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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] DIVERSIFYING RISK: THE BENEFITS OF REINSURANCE AND CREDIT RISK TRANSFERS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 22, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-71 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-156 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia AL GREEN, Texas WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin BILL FOSTER, Illinois WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio Carolina JUAN VARGAS, California MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania SEAN CASTEN, Illinois YOUNG KIM, California AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts BYRON DONALDS, Florida RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RITCHIE TORRES, New York SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MICHAEL LAWLER, New York CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee SAM LICCARDO, California ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska, Chairman MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas, Vice EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri, Ranking Chairwoman Member JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan Carolina AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina RITCHIE TORRES, New York ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon TROY DOWNING, Montana C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, April 22, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Mike Flood, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Nebraska................. 1 Hon. Emanuel Cleaver, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, a U.S. Representative from Missouri..... 3 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 4 Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from California................ 4 WITNESSES Mr. Anthony Vidovich, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Everest Group......................................... 5 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Mr. Ben Walker, Executive Managing Director, Aon Reinsurance..... 14 Prepared Statement........................................... 16 Mr. Jerry Theodorou, Director of Finance, Insurance, and Trade Policy Program, R Street Institute............................. 21 Prepared Statement........................................... 23 Dr. Susan M. Wachter, Albert Sussman Professor of Real Estate, Professor of Finance, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and co-director of the Penn Institute for Urban Research....................................................... 30 Prepared Statement........................................... 32 APPENDIX MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Hon. Mike Flood: National Association of Realtors............................. 54 SmarterSafer Coalition, dated April 22, 2026................. 56 Arch Mortgage Insurance Company, dated April 22, 2026........ 59 U.S. Mortgage Insurers (USMI)................................ 61 Hon. Troy Downing: Mr. Jerry Theodorou, ``Why a Federal Reinsurer Remains a Bad Idea''..................................................... 64 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Written responses to questions for the record from Representative John W. Rose Mr. Jerry Theodorou.......................................... 69 Mr. Anthony Vidovich......................................... 71 Mr. Ben Walker............................................... 73 Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Andrew R. Garbarino Mr. Jerry Theodorou.......................................... 74 Mr. Ben Walker............................................... 78 Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Nydia M. Velazquez Mr. Anthony Vidovich......................................... 79 Mr. Ben Walker............................................... 81 Mr. Jerry Theodorou.......................................... 82 Dr. Susan M. Wachter......................................... 84 DIVERSIFYING RISK: THE BENEFITS OF REINSURANCE AND CREDIT RISK TRANSFERS ---------- Wednesday, April 22, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, Committee on Financial Services Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Flood [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Flood, Rose, Fitzgerald, Downing, Hill, Cleaver, Williams of Georgia, Pettersen, Bynum, and Waters. Chairman Flood. The Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time and a reminder, we will have votes sometime in the 11 o'clock hour this morning, and we will be breaking for that. This hearing is titled ``Diversifying Risk: The Benefits of Reinsurance and Credit Risk Transfers.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE FLOOD, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEBRASKA First of all, I would like to thank all of our witnesses for being with us today and look forward to an interesting discussion focused on reinsurance and credit risk transfer. While distinct in how they are used, both reinsurance and credit risk transfer, or CRT, are used for a common purpose to distribute risk that would otherwise be concentrated in one entity across more market participants. Reinsurance does this by serving as insurance for insurers. Let us use an example to help demonstrate when an insurer might need reinsurance. Let us say a small mutual issuer--which I have a lot of in Nebraska--issues home insurance policies primarily in communities in western Nebraska. In most instances, that business model probably works pretty well but what if a severe storm moves through the panhandle, pelting homes across the region with baseball-sized hail and 60-mile- an-hour straight line winds? That insurer could see a large portion of its insureds file claims at the same time, a disaster that could even send the company into bankruptcy. One way for an insurer to deal with this is to get reinsurance, or insurance for the insurer, that would cover exactly the type of risk that would put them in a difficult position to pay for claims. By purchasing reinsurance, the insurer covers themselves from a worst-case scenario, much like a homeowner uses insurance to cover themselves in the event of an extreme weather event that causes massive damage to their home. Similarly, CRT is used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to distribute mortgage credit risk off of the enterprises' books. Much like reinsurance, CRT, if used properly, will help redistribute some of the risks on the government-sponsored enterprises' (GSEs') books to other financial actors, lessening the burden on the enterprises themselves. For those of us that are interested in lessening the taxpayers' potential liability from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, CRT is a tool that could help meet that goal. CRT is designed to put private capital ahead of the taxpayer in the case of mortgage defaults. When it operates properly, it both spreads the risk and lessens taxpayer exposure to downturns in the mortgage market. While this discussion will largely focus on transferring risk between insurers or the enterprises, both reinsurance and CRT have downstream effects on the insurance market and the mortgage market, including consumers. A market with concentrated risks is going to be more likely to have problems when unusual events arrive. As a policyholder, you want your insurer to have diversified risk to ensure that, when something happens to you, they pay your claim. As a prospective home buyer, when you are shopping for a mortgage, you want the best terms and the lowest interest rate possible, something that is easier to find when enterprises are healthy and conforming mortgage market is running smoothly. The bottom line: Reinsurance and CRT help distribute risk across the market. Both make our insurance market and mortgage market operate safely and soundly. I would like to add the following document into the record for this hearing, an April 21, 2026, letter from the National Association of Realtors. Without objection, it is received. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 54.] Chairman Flood. I look forward to hearing from our expert panelists today. I understand this is the first time in almost 20 years that we have had this in front of our committee. I am shocked that the paparazzi is not here checking in on what we are doing, but we are working on behalf of the taxpayers to make sure that the capital markets step in before they do in the event of a catastrophe. With that, I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Cleaver, for 4 minutes for his opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EMANUEL CLEAVER, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND INSURANCE, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling this meeting together. I say ``meeting''; it is more informational than it is going to be based on conflict and so forth. So, thank you very much. I think this is helpful. I would like to thank our witnesses for being here with us. Risk transfer mechanisms, including reinsurance and credit risk transfers, CRT, are core tools used by primary insurers and government-backed entities to manage risk. Reinsurance is often referred to as insurance for the insurance companies. Primary insurers purchase reinsurance to cede concentrated exposures they prefer not to retain or must transfer to satisfy regulatory and capital requirements. Credit risk transfers are a type of reinsurance used by the enterprises to offload mortgages, mortgage credit risk, to the private sector in exchange for a premium payment. Following the financial crisis, the Federal Housing Financial Agency, Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), wisely directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, GSEs, to reduce taxpayer exposure by transferring mortgage credit risk to private capital. These tools deliver multiple benefits, including taxpayer protection, distribution of systemic risk, increased capacity, and the provision of price signals. Most of the Federal insurance programs, including the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, and the National Flood Insurance Program shift the risk from the private sector to the Federal Government. By contrast, credit risk transfers, CRT, and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) use of reinsurance shift risk from the government to the private sector. I appreciate our witnesses, who will speak in detail about the mechanisms and benefits of these tools. It is important to know that reinsurance and CRT are not the only ways to manage or distribute risk. Alternatives include diversification, capital buffers, and hedging. However, they are widely recognized as critical components of the risk-management toolkit. At the same time, they are most effective when paired with strong management of underlying risk. Since assuming his role as Director, Mr. Pulte, Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, has taken a series of unprecedented actions, including appointing himself chair of both enterprises, removing the CEO of Freddie Mac, dismissing more than a dozen board members across the enterprises, dissolving the audit committee of Fannie Mae, and targeting officials appointed during the Biden-Harris Administration, including Lisa Cook. These developments have raised the legitimate questions about the direction of U.S. housing finance policy and the future of the enterprises and the secondary mortgage--market mortgage. American families have also faced sharply rising property insurance premiums since 2021, driven in part by the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related disasters. Addressing these pressures will require a greater focus on risk reduction, including mitigation, resilience, and climate adaptation to reduce underlying risk and overtime cost. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has emphasized the importance of strengthening the delivery of Federal disaster insurance assistance, including the National Flood Insurance Program, as disasters grow more frequent and severe. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about this important reinsurance and CRT. We apologize for the crowded room. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Flood. The gentleman yields back. I know recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. I thank the chairman and I know Cleaver and Flood always attract a big paparazzi gathering, and I am always taking pictures of both of us. We appreciate this panel. I think it is very important for our members to connect and think through the benefits of the use of reinsurance both in all of our Federal risk categories, like the National Flood Program, like, obviously, offloading the risk in our government-sponsored enterprise mortgage portfolios but how that is done is really important, and is the risk really laid off the taxpayers and is it the right--a layer of risk? So, this hearing is very important. I am grateful for a team of Flood and Cleaver in holding this hearing. I really look forward to the discussion, and I yield back. Chairman Flood. The chairman yields back. I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Waters, for 1 minute for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAXINE WATERS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Ms. Waters. Mr. Chair, credit risk transfers, or CRTs can offer benefits to our housing finance system. They can provide insight about market perceptions of the default risk of the housing portfolios of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and may allow private capital to help absorb losses but, to be clear, CRTs will never replace the role of the Federal Government in housing finance. In order to address the affordable housing crisis, Congress must ensure that Fannie and Freddie meet their mission to provide liquidity, sustainability, and affordability for all housing markets in the United States and at all times. That is why this committee should consider every tool available to increase access to affordable housing, including ways to leverage CRTs and other forms of reinsurance when it makes good sense. I yield back. Chairman Flood. The gentlelady yields back. Today, we welcome the testimony of Mr. Anthony Vidovich, the executive vice president and general counsel of Everest Group; Mr. Ben Walker, an executive managing director at Aon; Mr. Jerry Theodorou, the director of the Finance, Insurance, and Trade Policy Program at the R Street Institute; Dr. Susan Wachter, the Albert Sussman professor of real estate and professor of finance at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and the codirector of the Penn Institute for Urban Research. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. It looks like all of you have your microphones appropriately close to your mouth, but it does help if you speak right into them so that we can properly get it transcribed and that we can hear you. Mr. Vidovich, you now recognized for 5 minutes for your opening oral remarks. STATEMENT OF ANTHONY VIDOVICH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, EVEREST GROUP Mr. Vidovich. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The Reinsurance Association of America (RAA) also thanks Chairman Flood for his leadership in advocating for National Weather Service and the Federal science, infrastructure, personnel, and data that make forecasting and the assessment of natural hazard risk possible. Federal science is foundational to an insuring system that makes it possible to build and buy homes, finance businesses, and sustain jobs across our country, while helping families and communities recover and rebuild after disaster strikes. I am Anthony Vidovich of Everest Group, testifying on behalf of the Reinsurance Association of America. Reinsurance, as the subcommittee has noted, is simply insurance for insurance companies. It is a cost-effective, risk-management tool used to share risk, limit liability, stabilize loss experience, protect against catastrophes, and to increase capacity. It is not mandated. Insurers and government programs choose reinsurance because it is often a more cost-effective way to manage catastrophic risk and access additional capital at a lower cost than other forms of capital. The global capital of reinsurance matters. For example, reinsurers paid roughly 28 percent of the more than $90 billion in insured losses from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and more than half of the insured losses from the September 11th attacks and reinsurers remained open for business throughout the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. For the Federal Government, reinsurance reduces taxpayer risk, shifting risk to private markets, lowering exposure, and providing a market-based signal of the true cost of that risk, and supporting the availability of credit, as noted by the coordination of benefits (COB). Several Federal programs within this committee's jurisdiction are successfully using this risk management tool. In 2013, the Federal Housing Finance Agency established a Credit Risk Transfer Program, which transferred more than $230 billion of credit risk on over $8 trillion of mortgage balances with over 30 percent of the risk transfer shared by 70 reinsurers. Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) National Flood Insurance Program has transferred approximately $18 billion in risk since 2017, around $9 billion of which was assumed by 48 traditional reinsurers, who paid FEMA over a billion dollars in the program's first year after Hurricane Harvey losses. In 2018, the Export-Import Bank of the United States launched a pilot reinsurance program with 10 reinsurers providing approximately $1 billion in loss coverage in its first aircraft financing transaction, supporting U.S. exports and jobs. There is an opportunity to build on these successes by revising U.S. bank capital rules that do not clearly permit the use of insurance and reinsurance for capital relief. Allowing banks to use reinsurance would help them better manage risk and support access to credit while maintaining strong regulatory oversight and enhancing the safety and soundness of the banking system. Reinsurance is already working across the U.S. insurance industry and Federal programs that help people buy homes and finance rental housing, protect homes and businesses from flooding and support U.S. exports and jobs. The opportunity today is to build on that success and make full use of a proven, cost-effective tool to better manage risk, expand access to credit, protect taxpayers, support economic growth, and strengthen the safety and soundness of our financial system and Federal programs. Thank you for the honor of testifying today, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Vidovich follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Flood. Thank you very much. Mr. Walker, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF BEN WALKER, EXECUTIVE MANAGING DIRECTOR, AON REINSURANCE Mr. Walker. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you today. My name is Ben Walker. I am an executive managing director at Aon Re, where I lead our Global Credit Team. Aon works with major U.S. Government programs and government-sponsored enterprises, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Export-Import Bank, FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program, and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Credit risk transfer, or CRT, is a proven, scalable way to mitigate risk to the Federal balance sheet. It shares risk with private capital, protects taxpayers, and preserves access to credit through challenging economic cycles. In my brief time with you today, I would like to answer the three questions: What is CRT? How does CRT work and why does CRT matter? First, what is CRT? Traditional reinsurance is used to transfer the cost of physical events, such as storms, floods, or wildfires, to private markets. FEMA's NFIP Reinsurance Program, which had reinsurance recoveries after Hurricane Harvey, is one example of risk transfer. Credit risk transfer works similarly but is applied to credit risk, which is the risk if borrowers do not repay their loans. Export-Import's (EX-IM's) $1 billion credit reinsurance program on aircraft loans implemented at Congress' direction and funded from existing budget is another example of how a Federal agency can share risk with the private sector. Second, how does CRT work? After the financial crisis and while in conservatorship, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were directed to develop ways to better protect taxpayers through credit risk transfer. Typically, GSE CRT will cover a defined pool of mortgages and transfer a specific layer of potential losses above an attachment point and up to a detachment point. In exchange for loss protection, the GSEs pay insurance premium. The design was intentional. It was aimed to cover losses on the scale of the great financial crisis. The idea was that, if we ever see that level of stress again, a substantial portion of losses would be paid by private investors rather than taxpayers. Since inception, nearly 70 reinsurance balance sheets have written close to $75 billion of CRT limit. Reinsurance adds value by providing more stable pricing across cycles and by offering forward coverage, which locks in protection before loans are originated, rather than 6 to 12 months afterwards. Third, why does CRT matter? Credit risk transfer is important for four key reasons: It strengthens taxpayer protection by shifting a clearly defined amount of laws from Federal entities to private capital. It supports system stability by diversifying trillions of dollars of mortgages and other credit exposure off Federal balance sheet and in the global markets. It enhances market discipline, because independent underwriting and pricing by reinsurers and investors will provide a continuous check on risk management, which is complementary to regulatory efforts and it delivers capital efficiency, as CRT has often been cheaper than raising equivalent equity. This provides an overall lower cost of capital and supports stable or potentially even lower cost for borrowers. Program design choices, such as where to set attachment points or policy levers. They determine how many protection CRT provides in a stress scenario and how much cost is born in advance rather than during or after a crisis. From what we see in the market, there is significant private sector capacity to do more and to do it in a way that meaningfully protects taxpayers, if so desired. I will close by making the point that CRT is not theoretical, and it is not partisan. It is a practical tested mechanism that has already been used at the GSEs, at NFIP, and at EX-IM. Whatever choice Congress ultimately makes about the long- term structure of housing finance and Federal credit programs, CRT will be available as one of the most effective ways to reduce taxpayer exposure, improve the safety and soundness of the system, and leverage private expertise and capital in support of public objectives. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Flood. Thank you for your testimony. Mr. Jerry Theodorou, the director of finance, insurance, and trade policy at the R Street Institute, you are recognized for your oral remarks for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF JERRY THEODOROU, DIRECTOR OF THE FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND TRADE POLICY PROGRAM, R STREET INSTITUTE Mr. Theodorou. Chairman Flood, Ranking Member Cleaver, members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing and for the invitation to testify. My goal is to present an overview of the complex global reinsurance industry. Reinsurers are dispersed across the globe with reinsurance hubs in five geographic clusters--in Continental Europe, Bermuda, the Lloyd's Market, the U.S., and the Far East. Close to half of global reinsurance capital is in Continental Europe. The big four continental reinsurers--Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, SCOR--account for half of the world's reinsurance market. If the primary insurance industry is effectively the economy's financial first responder, the reinsurance industry is the market's shock absorber. Several features of the reinsurance market are responsible for its role in the economy. Reinsurance diversifies risk. A strong illustration of this is reinsurers' reaction to the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005. In 2004, four catastrophic hurricanes struck Florida--Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. In 2005, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma hit the Gulf in Florida. Cumulative losses from the seven hurricanes reached about a hundred billion dollars but more than half the losses were borne by overseas reinsurers. Were it not for insurers recovering the majority of 2004 to 2005 losses from global reinsurers, primary insurers would have shouldered the entirety of the $100 billion loss. The global reinsurance industry paid 61 percent of the losses from the 2005 hurricane season and 60 percent of the losses from 9/11 were assumed by the global reinsurance industry. You see, global reinsurers take the financial sting out of disasters. The losses of 2004 and 2005 were significant for another reason. Responding to a depletion of capital from those two bad years, entrepreneurial insurance executives created eight new Bermuda reinsurance companies, focusing on property catastrophe risk. This spawn of 2004 to 2005 is called the Class of 2005. Insurance companies have counterparty relationships with dozens of reinsurers. Medium-sized insurance companies typically obtain reinsurance from about 75 reinsurers, enabling the spread of risk. Reinsurers perform other functions beyond diversification, including volatility management, retro session, which is reinsurance for reinsurers, and serving as a flexible source of capital. After years of rate increases, reinsurers are now reducing rates as a response to below-average catastrophes in 2025 and in the first quarter of this year. Just a few weeks ago, on April the 1, property catastrophe rates came down by about 14 percent. Lower reinsurance costs mean more competition and lower prices. Reinsurers take on more than just property catastrophe risk. They reinsure liability, cyber, and mortgage insurance portfolios, and they engage in credit risk transfer. This is a financial mechanism enabling government entities that hold credit risk to offload default risk through reinsurers. Government-sponsored enterprises, the GSE, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, shift borrower default risk to reinsurers. Numerous reinsurers say it serves as CRT counterparties. These include the European big four, Bermuda, and Lloyd's. Reinsurer responses to the largest disaster toll of 2004 and 2005 showed that it was not government action that paved the way out for a capital-deprived industry; it was private investors who recognized uncorrelated insurance risk as a diversifying asset strategy. Over the years, there have been proposals introduced in Congress to create Federal reinsurance entities offering reinsurance products at below market rates. Such initiatives are ill-advised for three reasons: First, government-provided reinsurance would displace private market reinsurance; second, underpriced government reinsurance would undermine incentives for mitigating risk by suppressing transmission of price signals; third, enterprise government reinsurance means policyholders with low risk subsidize those with elevated risk. Thank you for holding this hearing and for consideration of my views. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Theodorou follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Flood. Thank you very much. Dr. Wachter, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF SUSAN M. WACHTER, ALBERT SUSSMAN PROFESSOR OF REAL ESTATE, PROFESSOR OF FINANCE, THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND CO-DIRECTOR OF THE PENN INSTITUTE FOR URBAN RESEARCH Ms. Wachter. Chairman Hill, Ranking Member Cleaver, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I am Susan Wachter, professor of real estate and professor of finance at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Since their introduction in 2012, CRTs have become a cornerstone of post-crisis housing finance. At their core, CRTs are instruments that allow government-sponsored enterprises to transfer a portion of mortgage credit risk from their balance sheets to private investors. CRTs trade and price and identify credit risk. Rather than concentrating risk within the GSEs and exposing taxpayers, CRTs distribute risk across a broad base of market participants, including institutional investors and reinsurers. This structure enhances systemic resilience. The CRT market has grown substantially over time, both in size and sophistication. CRT issuance has transferred hundreds of billions of dollars in mortgage credit risk to the private sector. This growth has not only reduced taxpayer exposure, but it has also created a mechanism through which credit risk is continuously priced by market participants. It is useful to identify the two complementary CRT markets that coexist. The first is the reinsurance market in which reinsurers assume mortgage credit risk through structured agreements. The second is the capital markets CRT segment in which risk is transferred through tradeable securities. These securities are issued to investors and actively traded, providing ongoing price discovery of risk. The availability of such information is critical for financial stability. Accurate pricing of credit risk can serve as an early warning system of potential catastrophe, signaling structural weaknesses before they escalate into systemic crises. By contrast, when risk is underpriced and obscured, as was the case in the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, risk can build, unchecked. CRTs help prevent the catastrophic outcome of this catastrophic outcome by embedding transparency and market discipline directly into the housing finance system. Thus, the CRT market is a vital component of a modern resilient housing finance system. By transforming risk to the private sector, providing transparent and continuous pricing of credit risk, CRTs enhance both market efficiency and financial stability. CRTs, however, are not a substitute for managing risk, particularly if and as the privatization of the GSEs is contemplated. A recent convening by the Penn Institute for Urban Research, which I codirect, brought together leading public and private sector stakeholders to affirm key principles for the reform of Fannie and Freddie Mac in contemplation of privatization. Foremost among them are, first, preserving the affordably public mission of the GSEs; and, second, insuring market stability. Embracing these principles must be a foremost priority in ensuring a resilient housing market to safeguard taxpayers, promote long-term financial stability, and support broad-based access to sustainable homeownership. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Wachter follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Flood. Thank you for your testimony. We will now turn to member questions. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Mr. Vidovich, can you help us understand how the reinsurance market currently views U.S. catastrophic risk and are they willing to take on catastrophic risk in higher risk areas? Mr. Vidovich. Thank you for the question. The reinsurance industry is quite vibrant. Capital is continuing to enter that market and rates for catastrophe reinsurance in a number of cat-prone areas are declining because we are seeing increased competition because of that inflow of capital. For example, in Florida, which we have heard from Mr. Theodorou and in my own remarks, has a history of being prone to a number of cat-risks, including hurricanes. We are seeing significant new capital come into that market, which is driving down the cost of cat reinsurance premiums. We are also seeing new entrants come into that market to assume that risk. So, the private market is responding and is quite vibrant. Chairman Flood. Continuing with you, sir, how could catastrophe bonds fit into the broader risk-sharing ecosystem as we look forward? First, for those at home who may not know, just maybe explain what a catastrophe bond is and then speak to the role catastrophe bonds play in the property and casualty and market. Mr. Vidovich. Of course. A catastrophe bond is bond but, at its core, is a reinsurance contract. An insurance company will cede risk to a special purpose vehicle, which will issue bonds to other capital providers. The cost of those bonds is used as collateral to ensure that the losses are paid, and those bond holders get an interest payment or a coupon based on the investment income that those assets earn but also based on the premium paid by the ceding insurer for that type of reinsurance. Chairman Flood. Just to clarify, there is room for both catastrophe bonds and reinsurances in our market? Mr. Vidovich. Actually, catastrophe bonds are simply a form of reinsurance. So ``reinsurance'' is an umbrella term. so, the answer to your question is absolutely there is room for both. With a type of tool---- Chairman Flood. I appreciate that. Let us pivot to CRT only because I am limited on time. Mr. Walker, as it relates to credit risk transfer, what types of investors are most interested in CRT, and what typically drives that interest? Mr. Walker. Thank you for the question. I can speak to the reinsurance marketplace for CRT, which is comprised of U.S. insurance companies, Bermudian insurance companies, Lloyd's of London entities, as well as Continental European reinsurers. It is a diverse, global financial system supporting U.S. CRT. The draw is that it is a diversifying risk. There is a significant amount of data available to price and analyze the risk and so insurers are eager to continue to diversify their balance sheets and evaluate the risk that is highly data-rich. Chairman Flood. Can you, Mr. Walker, speak to how the enterprises have been using CRT since the latest iteration of the capital rule back in 2020? Then, also, do you anticipate any changes to attachment points for CRT in the future? Mr. Walker. I mean, the GSEs have more or less continuously used CRTs since its inception in 2013. When the enterprise regulatory capital framework was released in 2020, finalized in 2021, we did see some change in the GSE attachment points and detachment points driven by dynamic aspects of that capital framework. It is something that, as a broker, we work all the time with the GSEs on, trying to figure out how to evaluate the structures, make them capital efficient, and balance risk transfer in the process. Chairman Flood. All right. I want to switch briefly to the National Flood Insurance Program, or NFIP. This is for Mr. Vidovich and Mr. Walker. Can you speak very briefly--I only have 50 seconds--to how the NFIP uses reinsurance; what kinds of reinsurance does it use; and what risk does it usually use it on? Mr. Vidovich. So, briefly, it uses a number of different types of reinsurance but including traditional treaty reinsurance, which transfers the risk of flood losses to the private market. Chairman Flood. Mr. Walker. Mr. Walker. Yes, I do not have anything to add other than traditional reinsurance, and catastrophe bonds are both part of their program. Chairman Flood. I will just add that I think it is imperative that the NFIP be buying reinsurance for its policyholders and for the taxpayers. With that, I yield back. It is my pleasure to introduce the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance, Mr. Cleaver, you are recognized. Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The FHFA attachment points, since 2022, 2023, the enterprises have shifted toward higher attachment points for a CRT. Some have even argued that this leaves more risk with taxpayers that private capital should absorb and has an impact on CRT's market discipline function. Mr. Walker, you talked about this in your testimony today. Finding attachment points that balance risk transfer and cost capital would move the program closer to its original intent. What, in your opinion, should this balance look like? Mr. Walker. Thank you for the question. As I mentioned in my statement, that is a policy question but, at the end of the day, what we are trying to do is figure out how to kind of be effective in the capital relief that the GSEs are getting and balancing the risk that is being transferred and shared with private capital. So those attachment points currently would not transfer a significant portion of a great financial crisis. It would be largely retained by the GSEs and the CRT programs that they are currently buying. Prior to 2020 and the enterprise regulatory capital framework, those were much closer to the risk sharing, a lot more risk with the private sector. Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. That is helpful. I want to move over into conservatorship. Facilitating a robust and competitive CRT market improves profitability and the value of taxpayer investments in the enterprises. One of the vital reforms for future success in whatever form the GSEs may take is entrenching and codifying the CRT and reinsurance programs. Ms. Wachter, thank you so much for being here every time we send out the signal. Thank you very much. You have testified in the past about what works and what considerations for future GSE reform should be scrutinized. What should we, what should this committee keep in mind during these discussions? What are the important things you would like for us to address? Ms. Wachter. Thank you so much for the question. I think there are two major points that we can take from our experience with CRTs and the tremendous amount of work that has gone into developing and implementing the CRT market on the part of the GSEs and private sector participants and those two are the following: First, the CRT market works to offload risk. In any privatization plan and any contemplation of privatization, we absolutely should preserve the CRT function. That should be codified in the privatization. We should not enable privatization without continuous exposure of the risk that occurs under the GSEs, whether they are privatized or not, to public identification and potential response. Second, using the CRT market to continuously price risk is appropriate, for information purposes, but it would be procyclical and potentially destabilizing if privatized entities, the GSEs as privatized, would use the price of risk for their pricing of default. That is a problem that has not yet been resolved in terms of the consideration of how the GSEs are to be privatized. How will G fees be determined? G fees are the public-facing, public charge--charged to mortgage holders with risk. If that G fee were to be driven by CRT pricing, it could be potentially very destabilizing to the system. The research that we have seen and the experience we have seen underlies that. So, those are the two principles that I would argue for in terms of contemplation of privatization. Mr. Cleaver. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Fitzgerald, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Walker, so private mortgage insurance helps first-time and, I would say, working- class buyers access homeownership, and it safeguards taxpayers from credit risk. It is kind of the original form of credit risk transfer, I guess, you could describe it as. The industry has grown more resilience through consistent mortgage insurance CRT transactions, which has been, I guess, ensuring support for new buyers and claim payments during all kinds of economic turmoil. Can you discuss how mortgage insurers use CRT to manage risk? How has it made the housing market stronger and then that would also include forward transactions covering any of the future business and how it has supported efforts to diversify the industry's capital base? Mr. Walker. Thank you. That is a great question. I would agree with your statement that private mortgage insurance is an original form of credit risk transfer, which is an important note. The mortgage insurers have actually gained the same benefits that we have been discussing here today from credit risk transfer that the GSEs do. Most importantly, you have heard all the panel members here talk a lot about diversification. It is effectively taking what is largely monoline mortgage risk and a private mortgage insurer and sharing it and spreading it out with a bunch of private entities either in bond form or in reinsurance form. So the mortgage insurance company has really leaned into credit risk transfer. They have been consistently purchasing it since 2012 or 2013, and they use it to transfer both risk and get favorable capital relief from those transactions. In the last couple of years, they have really leaned into forward reinsurance protection, which provides them with coverage on loans that they will insure in the future. That is very helpful to them because it gives them clarity and certainty as to the amounts of protection that they have in place, as well as the price of that protection in place, which has really been a huge benefit to the mortgage insurance industry and has made them much more resilient compared to pre- great financial crisis where they retained most of the risk themselves. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you. Dr. Wachter, I believe the credit risk transfer can play a role in continuing to ensure Fannie and Freddie are significantly less risky than before the financial crisis but I think there is a concern about CRT that it has been an underused tool by them for, in recent years, I guess you can say. So what are your thoughts on CRT using Fannie and Freddie, particularly regarding concerns on the ability for CRT to be countercyclical and prepayment risk eroding coverage? It could be, I guess, characterized as undercollateralized counterpart counterparty risk. I know it is kind of--that question is kind of all over the place. If you can try to respond to that. Ms. Wachter. Thank you so much for the question. The use of CRT can evolve over time. It already has. It has become more sophisticated and can evolve further but the use of security CRT, which I will--based on a response to your question on-- definitely it depends on the capital rule. Many economists--the consensus from many economists is that the capital rule is too stringent and may actually be undermining of future profitability. If so, with--and I just think capital is very important. Obviously, Congress agrees on that. It is not a CRT. It is not a substitute for capital at all but, if the capital rules were less stringent, there would be more of a role for CRT. I see that as a likely happening going forward. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Mr. Vidovich, do you believe that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's regulatory capital rules are sufficiently aligned with the actual credit risk characteristics of the underlying mortgages, such as loan-to-value ratios, borrower credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, and product structure? Mr. Vidovich. Thank you for the question. You know, in our view at the RAA--I am in the reinsurance industry. We think the GSEs have effectively used CRT to address and align interest along the lines that you have described but, as Mr. Walker has stated in answers to his questions and testimony, we think there is additional opportunity to leverage the private markets---- Chairman Flood. Sorry to interrupt you. Mr. Vidovich [continuing]. to further reduce taxpayer exclusion---- Chairman Flood. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The ranking member of the Financial Services Committee, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Waters, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Waters. Dr. Wachter, the Trump-appointed FHFA Director Bill Pulte has taken unprecedented action that calls the government of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the GSEs into question. He has illegally appointed himself Chairman of both enterprises, fired their most experienced leadership, and weaponized the GSEs for political targeting. Now, instead of addressing affordable housing crisis, Pulte has exacerbated it by rolling back and weakening critical policies like fair lending, fair housing, equitable housing finance plans, and the affordable housing goals. He rescinded earlier guidance of the GSEs on how best to identify and assess climate risk and has offered unserious housing proposals, like the 50-year mortgage, which would lock homeowners into mortgage debt for the rest of their lives. Dr. Wachter, are the tools available to Congress that we should consider so that we can respond and mitigate the kinds of governance risk posed by the Director to our housing finance market? Ms. Wachter. Thank you for the question. As a Nation, we are in the middle of a housing affordability crisis, which hits young households and underserved communities even more strongly than the case for most Americans. If you do not own a house today and you are young, this is a crisis. I do believe that there are tools that are available, and I do believe that these tools can be used more than they are right now. So, I thank you for the question. Ms. Waters. Dr. Wachter, if the enterprise has created innovative pilot programs for new mortgage products, for instance, related to manufactured housing or small-dollar loans, how could CRTs be used to manage the default risk with those pilot programs as the pilots are being evaluated? Ms. Wachter. Chairman--Congresswoman Waters, this is not an area in which I specialize. However, there is an excellent paper that I would like to reference by David Brickman, and he has a proposal that goes directly along those lines, which absolutely should be evaluated. Ms. Waters. Well, could there be staggered approaches taken to test this type of approach? For instance, where pilot bounds are initially held small and GSEs held the higher portion of the risk, do you see this as an effective use of CRTs? Ms. Wachter. Again, this is a very important issue and one which I am grateful to have David Brickman's expertise, and I think it needs to be considered. Ms. Waters. But effective? Ms. Wachter. Well, I cannot speak to the intricacies because I have not set it in as yet. Thank you. Ms. Waters. Well, I thank you. If you believe there are things that we could do, we could be using---- Ms. Wachter. Well, absolutely, there are. Ms. Waters. We could be using some of the rules that we have available to us. Then I would like to talk with you a little bit more, and we can begin to identify what those are so that we can utilize them because this is an important time for us to address these issues. Ms. Wachter. I appreciate that. Thank you. Ms. Waters. Okay. Thank you for being here. I appreciate your assistance, and I yield back. Chairman Flood. The gentlelady yields back. The chairman of the full Financial Services Committee, the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hill, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman. Again, thanks to our witnesses. I appreciate you helping us work through the issues surrounding the use of reinsurance. So much of this is offsetting loss for the taxpayers. At the end of the day, when the losses come due, you are trying to figure out who is left to make those major payments. Risk transfer tools, as we have established today, and reinsurance, credit risk transfer, all help answer that question on who picks up those losses by bringing private capital in before losses fall on the backs of taxpayers. I thought I might focus on how the tools work actually in practice and start with you, Mr. Walker. Credit risk transfer was designed to move mortgage risk off the GSEs' balance sheets and bring in private capital, but the real question is not whether the risk is transferred, but what layer of risk is actually transferred? I referenced this in my opening comments and, if the CRT buyers get the easy part, then that gives a modest benefit--but I am interested in the structure. As CRT structures have evolved, they have shifted toward higher attachment points that leave GSEs retaining more expected losses while transferring only the more remote tail end of the risk. Is that true? Mr. Walker, is that true? Mr. Walker. Yes, thank you for the question. It is true that the attachment points on GSE CRT programs have increased in the last couple of years but, recently, we are actually seeing a trend where they are starting to come down a little bit. It is something we are currently evaluating and constantly looking at. Chairman Hill. What would be the reason for that? Would it be that the perception is that the CRT--the Fannie and Freddie underwriting is weakened and therefore that reinsurance is less likely to take a broader selection of the losses or what accounted for that attachment point issue? Mr. Walker. I think the increase in attachment points was a balancing procedure around effective cost of capital and building retained earnings, which the GSEs are allowed to do at this point in time. The consequent slight decrease in attachment points has been part of the constant evaluation of market pricing, risk transfer, and capital relief. Chairman Hill. How should we balance that tradeoff when we ask questions about it or think about it? How do you think we should be--as we review the potential release of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from conservatorship, how should members think about that? Mr. Walker. I agree with Dr. Wachter that, under any future vision for the GSEs, credit risk transfer will be an important component and I think the determination of what the correct attachment points will be is solely a function of how much risk you want the GSEs to retain versus how much risk you want shared with the private industry. Chairman Hill. Let me turn to you, Mr. Theodorou. We have heard for a new--when I travel around the country, I will occasionally go to an insurance brokerage type meeting, and there is no risk that they would not like to see transferred to the Federal Government in some of those meetings. So, there is a decade-old effort to have a massive form of government-backed reinsurance, but the purpose of risk transfer is to move risk away from taxpayers and create a new pathway for the government to take it instead of creating new ways for the government to increase its exposure. When there are major losses hit, should the answer not be more private capital, not less? What do you think, Mr. Theodorou? Mr. Theodorou. Well, now, there is more capital. As we have heard, the catastrophe bond market, insurance-linked securities, is very vibrant. Last year was the strongest year on record for issuance of catastrophe bonds. You have other risks that are also being the subject of catastrophe bonds, as the industry matures, including wildfire and cyber and liability risks, which were sort of off limits because of the long duration of the claim. So you have got more private capital that is coming in. There is more interest in the reinsurance and insurance industry. When we spoke about Florida before, new capital was coming in, and also another indicator of the health of the market is look at--what does Wall Street say? The biggest Florida insurance company is Universal. A year ago, it was trading at $16 a share. Yesterday, closing about 34: more than double. So Wall Street analysts like insurance. They think that insurance companies and reinsurance companies are doing a good job with their calculations of probable and maximum loss and maximum possible loss. It is much more sophisticated industry than it has been for the last 25 or 30 years. Yes, more private capital coming in. Chairman Hill. Very good. Well, thank you for that. Mr. Flood, thank you for this hearing. I yield back. Chairman Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Colorado, Ms. Pettersen, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here today for such an important discussion. You know, the national state of housing is dire. Nationally, home prices have surged nearly 50 percent, and rent is up nearly 25 percent in just the last 5 years alone. On top of this, we are seeing a drastic increase in insurance prices, which is making it just untenable for families, especially in Colorado, as we have contributing factors of hail damage that are the number one reason for increase in costs but also wildfire risk. Mr. Walker, given the risk from extreme weather that is growing and compounding, such as droughts contributing to extreme fire risk and landslides following flooding and wildfires, how are current and future climate risk assessed by the reinsurance and credit risk transfer markets? Mr. Walker. Thank you for your question. I will answer that question from a credit risk transfer perspective and as not a property expert. Property risk does come into play with credit risk transfer. Those protections are in place regardless of the reason a borrower defaults. So, if there is natural catastrophe and a default happens because of it, credit risk transfer is there to kind of cover those claims. So reinsurers do evaluate their credit risk transfer exposure from a natural catastrophe perspective, and the current reality is there is not as much risk being transferred given the attachment points of those programs, but they do evaluate it, and they have modeling to kind of evaluate and price it. Ms. Pettersen. Dr, Wachter, while the severity and frequency of high-loss events continue to increase, unfortunately, the FH--the FH--the FHFA, oh, my goodness, sorry about that, has taken multiple actions to undermine climate risk transparency, including revoking climate risk management requirements for government-sponsored enterprises, and withdrawing from the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System. Is there a risk of investors pulling back from the American housing market, and how might that impact prices for American home buyers? Ms. Wachter. Thank you for the question. If I may, with co- authors, we have a recent paper that was published just in 2025 on climate risk in mortgage markets. I would like to point to the work there, which shows that CRTs do indeed price the risk that comes from climate events and so that is very useful for that purpose as well. I am aware that FHFA has pulled back its climate research. I do think more data on climate risk is absolutely critical and the mortgage market is particularly important work. I would hope to see more research going forward. Ms. Pettersen. Thank you. Another follow-up question, Dr. Wachter. As communities are becoming increasingly at risk for devastating losses, they are also facing uncertainty as insurance companies are completely pulling coverage out from communities. When I meet with some small businessowners just outside of the suburbs, even in Evergreen, Colorado, they are unable to ensure their businesses and homeowners who are unavailable to find insurance options are fleeing these communities because of the inability to find any options. What happens to the communities that do not have anywhere to turn for insurance options? Ms. Wachter. This is obviously an incredibly important problem, particularly for States that are exposed to risk, including Florida, California for wildfires, and there is ongoing work, but there needs to be much more. Particularly what I would like to see is more cooperative work among the reinsurers, insurers, and communities, particularly the communities that are in harm's way, to increase the availability of insurance. Ms. Pettersen. That leads me to--well, another piece of this, which--what role does AI play in modeling risk and managing reinsurance portfolios, clarifying risk mitigation, and processing claims, and what measures are being taken to ensure that consumer interests and data are being adequately protected? You have 4 seconds. Ms. Wachter. Not enough. Ms. Pettersen. All right. Thank you very much. Chairman Flood. The gentlelady yields back. I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter the following letters into the record. We have one from the SmarterSafer Coalition, dated April 22, 2026, and we have one from the Arch Mortgage Insurance Company, dated April 22, 2026. Without objections, these will be received. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 56.] Chairman Flood. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Rose, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Rose. Thank you, Chairman Flood and Ranking Member Cleaver, for holding this important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being with us today. Mr. Vidovich, in your testimony, you note that increased capital and competition have helped drive down the cost of reinsurance by making it more attractive risk-management tool-- making it a more attractive risk-management tool for programs like the National Flood Insurance Program. You also point out that, in some years, reinsurers have paid out nearly as much or more than they collect in premiums. Given that context, how durable is the current pricing environment? If conditions shift and reinsurance costs begin to rise, is the industry well-positioned to manage those price swings? What would that mean for the affordability and availability of coverage for Federal programs that rely on it? Mr. Vidovich. Thank you for the question, Congressman. The industry is quite resilient and capable of meeting risk today and into the future. If we just look at the increased frequency and severity of catastrophic weather-related events, the industry has seen what used to be an exceptional year of $100 billion of insured losses. We seen that 7 out of the last 10 years, and we have seen losses in excess of that every year for the last 5 years. Notwithstanding that, capital is moving into the reinsurance space, as I said earlier. In Florida, in particular, we are seeing the price of catastrophe reinsurance drop because of the fact that capital is coming in to support the market. There is a home for this risk in the private market. Mr. Rose. Thank you. I appreciate that. Dr. Wachter, in your testimony, you emphasize that the credit risk transfer market provides a forward-looking market- based signal of mortgage credit risk where investors actively put capital at risk based on their assessments. How effective is the credit risk transfer market in identifying early signs of deterioration in housing market conditions or the buildup of systemic risk compared to traditional indicators like delinquencies or foreclosures. Ms. Wachter. It is extremely efficient in comparison with existing measures. The existing measures are often delayed, backward looking, or simply do not operate. So, for example, default and foreclosure happen after the crisis. Particularly foreclosure can be months, years after the crisis. It is not a signal at all. Default itself is not a signal of a bubble that is building. As a bubble builds, prices increase. As prices increase, then we have less default currently but more danger of over leverage and increased defaults and foreclosure in the future, but no sign of it. As I was watching the leverage and risk buildup in the great--the buildup in the great financial crisis, I with others was noting, and we were not surprised, that default simply did not increase. Default is a reaction to a crisis because, after the crisis was revealed, then entities imploded, and, at that point, defaults increased as prices fell. So, they respond to prices. In the buildup, prices go up. On the other hand, it appears, and from our research, we have very good information showing that, yes, the credit risk transfer market is operating exactly as it should, and it does accurately price risk. It does price risk, and very, very subtle risk even, it does price. We see that in the risk of coming from Hurricane Harvey and Katrina in the paper that-- sorry. Harvey and Irma, the paper I referenced earlier. We also see it in the COVID experience. In the COVID experience, CRT prices gapped out tremendously, as they appropriately should have, and that occurred. Mr. Rose. Sorry to interrupt you, but in the interest of time, is there a way as policymakers that we can--because what you are saying makes complete sense to me, is there a way we can tap into that information and use it more effectively to overt future financial crisis? Ms. Wachter. Absolutely there is a way to tap into that, and there is--it is traced continuously. The Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) has the data continuously. You can watch it, look at it. In particular, I think it would be useful at moments of crisis, such as COVID, to consider it. All policymakers can and should make use of this information. I am sure many are, and there can be more--it is a bit of an obscure market, but it is working. Mr. Rose. Thank you. I see my time has expired. I yield back. Chairman Flood. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Flood and Ranking Member Cleaver, for holding this hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses because we are going through a housing crisis in my hometown of Atlanta, Georgia, and I welcome your expertise today. Owning a home is one of the most important ways American families build wealth. It is how working families get a foothold in the middle class. If we want to expand homeownership in this country, we need the systems behind mortgage lending to work well and fairly. Let me explain what we are talking about today, and perhaps you can help me with this explanation for the people back home. When you buy a home, your bank does not just hold your mortgage. It bundles your loan with thousands of others and sells them to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac but, when those companies are holding all that risk and loans go bad, taxpayers, homeowners, my constituents, the American people, they are on the hook. We learned that the hard way in 2008. Following the 2008 collapse, institutional investors bought thousands of single- family homes on the cheap turning Atlanta into ground zero of an investor takeover of the housing market. Credit risk transfer could have mitigated this risk of corporate landlords in Atlanta by enhancing market discipline on risk pricing and reducing the volume of distressed assets available for acquisition. Established CRT markets might have diverted private capital into financial securities, rather than the bulk of purchase of physical single-family homes, according to an analysis of CRT mechanisms in a report from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The 2008 crisis directly contributed to Atlanta's current high-cost housing market. The massive conversion of homes into rentals by investors coupled with long-term under-building of homes after 2008 created a persistent housing shortage that has fueled an affordability crisis that continues to loom in Atlanta today. CRT lets Fannie and Freddie pass some of that default risk to private investors, so losses do not fall entirely on the American people. Today I want to understand how well it is working for the financial system and for the families that I represent. Dr. Wachter, in your testimony, you describe CRT as a tool for spreading risk broadly so it does not pile up in one place, but what happens when things go wrong anyway? If we hit a severe economic downturn and private investors start pulling back, what does that mean for homeowners who are still making their payments every month? Distress in the CRT market will ripple back to the people at their kitchen table. Ms. Wachter. Thank you for that question. It is a very important question. What we saw in COVID was indeed the--in March 2020, the price of risk increased dramatically as unemployment increased to 15 percent. The fastest rise in unemployment that we had ever seen, and this was a moment of potential disaster for the United States. There was response, and it was an important response, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, forbearance. These are important programs. The indicators of risk, including the elevated unemployment rate, including the pricing of CRT, were indicators, and I am sure helped inform this important policy of forbearance. Let me just go to more specifically your question. Using this example, after COVID, the G-fees were not increased, immediately post-COVID in 2020, and mortgage rates were not increased. Fannie and Freddie stayed in the market. If they had been privatized, this would not have occurred, and the health crisis that we as a country were undergoing would have been accompanied by a financial crisis as well. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Dr. Wachter. Mr. Vidovich, am I pronouncing that correctly? My name is Nikema. So, I try to get the names right. Mr. Vidovich. It is Vidovich but thank you. Mr. Williams. Vidovich. Mr. Vidovich, expanding affordable homeownership is a priority for many of us on this committee on both sides of the aisle because we know how it is impacting our constituents regardless of what party they vote for. If Fannie and Freddie develop new mortgage products aimed at getting more families into homes, is the private market capable of stepping up and pricing that kind of risk? Mr. Vidovich. It would depend on the laws and the regulations that would be governing those new programs, but critical to the evaluation of the default risk would be the available data on the portfolios that would be constructed as a result of those new products. Our industry stands ready where we are able to evaluate the data and define the risk to provide a private solution, but it would depend on the availability of that data to assess the risk. Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you so much. Your testimony today has made it clear that this market is doing important work and not just to protect taxpayers but open doors for more American families. I want to leave here today committed to making that happen. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Flood. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses. I am happy we are having this hearing to explore ways that federally backed programs can and have been reducing the risk of losses born by taxpayers. Of particular interest to me has been NFIP, the National Flood Insurance Program, and I want to make sure that Montana ratepayers and taxpayers are not penalized with higher premiums or exposure there to subsidize lower rates in high-risk areas. That has been a concern of mine. As a former insurance commissioner, I have been thinking about this for a while. I am going to start a little bit broader about a proposal that has been circulating in Congress and amongst some think tanks of the idea of creating a Federal property reinsurer. I firmly believe that the Federal Government should get out of the business of insurance to the greatest extent possible, and that is one of the reasons that I have a bill to eliminate FIO, the Federal Insurance Office. I really believe in State-based regulation. I believe the private market should take this up. So that is something that I am supporting. I am going to start with Mr. Theodorou. You know, you have opined on this topic before and can you explain why Federalizing reinsurance continues to be a terrible idea, and one that runs the risk of shifting costs of living in riskier areas along the coast to people living in places like Montana? Mr. Theodorou. Thank you for the question. Indeed, I have seen that federally backed--or Federal reinsurance is not a good idea because it does the opposite of what reinsurance is designed to do. Reinsurance achieves a spread of risk whereas, if you remove the providers of the risk from the global environment--and it is strictly done in the United States--then you are concentrating risk because the U.S. actually has more natural catastrophes than other regions of the world. So, it is not a good idea from that point. The last hearing, as Congressman Flood indicated, on this subject of reinsurance was in 2007, and at that hearing, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Ed Lazear, made a really passionate presentation on why, after 2004, 2005, the Federal reinsurers is not the answer. I have indicated in my testimony earlier that, if you have Federal reinsurance, that crowds out the private market, and it suppresses the transmission of signal of price, and also it does a counter subsidy of subsidizing those with large million-dollar homes, and smaller ones pay for it. On many fronts, it was a bad idea. Fortunately, it was not carried through, but it has come up a few times with this similar kind of proposal. Mr. Downing. Yes. Well, I appreciate that. Thank you for your testimony there. To shift gears really quickly, Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to submit for the record Mr. Theodorou's piece titled ``Why a Federal Reinsurer Remains a Bad Idea.'' Chairman Flood. Without objection. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix on page 64.] Mr. Downing. Thank you. Now, on NFIP specifically, I am going to move to Mr. Walker here, can you describe how the NFIP has benefited from private insurance? Mr. Walker. Thank you for the question. So, as discussed on this panel, diversification and private capital has been immensely helpful to a lot of private--or public entities. The reinsurance marketplace provides pricing feedback and provides capital that can pay claims in a fast amount of time. After Hurricane Harvey, for example, the program in its inception year recovered a billion dollars from the reinsurance industry paid in a timely fashion. Mr. Downing. Yes. There was a notable increase in reinsurance participation NFIP program from 2024 to 2025. So, just going, why do you think that is? Mr. Walker. I am not an expert in the NFIP program myself, but as Mr. Vidovich has testified, there is more capital available in the reinsurance industry to take on property catastrophe risks, which I assume is correlated. Mr. Downing. Thank you. I will move to Mr. Vidovich. Can you discuss how the NFIP uses the insurance-linked securities markets to transfer risk? Mr. Vidovich. Yes. In addition--thank you for the question. Yes, in addition to the use of traditional treaty reinsurance, the NFIP has gone into the catastrophe bond space and used catastrophe bonds as a way to protect the NFIP from extreme tail risk. Mr. Downing. The strategy compared to traditional reinsurance, what are the advantages and disadvantages? Mr. Vidovich. As I testified earlier, reinsurance has a number of different--takes a number of different forms, and catastrophe bonds meet the investment needs of a group that see them attractive for that extreme tail risk. Mr. Downing. Well, thank you. Unfortunately, we ran out of time. Mr. Chair, I yield. Chairman Flood. The gentleman yields back. I would like to thank all the witnesses for your testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response. Witnesses, please respond no later than May 27, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] With that, this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]