bipartisan support here, too, for thinking about ways to expend 
financing for manufactured housing through a mortgage to help 
consumers access that housing stock as well.
 Ms. Pettersen. Thank you for adding to that.
 Quickly, we are running out of time, but, Mr. Bright, what 
are some of the top three suggestions for ways that the GSEs 
can better support access and affordability?
 Mr. Bright. Fannie has this home ready program I think it 
is called. It is kind of an interesting program. I would look 
at that. It involves I think a $2,500 rebate to first-time 
homebuyers and allows for a very low downpayment. I do not know 
off the top of my head the uptake on that program, but you 
already have sort of something that is right there to use.
 When it comes to affordability, one thing I think is always 
important to remember--and you know this because you said it--
the secondary market and the interest rates can only affect the 
demand side really and make it a little bit easier to borrow. 
It is the supply that I think really needs the most amount of 
focus, and I think rehabilitation of old homes, building on 
vacant land, conversion of office buildings as rentals and 
manufactured housing as well, these are all I think a holistic 
approach that can help address that.
 Ms. Pettersen. Thank you so much for that.
 Maybe we do not have time for a response, but I do not 
think that tariffs and deporting our workforce is also going to 
help with rising costs, but thank you all for being here.
 I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back.
 The gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here today.
 We have discussed at length today how the GSEs and the 
secondary mortgage market serve to provide substantial 
liquidity in the mortgage market and really make it possible 
for small and midsize lenders to originate mortgages. Yes, it 
is fair to say that homeownership, which epitomizes the 
American dream for many, has never been further out of reach.
 Today, the GSE securitized roughly 40 percent of new 
mortgage originations and own or guarantee nearly 70 percent in 
outstanding agency mortgage-backed securities.
 As a conservative, I prefer as little involvement in the 
Federal Government in the market as possible, and Congress 
created these GSEs.
 I am going to start my questioning with Dr. Michel. It is a 
two-part question. Is more competition needed in the secondary 
mortgage market? If so, what can Congress do to lessen the 
Federal Government's involvement to drive down the cost of 
lending and borrowing.
 Mr. Michel. Yes. Revoke the charters.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you very much.
 I am going to move on to Mr. Bright. Do you believe the 
secondary mortgage market is functioning as efficiently as it 
should be?
 Mr. Bright. I think it is functioning pretty well. Yes, I 
do.
 Mr. Downing. Well, thank you.
 Is there anything the commercial mortgage-backed 
securities, or CMBS market, something I have a little bit of 
experience with, that we should explore for the residential 
mortgage-backed security space? You know, there are all of 
these ideas like B-piece buyers for the higher risk tranches, 
yield maintenance to fees.
 Is there anything we should be exploring on the CMBS side 
that would apply here?
 Mr. Bright. Yes. That is a really interesting question 
because in the CMBS market, there is risk sharing that is 
already built in, which is what the PLS market does. If we can 
get Reg AB changes, then that market can really step in.
 Mr. Downing. Why do you think other countries have not 
adopted the GSE model of the United States?
 Mr. Bright. I mean, homeownership is literally uniquely 
American as an aspiration. Europeans are a little bit more 
comfortable, obviously, with renting culturally. There is a 
covered bond market in Europe that is very heavy. They rely on 
that.
 I will point out that the EU is undertaking some very 
aggressive reforms right now to attempt to jump start their 
securitization market because they realize that relying solely 
on giant banks with putting just loans on their balance sheet 
is not enough to achieve the growth that they want.
 So they are voting in June on a package of really 
substantial regulatory reforms to try and jump start their 
securitization market as well in all asset clauses.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you.
 I am going to move back to Dr. Michel. Do you see the U.S. 
needing the GSEs indefinitely?
 Mr. Michel. I am sorry. Do I see them----
 Mr. Downing. Needing. Do you see the United States needing 
the GSEs indefinitely?
 Mr. Michel. No. I mean, I do not think that they needed 
them in the first place, though.
 Mr. Downing. So if these disappeared tomorrow, what effect 
would that have on homeownership?
 Mr. Michel. In an abrupt fashion like that, that is 
probably not ideal. However, you have a really hard time to 
making a logical case that they are necessary.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you.
 Mr. Michel. Other people would invest. That is what I am 
trying to say.
 Mr. Downing. I appreciate your answer.
 We have discussed how the GSE's failing to stay within 
their congressional boundaries contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis. How do you think 2008 would have played out 
differently if the GSEs did not exist?
 Mr. Michel. Well, I mean, there is a very large percentage, 
and I do not have the numbers in front of me, but a large chunk 
of even the private labor market where we know they were 
buying, they were securitizing with the specific intent of 
selling some of that stuff to the GSEs. So the whole problem is 
this is more leverage, right, and that is what you get.
 If you have more Federal backing, more government backing 
to cover losses, you are going to get more leverage than you 
would have otherwise. So you would have had less leverage and 
less risk.
 Mr. Downing. Well, thank you for that.
 I am going to move to Mr. Broeksmit. You know, one reason 
for the failure of the GSEs in the run up to the 2008 financial 
crisis was the irresponsible political pressure of trying to 
put as many people in the home as possible. So in your opinion, 
what should Congress be considering as we work on housing 
affordability legislation to ensure we are responsibly 
increasing homeownership?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Well, I think there are some immediate steps 
that could be taken right now in terms of lowering the loan 
level price adjustments at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that 
would give lower rates to borrowers tomorrow. I think the 
mortgage insurance premium at FHA would also do the same thing 
and lower costs tomorrow and modernizing the credit report 
requirements would save hundreds of dollars per loan.
 So I think those are some short-term tangible actions that 
we could take.
 Mr. Downing. Right.
 Well, I thank the panelists again.
 On that, Mr. Chair, I yield my time.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 The gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Flood and 
Ranking Member Cleaver for holding this very important hearing 
today because I am hearing about homeownership and the 
affordability crisis every single day in my district.
 I represent Georgia's Fifth Congressional District centered 
in Atlanta where mortgage borrowers know that homes are only 
getting more expensive, and homeownership less attainable.
 Yesterday, had I had the opportunity to ask witnesses, I 
would have asked about the Trump Administration's plan to have 
Fannie and Freddie sell off stock and unwind the 
conservatorship relationship, which has protected our housing 
market since the crash of 2008. I did not get that opportunity 
so let us have that conversation today to better understand how 
deregulation of the government-sponsored enterprises will 
impact the secondary mortgage market and, most importantly, 
folks trying to buy a home.
 Dr. Cornelissen, if the GSEs lose their implicit guarantee, 
how do you anticipate this would impact the secondary mortgage 
market?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Well, if they lose their guarantee, 
investors will demand higher returns on MBS because they 
perceive more risk. That would drive up mortgage rates and make 
homeownership even more out of reach for people.
 Ms. Williams of Georgia. Even more out of reach, which is 
wild to me when this is not just my district that is facing 
this crisis, it is across the country. So we should all be 
concerned about this.
 Dr. Cornelissen, how does the current secondary mortgage 
market and the relationship between community banks and GSEs 
impact housing affordability and consumer protection?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I mean, at this point all lenders sort of 
have equal pricing when they want to try to--when they are 
trying to sell their mortgages to the GSEs, and it is something 
that MBA has really emphasized as something that needs to be 
protected in the future, too, for any kind of future plan for 
the GSEs.
 Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you.
 To follow up on that, finally, as we see movements toward 
GSE reform coming from the White House, how should Congress 
contemplate ingraining protections for borrowers into any 
change in the relationship between our government and the GSEs?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I think it is very important that as 
Congress gets involved, they are thinking about ways to really 
make sure that FHFA is this sort of well-staffed, independent 
regulator that we need in order to make sure that the GSEs stay 
safe and mission focused. So I would urge Congress to 
definitely focus on FHFA.
 I also want to mention the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB), right. We are talking about the secondary 
mortgage market, but, ultimately, this is premised on the 
safety of the primary mortgage markets. So we also need a safe 
and strong regulator to make sure mortgages are safe. So we 
need the CFPB as well.
 Ms. Williams of Georgia. Safe, strong, independent 
regulator that is actually advocating on behalf of the American 
people. Because, as I have stated, this is not just an issue in 
my district in Atlanta back home in Georgia. This is an issue 
that is nationwide. Our homes are one of the most expensive 
things that we will ever invest in, in our lifetime: Most 
people, the most expensive thing that we will invest in.
 In my district where I work daily to close the racial 
wealth gap, this is something that is extremely important to 
me.
 Thank you to our witnesses today, and I look forward to 
working with you as we continue to lower the cost of 
homeownership and make it more attainable for more Americans.
 Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlelady yields back.
 The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Timmons, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being with us today.
 Today's hearing give us an important opportunity to examine 
the structure and function of the secondary mortgage market and 
why it has been such a critical part of expanding access to 
mortgage credit for American families.
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in that 
system, and when they operate within clear guardrails, they 
help sustain a stable and effective housing market.
 History also reminds us that when the GSEs grow too large 
or assume excessive risk, taxpayers in the broader financial 
system can be exposed. Striking the right balance remains a key 
consideration for policymakers as we look at them.
 One of the most significant structural changes to the GSE 
model since 2008 has been credit risk transfer. Before turning 
to outcomes, it is important to understand what credit risk 
transfer is and how it functions and how much risk it actually 
shifts away from the GSEs.
 Mr. Bright, for members who may not work day-to-day in the 
mechanics of housing finance, could you explain what credit 
risk transfer is, when it emerged, and the problem it was 
intended to address in the aftermath of the financial crisis?
 Mr. Bright. Yes, thank you.
 CRT--I am not sure of the exact year, but this is post 
conservatorship. I want to say maybe 2011. The FHFA director at 
the time began looking for other ways to safely protect Fannie 
and Freddie from delinquencies.
 So credit risk transfer is essentially a security that you 
sell that has a predetermined definition of when it would pay 
out. So, for example, you sell a bond. Fannie would sell a bond 
to a credit investor. They would put money in a pot that Fannie 
has access. Borrowers in an underlying reference pool go 120 
days delinquent. Fannie at that point has to buy the loan out 
of the mortgage-backed security, put it on its own balance 
sheet, exposing it to risk but in the CRT transaction, it also 
can dip into that cash as lost protection for itself.
 So I think it is a very important part of a series of ways 
of protecting yourself. It is sort of like--the metaphor I use 
is--saying do not use CRT, only have equity capital, would kind 
of be like saying do not buy fire insurance on your house. Just 
have the value of your house sitting--that much cash sitting in 
a savings account. Sure, that sounds really nice, but that is 
really expensive, and you cannot really do it. So you need 
both. You need money saved in an account, and you need 
insurance against pre-defined risk.
 Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.
 These programs were designed to strengthen the secondary 
mortgage mark, reduce the GSE's footprint, and promote long-
term stability. Recently, however, some observers, including 
former Freddie Mac CEO Don Layton, have raised concern that the 
use of CRTs has declined, potentially increasing risk at the 
GSEs.
 Mr. Bright, again, drawing on your experience across the 
industry, do you believe CRT remains an important tool for 
protecting taxpayers and maintaining a stable secondary 
mortgage market and are we doing enough to ensure these 
programs remain efficient and consistent over time?
 Mr. Bright. I think CRT is an important tool, and I know 
that Mr. Layton has a lot of personal pride in their 
development. He is a friend of mine, so I am sure his writing 
was very good but yes, I think they are an important tool.
 Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.
 Finally, I want to ask about GSE cash window. It was 
originally designed as a safety valve to ensure that community 
lenders who do not have the scale or resources to access 
complex securitization markets could still sell loans and 
continue serving their borrowers.
 While that role remains important, there are growing 
concerns that the cash window is being used more broadly than 
originally intended. Heavy reliance on it can allow lenders to 
sidestep the pricing discipline and quality checks that exist 
in the private market. Because individual loans are combined 
into large pools, weaker underwriting can be harder to 
identify, and incentives for careful risk management are 
reduced.
 This reliance can also leave lenders vulnerable when 
policies change. For example, the FHFA 2021 volume caps showed 
how quickly access to the cash window can be limited, cutting 
off a primary source of liquidity for lenders that have not 
developed alternative market channels. At the same time, this 
approach can concentrate more risk on the GSEs' balance sheets 
and, ultimately, on taxpayers.
 Mr. Broeksmit, do you believe the GSE cash window has 
drifted away from its original mission of supporting small 
lenders and are there steps policymakers or regulators should 
consider to ensuring it remains a true backstop rather than a 
primary outlet for risk?
 Mr. Broeksmit. We think the cash window is a critical part 
of the way that lenders interact with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac so that they could sell loans one by one rather than 
securitizing them. We also think there is more Fannie and 
Freddie need to do to show you and the Congress that there is a 
level playing field between the cash window and their MBS 
purchases. Their annual reports to Congress on the G-fees, for 
instance, need to go into more detail on this to prevent just 
the kinds of things you cited.
 Mr. Timmons. Thank you for that.
 Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 The gentlewoman from Oregon, Ms. Bynum, is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
 Ms. Bynum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
witnesses this afternoon for joining our committee today.
 It is no secret that homeownership is out of reach for far 
too many Americans, and I am glad to have the opportunity today 
to talk about how we can fix that. Part of the problem is 
mortgages just are not affordable or accessible.
 Now, as this administration considers whether to release 
Fannie and Freddie from government control and prepares to 
potentially pursue public offerings for their shares, the 
entire mortgage system is at a critical inflexion point. I 
believe this could have a major impact on the housing market 
and wider economy, but my question actually is pretty simple: 
Where should all that money go?
 Should the administration proceed with this, this would be 
one of the largest stock offerings in history, raising as much 
as $30 billion for the Federal Government. If we use this money 
to plug holes in the Federal budget or give more tax breaks to 
billionaires, I think we will be making a major mistake.
 I do not believe we can afford to liquidate our housing 
finance system while failing to address the shortage of 4 
million homes. That keeps homeownership out of reach for 
Americans all over the country.
 In my view, this is pretty easy. The money should not 
deepen inequalities in our country. Instead, it should go to 
the States where housing development is most urgently needed, 
and in my home State of Oregon, it is estimated that we need to 
build 140,000 new homes in the next 4 years just to keep pace 
with demand. Never mind lowering the cost of housing.
 I believe we should use these funds to build more 
affordable housing of all types to get the housing supply where 
it needs to be. That includes investing in infrastructure like 
transportation, and clean drinking water, which enables more 
new builds. The money should also fund demand-side solutions, 
like offering downpayment assistance to first-time homebuyers, 
and I think this would make significant progress toward 
increasing housing affordability in both the short and long-
term.
 Now, I will pause here for just a second just to share--I 
always share a family story. I have four kids: 24, 21, 17, and 
15. After receiving a frantic call from my mother this weekend, 
she says: ``You all need to fix the tax policy in this country 
because I have property, and I need to unload it. You all are 
angry at my generation for not unloading it, but I have to pay 
for my retirement. I have to pay for my long-term care, and you 
all are forcing us to keep it.''
 Okay. Thanks, mom.
 So I talked with my husband, and we rekindled the 
conversation about our estate planning and so every Sunday 
night, we have a family meeting. So I am preparing the older 
kids who are away, hey we are going to talk about our estate 
planning and when I talked with my oldest daughter, the 24-
year-old, the first question out of her mouth was: Okay, we are 
talking about estate planning. Do I get the house? That was the 
first question.
 The young people are acutely aware of how out of reach this 
feels, and I think that is what we are talking about today.
 My question is--I want to ask Dr. Cornelissen--did I get it 
right?
 Ms. Cornelissen. Yes.
 Ms. Bynum. With the profits that would come from this 
public offering that were generated by American homeowners 
paying their mortgages, would it make sense to keep housing 
dollars in the housing sector rather than paying for, say, tax 
cuts for the wealthy or letting them go to the Treasury's 
general fund?
 Ms. Cornelissen. I think that totally makes sense. This 
money came from housing, and it should stay in housing.
 I also think you raised a really important point, that if 
we want to build 4 million homes over a short--you know, over 
the next 5 years, we need investments. We need real money to 
kind of prompt the housing industry into action and to build 
homes, not just any homes but homes that are affordable for 
families, too.
 So I think that is a great idea.
 Ms. Bynum. Thanks.
 Mr. Bright, so what do you make of this idea? If the 
administration is willing to buy up 200 billion in mortgage-
backed bonds to bring down mortgage rates, maybe we could be 
leveraging revenue from a potential public offering to offer as 
one solution to addressing our Nation's housing crisis? I have 
20 seconds left.
 Mr. Bright. I love the idea of finding revenue to address 
the housing crisis, absolutely. One caveat: I do not know how 
that cap really scores because Treasury is selling an ownership 
stake that comes with warrants with it. So I do not know that 
it scores as 30 billion as revenue. I just flag that.
 Ms. Bynum. All right. Thank you.
 Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
 Mr. Flood. The gentlewoman yields back.
 Now the gentleman from California, Mr. Liccardo, who is 
also going to be honored by Habitat for Humanity for his work 
in housing tonight, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Liccardo. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations as 
well on your award and thank you.
 I just wanted to note that Congresswoman Bynum's mom also 
called my office as well. She is a very effective lobbyist, but 
she is tough.
 Mr. Broeksmit, I appreciate that your members are deeply 
engaged in our battle to try to make housing more affordable 
for homebuyers. I know that there is also an opportunity for 
us, as we think about expanding housing supply, which I know is 
at the core of all this, of enabling and empowering homeowners 
to become home providers.
 In cities like Vancouver, we see as many as a third of the 
single family parcels have an ADU, and accessory dwelling unit 
backyard home, and I saw that opportunity when I was mayor of 
San Jose, to try to see how we could incentivize folks to build 
ADUs of their own, working with a private sector, of pre-
fabricated modular units that were more affordable.
 So, we streamlined our permitting and enabled folks to get 
a permit in a day online, and we were very proud of ourselves 
as we watched the number of permits a year go from about 15 to 
more than 800 in just a couple of years. Suddenly, we were 
seeing that this was a significant source of new housing.
 As we were patting ourselves on the back for this great 
success, then we went back and looked at whether or not we were 
actually getting housing after these permits were getting 
issued, and anecdotally, about half the homeowners I talked to 
said, we cannot build because we cannot get financing.
 Certainly, we have seen studies, for example, Terner 
Institute, where it indicates that roughly two-thirds of the 
ADUs that are getting built are really getting built or 
financed with liquid assets and we know for most homeowners 
that is just not attainable.
 So, as we think about those many moderate income homeowners 
with, perhaps, not nearly enough equity to be able to finance 
the construction of a backyard home, we are mindful, as we 
reached out to a lot of lenders, that there are a lot of 
challenges for lenders and lending in this space--we will go 
into all of those now--but we certainly heard from many of your 
members that they had real challenges, and the fact that there 
is no FHA backing for a second mortgage of this type is 
particularly challenging. It appears that Fannie and Freddie 
are largely engaged only in allowing lending for acquisition of 
a home with an ADU, not for new construction.
 And so I wanted to ask you about whether you believe there 
is an opportunity here, if we can get Fannie and Freddie into 
the game, FHA, to actually empower more homeowners to become 
home providers to get the financing they need to build ADUs 
and, perhaps, help them pay their mortgage over the long run?
 Mr. Bright. I think that more accessory dwelling units are 
good, and I think there should be ways to finance the 
construction. I know FHA has made it easier to use the rental 
income you get from an ADU to qualify for a loan, and we are 
open to all good ideas on this subject.
 I know that our people are in touch with you and your 
people on this topic.
 Mr. Liccardo. I appreciate that, and I appreciate your 
partnership.
 We agree that it is a good thing that they are starting to 
consider the rental income, but, of course, what we are seeing, 
for example, in the case of Freddie is you actually have to 
show proof on an executed lease, which means that it is already 
built and there is somebody in it. So I appreciate very much we 
have at least a direction here.
 I know there has been some concern about whether or not FHA 
would be healthy enough to be able to backstop this kind of 
lending with insurance, but I think you note in your written 
comments, I think on page 13, that the mutual mortgage 
insurance fund, the reserve ratio is now 11\1/2\ percent, which 
I think is, roughly, six times the statutory minimum. Is that 
right?
 Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you for reading my written testimony. 
Yes.
 Mr. Liccardo. Well, I will not go into how exactly I 
learned that. There are smarter people than me around me.
 So I like to think as you look at the landscape, we have 
healthy enough institutions to be able to expand this 
opportunity. Is that fair to say?
 Mr. Broeksmit. To expand, I am sorry, what?
 Mr. Liccardo. Expand this opportunity; that is, to help 
more homeowners.
 Mr. Broeksmit. Absolutely, yes.
 Mr. Liccardo. Well, I appreciate that very much, and I 
appreciate your organization's partnership with us. I 
introduced a bill, of course, with my colleague, Andrew 
Gabarino of New York, a bipartisan bill called the Supporting 
Upgraded Property Projects and Lending for Yards (SUPPLY) Act, 
and I look forward to working together and seeing if we can get 
this over the goal line.
 Mr. Broeksmit. Thank you.
 Mr. Liccardo. Thank you.
 Mr. Flood. The gentleman yields back.
 I would like to thank all of our witnesses for your 
testimony today.
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the 
chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for 
their response.
 Witnesses, please respond no later than March 18, 2026.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.]

 This hearing is adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
 
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