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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: CISA, TSA, S&T ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 21, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-35 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-557 WASHINGTON : 2026 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chair Ranking Member Michael Guest, Mississippi Eric Swalwell, California Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida J. Luis Correa, California August Pfluger, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Member Gabe Evans, Colorado Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania Nellie Pou, New Jersey Brad Knott, North Carolina James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas Vacant Keighle Joyce, Staff Director Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Statements Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress From the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: Oral Statement................................................. 1 Prepared Statement............................................. 3 Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: Oral Statement................................................. 4 Prepared Statement............................................. 10 Witnesses Hon. Pedro M. Allende, Under Secretary, Science & Technology Directorate (S&T): Oral Statement................................................. 12 Prepared Statement............................................. 13 Mr. Madhu Gottumukkala, Ph.D., Acting Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): Oral Statement................................................. 14 Prepared Statement............................................. 16 Ms. Ha Nguyen McNeill, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Administrator, Transportation Security Administration (TSA): Oral Statement................................................. 18 Prepared Statement............................................. 19 For the Record Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security: Letter, January 14, 2026....................................... 6 Letter, January 21, 2026....................................... 8 Chart.......................................................... 62 Article, Mother Jones.......................................... 63 Article, Bloomberg............................................. 67 Appendix I Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino For Pedro M. Allende. 71 Questions From Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy for Pedro M. Allende. 72 Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Madhu Gottumukkala................................................... 74 Questions From Honorable August Pfluger For Madhu Gottumukkala... 80 Question From Honorable Matt Van Epps For Madhu Gottumukkala..... 82 Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino For Ha Nguyen McNeill 82 Questions From Honorable Ryan Mackenzie For Ha Nguyen McNeill.... 88 Questions From Honorable Dale Strong For Ha Nguyen McNeill....... 89 Questions From Honorable Vince Fong For Ha Nguyen McNeill........ 90 Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps For Ha Nguyen McNeill..... 91 Questions From Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy for Ha Nguyen McNeill 93 Questions From Honorable Troy Carter for Ha Nguyen McNeill....... 94 OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: CISA, TSA, S&T ---------- Wednesday, January 21, 2026 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in room 320, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Andrew Garbarino (Chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Garbarino, McCaul, Guest, Gimenez, Gonzales, Luttrell, Strong, Brecheen, Crane, Ogles, Biggs, Mackenzie, Fong, Epps, Thompson, Correa, Thanedar, Magaziner, Goldman, Ramirez, Kennedy, McIver, Pou, Walkinshaw, and Green. Chairman Garbarino. The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. Without objection, the Chair may declare a committee in recess at any point. The purpose of today's hearing is to conduct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and assess priorities for calendar year 2026 for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security, Transportation Security Administration, and Science and Technology Directorate. The Chair reminds all Members that the Chair will enforce the rules of decorum at all times and urges all Members to be mindful of their remarks. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good morning, and thank you to our witnesses for being here. Today, we are conducting oversight of the Department of Homeland Security focusing on TSA, CISA, and the Science and Technology Directorate, otherwise known as S&T. Nearly 25 years ago, 19 hijackers exploited significant vulnerabilities in our commercial aviation system. The al-Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, killed nearly 3,000 Americans and changed our Nation forever. Our transportation system, among other critical systems, demanded accountability and hardened security to ensure a horrific event would never happen again. In response, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to establish TSA and grant DHS flexible operational authority, allowing it to prepare for and respond to an ever-evolving threat landscape. Over the past two decades, threats facing our Nation's aviation, transportation, and critical infrastructure have only risen. Today's risks are for more diverse, complex, and technologically advanced, and the motivations and methods of our adversaries have shifted rapidly with emerging technologies. Threats posed by lone-wolf actors, radicalized individuals, and home-grown extremists have only increased. Transnational criminal organizations pose a significant threat by exploiting the transportation system to traffick humans, drugs, weapons, and illicit goods. Traditional terror tactics have given way to more sophisticated methods of attack. Cybersecurity is now at the forefront of these conversations with adversaries attempting to take down our transportational systems through digital means. Similarly, the potential for coordinated tax using drones to disrupt flights or deliver explosives, represent the new and growing frontier of security threats. Sophisticated foreign adversaries, including the People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are actively targeting our digital system, systems that underpin essential services, economic activity, and national security. These state-directed campaigns are designed to position hostile actors with strategic disruption and coercion. Rapid advances in emerging technologies, including AI, are further accelerating the scale, speed, and sophistication of these cybersecurity operations. In cyber space, the United States is operating in a highly- contested environment. Congress created CISA to serve as the Nation's lead civilian cyber defense agency to meet this reality. CISA's responsibilities included securing Federal civilian networks, supporting owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and coordinating with the private sector to reduce systemic cyber risk. That mission has grown more consequential as adversaries become more capable, patient, and willing to operate inside U.S. networks for extended periods of time. CISA's authorities extend across a variety of sectors, including energy, water, communications, health care, transportation, and financial services. This committee has been clear about CISA, CISA's expectations. It is not a policy, think tank, nor a messaging agency. Its mandate is operational. When that mandate is carried out with discipline and focus, the agency earns bipartisan support in Congress and confidence from the industry. When it does not, that confidence erodes. Over the past year, CISA has faced real operational challenges. Those challenges include rapidly-evolving threat landscape, the scope of the agency's responsibility in an increasingly digital world, and organizational adjustments. As with any agency responsible for our national security, it is critical these changes do not degrade readiness, responsiveness, or mission delivery. This committee supports the administration's global aligning of Department resources toward urgent Homeland Security priorities. At the same time, work force continuity, clear leadership, and mission readiness are essential to effective cyber defenses. Professionals at CISA are some of the most experienced cybersecurity experts in the Federal Government. Preserving that expertise must remain a priority. We are encouraged by the President's decision to renominate Mr. Sean Plankey as director of CISA. Mr. Plankey is a respected national security professional with decades of experience. His confirmation provides long-needed stability and strategic direction at CISA, which has operated without it for far too long. This committee's oversight of CISA is granted in respect for its mission and confidence in its work force. Last, several major high-profile events are set to unfold across the United States, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 L.A. Olympics. These events will only increase the volume and complexity of threats facing the homeland, and DHS must be prepared to respond. The Trump administration, to its credit, has taken strong steps to prioritize, strengthen our Nation's security systems. However, modernization of TSA, CISA, and S&T will require sustained Congressional support. As Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, it's my priority to ensure we support and invest in the next generation of technologies, and adopt highly innovative and effective security approaches given the challenges facing the Department and our country. This hearing provides an important opportunity to assess how TSA, CISA, and S&T are carrying out their missions. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses and engaging in constructive dialog about how Congress can effectively support security, operational excellence, and accountability across the Department. I also want to take this opportunity to thank our DHS personnel who keep us safe every day, including our dedicated cybersecurity professionals, our innovative researchers and scientists, and our brave TSA security officers who work on the front lines to protect the traveling public, and who continue to do so even without pay during the Nation's longest shutdown last year. I'm confident that by working together, we can break through the challenges of today and prepare for threats of tomorrow. The stakes for the American people cannot be higher. [The statement of Chairman Garbarino follows:] Statement of Chairman Andrew Garbarino January 21, 2026 Good morning and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. We are conducting oversight of the Department of Homeland Security focusing on TSA, CISA, and the Science and Technology Directorate, otherwise known as S&T. Nearly 25 years ago, 19 hijackers exploited significant vulnerabilities in our commercial aviation system. The al-Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 Americans and changed our Nation forever. Our transportation system, among other critical systems, demanded accountability and hardened security to ensure a horrific event would never happen again. In response, Congress enacted the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to establish TSA and grant DHS flexible operational authority, allowing it to prepare for and respond to an ever-evolving threat landscape. Over the past 2 decades, threats facing our Nation's aviation, transportation, and critical infrastructure have only risen. Today's risks are far more diverse, complex, and technologically advanced. And the motivations and methods of our adversaries have shifted rapidly with emerging technologies. Threats posed by lone-wolf actors, radicalized individuals, and home-grown extremists have only increased. Transnational criminal organizations pose a significant threat by exploiting the transportation system to traffic humans, drugs, weapons, and illicit goods. Traditional terror tactics have given way to more sophisticated methods of attack. Cybersecurity is now at the forefront of these conversations with adversaries attempting to take down our transportational systems through digital means. Similarly, the potential for coordinated attacks using drones to disrupt flights or deliver explosives represents a new and growing frontier of security threats. Sophisticated foreign adversaries, including the People's Republic of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are actively targeting our digital system. Systems that underpin essential services, economic activity, and national security. These state-directed campaigns are designed to position hostile actors for strategic disruption and coercion. Rapid advances in emerging technologies, including AI, are further accelerating the scale, speed, and sophistication of these cyber operations. In cyber space, the United States is operating in a highly contestant environment. Congress created CISA to serve as the Nation's lead civilian cyber defense agency to meet this reality. CISA's responsibilities included securing Federal civilian networks, supporting owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and coordinating with the private sector to reduce cyber systemic cyber risk. That mission has grown more consequential as adversaries become more capable, patient, and willing to operate inside U.S. networks for extended periods of time. CISA's authorities extend across a variety of sectors including energy, water, communications, health care, transportation, and financial services. This committee has been clear about CISA's expectations. It is not a policy think tank nor messaging agency. Its mandate is operational. When that mandate is carried out with discipline and focus, the agency earns bipartisan support in Congress and confidence from the industry. When it does not, that confidence erodes. Over the past year, CISA has faced real operational challenges. Those challenges include a rapidly- evolving threat landscape, the scope of the agency's responsibility in an increasingly digital world, and organizational adjustments. As with any agency responsible for our national security, it is critical these changes do not degrade readiness, responsiveness, or mission delivery. This committee supports the administration's goal of aligning Department resources toward urgent homeland security priorities. At the same time, workforce community continuity, clear leadership, and mission readiness are essential to effective cyber defenses. Professionals at CISA are some of the most experienced cybersecurity experts in the Federal Government and preserving that expertise must remain a priority. We are encouraged by the President's decision to renominate Mr. Sean Plankey as director of CISA. Mr. Plankey is a respected national security professional with decades of experience. His confirmation will provide long-needed stability and strategic direction at CISA, which has operated without it for far too long. This committee's oversight of CISA is grounded in respect for its mission and confidence in its workforce. Last, several major high-profile events are set to unfold across the United States, including the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 LA Olympics. These events will only increase the volume and complexity of threats facing the homeland and DHS must be prepared to respond. The Trump administration, to its credit, has taken strong steps to strengthen our Nation's security systems. However, modernization of TSA, CISA, and S&T will require sustained Congressional support. As Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, it is my priority to ensure we support and invest in the next generation of technologies and adopt highly innovative and effective security approaches given the challenges facing the Department and our country. This hearing provides an important opportunity to assess how TSA, CISA, and S&T are carrying out their missions. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses and engaging in constructive dialog about how Congress can effectively support security, operational excellence, and accountability across the Department. I also want to take this opportunity to thank our DHS personnel who keep us safe every day, including our dedicated cybersecurity professionals, our innovative researchers and scientists, and our brave TSA security officers who work on the front lines to protect the traveling public and who continue to do so even without pay during the Nation's longest shutdown last year. I'm confident that by working together, we can break through the challenges of today and prepare for threats of tomorrow. The stakes for the American people could not be higher. Thank you. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes for his opening statement. Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding today's hearing on Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security. Congressional Republicans' oversight of the Trump administration has been dismal this Congress. Republicans have had administration witnesses before this committee the fewest times in any recent administration's first year. Most of that was on the watch of the prior Chairman, who was, to my favorite phrase of his, derelict in his duty to bring Trump administration officials before the committee. This hearing is a step in the right director. The Trump administration has created serious issues at TSA, CISA, and DHS S&T that need to be addressed. Committee Democrats are committed to taking a hard look at those issues. From President Trump's slashing the CISA work force, to Secretary Kristi Noem's unlawful rescinding union rights for front-line transportation security officers, to the administration cutting programs that leveraged university-based research to address critical Homeland Security challenges. But none of those things can be the sole focus of our oversight right now, because President Trump and Secretary Noem have weaponized DHS against the American people and are wreaking havoc in Minneapolis and other communities across this country. It's an absolute disgrace that ICE isn't here today in wake of the shooting death of Renee Good at the hands of an ICE agent. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have asked for ICE Acting Director Lyons to appear at today's hearing. I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record my letter to you dated January 14, 2026, requesting Acting Director Lyons appear before the committee without delay. I want to thank you for issuing that invitation, but Committee Democrats and I are outraged that ICE refused to appear today. Ms. Good was a wife, mother of three young children, a devout Christian, and a U.S. citizen. We all seen the shooting video with our own eyes. Ms. Good certainly did not deserve to be killed by her own government. She should be alive today. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I ask for a moment of silence in memory of Renee Good. [Moment of silence.] Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in the wake of Ms. Good's killing, ICE has an obligation to appear and answer Members' questions. Her tragic killing needs to be thoroughly investigated, and everyone involved from the ICE officer who pulled the trigger, to the President and Secretary who sent them to Minneapolis must be held accountable. DHS also needs to be held accountable for its out-of-control immigration operation, creating chaos in communities like Los Angeles, Chicago, New Orleans, and Minneapolis, terrorizing people from all walks of life and hurting U.S. citizens and immigrants alike. Mr. Chairman, in order to ensure that ICE appears before the committee, pursuant to clause 2(J)(1) of House Rule 11, I'm providing you with a letter signed by every Democratic Member of the committee requesting testimony from Acting Director Lyons. I ask unanimous consent that this Minority Day letter be submitted for the record. Chairman Garbarino. Without objection. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ------ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I understand that you intend to hold a series of oversight hearings with DHS officials. I look forward to ICE being before the committee at our next hearings; Democrats insist on that. Never has oversight and accountability been more necessary than it is now. President Trump and Secretary Noem are doing real damage to this country and to the Department that was stood up in the wake of 9/11 to protect Americans from future attacks. Unfortunately, President Trump and Secretary Noem have established a corrupt, above-the-law culture at DHS, and Noem has enriched herself and her allies at taxpayers' expense. She has awarded multiple, no-bid contracts to close associates and siphon $240 million of taxpayers' money to companies connected to her top adviser and close confidant, Corey Lewandowski, as well as to her spokesperson husband. She fast-tracked a contract worth almost $1 billion to a company led by a Trump donor. She is living rent-free in a U.S. Coast Guard housing designated for military members. She has also abused her power as Secretary. She has acknowledged cherry-picking, which court orders departments will comply with contrary to the rule of law. She has used access to disaster funds to punish political foes, illegally withholding Congressionally-authorized disaster funds. She has obstructed Congressional oversight, barring Members from visiting ICE detention facilities, and refusing to respond to oversight letters and requests. In short, she has enriched herself, abused the power of her office, obstructed Congressional oversight, and violated her oath of office to the Constitution. Never has oversight of the Department of Homeland Security been more important, and never has holding an administration accountable been more necessary. Be assured that accountability is coming. Accountability is coming, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson January 21, 2026 Congressional Republicans' oversight of the Trump administration has been dismal this Congress. Republicans have had administration witnesses before the committee the fewest times in any recent administration's first year. Most of that was on the watch of the prior Chairman, who was--to use a favorite phrase of his--derelict in his duty to bring Trump administration officials before the committee. This hearing is a step in the right direction. The Trump administration has created serious issues at TSA, CISA, and DHS S&T that need to be addressed. Committee Democrats are committed to taking a hard look at those issues--from President Trump slashing the CISA workforce, to Secretary Kristi Noem unlawfully rescinding union rights for front-line Transportation Security Officers, to the administration cutting programs that leverage university-based research to address critical homeland security challenges. But none of those things can be the sole focus of our oversight right now, because President Trump and Secretary Noem have weaponized DHS against the American people and are wreaking havoc in Minneapolis and other communities across this country. It's an absolute disgrace that ICE isn't here today, in the wake of the shooting death of Renee Good at the hands of an ICE agent. As you know, I asked for ICE Acting Director Lyons to appear at today's hearing. I want to thank you for issuing that invitation, but committee Democrats and I are outraged that ICE refused to appear today. Ms. Good was a wife, mother of 3 young children, a devout Christian, and a U.S. citizen. We've all seen the shooting video with our own eyes. Ms. Good certainly did not deserve to be killed by her own Government. She should be alive today. In the wake of Ms. Good's killing, ICE has an obligation to appear and answer Members' questions. Her tragic killing needs to be thoroughly investigated and everyone involved--from the ICE officer who pulled the trigger to the President and Secretary who sent him to Minneapolis--must be held accountable. DHS also needs to be held accountable for its out-of-control immigration operations creating chaos in communities like Los Angeles, Chicago, New Orleans, and Minneapolis, terrorizing people from all walks of life, and hurting U.S. citizens and immigrants alike. In order to ensure that ICE appears before the committee, pursuant to clause 2(J)(1) of House Rule XI, I am providing you with a letter signed by every Democratic Member of the committee requesting testimony from Acting Director Lyons. I understand that you intend to hold a series of oversight hearings with DHS officials. I look forward to ICE being before the committee at our next hearing. Democrats insist on that. Never has oversight and accountability been more necessary than it is now. President Trump and Secretary Noem are doing real damage to this country and to the Department that was stood up in the wake of 9/11 to protect Americans from future attacks. Unfortunately, President Trump and Secretary Noem have established a corrupt, ``above the law'' culture at DHS, and Noem has enriched herself and her allies at tax-payer expense. She has awarded multiple, no-bid contracts to close associates and siphoned $240 million of taxpayer money to companies connected to her top advisor and close confidant, Corey Lewandowski, as well as to her spokesperson's husband. She fast-tracked a contract worth almost $1 billion dollars to a company led by a Trump donor. And she is living, rent-free, in U.S. Coast Guard housing designated for military members. She has also abused her power as Secretary. She has acknowledged cherry-picking which court orders the Department will comply with, contrary to the rule of law. She has used access to disaster funds to punish political foes, illegally withholding Congressionally-authorized disaster funds. She has obstructed Congressional oversight, barring Members from visiting ICE detention facilities and refusing to respond to oversight letters and requests. In short, she has enriched herself, abused the power of her office, obstructed Congressional oversight, and violated her oath of office to the Constitution. Never has oversight of the Department of Homeland Security been more important and never has holding an administration accountable been more necessary. Be assured that accountability is coming. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. I am pleased to have a highly distinguished panel of witnesses before us today. As the Ranking Member knows, we have talked about doing other oversight hearings, and that is the intent of this committee to do what Congress is meant to do and conduct oversight. I'm pleased today that we have our first panel of DHS officials here. DHS is a big department, and there should be several of these, and we will have several of these. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(C), I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Garbarino. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you all. Please be seated. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Mr. Pedro Allende is under secretary for science and technology, leading the Department's research and development efforts and serving as science advisor to the Secretary. Previously, he served as Florida's secretary of management services and has held roles at DHS and the Department of Emergency and Labor. Mr. Madhu Gottumukkala serves as the acting director and deputy director for the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency; a role in which he helps to lead CISA's mission to understand, manage, and reduce risks to cyber and physical infrastructure. Prior to his appointment, he served as commissioner and chief information officer for South Dakota's Bureau of Information and Technology. Ms. Ha Nguyen McNeill is deputy administrator of the Transportation and Security Agency, a role in which she is performing the duties of administrator to advance TSA's mission to secure the Nation's transportation system and improve operational effectiveness. Previously, she served as acting president, commercial, and vice president of digital identity growth at Big Bear AI. Ms. McNeill also served as TSA chief of staff from 2017 to 2019. I thank all of the witnesses for being here today. I now recognize Mr. Allende for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF HON. PEDRO M. ALLENDE, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE (S&T) Mr. Allende. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am honored to serve as under secretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security. I appreciate the committee's continued oversight and engagement with their work. The Science and Technology Directorate plays a unique role within DHS. We are the Department's research, development, test, and evaluation organization responsible for anticipating emerging threats, identifying technology opportunities, and ensuring that DHS components have access to solutions that are timely, effective, and responsible. Our work is grounded in the simplest measure of success: Whether technology transitions into the real-world use are effectuated, and whether they measurably improve mission outcomes. In my short tenure as under secretary, I have focused on listening to the operators, across the Department, to understand where technology is helping today, where it can help fill up certain gaps. Those conversations reinforce a consistent message. Technology must be operationally relevant. It must be rigorously tested and delivered with discipline. Research alone is not enough. Capability must reach the operators in the field. To meet that standard, S&T works closely with the components. From the earliest stages of development--and we assess emerging threats, evaluate existing commercial solutions, and apply systems engineering in tests and evaluation to reduce risks before acquisition decisions are made. When a private-sector solution can meet mission needs, that is our preference. We prioritize adopting those solutions and adapting them in order to accelerate delivery to the field; and, frankly, to steward taxpayer dollars effectively and responsibly. At the same time, the threat environment facing our homeland is increasingly dynamic and technology-driven. From unmanned aircraft systems to cyber-enabled threats, to risks, to critical infrastructure, S&T's role is to look ahead while supporting today's operations. That means engaging with industry, with academia, national laboratories, and FFRDCs, and interagency partners to ensure that DHS remains prepared for the future, without losing focus of today's challenges. Ultimately, my goal as under secretary to ensure that S&T remains a trusted partner to DHS components; one that delivers capabilities that work in the field, supports informed decision making, and strengthens the security of the American homeland. I look forward to discussing our work with the committee this morning and to answering your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Allende follows:] Prepared Statement of Pedro M. Allende January 21, 2026 introduction Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to have the confidence of President Trump and Secretary Noem to serve as the under secretary for science and technology (S&T) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I look forward to executing the Trump administration priorities to make the Nation safer through advancement and application of science and technology. I appreciate the committee's continued engagement with the DHS S&T Directorate, and I look forward to our work together during my tenure as under secretary. The S&T Directorate plays a unique role within DHS. We are responsible for understanding emerging threats and opportunities, and for ensuring the Department has access to timely, effective, and responsible technology solutions to meet its evolving mission needs. As threats to the homeland become more complex, adaptive, and technology- enabled, S&T's mission is to help DHS stay ahead of those challenges. S&T works closely with DHS operational components, the private sector, academia, international and interagency partners to deliver solutions that enhance security, improve efficiency, and strengthen operational effectiveness. Our success is measured not by research alone, but by outcomes delivered to operators and the American people. In my short time in this role, I have been energized by seeing S&T in action and witnessing first-hand the critical role technology plays in keeping our Nation safe. Just last week, I had the opportunity to meet with our partners at operational sites on the West Coast, including our DHS colleagues in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as our local law enforcement partners. At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), I observed TSA security operations and gained valuable insight into how emerging technologies can create new opportunities for enhanced safety and security. At SoFi Stadium, I engaged with security teams to discuss how innovative solutions can strengthen our defenses as we prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026. I toured the complex operations and technology required for cargo operations and screening by CBP as they ensure the safety of two of the largest U.S. seaports in Los Angeles and Long Beach, California, to cargo operations and screening. At the Air and Marine Operations Center, I met with partners to discuss collaborative activities, such as the Kestrel system which enhances their ability to determine highest-priority threats and make real-time operational decisions and explore enhancements to achieve full domain awareness across our borders and air space. My experiences this past week have crystalized for me the importance of advancing the administration's priorities and my commitment to ensuring S&T remains focused on the needs of our operational components while staying ahead of our adversaries. Our organization is also taking on broader challenges, including leading efforts in areas such as Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Secretary Noem recently announced the establishment of the Program Executive Office for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, investing to rapidly procure and deploy advanced counter-drone technologies. As Secretary Noem noted, these are critical investments to protect our borders and to keep Americans safe and secure during America 250 celebrations and at 2026 FIFA World Cup venues. My recent trip also enabled me to engage with private-sector partners, which will be a key theme of my service as Under Secretary. Not only does the private sector operate much of the critical infrastructure upon which our Nation relies, but they are a major source of technological innovation necessary to protect the homeland. One of my guiding principles will be to seek out and adopt private- sector solutions whenever possible. Leveraging existing or adaptable technologies will allow DHS to accelerate delivery to the field. I look forward to working with Congress on key legislative priorities including the restoration of Other Transaction Authority (OTA). OTA is a critical tool used to partner with nontraditional small- and medium-sized businesses and organizations on innovations that enhance our national security. The expiration of the authority on September 30, 2024, brought to a halt various efforts at S&T to develop solutions across several mission areas. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, S&T is committed to delivering innovative, responsible, and operationally relevant solutions that strengthen the security of the homeland. We look forward to continuing our close collaboration with Congress, across DHS components and partner agencies, and our external partners as we work to execute administration priorities, understand emerging threats, and leverage private-sector innovation to make the Nation safer. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize Mr. Gottumukkala for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement. STATEMENT OF MADHU GOTTUMUKKALA, PH.D., ACTING DIRECTOR, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Mr. Gottumukkala. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Madhu Gottumukkala, and I serve as the acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency or, CISA. Before joining the Federal Government, I oversaw State-wide technology and cybersecurity operations for the State of South Dakota. Earlier in my career, I worked across a wide list of telecom and health technology sectors. Those experiences shape how I approach the role with a practical understanding of how State and local governments and critical infrastructure operators experienced this on the ground. I'm honored that the President and Secretary Noem asked me to lead this agency. Since arriving last May, I have been proud to see the professionalism, talent, and deep mission commitment of the CISA work force each and every day. I'm also grateful for this country's continued bipartisan support and for the authorities Congress has provided to enable CISA's mission. Over the past year and under President Trump's leadership and Secretary Noem's guidance, CISA has remained squarely focused on the mission Congress intended when the agency was established; that is, supporting, strengthening, and securing a Nation's critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats. That mission is operational and outcome-driven. Every day, CISA's people work to protect the financial systems, safeguard pipelines, and ensure the digital and physical infrastructure Americans rely on can withstand disruption. In 2025, CISA made meaningful progress in an increasingly aggressive threat environment. We strengthen our ability to detect and respond to cybersecurity threats, deepen collaboration across Government and industry, and shared threat information and mitigation guidance faster and in more integrated ways. As it is, CISA supported more than 4,000 victims of cyber incidents, published over 1,600 cybersecurity products, shared more than 2,500 threat and incident reports, and triaged over 30,000 incidents through our 24/7 operations center. These efforts produced real-world impact and helped ensure Americans could continue to rely on the S&T resources. As the operational lead for Federal civilian cybersecurity, CISA worked really closely with departments and agencies to promote risk-based policies and best practices to respond to the evolving threats. In 2025, we issued three emergency directors to address critical vulnerabilities and cyber threats. We also scaled the endpoint detection and response technology to over 60 agencies and more than 500,000 endpoints, giving analysts near real-time visibility to detect and stop those advanced threats. In early 2025 alone, CISA blocked more than 1.7 billion malicious connections on Federal networks, including 142 million targeting the critical infrastructure. CISA also continued delivering security directly to the State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments; a mission that is very personal to me given my time serving in the State level. With a nationwide presence across the 10 regions, we provided tailored training, technical assistance, and planning support, recognizing that many of our partners operate with limited budgets and staffing. To help address this, in August 2025, the Department of Homeland Security released funding opportunities under the State and local cybersecurity grant program, and the Tribal Cybersecurity Grant program making available over $100 million to help reduce the cybersecurity risk nationwide. Physical security remains a no-fail mission for the agency. In fiscal year 2025, CISA delivered more than 1,000 counter-IED and risk mitigation training courses to over 26,000 participants; strengthen preparedness, awareness, and also the response capabilities. We are also actively preparing for the major national and international neighbors, including the FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 Olympic Games. In April, CISA convened more than 730 partners from over 40 agencies at the Lincoln Financial Field for the first scale exercise of the workup. That exercise produced influence in coordination, communication, and public safety. As we enter 2026, CISA is executing a mission-first approach. We are launching targeted initiatives to close the most pressing risk gaps facing the critical infrastructure, but clearly, where cyber threats intersect with real-world consequences. We are proud as in what works, eliminating duplication and ensuring that every product and service directly advances CISA's regulatory mission and alliance with the administration's goals of efficiency, accountability, and impact. This includes incorporating the industry and Congressional feedback into the final rule for the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act. It also includes modernizing how we engage with critical infrastructure partners by replacing CPAC, the most streamlined and effective engagement framework. Finally, we recognize that a disciplined mission requires the right work force--not the larger one, but a more capable and a skilled one. In 2026, CISA will continue prioritizing in mission-critical roles while remaining aligned with the broader efforts to convert costs and maximize return. Under President Trump's leadership and Secretary Noem's guidance, CISA remains committed to being a focused, efficient, and accountable agency--one that executes the mission Congress assigned and diversity and security for the American people. Thank you, again, for your support, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gottumukkala follows:] Prepared Statement of Madhu Gottumukkala January 21, 2026 introduction Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for the opportunity to discuss the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's priorities to protect the Nation's critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats. I appreciate the committee's continued support for the critical mission that CISA carries out on behalf of the American people. Since President Trump took office last year, and with strong support and guidance from Secretary Noem, CISA has been laser-focused on fulfilling the mission Congress gave us when the agency was first established by President Trump in 2018: to support, strengthen, and secure our Nation's critical infrastructure. Our work today is squarely aligned with the agency's original statutory purpose. That means working with Government and private-sector partners to protect our financial systems, safeguard our pipelines, and ensure the digital and physical systems our Nation depends on to remain resilient against disruption from possible cyber attacks. To do this, over the past year, CISA has focused its work on efforts aligned to the agency's statutory priorities, including: Reinforcing Federal civilian network defense. Supporting critical infrastructure nationwide in defending against physical and cyber threats. Delivering security directly to State and local governments by offering an array of no-cost resources and tools, such as technical assistance, exercises, and cybersecurity assessments. Continuing to share threat information and mitigation guidance in a faster, more integrated way. Through these efforts, we remain deeply committed to working side- by-side with organizations of every size, across every critical sector. Because no single entity--not even the Federal Government--can manage these risks alone. Thanks to the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, CISA is leading the fight against malign actors. We strengthened our operational capabilities to detect and to respond to cyber threats, deepened collaboration across Government and industry, and continued to provide guidance to the critical infrastructure community to reduce vulnerabilities and systemic risk across our Nation's most critical systems and functions as malign actors seek to exploit our Nation's vulnerabilities. CISA has continued to provide practical services and guidance to critical infrastructure owners and operators, helping them to improve their resilience, limit disruptions, and recover more quickly when incidents do occur. Under the Trump administration, CISA is focused on our No. 1 priority: protecting and defending the American people. CISA's work has reduced the impact of cyber incidents and helped to ensure that Americans could continue to use the critical infrastructure functions they rely on. The agency also continues to share threat and incident reports, coordinate intelligence across the Federal Government, and partner through structured meetings and threat briefings to strengthen resilience nationwide. As the operational lead for Federal cybersecurity, and as part of our mission to protect and defend Federal civilian networks, CISA strengthened its work with each department and agency to promote the adoption of risk-based common policies and best practices to effectively respond to the ever-evolving threat landscape. Secretary Noem recognizes that cybersecurity is national security and in 2025, under her leadership, CISA issued 3 emergency directives to protect Federal networks from critical vulnerabilities and cyber threats. CISA also scaled its Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Technology, giving analysts near-real-time visibility to detect and stop advanced threats. The Trump administration recognizes that the Federal Government cannot fight our Nation's adversaries alone--we must empower our local partners. That is why CISA has worked alongside our State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to deliver security to our local partners. With a nationwide presence in 10 regions across the country, CISA delivered tailored resources, training, and technical assistance to help our partners anticipate, withstand, and recover from threats. We also recognize that many SLTT governments across the country are constrained by smaller, more limited operating budgets, and fewer IT staff than a similarly-sized business. Secretary Noem and I recognize this challenge, and so to help support our SLTT partners last year, the Department of Homeland Security released Notice of Funding Opportunities for the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) and the Tribal Cybersecurity Grant Program (TCGP)--$91.7 million to States and territories and $12.1 million to Tribal Governments to address cybersecurity risks. CISA remains dedicated to supporting critical infrastructure owners and operators. Physical security, defending against physical threats, remains a no-fail mission for the agency. In fiscal year 2025, CISA continued to train public and private-sector stakeholders on counter- improvised explosive device (C-IED) and risk mitigation practices, enhancing threat awareness, preparedness, and capabilities across the critical infrastructure community. We also continue to look ahead to preparing for major events in 2026 and beyond, including the FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles. To give you just one example of this work, in April, CISA convened participants from more than 40 agencies at Lincoln Financial Field in Philadelphia, one of the 11 American Host cities, for a full-scale exercise ahead of the FIFA World Cup. The exercise produced areas for improvement and action recommendations to enhance coordination, communication, and public safety. Continuing to look ahead as we begin 2026, CISA will reinvigorate its mission-first approach. We will be launching targeted initiatives designed to close the most pressing risk gaps facing critical infrastructure--particularly where cyber threats intersect with real- world consequences. These efforts are intentionally-scoped, operationally-focused, and aligned with the Trump administration's broader goals and priorities of efficiency, accountability, and impact. We are prioritizing what works from previous lessons learned, eliminating duplication, and ensuring every new service or product we release directly advances CISA's statutory mission and responsibilities. For example, CISA is currently reviewing public comments on the proposed rule for the Cyber Incident Reporting and Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, or CIRCIA. CISA appreciates the input it received from Congress and the public about aligning with Congressional intent and streamlining the CIRCIA requirements. CISA is also cognizant of the concerns raised regarding the scope and burden of the rule and improving harmonization of CIRCIA with other Federal cyber incident reporting requirements. CISA is considering this feedback as it works to issue a final rule. I look forward to continuing to engage with Congress on these efforts and providing updates as the final rule process nears its completion. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to thank Congress, and particularly this committee under your leadership, for their work on reauthorizing CISA 2015, which is mission-critical for CISA's work and information sharing with the private sector. The Secretary and I have been very clear that we fully support the reauthorization of this vital piece of legislation. CISA remains steadfast on the agency's statutory intent, we also recognize that a disciplined mission requires the right workforce--not a larger one, but a more capable and technically-skilled one. In 2026, CISA will continue to right-size and rebalance its workforce by prioritizing highly technical professionals in mission-critical roles, including cybersecurity operators and infrastructure security experts. These targeted positions will support front-line critical infrastructure owners and operators across every region in the United States in reducing their long-term risks. We will execute our hiring authorities while remaining consistent with the administration's efforts to streamline the Government workforce, control cost, and maximize return. Under President Trump's leadership and Secretary Noem's guidance, CISA remains committed to being a focused, efficient, and accountable agency--one that executes the mission Congress assigned, supports the administration's priorities, and delivers real security outcomes for the American people. We look forward to continuing to work with this committee to ensure that CISA has the tools and capabilities necessary to protect the Nation's critical infrastructure. Thank you again for your support and I look forward to your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Gottumukkala. I now recognize Ms. McNeill for 5 minutes to summarize her opening statement. STATEMENT OF HA NGUYEN MC NEILL, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) Ms. McNeill. Good morning, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify before you today on behalf of the Transportation Security Administration. I'm honored to be here, and grateful for the long-standing and productive partnerships TSA shares with this committee and Congress. I would like to start by thanking TSA employees for their unrelenting efforts day in and day out to secure the Nation's transportation systems. TSA is an agile security agency embodied by a dedicated and professional work force that work around the clock to outmatch an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic threat. TSA's greatest assets is its people, and I want to sincerely thank them. From our transportation security officers and K-9 handlers to our Federal air marshals, these men and women embody the agency's core values. They worked through the longest Government shutdown in American history, many without pay, and experience personal financial hardships. Their commitment to the TSA mission and to the traveling public is unparalleled. Under the leadership of President Trump and Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Kristi Noem, TSA is laser-focused on delivering for the American people. The upcoming World Cup, America 250, and 2028 Olympics present an enormous opportunity to boldly transform transportation security in the United States and usher in President Trump's vision for a new golden age of travel. Achieving these priorities starts with deploying upgraded state-of-the-art technology to our over 430 commercial airports nationwide, focusing on our core mission of transportation security and harnessing our collective investment power and innovation through robust, public, private partnerships. Last year, passenger volumes at airports reached record highs, recording 8 out of the top 10 busiest days in TSA's history. In 2025, TSA screened 907 million passengers, 480 million checked bags, and 2.1 billion carry-on bags. With the transportation sector remaining a top target for bad actors and continued year-over-year passenger volume growth, it is more critical than ever to have a technologically-advanced, seamless, and secure aviation system. I would like to thank the committee for its strong support of the agency's critical aviation security programs, including two I would like to highlight: First, the Screening Partnership Program through which TSA is working closely with airports and industry to incentivize investment in more tailored and innovative solutions to strengthen security; and second, the One Stop Security Pilot Program which significantly improves international aviation security and streamlines the transfer process for passengers inbound from the United States with a connecting flight. In addition to strong partnerships, we must invest in modernizing our security technology. One avenue to achieving this is for Congress to expand the amount and scope of the Aviation Security Capital Fund. Starting in 2004, Congress authorized the first $250 million in revenue collected each year from the passenger security fee to go to TSA's capital fund to be used for checked baggage technology. That amount has not been adjusted or raised in 21 years with the next $1.6 billion in the fee revenue going to annual national deficit reduction. If Congress were to return the funds collected to be used for its intended purpose, passenger security, and expanded to include checkpoint technology, TSA can significantly shorten its technology deployment time frames, improving both security and the passenger experience. TSA is committed to making the airport experience smooth and stress free for the traveling public, including military personnel and American families traveling with children. Last year we established the Serve With Honor, Travel With Ease Program which provides screening lanes for Active-Duty military personnel and their families, as well as the Families on the Fly Program, which dedicated lanes for families. With the strong leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, coupled with continued support from Congress and industry partners, we can transform aviation security and return America to being the world's No. 1 travel destination. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, it is a privilege to testify before you today. I thank you for your support of TSA and look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. McNeill follows:] Prepared Statement of Ha Nguyen McNeill January 21, 2026 introduction Good morning, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify before you today on behalf of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I am honored to be here and grateful for the long-standing and productive partnership TSA shares with this committee. I would like to start by thanking TSA's employees for their unrelenting efforts day in and day out to secure the Nation's transportation systems. TSA is an agile security agency, embodied by a dedicated and professional workforce that works tirelessly to outmatch an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic threat. Under the Trump administration and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem, TSA is laser-focused on delivering for the American people, fortifying travel security, renewing its commitment to the traveler experience, and serving as a responsible steward of the American tax dollar. This starts with deploying upgraded, state-of-the- art technology to airports nationwide, renewing our commitment to the American taxpayer, returning to our core mission, leveraging public- private partnerships, and enhancing hospitality and the passenger experience. tsa priorities With the transportation sector remaining a top target for malign actors, and passenger volumes at airports reaching record highs in 2025--including 8 out of the top 10 busiest travel days on record--it is more critical than ever to have a technologically advanced, seamless, and secure aviation security system. In 2025 alone, TSA screened 906.7 million passengers, 480 million checked bags, and 2.1 billion carry-on bags. The upcoming 2026 World Cup, America250 events, and 2028 Summer Olympics present an enormous opportunity to boldly transform transportation security in the United States. Through new policies, legislation, and private-sector partnerships that support technological innovation and modernizing the screening process, we can usher in President Trump's vision for a new Golden Age of American travel. Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to Advance the Mission TSA's mission is supported by critical public-private partnerships, and the Trump administration, DHS, and TSA are strongly committed to working more collaboratively with industry stakeholders than ever before, utilizing their expertise and efficiency, to strengthen aviation security and improve the passenger experience. On that note, I would like to thank this committee for ensuring TSA and our critical interagency, State, local, and private-sector partners have the resources needed to mitigate the evolving threat landscape, which includes the proliferating cybersecurity and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) threats. Screening Partnership Program Under the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), TSA contracts with qualified private companies to provide personnel to perform security screening operations at commercial airports. TSA is working closely with Congressional and industry partners to modernize SPP to incentivize airports and industry to invest in more tailored and innovative solutions faster, to optimize security operations, while maintaining the Agency's rigorous regulatory oversight and outcome- based security standards. One-Stop Security In close partnership with the Department of State, industry, and international partners, TSA is advancing the One-Stop Security (OSS) pilot program. OSS improves international aviation security, streamlines the transfer process for passengers inbound to the United States with connecting flights, and eliminates the need for passengers and their bags to go through screening again. Last summer, TSA launched its first OSS pilot location at London-Heathrow Airport (LHR), demonstrating an immediate success for all stakeholders. Currently, there are 7 OSS flights per day from LHR into Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL) and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), saving each OSS passenger up to 2 hours that he or she can now use to relax, shop, and dine at the airport. Reimbursable Screening Services Program Another critical pilot program that Congress has afforded us to explore with industry partners is the Reimbursable Screening Services Program (RSSP). RSSP enables TSA to work with industry to screen passengers in a location separate from the checkpoint, such as an off- airport cruise or VIP terminal. RSSP is an innovative public-private partnership to alleviate congestion at the checkpoint and offset TSA costs. Permanently authorizing RSSP, which is set to expire on January 30 of this year, will provide certainty and unlock innovation, further increasing industry interest and participation. Investing in Modernizing Security Technology Starting in 2004, Congress authorized the first $250 million in revenue collected each year from the Passenger Security Fee to go to the Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF), to be used for checked baggage technology. Along with amounts provided in annual appropriations, amounts in the ASCF were meant to recapitalize and modernize TSA screening technology, but unfortunately this level of investment has not kept pace with changing technology and the evolution of the threat landscape. Over the past several years, Congress has diverted approximately $1.6 billion in TSA Passenger Security Fee revenue each year for deficit reduction purposes. The President's fiscal year 2026 budget proposes to eliminate the deficit reduction contributions and instead direct Passenger Security Fee amounts to their intended purpose of bolstering TSA aviation screening operations. The fiscal year 2026 budget also includes proposed additional investments in aviation screening technology, such as Computed Tomography (CT) technology, that can supplement ASCF amounts to make improvements to both security and the passenger experience at the checkpoints. TSA encourages Congress to act on the President's fiscal year 2026 budget request so that the ASCF is not the only source of funding for modernizing TSA security technology. Renewing Focus on Core Mission and Serving the American Taxpayer REAL ID Under the leadership of Secretary Noem, since May 2025, TSA is fully enforcing its statutory requirements under the REAL ID Act of 2005. The legislation was enacted in response to the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations aimed at combatting fraudulent identity documents (IDs) and ensuring passengers are who they say they are. As the 9/11 Commission Report stated, ``For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.'' This administration acted swiftly to enforce the law to ensure TSA maintains the highest standards of aviation security for the American taxpayer and traveler. Currently, most travelers (about 94 percent) present either a REAL ID-compliant or another acceptable form of ID. However, we must ensure that everyone who flies is who they say they are. TSA ConfirmID is a new modernized alternative identity verification system to enhance and streamline identity verification for travelers that do not have an acceptable form of ID. Starting February 1, 2026, travelers who do not present an acceptable form of ID at TSA checkpoints and still want to fly, have the option of paying a $45 fee and undergoing the TSA ConfirmID process. The fee ensures that the cost to cover verification of an unacceptable ID will be borne by the non-compliant traveler, not the American taxpayer, and prevents malign actors from getting on a plane. TSA will continue working closely with all States to increase adoption of REAL IDs and urges all travelers to obtain a REAL ID, or other acceptable form of ID, as soon as possible to avoid delays and potentially missing flights. Improving the Travel Experience for Our Military and American Families TSA is committed to making the airport experience as smooth and stress-free for active-duty military personnel and their families, and American families traveling with children. To honor those who protect our Nation and to recognize their service and sacrifices, TSA has established the ``Serve with Honor, Travel with Ease'' program, which provides dedicated screening lanes for active-duty military personnel and their families at airports near the Nation's largest military bases. Similarly, the agency is actively working to create a welcoming environment for families with children. TSA's new ``Families on the Fly'' program provides dedicated lanes for families at select airports to create a welcoming environment and ease stress for families traveling with children. conclusion Today, TSA is at a strategic crossroads. With continued support from Congress and industry partners, a screening process that is more efficient, technologically integrated, secure, and affordable to the American taxpayer, is within our grasp. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee, it is a privilege to testify before you today. I thank you for your support of TSA and look forward to your questions. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Ms. McNeill. The committee will now--I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. But I want to--because it's an oversight hearing, and we do have--I want to make sure everybody can ask their questions--I will entertain unanimous consent at the end like we did last time. So we will accept them all. Just we want to do it at the end so there's enough time for everyone to ask questions. Because we do have a 2 o'clock--a very important 2 o'clock hearing that Chairman Guest is running. So, I want to make sure that that starts on time as well. So I will start. Dr. Gottumukkala, it's been a year now in the Trump administration, and there's been some major shakeups at CISA, specifically, with some RIFs, and there's been a lot of changes. But the agency still remains responsible for defending the Federal civilian networks, supporting State and local partners, and coordinating with critical infrastructure sectors under sustained targeting by foreign adversaries. I have said it publicly, I know a number of Members on this committee have said it publicly, that any organizational restructuring must reinforce CISA's ability to execute its core mission and should be done so in coordination with Congress. There have been reports that there are planned reorganization efforts for CISA. Can you please describe what, if any, organizational changes you, as acting director, are planning to make in the months ahead, and if there are any that you have already done? Mr. Gottumukkala. Chairman Garbarino, thank you for the question. I want to start by saying that CISA is trying to get back on its mission, which is protecting the critical infrastructure security from physical and cyber threats. CISA is a young agency, and we have grown. As we continue to make sure, and as we are rescoping, as you have suggested, sir, we do have a lot of changes in the last year. But we do not have or planned any organizational changes. But we are continuing to look at how we will scope our existing work that we have, so that we can get back on our mission of protecting the critical infrastructure. If there's any organizational changes, I will assure that we will communicate with you. Chairman Garbarino. So as of now, you don't have any planned reorganizational changes that will be coming to CISA? Mr. Gottumukkala. That's correct, sir. Chairman Garbarino. OK. I just wanted to reiterate, you just said you will--anything--you will be sure to notify Congress of any intent to reorganize CISA? Mr. Gottumukkala. Absolutely, sir. We want to make sure that our resources are aligned with the statutory authorities that you have given us and we'll make sure that we'll work with you. Chairman Garbarino. Wonderful. Do you have the proper staffing right now to fulfill CISA's critical mission? Mr. Gottumukkala. Chairman Garbarino, thank you for the question. We have the staff that we need for the mission that we want to protect. So, yes, we have--and like any other situation, we do have attrition, we use other hiring authorities to make sure that we go back and get back to our mission. We are protecting the Nation now every single day. Chairman Garbarino. You are in the process of hiring 4 specific positions right now? Mr. Gottumukkala. We have. We obviously use other hiring authorities that we have, sir. We are making sure that we have the right skills and the right talent that we need across our mission areas. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much. I want to follow up also. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act, or CIRCIA, was signed into law nearly 4 years ago. I was one of the co-leads on it. The final regulations, which were supposed to be in October 2025, the deadline has now slipped to May 2026. I am happy with that, actually, because a lot of us did not like what was coming out of the rule making. There was supposed to be a--I remember the Secretary last year said that there was going to be possible ex parte process to update the world. I just want to know where is CISA right now in the rule making? Has there been an ex parte process? Are they getting close to the Congressional intent that we had when we passed the bill originally? Mr. Gottumukkala. Chairman Garbarino, thank you for the question. The CIRCIA that you are referring to, the Cyber Incident Reporting for the Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, what it does, sir, is it requires the covered critical infrastructure entities to report any significant cyber incidents, ransomware payments to CISA, so the Government can highly detect threats faster and assist the systems more effectively, and be able to warn others before the attacks are spread. Chairman Garbarino. I'm going to interrupt you because I'm running out of time, but I want to make sure--are you on schedule to come out, and have you been working with the private sector to address the concerns that came out in the original rule-making process? Mr. Gottumukkala. Chairman Garbarino, absolutely. We are working really hard to make sure that we are getting toward the closure line. We did not miss the deadline due to inaction. It was a deliberate decision driven by a substance. Some of the key drivers that we have worked out, 280-plus detailed public comments. We have the stakeholder engagement that is on-going and extensive. We want to make sure that the protection for companies is there. We are making sure that there is not a burden on the people that are making those requirements. Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate it. I have run out of time. I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm kind- of taking off on where you started off with respect to CISA's staffing. Congressman McCaul and myself supported CISA becoming a part of DHS for all the right reasons. You said that no organizational changes; that you're able to accomplish the mission. How many vacancies do you have right now in CISA? Mr. Gottumukkala. Sir, our head count as of--Ranking Member, thank you for your question. We have about 2,400-plus employees at CISA. We have the required work force that does the mission support every day. Mr. Thompson. I need the numbers. How many are you short? Mr. Gottumukkala. We have the normal attrition like any other Federal agency, sir, which is at 7.5 percent approximately this past year. That is significantly less than the previous prior years, and as compared to the other Federal agencies as well. But, in general, we have the required authorities to make sure that we go back to hiring authority to be able to hire the required talent. Mr. Thompson. I appreciate it. But your staff has been cut by one-third. Is that not true? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ranking Member Thompson, what we had is a work force transition program, and people who left the organization, they participated voluntarily. We have the required staff that is supporting the mission like we do. Mr. Thompson. I'm sure you're going to say that. But I'm just trying to get to a number that you started with and what the President cut. I mean, it should be easy for you to just come up and say, I lost a third of my people, but I'm able to accomplish the mission. Mr. Gottumukkala. Understood, sir. Ranking Member Thompson, the way--let me clarify this. As of January 20, 2025, our CISA work force was 3,389-plus. At the end of December, we were at 2,389. We have the work force transition, like I said, and we have the normal attrition. But like I said, the way we are supporting background mission is to make sure that we are protecting our critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats; and our divisions are properly equipped; and we are making sure that we are aligning all existing resources---- Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. But you provided a November memo that said, contrary to what you're telling the committee; we will send a letter to you asking for the specific numbers that you're short, and just tell us. That's the only thing. But this leads me to another issue, since you wouldn't give me the number that I ask. Are you aware that you reportedly failed the counterintelligence polygraph test? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ranking Member Thompson, I do not accept the premise of the characterization, and I'm not going to discuss the testing outcomes or clearance matters in an open session. Those issues are handled through the DHS adjudication process which are currently under way. Mr. Thompson. Did you fail the test; yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Sir, like I said, I do not accept the premise of the characterization. I understand why people ask the question. I'm mindful that situations like this affect people, which is why I'm respecting the process and keeping the mission steady, sir. Mr. Thompson. You're in a very sensitive area, and CISA is important to us. I think we need to have people who are in that space that pass the standard test. So, I mean, we will pursue that a little later, but I was just looking for a yes-or-no answer. If you took the test and passed it, fine. If you didn't, that's a problem. But I can't get an answer one way or the other out of you, and we'll go forward with that. Are you aware of the chief information officers at CISA that you are, at present, trying to get rid of or have gotten rid of? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for the question. Individual, personal matters are not made. The decisions are not made in vacuum. It is a leadership level at the highest levels. We work according to how we see the roles fit. But I am not here to comment on them. Mr. Thompson. I understand. The last question, Mr. Chairman, are you aware of a SCIF being planned and paid for by DHS to be built in South Dakota? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for the question. I don't know the full specifics of who is building, what is building, but I think it is not Federally funded by us, which means we will probably be supporting in terms of like any other SCIF that we have, irrespective of where the location is. Mr. Thompson. So you don't know anything about it? Mr. Gottumukkala. Yes, sir, of course I know that there is propositions for a SCIF like any other location. Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chair, I'll follow up with some more questions for the witness. I yield back. Mr. McCaul [presiding]. The Chair recognizes myself for 5 minutes. I need to say, first, when I was Chairman of this committee, 2015, we passed the Cyber Information Sharing Act-- the Ranking Member and I did together. It's been a very bipartisan issue. In 2018, we passed the Cyber Security and Information Security Agency permanent authorization. The reason why I'm going through this legislative history, it's very important to know what is still authorized today and what is not. One of the most critical pieces of CISA, as we imagined in Congress, was to share information with the private sector, not only to the private sector, but from the private sector, which holds about 80 percent of the cyber threat information. Would you agree with that, sir? Mr. Gottumukkala. Yes, sir. Mr. McCaul. Yes. So, that was vitally important as the authors of this agency--and we had quite a battle with, I would say, with House Intelligence over whether this should be warehoused under the National Security Agency which is not a civilian agency to interact with the private sector. We thought a civilian agency would be the better fit. I would like to think that we were right about that. But then the goal was to expand the capabilities so that you could meet those requirements. Do you feel that you have those capabilities today? Mr. Gottumukkala. Sir, the CISA 2015, the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 that you're referring to, it provides the leader foundation for cyber threat information sharing between the Federal Government and the private sector. It remains one of the most important authorities for defending the U.S. critical infrastructure against increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Mr. McCaul. OK. So now, let me get back to the authorizations, because this is really important for the committee Members to know. That now, CISA, the agency was permanently authorized. So there's no expiration. However, there is one on the Cyber Information Sharing Act was just brought about by a compromise with various Members who would not vote for it unless we put that expiration term in there. So, as of now, it is no longer authorized. It was temporarily reauthorized in the CR, which will expire January 30. So if I can correct myself, it will expire on January 30 of this year. Mr. Garbarino and Mr. Thompson introduced a reauthorization that passed in the Homeland approps bill that did not go to the Senate. It is not in the Homeland approps we are voting on this week. My question to you is: While you still have appropriations to the majority, I think, of your agency, I think, if not all, to not be authorized, to have a lapse in authorization, at this point in time where the cyber threat is far greater today than when Mr. Thompson and I first created the agency in the Information Sharing Act, in addition, coupled with the World Cup FIFA events coming up, the Olympics, and the anniversary or 250th anniversary of the Republic, how does that harm your efforts to protect the Nation? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you, again. Like I said, I personally support, and DHS also supports the long-term reauthorization of the CISA 2015. I understand that the Act expires January 30. One of the strengths of CISA is the partnership and collaboration with the private sector. The private sector understands that this will be extended through the continuing resolution. Like we have worked with Chairman Garbarino and the committee and the wide-spread information---- Mr. McCaul. Again, if I could--my time is going to expire, but this is not your fault, this is Congress' fault. You know, it is incumbent, I think the House has done its job, but the Senate has not done their job on this. So, it is vitally important--and this is a message to the Senate--that when we do pass this, again, that the Senate reauthorize your mission, otherwise your ability to collect 80 percent of the threat information from the private sector is gone. You're no longer authorized to do that by law. So that is why that is so important, sir. This is always--as Mr. Thompson knows--it's always been a bipartisan issue. I really hope--and I don't have any doubt on my colleagues on the other side of the aisle or in the House when you get this done, but the Senate, for the sake of the Nation and our security, needs to act on this, is highly irresponsible, and quite frankly, just downright dangerous what they're doing. They're playing games with something that's very serious. With that, I now recognize--who is next--Mr. Correa. Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. Dr. Madhu, if I may, I wanted to follow up with some of the questions and thoughts, directions, of the Chairman and the Ranking Member. You said--correct me if I'm wrong--a third of your people have left voluntarily? Mr. Gottumukkala. About 806 people, sir, yes. Mr. Correa. A third. It was just stated from both sides of the aisle that the threat, cyber threat, is ever-increasing. It's even worse now. When I go home, I get stories from local vendors that they've been hacked. I get stories that they're essentially being held ransom because somebody from outside the country has got to them. From that level up to Colonial Pipeline, cyber threats everywhere, your agency lost a third of their staff. We're about to vote on a bill that cuts your funding by about $270 million. Is that correct, sir? Yes, no, maybe? You're under oath, by the way. Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you. I appreciate the---- Mr. Correa. Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. I have to look, sir. We have---- Mr. Correa. You haven't looked at it, yet---- Mr. Gottumukkala. We had a Defense budget of $2.5 billion. Mr. Correa. Are we about to cut your budget by $270 million--vote to do that? Are we, yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. I---- Mr. Correa. Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. I don't have the exact number---- Mr. Correa. We are. We are. Just watch the votes in the next couple of days. Yet you've said that you can still do your mission, your assignment to defend this country, satisfactorily. Is that what you're saying? Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman---- Mr. Correa. Yes or no? Do you need more resources? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, we are---- Mr. Correa. Yes or no? Do you need more resources, sir? You're under oath. Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman---- Mr. Correa. Can you assure the public of this country that based on all these cuts you've lost a third of your personnel; we are about to your cut your budget that you can still do your job? Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. Like---- Mr. Correa. Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Sir, I did---- Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. I have got 2\1/2\ minutes left. If you could answer that to me in writing later on, I would appreciate it. Ms. McNeill, thank you for being here today. Quick history. TSA, Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security was created as a result of 9/11. That cowardly attack on our country that cost us thousands of lives. We don't want to see that repeated again. If I remember correctly, hijackers, terrorists broke into the cabin of a number of airline flights on that day, took command, control of airplanes, and used them as weapons against the United States. Is that correct? More or less? Ms. McNeill. That's correct. Mr. Correa. Do you have the resources today to defend against something like that? Ms. McNeill. We do, sir. Since the establishment of TSA, we've taken a concerted layer of approach to aviation security. Mr. Correa. Recently--if I may? Ms. McNeill. Yes, sir. Mr. Correa. Reassignment of some of your personnel to ICE and CBP over the last year. So, is that correct? You've lost about 250 air marshals; air marshals who are randomly on airplanes, on commercial flights, to prevent another 9/11 from happening. Those folks are now assisting in ICE removals. Does that not concern you? Do you think you are still OK doing your job of defending this great country against another hijacking attack? Ms. McNeill. Yes, we do, Congressman. The Federal air marshals today are more agile than at any time before they---- Mr. Correa. Well, they're agile, but do you have the personnel to actually carry out your mission? Ms. McNeill. Yes, and they are deployed based on risk on our flights. They also offer ground-based security. Yes, they do support our colleagues across DHS to advance the National Security and Transportation Security Mission, that includes our colleagues at ICE, as you mentioned, also the Secret Service. Mr. Correa. If I may, I have less than half a minute left. If you can answer this question for me in writing: You're focused more on investment and technology. I like the focus on trained personnel. It sounds like we're cutting back in personnel and trying to focus more on technology. I think it's a combination of both. But if you can explain to me how we can assure this country, our citizens that they are safer today than they were back in 9/11. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. My time is up, and I yield. [The information follows:] TSA has recognized that there is a need for innovative approaches, including technology and process improvements, to enhance security effectiveness and operational efficiency. As passenger volume continues to grow, technology improvements will be key to maintaining passenger throughput, hospitality, and customer service that the American public expects at our Nation's airports. TSA is looking at new checkpoint technology to improve efficiencies and reducing staffing requirements. Examples of this include e-Gates and Image on Alarm Only, where new technology will allow us to screen more passengers with fewer officers, while continuing to maintain our security standards. Additionally, the fiscal year 2026 (FY26) President's budget request (PBR) included a request to end the requirement for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to staff airport exit lanes. Currently 80 percent of all airports maintain the sole responsibility for securing exit lanes from unlawful entry into sterile areas, while TSA provides staffing coverage at 89 of the over 430 Federalized airports. TSA continues to partner with airport authorities to transition from exit lanes that require TSO oversight, to those that utilize technological solutions to maintain access control as opportunities arise. This has allowed TSA to reallocate resources away from exit lane staffing to higher-priority security functions. This shift recognizes that not all aviation security challenges can, or should be, addressed solely through human staffing solutions. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. McNeill, thank you for being here. Thank you for the dedicated men and women who serve under your command. I particularly want to thank you in light that those men and women worked for a period of 6 weeks, without being paid, as my colleagues on the other side of the aisle chose to shut down the Federal Government. But they continued to come to work. They continued to protect the traveling people. So, thank you for their professionalism, for their dedication, for their hard work, particularly in a time where you talk about, in the statistics that you gave, that last year, passenger volume reached record high. You say in your opening statement that 8 of the 10 busiest traveling days were last year, and that the men and women who serve under TSA, that they screened over 906 million passengers, 480 million checked bags, and 2.1 billion carry-on bags, all for 6 weeks without getting paid, continuing to do their duty to the traveling public. You also mentioned in your opening statements some challenges, opportunities that lie ahead. Those include the 2026 World Cup, where we know that people will be coming from across the globe to America to enjoy soccer in the World Cup being hosted here. America 250, also next year. Then 2028, we know that the Olympics will be held in California. Once again, we will have individuals coming across the globe here, coming to America to enjoy those events. So I want to talk a little bit about--and you mentioned this in your statement--I know this is something that near and dear to the Chairman, the passenger security fee diversion. For now, some 20 years, we've seen a diversion of those funds, funds that were originally set up $5.60 for a one-way ticket; $11.20 for a round-trip ticket for reinvestment back into aviation security. We know that some 20 years ago, before most of us were here in Congress, that a decision was made to divert some of those fees. That diversion now totals roughly $1.6 billion a year. Also, in your statement, not only we talked about the diversion of those fees, but we talk about the Aviation Security Capital Fund which also was established some 20-some-odd years ago. Originally, $250 million was set aside in revenue to screen luggage that is checked by passengers. We've seen that that number has not increased now for 20 years. You talk about the fact that we are in need of and, one, returning those diverted fees back to TSA, putting that money back into aviation security, which is what it was created for. You also talk in your opening statement about the need to increase the Aviation Security Capital Fund. So I want to give you just a minute, if you could, to expound on both of those. Ms. McNeill. Absolutely. Congressman, I thank you for recognizing the work force, because seeing them turn up day in and day out throughout that Government shutdown was nothing short of inspiring. They kept our skies safe for the traveling public and did so with absolute commitment to the TSA mission. It is our responsibility to ensure that they have the best tools at their disposal to do the job that we are asking them to do, and that is why investment in technology is so critical. We are facing, year over year, volume growth at our checkpoints in infrastructure-constrained environments. The only way that we're going to be able to maintain our security posture and improve our security posture and deliver an increasingly improved passenger experience is through that combination of our human talent and technology. That is what we are looking to work with as Congress to do to ensure that the Passenger Security Fund is used for those purposes. I would say that there are several different buckets of technology advancement that we would want to ensure that we are investing in. One is that cutting-edge screening technology at the checkpoint that we all experience when we fly through the airports, making sure that that is detecting threats adequately as we face an evolving adversary and threat environment. Second is around identity verification, right. One of the cornerstones of our aviation computer security system is knowing who is coming through our checkpoints and doing that adequate vetting so we know who they are before they even show up. Then, third, is really bringing our checkpoint into the 21st Century and providing that IT infrastructure so that we can really drive improvement on a continual basis to our checkpoints. Mr. Guest. Ms. McNeill, thank you. My time has expired. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you Ranking Member for this hearing. Ms. McNeill, I have the honor of representing Detroit Metro Airport, Michigan's busiest airport, and one of the largest airline hubs in the world. Given that I represent Detroit, which prides itself on its long history of blue-collar contributions to our great Nation, you must also know that I am a strong supporter of unions, organized labor, and collective bargaining rights. In March, TSA announced it will be stripping the collective bargaining rights through the American Federation of Government Employees, or TSA personnel, but it was blocked by the courts. In December, TSA tried, again, to strip collective bargaining rights and were again blocked by the courts. Earlier last year, you were questioned regarding the role of TSA and if you believed that TSA should be privatized. You said that nothing is off the table. In July, TSA announced it would be seeking private-sector assistance for the development and deployment of turn-key solutions for use at the airport security checkpoints. Many speculate that this announcement means that the TSA is seeking to replace its personnel with private-sector security, a common union-busting tactic. Ms. McNeill, I have very little time, so just a yes-or-no question, do you value the work of our hardworking TSA personnel? Ms. McNeill. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. Yes, absolutely. In my opening statement, I stated that TSA's greatest assets are its people. Mr. Thanedar. Now, if you believe that their work is so valuable, why are you seeking to make their jobs harder by getting rid of collective bargaining rights, which will help them with job security, safe working conditions, and ensuring accountability in the workplace? Ms. McNeill. The existence of a collective bargaining agreement is inconsistent with the mission that TSA has to perform and the agility with which we need to run this agency, and our employees know that. Actually, the accountability of ensuring that we don't have 200 personnel that are doing nonscreening work is in place, and returning them to the checkpoint is actually better for our employees and the morale. Time and again---- Mr. Thanedar. This is hardworking men and women taking---- Ms. McNeill. Yes, they are. Mr. Thanedar. It's a very stressful environment. They do their best to work as hard as--to keep America safe. Look, it is a fact that work force morale and retention increased significantly since the Biden administration expanded bargaining rights. The move to end collective bargaining rights is wrong, and I look forward to the courts to continue to block these attempts to harm the workplace rights of our Nation's workers. Now, while I appreciate the TSA workers working so hard, I kept hearing a video that was--kept showing every time I'm crossing the TSA line. Ms. McNeill, in October a video of Secretary Noem blaming the Government shutdown on Democrats aired at TSA checkpoints across the country. As I am sure you know, this was a blatant violation of the Hatch Act, which bars partisan activity using Government resources. It also violates the Antideficiency Act, which prohibits Federal agencies from spending funds beyond what Congress has appropriated since the TSA was operating without funds at the time. Ms. McNeill, why did you allow these blatantly political- charged videos to play at TSA checkpoints across our country? Ms. McNeill. Our responsibility at TSA is, in part, to inform the traveling public of what they can expect when they arrive at our checkpoints. During the longest Government shutdown, that was absolutely necessary to ensure that they understood the environment that they were coming into and the facts behind that environment. The Secretary is very supportive of the TSA work force and our mission---- Mr. Thanedar. I have just a little bit of time. Chairman Garbarino. You have no time. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Chairman Garbarino. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for his 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much, and I'll try to keep this brief. Ms. O'Neill, have we ever had the capacity to put an air marshal on every single domestic flight in the United States? Ms. McNeill. The deployment of Federal air marshals---- Mr. Gimenez. Yes or no, have we ever had the capacity to put an air marshal on every single flight in the United States? Ms. McNeill. No. That is not---- Mr. Gimenez. No. OK. That would be--same as me as a fire chief closing down a fire station every once in a while and hoping a fire didn't happen in that area. So that's what I feel about the air marshal program. We're going to have to have a lot more conversation about the air marshal program in the future. I don't have time right now. Second thing, Mr. Gottumukkala--I'm sorry if I butchered your name, sorry--where does the Secretary of Homeland Security reside? Mr. Gottumukkala. In the NCR region. Mr. Gimenez. I think she's from South Dakota. OK? Don't you think that as the Secretary of Homeland Security, every once in a while she's going to need access to a SCIF? Yes. Thank you. All right. Now back to Ms. O'Neill. I don't represent an airport. I actually ran one, OK? As a mayor of Miami-Dade County, I ran Miami International Airport. So airport security is really important to me. We talk about passenger fees and all that, and if we--if we use the schedule you have right now, by what year are we going to have the things that you think are vital to our Nation's security installed in all our airports? Ms. McNeill. At the current pace of funding, Congressman, for our computer tomography technology, we're looking at 2042 and our credential authentication by 2049. Mr. Gimenez. Two thousand forty-nine. I hope I'm alive. I don't know. It's kind-of getting close. OK. So how do they fund these security measures in Europe? Ms. McNeill. In Europe, it's a vastly different construct than--than here in the United States. The regulatory body set the standards and put the requirements on the airports to---- Mr. Gimenez. That's right. They put it on the airports. You know why they put it on the airports? Because they can get it done. All right? We're not going to get it done because we have fiscal constraints. So let me tell you how an airport works. An airport decides--in the beginning, the budget, what happens is what is it that we need in order to operate this airport? There's a number. Then after that, they go, OK, how do we attain that number? Well, they attain that number through passenger fees, landing fees, concessions, et cetera, because there's revenue that comes into the airport and then they balance. So if we were to set the standards for what we believe we need to secure the American public, I think it would make a heck of a lot more sense for us to say the airports, because we're actually doing this for you, and the airport--and the traveling public, et cetera, to make it safe--which, by the way, if we make it unsafe and people don't travel by air anymore, it's an unbelievable economic impact on the United States. The No. 1 economic generator of Miami-Dade County is Miami International Airport, and I'm sure that in other communities around this country, the No. 1 economic generator is probably their airports. I bet you, you know, bottom dollar that in Atlanta, for sure, OK, the No. 1 economic generator is the airports; Chicago probably, too; New York, the 3 airports, too. So why don't we use the European model? Why don't we tell the airports what they need to purchase. They will figure that into their--into their budgets, finance it, and then give those assets over to--to us, which some airports do when they want to actually be a little ahead of the game. Isn't that correct? Ms. McNeill. We--yes. We have great partnerships with airports across the country, and we have put in place several different ways for which airports can drive investment to their checkpoints, and we have a capability acceptance program where airports can essentially donate qualified equipment to TSA so that we can upgrade the equipment at the checkpoint. That, combined with appropriated funds and looking to improve programs like the Screening Partnership Program, allow us to provide options to airports on how to drive that investment. I'm a big believer in public-private partnerships. Like you said, airports are major economic engines of the community around them, and this should be an all-hands-on-deck approach, and we are an important part of that. Our partnerships are actually--absolutely critical to advancing that. Mr. Gimenez. By the way, we divert a lot of what's supposed to be used for security to other purposes. The passenger security fee, which is supposed to be---- Ms. McNeill. Annually, about $1.6 billion. Mr. Gimenez. Right, which is supposed--which, when I pay a passenger security fee, I expect it to be used for passenger security and not to help balance the Federal budget, which is what we do here. All right. So I don't think we're going to be able to solve that. So, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to be introducing legislation to change the way that we fund security at the airports, more like the--more like the European model, and so, finally, we can--we can get the security that we need at our airports before the year 2049. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman. On a Saturday morning in Cicero, Illinois, a young couple got in the car with their 1-year-old child and drove to a Sam's Club to go grocery shopping. When they arrived, they saw a large law enforcement presence, some sort of an operation going on in the parking lot, and so they turned their car around to leave. As they were leaving the Sam's Club parking lot, this happened. Please show the first video. [Video shown.] Mr. Magaziner. Do you know how dangerous it is to spray pepper spray into a moving vehicle? Not only could that kill the people inside the car, it could kill other drivers and bystanders who might be hit by the vehicle. There is not a law enforcement agency in this country that teaches its officers to do that. In fact, in most law enforcement agencies, those officers will be fired, but not in Donald Trump's Department of Homeland Security. We don't know who these officers were or if they were disciplined in any way. All we know is that the White House keeps telling them that they have ``absolute immunity.'' Absolute immunity, pepper spraying a young family in a moving vehicle. Whenever we call attention to these kinds of abuses, the first thing the administration does is try to blame the victims, but this is a family of United States citizens. They weren't even protesting. They were just out to get groceries. This keeps happening again and again and again. Show the second video, please. [Video shown.] Mr. Magaziner. What was the response of the Homeland Security Department leadership after this? Did they express remorse? Did they suspend the agents or launch an investigation? No. They put up a false tweet blaming that family, the victims, calling the Jackson family ``radical agitators.'' Now, unlike a lot of the victim-blaming tweets that the administration posts, they actually took that one down because it was so indefensible. But why was it put up in the first place? What does it say about the rotten culture at the Trump Department of Homeland Security that, when American citizens are hurt by Federal agents, the response is to immediately blame the victims before you even know the facts? Now, we can keep going and going. These are just a couple of examples. I know that this hearing is supposed to be about TSA and cyber, which is important, but when the Federal Government is sending poorly-trained masked agents into the streets beating and gassing peaceful people, including American citizens, we cannot pretend that this is normal and act like it should be business as usual. We need real standards in place, just like every other law enforcement agency in the country has, to make sure that Federal agents are well-trained, do not use excessive force when not warranted, and are held accountable when they do things like tear gas a family inside a moving vehicle. This has to stop. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gonzales, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, panelists. Director, Dr. Gottumukkala, this--you know, CISA isn't a small little agency that you just go to retire at. It's arguably one of the most important agencies in our Government that most people don't realize what's happening. This year, I would argue one of the biggest things that's going to be in your purview is going to be the selection. It's going to determine the future not only of our country, but also the future of the world in general. So midterms elections, my question to you is, what is CISA doing to ensure our midterm elections are safe, secure, and fair? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you. We--election security is very important for national security and somehow the claim that DHS CISA has rolled back election security protections is not accurate. We treat election security like any other critical infrastructure sector and our election security services remain fully in place, including cybersecurity support that we provide, the physical security guidance provided. There is the incident response that we provide, and also the threat briefings for the State and local election officials. The election infrastructure owners and operators continue to receive the same level of support as other critical infrastructure entities. So the--what changed was the scope, not the security, sir. We ended activities that were outside its core mission but not election protections itself, and the election security is focused on the infrastructure by all means. What it means is we are exclusively focused on defending the election infrastructure from any cyber threats, any physical threats, and also any foreign adversaries that are out there. As you may know, sir, foreign threats remain a core priority for us. The nation-state adversaries continue to pose risks to our election infrastructure. CISA, we are providing that threat intelligence, we are conducting the vulnerability scanning to all our State and local infrastructure owners, and we are making sure that we are coordinating that incident response across the board. Election security remains integrated into CISA's broader cyber and physical security mission, sir. Mr. Gonzales. I ask that you make that a top priority, because it's a top priority for many Americans. You know, you can win an election, you can lose an election, but it has to be fair and has to be secure, and our adversaries don't want that. My question to you is, how many cyber intrusions do we expect this midterm election? Mr. Gottumukkala. Sir, we--we look at it as incident by incident, and we look at what the risks are. I don't have a specific number in mind. Mr. Gonzales. Well, we should have that number. We should-- it should first start by how many intrusions did we have last midterm and the midterm before that and the midterm before that. I don't want us waiting until after the fact to be able to go, Yes, we got it wrong, and it turns out our adversaries influenced our election. To that point, what actions is CISA doing to work with other partners, like CYBERCOM, to ensure that these--these adversaries are not intruding on our election? Mr. Gottumukkala. We have a very good working relationship. Our strength is collaboration. We want to make sure that we're working with our law enforcement and cluster intelligence partners across the country and international partners to make sure that we are safe. Mr. Gonzales. CYBERCOM in particular, is CISA working with CYBERCOM on any cyber offensive actions to prevent our adversaries from interfering in our elections? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you. We work with CYBERCOM on threat intelligence sharing and making sure that we have the incident response and we are working with the private and stakeholder communities to make sure that threat information is shared. Mr. Gonzales. OK. We need that to be a priority. That needs to be a priority. Between CYBERCOM and CISA, you two are the two organizations that are going to keep this Nation and our world safe to ensure that these elections are fair and secure. To that point, what actors--what actors--what state or non- state actors are the most aggressive in interfering with our elections? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you. I think the threat actors continue--the foreign state adversaries, especially the People's Republic of China and Russia, seems to be the most adversive nation-state actors. The strategic adversary is China. They are long-term, and they have patient campaigns focused on prepositioning in our critical infrastructure for a strategic advantage. As you might have seen with Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, they are both PRC state-sponsored campaign focused on repositioning themselves inside the U.S. critical infrastructure for potential disruption for a future crisis. Unlike the traditional espionage, these actors use living-off- the-land techniques. Mr. Gonzales. Director, I have 10 seconds left. What I'd say is, you just said everything that everyone has ever come before this committee and said. The same actors over and over and over again. So it's no surprise that these actors are going to be involved. They were involved in the last election, they'll be involved in this election, they'll be involved in every election going forward. What I ask is, instead of the United States playing defense, it's long time we play offense and prevent these bad actors from influencing our elections. With that, Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for 5 minutes of questions. Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman. I do have a number of articles I want to enter into the record at the end. So as a Chicagoan, I know the terror that DHS can inflict with unlimited resources and unchecked power. You just saw some of that with what Congressman Magaziner just showed. Our constituents are being surveilled, they're being threatened, they're being tear-gassed, and subjected to warrantless arrests, rammed with vehicles. They're being kidnapped, and you've seen it, they're also being disappeared. Yet, those--there are those in Congress who would still expand DHS's budget and ICE capacity to enact Trump's mass deportation agenda. So, I often get asked back in my district, how is this possible? How is it that they can behave this way? How can they tear gas a 6-month-old baby? Isn't Congress supposed to be a check on DHS? Well, first, I say to them, that would require my Republican colleagues to agree that bringing senior ICE officials to testify before this committee is critical. I do hear, Chairman, that that may happen in 6 weeks or so. I think it's far too late; they should be here right now. Second, that would also suggest that DHS is behaving in ways outside its design. Now, let me be clear. DHS and ICE, it's not rogue. Let me tell you why. Because from its establishment, Congress empowered DHS to violate our rights under the pretense of securing our safety. Who feels safe right now under DHS? DHS was intentionally established with an overbroad mission, an unchecked power, which has been expanded by Republicans with a blank check, unlimited personnel, and no guardrails whatsoever. Trump, with his authoritarian tendencies, is only making visible what so many communities have already known to be true. DHS is a threat to our collective safety and funding it only fuels our destruction and our human suffering. It's why 32 people have died in detention in ICE's deadliest year yet. U.S. citizens are being shot and killed, and the agency doesn't even know who they're hiring and doesn't seem to even care who they're hiring. Yet, Trump's campaign donors are profiting off the pain of our neighbors, including children. So today, I say enough. I am introducing today the Melt ICE Act that would prohibit DHS from using funds to detain or monitor immigrants, effectively limiting ICE's authority and ability to continue to cause pain and terror, while redirecting the funding that they have, taxpayer dollars that they're using to kill U.S. citizens, back into the communities impacted by ICE's terror through wraparound services, because we know that DHS is being used as a weapon to be pointed toward anyone the Government considers a public enemy. Fascism always requires a public enemy. So we must take the weapon away and hold those who have allowed our communities to be terrorized accountable. So let me get to the witnesses here. My understanding is that your agencies are working with ICE in some capacity under the Trump administration. Ms. McNeill, is your agency sharing data with ICE, yes or no? Ms. McNeill. Absolutely. We are part of the---- Mrs. Ramirez. Got it. Ms. McNeill [continuing]. Department of Homeland Security, and that's what we do. Mrs. Ramirez. Yes or no, that's it. Thank you. Ms. McNeill, I have a follow-up question for you. Why is TSA making life miserable for people that have every right to travel domestically and who pose no threat to aviation instead of focusing on your security mission? Ms. McNeill. I don't agree with your statement, ma'am. As we have seen, the men and women of TSA are absolutely dedicated to the transportation and national security mission, and that was very apparent during the 43-day shutdown where they continued to show up to work while we waited for funding to come---- Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Ms. McNeill. It is clear that people are living in fear, and TSA is working with ICE to terrorize our communities. Dr. Gottumukkala, has your agency taken personnel off mission to work for ICE? Let me add to that, that includes details and reassignments from your agency to ICE or CBP, as well as to the Federal Protective Service and U.S. Marshals in communities with ICE enforcement operations. That's a yes-or-no question. Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, not in my times at---- Mrs. Ramirez. So in the last year, your agency has not taken personnel off mission to work for ICE? Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Not in my time, ma'am. Mrs. Ramirez. OK. I'll have something into the record that indicates the opposite. So let me ask you another question. Does it concern you that your personnel might already have staffing shortages, as we just heard a moment ago, over a third in staff shortages, yet the administration is asking for your staff to be used for ICE enforcement? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman--Congresswoman, I think the-- -- Mrs. Ramirez. Does it concern you, yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. We are on mission. We are doing all the cyber from---- Mrs. Ramirez. Let me ask you a follow-up question to that. Has your agency transferred funding to ICE, yes or no? Has any of your funding gone to ICE, yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congresswoman, I--we--not in my time. Mrs. Ramirez. The answer is yes, my time is up. Chairman Garbarino. Gentlelady's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Strong. Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson. As my colleagues have noted, the United States is entering a period marked by high-profile special events that increase global travel, underscoring the importance of readiness across the homeland security enterprise. Thank you to our witnesses and their teams for their work to meet these challenges. Mr. Allende, within the Science and Technology Directorate R&D portfolio, where does the threat posed by unmanned aerial systems and Counter-UAS capabilities rank as a priority? Mr. Allende. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I think it's very high on our high-priority list. That's exhibited by Secretary Noem's creating a program executive office within S&T that brings together both the policy and the R&D aspects, acquisition support aspects to handle the Counter- UAS mission, particularly in a speedy manner as we approach the FIFA World Cup, L.A. 2028 Olympics, and America 250. Mr. Strong. Given the rapid evolution of drone technology, how is S&T keeping its Counter-UAS research ahead of its threats? Mr. Allende. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. At present, our focus is getting to speedy delivery of systems in the field in preparation for these events. So we're providing technical review and assistance to our partners to ensure that the right systems that work well get out into the field to prevent the threats. We are also doing a number of testing, development, and evaluation efforts to look at new technologies that may help change the game for us. But at present, given the short time frames, the thrust of our effort is getting delivery out into the fields. Mr. Strong. OK. My district is home to the joint S&T, FBI, and TSA TIDE Center, as well as the FBI's Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center. These centers work closely together to protect our homeland and stay ahead of potential threats. How does the FBI's expertise inform S&T's efforts at TIDE, and how does the collaboration enhance TSA's implementation of effective screening technologies? Ms. McNeill. Thank you for that question. We--as an agency, focused on delivering transportation security, the traveling public are always focused on looking at cutting-edge technologies and how to advance those in collaboration with our partners at S&T and across the U.S. Government. The evolving threat requires us to always evolve our posture, and that includes technology. So, you know, we look forward to our continued partnership across DHS to ensure that we're meeting that mission, but also to work with this committee and Congress to ensure that we've got the funding to be able to deploy that technology into the hands of our operators. Mr. Strong. Thank you. Dr. Gottumukkala--how do you say it? I won't ask again. Mr. Gottumukkala. You're good, sir. You can call me with my first name. Mr. Strong. Dr. G, there we go. CISA was created by Congress with bipartisan support to protect national security. Unfortunately, the Biden administration transformed an agency once focused on cyber and foreign threats to critical infrastructure into an unaccountable censorship agency that pressured social media companies to take down speech protected by the First Amendment. Can you confirm that CISA has stopped those policies of policing American speech and returned to its authorized mission scope? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. I mentioned earlier what changed was the scope, not security. CISA ended all the activities that were outside its core mission, not election protections. The activities that ended involved monitoring any American's lawful speech, any narrative management, or any coordination with those social media companies on election-related posts. Those activities are not operational election security services, so we ended abuses, not any protections that we do with elections. Mr. Strong. You said earlier--and I quote--``CISA is trying to get back on mission.'' For the record, during the Biden administration, what got CISA so off its core mission? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. As part of this administration and under the guidance of Secretary Noem, we are reviewing, line by line, on all the items that we do, and we are eliminating any redundancy. We have eliminated duplicative oversight roles, and we have consolidated fragmented IT support structures. We unified a lot of fragmented IT functions under one office. We eliminated overlapping IT operations. We removed over 300-plus duplicative contractor roles. We modernized some of the enterprise IT environment. Mr. Strong. Thank you. My time has expired. I thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy, for 5 minutes of questions. Sorry about those Bills, buddy. Mr. Kennedy. Yes, we are in pain with Bills Mafia. Thank you. We're here to talk about some very important issues here, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for bringing this committee together today. But I am terribly disappointed both by the answers that I'm hearing, or the lack thereof answers, as well as the lack of ICE being here with us to answer some very serious questions. They should be here testifying under oath, answering pressing questions that all of us have. This committee needs answers from ICE. The people of this country need answers of what is happening across this Nation. Like what happens to families like Renee Nicole Good's who are left with a massive hole in their hearts because of this administration's lawlessness? What credibility can investigation into this tragedy possibly have if it ends as quickly as it begins and scrutinizes everyone in Minneapolis except for the agent who shot her? How many U.S. citizens and lawful residents have been swept up in the Trump administration's immigration raids? How many of them have seen their due process rights, those enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, willfully ignored? Why is Secretary Noem taking no responsibility for the violence she has brought to our communities? How much farther is she willing to go to destroy the American dream as we know it? What critical DHS missions are being neglected at the expense of Secretary Noem's extreme immigration agenda? That last question, I'd like to ask the witnesses in detail about reassignments away from your respective agencies and immigration enforcement missions. We know that Secretary Noem has taken thousands of Federal personnel from their assigned duties, and it's felt acutely in my community in Western New York. My district has four bridges that connect New York and Canada, and yet, many of these travel processing booths are empty because Secretary Noem is diverting resources from Northern Border communities. This drives up costs, takes away good-paying jobs, deters travel with our closest ally to the north, and makes things less safe. So I understand both CISA and TSA have had employees reassigned to oversee the Trump administration's immigration and deportation operations, along with its Draconian crackdown on Americans exercising First Amendment rights. So, Acting Director Gottumukkala and Deputy Administrator McNeill, how many people from CISA and TSA have been reassigned? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, not to the knowledge of--I don't have the knowledge of any people from CISA. Mr. Kennedy. But your agency has been cut by over a third? Mr. Gottumukkala. The team participated in a voluntary--the work force transition program, and we are working toward our own mission of making sure that we are protecting the critical infrastructure from cyber and critical threats. Mr. Kennedy. Ms. McNeill, how many of your employees have been reassigned? Ms. McNeill. I'm not aware of any of our employees being moved over to ICE. Mr. Kennedy. Two hundred fifty air marshals, you've testified today, are--have been reassigned. Is that accurate? Ms. McNeill. That is not a reassignment. The Federal air marshals are providing in-flight security for deportation flights, which is actually--falls within their mission space. Mr. Kennedy. So outside of commercial flights---- Ms. McNeill. That's what they do is provide flight security. Mr. Kennedy. Outside of commercial flights, they have been resigned to other flights--250 air marshals have been reassigned. How can we assure the American people that flying in this country is safe post-9/11 if the air marshals that have been provided to do the work to keep them safe in the skies have been reassigned off of those commercial flights? Ms. McNeill. Providing in-flight security for deportation flight keeps our skies safe. I don't think that your number is accurate, Congressman, but we're happy to make sure that we get you that number. [The information follows:] As part of their regular mission scope Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) has provided approximately 100 Federal air marshals (FAMs) on a rotating basis to provide security on select ICE Enforcement and Removal Operation (ERO) domestic transfer and deportation flights. These FAMs are not reassigned to ICE but perform in-flight security and other law enforcement functions that align with LE/FAMS' existing in-flight security mission. Mr. Kennedy. I believe that's the number that was mentioned in this testimony today. Do you believe the TSA employees have the right to organize, Ms. McNeill? Ms. McNeill. As I stated earlier, the administrator has-- has the authority to set the terms and framework of employment of the TSO work force, and we need to do so in a way that keeps in mind the mission of TSA which was granted by Congress---- Mr. Kennedy. Is that a yes or a no? Ms. McNeill [continuing]. That we have a work force to deliver to the American people. Mr. Kennedy. Do you believe that the employees that keep our skies, our communities safe have a right to organize in this country? Ms. McNeill. I think that is---- Mr. Kennedy. Yes or no? Ms. McNeill [continuing]. Determined by--by the administrator. Actually, what we are focused on is delivering aviation and transportation security for the American people and being a good steward of the taxpayer. Mr. Kennedy. Yes. I will take that as either a nonanswer or, quite frankly--sounds like a no to me, which is very, very disappointing, disheartening not just to this panel and to this committee, but to the rank-and-file working families that are out there protecting us each and every day. It is their right in this country to organize if they choose to do so, and quite frankly, it is an obligation of this Government to work with them in a collective bargaining scenario to provide them the rights that they deserve. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by pushing back against my colleagues on the other side. You know, it's interesting to me, I've only been in Congress for 3 years now, but they clearly created this catastrophe. We warned about it in the last Congress, why the Southern Border was wide open, and many of our visa programs were being completely exploited, and now you have 15 million people in the country. That's a figure they won't even argue with. Now the American people elected President Trump and this administration to go and solve the problem. Now--so they've turned on ICE, whose job is to get the criminals and these people out of the country, and so they've turned on ICE. We even have a Member on this panel, again, who assaulted an ICE agent, and we wonder why this stuff continues to happen. I didn't hear any of them talking about the deportations that took place under President Obama, who I believe was deporting even more people than President Trump has in his first year. Next I want to turn what this committee is actually about, and I want to start with CISA. Dr. Gottumukkala, under the Biden administration, censorship, deplatforming, and flagging speech of Americans they didn't like was very common and often reported. They censored American citizens who were posting about election integrity. They were also deplatforming anybody who talked about COVID-19 and its origins. What is--correct me if I'm wrong, Doctor, but I thought CISA was for, you know, protecting American infrastructure and cybersecurity. Is that correct? Why do you think CISA started, you know, going after Americans for exercising free speech? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. You'd have--election security is focused on infrastructure, and CISA's election security is focused exclusively on defending the election infrastructure from cyber threats and physical threats and foreign adversaries. That includes any voter registration systems, election technology, and supporting systems, not speech or content moderation. Precisely why I keep saying is that watching was the scope, not the security. We ended activities that were outside its core mission and not election protections. Those activities that ended involved monitoring any Americans' lawful speech and narrative management, and like you said, sir, coordination with social media companies on election-related posts. Those activities are not operational election security issues. Mr. Crane. Thank you. Sorry I got to cut you off. I got more questions. I want to turn to Ms. McNeill with TSA. On July 8, TSA ended its shoes-off policy, which was obviously in place because we had incidents like the shoe bomber that tried to bring a bomb in his shoe on board an airplane. Why was that policy ended, Ms. McNeill? Ms. McNeill. Thank you for the question, Congressman Crane. At TSA, we're continually looking at the risk environment that we operate within and improving our standard operating procedures and operations at the checkpoint to reflect that risk picture. There had been multiple risk assessments done in past years that allowed us to make that change and amend our procedures to maintain the safety of the skies, while delivering for the American public continual improvement is something that, you know, TSA embraces and---- Mr. Crane. Ms. McNeill, real quick, do you think with technology adapting, it's impossible for somebody to make a bomb out of their shoes? Ms. McNeill. The way that we approach security is to deploy multiple different layers of security and pieces of technology to ensure that nobody can, essentially, game the system. We have multiple layers from identity and vetting through all of the physical screening that happens at the checkpoint and then in-flight security as well. So through that layered security approach is how we deliver for the American public, and that's something that, you know, has been in place since the inception of TSA. Mr. Crane. Thank you. I want to turn to some of the Somali cash going through airports. It's estimated that $700 million in cash in passenger luggage was leaving the Minnesota airport in the last 2 years. Has TSA made any changes to its policies to prevent this activity that is tied to the fraud in Minnesota from continuing on? Ms. McNeill. We are extremely proud of the team at TSA for highlighting this issue, by reporting what they saw in the normal course of their screening in Minnesota. Mr. Crane. But reporting is not enough, right? It continued to go on, and we got $700 million in cash. Has anything been changed? That's the question I asked you to stop this from happening. Ms. McNeill. We are working with our interagency partners and law enforcement partners to ensure that this issue is being addressed. We continue being a good partner to them. The money that was moved through, was moved through through legal means, and so, this is where I think Congress has a role to play to think about the authorities around--around this bulk cash movement. Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. McIver, for 5 minutes of questions. Mrs. McIver. Mr. Crane, I don't know what your obsession is with me. Mr. Crane. I thought you were supposed to address the Chair? Mrs. McIver. But I am so tired of you mentioning me. Mr. Crane. Mr. Chairman, is she supposed to address me or the Chair? Mrs. McIver. You can take that obsession and you can put it to the people of Arizona, not me. My name---- Mr. Crane. Yes. Well, If you quit assaulting ICE agents---- Chairman Garbarino. The committee will come to order. Mr. Crane [continuing]. Then I wouldn't keep bringing you up. Mrs. McIver. I am reclaiming my time. I am reclaiming my time. Chairman Garbarino. The committee will come to order. Mrs. McIver. Watch your mouth when you're talking---- Mr. Crane. Follow the rules of the committee, Mrs. McIver. Chairman Garbarino. Come to order. Mrs. McIver. Excuse me. I'm reclaiming my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. Let me get to the business that I'm here for, for the people of New Jersey, not Mr. Crane. Thank you for holding today's hearing. Here we are 3 weeks into the new year, and finally, we're having our first full committee hearing in more than a month. During that time, the lawlessness of DHS under Donald Trump and Kristi Noem has increased tenfold. Just last week, a parent in my home State of New Jersey was detained by ICE after ordering food for his 6-year-old daughter. When her dad didn't come home, the little girl was then found crying and wandering around for hours outside parentless. How inhumane. Like I told Secretary Noem when she sat in this room last month, the greatest threat to the homeland right now is the Department of Homeland Security under her control. Unfortunately, the Republicans, like Mr. Crane, in control of Congress are not up to the task. In the face of the administration's appalling escalation of violence, the Majority has set up this hearing with a random assortment of DHS leaders who are not the ones we really need to hear from in this moment. I join my colleagues in demanding that we bring ICE's acting director, Todd Lyons, before the committee as soon as possible, respectfully, Mr. Chairman. That would be just the start of providing the accountability and change our constituents are demanding of us right now in this moment. Now, since having administration witnesses is a rarity this Congress, I do want to talk a bit about TSA. Acting Administrator McNeill, I want to note that I am the top Democrat on the Transportation and Maritime Security Subcommittee, but this is the first time we have met. In fact, this is the first time we have had a single TSA witness before the full committee or any subcommittee this Congress, even as the Majority is embarking on an effort to reauthorize the agency. Ms. McNeill, as with other DHS components, this administration has been lawless in its direction for TSA. Last month, Secretary Noem tried to abolish the work force's collective bargaining rights in a blatant defiance of a court order to keep them in place. My fellow Democrats and I wrote to the Secretary and to you to demand that you halt those efforts, and I am glad that a court has since ruled that those efforts are, in fact, illegal. However, we still did not hear from you. Ms. McNeill, I recognize you have no control over Kristi Noem's lawlessness and cannot speak to whether she will continue to break the law. But speaking for yourself in this moment, yes or no, will you commit to abiding by the court order to keep TSA's collective bargaining agreement in place and fully honor its provisions? Ms. McNeill. Every step that the Secretary and that we have taken has been in compliance with the courts. Mrs. McIver. Is that yes or no? I'm speaking on behalf of you, not Secretary Noem. Will you commit to that? Will you commit to the---- Ms. McNeill. The Secretary and I have continued to be in compliance. Mrs. McIver [continuing]. Provision? Will you commit to the provision as the acting administrator, yes or no? Ms. McNeill. We are--we are both--both the Secretary and myself are committed---- Mrs. McIver. OK. I'll go to my next question, Ms. McNeill, because you're going to do this today. I don't have much time. OK. Ms. McNeill, what has TSA done prior to providing passenger data to ICE to ensure compliance with the law? Ms. McNeill. We are acting within our absolute authorities. We are part of the Department of Homeland Security. It was a department that was set up by Congress to ensure that these agencies weren't operating in silos, and that's what we are doing today to advance the mission--the national security mission of the Department. Mrs. McIver. Ms. McNeill, TSA mission is to secure transportation, not to assist ICE with immigration enforcement. There is no law that forbids undocumented people from flying domestically within the United States. The vast majority of undocumented people have no criminal record and pose absolutely no threat to aviation. Under what authority is TSA sharing passenger data with ICE? Ms. McNeill. We are absolutely within our authorities to share information within the Department of Homeland Security to further the national security mission. Mrs. McIver. What statute are you following, or policy? Point to the policy or the statute that you are following. Under what authority is TSA sharing passenger data with ICE, that you are allowed to do that? Ms. McNeill. We are allowed to do that. We have authority. Mrs. McIver. What policy or statute are you following? Ms. McNeill. I can get you the exact policy. Ms. McIver. Please do. We will wait on that. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Ms. McNeill. Gladly. [The information follows:] TSA is authorized to share information pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 114(f)), which empowers TSA to ``develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security'' and to ``carry out such duties, and exercise such other powers, relating to transportation security as the Administrator considers appropriate.'' The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (49 U.S.C. 44903(j)) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (49 U.S.C. 114(h)) direct TSA to implement watchlist matching and enhance information sharing for security purposes. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (49 U.S.C. 114(t)) also direct TSA to establish a Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan to promote the sharing of transportation security information between DHS and public and private stakeholders. The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(1)) allows intra-agency sharing, such as sharing between components of one agency, when there is a ``need to know.'' DHS's Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing (Policy Statement 262-18, 2007) clarifies that ``all DHS components are considered part of one `agency' for purposes of the Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(1), (b)(1),'' and that information shall be shared within DHS ``whenever the requesting officer or employee has an authorized purpose for accessing the information in the performance of his or her duties.'' Therefore, information sharing between DHS components is permissible under the Privacy Act when there is a ``need to know.'' Consistent with Privacy Act exception (b)(1) and DHS Policy Statement 262-18, TSA entered into an agreement with ICE to use information provided by ICE to identify potential matches in TSA's data, beginning in early June 2025. The information sharing outlined in the 2025 MOA reaffirmed and codified a history of coordination between TSA and ICE that has been used during multiple administrations to address threats within the U.S. border, including under the Biden administration. TSA only shares the flight information of potential matches to individuals that meet ICE mission needs, which is a very small subset of the traveling public. TSA assigns a confidence level to individual matches identified and any matches that score a confidence of 100 percent based on full name and date of birth are returned to ICE to perform any additional adjudication of the matches. TSA does not perform any vetting or adjudication of matches provided to ICE, nor does the agency advise on immigration enforcement decisions. ICE retains final authority for immigration enforcement operations. TSA complies with the e-Government Act of 2002 ( 208, 44 U.S.C. 3501), Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)), and Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 892, 6 U.S.C. 482) by publishing Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and System of Records Notices (SORNs) for the Secure Flight Program (73 Fed. Reg. 64018), ensuring transparency, accountability, and on-going oversight by DHS Privacy and Civil Rights offices. TSA has provided public notice that this sharing will occur in Privacy Impact Assessment DHS/TSA/PIA-018--TSA Secure Flight Program, which states TSA ``will share information within DHS with those offices and components that have a need for the information in the performance of their duties under 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(1). These purposes may include national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mission-related functions and to provide associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis.'' Chairman Garbarino. Gentlelady yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ogles, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses. You know, there's been a lot of talk about ICE and, unfortunately, really outside the scope of this hearing. For that, to our witnesses, I apologize, because Science and Technology, TSA, as Chairman of cyber, I'm going to spend a lot of my time with the good doctor here. But, S&T, if you would, please, if there's anything that we can do as Members of this committee and Congress to help you affect your job more efficiently, please, if you'll reach out to my office. I'd love to have an off-line conversation with you. TSA, same with you as well. I commend you and your office and your agents for the job you're doing during the shutdown. It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, that Joe Biden, you know, reassigned air marshals to assist with the movement of illegals across the Southern Border. So when we talk about reassignment of roles, let's look at the large scope of how it's been done under previous administrations. So--and then again, collective bargaining, you want to talk about manufacturing, when you look at Six Sigma, and Lean Six and efficiencies within operations, the---- Mr. Correa. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. Ogles [continuing]. Fact that we leave to the--to the Government is a good thing as we move forward. So specifically to Mr.--Dr. Gottumukkala, we have the privilege of talking, when you look at reductions within your agency, one of the things we've said--or I've said in a previous hearing of the Cyber Subcommittee, was that it's about quality, not necessarily quantity. Can you speak to the numbers and, quite frankly, the trend lines, your Department is--when you look at attrition, it's slightly below the Federal average. Take it away, sir. Mr. Gottumukkala. Thank you, Congressman. Mr. Correa. Gentleman yield? Mr. Ogles. I do not. Thank you. Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. First of all, I want to say that there is continued bipartisan support across for CISA. The personnel that we have, we are making sure that they are on mission. For somehow the bad press of whatever we see, we miss the point that CISA personnel are deployed across the 10 regions in support of all 56 States and territories. Mr. Ogles. Specifically, good Doctor, because we have limited time. So roughly, 800 agents. What percentage of the work force is that? Twenty-three semi-percent? Mr. Gottumukkala. That is correct, sir. There were 23 percent participated in the work force transition program. Mr. Ogles. Then the national average aside from that, roughly 9 percent across Federal agencies, you're trending what, 7 percent attrition? Mr. Gottumukkala. That is correct, sir. Compared with previous years, it's about 9.25 approximately across all Federal agencies, and we are or we were at 6.5 to 7.5 percent from an actual attrition this year. Mr. Ogles. So the facts, quite frankly, speak for themselves. As Chairman of Cyber, you know, I've spent a lot of time in the SCIF getting updates on the constant attacks that we face from threat actors like China, like North Korea, like Iran, like Russia. Yet, you're doing more with less, and you're doing it more efficiently. So for that, I say thank you. Now, one of the things that we've talked about and what's important, I think, to the American people, when we--again, I said in the hearing the war has already begun. We know who the adversary is. Our primary adversary is China. It's important that we on this committee, and you and your agency, have better communications, increase communications, and then were updated really on a much more timely basis. So with that--and, again, per our conversation, do you agree that Members of this committee, and in particular, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure--which has direct oversight of CISA--will be informed in a timely manner and, quite frankly, when needed, in a SCIF so that we can do our jobs and help you and assist you in doing yours, sir? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, I appreciate the support. Yes, definitely. Mr. Ogles. Then to change subjects--and I appreciate your willingness to meet with me. I appreciate all of you for being here. When we look at the mission statement and the directive we have here with the committee, it's important that we keep things in perspective. We have an obligation to the American people and to the American taxpayer. One of the things that we've seen under the previous administration--administrations, plural--is the absolute suck on our system, our infrastructure, and our welfare. So, for example, Bataan, 81.4 percent are on welfare; Yemen, 75.2 percent; Somalia, 71.9 percent; Marshall Islands, 71.4 percent; Afghani, 68.1; Dominican Republic, 68.1; Bangladesh, 54.8; Pakistan, 40.2; and I can go on. But this idea that doctors and lawyers were brought into this country to help our society is absolute nonsense. Go back to Hart-Celler, back to the 1960's, let's abolish it and, quite frankly, deport them all. This is the United States of America. We get to decide who comes in, and, Mr. Chairman, we get to decide who leaves. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Pou, for 5 minutes of questions. Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So as we sit here, DHS is operating an armed invasion of an American State: Minnesota. Local law enforcement described DHS tactics as ``profoundly detrimental to public safety.'' An American citizen was shot in the face and killed by an ICE agent. Secretary Noem and ICE Director Todd Lyons should be here testifying under oath what happened to Renee Good, and the pervasive ICE violence against Americans because we know Noem's taxpayers-funded media tour continues to spew outright lies about her Department, including calling Renee Good a domestic terrorist. Just this weekend, the Secretary went on TV and said that 70 percent of the people held by ICE have committed violent crimes. In fact, only 25 percent of individuals of--in ICE custody have criminal convictions, with many being minor offenses like traffic violations, and that's a fact. No one here can speak to the rampant DHS corruption, like the $200 million in taxpayers' money used for an ad campaign to the Secretary's aide and family, or her so-called border czar, who accepted a fast food checkout bag stuffed with $50,000 cash bribe. Why is DHS illegally blocking Congress from entering ICE facilities? Is it to cover up the 32 people who died in ICE custody last year or the 4 this year, including a reported homicide at a Texas ICE facility earlier this month? There are now reports that in my home State of New Jersey, ICE is looking to convert massive warehouses into detention centers, including one in Roxbury. None of these witnesses can speak to any of these abuses, but there are important questions that we can cover, starting with election security. I am alarmed by the administration's termination of funding for State and local elections offices for election security. We talked earlier, and someone asked about how safe are our elections? Are they fair? Will they be, indeed, secured? This President has attempted to weaponize CISA and spread disinformation about his election loss in 2020. So I'd like to ask Dr. Gottumukkala, did Donald Trump win or lose the 2020 election? Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congresswoman, I will be more than happy to talk about---- Ms. Pou. Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. I am not here to discuss about---- Ms. Pou. I know. Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala [continuing]. The 2000 election or the 2020 election. Ms. Pou. Did Donald Trump lose the 2020 election, yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ma'am, I'll be more than happy to discuss about the legwork that CISA does and how we are back on mission and---- Ms. Pou. You know what, it's--I can understand---- Mr. Gottumukkala [continuing]. How we are---- Ms. Pou. You know, I will tell you, it's--this is a simple question that only has the right--only has one right answer. Yes, he was, in fact, defeated. Do you believe that Donald Trump defeats--do you believe that Trump's defeat in 2020 contributed to this administration's cutting funds to support election security for State and local officials? Yes or no? Mr. Gottumukkala. Ma'am, election security is focused on infrastructure, and as CISA, we are exclusively focused on defending the election infrastructure. Ms. Pou. Quite honestly, it's very simple. What kind of justification could explain this reckless cut? Please explain that. Mr. Gottumukkala. Ma'am, once again, I have explained before, the people that have participated in the work force transition program, they have done that voluntarily. Ms. Pou. It's clear that you're not going to be able to do that. I'm sorry, but it's obviously clear that you're not looking to answer a simple question with a yes-or-no answer. I am very concerned, Mr. Chairman, over the fact that one of my colleagues asked earlier about sharing information. Ms. McNeill, the passengers, are we--are we, in fact, making TSA-- American citizens aware that TSA is, in fact, diverting resources and how are they--those personnel information being shared between agencies? Do the American people know that their information may very well be shared? Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady can maybe respond in writing to that question. The time has expired. Ms. Pou. That's fine. Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate that. [The information follows:] TSA is authorized to share information pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (49 U.S.C. 114(f)), which empowers TSA to ``develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security'' and to ``carry out such duties, and exercise such other powers, relating to transportation security as the Administrator considers appropriate.'' The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (49 U.S.C. 44903(j)) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (49 U.S.C. 114(h)) direct TSA to implement watchlist matching and enhance information sharing for security purposes. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (49 U.S.C. 114(t)) also direct TSA to establish a Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan to promote the sharing of transportation security information between DHS and public and private stakeholders. The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(1)) allows intra-agency sharing, such as sharing between components of one agency, when there is a ``need to know.'' DHS's Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing (Policy Statement 262-18, 2007) clarifies that ``all DHS components are considered part of one `agency' for purposes of the Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(1), (b)(1),'' and that information shall be shared within DHS ``whenever the requesting officer or employee has an authorized purpose for accessing the information in the performance of his or her duties.'' Therefore, information sharing between DHS components is permissible under the Privacy Act when there is a ``need to know.'' Consistent with Privacy Act exception (b)(1) and DHS Policy Statement 262-18, TSA entered into an agreement with ICE to use information provided by ICE to identify potential matches in TSA's data, beginning in early June 2025. The information sharing outlined in the 2025 MOA reaffirmed and codified a history of coordination between TSA and ICE that has been used during multiple administrations to address threats within the U.S. border, including under the Biden administration. TSA only shares the flight information of potential matches to individuals that meet ICE mission needs, which is a very small subset of the traveling public. TSA assigns a confidence level to individual matches identified and any matches that score a confidence of 100 percent based on full name and date of birth are returned to ICE to perform any additional adjudication of the matches. TSA does not perform any vetting or adjudication of matches provided to ICE, nor does the agency advise on immigration enforcement decisions. ICE retains final authority for immigration enforcement operations. TSA complies with the e-Government Act of 2002 ( 208, 44 U.S.C. 3501), Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)), and Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 892, 6 U.S.C. 482) by publishing Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) and System of Records Notices (SORNs) for the Secure Flight Program (73 Fed. Reg. 64018), ensuring transparency, accountability, and on-going oversight by DHS Privacy and Civil Rights offices. TSA has provided public notice that this sharing will occur in Privacy Impact Assessment DHS/TSA/PIA-018--TSA Secure Flight Program, which states TSA ``will share information within DHS with those offices and components that have a need for the information in the performance of their duties under 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(1). These purposes may include national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mission-related functions and to provide associated testing, training, management reporting, planning and analysis.'' Ms. Pou. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I would like, however, to be able to ask that question. Chairman Garbarino. Absolutely. All committee Members will have the time to submit questions in writing. Ms. Pou. Thank you. Chairman Garbarino. I know I have a bunch that I'm going to---- Ms. Pou. Thank you very much. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you. Gentlelady yields back. I now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina, Mrs. Biggs, for 5 minutes of questions. Mrs. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our panelists for being here today. I would like to elaborate on my colleague, Congressman Crane, what he was stating. It is concerning to me that for 2 years, Somali residents were walking through the Minneapolis airport with duffel bags filled with cash, on nearly $1 million a day totaling nearly $1 billion. I think that's astonishing. TSA reportedly flagged this flood of money and raised it to DHS and to intel agencies. So, Administrator McNeill, did that really happen, and who were these individuals responsible for this, and where was the cash going? Because to me, it--if that is what was reported, why wasn't it stopped immediately? This money could have easily been used for terrorists and tied to the same massive Somali fraud networks that we keep seeing across Minnesota. Ms. McNeill. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question. TSA did, indeed, report these incidents as it came across the checkpoint because bulk cash shows up as a mass on the X- ray, and so our officers have to resolve what they can't identify on the X-ray machine. Through the course of their normal day-to-day duties, they reported that to our law enforcement partners in compliance with their standard operating procedures. This is why it's really important to take a whole-of- Government approach on this and levy the authorities of all these law enforcement agencies, both across DHS and with the Department of Treasury, to ensure that we are taking a concerted whole-of-Government approach to this. I think this is where the role of Congress is also critical to ensure that we have the right framework in place to take action. As I mentioned earlier, the movement of this money historically had been done through legal channels, and so, you know, I think we're going to have to collectively work on this. Mrs. Biggs. I still didn't hear what is actually being done about it. Ms. McNeill. We continue to report it based on our standing operating procedures. I know there's a, you know, an on-going investigation with our law enforcement partners. We are part of that, and we are happy to brief you and the Members of this committee on any developments that we see on that front. Mrs. Biggs. OK. I guess my next question would be, why is Congress finding out about this from journalists and not from DHS? Ms. McNeill. I can't speak to that. I mean, again, I think we, you know, are committed to transparency with this committee. As the investigation evolves, we are happy to brief out on our part in this and, you know, work with the rest of the U.S. Government to make sure that we're taking action. Mrs. Biggs. Well, thank you for that. My constituents and the American people would love to hear a follow-up on that. Thank you. So my next question--TSA, the Touchless PreCheck is a biometric identity verification capability that enables enrolled PreChecked travelers to verify their identity at airport checkpoints using facial recognition and eliminating the need to present a physical ID. What is TSA's long-term vision for this TIS? Is it intended only as a checkpoint identity verification tool, or does TSA envision it becoming a broader identity platform across the transportation system? Ms. McNeill. So, we have launched the Touchless Identification System. As you mentioned, TIS in 15 locations today for PreCheck. It is a voluntary, facilitative technology that we offer to our PreCheck members. We're going to be rolling out additional locations, you know, based on the needs, experience, and feedback that we're getting from our PreCheck populations. It is very well-received. Again, I would just state it's voluntary, and it's meant to really provide that seamless experience to our trusted populations as they travel through our airports because you don't have to take out your identity or your boarding pass at the checkpoints. So, it is a facilitative tool. That is the intent of that program is to offer that benefit to our PreCheck populations. Mrs. Biggs. Just one more quick thing. So, is it beyond passenger screening? Will it be, like, for cargo or international operations? Will it go more in-depth? Ms. McNeill. It is intended for passenger screening and for our PreCheck population. Mrs. Biggs. OK. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking Member as well. I thank the witnesses for appearing today. Ms. McNeill, the Transportation Security Officers' Union is under attack. Thankfully, a court injunction has kept TSA's union in place. Most recently, the Secretary openly defied the court order and tried to disband TSA's union for a second time. Last week, the court said those actions plainly defy its injunction and ordered the Secretary to keep TSA's collective bargaining agreement in place or risk contempt. My question to you, acting administrator, is this: Will you commit to abiding by the court's order to keep the TSA's collective bargaining agreement in place? Ms. McNeill. Congressman, every step that we've taken to date, and we will continue to abide by court order---- Mr. Green. Excuse me, if I may. Since I control the time, if I may, please. This question can be answered with a yes or a no. If there's anything less than a yes or a no, I will assume you mean no. So, now, back to you again, will you commit to honoring a court's order, a court's order, a court's order? When you don't honor court's orders and you're the Secretary, you can be impeached. So, now, will you commit to honoring the court's order? Ms. McNeill. Yes. Mr. Green. Thank you. I'm pleased that you said yes because the Secretary needs to confer with you. She needs your advice. The Secretary, quite frankly, is probably being influenced by the President. Disobeying court orders is something that is antithetical to the Constitution. The courts are there for a reason. If we can disobey court orders, we no longer have a Constitution that we can count on. You're defacing, demeaning, and denigrating the Constitution when this happens--not you personally. You've already said yes, and I'm grateful to you for saying yes. But that's what's happening. I can assure you people are growing tired of seeing what's happening in terms of the lawlessness emanating from this Department. They're growing tired of it. What happened to Ms. Good is something that people are not going to forget. For the Secretary and others to contend that she was a domestic terrorist is beyond comprehension without even having investigated it immediately. This was a Christian woman with children, who according to her wife, they had whistles, and they indicated that the constabulary had pistols as evidenced by the fact that she is no longer with us. People are getting fed up with this behavior and the justifications for lawlessness. We must return to the rule of law. One of the ways to return to the rule of law is to enforce the law. One of the laws that we can use to make sure the rule of law prevails is impeachment. This Secretary is putting herself in harm's way as it relates to impeachment, not a physicality, but in terms of how she is conducting herself in office. My guess is if she is not very careful, she may become the first Secretary to be removed from office. We have a long runway here. It doesn't end at the end of this year. There is a long runway. So, I'm going to beg you to counsel with her and help her to better understand that the law prevails, and she is not the law, and neither is the President. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses, thank you. As typical in Washington, some of us having to shift in and shift out because of scheduling conflicts. I am certain, because I heard some of the commentary as I walked in, some of what we are going to be discussing, my part, is a little bit redundant. Please forgive me, because I did miss some of the prior discussion. Relative to CISA, and the weaponization that many felt like to the social component, social media, I just want to make this as a statement--this is kind-of a rhetorical statement, that is something of major concern to us that under this administration we continue to pay attention to that and make sure that our Government is not allowing that to continue that we saw in years past. That said and moving on for TSA. For the oversight we are conducting with the World Cup, with the Olympics, I know Director McNeill that you are very much attuned to what's ahead, the high volume, the international traffic; look, the heightened threat level, the landscape that we had in this hearing months ago because of the illegal populations that was led in by the prior administration. There is a different threat landscape. Whether it be the biometric security screening, REAL ID enforcement, the gaps in that, it's been astounding to me to find out the number of States that are allowing REAL ID- compliant driver's license. I've had some State-elected officials show me how that is in the past played out to whereby the way the prior administration was implementing parole in the work permitting process, that REAL ID-compliant driver's licenses were being handed to those who were here illegally. So to be able to--and I know by your response, I am taking it for granted that you may have not heard this before--but it's something I would very much like some feedback for our office to obtain where we're at on ensuring that with REAL ID coming into compliance this year, and all of the objections--and I was one of them on the State level--that if we have that type of possibility of illegal aliens getting a REAL ID-compliant driver's license, what a major security concern that is. [The information follows:] Under the REAL ID Act and relevant regulations, jurisdictions may only issue REAL ID-compliant Drivers Licenses/Identity Documents (IDs) to individuals who demonstrate evidence of lawful presence. Additionally, jurisdictions must set the credential's expiration date to match the end of the individual's lawful presence or a maximum of 8 years, whichever is sooner. When applying for a REAL ID, individuals must present documentation, as outlined in the REAL ID Act, sufficient to demonstrate that they are lawfully present in the United States which must be verified through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. DHS transferred the REAL ID program to TSA as part of the fiscal year 2023 budget, to include recertification requirements. TSA's recertification process follows the procedures established in the REAL ID regulations, specifically 6 CFR 37.59. As part of TSA's oversight of the REAL ID program, TSA recertifies a State's compliance with the REAL ID Act and regulations on a regular cycle. States and Territories are required to be recertified on a rolling 3-year basis. The recurring re-certification process includes a review of the State's procedures and practices, as well as on-site inspections, to ensure that all REAL ID requirements are satisfied, including the requirement that States only issue REAL IDs to individuals who are lawfully present in the United States. Mr. Brecheen. All right. I want to shift over. I know you've talked about the Somalian incident, cash, you've talked about, you know, in terms of what you all are doing. My question on that is when were you all as an agency made aware that this was happening? What was the time line of the millions of dollars that, you know, going through the airport security system, what timing did you all become aware of this? Ms. McNeill. I believe that the reporting started back in 2017. Mr. Brecheen. Two thousand seventeen. OK. With the World Cup, with the Olympics, I'm about to say something that I'm going to make sure my words are precise and give you a chance to kind-of think this thing through because there's an element to this just for national security purposes, the DHS Inspector General released a report on November 1, 2025 on its independent covert testing of the TSA checkpoint screening to see how effective it is at preventing threat items from being brought onto commercial aircraft. We cannot publicly talk about the contents of that report due to the sensitivity of the information. But let me ask you, generally, are you aware of the report? Have you read it? When did you receive it? Ms. McNeill. Yes. Yes to both of your first questions, in last November. Mr. Brecheen. OK. Do you agree with the findings and recommendations of that report? Ms. McNeill. I do. It's not anything that actually we didn't know already and fully consider in our security policies. Mr. Brecheen. Would you commit to providing this committee with results of any follow-up analysis conducted by TSA related to this report? Ms. McNeill. We would be glad to have a briefing on this topic in the proper Classified environment. Mr. Brecheen. Thank you. Transition to another little different direction here. New travelers are confused by TSA's facial screening practices. Can you please clarify whether this is mandatory or optional? Ms. McNeill. It is absolutely voluntary. We have signage at our checkpoints that notify the passengers of that. If they don't opt in, there are alternate procedures that they go through. So, it's 100 percent voluntary. Mr. Brecheen. With the 25 seconds that I have left, what would you say to travelers who are concerned about their biometric data being retained as a result of that process? Ms. McNeill. I would say that we don't retain the data that is captured at the checkpoint. It's solely for the purpose of identification at that point in time as we traverse through the checkpoint. Mr. Brecheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, panel. I yield, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman, for 5 minutes. Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good that we're having a full committee hearing here. I appreciate you calling this hearing. Of course, it relates to nothing that we have an urgent need to do oversight on. We do not have Acting Director Lyons here when what we're seeing around the country is a mass secret agency, dragnet, using violence against American citizens and others. It's bewildering to me because I know the Chairman is a very good person. We worked together on legislation. In fact, I'm optimistic we will pass the Zadroga Act together to make sure that 9/11 survivors have certainty and security in their health care. But I know, I know that you and your colleagues cannot possibly be OK watching secret masked ICE agents barging into homes without a warrant, pulling American citizens out in their underwear, stopping American citizens on the streets and demanding their citizenship. That, of course, is not even to mention the violence in Renee Good's murder as well as everything else we're seeing. There is an urgent, urgent need to conduct oversight from this committee of the Department of Homeland Security. But it is not the Science and Technology Directorate, it is not the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, it is not the TSA, all of which are very important agencies, and certainly do very important work. I am not disparaging the work you all do. But the urgency in this country right now is what's going on with ICE. Why are we having a hearing with Department of Homeland Security officials who know nothing about ICE? We get such misinformation from this Department of Homeland Security. We're told, oh, it's the worst. It's the murderers. It's the rapists. In our home State, Mr. Chairman, of the 22 of the 3,212 people ICE arrested in New York City in 2025 up through October 15, 70 percent had no pending criminal charges and no criminal convictions. Fifteen percent had pending criminal charges, which of course with due process would have to play out before they are removed. Fifteen percent were convicted criminals, and 5 percent had serious felonies. That is not the worst of the worst. That is what we should be doing oversight of. But since we do have the TSA here, Ms. McNeill, I want to ask you about this new policy that my understanding is you have implemented where you are--the TSA, rather, is providing information to ICE to assist them with the deportation effort. You're familiar with what I'm referring to? Ms. McNeill. I am. Mr. Goldman. Just to be clear, this was a new policy implemented under this administration, correct? Ms. McNeill. It is not new policy to share information between the agencies of the Department of Homeland Security. Past administrations have shared information. Mr. Goldman. No, that's not what I asked. Is it a new policy that the TSA sends identification information of all passengers to ICE so that they can check for potential deportation orders? Ms. McNeill. That is not what is occurring. We don't send the information to ICE. We help ICE check against information. Yes, absolutely, we do that, and we are supporting the mission of our colleagues at the Department of Homeland Security, and that includes enforcement of immigration laws, and---- Mr. Goldman. Can I--just because I have a little time--can I ask you in--last year, Secretary Noem said that the Biden administration allowed immigrants who are in our country illegally to jet around the country without identification. Is that true; they had no identification, but yet they were able to get on an airplane? Ms. McNeill. I can't speak to what occurred before, you know, this administration took place. But as you know, we started enforcing REAL ID last year which was a law that was passed by Congress over 20 years ago. Today, people who are---- Mr. Goldman. Just because I'm running out of time. Is it your view that the Biden administration said it's OK for people to go on airplanes without identification? I've never been on an airplane without identification, but was it OK in the Biden administration? Ms. McNeill. Apparently, it was allowed. Mr. Goldman. Apparently, because Secretary Noem said it? You ought to be careful what you testify to, and I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Mackenzie, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Mackenzie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the testifiers for being here today. Obviously, each of you cover very important agencies, and having you here is critical to the work we do at the Homeland Security Committee. I'm going to focus my questions to Ms. McNeill. The TSA is an important agency that keeps all Americans safe. First, I'd like to commend our local TSA agents at the A-B Lehigh Valley International Airport. They just went through the highest record and busiest year in history at the Lehigh Valley International Airport. Over a million passengers moved through successfully and faithfully, and we thank all of them for their work, especially during a Democrat-led shutdown where they were not being paid for a period of time. We thank them for their service and their work. Two things that I would like to highlight: First is ways that you were actually reforming the administration to move passengers through more quickly and improve the passenger experience. One of those is the Families on the Fly Initiative. Can you speak to that and how that program works, what you're doing to help families, typically with children under the age of 12, to not only move them through more expeditiously, but also speed up lines for everybody else? Ms. McNeill. Thank you, Congressman Mackenzie, for that question. Families on the Fly is an initiative--but we rolled out last year in support of American families traveling through our airports. It dedicates a lane, a specific lane for families that go through the checkpoint. You know, as many of us know when you travel with children, there's a lot of gear and equipment that gets brought through. So it provides a wider lane, easier access for families to go through and extra assistance to screen all of their gear that they bring through. It has the added benefit actually to driving down wait times in nonfamily lanes as well. So, you know, it's been a win-win for everyone. We're really happy to be able to support families traveling throughout our airports. Mr. Mackenzie. Well, thank you for that. It's an important improvement to making the agency--obviously, a lot people outside of A-B have difficult experiences with TSA. While it should be predominantly and primarily focused on safety and security, it is also a customer service-facing organization. We want to improve that experience. So, I think there are lots of great ways that we can coordinate to make sure that passengers have the best experience possible. The second thing I would like to focus on relates to the last administration. So, I understand you may not be in a position to share all the information that I'm looking for here. If you don't have the information, I would ask that you do follow up with committee with written documentation of the information that we do have. What it relates to is during the last administration, there was something that was commonly referred to as ghost flights where illegal immigrants in this country were being moved on planes across the country to different locations. Many times it was minors. The last administration then proceeded to lose thousands of minors that were supposed to be in their custody. When we went to our local airports and other airports in the region and asked for documentation of who was on those flights, they could not provide any manifest or logs of those flyers on the plane. We couldn't get any information on these individuals, whether they were here legally or in some kind of protected status. We couldn't get any information on who paid for those flights. Many of those people were in the country illegally, though, we know, based on some of the information that was shared publicly from the last administration, or they just said that it was people, there were minors here in the country illegally, and being moved to a different location. So, those individuals do not have proper documentation. So the last question I am going to ask, if people were being moved on flights without report identification? The answer is undoubtedly yes. We know that for a fact. So, my question to you is what information, what has this Department of DHS done under this administration to look into those transgressions that occurred in the last administration, those ghost flights. What can we now share with the public about what was going on, who was paying for them, who was on those flights? Again, if you don't have that information, I would ask that you look into it and get back to us with as much detailed information as possible--even if it has to be anonymized so that no individual information is disclosed. But that program and that activity is highly egregious and very concerning for the American people. Ms. McNeill. What I can say is that under no circumstances would that happen under this administration and the initiative that we have ruled out at our airports, namely, under the leadership of the Secretary, we have ruled out REAL ID, a law that was passed 20 years ago. That really does enforce identity verification standards at our checkpoints. I mentioned early on in my statement, identity verification is the cornerstone of our aviation security system. Knowing who is accessing our aircrafts is critical to our security posture. I'm happy to get back to you on the details of the scenario that you raised earlier. Mr. Mackenzie. Please do look into those ghost flights. It's something that, again, should not have been occurring, should not occur going forward. I know it wouldn't stand under this administration, but any information you can shed on what the last administration was doing incorrectly would be helpful for us going forward. Thank you, and I yield back. [The information follows:] TSA defers to DHS/ICE for a response. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Walkinshaw, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you, Chairman Garbarino, for convening today's hearing and for our witnesses for joining us. Last week, I visited Minnesota with 27 other Members of the House where we heard from community leaders and Members about the brutal masked secret police that had been unleashed in their streets. They have shackled peaceful protestors, pulled guns on children, dragged pregnant mothers, and as we all know shot an unarmed mother in the face. Just yesterday in Minnesota we heard from local law enforcement leaders that their off-duty officers, United States citizens, have been targeted by ICE. Had the Department honored the committee's request--and I appreciate the Chairman for making the request for Acting ICE Director Lyons to testify today--I and I think others would have questioned him directly about his role in escalating tensions by deploying thousands of masked immigration officers. I should say masked and minimally- trained immigration officers in Minnesota. That said, I want to just discuss another one of this administration's failures. Last year, President Trump's DOGE and its chain-saw wiped out 72,000 Federal jobs just here in the national capital region, which includes the district and Virginia that I represent, including a lot of cyber professionals. These are patriotic Americans who chose a career of public service, and instead they were fired, pushed out, or moved to support this administration's mass deportation effort. That's currently, as I noted, harassing U.S. citizens, including law enforcement officers in Minnesota. CISA--as we know, is a lead agency to defend and mitigate against threats to our cyber and physical infrastructure--lost a third of its work force. One year ago at CISA, much of its career work force was bullied into quitting. They were threatened with RIFs that would not come with any severance. So-called probationary employees were fired. In the recent Government shutdown, some CISA staff even received the illegal RIF notices. Court after court after court has determined that those attempted RIFs were illegal. Others were moved to ICE or to CBP or told they'd be fired if they didn't accept their transfer orders. CISA has cut support to critical partners like the multi-State ISAC and the Election Infrastructure ISAC, while the Department has dismantled key oversight and prevention efforts, including eliminating the Cyber Safety Review Board. The leaders behind the pre-ransomware notification and Secure-by-Design initiatives have left. At a time of persistent and growing cyber threats from malign foreign actors, these choices by the President and the Secretary have weakened our defenses and left our critical systems and infrastructure more exposed and the American people more vulnerable. Dr. Gottumukkala, has CISA conducted an analysis to prove that its current staffing levels enable mission delivery? Have you done that analysis? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. Please allow me to clarify. I think capability--somehow I think the narrative comes across in the media as 800 people just left overnight. That's not the case. This is a work force transition program. People who participated in the program did so voluntarily. And---- Mr. Walkinshaw. Yes, I don't agree with that. But just answer the question, please. Have you conducted an analysis to prove that your current staffing levels today enable you to accomplish your mission? Where is that analysis? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, the work that we do is mission-focused, which means capability is measured by outcomes, not head count. And CISA remains fully operational from what we do from securing the Nation from---- Mr. Walkinshaw. So you have not conducted an analysis. Is there an analysis you can provide to the committee to determine you can meet your mission with the work force you have today? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, we support every single statutory authority given to us, and we support every single one of that for the mission. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Thank you. Mr. Gottumukkala. That has not been compromised by anyone. Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. So there is no analysis. Funding for the multi-State ISAC has been eliminated. I referenced it. I'm sure you know a lot about it. The Senate provided no-cost services for cash-strapped State and local governments, especially small local governments in rural communities who don't have the ability to do this on their own. Has the threat landscape against State and local governments diminished or increased over the past year? Has it gone up or down? Mr. Gottumukkala. Congressman, thank you for the question. Again, consistent with all ISACs, there is no Federal funding. But we do work with all the ISACs and working with the joint safety of the products. We deployed automatic communication for the joint cyber communication, joint cyber defense collaborative, expanding the real-time communication---- Mr. Walkinshaw. OK. Mr. Gottumukkala. And---- Mr. Walkinshaw. Thank you. You've managed to answer none of my questions. You haven't answered a single question, but thank you for coming. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Fong, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Fong. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the panelists for the work that you do. I want to start with Under Secretary Allende. The threats our Nation faces require us to continue developing new technological capabilities. Specifically, my district is home to the Naval Air Weapons Station Channel 8, which supports the Navy's research, development, accusation, and testing, and evaluation of advanced weapon systems. Recently, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Naval Warfare Center Weapons Division, Channel 8, tested a contactless vessel-stopping capability prototype that uses high-energy radio frequency to safely stop small, noncompliant vessels, which is an exciting new development. How do S&T's partnerships with key military bases enhance testing and development efforts? Mr. Allende. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. At S&T, we take a whole-of-component, a whole-of-DHS approach to understanding the needs and requirements. We take a whole-of- Government approach to reduce duplication and create efficiencies. Often, some of the systems that are developed for other departments, including the Department of War may have a civilian application. Or the core technology may be transferable. Obviously, they're very different mission sets. But the technology you're referring to is very promising. We would like to do some continued testing on it to make sure that it is suitable for deployment. But it is a concern that I heard both in my engagements with the Coast Guard and from CBP and others in my trip to California this past week. Mr. Fong. Well, you're always welcome in California. So, certainly, if you're in the area, please, we would love to roll out the red carpet for you. I wonder if you describe how S&T is working with private- sector vendors to ensure technologies being developed, procured, and deployed are up-to-date, incorporate the latest innovations, and avoid becoming obsolete before they are fielded. So what does the procurement process look like? Are there changes that need to be made? Certainly, as mentioned before, we have major special events occurring in the United States with the World Cup and the Olympics, and the celebration of America's 250th birthday. How can we facilitate the spread of these technologies and deploy them ahead of these events for any threat that exist? Mr. Allende. Sure. Thank you for the question. The private sector is able to address a number of problems that Government just really could not do on its own in many aspects. It's generally wise to look for those technologies and the applications that they might be suitable for. We do that soup to nuts at the Department. We're always looking for opportunities to bring in existing technologies. I guess my answer to you is, if there's something that can be applied, our preference would be to either adopt it or adapt it for our use, rather than going through a long research development time line. Now, in fairness, there are those areas where there is no private-sector market. In those instances, it's suitable for us to take lead on that. Mr. Fong. Can you expound on that? What type of capabilities--I mean, does a demand signal have to be provided for the private sector to address some of the Department needs? Or is it something that is solely focused within the Department that you just prefer to have it in house? Mr. Allende. I would say there's two sets of demand signals. There is something that private sectors develop with a private market in mind that might have a very good Government application. There is the alternative which is something that is a--almost uniquely Government niche that ultimately has a private-sector application. In those instances we'd be looking to do tech transfer at the earliest possible moment, and that's the private sector. For the components, our--you know operation delivery is our goal. So, by either method, we look to get out in the field. Mr. Fong. Do you have a particular time frame you would look at when you're trying to deploy with your processes in place? Mr. Allende. ASAP is really my preference. There is nuance to that, of course. You want to make sure that it is properly tested, evaluated, and in a position to be deployed. We have very smart people that get after that issue. Mr. Fong. Sure. Well, I know that when it comes to the threats that our country faces, the technology is going to be critically important for us to address that both from the private-sector side and on the research and development side. So, find a way we can facilitate the deployment of promising technologies, but please let us know. With that I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps, for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Van Epps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for sharing with us today. This Department is tasked with the most sacred mission: To protect the American homeland. Our witnesses today represent vital aspects of that mission, and I'm grateful for your time. I'm going to build off of my colleagues' questions. Mr. Allende, S&T's Office of Safety Act Implementation, OSAI, plays an important role in mitigating litigation risks to incentivize the private sector to require and deploy antiterrorism technologies. Building off of previous questions, what additional resources, if any, does OSAI require in order to process applications for designated and certified antiterrorism technologies at a speed sufficiently appropriate to keep pace with emerging threats and technologies? Mr. Allende. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I would like to ask for an opportunity to come back and brief you on this. I can tell you, we currently have a large number of applications pending. We've had a 50 percent increase in applications, which we attribute to FIFA, L.A. 2028, and America 250. We are working very diligently to get through those. I have some time actually scheduled toward the end of this week to see how many we can get through. But certainly, it is top of mind and not something that we take lightly. Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. To what extent does OSAI perform evaluations of technologies that have already received safety act certifications or other safety act designations to ensure that these technologies remain effective at mitigating terrorist acts? Is OSAI adequately resourced to complete necessary reevaluation processes in a timely fashion? Mr. Allende. Thank you, Congressman. There are different sets of certifications that are offered by OSAI, and each of these is on a renewal review period. So, we periodically revisit the applications. There is a whole host of requirements that are part of that, including evaluations sites and so on. So, yes, we do try to keep with the times and the emerging threats if that's--I think that answers your question. Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. Pivoting here--and this will be for Administrator McNeill--TSA announced at the end of last year that passengers who do not present a REAL ID or acceptable form of ID at the TSA security checkpoint would have to pay a $45 fee for a 10-day travel authorization under new program called Confirm ID which we've talked about some today. With the new program starting February 1, the committee has concerns about whether TSA holds the requisite authority to levy this fee and bill by the contract for an alternative travel authorization system. Can you please explain to the committee why this Confirm ID program is necessary, how this program does not go against TSA's goal to enforce REAL ID compliance, and a pulled identification security since it would allow individuals without proper identification to still travel simply by paying the fee? Ms. McNeill. Thank you for your question, Congressman. When we rolled out enforcement of REAL ID in May 2025, we saw approximately 93 percent compliance rate. Today, it's around 94 percent. The Confirm ID is really meant to address the continuing noncompliant populations, about 6 percent of what we see through our airports every day. It's been 20 years since Congress passed this law, and, you know, for folks to show up with a noncompliant ID is a draw on our resources, operationally. So, and that cost today is borne by the taxpayer. So the fee is really meant to defray the cost of us processing people who don't show up with the acceptable form of ID, ensure that they do not pose a threat to our skies, and have the fee borne by the noncompliant population. Mr. Van Epps. Could you just talk a little bit about how TSA determined the $45 would cover the cost of the travel authorization for a passenger? Without an acceptable ID, I believe the original amount considered was $18. Ms. McNeill. Absolutely. So you know with any fee that we issue, there is a fee study that we conduct. There was a realization that we did not include all of the cost in the initial assessment. That's part of our fee revision process. You know, we will do so on a recurrent basis to ensure that the fee reflects the cost of carrying out that program. Mr. Van Epps. Great. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back. I will now entertain--and I appreciate my colleagues waiting for the--I will now entertain UC motions. Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask unanimous consent to introduce into the record a staffing chart provided by CISA that shows 65 employees have been transferred out of CISA in management-directed reassignments since January 20, 2025--and that CISA has lost 998 employees since January 20, 2025. Nearly one-third of its total personnel. Further, I ask unanimous consent to include in the record 2 articles describing how TSA and CISA are contributing to ICE's deportation push on behalf of Mrs. Ramirez. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Garbarino. Without objection. Well, I want to thank you all, the witnesses, for being here today. One of the main things we do here is oversight, and this was the first of many hearings. You all run very important departments under the Department of Homeland Security. I appreciate your willingness and your time coming here today. The Members of the committee may have some additional questions--I know I do--and we would ask that all the witnesses respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X I ---------- Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino For Pedro M. Allende Question 1. Under Secretary Allende, starting with this year's FIFA World Cup, our Nation is entering into an unprecedented period of hosting major international sporting events. How is S&T leveraging its programs, including the Program Executive Office within S&T you mentioned during the hearing, to provide C-UAS support to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement entities ahead of these events, and how is S&T collaborating with other DHS components in providing this assistance? Answer. The new Program Executive Office (PEO) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) in U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced by Secretary Noem on January 12, 2026, consolidates all supporting UAS and C-UAS activities across the Department, to include systems acquisition, research and development, and air space integration. The PEO will help streamline the Department's exercise of its C-UAS authorities and enhance coordination with interagency partners, as well as State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement--especially for significant events such as the World Cup and America 250 celebrations. S&T C-UAS subject-matter experts helped review submissions from SLTT partners related to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's C-UAS Grant Program. S&T engineers and research specialists are also conducting site surveys at World Cup stadium locations in partnership with SLTT entities to ensure each site receives adequate C-UAS equipment and resources. Broadly, the new PEO will address existing gaps and future challenges by centralizing acquisition decision making and investment oversight. The Program Executive Office will also collaborate with the U.S. Departments of Justice, Transportation, and War, including Joint Interagency Task Force 401 and other relevant organizations, to synergize acquisition, research and development, and testing and evaluation activities and reduce duplication of efforts in the homeland. These changes are fully aligned with the President's direction to restore air sovereignty over the United States (Executive Order 14305: Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty) and secure our Nation's borders (Executive Order 14165: Securing Our Borders; Presidential Proclamation 10886: Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States). Question 2a. Under Secretary Allende, a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) from October 2024 found that DHS S&T could amend its policies to prevent potential unnecessary research and development overlap among its Federally-funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). S&T's Program Management Office (PMO) has a role in overseeing the performance of DHS's FFRDCs and ensuring that research and development activities performed by these FFRDCs do not overlap between each other and with the research and development activities of DHS components. How effective has S&T's PMO office been in performing this work and what challenges remain? Answer. DHS remains committed to streamlining task oversight across the Department by centralizing review of analytic research activities, strengthening documentation requirements, and enhancing enterprise-wide visibility to prevent duplication of research and development (R&D). We are also improving collaboration across components to ensure our investments are aligned, complementary, and directly tied to operational mission needs. S&T's Program Management Office (PMO) has enhanced its oversight by implementing structured portfolio reviews, standardized task order approval processes, and cross-component coordination mechanisms. These steps have strengthened our ability to detect and prevent potential overlap. Establishing a more comprehensive quarterly and annual Federally-funded research and development centers (FFRDC) performance review will also enhance oversight, support reducing potential overlap, and will also support potential reuse of solutions across DHS. The integration of planning cycles across components remains an area of on- going focus, and we are committed to continuous improvement. Question 2b. How does the work completed by DHS's FFRDCs align with Departmental priorities, and how is S&T and its PMO working to integrate research performed by FFRDCs into DHS's current strategic focus? Answer. FFRDC projects are mapped to DHS strategic priorities, including border security, Counter-UAS, biosecurity and protection of critical infrastructure. The PMO ensures that work performed supports validated mission gaps identified and approved by operational components. The PMO supports the components in ensuring that the work is efficiently transitioned to support and effectively impact mission operations. Questions From Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy for Pedro M. Allende Question 1. Under Secretary Allende, DHS's fiscal year 2026 funding bill, if enacted, would move a significant portion of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office's mission into your directorate. Specifically, it transfers funding for ``Mission Support for Research and Development,'' ``Transformational Research and Development,'' ``Technical Forensics,'' and ``Detection Capability Development.'' How do you plan to integrate these operational and support functions into your existing research and development structure without losing the specialized expertise required for WMD threat detection? Answer. The S&T team has already engaged with the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) team to understand their R&D portfolio and activities. This exercise will allow us to better collaborate as a single or separate organizations within DHS. S&T will accept the transfer of these CWMD programs and specialized staff, ensure their continued operations, and then evaluate program performance, impact, and outcome to inform the fiscal year 2027 and out-year budgeting requirements. S&T will enable the programs to continue to meet the mission and the Congressional direction for these departmental capabilities. Question 2a. As Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology, I was troubled by the reports stating that the Trump administration had made the reckless decision to terminate funding for S&T's Centers of Excellence. These Centers are unique and essential partnerships between academic institutions, the private sector, homeland security agencies, and other partners who work together to produce groundbreaking research that helps keep our Nation safe now and in the future. For example, one of these Centers focused on enhancing critical infrastructure security to protect our Nation against a variety of threats, from natural disasters to attacks by hostile entities. How many of the 9 Centers of Excellence are currently operational? Answer. Although I disagree with your assertion that assessing and deciding to terminate Centers of Excellence (COE's) was reckless, I recognize and appreciate the relationships the DHS COE's have forged with DHS components and the broader Homeland Security Enterprise. On April 24, 2025, DHS reinstated the cooperative agreements for 2 DHS COE's: National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center, led by University of Nebraska Omaha. Arctic Domain Awareness Center--Addressing Rapid Changes Through Technology Innovation and Collaboration. The expertise and capabilities afforded through the other 6 Centers that DHS was funding through cooperative agreements remain available via utilization of their Basic Ordering Agreement. This task order vehicle is a funding mechanism through which Government agencies can directly contract with an emeritus COE, providing streamlined access to leading researchers. Additionally, projects conducted using a Basic Ordering Agreement are directly for the benefit of the Government. The Department is considering the future of the Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense COE as it relates to Department and administration priorities. Question 2b. If Congress provides funding to keep all 9 of S&T's Centers of Excellence fully staffed and operational, will you commit to respecting the will of this body by using that funding to keep these Centers open? Answer. I commit to working with you and the committee to align Congressional appropriations and intent for COE's with administration priorities. DHS recognizes the value of its partnerships between academic institutions, the private sector, and homeland security agencies across the Homeland Security Enterprise. We will continue to assess pathways for establishing these partnerships in alignment with administration priorities, including through university-led DHS COE's. Question 3a. For years, S&T has partnered with Minority-Serving Institutions, such as Historically Black Colleges and Universities, to expand the agency's talent pipeline and broaden its research base. Among other benefits, these partnerships helped DHS address persistent staffing shortages by producing qualified graduates who were familiar with DHS mission areas, and who otherwise might not have pursued a career in homeland security. Last April, S&T reportedly ended all of its partnerships with Minority-Serving Institutions. Among other impacts, this pulled the rug out from students who thought they could count on Federal funding to help attain their degrees. What specific deficiencies did S&T identify in its partnerships with Minority-Serving Institutions that justified ending all of these partnerships rather than addressing individual issues? Answer. S&T conducted a comprehensive review of its grants and cooperative agreements, with special attention given to alignment with new Departmental directives. Consistent with the administration's direction to uniformly implement funding restrictions and maintain fiscal discipline, continued funding of these cooperative agreements risked potential misalignment with current strategic priorities and conflicted with newly-issued Departmental guidance. Question 3b. Does S&T believe it is appropriate for the Federal Government to abruptly withdraw promised support from students who relied on these programs to complete their degree programs, and who want to support our Nation's homeland security posture? Answer. I do not agree with the premise of your question. S&T is tasked with a number of competing responsibilities relating to research, educational support, and general financial stewardship. In this instance, it was not possible to avoid the effect discontinuing all grants and cooperative agreements had on individual students. S&T Directorate continues to meet its mandate in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to support United States leadership in science and technology. Part of this includes funding internships and fellowships geared toward building the future homeland security science and engineering workforce. In addition, we continue to support graduate and undergraduate students engaged in homeland security research and development through our current DHS COE's. Question 3c. If evidence shows that ending these partnerships has harmed DHS workforce readiness or its homeland security research base, is S&T prepared to reinstate these programs? Answer. S&T continually examines the efficiency and effectiveness of its investments, including those that contribute to workforce readiness and homeland security research capabilities. Future investment decisions will be determined by those parameters and strategic alignment with the administration's priorities to ensure that we remain good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Question 4. When DHS was established, S&T played a critical role in developing technology to harden our critical infrastructure--making it safer for Americans to fly and take public transportation. Back then S&T worked closely with Department of Energy labs, as contemplated in the Homeland Security Act. Unfortunately, in recent years, with reductions to S&T budget, that relationship has eroded. As you think about the challenges that you intend to tackle, where do you see opportunities to reinvigorate the partnership with DOE labs? Answer. DHS maintains a strong and collaborative partnership with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), specifically within S&T. S&T continues to play a critical role in developing technology to harden our critical infrastructure in partnership with the DOE's National Laboratories as envisioned in the Homeland Security Act. This partnership, originally established in the Homeland Security Act, recognized the essential role of DOE labs in supporting DHS's mission. Over time, this relationship has evolved and been formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding between DHS and DOE, ensuring streamlined collaboration and access to world-class scientific resources. In the face of DOE National Lab realignment and mission re- focus on energy dominance, our collaboration with the DOE National Labs remains strong and continues to be a cornerstone of our efforts to advance homeland security research and technology. Through on-going coordination facilitated by our Office of National Laboratories, we have maintained robust engagement, streamlined access, and aligned projects with DHS mission priorities. As we look ahead to new challenges, there are numerous opportunities to expand our partnership with DOE National Labs--leveraging their world-class expertise, infrastructure, and innovative capabilities to deliver transformative solutions for homeland security. Our sustained collaboration positions us well to address emerging threats and enhance the safety and security of the American public. In both fiscal year 2023 and fiscal year 2024, DHS funded roughly 240 projects at the DOE National Labs. In fiscal year 2024 alone, nearly $390 million was expended by DHS to leverage DOE National Lab capabilities and support our mission. Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Madhu Gottumukkala Question 1. As the Sector Risk Management Agency for the communications sector, CISA has responsibility for helping secure infrastructure that nearly every other critical infrastructure sector depends on, including energy, financial services, emergency response, health care, and transportation. Recent nation-state cyber activity has made clear that U.S. telecommunications networks are increasingly viewed by sophisticated adversaries as high-value strategic targets. Campaigns attributed to PRC-linked actors, such as Salt Typhoon, have underscored both the scale of the risk and the potential cascading consequences of disruption in this sector. Please describe in detail how CISA is currently engaging with telecommunications providers and other relevant public and private- sector stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of the communications sector and to mitigate threats posed by cyber actors affiliated with the PRC. In your response, identify specific programs, operational activities, and coordination mechanisms CISA is using for information sharing, threat detection, incident response, and continuity and resilience planning. Please also explain how these efforts are designed to reduce the likelihood, severity, and duration of service disruptions and to ensure continuity of operations for the critical infrastructure sectors that rely on U.S. communications networks. Answer. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) engages with telecommunications providers and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of the communications sector and mitigate threats posed by People's Republic of China-affiliated (PRC) cyber actors. These activities include continuity planning, information sharing, guidance, and incident handling. One of CISA's joint planning efforts focuses on hardening telecommunications infrastructure against nation-state threats. It enhances the cybersecurity and resilience of the telecommunications sector by improving providers' ability to operate through compromise and recover quickly. Activities include routine threat exchanges and briefings for telecom executives, tabletop exercises simulating PRC- linked campaigns, and technical hardening guidance to reduce vulnerabilities and improve redundancy. Additional measures involve sector-wide risk modeling to assess cascading impacts on critical sectors such as energy, health care, and transportation, developing incident response playbooks, and creating continuity of operations templates to ensure essential services remain available during prolonged disruptions. CISA also leans into information sharing with Government and industry partners, including the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center. These partnerships help accelerate CISA and the sector's response to cyber incidents. Question 2. The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) was signed into law nearly 4 years ago, and Congress directed CISA to finalize implementing regulations by October 2025. That deadline has now slipped to May 2026. The justification given by the agency includes a need to better incorporate industry feedback and streamline the proposed rule to avoid undue burden. Please explain in detail how CISA is using this additional time to align the final rule with Congressional intent, including which elements of the proposed regulation are being revised to reduce overreach, clarify scope, and ensure the final rule reflects a practical, risk-based approach for covered entities. Answer. CISA received many written comments and requests from entities in critical infrastructure sectors and other stakeholders to directly engage CISA further on the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) rulemaking. CISA appreciates stakeholders' interest and concern that CISA implement CIRCIA to maximize its positive impact on improving the Nation's cybersecurity posture while minimizing unnecessary burden. Given the broad stakeholder community that CIRCIA may potentially impact and significant passage of time (including due to a prolonged lapse in DHS funding) since publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking in April 2024, CISA will conduct a series of town hall meetings to solicit additional input on the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). At the conclusion of the town hall meeting process, CISA will evaluate the feedback and determine the most appropriate next step for the CIRCIA rulemaking. Question 3. Much of the public and Congressional attention in recent years has understandably focused on cyber activity attributed to the People's Republic of China, particularly given the scope, persistence, and strategic nature of those operations against U.S. critical infrastructure and government systems. At the same time, other nation-state actors continue to pose serious, and in some cases, more immediate cyber risks to the homeland, even if they receive less sustained attention in public reporting or policy debates. Please explain how CISA assesses and prioritizes the cyber threats posed by Russia, Iran, and North Korea relative to the PRC. In your response, describe how differences in these actors' capabilities, objectives, and operational patterns are reflected in CISA's analytic, operational, and resource allocation decisions. Answer. CISA assesses and prioritizes cyber threats by evaluating each actor's capabilities, objectives, and operational patterns, focusing on potential severity and impact to the homeland. The PRC is the highest-priority threat due to the scale, sophistication, and persistence of its malicious cyber activity. CISA continues to closely monitor activity from Russia, Iran, and North Korea, especially focused on their collective potential to cause disruption or harm. CISA views Russia as a highly capable and historically aggressive actor, willing to conduct disruptive operations; this leads to focused analysis on Russian tools and targeting, joint advisories with partners, and concentrated support to sectors most vulnerable to disruptive Russian activity. Iranian cyber operations are often retaliatory or regionally focused but have demonstrated disruptive potential, prompting CISA to monitor targeting shifts tied to geopolitical developments and issue tailored guidance to likely targets. North Korea activity is primarily financially-motivated cryptocurrency theft, financial fraud, and ransomware. In response, CISA focuses its analytical and operational support towards the financial services sector and organizations at risk from ransomware. These differing profiles directly shape CISA's analytic priorities, operational planning, and allocation of limited resources across the threat landscape. Question 4a. Russia has long demonstrated a willingness to use cyber operations as a tool of state power, including disruptive attacks against energy systems, government services, and civilian infrastructure across Europe. Russia's on-going war against Ukraine has provided clear examples of how cyber operations are used alongside military activity to degrade civilian services, disrupt energy and communications systems, and shape the operating environment during conflict. These campaigns suggest that Russia treats cyber operations not merely as espionage tools, but as instruments of coercion and operational disruption. Please confirm whether CISA is examining or evaluating Russian cyber operations related to the war in Ukraine and, if so, explain in detail how CISA collects and analyzes technical and operational data from those campaigns and how that information is being used to inform risk assessments and defensive measures for U.S. critical infrastructure. Answer. CISA monitors malicious Russian cyber activity available through Classified sources, industry and international partners, cybersecurity vendors, and open-source reports, especially as it relates to critical infrastructure and government networks. CISA actively analyzes this data to identify relevant threats and operational patterns, and shares resulting synthesized insights with Government and industry partners when applicable to inform risk assessments and defensive measures. Question 4b. Please explain how those lessons are being translated into concrete guidance, preparedness activities, and operational support for U.S. infrastructure owners and operators. Answer. CISA issues timely advisories, technical alerts, and best practices based on threat actor activity. We support readiness by executing exercises, conducting cybersecurity assessments, and sharing real-time threat intelligence. These actions equip U.S. Government and critical infrastructure partners to defend against similar disruptive cyber tactics. Question 5a. North Korea presents a different but no less serious cyber challenge from the PRC and Russia, particularly through financially-motivated operations tied directly to regime survival. In addition to well-documented cryptocurrency theft, ransomware activity, and exploitation of financial systems, there are increasing reports that North Korea is placing or attempting to place IT workers inside U.S. and European companies under false identities. These individuals may gain legitimate access to corporate networks, generate revenue that flows back to the regime, and create opportunities for follow-on cyber activity, intellectual property theft, or insider-enabled attacks. Please describe how CISA is assessing and addressing the threat posed by North Korean cyber activity, including the placement of North Korean IT workers inside Western companies. In your response, explain how CISA works with other Federal agencies and the private sector to help organizations identify, prevent, and respond to this activity. Answer. CISA assesses and addresses the threat posed by North Korean cyber activity by monitoring their tactics and in collaboration with Government and industry partners, takes appropriate actions to include information sharing, alerts, and guidance. Together, these efforts help organizations identify, prevent, and respond to observed threat activity. Question 5b. From CISA's perspective, how significant is this threat to U.S. companies and critical infrastructure, particularly given the potential for revenues to flow back to the North Korean regime and support its weapons programs? Answer. CISA observes that North Korea cyber activity primarily focuses on revenue generation, targeting organizations that offer the greatest return on investment. North Korea actors often pursue easier targets rather than highly secured networks. Implementation of basic and foundational cyber defense and hygiene measures is the greatest defense to protect U.S. companies and critical infrastructure. We actively monitor threat reporting for evolving tactics; however, robust cybersecurity fundamentals remain currently effective in mitigating this threat. Question 6a. In December, CISA released a new report titled Venue Guide for Mitigating Dependency Disruptions to help stadiums and arenas strengthen resilience ahead of major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 Summer Olympics. The guide focuses on lifeline dependencies, including energy, communications, water, and transportation, and how disruptions to those systems could affect public safety at large gathering venues. At the same time, we are seeing growing concern about the use of unmanned aircraft systems, including drones, as a means to disrupt venue operations or exploit dependencies on critical lifeline services during high-profile events. Please describe CISA's current assessment of the evolving drone threat to stadiums, arenas, and other public gathering venues. Answer. Threats posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to stadiums, arenas, and other public gathering venues are evolving as commercial UAS platforms become more widely accessible and technically capable, raising the potential for both negligent and intentional misuse that could disrupt safety, operations, or critical dependencies at high-profile events. The 2025 DHS Homeland Threat Assessment underscores that UAS activity over sensitive critical infrastructure and large public venues remains a significant risk, with the potential to disrupt facility operations, impede emergency response, and enable intelligence collection by malign actors.\1\ Further compounding the challenge, small UAS platforms are increasingly capable of carrying larger, more sophisticated payloads, conducting surveillance, and undermining critical lifeline services. Even non-malicious or reckless activity can trigger serious safety, security, and operational consequences, including flight disruptions, crowd safety hazards, and delays in emergency response. High-profile events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, America 250 celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics present attractive targets, as demonstrated by the interception of 53 unauthorized drones during the 2024 Paris Olympics.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Department of Homeland Security, 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment, 2025, dhs.gov/publication/homeland-threat-assessment. \2\ Elaine Cobbe, CBS News. ``2024 Paris Olympics security challenges include 53 intercepted drones and 5,000 people barred from the Games,'' August 1, 2024, cbsnews.com/news/2024-paris-olympics- security-drones-intercepted-5000-people-barred-from-games/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 6b. Please explain how CISA is incorporating drone-related risks into its guidance, planning, and engagement with venue owners, operators, and State and local partners, including how these risks are factored into dependency mapping, vulnerability assessments, and event preparedness. Answer. CISA integrates UAS risk considerations into its efforts to strengthen stakeholder capabilities, recognizing these threats as an escalating concern that requires proactive planning, coordination, and layered security measures to protect public venues and the critical services they depend on, and incorporates these considerations across our guidance, planning, and engagement activities: Guidance.--Includes specialized resources with UAS-focused content to raise awareness and provide risk mitigation recommendations, through our Be Air AwareTM website that equips organizations with information and recommendations to advance UAS risk management and increase security and resilience against UAS threats, including: Unmanned Aircraft System Detection Technology Guidance for Critical Infrastructure provides critical infrastructure owners and operators with key considerations for how to select and leverage detection technology to increase awareness of UAS activity over a facility or site. Safe Handling Considerations for Downed Unmanned Aircraft Systems provides information on how to prepare for and respond to downed UAS that may pose a safety or security concern. Suspicious Unmanned Aircraft System Activity Guidance for Critical Infrastructure Owners and Operators offers criteria for recognizing suspicious UAS activity and recommendations for responding appropriately. Suspicious UAS Identification Poster and Postcard are quick-reference visual guides that help security personnel and the public recognize indicators of potentially suspicious drones, outlining warning signs, and recommending safety actions such as treating grounded UAS as potential explosive threats and reporting incidents to law enforcement. Interagency Security Committee Best Practices for Protecting Against the Threat of UAS provides Federal facility security professionals and critical infrastructure stakeholders with guidance on UAS threats, offering strategies for vulnerability assessments, protective measures, workforce awareness, and response planning to mitigate malicious drone activity. Planning.--Addresses UAS risks through coordinated air space security measures and preparedness exercises. These activities help stakeholders understand the potential impacts of UAS incidents and strengthen operational readiness for major events. In fiscal year 2025, 224 temporary flight restrictions were coordinated with the FAA to secure air space for special events, helping minimize risks from unauthorized UAS operations and deter activity that could lead to security incidents. CISA Tabletop Exercise Packages regularly include UAS scenarios and outline potential consequences--such as disruptions to nearby infrastructure--providing a self- service tool for stakeholders to examine plans and procedures, and CISA complements this by conducting facilitated, full-scale exercises with partners to strengthen preparedness and coordination. Engagement.--Focuses on training, dependency and vulnerability analysis, and interagency coordination to strengthen Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and critical infrastructure partner readiness and mitigate UAS risks. In fiscal year 2025, more than 370 infrastructure assessments incorporate UAS risk considerations to help venues identify dependencies and reduce potential disruptions. Accredited counter-improvised explosive device and risk mitigation training builds stakeholder capabilities to address weaponized UAS tactics and enhance protective measures. Information sharing and technical assistance improve situational awareness and support timely, coordinated responses to emerging UAS threats. Regional security advisors actively engage with and support local stakeholders by raising awareness and connecting them with available CISA UAS resources that support effective planning and coordination. Question 7. CISA plays an important role in defending Federal civilian networks, including through capabilities such as Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) and broader Federal threat detection and response efforts. As nation-state cyber activity becomes more persistent and sophisticated, the effectiveness of these programs is critical to preventing intrusions from becoming large-scale incidents. At the same time, both defenders and adversaries are increasingly using AI and automated tools to accelerate detection, analysis, and exploitation, raising important questions about how Federal cyber defense capabilities are evolving to keep pace. Please describe CISA's current assessment of Federal civilian network visibility and response capabilities, including how automation and AI-enabled tools are being integrated into detection, analysis, and mitigation activities. Answer. CISA continues to make investments to increase visibility throughout Federal agency networks via the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program, cyber shared services, and on-going coordination with agencies. Through CDM, CISA has improved asset visibility across newer asset classes, including mobile devices, cloud services, and internet of things/operational technology devices. These efforts are expanding CISA's operational visibility. Additionally, CISA is expanding network-level visibility through new CDM capabilities such as advanced network protection and security information and event management as a service. For those agencies that are in the process of adopting newer capabilities, CISA's operational visibility is substantially improved. The Federal Government's investments in endpoint detection and response capabilities further improve network visibility by complementing CDM asset management and network security management capabilities. Specifically, the use of endpoint detection and response and enrollment of agencies within CISA's persistent access capability result in significantly improved detection by adding near real-time and detailed, host-level asset and activity visibility. Additionally, the operationalization of endpoint detection and response and CISA's persistent access capability has greatly improved CISA's response capabilities. For those agencies enrolled, CISA can collaborate in real time with agency security operations centers to investigate and action against threats that span agency boundaries or utilize techniques for which there are no known indicators. When conducting advanced investigations and incident response, utilizing persistent access capability reduces CISA's time to engage with agencies from days to minutes. It eliminates the logistical challenges and delays associated with traditional on-premises response, allowing analysts in CISA to work directly with agencies virtually. All these visibility and response capabilities utilize commercial off-the-shelf tools, many of which are incorporating artificial intelligence-assisted capabilities into their standard commercial platforms. This approach has resulted in better correlation of seemingly unrelated data points that assist in detection, more effective elimination of false positives, and reduction of manual labor required when performing detailed analysis. Question 8. For many years, the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, or CIPAC, provided a formal, legally-supported framework that enabled sustained and structured engagement between the Federal Government and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure. Since its discontinuation, a number of stakeholders have expressed uncertainty about how best to coordinate planning efforts, share sensitive but unclassified information, and maintain consistent and reliable engagement with the Department on risk management and incident preparedness. Recent public reporting indicates that the Department is finalizing a new engagement construct referred to as ANCHOR that is intended to address these gaps. Can you describe in detail where DHS is in the process of finalizing and implementing ANCHOR, how the construct is expected to operate in practice across sectors, and how this new model will provide the clarity, predictability, and collaboration that private-sector partners need to manage cyber and infrastructure risk alongside the Federal Government? Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland is working to implement a new partnership framework, and we look forward to sharing additional details as soon as we can. Rapidly-evolving cyber threats demand a new level of partnership between Government and industry--one that goes beyond exchanging data to true actionable collaboration. Looking ahead, we need to continue to shift from transactional sharing to true actionable collaboration. In today's environment we know that sharing information alone isn't enough; we need joint action and shared responsibility. Question 9. CISA is often called upon to provide surge support during major cyber incidents affecting Federal agencies, State and local governments, or critical infrastructure operators. Maintaining that response capacity during periods of workforce transition and elevated threat is essential to the agency's credibility and effectiveness. Please explain how CISA is ensuring it retains sufficient incident response and surge capacity to respond to major cyber events, including what steps are being taken to sustain operations if multiple significant incidents occur simultaneously. Answer. CISA prioritizes the most critical operations--those that protect national security, critical infrastructure, and mission- essential systems. Prioritizing incident response and threat-hunting efforts along those lines enables rapid response to high-risk incidents, optimizes limited resources, and aligns efforts with strategic objectives. This ensures we aren't only reactive, but also take a proactive and prioritized approach, making the most efficient use of our resources to safeguard Federal networks and those of critical infrastructure operators. Currently, CISA's support in protecting and remediating the networks of Federal agencies and critical infrastructure owners and operators is based around the ability to support multiple on-going engagements with compromised entities at one time. In the event of an exigent major cyber event, CISA prioritizes finite resources towards threats assessed to be more significant to national security. Additionally, CISA leverages trusted partnerships with Federal and private stakeholders when appropriate to assist entities affected by significant cyber events. Question 10. CISA has emphasized Secure-by-Design principles as a way to encourage stronger security practices by technology manufacturers and reduce the burden placed on end-users. This approach reflects a longer-term effort to improve the security of products before they are widely deployed. Please describe the progress CISA has made in advancing Secure-by- Design principles and explain how the agency is working with industry to translate these principles into measurable improvements in product security. Answer. CISA continues to advance Secure-by-Design principles by publishing relevant, actionable guidance on topics such as modernizing the common baseline of software bills of materials, a key for supply chain risk management;\3\ how to improve authentication practices by critical infrastructure providers; working with the open-source software community to support secure development of the software that underlies the software products that Americans rely on;\4\ how to securely develop artificial intelligence software systems;\5\ and how organizations can acquire software that is secure by design.\6\ CISA is also measuring the effectiveness of the Secure-by-Design Pledge through the voluntary progress reports provided by pledge signers. A vulnerability management community such that consumers and operators know when there are vulnerabilities in their software continues to be a focus.\7\ Also, collaborating with international partners towards harmonization of Secure-by-Design expectations, as represented by the international partner co-seal endorsement on CISA's Secure-by-Design publications referenced above. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Department of Homeland Security. Request for Comment on 2025 Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials. Aug 22, 2025. Federal Register Notice 90 FR 41094. \4\ CISA. Open Source Security. https://www.cisa.gov/opensource. \5\ CISA and NCSC-UK. Guidelines for secure AI system development. Nov 27, 2023. \6\ CISA. Secure by Demand Guide: How Software Customers Can Drive a Secure Technology Ecosystem. 2025. https://www.cisa.gov/resources- tools/resources/secure-demand-guide. \7\ See for example the continued operational work in support of BOD 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, CISA's coordinated vulnerability disclosure program, and the CISA ``Vulnrichment'' project (which supplies information about vulnerabilities to Federal agencies and the public to support risk- informed cybersecurity decision making). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CISA is working with industry to translate principles into measurable improvements by holding regular sessions of the Technical Exchange Group for industry pledge signers to learn from one another through voluntary presentations on pledge goal progress. Additionally, CISA directed all devices on Federal information networks to receive supported security updates.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ CISA. BOD 26-02: Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices. Feb 5, 2026. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 11. Artificial intelligence is increasingly shaping both offensive and defensive cyber operations. While adversaries are already leveraging AI to scale attacks, these tools also offer opportunities to improve detection, analysis, and response. Please describe how CISA is currently incorporating AI into its operations and identify which applications show the greatest promise for improving detection, analysis, and response across Federal networks and critical infrastructure. Answer. CISA regularly evaluates tools for their potential to improve automation for CISA's mission. For example, CISA published the results of our Pilot for Artificial Intelligence Enabled Vulnerability Detection.\9\ Following Departmental guidance, CISA publishes an inventory of all the Artificial Intelligence use cases we currently deploy or plan to deploy for our mission: https://www.cisa.gov/ai/cisa- use-cases. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ CISA. Pilot for Artificial Intelligence Enabled Vulnerability Detection. July 29, 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/ resources/pilot-artificial-intelligence-enabled-vulnerability-detection --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Often, CISA finds that the best defenses against AI-enabled cyber incidents address weak or vulnerable points in the information system infrastructure through cybersecurity best practices. This includes more thorough application of existing guidance such as adhering to Secure- by-Design principles (described in Question 10), patching known exploited vulnerabilities, following CISA's cybersecurity performance goals, publishing an organizational vulnerability disclosure policy, using phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, and practicing or exercising incident response and recovery. Question 12. While large-scale quantum computing threats may still be years away, the transition to post-quantum cryptography will require early planning and coordination across Government and industry. Please describe how CISA is assisting Federal agencies and critical infrastructure operators in preparing for this transition, including what actions are being taken now to ensure systems can migrate securely to post-quantum standards. Answer. CISA recognizes the threat that cryptographically-relevant quantum computers pose to traditional encryption and is taking proactive measures to prepare Federal agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators for a secure migration to quantum-resistant systems. CISA helps raise awareness about the quantum computing threats and the actions needed to mitigate them by regularly engaging with partners across Government, critical infrastructure, and industry. Feedback from these engagements informs actionable recommendations to accelerate migration to post-quantum cryptography. CISA publishes guidance and best practices on its post-quantum cryptography webpage. Topics include considerations for operational technology, strategies for automated cryptographic discovery and inventory, and product categories that use post-quantum cryptography standards. These resources are often developed in collaboration with interagency partners. CISA actively collaborates with international, interagency, industry, and critical infrastructure stakeholders to coordinate efforts, share insights, and harmonize approaches for post- quantum migration. CISA works with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) to collect annual cryptographic inventories to understand the scope of the problem. The agency analyzes these inventories, identifies challenges, and shares lessons learned with Federal agencies. CISA also partners with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to demonstrate automated cryptographic discovery and inventory tools, which will improve visibility into cryptographic vulnerabilities and support automation. Questions From Honorable August Pfluger For Madhu Gottumukkala Question 1a. In recent years, there has been no shortage of high- profile cyber attacks attributed to our foreign adversaries, including SolarWinds, Colonial Pipeline, and, more recently, campaigns like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon targeting U.S. critical infrastructure and telecommunications networks. We have also seen Iran-aligned groups such as Cyber Av3ngers probe U.S. industrial control systems and water utilities, underscoring that multiple adversaries are targeting our critical infrastructure. Last month, it was widely reported that Salt Typhoon struck again, compromising email systems used by House staff on select committees dealing with China, foreign affairs, intelligence, and armed services. How is CISA working with critical infrastructure operators and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen resilience in the communications sector? Answer. CISA engages with telecommunications providers and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of the communications sector and mitigate threats posed by PRC cyber actors. These activities include continuity planning, information sharing, guidance, and incident handling. One of CISA's joint planning efforts focuses on hardening telecommunications infrastructure against nation-state threats. These efforts enhance the cybersecurity and resilience of the telecommunications sector by improving providers' ability to operate through compromise and recover quickly. Activities include routine threat exchanges and briefings for telecom executives, tabletop exercises simulating PRC-linked campaigns, and technical hardening guidance to reduce vulnerabilities and improve redundancy. Additional measures involve sector-wide risk modeling to assess cascading impacts on critical sectors such as energy, health care, and transportation, developing incident response playbooks, and creating continuity of operations templates to ensure essential services remain available during prolonged disruptions. CISA also leans into information sharing with Government and industry partners, including through the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center. These partnerships help accelerate CISA and the sector's response to cyber incidents. Question 1b. One issue CISA and the committee have been focused on is the threat posed by end-of-life network equipment that is so old it cannot be patched. How big of a problem is this issue, and what more can be done to secure our critical infrastructure, like Federal agency environments, from this risk? Answer. End-of-support devices, which no longer receive security updates from vendors, present a substantial and constant cybersecurity risk. CISA has observed advanced threat actors widely targeting these end-of-support edge devices, which when compromised, can provide the threat actor with extensive access to the victim's networks. Organizations can mitigate this threat by ensuring devices are proactively replaced before they become end-of-support. CISA issued Binding Operational Directive 26-02 on February 5, 2026. This Directive requires Federal agencies to phase out unsupported edge devices. CISA strongly recommends other organizations, including critical infrastructure, to voluntarily take the mitigatory actions in the Directive to address the risk beyond the Federal Government. Question 2a. I have heard from stakeholders that when a sophisticated cyber attack occurs, multiple agencies reach out to them, both seeking information on the scale of the attack and offering assistance. What ends up happening is that the company has to repeatedly process and respond to duplicative requests, which takes manpower and resources away from responding to the attack. Under CIRCIA and the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, is it CISA's role to serve as the primary Federal interface for a private entity going through a major cyber attack? Answer. For cyber incident response, 6 U.S.C. 659 and PPD-41 dictate that CISA leads the asset response activities, including offering technical support to reduce impacts of cyber incidents and speed recovery. PPD-41 separately provides that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads threat response activities, leading investigations in pursuit and disruption of threat activity, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) leads intelligence response. This complementary relationship ensures that each agency's mission is carried out and coordinated in parallel to ensure speed in response and recovery. CISA, FBI, and ODNI continuously synchronize efforts as appropriate, including to perform notifications and provide incident response support. For cyber incident reporting, CIRCIA tasks other Federal agencies that receive cyber incident reports, following implementation of the CIRCIA final rule, to share such reports with CISA for further interagency sharing and coordination (6 U.S.C. 681g). This will help provide a clearer picture of the threat landscape, enriching CISA and Federal partners' ability to carry out their respective cybersecurity missions. A goal of CIRCIA is to reduce the burden of entities reporting to multiple agencies so they can focus on incident response. CISA is committed to these benefits as it works to finalize the rule for CIRCIA. Question 2b. How are you working with other Federal agencies to streamline reporting and coordination, so that from the company's perspective they are not answering the same questions over and over while they are still trying to contain the incident? Answer. CISA continuously deconflicts with the FBI and Sector Risk Management Agencies when appropriate to avoid duplicating efforts during incident response. Question 3a. Congress is actively working toward a long-term reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, recognizing that it created the legal backbone for cyber threat information sharing between Government and the private sector. CISA 2015's liability protections, FOIA exemptions, and authorities helped address long-standing concerns from ISPs, cloud providers, and other critical-infrastructure owners about sharing sensitive threat data with the Government and with each other. At the same time, the threat environment and technology landscape have changed dramatically since 2015, with the rise of cloud, AI- enabled threats, and persistent campaigns such as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon targeting U.S. infrastructure. From your perspective, why are the core protections and authorities in CISA 2015 still essential to CISA's ability to work effectively with industry today? Answer. The U.S. Government and our private-sector partners rely on the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501 et. seq) to keep America safe. It fuels the trust, speed, and collaboration that make us stronger together. The law's protections play a vital role in the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures among private-sector entities and with Federal agencies, as well as in monitoring and defending their networks. Specifically, the law authorizes private entities to monitor their networks for cybersecurity purposes and to deploy defensive measures to detect or block malicious cyber threats on their networks without implicating Federal and State laws that may complicate defensive actions. Private entities are authorized to share cyber threat indicators or defensive measures with Federal and other entities for cybersecurity purposes, with protections including liability protection; an anti-trust exemption for private entities sharing with each other; exemptions from Federal and State disclosure laws and regulatory use; and preserved privilege for shared material. Question 3b. Are there areas where additional authority from Congress would materially improve CISA's ability to defend the U.S. Government and support critical-infrastructure operators? Answer. CISA is grateful that this committee advanced by a unanimous (25-0) vote H.R. 5079, the Widespread Information Management for the Welfare of Infrastructure and Government Act. This legislation would reauthorize the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 for another 10 years. This is an important step in strengthening our defenses at a time when our adversaries are constantly testing us. We stand ready to assist Congress in any way to ensure that these critical protections remain in place. Question From Honorable Matt Van Epps For Madhu Gottumukkala Question. Dr. Gottumukkala, while large-scale quantum computing threats may still be years away, the transition to post-quantum cryptography will require early planning and coordination across Government and industry. How is CISA helping Federal agencies and critical infrastructure operators prepare for this transition, and what steps are being taken now to ensure systems can migrate securely to post-quantum standards when the time comes? Answer. CISA recognizes the threat that cryptographically-relevant quantum computers pose to traditional encryption and is taking proactive measures to prepare Federal agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, and critical infrastructure owners and operators for a secure migration to quantum-resistant systems. CISA helps raise awareness about the quantum computing threats and the actions needed to mitigate them by regularly engaging with partners across Government, critical infrastructure, and industry. Feedback from these engagements informs actionable recommendations to accelerate migration to post-quantum cryptography. CISA publishes guidance and best practices on its post-quantum cryptography webpage. Topics include considerations for operational technology, strategies for automated cryptographic discovery and inventory, and product categories that use post-quantum cryptography standards. These resources are often developed in collaboration with interagency partners. CISA actively collaborates with international, interagency, industry, and critical infrastructure stakeholders to coordinate efforts, share insights, and harmonize approaches for post- quantum migration. CISA works with OMB and the ONCD to collect annual cryptographic inventories to understand the scope of the problem. The agency analyzes these inventories, identifies challenges, and shares lessons learned with Federal agencies. CISA also partners with the NIST to demonstrate automated cryptographic discovery and inventory tools, which will improve visibility into cryptographic vulnerabilities and support automation. Questions From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino For Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1a. As TSA is set to launch the new Confirm.ID program February 1, 2026, the committee remains concerned over the scope of the program and TSA's requisite authority to implement it. In official statements and briefings to the committee, TSA has asserted its authority to set a fee under Confirm.ID derives from the Registered Traveler program. However, TSA has also separately cited Pub. L. 109-90 and 49 U.S.C. 114 as legal justification for the start of this new program. Specifically, the statutory language cited by TSA only notes the existence of the Registered Traveler program, and TSA's ability to recover costs associated with such programs. Please clarify, how does TSA hold the requisite authority to start the Confirm.ID program without explicit Congressional authorization? Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has broad statutory authority to prescribe screening measures and procedures for individuals entering the sterile areas of airports.\1\ The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) directs TSA to perform ``the passenger prescreening function of comparing passenger information to the automatic Selectee and No Fly lists and utilize all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist maintained by the Federal Government in performing that function.''\2\ TSA carries out this statutory requirement through the Secure Flight program, which relies on information that passengers provide to airlines at the time they make a reservation.\3\ Secure Flight compares the passenger's reservation information to the identifying information of individuals on Federal Government watch lists and informs the airline whether or not it may issue a boarding pass based on the results of the prescreening process. IRTPA further directs TSA to establish ``procedures to ensure that individuals selected by [computer assisted passenger pre-screening] and their carry-on and checked baggage are adequately screened.''\4\ Identity verification procedures at the checkpoint are necessary to ensure that each passenger receives the appropriate level of screening, or is denied entry to the sterile area, in accordance with Secure Flight vetting results and security considerations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 44901(a)-(b) (directing TSA to provide for and supervise the screening of all passengers and property that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft); 44903(j)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring TSA to establish ``procedures to ensure that individuals selected by [computer-assisted passenger prescreening] and their carry- on and checked baggage are adequately screened''); 114(f)(3) (directing TSA to ``develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security''); 114(f)(11) (directing TSA to ``oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at airports''); 114(h)(3) (requiring TSA to establish policies and procedures to prevent individuals who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security from boarding an aircraft). \2\ 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(C)(ii). \3\ Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64018 (2008) (codified at 49 CFR parts 1540, 1544, 1560). \4\ 49 U.S.C. 44903(j)(2)(A)(ii); see also 49 U.S.C. 44901(a). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under TSA's current screening procedures, the primary method of identity verification at the checkpoint is asking a passenger to present an acceptable form of ID that matches the passenger's identifying information in Secure Flight. TSA has long sought to facilitate passenger travel, consistent with its responsibility to ensure the security of aviation. For this reason, using appropriated funds, TSA has historically provided a call-center-based option to attempt to identify individuals who failed to produce acceptable IDs at the checkpoint. The limited number of individuals who used this alternative identity verification process received substantially heightened screening. With full enforcement of REAL ID, the number of individuals presenting without acceptable ID at the checkpoint significantly increased, exceeding both the capacity of the call center and resources for subsequent additional screening. As a result, TSA transformed its process for alternative identity verification, replacing a one-size- fits-all approach with a registered travel identity verification model. The new model allows individuals who choose to participate to provide additional biographic and/or biometric information that TSA can leverage for alternative identity verification, with differing levels of reliability. As a result, there is a continuum of risk-based screening that reflects both the information available to TSA as part of the Secure Flight vetting process, including whether an individual has been vetted as a member of TSA PreCheck, and TSA's level of identity assurance that the pre-vetting established by Secure Flight applies to the individual presenting at the checkpoint. ConfirmID, like all TSA registered traveler programs, allows passengers to receive facilitated travel while enabling TSA to appropriately assign limited screening resources based on the risk associated with the individual passenger. Question 1b. How did TSA come to the determination to include Confirm.ID under the Registered Traveler program? Answer. In 2006, Congress directed TSA to collect a non-refundable fee to cover the costs of any registered traveler program.\5\ This provision requires TSA to ``impose a fee for any registered traveler program undertaken by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by notice in the Federal Register'' provided that ``such fees shall not exceed the aggregate costs associated with the program.'' TSA may also modify the fee through notice published in the Federal Register. As exemplified by the 2008 Registered Traveler Interoperability Pilot Program Fee Notice, programs funded under registered traveler fee authority have always consisted of components including Secure Flight vetting, additional pre-vetting, and identity verification.\6\ In fact, registered traveler programs consisting solely of enhanced identity verification and Secure Flight vetting, without additional pre-vetting, are active at 60 airports across the Nation through public-private partnership. As TSA transformed its former ``back-up call center'' into a multi-tiered capability for alternative identity verification, where passengers provide additional biographic and/or biometric information to enable access to expedited risk-based screening and TSA's application of limited screening resources to the highest-risk passengers, it was determined the program fit within the ``registered traveler'' category alongside those other programs. Therefore, consistent with the statutory mandate, TSA imposed a fee to recover the costs of providing this service, ensuring that individuals who benefit from the program rather than the taxpayer bear those costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Public Law 109-90, sec. 540, (119 Stat. 2064, 2088-89 (Oct. 18, 2005)) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 114 note). \6\ 73 Fed. Reg. 44275 (July 30, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 1c. Given this, why would TSA interpret the Registered Traveler program to mean it has free-standing authority to create any new program under the guise of ``Registered Traveler,'' even when Confirm.ID explicitly deals with travelers outside the Trusted Traveler population? Answer. Reliable identity verification has long been a fundamental component of Registered Traveler programs. There are existing registered traveler programs that, like ConfirmID, rely on identity verification alongside Secure Flight vetting.\7\ Identity verification is the first step of physical screening at a TSA security checkpoint and the last step of TSA's intelligence-based prescreening of individuals. It ensures individuals receive the appropriate level of screening, ranging from expedited screening to enhanced screening (i.e., Selectees), including any additional screening associated with special circumstances, before entering the sterile area of an airport or boarding a flight. It also ensures that individuals designated as ``No Flys'' are excluded from the screening checkpoint. There is a continuum of risk-based screening that reflects both the information available to TSA as part of the Secure Flight vetting process, including whether an individual has been vetted as a member of TSA PreCheck, and TSA's level of identity assurance that the vetting status established by Secure Flight applies to the individual presenting at the checkpoint. Although ``trusted traveler'' programs that involve additional vetting in advance of passenger arrival also rely on registered traveler fee authority, it is not additional pre- vetting of individuals beyond Secure Flight that defines something as a registered traveler programs, but rather the provision of additional biographical and/or biometric information by passengers that in turn enables TSA to appropriately assign screening resources based on the risk associated with that individual passenger. As with all registered traveler programs, this serves both to expedite low-risk passenger travel and maximize the security effectiveness of finite TSA screening resources. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ 73 Fed. Reg. 44275 (July 30, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Question 1d. Last, please explain further how the TSA does not view this as a ``mandatory'' fee, but rather as an optional one. Wouldn't a passenger going through the Confirm.ID process be required to pay the fee in order to receive the 10-day travel authorization? Answer. ConfirmID is not mandatory; but like all registered traveler programs, it requires a fee to use the service. ConfirmID participation is not required for passengers to receive TSA security screening and enter the sterile area. Under TSA's current screening procedures, the primary method of identity verification at the checkpoint occurs through the presentation of an acceptable form of ID that matches the passenger's identifying information provided to Secure Flight. TSA's list of acceptable forms of ID is prescribed in the Checkpoint and Specialized Screening Standard Operating Procedures, and TSA has published an abbreviated list (which includes the most common and widely-accepted IDs) for the public at TSA.gov. ConfirmID represents a risk-based effort by TSA to provide alternative identity verification options when an individual arrives at the checkpoint without an acceptable form of ID to facilitate passenger travel, consistent with TSA's responsibility to ensure the security of aviation. Federal Security Directors retain additional authorities regarding the screening process to address special circumstances. Question 2a. TSA has long emphasized a ``layered approach'' to transportation security, from the deployment of canine units to advanced technologies, to enhance the screening process and maintain the safe flow of travel. What does the layered security approach look like today, and can you explain how it is currently implemented? Specifically, can you address the role explosive detection canine units play within that framework? Answer. Every day, TSA relies on its intelligence and risk-based, layered security approach to aviation security that employs over 20 layers, seen and unseen, from vetting and checkpoint screening to in- flight security. TSA is prepared to offer a briefing at the proper classification level for layered security approach. TSA's layered approach begins before an individual arrives at the TSA checkpoint, when he or she is vetted through Secure Flight, TSA's automatic pre-screening program. Key to this security layer is identity verification, which ensures passengers receive the appropriate level of physical screening at the TSA checkpoint. Through automation efforts, TSA is able to leverage the Credential Authentication Technology and Touchless Identity Systems biometrics to confirm the passenger's identity and ensure the passenger does not present a threat to aviation security. In keeping with TSA's layered security approach, Explosive Detection Canine teams can be used to reduce risk and facilitate more efficient screening during periods of high passenger throughput or when checked baggage screening capacity has been exceeded. TSA continuously advances deployment strategies for Explosive Detection Canine teams through rigorous research, testing, and analysis. Canines serve as a critical complement to TSA's advanced technologies, providing capabilities that are additive, not substitutive. Where canine assets are deployed, they significantly enhance security operations by offering rapid, non-intrusive screening for explosives and explosive devices. Canines act as a visible deterrent to malicious activity and are uniquely able to adapt quickly to dynamic environments and evolving threats. Their exceptional ability to detect concealed threats in crowded and complex areas strengthens TSA's security protocols, delivering an additional layer of protection that is both flexible and highly effective. This synergy between canine teams and advanced technology ensures a robust, multi-faceted approach to safeguarding transportation systems. Question 2b. What risk assessments drive a decision not to deploy canine units, and how does TSA ensure that any security gaps are still mitigated? Answer. The primary constraint on deploying canine units at a particular location is the availability of the resource rather than a risk assessment. Canine units are unique in their deterrent effect and their high-volume screening capability, and they are therefore often deployed where those characteristics--in addition to their detection capabilities--are most needed. In the absence of canine units, security gaps are mitigated with other screening capabilities. TSA is prepared to offer a briefing at the proper classification setting to discuss the ``other screening capabilities.'' Question 3. Ms. McNeill, you mentioned in your testimony that TSA flagged the appropriate law enforcement agencies about the frequent large-sum cash-flow through Minneapolis Airport. Please provide a list of the agencies TSA notified along with the dates and information reported. Answer. In calendar years 2024 and 2025, TSA recorded 362 instances in which bulk currency was found during security screening at the passenger checkpoint at Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport (MSP), which required law enforcement notification. The Minneapolis- Saint Paul International Airport follows the TSA standard operating procedure for reporting large amounts of currency discovered during screening at the checkpoint. Carrying currency in and of itself is not prohibited nor illegal. When clearing an alarm during the screening process, if a Transportation Security Officer discovers currency that appears to exceed $10,000 and is bound for an international destination, or appears to be related to potential criminal activity, the Transportation Security Officer notifies a supervisor to determine whether further notification to Federal or State authorities is required. If the Supervisory Transportation Security Officer determines that the large amount of currency appears to exceed $10,000, and the individual is traveling internationally, the Supervisory Transportation Security Officer notifies the TSA Coordination Center at the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport, which in turn notifies U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and provides the individual's name, flight information, and airport code. If any amount of currency is discovered during the screening process that appears to be related to criminal activity, the Supervisory Transportation Security Officer must notify a law enforcement officer, which can include TSA's Federal partners; and at a local Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport law enforcement level, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport Police Department. If TSA has cleared all alarms, and the law enforcement officers who have been notified are not present at the conclusion of the screening process, the individual may be asked to wait, but he or she will be free to leave once TSA screening is completed. Any further action concerning the individual or his or her property will be handled by the appropriate law enforcement agency. Question 4. As you know, TSA is the lead on pipeline security across the United States. Given the current global terror landscape, what are the most pressing threats to U.S. pipeline infrastructure? What steps is DHS taking to enhance pipeline security, and how does technology factor into that effort? Answer. Current threats to U.S. pipeline infrastructure is defined by a combination of evolving physical and cyber risks, such as sabotage, drone-enabled attacks, theft, vandalism, insider actions targeting critical assets and facilities, and persistent state- sponsored cyber risks. Other risks include theft or stripping of pipeline assets for copper, trace amounts of precious metals, and other materials for criminal economic gain. Among the most pressing threats to U.S. pipeline infrastructure are increasingly sophisticated nation- state cyber operations and, increasingly, the integration of Artificial Intelligence capabilities. Examples include: Nation-State Cyber Persistence.--Adversaries are increasingly shifting from short-term disruption to ``living off the land,'' where they embed themselves in systems for months or years to strategically position for future global conflict. China remains the most active of these state actors,\8\ as seen in the Volt Typhoon campaign which compromised, among others, transportation entities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Volt Typhoon targets U.S. critical infrastructure with living- off-the-land techniques/Microsoft Security Blog. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AI-Enhanced Attacks.--Malicious actors are leveraging Artificial Intelligence to plan, scale, and automate physical and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. This includes more sophisticated phishing techniques and the scaling of cyber compromises. Operational Technology Vulnerabilities.--Many pipeline systems use legacy Operational Technology that was not originally built with cybersecurity in mind, making these systems highly vulnerable to remote exploitation and potential physical destruction (e.g., explosions or sabotage). Ransomware and Criminal Groups.--High-profile incidents like the ransomware attacks against Colonial Pipeline (2021) and the Port of Seattle (2024) demonstrate that even non-state criminal groups can cause massive national disruption by targeting Information Technology systems and even force the precautionary shutdowns of operational networks across the U.S. Transportation System. Physical and Social Unrest.--Pipelines face threats from ``hacktivist'' campaigns and physical vandalism or equipment destruction related to political issues and high-profile development projects. Through robust, mandatory performance- based requirements and enhanced incident reporting protocols, TSA has significantly strengthened the cybersecurity posture of critical pipeline owners and operators, ensuring proactive mitigation and rapid response to evolving cyber threats. Notable actions include: Mandatory Cybersecurity Directives.--TSA-issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02. This directive requires critical pipeline owners and operators to submit and maintain a unique Cybersecurity Implementation Plan, develop a system-specific Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan, and conduct an annual Cybersecurity Architecture Design Review. Strengthened Incident Reporting.--TSA-issued Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01. This directive requires critical pipeline owners and operators to also report cyber incidents to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator. Notably, non-U.S. citizens in this role must now undergo specific vetting via programs like Global Entry or NEXUS. While TSA's cybersecurity directives are mandatory, its physical security strategy leverages targeted, risk-based guidance and proactive engagement with industry partners. Through the Corporate Security Review program, TSA conducts comprehensive assessments based on a set of jointly agreed-to best practices and encourages operators to promptly report significant physical security concerns. TSA conducts Critical Facility Security Reviews to assess the physical security measures in place at critical pipeline facilities. TSA provides recommendations as appropriate to owners and operators to enhance their physical policies, plans, and practices. TSA further enhances protection by delivering timely intelligence on emerging physical threats, such as sabotage, vandalism, or terrorist activity, enabling owners and operators to take swift, informed action to safeguard critical infrastructure. Question 5a. Under the Biden administration, TSA increasingly relied on rapidly promulgating rules through Security Directives rather than the formal rule-making and comment process, leaving stakeholders to comply with new security changes often at a higher cost. What steps does TSA take to ensure that Security Directives do not impose unnecessary costs or operational burdens on airlines, airports, and surface transportation operators? Answer. When a regulation or security directive must be issued immediately to protect transportation security, TSA will issue it without providing notice or an opportunity for comment. See 49 U.S.C. 114(l)(2). In developing mandatory requirements, TSA weighs options and courses of action and considers the operational and economic impact to ensure the measures are practical and tailored to the specific threat. To the extent practicable, TSA shares the proposed security directives with the affected regulated entities to ensure the mandatory security measures reduce the risk, and that industry--regardless of the size of the regulated party--is able to operationally and economically implement the requirements. If necessary, TSA revises the security measures to ensure the measures reduce risk and industry can implement the requirements. Question 5b. Please provide examples of how TSA has improved coordination with the regulated entities to ensure practical and tailored rules fit for specific operating environments. Answer. TSA complies with existing standards and practices to ensure that unnecessary costs or burdens are not imposed on our industry stakeholders. TSA is required, by law, to comprehensively review each security directive in consultation with the appropriate regulated entities to determine its continued relevance; determine whether the directive should be streamlined to most efficiently maximize risk reduction; and update, consolidate, or revoke any directive as necessary. TSA's Policy, Plans, and Engagement Aviation Division Airlines Policy Branch conducts annual reviews of each security directive in accordance with: ``FAA Extension and Safety Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190); Tile III Aviation Security, SEC. 3409. SECURITY DIRECTIVES. ``(a) REVIEW.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Administrator, in consultation with the appropriate regulated entities, shall conduct a comprehensive review of every current security directive addressed to any regulated entity to--(1) determine whether each such security directive continues to be relevant; (2) determine whether such security directives should be streamlined or consolidated to most efficiently maximize risk reduction; and (3) update, consolidate, or revoke any security directive as necessary. ``FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254); Subtitle E--Foreign Airport Security, Sec 1953 Last point of departure airports; security directives ``(a) NOTICE AND CONSULTATION.--(1) IN GENERAL.--The Administrator shall, to the maximum extent practicable, consult and notify the following stakeholders prior to making changes to security standards via security directives and emergency amendments for last points of departure: (A) Trade association representatives, for affected air carriers and airports, who hold the appropriate security clearances. (B) The head of each relevant Federal department or agency, including the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.'' When conducting comprehensive reviews and considering revisions to these directives, TSA holds roundtable discussions with industry stakeholders. These meetings garner an understanding of operational realities and the potential impact of new requirements. TSA uses a risk-based approach to decide which owners and operators are covered by the directives, focusing compliance obligations on entities that present the highest risks to national and economic security. Any time TSA issues a revised security directive, TSA consults with the affected industry to determine if the measures continue to be relevant. Once it is determined that the measures are necessary, TSA shares the proposed changes to the security directive with the affected regulated entities to ensure the mandatory security measures reduce the risk, and that industry is able to implement the requirements. Question 6a. DHS OIG recently completed a review of Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Security Screening Effectiveness that raises serious issues in its final report. What role did TSA have in reviewing and providing comments on that final report? Answer. TSA was not afforded the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report prior to the issuance of the final report. A technical meeting between TSA and the DHS Office of the Inspector General is occurring on April 23, 2026. Question 6b. How confident are you that TSA's technology can catch rapidly-evolving threats rather than reacting after vulnerabilities are exposed? Answer. TSA employs a risk-based, layered security approach and remains confident in our security posture in the face of evolving threats. The agency performs continuous risk analyses and tests to inform its procedures and address the changing risk landscape. Question 7a. TSA recently announced a $1 billion nationwide upgrade to TSA's security screening equipment, specifying the funds will be used to update screening equipment across multiple airports and expand training programs to better detect potential threats. How would the $1 billion be allocated to support modernization of TSA's screening technology? Answer. TSA assessed the capital investment requirements that are needed to provide the Nation's highest-passenger-volume airports with advanced screening technologies. This includes requirements for Computed Tomography, Credential Authentication Technology, Advanced Imaging Technology, and Next-Generation Liquid and Powder Explosives detection systems. However, TSA's current capital resources are insufficient to meet these needs at the necessary scale and pace, resulting in a significant multi-year funding shortfall that constrains TSA's ability to stay ahead of the evolving threat environment. Restoring to TSA the portion of aviation security fee collections that is currently diverted outside the agency is critical to closing this gap, enabling timely deployment and recapitalization of these essential screening technologies, and ensuring TSA can proactively address current and emerging threats. Question 7b. Has DHS determined which airports or kinds of equipment would be prioritized for investment, such as passenger, baggage, or cargo screening technology? Answer. If funding is available, TSA would deploy the equipment to the Nation's highest-passenger-volume airports. Question 7c. How would this address the backlog of airports that have requested support to update or procure new screening technology? Answer. If these funds become available, they would significantly reduce the current backlog of airports seeking support to update or procure new screening technology by accelerating deployment time lines and expanding coverage across the system. Questions From Honorable Ryan Mackenzie For Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1a. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) responsible for security across all transportation modes, including pipelines. The agency provides security oversight, risk assessments, and guidance, working with the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and operators to secure these critical energy infrastructure assets. As the SRMA for pipelines, how does TSA support this critical infrastructure sector in mitigating risk? Answer. As the Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) for pipelines, TSA supports this critical infrastructure sector through a layered, risk-based approach that integrates mandatory regulatory oversight with collaborative public-private partnerships. Since 2021, TSA has transitioned from a primarily non-regulatory security model to one with enforceable security standards relating to cybersecurity for the most critical U.S. pipelines, significantly enhancing sector resilience. TSA deploys cybersecurity professionals who work closely with industry partners to ensure compliance with technical requirements across both Information Technology and Operational Technology environments. In addition to regulatory oversight, TSA offers non-regulatory services to strengthen cyber resilience and posture. For physical security, TSA relies on non-regulatory activities and risk-based guidance, primarily utilizing the Corporate Security Review and Critical Facility Security Reviews programs. In addition to the required cyber incident reporting, facility owners and operators are encouraged to report significant physical security concerns, and TSA provides timely intelligence on emerging threats, including sabotage, vandalism, and terrorist plots, which enable rapid and informed responses. Question 1b. How does TSA interact with the pipeline sector? And similarly, how does the agency coordinate with the Department of Energy (DOE) as the SRMA for the energy sector? Answer. TSA maintains robust working relationships with pipeline industry owners and operators, fostering open, on-going dialogue to collaboratively address security challenges and develop effective ways to mitigate risks. TSA holds regular conference calls with industry about security issues, particularly when TSA has revised its cybersecurity requirements. This partnership-driven approach ensures that industry feedback is taken into consideration for TSA's regulatory development; and industry engagement ensures practical, informed, and effective implementation, which enhances sector resilience. TSA also coordinates closely with the U.S. Department of Energy through the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Model and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan Partnership Framework that aligns TSA's regulatory authority over pipeline security with the Department of Energy's broader responsibilities as the SRMA for the energy sector, ensuring unified risk mitigation and information sharing across both agencies. Question 2. The Known Crewmember (KCM) program is a critical risk- based aviation security capability that enables expedited screening for trusted flight and cabin crew while supporting operational reliability across the airline system. As TSA moves to assume governance of KCM through the Crewmember Access Point, the transition represents a significant shift in program oversight with direct implications for system performance, labor trust, identity assurance, and insider threat mitigation. Congressional oversight is necessary to ensure the transition strengthens security and governance without degrading timely crewmember access or airline operations. What is TSA's plan and time line to assume governance of the Known Crewmember program, and how will you preserve expedited, risk-based crew access while strengthening identity assurance and insider threat protections? Answer. TSA is committed to providing crewmembers an expedited method for accessing the sterile area of airports, as is statutorily required, and mitigating transportation security risk. Transition from the Known Crewmember program to the Crewmember Access Point program is planned to begin in the summer of 2026 and will take approximately 6 months to fully incorporate across all impacted airports. TSA's approach aligns with TSA Modernization efforts and incorporates technology to strengthen identity verification of crewmembers at designated Crewmember Access Point program locations and expedite screening. It also incorporates Unpredictable Screening Procedures, in which the Crewmember Access Point technology randomly selects participating crewmembers for additional screening, to directly address potential insider threats. TSA will continue to work with its industry partners and stakeholders to facilitate a smooth transition. Question 3a. TSA Touchless PreCheck is a biometric identity verification capability that enables enrolled PreCheck travelers to verify their identity at airport checkpoints using facial recognition, eliminating the need to present a physical ID. The capability is currently operational at 20 airport locations, including major hubs such as DFW, JFK, ORD, DCA, LGA, LAX, CLT, PHL, and BOS. Expansion is under way to an additional 2 hubs and 35 spoke locations, with full deployment targeted for completion by Q1 2026. As of mid-January, traveler adoption continues to grow, with approximately 955,000 options and more than 209,000 successful Touchless ID transactions completed. What is TSA's long-term vision for Touchless ID? Is Touchless ID intended solely as a checkpoint identity verification tool, or does TSA envision it becoming a broader identity platform across the transportation system? Answer. TSA PreCheck Touchless ID is an identity verification tool that delivers a seamless, curb-to-gate experience for trusted travelers who opt-in to participate. As of February 11, 2026, the capability is operational at 40 airport locations, and by April 2026 it will be operational at 65 airports and 112 aviation security checkpoints. As adoption grows, TSA's long-term goal is to accelerate the deployment of touchless technologies across the TSA enterprise and to enhance automation throughout the transportation system. To date, 5 airlines are currently participating in TSA PreCheck Touchless ID at the security checkpoint, and all participating carriers have indicated interest in extending its use to baggage check-in. Two of the participating carriers have already begun rollout of TSA PreCheck Touchless ID for baggage check-in at select locations. Question 3b. Are there future use cases TSA is evaluating for Touchless ID beyond passenger screening such as employee access, cargo, or international operations? Answer. At this time, additional use cases for TSA PreCheck Touchless ID, beyond passenger screening, have not been identified. TSA continues to leverage the infrastructure developed for TSA PreCheck Touchless ID to identify opportunities to improve security and improve the passenger experience. Question 3c. As TSA considers scaling Touchless ID nationwide, what challenges do you see related to infrastructure, funding, and system reliability, and how is TSA planning to sustain the system over time? Answer. The current TSA PreCheck Touchless ID edge device may evolve to enable the expansion of TSA PreCheck Touchless ID and allow additional trusted travelers to experience the capability throughout their travel journey. As we continue to scale nationwide, TSA will work to align Touchless ID with other DHS initiatives to minimize impact to infrastructure and system reliability. Questions From Honorable Dale Strong For Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1a. Ms. McNeill, TSA plays a critical role in protecting the traveling public by both proactively identifying emerging threats and ensuring that aviation security protocols keep pace with changes in the industry. With charter operators increasingly functioning like scheduled commercial airlines, how does TSA view the security implications of this shift, and what risks, if any, does it present for passenger screening and vetting? Answer. TSA has substantially enhanced security requirements for scheduled commercial airlines over more than 2 decades. As some charter operators are now functioning and increasing charter passenger volume in ways that are more similar to other scheduled, commercial operations, TSA has updated its security programs for charter operations to ensure comprehensive vetting and screening of passengers and their accessible property to mitigate potential threats to aviation. In addition, through regular engagements with the aviation community, TSA actively shares threat information, best practices, and lessons learned, reinforcing the shared responsibility of securing the national air space among pilots, air carriers, airport operators, fixed-base operators, and Government agencies. Despite these efforts, TSA has concerns about how foreign governments approve charter operations, stemming from well-documented cases in 2023 and 2024 of Legend Airlines, a Romanian charter airline, which engaged in human smuggling and trafficking. Question 1b. As charter operations grow and more passengers are flying through fixed-based operators rather than traditional commercial terminals, are you confident these facilities are properly equipped to screen the increasing number of travelers, or do you see potential security gaps if charter flights continue operating outside the same screening framework as commercial aviation? Answer. TSA's role in conducting passenger and property screening is generally focused on passengers that will enplane or deplane within sterile areas of airports. Outside of this context, the responsibility for passenger screening generally rests with the aircraft operator. TSA regulates both Private Charter and Public Charter operators through established security programs, such as the Private Charter Standard Security program and the Twelve-Five Standard Security program, which mandate comprehensive vetting and screening procedures. While their operations may be conducted through fixed-base operators, the fixed- base operators are not responsible for the screening. Question 2a. Ms. McNeill, it has been nearly 3 years since TSA first issued emergency cyber requirements for the aviation sector, and since then, the agency has made a number of updates and adjustments to the program. How is TSA evaluating how well the program has worked over this period, and what steps are you taking to ensure these requirements are strengthening aviation cybersecurity while being implemented effectively across the aviation industry? Answer. TSA is working closely with all entities that fall under TSA's aviation cybersecurity requirements. TSA's initial outreaches and inspections show that cybersecurity maturity varies widely across the aviation sector. We are focusing our efforts on helping each organization meet these cybersecurity requirements and strengthen their cybersecurity practices. Through these partnerships, we are seeing strong cooperation, and overall cybersecurity is improving across the sector. TSA built into its cybersecurity program a proactive evaluation of the cybersecurity measures that entities are implementing. TSA requires certain entities to develop and submit annually to TSA a Cybersecurity Assessment Program, which proactively assesses the effectiveness of the cybersecurity measures they are required to implement. The Cybersecurity Assessment Program is designed to ensure that the policies, procedures, capabilities, and measures being implemented by entities are effective and strengthen aviation cybersecurity. Additionally, TSA actively gathers input from airports and industry partners, recognizing the real-world challenges of funding and prioritizing cybersecurity. The feedback from inspections and engagements is used to refine TSA's cybersecurity requirements, as well to clarify guidance and provide necessary support to entities. By the end of fiscal year 2027, cyber compliance inspectors will have completed the initial baseline inspections for each airport/aircraft operator/fuel farm consortium covered by the Joint Emergency Amendment, Fuel Order, and National Amendments. During fiscal year 2026, our cybersecurity inspectors and architects completed the first 87 inspections; we are on schedule to complete the remaining 84 initial inspections during fiscal year 2027. Through feedback from our regulated partners and the inspection process, the cyber inspectors share these results with the TSA enterprise, so timely adjustments can be made to the Joint Emergency Amendment and National Amendments. To ensure TSA's cybersecurity requirements are being effectively implemented across the aviation industry, TSA conducts inspections of covered entities to assess compliance. These inspections are an important tool and serve as a catalyst for improving cybersecurity maturity, helping covered entities identify gaps and prioritize cybersecurity measures. TSA provides guidance and assistance prior to the on-site inspection, fostering a supportive environment that helps airports prepare and understand requirements. During the inspections, TSA ensures that entities are implementing TSA's cybersecurity requirements and provides entities with recommended areas of improvement to enhance their cybersecurity posture beyond what is merely required. TSA tracks compliance, incident reporting, and progress on security upgrades to ensure requirements are not only met but are also improving the overall cybersecurity posture. Questions From Honorable Vince Fong For Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1. The Screening Partnership Program (SPP) allows airports to opt in to private screening solutions, which can generate savings of up to 20 percent on personnel costs for TSA without jeopardizing safety standards. How does TSA plan to leverage public-private partnerships, including SPP, to increase efficiencies and free up savings that can be reinvested in needed technology upgrades? Answer. TSA is working to enable innovative public-private partnerships through the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). In July 2025, TSA released the ``Turnkey Request for Information (RFI)'' to solicit industry input on potential fully integrated, turnkey solutions that could drive new innovations at checkpoint and in checked baggage screening. TSA sought comment from both traditional and non-traditional industry partners. Using input from the Turnkey RFI, TSA is developing a framework to modernize the SPP to drive public-private partnerships. This new framework will give airports a choice in how they engage with TSA and will drive greater capital to the checkpoints, to airports, and the communities they serve. By enabling public-private partnerships, TSA can drive greater efficiencies and create a more competitive market for innovative aviation security technologies. This market will drive savings for TSA by incentivizing private investment at the checkpoint, in checked baggage screening technologies, and at airports more broadly. Question 2. Cutting-edge, current-day baggage screening technologies are not expected to be deployed at all U.S. airports until 2040, at which point they will be obsolete. How can TSA accelerate the modernization of aviation safety infrastructure, including by leveraging public-private partnerships and the Screening Partnership Program (SPP)? Answer. TSA will leverage the SPP to develop security solutions that include technology and maintenance in addition to personnel, which will incentivize industry to accelerate deployment of checkpoint and checked-baggage screening technologies that provide better security, passenger experience, and throughput. Additionally, TSA is enhancing its existing Capability Acceptance Process and Third-Party Testing programs to increase the speed of testing, certifying, and deploying new security technology innovations. This will expedite the delivery of innovative checkpoint and checked baggage solutions to the marketplace and further support innovation in future public-private partnerships. Question 3. What airports has TSA determined are most in need of screening technology upgrades, and how may public-private partnerships, including participation in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), help to accelerate the process of purchasing and deploying upgraded equipment? Answer. TSA considers many factors when identifying airports in need of screening technology upgrades, including airport volume, airport capacity constraints, age of currently deployed technology, potential risk reduction provided by upgrades, and future growth or infrastructure investments. Leveraging the SPP could attract the additional private investment necessary to accelerate the deployment of next-generation checkpoint and checked-baggage screening technologies. TSA is exploring a number of areas including equipment, maintenance, and future technology upgrades in the scope of the SPP. While the SPP currently focuses on privatized screening personnel, allowing participating airports to incorporate both privatized screeners and technology into the SPP may incentivize private partners to innovate and automate screening operations. Questions From Honorable Matt Van Epps For Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1a. Ms. McNeill, as we consider new threats to air transportation, what would TSA's response to a drone attack on an airport look like? How is TSA addressing UAS threats? Answer. TSA employs a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to address the threat of careless/clueless, reckless/ negligent operators, or even potentially nefarious actors utilizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the national air space. These tactics, techniques, and procedures can be grouped into 3 broad categories: Left-of-Launch.--Pre-incident activities that help to reduce risk from potential UAS threats before they occur; Incident response.--Actions taken to address or mitigate threats in real-time; and Post-incident response.--Actions taken to improve future left-of-launch or incident response activities. Left-of-launch activities consist of several steady-state functions that Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) from headquarters and the field perform on a routine basis. These activities include: Deployment of drone detection equipment to improve domain awareness around airports and transportation infrastructure. Developing an understanding of what's flying in the air space allows FAM's to share these data (while complying with the privacy requirements of section 124n of title 6, and with the First and Fourth Amendment) with local stakeholders, so that everyone has a better idea of what is occurring in their areas of responsibility. Conducting airport vulnerability assessments to improve an airport's preparedness and response posture in the event of a potential disruption. Outreach and education among public and private-sector stakeholders to help reduce the risk of careless/clueless violators operating in controlled air space. Pilot engagement to document interactions and potential regulatory violations for referrals to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Proactive utilization of FAMs' access to the FAA's registration and drone authorization database so that FAMs can reach out to pilots ahead of time to inform them of pending Temporary Flight Restrictions to ensure pilots are aware of these changes. Incident Response occurs in real-time, with FAMs addressing a drone incident that has the potential to impact an airport, transportation sector, or a special event. These activities will be guided by the Core 30 CONOPS, an interagency command and control document for Counter- Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) emergency response at the Core 30 airports that designates TSA as the Lead Federal Agency for C-UAS response at airports. The response will include: Real-time utilization of TSA's access to the FAA's registration and drone authorization database so that FAMs can attempt to identify air space violators in real time. Conduct ground response-based on technical or visual sightings, whereby FAM's identify and make contact with operators, instructing drone violators to safely land aircraft that may pose a potential danger. Conducting field interviews that document misdemeanor violations that could result in the issuance of a District Court Violations Notice or ticket. In the event of a persistent disruption, FAMs are prepared to respond to an on-going shutdown of a Core 30 airport in accordance with the Unified National Level Response to a Persistent Disruption of Operations at Core 30 Airports, utilizing all its field-based capabilities, up to and including conducting mitigation operations. Post-incident response activities include conducting data analysis and information sharing (as permitted under section 124n of Title 6, and the First and Fourth Amendment) in response to inter-agency requests for support; and engaging in routine cooperation among law enforcement and transportation stakeholders to identify trends or gaps to better prepare for future incidents. Question 1b. How is TSA implementing the Safer Skies Act of last year's NDAA? Answer. In response to the passage of the Safer Skies Act, TSA started or increased several initiatives to better prepare itself to utilize the broader DHS authorities ``to enforce the law'' and ``protect the public.'' TSA no longer must rely on the emergency provisions under 124n and can now proactively prepare and develop its own C-UAS capabilities and operational framework to be executed when authorized by the Secretary. These current efforts can be divided into 3 main pillars: procurement, training, and operational planning. Question 2. Ms. McNeill, what operational, policy, and interagency coordination reforms could TSA implement with law enforcement and CBP to strengthen oversight and reduce risk of suspicious cash-flow through travel hubs? Answer. TSA relies on administrative search authority for its operations at travel hubs. An administrative search is an exception to the 4th Amendment and is conducted without a warrant as part of a regulatory plan in furtherance of a specified non-law enforcement government purpose, such as to determine compliance with TSA regulations or to prevent the carrying of threat items or entry of an unauthorized person into the sterile area, or to screen passengers entering any public conveyance. Consistent with the parameters of the 4th amendment exception, TSA conducts all administrative searches in a manner designed to be minimally intrusive, in light of current technology, to detect the presence of threat items. TSA recognizes that individuals being searched have an expectation of privacy in their persons and property and requires that all TSA personnel conduct searches in such a way as to respect those privacy interests, while advancing TSA's transportation security mission. Administrative searches may not be conducted to detect evidence of crimes unrelated to transportation security. However, if such evidence is discovered during the normal course of a screening, TSA personnel refer it to a supervisor and/or a law enforcement official for appropriate action. TSA has specific procedures for these referrals, including when certain currency is discovered at checkpoints. TSA is looking into ways to simplify the reporting requirements built into screening procedures. In addition, any information reported to TSA's Coordination Centers may also be included in a Field Intelligence Officer's Field Information Report. A Field Information Report is a mechanism TSA uses to provide raw data to deliver valuable, relevant, and timely information to the DHS Intelligence Enterprise on transportation security operations. The raw data are not actionable in and of themselves; rather, it is information that may be analyzed and assessed for relevant patterns and trends and evaluated, in context, to determine the existence of actionable information. Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service Assistant Federal Security Directors--Law Enforcement, HSI Border Enforcement Security Team Task Force Officers, and Homeland Security Task Force Officers are aware of the current bulk cash issues and remain in contact with both TSA Security Operations personnel and law enforcement entities with a vested interest in the movement of the suspicious cash. Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service personnel will continue to support efforts to reduce the risk of suspicious cash flow through travel hubs, as permitted based on legal authorities, policy, and standard operating procedures. Question 3. Ms. McNeill, while Confirm.ID is designed to alleviate the burden of accommodating travelers without an acceptable form of identification, under what authority did TSA increase the fee and under which authority does TSA collect and appropriate such a fee? Answer. In 2006, Congress directed TSA to collect a non-refundable fee to cover the costs of any registered traveler program.\9\ This provision requires TSA to ``impose a fee for any registered traveler program undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security by notice in the Federal Register,'' provided that ``such fees shall not exceed the aggregate costs associated with the program.'' TSA may also modify the fee through notice published in the Federal Register. As exemplified by the 2008 Registered Traveler Interoperability Pilot Program Fee Notice, programs funded under registered traveler fee authority have always consisted of components including Secure Flight vetting, additional pre-vetting, and identity verification.\10\ Registered traveler programs consisting solely of enhanced identity verification and Secure Flight vetting, without additional pre-vetting, are active at 60 airports across the Nation through public-private partnerships. As TSA transformed its former back-up call center into a multi-tiered capability for alternative identity verification, where passengers provide additional biographic and/or biometric information to enable access to expedited risk-based screening and TSA's application of limited screening resources to the highest-risk passengers, it was determined the program fit within the ``registered traveler'' category alongside those other programs. Therefore, consistent with the statute, TSA imposed a fee to recover the costs of providing this service, ensuring that individuals who benefit from the program rather than the taxpayer bear those costs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Public Law 109-90, sec. 540, (119 Stat. 2064, 2088-89 (Oct. 18, 2005)) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 114 note). \10\ 73 Fed. Reg. 44275 (July 30, 2008). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Questions From Honorable Timothy M. Kennedy for Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1. TSA, through AbilityOne, has created employment opportunities for certain individuals who are blind or severely disabled in Upstate New York and nationwide. For example, Upstate New York-based non-profit organizations working under AbilityOne supply TSA with 1.3 million nitrile exam gloves annually. Please describe TSA's plans to continue use of the AbilityOne law to procure products. Is TSA considering expanding its use of the AbilityOne program? Answer. TSA remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the AbilityOne program and continues to utilize AbilityOne to procure products and services, including personal protective equipment such as nitrile exam gloves. TSA is required to use the DHS Safety Stock Personal Protective Equipment Strategic Sourcing Vehicle. The contractor, LC Industries, partners with the Central Association for the Blind and Visually Impaired to support TSA's nitrile glove needs. Currently, TSA does not have any service contracts with AbilityOne; however, TSA regularly evaluates procurement strategies to ensure compliance with Federal requirements and to maximize opportunities for AbilityOne participation. Any expansion of AbilityOne use would be considered in accordance with DHS and Federal procurement guidelines. Question 2. Based on TSA's data, please outline the number of jobs created nationally for the blind and severely disabled who rely on TSA AbilityOne contracts. Answer. TSA does not possess data regarding this matter. For information regarding job creation, TSA recommends contacting the AbilityOne program or its affiliated non-profit agencies, as they are best-positioned to provide detailed employment statistics. Questions From Honorable Troy Carter for Ha Nguyen McNeill Question 1. With the rise of charter operators operating more like scheduled commercial airlines, are you concerned that they are skirting appropriate safety protocols, such as TSA screening, and creating a potential threat to the flying public? Can you explain what is being done to address this threat? Answer. In response to some charter operators now functioning similarly to scheduled commercial operations and increasing charter passenger volumes, TSA updated its security programs for charter operations to ensure comprehensive vetting and screening of passengers and their accessible property to mitigate potential threats to aviation. In addition, through regular engagements with the aviation community, TSA actively shares threat information, best practices, and lessons learned, to reinforce the shared responsibility of securing the national air space among pilots, air carriers, airport operators, fixed-base operators, and Government agencies. Question 2. Charter operators who act like commercial airlines don't have to follow the same safety protocols as commercial airlines. What are you doing to ensure that their growth doesn't create a safety risk for the traveling public? Answer. While the FAA is responsible for establishing safety protocols, TSA is committed to securing the aviation system for the traveling public by implementing and updating security measures for aircraft operators. TSA actively collaborates with charter operators and industry partners to enhance security within general aviation. TSA provides comprehensive guidance and screening frameworks and has updated security programs for charter operations to ensure that passengers are properly vetted, and their persons and accessible property are screened. These measures effectively mitigate potential threats and support the safe and secure growth of charter services. Question 3. Are fixed-based operators equipped to properly screen the growing number of passengers flying on scheduled charter operations? Are you concerned about their ability if this loophole continues to be exploited? Answer. There is no security loophole for scheduled charter operations. While Fixed-Base Operators are not required under TSA regulations to conduct passenger and accessible property screening, for private and public charter passenger operations, aircraft operators are required by regulation to provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights provided by the aircraft operator against acts of criminal violence; air piracy; and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or weapons aboard aircraft. TSA security programs mandate that aircraft operators implement appropriate screening measures at Fixed-Base Operators locations. These required screening measures are to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft and facilities, address insider threats, and mitigate misuse of aircraft. TSA maintains on-going oversight and enforcement of these security requirements, and we ensure any issues identified during compliance inspections are addressed in a timely manner. [all]