SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET: COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS

House April 15, 2026

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET: COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET:
 COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION
 IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 APRIL 15, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-69

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 www.govinfo.gov
 
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-154 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
======================================================================= 
 
 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES

 FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 
 Chairman Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice 
PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member
ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York
ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas
JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut
WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois
 Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California
RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York
MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado
MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
TIM MOORE, North Carolina

 Ben Johnson, Staff Director

 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

 ANN WAGNER, Missouri, Chairman

ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York, BRAD SHERMAN, California, 
 Vice Chairman Ranking Member
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
PETE SESSIONS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JUAN VARGAS, California
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey
MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SEAN CASTEN, Illinois
ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
LISA McCLAIN, Michigan CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana
MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon
TROY DOWNING, Montana
MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, April 15, 2026
 OPENING STATEMENTS

 Page
Hon. Ann Wagner, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Capital 
 Markets, a U.S. Representative from Missouri................... 1
Hon. Brad Sherman, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Capital 
 Markets, a U.S. Representative from California................. 2

 STATEMENTS

Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial 
 Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 3

 WITNESSES

Mr. Bryan Smith, Senior Vice President of Complex Investigations 
 and Intelligence, FINRA........................................ 4
 Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Ms. Jilenne Gunther, National Director of BankSafe Initiative, 
 AARP........................................................... 23
 Prepared Statement........................................... 25
Mr. Matthew Michel, Founder and Managing Partner, InvestorLink 
 Capital Markets, LLC........................................... 39
 Prepared Statement........................................... 41
Mr. Andrew Verstein, Professor of Law and Vice Dean for 
 Curricular and Academic Affairs, UCLA School of Law............ 44
 Prepared Statement........................................... 46

 APPENDIX

 MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Hon. Frank D. Lucas:
 Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association 
 (SIFMA).................................................... 78
Hon. Andrew R. Garbarino:
 OTC Markets Group Inc........................................ 81
Hon. Michael Lawler:
 CFP Board.................................................... 83

 LEGISLATION

H.R. 2478, the Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025..... 87
H.R. 6161, the SEC Data Protection Act........................... 100
H.R----, the Honesty in Your Promotions and Endorsements (HYPE) 
 Act of 2026.................................................... 102

 
 SAFEGUARDING MAIN STREET:
 COMBATING FRAUD AND EXPLOITATION
 IN OUR CAPITAL MARKETS

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, April 15, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
 Committee on Financial Services,
 Washington, DC.
 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in 
room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ann Wagner 
[chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Wagner, Lucas, Davidson, Steil, 
Garbarino, Lawler, Nunn, Downing, Haridopolos, Sherman, Scott, 
Vargas, Gonzalez, Casten, Lynch, and Bynum.
 Also present: Representatives Hill and Waters.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Good morning. The Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets will come to order.
 Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time. Today's hearing is 
entitled, ``Safeguarding Main Street: Combating Fraud and 
Exploitation in Our Capital Markets.''
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for 
inclusion for the record.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANN WAGNER, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSOURI

 I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening 
statement. Once again, good morning. I want to start by 
thanking our witnesses for being here today to discuss this 
very important topic. This hearing builds on the committee's 
work to protect American investors from financial fraud.
 In 2024, investment scams accounted for nearly half of the 
$12 billion Americans lost to financial exploitation. 
Representing a 24 percent increase from the previous year.
 Securities fraud can take many forms from pump-and-dump 
schemes where scammers use false information to pump up stock 
prices only to dump their shares and swindle everyday investors 
to account takeovers where hackers hijacked brokerage accounts 
and sent assets to untraceable locations.
 These scams ranked as the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI's) fourth most frequently reported cybercrime. Yet, they 
cause the highest total financial loss to investors. Criminals 
are targeting our most vulnerable citizens, including seniors 
and adults with impairments.
 Today, as we know, on April 15 is tax day, and now that the 
Working Families Tax Cut ensures that seniors have no tax on 
Social Security, we need to make sure that they are protected 
from these scams.
 The FBI reported that people over the age of 60 lost more 
money to fraud than any other demographic but these statistics 
are more than just numbers. They represent real pain for 
families and businesses across our country. Retirement funds 
erased, emergency savings gone, and hard-earned investments 
wiped away in an instant. These threats not only hurt American 
citizens, but they undermine the integrity of our capital 
markets as a whole. When bad actors exploit the markets for 
their own gain, Main Street loses trust that their investments 
are safe.
 Unfortunately, new technologies have allowed scammers to 
proliferate fraud on a larger scale than ever before. Much of 
which is coordinated across social media platforms and 
encrypted messaging apps. Criminals can now create websites 
that look identical to your broker-dealers siphoning away money 
that you thought was secure. Artificial intelligence opens new 
frontiers for scams to fake voices and altered videos. With 
scammers masquerading as loved ones or trusted financial 
advisers.
 On top of that, we now have overseas scam centers operating 
at an industrial scale far from the reach of U.S. law 
enforcement. We have seen Chinese companies, listed on our 
stock exchanges, take part in ramp-and-dump schemes, where 
scammers ramp up stocks priced through bots and fake accounts 
to then dump their stock at a peek and profit at the expense of 
the American investor. This is a global problem that calls for 
a multilevel intergovernmental approach. That is why I am glad 
regulators and industry stakeholders have made this a top 
priority, including the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) under Chairman Atkins which has targeted malicious 
foreign actors through the Commission's cross border task 
force.
 Fighting fraud and exploitation is not a partisan issue. It 
is about protecting Main Street investors who put their trust 
in our capital markets. Our witnesses today bring deep 
experience in financial regulation, law enforcement, market 
mechanics and fraud prevention. I look forward to today's 
discussion.
 I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. 
Sherman, for 4 minutes for his opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, RANKING MEMBER OF THE 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 CALIFORNIA

 Mr. Sherman. Thank you for holding this hearing. I think 
your opening statement demonstrates why this administration 
should not have cut the SEC enforcement staff by 20 percent. 
Two or three things we need to focus on, first are the 
influencers on social media. Social media platforms need to do 
a better job of policing the ads that power their companies. 
Reuters has reported that Meta allegedly projects a nearly 10 
percent of its revenue derived from advertisements for scams, 
banned goods, that include these folks who have a financial 
interest in the free financial advice they are providing.
 Second, Congress has recently targeted fraudsters by saying 
brokers dealers can, under extraordinary circumstances, provide 
a 15-day hold when the reasonably suspect the inventor is being 
targeted for fraud. When an investor wants to send--an older 
male investor wants to send $1 million to a beautiful young 
woman he has met only online, we have to say, she does not love 
you, she is not a she.
 We need to stop the idea of tokenized securities because 
that kills the consolidated audit trail. You will be able to 
see that this or that account number seems to be making 
brilliant trades which you will never know who owns that 
account and without that, you end up with a perfect methodology 
for insider trading.
 Chinese companies often sell not the stock of their company 
to Americans, but variable interest entities based in the 
Cayman Islands. Such securities pretend to be common stock in 
the underlying, well-known Chinese company. These Variable 
Interest Entities, VIEs, do not belong in index funds, and I am 
not sure they belong in any portfolio.
 We need to deal with naked shorting, and I hope the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) will take a 
stronger view on that.
 Finally, when it comes to fraud in our capital markets, one 
need not to the look any further than Trump coin: Pumped to 
$75.35, dumped down to today's price of $2.80. A particular 
concern with the fact that it is the President's coin, is it 
anyone seeking influence with the President, could have bought 
the coins from his family for $75.35 and then not worried about 
whether the coins are now worth $2.80, because after all, the 
purpose was not to make a profit, the purpose was to influence 
a President.
 We have a lot of fraud to police here and I look forward to 
these hearings. Believe it or not will end my statement with 40 
seconds left to go.
 I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. A very good start. The gentleman yields 
back.
 I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. 
Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement.

 STATMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
 FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS

 Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chair Wagner and Ranking Member 
Sherman. I appreciate you having this important hearing. It is 
something that we are dealing with across all aspects of 
financial services.
 As emerging technologies and new digital platforms are 
rapidly reshaping the financial markets making it increasingly 
difficult to detect and prevent fraud posing significant risk 
to investors and I would say bank customers and others across 
the country.
 Between 2020 and 2024 since the pandemic, securities and 
investment fraud offenses have increased 25 percent. In 2024 
alone, investors lost almost $6 billion to scams. Those are 
just the cases that we know about through reporting. Financial 
scams are becoming increasingly sophisticated ranging from 
market manipulation, like pump and dump, to digital-age Ponzi 
schemes and account takeovers.
 Unfortunately, seniors and retail investors are bearing the 
heaviest burden. The bad actors behind these schemes come in 
many forms and the purpose of this hearing is to make sure 
Congress knows what tools that we can have and we can suggest 
to be used by our regulators to keep Americans safe and 
encourage the best behavior by our private sector.
 I yield back to the chair.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
 Today, we welcome the testimony of Mr. Bryan Smith, the 
senior vice president of complex investigations and 
intelligence at FINRA; Ms. Jilenne Gunther, the national 
director of the BankSafe Initiative at AARP; Mr. Matthew 
Michel, the founder and managing partner of InvestorLink 
Capital Markets; and Professor Andrew Verstein, a professor of 
law and vice dean for curricular and academic affairs at the 
UCLA School of Law.
 We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each 
of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral 
presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written 
statements will be made part of the record.
 Mr. Smith, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
remarks.

 STATEMENT OF BRYAN SMITH, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF COMPLEX 
 INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE, FINRA

 Mr. Smith. Chairman Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman and 
members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to 
appear today to discuss fraud within capital markets and 
FINRA's role in combating the problem. My comments are informed 
by my current roll overseeing complex investigations at FINRA, 
but also my over 20 years at the FBI where I led operations in 
cyber, financial and organized crime. When it comes to fraud, 
the bottom line is we have challenges in front of us. FBI 
internet crime complaint center statistics released just this 
month, revealed over $20 billion in attempted fraud in 2025, 
with cyber-enabled fraud accounting for 85 percent of that 
total. With fraud rising sharply in recent years, it will take 
a collective approach to combat this evolving threat and to 
form this work there are a few things to understand. First, the 
threat is international, with actors and infrastructure widely 
dispersed. They explain the interconnectedness of the global 
economy and the ability to access targets 24/7 from across the 
globe.
 They are specialized and adept as early adaptors of 
technology used to achieve their criminal ends. They are 
adaptable, evolving to bypass individual and company defenses, 
and evade actions taken by law enforcement.
 Finally, they operate as a business. No longer is this a 
small close knit group of individuals in a boiler room. These 
are organized criminal enterprises, focused on profits and 
losses where they leverage specific skill sets often outsourced 
to achieve their criminal goals, through which we call the key 
services. These include malware in some of delivery system by 
which to get it onto the network; infrastructure needed to 
launch and facilitate the attacks; communications to engage 
with victims and with fellow criminals. Finally, the most 
important, the financial piece. They need to discreetly 
transfer money from the victim's wallets to their own.
 As a self-regulatory organization, focused on investor 
protection and market integrity, FINRA is uniquely situated to 
help tackle the fraud challenge, given the expert--rely upon 
the expertise of our member firms to inform our work, while 
also equipping them with tools to address fraud.
 While FINRA plays a key role in protecting capital markets, 
our jurisdiction is limited. To be effective we must operate 
within a broader network of regulators, law enforcement 
authorities and private entities. One example of this 
collaboration is our recently launched Financial Intelligence 
Fusion Center, a secure information platform, designed to 
collect, filter, and disseminate intelligence based in part on 
member firms sharing real-time threat activity and is already 
paying dividends.
 On its first day, three firms shared intelligence about a 
fraudulent scheme and within 3 hours, FINRA had sent an alert 
notifying all firms about the issue. The information flowing 
this instance nearly kept pace with the crime and we know of no 
firms who are victimized.
 Collaboration is also important because FINRA has limited 
jurisdiction and where we cannot act, we work with parties who 
can. Recent examples include referrals that led to hundreds of 
millions in seizures by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
FBI, resulting in money returned back to investors. The sharing 
of threat activity, which led to takedowns of millions of 
social media accounts being used to facilitate fraud and 
support a technology company which took town technical 
infrastructure being used to infiltrate customer accounts.
 One area of critical concern is the connection between 
cyber and financial crime. To assist firms and investors in 
this area, FINRA proactively shares our own intelligence and 
mitigation techniques with firm, including through our cyber 
workshops and tabletop exercises. These practical hands-on 
experiences and exercises bolster firm resiliency against the 
criminal experts and while fraud impacts every generation, 
criminals frequently target seniors for their relative wealth 
to help FINRA focus on investor education, offers a helpline 
for seniors and their families, trains firms and has rules that 
help firms identify a trusted contact for clients and permit 
temporary account holds where fraud is suspected.
 Investors and broker-dealers are confronting a complex and 
evolving threat landscape. With fraud expanding amid 
technological changes and globalization. The solution requires 
an ecosystem of groups working in concert to address the fraud 
and FINRA plays a vital role.
 We also know that as these threats evolve so must we. It is 
why we remain committed to innovative solutions like the 
Financial Intelligence Fusion Center (FIFC) and continuous 
improvement of our regulatory programs. As the committee 
continues to focus on this issue, we welcome the opportunity to 
serve as a resource for you.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
 
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
 Ms. Gunther, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your 
remarks.

 STATEMENT OF JILENNE GUNTHER, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF BANKSAFE 
 INITIATIVE, AARP

 Ms. Gunther. Good morning, my name is Jilenne Gunther, and 
I am the national director of AARP's BankSafe initiative. I am 
really honored to speak with you today on behalf of more than 
100 million Americans, age 50 and older. I have spent my career 
working to prevent fraud, first with victims of crime in 
Missouri and now running programs nationally at AARP. Congress' 
work addressing fraud has opened up real opportunities for 
prevention, including protections that allow financial 
institutions to act when they train staff and we are seeing the 
results. AARP's BankSafe program builds on those goals of those 
laws. We have partnered with more than 1,500 financial 
institutions, including investment firms, to stop the 
exploitation before the money leaves the account.
 The free training we created with the industry, paired with 
policy adoption has helped prevent more than estimated $560 
million from ever being stolen from Americans but this fight is 
personal.
 It is in my DNA. My grandfather worked in the financial 
industry and was a victim. In his 90s, someone was stealing 
cash from his wallet. My uncle also in industry recognized the 
red flags and in a move only someone in the industry would 
think of, he placed a dye pack in my grandfather's wallet, and 
our family literally caught the thief red handed. Most families 
are not that lucky, they do not have bankers, they do not have 
dye packs. That is why I built a program with my father at the 
very institution my grandfather had worked at, so other 
families do not have to rely on luck to protect the people they 
love.
 Because fraud is not an accident, it is a crime, and it is 
happening at a devastating scale. The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) estimates that older adults lose between $7 billion and 
$62 billion each year. In a blink of an eye, someone can lose 
their entire retirement savings.
 The financial industry can be the last line of defense, but 
only if we give them the authority to act. Right now, we are 
leaving critical tools on the table. Criminals coordinate 
across telecom, tech, social media and across the financial 
system. We do not. We operate in silos. That gap is where fraud 
succeeds. We need to operate as a connected ecosystem, that 
means enabling real-time targeted information sharing across 
institutions and sectors. Fraud does not start at a point of 
transaction, it starts upstream with a text message, social 
media post, or an online ad. By the time someone is liquidating 
their assets, the victim has already been manipulated.
 If we do want to stop losses, we have to intervene earlier. 
When we act earlier and act together, we can stop fraud before 
it turns into a devastating financial loss. We need a 
coordinated Federal response and under your leadership, you can 
make that happen. That means empowering the entire financial 
industry to delay suspicious transactions without the fear of 
liability. Enabling real-time information sharing about fraud 
across the entire financial system, not just in securities and 
requiring social media, tech and telecom platforms to be part 
of the solution, not hiding places for criminals. Other 
countries are doing this.
 In Australia, scam losses dropped 43 percent in 1 quarter 
after launching a coordinated national response. We can do the 
same. This is not just about stopping theft; it is about 
protecting trust. Preventing negative impacts to business and 
government and preserving independence of Americans later in 
life.
 Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Ms. Gunther follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Chairwoman Wagner. I thank you, Ms. Gunther. Mr. Michel, 
you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks.

 STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MICHEL, FOUNDER AND MANAGING PARTNER, 
 INVESTORLINK CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC

 Mr. Michel. Chairman Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today. My name is Matt Michel, I am the 
founding and managing partner of InvestorLink Capital Markets. 
I have spent the better part of my career in the equity capital 
markets supporting the distribution of over 1,500 Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) and follow-on offerings representing 
more than $400 billion in capital raised. This experience has 
given me an unobstructed view of how capital is formed and 
distributed in our public markets and how easily those 
processes can be exploited.
 In recent years, I have turned my attention to mechanics of 
that exploitation, specifically ramp-and-dump schemes that 
target retail investors through social media promotion, online 
investment clubs and coordinated volume spikes in lower priced 
securities. As the only witness today focused on market 
structure and manipulation, I will keep my remarks squarely in 
that lane. These schemes are not abstract; they take real money 
from real people. Savings meant for a child's education, a 
retirement or a first home but the damage extends well beyond 
the individual investor, our small cap markets run on retail 
participation. It allows early stage companies to fund growth 
and mature into durable businesses and that growth is a key 
driver of wealth creation. It is a virtuous cycle and 
manipulation breaks it. When fraud erodes confidence in the 
small cap space, capital dries up, the cost of capital rises 
and legitimate issuers are shut out of our markets. The result 
is not just investor harm, it is American innovation stifled in 
our own markets. Here is the core insight from the front lines. 
We no longer have a detection problem, we have a response 
problem.
 Over the past 18 months private sector tools have 
demonstrated the ability to generate high confidence, early 
warning signals on these patterns, often with meaningful lead 
time before significant investor harm occurs. These 
capabilities have been developed, validated, and shared with 
regulators and market participants for review and discussion. 
The technology exists, but the critical gap is what happens 
after a warning signal is identified.
 Our current regulatory and compliance framework is 
fundamentally reactive, optimized to investigate fraud after 
the fact. It is not structured to enable proactive 
intervention, nor is it flexible enough to allow firms to 
safely adapt new tools and methodologies at the pace of 
evolving fraud.
 As a result, firms that seek to act on forward-looking 
intelligence face uncertainty about when and how they can do so 
without exposure to second-guessing. There are, however, 
encouraging developments. FINRA's Financial Intelligence Fusion 
Center provides a no-cost channel for sharing threat 
intelligence on rampant dump and investment club schemes. The 
speed bumps proposed in H.R. 2478 and proposed rule 2166 offer 
firms a targeted mechanism, a brief delay when there is a 
reasonable suspicion of fraud, paired with notification 
safeguards. These are constructive steps toward earlier 
response times without imposing heavy new mandates. A modest 
amount of regulatory clarity could unlock meaningful progress, 
particularly around when firms can rely on validated signals to 
act proactively and with confidence. Principles-based guidance, 
flexibility across business models and approaches that combine 
shared intelligence with firm level capabilities would go a 
long way toward closing the gap between detection and response.
 I look forward to sharing the advancements the private 
sector has made in early detection and to discussing the gap 
between what is now possible and what firms can practically 
adopt under our current framework.
 Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Michel follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Michel.
 Professor Verstein, you are now recognized for 5 minutes 
for your remarks.

 STATEMENT OF ANDREW VERSTEIN, PROFESSOR OF LAW AND VICE DEAN 
 FOR CURRICULAR AND ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW.

 Mr. Verstein. Thank you. Chairman Hill, Ranking Member 
Waters, Subcommittee Chair Wagner and Ranking Member Sherman 
and the rest of the distinguished members of this subcommittee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Andrew Verstein, 
vice dean and professor of law at the UCLA of Law. I am here in 
my personal capacity and not as a spokesman for UCLA.
 Today's hearing concerns fraud in our financial markets and 
I want to address what I consider to be, after my research, the 
most pressing concern about fraud at the current moment, which 
is insider trading by individuals in the government.
 I consider this problem to be significant, but I am not the 
first one to talk about it. The most famous book on insider 
trading was written by Henry Manne, a George Mason professor in 
the 1960s and Manne took the surprising view that insider 
trading by corporate executives is good. He defended it for 
200-some pages, that is not my view, but I point it out because 
even Manne, who wanted to decriminalize the whole space, drew 
the line at government insider trading. Even he thought there 
are really big problems where that logic unravels. Government 
officials have access to information that they can profit from. 
They can use information as payoff devices and using the powers 
of the State they can create the very outcomes they are betting 
on and when they do things that are not appropriate the 
accountability mechanisms are reduced because there are no 
shareholders to vote them out, there are just the voters to 
vote them out. It undermines trust in both corporate sector and 
the governmental sector. So Manne drew the line there and if 
that guy drew the line there, we should take that line very 
seriously. That is why I am very concerned about recent media 
reports of suspicious trades in commodity and stock markets. I 
am troubled by patterns, I will just mention a few, I am sure 
you have been made aware of the same kinds of stories I have. 
On March 23, roughly $580 million of crude oil futures were 
sold in 2-minute window, approximately 15-minutes before the 
President announced a halt to strikes on Iranian energy 
infrastructure, and so those were very profitable commodity 
trades.
 Another example, in January a previously inactive 
polymarket account wagered that Venezuelan President Maduro 
might be deposed or abducted or put out of office, and, of 
course, he was through a covert military operation and that 
allowed that trader, who we do not know, to make $34,000 turn 
into $400,000.
 Now I cannot tell you that either of these events or other 
events constitute illegal insider trading nor can I say for 
sure that they are linked back to the administration. To know 
any of that, we would need to do investigations into beneficial 
owners, establish access to nonpublic information, and trace 
accounts. It is possible that either of these traders were just 
lucky, or that their access to information was lawful or it was 
unlawful from other sources besides the administration. 
Nevertheless, these are trades that bear the hallmarks of 
illegal insider trading, and ideally, we would be investigating 
them and whether anyone is investigating is something that this 
committee should care a great deal about.
 This leads to my second point. Suspicious trading does far 
more damage to the public when the public has no confidence it 
anyone is investigating. Weak enforcement does not merely fail 
to catch wrongdoers, it invites suspicion that there is trouble 
everywhere and it raises trading costs and the cost of capital 
more broadly.
 Therefore, I am concerned about the erosion of the SEC's 
capacities in recent days. As you know it is enforcement 
results recently announced, celebrated the closure of 1,000 
matters without action. Whistleblower awards are down 90 
percent, staffing down some 20 percent. You know, the 
consolidated audit trail, a comprehensive surveillance tool 
only recently deployed is being scaled back. I take that last 
point very seriously, my research as a scholar involves using 
publicly available data from the SEC to try to track insider 
trading. For example, co-authors and I found about $100 billion 
a year of overvalued stock being sold. You are able to 
determine that corporate insiders were doing that on the basis 
of public information, but when we tried to look at whether 
this went back to the time of Enron and WorldCom, we could not 
check because the SEC had shredded the relevant information 
making our research hit a brick wall.
 When information is deleted or lost, it means that scholars 
and enforcement officials, to say nothing of journalists and 
shareholders cannot learn the truth and cannot protect 
themselves, and they may suspect the worst. So, I am concerned 
about reduced transparency and reduced capacity at the SEC, and 
I am concerned about how that will affect all the issues before 
the committee today. I think that elder fraud is a really big 
problem, Chinese ramp-and-dump schemes are a problem. 
Influencer fraud is a big problem and insider trading, 
corporate and governmental, is a big problem and markets 
benefit when there is a robust regulator working to enforce on 
these issues. The United States has the most trusted financial 
markets in the world, appropriately so, and it is important 
that we defend it so that we can keep them----
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
 Mr. Verstein. I thank you for your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Verstein follows:]
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you very much, Professor.
 We will now turn to member questions, and I recognize 
myself for 5 minutes for questioning.
 The Federal Trade Commission reports that Missourians, my 
home State, lost over $76 million to investment scams last 
year, a staggering $24 million increase from 2024. During that 
same time, the FBI saw a 300 percent increase in victim 
complaints about ramp-and-dump stock fraud. Investment scams 
are not new, but the astonishing rise is deeply concerning. Ms. 
Gunther, what do you attribute this increase to?
 Ms. Gunther. Thank you, Representative, for the question. 
It is driven by criminals who are really scaling faster across 
platforms using artificial intelligence, combine that with the 
low friction from moving money quickly and then limited ability 
to intervene at the point of the transaction. What we are 
seeing also is the greatest wealth transfer that we have seen 
in history, which is $900 trillion being passed from one 
generation to another. To really get ahead of this we have got 
to look upstream where you have got the first point of contact 
between the criminal and consumer is really key to preventing 
this.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Now, how do you see criminals using AI 
or artificial intelligence to make scams more believable?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes, so a lot of--they are doing a lot of 
different things. Gone are the days where you can pinpoint a 
scam because someone is making a spelling error or a grammar 
mistake. They are either using AI to write realistic messages. 
They are cloning people's voices, they are doing deepfake 
videos of people that they may know. So, it makes those scams 
feel a lot more credible but also, reduces the chance that 
consumers are really going to question that interaction and 
that is why it is so important and critical to really look at 
upstream with the first point of interaction between the 
criminal and the potential victim.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Ms. Gunther, AARP has been a vital 
partner in endorsing my bill, the Financial Exploitation 
Prevention Act. This legislation grants investment companies 
the power to pause redemptions for seniors and individuals with 
impairments when exploitation is suspected. We know that once a 
fraudulent wire transfer or security redemption is processed, 
that money is often gone forever, leaving seniors with no path 
for recovery.
 Under current law, mutual funds are often forced to process 
these redemptions within a very strict window, even if they see 
what I will call real red flags. How does my bill provide that 
critical breathing room for financial institutions to actually 
stop the theft for the damage is irreparable?
 Ms. Gunther. Thank you so much for the question. Really 
stopping money before it gets lost, before it leaves that 
account is really critical to preventing exploitation. So, we 
had Virginia Tech do a random control study within the 
financial industry, about 200 financial institutions 
participated. The number one thing in terms of the most 
effective intervention was when they have the ability to pause 
a suspicious transaction. That gives both the mutual fund 
institutions the ability to ask those suspicious--ask 
questions. Is it suspicious? Take time to investigate it but it 
also gives that time to the potential victim to slow it down, 
to get out of that fight-versus-flight that they are 
experiencing. So it is extremely critical for mutual funds to 
have this power.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Financial Exploitation Prevention Act 
that I have authored and sponsored in other previous Congresses 
is absolutely vital that we make this into law, especially as 
we see these terrible increases. Given that so many investment 
scams originate overseas, it was encouraging to see the SEC 
announce a creation of its cross-border task force to 
strengthen the Commission's efforts to identify and combat 
international fraud.
 Mr. Smith, can you explain how law enforcement and 
regulators work together to target bad actors oversees and what 
barriers exist to doing so?
 Mr. Smith. Thank you for that question. As I said in my 
opening statement, this is an international problem, and we 
have got actors and services that are being leveraged across 
the globe to defraud American investors and within that 
ecosystem. If you think about all those key components to it, 
there is not one entity that has oversight or authority amongst 
all of those. That is why the more that private sector 
entities, government, regulators can get together to bridge the 
gaps between those will help investors----
 Chairwoman Wagner. And really just more cooperation, even 
between countries to hold foreign scammers who are targeting 
Americans accountable.
 My time has expired. I will--I did not get to all my 
questions at all, but I am now pleased to recognize the ranking 
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes for his 
questions.
 Mr. Sherman. The SEC launches effective investigations, 
somebody sees they are in the cross-hairs, they buy $100 
million worth of Trump coin, they--magically the investigation 
vanishes. Trump is $100 million richer, what could be better 
than that?
 Now we have talked a bit about a 15-day delay in someone 
getting their money. I would point out that when I first met my 
wife, many people recognized that she was completely out of my 
league, figured she must think I was wealthy, it worked out. 
So, not every--I am concerned about the loss of freedom, but 15 
days is not too long to wait in extraordinary circumstances. I 
am concerned about whether this would apply to political 
organizations. An organization could say, ``Oh, you want to 
spend money on your campaign to defraud voters or you are 
fraudulent in thinking you have a chance of winning, we are 
going to hold your money.'' We have got to make sure, given the 
politicization and how extreme things are getting in our world 
of politics that no political organization is prevented from 
spending its money by a financial institution.
 Mr. Verstein, there is this idea of having deed by trading, 
tokenization of our stocks. Of course, exchanges provide 
transparency regarding the fees, conflicts of interest, access, 
user segmentation, and most importantly, if on an exchange, you 
buy $100 million worth of a particular stock 5 minutes before 
the announcement, there is a decent chance they will figure out 
who you are. If we were to tokenize our securities, would this 
not be an open door to those with insider information?
 Mr. Verstein. Well, it is a technological question, with 
the current tokens due, and it is a political question of how 
we feel about that. I think it is really important to have 
systems and surveillance and accountability, it is important 
that when you place a stock trade on Charles Schwab, if it 
looks suspicious, you are going to get a call from your broker, 
FINRA, or they might call the SEC. That is appropriate, it is 
appropriate that there is a system of accountability that can 
trace things and can figure things out. We do not necessarily 
have to use the same fiber optic cables and same exchanges we 
have been using for a long time. We could go to new 
technologies, but it is really important that along the way, we 
not lose the visibility that we need in order to----
 Mr. Sherman. Well, the whole purpose of tokenization is to 
eliminate the know-your-customer rule. If you that the crypto 
out of crypto, take the hidden out of crypto, take the hidden 
out of crypto, it is not crypto anymore.
 Mr. Verstein. I do think that----
 Mr. Sherman. You are saying that if we have tokenization, 
we need to somehow know your customer for every account?
 Mr. Verstein. I think we do not want to have a slight of 
hand where we lose visibility just because we changed 
technologies. It seems like that could happen with a lot of 
the--that are happening.
 Mr. Sherman. I want to focus, okay.
 Staggeringly, Meta allegedly has projected 10 percent of 
its revenue is derived from advertisements for scammed, banned 
goods. International documents suggest they are serving as many 
as 15 billion high-risk scam ads every day.
 Ms. Gunther, at what point do we need to recognize that the 
business models of social media which prioritize ad revenues 
and traffic over fraud prevention are becoming a real threat to 
financial stability?
 Hello. Ms. Gunther.
 Ms. Gunther. I am sorry, can you repeat the question?
 Mr. Sherman. Did any other witness hear the question and 
want to answer? Okay, Ms. Gunther. At what point do we 
recognize that the business models of social media and telecom 
companies which prioritize ad revenue and traffic over fraud 
prevention are becoming a threat to financial stability?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes, One of the things that we need to do is 
we need to put guardrails there for social media companies. It 
is really important to fight things upstream. That was one of 
the most important things. I think we spent a lot of time 
focusing on the downstream and we need to be a lot more 
proactive in preventing this so that the criminals are never 
contacting that potential victim.
 Mr. Sherman. Thank you. My time has basically expired.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee, 
Mr. Hill of Arkansas, for 5 minutes for questioning.
 Chairman Hill. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is important 
that you are having this hearing in the committee and both 
sides of the aisle are really concerned about this. We have Dan 
Meuser, who chairs our Oversight Committee, also working on 
this in various ways and then Andy Barr, who chairs our 
Financial Institutions Subcommittee, that committee also is 
looking at this in the banking space. So, I want to thank 
Sherman and Wagner for moving this topic into the fintech 
broker dealer space, equally important, overwhelming numbers 
when you look at the fraud numbers that have been announced.
 Let me start with you, Mr. Smith. I was a registered person 
in broker dealer business for three decades, and also in 
community banking in my career before Congress. Every 
Wednesday, we met on the phone, our operations people, and we 
talked about the bad people lurking around Little Rock trying 
to pass a bad check or make a bad loan or have a fraudulent 
financial statement. It probably was not condoned by law, but 
it was condoned by protecting our customers. These kinds of 
things that we have been talking about today are important, and 
FINRA, I think, has proposed rule 2166 the so called speed-bump 
rule that has been referenced here, it would put a temporary 5-
day business day hold on suspicious transactions. Can you tell 
me how you think that would benefit? And is that legal under 
the SEC's statutory authority for FINRA to have that kind of a 
hold?
 Mr. Smith. You hit on two things there. One is the sharing 
of intelligence. So we do not think we called it that back 
then, but that is really important, so people understand what 
we are dealing with, which is why we have implemented some 
things that we have done at FINRA.
 Regarding the speed bump rule I will also go back to when I 
was an agent working investigations and Ponzi schemes and 
investment frauds. I will tell you anecdotally that in every 
single one of those instances that if the victim had asked one 
more question, if they had inquired about what they were going 
to do with the money, when would they be getting the money 
back. If they said, I do not understand what is happening here, 
those Ponzi schemes, those investment frauds would have fallen 
apart because the bad actor did not have the answer to those 
questions. When you look at the proposed rule here in this 
instance, it is a bit of putting that speed bump in place so 
people can make rational decisions based off the facts and 
based off real information. If that means that you have an 
institution coming in and asking that question and getting 
those hard answers, that is really important and I think it 
really can help victims and investors.
 Chairman Hill. Yes, I think it is important, but I do think 
a lot of customers--I mean, I have seen this firsthand and I 
have seen it as a Member of Congress. They insist they are 
right, and they do not need you telling them to get in their 
business and tell them how to spend their money, and I think 
that puts broker-dealers and bankers in an awkward position but 
I think still that rule may, as you say, slow down that 
rationality.
 How are you coordinating with State regulators? I know our 
State Attorney General Tim Griffin, my predecessor here in the 
House, reported that 73 percent of all Arkansas adults have 
been the victim of a cyber-related fraud, mostly coming to them 
probably through the telecommunication system but how are you 
coordinating with the State regulators, securities regulators 
and the States' Attorneys General.
 Mr. Smith. As I have talked about in the opening statement, 
we have a limited role in our jurisdiction over broker-dealers, 
but we recognize that the problems that our firms and 
registered reps of investors and those are also the ones being 
seen by other entities, which is why we have ongoing engagement 
with the SEC, and with State regulators.
 It is critically important that we understand what they are 
seeing on the ground, because what may be happening in Arkansas 
may not be seen in Texas and so if we can get intelligence from 
what is happening there and share it with other individuals, as 
well as then with our member firms, that builds up some 
resiliency, with an ecosystem and firms whether they are in 
Arkansas, Texas, or Washington, can identify this and learn 
from each other.
 Chairman Hill. Thank you very much. I appreciate AARP's 
deep engagement on this topic with your members and your work. 
I was intrigued to read about your BankSafe curriculum. Can you 
tell us how you keep it up to date with this just exploding AI-
driven attempt at changing the rules of the game every day?
 Ms. Gunther. Thank you, Representative, for that question. 
We rely on our 1,500 financial institutions that we work with. 
We put together advisory groups, so we are always updating our 
training and our policies and resources. That allows us to act 
really quickly to address emerging threats like AI-driven 
scams. It is one of reasons we have been able to save consumers 
over $560 million on behalf of consumers. One example that we 
have just recently put into our training is a video testimonial 
where a criminal cloned----
 Chairman Hill. Thank you so much. Expand on that for the 
record for us and I know members will benefit from your work.
 I yield back, Chairman.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full 
committee, Ms. Waters of California, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Ms. Waters. Thank you so very much, Chair Wagner.
 This subject matter today is entitled, ``Safeguarding Main 
Street: Combating Fraud and Exploitation in Our Capital 
Markets.'' Well, you missed the mark. This is too narrowly 
designed to deal with the issues that the subject matter that 
you have initiated here does. It does not do that.
 The Trump family is openly using the office of the 
Presidency to enrich themselves and their billionaire friends. 
Using meme coins and other ventures, they have extracted 
billions of dollars from the American people. At the same time, 
Trump is raising gas, grocery and housing costs. So, part of 
the scam against the American people has been to weaken the 
Securities and Exchange Commission that is the SEC, so that is 
no longer able to enforce securities laws and protect 
investors. The SEC has done nothing to address several well-
documented crypto frauds and suspicious trades. Oftentimes, the 
Trump's press conferences and tweets. If we want to address 
fraud and scams, we need to look no further than 1600 
Pennsylvania.
 Professor Verstein, you are an expert in insider trading 
and market manipulation. Your testimony highlights how insider 
trading market manipulation and a weakened SEC can break trust 
in Americans' financial market. On March 23, roughly $580 
million in crude oil futures were sold in a 2-minute window of 
just 15 minutes before the President announced a halt to 
strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure.
 On April 7, 16 investors placed approximately $950 million 
in bets that oil prices would fall just hours before President 
Trump announced that the United States and Iran had entered an 
apparent cease-fire agreement. There are yet several other 
examples of individuals placing abnormal amounts of bets on 
specific government actions or announcements using the 
prediction market platform. Please explain how the future of 
the SEC is to enforce the securities laws and otherwise detect 
and prevent fraud and can hurt our markets? What should the SEC 
be doing to enhance confidence in the financial markets?
 Mr. Verstein. Oh, this goes to the basic building blocks of 
a successful financial market. Financial markets do not operate 
spontaneously without any support. They operate if people feel 
like they are going to get a basically fair shake. In a human 
sense, ordinary investors do not take their money out from 
under their mattress if they think they are playing on an 
unfair field but even sophisticated investors, big cybernetic 
trading firms, high-frequency trading firms, everybody at the 
top of the food train too cares about whether they are trading 
against somebody who is getting secrets from the White House or 
some government official. People do not play the same way if 
they think there is no accountability. Trading costs rise, 
liquidity falls, capital withdraws from markets, and a culture 
of trust erodes. It is not hypothetical, there are places in 
the world where the markets fail because an unraveling occurs 
as people think: Well, I am going to be cheated, so I might as 
well cheat. Or I should not participate if I am not willing to 
cheat. Cultures of trust built on foundations of law are really 
hard to build and they are worth maintaining. I am I concerned 
that if we make it common knowledge that the SEC is 
underresourced and unable to do it its part, then people will 
begin to take for granted that more is permissible and less is 
safe than we want.
 Ms. Waters. I mentioned the prediction markets. Do you 
think that the President knows and is understanding--and is 
understanding, or participating in some way in the prediction 
market?
 Mr. Verstein. I wish I knew. I mean, I am a reader of the 
newspaper like everybody else. The newspaper stories look 
pretty suspicious. There are suggestions that the President and 
those friends of his are doing well in these markets and has 
bragged about it. I would say the important point is not that I 
can point the finger and say this was illegal, this was 
inappropriate, it is that people are led to wonder, these look 
like suspicious trades, they are consistent with leaks from the 
White House. They might not be leaks from the White House. We 
would feel better as ordinary Americans reading the paper if we 
knew a robust Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), a 
robust SEC, a robust congressional subcommittee all examining 
these things and then reporting back, Hey, everything is 
squeaky clean, let me show you, or Hey, we found some problems, 
but everything else is fine.
 Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentlelady yields back.
 The chair now recognizes the chair of our Task Force on 
Monetary Policy, Mr. Lucas of Oklahoma, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Chair Wagner. I would like to enter 
into the record this letter from Securities Industries and 
Financial Markets Association on the work their members are 
doing on combat-to-combat fraud.
 Chairwoman Wagner. So ordered.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix 
on page 78.]

 Mr. Lucas. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you to 
witnesses today for being here and sharing your expertise on a 
threat that unfortunately continues to persist across the 
entire country.
 Mr. Michel, you mentioned in your testimony the prolific 
use of new and emerging technologies to facilitate fraud and 
scams. What are the trends you were noticing in the past 
several years as it relates to the abuse of innovation and 
technology?
 Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question, Representative. One 
of key things that sort of underpins the entire mess is the 
proliferation of these issuers that list on national exchanges. 
Once the issuer lists, it is available everywhere and the 
liquidity that underpins that is global. Furthermore, the use 
of what I will call industrial AI across encrypted platforms is 
what makes the speed very hard to get our arms around. So the 
access to liquidity--the national exchanges at which they trade 
on, and the ability to promote these things 24 hours a day has 
decimated the retail investor over the past couple of years.
 Mr. Lucas. Continuing with you, Mr. Smith, how can Congress 
streamline efforts across multiple agencies and jurisdictions 
so that we can have a coordinated approach to combating fraud?
 Mr. Smith. This is a complicated ecosystem that the 
adversary is leveraging and so, it takes multiple entities to 
have a successful resolution to it. Efforts that encourage 
information sharing, efforts that encourage bringing the right 
skill to the fight is going to be helpful for investors and for 
the capital markets.
 Mr. Lucas. How have agencies specialized in certain aspects 
of fraud response and how can others benefit from increased 
collaboration and the lessons learned?
 Mr. Smith. Yes, so one of the things that our unique 
position as a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO), we have a 
subset of this ecosystem that we can see and we can leverage 
our expertise in that fight, but there are also other entities 
who have skill sets and authorities. So law enforcement has the 
ability to seize assets when identified that there is proceeds 
from criminal activity and the more that we can connect that 
and enable entities to take action, we have seen some positive 
results over this last year in the small cap fraud space where 
DOJ and the FBI seized over $214 million based off of a 
referral from a firm to us about activity, and then we reached 
out to the government.
 Mr. Lucas. Ms. Gunther, we all know the old line about an 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Particularly when 
it comes to financial fraud. What are the most effective 
mitigation techniques in preventing these crimes before they 
affect investors?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes, one of the most important things people 
can do at the financial institution level is really to put that 
speed bump in which gives people--it gives the investor the 
time to think about, Hey, something is going wrong. It also 
gives the institution the ability to also look at, Hey, we do 
need an investigation. It is that speed bump that we found in a 
random control study is the most helpful for both the victim, 
but also for the institution as well.
 Mr. Lucas. Thank you and thank you, Madam Chair. I yield 
back the balance of my time.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, 
for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Chairlady.
 I want to address my questions to Mr. Verstein. Am I 
pronouncing that right?
 Mr. Verstein. Yes, perfectly. Thank you.
 Mr. Scott. I think I would like for you to tell us what we 
can do here in Congress addressing this issue? Now I am trying 
to do something along with my partner, Congressman Loudermilk, 
he and I are working on a bill that will address some of these 
concerns and our bill really is the legislation. It is called 
the SEC Data Protection Act, alongside, of course, I mentioned 
with Congressman Loudermilk. We can do something, and we need 
to know as we move this legislation, what do we need to do, and 
what we are going to be looking at is the vulnerabilities, the 
bad actors, and how do they access this information. When you 
are doing a bill and we want to respond to it, I want to hear 
from you the experts, what would you like to see in our bill? 
What must be in there, number one, to address the concerns that 
you raised?
 Mr. Verstein. Thank you. Well, I would say there are three 
things that I would propose that a Member of Congress looking 
at this area would do. The first is a suite of things to 
largely reverse the defanging of the SEC. The SEC in the past 
may not have been perfect but I----
 Mr. Scott. You said defanging.
 Mr. Verstein. What I mean is the reducing of staff, the 
reducing of the consolidated audit trail. I would say these 
trends are not good trends for the SEC. It would be better if 
the SEC had enforcement capacity, funding and surveillance 
capacity. So that would be the first thing would be to 
reestablish those parts of the SEC----
 Mr. Scott. How bad is that situation, the lack of the 
talent in there to do this? Our bad actors are outnumbering 
people that can stop them.
 Mr. Verstein. I think the situation, as you have heard from 
the members, witnesses down here, is pretty bad. There is an 
army of fraudsters out there and so having staff sufficient to 
deal with elder fraud should not mean you cannot deal with ramp 
and dump; it should not mean you cannot deal with insider 
trading. So having enough staff to actually do the work is 
vital. The second thing would be to make sure that we are 
taking commonsense prophylactic approaches to government 
officials trading, I do not think any government official 
should have a polymarket account. I cannot see any 
justification for their family members to have one. So we 
should have stronger rules to prevent, not just insider 
trading, but the appearance of insider trading or the 
possibility of it. Then third----
 Yes, Congressman did you want to----
 Mr. Scott. Yes, now Reuters had an excellent article in 
here, and I want to share it with you. They highlighted a 
decline in the SEC's enforcement measures by 20 percent. How do 
you--excuse my coffee, it probably agreed with me--but how do 
you address that? I mean, are you aware of that?
 Mr. Verstein. I am terribly sorry to say the noise from the 
hallway was so loud, I could not really hear the question. I am 
sorry to say that.
 Mr. Scott. Reuters article had highlighted the decline and 
the SEC's enforcement measures of 20 percent in the latest 
fiscal year.
 Mr. Verstein. Yes.
 Mr. Scott. On top of that, a staffing reduction also--well, 
they have 18 percent.
 Mr. Verstein. Yes, Congressman, I am sorry to make you 
repeat that. Yes, it is true, these staffing cuts are real, 
they are huge, they are significant, they are worrying to me. 
It is true that any organization needs to change things from 
time to time. It is okay for the chairman to reshuffle, but I 
think it looks like an overcorrection to me.
 Mr. Scott. Would that be something that you would--I 
recommend that Congressman Loudermilk and I----
 Mr. Verstein. I would recommend that you fund and staff the 
SEC robustly, and then we can debate which the relative 
priorities are. I think it needs to be funded.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
 Mr. Scott. Good. Thank you.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on 
National Security, Mr. Davidson of Ohio, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairwoman.
 To our witnesses, thank you for your work in preparation 
for this and your testimony and your participation today in 
today's hearing.
 A very timely hearing. When you look at safeguarding 
American citizens against scams, I think there is no real 
partisanship here and I have been really encouraged by the work 
I have had with Ranking Member Beatty on confronting that with 
respect to traditional scams.
 When you look at some of the scams in the capital markets, 
there has been a longtime concern that--you have seen a rise of 
what have historically been known as pump-and-dump scams, where 
you see something hyped and then there is a rug-pull later.
 Some of that is allegedly taking place in crypto, and for 
the longest time, really since 2017 when the initial coin 
offering market was going on, I started working with colleagues 
to produce market clarity. Back then, we called it the Token 
Taxonomy Act, and the SEC has recently put out their own 
taxonomy. I think that is the goal: is to make a clear, bright-
line test for when something is a security and when something 
is not a security.
 Mr. Smith, maybe I will start with you.
 How important is it that we get those clear rules of the 
road versus regulation by enforcement?
 Mr. Smith. In my experience, both in law enforcement and 
here in FINRA, having clarity as to what things are, what the 
rules are in the road are important, and taxonomy is really 
important to that.
 It is why we focused on--you heard me talk about the key 
services of how the adversary is using cyber-enabled tactics to 
enable pump-and-dump schemes, to enable business email 
compromise (BEC), to enable romance fraud and ransomware.
 That taxonomy that we have used is now pervasive and so 
everyone understands that those are key areas to address those 
frauds.
 As a great example, if we all are focused and we understand 
what the problem is, then we understand where we fit within it 
and how we then can address it.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you.
 I think one of the things you see increasingly is, like, 
cross-border and I think the other thing is, if you look at, 
particularly with crypto, people are saying, well, does this 
token really represent real voting rights or real control of a 
company? But, on the other hand, every Chinese company that is 
traded in America is effectively a proxy. You do not really 
control that.
 What kind of safeguards do we have for cross-border fraud 
in those cases? Does anyone want to weigh in on that issue?
 Mr. Smith. Certainly, we have a responsibility in those 
areas where it is a member firm or a registered rep that is 
involved in those transactions, and we will take action when we 
see an issue.
 Where we have seen instances where we do not have 
authority, that is when we partner with other entities, like 
law enforcement, and hand it off to them.
 Mr. Davidson. So the broker-dealer does have some 
liability, some risk for their recommendations and their due 
diligence in that sense, correct, to the SEC?
 Mr. Smith. They can, yes.
 Mr. Davidson. Mr. Michel, could you kind of comment on 
that, when you look at kind of the role and importance of 
broker-dealers?
 Maybe also part of the appeal in the market is to get more 
democratic access to capital. I mean, with only less than 5 
percent of the world's population, we have got more than 50 
percent of the world's invested capital. Our markets are 
incredible but a lot of the reach we have wanted to see is to 
get ordinary Americans to have easier access to this.
 Mr. Michel. Yes.
 Mr. Davidson. What is the role of the broker-dealer there, 
and why is it not just a plain accredited investor and it is my 
money, I can do what I want?
 Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question.
 The broker-dealers are the front lines, and I think FINRA--
I formed a broker-dealer. I ran one. So we consistently hear 
that messaging.
 One of the key things that we can do is give them an 
environment from which they can evolve into the various threats 
that face them and ultimately the retail investing community. 
So by having a framework that allows their regulatory posture 
to kind of meet the threat as it evolves is critical for 
preserving exactly what you are asking.
 Mr. Davidson. Yes. Okay. Well, thank you for that.
 As the tools evolve, I think probably the biggest threat--
and we will surely cover that some--is artificial intelligence. 
I was encouraged to see Secretary Bessent and Chairman Powell 
and others talking about Claude as a tool or ongoing roles of 
these kinds of tools.
 So Congress really has not kept up with privacy laws, let 
alone artificial intelligence. What should we be doing, or is 
an executive order enough?
 Mr. Michel, have you got a thought on that?
 Mr. Michel. Again, that is not really my lane of expertise 
in terms of the policy aspect of this but the phenomenon that 
you are describing of ramp and dump is certainly observable, 
and firms need to be able to evolve to protect themselves from 
that.
 Mr. Davidson. Thank you. I yield.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the ranking member of our Task Force 
on Monetary Policy, Mr. Vargas of California, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I 
appreciate this hearing. I think it has been very good, and I 
appreciate all the witnesses here today.
 Professor Verstein, I did hear the conversation between 
yourself and Mr. Scott, I mean, the cuts at the SEC, having 
sufficient staff.
 Could you go into that a little bit further? Because I do 
think that one of the things that makes the capital markets so 
robust in our country is the SEC's disclosure and the world 
class staff that we have there policing this.
 So could you go into a little bit more depth about that? 
Because I think that is a problem.
 Mr. Verstein. Well, I think we should distinguish between 
ordinary politics of different administrations liking different 
things out of an office from the nuts-and-bolts issue of what 
talent is there and how capable you want the capacity of this 
group to be.
 The SEC is a hundred-year-old organization with a blue 
ribbon history, and at its best it is commendable in every way 
and at its worst makes some mistakes. I think we have seen an 
overcorrection, though. I think there are really talented 
people that we have seen----
 Mr. Vargas. Overcorrection in the sense of what?
 Mr. Verstein. Well, I think we had--we have had Republican 
Administrations with robust enforcement and Democratic 
Administrations with robust enforcement. There are ways to have 
robust, talented, well-resourced SECs without axing all the 
talented people.
 Mr. Vargas. All right. Thank you.
 Two things that really jumped out at me today were this, 
that said that we no longer have a detection problem--Mr. 
Michel, you said this--now we have a response problem. Then I 
heard from a few of you that, really, if we could have a brief 
delay or a pause, that would be really significant.
 Mr. Smith, first of all, thank you for your service in the 
FBI. We appreciate that and thank you for your work at FINRA. 
Could you comment about that?
 Mr. Smith. Yes. As I talked about, just as a case agent 
working on these things, very often you would see instances 
where people just went along. They were embarrassed. They did 
not want to ask a question. They did not understand something.
 So putting a speed bump in to get the information that the 
investor needs can be helpful, because at the end of the day 
what we want is rational decisions that are made that are not 
based off of a sense of----
 Mr. Vargas. What does that mean? I mean, what does that 
mean in a practical sense? So you are trying to pull money out 
of your mutual fund or whatever. What does that mean? If 
someone is trying to screw you overseas, what does that mean? 
What does it mean to put a pause in there to ask a question?
 Mr. Smith. Yes. So in that instance, it would be that the 
firm is asking the potential victim: How did you get in contact 
with these individuals? What is it that you are investing in, 
in this? Oh, this is now a microcap stock that you are 
investing in, and you have always been in blue chips.
 So it pauses them and then if there is a trusted contact in 
the family who can help them through this because the other 
thing that we have seen with particularly elderly victims is 
that they have coached them through how to respond and having 
that trusted contact from a family to help is really beneficial 
to prevent fraud.
 Mr. Vargas. Okay.
 Ms. Gunther, you said that there should--something similar, 
but there should be no liability. In other words, pause it, 
stop it a little bit, but no liability of the firm. Could you 
talk a little bit more about what that means?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes. So I can talk a little bit about--it is a 
liability to actually report the financial exploitation. I 
wanted to key on something that was said earlier about older 
investors.
 One of the things that is so important about a trusted 
contact is we know from psychology somebody needs to be told 
from by different people that something is amiss before they 
realize and they get out of that fight-or-flight. That is why 
the speed bump is really critical, but also that trusted 
contact who can be one of those three people so they can 
realize that something is amiss.
 Mr. Vargas. Okay. I have about a minute left, so what I do 
want to say is, of course, I agree with the insider trading. I 
do not think that politicians--anybody--should be able to trade 
individual stocks or on futures, anything like that. We should 
have our investments in mutual funds, and that is that. We 
should not be able to pick winners and losers, because, again, 
we do get a lot of information.
 I hope we pass that law. I have always been in favor of 
that. I have my money in mutual, so I do not pick individual 
stocks, but we did talk about technology today, and I think 
that is an important thing, AI and other things. How really can 
that help here to make sure that we do not have more fraud? 
Because it also--we heard from Mr. Smith--it also hurts the 
other way. Technology is also improving the way the thieves rip 
our money off.
 Mr. Verstein. That is right. This is part of why I am 
concerned about the decline of the Consolidated Audit Trail. I 
think one of the great things that AI lets you do is use the 
information you have to be more effective, and that is why you 
want to have good information.
 So having the SEC has at its fingertips all the personally 
identified information, all the brokerages, all the transaction 
history, I understand that it is expensive, but it is valuable.
 Mr. Vargas. My time is up, and I thank the chair. Thank 
you. Yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the chair of our Subcommittee on 
Digital Assets, Mr. Steil of Wisconsin, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Chair Wagner. I appreciate 
you holding today's hearing.
 Before I begin my questions, I just want to return to a 
previous colleague's assertion about tokenized securities. In 
particular, there was an assertion made that it would make it 
easier for insider traders to trade on nonpublic information if 
the security was tokenized. That is not true.
 To be clear, placing a security on a blockchain does not 
confer any special treatment. It does not alter its regulatory 
status. It remains a security and must comply with all 
applicable laws and regulations. I think that is really 
important to put that back in the record based on the previous 
assertion that was made.
 Now I want to dive into my comments.
 U.S. capital markets are the envy of the world. There is 
really no second when it comes to U.S. capital markets. They 
provide families with low-cost ways to save, to build wealth, 
and they give companies the opportunity to raise capital and 
create jobs here in the United States of America.
 Increasingly, a lot of our capital markets are under 
threats from fraudsters and criminals, and a majority of 
Americans are encountering scams. The dollar amounts are 
staggering, in particular with our seniors. The FTC reported it 
was 16 billion, but if we assume that there is underreporting--
which I think we all agree with--it is significantly higher 
than that.
 It is not a partisan issue. It is something we need to be 
working with broadly to prevent this from occurring.
 I want to start with you, Mr. Smith, if I can, based on 
your work with FINRA. In your opening testimony, you were 
talking about the landscape dominated by international actors 
who are using technology to exploit jurisdictional gaps across 
countries and regulators and evade prosecution.
 I want to dive into that and identify some of the 
jurisdictional or regulatory gaps that international criminals 
are leveraging to the detriment of U.S. capital markets and 
U.S. consumers.
 Can you comment on some of those jurisdictional and 
regulatory gaps?
 Mr. Smith. Certainly. When you are dealing with an 
adversary that is located across the globe, the rules that they 
operate under vary. I saw this when I was at the FBI of the law 
enforcement capabilities who have that. You also see that 
within the regulatory environment.
 We have to recognize that a problem in another jurisdiction 
could very quickly become a problem within our jurisdiction, 
and so that is where the concept of engagement and partnerships 
and collaboration is key.
 We have seen some success in this of bridging some of those 
gaps where we have done information sharing with our partners 
in Japan on the small cap fraud space and let them know what we 
are seeing. They then let us know about new activity with new 
account fraud and account takeovers involving cyber means which 
encouraged it, which informed our membership. If we could 
replicate that----
 Mr. Steil. Are there specific jurisdictions that are 
causing you concern?
 Mr. Smith. Within the small cap fraud space, that is 
particularly concerning with us with the issuers that are 
coming out of China and that is why we have pushed a 
significant amount of intelligence out about that to firms to 
let people know what we are seeing in that space.
 Mr. Steil. So a lot of that is about jurisdictions policing 
their own jurisdiction. Is that what you are saying----
 Mr. Smith. At times, that can be.
 Mr. Steil [continuing]. in particular as it relates to 
China?
 Mr. Smith. At times, yes, it can be.
 Mr. Steil. Let me jump to you, Ms. Gunther, if I can.
 Criminals are perpetuating frauds, scams, and becoming 
increasingly sophisticated. AI can work in two ways, right? 
They can work to create scams. They can also work to prevent 
scams.
 Can you talk about this balance about how we can leverage 
AI to prevent the scams that are occurring but also the risks 
that AI is bringing?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes, absolutely, and thank you for the 
question.
 AI is both a tool for good and for evil. One of the ways we 
really encourage financial institutions to use artificial 
intelligence, machine learning. It can detect patterns faster 
to stop this crime, and it is also important to--with 
artificial intelligence--is then you have got to train someone 
for that human touchpoint to tell that victim.
 The other thing is that artificial intelligence can also be 
used by criminals to scale scams. They are using bots and other 
things, but it is really critical for financial institutions to 
use artificial intelligence to recognize those patterns.
 Mr. Steil. I appreciate all of our witnesses for being here 
today.
 Madam Chair, I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back, and I thank 
him for correcting the record on tokenization.
 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 
Casten, for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Casten. Thank you, Madam Chair.
 Just briefly, I want to correct something Mr. Steil said. 
It is true that a tokenized security is a security. The SEC has 
been very clear about that. It is also true that Section 202 
and Section 203 of the CLARITY Act says that if you raise a 
security less than $200 million, you are exempted from those 
provisions.
 This Congress, this committee has opened a back door if 
that CLARITY Act becomes law. I think it is important for us to 
understand that if we care about fraud, let us not pretend that 
laws we passed, just because they have not passed the Senate 
yet, it does not represent the intentions of this committee. 
Not yours truly, but this committee.
 I am happy to have this hearing. I am grateful to Chair 
Wagner for doing this and supporting your efforts and the 
legislation you have introduced and noticed for this hearing. 
It is extremely timely.
 On Monday, I did a--coincidentally, I did not know this 
hearing was coming--did a roundtable back in the district 
specifically on senior fraud with seniors and the statistics we 
are hearing, they just come out in all of these stories.
 I sat with a credit union who is sitting there saying: We 
do not actually have the ability legally to prevent a senior 
from withdrawing their money to put it through, but we try to 
put practice in.
 They told this story about going through two levels of 
escalation within their bank and finally persuading a senior 
that this Hollywood celebrity who she claimed was her husband 
and needed money for a home repair was highly unlikely to be 
her husband because they had never met and was therefore highly 
unlikely to also need money for a home repair, and they were 
ultimately able to stop that but they had no legal authority to 
prevent that. This was just about persuasion, and I am grateful 
for the work you are doing with BankSafe and others, but the 
consistent sort of nexus of all this fraud was some combination 
of social media and crypto ATMs.
 I guess I just want to start, leaving the tools aside for a 
minute--and I do not know, Mr. Smith or Mr. Verstein, if either 
of you want to comment on this.
 Can you clarify, if I convince you to transfer money to me 
for fraudulent purposes, what is the statute that I have 
violated, and what is the penalty if I am found guilty, and who 
is the enforcement agency that chases that down?
 Mr. Verstein. I am happy to take a stab at this. I have 
written about crypto in the securities context, and I have, I 
think, the only article on crypto in insider trading.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. I am not even really asking about crypto. 
I am just saying, like, I show up and I tell you a lie that 
gets you to give me money.
 Mr. Verstein. Yes. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act says 
that if there is a purchase or sale of a security and there is 
a material misrepresentation or omission in connection with 
that, that is a fraud and a violation of the 34 Act. So, that 
is a civil and can be a criminal violation, just like any time 
your broker misleads you about whether you are sending money to 
the right person or something.
 Mr. Casten. Okay, and what if I tell you that I am Matt 
Damon and you and I are married and I need $10,000 for a home 
repair and you give it to me?
 Mr. Verstein. That is part--as long as it is a material 
misrepresentation----
 Mr. Casten. Okay.
 Mr. Verstein [continuing]. it might be.
 Mr. Casten. Okay.
 Now does that same statute apply if I am abetting that 
crime? So, I connect the mark to the perp, and I get a fee in 
exchange for that service. Am I also--I do not know. Is that 
going to RICO? Like, am I also liable in that case?
 Mr. Verstein. Well, there is RICO, there is aiding and 
abetting, and there is scheme liability. All three are kinds of 
theories that float around the underlying violation.
 Mr. Casten. Okay, and that is a felony?
 Mr. Verstein. It can be, yes. Absolutely.
 Mr. Casten. Can you get jail time?
 Mr. Verstein. You can get--yes. You can get jail time if 
those things were established.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. Given what Mr. Sherman and others have 
raised, the Reuters reporting that Meta, something like 10 
percent of their income has come from connecting from these 
fraudulent scams, could those tools be applied to Meta if a 
prosecutor wanted to apply them, or is that exempted because of 
all of our other rules around social media?
 Mr. Verstein. I am not sure whether it is the social media 
exemption. My guess would be that would be--that their 
awareness of these issues would be something we would really 
look at. We would look at whether there is scienter.
 If Congress wanted that to be illegal, what Meta is up to, 
Congress could clearly clarify that it is illegal. Right now, I 
think it would be an unclear thing whether a court would 
determine that is a violation of our law.
 Mr. Casten. So the implication is that Meta could do 
something potentially and not violate the law and not be 
subject to penalties that I, as an individual, could not do?
 Mr. Verstein. I think the--we are in country that is new. 
We have not had enterprises like Meta for many years, and so--
--
 Mr. Casten. I am close on time. Same question for crypto 
ATMs, because some of these Bitcoin sales in the ATMs are 
getting 50 percent markups, so they are profiting from 
monetizing these transactions. Could the law apply to them?
 Mr. Verstein. I think it ought to be the case that law 
applies there. I think the law under the Commodity Exchange 
Act, which is not subject to this committee's jurisdiction, is 
probably weaker than for securities.
 Mr. Casten. Okay. Well, we are out of time, but I welcome 
any thoughts on how we get those regulated in the same way that 
other criminals are regulated, reward the same behavior, 
incentivize the same behavior, and if it is a money transfer 
business, regulate it like one.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
 Mr. Casten. I yield back. Thank you.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the chair of the House Homeland 
Security Committee, Mr. Garbarino of New York, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Madam Chair, for having this 
hearing.
 Thank you to the witnesses for being here.
 Before I ask questions, I have a request to enter a letter 
from over-the-counter (OTC) Markets in support of legislation 
being considered here today into the record.
 Chairwoman Wagner. Without objection.

 [The information referred to can be found in the appendix 
on page 81.]

 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you.
 The U.S. securities regulatory framework relies in part on 
self-regulatory organizations like FINRA which operate under 
the oversight of the SEC. Unlike purely external regulators, 
FINRA has continuous access to firm-level data, conducts 
routine examinations, and enforces compliance standards within 
broker-dealers.
 That proximity allows for earlier detection of suspicious 
activity, faster intervention, and more practical insight into 
how fraud develops in real world marketing settings. It also 
positions FINRA as a first line of defense in identifying 
emerging risks before they escalate.
 Mr. Smith, how does the SRO model and FINRA's proximity to 
firms help identify and reduce fraud?
 Mr. Smith. We are in a very unique position because of the 
authorities that we have and insight that we have into the 
markets that others do not and that is an advantage that can be 
leveraged by investors. It is an advantage that can be 
leveraged by firms for better protection and then the knowledge 
and expertise that we can provide to the government entities 
and regulators of really stitching together expertise and 
authorities that, individually, none of us have.
 That is why the model has worked so well for us. We have 
seen results from that of late of where we have informed 
entities about threats that are coming their way, and we have 
been able to reduce and prevent fraud because of what we see 
that otherwise they would never have seen before.
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you very much.
 Just following up on something my colleague Mr. Steil was 
talking about, recent research from the FINRA Investor 
Education Foundation highlights that younger investors are 
increasingly turning to social media platforms for financial 
information and investment ideas. This shift has exposed them 
to a growing number of fraud schemes, including influencer-
driven promotions, crypto scams, and coordinated pump-and-dump 
activity.
 The speed and reach of online content can amplify 
misinformation and make it more difficult for traditional 
safeguards to keep pace. These trends raise concerns about 
investor protection in a rapidly evolving digital environment.
 Mr. Smith, what is FINRA doing to address this issue?
 Mr. Smith. It is natural that the younger generation is 
getting their investment advice from social media because that 
is where they are and so that is where the bad guys go.
 One, we try and engage in a lot of investor education, 
inform individuals, particularly younger individuals, about the 
risks and about where they are getting information so they can 
make informed decisions.
 In addition, we are partnering with technology companies, 
and in certain instances we have identified fraud that has been 
occurring on some of their platforms and alerted them to some 
of the indicators of that, which then they have been able to 
put a stop to the activity on that platform.
 Mr. Garbarino. Thank you.
 Mr. Michel, how have you seen market participants adapt to 
this trend?
 Mr. Michel. We are certainly seeing the advent of these--
the proliferation of online platforms--driving liquidity 
through these names that has ultimately been hyped on these 
institutional platforms.
 To the extent that the trading platforms can either 
disclose to their client that this is ongoing, or if the 
platforms themselves the Metas of the world can step in with a 
heavier hand to reduce this, we can kind of make a better--more 
of a dent in the problem.
 Mr. Garbarino. Have they been stepping in? Have you seen 
them step in with a heavier hand?
 Mr. Michel. Who specifically?
 Mr. Garbarino. Meta and the----
 Mr. Michel. We have not, no.
 Mr. Garbarino. All right. Thank you.
 I am going to switch gears here for my last minute.
 Cyber-enabled threats, including account takeovers, 
ransomware, and AI-driven impersonation, are increasingly 
targeting financial institutions, market infrastructure, and 
retail investors, often by sophisticated and sometimes foreign-
based actors who exploit gaps in coordination information.
 CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 
plays an essential role in safeguarding critical infrastructure 
by facilitating threat intelligence sharing.
 Mr. Smith, how important is the reauthorization of CISA 
2015? It is reauthorized through September 30 but expires after 
that. How important is the reauthorization to strengthening 
cybersecurity coordination and protecting U.S. capital markets 
from increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks?
 Mr. Smith. Information sharing in the cyber arena is 
critical to success. We recognize with an ecosystem they are 
attacking a bunch of different targets. If we can identify IP 
addresses, we can identify the VPN services that they are using 
and share that amongst entities, it gives us a chance to 
actually identify who they are and then the ability to then 
respond to that.
 Mr. Garbarino. Would we be less safe if this lapses?
 Mr. Smith. I cannot speak to the individual legislation on 
that. I can speak to the just general information sharing is 
critically important.
 Mr. Garbarino. All right. Thank you very much.
 I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the ranking member of our Subcommittee 
on Digital Assets, Mr. Lynch of Massachusetts, for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
 Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Madam Chair. I do believe this 
hearing is very timely.
 Combating fraud, that is the name of this committee. If we 
are really interested in combating fraud, I would suggest where 
we could look. I even have the address: 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
 That is fraud central. Frauds ``R'' Us. They should have 
that sign on the front of the White House as they are doing it 
over.
 It is no secret. President Trump has gutted enforcement of 
the SEC, which is responsible for protecting investors and 
consumers. He has reduced the staff by 20 percent.
 His SEC chair, Mr. Atkins, has dropped some of the most 
notorious cases. He dropped the case against Justin Sun. Justin 
Sun, just so you remember, he made about $400 million for the 
Trump family. He also dropped cases against the Winklevoss 
twins who donated 21 million to a political action committee 
(PAC) that supported Donald Trump.
 He would have dropped the case against Changpeng Zhao, the 
CEO of Binance, but he was a little late, because Changpeng 
Zhao had already pled guilty to money laundering. He had pled 
guilty. So what did Trump do? Trump pardoned him.
 Changpeng Zhao invested $2 billion in Trump's World Liberty 
Financial, benefiting the family tens of billions of dollars, 
which--excuse me, tens of millions of dollars--which they 
netted.
 As the SEC has retreated, as we have--as the Trump 
Administration has cut enforcement, dropped the number of 
cases, they no longer--I think their enforcement actions are 
down by 30 percent compared to the previous administration--as 
the SEC retreats from securing America's capital markets, the 
Trump Administration is fostering a culture of corruption, 
plain and simple.
 Since the beginning of the second Trump Administration a 
disturbing pattern has also evolved in the prediction markets 
where large trades are placed just hours or minutes leading up 
to a major announcement by President Trump, which posts massive 
profits after news of the announcement has broken.
 The serendipitous timing and scale of those trades would 
suggest that those placing them had prior knowledge of the 
White House's intentions, and they raise serious concerns that 
the President and his associates, knowing that those 
announcements almost always result in large market swings, are 
purposely manipulating the markets and sharing confidential 
government information--which puts our sons and daughters in 
uniform at risk--in order to enrich themselves, their family, 
and their friends.
 I have a select number of cases. I know the ranking member 
of the full committee has already mentioned some of these but 
the Trump tariff announcements netted people hundreds of 
millions of dollars in terms of Trump announcing relaxation of 
some of those tariffs.
 One particular investor had placed $51 million in short 
positions in hours leading up to the post regarding the attacks 
on Iran and made approximately $170 million in profit after the 
story broke, after the announcement broke.
 Suspiciously--this is amazing--this one individual, of the 
last 16 trades that individual has made, all 16 posted large 
gains. Like the aforementioned instances, this individual and 
others who shorted oil prices would appear to have prior 
knowledge of President Trump's announcements.
 Why are we not looking at that? Why is the SEC not in the 
middle of an investigation on that?
 Mr. Verstein, there is plenty of evidence out there. What 
should our cops on the beat be doing right now in light of all 
this evidence?
 Mr. Verstein. Congressman Lynch, the optics are terrible. 
The stories that you are citing are in the media. People read 
them and they wonder why nothing is happening.
 This is not a court of law. We do not know which incidents 
were illegal and which were not, which were dumb luck and which 
were not, but it is really important that the American people 
and that traders----
 Mr. Lynch. Sixteen times in a row, though, that is more 
than luck.
 Mr. Verstein. It is very suspicious.
 Mr. Lynch. Go ahead.
 Mr. Verstein. We really wish the SEC and the CFTC were 
looking at these cases and reporting back: Yes, we found 
wrongdoing in this case; we did not find it in that case.
 Clearing people's names is also part of the job, but you 
have got to have robust enforcement in order to do that 
credibly.
 Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
 Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair reminds members to avoid engaging in 
personalities or imputing motives of another Member or the 
President of the United States.
 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Lawler, for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you all for 
being here today.
 Ramp-and-dump stock schemes frequently involve small 
Chinese companies listing on U.S. exchanges. Most use the 
variable interest entity structure, which gives shareholders 
interest in an offshore shell company rather than actual equity 
and rights.
 Mr. Michel, does the VIE business structure contribute to 
the rise in ramp-and-dump schemes?
 Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question.
 It is certainly tangential to the problem, but we have seen 
domestic issuers experience this phenomenon as well. So while 
most have that structure, there are other kinds of complicating 
factors within these small issuers that make them susceptible 
to the phenomenon that we witness.
 Mr. Lawler. Ms. Gunther, the committee continues to hear 
from families and older Americans who are being targeted by 
increasingly sophisticated scams, AI-generated impersonations, 
remote access fraud, and high-pressure social engineering 
tactics, to drain savings in minutes. Financial institutions 
are trying to keep pace, but the threat environment is evolving 
faster than the tools designed to stop it.
 Your work with AARP's BankSafe initiative gives you a 
unique vantage point on what actually works on the ground and 
where the gaps still are. With that in mind, I would like to 
explore the landscape of solutions and challenges.
 What do you see as the biggest barrier or challenge facing 
the financial industry in the fight against exploitation?
 Ms. Gunther. Thanks so much for the question.
 One of the largest challenges we see--and you mentioned 
this--is that there is so much attention--we are really 
getting--being reactive and not proactive. We are waiting until 
it gets to the point of transaction.
 What we really need to do is look at where is it that 
criminals--what methods are they using to contact consumers. So 
telecom, social media, those types of things and having faster 
takedowns so criminals do not even have the ability to contact 
that consumer. That way, we are staffing off so that we are not 
having to be so reactive at the financial institution level or 
even in the law enforcement.
 Mr. Lawler. With that in mind, I mean, the reality is 
scammers are exploiting new technologies, new platforms, new 
psychological tactics at a scale we have not seen before. While 
banks are investing heavily in fraud prevention, the criminals 
are adapting just as quickly to get around it. That is why 
understanding where true innovation is happening and what is 
actually making a measurable difference is important to this 
committee.
 What innovations are showing the most promise in detecting 
and stopping these scams?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes. Thanks for the question.
 We did a study with Virginia Tech to really look at what 
are the interventions that actually stop the money from leaving 
the account. About 200 financial institutions participated.
 The number one thing is when you are able to hold that 
transaction that gives time to the institution to conduct an 
investigation. It also gives time for that consumer to slow 
down, get out of that fight-versus-fear response.
 Then the other thing that is really helpful is a trusted 
contact. We know that people have to hear it from three 
different people before they realize something is amiss. So 
having a trusted contact at that financial institution that 
they can call and say, ``Hey, something is amiss, you might 
want to call your parent,'' is really, really helpful.
 Also, asking the right questions, training people at the 
front lines of saying, ``Hey,'' asking, ``Where did you meet 
this person? What is this for?''
 Asking those questions is really, really helpful to get to 
the end of it of is this suspicious.
 Mr. Lawler. Mr. Smith, one of the most heartbreaking 
patterns we hear about in our districts is seniors losing their 
life savings in a matter of hours, often after a fraudster has 
coached them through a transaction step by step.
 Firms can sometimes see the red flags, but by the time 
anyone intervenes, the money is already gone and almost 
impossible to recover.
 FINRA's proposals around temporary holds and trusted 
contacts are clearly aimed at giving firms more room to act. 
From where you sit, and based on what Ms. Gunther said, how 
often do you see situations where a longer hold or earlier 
intervention would have prevented a senior from losing their 
savings?
 Mr. Smith. It is hard to get to quantify that of the 
prevented fraud and say how many times we have seen that but we 
certainly see instances where, when firms have the information 
they need to ask the right questions that slows down that 
transaction, that people make different decisions than they 
would when they are being pushed into this by an adversary.
 Mr. Lawler. Thank you. I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Gonzalez, for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
 Ms. Gunther, we often say retirement is a three-legged 
stool: Social Security, personal savings, and pensions or 
investments but right now that stool is already unstable for 
millions of Americans.
 According to recent retirement readiness data, only about 
45 percent of Americans feel financially prepared for 
retirement, and 78 percent are worried about inflation eroding 
their savings. At the same time, we are seeing an explosion in 
financial scams.
 What concerns me is that, for many seniors and near 
retirees, personal savings are the most vulnerable leg of that 
stool. It is also the one they have spent decades building and 
the one that can be wiped out in one swoop.
 How are these escalating scams undermining retirement 
solvency for seniors in America and what more can Congress be 
doing right now to protect that critical leg of our retirement 
system?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes. Thank you for the question, 
Representative.
 There is a lot that we have done, and there is a lot more 
to be done.
 As you mentioned, people are losing--the average, according 
to the FBI, is $38,000. If it is a known other that is the 
perpetrator, it is $120,000. That is typically what a 50-year-
old has in retirement savings. So in the blink of an eye, they 
can lose everything.
 One of the most important things--and I will say it again 
and again--is that we need to get to the point of where is this 
criminal contacting the consumer and taking those things down. 
When they are on social media, when they are advertisements, 
whether it is telecom, getting at the point of the front of the 
upstream is really, really critical.
 Having trusted contacts is another one. Having a speed bump 
for holding that transaction is also training front line, so 
they know how to deal with this.
 People are in a fight versus flight. How do you calm that 
person down? And we know statistically that one out of two 
times that frontline worker talks to that consumer, they are 
able to get them out of that fear bubble, that fight versus 
flight and actually stop the money before it leaves the 
account.
 Mr. Gonzalez. Are we doing enough with communicating to 
seniors in this country about the risks that are out there?
 Ms. Gunther. We are doing a tremendous amount in terms of 
educating consumers.
 Mr. Gonzalez. How?
 Ms. Gunther. But we are not doing enough. The fact of the 
matter is we want to get it before anybody ever communicates 
with a consumer.
 Mr. Gonzalez. How are we communicating with them? How are 
we educating seniors of these scams?
 Ms. Gunther. There is a variety of different education.
 So we run AARP's Fraud Watch Network. We do events all over 
the country really educating people, not only just older 
adults, but also their children and caregivers. Government 
agencies are also doing that, but we have to have effective 
communication.
 We really do need to go beyond just communicating with the 
consumer. These are hardworking Americans. They are raising 
their families. They are working their jobs. They are going 
home, fixing their houses. They wake up the next day, and they 
do it all over again. They do not have time to read consumer 
disclosures, terms and agreements. They deserve to have a 
government that has a critical role in preventing financial 
exploitation.
 Mr. Smith. If I could add, sir, one of the key components 
in it is that we have got to get to the investors, but we also 
have to get to the institutions that are having those 
conversations with them, which is why FINRA has done a lot of 
work engaging with broker-dealers and reps, leveraging the 
expertise of AARP, so that we have multiple layers of defense 
and there is some resiliency.
 Mr. Gonzalez. Very well. Thank you.
 My next question is for Mr. Verstein.
 Mr. Verstein, last year I was proud to lead a provision 
included in the House version of the CLARITY Act that would 
direct the Department of Treasury to study and strengthen 
resources for the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to better address the 
misuse of digital assets in money laundering.
 The urgency of this issue has only grown. Recent FBI 
reporting shows that Americans lost $11 billion to digital 
asset fraud last year alone and a staggering 37 percent 
increase in cyberfraud.
 While we often think about seniors being targeted, this is 
not limited to one group. Younger investors--and I think we 
talked about that earlier--tend to be more willing to take 
risks and engage in emerging technologies and are increasingly 
exposed to these schemes as well.
 Professor Verstein, from your perspective, what additional 
resources or information-sharing authorities should Congress 
provide to help Federal regulators and law enforcement to 
better combat digital asset fraud? And what are the key 
coordinating gaps between Treasury, the SEC, and the CFTC that 
need to be addressed?
 Mr. Verstein. Congressman, I commend you for bringing this 
issue to the table.
 The fact is that digital assets are a part of our money 
laundering and our fraud landscape. Whether or not that is 
because of intrinsic features to the assets or just because of 
the marketing that is now associated with them--the razzmatazz 
of a new thing that attracts a different kind of ignorant 
person to lose their money on them--they are where the action 
is.
 So, we need to be giving the resources to people to focus 
on these and develop the expertise to coordinate one agency 
with another.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired.
 Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you and I look forward to continuing 
this conversation. We are out of time.
 Thank you, and I yield back.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 If I could take a point of personal privilege, I can say 
that, in our own district, we do have a program called Beat the 
Cheats, and we go among our senior communities and vulnerable 
citizens with a full template I am happy to share with you 
about how for them to avoid it, including a hotline for them to 
even call. So I would be pleased to share that.
 Mr. Gonzalez. Yes. I think it is a real education effort 
that we need to push.
 Chairwoman Wagner. I could not agree more. So anyway.
 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Nunn, 
for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Nunn. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Wagner, and I 
appreciate you holding this meeting on fraud.
 Look, before I begin, I would just like to ask for a show 
of hands if you or one of your loved ones or someone you know 
has gotten that call--``There is something urgent, we need to 
talk to you, you are going to deposit your money here''--only 
to later find out that you have become a victim of fraud.
 I see our AARP folks in the background, too, all raising 
your hands.
 This is an impact which is outsized. In my home State of 
Iowa, I briefed this committee last year on the grave threat 
coming from fraudsters. At that point, $52 million was lost to 
fraud, and that is just in a farm State like Iowa.
 Well, Madam Chair, I am sad to say that today that number 
has jumped to almost $100 million. So in less than 12 months, 
we have nearly doubled the amount of fraud loss happening on 
the front lines in a hometown community, but that number should 
stop us cold in our tracks when we realize who is the target of 
the types of fraud we are talking about. In Iowa, the average 
victim was over 60 and lost $9,000 last year. This year, that 
has quadrupled to a loss of nearly $37,000 per individual.
 This is catastrophic. It is wiping out a family's wealth, 
but it is also destroying their future. This is no longer a 
trend. This is now a real crisis impacting each of us.
 Behind every one of those dollars is a real person--an Iowa 
farmer, a Des Moines retiree, an Ankeny small business owner.
 The worst part about this is those dollars are not being 
taken by a criminal down the street. In too many cases, they 
are being actioned by foreign governments. They are being 
perpetrated by slave labor camps in South Asia, and they are 
being taken over shores to fund some of the very horrific 
events that are happening to Americans right here on our own 
shore.
 That is why I believe that there are two bills that I have 
led on that deliver a direct one-two punch to go after our 
scammers.
 The first is the Guidelines for User Age-verification and 
Responsible Dialogue (GUARD) Act. It arms our State and local 
law enforcement with blockchain tracing technology to follow 
the money before it disappears offshore so that when you get 
that phone call and you call the sheriff, their answer is, ``I 
am sorry, you will have to report it to the FBI.''
 The second aspect is the Taskforce for Recognizing and 
Averting Payment Scams (TRAPS) Act. The TRAPS Act brings 
together our banks, our telcos, our tech platforms, and our 
local law enforcement--both at the hometown level all the way 
up to the Federal level--to be able to really go after this and 
trap these fraudsters before they proliferate their behavior.
 Madam Chair, I would offer we cannot wait another year to 
act on this important legislation.
 Now, Ms. Gunther, I want to thank you and your team at the 
AARP for all the work that you have done. You have been a 
strong supporter of GUARD and TRAPS Act.
 Do trusted contact designations and report-and-hold 
authorities give frontline employees at a small Iowa community 
bank enough authority to stop a transaction before this money 
disappears, do you believe?
 Ms. Gunther. Thank you for the question.
 The trusted contact and report-and-hold authorities are 
critical tools, but they are not enough on their own. As you 
mentioned, fraud starts upstream. We have to stop the criminal 
from contacting the consumer. Efforts like the TRAPS Act are 
really, really important.
 We have got to get more on the legislative and law 
enforcement arena, but we also need to get ahead of this as 
well. It is essential in the TRAPS Act to have and to create 
innovative ways and get people to share information so we can 
stop these scams entirely.
 Mr. Nunn. I totally agree with you. We should not put all 
the responsibility on both the individual and the local lender, 
our banks, our community lenders, to have to do this. Getting 
upstream is probably the best possible way to get after this 
comprehensively.
 Mr. Michel, I am going to turn to you, because when we talk 
about comprehensively, we recognize that criminals extracted an 
estimated $16 billion last year through pump-and-dump schemes. 
As a result, 25 percent of small capital Chinese IPOs show 
manipulation.
 At what point does a red flag appear clearest and do we 
have the authority and the data to act before a retail investor 
would be impacted by this?
 Mr. Michel. Thank you for the question. I can really only 
speak to our platform and how it identifies such things.
 We launched the platform about 18 months ago, and we have 
issued 40 alerts where we have captured $15 billion worth of 
documented harm, a median lead time of 19 days prior to the 
loss of that. Our work product has also supported multiple SEC 
Section 12(k) halts of issuers suspected of manipulation.
 Mr. Nunn. Very good.
 Mr. Smith, very quickly. My TRAPS Act creates a Treasury-
led task force to drive coordination across agencies. Does the 
information sharing between FINRA and the SEC, FBI, and other 
State regulators move fast enough to stop these type of ramp 
up-and-dump schemes, and would the TRAPS Act help?
 Mr. Smith. I cannot speak to the legislation, but I can 
speak to the more and faster information sharing that we have, 
the better off investors will be.
 Mr. Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. That is exactly 
what the TRAPS Act does.
 Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back my time.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana, Mr. 
Downing, for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you for the 
witnesses for being here.
 I am going to start off just correcting the record on a 
point. One of my colleagues made the comment that the CLARITY 
Act creates a loophole to exempt individuals from complying 
with securities laws if you raise under a certain amount for a 
digital commodity project. I just want to, for the record, say 
that is utterly false.
 Under the CLARITY Act, the SEC retains jurisdiction over 
insider disclosures and obligations, such as lock-up 
requirements on related parties where digital commodities are 
involved in a capital race.
 Furthermore, the CLARITY Act reaffirms that the SEC 
maintains robust anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority. So 
any claim that the CLARITY Act allows insider trading is 
unfounded, it is inaccurate, and it is just false. So I just 
wanted to get that correction out there.
 In 2024, the FBI reported that the costliest type of scams 
perpetrated on our elders were investment scams, totaling a 
staggering $1.8 billion in reported losses. As the former 
securities regulator for the State of Montana, one of my 
primary responsibilities was to protect investors from fraud 
where possible and give victims some restitution.
 We did a lot of stuff. As the securities regulator for 
Montana, we set up elder justice councils around the State, had 
some great success in those. I created, in my office, a 
financial abuse specialist team that specifically dealt with 
this type. It was prosecutors, lawyers, folks to help with 
this.
 We saw just so much coming through the State, from pig 
butchering scams to romance scams to using tech to imitate 
Federal agencies and we see more and more technology coming in 
to defraud and scam folks. We did a lot of public outreach, a 
lot of tours, and fraud summits.
 One of the other things that we did that I am particularly 
proud of is we had the Lynne Egan Memorial Securities 
Restitution Fund, which we used to help give relief to folks 
that were scammed, and that was named after my former deputy 
securities commissioner, who, unfortunately, we lost a few 
years ago.
 I am going to start on my questioning with Ms. Gunther.
 Can you discuss the important role that State securities 
regulators play in combating fraud?
 Ms. Gunther. Yes. They can see local patterns. They can do 
local enforcements and so they remain a critical piece of the 
puzzle.
 Mr. Downing. Thank you.
 Do you consider State regulators or Federal regulators like 
the SEC as the primary enforcer of anti-fraud laws?
 Ms. Gunther. I cannot speak to that, but what I can say is 
they are a critical part. We need everybody on the ground to 
fight this. As you mentioned, some of the horrible statistics, 
we are seeing losses of up to $196 billion total, and that does 
not even target the people who do not realize that they are a 
victim.
 So it is really important to have all government players in 
this space helping to protect consumers.
 Mr. Downing. Are there any States that you have in mind 
that you believe have been particularly effective in combating 
fraud?
 Ms. Gunther. What I can say is one of the most effective 
tools that States can use is the report-and-hold laws. Right 
now, we have almost all States that have that, but there are a 
few States that do not, and that is one of the most important 
things that we found in a study of financial institutions was 
the number one thing to stop money before it leaves the 
account.
 Mr. Downing. Right. Well, I appreciate you saying that 
because that was something that we have some pretty strong 
delay-and-report laws in Montana.
 One of the issues that I ran into as a regulator is the 
training for folks to actually use those, because the rules 
there were pretty simple. As long as you had procedures in 
place and had minimal training, then you could keep yourself 
out of liability and do that.
 As most people in this room know, once the money is out the 
door, it is out the door. If you can actually delay that and 
take care of it, it is very helpful. So I appreciate that.
 Moving on. I am going to go to Mr. Smith on here.
 We know that many scams originating overseas, like pig 
butchering scams, come from China. How do we hold overseas bad 
actors accountable when they are not easily subject to our 
jurisdiction or our justice systems and foreign officials who 
might not be willing to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement?
 Mr. Smith. That is where, in our role as an SRO, we have 
unique insight that others may not have but we also have limits 
in our authority and our jurisdiction. That is where the power 
of the engagement and partnerships with other entities, like 
Federal law enforcement, where they may have a reach in these 
overseas jurisdictions or they may have partners with other law 
enforcement that can reach out and put a stop to the activity, 
is critically important.
 Mr. Downing. Right. Thank you.
 I could go on for another 10 minutes, but, unfortunately, I 
have run out of time.
 So on that, Madam Chair, I yield.
 Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back.
 I would like to thank our witnesses for their testimony 
today.
 Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the 
chair. Questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their 
response.
 Witnesses, please respond no later than May 20, 2026.

 [The information referred to was not submitted prior to 
printing.]

 This hearing is now adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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