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- A NEW DAY AT THE SEC: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY, DUE PROCESS, AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE [House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] A NEW DAY AT THE SEC: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY, DUE PROCESS, AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 4, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-55 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-862 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Chairman BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan, Vice MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking Chairman Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas, Vice PETE SESSIONS, Texas Ranking Member ANN WAGNER, Missouri NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York ANDY BARR, Kentucky BRAD SHERMAN, California ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York TOM EMMER, Minnesota DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio AL GREEN, Texas JOHN W. ROSE, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut WILLIAM R. TIMMONS, IV, South BILL FOSTER, Illinois Carolina JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana JUAN VARGAS, California RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey DANIEL MEUSER, Pennsylvania VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas YOUNG KIM, California SEAN CASTEN, Illinois BYRON DONALDS, Florida AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin RITCHIE TORRES, New York MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia MICHAEL LAWLER, New York BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa SAM LICCARDO, California LISA McCLAIN, Michigan MARIA SALAZAR, Florida TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida TIM MOORE, North Carolina Ben Johnson, Staff Director ------ SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS ANN WAGNER, Missouri, Chairman ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York, BRAD SHERMAN, California, Vice Chairman Ranking Member FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DAVID SCOTT, Georgia PETE SESSIONS, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio JUAN VARGAS, California BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey MARLIN STUTZMAN, Indiana VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas MICHAEL LAWLER, New York SEAN CASTEN, Illinois ANDREW OGLES, Tennessee EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts LISA McCLAIN, Michigan CLEO FIELDS, Louisiana MARIA SALAZAR, Florida JANELLE BYNUM, Oregon TROY DOWNING, Montana MIKE HARIDOPOLOS, Florida C O N T E N T S ---------- Wednesday, February 4, 2026 OPENING STATEMENTS Page Hon. Ann Wagner, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from Missouri................... 1 Hon. Brad Sherman, Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, a U.S. Representative from California................. 3 STATEMENTS Hon. French Hill, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, a U.S. Representative from Arkansas.................. 4 WITNESSES Mr. Peter Chan, Partner, Baker Mckenzie.......................... 4 Prepared Statement........................................... 7 Mr. Alexander Cohen, Partner & Co-Chair of the National Office, Latham & Watkins............................................... 25 Prepared Statement........................................... 26 Mr. Chris Iacovella, President and Chief Executive Officer, American Securities Association (ASA).......................... 34 Prepared Statement........................................... 36 Mr. Ben Schiffrin, Director of Securities Policy, Better Markets. 47 Prepared Statement........................................... 49 APPENDIX ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD LEGISLATION H.R. 3318, the SEC Modernization Act............................. 90 H.R. 216, the Securities Enforcement Clarity Act of 2025......... 93 H.R. ----, the SEC Reform and Restructuring Act.................. 99 H.R. ----, the SEC Regulatory Accountability Act................. 130 H.R. ----, the SEC Cybersecurity Act............................. 140 H.R. ----, the SEC Transparency Act.............................. 142 H.R. ----, the Review the Expansion of Government (REG) Act...... 144 H.R. ----, the SEC Regulatory Evaluation, Verification, and Integrity of Effective Workflows (REVIEW) Act.................. 148 H.R. ----, the Streamlining Public Company Accounting Oversight Act............................................................ 153 H.R. ----, a bill to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek disgorgement, and for other purposes....................................................... 164 H.R. ----, a bill to amend the securities laws to codify certain disqualification waiver processes, and for other purposes...... 167 H.R. ----, a bill to require the Comptroller General of the United States to carry out a study regarding major rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission...................... 173 H.R. ----, a bill to establish a minimum public comment period with respect to proposed rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission............................................ 176 H.R. ----, a bill to require the Director of the Office of International Affairs of the Securities and Exchange Commission to semiannually report to Congress with respect to discussions with international securities standard setting bodies.......... 178 A NEW DAY AT THE SEC: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY, DUE PROCESS, AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE ---------- Wednesday, February 4, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ann Wagner [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Wagner, Garbarino, Lucas, Davidson, Steil, Stutzman, Ogles, McClain, Downing, Haridopolos, Hill, Sherman, Vargas, Casten, Waters, and Bynum. Chairwoman Wagner. The Subcommittee on Capital Markets will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. Today's hearing is titled: ``A New Day at the SEC: Restoring Accountability, Due Process, and Public Confidence.'' Without objection, all members will have five legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chair for inclusion in the record. Before I recognize myself for an opening statement, I do want to inform our witnesses, who so graciously appeared here today, along with both majority and minority that we are going to have a--this is going to go quickly here; a hard gavel. They have moved up votes to around 3:30 or so, and then we are recessed. So this is going to be--it will not be possible for us to come back. So, we are going to move through this as quickly as we possibly can. So I appreciate everyone's indulgence and certainly their valued time. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ANN WAGNER, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI Good afternoon, and I want to thank our witnesses again for all those in attendance for joining us here today. This hearing is part of an ongoing effort by the subcommittee to examine how effectively the Securities and Exchange Commission is executing its congressional mandate and to ensure our regulatory framework supports rather than stifles the world's strongest capital markets. For several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) drifted away from the principles that have long made our capital markets work. Rulemaking accelerated without sufficient economic analysis, enforcement actions increasingly replaced clear rules, and decisions of enormous consequence were made with too little transparency or accountability. That period raised serious concerns among public companies, Main Street investors, small businesses, and entrepreneurs about whether the SEC was faithfully serving its statutory mission. This hearing is not about relitigating the past; it is about ensuring the future of the SEC is grounded in the rule of law and respect for due process. Under Chairman Paul Atkins, the Commission has begun the hard work of righting the ship, restoring internal discipline, and recentering the agency back to its core statutory mission. We welcome that progress but progress alone is not enough. Lasting reform requires durable guardrails, and that is where Congress must lead. First, we must restore integrity to the SEC's rulemaking process. Rules should not be rushed, stacked on top of one another, or justified by speculative benefits with real costs are ignored. Notice and comment is not a box to check; it is a foundation of administrative law. Rigorous cost benefit analysis is not optional or cut and paste. It is essential to ensure that rules actually serve investors and markets rather than undermine them. Second, we must end regulation by enforcements. The SEC is a civil enforcement agency, not a policymaking substitute for Congress. Market participants deserve clear rules of the road before they are punished for crossing them. Enforcement should target fraud and clear violations of established rules, not serve as a substitute for notice and comment rulemaking or expand regulatory authority beyond what Congress has authorized. Third, we must address the SEC structure and internal decisionmaking. Over time, authority has drifted away from the commission itself toward staff-level actions that lack transparency and accountability. Structural reform is necessary to ensure major policy decisions are made by accountable officials and subject to proper oversight. That is why this subcommittee is examining targeted legislative reforms, including proposals to strengthen economic analyses requirements, reinforce meaningful public comment periods, clarify enforcement standards, and modernize the commission's structures so it operates efficiently and within its statutory bounds. Let me be clear, these reforms are not about weakening the SEC, they are about making the agency stronger, more credible, more predictable, and more faithful to the law. Today's witnesses will bring deep experience from inside and outside the commission. I look forward to restoring accountability, due process, and public confidence in the commission. Now the chair recognizes the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 4 minutes or--what are we--do you want 4 minutes or 5 minutes, sir? Mr. Sherman. I will take 5 minutes, unless she shows up. Chairwoman Wagner. Mr. Sherman for 5 minutes for an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, RANKING MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA Mr. Sherman. The title of this hearing implies that things at the SEC have gotten better over the last year. I would beg to differ. I agree that we should not have regulation by enforcement. Why? Because if you actually write irregulation, it is clear, it reflects input, it applies to everyone, and it is pretty stable. That is to say you get a new chair of the SEC, those regulations are still on the books, and we should both regulate and adjust regulation and deregulate by following the Administrative Procedure Act. Instead of regulation by enforcement, we have now deregulation by nonenforcement. We also have deregulation by capitulation. What does that mean? It means we are dealing here with regulations that affect billions and hundreds of billions of dollars and so there is a lot of money for a lot of lawyers to contest these regulations. So, somebody brings a case challenging a regulation, and instead of defending the regulation, the SEC erases the regulation not by going through the Administrative Procedure Act but simply tossing in the towel in a litigation. So, you get deregulation by capitulation. You then get deregulation by pardon, and this is certainly the most troubling aspect. You have got Justin Sun who buys a hundred million dollars worth of Trump coin, and then all of a sudden the investigation ends, the trial is dropped. You have got the Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss where the SEC terminates its lawsuit because these folks are very close to Trump. You get Ripple Labs. Again, the SEC drops the appeal of the case after a multi- million dollar donation to the Trump ballroom and the inauguration committee. Finally, you have Mr. Zhao over at Binance, actually convicted of a crime, gets pardoned, and we will never know how much Trump coin was purchased but keep in mind, every dollar that you spend, quote, buying Trump coin can be secret. You can disclose it to one or two aides to the President, and all the money or a big, big chunk of it goes to the Trump family. Now, I am going to be a bit facetious here, but this SEC is demonstrating a hatred for Donald Trump. Because for this process to work, it started with Gensler enforcing the laws and then you have somebody who buys the Trump coin, and then the investigation is dropped or the convict is pardoned. What has happened here is that the SEC has cut its enforcement by staff by about 20 percent. Well, what that does is it cuts Trump's income by 20 percent. There are fewer people charged, fewer people who have to buy Trump coin, fewer people that can get the pardon, or see the investigation stopped. This also and more seriously has had an adverse impact on our ability to police Wall Street. Defunding the police is not a good idea, and that is what we have defunded when we are going after crime in the suites. In 2024, the SEC levied $8.2 billion in fines, returned 3.2 billion to investors. What we have seen in 2026 is that is one- tenth of the fines, less than half the average amount of fines looking at over the last 10 years. As I have mentioned, the enforcement staff's been cut by 20 percent. Finally, we have an unipartisan SEC because when a Democrat leaves the SEC, no Democrat is replaced. For as long as I have been here, which goes back to the days of Moses, we have always had the minority party with two seats. We need genuine Democrats, not just people who change their authority affiliation a week before they were appointed, appointed to the SEC. If there is not going to be any Democrats on the SEC in the Trump term, what is the next Democratic President going to do? I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Hill, for 1 minute for an opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. FRENCH HILL, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS Chairman Hill. Thank you, Chair Wagner, and I appreciate the panel being with us today. The SEC plays a critical role in ensuring America's capital markets remain the envy of the world. However, during the Biden Administration, many market participants raised concerns about the bureaucratic overreach of that administration, and particularly regulation by enforcement at the commission. Accountability must be restored at the SEC by ensuring the commission follows the proper notice and comment procedures, reduces rigorous cost-benefit analyses, and reexamines its enforcement process. These actions will restore public confidence, create transparency, and increase stakeholder engagement. Under Chairman Atkins, we have seen significant progress and returning the SEC to its core mission of facilitating capital formation, protecting investors, and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets. I look forward to the discussion today, and I thank the chair for yielding. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. Today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Peter Chan, a partner at Baker McKenzie; Mr. Alexander Cohen, co-chair of the National Office of Latham & Watkins; Mr. Chris Iacovella, the president and CEO of the American Securities Association and; Ben Schiffrin, director of Securities Policy at Better Markets. We thank each of you for taking the time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give you oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. Mr. Chan, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral remarks. STATEMENT OF PETER CHAN, PARTNER, BAKER McKENZIE Mr. Chan. Thank you, Chair Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members on the Subcommittee on Capital Markets. I am Peter Chan, and I am partner at the global law firm of Baker McKenzie. The views I express in this testimony are my own. I testify today on how best to ensure a culture of fairness at the SEC through concrete steps that will preserve the good work already begun under the leadership of SEC Chairman Paul Atkins. My perspective is informed by decades of experience as a securities attorney, including close to 20 years at the SEC's Division of Enforcement. At the SEC, I had the privilege of working alongside commissioned staff members who are a hardworking, intelligent, and absolutely dedicated to the SEC's mission to protect the investing public. Being fair has always been part of the ethos of the staff I work with at the SEC but in recent years, the commission has lost its way when it comes to fairness. For example, the SEC has engaged in regulation by enforcement by setting de facto rules through enforcement actions without fair notice, as documented by a White Paper I co-author with my friend and former colleague, Valerie Mirko, for the Financial Services Institute. A recent example is the SEC's off-channel communications initiative involving the deployment of just about the entire enforcement staff to pressure over 100 financial funds to settle over $2 billion in penalties, even when there was no evidence of bad faith. Ironically, the commission itself was unable to comply with the same stringent standards that the SEC is enforcing against industry, as evidenced by the avoidable destruction of text messages of the then SEC Chairman Gensler. There is also the well-documented attempt to use enforcement actions to stifle innovations in digital assets and block chain technology. To pressure parties to settle cases where the SEC may not prevail in court, the enforcement staff has also engaged in unfair practices, such as threatening burdensome investigative requests or unwarranted outreach to customers if parties do not agree to settle. Despite the searing lessons from Madoff, the enforcement staff has been incentivized in recent years to pursue cases involving esoteric theories and large penalties that generated headlines, such as the off-channel communications initiative. The staff has failed to focus limited SEC resources to detect, prevent, or stop at inception, traditional intentional fraud schemes, cases that would have garnered little publicity but protected investors. The SEC should be focusing on getting rid of burdensome regulations that no longer make sense. Instead, the past commission engaged at a break-neck pace to promulgate rules, resulting in unfair process and bad rules. Thankfully, Chairman Atkins is righting the ship and returning fairness to the commission. He has issued key policy statements to reform enforcement, he has launched initiatives to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens, but it is difficult to correct the course of an aircraft carrier, and there is no guarantee that future leadership will not deviate from the path of fairness. The commission should thus establish clear rules to hot- wire fairness into the SEC's culture. An independent advisory committee of outside experts, as well as 2.0 committee can help the SEC further identify methods to align staff incentives to revitalize the SEC's culture of fairness. Better yet, legislation, including legislation currently proposed by members of this subcommittee can ensure that fairness will always be part of the SEC's DNA. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chan, and thank you for beating the clock. Mr. Cohen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER COHEN, PARTNER & CO-CHAIR OF THE NATIONAL OFFICE, LATHAM & WATKINS Mr. Cohen. Chair Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I have been practicing as a securities lawyer for nearly 36 of my 38-year legal career. During this time, I had the honor to serve as the SEC's Deputy General Counsel for Legal Policy Administrative Practice--a fancy title that basically means I was responsible for the regulatory program; later as the SEC's Deputy Chief of Staff to then Chairman Christopher Cox. This experience has led me to two overarching conclusions about the U.S. securities laws. First, the U.S. securities laws have been remarkably successful in making the United States a gold standard of securities regulation. Second, in the nearly 93 years since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the securities regulatory system has accumulated numerous features that like barnacles in the hull of a ship serve only to slow down progress. Congress now has the opportunity to sandblast some of these regulatory impediments off and I am very grateful to the subcommittee for the opportunity to add some sand to that undertaking. In the appendix of my testimony, I describe a package of ten improvements that Congress can make to SEC functioning and U.S. securities regulation organized into four broad categories: Modernizing the SEC structure; improving the SEC's regulation of public company accountants; reining in SEC regulatory overreach; and eliminating regulatory inefficiencies and failed initiatives. I recognize that my proposals range from the far-reaching to the quite technical, but I am convinced all would help assure that the United States retains its position as the leader of global securities regulation. I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Wow. Well done, Mr. Cohen. All right. You are pretty wordy, Iacovella. We will see, Chris. You are recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF CHRIS IACOVELLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN SECURITIES ASSOCIATION (ASA) Mr. Iacovella. Thank you, Chair Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the committee for the opportunity to testify today. The ASA is a trade association of American financial services firms whose mission is to promote investor trust in confidence and support competitively balanced financial markets. We strongly support the SEC return to the mission that Congress gave it. Congress created the SEC in the wake of the 1929 Stock Market Crash to restore Americans' faith in our capital markets. For much of its history, the SEC did just that, becoming the world's preeminent securities regulator. However, since the 2008 financial crisis, a concerning trend has emerged. The SEC has increasingly acted outside the scope of its authority to pursue partisan political policies. The pendulum on the hot-button political and cultural issues has swung from administration to administration and this has turned the historically apolitical and technocratic agency into an unelected political actor. This injection of politics into our capital markets has created uncertainty for companies and their shareholders, and it has led to a multi-year transfer of wealth from American investors to a professional class that profits from unauthorized regulation. The SEC needs to be an objective regulator focused solely on its statutory mission, not one that caters to special interests regardless of where they sit on the political spectrum. Congress can end the SEC's mission drift by reasserting its policymaking prerogative over the agency. By that I mean, if Congress cannot agree on the details of a policy issue, then language about that policy should not be in the legislation, and a legislation should not include broad, opaque, or public interest language that allows unelected individuals to make policy decisions. Congress' delegation of its power to the administrative State has gone too far for too long, and it is the central reason the agency has become so politicized. If Congress does not reclaim its power now, then it risks sending letters that go unanswered and complaining about policies it did not authorize and that is certainly not what the Framers envisioned when they gave you the power to make law. Now I will briefly summarize the rest of my testimony. First, the commission's delegation of policymaking authority to career staff must end. This is appropriate solely for administrative matters but not policy decisions. Second, career staff must obtain commission approval to initiate industry-wide sweeps. This power is too great to be delegated to unaccountable career staff. Third, the public deserves a minimum 60-day comment period for rule proposals and at least 90 for complex rules. Fourth, the SEC needs to publish a transparent fine schedule for administrative rule violations, such as recordkeeping so the public understands how fines are calculated. Fifth, enforcement staff must be held to the same ethical standard as every other licensed attorney. Having staff sanctioned for lying to Federal courts and having to dismiss dozens of cases because staff enacted improperly erodes the public trust in the agency. To change this, senior leadership and the enforcement division should have securities experience, not just prosecutor experience. Sixth, SEC rules must respect cost-benefit analysis that Congress required. Using random unjustified costs and saying quote, We are unable to reliably quantify the potential benefits and cost of a rule, end quote, is unacceptable. This disregards a congressional directive specifically designed to stop unjustified rules from harming the economy. Seventh, SEC rules must be authorized by Congress. The public should not be subject to a comply or sue scenario. Lawsuits are costly, and repeated court losses damage the agency's credibility. Eighth, rule filings from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) should be sent directly to the commission. They should not be subject to pre-negotiated signoffs by career staff before going to the commissioners. Ninth, the SEC's unauthorized delegation of its core functions to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) must end. These delegations circumvent the appropriations process, and they impose open-ended costs on the industry that should be on the agency's budget. An example of this is the SEC's delegation of Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) to the SROs which require the industry to fund a million-billion dollar regulatory surveillance scheme that illegally collects the personal and financial information of every American investor. Tenth, Congress should revisit the current structure of the agency to insulate it from partisan political pressure and while there are many ideas one might be that the commission should be evenly divided with permanent co-chairs, one from each party. Thank you again for the privilege of testifying today, and I look forward to taking your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Iacovella follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Iacovella. Mr. Schiffrin, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your remarks. STATEMENT OF BEN SCHIFFRIN, DIRECTOR OF SECURITIES POLICY, BETTER MARKETS Mr. Schiffrin. Good afternoon, Chairman Hill, Chairman Wagner, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today. My name is Ben Schiffrin, and I am the director of Securities Policy at Better Markets. Better Markets is a nonprofit, non-partisan and independent organization founded in the wake of the 2008 final crisis to promote the public interest in the financial markets, support reforms at Wall Street, and make the financial system work for all Americans. For 90 years since its creation in 1934, the mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission was to protect investors and it has done so by acting as an independent agency but in 2025, under current SEC Chair Paul Atkins, the SEC's mission changed. Chair Atkins views the SEC as an arm with the administration and his SEC exists to protect the financial industry. Chair Atkins may be ushering in a new day at the SEC, but he is not returning the SEC to its roots. Chair Atkins is turning his back on the SEC's historic mission of investigator protection. The SEC has spent the last year curtailing the rights of investors in public companies, endorsing the sale of risky and expensive private market acts to return investors, promoting the crypto industry relentlessly, reducing enforcements to its lowest levels in a decade. Dismantling the data base it uses to catch crooks and revisiting the lane or abandoning rules to protect investors. These actions have profound consequences for investors, markets, and our economy. The SEC's determination to prioritize the interest of Wall Street and corporate management comes with the expense of investor protection. It is fundamentally altered relationships between public companies and investors. The SEC has limited the ability of the investors to have a say in how the company is own or run, such as the small group of nuns in Kansas, who according to the National Public Radio (NPR), estimated they had filed over 350 shareholder resolutions over 20 years because they want to advocate for change at the companies in which they invest. The SEC has also made it harder for such investors to seek redress for corporate misconduct, and it has poised to significantly reduce the information investors receive about the companies they own. This transformation of the SEC's priorities and its broad- based attack on disclosures, rights, and remedies will hurt all investors, including institutional investors, State and local pension funds, private retirement funds, and individual retirement accounts will all suffer as they get less disclosure, less protection, and fewer remedies and chances to recover also losses. At the same time as the SEC is making it harder to invest in public companies, it is making it easier for private market funds to solicit retail investors. Private market assets have long been considered risky for retired investors, because they lack the disclosure that a company publicly offered securities. The recent bankruptcy of the investment platform at Lido highlights the perils for retail investors in the private markets--with Bloomberg reporting that bankruptcy has left thousands of retail investors with frozen savings. Even the so- called accredited investors doing private market threshold complain about the lack of transparency in the private markets and the reason private markets do not now want to access to these investors is that due to problems in the private markets, money from institutional investors is drying up. For example, The New York Times recently reported that Yale University's endowment and New York City's public worker pensions recently sold their stakes in some private equity funds at discounted prices to get cash back. Under the guise of Democratizing access to these securities, the SEC is trying to steer return investors into the private markets. At the same time, institutional investors are pulling back from assets that offer greater risk and lesser returns. These actions will not only hurt investors but also harm our markets and our economy. Our capital markets are the envy of the world, but that is because they are well-regulated and well-policed. Investors have faith and confidence in them. This has been our competitive advantage for almost a century and has thrown trillions of dollars worldwide into the U.S. markets. That will change as the U.S. retreats from protecting investors and enforcing the law to exploiting investors and protecting the industry. As investors' rights and protections are stripped away, investors look elsewhere to invest their money. That will hurt the economy, because it will be less money invested in the U.S., leading to fewer jobs and the businesses. So under this SEC, Wall Street and management win, but investors markets and our economy lose. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffrin follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Schiffrin. We will now turn to member questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Cohen. Members of this committee have repeatedly warned that 30-day comment periods are inadequate for understanding and providing meaningful replies or proposals that are hundreds of pages in length sometimes. This is not just a partisan concern. In October in 2022, 12 Senate Democrats wrote to the commission warning that these compressed windows were undermining the Democratic process. How would a statutory 60-day minimum comment period shift to process from a check-the-box exercise to a genuine dialog fulfilling the original intent of the Administrative Procedure Act? Mr. Cohen. Oh, well, thank you, Chair Wagner. I think that would be very helpful. The comment progress, as anyone who has been involved in it from the SEC side can tell you yields a lot of really interesting, important feedback. Sometimes very critical, but that of itself is often very useful. Just to cite an example that I was involved in, the SEC's de-special purpose acquisition companies (SPAC) rules, in particular, proposed Rule 140(a) were the subject of considerable amount of criticism and that is really complicated stuff. You just could not do it in 30 days. So I think 60 days is a very good idea. Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. Mr. Chan, this committee will work to ensure that the progress made to restore a materiality- based approach to SEC regulation and enforcement is permanent and cannot be reversed. In your view, would codifying the SEC regulatory Accountability Act, for instance, which requires definitive problem identification before rulemaking provide the necessary guardrails to prevent a future administration from reverting to regulation by enforcement? Mr. Chan. Chair Wagner, your question very astutely identifies the age-old problem of the phenomenon of solution looking for a problem. I do think that having statutory guardrails to make sure that there is actually a material problem or an issue that needs fixing would very much assist the SEC in focusing on fairness and going after fraud. I think in terms of the answer on regulation by enforcement, it will help. I note one of the problems is that when there are guardrails on rulemaking, that is when temptation regulated by enforcement is the greatest. So, I do think that combined with policies and rules that will limit regulation by enforcement, I think, is the key. Chairwoman Wagner. Thank you. Mr. Iacovella, in your testimony you suggest that Congress itself may bear some responsibility for the SEC drift, particularly, when statutes delegate broad discretion or rely on open-ended public interest standards. From your perspective, how can Congress write clear, more durable securities law that constrain regulatory overreach while still giving the SEC enough authority to respond to real market risks? Mr. Iacovella. Thank you for the question. I think this body did just that with the Jobs Act. In Title 1, you made it self-effectuating and as soon as it was passed, companies started the initial public offering (IPO) using that. What did not happen in the rest of the Jobs Act where the other titles, general solicitation and crowd funding, those took a lot of time with SEC comment, and they were watered down in way that was not negotiated in a bipartisan way in this body at the time. So, having language that takes effect immediately upon being signed by the President is very important because it bypassed the rulemaking process and you can give them some time to review that after a two-to 3-year period to see if the correction--if there are corrections that are necessary to improve processes. Chairwoman Wagner. Would you like to expand on any of the-- how many do you have--ten, 12 different recommendations for this esteemed committee to consider legislatively? Mr. Iacovella. I would add one point on the comment period--and I think you were noting it--it really harms small businesses who do not---- Chairwoman Wagner. Yes. Mr. Iacovella [continuing]. who do not have an Army of lawyers or a lot of legal budget to be able to outsource to comment on a complex rule in a 30-day time span and that is why it is necessary to be at least 60. Chairwoman Wagner. I am tired of cut and paste cost benefits where we do not hear the truth about the cost and/or the benefits. So, thank you very much for the testimony. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes for questions, Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I kind of made the mistake in my opening statement because I mentioned deregulation by nonenforcement, deregulation by capitulation, and deregulation by pardon, and I forgot deregulation by Tweet. We have seen the President of the United States say that shareholders should not be able to put forward proposals to committees, and that you should not be able to hire an adviser as to how to vote your shares. Although, companies are free to hire five or ten law firms on their side. Then we see--and this is I think the most extreme thing-- the President say we should get rid of quarterly financial reports. What an insane idea. Obviously, rumor mills are going--whoever picks up the rumor is going to be in a stronger position and those who are relying on official reviewed or audited financial statements are going to be in a worse position. There are two areas where I think the SEC should be acting and just refuses to act. One of these is the Small Business Investor Capital Act which is there to correct how they calculate expenses so that small business--so that business development corporations can be, as a practical matter, included in mutual funds. This committee has passed this bill over and over again, and the SEC sits and does nothing. In addition, this committee has done much to try to save some trees by providing for e-delivery. As I have commented here before, e-delivery is sometimes better because if you get it on paper, you tend to throw it away--I mean it is--whereas, if you get it on electronically and you happen to have some extra time, perhaps you are at a hearing and looking for something to read, you can go back and find it and read it but this committee has acted again and again. It is time for the SEC to do its job. I agree with our chairwoman about the need for more than 30-day comment period on major regulations but I disagree with what she mentioned and what others have mentioned and that is materiality having nothing to do with anything other than an expert share. Mr. Schiffrin, is there something illegitimate about an investor who thinks that greenhouse gases or conflict diamonds are material to their decision as to where they want to invest? Mr. Schiffrin. Thank you for the question. No, I think there is a lot of information besides financial information that is material that can form the investment decision that investors want to make, and certainly things like the effective climate change on a company's operations would be one of those things. Mr. Sherman. Now, I think one of our witnesses had suggested the idea that we permanently have an evenly split SEC. I find that intriguing. It is probably a good idea but at least we have had a situation where there would be two from the minority party. Congress structured the SEC to be an independent bipartisan irregulator. Yet, we were down to one Democratic commission for 12 months, and now we are down to zero and there is no end in sight. Mr. Schiffrin, why is it important to have two Democrats on the SEC in a bipartisan board? Mr. Schiffrin. Well, because you need a diversity of viewpoints on the commission that is going to not only make the commission's rules better in the long run, but also more durable in the long run. I think Congress is kind of a good example right. My perception is that Congress tries to do everything on a bipartisan basis, and I think it would be better for the SEC to do that as well. That way, you know if another administration comes in, it is going to be way harder to undue something that was passed 5-0 versus 3-0 or 3-2. Mr. Sherman. Then we had this with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and discussions as top whether to have a board or an individual. Those who wanted the most extreme actions went with the single Member and so we had a single person making the decisions. Now, we have a single person erasing all the--well, actually, they have erased the board altogether and there is something to be said for moving the pendulum less in one direction and less than the another, and I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas, the chairman of the full Financial Services Committee, Mr. Hill, for 5 minutes. Chairman Hill. Thanks, Chair Wagner. Again, I appreciate the panel being here. I have spent really almost three decades as a registered person. The last 10 years not registered but I will reflect back on that. I was National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) FINRA registered since 1986. I was chairman of the District Business Conduct Committee in New Orleans, District Six. I was on the Small Firms Advisory Board. I have been a corporate director for a public company. So, I spent a lot of my life with the 33 and 34 acts and all the great work all of you have advocated for. One of the things as a CEO, a managing general principal with three different firms, it just irritated the absolute tar out of me is this idea that we are going to start with enforcement before we inform anybody of what it is that we are trying to solve. I want to visit with Mr. Iacovella, because this one really burns me up because it is a classic example where people assert that if they do not correct this immediately, our world will come to an end. It will cease spinning on its axis. So the government decides to shut down the economy during coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). None of us knew what was going to be the--we were here. We did not know what the real result of all this was. We were dealing with the crisis in real time just like the private sector was. But--so, people who were financial advisers, registered broker dealer employees were sent home, and I do not think they were told not to ever talk to their customers again. So they were sent home, and they probably had a virtual private network (VPN) to dial into a laptop that maybe was company-owned, maybe it was not. A lot of people in the modern world do not have a landline, so they were talking on their cell phone. Well, that is the case for everyone here. All the Members of Congress. Exactly the same situation. Not ideal but here comes the commission suddenly in 2021, and suddenly dreams up this idea that, oh, my God, there are people with off-channel communications. These registered broker dealers are not storing every text message. Clearly, this is a violation of communications rules, the correspondence rules, the approval by a principal of anything you say to a client rule, and they began to enforce that. I do not think my friends on either side of the aisle really appreciate how outrageous this was. Starting with C- suite, we want all your texts, we are going to write you a letter, our lawyer is going to contact you. If you do not give us all your texts and access to your phone, we are going to then, I guess, take action against the firm. It resulted in billions and billions and billions of dollars of fines for these firms for something that all you had to do was say in a notice to members under FINRA or under a proper rulemaking from the SEC, we believe now in the modern age that we want to collect and treat as correspondence, treat as principle- approved communication, texting, or emails, or even a telephone call on your personal phone because you were sent home from your office. So, no, we are not recording it and there is nobody here that would dispute that but instead of publishing a notice to members, we just start fining people. Yet, we have a chairman of the SEC who has lost his text messages that we have subpoenaed from this committee for. So the hypocrisy is not lost on me or on an Inspector General at the SEC. So, Mr. Iacovella, how do we get this back on track? Firms want to do good-faith compliance. All you have to do is tell a firm, here is our expectation, here is the timeframe, and we want you to comply. How did the scale and structure of these penalties affect perceptions of fairness and credibility at the SEC? Mr. Iacovella. Thank you, Congressman. I think what you said is exactly what should have been done. There should have been a notice to the industry that said, we understand there were extenuating circumstances during COVID, and that people communicated through texting. We would expect you before the next examination to collect all of that information and have it ready. If you do not, then there better be a good reason why and you could be subject to fines as a result of that but that is not what happened. Chairman Hill. Right. Mr. Iacovella. What happened was---- Chairman Hill. I would go into the details, but there is a perfectly good case study about exactly what we are talking about today under the leadership of Ann Wagner. I would say what hypocrisy that the chairman of the SEC cannot produce and retain his own text messages for review by this committee. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The chairman yields back and the chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Vargas, for 5 minutes. Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and ranking member, and especially I want to thank the witnesses today. Mr. Cohen, you set up a very provocative analogy. You set up this analogy of a ship that has barnacles on it. It has been sailing for 93 years, and it has collected these in such a way that it has caused the ship not to be very efficient in its movement. So they should be--and I want to quote you-- sandblasted off, so then it could move more efficiently. The analogy is a good one. However, I am from San Diego, and I worked in the shipyard. We normally do not sandblast. It depends on the hull. You would not sandblast the barnacles because you would actually damage the ship. If it was fiberglass, you would water blast them and if it was a steel ship, would you sandblast? The reason I say that is because sandblast is much harsher than water blasting. Although, there are some water blasters, of course, that are very profound. The reason I say that is I think that there probably are some rules and regulations that should be taken off this ship. By the way, if I had to hire an attorney, I would hire you. You are very capable, I see and you are also very precise. I know you would not churn my case. Your testimony was fantastic. Mr. Sherman. I do not think you could afford him. Mr. Vargas. I could not afford him either. That is true, too. So, Mr. Schiffrin, how would you confront that reality that there are barnacles on the ship? Instead of sandblasting, how would you water blast them off? Now I do want to give you a chance to come back, Mr. Cohen. Mr. Schiffrin, why do you not start with that. If we are going to blast, are we not blasting too hard? If he is going to use sand, I mean, is it not the problem that we then erase a lot of these investor protections? Mr. Schiffrin. Thank you for the question. I think that is exactly right. We have to be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak. It is one thing for the SEC to go back and look at its rules and say, well, this particular rule that was passed 50 years ago maybe no longer makes any sense. Right now what the SEC is doing is seemingly eliminating core investor protections. Chair Atkins has talked about revising Regulation S-K, which is core disclosures, not financial disclosures, but other material information that investors rely on. Disclosure is the bedrock of securities regulation in this country, and we cannot just be doing away with that. Mr. Vargas. Mr. Cohen, I do want to give you an opportunity to discuss that. Mr. Cohen. Well, thank you, Congressman. You are quite right, I did make the assumption that the SEC is whole with steel rather than fiberglass and having had the experience as a teenager having to hand clean fiberglass hulls, I would not wish it on Congress or anyone else. I think the point that I was really trying to make is that the success of U.S. securities regulation does not mean that we have to regard the system as static, and that, in fact, we should be open to making changes. For example, one of the proposals that I made in my appendix was to add a vice chairman to the position of the chairman. My observation from being in the chairman's office is that the chairman of the SEC has too many direct reports, too many statutory responsibilities, and it impedes his or her ability to be effective in the job. I think we all would like the SEC to be run on an effective basis. Mr. Vargas. Right, but you do have a vice chair at the Fed, and I do not think that necessarily makes it more efficiently. How would that protect really investors' rights? Mr. Cohen. Well, I think the issue is that it is very difficult when a chairman has--and I think from the last time I looked at the org chart--something like 26 direct reports, plus statutory responsibilities at the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), at Federal Housing Financial Agency at the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). It is just difficult to spend time doing the kind of strategic thinking that you would really want an SEC chair to do to really drive forward regulation in the right way. You risk being bogged down in too much detail. Again, I think from all of our perspective, effectiveness is really what we would like to see of regulation. Mr. Vargas. Mr. Schiffrin, would you like to comment on that? The last comment you made that really what they are looking at is effectiveness, trying to move more efficient. Mr. Schiffrin. Well, what I really want the SEC to be is effective as possible. I do not know that it has been in the last year. I am not sure if adding a vice chair position is what it needs to do so much as recognize that its mission is investor protection. I think it seemed to lose track of that in the last year. Mr. Vargas. I guess, with my last 20 seconds, I say it is obvious that in one administration goes one way a little bit more than the other way, but when there is no representation at all, I think there is the danger that it swings too far one way, and I do think there should be Democratic representation from the SEC. With that, I thank the chair, and I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Michigan, Mrs. McClain, for 5 minutes. Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for holding this hearing. I thank you all for being here. I appreciate it. I spent a little time in the financial services industry myself, about 35 years, and I saw the evolution, especially around FINRA. When I started, FINRA used to be an agency. It was really concerned with overseeing the educational arm, right, our continuing education (CE) credits, making sure we are properly licensed, et cetera, et cetera. It seems that FINRA has just grown out of that a little bit. I am not really sure how it got there. So, Mr. Iacovella, I was wondering if you could enlighten us a little bit on how FINRA has evolved from more a licensing and educational organization, which is what it originally was set out to do into its current form of really an unaccountable regulatory agency. Can you explain how that happened? Mr. Iacovella. Well, I mean, what it does now is regulating broker dealers and SEC delegates what it does not want to do in relation to broker dealers and oversight of the security markets to FINRA and to other SROs. I think that is the concern that you are trying to raise here is that delegation has not been authorized by Congress, and it has happened by virtue of the agency doing it on its own accord. Mrs. McClain. Yes, and that is extremely concerning to me because it seems like we have one more layer of bureaucracy out there. Even more concerning with that is the lack of transparency. Right? I am curious to get your information or your opinion on-- what threats do you think FINRA poses to capital markets? Because they write the rules, they enforce the rules, and they really keep a lot of those proceeds from the plaintiffs. Mr. Iacovella. You are touching on a very important topic right now, and I think it has been the subject of multiple lawsuits by individuals against FINRA, and I think it is something that this body should really take up, which is what is FINRA? Is it a private institution that is member-driven, or is it a governmental entity? What powers does it have that it should be using? Should it be an enforcement agency? That is an open question that this body should answer. Should it be an adjudicatory agency for arbitration. I mean, these are functions that were set out in three different branches in our Constitution, and they have been rolled up into one entity that is not accountable to anybody but the SEC and to hopefully this body. Mrs. McClain. Yes, I would agree with you. I think I would encourage Congress to really take a look at the role of FINRA and get some definition of what their job and what their responsibilities truly are because I think the problem people have with FINRA is they do not know what they do not know. When you are the judge, the jury and the executioner, people kind of get a little weary of that. Just curious, when FINRA comes in and assesses a fine to a firm, what happens to those fines? Do those fines get back to the plaintiff? What happens to those fines? Mr. Iacovella. I believe that when FINRA assesses a broker dealer with a fine, that the money goes into its general fund. Mrs. McClain. Into FINRA's general fund? Mr. Iacovella. Yes, ma'am. Mrs. McClain. Any idea what that general fund is worth? Mr. Iacovella. There were previous reports that FINRA has over $2 billion in its funds. Mrs. McClain. $2 billion? Do they use that for educational training for helping firms do a better job--maybe as Chairman Hill was talking about earlier, helping people get out of the State of uncertainty that they may be in? What do they use that $2 billion for? Mr. Iacovella. Salaries. They---- Mrs. McClain. Salaries to go back and collect more fines? Mr. Iacovella. Yes, yes. Mrs. McClain. Just out of curiosity, what does the President of FINRA make? Do you know? Mr. Iacovella. I am not sure of the exact figure, but I understand---- Mrs. McClain. Would you call me a liar if it was around 4 million? Mr. Iacovella. That sounds about right. Mrs. McClain. Just curious. Can you explain a little bit of a lack of accountability that FINRA has and how that results in higher fees, fewer investment choices, and lower returns? The because the biggest concern I have is with all the rules and regulations right now, it would be really tough to start a new firm. So, I am curious if you could touch on that. Mr. Iacovella. I think it is extremely difficult to start a new firm, and compliance costs are overwhelming for small firms. That is why a lot of them are going away. They are either being bought out, merging, or they just go out of business. Mrs. McClain. Yes, FINRA is sitting on about $2 billion. With that, Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, for 5 minutes. Mr. Casten. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks all of you for being here. So I want to lay my biases up first. I had some real concerns with Chair Atkins' leadership and particularly for the way that he has weakened investor protections and in so doing weakened confidence in U.S. markets. I want to get specifically--and there is no way to say this without getting political, but SEC's recent decision to stop reviewing no action decisions per shareholder proposals is going to allow firms to exclude various environmental, social, and governance (ESG) requests. You cannot say the word ``ESG'' without getting in some nonsense culture war fight now. The debate as I understood capitalism. Most of my adult life was between Milton Friedman's view of shareholder capitalism and some broader view of stakeholder capitalism. If the owners of a company have things they want to know about the risk exposure of that company, and management disagrees, if you believe Milton Friedman, the shareholders here will have the final say. Yet, these no-action rules say, well, if you are doing things that affect environmental issues or government issues or employment issues, somehow that is off the table. So, basically, we are just going say, forget about shareholders, forget about stakeholders. I am just going to elevate the C-suite. I want to, specifically, give a recent example. Last year, the SEC granted no action related to Exxon Mobile over their problem which would enable retail investor to automatically cast their votes on shareholder proposals in favor of management, at few future meetings, before they even know what they are voting on. Mr. Iacovella, you issued a statement in support of that saying that the SEC's decision prioritizes the interest of working families, savers, and retirees. I guess what I am wondering is how does that meaningfully prioritize individual investors' preferences if they have to vote before they know what they are voting on? Mr. Iacovella. Well that particular program that you just described I think that there are some issues with it. I was not aware of it exactly. Mr. Casten. But you would put a statement in support of this. I mean, I sort of think, like in Illinois--respect, Mr. Chan, Illinois--we have a primary on March 17, which means my voters will know who my opponent is on the Republican side of the ticket on March 18. If I went and asked them to vote for me now before they know who my opponent is, I am hard pressed to say how that enhances democracy. Yet, that is essentially what the SEC has allowed Exxon to do. Let me move on. Mr. Cohen, Exxon's stated purpose was they said to enhance retail participation at shareholder meetings. Is it your understanding that is why Exxon created that program. Mr. Cohen. Well, I cannot comment specifically to it. Mr. Casten. Because there was a client alert from your firm saying that retail voting is an effective tool to help defeat an activist investor in a proxy fight but I think in practical reality, as we all know, there are large sophisticated investors--he pension funds, mutual funds--what have you and there is a lot of small retail folks. If you basically bake them in, I go back to my example, if I get everybody to vote for me before, why do forums? I have already baked in the win, right? Are you not effectively just disenfranchising the most sophisticated participants in your capital structure. Mr. Cohen. Well, thank you very much for the question. There was a speech that the general counsel for whom I worked with, Brian Cartwright, gave in 2007 talking about the notion of its an ugly word deretailization, but he was making a point that because of the enormous concentration of money in funds, it is very difficult to actually for retail investors to have any particular say at least on fraud. So it is a phenomenon of---- Mr. Casten. Look, I take--I mean, look, we can go into our history. Our Founders were not really wild about Joe Rubin of J Street either, that is why we have the senate but structurally either we like democracy or we do not. I want to shift just quickly to tokenization. Last week the SEC issued a statement confirming that a tokenized stock is still a security regardless of whether it is representing a blockchain or a derivative. Mr. Iacovella, do you share the SEC's view. Mr. Iacovella. Yes, I think it should take the form of whatever it tokenizes from a regular tourist standpoint. So it is subject to the National Market System (NMS) if it is inequity. Mr. Casten. I appreciate that. So would you oppose legislation that would create a loophole that would allow companies to get out of SEC jurisdiction just because they had a tokenized security? Mr. Iacovella. No, I would not oppose that. Oh, we would oppose that, yes. Sorry, I am sorry. Mr. Casten. Okay, okay. Well, that was why I posed the CLARITY Act last year that passed out of this committee because what the CLARITY Act said is if you tokenize your securities, you can get away from those sorts of protections. I leave that to come back to where I started, either this SEC is going to protect investor rights and investor disclosures and not pretend something that something is not a security. If it walks and talks and quacks like a security or it is not. I think it behooves us to fix---- Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Casten. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas, who is the chair of the Task Force on Monetary Policy, Treasury Market Resilience, and Economic Prosperity. You are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Lucas. That is a mouthful, chairman. Thank you and thank you to our witnesses here today. I think one of the things we would all agree on so far in course of this hearing is that the SEC looks dramatically different from the SEC 2 years ago. It is truly a new day at the commission. Mr. Chan, can you speak to the enforcement side of the commission? How would you characterize the change in it capital markets under Chairman Atkins' leadership. Mr. Chan. It has been traumatic and it is going back to commonsense. If you take a quick look at the enforcement cases since Chairman Atkins appointed Judge Ryan to be the director of enforcement, you will notice the majority of the cases involve going after intentional fraud. I think that is something that sitting here in this room we all agree that is what the SEC should be doing. As someone who has gone after fraudsters, Ponzi schemers, executives who have lied, cheat and stolen, it is tough to go after fraudsters who tried to avoid detection. I think if you think about what the SEC did in the previous administration where they spent the entire resources of the SEC going after people who might have used an emoji on a text message or might have gone by an interpretation crushed a little yellow sticky that is considered a violation of the law. I worry about how much was missed in terms of failure to detect intentional fraud. So I really applaud the chairman in terms of returning the SEC going back to its core, which is going after intentional fraud with an enforcement perspective. Mr. Lucas. Mr. Cohen, this committee reported out my bipartisan bill last month, it would establish a public company advisory committee within the SEC. That seems to align with the progress Chairman Atkins has already made increasing transparency with the commission and seeking broad industrial feedback on potential regulatory changes. What is your view, does the commission benefit from thoughtful rulemaking that takes into account the impacts to market participants. Mr. Cohen. Absolutely. There is no question that makes regulation better when you have that kind of feedback. Mr. Lucas. Continuing with you, Mr. Cohen, can you describe the benefits of using the process established under the Administrative Procedures Act to regulate our market behavior rather staff bulletins that previous administration relied on? Mr. Cohen. Well, notice and comment rulemaking is an extremely effective tool because of the complexity of all the financial markets it is simply very difficult, even for a very knowledgeable regulators to actually be able to get the full understanding of what the import of the actions that they are taking are. There is of course always a room for interpretation, there is always a room for staff action, you need that also as a safety valve but certainly notice and comment ought to be the preferable way to go. Mr. Lucas. Absolutely. Mr. Iacovella, the commission has begun right size regulation, restoring progrowth opportunities capital markets. How does the Incentivizing New Ventures and Economic Strength Through Capital Formation (INVEST) Act build on that work and make these policies durable for future administrations? Mr. Iacovella. There are a few ways, section 301, title 3, allowing EGCs to do 2 years of financial statements instead of 3. That is very important and that it is going to be taken up immediately once the INVEST Act passes the Senate. Also, you are directing the SEC to expand the test the waters provision. That is a very useful provision that provides good feedback between the companies and the SEC so that they know and they have a fully prepared statement when it is time to go IPO and I think lowering the well-known seasoned dish or a requirement from 700 to 400 was very important as well. I mean, it allows the ease of follow-on offerings for small and mid-cap companies and that is what allows them to become large cap companies. Mr. Lucas. Absolutely. I thank the panel for your observations and your insights. I yield back, Madam Chair. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back and the chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters, who is also the ranking member. Ms. Waters. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Schiffrin, in this and prior Congresses I have offered proposals to increase transparency and accountability in our private markets. Your testimony echoes many of the concerns my proposal would remedy and paints a troubling picture of the SEC's agenda to undermine our public markets. You say that Chairman Atkins prioritized the needs of private equity firms over the safety of everyday American investors. You also argue that the private markets are inherently riskier, less transparent, more expensive and less liquid than our public markets. I am going to ask you a series of questions about private markets and would appreciate to the extent possible a brief yes or no answer. Is it true that private markets have performed worse than the S&P 500 over the past 5 years? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes. Ms. Waters. Is it true that institutional investors like private equity and pension funds are currently fleeing private markets due to under performance? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes. Ms. Waters. Is the SEC now attempting to steer retail investors into these private markets at the exact moment that large institutional investors are pulling back from them? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes. Ms. Waters. Is it also true that Chairman Atkins recently permitted an exchange graded fund to invest in private credit despite SEC career staff concerns regarding the liquidity and valuation of those assets? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes. Ms. Waters. Well, does not the expansion of private offerings without the same kinds of disclosures require for public companies increase the risk of fraud for retail investors? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes. Ms. Waters. Is it your opinion that pushing mom and pop investors to add these unregistered securities to their nest egg will likely lead to significant financial losses for them and millions of American families? Mr. Schiffrin. Yes, I think it is very risky for retail investors to enter the private markets. Ms. Waters. Finally, what advice would you have for both Congress and the SEC as it contemplates allowing companies and their Wall Street brokers to sell private assets to everyday investors? Mr. Schiffrin. Well, I think you have to bear in mind that is kind of antithetical to the Federal securities laws. If you are talking about selling private market assets to retail investors, you are talking about selling them to the general public. If you are making a public offering of securities, you are supposed to register that with the SEC and provide all the disclosures that a public offering entails and those disclosures they like to protect investors. If you are talking about offering private market securities to retail investors, you are talking about doing something that really the law does not provide for without detailed disclosures under the securities laws. Ms. Waters. Do you consider that the SEC is independent? Mr. Schiffrin. Can you repeat the question? Ms. Waters. The SEC, who controls it? Is it independent or the President involved, who---- Mr. Schiffrin. It should be an independent agency and that is historically what it has been. I think Chair Atkins seems to view it more as an arm of the administration. Ms. Waters. Well, let me just tell you this, we have fought very hard and we have to keep fighting to fund and make sure that the SEC has what it needs to be the cop on the block. So all you have to do is not help them get any resources, no money to do the job and they get to do what they want to do, and nothing gets done. Is that an issue that is a concern to you and others. Mr. Schiffrin. Yes, I think I SEC needs resources in terms of funding and in terms of staff so that it can do its main job, which is to be the cop on the Wall Street beat and ensure that financial fraudsters are not taking advantage of everyday Americans. Ms. Waters. Has it traditionally been understaffed? Mr. Schiffrin. I think that the SEC has to regulate $100 trillion capital markets and it has always been underfunded and understaffed. In that respect, I think that the reason staffing cuts at the SEC only exacerbate the already difficult task that the SEC has in regulating the size of those markets. Ms. Waters. Well, thank you very much. I am concerned. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The ranking member yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Davidson and chair of the subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions. You are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Davidson. Thank you, chairwoman, witnesses I thank you for your testimony and your work in the field. We are coming off the wake of Gary Gensler's failed leadership at the Securities and Exchange Commission. For years I sought to fire Gary Gensler. We never succeeded in that but frankly one of the first things that happened when Donald Trump became President is we fired Gary Gensler. All of capital markets are better because of it. So we saw really a mind-set in terms of the senior leader at the Securities and Exchange Commission really shape everything and that led me to question is the structure even right at the Securities and Exchange Commission. So I looked at maybe it should be at parity so that no one party has it, because everybody had deferred to Gary Gensler and we did not have the votes to change course on it. So then you have a yo-yo back and forth, one idea versus the other. I thought, maybe the 80/20 issues the commission on a deal was because then partisanship would not be the driver for some of the policy approaches because that is really what we saw is the war on crypto led out of Elizabeth Warren's office in the Senate was basically had a foot soldier in Gary Gensler. Now we are trying to pass regulatory clarity in Congress. I had a colleague earlier characterize that if you tokenize the security under the CLARITY Act, it is not a security. No, if you tokenize the security, it is still a security. What the CLARITY Act says is that if you tokenize something that is not a security, then not a security. Gary Gensler struggled with that idea, and he did sue and subtle things not to provide clarity. He did not do structured rulemaking with notice and comment periods. He did regulation by enforcement. One of the examples I always put on to you is they sued one of the Kardashian people and settled for $1 million, $2 million for marketing an unregistered security but they took no action against the unregistered security that was supposedly the problem. They did not shut it down because it was some bad offering and dangerous to the public. They created chaos on purpose. They told everyone to come in and talk to us, and we will work with you and then they used that information to target them for enforcement actions. They did not produce an escape. I said it was like hotel California; you can check in but you can never leave. So I want to thank Chairman Atkins for providing a great direction, but a couple of questions. Mr. Cohen, in the Coinbase case the Biden SEC issued a Wells notice advancing novel legal theories about digital assets without identifying a clear statutory authority or rules adopted through notice and comment. How could Congress reform the Wells process to require disclosure of specific legal theories or evidence so that Wells notices cannot be weaponized. Mr. Cohen. I think that is probably more appropriately directed to Mr. Chan who has more---- Mr. Davidson. Mr. Chan, my apologies. Mr. Chan. As someone who has gone on both ends on a Wells process, I do think it would be very helpful consistent with what Chairman Atkins has done to reform the Wells process and make sure that if I am getting sued, I should know what I am getting sued for and I should know what the evidence is against me because the whole point of Wells process is so that the commission can hear in a fair process what--the potential defendant's voices. So I do think that having clarity as to the evidence to legal theory, but also what exactly is going on. I do think transparency would be very much needed. Mr. Davidson. Yes and we hope the commission brings that, but we need to pass laws to provide clarity, and we are trying to do that in digital assets. There are things just like the Wells notice that the loophole there was weaponized by the previous SEC. In recent years the SEC's advance other legal theories, they were rebuked in court, even for arbitrary and capricious actions. So including efforts to treat decentralized finance protocols as securities., they held software developers and programmers liable for how their code was used. This would be like holding Bill Gates accountable for somebody tracking elicit finance in Excel. I mean Excel is useable for all kinds of things, whatever you want to track with it. This is just a different version of software. What guardrails can Congress put in place to ensure enforcement actions cannot be weaponized in the future. Mr. Chan. Well, first it of all, the oversight by this very subcommittee is actually important. I do think in terms of guardrails it goes back to hardwiring fairness and clarity in the enforcement process. One of the things Congressman highlighted is the problem of the SEC making up standards of enforcement, even with new technology. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Davidson. Thank you. I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Stutzman for 5 minutes. Mr. Stutzman. Thank you, Madam Chair. The SEC was created to protect investors to maintain fair orderly and efficient markets and facilitate capital formation, not to serve as a vehicle for advancing political or social priorities. However, under President Joe Biden and Chairman Gary Gensler the SEC strayed beyond its statutory mandate and pushed forward a large and complex regulatory agenda. The result of this was hire compliance costs, reduced market competition and fewer opportunities for businesses to raise capital. Much like our banking industry, our capital markets are among the most heavily regulated sectors in the world. Therefore, it is important that regulators carefully calibrate their actions to address market deficiencies without causing undue harm. Mr. Iacovella, I would like to ask you how important is it for the SEC to evaluate the total economic impact of its rulemakings and what happens when regulators move too fast without fully understanding the consequences? Mr. Iacovella. It is extremely important to fully evaluate and ask the public for information so that you can quantify the cost, the real cost to everybody of different sizes. You cannot aggregate those costs and then extrapolate them on to the industry. People need to understand at what levels they are going to be impacted. The unfortunate part is that when those are not done properly, you are left with one scenario which is to either comply with a rule that is faulty and that you know could potentially put you out of business or put a strain on competition or to sue and that is not good for the industry, it is not good for our economy. Mr. Stutzman. Thank you. One of the things that we saw during the Gensler SEC was the departure from the traditional 60-day public comment period on a proposed rule. So this shorter timeline makes it harder for our--it might be feasible for large firms with plenty of lawyers on a retainer, but I am sure that for smaller firms it is much more difficult. Mr. Cohen, how do shorter public comment periods negatively affect smaller firms and independent researchers? Mr. Cohen. Well, exactly for the reason that you stated, digesting several hundred pages of release and coming up with coherent views on them is just not something one does overnight and you have to put aside a lot of other pressing business to do it. Mr. Stutzman. So broadly speaking, would you see a difference between the Biden SEC's activity and the Trump-era SEC? Mr. Cohen. Yes and one of the market aspects of it is comment. Mr. Stutzman. Comment? Mr. Cohen. Yes. Mr. Stutzman. Yes. Anything else? Mr. Cohen. Well, regulation by enforcement, as has been mentioned. Yes. Mr. Iacovella, how about you? Mr. Iacovella. Oh, I would agree. I think, cover that. Mr. Stutzman. So it is much easier--I mean, it is better for the industry, it is better to move business along, giving people an opportunity to raise the capital that they need. This committee's currently considering legislation that would guarantee a 60-day comment period with certain exemptions. Would this sort of policy help improve the quality of stakeholder feedback? Any of you could answer that. Mr. Iacovella. Yes, absolutely. I think the more time that people have to be able to absorb, get their teams together, ask them how this kind of a policy would work, but let those business people and operational people actually understand what is being proposed and tell management and the legal and compliance folks what it is going to do to the business, that is how you get informed comment. Mr. Stutzman. Thank you. Thank you, I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana, Mr. Downing for 5 minutes. Mr. Downing. Thank you, Madam Chair and thank you to the panel for being here. As an entrepreneur, and a former regulator, I cut my teeth in tech venture alternatives, a lot of Reg D exemptions. Coming out of the space it is really exciting to me to once again have an SEC that cares about its core mission of facilitating capital formation, rather than pursuing a political agenda. I am glad that this hearing is focused on ways to reform the SEC to ensure that the Gensler-era antics can no longer plague our capital markets. I am going to start with Mr. Iacovella. Thank you for being here. Under former Chair Gensler, the SEC finalized 34 substantive rules. This exceeded the average of the three most recent predecessors by 36 percent matching only the financial crisis-era pace of former Chair Mary Shapiro. Can you discuss the harm caused to U.S. capital markets by rushing through so many rules? Mr. Iacovella. Yes, I think it goes hand and glove with what we were just talking about, Congressman, that when you do not have the time and opportunity and when you have one complex rule, it takes a long time, and it takes a lot of resources and manpower. When you have a number of them coming at you at one time and in the case of market structure, there were four of them and we did not understand exactly how they were going to work intertwining together to change the entire market structure. That was very problematic because it started to make people very nervous about what the changes were going to look like. Instead of actually putting comments together, people were contemplating whether they should just sue. Mr. Downing. All right, thank you. Thank you for that answer. I am going to move to Mr. Cohen. The SEC currently has 43 offices, yet only seven are established by statute. I currently have legislation noticed for this hearing H.R. 3318: 3318, the SEC Modernization Act, which reorganizes the SEC bureaucracy into just 12 offices. So my question is: How can the SEC's current organizational structure be improved so that it operates more efficiently? Mr. Cohen. Well, in addition to the ideas contained in the legislation, in my own appendix creating a position of vice chair, as well as I think folding the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) into the SEC, which is I know the subject of another piece of legislation. Mr. Downing. Thank you. So under the SEC's previous leadership, market participants heavily criticized how the SEC's economic analyses were performed in its rulemakings, particularly when it came to climate disclosures and market structure reforms. As a former regulator, I had to deal with that whole issue, but my question is how should the SEC properly conduct its analysis for its rulemakings impact on capital formation? Mr. Cohen. Well, we talk a lot about tone at the top and tone at the top is incredibly important. Chairman Atkins used to point out quite often when he was a commissioner that the SEC's estimate of the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 404(b) the order attestation was in the order of $90,000 and probably missed several different zeros. So I think rigor in economic analysis is extremely important. Mr. Downing. Thank you. I want to turn now to the SEC's notice and comment period. Historically, the SEC is allowed at least 60 days for notice and comment from the public on rulemaking. Under Chairman Gensler, public comment periods were frequently shortened, concerningly enough for it to be raised in a 2022 Inspector General report. So first, why is it important for the public to have an adequate time to comment on a proposed rule. Mr. Cohen. Well, again, I think it is the complexity of the financial market simply makes it very difficult to just react from the hip. I can tell you from my own experience at doing emergency rulemaking in 2008 that input was really valuable. Do you think that 60 days is adequate or is more time needed? Mr. Cohen. That would be interesting to see what other people with industry consensus is on this. Sixty days at least establishes a reasonable starting point. Mr. Downing. There have been times when the public comments led to a substantial change in the SEC's final rulemaking. Mr. Cohen. Absolutely. I think in the comments on the SEC's de-SPAC rulemaking in particular for proposed rule 140a really led to the SEC to pull that one back, right? Mr. Downing. Well, I appreciate your responses there and I appreciate the panel being here. On that, Madam Chair, I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, chair of Digital Asset FT and AI for 5 minutes. Mr. Steil. Thank you, Chair Wagner. I appreciate all of you being here today. We have got a big opportunity, and I think we have made real progress in turning the SEC around to its actual task of being there for investors rather than driving forward political agendas. I want to cover two topics today that I think are really important. One is the politicization of the Gensler-era SEC, and have we made the reforms needed to bring us back and away from that in particular the Staff Bulletin 14L. I do not want to cover materiality and what we are doing in that regard. I will start with you if I can, Mr. Cohen. Staff Legal Bulletin 14L really gave staff at the SEC massive authority no make a decision is to what had a societal policy--based on what was having a broad societal impact, that is the language. What we saw is after the staff bulletin comes out we see a dramatic increase in shareholder proposals going before the SEC, we see this whole drive of the liberal left trying to drive through policy agendas, via publicly traded companies in the United States so they cannot move through Congress because no sane elected individual would support a lot of the stuff that they were trying to force publicly traded companies to do. We finally get sanity back at the SEC. Have we done enough? Where are we at? Can you give us a status update. Mr. Cohen. Well, certainly having rescinded Staff Legal Bulletin 14L really brought back the practices in this area to what it had traditionally been, which is it should have to have a connection to something company specific in the proposal. Mr. Steil. But the staff that was reviewing and many of them are still there, does that cause concern or is the change in the removal of the legal memo sufficient? Mr. Cohen. I---- Mr. Steil. Are people still operating in a politicized way? Mr. Cohen. I have to be careful in answering that because my wife who is sitting behind me was for 10 years a staff member at the Division of Trading and Markets, but I can say that I just have enormous respect for the profession. Mr. Steil. I am not saying that there are not many great men and women at the SEC and I would not want to disparage everyone there. I think it is pretty clear when you were seeing some of saw the rules coming out of the SEC under the Gensler chairmanship that it was pretty politicized. You had staff members who were making decisions as to whether or not something had a broad societal impact. I do not know if Mr. Chan or Mr. Iacovella would like to comment on that, maybe your wife or partner is not sitting behind you, and you can speak broadly on this. I say that teasingly. Do you have concerns with some of the individuals at the SEC who were clearly pushing a politicized agenda previously? Mr. Chan. I think my concern in the past years is the shift of cultural fairness. I do think that at the core we are dealing with materiality. We are dealing with a variety of issues. I think the north star should be creating incentives to get the staff back to focusing on what is fair and that includes trying to figure out what is material and understanding an investing public, also that includes making sure---- Mr. Steil. But does that cultural challenge that was created, I think it is highlighted by Staff Legal Bulletin 14L. Is that culture where people would have been--you if you were an individual and you came out of law school and thought boy, I like securities law, but man, I want to drive forward a wackadoodle agenda, boy the SEC might be a great spot to go because under Legal Bulletin 14L you could pretty much willy nilly make a determination as what had a broad societal impact. Now good we removed 14L, positive. Maybe those individuals that came in--again, not everybody at the SEC is of this mind-set, but it is pretty clear that there were some people there who were trying to drive forward a liberal agenda under Staff Bulletin 14L. Mr. Chan. Yes, and I think that goes back to the culture. If you ask and take a poll of the frontline staff in the division and enforcement people, the great people I work with, they want to fight fraud and they want to fight securities fraud and they want to focus on protecting investors. So I think anything that can return the staff to doing what they actually want to do, which is to fight fraud, would be great. Mr. Steil. Mr. Iacovella, did you want to comment on that as well. Mr. Iacovella. I would just say that the tone is set at the top and Chair Atkins was very clear about what he was going to use staff resources for and what he was not going to. I think you see a material change at the agency. Mr. Steil. That is great to hear, because I think Chair Atkins has done a spectacular job. I think that there is a massive shift of tone at the top. I think you see it in removal of Staff Bulletin 14L. You also see it in Chair Atkins and the now SEC board actually diving into what is actually material to the company, not creating and allowing staff to drive forward a political agenda to determine what is material. Let alone what some of my colleagues on the left side of the aisle want to do where they want write in statute that something is by definition material even if it has nothing to do with the company. I appreciate you all being here. We have made some real progress at the SEC. We have got more work to do. Madam Chair, I yield back. Chairwoman Wagner. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino, who is the vice chair of the subcommittee on Capital Markets. 5 minutes. Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, chairman. Thank you very much for having the hearing today and thank you to the witnesses for being here. U.S. institutional investors, including pensions funds, asset managers and insurance companies invest and trade across global markets, often they do work with foreign broker dealers to access the deepest liquidity outside of the United States. SEC's cross border broker framework, including rule 15a-6 was written decades ago and generally requires foreign brokers to operate through a registered U.S. intermediary. While intended to protect investors, market participants say these requirements can create unnecessary costs and friction at sophisticated institutions and may put U.S. investors at a competitive disadvantage. By contrast, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) uses equivocal frameworks that allows certain well-regulated foreign firms to serve U.S. participants without duplicating full U.S. registration. Markets are now far more interconnected and cross border trading is more common. There is a growing discussion about whether a similar modernization could be considered on the security side. Mr. Chan, are there areas where the SEC could focus to allow U.S. institutional investors more efficient access to broader global liquidity in non U.S. markets through well- regulated foreign broker dealers such as equivalency regimes with major similarly regulated jurisdictions. Mr. Chan. Absolutely, I call this the four corners of global interoperability. The SEC can do a better job on ensuring that investment products can be acessible seamlessly and internationally; professional licensing can easily be clarified and simplified--the reporting regime and also the examination. There can be a lot of work done with other regulators, globally, that can make international trading and investment securities much easier. As someone who worked with my partners on other jurisdictions, the key is the SEC understanding to what else is going on in the rest of the world. Mr. Garbarino. You just answered any follow up question, so I appreciate that very much. I am going to switch some gears here. Chairman Atkins has recognized that the SEC's rule book has become bloated and is an obstacle to growing our markets, to address that problem created over the past 5 years the chairman has noted that the SEC rulemaking agenda includes a number of proposals to reduce compliance, burdens and facilitate capital formation. Recent years the SEC adopted deeply problematic fund related rulemakings, example under former Chair Gensler is in 2023, funding. The 2023 fundings rules amendments which the SEC estimated would affect 76 percent of funds and introduced new compliance costs and operational complexity for funds. Those added burdens would ultimately be passed on to American savers. Mr. Cohen consistent with the SEC's goal of reducing unnecessary burden how should the commission or staff address those rulemaking excesses. Mr. Cohen. Well, I think the proposal that Chairman Atkins has made to revisit for example regulation S-K and much that is in it is very welcome. One thing you will note is that he articulated the concern about too much disclosure overwhelming people. I think that is a long-standing concern that many SEC chairman have articulated. Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that. I know I have two more questions, but I think I am going to yield back so Mr. Ogles can get some time. Chairwoman Wagner. I appreciate that. The gentleman yields back. Votes have been called about 6 or 7 minutes ago. Mr. Ogles, I appreciate, please submit whatever you have in writing for the panel. I would like to thank all our witnesses for your tremendous testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions for the witnesses to the chair. The questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for their prompt response. Witnesses please respond no later than March 11, 2026. [The information referred to can be found in the appendix.] This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]