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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] DEEPSEEK AND UNITREE ROBOTICS: EXAMINING THE NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS OF PRC ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND BUILDING A SECURE U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ MARCH 17, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-42 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-201 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chair Ranking Member Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas Vacant Keighle Joyce, Staff Director Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California, Ranking Morgan Luttrell, Texas Member Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex officio) Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Statements The Honorable Vince Fong, a Representative in Congress From the State of California: Oral Statement................................................. 1 Prepared Statement............................................. 3 The Honorable James R. Walkinshaw, a Representative in Congress From the State of Virginia: Oral Statement................................................. 4 Prepared Statement............................................. 6 The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: Prepared Statement............................................. 7 Witnesses Mr. Max Fenkell, Global Head of Policy and Government Relations, Scale AI: Oral Statement................................................. 9 Prepared Statement............................................. 10 Mr. Matthew Malchano, Vice President of Software, Boston Dynamics: Oral Statement................................................. 13 Prepared Statement............................................. 15 Mr. Michael Robbins, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International: Oral Statement................................................. 22 Prepared Statement............................................. 24 Mr. Rush Doshi, Ph.D., C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia Studies and Director of the China Strategy Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations: Oral Statement................................................. 31 Prepared Statement............................................. 34 DEEPSEEK AND UNITREE ROBOTICS: EXAMINING THE NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS OF PRC ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, ROBOTICS, AND AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND BUILDING A SECURE U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE ---------- Tuesday, March 17, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Vince Fong [Acting Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives: Fong and Walkinshaw. Mr. Fong. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure will come to order. Without objection, the Chairman can declare the committee in recess at any point. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the national and economic security risks to the United States by artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomous sensing technologies developed by companies affiliated with the People's Republic of China. This hearing will also evaluate whether existing Federal guidance and supply chain security practices sufficiently address the risks posed by China as these classes of emerging technologies are rapidly adopted and our adversaries try to keep pace with American innovation. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good afternoon and thank you all for being here. Today, this subcommittee is examining a national security challenge that is currently unfolding inside the United States. The People's Republic of China is moving aggressively to dominate the technologies that are reshaping the global economy and security, including artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomous systems. This competition is already present on American campuses, in American police departments, on American smartphones, and increasingly within systems connected to our critical infrastructure. The pattern behind this expansion should look familiar. Chinese companies replicate or acquire American innovation, benefit from large-scale state support, undercut competitors on price, and then use the growing market presence to collect data and expand Beijing's strategic reach. Washington saw this pattern before in industries such as solar panels, drones, and electric vehicles. We are now seeing it again in artificial intelligence and robotics. I want to start with DeepSeek because what happened during the past year represents something genuinely alarming that we have not fully reckoned with. In January 2025, a Chinese artificial intelligence company called DeepSeek released a model that rivaled the best systems produced by leading American AI innovators at a claimed cost that was a fraction of what American companies invested. The technology world and the market was shocked. Observers called it an AI Sputnik moment. But the real story was not just what DeepSeek built. It was how. Within weeks of its release, American AI companies raise serious concerns that DeepSeek used their proprietary models without consent to train its own through a process known as model distillation. Rather than investing years of effort and billions of dollars in frontier research, DeepSeek appeared to have fed outputs from leading American AI systems into its training pipeline, illicitly reverse engineering the capabilities those companies had developed through legitimate investment. More recently, in February 2026, DeepSeek, along with Chinese AI firms MiniMax and Moonshot AI, had reportedly orchestrated an industrial-scale campaign to extract capabilities to distillation attacks. Further reporting suggested that DeepSeek employees used third-party routers and networks of unauthorized resellers to circumvent existing safeguards and may have sought to override safety protections around biological and chemical weapons research. Let me be clear about what that means. DeepSeek did not simply out-compete American companies. According to these disclosures, it stole from them. DeepSeek is not just a competitive concern. It is also a data and influence concern sitting on millions of American devices. The application is available today in the Apple App Store. Every interaction is stored on servers located in the People's Republic of China, where authorities can demand access to that data under Chinese law. Researchers have also documented that DeepSeek censors questions related to issues sensitive to Beijing and frequently produces responses that align with official Chinese Communist Party positions. The same concerns apply to Unitree Robotics. Unitree has become a dominant global supplier of robotic dogs and humanoid robots, supported by Chinese manufacturing scale and State subsidies that allow its products to be sold at a fraction of the price of American systems. As a result, these robots are already appearing in police departments, universities, and even parts of the Federal Government here in the United States. Researchers have discovered vulnerabilities in Unitree systems that could allow unauthorized access to live camera feeds or even remote control of the devices. Additional research has identified weaknesses that could allow one compromised robot to spread attacks to others nearby. Some of these systems have also been observed transmitting operational data back to servers located in China. American companies are innovating and competing seriously in robotics and artificial intelligence, and this subcommittee strongly supports their work. The answer is not to retreat from these technologies. It is to invest in trusted American alternatives, strengthen cybersecurity practices, and prevent Federal funds from supporting platforms that put American data and infrastructure at risk and give China an economic and military advantage. The witnesses before us today have direct knowledge of these threats and the larger dynamics at play across these industries. I look forward to their testimony. Thank you. [The statement of Chairman Fong follows:] Statement of Chairman Vince Fong March 17, 2026 Good morning and thank you all for being here. Today, this subcommittee is examining a national security challenge that is currently unfolding inside the United States. The People's Republic of China is moving aggressively to dominate the technologies that are reshaping the global economy and security, including artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomous systems. This competition is already present on American campuses, in American police departments, on American smartphones, and increasingly within systems connected to our critical infrastructure. The pattern behind this expansion should look familiar. Chinese companies replicate or acquire American innovation, benefit from large- scale state support, undercut competitors on price, and then use their growing market presence to collect data and expand Beijing's strategic reach. Washington saw this pattern before in industries such as solar panels, drones, and electric vehicles. We are now seeing it again in artificial intelligence and robotics. I want to start with DeepSeek, because what happened during the past year represents something genuinely alarming that we have not fully reckoned with. In January 2025, a Chinese artificial intelligence company called DeepSeek released a model that rivaled the best systems produced by leading American AI innovators at a claimed cost that was a fraction of what American companies invested. The technology world, and the market, was shocked. Observers called it an AI Sputnik moment. But the real story was not just what DeepSeek built. It was how. Within weeks of its release, American AI companies raised serious concerns that DeepSeek used their proprietary models, without consent, to train its own through a process known as model distillation. Rather than investing years of effort and billions of dollars in frontier research, DeepSeek appeared to have fed outputs from leading American AI systems into its training pipeline, illicitly reverse-engineering the capabilities those companies had developed through legitimate investment. More recently, in February 2026, DeepSeek, along with Chinese AI firms MiniMax and Moonshot AI, had reportedly orchestrated an industrial-scale campaign to extract capabilities through distillation attacks. Further reporting suggested that DeepSeek employees used third- party routers and networks of unauthorized resellers to circumvent existing safeguards, and may have sought to override safety protections around biological and chemical weapons research. Let me be clear about what that means. DeepSeek did not simply outcompete American companies. According to these disclosures, it stole from them. And DeepSeek is not just a competitive concern. It is also a data and influence concern sitting on millions of American devices. The application is available today in the Apple App Store. Every interaction is stored on servers located in the People's Republic of China, where authorities can demand access to that data under Chinese law. Researchers have also documented that DeepSeek censors questions related to issues sensitive to Beijing and frequently produces responses that align with official Chinese Communist Party positions. The same concerns apply to Unitree Robotics. Unitree has become a dominant global supplier of robotic dogs and humanoid robots, supported by Chinese manufacturing scale and state subsidies that allow its products to be sold at a fraction of the price of American systems. As a result, these robots are already appearing in police departments, universities, and even parts of the Federal Government here in the United States. Researchers have discovered vulnerabilities in Unitree systems that could allow unauthorized access to live camera feeds or even remote control of the devices. Additional research has identified weaknesses that could allow one compromised robot to spread attacks to others nearby. Some of these systems have also been observed transmitting operational data back to servers located in China. American companies are innovating and competing seriously in robotics and artificial intelligence, and this subcommittee strongly supports their work. The answer is not to retreat from these technologies. It is to invest in trusted American alternatives, strengthen cybersecurity practices, and prevent Federal funds from supporting platforms that put American data and infrastructure at risk and give China an economic and military advantage. The witnesses before us today have direct knowledge of these threats and the larger dynamics at play across these industries. I look forward to their testimony. Thank you. Mr. Fong. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for his opening statement. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, everyone. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the national security risks posed by technological advances in the People's Republic of China. We are living through a period of rapid technological transformation. AI, advanced computing, and digital technologies are reshaping our economy and our national security landscape. The implications are profound and the United States must be prepared. Maintaining leadership and technological innovation is not simply an economic priority. It is a national security imperative. To succeed, we must pursue policies that both drive innovation at home and mitigate the risks posed by adversaries. That requires a clear-eyed understanding of the PRC's strategy. We have known for many years that the PRC views its industrial policy as a critical tool to reshape the world order and emerge as the economic leader in global superpower. With extensive State investment in technology companies and laws that enlist private companies to serve the interests of the government, the PRC's military-civil fusion is a serious threat to our own national security. Historically, Congress has recognized this threat. There has been bipartisan consensus around reducing supply chain vulnerabilities, restricting the use of certain PRC technologies, limiting exports of sensitive U.S. technologies, and strengthening secure supply chains with trusted partners. Unfortunately, policies of the Trump administration have undermined that progress. Upon taking office, President Trump took his DOGE chainsaw to the Federal work force, weakening agencies essential to our national security and scientific leadership. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, has lost nearly a third of its work force because the Trump administration fired people, reassigned people, or bullied people into quitting. At the very moment our adversaries are expanding their cyber arsenals, the administration is cutting our own defenses. From the PRC to Russia to Iran, our adversaries leverage cyber space and related technologies to fight international conflicts on our homeland. We have seen Iran do this already. Just last week, a pro-Iran Iran-connected hacker group caused global disruptions at a major medical device manufacturer, Stryker, in response to the President's war with Iran. The PRC is a far more capable cyber actor than Iran, and the potential consequences of a future conflict with the PRC are far more severe. Yet instead of strengthening our technological and cybersecurity defenses, the administration has weakened the agencies responsible for securing our networks and advancing our scientific leadership. Key institutions, like the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, have also seen major work force cuts. At a time when technological competition is intensifying, dismantling our technical expertise is incomprehensible to me. The administration also launched a chaotic trade war that fails to distinguish between allies and adversaries. Rather than building trusted supply chains with our partners, these erratic policies alienate allies and inject uncertainty into the global economy. Even more troubling, in the fall last year, the Trump administration announced that it would allow for the export of advanced semiconductors, Nvidia H200 chips, to the PRC. With access to more advanced chips, the risk of a more rapid frontier AI development in China increases. Imagine you were in a race and only you had access to high-octane fuel that let you drive 10 miles per hour faster than your opponent. Would you give that high-octane fuel to your opponent, your opponent who is determined to leave you in the dust and crush you? That is what President Trump did. It was weak. Finally, we should recognize a fundamental truth about American innovation. The United States leads the world in technology because we attract the best talent from around the globe. Immigrants have played an outsized role in building our technology sector. Policies and statements that target immigrants do not strengthen America. They weaken our ability to compete with our adversaries. We could spend all day naming the immigrants who have played a critical role in developing technologies that advance American economic and national security. I will name just a few. Sal Khan, the son of a Bengali Muslim immigrant, created Khan Academy, household name, and in 2023, launched Khanmigo, an AI-powered personal tutor and teaching assistant now offered free to every teacher in every classroom in the United States. Rana el Kaliouby, an Egyptian-American who founded Affectiva, which built AI that understands human emotions and cognitive states by analyzing facial and voice expressions. She cohosts a PBS NOVA series on AI. Dina Katabi, an immigrant from Syria, who is one of MIT's most decorated scientists, the winner of every science award there is to win. She developed an AI-powered device that can detect Parkinson's based on how a patient breathes at night. Mr. Chairman, these are some of the people that Chairman Ogles and other Republicans in this body recently said don't belong in America. Sal Khan's father came to this country from Bangladesh, Rana el Kaliouby from Egypt, Dina Katabi from Syria, all happened to be Muslim. Together, along with many others, they are helping America win the AI race, win the robotics race, win the technology race. Our adversaries, China, Russia, Iran, would love nothing more than for us to drive out the scientists, engineers, innovators, and entrepreneurs who help make this country the most advanced and, yes, the greatest nation on Earth. So I beg my colleagues, I beg you, Chairman Ogles, stop doing their work for them. With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back. [The statement of Ranking Member Walkinshaw follows:] Statement of Ranking Member James Walkinshaw March 17, 2026 I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the national security risks posed by technological advances in the People's Republic of China. We are living through a period of rapid technological transformation. Artificial intelligence, advanced computing, and digital technologies are reshaping our economy and our national security landscape. The implications are profound, and the United States must be prepared. Maintaining leadership in technological innovation is not simply an economic priority, it is a national security imperative. To succeed, we must pursue policies that both drive innovation at home and mitigate the risks posed by adversaries. That requires a clear-eyed understanding of the PRC's strategy. We have known for many years that the PRC views its industrial policy as a critical tool to reshape the world order and emerge as an economic leader and global superpower. With extensive state investment in technology companies and laws that enlist private companies to serve the interest of the government, the PRC's military-civil fusion is a serious threat to our own national security. Historically, Congress has recognized this threat. There has been bipartisan consensus around reducing supply chain vulnerabilities, restricting the use of certain PRC technologies, limiting exports of sensitive U.S. technologies, and strengthening secure supply chains with trusted partners. Unfortunately, the policies of the Trump administration have undermined that progress. Upon taking office, President Trump took his DOGE chainsaw to the Federal workforce, weakening agencies essential to our national security and scientific leadership. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency--CISA--has lost nearly a third of its workforce because the Trump administration fired people, reassigned people, or bullied people into quitting. At the very moment our adversaries are expanding their cyber arsenals, the Trump administration is cutting our own defenses. From the PRC to Russia to Iran, our adversaries leverage cyber space and related technologies to fight international conflicts on our homeland. We've seen Iran do this already. Just last week, a pro-Iran hacker caused global disruptions at a major medical device manufacturer--Stryker--in response to the President's war with Iran. The PRC is a far more capable cyber actor, and the potential consequences of a future cyber conflict with the PRC are far more severe. Yet instead of strengthening our technological and cybersecurity defenses, the administration has weakened the agencies responsible for securing our networks and advancing our scientific leadership. Key institutions like the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have also seen major workforce cuts. At a time when technological competition is intensifying, dismantling our Government's technical expertise is incomprehensible. The Trump administration has also launched a chaotic trade war that fails to distinguish between allies and adversaries. Rather than building trusted supply chains with our partners, these erratic tariff policies alienate allies and inject uncertainty into the global economy. Even more troubling, in the fall, the Trump administration announced that it would allow for the export of advanced semiconductors--NVIDIA H200 Chips--to the PRC. With access to more advanced chips, the risk of more rapid frontier AI development in China only increases. Imagine you were in a race and only you had access to high-octane fuel that let you drive 10 mph faster than your opponent. Would you give that high octane fuel to your opponent? Your opponent who is determined to leave you in the dust and then crush you? That's what Trump did. It was weak. Finally, we should recognize a fundamental truth about American innovation. The United States leads the world in technology because we attract the best talent from around the globe. Immigrants have played an outsized role in building our technology sector. Policies that target immigrants do not strengthen America--they weaken our ability to compete with our adversaries. We could spend all day naming the immigrants who have played a critical role in developing technologies that advance American economic and national security. I'll name just a few. Sal Khan, the son of a Bengali-Muslim immigrant, created Khan Academy and in 2023 launched Khanmigo, an AI-powered personal tutor and teaching assistant now offered free to every teacher in the United States. Rana el Kaliouby, an Egyptian-American who founded Affectiva, which built AI that understands human emotions and cognitive states by analyzing facial and voice expressions. She co-hosts a PBS NOVA series on AI. And Dina Katabi, an immigrant from Syria, who is one of MIT's most decorated scientists, winner of every science award there is to win, who developed an AI-powered device that can detect Parkinson's based on how a patient breathes at night. Mr. Chairman, these are the people you recently said don't belong in America. Sal Khan's father came to this country from Bangladesh, Rana el Kaliouby came from Egypt. Dina Katabi came from Syria. All happen to be Muslim. And together, along with many, many others, they are helping America win the AI race, win the robotics race, win the technology race. Our adversaries--China, Russia, Iran--would love nothing more than for us to drive out the scientists, engineers, innovators, and entrepreneurs who make this country the most advanced--and, yes, the greatest--nation on Earth. I beg you . . . Stop doing their work for them. Mr. Fong. Thank you, Ranking Member Walkinshaw. Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson March 17, 2026 Before I begin, I would like to address disparaging comments about immigrants and America's Muslim community made by my Republican colleagues on social media. As Members of Congress, our job is to advocate vigorously for policy positions that make the Nation more secure, more prosperous, and more just. Maligning entire groups of people while parroting bigoted stereotypes does nothing to achieve any of those ends. When I began my work in the civil rights movement in the 1960's, there were people in this country who thought Black people didn't belong in schools, didn't belong in certain jobs, and didn't belong at polling places, much less on the ballot. Americans across the political spectrum worked hard to dismantle entrenched beliefs that certain types of people were less deserving of being American or enjoying the full benefits of citizenship. I'm disturbed that today, in 2026, Republicans in Congress are devoting so much energy to undoing the progress we made and perpetuating such ugly divisions. As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, our job is to keep the homeland secure--and that requires uniting Americans, not dividing them. I urge my colleagues to stop their divisive rhetoric about their fellow Americans and immigrants-- you are putting entire populations of people at risk. Turning to the subject of today's hearing, we have known for well over a decade that the United States would need to work aggressively to maintain its dominance in technology. Our most formidable competitor-- the People's Republic of China--is willing to do things the United States will not in pursuit of innovation. Notably, the PRC has a notorious track record of engaging in intellectual property theft. As we've seen with DeepSeek, the PRC entities will devote significant resources to stealing U.S. AI models, as it is has done with Anthropic and Open AI. The PRC has also invested significant government resources in tech innovation, through which it intends to gain global influence economically and politically. Although the United States would not and should not engage in the kind of intellectual property theft supported by the PRC, we can and should certainly be investing in tech innovation. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has gutted investment in agencies that support research and development. Moreover, the administration has decimated agencies responsible for mitigating the national security risks associated with the emerging dual-use technologies that will define the 21st Century. This committee oversees the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Bipartisan Members of this committee established CISA to empower the United States Government to harness the potential of emerging technology securely while defending against the malicious use cases our adversaries might pursue. Over the past 8 years, CISA has taken on that mantle, building programs to advise critical infrastructure owners and operators on how to deploy security technologies to defend against modern threats and helping tech companies build security into their products so that they are safe for the digital ecosystem out of the box. Unfortunately, the Trump administration harassed one-third of CISA's staff into leaving their jobs, leaving United States less secure as the PRC more aggressively pursues its tech innovation agenda. The President has also recklessly ceded America's competitive edge in AI by permitting the sale of high-powered AI chips to the PRC. If the President is sincere in his commitment to pursuing ``America first'' policies, he has a funny way of showing it. I look forward to discussing what the United States can do--on our own and with our allies--to facilitate innovation and preserve our competitive edge in tech innovation. Mr. Fong. I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Pursuant to committee rule VII(C), I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Fong. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. First, Mr. Max Fenkell is the global head of policy and government relations at Scale AI, where he leads the company's global engagement on AI governance, data policy, and emerging technology strategy to shape frameworks that ensure U.S. technological leadership and national security while promoting innovation. Prior to joining Scale, he most recently held jobs and roles at Joby Aviation and the Aerospace Industries Association. Next, Mr. Matthew Malchano is the vice president of software at Boston Dynamics, where he has worked for 22 years, contributing to projects on advanced robotics technologies, AI, and autonomy. He also currently holds the role of Boston Dynamics' security officer. Mr. Malchano holds degrees from MIT in computer science and electrical engineering, and prior to Boston Dynamics, worked in software development and engineering roles at Akamai Technologies and Google. Mr. Michael Robbins is the president and CEO at the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, an association representing uncrewed systems, robotics, and autonomous companies in both the commercial and defense sectors. Mr. Robbins also currently serves as the MITRE Corporation's Aviation Advisory Committee and the National Advanced Mobility Consortium's Advisory Committee, and is an officer in the United States Naval Reserve. Thank you for your service. Dr. Rush Doshi is the C.V. Starr senior fellow for Asia studies and director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations, and is an assistant professor at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. His expertise includes China's foreign policy, U.S. strategy toward China, cross- strait issues, and Indo-Pacific security. Prior to joining CFR, Dr. Doshi most recently served on the National Security Council's China Directorate. I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here today. I now recognize Mr. Fenkell for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF MAX FENKELL, GLOBAL HEAD OF POLICY AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, SCALE AI Mr. Fenkell. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member Walkinshaw, Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Max Fenkell and I lead global policy and government relations at Scale AI. Since 2016, we have worked with nearly every major AI lab, powered Fortune 500 companies and the most ambitious government AI programs, and are now at the frontier of physical AI and robotics. We do this across two main lines of effort: providing high-quality data to train, improve and evaluate AI models; and building applications to help our customers bring AI into production. Let me start with a reflection of where things stand today. Last month, Chinese viewers rang in the Lunar New Year watching AI-powered humanoid robots perform coordinated martial arts on live television. The video went viral not because it was impressive, but because of what happened when people compared it to last year. Twelve months ago, those same robots could barely shuffle through a dance routine. This year they were doing karate. That is the speed of this competition. The United States is winning on the dimensions Washington tracks: the models and the chips. But we are losing where the future will be decided: data and implementation. We are seeing two different races play out. I fear right now the United States may be winning the wrong one. Nowhere is that gap more alarming than in physical AI and robotics. Unlike large language models, which train on data scraped from the internet, robots have no such resource. A robot learns by doing in the physical world. That requires thousands of hours of real-world data collected, labeled, and ready to train on. This is why autonomous vehicles spend months driving city streets before launch. Every mile is training data. For robotics think warehouse-scale facilities filled with machines running around the clock not to move goods, but to generate the fuel that trains the next generation of AI. China has industrialized that process. We have not. According to Scale's internal estimates, China owns roughly 90 percent of the commercially-available robotics AI data market today. They produce that data at 60 percent lower cost than U.S. companies can match. The U.S. Government invests roughly $100 million a year in AI data. China invests 1 to 1.5 billion, 10 to 15 times more. They have 7 government-directed data labeling hubs and warehouses with robots running 17 hours a day solely to generate training data. By all accounts, this is a state- directed campaign to win. That structural advantage has direct national security consequences. The same platforms training on Chinese data today are candidates for deployment in American ports, hospitals, defense facilities, and homes tomorrow. The data that trains these systems shapes how they behave, what they optimize for, and where they are vulnerable. Ceding the robotics data layer to China is not a technology policy concern. It is a critical infrastructure risk and the window to address it is closing fast. Winning requires a whole-of-Government approach and 4 key actions. First, investigate Chinese robotics data as a national security threat and treat U.S. data as a national asset. Congress should ask the national security apparatus to study this dependency and require U.S. Government data assets be made AI-ready. Second, establish one national regulatory framework for artificial intelligence. This should govern outputs, not inputs. A patchwork of state rules is not a regulatory system. It is a competitive liability. Third, mandate government AI deployment. The Department of War has transitioned one AI program--to program of record since 2016. China deployed 81 large language models into their People's Liberation Army in the first half of 2024 alone, 1 versus 81. That is not a technology gap. It is a failure of will. Congress should direct every agency to launch at least 5 flagship agentic AI programs by 2028 to start to fill the gap. Fourth, export the AI technology stack to our allies before China does. China won on 5G because America didn't show up with a competitive alternative. We are at that same fork in the road on AI right now today. The Exporting the American AI Tech Stack Executive Order is a great first step, but Congress must codify and resource it. This is not the first time America has faced a defining technological competition and is not the first time the outcome looked uncertain. We have every asset required to win: the talent, the capital, and the allies. The variable is urgency, and the time to act is now. Scale is fully committed to supporting the United States in this race. We look forward to working with Congress and the Trump administration to find ways to do just that. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Fenkell follows:] Prepared Statement of Max Fenkell March 17, 2026 Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and Members of the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Max Fenkell, and I serve as Scale AI's (Scale) global head of policy and government relations. This hearing comes at a critical time for the future of United States leadership in artificial intelligence (AI), and I appreciate the chance to discuss the steps necessary to ensure the United States wins the global AI race. introduction Over the past 5 years, no topic has captured global attention more than AI and since our founding in 2016, Scale has been at the forefront of AI innovation. Every day, our company works to build reliable AI systems for the world's most important decisions. We work across the entirety of the AI ecosystem, supporting customers from AI labs developing frontier models, to governments and enterprises looking to implement AI solutions. We do this in two main ways: first, by building high-quality, frontier data to develop, improve, and evaluate AI models; and second, by building applications to deliver solutions. In the earliest days of our company, we started by building the Data Engine to power the autonomous vehicle industry. Later, that same Data Engine matured to serve as the foundational infrastructure to power the generative AI (GenAI) revolution; it now powers leading AI companies working to bring the technology into the physical world through robotics and autonomous systems. Our expertise in data has also enabled us to understand how to best implement our AI solutions across leading enterprises and governments, placing us at the forefront of AI deployment. Today, our Data Engine has powered the most ambitious Government AI programs, shaped the frontier of industry, and is actively working to power the next generation of agentic and physical AI platforms. AI has always been powered by a data foundation, and winning on data will contribute to the United States winning on AI. Scale directly enables this to occur. winning starts with the right strategy To start, it is useful to understand the AI tech stack. Across almost all use cases, AI fundamentally boils down to four parts: compute, model, data, and applications. Compute refers to the chips that power AI development and implementation; models are the engine that powers the AI to be useful; data is what makes the AI robust and intelligent; and applications leverage the rest of the tech stack to deliver high-quality AI solutions. Understanding the state of the AI race requires examining leadership across each element of the tech stack. While the United States maintains an advantage on models and compute, China has established significant advantages in data and large-scale deployment. China continues to invest aggressively across the entire tech stack through an approach that fundamentally differs from the United States. The United States is chasing technological superiority, whereas China is looking to win on implementation \1\ and diffusion of its technology across the world.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-vows- accelerate-technological-self-reliance-ai-push-2026-03-05/. \2\ See, https://www.index.dev/blog/chinese-open-source-ai-models- statistics. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As the AI industry continues to advance from a model-first approach to applications and embodied AI platforms, it is clear that the country that best implements AI solutions will reap the biggest benefit. Leadership in chips and models alone will not be sufficient. Without a stronger focus on implementation and deployment, the United States risks falling behind and never catching up. robotics is the next frontier, but the united states is not currently in the race Since the public release of generative AI systems in November 2022,\3\ they have garnered much of the world's attention. However, this represents only the beginning of the AI transformation. AI capabilities are already evolving beyond conversational systems toward agentic workflows, and the next wave of AI will see models shift from text-based to physical, powering real-world systems such as robotics. Winning on these systems requires a fundamentally different approach from the ground up, starting with how you train the models. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Training a Large Language Model (LLM) requires two foundational steps. The first is pre-training: training on publicly-available data. The second is post-training: augmenting a pre-trained model with high- quality, human decisions to fine-tune and evaluate it. Once completed, that AI model is deployed through a user interface and constantly improved based on real-world feedback. A physical AI system follows a different path. These systems require the collection of thousands of hours of real-world data prior to the labeling process. Once collected, that data is labeled, tagged, and annotated to build a high-quality Vision Language Action Model, and once deployed in a real-world environment, it is augmented by real- world data to continuously improve. This is why autonomous vehicles spend months driving city streets before launch--every mile is training data. For robotics, the equivalent is warehouse-scale facilities filled with machines running around the clock, not to move goods, but to generate the data that trains the next generation of AI systems. China has industrialized this process in a way the United States has not. According to Scale's internal estimates, China owns roughly 90 percent of the commercially- available robotics AI data industry today and produces it at 60 percent lower cost than U.S. companies can match. More investment alone will not close that gap. The advantage China has built is structural, state- directed, and years in the making. The reason for this lies in China's approach. For many years, China has viewed data dominance as a key pillar of its AI Master Plan. While the U.S. Government directly invests roughly $100 million a year in AI data, China invests between 10x and 15x more, or roughly between $1 billion and $1.5 billion annually.\4\ However, the difference extends beyond the investment levels. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ These statistics are based on Scale's internal analysis of publicly-available sources. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- China currently has 7 data-labeling hubs \5\ across the country, provides government tax credits and subsidies for AI data,\6\ and operates multiple of the world's largest warehouses with robots working up to 17 hours per day for the sole purpose of data collection.\7\ This is not organic industrial development: it is a state-directed campaign to leverage the entirety of state capacity to control the foundational inputs of AI before the United States recognizes the threat. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ See, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202404/1309974.shtml. \6\ See, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202501/14/ content_WS67859ba1c6d0868f4e8eeca- 1.html. \7\ See, https://robotsbeat.com/china-closes-robotics-gap-physical- ai/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The national security implications are clear. The same AI models being integrated into platforms and trained on Chinese data today are candidates for deployment in American homes, ports, hospitals, warehouses, and defense facilities tomorrow. The data that trains these systems shapes how they behave, what they optimize for, and where they are vulnerable. Ceding the robotics data layer to China is not an abstract technology policy concern, it is a critical infrastructure risk. If the United States wants to win, we must recognize that the race is not just about platforms or technology superiority: we must also win on data. As with every form of AI, winning comes down to having a data advantage. Beyond global leadership, relying on Chinese data to train American companies' AI platforms carries significant security risks: supply chain issues, data poisoning,\8\ backdooring,\9\ and more. Unless we change our approach quickly, we will be almost entirely reliant on China to build America's robotics industry. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ See, https://www.knostic.ai/blog/ai-data- poisoning?utm_source=chatgpt.com. \9\ See, https://cybernews.com/security/dji-robot-vacuum-backdoor/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- winning requires four key actions Given the state of the global AI race and China's clear strategic advantage, the United States must act with urgency. The United States is winning the AI race on the dimensions we can see--the models and the chips. We are losing it on the dimensions that will ultimately decide the outcome: data and implementation. Winning is not just about building the best technology; it is also about successfully deploying these systems across real-world applications. To achieve this, 4 actions are necessary: First, investigate Chinese robotics data as a national security threat and treat U.S. data as a national asset.--China's growing dominance in the robotics AI data raises significant national security concerns for U.S. industry, and an over-reliance on China to provide our leading companies with AI-ready data carries risks that should be carefully examined and mitigated. Further, we should explore how the U.S. Government's best-in-class data could be better leveraged as a strategic asset for AI leadership. Multiple National AI Strategies have called AI-ready data vital to advancing AI, and while progress has been made, more must be done to translate these commitments into action. China is taking a whole-of-government approach to winning on data. The United States must be prepared to match that intensity--and where possible, surpass it. Recommendation.--Congress should immediately ask the National Security apparatus to study the risks associated with an over- reliance on Chinese robotics data. Additionally, Congress should require Federal data assets be made AI-ready and put in place Government-wide AI-ready data infrastructure to harness it. Second, establish the right regulatory framework that maximizes innovation while putting in place guardrails where needed.--The right framework will lay the groundwork for global leadership. Scale strongly believes that this system starts with a use-case-based approach that leverages the existing regulatory system, finding and filling gaps if they exist. The right model governs outputs, not inputs--just as the Government does not regulate a laptop, it regulates the malicious use of a laptop. AI should be governed the same way. Where a regulation is sufficient, it requires clear implementation and compliance guidance, as well as third-party testing to verify compliance. Regulation that handicaps American AI companies is not sound policy; it is a strategic concession to Beijing. Recommendation.--Congress should work to pass a legislative package that sets one national framework for AI governance and codifies the regulatory gap analysis approach. Third, shift to an implementation-first mindset.--As previously stated, the United States is pursuing technology superiority whereas China has an implementation-first mindset. This is most visible in government adoption for defense use cases. Since 2016, the Department of War has successfully transitioned only one AI program to a Program of Record. In contrast, China implemented 81 LLMs into People's Liberation Army operations in the first half of 2024 alone.\10\ This is true across the private sector as well. Recent studies show that only roughly 1 in 20 enterprise AI pilots reach production.\11\ If we want to win, we must shift to an implementation-first approach. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ See, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3267866/ chinas-public-sector-accelerates-ai-adoption-2024-zhipu-and-iflytek- emerge-winners. \11\ See, https://fortune.com/2025/08/18/mit-report-95-percent- generative-ai-pilots-at-companies-failing-cfo/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recommendation.--Congress should require Federal departments and agencies to stand up at least 5 flagship agentic AI programs, or programs that leverage frontier AI capabilities to solve for individual use cases, no later than the end of 2028. The over 1,700 AI use cases already identified across the Federal Government make clear that agencies know where AI can be most effective--the barrier is not imagination, it is execution. Additionally, they should set up an interagency working group tasked and empowered to break down all barriers to Government AI implementation and use every tool at their disposal to encourage private-sector adoption of agentic AI solutions. Fourth, export the AI tech stack to our allies and partners.--For too long, the United States has allowed China to dominate global tech exports through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road,\12\ which saw China win on 5G. This has led to China's technology becoming the global standard around the world and this cannot happen on AI. Countries around the world, or AI geopolitical swing states, will soon be forced to choose between deploying Western or Chinese technology. The Trump administration has taken critical steps to counter China's exports around the world through the ``Promoting the Export of the AI Technology Stack''\13\ Executive Order, but this must only be a starting point. It is critical that Congress codifies key provisions from this Executive Order and ensures that the Departments of State and Commerce are resourced to effectively carry out their mandates. Global leadership on AI starts with becoming the global standard. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ See, https://www.cfr.org/china-digital-silk-road/. \13\ See, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/07/ promoting-the-export-of-the-american-ai-technology-stack/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recommendation.--Congress should immediately work to codify this Executive Order and ensure adequate funding for the agencies tasked with implementing it. conclusion The AI race will not be won in a laboratory or manufacturing plant alone. It will be won through the strategic decisions we make today. This is not the first time America has faced a defining technological competition, and we have every asset required to win: the talent, the capital, and the allies. The variable is urgency. Despite years of strong rhetoric, a clear-eyed understanding of where this race is actually being run has been missing. It is being run on data and implementation, and without direct action, we will lose. The window to act is open, but it will not remain open indefinitely. Scale is fully committed to supporting the United States in the global AI race. We look forward to working with this committee to find ways to do just that. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions. Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. I now recognize Mr. Malchano for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MALCHANO, VICE PRESIDENT OF SOFTWARE, BOSTON DYNAMICS Mr. Malchano. Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, I am the vice president of software at Boston Dynamics and I serve as the company's security officer, responsible for overseeing our cybersecurity and data sovereignty protocols. At Boston Dynamics, our mission has always been to create a future in which humans and machines work together to improve everyone's safety, productivity, and quality of life. Our robots are in use in manufacturing facilities, semiconductor fabrication, energy plants, and by first responders. Our robots are used by the Secret Service to protect the President and by military agencies to neutralize the threat of IEDs. One of our robots has taken bullets in the line of duty, keeping police and bystanders safe from harm. We have a growing work force of over 1,000 employees and proudly design and manufacture our robots in the United States. There are at least 4 reasons why robotics should be a top policy priority for Congress. First, advanced robots are the physical manifestation of AI. Robots leverage AI techniques such as computer vision and reinforcement learning to perform a wide range of useful tasks. In order to win the AI race, we must also win the robotics race. Second, robots are increasingly crucial in manufacturing. Humanoids allow for automated physical operations and work spaces designed and built for humans. The countries that build and deploy robots will be the ones that will manufacture on their own shores and address demographic challenges. Robotics will be crucial to economic security. Third, robots present new and unique classes of cybersecurity risk and beyond AI and computer systems. The combination of hardware, software, sensors, mobility, and communications makes advanced mobile robots higher risk than other IoT technologies. Attackers could sabotage those systems to interfere with manufacturing lines or halt security patrols. Robots are becoming a potent threat vector to crucial infrastructure. Fourth, robotic technologies are dual-use. Robots with enhanced mobility and AI-powered capabilities will become increasingly important in military applications. We have seen how aerial robotics, namely drones intended for consumer use, can become a pivotal technology in warfare. Robots increasingly will become part of national defense strategies. The Chinese government understands this. This is why China just released a new 5-year plan that identifies robotics as their top new industry tracks. The plan envisions transforming virtually every major industry in China by integrating AI- powered robots. It unlocks access to funding and implements policies that drive adoption across industries, creating a flywheel effect for robot AI. As one analyst remarked, this is less an industrial policy for robots than an industrial policy through robots. This government support isn't new. Previous government plans from the past decade outline the many mechanisms and policies that have supported Chinese robotics industry. These plans are already working. China last year adopted and installed 10 times more robots in factories than the United States. China also uses its little giant designation to provide companies with government funding and support. One of the companies designated as a little giant is Unitree, the most visible Chinese company selling legged robots in the United States. Unitree is rapidly capturing market share in the U.S. university, research, and law enforcement markets. Researchers have reported crucial Unitree cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Unitree's products have also been seen in PLA military exercises and its ties to Chinese military have been noted by the House Select Committee on China as well as the Department of War. So it's not surprising that Unitree has captured the attention of this committee and the U.S. Government. However, there are dozens of other Chinese companies working to develop advanced robotics technologies powered by AI. At the recent CES Las Vegas show, Chinese robots on display, humanoids, outnumbered American humanoids by 5 to 1. While Unitree deserves close scrutiny, a broad whole-of- Government strategic approach is what's truly needed. This is why we are asking for the development and launch of a national robotics strategy consistent with a broad set of policies designed to support the growth and success of the industry. Time is running out for policy efforts to have an impact. The recently-introduced National Robotics Commission Act, H.R. 7334, would kick-start the process of developing such a strategy. We urge Congress to pass this bill. We also respectfully ask this subcommittee to direct CISA to swiftly undertake a security evaluation of foreign robots. Independent researchers have already revealed crucial vulnerabilities, but a more comprehensive Government-directed study would provide broader guidance to users and Government about the risk of foreign robotics projects. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Malchano follows:] Prepared Statement of Matthew Malchano March 17, 2026 Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this very important and timely topic. I am vice president of software at Boston Dynamics, the world's leading developer of advanced mobile robots. I also serve as the company's security officer, responsible for overseeing our cybersecurity and data sovereignty protocols. Having worked for the company for 22 years in leadership and technical roles, on both commercial products and Government projects, I have witnessed our industry's transition from its initial era of academic experimentation, to Government-funded research projects, to early commercial deployment and, now, to a company that is engaged in one of the most consequential global competitions in advanced technology. Our company, founded over 30 years ago by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor and his students, is at the forefront of an industry which will result in advanced mobile robots becoming common in industrial, public safety, entertainment, defense and security applications. Advanced mobile robots are still a new technology, but our robots are already in use in manufacturing facilities, semiconductor fabrication plants,\1\ energy plants,\2\ as well as in police departments. One of our robots has even taken bullets in the line of duty.\3\ Our robots are used by the United States Secret Service to protect the President,\4\ and by military agencies to investigate and neutralize the threat of improvised explosive devices.\5\ We are headquartered in Massachusetts, with a growing workforce of over 1,000 employees, and we proudly design and manufacture our robots in the United States. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See Global Foundries Case Study, available at https:// bostondynamics.com/case-studies/globalfoundries/. \2\ See Meet Chevron's New Energy Watchdog, available at https:// bostondynamics.com/case-studies/meet-chevrons-new-energy-watchdog/. \3\ See ``Robotic police dog shot multiple times, credited with avoiding potential bloodshed,'' Associated Press, March 27, 2024, available at https://apnews.com/article/massachusetts-cape-cod-robot- dog-polic-f63586d5286750702f396109c9a81836. \4\ See ``Robotic dogs are patrolling Mar-a-Lago to help protect Trump, Secret Service confirms,'' FOX 59, November 8, 2024, available at https://fox59.com/news/national-world/robotic-dogs-are-patrolling- mar-a-lago-to-help-protect-trump-secret-service-confirms/. \5\ See ``Boston Dynamics Awarded Contract to Supply Spot to the Dutch Ministry of Defence,'' available at https://bostondynamics.com/ blog/boston-dynamics-awarded-contract-to-supply-spot-to-the-dutch- ministry-of-defence/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Exciting recent advances in AI are already accelerating the development of a new generation of mobile robots. Computer vision enables robots to perceive their environment, recognize objects, and offer contextually relevant services. Vision and natural language processing will enable us to more easily communicate with robots using language and gestures. Motion control software, created by machine learning and reinforcement learning, increasingly drives the robots, accelerating their development. Robots now learn tasks using AI technologies to observe and analyze the movements of people or other robots doing that task.\6\ But these advances in AI also enable competitors, including those headquartered in foreign adversarial nations, to quickly close the gap in capabilities. Their robots and ours can now be built and programmed in 30 months to do what our company once took 30 years to develop. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ For a recent explanation from our robotics AI team of how we are using AI to make robots more capable than ever before, with accompanying illustrative videos, please see ``Large Behavior Models and Atlas Find New Footing,'' Boston Dynamics, available at https:// bostondynamics.com/blog/large-behavior-models-atlas-find-new-footing/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the new generation of robotics raises economic security and national security risks The types of products or machines that could be described as a ``robot'' are very broad. I focus my testimony on what I call advanced robotic technologies. Advanced robotic technologies consist of highly- agile mobile robots designed to be put to work in a variety of environments and applications, and whose functionality is trained by, or enhanced by, artificial intelligence methodologies. These types of robots raise heightened economic security interests and national security risks, and therefore should most squarely be the focus of Federal policy, for the following reasons: 1. Advanced robotic technologies are dual-use.--A robot developed to navigate complex environments, using legs or other methods providing enhanced agility and dexterity, will eventually be useful in the battlefield. Just in the past few months, we have seen Chinese-made quadrupeds exhibited during China's military parade,\7\ and videos of Chinese humanoids training to fight in hand-to-hand combat.\8\ There have also been reports of quadrupeds, developed by Chinese robotics companies including the company identified in the title of this hearing, armed with machine guns and used in joint military training exercises in Cambodia.\9\ And of course, U.S. forces have been using mobile robots for years to investigate and mitigate IEDs. Robots with enhanced mobility and AI-powered capabilities will be even more important in military applications, and we have seen in recent years how aerial robotics (drones), including those designed and intended for commercial or consumer use, can become consequential, or even outcome- determinant, in warfare.\10\ Therefore, ensuring the success and growth of the domestic advanced robotics industry, including ground robotics systems designed and developed for commercial and industrial applications, is of national security importance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ See ``Weaponised `robot wolves' make cameo at China military parade,'' The Guardian, September 5, 2025, available at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/video/2025/sep/04/weaponised-robot-wolves- make-cameo-at-big-china-military-parade-video. \8\ See ``China Just Held the First-Ever Humanoid Robot Fight Night,'' Vice.com, May 27, 2025, available at https://www.vice.com/en/ article/china-just-held-the-first-ever-humanoid-robot-fight-night/. \9\ See ``Meet the Chinese army's latest weapon: the gun-toting dog,'' The Guardian, May 30, 2024, available at https:// www.theguardian.com/science/article/2024/may/30/chinese-armys-latest- weapon-gun-toting-dog. \10\ ``Ukraine Says More Than 80 percent of Enemy Targets Now Destroyed by Drones,'' Defense News, January 28, 2026, available at https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/01/28/ukraine-says-more- than-80-of-enemy-targets-now-destroyed-by-drones/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Advanced robotic technologies are increasingly crucial in the manufacture, production, and supply chain of other goods.--These technologies will help address workforce shortages of the future due to demographic inevitabilities arising from diminishing birth rates in the United States and elsewhere. Humanoids and similar form factors allow for automated physical operations in work spaces designed and built for humans, allowing existing infrastructure and factories to remain in operation even during labor shortages. The countries that build and deploy these advanced robots will be the ones that are best poised to manufacture on their own shores efficiently, and to protect their supply chains in other industries including automobiles, ships, defense materiel, and rail cars. Manufacturing in these other sectors has already been recognized by the Federal Government as being of national security importance to the United States. The robots that enable and sustain such manufacturing are a matter of economic security as well. Fast, agile manufacturing is, in turn, a key flywheel for advanced research and development. It is likely that robot acceleration may create a run-away amplification effect for technology development and industrial dominance. 3. Advanced robotic technologies are the physical embodiment of artificial intelligence.--Various officials in the United States Government have rightfully emphasized the need for the United States to win the AI race. Advanced robots are the physical manifestation of AI, leveraging everything from computer vision and reinforcement learning to visual language action and large behavior models--to learn how to interface with the real world and perform a wide range of useful tasks. Some of these tasks will have national security importance. Even if the United States leads on software AI, the potential for dominance of robotic hardware by foreign adversaries will create national security vulnerabilities. If U.S.-sourced software can only be deployed in machines that have been produced elsewhere because of the erosion of the domestic robotics industry, AI-only security will be insufficient. To win the AI race, the United States must win the robotics race. 4. Using foreign advanced robotics technology in critical roles creates a risk of interference, access, and denial of service.--The unique combination of hardware, software, sensors, mobility, and communication mechanisms makes advanced mobile robots higher risk than other internet-of-things technologies, and it can be practically impossible to rule out tampering by adverse interests if done by the manufacturer. As robots become a critical part of key infrastructure, they become a potential and potent threat vector to that infrastructure. other nations, including u.s. adversaries, are prioritizing robotics The economic, strategic and national security importance of robotics is evident from efforts made by other nations to support and promote their domestic robot industries. Nations that have implemented some form of national strategy initiative for robotics include Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Germany, France, the Netherlands, India, and China. See ``A Time to Act: Policies to Strengthen the US Robotics Industry,'' Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, July 18, 2025, available at https://itif.org/publications/2025/07/18/time-to- act-policies-to-strengthen-us-robotics-industry/. Recent events demonstrate that China, especially, has recognized the national security implications of its advanced robotic technologies sector. In February 2025, the CEO of prominent Chinese robotics company Unitree, which develops and manufactures quadrupeds and humanoids, was seated prominently across from Chinese President Xi at a summit of tech executives. See ``What did China's tech entrepreneurs tell Xi Jinping at the symposium?'' South China Morning Post, February 21, 2025, available at https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3299599/what- did-chinas-tech-entrepreneurs-tell-xi-jinping-symposium. China also recently hosted a humanoid half-marathon and humanoid ``Olympics.'' See ``China's robots race against humans--and their U.S. counterparts,'' NBC News, April 23, 2025, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ world/china-robots-race-humans-half-marathon-rcna195586; ``Tesla Optimus rival Unitree shines at the `World Humanoid Robot Games' in China,'' CNBC, August 18, 2025, available at https://www.cnbc.com/2025/ 08/18/world-humanoid-robot-games-china-tesla-unitree.html. The elevation of China's robotics community onto its national stage is not accidental. Instead, it is a direct consequence of comprehensive government support of China's robotics industry and AI-driven innovations. For example, we note the PRC's ``Fourteenth Five-Year Plan for the Robotics Industry'' (2021-2025), Central People's Government, December 21, 2021, available at https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/ 2021-12/28/content_5664988.htm as well as its ``Implementation Plan for the `Robotics Plus' Application Special Operation,'' PRC Central People's Government, January 18, 2023, available at https://www.gov.cn/ zhengce/zhengceku/2023-01/19/content_5738112.htm. These documents outline the many mechanisms and policies that have supported the Chinese robotics industry, ranging from government-funded R&D, to tax deductions, to government acting as first adopters to SOE robot procurement prioritization. See also China M.I.I.T. ''Guiding Opinions on the Innovative Development of Humanoid Robots,'' Center for Science and Technology Innovation (Beijing), November 3, 2023, available at https://www.ncsti.gov.cn/zcfg/zcwj/202311/t20231103_140346.html. Commentators and experts have evaluated the impact of these policies on the industry. See, e.g., ``America Is Missing The New Labor Economy--Robotics,'' SemiAnalysis, March 11, 2025, available at https:/ /semianalysis.com/2025/03/11/america-is-missing-the-new-labor-economy- robotics-part-1/ (indicating that there is ``an existential threat to the US as it is outcompeted in all capacities''); ``The Humanoid 100: Mapping the Humanoid Robot Value Chain,'' Morgan Stanley, available at https://advisor.morganstanley.com/john.howard/documents/field/j/jo/ john-howard/The_Humanoid_100_Mapping_the_Humanoid_Robot_Value_- Chain.pdf (``Our research suggests China continues to show the most impressive progress in humanoid robotics where startups are benefiting from established supply chains, local adoption opportunities, and strong degrees of national government support.''); ``How Innovative Is China in the Robotics Industry?,'' Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, available at https://itif.org/publications/2024/03/11/how- innovative-is-china-in-the-robotics-industry/ (``China had 12 times the rate of robot use in manufacturing than did the United States.''); Testimony of Sunny Cheung, Jamestown Foundation, before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 6, 2025, available at https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/ Sunny_Cheung_Testimony.pdf (``The results of these sustained efforts are evident in the rapid rise of leading Chinese robotics companies such as UBTech, Fourier Intelligence, Unitree Robotics, and major tech giants like Xiaomi and XPeng, which have expanded into humanoid robotics development. These companies are increasingly competitive in global markets, not just as adopters of automation but as innovators producing cutting-edge robotic systems with intelligent AI integration.''); Embodied Intelligence: The PRC's Whole-of-Nation Push into Robotics, Sunny Cheung, Jamestown Foundation, August 9, 2025, available at https://jamestown.org/program/embodied-intelligence-the- prcs-whole-of-nation-push-into-robotics/ (``The rise of the PRC's robotics industry represents a tightly-coordinated, whole-of-nation campaign driven by national strategy, regional policy alignment, and deep industrial integration.''). National strategies in Chinese industry policy are often executed via government subsidies at the local or provincial level. See Far From Normal: An Augmented Assessment of China's State Support, Rhodium Group, March 17, 2025, available at https://rhg.com/research/far-from- normal-an-augmented-assessment-of-chinas-state-support/ (``China spends more through direct grants and tax benefits than any other major economy, both in absolute amounts and as a share of GDP''). ``China's industrial policy spending is enormous, totaling at least 1.73 percent of GDP in 2019. This is equivalent to more than $248 billion at nominal exchange rates and $407 billion at purchasing power parity exchange rates.'' See ``Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective,'' Center for Strategic & International studies, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-ink-estimating- chinese-industrial-policy-spending-comparative-perspective. According to Jamestown Foundation's research, state-sponsored overproduction is another policy-driven approach that will have an impact on the robotics sector. See, e.g., Beyond overcapacity: Chinese-style modernization and the clash of economic models, Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 1, 2025, available at https://merics.org/en/report/beyond- overcapacity-chinese-style-modernization-and-clash-economic-models (indicating that ``advanced industrial machinery and components'' is one of the sectors most likely to see overcapacities emerge due to Chinese government policy). China has used state-backed financing to boost its intelligent robotics industry, offering tens of millions of dollars in subsidies, loans, and other financial support. ``[P]rovinces and cities [in China] are engaged in a de facto `subsidy race,' each vying to foster the next national robotics champion within their jurisdiction.'' Id. One example of Chinese government support that we have been able to trace is the ``little giant'' designation. Enterprises that secure a national designation from China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) as specialized, refined, distinctive, and innovative ``little giant'' firms are eligible for provincial funding, reduced corporate income tax rates, accelerated depreciation of R&D equipment, and matching grants for innovation projects. Our research of sources in China indicates that various leading Chinese robotics companies have received the so-called ``little giant'' designation, including Unitree but also DEEP, Fourier, Leju, Qiteng, and Tianlian. This designation signals their ability to access a wide range of government funding and support. Indeed, a recent Guangdong province policy document, ``Notice on Organizing the Project Entry of Specialized, Refined, Distinctive, and Innovative `Little Giant' Enterprises in the Field of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics'' (September 2, 2025), outlines subsidies for designated ``little giant'' enterprises specifically in the field of AI and robotics. It is evident that China's robotics producers have been the beneficiaries of state subsidies and support. China is proceeding expeditiously with its government-sponsored industrial strategy. As just one example, in November 2025, the Chinese government formed an advisory committee on humanoid robotics, overseen by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and appointed the CEOs of Unitree and AgiBot as co-chairs.\11\ By March 2026, barely 3 months later, working together with 120 research institutions, the committee had already developed and released a six-pillar national standard for humanoid robotics, described as the ``first comprehensive, top-level design covering the entire industrial chain and full life cycle of humanoid robotics and embodied intelligence.''\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ ``Unitree, AgiBot founders, China's robotics stars, join panel to shape industry standards,'' South China Morning Post, November 25, 2025, available at https://www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3333964/ unitree-agibot-founders-chinas-robotics-stars-join-panel-shape- industry-standards. \12\ ``China's first national standard system for humanoid robotics poised to spur industry development,'' Xinhua, March 3, 2026, available at https://english.news.cn/20260303/0e51ac8- f66c542c5bacf2af3f80b3a40/ c.html . --------------------------------------------------------------------------- China's strategy for advanced robotic technologies mimics the same approaches that it has used in other technology sectors: marketing products at prices which can only be possible by government support, intentionally over-produced and/or sold below cost. If left unchecked, over time, the impact of China's state support will echo in robotics the results seen in unmanned aircraft systems (drones): producers in the United States will struggle to compete, lose sales due to price differentials, and eventually many of them may be forced to drop out of the market. Due to the nascent nature of the advanced robotic technologies industry, these impacts have yet to be felt in the U.S. industrial sector, but they have become evident in research universities and academic institutions, who are typically the early adopters of such technologies. Boston Dynamics' Spot robot dominated this research market from 2020-2022. However, in only the past 12-18 months, advanced robotic technology uses in that market have become dominated by the less-expensive and less-featured Chinese brands, particularly Unitree. This rapid shift in the academic/research market foreshadows the potential future dominance of foreign producers of advanced robotic technologies across other sectors worldwide, such as manufacturing, energy, logistics, security patrol, law enforcement, and even defense. Indeed, we are already seeing a notable increase in adoption of Chinese quadruped robot ``dogs'' by domestic law enforcement agencies, similar to the early years of Chinese drone adoption by law enforcement agencies.\13\ Additionally, network effects here mean that as a platform becomes dominant in the new market, new capabilities and applications will favor that platform, leading to a substantial first mover advantage. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ U.S. police departments and public safety agencies that have recently adopted Chinese ``robot dog'' models include Brawley Police Department (California), Charles County DES (Maryland), Topeka Police Department (Kansas), Pullman Police Department (Washington), and Port St. Lucie Police Department (Florida). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The role of robotics across key industrial sectors, and the extent of the Chinese government's support for robotics, are starkly revealed by the Chinese government's new 5-year plan, released earlier this month in Beijing. Robotics ``now commands its own dedicated inset box among the plan's top ten `new industry tracks.' '' China's New Five- Year Plan Prioritizes Robotics. The World Should Pay Attention, The Diplomat, March 14, 2026. ``[R]obotics is not treated as a standalone sector but as an enabler woven across chapters on manufacturing, digital transformation, elderly care, national security, and even cultural development. This is less an industrial policy for robots than an industrial policy through robots. ``Id. (emphasis in original).'' This new plan makes clear that the full support of the Chinese government now stands behind its robotics sector, including ``access to the 60 billion RMB ($8.2 billion) National AI Industry Investment Fund, provincial matching funds, and the full apparatus of state-backed venture capital.'' Id. These efforts are currently unmatched by any policy efforts in the United States to support its domestic robotics industry. the nature of the cybersecurity threat Robots that are not secure and that contain cyber vulnerabilities, especially those produced by adversarial actors, pose a variety of serious risks to the facilities and/or agencies that deploy them. Advanced mobile robots present new and unique classes of cybersecurity risk beyond AI and computer systems. These robots are complex systems made of software and hardware. When produced by adversarial nations they carry larger probabilities of being compromised with backdoors and remote access allowing nation-state attackers (intelligence or military) to take control. If compromised robots become critical components of in-turn security critical systems, attackers can sabotage those systems, interfere with a manufacturing line or halt a security patrol. As robot capabilities approach those of humans in terms of seeing, moving, and manipulation, a compromised robot gives attackers eyes and hands throughout sensitive facilities. Growing autonomy lets these robots take actions on their own. Public security researchers have additionally demonstrated clear gaps in Chinese manufactured robot security. Even in the absence of specific attack intent, these vulnerabilities open users of these systems to potential third-party attacks. Securing systems that are used in high-value or sensitive operations should be a priority for both engineers and nations. Boston Dynamics has set out our approach to securing robots in a white paper describing how we maximize the security of our products, including the features and design considerations which enable these platforms to be trusted parts of customer IT integrations. See https:// bostondynamics.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/spot-and-site-hub- security-white-paper.pdf. unitree: one of many companies raising concerns This hearing's title calls out Chinese robotics company Unitree specifically. To be sure, Unitree has been the most visible company marketing and selling its legged robots in the United States, and also appears to have been chosen by the government of China as a national champion. News media have reported cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the company's products, including data exfiltration exploits and remote- control backdoor access.\14\ Additional security research relating to Unitree robots that did not receive wide press coverage include a reported exploit that enables a network-based takeover of the robot and the discovery of a reported Unitree AI/LLM cloud service that could cause arbitrary commands to be executed on the robot.\15\ The company also seems to be widely engaged in white labeling products that appear in the United States under different brand names.\16\ A few weeks ago, following earlier reports of connections between Unitree and the PLA,\17\ Unitree was placed on the Department of War's Section 1260H list of Chinese Military Companies, before that list was withdrawn (apparently, temporarily and not for reasons related to Unitree).\18\ Most recently, 49 Unitree humanoids performed at a high-profile Spring Festival spectacular, dancing rhythmically, vaulting, breakdancing, and mock sword fighting, showing a high degree of confidence in placing fast-moving robots next to child performers before a live audience. Unitree is also moving forward with an initial public offering this year. Given its market penetration, reported security vulnerabilities, and apparent ties to the Chinese government and military, it is not surprising that Unitree has earned the focus and attention of the U.S. Government, security analysts, and policy makers. Scrutiny by this subcommittee is certainly warranted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ See ``Exploit Allows for Takeover of Fleets of Unitree Robots,'' IEEE Spectrum, Sept 25, 2025, available at https:// spectrum.ieee.org/unitree-robot-exploit and ``Unitree humanoid robots send data to China every 5 minutes, raising security fears,'' Interesting Engineering, October 1, 2025, available at https:// interestingengineering.com/innovation/security-flaw-unitree-humanoids- china. \15\ For the original research reporting these issues, see: ``The Jailbroken Unitree Robot Dog ,'' available at https://www.darknavy.org/ darknavy_insight/the_jailbroken_unitree_- robot_dog/; ``39C3_Skynet Starter Kit: From Embodied AI Jailbreak to Remote Takeover of Humanoid Robots,'' available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjA_5-Bybs; ``Skynet Starter Kit--Researchers control humanoid robots via radio & AI,'' available at https://www.heise.de/en/background/39C3-Skynet- Starter-Kit-Researchers-control-humanoid-robots-via-radio-AI- 11125615.html. \16\ One example is a flamethrower-equipped quadruped robot sold by a company called Throwflame, which is obviously a white-labelled Unitree robot. https://throwflame.com/products/thermonator-robodog/. Another company, Robot.com, is using rebranded Unitree robots for urban delivery. https://www.robot.com/. \17\ `` `The Robot Dog's Time to Kill': At China's Star Robotics Firm, the Military Ties Keep Mounting,'' Kharon The Brief, July 17, 2025, available at https://www.kharon.com/brief/unitree-robotics-china- pla. \18\ ``U.S. Briefly Adds Alibaba, BYD and Other High-Profile Firms to List of Chinese Military Companies,'' Kharon Research, February 13, 2026, available at https://www.kharon.com/brief/us-china-news-alibaba- byd-defense-department-1260h. (Source: https://x.com/Robo_Tuo/status/ 1991882471156457894). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, there are literally dozens of other Chinese companies making rapid progress with government support, particularly in the humanoid space. At the 2026 Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, where we debuted the new version of our Atlas humanoid robot, Chinese companies displaying humanoid robots appeared to outnumber U.S. companies by a factor of 5 to 1. On social media, industry observers are tracking dozens of Chinese humanoid companies, compared to just a handful in the United States: [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] This wide set of actors means that, although Federal policy can and should target specific companies that are of concern to national security, a broader all-of-government strategic approach is needed to support the U.S. robotics industry and to provide greater assurance of economic security. recommendations We respectfully make the following recommendations to this subcommittee, to Congress, and to the broader United States Government: 1. Direct the Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to expeditiously undertake a national security evaluation of the use of foreign adversarial robots in American industry and governmental operations. Although private researchers have raised alarm by uncovering backdoors and vulnerabilities in specific Chinese robotics products on the market, these are one-off studies and we are not aware of any comprehensive Government-led study of this issue. Such a study would provide clear guidance to private industry, Government contractors, public safety agencies, and other stakeholders regarding the security of advanced robotics products acquired from foreign companies. The examination would be informative to both important end-users and policy makers and is, we believe, overdue. 2. Pass the National Robotics Commission Act, as a Step Toward a National Robotics Strategy. Recently, a bipartisan bill was introduced in the House that would establish a National Robotics Commission, H.R. 7334. Modeled on the AI and Biotech Commissions that were so useful to those industries and to Government stakeholders, a Robotics Commission would bring experts, industry, and Government together to recommend the policies that would support the growth and success of the industry. Our company began calling for the development of a national robotics strategy in 2023. While Chinese advisory committees have already made quick progress on collaborative standards and strategies, and another 5-year plan emerges from the Chinese government that elevates robotics even more than the prior plans, and while about a dozen other counties have their own robotics strategies, the United States Government has yet to move forward with establishing a deliberative body or tasking an agency to begin developing its own national strategy. Time is running short and we urge Congress to move forward as soon as possible with this legislation and related policy efforts to kick-start the development of a national robotics strategy. Boston Dynamics is grateful for the opportunity to share our perspectives with you on this important topic. I look forward to your questions. Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. I now recognize Mr. Robbins for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL ROBBINS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ASSOCIATION FOR UNCREWED VEHICLE SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL Mr. Robbins. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member Walkinshaw, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you so much for the invitation to testify today. My name is Michael Robbins. I am the president and CEO of AUVSI, the trade association for the autonomous systems, drones, and robotic industry. Our members, including Boston Dynamics, are at the leading edge of the transformation where AI, robotics, and autonomy are converging to create a new frontier of cyber physical systems. Today, we are at the precipice of a new era defined by the convergence of AI and physical machines, and it holds immense promise for American productivity and competitiveness. But also introduce unprecedented national security vulnerabilities when these systems are developed within adversarial-controlled technology ecosystems. Modern robots are highly networked physical cyber systems. A compromised laptop can expose data, but a compromised robot can expose data and map, move, surveil, or physically disrupt operations in the real world. We are here today because our adversaries, specifically the People's Republic of China, are methodically executing a centrally planned playbook to hollow out the U.S. robotics industrial base and install Trojan horses within our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, we have seen this exact threat before and we cannot ignore the lessons learned from the commercial drone industry. Over the last decade, the PRC leveraged massive state subsidies, IP theft, and deliberate market dumping to drive many American drone manufacturers out of business by flooding the global market with artificially cheap systems. This deliberate market capture engineered a profound national security crisis here in America, exposing sensitive U.S. data to Chinese state intelligence and leaving our Nation dangerously dependent on adversary-built technologies. Today, the PRC is aggressively executing the exact same playbook in the advanced robotics sector. Fueled by over $137 billion in state subsidies and initiatives, like Made in China 2025, PRC robotics firms are systematically undercutting American companies, starving U.S. firms of the revenue needed to scale domestic capacity and maintain our technological leadership. If we fail to act, the U.S. robotics and autonomy industrial base will be hollowed out, leaving us dangerously dependent on adversarial-linked technology to run our economy. Furthermore, we must address this vulnerability in the upstream supply chain, where PRC's dominance of rare earth minerals and the threat of export controls could effectively decapitate American robotics manufacturing before a single system is even built. This aggressive market capture is not just an economic issue, it is a profound national security threat. The PRC is actively weaponizing advanced civilian robotics to enhance its military capabilities. Recent footage released by the People's Liberation Army features a video ominously titled ``The Robot Dog's Time to Kill Has Come,'' depicting a unitary robotics quadruped equipped with an automatic rifle, striking targets with precision. Because of Beijing's military-civil fusion strategy, PRC robotics firms flooding our markets are directly serving as R&D extensions of the PLA. Even more alarming, PRC companies pair their robots with subsidized LiDAR from firms like Hesai and DJI's Livox, companies our Department of Defense designates as Chinese military companies. These sensors generate precise 3D maps and persistent spatial awareness, thereby handing the CCP a persistent digital map of our Nation. Furthermore, PRC AI firms like DeepSeek are accelerating this threat, illicitly extracting the capabilities of advanced U.S. AI models to rapidly and cheaply build the brains for these subsidized robotic platforms. The PRC's national intelligence and cybersecurity laws create a homeland security crisis, compelling all Chinese commercial entities to provide state intelligence unfettered access to their systems. Allowing PRC market dominance is a national security nightmare for America. Allowing the CCP to install Trojan horses within U.S. critical infrastructure, exposing our Nation to severe risks of data exfiltration, remote operational disruption, and the weaponization of our supply chains. We simply cannot allow this dangerous erosion of American industrial capacity and national security to happen. Recognizing this, AUVSI recently launched our Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness. Securing our future requires both carrots and sticks. We must pair aggressive restrictions on adversary technology with bold incentives for domestic production to restore a level playing field and ensure American technological leadership. We urge Congress to pass a coordinated national robotics strategy and update trade enforcement mechanisms to counter PRC dumping. We must address risk-based restrictions on PRC technologies in sensitive environments, including bans on PRC UGVs and on the importation of 1260H companies, while also deploying robust economic incentives, like production, tax credits, loan guarantees, and employing advanced market commitments to stimulate domestic manufacturing and derisk private investment. We must learn from the past to protect our future. The window to ensure American dominance and autonomy in robotics is closing and the stakes could not be higher. By acting today, we ensure that the next generation of autonomous systems bolsters rather than threatens the security and resilience of the United States. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Robbins follows:] Prepared Statement of Michael Robbins March 17, 2026 Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Swalwell, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Michael Robbins, and I am the president and chief executive officer of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, or AUVSI, the world's largest industry association representing robotics, uncrewed systems, and autonomous technologies. Our members develop and deploy advanced systems that operate in the air, on the ground, and in the maritime domain across commercial, public safety, and defense applications. Advanced technologies can transform society for the better, improving safety, strengthening resilience, and expanding opportunity. However, these same technologies can also become a direct threat to freedom when serving authoritarian power. The technologies examined in today's hearing, particularly artificial intelligence systems and robotics platforms associated with companies based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) such as DeepSeek and Unitree Robotics, illustrate how emerging technologies can introduce new national security risks when developed within adversary-controlled technology ecosystems. Robotics systems of today are not simply software tools, nor are they the simple robots of the past executing a scripted task. They are networked machines capable of sensing, communicating, and acting in the physical world. When vulnerabilities exist in these systems, the consequences can extend beyond data exposure to surveillance, disruption of infrastructure, and physical operational risk. While consumer-facing, `chat-based' AI has attracted much of the public's attention, physical applications of AI-enabled robotics represent the next frontier. This integration of artificial intelligence technology in modern robotics and autonomous platforms allows for significant leaps in perception, navigation, and decision making. Here in the United States as well as among our allies, AUVSI's members, including Boston Dynamics, testifying with me here today, are at the leading edge of this transformation across the entire robotics technology stack. However, our adversaries--specifically the People's Republic of China--are methodically executing a centrally-planned playbook to capture global market dominance at the direct expense of American industry. Backed by initiatives like ``Made in China 2025'' and fueled by over $137 billion in state investment funds, the PRC is deliberately flooding the global market with artificially cheap, subsidized robotic platforms. This aggressive dumping is designed to systematically undercut U.S. producers--offering systems at a fraction of the cost of American-made counterparts--which starves U.S. companies of the revenue needed to scale domestic industrial capacity and stifles private-sector investment in research and development. Ultimately, this concerted national effort aims to hollow out the U.S. robotics industrial base, creating entrenched technological and industrial dependency while embedding structural cyber-physical vulnerabilities across our critical infrastructure. This convergence between artificial intelligence and robotics is a major technological development. But it also introduces a new category of risk. When AI software systems are embedded in connected physical machines, the result is a cyber-physical system whose vulnerabilities can affect both digital networks and real-world operations. Furthermore, documented vulnerabilities and software back doors, such as those in Unitree Robotics' Go1 robot and DJI's robot vacuums and drones, underscore how real this threat is: these vulnerabilities are not hypothetical, but a real and present threat to homeland security.\1\ \2\ \3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Sam Sabin, ``Chinese Robotics Manufacturer Left Backdoor in Product,'' Axios, April 1, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/01/ threat-spotlight-backdoor-in-chinese-robots-future-of-cybersecurity. \2\ Eric Berger, ``Spanish Engineer Reports Flaw in `Smart' Vacuums After Gaining Control of 7,000 Devices,'' The Guardian, February 24, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/24/spanish-engineer- smart-vacuums-remote-control. \3\ Fortress Information Security, Securing the Skies: Case Study (v1.1), DJI Mini 2 Drone Teardown Exposes Security Risks, 2024, https:/ /8759415.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/8759415/ Securing%20the%20Skies%20%20Case%20Study_v1.1.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Further underscoring the risk to U.S. national security, the PRC is aggressively weaponizing advanced civilian robotics to enhance its military capabilities, a reality that demands immediate Congressional attention. Recent footage released by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) starkly illustrates this threat, including a video ominously titled ``The Robot Dog's Time to Kill Has Come,'' which depicts a Unitree Robotics quadruped equipped with an automatic rifle striking targets with precision. Chinese state media has broadcast joint military exercises featuring these robotic dogs operating alongside armed quadcopters and human troops in urban assault simulations, while recent university-led military training exercises have even deployed robot dogs capable of launching rockets.\4\ To enable the autonomous navigation, terrain mapping, and off-road mobility of these platforms, the PLA frequently pairs these military robots with LiDAR sensors produced by subsidized Chinese firms, including Hesai, a company on the U.S. Department of Defense's 1260H designation as a Chinese military company, but still with deep penetration into the U.S. market.\5\ This rapid battlefield integration is the direct result of Beijing's Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which systematically funnels ostensibly commercial technology through defense-linked universities into the hands of the PLA. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Jane Tang, `` `The Robot Dog's Time to Kill': At China's Star Robotics Firm, the Military Ties Keep Mounting,'' The Brief (Kharon), July 16, 2025, https://www.kharon.com/brief/unitree-robotics-china-pla. \5\ U.S. Department of Defense, ``Notice of Designation of Chinese Military Company,'' Federal Register 89, no. 205 (October 23, 2024): 84547-84548, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/23/2024- 24723/notice-of-designation-of-chinese-military-company. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Crucially, the Chinese commercial robotics firms supplying these systems--such as Unitree--are bolstered by massive state subsidies and protective industrial policies deliberately designed to capture the global market at the direct expense of U.S. industry. By flooding the international market with artificially cheap robotic platforms, the PRC systematically undercuts American producers, starving U.S. companies of the revenue needed to invest in R&D and scale domestic industrial capacity. As these subsidized Chinese firms drive American competitors out of business, they are simultaneously functioning as critical research and development extensions of the PLA. As the PLA advances to the next phase of modern warfare by integrating artificial intelligence into these unmanned systems, we must recognize that allowing PRC dominance in the commercial robotics sector directly underwrites their military modernization, hollowing out U.S. industrial capacity and presenting a profound national security threat. Unfortunately, we have seen this in the United States before in another segment of the autonomous systems industry. The PRC is executing the exact same centrally-planned playbook in the advanced robotics sector that it used to decimate the U.S. commercial drone industry: leveraging massive state subsidies to flood the market with below-cost systems and deliberately drive American manufacturers out of business.\6\ Propelled by initiatives like ``Made in China 2025'' and over $137 billion in state investment funds, subsidized Chinese robotics firms are artificially suppressing prices, starving U.S. companies of the revenue needed to scale domestic capacity, and maintain technological leadership.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), Partnership for Drone Competitiveness White Paper (Arlington, VA: AUVSI, 2025), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/AUVSI- Partnership-for-Drone-Competitiveness-White-Paper.pdf. \7\ Keith Bradsher, ``China Has an Army of Robots on Its Side in the Tariff War,'' The New York Times, April 23, 2025, https:// www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/business/china-tariffs-robots- automation.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This aggressive economic market capture transforms into a dire national security threat when combined with the PRC's sweeping legal framework--including its National Intelligence, Cybersecurity, and Data Security laws--which legally compels all Chinese commercial entities to provide state intelligence services with unfettered access to their data and systems. Because modern robotic platforms are highly-connected cyber-physical systems embedded across our logistics, manufacturing, and defense sectors, allowing PRC market dominance effectively installs Trojan horses, or embedded vulnerabilities, within U.S. critical infrastructure, exposing our Nation to severe risks of data exfiltration, remote operational disruption, and the weaponization of our supply chains during times of conflict. Furthermore, the systematic expropriation of U.S. technology extends beyond hardware into the very foundation of artificial intelligence through industrial-scale ``distillation attacks''. Leading Chinese AI laboratories--including DeepSeek, Moonshot, and MiniMax--are illicitly extracting the capabilities of advanced U.S. models to train their own systems.\8\ By utilizing proxy networks and fraudulent accounts to farm millions of interactions from American models like Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's ChatGPT, these PRC firms acquire frontier AI capabilities at a fraction of the time and cost required for independent development. This theft presents a severe and immediate national security risk: illicitly-distilled Chinese models bypass the critical safety guardrails embedded in U.S. systems, directly enabling authoritarian governments to deploy frontier AI for offensive cyber operations, mass surveillance, and disinformation campaigns. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Anthropic, ``Detecting and Preventing Distillation Attacks,'' Anthropic News, February 23, 2026, https://www.anthropic.com/news/ detecting-and-preventing-distillation-attacks. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Furthermore, as highlighted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, this accelerated development allows China to aggressively export its artificially cheap, open-weight models globally, securing future tech ecosystems in developing economies and fostering international dependence on PRC technology.\9\ DeepSeek is emblematic of how rapidly these capabilities can proliferate when illicit extraction, open weights, and state-driven incentives converge. When these unregulated, illicitly-trained AI ``brains'' are combined with the heavily-subsidized robotics platforms currently flooding the market, they create an unprecedented cyber-physical threat to U.S. national security and economic leadership. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Richard Gray and Michael H. Gary, ``Hedged Bets on the U.S.- China AI Race,'' Charting Geoeconomics (Center for Strategic and International Studies), January 20, 2026, https://www.csis.org/blogs/ charting-geoeconomics/hedged-bets-us-china-ai-race. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We simply cannot allow this dangerous erosion of American industrial capacity and national security to happen, and AUVSI commends the committee for holding this vital hearing to confront these urgent threats and ensure U.S. leadership in advanced robotics. Recognizing both the critical importance of these technologies to the United States' economic competitiveness and national security, as well as the risks associated with insecure or adversary-linked systems, AUVSI recently launched our Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness, an industry initiative focused on strengthening U.S. leadership in robotics and physical artificial intelligence while addressing cybersecurity, supply chain, and national security risks associated with connected robotics systems.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S. Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington, VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/ AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- robotics and physical ai as a homeland security issue As AI-enabled robotics systems become more capable and more widely deployed, they are increasingly operating in highly-sensitive environments with significant implications for homeland security. These include logistics hubs, ports, warehouses, manufacturing facilities, transportation systems, energy infrastructure, public safety operations, and emergency response environments. In these settings, robotics systems are not isolated machines. They are connected cyber-physical platforms that combine sensors, software, networking, cloud connectivity, and physical actuation. They collect data from the surrounding environment, transmit and receive information across networks, and in many cases can be monitored, updated, or controlled remotely. That combination of digital connectivity and real- world physical action is what makes robotics in this context such a pressing homeland security issue. That is what makes the risk posed here so significant: A compromised laptop exposes data; a compromised robot can expose data and move, map, surveil, disrupt operations, or create physical hazards. With advanced sensors used in these systems, including Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) sensors, the data exposed itself presents a unique risk: data vulnerabilities might mean a highly-detailed three- dimensional map of critical infrastructure or other sensitive sites. Moreover, because these systems interface with the physical world, a compromised robot could present a physical threat in myriad ways: cyber-physical risk in connected robotics systems Modern robotics systems should be understood as connected cyber- physical platforms that combine software, communications networks, sensors, and physical machines capable of interacting directly with real-world environments. As these systems become more advanced, they increasingly rely on cloud connectivity, remote monitoring, over-the- air software updates, and continuous data collection to support performance improvements, predictive maintenance, and adaptive learning. While these capabilities provide important operational benefits, they also expand the attack surface associated with robotics systems and introduce new forms of cyber-physical risk. In practical terms, these risks generally fall into 3 categories: First, robotics systems create data exposure risks. Connected robots routinely collect detailed operational data from the environments in which they operate. This can include facility layouts, movement patterns, environmental sensing data, workflow information, and records of human-machine interaction. Over time, aggregated data from these systems can reveal sensitive insights about infrastructure operations, logistics networks, and industrial processes. Second, robotics platforms create remote disruption risks. If vulnerabilities exist in software, firmware, communications links, or cloud management tools, these systems may be susceptible to unauthorized observation, manipulation, or loss of control. Because robotics platforms operate in the physical world, a cyber compromise can translate directly into physical consequences, including disruption of operations or interference with safety-critical environments. Third, connected robotics systems can create persistent access risks through update and support pathways. Many systems rely on remote software updates, cloud services, and vendor- managed diagnostics throughout their life cycle. When those pathways remain accessible after deployment, they can create long-term dependencies on external software environments and provide on-going access points into operational systems. Recent incidents illustrate these risks in concrete terms. Security researchers identified an undocumented access pathway in a Unitree Go1 quadruped robot that allowed remote access to camera feeds and control functions without user authorization, demonstrating how hidden vulnerabilities in connected robotics platforms can enable both surveillance and system takeover.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Dave Lawler, ``Threat Spotlight: Backdoor Found in Chinese Robots,'' Axios, April 1, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/04/01/ threat-spotlight-backdoor-in-chinese-robots-future-of-cybersecurity. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The potential implications of these technologies have also drawn bipartisan concern in Congress. In 2025, members of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party warned that robotics platforms, such as those produced by Unitree, could present surveillance and national security risks if deployed within sensitive U.S. institutions and infrastructure environments. The committee also urged that Unitree be accordingly designated as Chinese Military Companies under 1260H of the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.\12\ It is notable that when the Department of Defense briefly updated the 1260H list in February 2026, Unitree Robotics was listed, however the list was rapidly taken down after posting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, ``Trojan Horse Tech: Select Committee Sounds Alarm on CCP Robots Inside U.S. Institutions,'' press release, May 7, 2025, https:// chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/trojan-horse-tech- select-committee-sounds-alarm-on-ccp-robots-inside-us-institutions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- sensor risk, lidar, and sensitive infrastructure mapping Modern robotics and autonomous systems rely on integrated sensing suites that may include cameras, radar, and LiDAR to perceive and navigate their environments. These sensing technologies allow machines to identify obstacles, understand spatial relationships, and operate safely alongside people and other equipment. Among these technologies, LiDAR merits particular attention because of its ability to generate high-resolution, three-dimensional representations of physical environments. In robotics and autonomous systems, LiDAR supports localization, mapping, obstacle detection, and coordinated autonomous behavior. These capabilities allow robotic systems to move through complex environments, build detailed maps of their surroundings, and perform tasks with increasing levels of autonomy.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S. Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington, VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/ AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, the same capabilities that make LiDAR valuable for robotics applications can also introduce security concerns when deployed in sensitive environments. It is almost certainly for this reason that a LiDAR sensor was used by Chinese intelligence in an attempt to map a U.S. military installation in the Philippines.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Jack Burnham and Johanna Yang, ``Philippines Busts Chinese Spy Ring Targeting U.S. and Allied Military Infrastructure,'' Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 3, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/ analysis/2025/02/03/philippines-busts-chinese-spy-ring-targeting-u-s- and-allied-military-infrastructure/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Because LiDAR sensors continuously generate precise spatial data, they can produce highly-accurate digital maps of the environments in which they operate. In industrial or infrastructure settings, this may include facility layouts, equipment locations, operational workflows, and patterns of movement within a site. Over time, aggregated data from these sensors can provide detailed insight into how facilities function and how sensitive environments are structured. Where LiDAR-enabled systems are deployed in factories, ports, logistics hubs, transportation nodes, energy infrastructure, warehouses, or public safety environments, they can generate persistent spatial awareness of locations that may be commercially sensitive, operationally sensitive, or nationally sensitive.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Foundation for Defense of Democracies Action, ``Policy Alert: Urgent U.S. Response Needed to Counter China's Strategic Use of LiDAR Technology,'' September 23, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/09/ 23/urgent-us-response-needed-to-counter-chinas-strategic-use-of-lidar- technology/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These concerns are not hypothetical. In June 2025, AUVSI wrote to New York State and city officials warning about potential security risks associated with LiDAR sensors manufactured by Livox, a Chinese company owned by DJI, after such sensors were observed deployed at JFK International Airport and Penn Station in New York City.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), Letter Regarding Security Risks of Livox LiDAR Deployments at JFK Airport and Penn Station, March 2026, https://www.auvsi.org/wp- content/uploads/2026/03/AUVSI-Livox_JFK_PennStation.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As described in that letter, LiDAR sensors can collect detailed real-time spatial data that could reveal sensitive information about transportation infrastructure, security postures, and crowd flow patterns if compromised or accessed by adversaries. In this case, these sensors were deployed in a static setting, affixed to certain points at these facilities; deployed in a dynamic setting, such as on a robotic platform, further compounds the threat. structural and jurisdictional risk in networked robotics systems Cyber-physical risk in robotics systems cannot be evaluated solely through the lens of individual software vulnerabilities or hardware components. Instead, these risks must be understood within a broader geopolitical and legal context of supply chains, software dependencies, and data flows. Modern robotics platforms are not stand-alone machines. They are networked cyber-physical systems that often rely on cloud services, data streams, remote diagnostics, and software updates delivered throughout the operational life of the system. These features provide important operational benefits but also create on-going connections between deployed machines and the vendors responsible for maintaining them, such as on-going software and firmware updates, data storage, and even remote access. Accordingly, China's legal and regulatory framework governing technology companies must be considered when evaluating the security implications of connected robotics platforms. Unitree Robotics and DeepSeek, like any Chinese company, operate within the legal system of the People's Republic of China. Under China's national security laws, these companies can be, and are, compelled to operate functionally as an instrument of Chinese Communist Party (CCP).\17\ \18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ Chun Han Wong, ``China Adopts Sweeping National Security Law,'' The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/ articles/china-adopts-sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589. \18\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity Guideance: Chinese-Manufactured Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), January 17, 2024, https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-01/Cybersecurity%20- Guidance%20Chinese-Manufactured%20UAS.pdf --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A series of national security and data governance laws, including the National Intelligence Law, Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law, collectively establish an environment in which companies operating within China's technology sector may be required to cooperate with state intelligence and security authorities and provide access to relevant data, systems, or technical capabilities.\19\ The National Intelligence Law mandates that all citizens and organizations must assist and cooperate with national intelligence work when requested. This provision establishes a legal obligation for companies to comply with intelligence-related directives issued by state authorities whatever they may be. This is further entrenched by China's Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law which establish mechanisms through which government authorities may require access to data, technical systems, or other information under the control of companies operating within China's technology ecosystem. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), Partnership for Robotics Competitiveness: Securing U.S. Leadership in Robotics and Physical Artificial Intelligence (Arlington, VA: AUVSI, 2026), https://www.auvsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/ AUVSI-PFRC-Whitepaper.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These legal obligations create structural pathways through which operational data or system access could become available to the Chinese state. As a result, risks associated with connected robotics platforms are not limited to technical vulnerabilities alone; they are also shaped by the legal jurisdiction governing the companies that design, manufacture, and maintain those systems. In this case, the laws promulgated by the CCP. In the context of connected robotics systems, where cloud services, telemetry data, remote diagnostics, software updates, and continuous data collection are core operational features, these authorities create structural pathways through which operational data or system access could be obtained by the state. Cyber-physical risk exposure in robotics systems is not neutral across suppliers but rather is greatly shaped by the legal framework governing the companies that develop, maintain, and support the technology. Accordingly, the risks posed here are not normal cybersecurity risks but rather a potential vector for nation-state- level cyber warfare enabled by Chinese law and civil-military fusion. Knowing this, it is therefore crucial that policy action be taken to address the serious and unique threat posed by PRC-based companies across the entire robotics technology stack. economic competition and supply chain risk in robotics Beyond cybersecurity considerations, robotics must also be understood through the lens of global economic competition and industrial policy. Advanced robotics systems depend on complex supply chains that include rare-earth magnets, electric motors, batteries, precision actuators, sensors, semiconductors, and specialized software systems. These components are deeply integrated into robotics platforms and are not easily interchangeable. Over the past 2 decades, the People's Republic of China has pursued a coordinated national strategy to build dominance across many of these enabling technologies. Through unprecedented subsidies, preferential financing, industrial planning, and coordinated investment, Chinese firms have rapidly expanded production capacity across multiple layers of the robotics technology stack. At the national level, China's top economic planning agency announced a 1 trillion yuan (roughly $137 billion) venture capital fund dedicated to robotics, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies. This is compounded at the local level by municipal governments and state-backed hedge funds, including a $14 billion robotics and AI fund in Beijing and a $77 million embodied AI fund in Shanghai. Furthermore, China's government- controlled banks have increased industrial lending by a staggering $1.9 trillion over the past 4 years to bankroll factory construction and robotic automation.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ Keith Bradsher, ``China Has an Army of Robots on Its Side in the Tariff War,'' The New York Times, April 23, 2025, https:// www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/business/china-tariffs-robots- automation.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These efforts are closely tied to China's Military-Civil Fusion strategy, which explicitly seeks to integrate civilian technological innovation with national defense and intelligence objectives. State- backed firms operating with this massive, multi-tiered financial backing can aggressively dump products at artificially suppressed prices, placing market-based American companies at a severe structural disadvantage. Over time, this deliberate strategy leads to market capture, supply chain concentration, and dangerous technological dependency. We have seen this exact centrally-planned playbook executed before in the commercial drone industry, where sustained dumping by heavily- subsidized Chinese firms like DJI decimated the U.S. drone manufacturing base and left our Nation dangerously dependent on adversary-linked technology. Fortunately, we still have a critical window of opportunity to stop this from happening to the robotics industry. However, if we fail to act before PRC market dominance hardens into structural dependence, U.S. and allied companies will be forced out of the global market by these unfair trade practices, leading to the wide-spread deployment of unsecure robotic systems that amount to a global back door into our critical infrastructure. policy steps congress can take now As robotics and autonomous systems become increasingly embedded in infrastructure, logistics, manufacturing, and public safety environments, policy makers must consider how these technologies intersect with cybersecurity, supply chain integrity, and infrastructure protection. Accordingly, AUVSI urges Congress to consider several policy priorities: Congress should support the development of a coordinated national strategy for robotics and physical artificial intelligence. Robotics is rapidly becoming foundational infrastructure for modern economies and future military operations, yet the United States lacks a comprehensive Federal strategy guiding policy across research, manufacturing, deployment, workforce development, and supply chain security. Bipartisan legislation introduced this Congress, such as the National Robotics Commission Act (H.R. 7334), introduced by Congressman Jay Obernolte (CA-23) and Congresswoman Jennifer McClellan (VA-03), would take crucial steps toward a national strategy by working to align Federal efforts, set measurable goals, and ensure sustained U.S. leadership in this strategically important technology domain. Leadership in advanced robotics is essential for sustaining the American workforce. Rather than replacing human labor, robotics augment our workforce, addressing persistent labor shortages, improving occupational safety by taking over hazardous tasks, and keeping U.S. manufacturing globally competitive. AUVSI explicitly calls for a comprehensive National Robotics Strategy that prioritizes robust workforce development programs. By pairing these initiatives with workforce development tax credits, we can offset the costs of training workers for the robotics age, transitioning the American workforce toward higher-skilled programming, system integration, and maintenance roles that command higher wages. Congress should build on recent work addressing adversary- linked uncrewed ground vehicles, including robotics, in Federal procurement. AUVSI was active in supporting the inclusion of a provision in House version of the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act which would have prohibited Federal procurement of uncrewed ground vehicles produced by foreign countries of concern, such as the PRC. This would have restricted government procurement of any uncrewed ground system--from small multipurpose robots to large autonomous vehicles. Beyond managing the serious risks posed by deployment of these systems by the Federal Government, Federal procurement policies play a powerful role in shaping emerging technology markets. Accordingly, we urge Congress to take up this measure again as a stand-alone bill as well as in this year's National Defense Authorization Act. Congress should continue advancing risk-based restrictions on adversary-linked technologies deployed in infrastructure environments. Legislation such as the Securing Infrastructure from Adversaries Act (H.R. 4802/S. 4000) reflects serious risks posed by foreign-adversary made LiDAR sensors embedded within sensitive operational environments. Robotics systems, sensors, and related technologies produced within adversary-controlled ecosystems introduce surveillance vulnerabilities, data exposure risks, and persistent access pathways into critical infrastructure systems. Establishing clear authorities to evaluate and restrict the deployment of adversary-linked technologies in critical infrastructure environments represents an important step toward protecting the security and integrity of the Nation's operational systems. Policy makers should continue examining the security implications of key enabling technologies used in robotics and autonomous systems. Technologies such as advanced sensing systems, including LiDAR, are foundational to the operation of modern robotics platforms. At the same time, their ability to generate detailed spatial and environmental data raises important security considerations when deployed in sensitive environments. The SAFE LiDAR Act (H.R. 6576) represents an important effort to address these risks by evaluating the national security implications associated with certain LiDAR technologies and by promoting greater transparency into the supply chains behind these systems. Beyond this, we urge Congress to consider similar measures across the robotics technology stack. Addressing the cyber-physical risks requires not only restricting unsafe technologies but also accelerating the growth of trusted alternatives. Congress should prioritize strengthening the U.S. robotics industrial base and building secure allied supply chains for critical technologies. Congress should support policies that expand U.S. robotics manufacturing, use Federal procurement and demand signals to support trusted systems, and encourage private investment in domestic production to build resilient supply chains for critical robotics components; including sensors, batteries, rare earth magnets, and advanced electronics. Taken together, these efforts represent important early steps toward developing a broader policy framework for addressing cyber- physical risk in robotics and autonomous systems. By proactively addressing these issues now, Congress can help ensure that robotics technologies strengthen U.S. infrastructure, economic competitiveness, and national security rather than introducing new vulnerabilities into the systems that underpin the Nation's economy and public safety operations. conclusion The issues raised by companies such as DeepSeek and Unitree Robotics reflect a broader challenge as robotics, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems become increasingly embedded across the U.S. economy and critical infrastructure. These technologies are rapidly becoming foundational to logistics networks, manufacturing systems, transportation infrastructure, energy operations, and public safety environments. While they offer significant benefits in productivity, efficiency, and safety, their growing integration into the physical world also means that vulnerabilities in these systems, or in the ecosystems that produce them, can introduce serious risks to both national security and economic resilience. The threat posed by PRC-linked robotics companies must be understood within this broader context. These firms operate within a state-directed system that combines aggressive industrial policy, supply chain consolidation, and legal obligations to cooperate with state intelligence authorities. When robotics platforms produced within this ecosystem are deployed in sensitive environments, the risks extend beyond ordinary cybersecurity concerns to include potential surveillance, exposure of sensitive operational data, and persistent access to critical infrastructure systems. At the same time, sustained subsidies and coordinated industrial strategies can enable these companies to capture global markets, creating technological dependencies that are difficult to reverse once systems are widely deployed. For the United States, the challenge is therefore both a security issue and a strategic economic one. Ensuring that robotics systems deployed across our infrastructure and industries are secure, trusted, and developed within resilient supply chains will be essential to protecting both national security and long-term technological leadership. By recognizing the strategic implications of robotics and taking proactive steps to address the risks posed by adversary-linked technologies, Congress can help ensure that the next generation of robotics strengthens, rather than undermines, the security, resilience, and competitiveness of the United States. AUVSI and our members stand ready to work with Congress and Federal agencies to support that effort. Mr. Fong. Thank you, Mr. Robbins. I now recognize Dr. Doshi for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. STATEMENT OF RUSH DOSHI, PH.D., C.V. STARR SENIOR FELLOW FOR ASIA STUDIES AND DIRECTOR OF THE CHINA STRATEGY INITIATIVE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS Mr. Doshi. Thank you. Chairman Fong, Ranking Member Walkinshaw, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My core argument today is simple: AI and robotics are changing the global balance of power. China has moved faster and achieved more than most Americans realize, but we still have advantages. The question before this subcommittee is whether we will use them before China pulls too far ahead. I'd like to structure my testimony to answer 4 questions. First, what are China's objectives in AI and robotics? The Chinese Communist Party aims to catch up and surpass the West. It believes there have been 4 industrial revolutions that determine the fate of nations. The first was steam power, which brought British dominance. The second was electrification. The third was mass manufacturing, which brought American dominance. Now we're in the fourth, quantum, biotech, and, of course, robotics and AI, which China is determined to win, not just for the sake of prosperity, but for the sake of relative power. That brings me to a second question. How is China doing? In robotics, China increasingly is winning. In 2024, Chinese factories installed roughly 300,000 new industrial robots. American factories installed 30,000. Today there are now more than 2 million industrial robots working in Chinese factories. In the United States, the number is one-fifth that. China is investing in the future. It's pulling ahead in research publications and patent filings and pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into the robotics sector. Just 10 years ago, China imported three-quarters of its industrial robots. So how did all this happen so quickly? Part of it is because China is the world's greatest manufacturer, with 2 times our share of global manufacturing. But a lot of it is because of sustained government focus. China acquired robotics know-how from German companies like KUKA. It protected its home market. It then launched a decade of industrial policy programs, like Made in China 2025, to dominate the sector. This year alone, China may spend $400 billion on industrial policy. The U.S. CHIPS and Science Act, by comparison, provided $50 billion over multiple years. In AI the story is more complex. China has made AI an industrial policy priority for more than a decade. It's the only country that rivals the United States. Many of its open- source models are on top lists for key benchmarks and it's diffusing those models throughout society. But America is still ahead at the frontier. Unlike in robotics, where China's manufacturing advantages pay rich dividends, China's progress in AI relies on access to compute. That is access to advanced AI chips. China's own AI companies openly admit this and reports show that U.S. chips are 4 to 5 times better. They may soon be 17 times better in the next 2 years that the United States has a growing share of global compute. If we surrender this advantage, we will probably fall behind. China has more energy. It added 8 times more power to the grid last year than we did. It has more talent. But for now, it has less compute. That leads me to a third question. What are the risks of falling behind in robotics and AI? Let me offer 3. First, robotics will be critical to manufacturing. If we lose robotics the way we lost solar panels and batteries and EVs, we will hollow out our American manufacturing ecosystem and become even more dependent on China. We've seen that in rare earth minerals and magnets. It's not wise to put ourselves in that position of dependency. Second, China's National Intelligence Law, its counterespionage law, require Chinese companies to cooperate with Chinese intelligence and not disclose that fact to others. That creates espionage risks. These robots are equipped with LiDAR systems, microphones, and cameras that make them mobile surveillance platforms. Already, Unitree's quadruped robots have been shown to have back-door camera access. Its humanoid robots transmit data back to China every 5 minutes. But espionage is not the only risk. Last year I testified before this committee on how China was pre-positioning for destructive cyber attack on American power, gas, water, telecom, and transportation infrastructure. We simply cannot employ robots in sensitive facilities from the very country that is targeting those facilities. A third and final risk is that AI and robotics are dual- use. China is using American AI tools to launch cyber attacks. It's incorporating armed robots into military exercises. If we fall behind, it means our deterrence will be less effective. Which leads me to the question of what we should do. First, we should extend the ICTS framework that we apply to connected vehicles to cover PRC robots. That limits their importation unless China addresses key vulnerabilities. Second, we should direct CISA to audit where robots and AI models are deployed in critical infrastructure so we know the risks that we face. Third, we should prohibit Federal agencies and Federal contractors from procuring PRC robotic systems or AI systems. We currently treat American AI companies, like Anthropic, with more regulatory scrutiny than we treat Chinese ones, like DeepSeek. Fourth, we should maintain and strengthen semiconductor export controls, the one advantage we retain in AI, and limit remote access and smuggling. Finally, we should build allies' scale to rival China's scale in the sector. That means better terms for allies and partners than for Beijing. It gives us a chance to bring down costs and reduce China dependence. China believes this is a pivotal moment. They're probably right. We should believe it, too. With that, thank you and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Doshi follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Fong. Thank you, Dr. Doshi. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. My first question goes to you, Mr. Fenkell. Many American start-ups and developers are beginning to build on Chinese open models, like DeepSeek, because they appear highly capable and are offered at extremely low costs. We have seen this strategy before. Chinese companies, like DJI, use aggressive pricing and rapid deployment to dominate the global drone market, which made it extremely difficult for American companies to compete. Unlike the drone sector, however, the United States already has leading AI developers that are building highly-capable frontier models. Do you see Chinese AI companies attempting to follow a similar strategy with models like DeepSeek by rapidly expanding global adoption in order to capture market share before trusted alternatives can compete? Mr. Fenkell. Thank you for that question. Yes, simply, I think as we've seen play out in AI, the diffusion of the technology will ultimately win out. I think for the last year or so we've believed it's been a model-based adoption. I think we're shifting into a belief of a tech stack-based adoption. So when you look at the AI tech stack, it fundamentally is made up of compute, data, model, and applications. I think we've seen people begin to recognize in order to really win on AI, you have to win on the tech stack, which ultimately solves a hard problem. We've seen China look to imitate their Belt and Road Initiative, their Digital Silk Road Initiative to ensure that their models are winning across the world. It's imperative, and we spoke about it in our testimony, that the United States not only counters this, but wins on it. That's why we feel really strongly that the Exporting American AI Tech Stack Executive Order is a critical path forward on this that must be codified and resourced. Then we as industry have to do everything we can to bring our technology to the world. Mr. Fong. So as a follow-up question, but in terms of censorship and information control by DeepSeek, researchers and journalists have found that DeepSeek censors its own answers in real time, deleting responses and related topics, like Tiananmen Square, Taiwan, or criticism of the Chinese Communist Party. In some cases, the model initially generates accurate information, but then erases it and replaces it with a different answer. What risks arise when an AI system that may reflect the information controls and propaganda narratives of an authoritarian government become widely used around the world? Mr. Fenkell. I believe there are a number of different risks associated with it. What we've seen is that in order to release a model in China, you have to pass a test, essentially adhering to those laws that you referenced. I think Scale as a company is now doing more AI evaluations than nearly anyone else and we evaluate all of the world's leading models to better understand their capabilities. AI evaluation is an amazing tool for this. It's really important, though, that we're putting models out to the world that we believe have democratic values and ideals and uphold American values. That's, again, why it's important that we not only match, but exceed China's intensity in diffusing our tech globally. Mr. Fong. Thank you. Mr. Malchano, unlike traditional internet of things devices, robots are not just collecting data. They are physical machines capable of movement and interaction with the environment. If a malicious actor gained control of a connected robot operating in a sensitive environment, such as a research laboratory, industrial facility, or transportation hub, what kinds of physical or operational risks could arise? Mr. Malchano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those risks are very similar to the kinds of risks that would happen if you allowed someone into your environment that was a hostile person. Right? So that robot could go around, manipulate things, look at things. To make that very realistic, if you had an assembly line, that robot could destroy the assembly line or otherwise take malicious photos of materials going through. So in many ways, a robot represents a kind of risk that is beyond the passive risks of IoT devices if compromised. Mr. Fong. Thank you. Mr. Robbins, we have already seen what can happen when Chinese technology rapidly dominates critical markets, like I mentioned with DJI drones. What lessons should policy makers take from that experience when thinking about AI systems, robotics platforms, and autonomous technologies developed by Chinese companies? Mr. Robbins. Yes, thank you for that question, Mr. Fong. The No. 1 lesson is don't wait 'til the problem is upon us and we get behind. Take action now to level the playing field for U.S. robotics and AI companies and autonomy companies so they can compete globally on a level playing field now instead of having to fight from behind like American drone companies are doing today. There are policy actions Congress can take, there's actions the Executive branch can take now with existing authorities to level the playing field. We spell those out in our partnerships for robotics competitors' white paper. Mr. Fong. Let me throw this out to everyone. But in terms of procurement, should Congress consider a policy similar to existing restrictions on Huawei or DJI, where certain Chinese technologies are prohibited from procurement by Federal agencies? I got 15 seconds, so maybe I just open it up to everybody. Mr. Doshi. Absolutely, yes. Mr. Robbins. Yes. Mr. Malchano. Yes, in line with the things that is done in the past with DJI. Mr. Fenkell. Yes. Mr. Fong. Thank you. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for his 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses. Really powerful opening statements. I want to start just on international collaboration and supply chains. We know and you all ably outlined the ways in which the PRC's threats pose a significant challenge not just to the United States, but to our allies around the world. While we have significant resources and capabilities that perhaps we need to do a better job of bringing to bear, our allies also have resources and manufacturing capabilities and supply chain capabilities that could help us in this effort. Dr. Doshi, your testimony discusses the importance of working with allies like Japan to develop alternative supply chains to avoid reliance on the PRC. Can you just elaborate on the importance and maybe the opportunity of international collaboration in combating PRC supply chain risk? How can we ensure that our policies are implemented in conjunction with key allies and partners around the globe? Mr. Doshi. Well, thank you very much for the question, Ranking Member Walkinshaw. Let me begin with one quick point, which is that China outscales the United States when it comes to manufacturing. They are two times American manufacturing value-added. How do you deal with a competitor that outscales you in manufacturing? The only way is to add up American manufacturing with allied manufacturing. Collectively, that block completely outscales China. So what I'd like to see is a preferential system, a trading block, if you will, among allies, where we lowered the barriers to each other and raise them against China, so that we have that chance to sell to each other and build scale within our own collective market. Right now, there are allies like Japan which dominate key inputs for the robotics industry. We should help those companies succeed. Maybe they can set up plants in the United States, but either way, if those companies disappear, then the only game left in town for the robotics supply chain is China, which we simply cannot allow. Mr. Ranking Member, we've seen this story in industry after industry. We're seeing it in cars, we're seeing it in pharmaceuticals, we're seeing it in biotech. We don't want to see it in robotics because it is a critical enabling technology. So one way we could do this kind of collaboration, in addition to tariff-based or trade-based policy, is regulatory policy. We have a tool, the ICTS tool, which basically allows us to prohibit or import control certain finished products from foreign countries that are threats and connected to our networks. We can align that regulatory tool with our allies and partners and create a bit of a wall that keeps certain Chinese products out and gives ourselves and our friends time to rebuild. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Anyone else with a thought on that? Mr. Robbins, you looked antsy there. Mr. Robbins. No, I gave a speech last May where I quoted a very smart individual where I noted that if our authoritarian rivals can work together to undermine democracy, then democratic rivals must work together to protect democracy, and that person was Dr. Rush Doshi. So I completely agree with what Rush said. We have an I at the end of our name. We work very aggressively to enhance partnerships with international democratic allies, like Taiwan, like Japan, and Europe, and throughout the world. That is really the key to the future of the robotics and autonomy and AI industry, is ensuring that American leads and that Western values are driving this technology forward. But as Rush said, we're stronger when we do that together and we work with our Western allies on this front. Mr. Walkinshaw. Dr. Doshi, your written statement referenced extending export controls to inference chips. I want to give Mr. Fenkell and Mr. Malchano a quick opportunity to describe for us, why are inference chips so critical when it comes to robotics relative to training chips? What is the distinction? Why is it relevant to robotics? Mr. Malchano. So training chips are relevant to robotics in order to train, but in terms of what is deployed inside the robot is a different kind of chip, an embedded processor designed to be able to run ML applications quickly at a low power state inside of a robot. Those chips are just as important and exist one per each robot that you build. So although America is doing a good job of thinking about the plans with regards to the chips used for training, we would encourage also thinking about inference chips as are distributed in a vended context. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Mr. Fenkell, anything on that, training versus inference chips? Mr. Fenkell. Nothing to add specifically. I think he covered it. I do think, getting back to the allies point, there's two sides where ally cooperation is very important. One is diffusion of the technology stack, and we've spoken about that already. The second is on standards collaboration. I think we look at the Center for AI Standards and Innovation, the U.S. CAISI, which is housed at the Department of Commerce. There are also AI safety institutes and security institutes around the world. It's critical that we're working together on the measurement science for these technologies because, ultimately, what we saw in 5G is China began to win that race when they won on standards. On AI, those standards are currently being written and it's critical that they're being written by America and Western ideal countries. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. Maybe we will do one more round of questions then before we conclude this hearing. I wanted to follow up on the last question I asked in terms of procurement. You certainly all answered in the affirmative that we should have a policy restricting certain technologies from procurement by Federal agencies. I wanted to ask about the supply chain then in that aspect. China has spent years positioning itself at key points in global technology supply chains. In a geopolitical crisis, what technology supply chain choke points could China potentially exploit to pressure the United States or our allies? How do we go about this? I will open that question to all of the panelists and leave that to you, Jay, how you guys want to answer it. Mr. Fenkell. Yes, maybe I'll start with the data portion of it. Obviously, Scale is one of the leading companies working on providing training and evaluation data to nearly every frontier AI lab, as well as the robotics industry today. We work with a number of robotics companies and have done over 250,000 hours of robotics data to those companies. What we've seen today, though, is still China owns 90 percent of the commercially- available AI data market for robotics. Obviously the cost is much higher at about 60 percent. So that is a massive dependency on the Chinese supply chain. Obviously, during a geopolitical context, that can become an issue. Mr. Fong. You said 90 percent? Mr. Fenkell. That's based off our internal estimates, yes. So what we've seen is that a geopolitical context, that's a big issue. So in our testimony, we've asked the national security apparatus to begin to look into this dependency and then also not only counter, but exceed their intensity on data. They're outspending us tremendously. They value this far greater. So as we look at it, every Federal data asset should be made AI-ready. Every asset that can be open-source should be open-source. Then, ultimately, we have to value data as a critical part of the supply chain. Mr. Robbins. Yes. I'll just add, sir, that in my--as I said in my opening statement, it has to be a policy of both carrots and sticks. You asked previously about the restrictions, and that's an absolutely critical piece of the, getting this right. There also have to be incentives to scale domestic manufacturing to break some of those critical chokeholds. One good example where there is some good work being done right now is in the area of rare earth magnets. We experienced this in real time in our industry last year, in May, when China began throttling export controls on rare earth magnets as part of the broader trade war with China and the United States. That was sending shock waves through our industry because, as I mentioned in my critical statement, without those rare earth magnets, we're not building robots, we're not building drones. We're also not building Columbia class submarines or F-35s. It is a critical dependency on China. So in the United States, companies like Vulcan Elements have worked with the U.S. Government to leverage existing tools, like the Office of Strategic Capital and leftover funds from the CHIPS Act, to drive scaling manufacturing here in the United States. We need to double down on that in a significant way, both in that industry as well as other industries as well, including in batteries, in lithium and graphite, some of the critical minerals that make up batteries as well. Mr. Fong. Thank you, sir. Mr. Doshi. Mr. Chairman, I'll just add one quick point. I agree with what Mr. Robbins said. Right now, if we were to just do a blanket prohibition on Chinese robots, it would be effective in securing elements of our national security. Of course, those robots are cheaper than the ones that we make here at home. So the question then is, what do we do about that price differential? That is where the government has to step in and provide a solid industrial policy framework to help drive this industry. Let's just look at the historical record. Again, 10 years ago, China was not a leader in robotics. They did not have-- they were importing most of their industrial robots, more than 65 percent. Today they produce those robots at home. The way they did that was a careful combination of market restrictions and market access protection combined with industrial policy. So some combination of those tools will have to be in our toolkit going forward. Mr. Malchano. I'd just like to add that the supply chain for robotics is very broad and involves many high-tech areas, which is all a reason for us to consider the national strategy as a way to create a central point of contact for both sides of that supply chain to interact with the U.S. Government and figure out the best ways to make that move forward on American soil. Mr. Fong. Then on that note, is it possible then, I mean the phrase ``decouple,'' but is it possible to nearshore or decouple from China in the context of supply chain? Mr. Robbins. It is possible. It will take time and it requires, as the other witness said, a concerted national strategy. If we go about this in a sort-of one-off way here and there, we won't get there. We won't get there in time. Mr. Doshi. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one point. China still has its own dependencies in its robotic supply chain, dependencies not just on our chips, but on certain products manufactured in Japan. So when we think about the overall supply chain, we should think where do we have advantages and choke points that we can harness? Where do the Chinese have choke points and how do we mitigate those choke points? Mr. Fong. Any of the other two, do you have anything to add? You want to jump in? Mr. Fenkell. I think the only thing I'd add to that is as we look at the supply chain, we have to recognize all aspects of it. We typically focus on the platform-based aspects of it. Obviously from the scale side, we definitely would recommend that we also include the data supply chain in there, just given that AI, ultimately, is only as good as the data that it's trained on. Mr. Malchano. I'd also just add that in terms of a national strategy, demand-side activities, like encouraging the additional use of robots in the Federal Government as well as incentivizing people to adapt robots and adopt their industries for the coming high-tech future, are all key ways for us to push that supply chain to produce on American soil. Mr. Fong. Thank you. Well, I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony and for the questions from the Ranking Member. Critically important short-term, long-term challenges that we need to address and we need to take care of these issues in real time. So thank you for your expertise. Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [all]