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- ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS IN FRIGID WATERS [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL COM- PETITION: SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS IN FRIGID WATERS ======================================================================= JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 26, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-44 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-203 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chair Ranking Member Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Nick LaLota, New York Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Brad Knott, North Carolina Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Vince Fong, California Al Green, Texas Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Keighle Joyce, Staff Director Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey, Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Ranking Member Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Troy A. Carter, Louisiana officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex officio) Hannah Hagen, Subcommittee Staff Director Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island, Morgan Luttrell, Texas Ranking Member Gabe Evans, Colorado J. Luis Correa, California Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Daniel S. Goldman, New York Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex Nellie Pou, New Jersey officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex officio) Natalie Hurst, Subcommittee Staff Director Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Statements The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security: Oral Statement................................................. 1 Prepared Statement............................................. 3 The Honorable LaMonica McIver, a Representative in Congress From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security: Oral Statement................................................. 4 Prepared Statement............................................. 5 The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: Oral Statement................................................. 5 Prepared Statement............................................. 6 Witnesses Ms. Heather A. Conley, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute: Oral Statement................................................. 8 Prepared Statement............................................. 9 Mr. Bryan Clark, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, Hudson Institute: Oral Statement................................................. 14 Prepared Statement............................................. 16 Ms. Marisol Maddox, Senior Arctic Fellow, Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College: Oral Statement................................................. 25 Prepared Statement............................................. 27 Appendix Questions From Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez for Heather A. Conley.. 39 Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Heather A. Conley..... 40 Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Heather A. Conley..... 44 Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Bryan Clark........... 45 Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Bryan Clark........... 46 ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: SAFEGUARDING U.S. INTERESTS IN FRIGID WATERS ---------- Thursday, March 26, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, and the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington, DC. The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3:35 p.m., in room 360, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos A. Gimenez [Chairman of the Subcommittee of Transportation and Maritime Security] presiding. Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security: Representatives Gimenez, Crane, McIver, and Kennedy. Present from the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: Representatives Pfluger and Pou. Chairman Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. Without objection the Chair may declare the committee in recess at any point. First of all, let me apologize for being here so late and we were waiting for votes to happen and you know, we don't run like, you know, like the trains in Europe, I guess, are right on time. So we, we're in the United States. We don't, we don't do that. But first of all, again, apologize for everybody that's here and also the witness, especially the witnesses for, you know, indulging us for the 90 minutes. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the current readiness of U.S. arctic forces, evaluate interagency capabilities and account for strategic investments in Arctic security assets. I recognize myself for an opening statement. Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. Today's hearing will focus on the importance of Arctic security and the urgent need for the United States to strengthen its presence, coordination, and defense capabilities in this challenging yet vital region. The Arctic, long considered a strategic frontier for the United States, has become a competitive tundra with melting ice opening new shipping routes and expansive new access to critical minerals. Given these developments, Russia has stepped up its Arctic posture. Despite its on-going war with Ukraine, Russia has quietly expanded its military footprint in the High North and reactivated its Cold War-era bases to deploy more advanced air and missile defense systems and increase complex naval operations across the region. Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest fleet of heavy icebreakers and increased investment in northern ports, airfields, nuclear-powered vessels, and critical energy infrastructure. This allows Russia to strengthen its projection of maritime power and close in on critical maritime corridors along the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, China is positioning itself as a quote, ``near-Arctic State'' and steadily expanding its presence along the region. Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and pursued what it claims to be scientific research, activities to gain greater access to critical minerals and natural resources. China is actively integrating the Arctic into its broader global strategy, leveraging investments in dual-use capabilities that could support future military and intelligence-gathering activities. These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a clear intent by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their Arctic domain and put pressure on the United States. Meanwhile, as our adversaries plot in the Arctic, the United States has limited operations in the region. To support our national security priorities we must re-engage as an Arctic nation and harness the power of the High North. Last year, Congressional Republicans bestowed the Coast Guard with unprecedented resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed into law by President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including tens of billions directed toward the procurement of new ice breaking, polar security, and national security, and Arctic security cutters, gives the United States an unprecedented opportunity to deploy the Coast Guard's Arctic assets and exert greater dominance. As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned the building of a new medium polar icebreaker called Storis in addition to its one medium icebreaker, the Healy. The Coast Guard's only operational heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, just completed its 29th Antarctic tour despite being long past its intended service life. This widening gap in U.S. Arctic capability is unacceptable and the United States cannot afford to fall behind Russia and China. We must implement this historic investment expeditiously to expand U.S. presence, capability, and commitment to Arctic security. For years, the Coast Guard has been plagued by delays, cost overruns and contract mismanagement, and this subcommittee has sounded the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges, they are growing national security vulnerabilities. While these investments act as a down payment on Coast Guard readiness, Congress must also consider future opportunities and challenges on the frozen frontier, including through improving international partnerships and hardening our intelligence- gathering methods to improve our Arctic strategy on all fronts. We must recognize that the Arctic is a challenging but promising frontier and the competition to dominate it is increasing day by day. The Trump administration is appropriately considering how to leverage strategic vantage points such as Greenland to improve U.S. military readiness in the Arctic. Today we should explore those opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters, where the U.S. stands with our Arctic allies, and what must be done to prepare and protect our interests. Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing in today's hearing and I look forward to your testimony. [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:] Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. Today's hearing will focus on the importance of Arctic security and the urgent need for the United States to strengthen its presence, coordination, and defense capabilities in this challenging yet vital region. The Arctic, long considered a strategic frontier for the United States, has become a competitive tundra with melting ice opening new shipping routes and expansive new access to critical minerals. Given these developments, Russia has stepped up its Arctic posture. Despite its on-going war with Ukraine, Russia has quietly expanded its military footprint in the High North and reactivated its Cold War-era bases to deploy more advanced air and missile defense systems and increase complex naval operations across the region. Over the years, Moscow has built up the world's largest fleet of heavy icebreakers and increased investment in northern ports, airfields, nuclear-powered vessels, and critical energy infrastructure. This allows Russia to strengthen its projection of maritime power and close in on critical maritime corridors along the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, China is positioning itself as a quote, ``near- Arctic State'' and steadily expanding its presence along the region. Beijing has invested in Arctic infrastructure and pursued what it claims to be scientific research, activities to gain greater access to critical minerals and natural resources. China is actively integrating the Arctic into its broader global strategy, leveraging investments in dual-use capabilities that could support future military and intelligence-gathering activities. These aggressive tactics by Russia and China demonstrate a clear intent by two of our greatest adversaries to expand their Arctic domain and put pressure on the United States. Meanwhile, as our adversaries plot in the Arctic, the United States has limited operations in the region. To support our national security priorities we must reengage as an Arctic nation and harness the power of the High North. Last year, Congressional Republicans bestowed the Coast Guard with unprecedented resources through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act signed into law by President Trump. This $25 billion investment, including tens of billions directed toward the procurement of new ice breaking, polar security, and national security, and Arctic security cutters, gives the United States an unprecedented opportunity to deploy the Coast Guard's Arctic assets and exert greater dominance. As such, the Coast Guard has commissioned the building of a new medium polar icebreaker called Storis in addition to its one medium icebreaker, the Healy. The Coast Guard's only operational heavy icebreaker, the Polar Star, just completed its 29th Antarctic tour despite being long past its intended service life. This widening gap in U.S. Arctic capability is unacceptable and the United States cannot afford to fall behind Russia and China. We must implement this historic investment expeditiously to expand U.S. presence, capability, and commitment to Arctic security. For years, the Coast Guard has been plagued by delays, cost overruns and contract mismanagement, and this subcommittee has sounded the alarm. These are not just acquisition challenges, they are growing national security vulnerabilities. While these investments act as a down payment on Coast Guard readiness, Congress must also consider future opportunities and challenges on the frozen frontier, including through improving international partnerships and hardening our intelligence-gathering methods to improve our Arctic strategy on all fronts. We must recognize that the Arctic is a challenging but promising frontier and the competition to dominate it is increasing day by day. The Trump administration is appropriately considering how to leverage strategic vantage points such as Greenland to improve U.S. military readiness in the Arctic. Today we should explore those opportunities and examine why the Arctic matters, where the United States stands with our Arctic allies, and what must be done to prepare and protect our interests. Thank you again to our witnesses for appearing in today's hearing and I look forward to your testimony. I now recognize a Ranking Member, McIver, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, to deliver her opening statements. Chairman Gimenez. I now recognize a Ranking Member, McIver, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, to deliver her opening statements. Mrs. McIver. Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon and thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for your patience. The Arctic is no longer a remote or frozen frontier. It is rapidly emerging as a central arena of geopolitical competition, economic activity, and national security risk. As sea ice recedes and access to the region increases, so too does the urgency for the United States to define and defend its role in the Arctic. Russia has significantly expanded its military footprint and China is actively attempting to position itself as a global Arctic stakeholder. The reality is simple. The Arctic is becoming more contested, more accessible, and more significant to our national security. Unfortunately, at the very moment when strategic focus and coordination are most needed, the United States is falling behind. We are operating with limited icebreaking capacity, underdeveloped infrastructure, and significant gaps in domain awareness. The Coast Guard, which serves as the primary Federal presence in the Arctic, continues to face workforce strain, aging assets, and increasing mission demands. This is not suitable. We cannot expect the Coast Guard to carry out complex and expanding missions in one of the most challenging environments on Earth without the tools, personnel, and resources necessary to do so. But capability gaps are only part of the problem. Our strength in the Arctic has always depended not just on our presence, but on partnership. Cooperation with allies like Canada and our border Arctic partners is essential to maintaining a stable and secure region. Yet recent actions by Trump and his administration have placed unnecessary strain on those relationships at a time when unity is critical. Trump has threatened to invade Greenland, an insane proposition that has angered and made our NATO allies very weary. Trump has launched a reckless, illegal war in Iran without attempting to build support among NATO allies, only to then call upon those allies to place their service members in harm's way to assist the United States. These actions have increased terrorist threats to the homeland and our allies, generated a growing energy crisis, and emboldened our adversaries around the globe, including the Arctic. When we undermine trust with our closest partners, we do not strengthen our position, we weaken it. The United States cannot lead in the Arctic alone, and we cannot afford to create conditions where our allies question our trustworthiness. When we fail to lead with clarity, purpose, and credibility, we risk ceding influence in a region that is increasingly vital to our national security and economic future. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can close these gaps, strengthen our partnerships, and ensure that the United States is prepared to meet the challenges of a rapidly-changing Arctic. With that, I yield back. [The statement of Ranking Member McIver follows:] Statement of Ranking Member LaMonica McIver March 26, 2026 The Arctic is no longer a remote or frozen frontier. It is rapidly emerging as a central arena of geopolitical competition, economic activity, and national security risk. As sea ice recedes and access to the region increases, so too does the urgency for the United States to define and defend its role in the Arctic. Russia has significantly expanded its military footprint, and China is actively attempting to position itself as a global Arctic stakeholder. The reality is simple: the Arctic is becoming more contested, more accessible, and more consequential to our national security. Unfortunately, at the very moment when strategic focus and coordination are most needed, the United States is falling behind. We are operating with limited icebreaking capacity, underdeveloped infrastructure, and significant gaps in domain awareness. The Coast Guard, which serves as the primary Federal presence in the Arctic, continues to face workforce strain, aging assets, and increasing mission demands. This is not sustainable. We cannot expect the Coast Guard to carry out complex and expanding missions in one of the most challenging environments on Earth without the tools, personnel, and resources necessary to do so. But capability gaps are only part of the problem. Our strength in the Arctic has always depended not just on presence, but on partnership. Cooperation with allies like Canada and our broader Arctic partners is essential to maintaining a stable and secure region. Yet recent actions by President Trump and his administration have placed unnecessary strain on those relationships at a time when unity is critical. President Trump has threatened to invade Greenland, an insane proposition that has angered and bewildered our NATO allies. And Trump has launched a reckless, illegal war in Iran without attempting to build support among NATO allies--only to then call upon those allies to place their service members in harm's way to assist the United States. These actions have increased terrorist threats to the homeland and our allies, generated a growing energy crisis, and emboldened our adversaries around the globe--including in the Arctic. When we undermine trust with our closest partners, we do not strengthen our position. We weaken it. Let me be clear: the United States cannot lead in the Arctic alone. And we cannot afford to create conditions where our allies question our reliability and trustworthiness. When we fail to lead with clarity, purpose, and credibility, we risk ceding influence in a region that is increasingly vital to our national security and economic future. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can close these gaps, strengthen our partnerships, and ensure that the United States is prepared to meet the challenges of a rapidly-changing Arctic. Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the Ranking Member, and I recognize Chairman Pfluger, the gentleman from Texas, and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence to deliver his opening statements. Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, our apologies for holding up this hearing today. Thank you for your patience and for being here, and especially as we consider the security of the Arctic, the newest frontier, I think, for great power competition. The witnesses that we have here with us this afternoon each bring a deep knowledge of the Arctic and the operating environment and our readiness to confront emerging threats. I'm grateful to them and to Chairman Gimenez for bringing this forum together. Until recently, the Arctic was really only a peripheral place in our strategic guidance, and understandably so. But limited navigability constrained our access to its sea lanes. With NORAD, established at the height of the Cold War, North America air space remained well-protected. Arctic security at that time was largely unquestioned. Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. New sea lanes and rapid advances in military capabilities have expanded the region's operational significance. While our capacity to detect, monitor, and mitigate these threats has really largely stayed the same. This widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach to that security, it can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a peripheral theater. Complacency severely reduces our competitive advantage. ODNI's annual threat assessment, released just last week, underscores the ambitions of our adversaries. They assess that Russia seeks to leverage its Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader efforts to reshape the global balance of power, relying on persistent military activity and assured access to the region's natural resources. China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific and commercial investments that could advance its own strategic aims. The challenge for the United States now is to ensure that we can detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that keeps pace with the environment and the tools that adversaries are using. Aside from sustained investments in polar-capable ships and aircraft, vulnerabilities below the surface, especially surrounding subsea cable infrastructure, should inform our posture to prevent any actor from being able to exploit or disrupt everyday service used by Americans. Like the Arctic itself, the space domain presents new challenges and opportunities. As ground-based assets start to wear and provide a soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help complete our operational picture and enhance our defense posture. But beyond physical assets, we must ensure the U.S. security interests in the Arctic are not a casualty interagency--are not a casualty of interagency silos. The intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of War, and many of our NATO allies are all Arctic stakeholders. A spirit of partnership and cohesive information sharing should characterize this security. Relationships do serve as force multipliers, and if that's not the case now, then our job as policy makers are to engage the experts and create the needed efficiencies. As this committee knows well, threats to our interest in our homeland are pervasive, and it's through dedication of the service members, the skill of our intelligence analysts, and a consistency in our homeland workforce that we remain proactive and agile in confronting these threats. Today's Arctic may remain a forum for great power competition for the foreseeable future, but we have a small window of opportunity to prevent it from becoming exploited and weaponized by bad actors. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. [The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:] Statement of Chairman August Pfluger Thank you all for being here today as we consider the security of our Arctic homeland--the newest frontier for great power competition. The witnesses we have with us this afternoon each bring with them deep knowledge of the Arctic operating environment and our readiness to confront emerging threats there. I'm grateful to them, and to Chairman Gimenez, for holding this hearing, and I'm hopeful that we all leave this conversation with a clearer understanding of the path forward in this strategically vital region. Until recently, the Arctic was only a peripheral place in our strategic guidance--and understandably so. Limited navigability constrained our access to its sea lanes, and with NORAD established at the height of the Cold War, North American air space remained well- protected. Arctic security, at the time, was largely unquestioned. Today, however, the strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. New sea lanes and rapid advances in military capabilities have expanded the region's operational significance, while our capacity to detect, monitor, and mitigate threats has largely stayed the same. This widening gap demands a renewed and more deliberate approach to Arctic security. The Arctic can no longer be viewed as a safe haven or a peripheral theater. Complacency in our posture risks diminishing our comparative advantage. ODNI's Annual Threat Assessment, released just last week, underscores the ambitions of our adversaries. ODNI assesses that Russia seeks to leverage its Arctic presence as a pillar of its broader efforts to reshape the global balance of power--relying on persistent military activity and assured access to the region's natural resources. China, for its part, continues to pursue dual-use scientific and commercial investments that could advance its strategic aims. The challenge for the United States now is to ensure that we can detect and defeat threats to the homeland in a way that keeps pace with the environment and the new tools at our adversaries' disposal. As it relates to the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard will continue to be an essential piece of our collective efforts in the Arctic. Last summer, Republicans provided the Coast Guard with billions of dollars through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act to improve the force's capabilities, including funding for Polar Security Cutters and Arctic Security Cutters capable of operating in this dynamic region. Aside from sustained investments in polar-capable ships and aircraft, vulnerabilities below the Arctic surface--especially surrounding subsea cable infrastructure--should also inform our posture, preparing us to prevent any actor from being able to exploit or disrupt everyday services used by Americans. Like the Arctic itself, the space domain presents new challenges and opportunities. As ground-based assets start to age and provide a soft target for our adversaries, space-based assets can help to complete our operational picture and enhance our defense posture. But beyond physical assets, we must also ensure that U.S. security interests in the Arctic are not a casualty of interagency siloes. The intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of War, and many of our NATO allies are all Arctic stakeholders. A spirit of partnership and cohesive information sharing should characterize Arctic security. Relationships should serve as force multipliers. If that's not the case now, then it is our job as policy makers to engage the experts, evaluate the problems, and create the needed efficiencies. As this committee knows well, threats to our interests and our homeland are pervasive. It is through the dedication of our service members, the skill of our intelligence analysts, and professionalism of our homeland security workforce that we can consistently remain proactive and agile in confronting those threats. Today's Arctic may remain an arena for great power competition for the foreseeable future--but we have a window of opportunity to prevent it from being exploited and weaponized by bad actors. Thank you again to our witnesses for being here, and I look forward to the conversation that we're about to have. Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the Chairman Pfluger for your opening statements. Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Ms. Heather Conley is a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where she focuses on transatlantic security, Europe, Eurasia, and Arctic geopolitics. She previously served as president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and held senior leadership roles at the center for Strategic and International Studies. Earlier in her career, she worked at the U.S. State Department, including as deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs. She is widely recognized as an expert on security policy regarding Russia, Europe, and NATO security. Mr. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, serving as the director of its Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, specializing in naval operations and autonomous systems. He was also previously a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, leading studies for the Department of War on emerging technologies. Before that, Mr. Clark served in the U.S. Navy, including as special assistant to the chief of naval operations and in strategic planning roles, with experience as both an officer and submariner. Ms. Marisol Maddox is a senior arctic fellow at the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth College, where her work focuses on geopolitics in the Arctic. Through her research, Ms. Maddox assessed how emerging threats and strategic competition in the Arctic intersect with national and international security. Previously, she taught Arctic security at institutions such as the Ted Stevens center for Arctic Security Studies and was an adjunct professor at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. I would like to thank all of the witness for being here today. Pursuant to committee rule VII(C), I ask that the witness please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you so much and please be seated. [Witnesses sworn.] I now recognize Ms. Conley for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statements. STATEMENT OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, NON-RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Ms. Conley. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member McIver, thank you. This was very worth the wait, so we appreciate your time. Thank you for convening this hearing, despite the many serious and pressing priorities this committee currently addresses. However, if we do not maintain a sustained focus on strengthening America's Arctic security, we will have failed in our duty to protect the United States. I would just like to offer 3 observations, and I look forward to your questions and comments. First, I believe it's extremely important to acknowledge a significant shift in policy by the United States. The United States has moved away from its post-Cold War concept of a circumpolar Arctic that is a separate and distant region where long-term security challenges and new economic opportunities are managed cheaply and from a distance. We have recentered that the Arctic region within Homeland Defense and as part of an integrated defense strategy of the Western Hemisphere. The on-going modernization of our Arctic-based missile defense architecture, as well as developing a persistent presence in the maritime Arctic with overdue investments in our icebreaker fleet are critical components of this shift. In response, our Arctic allies have also shifted their policies to one of homeland security. Canada has committed U.S. $29 billion to substantially increase its military force presence across the Canadian Arctic. The Kingdom of Denmark has committed over $6 billion in 2 new agreements to improve Arctic security in Greenland. After much delay, NATO has now embraced a more active deterrence and defense role in the Arctic. It is an important first step. But I also want to acknowledge this shift came at a cost of the loss of trust between our NATO allies. But the response of our NATO allies is important as the United States will be unable to secure and defend the homeland effectively from the north without the strong cooperation and integration and coordination with our Arctic allies. The Arctic, the ice pack, the new allied defense procurement model to help us develop those Arctic security colors are really a leadership model to rapidly develop interoperable platforms to strengthen allied defense and deterrence. This is why I believe that we need to create an allied Arctic shield, working closely together with our 6 NATO Arctic allies and those who wish to be part of that shield. We do this because Russia and China are advancing their interest in the Arctic. Your opening statements framed this perfectly. I'm particularly concerned about China's scientific and economic activity that's focusing on the future biodiversity and fishing opportunities of the Central Arctic Ocean, the testing of future shipping routes in the high sea area and seabed mining. We need to make sure we have a persistent presence to ensure that that in no way hinders freedom of navigation for the United States. Combined, Russia and China are certainly solidifying their military, their joint military operations, specifically in the Pacific Arctic. We've seen that increase over the last several years. Just as of August 2025, there were 5 joint maritime patrols between Russia and China. They've had a joint bomber patrol entering the Alaskan Air Defense identification zone. In 2024. It was the first time that both aircrafts were detected simultaneously in our ADIZ. So the challenge is great. We have a new approach and now it's time to shift our policy and rethink our organizational structure. U.S. Arctic Policy as homeland defense requires a very different, a high-level and purpose-driven strategic coordination effort at the highest levels of government, the Department of Homeland Security, the Pentagon, the Interior and the Energy Departments, as well as the State of Alaska. The private sector also must be meaningfully engaged to develop dual-use infrastructure and build greater resiliency to Russian and Chinese military and hybrid tactics. This new coordination effort will likely require new command-and-control arrangements for the U.S. military, as well as new lines of civilian authority. For example, this new, wonderful icebreaker fleet must be integrated into an overarching new national defense strategy. It is critical that America's Arctic science agenda is fully integrated into this national strategy, as science is the underlying foundation for all future activities in the Arctic, particularly the sea floor and the high seas area. With this new policy approach, with an Arctic allied shield and a new organizational structure, I believe the United States will be well-prepared to enhance Arctic security. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Conley follows:] Prepared Statement of Heather A. Conley Thursday, March 26, 2026 Chairmans Pfluger and Gimenez, Ranking Members Magaziner and McIver, thank you for holding this joint hearing to better understand the long-term Arctic threat picture. Understanding this threat can ensure that the United States, in close cooperation with its Arctic allies, can protect and defend the northern flank of our homeland and its two Arctic avenues of approach via the Pacific and the Atlantic. Changes in the Arctic Great Powers.--There are 3 Arctic great powers: The United States along with its NATO allies, Russia, and China, which aspires to be a great polar power by 2030. Over the past 14 months, the United States has significantly shifted its Arctic policies and its security posture. This has, in turn, dramatically shifted the Arctic security stances of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, and NATO. As the international system accelerates its transition from the post-1945 order, sovereignty and maritime access will be increasingly challenged by the great powers as they compete for increased access and control across the Arctic region. Arctic America. The United States has moved away from its post-Cold War concept of the circumpolar Arctic as a separate and distant region where long-term security challenges and new economic opportunities are managed cheaply. Washington has returned ``home'' to the Arctic as it centers the region within homeland defense as part of an integrated defense strategy for the Western Hemisphere. The United States has prioritized modernizing its Arctic-based missile defense architecture and begun to develop a persistent presence in the maritime Arctic with long-overdue investments in its icebreaker fleet. The most notable step in this direction is the construction of up to 11 Arctic Security Cutters in cooperation with Canada and Finland through the Icebreaker Collaborative Effort (ICE Pact), with the first deliveries scheduled for 2028.\1\ In addition to the Arctic Security Cutters to be built through ICE Pact, 3 heavy Polar Security Cutter icebreakers will replace the only aging heavy icebreaker in the U.S. inventory and ensure access thick year-round ice in the Arctic and Antarctica, with the first vessel anticipated to be completed by 2030.\2\ This forthcoming icebreaker fleet must play a vital role in detecting and deterring Arctic threats, protecting America's territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and ensuring Freedom of Navigation in increasingly ice-free waters in the high seas area of the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO). However, today, the integrated mission for these new security cutters is unclear. It is important to note that an icebreaker alone does not provide Arctic security--it is a tool to detect, deter, and defend sovereignty and freedom of navigation when required while being able to conduct a range of activities to advance American interests. America's new icebreaking fleet must be accompanied by a suite of Arctic capabilities that are able to develop a common operating picture with our Arctic allies through data integration of seafloor sensors, polar orbital and navigational satellites, as well as autonomous systems. These capabilities must be accompanied by new dual- use infrastructure and operating bases to increase the American and allied physical presence in the Arctic. The Trump administration has persuasively outlined this wider suite of Arctic capabilities in America's Maritime Action Plan's Arctic Waterways Security Strategy, yet it is unclear what (and from where) new budgetary resources will be identified to implement this waterways strategy and who will ensure its implementation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ United States Coast Guard News, ``U.S. Coast Guard completes the President's contract awards for 11 Arctic Security Cutters.'' February 11, 2026: https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/ 4403354/us-coast-guard-completes-the-presidents-contract-awards-for-11- arctic-security/. \2\ Mike Schuler, ``Bollinger Shipyards Secures Full Funding for Troubled Polar Security Cutter Program.'' gCaptain. August 5, 2025: https://gcaptain.com/bollinger-shipyards-secures-full-funding-for- troubled-polar-security-cutter-program/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- America's Arctic allies have responded to this shift in America's Arctic strategy, specifically motivated by President Trump's challenge to the sovereignty of America's Arctic neighbors, Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark. In response, Canada has committed $29 billion (USD) to substantially increase its military force presence across the Canadian Arctic. This includes the establishment of 3 Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, upgrading and modernizing Arctic airports, and connecting the territory of Nunavut with Canada's national highway system.\3\ Ottawa has made overdue investments in upgrading NORAD early warning capabilities, pledging $28 billion (USD) for the Arctic-Over-the-Horizon radar project.\4\ To enhance domain awareness in its distant northern regions, Canada has also announced plans to strengthen the Canadian Forces military satellite communications capabilities.\5\ As a partner alongside Finland and the United States in ICE Pact, Canadian shipbuilder Seaspan Shipyards will provide the design specifications for the our Arctic Security Cutters that are to be built in Finland, Houma, Louisiana,\6\ and Galveston, Texas.\7\ Canada has also recently completed a class of 6 Arctic and offshore patrol ships, further enhancing Ottawa's ability to police its territorial waters.\8\ Canada and the 5 Nordic countries (Arctic 6) have recently participated in a first of its kind summit in Oslo, Norway where they have announced new defense industrial partnerships.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Prime Minister of Canada, ``Prime Minister Carney announces ambitious new plan to defend, build, and transform the North.'' March 12, 2026: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/03/12/prime- minister-carney-announces-ambitious-new-plan-defend-build-and. \4\ Government of Canada, ``National Defence announces progress on the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar project.'' July 17, 2025: https:// www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2025/07/national- defence-announces-progress-on-the-arctic-over-the-horizon-radar- project.html. \5\ Government of Canada, ``Government of Canada announces strategic partnership to strengthen military communications in the Arctic.'' December 9, 2025: https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services- procurement/news/2025/12/government-of-canada-announces-strategic- partnership-to-strengthen-military-communications-in-the-arctic.html. \6\ Mike Schuler, ``Canadian Icebreaker Design Picked for U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Security Cutters.'' gCaptain. January 7, 2026: https://gcaptain.com/canadian-icebreaker-design-picked-for-u-s-coast- guard-arctic-security-cutters/. \7\ Mike Schuler, ``U.S. Coast Guard Awards Arctic Security Cutter Contracts to Davie Defense, Closing Out 11-Ship Program.'' gCaptain. February 11, 2026: https://gcaptain.com/u-s-coast-guard-awards-arctic- security-cutter-contracts-to-davie-defense-closing-out-11-ship- program/. \8\ Naval News, ``Canada Launches Sixth and Final Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship.'' November 12, 2024: https://www.navalnews.com/ naval-news/2024/12/canada-launches-sixth-and-final-arctic-and-offshore- patrol-ship/. \9\ Prime Minister of Canada, ``Prime Minister Carney deepens cooperation with Nordic countries in defence, Arctic security, and critical minerals.'' March 16, 2026: https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news- releases/2026/03/15/prime-minister-carney-deepens-cooperation-nordic- countries-defence. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Kingdom of Denmark has committed over $6 billion \10\ dollars in 2 agreements,\11\ to improve Arctic security in Greenland. This new funding includes the addition of 3 Arctic patrol vessels, long-range drones, additional funding for coastal radars, and the establishment of a new Joint Arctic Command Headquarters in Nuuk with a new military unit affiliated with the command to be stationed in Greenland. For well over a decade, the United Kingdom has taken a leadership role in the defense and security of Northern Europe through its Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF), collaborating with Norway on the purchase of interoperable anti-submarine warfare frigates \12\ and taking a leading role in responding to threats to underseas cables.\13\ The United Kingdom has announced it will deploy forces from the Royal Marines to northern Norway.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Danish Ministry of Defence, ``First agreement on the Arctic and North Atlantic,'' https://www.fmn.dk/globalassets/fmn/dokumenter/- fact-sheet-first-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-.pdf. \11\ Danish Ministry of Defence, ``The Second Agreement on the Arctic and North Atlantic strengthens the operational effectiveness of the Danish Armed Forces with new acquisitions totalling DKK 27.4 billion.'' October 10, 2025: https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2025/the- second-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-strengthens-the- operational-effectiveness-of-the-danish-armed-forces-with-new- acquisitions-totalling-dkk-27.4-billion. \12\ Fatima Bahtic, ``UK and Norway sign major defense deal, establish interchangeable Type 26 fleet.'' Naval Today. December 5, 2025: https://www.navaltoday.com/2025/12/05/uk-and-norway-sign-major- defense-deal-establish-interchangeable-type-26-fleet/. \13\ Tinshui Yeung, ``UK and Norway form naval alliance to hunt Russian submarines.'' BBC. December 4, 2025: https://www.bbc.com/news/ articles/c3v152ep9l0o. \14\ Clara Bullock, ``Marines arrive in Norway as part of new agreement.'' BBC. January 26, 2026: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ cgl8ddy18yno. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- After much delay, NATO has embraced a more active Arctic deterrence and defensive role. Pressed into action by the transatlantic crisis over Greenland, NATO has increased defenses of Greenland under the umbrella of the Arctic Sentry mission and the Arctic Endurance exercise by committing additional air, sea, and ground assets.\15\ NATO has also developed a permanent NATO presence through a Forward Land Forces (FLF) Multinational Staff Element (MNSE) in Rovaniemi, Finland. Sweden is the lead nation in NATO's enhanced forward presence in Finland.\16\ Finland and Norway this month hosted land, sea, and air exercises involving 32,500 participants from the United States and 13 other allied nations for NATO's Cold Response 26 exercises.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Danish Defence, ``Arctic Endurance continues throughout 2026.'' January 23, 2026: https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/news/2026/arctic- endurance-fortsatter-i-hele-2026/. \16\ NATO, ``Strengthening NATO's eastern flank.'' October 23, 2025: https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/ strengthening-natos-eastern-flank. \17\ Dzirhan Mahadzir, ``NATO Forces Wrap Arctic Warfare Cold Response 26 Drills.'' USNI News. March 19, 2026: https://news.usni.org/ 2026/03/19/nato-forces-wrap-arctic-warfare-cold-response-26-drills. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- American and allied Arctic security investments are long overdue and very welcome. NATO's role will be particularly important as Arctic allies implement their regional defense plans, exercise cold-weather fighter capabilities and work on greater interoperability and a common operating picture. ICE Pact is a new allied defense procurement model which not only benefits all 3 countries' shipyards but produces more rapidly interoperable platforms to strengthen allied deterrence and defense. However, to optimize collective defense and deterrence in the Arctic, it is vital that the 7 NATO allies and the United Kingdom integrate their new Arctic capabilities to create an Allied Arctic shield. Sino-Russian Pursuits in the Arctic. Russia is an undisputed superpower in the Arctic with its nuclear deterrent housed above the Arctic Circle on the Kola Peninsula and its long-term economic ambitions in the region. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's elite Arctic special forces have sustained significant losses following deployments to Ukraine but it continues to modernize its Borei- and Yasen-class strategic nuclear submarines as well as enhance its hypersonic missile and autonomous capabilities, such as the Zircon cruise missile and Oreshnik ballistic missile (used twice in Ukraine, with a range of 3,500 miles.) These systems, designed to evade U.S. missile defenses, are tested in and fired from the Arctic. Russia's re-deployment of its deep-sea nuclear-powered submarine, the Losharik, designed for special intelligence missions, is capable of cutting transatlantic undersea cables or launching devastating weapons. Moscow's advanced hybrid warfare capabilities will also shape the future Arctic landscape. Russia's use of aerial and underwater drones, accelerated adaptation, production and electronic jamming capabilities are and will continue to be used against NATO Arctic bases and allied capabilities. We see these tactics revealed in the cutting of undersea cables, suspicious drone activity near civilian airports and NATO bases, economic coercion to sponsor arson attacks, and other sabotage campaigns. Through its ``unlimited'' partnership with China, Russia has facilitated the PRC's increased access to the Arctic as it advances its dual-use economic and scientific presence. China's focus in the Arctic centers on resource extraction, maritime infrastructure development, satellite communications and military and coast guard cooperation that include joint exercises and patrols between the Russian Federal Security Services and the China Coast Guard along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and on the high seas. The PRC is also increasing its Arctic satellite tracking and monitoring capabilities with a recently established ground station near Avacha Bay in the Russian Far East, co- located with a Russian submarine base which also serves as an access point to the NSR. Rosatom, which operates Russia's icebreaker fleet, increasingly relies on Chinese satellite data to facilitate navigation and ice forecasts along the NSR. Chinese scientific and economic activity prioritizes the future biodiversity and fishing opportunities of the Central Arctic Ocean and the testing of future shipping routes in the Central Arctic high seas area. Its icebreakers are able to penetrate the deepest reaches of the Central Arctic and Pacific Arctic. In an unprecedented display of its growing Arctic capabilities, in the summer of 2025, 5 Chinese icebreakers were present in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas, in some instances only 200 miles off the Alaskan coast.\18\ Beijing's Arctic scientific research is concentrated around the Chukchi Borderland, a region that extends northward from Alaska's Beaufort and Chukchi Shelf into the deep Arctic Ocean. This is likely to advance the PRC's knowledge of the Arctic seabed for future submarine activity and fisheries. The PRC has also focused its scientific research on the Atlantic Arctic seabed, specifically near the Gakkel and mid-Atlantic Ridges, where its manned submersibles have probed the seafloor and could be applied to future sonar detection systems to detect American submarines and undersea cables as well as exploit future seabed mining and fisheries. Chinese science drives the underlying data that will shape future Arctic governance through multilateral mechanisms such as the High Seas Treaty and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ James Brooks, ``U.S. Coast Guard intercepts two Chinese research ships in disputed portions of the Arctic Ocean.'' Alaska Beacon. September 5, 2025: https://alaskabeacon.com/2025/09/05/u-s- coast-guard-intercepts-two-chinese-research-ships-in-disputed-portions- of-the-arctic-ocean/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The threat from Russia and China in the Arctic, separately and combined, is real and it is growing, particularly in the Pacific Arctic. Russia and China have conducted 10 joint air patrols since 2019 (as of December 2025)\19\ and 5 joint maritime patrols (as of August 2025.)\20\ The tempo and scope of these patrols have increased, with a joint bomber patrol entering the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2024, the first time that both countries' aircraft were detected simultaneously entering the ADIZ.\21\ The NSR is increasingly becoming a preferred route for Russia's sanctioned shadow fleet and a new diversified source of liquid natural gas (LNG) for China, originating from Russia's LNG facilities located on the far northern Yamal Peninsula. China began receiving LNG shipments from the sanctioned Arctic LNG-2 project in the summer of 2025 and has steadily increased the rate of delivery.\22\ Already 8 LNG shipments Arctic LNG- 2 have been delivered to China this year alone.\23\ Since 2023, the Russian government has given Beijing extensive access to Russia's largest Far East port of Vladivostok as it becomes a transit hub for Chinese goods that will traverse the narrow Bering Strait to the NSR. This is the first time the port has been opened to Chinese shipping since the Qing Dynasty 163 years ago, codifying Beijing's aspiration to be a ``near-Arctic'' state.\24\ This was the same year that China participated in a naval exercise with Russia in the North Pacific.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, ``China, Russia hold 10th joint strategic air patrol over E. China Sea, western Pacific Ocean; simultaneous operation with carrier Liaoning possible: expert.'' Global Times. December 9, 2025: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/ 1350124.shtml. \20\ USNI News, ``Russia, China Wrap Fifth Annual Joint Patrol,'' https://news.usni.org/2025/08/25/russia-china-wrap-fifth-annual-joint- patrol. \21\ Chris Gordon, ``NORAD Fighters Intercept Russian, Chinese Bombers Near Alaska.'' Air and Space Forces Magazine. July 24, 2024: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/norad-fighters-intercept-russian- chinese-bombers-near-alaska/. \22\ Stephen Stapczynski, ``US-Sanctioned Russian LNG Lands in China for First Times.'' Bloomberg. August 28, 2025: https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-28/us-sanctioned-russian-lng- shipment-docks-in-china-for-first-time. \23\ Reuters, ``China receives eighth LNG cargo from Russia's sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 this year.'' March 13, 2026: https:// www.bairdmaritime.com/shipping/tankers/gas/china-receives-eighth-lng- cargo-from-russias-sanctioned-arctic-lng-2-this-year. \24\ Wong Siew Fong, ``Russia opening Vladivostok port to China after 163 years.'' ThinkChina. May 16, 2023: https://www.thinkchina.sg/ economy/russia-opening-vladivostok-port-china-after-163-years. \25\ Erdem Lamazhapov, Andreas Osthagen, ``Alaska, not Greenland, should worry the United States in the Arctic.'' October 28, 2025: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/alaska-greenland-should-worry-the- united-states-arctic/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Safeguarding U.S. Interests. The United States and its NATO allies have begun to reorient their Arctic policy approaches based on improved territorial, regional, and collective defense. This reorientation however came at an enormous cost: there has been a significant loss of trust between the United States and its allies, particularly with Denmark and the people of Greenland, that will take time to repair, and it will not be the same transatlantic security relationship moving forward. We have a brief window of opportunity to get this right as China and Russia advance their interests while challenging U.S. and allied interests. U.S. Arctic policy as homeland defense requires a very different, high-level and purpose-driven strategic coordination effort at the highest levels of government at the Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard) and the Pentagon as well as the Interior and Energy Departments, and the State of Alaska. The private sector also must be meaningfully engaged to develop dual-use infrastructure and build greater resiliency to Russian and Chinese military and hybrid tactics. This new coordination effort will likely require new command- and-control arrangements for the U.S. military and new lines of civilian authority. For example, the new icebreaker fleet must be integrated into an overarching national defense strategy, or it will be a fleet searching for a mission, providing Washington with a false sense of security. It is also essential that this strategy is seamlessly integrated with the new capabilities of our NATO allies in order to create an enduring Allied Arctic shield. It is also critical that America's Arctic science agenda is fully integrated into this national strategy as science is the underlying foundation for all future activities in the Arctic. The Arctic seafloor and Central Arctic high seas must be given greater priority in our scientific agenda and the United States and its allies must demand greater transparency and accountability from Beijing for the science it conducts in the Arctic. Nothing is more important than protecting the homeland and revitalizing the defense of our northern flank must remain an urgent priority. But to do so, we must organize ourselves differently, both internally and externally. The United States can only strengthen its air and maritime northern shield in close coordination with its NATO allies--not by challenging their sovereignty. The United States no longer has the luxury of time; in fact, we have wasted the past 15 years in a paper avalanche of studies and strategies that did not create capabilities. Unfortunately, we wasted those 15 years not reconstituting our icebreaker fleet or developing a deep-water port in Nome, Alaska that could have been available to the national command authority today had we acted with urgency. China will continue to advance its interests through governance and scientific avenues, areas the United States has now largely abandoned. Russia will seek to maintain great power parity with the United States through its nuclear deterrent and hypersonic capabilities based in the Arctic and its dependent relationship with China. Together, they will continue to work against American and allied security interests in the region. As the conflict in the Middle East today demonstrates, we must anticipate a potential future contested maritime chokepoint in the Bering Strait. We must also understand the national security implications of the demand for greater diversification of international maritime routes as well as energy, mineral, and protein sources that only a more-accessible Arctic region can provide. This is why it is essential that the United States prioritizes developing an allied Arctic shield to better defend the homeland. And because of the enormous challenges of operating in the Arctic, the future we must prepare for is now. Chairman Gimenez. Thank you Ms. Conley. I now recognize Mr. Clark for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF BRYAN CLARK, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY, HUDSON INSTITUTE Mr. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pfluger, and Ranking Member McIver. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today. You've all laid out the challenges that we face, I think very effectively. Heather did a great job of identifying kind-of the strategic overview of where we stand with regard to Arctic security. After having served in the military for 25 years, I can tell you we went 20 years by developing new road maps and strategies and plans for the Arctic and never really translated any of those into improved Arctic security. Now we see how much more important the Arctic is becoming because climate change is making it more available. Our adversaries are beginning to operate there much more, much more consistently than they have in the past. Obviously commerce is taking off in the Arctic region. So we need to pay attention to it. We need to start translating our aspirations into something real on the ground and in the air. I'm going to identify 3 major areas where we need to improve our efforts with regard to Arctic security. So, the first is air and missile defense. Since the Cold War, we've been trying to protect the homeland from ballistic missile threats emanating from Russia, Soviet Union before that, and then now China, as well as North Korea. But we really have only focused on the ballistic missile threat. Our new golden dome that we're developing to try to protect the homeland is still primarily focused on that ballistic missile threat. But as we look at what's happening right now in Iran, what's happening in Ukraine, drones are now the newest air threat that we're going to face. Drones can be deployed from uncrewed vessels of their own or they can be deployed from civilian vessels that merge into the background traffic. We could find ourselves facing significant air and missile threats via the Arctic that have nothing to do with ballistic missiles and at a scale that our existing defenses would not be able to handle. We could easily find ourselves overwhelmed and surprised by what an adversary, whether it's a non-state actor or an actor like Russia or China, might be able to do using drone technology and other uncrewed system technology via the Arctic. So plugging these holes in the golden dome will require a different set of surveillance mechanisms and targeting mechanisms, and also interdiction methods which might have involved more consistent presence with our own uncrewed systems up in the Arctic region to complement our existing radars. The other thing we--the second area I want to talk about is undersea. You've all mentioned the threat to undersea infrastructure that's posed in the Arctic. We depend on the Arctic to run communications between here and Asia or Europe. We also depend on the GIUK gap, or Greenland Iceland UK gap, as the main choke point between our North Atlantic waters and Russia. Today, Russia's been mapping the undersea infrastructure along the GIUK gap. It has been looking for our undersea sonar arrays, looking for our undersea cables. We surmise they probably have the ability to break some of those or interdict them and even destroy them unnecessary in conflict, leaving us potentially unable to communicate with Europe and also unable to find their submarines at the kind of scale we need to successfully defend the homeland. Having the ability to both augment that capability and then respond to the undersea threat that China and Russia might pose in the Arctic will involve new investments in uncrewed systems to augment our existing submarine force. The third area I'll note is presence an Arctic presence. Since my time in the Navy, we treated the Arctic as kind of flyover country, right? So stuff would fly at us from the Arctic. We might fly over the Arctic to the other guy, but nobody really lived there. Well, now there's a lot of people operating there full-time. We need to think about having Arctic presence in the same way that we maintain presence in other areas of the homeland. The investment in icebreakers is a great way to start, but if you want to buy 17 icebreakers and give those to the Coast Guard, you need the people to crew them, the investment and the maintenance to keep them up, and the infrastructure to have them somewhere close to the Arctic to deploy. That infrastructure investment will be sizable and could also redound to the benefit of our other military forces, especially if we use more uncrewed systems in the Arctic. Making that investment, though, will be a consistent level of spending that has to happen each year rather than a one-time infusion of cash like we had with reconciliation. So keeping that investment up will be necessary for us to be able to treat the Arctic as a destination in the future rather than as flyover country. So I think these 3 areas are ones we need to focus on as we think about how to make changes to improve our Arctic security. I'm looking forward to the discussion and your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Clark follows:] Prepared Statement of Bryan Clark March 26, 2026 Chairmen Gimenez and Pfluger and Ranking Members McIver and Magaziner, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittees on the topic: Arctic Security in an Era of Global Competition: Safeguarding U.S. Interests in Frigid Waters. a destination or ``fly-over country?'' The arctic is becoming more militarily relevant and accessible for commerce. U.S. Government leaders recognized this trend during the last 2 decades with strategies, action plans, statements, and testimonies. However, these aspirations never translated into substantial changes to America's security posture. As a result, the United States faces growing risks of air or undersea attack, damage to information and energy infrastructure, or loss of its natural resources. The Trump administration's recent threat to annex or seize Greenland highlighted the U.S. Government's arctic say-do gap. The rising interest of Russia and China in resource exploration, military operations, and shipping across arctic waters led the President and senior officials to seek greater control or outright sovereignty over Greenland. In addition to its significant mineral deposits, Greenland sits astride key arctic crossroads including the Greenland-Iceland- United Kingdom (G-I-UK) gap and Northwest Passage. However, the U.S. military's lack of arctic capacity made the threat of seizure a hollow one. The U.S. Navy's only ice-hardened ships are submarines, which are in short supply and needed to deter Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps include units trained and experienced in cold weather operations, but do not have enough aircraft or support equipment to mount battalion or larger operations during the arctic winter. And while U.S. Air Force can operate in the arctic, it does not have the ground equipment to sustain year-round flight operations there.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Sonner Kehrt, ``US Military Can't Sustain Arctic Operations, `Let Alone Dominate,' Experts Say,'' The War Horse, January 18, 2024, https://thewarhorse.org/us-military-cant-sustain-arctic-operations- experts-say/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the U.S. Government is serious about protecting America's arctic interests it should focus on improving the U.S. military's ability to operate in the High North, especially the supporting physical and digital infrastructure. New technologies can help. Since the Cold War, robotic and autonomous systems, low-earth orbit and small satellites, and artificial intelligence (AI) have changed modern life and military operations. They can also help solve America's arctic dilemma.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ For a more detailed analysis on these needs, see Liselotte Odgaard, ``Closing the Arctic Gaps: NATO Allies and Partners Can Protect Their Homelands by Updating Their Defense Force Postures,'' (Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2026), https://www.hudson.org/ national-security-defense/closing-arctic-gaps-nato-allies-partners-can- protect-their-homelands-liselotte-odgaard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The United States does not depend on the arctic-like other nations with territory above the Arctic Circle. For example, nearly all of Russia's gas fields and more than half of its oil reserves are in the arctic, which together fund about one-quarter of the government's budget.\3\ Canada relies on arctic mineral extraction for 5 percent of its GDP.\4\ And oil and gas production in the arctic provides about 20 percent of Norway's GDP.\5\ In contrast, Alaska North Slope oil production is only about 5 percent of total U.S. output and other Alaskan arctic industries such as fisheries are essentially self- sustaining.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Sergey Vakulenko, ``A Tight Spot: Challenges Facing the Russian Oil Sector Through 2035,'' (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment Eurasian Center, March 20, 2026), rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/ commentary/stalking-seabed-how-russia-targets-critical-undersea- infrastructure. \4\ Jason Moyer, ``Prioritizing Canada's investment in Arctic infrastructure,'' (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, December 23, 2025), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue- brief/prioritizing-canadas-investment-in-arctic-infrastructure/. \5\ Arief Rahman, David Wadley, Paul Dargusch, ``The contested political economy of Norway's oil and gas industry,'' Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 131, 2026, 104510, https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.erss.2025.104510. \6\ See Energy Information Agency (EIA), ``EIA forecasts Alaska crude oil production to grow 13% in 2026,'' EIA, November 19, 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66664#; and EIA, ``EIA adjusts forecast for U.S. oil production as producers set a record in July 2025,'' https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press577.php. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For decades, the U.S. military has treated the arctic as ``fly-over country.'' Its main concern was the ability of enemy bombers or ballistic missiles to attack America from the north. Almost all of the Department of War's (DoW) infrastructure and systems in the High North are designed to detect and intercept these threats, from the COBRA DANE surveillance radar at Eareckson Air Station in the Aleutian Islands to the Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Pituffik Space Base, Greenland.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Ian Williams, ``Cobra Dane,'' Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2016, last modified June 7, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/cobra-dane/; U.S. Space Force, ``Pituffik Space Base, Greenland,'' U.S. DoW, https:// www.petersonschriever.spaceforce.mil/pituffik-sb-greenland/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- figure 1: arctic region, including relevant u.s. military installations.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Map created by Hudson Institute with sea ice data from ``2025 Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Squeezes into the Ten Lowest Minimums,'' National Snow and Ice Data Center, September 17, 2025, https:// nsidc.org/sea-ice-today/analyses/2025-arctic-sea-ice-minimum-squeezes- ten-lowest-minimums. Note: Minimum sea ice is based on the sea ice extent on September 10, 2025. GIUK = Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom. The DoW's arctic basing, capabilities, and exercises largely reflect the expectation U.S. military forces may need to engage at most a few hundred air or missile threats at once, given the size of the Russian, North Korean, and Chinese intercontinental bomber and ballistic missile arsenals. Ground operations would be confined to Europe, where U.S. troops would back up better-equipped and -trained European forces. And naval operations would be almost entirely undersea and conducted primarily by submarines like during the Cold War. Today, climate change and technology are making the arctic a destination. Ice is covering less of the Arctic Ocean each year, creating opportunities for new transportation routes, resource exploration and extraction, and military campaigns. Technologies for satellite communications and autonomous systems are allowing companies and governments to operate in harsh polar environments without risks to humans and at a scale surpassing what is possible with crewed systems. These trends are upending some of the U.S. military's traditional assumptions around arctic security. For example, an attacker like Russia could combine bombers launching dozens of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) with hundreds of UAS launched from autonomous vessels or cargo aircraft. As they have in the invasion of Ukraine, Russian commanders could use these large, complex salvos to confuse or overwhelm U.S. arctic sensors and air defenses designed to track smaller numbers of ballistic missiles.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Associated Press, ``Russian strike on Kyiv region kills 4 and wounds 15, with peace talks stalled,'' NPR, March 14, 2026, https:// www.npr.org/2026/03/14/nx-s1-5747959/russian-strike-kyiv-region. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. Government faces similar changes across each domain. Warming arctic waters and rapidly proliferating and commercialized technologies are enabling a new set of arctic security concerns. However, these same changes also create opportunities for the U.S. DoW and Government more broadly to improve America's arctic security before a crisis emerges. plugging holes in the golden dome Even before it is built the U.S. military's Golden Dome program is springing leaks. Drone and missile threats are rapidly improving and proliferating as commercial technologies for targeting, navigation, communication, sensing, and guidance make their way into the arsenals of aggressor nations and stateless groups. Forces from Iran, Ukraine, Russia, and the Houthis can now use these components to assemble diverse weapons at scale, enabling structured attacks that exploit the capacity or sensor limitations of U.S. air defense systems and tactics. The same technology proliferation is also enabling more capable opponents to improve the lethality and survivability of the ballistic missiles that have traditionally been the focus of U.S. arctic-based air defenses. This will raise the difficulty of countering ballistic missile attacks and create capacity or sensor gaps that will demand increased investment. Two developments are most concerning with regard to protecting America's northern approaches: Decoys and electronic countermeasures in ballistic missile warheads that could confuse U.S. early warning and tracking sensors. The DoW has long assessed that Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles incorporate ``penetration aids'' like decoys to confuse defenders' sensors or consume air defense interceptors.\10\ Analysts believe these opponents are improving their on-board countermeasures and that North Korea is also including these capabilities on its ballistic missiles.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Defense Intelligence Agency, ``CHINA MILITARY POWER: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,'' (Washington, DC: US DoW, 2019), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/ Military_Powers_Publications/China_Military_Power.pdf. \11\ Missile Defense Project, ``Hwasong-15 (KN-22),'' Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2017, last modified April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/ missile/hwasong-15-kn-22/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Long-range one-way attack (OWA) drones that can be deployed at scale and overwhelm U.S. missile defenses. Iran's Shahed drone and its derivatives helped Russia regain an edge in its war against Ukraine. Drones like these can travel 1000 nm, carry a 200 lb. warhead, and be launched from containers on a ship or uncrewed surface vessel (USV). At a cost of around $100,000 each, an aggressor could buy hundreds for the cost of one ICBM and use a converted merchant ship to launch dozens at a time across America's unguarded arctic approaches.\12\ As the arctic becomes more of a destination, higher shipping levels could make these drone carriers harder to detect. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Uzi Rubin, ``Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile'', Commentary, 13 January 2023, RUSI https://www.rusi.org/ explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs- technical-profile. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The DoW's collection of long-range ground-based radars are well- suited to counter ballistic missiles and aircraft. Ballistic missiles are fast and the doppler shift they create in radar returns makes them easier to detect and track. Their speed also means they generate heat in the atmosphere and can be detected using space-based infrared (IR) sensors like the U.S. Space Force's new Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) satellites.\13\ But these sensors will have difficulty tracking slower and lower-altitude cruise missile or drone salvos that do not generate significant heat or doppler shifts. And unlike ballistic missiles that come from known launch locations, drones and cruise missiles can come from unexpected directions if they are deployed by a USV or merchant vessel. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Unshin Lee Harpley, ``Pentagon to Deploy Discriminating Space Sensor for Ballistic Threat as Part of Golden Dome,'' Air and Space Forces Magazine, May 14, 2025, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ discriminating-space-sensor-golden-dome/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The DoW could pursue a common portfolio of solutions to address these threats. AI-enabled sensor processing has shown its value during the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, identifying hidden targets such as drone or missile storage and launch facilities.\14\ These analytic capabilities, such as those used in the Maven Smart System or a growing range of DoW intelligence programs, could help existing arctic sensors identify new threats like drones or discern real warheads from decoys and other penetration aids. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Tara Copp, Elizabeth Dwoskin and Ian Duncan, ``Anthropic's AI tool Claude central to U.S. campaign in Iran, amid a bitter feud,'' The Washington Post, March 4, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ technology/2026/03/04/anthropic-ai-iran-campaign/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- But AI-enabled algorithms still need data. Tuning the DoW's existing arctic missile defense sensors to better detect cruise missiles or drones may make them less able to detect ballistic missiles with the resolution needed to differentiate warheads from decoys. The U.S. military will need additional sensors that can better detect and track airborne threats across the North American arctic. The DoW intends to eventually provide this capability at continental scale using air moving target indication (AMTI) processing on satellites. However, this technology is years from maturation and will likely take a decade to field.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Theresa Hitchens, ``With funding flush, Space Force hopes to speed satellites to track aircraft, missiles,'' Breaking Defense, February 26, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/02/with-funding- flush-space-force-hopes-to-speed-satellites-to-track-aircraft-missiles/ #:?:text=Senior%20Space %20Force%20officials%20have,mobile%20missile%20launchers%20and%20'ships. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The DoW should pursue an affordable sensor architecture for arctic air space in the near- to mid-term, and as a backup in case AMTI fails to deliver. For example, stratospheric balloons or ultra-long-endurance UAS that cost $1-2 million could carry passive radiofrequency (RF) or IR sensors to detect incoming threats.\16\ They could be purchased at scale, stored at bases around the country, and deployed when conditions warrant. Unlike space-based IR sensors that are looking down at missiles and drones whose bodies are not dramatically hotter than the earth underneath, balloons would look horizontally for aircraft against the cooler sky where their engines could be discerned. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ RanjithKumar Dharma, ``Unmanned Long-Endurance Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft (ULTRA), USA,'' Air Force Technology, June 28, 2024, https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/unmanned-long- endurance-tactical-reconnaissance-aircraft-ultra-usa/?cf-view; Jerod MacDonald-Evoy, ``Army surveillance balloons spotted over Tucson raise privacy concerns from advocates,'' Arizona Mirror, June 3, 2025, https://azmirror.com/2025/06/03/army-surveillance-balloons-spotted- over-tucson-raise-privacy-concerns-from-advocates/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- U.S. forces have been challenged to affordably or sustainably defeat combined missile and drone attacks in the Middle East. In many cases, fighter aircraft proved to be the most cost-effective defenses against OWA drones like the Shahed and slower cruise missiles.\17\ Given its much larger area, defending U.S. arctic air space from slower cruise missiles or drones using crewed fighters is not scalable or sustainable given personnel and equipment limitations. However, U.S. forces have experimented with using MQ-9B Reaper medium altitude long- endurance (MALE) UAS to shoot down drones and cruise missiles.\18\ Moreover, MALE UAS also carry passive sensors that could detect air threats and radars that would allow tracking drones or cruise missiles.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ Jake Epstein, ``US fighter jets used cheap laser-guided rockets for nearly half the drone kills during Operation Rough Rider,'' The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2025, https:// www.businessinsider.com/us-fighter-jets-used-laser-guided-rockets- houthi-drone-kills-2025-6. \18\ Savannah Bray, ``ABMS Onramp 2 sees second MQ-9 AIM-9X shot and other CMD tactics development,'' US Air Force, September 11, 2020, https://www.creech.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2343561/abms- onramp-2-sees-second-mq-9-aim-9x-shot-and-other-cmd-tactics- development/#:?:text=The%20Advanced%20Battle%20Management%20System%20(AB MS)%20- Onramp,%20The%20422d%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Squadron. \19\ Thomas Newdick, Tyler Rogoway, ``MQ-9B Airborne Early Warning Variant Could Fill Major Aerial Surveillance Gaps,'' The War Zone, June 17, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/mq-9b-airborne-early warning-variant- could-fill-major-aerial-surveillance-gaps. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With a cost per flight hour about one-tenth that of an F-35, MALE UAS would be a sustainable way to expand air defense capacity across America's arctic approaches.\20\ Because they are modular, the U.S. Air Force could purchase MALE UAS for multiple applications. For example, MQ-9s are providing a large fraction of air strikes during the current war against Iran.\21\ The Air Force could replace these aircraft with MALE UAS that can support future strike or reconnaissance missions and be reconfigured to support air surveillance or defense when needed. And in contrast to crewed fighters, UAS operators can remain proficient using simulators or be contractors who are activated on demand. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), ``Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Department of Defense (DoD) Fixed Wing and Helicopter Reimbursement Rates effective October 1, 2024,'' (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2024), https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/ documents/rates/fy2025/2025_b_c.pdf. \21\ Stephen Losey, ``MQ-9s Over Iran: Striking and Finding Targets--But Taking Some Losses,'' Air and Space Forces Magazine, March 11, 2026, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/mq-9s-over-iran-striking- and-finding-targets-but-taking-some-losses/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- New fleets of uncrewed sensors and engagement platforms will increase the complexity for operators who need to verify threats, match defensive weapons against appropriate threats, sequence actions to ensure they engage threats in time to allow follow-up engagements and assess if engagements succeeded. Air defenders are increasingly using AI-enabled decision support tools to help with these tasks in Ukraine and the Middle East.\22\ They could help operators in North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) coordinate disparate sensor feeds or defensive actions from a growing portfolio of ground, space, and airborne sensors and weapons. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ Tal Shahaf, ``Seconds that save lives: how the IDF's `digital brain' uses AI to reshape the battlefield,'' Y-Net Global, March 23, 2026, https://www.ynetnews.com/tech-and-digital/article/syjhyhp5bg. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- winning the adaptation competition The challenges of 21st century air and missile defense highlight how adaptation is quickly becoming central to military competition. During the war in Ukraine, both sides are changing their tactics, drone configurations, and electronic waveforms almost every week. In response, manufacturers have to design drones and other weapons for rapid adaptation, sometimes on the battlefield.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Sinead Baker, ``Arms Makers Say That the Fast-Moving War in Ukraine Is Changing How They Design and Upgrade Weapons,'' Business Insider, January 15, 2026, https://www.businessinsider.com/speed- ukraine-battlefield-development-pushes-weapons-makers-modular-software- first-2026-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Houthi rebels have also used a changing combination of drones and missiles to impose new dilemmas on the Yemeni government and the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea.\24\ Houthi and Iranian tactical and technical innovations compelled the U.S. Navy to stand up a rapid response cell in concert with industry to keep up through changes to the Aegis Weapon System.\25\ The Navy is now adopting this model more broadly in its new acquisition structure to enable adaptation at scale.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ Luca Nevola and Valentin d'Hauthuille, ``Six Houthi drone warfare strategies: How innovation is shifting the regional balance of power,'' ACLED, August 6, 2024, https://acleddata.com/report/six- houthi-drone-warfare-strategies-how-innovation-shifting-regional- balance-power. \25\ Megan Eckstein, ``US Navy making Aegis updates, training changes based on Houthi attacks,'' Defense News, March 21, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2024/03/21/us-navy-making-aegis- updates-training-changes-based-on-houthi-attacks/. \26\ U.S. Department of the Navy, ``Navy Reshapes Warfighting Acquisition System,'' U.S. Department of the Navy, March 16, 2026, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/ Article/4435370/navy-reshapes-warfighting-acquisition-system/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robotic and autonomous systems are generally more adaptable than their crewed counterparts because they can be more modular and numerous. Operators can change an uncrewed system's sensors, radios, weapons, or autonomy algorithms in minutes or hours. Although a crewed fighter or bomber can also adopt new tactics and update its mission programs, these changes may take days or weeks to approve due to their impact on safety of flight. Moreover, the DoW will field uncrewed systems in larger numbers than crewed platforms and treat them as expendable, enabling a wider variety of operational concepts than are possible with crewed systems. staying connected Fielding a larger, more distributed arctic force of uncrewed systems and their support units will create new communication challenges for U.S. military forces. Improving polar commercial or military satellite communications (SATCOM) are increasing their coverage in polar areas. The U.S. military's larger uncrewed systems such as MALE UAS or medium USVs (MUSV) could use SATCOM systems to stay connected with operators and provide data for analysis or decision making. However, the ground crews supporting larger uncrewed systems will need connectivity in remote areas. And smaller uncrewed systems that larger uncrewed systems deploy may not have the space or weight available to host SATCOM terminals. The DoW and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) will need to field tactical communication systems able to operate in polar environments and over dozens of miles that can connect these disaggregated vehicles and operators to SATCOM hubs. neutralizing russia's undersea ``trump card'' Although its submarine force is smaller today compared to its Cold War heyday, Russia continues fielding quiet nuclear attack submarines (SSN) that prove challenging for U.S. and allied forces to detect and track.\27\ In the decades since the Cold War ended, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) also expanded its undersea reconnaissance program and developed new uncrewed undersea vehicles (UUV). The most concerning of these new vehicles is the Status-6 ultra-large UUV (ULUUV), which can carry a nuclear warhead and travel thousands of miles underwater using nuclear power.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ Ellie Cook, ``The New Hunt for Red October: How NATO Keeps Up With Russian Submarines,'' Newsweek, September 25, 2025, https:// www.newsweek.com/2025/08/29/new-hunt-red-october-how-nato-keeps- russian-submarines-2115307.html. \28\ Vikram Mittal, ``Russia Showcases Poseidon UUV To Revive Its Military Tech Reputation,'' Forbes, November 6, 2025, https:// www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2025/11/06/russia-showcases-poseidon- uuv-to-revive-its-military-tech-reputation/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the arctic, Russian military intelligence organizations are surveying and mapping undersea infrastructure, including transatlantic communication cables and sonar arrays of the U.S. fixed distributed system (FDS), which is the successor to the Cold War-era Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). At significant cost, the RFN has developed and fielded a family of special purpose SSNs and UUVs to support these missions.\29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Sidharth Kaushal, ``Stalking the Seabed: How Russia Targets Critical Undersea Infrastructure,'' (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2023), https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/ publications/commentary/stalking-seabed-how-russia-targets-critical- undersea-infrastructure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During a conflict, Russia could use this intelligence to attack U.S. and allied seabed sensor and communication networks. By degrading or damaging FDS arrays, Russian leaders would hope to prevent the U.S. Navy from detecting RFN SSNs in time to intercept them at the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. If RFN submarines make it past the gap undetected, U.S. and allied navies would be hard-pressed to locate them in the open ocean. Russian leaders could use these unlocated SSNs to threaten conventional or tactical nuclear attacks against the U.S. East Coast of Western Europe. This was the scenario used in a recent series of Hudson Institute wargames. The results of one are depicted in Figure 2. Overall, these wargames found that U.S. and allied navies will need robotic and autonomous systems, supported by AI-enabled C2 and sensor processing, to fill likely anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capacity gaps. During the vignette shown in Figure 2, the team used several dozen temporary seabed sonar systems, similar to those already in NATO inventories, to detect Russian SSNs. They also used 6 new MUSVs and 6 new MALE UAS with sonobuoys to detect and track SSNs north of the GIUK gap. To trail and potentially engage Russian SSNs, the team used 2 NATO SSNs, 2 P-8A patrol aircraft, a guided missile destroyer (DDG), and a NATO multimission frigate (FFM). As figure 2 shows, even this substantial force was unable to maintain track on 2 Russian SSNs (Red Sub 1 and 4 in the figure) past the GIUK gap. Figure 2 highlights several challenges facing U.S. naval forces to achieving arctic undersea superiority. These include: Lack of track and trail capacity.--Even with the addition of a dozen MUSVs and MALE UAS not currently in DoW plans, the team had difficulty tracking Russian SSNs past the GIUK gap. Today, the DoW would address this challenge by deploying more SSNs, DDGs, and P-8As to retain custody of SSN tracks once detected. However, Russia is only likely to simultaneously deploy 4 SSNs or ULUUVs during a conflict. In that case, the U.S. Navy is unlikely to have multiple surface combatants and SSNs available for GIUK ASW operations. U.S. and allied militaries will need them for missile defense, strike operations, or coastal defense of the United States or Europe. The DoW could address this shortfall using uncrewed systems hardened for arctic operations. The scenario in figure 2 used MUSVs and MALE UAS mainly to detect and track Russian SSNs north of the GIUK gap. If used south of the gap after SSNs were already detected, these platforms could retain track using active sonobuoys or towed sonars at longer ranges--and potentially more effectively--than SSNs or DDGs using passive sonar arrays. Few engagement platforms.--The U.S. Navy's ASW approach emphasizes attacking submarines at chokepoints or other areas away from defended forces or territory and where the submarine is constrained in its ability evade.\30\ But the U.S. Navy's most lethal ASW platform, its SSNs, are likely to be short supply or out of position to engage a large Russian arctic SSN deployment when and where ASW attacks would be most effective. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ William Toti, ``The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW,'' USNI Proceedings, June 2014, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/ 2014/june/hunt-full-spectrum-asw. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although the lightweight torpedoes MUSVs and MALE UAS could launch are less lethal than an SSN's heavyweight torpedoes, these uncrewed systems could remain persistently on station to intercept Russian SSNs that they or other uncrewed systems are already tracking. MALE UAS and MUSV attacks would force the target SSN to evade, creating a noisier signature for continued tracking. And through successive attacks, either the uncrewed systems could herd Russian SSNs into kill boxes for U.S. SSNs to engage or drive them away from defended forces or territory. Vulnerable undersea infrastructure.--The United States and its allies depend on fiber optic communication cables along the seabed from North America to Greenland, Iceland, and Europe to carry more than 95 percent of internet and telephone traffic across the Atlantic Basin. Russian intelligence ships have been mapping these cables and the likely locations of FDS using remotely-operated vehicles (ROV) and UUVs for decades. Russia could attack this infrastructure to impact NATO countries economically or to enable easier access for its SSNs and UUVs to open ocean. The U.S. Navy has few counters to Russian threats against undersea infrastructure. FDS arrays may initially detect Russian undersea operations but could quickly go dark when cut by an ROV or UUV, damaged by a dragging anchor or net, or struck with an explosive charge. Additional deployed sonar sensors could help by allowing continued tracking of Russian operations and uncrewed systems could deploy ASW weapons against the attacking platform or host vessel. The U.S. Navy's planned Ocean Explorer ULUUV could be used in this mission, where its long endurance would allow it to stand sentry for months at a time while its relatively high speed would allow it to engage threats when they emerge. Although an ULUUV will likely cost $60 to $80 million, it would be more economical than using a $3 billion SSN that would only be able to be on station for a few weeks before moving on to other missions.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ Office of Naval Research, ``Special Program Announcement for Office of Naval Research Research Opportunity: Ocean Explorer (OEX) Large Underwater Vehicle Demonstrator Industry Day,'' (Washington, DC: US Department of the Navy, May 28, 2025), https://www.onr.navy.mil/ assets/2025-05N0001425SBC04.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Russian leaders see their undersea capabilities as a trump card that they can employ to gain escalation dominance against the United States and NATO. The allies' lack of naval presence in the arctic creates an opportunity for Russia to prepare these capabilities for use during wartime and reduces NATO's ability to guard its arctic approaches. Using uncrewed systems, especially MUSVs and MALE UAS, the allies could establish the sensing and targeting needed for indications and warning of Russian aggression as well as ways to initially respond to attacks. virtual presence is actual absence Uncrewed systems can help solve the U.S. military's operational problems in the arctic, but they will not address the strategic challenge of exerting U.S. arctic sovereignty. The United States already benefits economically from being 1 of only 6 nations with territory above the Arctic Circle, but those gains could increase substantially as the region becomes more accessible due to climate change.\32\ This will enable more mining, oil and gas extraction, and fishing as well as increased vessel traffic. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ James Halsell, ``The Future of Sovereignty in the Deep Sea,'' USNI Proceedings, January 2026, https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2026/january/future-sovereignty-deep-sea. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Government agencies project substantial mineral and energy deposits in the arctic. However, most are likely to be within at least one nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).\33\ During the last decade, China's businesses and government have ramped up deep-sea robotic mining technology development and operations. Their operations are currently focused on mid-latitude zones with large known deposits, but Chinese companies will eventually need new opportunities, which could include areas adjacent to or within America's arctic EEZ.\34\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ European Economic Agency, ``Arctic Resources,'' September 17, 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/maps-and-charts/arctic- resources. \34\ Lily Kuo, ``China is set to dominate the deep sea and its wealth of rare metals,'' The Washington Post, October 19, 2023, https:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-deep-sea-mining- military-renewable-energy/; Darshana M. Baruah, ``Uncharted territory: deep-sea mining and the underwater domain,'' International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 25, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online- analysis/online-analysis/2025/03/uncharted-territory-deep-sea-mining- and-the-underwater-domain/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Arctic fisheries like those in the Bering Sea are also becoming more attractive to outside actors. As waters in lower latitudes warm up, cold-water fish are moving north, making arctic fisheries more lucrative.\35\ China has already aggressively deployed its maritime militia and fishing fleets to other countries' EEZs to illegally harvest fish for economic and strategic purposes.\36\ It could employ this technique against U.S. arctic fisheries. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, ``Tracking Climate- Driven Shifts in Fish Populations Across International Boundaries,'' NOAA, June 5, 2023, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/ tracking-climate-driven-shifts-fish-populations-across-international- boundaries. \36\ Alexander Goodno, ``Combating IUU Fishing in the South American Pacific: An Opportunity to Counter Chinese Influence Closer to Home,'' Joint Force Quarterly, January 9, 2026, https:// ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4364800/ combating-iuu-fishing-in-the-south-american-pacific-an-opportunity-to- counter-c/#:?:text=In%202016%2C%20an%20- Argentine%20coast,as%20well%20as%20with%20China. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Arctic shipping traffic will likely increase as summers become nearly ice-free across the northern Canadian, Russian, and U.S. coasts. The Northern Sea Route above Russia is the most navigable arctic path from Europe to Asia, and access is essentially controlled by Russia's government. The route's exit passes through the Bering Strait, which is jointly controlled by the United States and Russia. The Northwest Passage above Canada provides an alternative path. Although it is more geographically-constrained, shipping companies may prefer the Canadian route if Russia proves an unpredictable host. The U.S. Navy and USCG need ice-capable crewed ships to protect U.S. access to waterways like the Bering Strait and prevent illegal exploitation of resources within America's EEZ. Although the waters where these activities happen will likely be ice-free during the summer, U.S. Navy and USCG vessels will need the ability to transit icier waters to ensure they can enforce U.S. sovereignty during seasons when ice floes may be prevalent. The USCG's 3 icebreakers are insufficient for this task, especially since one--the USCGC Polar Star--is dedicated to the annual Antarctic resupply mission. The USCG's capacity will improve with the addition of 3 Polar Security Cutters (PSC) and 11 Arctic Security Cutters (ASC) currently under contract. Overall, the U.S. Government has budgeted to build at least 17 new icebreakers total, including 4 or more light icebreakers.\37\ This fleet should be sufficient to patrol U.S. EEZs and provide search and rescue in U.S. arctic waters, based on government and our own estimates.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Tabitha Reeves, ``Details Foggy as Coast Guard Expands Icebreaker Fleet,'' National Defense, November 18, 2025, https:// www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/11/18/details-foggy-as- coast-guard-expands-icebreaker-fleet. \38\ Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman, ``Securing the Frontier: Challenges and Solutions for U.S. Polar Operations,'' (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2017), https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/ CSBA6303-Securing_the_Frontier_WEB.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, implementing the USCG's icebreaker vision will be challenging. The associated shipbuilding effort is larger than any previous USCG program and will require effective oversight. For example, the PSC program was delayed significantly under its original yard, which has since been acquired by a larger shipbuilder.\39\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Justin Katz, ``Coast Guard awards nearly $1B contract mod to Bollinger for heavy icebreaker design, construction,'' Breaking Defense, March 26, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/03/coast- guard-awards-nearly-1b-contract-mod-to-bollinger-shipyards-for-heavy- icebreaker-design-construction/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More important, growing the icebreaker fleet from 3 to 17 will place new demands on USCG personnel, infrastructure, and sustainment. The USCG is upgrading facilities in Seattle to host PSCs, but ASCs and light icebreakers should be homeported closer to operational areas in the northeast United States and Alaska.\40\ These areas lack the infrastructure for icebreakers, USVs, or small Navy combatants. Moreover, the USCG already faces a $7 billion infrastructure maintenance backlog that will only be exacerbated by the need to support new ships.\41\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\ Caitlyn Burchett, ``Coast Guard Commits $323M to Modernizing Future Polar Security Icebreaker Homeport,'' USNI News, February 3, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/02/03/coast-guard-commits-323m-to- modernizing-future-polar-security-icebreaker-homeport. \41\ Heather MacLeod, ``Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Project Backlogs Reportedly Exceed $7 Billion,'' (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2025), https://www.gao.gov/ products/gao-25-108064. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The USCG is also falling short in ship maintenance. For example, in fiscal year 2024 the USCG Surface Forces Logistics Center could only complete about half of its planned maintenance periods on USCG ships due to a combination of funding shortfalls and schedule constraints.\42\ The USCG will exacerbate this problem by adding new icebreakers to an already overburdened maintenance enterprise. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Grayson Glivar, ``How to Modernize the Coast Guard Fleet,'' USNI Proceedings, October 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/ proceedings/2025/october/how-modernize-coast-guard-fleet. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The USCG does not currently have enough personnel for its new icebreakers and is not on a path to obtain them. The service missed its recruiting goals 5 of the last 6 years and fell behind its retention goals each of the last 6 fiscal years. As a result, the UCSG is losing members faster than it can replace them. Today, the service is about 2,000 personnel understaffed, or about 5 percent of its total end strength. Recent efforts to boost recruiting and retention may help but require dedicated assessments to determine which measures are most effective.\43\ The USCG will be challenged to staff its 14 additional icebreakers, each of which have crews of 85 to 135 personnel.\44\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ Heather MacLeod, ``U.S. Coast Guard Left Short Staffed Amidst Recruitment and Retention Challenges,'' May 20, 2025, https:// www.gao.gov/blog/u.s.-coast-guard-left-short-staffed-amidst- recruitment-and-retention-challenges. \44\ Ronald O'Rourke, ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) Icebreaker Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,'' (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2025), https://www.Congress.gov/crs-product/RL34391. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The solution to the USCG's infrastructure, maintenance, and personnel shortfalls is generally money. The service needs investment to build piers, buildings, and utilities to host additional icebreakers, some of which will need to be in relatively remote locations. The USCG will need to augment its Government-owned shipyard by conducting more overhauls at private ship repair yards, which demands increased annual operations and maintenance funding. And the USCG will need to augment its existing financial incentives for recruiting and retention and consider improvements to housing for Coast Guardsmen stationed in remote areas. The generational investment provided by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act puts the service on course to better protect U.S. arctic security, but sustained support will be required to keep these ships at sea. The U.S. Navy is even less well-prepared to secure U.S. arctic interests. Other than submarines, it has no ice-hardened crewed ships. The service could use USVs and MALE UAS to make up shortfalls in surveillance and strike capacity but lacks the infrastructure to host them close enough to arctic operating areas. However, Navy USVs or MALE UAS could use civilian or USCG piers or airfields, if properly outfitted and provisioned with prepositioned maintenance and logistics support equipment. Notably, Greenland could be a useful location for some of these U.S. Navy or USCG dual-use facilities. The current agreements between the United States and Norway regarding the use of Greenland's territory for military facilities allows the U.S. Government to expand its footprint as needed. Uncrewed platforms lack the strategic impact of a crewed ship or aircraft countering gray-zone operations like maritime militia interference or illegal fishing. The USCG's growing ice-capable cutter fleet will help address these threats. However, the Navy could create capacity for military support to the USCG by by incorporating features into the new patrol frigate--funded as part of the same budget that bought the USCG's new icebreakers--that would allow it to support military responses in the High North. reclaiming the american arctic The U.S. Government has budgeted and operated for decades as if the arctic was ``fly-over country.'' Threats could come and U.S. military forces could move via the pole. But other than a small cadre of intrepid oil and gas workers, the American arctic was not a destination. The arctic's role is quickly changing as warning waters and migrating people and wildlife transform the region's economic and strategic value. To protect America's interests in the High North, the U.S. Government needs to invest in capabilities that can plug holes in the emerging Golden Dome missile defense system, take away Russia's undersea trump card, and establish a continuous U.S. presence in the arctic. Some specific recommendations include: Procure and field modular MUSVs, MALE UAS, and ULUUVs that can support undersea surveillance and response, air and missile tracking and defense, and maritime domain awareness. Invest in infrastructure to support icebreaker and uncrewed system deployment closer to arctic operating areas. Restore USCG readiness to field new icebreakers through sustained budget increases for maintenance and improved incentives for recruiting and retention. Field tactical communication systems that can bridge between commercial or military SATCOM and the tactical needs of smaller uncrewed systems or ground troops. The fiscal year 2026 budget provided a good start on the procurement needed in icebreakers and uncrewed vehicles. Future budgets need to continue the investment in autonomous systems and prepare U.S. air maritime forces to operate, maintain, and crew a polar force that can protect America's arctic. Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Clark, and I recognize Ms. Maddox for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statements. STATEMENT OF MARISOL MADDOX, SENIOR ARCTIC FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF ARCTIC STUDIES, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE Ms. Maddox. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member McIver, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you so much for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Marisol Maddox and I'm a senior arctic fellow at the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth. Today I am testifying in my personal professional capacity and the views expressed are my own. The 3 pillars I will speak about today provide an overview of the strategic environment. This includes Russia and China's Arctic activities and interests, why the alliance is our strategic advantage, and why environmental change matters for security. Despite the massive expenditure of missiles used in the war against Ukraine, experts estimate in early 2026 that Russia's stockpile includes about 3 times as many cruise ballistic and quasi ballistic missiles as they had at the beginning of 2022, and that their military will likely reconstitute once the war is over. Particularly, if the war against Ukraine does not end in a just way, Russia is likely to expand their aggression in the Arctic and beyond, especially if the U.S. commitment to Article 5 is at all in doubt. China has invested in Arctic-capable platforms to gain domain awareness, operational capability, and to position themselves as an indispensable provider of key data to understanding changes in the fastest warming region on Earth. China is interested in the Arctic as it relates to the larger vision they hold for themselves as a great power, including as an arena for power projection. It is important for the United States to meet presence with presence, so it is really encouraging to see the U.S. Coast Guard as the U.S. primary surface presence in the region finally receive an historic level of appropriations. Now it will be important for Congress to have tight oversight to keep the service on time and on budget and to ensure that Coast Guard has the necessary pipeline of expertise and staffing. Programs like Evergreen are also important to resource as they play important roles in developing robust strategic foresight amidst significant environmental change. The Department of Defense's 2024 Arctic Strategy update identified a significant increase in collaboration between China and Russia, and that trend has only continued. However, this relationship is at its heart a transactional one, and it doesn't have the longevity of a true alliance. NATO is the greatest strategic enabler of U.S. interests in the Arctic region. One of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is the pursuit of all domain awareness from space to the seabed so as to detect, track, and defend against any threats. The complexity of this task requires allied cooperation from innovation to leveraging strategic geography. In 2024, for instance, Space Norway's Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission launch marked the first time an Allies space vehicle hosted an operational U.S. military payload. This allows us to fill a gap in vital secure communication capabilities for Arctic operations until a more advanced platform can come on-line in the early 2030's. The United States does not need to acquire new territory in the Arctic in order to implement the Golden Dome or any type of highly- coordinated continental defense architecture. Language from the United States indicating a desire to acquire an ally against their will, such as the repeated statements about buying Greenland or making Canada the 51st State, is counterproductive and harmful. Our competitors benefit when trust between America and her allies erodes and it is damage not easily repaired. At Munich Security Conference, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly stated China will be a reliable force for stability. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the rationale given for a U.S. acquisition of Greenland to justify the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Forums like the Arctic Council are crucial in stabilizing forces in the Arctic region as well as platforms for demonstrating interagency leadership by the U.S. Government. Geopolitical and security dynamics can change, but geography doesn't, and the Arctic remains a region strongly characterized by trans-boundary challenges and opportunities. The growing risk of wildland fire in the Arctic puts our assets, personnel, and readiness at risk. Permafrost underlines 15 percent of the northern hemisphere and increasingly is thawing. In a 2023 report to Congress, Pituffik Space Base in Greenland was identified as having moderate to considerable levels of risk because it is entirely underlaid by permafrost. Growing powers such as India point to Arctic climate change as an acute security threat because of how it affects their monsoon precipitation and therefore their economic and food security. Our planet is composed of complex systems, so systems-level analysis is necessary to understand the consequential systems at play when referencing significant environmental change, and for this reason I recommend referencing the Planetary Boundaries framework to appreciate the complexity of changes under way. Last, robust international cooperation on scientific research and the incorporation of different types of knowledge systems are essential for understanding these changes so as to mitigate risk and eliminate blind spots. The complexity of the threat environment requires unprecedented levels of cooperation for successful risk mitigation and opportunity realization. I look forward to answering your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Maddox follows:] Prepared Statement of Marisol Maddox March 26, 2026 introduction Chairman Gimenez, Chairman Pluger, Ranking Member McIver, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Marisol Maddox and I am a senior arctic fellow at the Institute of Arctic Studies at Dartmouth, where I study the Arctic interplay between security, geopolitical, and environmental change dynamics. Today I am testifying in my personal professional capacity, and the views expressed are my own. The three pillars I will speak about today provide an overview of the strategic environment. This includes Russia and China's Arctic activities and interests, why the Alliance is our strategic advantage, and why environmental change matters for security. strategic competition Russia is the largest Arctic state, and the region features prominently in their core strategic security and economic priorities. Russia prioritizes military investments in the Arctic--strengthening their ability to enforce the vision they hold for what they perceive to be the rightful Russian Arctic--including by controlling access to it. Despite the massive expenditure of missiles used in the war against Ukraine, experts estimate in early 2026 that Russia's stockpile includes about 3 times as many cruise, ballistic, and quasiballistic missiles as they had at the beginning of 2022, and that their military will likely rapidly reconstitute once the war is over.\1\ Particularly if the war against Ukraine does not end in a just way, Russia will likely expand its aggression elsewhere, including heightened levels of brinksmanship toward NATO members in the Arctic and beyond, if the United States' commitment to Article 5 is perceived to be in doubt.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Michael Kofman, ``NAA Speakers Series: North American Arctic Defense Cooperation,'' Dickey Center for International Understanding Youtube Channel, January, 8, 2026. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=kQ7Crd9BaR4. \2\ Eugene Rumer, ``Belligerent and Beleaguered: Russia After the War with Ukraine,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 19, 2026. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/03/russia- ukraine-postwar-divided-european-security. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since 2018 when China declared itself to be a ``near-Arctic state'' and launched the Polar Silk Road extension of the Belt and Road Initiative, they have invested in Arctic-capable platforms to gain domain awareness, operational capability, and to position themselves as an indispensable provider of data key to understanding changes in the fastest-warming region on earth. China is interested in the Arctic region as it relates to the larger vision they hold for themselves as a great power, including as an arena for power projection. China's military views the Arctic Ocean as a potential region of future contestation and strategic interest. It is important for the United States to meet presence with presence, so it is encouraging to see the USCG--as the United States' primary surface presence in the Arctic--finally receive an historic level of appropriations to fund icebreakers, sensors, C-130's, and more. Now that this money has been appropriated it will be important for Congress to have tight oversight to keep the service on time and on budget, and to ensure that Coast Guard has the pipeline of expertise and staffing necessary to support these platforms as they come on-line. Programs like Evergreen are also important to resource as they play important roles in developing robust strategic foresight amidst significant environmental change. The Department of Defense's 2024 update to its Arctic Strategy identified a significant increase in collaboration between the People's Republic of China and Russia,\3\ and that trend has only continued. China has benefited from Russia's relative isolation after 2022, but there are limitations and tensions in the relationship and the longer term is likely to be less rosy than the ``partnership without limits''\4\ image they project. The threat of sanctions has been effective in deterring China from even further levels of commercial alignment. This relationship is at its heart a transactional one, that doesn't have the reliability, longevity, trust, and confidence of a true alliance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ ``2024 Arctic Strategy,'' Department of Defense, June 21, 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC- STRATEGY-2024.PDF. \4\ ``Moscow-Beijing partnership has `no limits,' '' Reuters, February 4, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/moscow-beijing- partnership-has-no-limits-2022-02-04/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- allies are key to securing u.s. interests in the arctic The NATO Alliance is the greatest strategic enabler of U.S. interests in the Arctic region. Exercising and embedding with our allies who have expertise in Arctic survival and warfighting allows us to relearn skills and instincts that are essential to survive and thrive in extreme and austere Northern environments. It is because of these trusted relationships that an agreement like ICE-PACT with Finland and Canada is possible, and for a waiver to allow Finland to construct 4 badly-needed icebreakers for us on an accelerated time line. As close allies and neighbors, the United States and Canada share the world's only bi-national military command, NORAD. Canada recently changed their position on non-participation in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense system, which creates even greater potential for integration and alignment. One of the biggest challenges in the Arctic is the pursuit of all domain awareness, from space to the seabed, so as to detect, track, and defend against any threats. The complexity of this task requires allied cooperation from innovation to leveraging strategic geography. Cross- sector all-domain awareness includes ideas such as higher levels of coordination with allies on investment screening to protect against predatory investments, and refinement of concerns regarding dual-use research. In 2024, Space Norway's Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) launch marked the first time an ally's space vehicle hosted an operational U.S. military payload. This allowed us to more easily get a payload up into space to fill a gap in ``vital secure communication capabilities''\5\ for Arctic operations until a more advanced platform can come on-line in the 2030's. Norway, as Russia's immediate coastal neighbor in the North, provides crucial intelligence on Russian submarine activity on the way toward the GIUK Gap. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ USSF Combat Forces Command Public Affairs, ``US Space Force's EPS-R achieves operational acceptance, extending secure Arctic SATCOM capabilities into the 2030's,'' U.S. Space Force, March 20, 2026. https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4439987/us- space-forces-eps-rachieves-operational-acceptance-extending-secure- arctic-s/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is no indication that Russia or China have the desire or intention to invade Greenland.\6\ Greenland, as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, is a member of NATO so if they were attacked Article 5 would be triggered, and Allies would respond just as they unhesitatingly responded after 9/11 when the United States activated Article 5. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Richard Milne, ``Nordic diplomats reject Donald Trump's claim of Chinese and Russian ships around Greenland,'' Financial Times, January 11, 2026. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As we approach the 25th anniversary of 9/11 it is important to recall that our alliance is tested and proven. Our own military describes Canada as ``unsung heroes of 9/11''\7\ because they accepted hundreds of international flights that could no longer enter U.S. air space, and even provided shelter for Americans in their homes. Denmark suffered the highest per-capita rate of casualties among coalition forces because they would accept the most dangerous missions. Both Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark are exemplary allies. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Airman 1st Class Cody R. Miller, ``Canada: Unsung Heroes of 9/ 11,'' 325th Fighter Wing Public Affairs, Tyndall Air Force Base, September 9, 2015. https://www.tyndall.af.mil/News/Features/Display/ Article/669731/canada-unsung-heroes-of-911/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The United States does not need to acquire new territory in the Arctic in order to implement the golden dome or any type of highly- coordinated continental defense architecture. Language from the United States indicating a desire to acquire an ally against their will--such as the repeated statements about buying Greenland or making Canada the 51st State--is counter-productive and harmful. Our allies view us as increasingly unreliable, unstable, and as a potential aggressor. U.S. language about the desire to acquire Greenland has also created an opportunity for China to assert itself as a responsible actor.\8\ At Munich Security Conference this past February, China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly stated, ``China will be a reliable force for stability.''\9\ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointed to the rationale given for a U.S. acquisition of Greenland to justify the 2014 annexation of Crimea.\10\ Our competitors benefit when trust between America and her allies erodes, and it is damage not easily repaired. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ ``China distances itself from Greenland issue but warns against US dependence,'' Reuters, January 21, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/ world/china/china-distances-itself-greenland-issue-warns-against-us- dependence-2026-01-21/. \9\ Wang Yi, ``Joining Hands to Set the Ship of History on the Right Course,'' People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202602/ t20260215_11860435.html. \10\ Charles Maynes and A Martinez, Trump's Greenland demand has been a gift to U.S. geopolitical foes like Russia, NPR, January 21, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/01/21/nx-s1-5683070/trumps-greenland- demand-have-been-a-gift-to-u-s-geopolitical-foes-like-russia. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The most prominent intergovernmental forum for Arctic regional cooperation is the Arctic Council, which the Kingdom of Denmark--led by Greenland--chairs until May 2027. Although the Arctic Council excludes matters of military security, it serves our security interests as a stabilizing force within the region, as a unique forum for pursuing cooperation on areas of mutual interest, and as a significant demonstration of interagency leadership by U.S. Government representatives from the Department of State, the U.S. Coast Guard, NOAA, and others. This is a critical forum for centering the 8 Arctic states and the Permanent Participants as the primary decision makers for the region, while allowing for common-sense cooperation and engagement with non-Arctic states that have interests and equities in the region.\11\ Geopolitical and security dynamics can change but geography doesn't, and the Arctic remains a region strongly characterized by transboundary challenges and transboundary opportunities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Marisol Maddox and Julia Nesheiwat, ``The Arctic Council requires reform, not a funeral,'' Arctic Today, October 15, 2025. https://www.arctictoday.com/the-arctic-council-requires-reform-not-a- funeral/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the growing prominence of actorless threats The growing risk of wildland fire in the Arctic puts our assets, personnel, and readiness at risk. Permafrost underlies 15 percent of the Northern Hemisphere and increasingly is thawing. In a 2023 Report to Congress, Pituffik Space Base in Greenland was identified as having ``moderate to considerable'' levels of risk because it is entirely underlaid by permafrost.\12\ The loss of land-fast ice exposes our coastal infrastructure to threats from storm surge and erosion. There is greater demand for our military to provide defense support for civil authorities.\13\ Growing powers such as India point to Arctic climate change as an acute security threat because of how it affects their monsoon precipitation and therefore their economic and food security.\14\ What happens in the Arctic doesn't stay in the Arctic. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ ``REPORT TO CONGRESS: Permafrost Thaw on Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations of the Department of Defense,'' Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, May 2023. https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/imr/mc/Downloads/2023_Report_to- _Congress_on_Permafrost_Thaw.pdf. \13\ ``Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense,'' Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, January 2019. https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2019/01/sec_335_ndaa-report_effects_of_a_- changing_climate_to_dod.pdf. \14\ Zerin Osho & Eoin Jackson, ``The Polar Tiger: Climate Change, India, and US Arctic Security Policy in a Multipolar World,'' The Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies Journal of Arctic Security, Volume 2, 2025. https://tedstevensarcticcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2025/02/JAS_Vol-2_Osho_Jackson_Polar-Tiger.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our planet is composed of complex and highly interactive systems, so systems-level analysis is necessary to understand the changes under way. I recommend referencing the Planetary Boundaries Framework \15\ to understand the consequential systems at play, which demonstrate a need to break out of siloed thinking. This framework articulates 9 components of the Earth System that promote stability for life on Earth. Seven of the 9 components are in the red (unsafe) zone, and only one of these is climate change. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ ``Planetary Boundaries,'' Stockholm Resilience Centre. https:/ /www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Robust international cooperation on scientific research and the incorporation of different types of knowledge systems are essential for understanding the changes under way, and the tools we have to mitigate risk.\16\ Underinvesting in data collection and scientific research threatens to create blindspots in our analysis, which needs to project forward since there is not historical analog for the conditions we encounter today. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ ``Wildland Fire,'' The Arctic Council. https://arctic- council.org/explore/topics/climate/wildland-fire/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The threat environment is becoming more complicated. There is an inclination to have tunnel vision and focus on the actor-based threats we are more accustomed to, but it is the duty of security professionals to appropriately account for all factors that bear upon the threat environment. Especially in the presence of significant global conflict--which only furthers the release of emissions and degrades the environment--this task become more essential. And the complexity of this task requires allied cooperation, where we can leverage each others' strengths to more efficiently mitigate risk and develop solutions that benefit us all. Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. Maddox. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Ms. Conley, you stated that Canada recently stated that they're going to increase their defense spending or spending in that region by, was it $29 billion? Ms. Conley. Yes, sir. Chairman Gimenez. When did they make that statement? Ms. Conley. The statement was this year. It's a combine of 2 significant packages, in part, modernization of NORAD, as well as an enhanced Arctic security package to create 4 forward operating locations, northern operational support hubs, as well as their continued satellite Arctic patrol vessels and assorted packages. Chairman Gimenez. You said Denmark also put an addition $5 billion? Ms. Conley. Yes, $6 billion. Six billion--through 2 packages. Chairman Gimenez. Is that for Greenland? Ms. Conley. It is primarily, yes. For Greenland it is. Sensors, patrol vessels, additional presence to strengthen Danish Arctic command. Chairman Gimenez. This was done after President Trump said that he would like to acquire Greenland and then--and after he said about 51st State of Canada. Is that what happened? Ms. Conley. It was certainly motivated by President Trump's comments, but I will say senior leadership of both governments have also been clear to say they were behind. They needed to do this. This was long overdue. So it was a motivating factor. It's also the acknowledgement by both countries that they have to protect their sovereignty and their territorial integrity in the area. Chairman Gimenez. Correct. Do you think that maybe that's exactly what President Trump wanted them to come to that conclusion? Would they have come to that conclusion on their own? Ms. Conley. I don't believe we would have seen the substantial investments without the President's comments. That's the upside. Chairman Gimenez. Exactly. Ms. Conley. The downside is it's a different security relationship moving forward, and we'll have to reckon with that. Chairman Gimenez. Well, the different security relationship is actually that Denmark and Canada are footing more of the bill, which I think is exactly what the President wanted to happen. Also to acknowledge the fact that there is a problem up there and that they needed to invest more in securing their territory and becoming partners. All right. So--but the President has an interesting way of trying to push our allies, OK, into doing what he thinks they should be doing. I don't think there's any threat to the alliance, to be honest with you. It's just his way of getting them to do things that they should have been doing all along. So, Mr. Clark, do you agree with that assessment? Mr. Clark. That they're doing things they should have been doing all along? Absolutely. This is--the United States is obviously behind in its investment in the Arctic and our allies were even further behind, arguably in their investment. This is sort-of them trying to catch up. Chairman Gimenez. The same thing happens with the war in Ukraine that the President, by saying that they needed to spend more, is that Europe needs to spend more in its defense because they have a bear in their backyard. OK? While we may still be there, and we will be there and we will answer the call, they also need to show a little bit more of the burden of defending their homeland, right, from Russia. Russia needs to understand that it's not just the United States that they're going to be facing. They're going to facing a much more potent Germany, a much more potent Poland, a much more potent France. All of them will be much more potent. Then the United States will always be there. We'll always be there. It is the greatest alliance, and it's the one that keeps the world safe. But they needed to step up. So, yeah, some people may not agree with the way it's done. You know, some people. Oh, God. But at the end, at the end, we actually got the world--is a safer place because they are making those investments. I doubt those investments would have been made by saying, gee, please could you do this? Because we've been asking them to do that for a long time, and they haven't done that for a long time. Now going to--we've had issues with our, the procurement and the design and the construction of our icebreaker. So I don't know which one of you would answer this question. If you do have the answer, where are we on the design and construction of our new heavy icebreaker? Mr. Clark. So the Polar Security Cutter program, which was the first out of the gate, had significant issues with the initial builders of VT Halter down in Pascagoula. They were way behind on the design. They were having difficulty starting up the manufacturing process. They ended up getting bought out by another shipbuilder, Bollinger, who now owns the company, is now restructuring the program with the Coast Guard. So it's getting back on track, but it's years behind now as a result of poor decisions made early on with regard to how you're going to manage the program. They started to do construction before they completed the design. All practices that we kind-of know from history are bad things to do when you're trying to start a shipbuilding program. Chairman Gimenez. In fact, it should already have been launched? Mr. Clark. Yes. Chairman Gimenez. It's not even--the draws, the drawing is not even completed. Right. Mr. Clark. Correct. Right. Detail design is not complete. There's---- Chairman Gimenez. Yeah, I think we need to look at that entire program. Anyway, my 5 minutes are up and I recognize a Ranking Member for 5 minutes of question. Mrs. McIver. Thank you. There has been, first of all, thank each of you for your testimony and your expertise. It's truly appreciated. I just want to thank you again for your patience because I know what that's like waiting around for us twofold. There has been growing discussion about how the United States engages with key partners in the region, including Denmark and Greenland, and whether certain approaches may be creating friction at a time when cooperation is increasingly important. Ms. Maddox, if you can elaborate a little bit what you talked about in your statement. How critical are alliances to achieving U.S. objectives in the Arctic? Ms. Maddox. The alliance is our critical strategic enabler for being able to realize U.S. interests in the Arctic, both because of the strategic geography that our allies hold and we have different defense cooperation agreements that allow us to pre-position assets to be able to exercise so that we can regain our war fighting capabilities for the Arctic to not just survive where, you know, you hear about the operators in the region, they talk about, you know, that the environment is the No. 1 enemy trying to kill you. You need to have that ability to survive. Then to be able to be, you know, a capable war fighter amidst all of that is no easy task. So our allies are critical in teaching us that. I would just say that there are ways that we can be very clear that there are certain things that need to change, but in a way, that's rooted in the respectful cooperation that has characterized the alliance and that does not in any way threaten their sovereignty. Because what happens there is it erodes trust, which is really at the heart of, you know, is the United States a credible ally? If that's not perceived to be so, it emboldens Russia and that leads to a whole slew of other issues. Mrs. McIver. Yeah, I would agree. In your opinion, how has the Trump administration's actions, the way they do things and statements with respect to Greenland alone impacted those alliances? Ms. Conley. So again, I think that the language that we've seen has really demonstrated a high level of personalization. So when President Trump has said things like he would psychologically feel better about owning Greenland, the letter that he sent to the Norwegian Prime Minister saying that because he didn't get the Nobel Peace Prize, that there's not a value in him being peaceful, so he's going to pursue an acquisition of Greenland one way or another. You know, after the Venezuela invasion, then saying that he doesn't need international law, he's only kind-of constrained by his own morality and that he wants to own Greenland. So these repeated statements make the Greenlanders think it sounds like he wants us and he is the commander-in-chief. You know, for a small nation that is rising in strategic importance, you know, where we've had such a great relationship, it's really harmful, the approach because they fear us now and they look at our presence where they used to see it as positive, it's seen with the same level of skepticism as Chinese offers of presence. That's not good for being able to pursue the opportunities that we want. Mrs. McIver. Yeah, thank you so much for that. Ms. Conley, if trust among our partners is weakened, does that make it more difficult for the United States to effectively lead in the Arctic? Ms. Conley. So I think we have some repairing to be done and I'll just take the, the relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark, but I think we are in a much better place post the crisis over Greenland. We have strong agreements. The 1951 U.S. Kingdom of Denmark defense agreement. Testimony earlier this week by the commander of NORTHCOM suggests we are now thinking about opening new military bases on Greenland. This is how partners work. There is a strong relationship with our military, our intelligence sharing. We need that political, that top-level political dialog to support and nurture that. But I think we're repairing it. To Chairman Gimenez's question, look, we're rebalancing this relationship. It is painful to rebalance a relationship that has been out of balance for 2 decades. Europe is having some painful decisions and I think President Trump just discovered that if you don't have our allies there at the beginning of an operation, it's harder to fit them in afterwards. We're learning to rebalance this critical relationship so we keep it on repair. Our Arctic allies understand the critical nature of Arctic security. We have to be there together and we have to create the mechanisms to make sure the United States is at the center of it, not having our Arctic allies coordinate outside of us. That's what we have to focus on. Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for each of you, your expertise. With that, I yield back. Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane. Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you guys for coming today. Ms. Conley, you talked in your opening statement about eroded trust with our allies in NATO. Can you unpack that a little bit for the committee? Ms. Conley. Yes, Congressman. So the question of many of our NATO allies regarding the President's comments about Canada and Greenland would be, would the United States respect the sovereignty of our NATO allies? They interpreted the President's comments as calling that into question and our NATO allies began to respond to protect that sovereignty. I believe the worst of this crisis is over. We need to begin to repair and rebuild that trust. We have a ways to go. It's also a new relationship moving forward. The old NATO is gone. The new NATO is arriving. I think this is new security that the substantial Arctic security packages that both the governments of Canada and Denmark have responded. That's where we build the future and hopefully put this crisis behind us and build that future. Mr. Crane. I do find it interesting, ma', am, when I listen to your response to my question, that you only covered one side of the, of that trust issue. Do you know how many countries within NATO were paying the 2 percent benchmark of defense spending before the war in Ukraine? Ms. Conley. Yes, sir. Before, well, 2014, before the Wales Declaration was pledged, there were only 7 NATO members that were paying a 2 percent. Mr. Crane. Out of how many countries? Ms. Conley. Well, in 2014 that would have been before some of the 26. Yes, thank you. But here's the good news, Congressman. Today NATO released their annual report. You now have. Mr. Crane. Yeah, I understand that, ma'am. I understand that they have started spending more now with the war in Ukraine. I think that's a great thing. I think part of that has to do with what we were talking about earlier and the language and rhetoric that came from the President, because as Mr. Gimenez pointed out, hey, please pay the 2 percent that you're required to pay per our agreement. They hadn't done it for a long time. So clearly what the President was doing in his first term and even now has had some effect. I know the war has had some effect. But I think it's interesting when you testify before this Congress and this committee that you point out both sides of it, because I could can tell you right now that a lot of my constituents that I represent up here and a lot of Americans I talk to, they do feel like NATO is a paper tiger and they feel like NATO often--many of the countries in NATO ride the coattails of the United States and hope the United States is going to come and bail them out. That's why they don't pay their fair share in defense per the agreement. Do you think that's fair, ma'am? Ms. Conley. I think that's certainly a fair, fair public perception. I think what's vital though, for the American people to understand. A new NATO with our allies increasing their defense spending and making a contribution keeps the United States safer. It's not a one-way street. It is a two-way street. As I said, I wish the more American people understood the value of that alliance. But your points are absolutely correct, that they have underspent. It has taken threats of sovereignty to get them moving in the right direction. That's not what we want to see. But let's hope we are in a better place, because allies are important. We understand the cost. When we go in it by ourselves, we can do it. We have massive strength, but we are better and stronger with overwhelming force, with as many partners on our side. That's the vision we'd like to see. Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ms. Conley. Ms. Maddox, in your opening testimony, you talked about, as we're talking about the Arctic, the importance for environmental change. Can you unpack that a little bit for us? Ms. Maddox. Yeah. So a lot of times when people talk about Arctic change, they really reference the Arctic ice cap shrinking and thinning, so facilitating new maritime routes. But it's much more complex than that. Like I said, 15 percent of the northern hemisphere is underlaid by permafrost that is thawing. This is about 60 percent of Russia, 80 percent of Alaska, 40 percent of Canada. So we're having lots of infrastructure that's being impacted, runways, roads. So the maintenance that goes into infrastructure in the Arctic, where there's permafrost involved, adds to the enormous costs of maintaining it. But we're also seeing things like, you know, we had billions of snow crabs that died off the coast of Alaska because of a marine heat wave that, that gutted the industry and collapsed it. Right. So in terms of being able to understand the changes that are occurring and how do we understand looking ahead to advise industry on what should they be investing and what are the economic opportunities and where should they not be putting investment? Right. So both from the economic security side, the food security side, we have harmful algae blooms that are activating in the warmer water at higher latitudes. So this is compromising, again, the fisheries from a subsistence as well as an economic harvesting perspective. Then the wildland fire, as these fires are becoming more intense because there's prolonged droughts and then more extreme temperatures, and there's actually more lightning occurring in the Arctic. So this is creating the conditions for these extreme fires that pose an acute threat to human health, but also to our military infrastructure. There's questions about how sensors and military infrastructure is impacted by prolonged smoke exposures. There's knowledge gaps here, and there are solutions as well, but we need to draw from different types of knowledge. Mr. Crane. Thank you. I'd like to get to those solutions at some point. I have run out of time for my questioning, so thank you, and I yield back. Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, gentlemen from Arizona. Now I recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Pou. Ms. Pou. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member McIver, for calling this hearing. Thank you to the witnesses that are here today. The Arctic region is of great consequence to both America's national security and our domestic interests. While we have maintained a presence in the region for nearly 150 years, today we face a new challenge from--from challenge from both China as well as Russia, as well as from actor-less threats like climate change. You were just speaking about that, Ms. Maddock. Russia controls over 50 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline and has the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world. Meanwhile, China is aggressively expanding its presence in the region with its Polar Silk Road Initiative and collaborating more closely with Russia than ever before. The United States must work with our allies to combat these threats. But instead, we are actually straining our relationships. Our degraded relationship undermines joint planning, information sharing, and cooperation at a critical point. For example, the Trump administration repeated threats toward the Greenland has badly damaged our relationship with Denmark and Europe and has long been critical to Arctic cooperation. For months, the President has publicly stated his intent to annex Greenland by force. He has threatened tariffs on our European allies. In January, Trump stated that the only constraint in his power is ``own morality.'' Ms. Maddox, if the United States uses economic and military coercion to achieve our goals in the Arctic, how do you think China and Russia will act toward us and other smaller nations in the region? Is coercion the best way to achieve our aim in the region? Ms. Maddox. Thank you for the question. So the way that I think, Russia and China are kind-of looking at what the United States is doing and trying to kind-of figure out, because there is a certain level of unpredictability associated with the strategy that President Trump employs. But there's also, it's kind-of figuring out, how do you have that balance of effective deterrence and effective signaling? Right. There are concerns about the ability, especially as China's seeking, to become a nuclear peer of the United States and Russia. How does that signaling work out? How do we prevent unintentional escalation or misinterpretation? But like I said in my initial remarks, we've seen that China has really been quiet, fairly quiet, when seeing how the United States is speaking about Greenland, kind-of within the context of the idea that you don't interrupt your adversary when they're making a mistake. Then with Russia having Sergei Lavrov specifically, you know, pointing to the language that the United States uses to justify Greenland annexation to justify their annexation of Crimea. So it's about that whole spheres of influence approach and might makes right and the ways that if the United States is not abiding by the rules-based order doesn't signal or demonstrate a regard for international law. There's some challenges with that. Ms. Pou. I know that my time is running out very quickly. I do want to put on the record and perhaps if we can get some response, if not through the Chair, I'd like to perhaps be able to get those answers in writing. One of the, the 2 questions, the other 2 questions I wanted to talk about was in fact some of what has occurred with the reduction in NOAA workforce and the proposed budget cuts of how is it affecting America's ability to address the impact on climate change and develop strategies in the Arctic? The other question is, is it important for the Coast Guard to maintain an understanding of climate change to comprehend the ice coverage and sea level in the Arctic? I know that many of you are well- versed in that area and certainly can help to respond to those questions. I have like 6 minutes, right? Oh, actually I--it looks like I've ran out of time. But please, if you would through the Chair, Mr. Chairman, I would love for the opportunity to get those responses if through you sir. I yield back. Chairman Gimenez. I want to thank the gentlelady from New Jersey. Without objection, if you could respond to those questions in writing, we would appreciate it. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] A P P E N D I X I ---------- Questions From Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez for Heather A. Conley Question 1a. In the context of growing competition with Russia and China in the Arctic, how critical is speed to delivery for U.S. icebreaking capability? Question 1b. Does adopting a proven, in-production design, like the icebreakers already built by Davie Shipbuilding, offer a meaningful advantage in delivering the Arctic Security Cutters faster and making them operational sooner? Answer. The need for rapid U.S. icebreaking capability has now reached a critical threshold, particularly for heavy icebreakers. Because the United States' icebreaker fleet has been woefully under- resourced for the past 20 years, the Coast Guard struggles to meet simultaneous operational requirements in Antarctica and the Arctic. Should America's only heavy icebreaker, the 50-year-old Polar Star, experience a catastrophic mechanical failure and be unable to conduct operations, the United States would not have heavy icebreaking capabilities available until its replacement is available, at the earliest, by 2030.\1\ Fortunately, the planned medium icebreaking Arctic Security Cutters through the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact) with the participation of Canadian and Finnish firms and shipyards, will be able to deliver greater icebreaker capability and redundancy for the Healy and Storis while ensuring greater interoperability with NATO members Canada and Finland. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Caitlyn Burchett, ``Coast Guard Commits $323M to Modernizing Future Polar Security Icebreaker Homeport.'' USNI News. February 3, 2026: https://news.usni.org/2026/02/03/coast-guard-commits-323m-to- modernizing-future-polar-security-icebreaker-homeport. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 2. The Coast Guard currently has a budget of $3.5 billion for ASCs from the OBBBA, but more will be necessary to build out the 11 currently under contract. How critical is it for the administration and Coast Guard to ensure adequate funding is available for the entire fleet? Answer. It is essential that the U.S. administration provide multi- year funding for the entire icebreaking ecosystem to include not only the vessel itself but the recruitment and training of a new generation of Coast Guard icebreaking pilots and crew, sustainment and maintenance costs, infrastructure and port improvements, modularization, integration of autonomous systems, and data integration. The icebreaking fleet requires a permanent line-item in the Coast Guard budget. Question 3a. OBBBA provided funding for $266 million ``for procurement and acquisition of long-range unmanned aircraft and base stations . . . to provide for security of the maritime border.'' This funding was initially requested by Congress from the Coast Guard to procure the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, a medium-altitude, long-endurance aircraft that is specifically designed for the maritime domain awareness mission, including the Arctic. Coast Guard participates in a joint program on an earlier variant of the MQ-9 with CBP. The MQ-9B is now being deployed by Canada, Denmark, and Japan because of its ability to operate in the Arctic. It is unmatched in this space. Ships (and other manned systems) can't be everywhere in the arctic. Therefore, do you believe unmanned, long-endurance (36-hour) aircraft could serve to support arctic security and provide maritime domain awareness? Question 3b. Are you aware of any NATO allies procuring this kind of capability? Answer. Unmanned aerial and underwater systems will be critical to achieving greater Arctic domain awareness. It will also be essential for these uncrewed systems to be interoperable with our allies to develop an integrated, common operating picture. Along with Canada, Denmark and Japan, Germany has procured 8 MQ-9B Sea Guardians of its own.\2\ In addition, Greece operates 3 MQ-9Bs to patrol its maritime space.\3\ The MQ-9B was used in the 2023 Arctic Edge exercise.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ General Atomics Aeronautical, ``Germany Buys Eight MQ-9B SeaGuardian RPA Through NSPA.'' January 12, 2026: https://www.ga- asi.com/germany-buys-eight-mq-9b-seaguardian-rpa-through-nspa. \3\ Inder Singh Bisht, ``Greek Parliament Approves $400M MQ-9B SeaGuardian Drone Purchase.'' The Defense Post. July 8, 2022: https:// thedefensepost.com/2022/07/08/greece-mq-9b-purchase/. \4\ General Atomics Aeronautical, ``GA-ASI SeaGuardian Supports Northern Edge 2023.'' June 7, 2023: https://www.ga-asi.com/ga-asi- seaguardian-supports-northern-edge-2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Heather A. Conley Question 1. For years, China has characterized itself as a ``near- Arctic'' state, formally publicizing its intent to govern in the region through its Arctic Policy paper, released in 2018. Since then, China has carried out both scientific and commercial exploration and has been granted permanent observer status by the Arctic Council. What is the end-state that China would like to achieve and how close would you say China is to reaching that goal? Answer. Xi Jinping has declared that China will be a great polar power by 2030.\5\ Although Beijing has not established any specific metrics by which to measure whether it has achieved this goal or not, the PRC has made substantial advancements since the release of its first Arctic White Paper in 2018 (the only Arctic policy paper published by the country to date.) The PRC views the Arctic (polar regions) as 1 of 4 new strategic frontiers, alongside space, cyber space, and the deep sea.\6\ Of course, all 4 of these domains are highly complementary in the Arctic. Beijing also views the Arctic region as ungoverned space where the great powers will ``focus on the struggle over and of global public spaces'' and the use of force cannot be ruled out in the ``scramble'' for these new strategic spaces. China seeks unfettered access to the Arctic's considerable resources (energy, minerals, and protein) and long-term strategic military advantage.\7\ It will be able to do so through its ``unlimited partnership'' with Russia, its military-civil fusion of dual-use applications from its scientific and economic presence, the growing reliance on China's navigational system (BeiDou), and ability to shape future Arctic governing structures such as the High Seas Treaty, the International Seabed Authority and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Rush Doshi, et al, ``Northern expedition: China's Arctic activities and ambitions.'' Brookings Institution. April, 2021: https:/ /www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic- activities-and-ambitions/. \6\ Helena Legarda, ``The Arctic, outer space and influence- building: China and Russia join forces to expand in new strategic frontiers.'' Mercator Institute for China Studies. October 22, 2025: https://merics.org/en/report/arctic-outer-space-and-influence-building- china-and-russia-join-forces-expand-new-strategic. \7\ Rush Doshi, et al, ``Northern expedition: China's Arctic activities and ambitions.'' Brookings Institution. April, 2021: https:/ /www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic- activities-and-ambitions/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 2a. It is clear that China sees itself as an important stakeholder in the Arctic region and is determined to actively participate in Arctic governance. To that end, what tools does the United States have at its disposal to limit Chinese presence in the Arctic? Answer. As General Guillot of U.S. Northern Command has stated in Congressional testimony, you cannot defend what you cannot see.\8\ The United States must improve its ability to detect Chinese presence in the Arctic. Today, the United States and its allies have insufficient Arctic domain awareness to detect threats and lack persistent presence to deter an adversary's encroachment of American sovereignty in the Arctic. A more significant U.S. icebreaker fleet will increase both domain awareness and persistent presence as well as serve as a data integration platform for unmanned systems and satellite coverage to alert the United States to adversarial presence. Limiting Chinese presence in the Arctic may not be possible when allowed by international maritime law and through its partnership with Russia, but the U.S. administration should demand greater transparency of its scientific and economic activities. Washington could pursue a transparency code of conduct within the Arctic Council for all Arctic- related science by members and observer countries. This transparency code would include how China is influencing indigenous communities as well as researchers and organizations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, ``Open/Closed: Hearing to receive testimony on the posture of United States Northern Command and United States Southern Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program.'' February 13, 2025: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/ hearings/to-receive-testimony-on-the-posture-of-united-states-northern- command-and-united-states-southern-command-in-review-of-the-defense- authorization-request-for-fiscal-year-2026-and-the-future-years- defense-program. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 2b. Is it possible, through NATO partnerships or otherwise, to discourage the other Arctic nations from engaging with China? Answer. America's Arctic allies--Canada and the Nordic countries-- have a clear-eyed view of the security challenges that the PRC poses. Over the past decade-plus, Canada, Norway, and Sweden have been impacted by Chinese trade sanctions due to national human rights decisions. These countries have increased vigilance when Chinese shell companies seek Arctic infrastructure, energy, and mining opportunities. However, the more that the United States challenges their allies economically and questions their sovereignty, the more susceptible our allies become to China's message of international stability. U.S. allies also see Washington pursuing its own stable economic agenda with Beijing and will not seek to economically disadvantage themselves despite their awareness of the dangers of IP theft, overcapacity, and state-owned subsidies. Question 2c. As it relates to constraining China in the Arctic, in the long-term, would it be more effective to strengthen our coordination within existing international partnerships and Arctic governance frameworks or to expand U.S. presence and manpower in the region? Answer. All of the above. The United States should expand its presence and manpower across the diplomatic, economic, scientific and security spheres throughout the Arctic region in close coordination with its 6 Arctic allies, the United Kingdom, NATO, and the European Union. New organizational structures may be needed to support these arrangements, particularly those that bridge the security needs of America's Indo-Pacific allies with its Euro-Atlantic allies as the United States restores the Arctic as a homeland defense requirement. Question 3. Relations between Russia and the 7 other Arctic nations have been strained since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. What impact has Russia's invasion of Ukraine had on the engagement between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard? Answer. The United States Coast Guard and the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) continue to communicate via the North Pacific Coast Guard Automated System to facilitate daily information exchange, vessel tracking, and secure communication to manage the Bering Strait. Occasionally, there are scheduled, highly-scripted conversations at the staff level. It is my understanding that all senior leadership engagement and in-person professional exchanges ended following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\9\ It does not appear that the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) has been active since February 2022. There could be interaction with the FSB (if a part of the Russian delegation) at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) related to implementation of the IMO Polar Code. Although there was prior Coast Guard interaction with Russia at the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum (NACGF), it appears that Russia has not participated in the NACGF since its first invasion and annexation of Ukraine in 2014.\10\ The most recent interaction at the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF) was in September 2025 when officials from the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and Korea met with Chinese officials in Shanghai.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Information sourced from private conversations. \10\ Information sourced from private conversations. \11\ Arab News Japan, ``Russia, US participate in North Pacific Coast Guard Forum.'' September 27, 2025: https://www.arabnews.jp/en/ japan/article_155937/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 4a. Since 2011, the United States has been part of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with the other 7 Arctic states. Part of the United States' area of responsibility under the Agreement borders the area Russia is responsible for. What have we seen regarding the level of coordination between the Coast Guard and the Russian Border Guard in fulfilling this Agreement? Question 4b. How does that level of coordination compare with the Coast Guard's work with their counterparts in Canada, Norway, and Denmark, whose areas of responsibility under the Agreement also border the United States? Answer. Under the auspices of the ACGF, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Russian FSB participate in tabletop exercises and participate in seminars that focus on fulling both the search-and-rescue agreement and the marine oil pollution preparedness and response agreement. As noted above, it appears the ACGF has not functioned since 2022. Also, as noted above, the FSB and Coast Guard continue to communicate and monitor their maritime demarcation agreement (1990 Baker-Shevardnadze Agreement.)\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Information sourced from private conversations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In absence of a functioning ACGF, the U.S. Coast Guard's close coordination and cooperation with its NATO partners becomes even more essential and is not comparable in any way to the USCG's technical interaction with the FSB. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States have decades of experiencing working together, whether through the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, through NATO channels or bilaterally. The U.S. Coast Guard has a particularly strong partnership with the Royal Canadian Coast Guard, where the Coast Guard operates in Canadian waters, and coordinates icebreaking and buoy tending operations in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River as well as SAR activities in the Arctic.\13\ The Norwegian coast guard, part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, also works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy. In 2023, the U.S. medium icebreaker Healy, sailed alongside the Norwegian icebreaker, the KV Svalbard, to conduct exercises in Northern Norway and the Barents Sea, sailing near Franz Joseph Land.\14\ The Healy has docked in Troms, Norway. Similarly, the Royal Danish Navy is responsible for maritime operations with its coast guard element under the command of Danish Armed Forces. For its operations in Greenland, the Danish Joint Arctic Command has primary responsibilities. As founding members of NATO, Canada, Norway, and the Kingdom of Denmark have strong bilateral defense relationships. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ``Canada-U.S. Shiprider.'' July 31, 2025: https://rcmp.ca/en/federal-policing/border-integrity/canada- us-shiprider. \14\ United States Coast Guard News, ``U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy departs Troms, Norway following engagements with Norwegian Coast Guard, maritime government officials.'' October 6, 2023: https:// www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/article/3549076/us-coast-guard-cutter- healy-departs-troms-norway-following-engagements-with-nor/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 5a. In 2023, Russia submitted a claim to the United Nations for an extended continental shelf over the Gakkel Ridge, which is over 500,000 square nautical miles of the Arctic seabed. If the United Nations ultimately accepts Russia's 2023 evidence to include the Gakkel Ridge region, it will formalize Russia's rights to exploit Arctic seabed resources, such as oil and natural gas. Russia would also then control any seabed installations, pipelines, observation stations, and sensors. Could recognition of seabed claims translate into de facto control over shipping lanes, such as the Northern Sea Route, even though UNCLOS is meant to protect freedom of navigation? Question 5b. Are there mechanisms outside UNCLOS for the United States to assert its interests if adversaries continue to use it to justify strategic expansion? Question 5c. Should the United States consider alternative or supplementary agreements to UNCLOS to ensure Arctic security and maintain operational freedom for military and commercial activities? Answer. The U.N. Article 76 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has stated that Russia did not provide sufficient scientific data to make a legal determination that the Gakkel Ridge was an extension of the Russian outer continental shelf. Should the Article 76 Commission eventually rule in Russia's favor, Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark have submitted competing claims which would require a trilateral diplomatic mechanism for resolution. Thus far, the Russian government has closely hewed to UNCLOS parameters in the Arctic with the exception of treating the Northern Sea Route as a national waterway rather than an international passage. The seabed falls under the authority of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and would not necessarily impact the international maritime legal issues surrounding the Northern Sea Route, such as Article 234 addressing icy waters and the IMO's Polar Code. The Gakkel Ridge, which represents between 5-6 percent of the Central Arctic Ocean, falls under Article 136 of UNCLOS which considers the ridge to be the ``common heritage of mankind.'' At present, companies from 10 countries have submitted their intent to mine the seabed, to include China. As noted in my written testimony, Chinese scientific research has concentrated on the seafloor along the Gakkel Ridge, a volcanic ridge that could be rich in critical minerals in its seafloor sulfide deposits. The Russian government has also expressed concerns about the extensive Chinese scientific activity in the area of the ridge. A senior official with the Russian Academy of Sciences has described the ridge as a ``zone of blood right interest'' to Russia.\15\ Moscow's concern however has not inhibited Chinese manned submersibles to continue their sonar and acoustical mapping of the region. China will continue to exploit the ``common heritage'' nature of the Gakkel Ridge to advance its interests in the absence of coastal state clarity on its extended continental shelf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Vyacheslav Terekhov, ``A new challenge to expand Russia's Arctic shelf.'' Interfaks. December 16, 2024: https://www.interfax.ru/ russia/997801. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The United States could attempt to manage its UNCLOS interests through its geographically-closest Arctic allies, Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark, but the administration would have to restore trust with both allies and work constructively with them. The United States could work closely with the United Kingdom and Norway to potentially extend in its Atlantic Bastion mission (a joint operation to protect North Atlantic undersea cables from Russia submarines and manned intelligence gathering submersibles) to create an Arctic Bastion mission to track Russian and Chinese intelligence and ``scientific'' vessels near the Gakkel Ridge and Chukchi Borderland to the north of Alaska. The United States could work with Arctic allies and partners to insist on greater transparency for all science conducted on the Arctic seafloor. The most straightforward approach of course would be for the U.S. Senate to ratify UNCLOS which would allow the United States to receive the full benefits of the Convention from extending its outer continental shelf to maximizing its influence at the International Seabed Authority. Short of this, the United States may choose to work outside UNCLOS (e.g., deep sea mining in the Pacific) and submit its extended outer continental shelf claims, which could encourage other states, such as Russia and China, to work outside UNCLOS as well. Repeated violations by Iran, China, and non-state actors of freedom of navigation as well as unilateral maritime claims in the South China Sea have already damaged international maritime law. The Arctic region has enjoyed a series of supplemental maritime agreements--such the IMO Polar Code, the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC), and the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement signed by the 5 Arctic maritime states and China, Iceland, Japan, Korea, and the European Union. As noted above, there could be bespoke agreements for the Gakkel Ridge and Chukchi Borderland seafloor related to scientific and economic exploration.\16\ Militarily, NATO's 7 Arctic members could develop greater Arctic capabilities to strengthen deterrence and defense through the rapid implementation of NATO's regional defense plans and additional exercises and training. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Lars Kullerud and Oran R. Young, ``Adding a Gakkel Ridge Regime to the Evolving Arctic Ocean Governance Complex.'' Marine Policy 122 (2020.) 1-s2.0-S0308597X20309167-main.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 6. Russia and China have collaborated to enhance their respective Arctic capabilities, including icebreaker production and joint military exercises. Do you anticipate that this collaboration will remain mutually beneficial for the foreseeable future or are there diverging interests within their Arctic relationship? Answer. For the foreseeable future, the Russian and Chinese governments have a mutually beneficial relationship in the Arctic. Beijing gains greater access and experience working in the Arctic environment while Russia receives financial benefit from Chinese purchases of its Arctic LNG and select infrastructure investments, such as in the port of Vladivostok. Their joint military exercises in the Russian Far East and the East China Sea test the readiness and capabilities of U.S. aviation assets from the First Island Chain to the Third Island Chain. Question 7. Monitoring Russian and Chinese intelligence operations in the Arctic requires robust information sharing and multilateral coordination. How can the United States work with strategic partners in the Arctic to ensure effective situational awareness and deter potential threats? Answer. Creating a common allied operating picture across the circumpolar Arctic that knits together U.S. and allied domain awareness from the seafloor to space will be essential to detect, deter, and ultimately to defend territorial integrity and strengthen collective defense. While the United States and its allies must be prepared for a potential nuclear and conventional missile attack from Russia or, in the future, China, which originates from the Arctic, it is more likely that Russia and China will use hybrid warfare tactics (e.g., drones on sanctioned oil tankers) and dual-use infrastructure to test American and allied resolve and exploit weaknesses in the seam between civilian and military capabilities. To construct this allied operating picture, the 7 Arctic allies must be highly interoperable and develop systems that integrate wide-ranging data sets derived from military, scientific, economic, and climate sources and are able to efficiently relay that information to the warfighter. Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Heather A. Conley Question 1. The Department of War, the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. intelligence community, and our Arctic allies all play a role in shaping the Arctic theater. How does the number of actors involved complicate our ability to have a cohesive picture of the environment? Answer. U.S. interagency as well as State and Federal coordination of Arctic policy has always been its Achilles heel. During the Cold War, security and defense considerations were paramount and international science cooperation was considered a positive channel to be protected for communication and dialog with the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War environment, defense and security needs became a secondary consideration and the scientific and environmental agenda was prioritized. Today, the United States and its allies have only just begun to re-prioritize the Arctic security agenda while struggling to address China and Russia's weaponization of its science, economic, and governance agendas. To address this, the United States must prioritize developing a persistent physical presence in the Arctic and develop allied Arctic domain awareness and highly interoperable military capabilities and dual-use infrastructure. Question 2a. Considering that Chinese technological investments in the Arctic focus on both commercial and scientific sectors, should U.S. Arctic policy differentiate between purely scientific projects and those with dual-use potential? Question 2b. What legal or diplomatic tools are available to respond to gray zone maritime incidents in the Arctic without escalating to open conflict? Answer. Science underpins every element of power the United States and its allies possess in the Arctic, making policy differentiation impossible. It is science that helps geo-engineer repairs to runways or pipelines damaged by permafrost thaw, acoustical modeling of the seafloor for submarine activity and ensures the survivability of the warfighter in extremely cold climates. The U.S. Arctic Research Commission has realigned its science agenda to support U.S. security and economic interests in the Arctic. What the Arctic science agenda lacks is transparency and a code of conduct that is applied to all countries which engage in scientific research in the Arctic. Greater efforts could be made to enforce the International Maritime Organization's Polar Code and enforcing stiff financial penalties on the firms and nations of flagged vessels that traverse the Arctic in violation of the code, reflagging in mid-course or turning off or obstructing their Automated Information System (AIS). Enforcement would fall on the shoulders of the Arctic coastal states. The United States and Arctic nations could seek stronger inspection regimes for nations that repeatedly violate the Polar Code and utilize sanctioned vessels. The Ted Stevens Center could also serve as a focal point for U.S. and allied agencies to simulate and respond to hybrid activities through wargaming and tabletop exercises that would include the private sector. Question 3a. When discussing Arctic security and cooperation with our allies, the conversation often focuses on the European Arctic maritime domain, but Chinese ambitions largely come from the Pacific and Bering Sea. How does the threat environment differ in the Pacific Arctic? Question 3b. How should the U.S. leverage the Aleutian Islands to deter Chinese traffic? Answer. There remains institutional and defense ``muscle memory'' to conduct robust anti-submarine warfare, improve domain awareness, and protect the North Atlantic strategic lines of communication within NATO and by individual NATO members. The United Kingdom and Norway's recent operation in the North Sea which detected and deterred Russian intelligence activity around transatlantic undersea cables is a notable example of this.\17\ The United States and its NATO allies may not have sufficient persistent air and maritime presence, but active steps are being taken to secure maritime domain in the Atlantic Arctic via Arctic Sentry and enhanced security measures in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom-Norway (GIUK) gap.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ Jill Lawless, ``UK and Norway led a military operation to deter Russian submarines in the North Atlantic.'' Associated Press. April 9, 2026: https://apnews.com/article/britain-norway-russian- submarines-atlantic-7aa163bc29266504dd1d4c9949aeafde. \18\ Dzirhan Mahadzir, ``NATO Launches Arctic Sentry in High North in Response to Russian Activity.'' USNI News. February 16, 2026: https://news.usni.org/2026/02/16/nato-launches-arctic-sentry-in-high- north-in-response-to-russian-activity. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This institutional security framework and security muscle memory does not exist in the Pacific Arctic. The U.S. military is not organized for command-and-control success in the Pacific Arctic as USINDOPACOM does not have operational oversight for the Arctic in the Unified Command Plan--this despite the fact that the Army's elite 11th Airborne Division and Arctic Aviation Command (activated in 2024) is under INDOPACOM. The regional coast guards are aligned in the NPCFG (which includes Japan, South Korea, and Canada) but this is largely for law and fisheries enforcement purposes, not national security and defense requirements. Ideally, a new unified command plan for the Arctic region would include an operational role for INDOPACOM in the Arctic and Alaskan based naval and air exercises would include Korea, Japan, and Canada. Modernizing the naval and air facilities at Adak would create an interoperable Forward Operating Location that would allow for increased maritime reconnaissance and provide a persistent presence to monitor vessel traffic and violations of U.S. territorial waters or the U.S. EEZ prior to entering the narrow Bering Straits. A more streamlined command that includes INDOPACOM and additional facilities, such as Adak, a deep-water port in Nome and a persistent (rather than seasonal) Coast Guard presence in the Aleutians and along the Alaskan coast would improve Arctic security. Questions From Chairman August Pfluger for Bryan Clark Question 1. China has characterized itself as a ``near-Arctic'' state since 2018 and has since carried out both scientific and commercial exploration, as well as military collaboration with Russia. Where are there opportunities for the Coast Guard and DHS to counter the growing influence of the People's Republic of China in the Arctic and in Antarctica? Answer. In the Arctic, the U.S. Government should expand its Arctic presence beyond annual research deployments and biennial submarine ice exercises. With a larger icebreaker fleet, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) could maintain a continuous presence in the U.S. Arctic nearly year- round. To prevent other countries from eroding the protections associated with the U.S. EEZ, USCG cutters will need to be in the Arctic to enforce U.S. and international law. In the Antarctic, the United States should work with allies such as Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and France to prevent China from expanding its existing footprint on the continent. These U.S. allies are among the 7 which are recognized in the Antarctic Treaty as having territorial claims. Other claims are not recognized while the treaty remains in force. China has established several research stations on Antarctica inside the claims of Australia and New Zealand. These allies could ramp up inspections of the Chinese stations to ensure they are engaged in peaceful research. The USCG could also increase its deployment tempo in the Antarctic. Currently, the Polar Sea deploys there annually to resupply McMurdo Station. With a larger icebreaker fleet, the USCG could support U.S. and allied operations around the continent through a longer period. As U.S. allies with claims in Antarctica lack substantial icebreaker fleets, this could be a way for the USCG to improve collaboration on efforts to curb Chinese activity there. Question 2. The U.S. Air Force has maintained a presence in Alaska for decades and regularly flies in Arctic skies to intercept incursions into U.S. air space by Russian military planes. The Air Force also has an extensive array of sensors in Alaska to help support its homeland defense mission. As DHS and the Coast Guard work toward improving domain awareness capabilities, are there opportunities to work together with the Air Force or Pentagon as a whole to jointly develop and deploy cutting-edge domain awareness assets that fulfill both defense and homeland security missions? Answer. Yes, the USAF and USCG could cooperate on establishing an airborne layer of surveillance to address smaller air threats such as balloons, drones, and cruise missiles that may not be easily detected by ground-based radars optimized for ballistic missile defense. For example, the USCG could deploy medium-altitude long-endurance UAS like the MQ-9B over the Arctic for maritime and air surveillance using surface search radar and passive electronic sensors. The USCG could also deploy high-altitude balloons like those used by China against the United States to conduct passive surveillance of Arctic air space. Using AI-enabled algorithms, passive electro-optical and radiofrequency sensors could find and track adversary aircraft that would be too small for ground-based BMD radars to detect. Question 3. As the United States considers the future of Arctic resourcing, how should Congress prioritize investments across icebreakers, unmanned systems, satellite coverage, and domain awareness? Answer. The most urgent threats facing the U.S. Arctic are adversary efforts to access resources in the U.S. EEZ and potential attacks by uncrewed surface and air systems. More satellite coverage and domain awareness only improve monitoring of these threats without the ability to gather intelligence on them or respond. Icebreakers and long-endurance UAS can provide the ability to both gather detailed intelligence and intervene to stop threats. Therefore, they should be the Government's top Arctic investment priorities. Question 4a. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act provided over $8 billion for icebreaker procurement. What measurable capability gains should Congress expect by fiscal year 2027? Answer. Unfortunately, there is unlikely to be a noticeable improvement by 2027. The USCG is behind on its initial icebreaker program, the Polar Security Cutter, and it will probably not deliver until 2030. The first Arctic Security Cutter, since it is being built to an existing design by an established icebreaker builder, should be done before then, in 2028. Question 4b. How should Congress structure fiscal year 2027 appropriations to avoid a ``boom-bust'' shipbuilding cycle following this one-time funding spike? Answer. The one-time investment will provide a full order book to the relevant shipyards through this decade. The two key items in 2027 appropriations will be ensuring personnel and maintenance budgets are rising to accommodate the growing USCG fleet. Right now, the USCG lacks the personnel to crew its incoming icebreakers and its cutter fleet is already behind on maintenance. Question 5. Both China and Russia are known to surveil and linger near sensitive subsea cables. Given the vulnerability of subsea cable infrastructure in the Arctic, what are the potential economic and military consequences should Russia or China interfere with their operation? Answer. Chinese or Russian undersea reconnaissance operations could tap into cables to extract data or disrupt cables to cut off access between Europe and the United States or between Europe, Greenland, and Iceland. Question 6a. As referenced in your testimony, your experience in wargaming the Arctic theater suggests that U.S. and allied forces would struggle to detect and defeat incoming threats from peer competitors. In your experience, in what ways are our adversaries most likely to hold the homeland at risk? Answer. The most likely approaches are by using cyber operations or undersea drones to attack critical infrastructure. These attacks could come from U.S. territory using capabilities smuggled into the country or built here by agents acting on an adversary's behalf. They could also deploy from adversary territory or ships. The Arctic is important because adversaries could use the lack of surveillance in the region to deploy uncrewed vehicles close to U.S. territory, such as the Russian Status-6 long-endurance undersea vehicle. Adversaries could also attack U.S. undersea cables to achieve large-scale disruption of telecommunication and internet traffic. Question 6b. How should we prioritize investments to alleviate those vulnerabilities and effectively deter potential aggression? Answer. The United States has an extensive surveillance architecture along portions of the East and West Coast for air and undersea threats, but it is concentrated around U.S. military installations. The U.S. complements this network with undersea surveillance systems like the Fixed Distributed System that operate around the G-I-UK gap and other areas. Recent Russian operations suggest they are attempting to map this surveillance infrastructure, potentially as a preclude to disrupting it in conflict. The United States should expand its homeland surveillance networks undersea around areas of critical infrastructure such as cable nodes or ports, and invest in back-up surveillance capacity using uncrewed surface and air systems that can fill in when fixed systems are degraded or to track threats after they are detected until they can be neutralized. Question 6c. Based on your results, how should our underlying operational approach and military assumptions about the Arctic change to reflect the threat environment? Answer. Overall, the United States should ensure it has more uncrewed mobile surveillance and tracking capacity that can back up fixed or space-based systems when they fail or are degraded. In addition to providing redundancy, these uncrewed vehicles can enable more precise identification of targets and determination of their activities compared to wide-area sensors. Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps for Bryan Clark Question 1a. In your view, what statutory authorities does the Coast Guard currently lack to operate effectively in a contested Arctic environment? Question 1b. Should Congress expand the Coast Guard's role as a military service in Arctic deterrence, or keep its primary law enforcement and safety missions? Answer. Yes, the Congress should expand the USCG's responsibilities in the Arctic, given its expanding icebreaker fleet and the need for it to help monitor for threats to the homeland well beyond U.S. territorial waters or EEZs. Question 2. U.S. infrastructure in the Arctic remains severely outdated: insufficient rail networks make resource transportation difficult, runways are incapable of sustained air travel, and radar and communication sites date back to the Cold War. In what ways have these infrastructure-related challenges diminished the United States' advantage in the Arctic? Answer. The lack of port facilities and airfields in the Arctic reduces the presence U.S. forces can maintain in the region and constrains their responsiveness to crises or emergencies. As adversaries increase their operations in the Arctic, the inability of U.S. forces to detect and interdict threats will create risks for the U.S. homeland. The U.S. Government should encourage commercial investment in the Arctic to create opportunities for dual-use infrastructure that can support naval or Coast Guard operations. Question 3a. One of our best opportunities to prepare for the Arctic environment is through joint exercises like Cold Response 2026 and Joint Viking. But these are limited to certain military forces, and our broader Arctic forces need increased opportunities to adapt to the harsh environment. Compared to their counterparts in other theaters, what differences in capabilities and training, if any, are required for U.S. personnel operating in the Arctic? Answer. U.S. forces need to train on potential combat situations at sea and in the air, like they do in other regions. Most U.S. Arctic exercises currently center on ground troops, as they are a holdover from the Cold War when U.S. forces expected to join their European counterparts to defend against Soviet invasions. For example, the DoW's Northern Edge exercise is a multi-domain, large-scale combat demonstration and training event held annually in Alaska. However, it is conducted during the summer and primarily simulates a China-Taiwan conflict. U.S. forces can conduct electronic warfare in the remote environment, and the sea/land interface provides a useful backdrop for practicing counter-invasion operations. U.S. forces should also conduct some air and maritime exercises in the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) during the winter to exercise cold-weather combat capabilities. Question 3b. What challenges must they be prepared to overcome? Answer. The main operational challenges are use and maintenance of equipment in cold weather and addressing unique environmental aspects of operating in the Arctic such as low ceilings, high winds, and poor visibility. Additional challenges are communications and sensing in the High North, because satellite networks provide less coverage there. But the larger strategic issues are how forces are deployed to and sustained in Arctic operating areas. Because it is intended to assess readiness for a Western Pacific contingency, Northern Edge does not test specific aspects of operating in and around Alaska. And other exercises such as Arctic Edge do not include substantial air or any naval operations. The U.S. Military needs to conduct realistic Arctic combat exercises that address all domains, including space. Question 4. Chinese investments in the Arctic increasingly include dual-use technologies (i.e. satellite ground stations, undersea fiber- optic cables, maritime domain awareness sensors, polar research facilities) that can be used for military purposes. How can the United States anticipate and mitigate risks from dual- use technologies in Arctic waters? Answer. The United States cannot eliminate or mitigate these efforts by China but should seek to compete in these areas by making commensurate investments in its own dual-use infrastructure. Question 5a. Combatant commands, NATO members, and Departments across the Federal Government operate on distinct communications platforms and at different levels of classification. What are the implications, and deficiencies, for the information- sharing environment around Arctic security? Answer. The lack of interoperable information management systems creates seams that can result in threats being missed as they pass from one domain or region to another. For example, the Navy manages the Fixed Distributed System that surveils underwater areas in the north Atlantic, along the U.S. coasts, and elsewhere. This system may not interface directly with command-and-control systems being used by U.S. Northern Command or DHS for homeland defense. As a result, undersea threats like submarines or long-range underwater drones could be lost as they move between regions or surveillance systems. Question 5b. What opportunities exist to strengthen information sharing in the region? Answer. New command and control (C2) software suites like the Maven Smart System (MSS) incorporate software tools that enable multi-level security and integration of information from multiple disparate intelligence and surveillance sources. By shifting the locus of information sharing from networks to data, C2 systems like MSS allow for greater interoperability between information sources and can more easily share outputs with other C2 systems Question 6a. Given the Arctic's huge area, harsh conditions, and limited infrastructure, what kinds of emerging technologies such as satellites, unmanned systems, or new sensing capabilities could help the Coast Guard maintain better awareness while easing some of the strain on its cutters? Answer. The Coast Guard should expand its capacity for responsive reconnaissance using long-endurance uncrewed air systems (UAS) that could provide the ability to monitor large swaths of Arctic waters with greater persistence and resolution compared to satellite systems. This would ease the strain on cutters by allowing better identification of threats and emergencies and prioritization of Coast Guard resources. Another important for the Coast Guard is using AI in concert with existing and new surveillance technologies. The Coast Guard could use AI-enabled software packages that can evaluate recent sensor data and predict where emergencies or adversary actions are likely to occur. The Coast Guard could then prioritize cutter deployments to those areas. Question 6b. How should the Coast Guard strategically invest in these technologies to avoid strain on its current priority investments? Answer. The Coast Guard should pursue more service-type contracts for surveillance operations and analysis. Multiple companies can operate long-endurance UAS and associated analytic processes as a service. This would reduce the personnel and maintenance burden on the Coast Guard, which is already undermanned and behind on cutter maintenance. [all]