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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE SHEET ======================================================================= HEARING before the TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY of the COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 14, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-52 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-859 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan JUAN VARGAS, California, Ranking ANDY BARR, Kentucky Member MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana BRAD SHERMAN, California SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska SEAN CASTEN, Illinois MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana TROY DOWNING, Montana JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, January 14, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Frank D. Lucas, Chairman of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from Oklahoma.............................. 1 Hon. Juan Vargas, Ranking Member of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, a U.S. Representative from California............................ 2 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative From Arkansas.................. 3 WITNESSES Dr. James A. Clouse, Senior Fellow, Andersen Institute for Economics & Finance............................................ 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Dr. Bill Nelson, Executive Vice President, Chief Economist and Head of Research, Bank Policy Institute........................ 19 Prepared Statement........................................... 21 Dr. Allison Schrager, Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute......... 34 Prepared Statement........................................... 37 Dr. William B. English, Eugene F. Williams, Jr., Professor of the Practice, Yale School of Management............................ 43 Prepared Statement........................................... 45 APPENDIX MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD Written responses to questions for the record from Representative Troy Downing................................................... Dr. Bill Nelson.............................................. 80 STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE SHEET ---------- Wednesday, January 14, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Task Force On Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The task force met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Frank D. Lucas [chairman of the task force] presiding. Present: Representatives Lucas, Huizenga, Fitzgerald, Flood, De La Cruz, Downing, Vargas, Casten, Fields, and Bynum. Also present: Representatives Hill, Waters, Green of Texas, Foster, and Liccardo. Chairman Lucas. The Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. This hearing is entitled, ``Striking the Right Balance Sheet.'' Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. I now recognize myself for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATMENT OF HON. FRANK D. LUCAS, CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OKLAHOMA Welcome to the first task force hearing of 2026. Our focus today is on the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) balance sheet, a record of its assets and liabilities that demonstrate its operations. The Fed's balance sheet has undergone dramatic changes in the last 15 years, growing from less than $1 trillion in 2008, or 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), to almost $9 trillion in 2022, or 35 percent of GDP. In 2008, the Fed moved from a quarter system to a floor system, necessarily demanding an increase in the quality of reserves on the balance sheet. Despite that change, the Fed has continued to express the view that reserves should be at the smallest levels consistent with the effective implementation of monetary policy. We have not always seen the Fed stick to that view, instead using its balance sheet to provide economic stimulus, not merely as a means to control rates. In 2008, the Fed engaged in four rounds of large-scale asset purchases, or quantitative easings (QEs), with its balance sheet standing at $6.5 trillion today. Yet, the academic literature shows mixed results on the effectiveness of QE at economic support. While the jury is out on the benefits of QE, we do know that it raises risks of inflation and market distortion. The Fed should rely on conventional monetary policy tools under its ample reserves regime and avoid market operations that may have unintended and lasting consequences. Additionally, the Fed should clearly articulate under what conditions it uses the balance sheet for economic stimulus, economic contraction, and policy implementation in the future. This is particularly important now as the Fed engages in reserve management purchases. Finally, it may be tempting to allow the news of the day to distract us from the purpose of today's hearing. I will continue to emphasize that the independence of the Fed is critical to ensuring it makes sound interest-rate decisions that are essential to favorable economic outcomes. We will do well to remember that decisions made now have lasting implications, not just for the next Fed chair but for the next 10 Fed chairs. That said, let us focus our discussion today on the proper use of the balance sheet and its impact on monetary policy implementation and Treasury market functioning. I yield back. I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. Vargas, for 4 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATMENT OF HON. JUAN VARGAS, RANKING MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE ON MONETARY POLICY, TREASURY MARKET RESILIENCE, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Mr. Chairman, you have assembled a very distinguished group of witnesses today, and I was looking forward to discussing quantitative easing and quantitative tightening and the transition between scarce and ample reserves regimes and other aspects of the Fed's balance sheet, but the developments of the past few days have been incredibly alarming. I do not see them as a simple distraction. The Department of Justice has threatened Chairman Powell with a criminal indictment. The threats represent a full-frontal assault by President Trump on the independence of the Fed. Just 11 days ago, after the President said, quote, ``We're going to probably bring a lawsuit against him,'' end quote, the Department of Justice served the Federal Reserve with grand jury subpoenas. This is not an isolated incident. In August, the President said he was, quote, ``considering allowing a major lawsuit against Powell to proceed,'' end of quote. In November, he said of Chairman Powell, ``He should be fired, and he should be sued,'' end of quote. These repeated threats are designed to pressure the Federal Reserve into submission. Protecting the Fed's independence and credibility is critical to a stable economy. Credibility keeps mortgage rates low for home buyers. Credibility keeps borrowing costs predictable for small businesses. Credibility prevents credit card payments from spiking for working families. When monetary policy is guided by data and evidence, families can plan, save, and build financial security. When Presidents attempt to interfere with the Fed, markets lose confidence, and Americans pay the cost. Congress imposed staggered 14-year terms to insulate monetary policy from political pressure. Yet, President Trump has shown he is willing to ignore that safeguard to reshape the Fed in his own image. Chairman Powell's professionalism, seriousness, and character have earned him respect across ideological and party lines. I agree with Chairman Hill when he says he knows Powell to be, quote, a man of integrity with a strong commitment to public service, end of quote, and Governor Cook's experience and academic background have made her a respected voice among economists and policymakers. Yet the Department of Justice is threatening criminal prosecution, and next Wednesday the Supreme Court will hear arguments on President Trump's attempt to remove Governor Cook. Let us be clear: This is not just about two individuals; it is about the future of the Federal Reserve, as the chairman noted. That is why all three living former Fed Chairs condemn this criminal inquiry. They wrote, quote, This is how monetary policy is made in emerging markets with weak institutions, with highly negative consequences for inflation and the functioning of their economies, end quote. Congress cannot stand by and allow this to happen. That is why I am urging the Senate Banking Committee to follow Senator Tillis' lead and oppose the confirmation of any nominee for the Fed until this matter is resolved. The strength of our economy and our status as the world's reserve currency are on the line. With that, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chairman Lucas. I appreciate your leadership and that of the ranking member. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet is a monetary policy tool that was once deemed unconventional some 15 years ago. Now it is regularly used as a tool intended to keep our economy steady and secure. Since 2008, the Fed's balance sheet has grown significantly. What began as a modest tool used to support traditional monetary policy during times of stress appears to be the central way the Fed operates. Today, we will examine that whole process. Quickly, before we turn to today's hearings, I do want to emphasize what Mr. Vargas talked about. Chair Powell is a man of integrity. This hearing today is not about these events that unfolded over the weekend. We have a good, solid monetary policy topic before us today, and I encourage all of our members to ask thoughtful questions about the direction of the Fed's balance sheet. Regarding the hearing on the Federal Reserve's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report, the hearing is typically scheduled at this time of year, and the committee is at work to get it scheduled. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. Today, we welcome the testimony of Dr. Jim Clouse, senior fellow at the Andersen Institute for Finance and Economics; Dr. Bill Nelson, executive vice president and chief economist and head of research at the Bank Policy Institute; Dr. Allison Schrager, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute; and Dr. Bill English, the Eugene F. Williams, Jr., professor of practice at the Yale School of Management. Each of you--first off, thanks to each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony and without any objection, your written statements will be made a part of the record. Dr. Clouse, you may begin. STATEMENT OF JAMES A. CLOUSE, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, ANDERSEN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND FINANCE Mr. Clouse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vargas, and members of the task force. It is an honor to be with you here today to discuss issues related to the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. My name is Jim Clouse, and I am currently a senior fellow at the Andersen Institute for Economics and Finance. Prior to joining Andersen, I---- Chairman Lucas. Doctor, would you pull the microphone just a little closer to you, please? Mr. Clouse. Is that better? Chairman Lucas. Thank you very much. Mr. Clouse. Sorry. Prior to joining Andersen, I was on the Fed Reserve Board staff for many years, with much of that time spent focusing on issues related to the Federal Reserve's balance sheet and monetary policy implementation. The Federal Reserve's ``balance sheet'' is a term used to refer to its assets and liabilities. The Federal Reserve Act specifies the types of assets the Fed can hold. The Federal Reserve's assets currently consist largely of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). On the other side of the balance sheet, the Fed's primary liabilities include physical currency and reserve balances held by depository institutions. The Federal Reserve publishes a great deal of information on the balance sheet in a range of reports. Prior to the global financial crisis in 2008, the role of the balance sheet in the implementation of monetary policy centered around the use of open market operations to align reserve supply with reserve demand at the targeted Federal funds rate. Reserve demand was driven largely by reserve requirements. Reserves did not earn interest, and banks sought to keep any excess reserves to a minimum. Fed assets at this time were almost entirely U.S. Treasury securities, with an average maturity of about 3 years. Over the last 20 years, the Fed's balance sheet has undergone a major transformation, largely reflecting the policy actions taken in response to the global financial crisis and the pandemic. In both cases, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the target Federal funds rate to the effective lower bound and purchased large volumes of longer-term Treasury securities and agency securities in an effort to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and ease broad financial conditions. The expansion of the Fed's securities holdings during these episodes was accompanied by large increases in reserves in the banking system. Over time, it became apparent that the demand for reserves had dramatically changed from that prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Surveys of banks suggested that changes in bank liquidity regulations and a cautious approach to liquidity risk management had contributed to higher reserve demand. Partly in recognition of these changes, the FOMC announced in early 2019 that it intended to continue to operate in a so- called ``ample reserves'' regime. The ample reserves regime has many attractive features. First and foremost, it delivers excellent interest-rate control, even in environments with very large quantities of reserves in the banking system. That said, there can be challenges in identifying whether reserves remain ample, a point that was painfully illustrated by a period of severe stress in money markets in September 2019. Following the period of balance sheet reduction over the last few years, the FOMC judged that reserves had returned to ample levels and announced that it would begin reserve management purchases of Treasury bills to maintain ample reserve conditions over time. While the size of the Fed's balance sheet has now apparently reached a new normal, the composition of the balance sheet still has a long way to go. The FOMC has indicated that it intends to hold primarily Treasury securities in the longer run, but agency MBS holdings are still sizable and running off slowly. Moreover, the maturity structure of the Fed's securities holdings is heavily weighted toward longer-term securities. The FOMC'S desired long-run composition of the balance sheet could depend on a number of policy considerations, including potential implications for future policy actions, Treasury market functioning, and Federal Reserve net income. Regarding other balance-sheet-related issues, some observers have suggested that eliminating the Fed's authority to pay interest on reserves could be a way to boost Fed remittances to the U.S. Treasury. Eliminating interest on reserves would not boost Fed remittances, because the Fed's interest income would fall along with a decline in interest expenses. Moreover, eliminating interest on reserves would necessitate very large and potentially disruptive sales of the Fed's securities holdings and would require wholesale changes in the framework for monetary policy implementation, with the attendant uncertainties about the Fed's ability to effectively manage the level of short-term interest rates. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Clouse follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Dr. Clouse. Dr. Nelson, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF BILL NELSON, PH.D., EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, CHIEF ECONOMIST, AND HEAD OF RESEARCH, BANK POLICY INSTITUTE Mr. Nelson. Thank you. Chairman Lucas, Ranking Member Vargas, and members of the task force, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Bill Nelson, and I am chief economist and head of research at the Bank Policy Institute. I previously served at the Federal Reserve Board, working on monetary policy analysis, including balance sheet policy. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet matters because it shapes how monetary policy is implemented, how the Fed interacts with the financial system, and the risks ultimately borne by taxpayers. On the asset side, the Fed holds mainly Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. On the liability side, its largest item today is reserve balances--deposits of banks with the Fed--along with currency and the Treasury's general account. Because currency demand is set by the public, and the Treasury controls its own account, the minimum size of the Fed's balance sheet is largely determined by banks' demand for reserve balances. Before the financial crisis, the Fed implemented policy in what is called a ``corridor system.'' In that system, the Fed only supplied the level of reserve balances that the banking system needed, and private interbank markets actively distributed liquidity and imposed discipline. The Fed had good interest-rate control even though its footprint in markets was tiny. After 2008, emergency lending, quantitative easing, and the authority to pay interest on reserves led the Fed to adopt a ``floor system,'' in which a massive quantity of reserves pins money market rates to the floor created by the interest rate the Fed pays for reserves. In January 2019, the Fed formally chose to remain in that system. That decision has had serious consequences. First, the unsecured interbank market has withered. With an excess supply of reserves, banks no longer need to borrow from one another for liquidity management purposes. Second, an unconstrained balance sheet becomes an attractive source of funding for government initiatives. As FOMC participants warned at the time the Fed officially adopted a floor system, a large and unbounded balance sheet invites political pressure to use it. Third, the floor system may have encouraged complacency on the part of the Fed about interest-rate risk. Quantitative easing transfers that risk from the private sector to the Fed and, therefore, to taxpayers. When short-term rates rose sharply in 2022 to 2023, that risk materialized in large Federal Reserve losses. Fourth, abundant reserves worsen discount window stigma. Borrowing becomes rare and signals distress, preventing banks, supervisors, and investors from viewing the window as a normal backstop. Finally, there is a ratchet in the demand for reserves. Reserve demand rises easily but falls only with difficulty because bankers and bank examiners grow accustomed to abundant and cheap reserve balances and make adjustments to make use of them. In 2008, the Fed estimated that a floor system required about $35 billion in reserves. Today, that figure is roughly $3 trillion. The Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of Canada, and the Reserve Bank of Australia have recognized these costs and are shrinking their balance sheets and seeking to revive private markets. If the Fed wants to do the same, it needs to take three steps. First, move overnight market rates modestly above the interest rate paid on reserves, creating an incentive for banks to economize on reserve holdings. Second, avoid repo market volatility by conducting temporary open market operations to manage easily predictable variations in reserve supply and demand, such as occur on quarter ends and days with large settlements of Treasury securities. Third, reform liquidity regulations so that banks can count discount window borrowing capacity established with prepositioned collateral as a source of liquidity. This single change would reduce reserve demand, make liquidity regulations more accurate, encourage discount window preparedness, and boost economic growth and employment. It would support growth by allowing banks to make loans to households and businesses, which they would then pledge to the Fed, rather than forcing them to fill up their balance sheets with reserve balances. In closing, turning a large institution is never easy, but the experience of other central banks shows that a smaller Fed, one that acts as a backstop rather than a market replacement, is both feasible and desirable. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Dr. Nelson. Dr. Schrager, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral testimony. STATEMENT OF ALLISON SCHRAGER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE Ms. Schrager. Thank you for the invitation to discuss with you today the size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. I am a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, where I research fiscal and monetary policy and financial markets. I am also a columnist at Bloomberg Opinion. The size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has grown exponentially since the start of the financial crisis. This has happened for two main reasons. The Fed switched from a scarce reserves system to an abundant reserves or an ample reserves system, where it sets policy rates by paying interest on reserves. Paying interest on reserves means banks keep more reserves at the Fed, which is naturally going to increase the size of the balance sheet and there are some advantages to this. It makes it easier to control the policy rate, especially when rates are near zero. Traditionally, the Fed bought mostly short-term Treasuries with bank reserves, which, like reserves, are highly liquid and have a very short duration but this changed in November 2008, when the first of four rounds of quantitative easing commenced and the Fed used reserves to make large-scale purchases of longer-dated bonds and mortgage-backed securities. The size and scope of QE is the other reason why the balance sheet has grown as much as it has. Now, the ample reserves system, I guess, can be justified. It has made it easier in some ways to conduct monetary policy within reason without causing inflation. However, the growth of the Fed's balance sheet has not been completely benign, because the compositions of its assets can have a profound impact on the economy. Buying longer-term bonds and mortgage-backed securities not only introduces distortions into the economy, it might also threaten the Fed's independence in the future. Now, when the pandemic arrived and we risked a severe recession and great disruption in financial markets, the scale of the new QE program, QE4, was unprecedented. Cumulative purchases since 2020 exceeded $4.6 trillion, more than all three previous QE programs combined. My primary concern is the risk QE introduces to the economy with very questionable benefits. The hope is, when the Fed reduces the supply of long-duration assets in the hands of the private sector, long-term yields will fall, providing a stimulative effect on the economy and when short-term rates are near zero and we cannot go much lower. This might offer the Fed another avenue to boost economic demand but whether the first three rounds of QE actually had a notable and long-term impact on interest rates is hotly debated amongst economists. One research paper found that while Fed economists found that QE did reduce the rate yield on 10-year bonds, academic economists found very little or only a fleeting impact. Take that for what you will. So, even if there is spotty evidence of QE's impact on long-term yields, it can still have a distortionary impact on the wider economy. Traditionally, bond markets are segmented. The Fed has a significant impact on shorter-term rates--say, below 5 years-- and less impact on longer-term rates, which are set in the market. That market price conveys very important information about the price of risk in the economy, and it makes the foundation of how many assets are priced throughout the economy. When the Fed attempts to alter this rate or simply just becomes a large and captive buyer of longer-term bonds all these prices then have less meaning. In that case, risk can be mispriced, causing bubbles and financial instability. It also poses a financial risk to taxpayers, because longer-term bonds are more volatile, or their price is more volatile, because they have a longer duration than the Fed's liabilities. One estimate projects the cost of QE will be more than $760 billion. The evidence is stronger that buying mortgage-backed securities has a notable impact on the mortgage market by lowering the spread between mortgage rates and bonds. When the Fed resumed QE in March 2020, there was apparent distress in the mortgage market, but the Fed kept buying mortgage-backed securities for another 2 years when the housing market had not only fully recovered but was extremely tight, as many Americans moved homes, refinanced, and home prices hit record highs. We are still feeling the impact of this policy error. More than 50 percent of mortgage holders have mortgage rates below 4 percent and cannot afford to move and take on a higher rate, and this is constraining supply in the housing market, making Americans less mobile and contributing to high housing costs. Another problem with QE is, while it was relatively easy to implement, it is very hard to end. Ending QE too quickly, as we have seen, creates some major financial stability issues and this creates inherent asymmetry. QE can be implemented very quickly when the economy is weak but must be ended very slowly when the economy is hot. Even more worrying, if QE becomes a regular feature of monetary policy--which it seems it has--this can pose grave risks for Fed independence. When this is a tool in the Fed's toolbox, it is just all too tempting to pressure the Fed to keep the entire yield curve low in order to reduce the cost of debt service or just lower the cost of mortgages to consumers. Japan attempted this, at the cost of introducing major distortions into its economy. Firms stayed in business for years only because of the low cost of credit and this misallocation of capital lowered economic growth and contributed to their ``Lost Decades.'' Listen, some increase in the Fed's balance sheet is not necessarily a concern. It can be part of a healthy and growing economy but the reasons why the balance sheet has grown as much as it has and the changing composition of its assets should be a matter of grave concern for policymakers. There may be some justification for buying assets other than short-term Treasuries in extreme instances of illiquidity in the spirit of fostering financial stability, but any such program should only last a short amount of time, perhaps 6 months or less, after a liquidity event has passed and not just be used as a way to manage economic demand or influence asset prices. I am happy to take your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. Schrager follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Dr. Schrager. Dr. English, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your oral testimony. STATEMENT OF WILLIAM B. ENGLISH, PH.D., EUGENE F. WILLIAMS, JR., PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE, YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT Mr. English. Thank you, Chairman Lucas and Ranking Member Vargas, for holding this hearing and inviting me to testify today about the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. The size and composition of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet reflect a range of policy decisions by the Fed. For example, lending and quantitative easing have significant effects on the balance sheet. One important choice affecting the balance sheet is the method the Fed uses to implement its conventional interest-rate policy. These policies can be implemented in a variety of ways. One possibility, employed by the Fed prior to the financial crisis, is to implement policy with a relatively small balance sheet--that is, relatively low levels of securities and relatively low levels of reserve balances at the Fed--and then use securities purchases and sales to adjust the level of reserves to achieve the desired outcome for short-term interest rates. This approach is sometimes referred to as a ``scarce reserves'' or a ``corridor'' system. This sort of implementation was no longer possible by late 2008 because of the huge increase in reserves resulting from the Fed's emergency lending and QE. As a consequence, the Fed began implementing policy using the interest rate it pays on reserves and other administered rates. Since leaving money at the Fed is completely safe and liquid, banks should not lend out funds at rates much below the rate paid on reserves, and so that rate should set a rough floor for market rates. This approach is sometimes referred to as an ``ample reserves'' or a ``floor'' system, and it works even with a very high level of reserve balances. As the Fed shrank its balance sheet between 2017 and 2019, it considered whether it should return to a scarce reserves approach with a smaller balance sheet or stay with an ample reserves system and a larger balance sheet. In January 2019, the Fed announced it would stick with the ample reserves system. That decision reflected a balancing of a number of potential costs and benefits. One cost, as Bill Nelson noted, was the impact of a high level of reserves on overnight interbank funding markets. With banks holding very high levels of reserves at the Fed, they have little need to borrow and lend reserves to manage their holdings, and, as a result, the overnight interbank funding market has become much smaller and idiosyncratic. On the other hand, the Fed viewed the high level of bank reserves under the ample reserves system as likely to contribute to financial stability. In the event of a shock to the financial system, there would be less need to add reserves, as ample reserves would already be in place. Moreover, problems at large banks, the failure of which could cause systemic problems, can be managed better if those banks have a larger cushion of reserves to draw on. In addition, by 2019, the ample reserves system had been in place for more than a decade, had been working well to allow the Fed to set its policy rate, and there were presumably risks associated with trying to transition back to a scarce reserves regime. When policymakers assessed the overall costs and benefits of the two systems in 2019, they concluded that staying with the ample reserves system was preferable. Some have expressed the concern that the Fed, by operating with a larger balance sheet, may encourage the view that it will use its balance sheet to address other non-monetary-policy concerns or be willing to ease policy to address fiscal stresses by monetizing Federal debt. However, such concerns can arise regardless of the size of the Fed's balance sheet. Instead, these risks point to the importance of the Fed's monetary policy independence. The Fed should implement monetary policy to foster the objectives given by Congress--maximum employment and price stability--without regard for political or other pressures to use its tools for other aims. Thank you. I look forward to our discussion. [The prepared statement of Mr. English follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. We will now turn to members' questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning. Dr. Nelson, the Fed maintains that a floor system provides more rate control, a safer banking system, and a more resilient Treasury market. Do you share that view and what are the risks--what are the downside risks of a large balance sheet? Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No, I do not share that view. There is, in fact, generally widespread agreement across folks that have studied this that both a scarce reserves system and an ample reserves system provide good interest-rate control in normal times. Now, it is true that when the Fed has to expand its balance sheet in response to a crisis and reserve balances go up, what happens at that time is: a corridor system naturally becomes a floor system. The ECB, indeed, moved in and out of a corridor and floor system with no difficulty during the European banking crisis and that demonstrates that it is not necessary for the Fed to operate a floor system all the time with the attendant costs in order to be able to handle times of a crisis. Moreover, it is not true that a banking system is more resilient under a floor system. In fact, as we saw, one of the things that a floor system does is it increases discount window stigma, and it reduces the incentive for banks to be prepared to use the window. As we saw in August 2023, the banking system is much less resilient if the banks are not prepared to use the discount window. Chairman Lucas. Continuing with you, Dr. Nelson, banking regulations like the liquidity coverage ratio, resolution requirements, and liquidity stress tests incentivize financial institutions to hold reserves, growing the Fed's balance sheet. Should the regulators contemplate the impact that liquidity requirements have on the size of the Fed's balance sheet and what regulations need to be adjusted? Mr. Nelson. Yes, they should. Last week, we conducted a survey of our member banks and published the results of that survey this morning on what leads banks to demand reserve balances and what policies could change them. The things that the banks listed were, first and foremost, their own risk management, but then also needing to pass liquidity requirements, as well as discount window stigma. They indicated that the things that would most effectively allow them to reduce their demand for reserve balances was to recognize discount window capacity in the liquidity requirements to which they are subject. Chairman Lucas. Dr. Clouse, if the balance sheet gets too large, are we not in danger of markets becoming dependent on the Fed for proper functioning? In a crisis, Fed intervention may be necessary, but in normal times is the Fed unnecessarily distorting market behavior? Mr. Clouse. Thank you. I think that is possible and certainly was a concern at the time when large-scale asset purchase programs were initiated, that the growth of the balance sheet could be too rapid and there could be problems in market functioning. In the event, the FOMC carefully calibrated its pace of purchases and also tried to spread its holdings of Treasury securities across a range of quant Specialized Investment Funds (QSIFs) to address those issues. At present, my own sense is that the balance sheet is not exerting any particular distortions in the Treasury market. An interesting fact is that the Fed's Treasury holdings now, as a share of the total Treasury market, are below those prior to the GFC. Chairman Lucas. Dr. English, in my view, the primary benefit of QE is the strong signal it sends to the market that the Fed is committed to easing policy and supporting the economy through dramatic and unconventional actions. Can you talk about the importance of clear communication from the Fed as it manages its balance sheet, given that reserve management purchases are not intended to stimulate the economy? How can the Fed clearly communicate that to the market and differentiate it from QE? Mr. English. Yes. So I think---- Chairman Lucas. Hit your button, Doc. Mr. English. Ah. I think I agree with you that QE works in part by just signaling resolve of the Central Bank. I think we may disagree over other possible channels through which QE can affect interest rates and the economy but, certainly, communication about asset purchases is very important. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Fed should be clear about what the intended purpose of purchases is, and then the purchases should be designed and calibrated to meet that purpose. I think that is important for clarity on the part of the Fed, for the understanding of financial markets, and so on. In the current situation, I actually think the Fed has done a very good job of explaining the reserve management purchases which it started this month. It has said in its post-meeting statement that purchases of shorter-term Treasury securities-- or, it ``will purchase shorter-term Treasury securities as needed to maintain an ample supply of reserves on an ongoing basis.'' So it was clear it was buying short-term Treasuries, not long-term Treasuries, as it would for QE aimed at easing policy and it was clear that the aim was to supply reserves and not to provide accommodation. Chairman Lucas. Thank you, Doctor. My name has expired. I now recognize the ranking member of the task force, Mr. Vargas, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. Again, I want to thank the witnesses. In fact, I do not want to violate any confidences here, but the chairman did lean over to me a second ago and say that we have a really excellent group that is testifying today. I hope you do not mind me saying that, but I agree. I did hear the admonishment from the chair of the full committee that we should focus on the balance sheet today and not talk about the issues that have happened in the last few days, but I think, for me, that would be irresponsible, not to talk about possible criminal prosecution of the Chairman. I mean, I do not see how I cannot do that. I am going to. In fact, in Chairman Powell's statement, he said this: ``This is about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions or whether, instead, monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation.'' Yesterday, The Wall Street Journal reported that Jeanine Pirro, the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, was at a White House event last week with other U.S. attorneys where President Trump called them ``weak'' and said he felt ``betrayed.'' The next day, the very next day, her office sent out grand jury subpoenas to the Federal Reserve, which I think is outrageous. It is interesting, too; even in all of your testimoneys today, you all talked about the balance sheet being able to be used for policy or political purposes, interestingly. Dr. English, you mentioned, whether it was small or whether it was big, that it could be used either way. It does not matter the size; it could still be used politically. I think that is the problem when we do not have an independent Fed. I mean, the reason the Fed was set up in the first place was to bring it out of the politics. That is why they have the 14-year staggered terms. Could you comment on that, Dr. English? Because I think that is important for the discussion, to hear it is impossible just simply to talk about this and not say, well, there is the balance sheet. It is important whether we shrink it, whether we grow it, whether it is in times of emergency, not when it could be used politically this whole time if the President has captured it. Mr. English. Congressman, when Congress set up the current structure of the Federal Open Market Committee and the Federal Reserve Board in 1935, they were trying to ensure that the Fed could operate independently, could operate in the public interest. There is a very interesting paper by Gary Richardson and David Wilcox looking at this that came out last year. In particular, Congress wanted to ensure the Fed was independent of the President, who might have political and personal incentives that would affect policy in ways that would not be good for the public interest. There are several pieces of the structure that help ensure this independence. As you say, 14-year terms for Board members, they only turn over every 2 years. That limits the number of people that a particular President in a particular term can nominate to the Board. In addition, the---- Mr. Vargas. Unless he gets them removed by applying to court, right? I mean, as he is attempting to do with Lisa Cook. Mr. English. Let me come to that in a moment. The votes of Reserve Bank presidents on the FOMC mean that there are voters who are not subject to Presidential nomination at all and that provides additional independence. Congress intentionally put in place the arrangement that the President could only fire Board members with cause to protect the Fed from being used by the President to accommodate fiscal needs. So this was the structure that Congress intended. As you say, we will see, in some sense, what the courts decide about this but the intent, I think, at the time was clear, that Congress intended an independent Federal Reserve for the public good. Mr. Vargas. I think it has functioned fairly well, with exception. I mean, we did see an exception when Nixon, I think, pushed very hard politically to change the rates. I mean, I do not think it worked well. I mean, I do not think it worked well in Turkiye, I do not think it worked well in other places when the central bank is not independent from the politics, the particular politics, of the President or whomever the leader is of the country at that time. Is that not correct? Mr. English. I think that is right. As you say, in Turkiye in recent years, there was strong political pressure put on the central bank to leave policy easy for too long. They ended up with very high inflation there. I think you mentioned Richard Nixon and Arthur Burns. That is another famous example, where Burns was an advisor and confidant of Nixon. He wanted Nixon to be successful. Mr. Vargas. Uh-huh. Mr. English. Nixon put a lot of pressure on Burns to keep policy easy. We see that in the Nixon tapes; we see that in Burns' diary, for example. I think that did contribute--only contributed; there were many factors at play--but it contributed to the high inflation that we---- Mr. Vargas. My time is up. I thank you and I think it is very dangerous what is going on right now. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Huizenga, vice chairman of the full committee. Mr. Huizenga. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, am going to divert a little bit from my prepared questions, because I just need to point out a couple of facts. This is my third Fed Chairman since I have come into Congress in 2010--Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and now J. Powell. I was chair of something called the Monetary Policy and Trade Subcommittee, which does not even exist anymore. In fact, I have an article from 2016 of a much thinner and slightly less gray Bill Huizenga chairing a very similar hearing. John Taylor was one of our witnesses, Dr. Eisenbeis, also somebody from Cato. So we have been dealing with this, and I will tell you, at the time, there were friends of mine on the other side who were very critical of Ben Bernanke and his relationship with George W. Bush. There was a lot of us very critical of Janet Yellen and her relationship with Barack Obama. In fact, we were debating whether we were going to have to subpoena meeting logs--not notes, but logs--of how often Janet Yellen was meeting directly with President Barack Obama. Interestingly enough, that was because people suspected collusion between the Fed Chair and the President. Now we are seeing sort of the opposite; we are seeing a disagreement between the Fed Chair. So this notion that there has never been political pressure and that there has always been an independent Fed and it is somehow sterile and completely independent is just a fool's errand to pursue that. The question that I have on this is dealing really, sort of, with the balance sheet and reserve regime. Banks hold plenty of reserves and do not have many incentives to trade with each other in the Fed funds market. However, the Fed funds market can be more susceptible to experiencing sharp changes when conditions change. Dallas Fed President Lorie Logan suggested that the Fed should move away from this market; instead, target a repo rate for monetary policy implementation. Dr. Clouse, Dr. English, I am curious, do either of you believe this change is something the Fed ought to consider and what would be the benefit or challenge in doing so? Dr. Clouse? Mr. Clouse. Thank you. That is a very interesting proposal. My own--and I do agree that the Federal funds market is different now than it was in the past. I think of it as largely a deposit market. I think it is maybe more stable than many people think, but there are good arguments for shifting to a broader concept of bank's marginal funding rate. I personally am a little uncomfortable with the use of a repo rate, because I think that ties monetary policy more closely to Treasury financing needs, large non-bank financial institutions. So that is my view. Mr. Huizenga. Real quickly, Dr. English? Mr. English. I think I basically agree with Jim. I do not see a need for that, and I do not think it is desirable. I think the current system operates pretty effectively. Mr. Huizenga. Okay. Mr. English. So I am not sure I see a need to make a change. Mr. Huizenga. Dr. Schrager, why does the Fed still use quantitative easing to stimulate an economy when the economic community is not agreed whether the QE is actually even effective in the first place? Actually, that was one of my first meetings with Ben Bernanke in my office. I am a former realtor, and I would watch interest rates all the time. I had no other way of explaining other than an artificial lowering of the interest rates. He literally came out of his chair, and he was so angry. He was like, ``We did not have a choice.'' It seems like we are in a different position now, but why are we still using it? Ms. Schrager. Well, certainly, when we started with QE, interest rates were at a very--were near zero, and we were in the midst of a very deep recession, and I think the Fed was under a lot of pressure to feel like it was doing something and it was something, you know? So I think, as well, it got revised--it was supposed to just be an extraordinary situation because this was an extreme financial crisis, a very deep recession but I think the concern is, one, it went on for a really long time, because it is very hard to get out of QE, and---- Mr. Huizenga. Well, if you do not mind, I would say it is very hard to break ourselves of the low-interest-rate sugar high. Ms. Schrager. Exactly. Then, during the pandemic, it got revived even bigger. Again--going into the pandemic, interest rates were also near zero. So I think, anyway, as I mentioned--and I cited a paper that found that, while Fed economists do find it effective, academic economists, less so. Mr. Huizenga. I would note, one benefits professionally; the other may not. Ms. Schrager. Well, you know---- Mr. Huizenga. Arguably. Ms. Schrager [continuing]. I am just citing the paper. Mr. Huizenga. Okay. Ms. Schrager. I think it is very tempting for the Fed to use it just because, as I said, it needs to do something, and it is---- Mr. Huizenga. So I referenced Dr. Taylor as having testified. Would the Taylor rule make sense or any sort of rule? I know the chairman is tapping, but I would love to get-- -- Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Huizenga. I would love to get it in writing. Ms. Schrager. Yes. I---- Chairman Lucas. You can respond in writing. Ms. Schrager. Yes. I mean, I think, definitely, I am more of a fan of a rules-based framework rather than discretion and I think that is sort of an issue QEs. It does also leave open more discretion. Chairman Lucas. The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California, the ranking member of the full committee, Ms. Waters, for 5 minutes. Ms. Waters. Thank you so very, very much. I appreciate so very much, Mr. Vargas and Mr. Lucas, this hearing that you have put together, and I would love to engage with you about the balance sheet, but we should not be talking about anything but the independence of the Fed, our central bank. A few days ago, President Trump again escalated his attacks on the Federal Reserve, this time through grand jury subpoenas, threatening criminal prosecution of the Fed's Chair, Jerome Powell. This comes after months of Trump bringing baseless accusations against Fed Governor Lisa Cook to remove her from her position. Next week, Cook's case will be before the Supreme Court, and I expect they will reject Trump's power grab. That is because Trump's attacks are not about transparency or accountability; it is about his desire to control the Fed, interest rates, and our money supply to serve his agenda and not to fulfill the Fed's statutory mandates. I commend Chairman Hill and others for speaking up, but this committee, with its clear authority over the Fed, must take a bigger role in defending the Fed's independence. Can I just keep talking? No, I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back. Ms. Waters. Oh, I am going to give him the whole 5 minutes? [Laughter.] Well, let me just say this. I am thinking that I am doing the---- Chairman Lucas. Would the ranking member, yes, please finish your 5 minutes. Of course. Ms. Waters. Okay. We are going to get to some questions here. Okay. I think this first question is: It is imperative that our committee does everything in its power to defend the Fed's independence for the benefit of our constituents. Chair Hill, Mr. Lucas, I would like to yield to you for a question. What actions will the committee take to fight back against these efforts to undermine the Fed's independence, including stopping this latest attack on Chair Powell from continuing? Will you commit to holding a full committee hearing and a bipartisan investigation? Will you issue subpoenas to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director Pulte, and Treasury Secretary Bessent regarding their role in this latest attack? Chairman Lucas. Will the gentlelady yield? Ms. Waters. Mr. Hill is not here, and so I expect that Mr. Lucas will answer for him. Chairman Lucas. The task force held a hearing in September entitled, ``Less Mandates, More Independence,'' where we discussed Fed independence. It has been, I believe, the goal of myself and the full committee chairman to address these issues. I cannot speak for the full chairman of the committee, but I much appreciate the lady's points. Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. I take back my time. Dr. English, time and again over the past year, President Trump has taken extraordinary actions to attempt to control the Federal Reserve. For example, his administration manufactured mortgage fraud allegations to fire, again, Governor Lisa Cook and seize more control over the Federal Reserve, and last week his administration threatened Chair Powell with criminal charges. From your perspective as a former Federal Reserve official for 25 years, how does this political interference from the White House undermine the Fed's ability to make objective and sound monetary policy decisions? Mr. English. Well, I trust that it will not; that the Fed will stand tough. I think the statement by Chair Powell over the weekend was clear that he is not going to change his behavior as a result of this. So I think the Federal Reserve has legal protections to its independence. We will see what the courts say, but I am hopeful that the Federal Reserve will continue to use its tools to foster its objectives set by the Congress. Ms. Waters. Excuse me, Dr. English. Do you remember, was it Mr. Trump that nominated and got Mr. Powell the chairmanship, the presidency of the governing board? Mr. English. Yes, he was the one who nominated Chair Powell. That is correct. Ms. Waters. Is it your experience that Chairman Powell has been able to work effectively on both sides of the aisle? Mr. English. Certainly that is my impression, yes. He has talked to people on both sides of the aisle. We know that because his calendar is public and I think he is a very smart, talented public servant who has done a very good job. Ms. Waters. So, basically, he has the respect of both sides of the aisle and hopefully the courts will see this and understand this. Is that right? Mr. English. I would hope so, yes. Ms. Waters. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Fitzgerald, for 5 minutes. Mr. Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has expanded dramatically and remains historically large, even after a period of quantitative tightening. Dr. Clouse, from your perspective, how does a persistently large Fed balance sheet affect private market intermediation, particularly dealer balance sheet capacity? Does it risk crowding out banks and market participants that would otherwise provide liquidity in the Treasury market? Mr. Clouse. Thank you for that question. I think that was an important question, particularly on the earlier rounds of quantitative easing, that the additional reserves and bloating bank balance sheets could cause capital constraint to bind more closely but we did not actually find that to be the case. I actually think Bill English did a major study at the time. More recently, as I tried to indicate earlier, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet in dollar terms is quite large, but its holdings of Treasury securities, while large in dollar terms, are actually quite modest relative to the size of the overall Treasury market, on the order of, actually, prior to the crisis. So my assessment right now is that the Fed's holdings of Treasuries are not having meaningful distortionary effects in markets. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you. Dr. English argues--I do not want to put words in your mouth, but I think this is where you are at--that the Fed's large balance sheet and ample reserves system impose little long-run cost, while Dr. Nelson and Dr. Schrager warn that it distorts markets, could ratchet it upward, and expose taxpayers to risk, ultimately. Dr. English, what concrete metrics should Congress use to decide when the Fed's balance sheet is too large in size relative to GDP reserve balances, relative to bank assets, market functioning indicators maybe, or taxpayer exposure? If none of these work, what measurable limits should replace them, I guess is the question? Mr. English. Congressman, I think there are several issues here. One is the question of distortions. I think, as Jim just said, if the Fed's holdings of Treasuries got very large, that could distort the Treasury market but at the moment, holdings are not that large relative to the Treasury market. I think it is unlikely there are serious distortions there. You could look at things like vast spreads and things like that in the market, but I do not think that indicators of market functioning are particularly showing signs of concern. It is true that, when the Fed does QE, it purchases longer- term securities, it takes interest-rate risk onto its balance sheet. That is intentional. That is the way QE works. It takes interest-rate risk out of private hands, reduces risk premiums in private markets, lowers longer-term interest rates because those risk premiums are lower and whether that ends up with losses for taxpayers or not, or gains, depends on whether interest rates after those purchases end up being higher or lower than were expected at the time of the purchases. On average, over time, those gains and losses you would expect to roughly offset. So I am not sure there are big problems here. I would worry if the size of reserve balances got so big that it began to impede the ability of banks to do their job but by creating the Overnight Request for Proposal (RFP) program, the Fed provided a safety valve where extra reserves can move out of the banking system. What we have seen in the last year or so is, as the Fed's balance sheet shrank, that Overnight RFP program shrank and is now essentially gone. I think that is an indicator that the level of reserves is now manageable for the banking system. Mr. Nelson. Mr. Congressman, may I offer a view on the distortions? Mr. Fitzgerald. Yes, go ahead, sir. Mr. Nelson. Thank you. So one way that the Federal Reserve's large balance sheet does distort Treasury markets is through the creation of reserve balances, which tends to make leverage ratio requirements more binding on the part of the banking system. Because reserve balances are a low-risk, a zero-risk weighted asset, when they are very high, leverage ratios tend to be more binding. That discourages banks and the broker-dealers owned by bank holding companies from intermediating in Treasury markets because that requires them to take on similar low-risk assets. Now, the banking agencies have addressed that, to some extent, recently by adjusting the supplementary leverage ratio requirement but there remains the Tier 1 leverage ratio requirement, which is binding on other banks and continues to discourage Treasury market intermediation. Mr. Fitzgerald. Very good. Thank you so much. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman yields back. Does the ranking member seek recognition for a unanimous consent request? Ms. Waters. Yes, I certainly do. I have a unanimous consent request to enter into the record a series of documents relating to Trump's attacks on the Fed's independence, including: Chair Powell's statement on Sunday about extraordinary subpoenas and criminal threats from the administration; court documents relating to Trump's attempted firing of Governor Lisa Cook; and statements from myself, Chairman Hill and other Republicans, Treasury Secretary Bessent, Wall Street executives, foreign central bankers, and all living former Fed Chairs strongly opposing Trump's latest attack on the Fed's independence. Chairman Lucas. Seeing no objection, so ordered. [The information referred to was not received prior to printing.] Ms. Waters. Thank you. Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten---- Mr. Casten. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Lucas [continuing]. for 5 amazing minutes. Mr. Casten. Thank you. It is always a pleasure, Mr. Chairman. I am going to channel my inner ``X Files'' here for a moment. I was looking back over the history--and I love this task force, and I think the chairman has done a wonderful job of leading it. We had a task force hearing just after Trump's first tariffs announcement. We had a task force hearing just after his attempt to fire Governor Cook and we are now having a task force hearing just after the threats of criminal prosecution of J. Powell. I do not think these things are connected, but if you are watching out there---- Chairman Lucas. I have made mistakes, obviously. Mr. Casten [continuing]. watch when Mr. Lucas announces our next hearing. That is probably a good time to shorten the bond market. More seriously, I want to be clear, I completely stand with Secretary Powell. It is absolutely critical that the Fed be independent from the executive. They have to be able to make hard decisions, especially when they are politically unpopular. I cannot believe we need to say that, but I hope that everybody in a position of power, public or private sector, takes the chance to make that statement, because he needs to hear that now and our economy needs to hear that now. Mr. Chair, in addition to the extensive list that our ranking member just entered into the record, I would ask unanimous consent to enter a statement from the European Central Bank. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman asks by unanimous consent to enter into the record. Seeing no objection, so ordered. [The information referred to was not received prior to printing.] Mr. Casten. This is a statement from the leaders of the Central Bank and its counterparts in the U.K., Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, South Korea, and Brazil, standing, quote, ``in full solidarity'' with Chair Powell and stating that central bank independence is a cornerstone of price, financial, and economic stability. I want to take a little bit of issue with what Mr. Huizenga suggested, that this is normal. Those leaders are not compelled to make those statements. Mr. Huizenga. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. Casten. No, I will not. I want to finish my comments here. Mr. Nelson, your organization represents the Nation's leading banks, who manage trillions in assets. Do you agree that Federal Reserve independence is central to the strength of the U.S. economy and the U.S. dollar? Mr. Nelson. [Off-mike.] Mr. Casten. Yes and do you agree that threats of a criminal investigation into a sitting Federal Reserve Chair could undermine the institution's independence, yes or no? Mr. Nelson. I am sorry, I am not prepared to answer that question. Mr. Casten. Okay. Well, I just would note that Jamie Dimon, who sits on your board, has said that those threats will likely raise inflation expectations and raise interest rates over time. Do you agree with Jamie Dimon? Mr. Nelson. I am sorry, I think it is best that I stick to the Fed's balance sheet---- Mr. Casten. Okay. Mr. Nelson [continuing]. which is the topic of today's hearing. Mr. Casten. All right. Well, I will just read a quote from someone who is not here. ``Thank you, Jamie Dimon, for stating reasonable facts about the undermining of our Fed Chair Powell. Thanks for standing up to the administration for their bullying. I salute you, sir. Sad the politicians are scared of our leader.'' That was from the great Reggie Jackson, ``Mr. October.'' I want to move to our balance sheet, and I want to start with how QE started. Dr. English, there is a lot of talk about, leaving aside Fed independence--although Fed independence certainly makes this worse--when is the next rate cut going to come? What is the size going to be? How should we think--or how should the Fed think about a lower bound so that they do not end up out of ammunition? Which was, of course, what happened last time. Where should rate cuts stop, if they indeed keep going forward? Mr. English. So, if what you mean is that the Feds should hesitate to cut rates, say, after they get to 1 percent in order to keep their powder dry to cut later on, I think that is a bad idea. I think, if the economy is weak, and you think there is a real risk that you are going to end up at the zero lower bound, if anything, you want to cut rates faster because you want to stay away from the zero lower bound if you can because that constraint when it binds is extremely painful. It means you cannot provide as much accommodation as you would like So I would disagree with that. I think, if anything, I would do the reverse. As I get close to the lower bound, I would cut a little bit more. Mr. Casten. Okay. Well, let me maybe shift, then. This is, I guess, for Ms. Schrager. There is this tension that the Fed will say publicly, as they should, that managing the assets on their balance sheet should only be dealt with from a balance sheet perspective. That is not done to affect monetary policy. Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge. We all know it affects rates. There has been research suggesting that the MBS purchases in 2022 had the practical effect of making house prices go up, which of course we are now grappling with that on the other side. How should we be thinking about Pulte and Trump putting pressure on Fannie and Freddie to buy mortgage-backed securities right now? Is that not an intentional distortion of interest rates? Ms. Schrager. Well, I mean, Fannie and Freddy, in a sense, are a distortion of interest rates but yes. I mean, that is, I guess--you could argue that is serving a similar role, but I guess the difference is, is at least it is happening in different branch of government that is--the Fed's independence largely exists by keeping its narrow mandate and because it is not democratically elected in the same way other parts of the government are. So, I mean, I am not really here to comment about whether or not---- Mr. Casten. Is it---- Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman's time has expired. The doctor can forward a written response. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Fields, one of my old colleagues from the 103rd Session of Congress, for 5 minutes. Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank all the witnesses for being here today. We are here today to talk about balance sheets and monetary policy. Important stuff, no doubt, but there is an elephant in the room that we cannot ignore. Just a few days ago, the Department of Justice sent grand jury subpoenas to the Federal Reserve threatening criminal prosecution of Chairman Jerome Powell and that raises a far more pressing concern than banks' balance sheets for the moment. Under the guise of testimony that Chairman Powell gave to a Senate Banking Committee last June, the President has chosen to strong-arm the Federal Reserve by putting forward unconscionable allegations against the longstanding bipartisanship practice that we have had with the Federal Reserve. Since being elected to his second term, President Trump has failed to recognize any form of diplomacy when dealing with people who will not do whatever he says. Why should Chairman Powell or anyone else, for that matter, be subject to criminal prosecution solely for choosing not to engage in a President's partisan politics? Now, I have been in public service for a long time, and I have never ever seen anything like this. Chairman Powell said it best. ``This is not about whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions, but it is about political pressure and intimidation.'' If a person as nonpartisan as Chairman Powell can be subject to these accusations, is there anyone in our government who is truly safe from similar prosecution? That is what we are really dealing with today. So, on that, I have my first--direct my first question to Mr. English. Dr. English, I appreciate you being here, and I know you have spent a good part of your career at the Federal Reserve. In all of your years studying the Feds, in all 112 years of its history, has the Department of Justice ever, ever threatened to criminally prosecute a sitting Federal chair? Mr. English. Not that I am aware of, Congressman. Mr. Fields. Now, Dr. English, my second question to you would be--I want you to help me explain something to the folks back home in Louisiana. When the President goes after the Federal--the Feds like--like this one, when he threatens the Federal chair with prison, what does that actually mean for families in Baton Rouge trying to buy their first home? What does it mean to a senior citizen in Shreveport living on a fixed income? Break it down for me. What happens to regular people when you shake the confidence in the Federal Reserve? Mr. English. So, I think the risk, Congressman, is that, if the President were successful in undermining the Fed's independence, then monetary policy would be made in the interest of short-term political gain and not in the interests of the objectives set by the U.S. Congress, maximum employment and stable prices. The likely effect is that monetary policy will be too easy. Presidents often call for monetary policy to be easier. They rarely call for monetary policy to be tighter and so the result would be higher inflation over time. There is a lot of empirical evidence that less independent central banks deliver higher average inflation over time, also more volatile inflation over time, I think. So granting central banks independence brings inflation-- helps keep inflation low and relatively stable so everyday Americans, as they look at this issue about central bank independence, they should be concerned that, if independence is undermined, the effect will be higher inflation, higher cost of living, and more uncertainty, more volatility around the cost of living over time. Mr. Fields. My last question to you, Mr. Nelson. Your member banks need stable monetary policy to do business. They need predictability. So, with that said, what is your feeling about the attacks on the Feds? Chairman Lucas. The witness will need to respond to that in writing. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Fields. I thank the chair, and I yield back the balance---- Chairman Lucas. Thank you. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Flood, who is chair of the Subcommittee on Housing, for 5 minutes. Mr. Flood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subject of today's hearing is exceptionally important. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet grew exponentially after the recession of 2008 and then grew again after the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This is part of a trend in Federal Reserve monetary policy over the last 20 years. In harsh economic times, the Federal Reserve purchases assets, whether it be treasuries, mortgage-backed securities, or other assets. Then, in fairly stable economic times, the Reserve lets those assets roll off the balance sheets slowly as they mature. We have seen this escalation play out once. Back before the financial crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet was only around $900 million. However, before the Federal Reserve began purchasing assets in 2020 to combat economic instability from the COVID-19 shutdowns, the balance sheet was already around $4 trillion. Today, the Federal Reserve's balance sheet is at 6.5 trillion, which is still higher than where the balance sheet was prior to 2020. If the Federal Reserve already has a $6 trillion balance sheet when the next recession hits, the Federal Reserve will be more--will be--being more assets on top of their already elevated holdings. My concern is whether this is sustainable long term. If quantitative easing remains a tool in the Federal Reserve's toolbox in the event of economic turbulence, would not a larger balance sheet in good times blunt the economic impact of that tool when things get tough? My first question: Dr. Clouse, Dr. Nelson, Dr. Schrager, would you mind reacting to that sentiment? How should we be thinking about the implications of a larger Federal Reserve balance sheet for future bouts of quantitative easing? Mr. Clouse. Thank you. I will offer my comments. As you indicated, Federal Reserve has embarked on those QE programs in response to very severe adverse shocks. I would not anticipate balance sheet expansion beyond just what was necessary to accommodate the trend in growth and currency and other technical factors in normal times. It is true that the dollar of magnitude of the Fed's current balance sheet is sizable, but it has--Federal Reserve through the last few years has reduced the size of the balance sheet relative to non-GDP quite substantially, so. Mr. Flood. Mr. Nelson. Dr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson. Thank you. I think the big challenge--the particular challenge is that once--every time the Fed increases its size, that size gets locked in, and it has to increase it further. For example, as I noted in 2008, the staff judge that--30 billion was needed to conduct policy over the floor system. Now it is 3 trillion. But, importantly, when the Fed decided to adopt a floor system, the staff estimated that it would require 1 trillion in reserves. At that time, in large part because Chair Powell wanted to be able to demonstrate that QE could be reversed, he indicated that while 1 trillion--I will support it at that level, but if it turns out to be 1.5 trillion, then I will have buyer's remorse. Eleven months later, the staff revised its estimate of the amount needed to 1.5 trillion. So I think that the fundamental tendency for the balance sheet to just have to keep growing is part of the severe problem with the approach. Mr. Flood. Dr. Schrager? Ms. Schrager. Yes. I agree with all of that. I think what we are seeing as well is financial markets become very dependent on this. I mean, that is one of the reasons why they have even had to end quantitative tightening already is sort of maintaining their ability to do the ample reserve system is sort of--really limits the size to even shrink the balance sheet and this is one of the reasons why it just seems to be growing and growing and growing. Mr. Flood. The minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meeting in December suggested that they would stop quantitative tightening, which would have continued to shrink the size of the Federal Reserve's budget over time. Dr. Clouse, Dr. Nelson, and Dr. Schrager, with the Federal Reserve's balance sheet still at 6.5 trillion and the end of quantitative tightening, how large can we expect the balance sheet to get after the next round of quantitative easing? This is kind of a speed round because I have 50 seconds. Dr. Clouse. Mr. Clouse. It is hard to say because the quantitative easing episodes are really largely restricted to severe adverse economic shocks. So it would depend on how adverse those shocks are. Mr. Flood. Dr. Nelson? Mr. Nelson. The Federal Reserve cannot get any smaller than the sum of banks' demand for reserves and the Treasury's general account and the currency. Those things are going to be growing over time, which is why the Fed is currently purchasing securities in order to hold the level of reserve balance as relatively constant. So it is going to grow over time. As Jim noted, really, the amount of quantitative easing that might be necessary if, again, they reached zero would depend upon the circumstances. Mr. Flood. Dr. Schrager. Ms. Schrager. Yes. Again, it would depend on the nature of the shock and where the shock was, if it was in the mortgage market or even maybe corporate bond market or what have you, but I think, as we are seeing, it is going to be bigger each time. Mr. Flood. Thank you very much for your testimony, and I yield back---- Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time expired. The chair now recognizes the ranking member for a unanimous consent request. Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. I have a unanimous consent to request to enter into the record a set of documents relating to the Trump Administration's radical theory about the Federal Reserve lacking authority to transfer Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) funds that was rebutted--that was rebutted by former Fed officials, including one of our witnesses, by Democratic committee members and by a Federal judge. Chairman Lucas. Seeing no objection, so ordered. [The information referred to was not received prior to printing.] Chairman Lucas. The chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Oregon, Ms. Bynum, for 5 minutes. Ms. Bynum. Good afternoon, Chair Lucas and Ranking Member Vargas. Thank you for holding this important meeting today on balance sheets and I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss this very important issue. I will say I cannot sit here and pretend that this is business as usual because it is not. The Fed, which our committee oversees, I believe is under attack by the Trump Administration and the American people cannot afford for us to sit around talking about our balance sheets and pretend that this is not happening. When I am home in my district, people ask me what do I believe and I tell them ``Believe what you see right in front of your very eyes,'' and this is what I am seeing. This attack on the Fed threatens to raise costs, hurt retirement accounts, and mess with our entire financial system. As you know, the Fed is mandated to be independent of the President, and that independence has meant over the last year that the Fed has done what is best, I believe, for the American people, not catering to President Trump. Now the Trump Administration is threatening criminal investigations into Jerome Powell, the Fed's Chair, and attempting to use the Fed to play political games. Now, I would argue that this is not some partisan attack on Trump by Democrats. Global central bank chiefs and top Wall Street bank CEOs are supporting Chair Powell. Senior Republican Senators on the Senate Banking Committee have come out against the investigation. Even Chairman Hill, the chair of this committee, said it, quote, creates an unnecessary distraction. I am a moderate Democrat, so I believe my Republican colleagues from time to time. This is unusual but it is necessary for us to tell the truth about what is happening. Let me tell you what happens if the President can bully or threaten the Fed Chair: Interest rates become a political tool. Inflation becomes a campaign strategy and your mortgage, and your job and your savings become collateral damage. So let us be clear here: This is not the first time the President has done some foolishness that hurts our economy. In his first term, unemployment has risen to the highest rate since the Great Depression. Since he has taken office this time, businesses have had to pay over $1 trillion in tariff costs. That affects my State and the people of Oregon. Today, everyday items are still too expensive, and President Trump needs to stop playing games with our economy and our wallets and focus on making things cheaper. Attacking the Fed does not do that. So make no mistake. This attempt to intimidate the Fed is not about justice or the American people. According to my staff, it is about the President's ego. You could argue about that, but I cannot and I will not stand by and let that happen. I will continue fighting to make sure that the Fed works for Oregonians and not our President, particularly. Thank you, and I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentlelady yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking member as well. I concur with something the ranking member said at the genesis of his statement, or perhaps it was at the closing. Maybe it was at Revelations. He talked about the dollar as the reserve currency. It is the reserve currency of choice globally. As such, it affords us such--some preeminent privileges that many other countries do not enjoy. I would like for you to indicate to me whether you think that losing its independence would have some impact on the dollar as a reserve currency of choice. Mr. English, would you kindly start? We will move from your left down the line. Mr. English. Yes. Congressman, I think that is correct. If the Fed we are seeing is not independent and that would lead to real concerns about high inflation. I think longer term interest rates would probably rise, and people would pull back some from holding dollar assets. So it would hurt the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. The extent of that would depend some on how bad people thought monetary policy was going to be with less Fed independence. I think there also is a problem because there is not a good alternative reserve currency. There is not another market that is as big and as liquid as the Treasury market. So I do not know how far that would go, but at the margin, it would surely reduce the use of the dollar as the reserve currency, yes. Mr. Green. Thank you. Let me continue with Mr. English for just a moment more. Mr. English, there is a war for currency supremacy. You caused me to come into this line of thinking with your commentary and there are other countries that would dearly enjoy having the prominence that our country has with its currency. The dollar is used in many ways. When we sanction countries, we can deal with them by way of manipulating the dollar--our currency. Does that concern you, our ability to impose sanctions, because we have allowed somehow our supremacy with the dollar to erode? Mr. English. I think it would depend a great deal on what the alternative reserve currency was that emerged. I think if it were Euro-denominated securities, if there were EU bonds that were issued, for example, I am not sure it would actually make a huge difference. If there was a big shift to the renminbi, for example, then of course there would be. On the other hand, I think--I think the renminbi is a long way from being a global reserve currency because there is not capital market openness in China, and so there are real limits to how much people want to hold their reserves in the Chinese currency. Mr. Green. Thank you for this. Next point. As a magistrate, I conducted many probable cause hearings, practiced law for a good many years and it is a very basic fundamental principle that you do not investigate without some cause. You just do not decide one morning that you are going to investigate the chair of the Fed to do so without some cause. Where is the cause? Where is the transparency that would lead the American people and, in fact, the world to believe that this is a legitimate investigation as opposed to a vindictive means by which a President can acquire control of the Fed? Where is the probable cause? By the way, this is rhetorical. I do not expect any of you to answer this. Okay. Do not--please do not. This is, without question, creating an erosion in the confidence that we will have in the Fed, saving one thing: President Powell. He has stood his ground. He is not a man who is going to allow the President to just walk over him. Mr. Powell, Mr. Chairman, if you hear this message, I thank you for what you are doing to stand your ground. Continue to have courage to take on this reckless, ruthless President who ought to be impeached. I yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing, for 5 minutes. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Chairman Lucas. Since the 2008 financial collapse, we have seen the Fed's balance sheet increase substantially, as we have talked about here today. I really appreciate the discussion we have had to evaluate the effectiveness of the Fed's balance sheet targets in promoting economic stability. I am going to start my questioning with Dr. English. What would it look like if we--if the Fed shrank its balance sheet to pre-2008 levels, both the dollar amount or as a percentage of GDP and would that be a wise decision? Mr. English. So I think we do not know exactly what that would look like. I think one of the reasons why the Fed has been hesitant to move to a smaller balance sheet is they do not know how that would play out. We do not really know what the demand for reserves would look like in a system like the one that we had before the financial crisis and we do not know what stumbles there would be along the way back to that, that smaller balance sheet. So I think it is just very hard to say. The point I would emphasize--and here I am going to disagree with Bill Nelson, for sure, so you should ask him these questions too, but I think it does not matter as much as you perhaps would think. The Fed can implement policy with a bigger balance sheet or a smaller balance sheet. What is important is that it can successfully implement policy and it can. I used to travel around a lot and talk to central bankers from other countries. They all implemented policy in different ways. They all thought their way was the right and obvious way and everybody else was crazy. I think the way that you implement policy is less important than it simply being an effective way to implement-- -- Mr. Downing. Thank you. I appreciate that. Mr. Clouse, do you believe that would be a wise decision? Mr. Clouse. No. I do not believe it would be a wise decision, partly for the reason Bill just described. We do not really know what reserve demand looks like. Also, I think the world is quite different now than it was in 2007. Notably, the Federal debt outstanding is much, much larger than it was then, and there are linkages now between repo markets and overnight funding markets and money markets now that are just much larger than they were in the past. We do not really understand those as well as we would need to in order to be able to make that-- that sort of move. Mr. Downing. So we are not clear on the effects it would have if we brought the balance sheet grow too quickly or too much, what affect that would have on the market? Mr. Clouse. That is my--that is my view. I mean, we all like to have nice smooth reserve demand curves, but the truth is we do not really have a good sound understanding of what those---- Mr. Downing. Thank you. There has been a lot of discussion this Congress about maintaining the independence of the Fed, which I strongly support. This question is for Dr. Schrager and for Dr. Nelson. Is it easier for the Fed to lose its independence if its balance sheet is too large? If so, are there policy recommendations that you have for Congress to consider? Start with Dr. Schrager. Ms. Schrager. Yes. I mean, it depends on what you mean by ``too large.'' As I said, it is not only the size of the balance sheet, it is also its composition and as it is buying assets other than short-term treasuries certainly long data treasuries or mortgage-backed securities or briefly corporate bonds, which other countries have gotten into, or even stocks, then you really do have a serious threat to Fed independence because it becomes all too easy for the President to say, ``I want lower mortgage rates, buy more mortgage-backed securities,'' or, as we have seen in Latin America often, the cost of servicing the debt is way too high; we want the Fed to lower rates. I mean, large debt is traditionally the biggest threat to Fed independence, and that is certainly a risk we have been playing with for a long time. Mr. Downing. Thank you. Dr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson. I do think that it puts risk to the Fed's independence. Back--the way the Fed used to conduct policy, reserve balances were extremely low so the Fed could get no bigger than the public's demand for currency and the Treasury's general account but if the Fed tried to get bigger, it would lose control of monetary policy under the old regime. Under the current regime, the Fed's balance sheet is effectively unbounded, and that makes it a more attractive target, as several FOMC participants have indicated, for political manipulation. We have seen that with the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which--in which directed the Fed to fund--to extend credit to middle market firms rather than Congress doing so itself, and the Fed did. We see it--we saw it with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) borrowing from the Fed rather than the Treasury, which was bound by the debt limit at that time to fund its bailouts of uninsured depositors in the spring of 2023. Mr. Downing. Thank you. In my last second--actually, Mr. Chair, I do not have time for next questions. I will yield back. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster, who is ranking member of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee, for 5 minutes. Mr. Foster. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to our witnesses. I take it all of you have probably had a chance to read the statement on the Federal Reserve independence from all of the luminaries: Ben Bernanke, Bernstein, Jason Furman, Tim Geithner, Phil Gramm, Alan Greenspan, Glenn Hubbard, Jacob Lew, Greg Mankiw, Hank Paulson, Ken Rogoff, Christina Romer, Robert Rubin, and Janet Yellen. You have all had a chance to read that, I presume. So my question to you is--if you had been asked to sign, were in the position there--if you had been asked to put your name on that, would you have put your name on that statement, and why or why not? Just start from the right. Dr. English. Mr. English. Yes, I would have. Mr. Foster. Dr. Schrager. Ms. Schrager. I mean, I do not like to sign statements, but I am supportive of the spirit. Yes. Mr. Nelson. I am sorry. I have not read the statement, but I do think Fed independence is a national asset, a precondition for low inflation and prosperity. I think the Fed is subject to congressional oversight, and this task force is an outstanding example of that oversight. Mr. Clouse. I have not read those particular statements either, but I am certainly a strong supporter of Fed independence. Thank you. Mr. Foster. Well, I urge you to take a--well, to read it. I mean, it was a very eloquent thing. There was a similar statement from international central bankers from everywhere from Korea to Canada to the Bank of England and they understand what is at stake, and they see--they look on in sympathy. When you see third-world countries find their central bank come under assault, and you see the damage that does to the citizens of those countries. We do not want to go down that road. So let us see. There are a number of things. One of the things that has come up here, the Taylor Rule. Up there on the wall is--for many, many years, we sat there and had endless debates about whether you could replace the entire Federal Reserve with a Taylor Rule, which is a little formula that has, I think, one or two free coefficients in it. For example, one of its many shortcomings--it does not have anywhere in it the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve, which is obviously a big player in this. So Albert Einstein has a famous quote that theories of the world--of the universe should be as simple as possible but no simpler. It always struck me that the monomania by the former chair about ``let us just get rid of the Federal Reserve and follow the Taylor Rule,'' it just seems like that cannot possibly work. It is sort of mind-numbing to me to find that from going to having no freedom at all from Federal Reserve be the position of the Republican Party, and now we have, ``Oh, everything the Federal Reserve does should be at the whim of one man,'' is now the current position. I just find that hard to actually understand. Do you--there is--I find myself in the middle--from time to time will go and download one of these macro models and make a few experiments. I am very pleased that people have transitioned away from MATLAB to Python in those. So there is a lot to learn, but there has also got to be a human part of that too. It is not just the models. I was just wondering what--you know, why--why we have been so proud for so long, and now we seem to have gone off course on this? Did any of you have comments on that or--yes. Mr. English. I am sorry. I missed the last sentence---- Mr. Foster. Well, just the--you know, why--you know, what is it that is really at stake here? When you say that, instead of having thoughtful debate, partly quantitative and partly gut feeling for where markets are moving and--which is, I think, the only way that you will have a workable monetary policy. Now, all of a sudden, we are sitting there just talking about whether just some guy trying to run a gang should order people--you are all familiar with countries where that has happened and why is it we have not decided to fight for that as a country? Mr. English. So, if you are asking whether I think monetary policy should be done in a deliberative way based on data and judgments and assessment, sure. Mr. Foster. Partly. Partly and then there is a--there is a gut feeling part of it too. Mr. English. I am sorry? Mr. Foster. There is a gut feeling part of it too. You run all the models you can. You average all the models in your brain and then in the end you---- Mr. English. There is an element of judgment to all of these things. Mr. Foster. Yes. So that seems to be the only way it will work. I--just wondering now when you find that all of that hard work by brilliant people is just being run roughshod over, it is just--it is amazing that every--every credentialed economist in the country is not standing up and yelling at least as clearly as those ladies and gentlemen on that list I just read off. Anyway, I just want to--you have important voices. You are up in front of an important committee of Congress and it matters that we all stand up in this together. Chairman Lucas. The gentleman's time has expired. Seeing no other requests for time, the chair would like to thank all the witnesses for your written and oral testimony today. Your input is invaluable as we as a task force try to address these questions of independence and the Fed balance sheet. Without objection, all members have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response, and witnesses, please respond no later than February 18, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]