Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.
[Senate Hearing 119-188] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-188 BAD MEDICINE: CLOSING LOOPHOLES THAT KILL AMERICAN PATIENTS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ WASHINGTON, DC __________ OCTOBER 8, 2025 __________ Serial No. 119-15 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov _______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 61-877 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland ---------- McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1 Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member......................................................... 4 PANEL OF WITNESSES Tony Sardella, Founder and Chair, API Innovation Center, Distinguished Fellow of Health Innovation, Washington University in St. Louis Olin Business School, Chesterfield, Missouri....................................................... 5 Tony Paquin, President and Chief Executive Officer iRemedy Healthcare, Inc., Stuart, Florida.............................. 7 Andrew Rechenberg, Economist, Coalition for a Prosperous America, Washington, DC................................................. 9 Marta E. Wosinska, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center on Health Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC...................... 10 APPENDIX Prepared Witness Statements Tony Sardella, Founder and Chair, API Innovation Center, Distinguished Fellow of Health Innovation, Washington University in St. Louis Olin Business School, Chesterfield, Missouri....................................................... 36 Tony Paquin, President and Chief Executive Officer iRemedy Healthcare, Inc., Stuart, Florida.............................. 45 Andrew Rechenberg, Economist, Coalition for a Prosperous America, Washington, DC................................................. 70 Marta E. Wosinska, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center on Health Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC...................... 101 Questions for the Record Tony Sardella, Founder and Chair, API Innovation Center, Distinguished Fellow of Health Innovation, Washington University in St. Louis Olin Business School, Chesterfield, Missouri....................................................... 119 Tony Paquin, President and Chief Executive Officer iRemedy Healthcare, Inc., Stuart, Florida.............................. 130 Andrew Rechenberg, Economist, Coalition for a Prosperous America, Washington, DC................................................. 137 Marta E. Wosinska, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Center on Health Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC...................... 141 Statements for the Record Association for Accessible Medicines Statement................... 149 American Hospital Association Statement.......................... 156 American Society of Health-System Pharmacists Statement.......... 160 Continuus Pharmaceuticals Statement.............................. 165 Doctors for America Statement.................................... 179 Lupin Statement.................................................. 181 Lupin - Coral Springs, FL Statement.............................. 183 National Taxpayers Union......................................... 185 Teva Pharmaceuticals Statement................................... 191 BAD MEDICINE: CLOSING LOOPHOLES THAT KILL AMERICAN PATIENTS ---------- Wednesday, October 8, 2025 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:27 p.m., Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senator Scott, Tuberville, Johnson, Moody, Gillibrand, Warren, and Kim. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN The Chairman. The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging will now come to order. Last month, this Committee held a hearing about the dangers older Americans face due to unsafe foreign generic drugs. We exposed not only the threat posed by poor quality, generic drugs that can hurt or even kill American seniors, but also how dependent the United States is on dangerous supply chains that threaten shortages, keeping life- saving drugs from getting to those who need them. The terrifying reality we face is that our Nation is completely beholden to Communist China and India for the vast majority of our generic drugs and their ingredients. Communist China is the world's largest producer of active prescription drug ingredients, and India, relies on Communist China for approximately 80 percent of the active drug ingredients it uses in drug manufacturing. A study from one of our witnesses, Mr. Tony Sardella, found that 83 percent of the top 100 generic drugs consumed by U.S. citizens have no U.S.-based source of active drug ingredients. Another 11 percent have only one domestic source of active drug ingredients. We also learned in our last hearing that if Communist China or India shut off the flow of these essential drugs, the U.S. would only have months of prescription drug supply, forcing us to begin rationing drugs and turn away all but then the most in need within a matter of weeks. Let me say that again. If Communist China, our adversary, or India decided to shut off supply and generic prescription drugs to the United States, we would run out of prescription drugs in a matter of months and be forced to begin rationing drugs and turning away all but the most desperately in need within a matter of weeks. I think everyone here remembers the supply shortages we faced during the COVID-19 pandemic; PPE supplies and even baby formula. Think about the catastrophic scenario we would face if millions of Americans didn't have the prescription drugs they need to survive. The health of older Americans is too important to leave to chance. Congress has to work with the Trump Administration, and now, to make sure that Americans have safe and high-quality drugs, and secure the prescription drug supply chain. Ninety- one percent of prescriptions filled in the United States are for generic drugs. It's essential that the quality and safety of generic prescription drugs meet the same high standards of brand name drugs. A study showed that serious adverse events like hospitalization, even death, were 54 percent more likely for foreign generic drugs compared to American-made generic drugs. I'm not exaggerating when I say that people are dying in America today because of bad medicine from under-regulated markets in India and Communist China. When I asked Peter Baker, a former FDA inspector, if he would allow himself or his family to take generic drugs made in India or Communist China, he said not. He told us that he believed that Americans were being killed every day from foreign-made generic drugs. I want to say that again. A former FDA inspector who worked in China and India, told this Committee that he believes Americans are being killed every day from dangerous foreign-made generic drugs. Mr. Baker also told a heartbreaking story of having to go to multiple pharmacies with his elderly grandmother to find a safe generic drug for her prescription, only to be forced to accept an Indian-made drug that paid a massive settlement to the U.S. Department of Justice for falsifying quality testing. Peter knew that the drug in his grandmother's prescription was potentially dangerous, but had no other options. No American should ever have to deal with what Peter talked about, and be worried that a family member will be hurt or killed by the medicine that is supposed to heal or treat them. It's unacceptable for that to be happening in our country. Every American needs to get loud and demand change. Everyone knows that how I feel about Communist China, but I'm not the only one concerned about the dangers of foreign, major generic drugs. The BBC reported earlier, earlier this year that doctors in Communist China are worried about the quality of their generic drugs. One doctor said that antibiotics coming out almost entirely from Communist China were causing allergies and elevated blood pressure. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party downplays these reports just like they've denied using slave labor, but this is a real problem and we cannot rely on low quality, ineffective generic drugs from Communist China. In our last hearing, our witnesses underscored quality issues that present real dangers to the health of patients. In 2007 and 2008, heparin that sourced contaminated ingredients from Communist China killed up to 100 people in the United States. These problems continue to happen nearly 20 years later. In 2023, contaminated eye drops from India, killed four people, and caused adverse events in at least 55 patients. The Federal Government needs to ensure access to safe and high- quality drugs today. Following our hearing last month, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I sent a letter to the FDA asking what steps they're taking to stop dangerous drugs from coming into our country. I also met with FDA Commissioner Makary and he talked about his fight to fix the issues we have highlighted. I applaud his attention to the issue, and the Trump Administration's work to increase the amount of unannounced foreign inspections, a crucial first step to holding foreign manufacturers accountable to the same standards we hold American manufacturers. When it comes to solutions, I believe one of the most important things we can do is to establish a federal buyer's market. The Federal Government is the largest purchaser of drugs in the United States, accounting for 40 percent of outpatient prescription drugs purchased as of 2018. On the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have pushed for the Department of War to leverage its buying power to prioritize purchasing drugs made in America, using American ingredients. Senator Warren held a hearing last year on this same issue. If no American option is available, then the Federal Government should prioritize drugs and ingredients from allies and Trade Act-compliant countries. The buying power of the Federal Government can move the needle and bring manufacturing for essential drugs back to the United States. The national security risk of relying on Communist China for essential drugs and drug ingredients are unacceptable. The same risk risks are unacceptable for seniors who trust they will have access to the drugs they need. In 2024, the U.S. manufactured 37 percent of its consumed drugs. This number is down from 2002 when it was 83 percent. In just 20 years, we have seeded control of our medical supply chain to Communist China and India. Even if we start prioritizing certain drugs or types of drugs like antibiotics which come as China's supplies, 90 percent of the ingredients for globally, we'd be making our medical supply chains much safer, not just for seniors, but for all Americans. I will continue fighting for the Federal Government to purchase American-manufactured drugs. We cannot rely on Communist China for something as important as the health of Americans. Every American deserves to know where the drugs their purchasing came from. That is why I support mapping our supply chains as well as our country-of-origin labeling. I've introduced the Country of Origin Labeling Online Act to require country of origin labeling for consumer products. Consumers deserve to know where items they purchase are made, and for something as important as the medications you take, that information is crucial. I will be introducing legislation on country of origin labeling for prescription drugs that would require drug labels include the country where each drug ingredient and the finished drugs are manufactured, processed, or compounded. We've already seen Communist China place export restrictions on rare earth elements as part of trade negotiation, and there's no reason why they won't do the same for medicines. Agencies like the Department of War and Veterans Affairs stepping in to purchase American made drugs could bring industry back and create a steady supply of important medications and ingredients for the American people. Other steps like the Department of Commerce Section 232 investigation could level the playing field for American manufacturers. Section 232 tariffs are for goods that impact our national security, and I can't think of anything more crucial to health of our seniors than generic drugs. On Friday, I sent a letter to Secretary Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Greer, encouraging them to immediately place Section 232 tariffs on generic drugs. This is a national security and a public health issue for seniors and all Americans. I look forward to this discussion with our witnesses on how we can make sure Americans never have to worry about missing a dose of their medication or the quality of drugs in their medicine cabinet. I'd like to turn it over to Ranking Member Gillibrand for her opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for today's hearing. Thank you to all our witnesses for being here today. We really appreciate you. I'm looking forward to continuing our robust discussion on ways to improve and secure our domestic generic drug supply, which includes ensuring that pharmaceuticals entering the United States are of the highest quality and standard. During our previous hearing, we heard about some of the problems that consistently plague the generic drug industry and some proposals to begin to help to address the issues. Today, we will dig deeper into some bipartisan solutions that this Committee and other committees of jurisdiction can work on together to ensure Americans can access high-quality drugs that they need when they need them. Currently, too many active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials are made outside the United States. Given recent instability in geopolitics and international trade policy, this reliance increases the risk that Americans may not have access to life-saving drugs in times of crisis, threatening our national security. However, we must approach strengthening and reforming this extremely complex supply chain thoughtfully and thoroughly. Generic drug manufacturers cannot simply flip a switch and move all components of production to the U.S. or other allied nations. To ensure Americans have a reliable supply of safe and affordable drugs, Congress will need to work to make more targeted investments in biotechnology, research, and infrastructure, to create long-term support and stability for this critical industry in our Nation. We must examine the underlying economic dynamics in the current marketplace and adjust incentives to fix the "race to the bottom" in generic drug pricing, which can create drug quality issues, drive manufacturing outside of the U.S., or cause companies to stop production of certain drugs altogether. Additionally, we must strengthen the ability of federal agencies to ensure strict oversight of foreign manufacturing facilities, to strengthen the supply chain and enable patients to access the quality medicines they need. As we look to address these issues, we must make sure drugs remain affordable for our constituents, particularly our seniors, many of whom are on fixed incomes. Americans are already struggling with high costs across the board, and I'm committed to working with Chairman Scott and my colleagues across the aisle to find solutions that serve our constituents by strengthening the generic supply chain, promoting quality domestic production, and protecting our national security. I look forward to this robust discussion, as well as the future potential bipartisan legislation on the issue. The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Gillibrand. Now, I'd like to welcome our witnesses who are here to talk about their work to bring drug manufacturing of essential drugs back to the United States, and making sure the American people have access to the drugs they need. First, I'd like to recognize Tony Sardella. Mr. Sardella is the founder and chair of the API Innovation Center, a non- profit that establishes public-private partnerships to secure a drug supply chain. He is a distinguished fellow for health innovation at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis. Thank you for the critical work you do and for being here today. Please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF TONY SARDELLA, FOUNDER & CHAIR, API INNOVATION CENTER, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW OF HEALTH INNOVATION, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS OLIN BUSINESS SCHOOL, CHESTERFIELD, MISSOURI Mr. Sardella. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee. As chairman indicated, I'm the founder and chairperson of the API Innovation Center, dedicated to building health security of our generic drug supply chain. I'm honored to be here this afternoon and share how our work at the API Innovation Center is addressing the severe challenge of a vulnerable U.S. generic pharmaceutical supply chain. There are three key things that I want to share with you today. The first, is the U.S. generic drug supply chain is over-reliant on foreign manufacturers, and specifically placing our seniors and veterans at severe risk. Second, the API Innovation Center's private-public partnership model is showing promise in addressing this complex issue and the economic roots that drove the dependency. Third, policy instruments can foster increased U.S. private sector investment and production to address our vulnerabilities. Our over reliance on foreign sources to meet our Nation's needs are quite stark. As Chairman Scott mentioned, research we've done found 83 percent of the top 100 generic medicines prescribed to Americans have no U.S. source. I'd like to share some new research we just conducted on behalf of the Committee. Our mapping of generic supply chain reveals that for 10 of the most frequently prescribed medications for our elderly and veterans, 95 percent of those medicines have no U.S. API source. Even more stark, 84 have no finished drug production and they're dependent primarily on China. This continues with the research we provided before that mapped our generic supply chain from drug all the way to key starter materials, and showed that for 40 critical medicines that we identified for our Nation to have its own secure supply, that the key starter materials were exclusively 100 percent dependent on China. For half of them, half of those critical medicines and nation require. The API Innovation Center focuses on addressing this national security. It emphasizes modernizing existing idle domestic manufacturing that we uncovered through our research with manufacturers and doing so to ensure our resiliency and stable supply chain. The model has three key components. First, investment of public funds that APEC has received from the State of Missouri, as well as from the bio map as per federal program. That capital modernizes the production methods to produce these medicines. We not just bring back production, but we're producing it in modern, advanced, more efficient manners and also using new technologies, many of which have been developed here in the United States by equipment manufacturers. We take the investment in the new modern techniques and we contract existing idle FDA facilities that exist already to produce these modern methods of production. Third, we partner with long-term agreements with end healthcare systems, national retail pharmacies, as well as drug production companies to be able to ensure predictable demand and supply for the entire network. The approach is delivering promising results. Over 70 U.S.- based manufacturers are collaborating and entering into agreements with APIIC to build an end-to-end domestic supply chain capable of sourcing, developing, producing, and distributing cost-competitive, U.S.-made medicines, with a near-term focus on 25 priority medicines that we've itemized, and a long-term goal of 300 medicines made here in the United States. The partnership enables the U.S.-based API and drug manufacturers to gain certainty of their demand and economic viability to produce in the U.S. It gives healthcare systems and national retail pharmacies certainty of supply and stability of cost, and our citizens and seniors gain a drug supply resiliency and we as a nation gain national security. While innovative partnerships are essential, policy plays a decisive role. There's a need, a critical need to clarify and harmonize the definition of made in America. For pharmaceuticals, current procurement rules allow drugs assembled in America, but comprised of foreign APIs to be labeled as USA-made. Second, the Federal Government's purchasing power can be leveraged. Last, sustained public- private investment to modernize idle facilities. The vulnerabilities are significant but solutions visible. Thank you for the opportunity to share our research and perspective. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Sardella. Now, I'd like to introduce Tony Paquin, the co-founder, president, and CEO of iRemedy, a company from my home State of Florida, working to provide buyers with American made medical products. Mr. Paquin's company worked tirelessly to supply the Federal Government with medical supplies during COVID, and he brings a wealth of expertise into the medical supply chain. Mr. Paquin, thank you for being here today. Please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF TONY PAQUIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER IREMEDY HEALTHCARE, INC., STUART, FLORIDA Mr. Paquin. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. For over 25 years, I've worked in the healthcare technology, logistics, and distribution. At iRemedy Healthcare, we manage an artificial intelligence procurement platform that supports manufacturers worldwide. My experience includes building software, scaling networks, partnering with hospitals, manufacturers, and government agencies, all of which has given me a clear view of how our supply chain actually functions on the ground. That vantage point has revealed two urgent truths. First, that far too much of our production of essential medicines has been ceded to China and India, leaving our Nation dangerously exposed to weak oversight, counterfeit risks, and most importantly, price manipulation. Second, then an unintended consequence of that globalization is the concentration of our supply chain into a small group of intermediaries that restricts the flow of drugs into American hospitals, locking providers into contracts, and stifling supply chain and market innovation. Combined, these two truths are deadly. I grew up in Flint, Michigan, and have seen firsthand the prosperity of an active manufacturing economy as well as the devastation when industries are hollowed out. Today, I'm here to say bluntly, we must end our dependences on foreign adversaries, and restore control of our medical supply chain to the United States. During Operation Warp Speed, my company was a key supplier of needles and syringes. We delivered more than one billion items for the country's needs. What I witnessed during that period was alarming. At one point the Chinese Communist Party seized 40 percent of our China-based inventory awaiting shipment. We routinely dealt with bad actors attempting to bribe dock workers and factory managers peddling fake FDA 510(k) certifications. As you know, the vast majority of prescription medicines are generic, yet those drugs overwhelmingly come from high-risk overseas suppliers. When supply lines are disrupted, we quickly see shortages of life sustaining medicines for conditions like diabetes, heart disease, and cancer oversight is essential for immediate relief. We must enforce unannounced FDA inspections overseas as we do here in the U.S. We must require a clear country of origin labeling, and independently validate imported shipments for quality. These are Band-Aid fixes that do bring transparency and deter quality failures, but they won't fix the problem. The only real cure is to reshore the supply chain, and I'm here to report that we can do so. First, APIs nearly all come from overseas, especially China. We must invest in new technologies and fast track permits for factories. We must treat this as the national security issue that it is and prevent bureaucratic delays. Second, generic drug manufacturing. Here's the truth. The technology already exists in this country to make generics profitably without raising costs for consumers. What we lack is fair competition. Generics are often a commodity, and foreign governments have learned how to weaponize commodity pricing against us. Until we level that playing field, American manufacturers will never have a chance to compete. Let me give you a real-world example. Oxford Pharmaceutical is an Alabama-based generic drug manufacturer with the capability to produce life-giving medicines domestically. They're a high-quality modern U.S.-owned example of American manufacturing excellence. They make drugs here in America efficiently, safely, and at scale. What stands in their way is a market that has been deliberately tilted against domestic producers. Even when companies like Oxford can produce at competitive costs, they're forced to compete against artificially subsidized Chinese and Indian importers that are all too often unfairly awarded U.S. Government contracts. Shockingly, this happened to Oxford just a few months ago. That system has to end. We must protect American producers with targeted licensing and trade enforcement. We must use artificial intelligence to overhaul the drug marketplace, and reform federal procurement so that U.S.-made drugs are the default, not the exception. If given fair access, domestic manufacturers can compete and win. If not, we remain captive to adversaries abroad. President Trump has shown leadership with executive orders to prioritize American made medicines, but we need an all- government response involving regulation, legislation, and procurement. We must act now. First, apply the immediate Band- Aid fixes; unannounced FDA inspections overseas, clear country of origin, labeling and randomized testing on imported drugs. These bias transparency, and time, then cure the disease reshore API production with new technology manufacture domestics generics domestically with fair trade protections free from foreign price manipulation, and use the full weight of government purchasing power to put resilience above cheap imports. Members of the Committee, this is not just economics. This is sovereignty. This is national security. It is needed to protect our seniors, our soldiers, and our families when the next crisis strikes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership, and to the Committee for this opportunity. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Paquin. Next, I'd like to introduce Andrew Rechenberg, with the Coalition for Prosperous America, a nonprofit organization that represents American manufacturers and producers across a number of industries and sectors, to support domestic industry and protect our national security. Mr. Rechenberg has experience with the Department of War, as well as the Department of Commerce, and is an expert in trade industrial policy. Mr. Rechenberg, thank you for being here today. You may begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF ANDREW RECHENBERG, ECONOMIST, COALITION FOR A PROSPEROUS AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Rechenberg. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. My name is Andrew Rechenberg, and I'm an economist with the Coalition for Prosperous America, leading analysis on pharmaceutical supply chains and domestic manufacturing. America's medicine supply chain is in a crisis. Two decades of offshoring have caused domestic pharmaceutical production to fall from 84 percent of the U.S. market in 2002 to just 37 percent today, leaving 80 percent of active pharmaceutical ingredients with no U.S. source whatsoever. India and China have captured the market by undercutting American producers, not through efficiency, but through state subsidies, poor labor standards, and safety shortcuts. This dependence has consequences. As U.S. production collapsed, drug shortages tripled from 88 in 2002 to more than 300 in 2024, driving 300 to 500 percent price hikes that erased any supposed cost savings. This is because 40 percent of our essential drugs rely on only a single manufacturer. When I was in Pharmaceuticals in India and was shut down in 2023 for falsified data and safety failures, U.S. hospitals had to ration chemotherapy because one factory made half of our cisplatin supply. These failures show what happens when we chase the cheapest offshore medicine instead of safe American production. That is not resilience. It is a national security breach at the heart of America's healthcare system. It can be fixed. At CPA, we've developed a five-pillar strategy to rebuild pharmaceutical independence. Pillar 1, the tariff rate quota system restores control. The TRQ allows a limited volume of imports from trusted countries at zero tariff rates. Imports above that quota volume or from high-risk nations face steep tariffs. Quota volumes are based on the gap between total U.S. demand and current U.S. production, then adjusted each year as capacity grows. Trusted in-quota countries would be limited to those with equivalent FDA-recognized safety standards. This TRQ system rebuilds capacity steadily without disrupting short-term supply. Strengthening domestic production directly is just as vital. Pillar 2, the PILLS Act, provides production and investment tax credits for U.S. made generics, active pharmaceutical ingredients and biosimilars, plus a domestic content bonus for U.S. sourcing. This creates the conditions for sustained growth in U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturing. Rebuilding does take time. Pillar 3, FDA reform, ensures the safety of current imports. Ninety percent of foreign FDA inspections are pre-announced, and many plants go five years or more without review. When inspections do occur, they often reveal falsified tests and unsafe conditions, reflected in studies showing that generics made in India have a 54 percent higher rate of severe adverse events. Yet, for imports, the FDA still relies on company paperwork instead of independent testing. We can address all of this by requiring independent batch testing for imported drugs in U.S. labs, regular unannounced foreign FDA inspections, and strict penalties for offenders, including import bans. Next, Pillar 4, federal purchasing realignment treats medicine procurement as a matter of national security. It ensures that federal programs prioritize reliable U.S.-made medicines. This aligns directly with the pharmaceutical supply chain, Defense and Enhancement Act to strengthen domestic resilience and minimize reliance on risky and adversarial nations. Finally, we must look to the frontier of medicine. Pillar 5, biotechnology leadership. The U.S. must invest heavily in NIH and biotech startup innovation, and raise clinical trial standards that protect U.S. patients and ensure drug quality. These steps will ensure the next generation of cures is discovered and made here at home. These five pillars are how we end shortages, ensure safety, and restore America's capacity to make the medicines our people depend on. America's medicine system is fragile by design, but it does not have to stay that way. Congress can act now to rebuild what was lost, and ensure that never again will our patients, our hospitals or our troops depend on foreign supply for life itself. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Rechenberg. Now, I'll turn it over to Ranking Member Gillibrand to introduce our next witness. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I want to move to introduce our next witness, Dr. Marta Wosinska. Dr. Wosinska is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution Center on Health Policy, with expertise in prescription drugs and pharmaceutical supply chains. Dr. Wosinska previously served in the Federal Trade Commission, in the Office of Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. She's also served as economic advisor to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee. You may begin. STATEMENT OF DR. MARTA E. WOSINSKA, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON HEALTH POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC Dr. Wosinska. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. My name is Marta Wosinska, and I'm a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Today, I speak in my personal capacity, reflecting nearly 15 years of studying drug supply chain issues from within the government and outside, and with no financial stake in the outcome. Over all these years, I have observed what policy solutions catch the interest of lawmakers. I have seen that many of the solutions that resonate sound good, but they don't address the problem that lawmakers claim they want to solve. Today, as we talk about solutions, I urge you to ask the following questions; What specific problem is the solution meant to address? What else is needed for this solution to succeed? How do we handle the unintended consequences? Is this the most effective and efficient cost effective and efficient path? Only when you ask these questions, you will be best prepared to design policies that not only do the job well for patients, but also assured that taxpayer dollars are used wisely. For instance, if persistent drug shortages in hospitals are the top priority, durable solutions require shifting hospital incentives so that reliability, not just low cost is valued. Transparency to hospitals around supply chain reliability will be important, and you will want to keep far away from tariffs unless you fix various payment systems. If the concern centers on China, then the focus should be on antibiotics and, _for pretty much any other drug_ the focus should shift upstream away from pharmaceutical production steps and toward chemicals that are not regulated by FDA. You will also want to think about how to leverage India in de-risking from China. If the objective is to increase domestic drug manufacturing, which by the way, is a solution to supply concerns, not the problem, then any new facility counts as progress, regardless of whether it addresses areas of critical need or shortage risk. If domestic manufacturing is the goal, then you may not pay as much attention to whether policies designed to promote onshoring like tariffs could destabilize supply. What if we're concerned that weak FDA oversight abroad creates opportunities for defective drugs making their way to American patients? Onshoring could help because we will be building newer, more automated facilities, and FDA would have an easier access to these facilities. Let's be realistic. Onshoring will require government support to undo the economic forces that moved production offshore. In fact, a lot of government support. With constrained budgets, this means policymakers should prioritize. I would urge you to consider that essential medicines and choke holds with China are much more pressing onshoring targets than Indian-made statins or blood pressure medications. Fortunately, we do have other options for addressing product defect risks in commonly used medications. FDA can create greater quality assurance by increasing unannounced inspections, and Congress can support FDA by providing more resources, but we would need to do more because many industry observers and compliance professionals tell me that the current inspection-based model for oversight is not enough. This is where I urge the Committee to consider the proposal I published this morning, which would require every importer to designate a qualified person based in the U.S. with personal responsibility for verifying that each batch meets quality standards. Mandatory product testing would be part of that process. This system is already working for drugs in Europe and has precedent in U.S. drug regulations and other U.S. sectors like finance, where CFOs must personally certify financial disclosures. To conclude, let me reiterate that lasting policy must focus on clearly defining the problem, aligning incentives, so the right behaviors follow, and adapting proven practical solutions from other settings facing similar challenges. When reforms are grounded in clear objectives and match to the challenge, they will best protect patients and ensure prudent use of public resources. Thank you again for inviting me to participate. I look forward to your questions, and to this Committee's leadership in advancing meaningful reforms that will enhance both the quality and reliability of America's drug supply. The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wosinska. Now, we'll turn it over to questions we'll start with coach Tuberville. Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for the panel being here today. I'm going to ask the obvious question, Mr. Rechenberg. If we closed our borders, do we have the ability, and the assets, and the chemicals that we could mine to make every drug that we need in this country? Mr. Rechenberg. No, not currently. That's why in the TRQ plan that I'm proposing, we do work with trusted countries with regulatory standards equivalent to our own. The FDA already recognizes this through mutual recognition agreements with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland as well. We do have enough capacity when working with trusted equivalent regulatory nations like that, but currently on our own, no, we do not. That's why we need to rebuild this capacity. Senator Tuberville. Would we have to use China at all? Mr. Rechenberg. No, we would not. Senator Tuberville. Okay. Good. Mr. Paquin, when you talk about how companies like Oxford Pharmaceuticals should be used as an example of how it is possible to own shore drug manufacturing in a competitive environment? Mr. Paquin. That's correct, Senator. They are a very well run, significantly sized, highly automated production facility in Birmingham, Alabama. They really can produce pretty competitively. I think sometimes, we sort of misunderstand a little bit of the cost factor of these drugs. Amlodipine, for example, costs about two cents a dose to manufacture, but it is reimbursed by Medicare Part D at 10 cents. Actually, the manufacturing cost is a very small part of the total cost that ends up going to the consumer or to the payer. The manufacturers like Oxford Pharmaceutical here in the United States can operate pretty competitively if they're not at target of unfair competitive practices coming out of India. Senator Tuberville. What changes do you think we need to make to have Oxford and other companies to be on a level playing field? What do we need to do? Mr. Paquin. Well, I think there's really two main things we can do, but there's two immediate actions that we could be looking at. I think Andrew and the Coalition for Prosperous America made a good recommendation about, you know, quotas based on the marketplace, and not allowing a country like India to overwhelm our supply, thereby driving down the value of those drugs. Second, the VA and the U.S. Government should really prioritize domestic manufacturing over foreign manufacturing, and that is something that can be done without any major additional cost to the government and is not happening currently. Senator Tuberville. You mentioned in your testimony that Oxford has modern FDA-approved facilities, but still loses contracts to virtual importers tied to China and India. Can you explain what that says about the way our current system works? Mr. Paquin. Well, first off, I would say it doesn't work very well in terms of recognizing the national security implications and just the good sense of supporting a domestic manufacturer. Those contracts that they recently lost were probably a lowest price, technically acceptable type of contract. I think what's happening there is the VA is really not applying the right way to think of technically acceptable. All generic drugs, I would argue, are not equivalent. A generic drug manufactured in Birmingham, Alabama, is probably going to be much higher quality and reliable than a drug made somewhere in India where we don't have good access to surveillance of that manufacturer. I think that--and then also, when we look at technically acceptable, we should consider resilience issues, investing in our domestic manufacturing capability should be one of the considerations when somebody like the VA is putting a contract out for bid. Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Rechenberg as we saw during COVID, United States is way too relying on China, we mentioned that, and India. How can a well-designed tariff rate quota system be used to strengthen domestic production and mitigate shocks or supply shortages in the U.S. market? Mr. Rechenberg. Yes. The main cause of the supply shortages in the market right now is disruptions to these very few sole manufacturers in China and India. We're very much reliant on the single source vulnerabilities, but if we give the market space for U.S. producers through a tariff rate quota system, it very much encourages companies to reinvest in the U.S. and bring production because there's this guaranteed market space that domestic producers can capture. Over time, it will bring back and diversify our supply base, which will lead to less shortages over time as we have more backup options and more U.S. domestic supply. Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Senator Kim. Senator Kim. Thank you. Dr. Wosinska, I wanted to just start with you. I was intrigued by what you raised in terms of that idea about the EU-qualified persons. I guess I just wanted to start by just asking, does the framework like that model already exist in other sectors in the United States? I felt like you said something about on the finance side and others, but I just wanted to get a little bit more clarity from you just how novel of an idea this is. Dr. Wosinska. It's actually not a novel idea. I mean, for one, it has been used in Europe for decades, but in the United States, in terms of FDA and something that FDA is already familiar with during when FSMA passed, so the Food Security Modernization Act, there are a couple of programs for drug importers. I discuss in the paper that I published earlier today where the importer is an extra layer of verification that the product that is being imported into the United States, they have to do a certain set of checks, and in a sense, verify. There's a person who is responsible for verifying and signing off that everything meets the standards that are expected. We have that, we have it in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It's the same general concept that somebody takes on personal responsibility for what is being put forward. It also exists in an of other professions where there is actually this kind of accountability that's added. Senator Kim. Given your knowledge about, you know, our markets and our structures here in terms of this industry, how challenging would it be to be able to implement this? How significant of a change would this create? Dr. Wosinska. You would have to modify legislation. You would have to--the HELP Committee would need to make changes to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. That would be necessary. In terms of how big of a shift it would be, it would depend how it would be designed. I don't think we have enough time to kind of go into the details about what are the levers, but for example, the qualified person framework in Europe applies to every manufacturer, including domestic European manufacturers. Here, the idea is to, in a sense, complement what FDA is already doing, complement the areas where they are struggling much more, which is with countries that don't have comparable regulatory systems, and so, you could narrow it down in that particular way. You know, there's a question, do you do it? There's mandatory testing that Europe does, and the product actually have to make it into Europe first before it gets tested. It sits there in warehouses. Would that be necessary? It adds to cost, but then it also adds a certain level of assurance. One thing I would like to mention is that there are different ways of trying to solve this and level the playing field. If you were to ask me, I would prefer to level the playing field in a way where we actually have this kind of quality assurance, because overnight, we're not going to be able to switch away from our reliance, especially on India. India in 2024 produced 61 percent of solid oral dose products that we sell in the United States, and the full market is 187 billion pills, and India makes 60-61 percent of them. We're talking about 180 different facilities. We're talking about API facilities of probably over 200, well over 200. The size of this is massive, and I think we need to prioritize. One way for us to deal with that is to save onshoring for priorities and figure out some other ways to deal with manufacturing quality. Senator Kim. Well, I think the idea is that we can have multiple tools that don't have to run sequentially---- Dr. Wosinska. That's right. Senator Kim [continuing]. but simultaneously. Mr. Rechenberg, you raised the issue about independent batch testing and things that are somewhat similar to what we just heard. I don't know how familiar you are with this qualified person model. What's your sort of initial reaction to that, and what else can we be thinking about in terms of independent batch testing? Mr. Rechenberg. Yes, I think that this is also a critical point for anything that we're currently importing needs to be verified for quality. Because a lot of the time, in the U.S. currently, we're getting drugs that are imported, and we only find out after the fact that they have these bad tests, and then they're recalled, and U.S. patients have already taken them. If we adopt a more European-style model where we have this independent batch testing that in order to have these drugs released into the U.S. market, they have to be tested and verified that they are quality drugs, that they work for what they say they're going to work for. Then this will greatly reduce the risk. This is an essential first step. Senator Kim. You think it's worth exploring these different ideas that are out there? Mr. Rechenberg. Absolutely. Senator Kim. Okay. Well, thank you so much, and with that, I'll yield back. The Chairman. Senator Johnson. Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, having supplied the medical device industry for close to 30 years, I mean, this is just quality control 101 we're talking about here. It's actually shocking it's not in place. Chairman knows I'm big into data, so I want to understand the raw material supply chain here. We talk about precursor chemicals. Approximately, how many precursor chemicals do you need? What's the universe of that? I'll ask you, Mr. Paquin, or whoever knows it. Mr. Sardella. I could say within one dimension. We looked at 40 critical medicines. They were based on seven foundational chemistries, so seven to make the 40 started with raw chemistry, seven raw chemicals, they got converted into key starter materials. Those got converted to active pharmaceutical ingredients and then drug. The ratio is not of magnitudes of order that's insurmountable. It's achievable. Senator Johnson. How many total drugs are we--how many total drugs? Anybody have a number? Mr. Sardella. It is 3,200 approved drugs for use in the United States. Senator Johnson. Over 3,000? Mr. Sardella. Correct. Senator Johnson. How many active pharmaceutical ingredients comprise those 3,000 drugs? Mr. Sardella. We don't have specific data on it, but I would say in the hundreds, not thousands, by any means. Dr. Wosinska. For API it would be the same number. Because a drug is the API. It would be the same number, but the question is how many intermediates, or reagents, or solvents, or key starting materials, that will be less. Senator Johnson. Again, I'm just--so are there 100 precursor chemicals, or is that overstating the case? Mr. Sardella. Probably, a little higher than 100 as raw chemicals. I mean, within magnitude of order. Senator Johnson. Almost all those are produced in China. Mr. Sardella. A predominant number of those are produced in China. Our chemical manufacturing base moved to China many decades ago, and they control that. Senator Johnson. If you're getting a brand name drug, are those precursor chemicals for the brand name drugs produced here in America? Mr. Sardella. No. They would be likely also produced elsewhere. Keeping in mind that most of our new branded drugs are biologicals, and we're talking about drugs that are called small molecules. They're chemically derived. Senator Johnson. We are highly deficient in the base raw material, right, the precursor chemicals. Most in China, even with brand name drugs, that's a precursor chemical coming in from China. Is it easier to quality control than the active pharmaceutical ingredients? Mr. Sardella. The key starter materials from a control standpoint still have issues in regards to their quality. If you want to say, like, impurities still exist in those key chemicals---- Senator Johnson. Because we're taking those precursors chemicals now for brand drug, are they also getting the API then primarily? Mr. Sardella. That is correct. Senator Johnson. Then, they're just stamping the pill. Dr. Wosinska, you're shaking your head. Dr. Wosinska. API is largely for branded drugs, is largely made in the United States and Europe. Senator Johnson. Okay, say that over again? Dr. Wosinska. For branded drugs, API is overwhelmingly made in the United States and Europe, but using---- Senator Johnson. Not in China, but using precursor chemicals primarily from China. Dr. Wosinska. Only if they are small molecules. Back to the point that Tony made, if you have biologics, the ones--and a lot of the branded drugs are biologics, those are made with an entirely different process. That's not chemical. You actually grow them in cells. Senator Johnson. Okay. Then that's done here in the U.S.? Dr. Wosinska. That would be done in U.S. and in Europe. Senator Johnson. The precursor chemicals, that's a frightening process, requires permitting. Why was that off shored? Because of permitting process? Or is there any kind of--I wouldn't think in big man, you know, large refining process, you're going to have much cost advantage due to offshore. Is it a primary problem of permitting? Mr. Sardella. No, the genesis of that offshoring had multitude of factors. One was regulatory oversight in the United States for those facilities versus foreign, the cost of labor in foreign countries versus the United States. Senator Johnson. Refining, you got a lot of equipment, and there's not many people hanging around a refinery plant. Mr. Sardella. Well, and the third part was this a desire not to have those facilities here or near populations in the United States Senator Johnson. Because it's a dirty manufacturing process. Mr. Sardella. Just large emissions, large facilities. Senator Johnson. Correct. We're going to first have to overcome that. There're basic and precursor chemicals, and we have to have that honest discussion. By the way, Dr. Wosinska, you know, we are staying on the same hymnal here. You know, solve a problem. You had to first properly define it. That's why I'm--again, I've only got five minutes. I'm basically out of time here. We need to properly define this problem. We need to understand the raw material supply chain. We need to understand volumes. We need to understand how many--what we're talking about. Before we leap to a solution that's mistargeted, but let's get all this data down. Again, this, Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate this hearing. This is extremely important. We need to fully understand this. We need more data. Mr. Sardella. If I could add to it, one of the things I'd mentioned was the fact that we're not just reshoring, we're using advanced technology. The ability to convert those large facilities into equipment that fits on this table is a critical added value. Bringing it to United States with advanced technologies, advanced equipment that allow us to make those facilities smaller, cleaner, and more efficient. Senator Johnson. But let me, final point. Doing a QC check on even imported drugs, this is not rocket science. Now people can cheat on it, it needs regulatory oversight. This should not be hard. It's shocking that it's not already in place. It shows the failure of our federal health agencies. Truthfully, it's the utter failure that this is happening today. The Chairman. Well, the fact that we don't have, we don't have a supply chain, we don't have a map, right? There was no-- we haven't thought about having a map. We've allowed ourselves to be so dependent, it doesn't make any sense. Senator Johnson. We've known about these drug shortages for a long time and we've done nothing about it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Ranking Member. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome this Committee's eager efforts on this issue, because I think we can make a difference on a bipartisan basis on this. Dr. Wosinska. Let's talk a little bit more about China, specifically. You mentioned your concerns about antibiotics, and that should be prioritized. Tell us what else you think should be prioritized. What specific medicines do you believe are most vulnerable to dependency? Lay the out the risk for us. Dr. Wosinska. Thank you for this question. I think every one of us here at this table would agree that antibiotics are by far the most vulnerable. If you actually look at India and what the Indian government is concerned about, they are also themselves very nervous about their own reliance on China, especially around antibiotics. A lot of the subsidies that they are doing is to actually de-risk their own supply chains, actually on our behalf to a large extent, so, this is great because they're invest, they're making these investments without the American consumers having to pay, for taxpayers to pay for this, but there's this concern about antibiotics. That's by far the most concerning. I think it's much more difficult back to the mapping exactly which drugs have the largest exposure to China other than that. I would say is, that we don't have to figure that antibiotics need support and we need to move on other things. We do need to do more homework and understand it. I will say that in terms of mapping, I am a little wary about mapping it for everything. I would much rather start with: here are the essential medicines, and here, let's figure out where they come from, because those are the ones that we know we will be able to secure I would probably start prioritizing drugs first in terms of their importance, and then really in detail mapping, because it's not just figuring out where the KSM comes from. The key starting material is only one of the chemicals that you use. You need reagents and you need solvents. Those are largely made in China. You need to know all the pieces. If you try to do this for 3,000 drugs, we're going to be stuck in analysis paralysis for a really long time. I would say yes, absolutely mapping, but let's prioritize where we map first. Senator Gillibrand. Does anyone want to add to that answer from their perspective? Mr. Sardella. I do. On the mapping, one of the things we've found is we have worked to map several hundred, is that there's purposeful obfuscation of where the supply comes from and so on. Senator Gillibrand. By whom? Mr. Sardella. By companies in China, who in other areas where they don't---- Senator Gillibrand. They pretend they're from the United States. Mr. Sardella. Correct. They are many different versions of a company. You can't quite track back to is it produced in a China facility? It could be a multitude of reasons. It could be that maybe the facility has some sort of FDA warning. It could be just based on business and ownership structure that they don't want it to be known who owns which company. It's very difficult. We've found that although we're working through it, there are data sets that allow you to identify where those sources of are coming from, from beginning to end. Senator Gillibrand. Tony or Andrew, do you have anything you want to add to the China problem? Mr. Paquin. Yes, I would just add that I think it underscores our inability, ultimately, to have oversight into China, and to really understand what the problem and the sourcing is. I agree that we should focus on essential medicines. That's a definable problem. We can zero in on that. I think the strategy is to then move that into domestic manufacturing as quick as possible. Then we have control of the supply chain. Mr. Sardella. If I could add to that. We've also taken a lens on not only essentials because some of these are very, very low-cost medicines, but also what do the healthcare systems need? What do national retailers need? What does the government need? What makes economic sense to produce here in the United States with advanced technology? When we put those lists together, we did come together with a prioritized list where it makes economic sense. There's demand for those medicines, there's a need for them and they can be a sustainable investment by the us. Senator Gillibrand. Have you submitted that list to us? Mr. Sardella. We've submitted it in collaboration with ASPR, and be happy to submit those as well. Senator Gillibrand. Please submit it to the Committee. Mr. Sardella. I'll be happy to. Senator Gillibrand. Andrew? Mr. Rechenberg. Yes. The final part that I would add is that this does have to be a drug-by-drug approach, especially for a program like the TRQ. I agree that the antibiotics are one of the most critical and one of the most urgent to start on. These are going to have different solutions because they have different supply chains. Additionally, I would say that India is not necessarily a de-risking from China. India has plenty of its own problems, whether it's safety issues, FDA flags that have been in Indian facilities. As on top of that, India had the same problems during COVID. They cutoff some of their supply to the United States, not because of any adversarial, geopolitical reasons, but they have their own population they're trying to supply. The more we can bring back to the U.S., the safer our supply chain will be. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Moody. Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman Scott. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today, especially a great Floridian. Always appreciate seeing a fellow Floridian. You know, I think during the COVID years, a lot of things came to light that maybe Americans weren't paying attention to, even those in the industry. Dependencies for our drug supply chains on these four nations, I think, really started hitting home for a lot of people. I don't think most Americans know that more than 50 percent of the manufacturers supplying our market, it's coming from overseas. I don't think they know that. I don't think that they know that, one of you mentioned, 80 percent of active pharmaceutical ingredients are manufactured overseas, or that China and India combined, make up 85 percent of active API filings. I don't think Americans understand that. Just for having this hearing, I think, Chairman Scott, does Americans a service in shining a light on this specifically when you look at the fact that drug and API manufacturers in China and India receive the most FDA warning letters for violations, which can mean carcinogens and medicines destroying, or falsifying data and non-sterile manufacturing. Everybody's shaking their head, correct. I mean, how long has this been prevalent, that we've been seeing these types of violations? Has that increased as our dependencies on these foreign nations has increased? Mr. Paquin. I think this is a, you know, unintended consequence of the globalization activity over the last 20 years. Senator, and I think you make a very good point. COVID really created the awareness because it broke the global supply chain, and then we all experienced what you're referring to. I think that the average person in America is not really aware of this problem. I do believe that there is a growing awareness that we didn't have maybe five or ten years ago. You know, when we talk about the various actions to take place, and obviously, I keep going back to the idea of bringing supply back to domesticating here, the United States. The idea of country of origin labeling on a medication would probably do a lot toward what you're describing, and that is making the average consumer, and by that, I mean not just patients, but also the doctors, and pharmacists, and healthcare professionals aware of this risk, and that'll probably serve us well as we try and correct the problem. Mr. Sardella. I wanted to add, when we commenced the initiative informed the API Innovation Center, it's only been three years in existence. The first study we did was a perception gap study, and that study looked at the perception of our reliance, of shortages, versus real data around the shortages. What was striking at that time was the two most important stakeholders in our country underestimated the risk scientists and government. I really commend these hearings to expose that both from a government and a scientific community. By nation, we greatly underestimated the risk of shortages and overreliance compared to other nations like China, India, and Europe. That perception gap is starting to close thanks to these types of sessions and the interest. We're working effortly to continue with our publications to close those gaps. Senator Moody. I have to imagine that if consumers had the information and the choice, knowing where about the increase in violations, I mean at this point is are consumers ever informed that where the main ingredients and the drugs that they're taking are manufactured? Mr. Sardella. Very unlikely. There's no transparency. This is a very interesting concept. This is an industry like any other supply chain. Any other supply chain, you can look and understand where the product comes from, what the ingredients are, and where it's sourced. Not our pharmaceuticals. Any other product that you procure has clarity where you can compare quality of that product. You cannot compare the quality of the pharmaceuticals as a result. One in every four prescriptions in the United States is from a facility that has an FDA violation. A quarter of the prescriptions have a violation. I don't want to create alarm. Some of them are simple procedural violations, but nonetheless, it means a quarter are being prescribed that have some sort of violation on the FDA. It is not known. What's also striking is while we overestimate the cost when we work with manufacturers, we're talking like less than a penny to have a U.S. existing manufacturer manufacture that medicine here in the United States with the highest quality of manufacturing standards. Senator Moody. I'm out of time, but I hope you will explore, Mr. Chairman, as you do your questioning, the national security implications for a failure in that supply chain. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Warren. Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Ranking Member for holding this hearing today. We're talking about a broken supply chain, and I was looking at the numbers on this. The U.S. imports seven times the amount of drugs that we were importing in the year 2000. That's how much this has gone up, and you-all are discussing how our reliance on foreign-made pharmaceuticals exposes Americans to drug shortages, to safety risks, and exposes seniors more than anyone. For years I've been working with my colleagues to try to advance reforms, establishing stronger transparency rules, closing loopholes in the Buy American requirements. I just want to say we've gotten a lot of pushback from people who make a lot of money by keeping all of this opaque, and maximizing their profits, and minimizing safety for the American people. Today, I want to hit on something that you all have mentioned, and that is how we get more drugs manufactured domestically. How do we move our supply chain here to the United States. Mr. Rechenberg, you're an expert on drug supply chains. You know that other countries are subsidizing the manufacturer of prescription drugs. How does that affect our ability to make these drugs here in the United States? Mr. Rechenberg. Yes, and this is one of the main problems; that these foreign companies are being subsidized by their own governments. They're able to severely underprice U.S. producers and drive them out of the market. We really need a comprehensive approach here, starting with something like a tariff rate quota system to create a space in the market for U.S. producers. We need to supplement that with direct production incentives for companies, whether through an act like the PILLS Act or through federal procurement. Federal procurement can be a huge part of this, and incentivizing and prioritizing American-made medicine. Senator Warren. Let's talk a little bit about buying here in the United States. The Federal Government could make it easier and less risky for manufacturers to make their products in the U.S. if we would just leverage the power of our federal contracts. That means the government makes a deal with the manufacturer, and says, we guarantee we will buy a certain volume of drugs over the next several years. That makes it better for you. Make the investments, you get out there, you produce the drugs. Now, the DOD actually has contracts for essential medicines, because for obvious reasons, it is important to make sure that our service members have the drugs they need as a national security issue. I have been pushing DOD to make those contracts, domestic production advances. Mr. Sardella, you lead the API Innovation Center, and you've actually looked in to how many critical drugs rely on ingredients manufactured exclusively in China, I think you were talking about this earlier. Would it help national security to expand federal contracting programs at DOD and other agencies and focus them on domestic drug manufacturing? Mr. Sardella. Absolutely. It would be a significant lever to bring back a strong U.S. industrial base for manufacturing. I commend all the incredible work you've done in this area. Then second, one of the elements that would be also very effective is shifting the contracting vehicle from what is an IDIQ, indefinite demand, indefinite quantity, in business. Indefinite demand and indefinite quantity does not reduce the risk. There's no certainty you could lose a contract or volume turning that into a certainty of demand and volume and even cost or price so that a manufacturer can make an investment. We have a small business in Missouri where we've placed two medicines for manufacturing for a healthcare system. We've provided them our technology that we developed. They are now making investments to expand their facility because they have certainty that the healthcare system is giving them a long-term agreement. If the newest government did the same, we expect the same. Senator Warren. You and I are in the same place on this; that more robust federal contracting can create the kind of sustained demand that manufacturers need so that we can eliminate these supply chain vulnerabilities and protect our national security. For me, that is reason enough to implement them. Some critics have warned that, oh, if you shift to American-made drugs, it will be too expensive. On the other hand, we're paying a price, A for vulnerability, and B, if our seniors end up taking drugs that are ineffective and so they are sicker, they stay sick, or if our hospitals are getting price gouged during shortages. Mr. Rechenberg, do you think that shifting to more domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals would over the long run cost more money or save more money? Mr. Rechenberg. It would save far more money. We've seen, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 300 to 500 percent price hikes during a shortage. That's one way we would save money, but also, we're paying a lot more every time the medicine's not there, and the PE have to be in the hospital longer, or you have to have substandard medicine or the hospitals have to pay extra staff to take care of people. Over the long run, you save much more money than you would otherwise because you stop these shortages and you guarantee safer, more effective medicine. Senator Warren. Thank you. You know, Americans shouldn't have to worry about the quality of their prescriptions, whether they're safe to be able to take, whether they're effective, what will happen if the supply chain breaks. For me, that's reason enough to manufacture right here in the United States and using federal contracts to lower those production costs. I think there are a lot more benefits for doing this. That is why I have a bill, the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Defense Enhancement Act that would do just that. I hope we can get some bipartisan support and get that moving. Thank you very much. Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing today. The Chairman. Thanks. Senator Warren, we served on a subcommittee together, Subcommittee on Armed Services. We had she had a hearing and the individual from DOD tried to explain that he couldn't buy American because there's regulation that required him to buy foreign, and then, we found out that there was no regulation. Senator Gillibrand. I think there's a regulation that says to buy the cheapest. There's always a cheap thing, and that's the problem that we talked about. The Chairman: He couldn't explain. Senator Gillibrand. He probably didn't know. Mr. Sardella. We have analyzed those costs for specific molecules among our industrial base, and we verify that they can be produced by U.S. manufacturers an equivalent price. What's preventing that is certainty that they will have a long- term agreement to supply it so that they can make the investment. Then, second, we submitted data for the Congressional Budget Office based on this bill that showed one must and think of it as one temporal point in time where an adversarial country or a foreign manufacturer purposely to drive out, all U.S. manufacturers put the price way below the cost. If you look at it on a five-year average, as Andrew said, you would save significant dollars because once they drive every U.S. manufacturer out, they increase the price, massive volatility. It has to be looked at from a budgeting office on a five-year average basis. That's not even, to bring in what Andrew said, it costs over tens of millions of dollars per shortage of drug within a healthcare system. They're incurring significant costs of those shortages as well. The Chairman. You know, and I just get followup---- Senator Warren. I was just going to say, I get really frustrated on this, that people treat risk as if it's free. We are paying a price for risk, for the fact that yes, we got it right down to the tightest nickel on how to purchase this stuff. It's a very fragile system for way, just pay for another way. That's a cost. The Chairman. We'll go back to what Senator Warren was bringing up. If we had--if we took the DOD and we took the VA, right, if we just took those two and they--I'll just take their drug buying, would that be enough volume to move volume? Mr. Sardella. You would transform the U.S. generic supply chain, and you would also cause a force function for private markets to then also now procure from U.S. manufacturers, because of the reasons we just said, you don't want a quarter of your pharmaceuticals in an FDA violation site. You want to have certainty in local response time resiliency. You would fundamentally transform our generic supply chain. The Chairman. What percent of the generic drugs that the-- if the DOD and VA did just their generics, what percent of the volume that come into the country, would that be you? Just like, is that of 100 percent of generics sold? What percentage does DOD of that 100 percent and VA together. Mr. Sardella. Oh, I don't have specifically those numbers, but it from a standpoint of moving the market and creating an industrial base, 200, 300 medicines into generic would cause a significant resiliency base and a U.S. manufacturing base. The Chairman. All right. Then Mr. Sardella, so you've worked with companies that have opened up plants---- Mr. Sardella. Expanded. The Chairman [continuing]. so have they been able to make the price almost equivalent to what's being bought from overseas? Mr. Sardella. Correct. With new technology. We're not just saying make it the same way. We're through the private investment in public from State of Missouri and ASPR, they're making it in modernized methods. I give the example, it's like they currently make them in batches, the size of this room. Now, they make them in equipment that's the size of this table. The Chairman. Do you have what the return on investment is? Do you know if--so if you were going to invest, how much would it take to open up a plant and how, what would be the how long would it take to get your money back? Do you have any idea yet? Mr. Sardella. On some of the drugs, because we're focused on expansion because there's 30 billion doses of idle capacity in the United States, 30 billion just sitting there. We're focused on taking those idle facilities that are already FDA- approved. What it means is they can get the drug commercialized in less than five years and they get a return on investment in three years. The Chairman. Three years. Okay. We actually don't have to invest money--I'm a business guy. If you gave me a three-year return, I'll do that every day. Right? Mr. Sardella. Absolutely. The Chairman. I mean, so, okay, so number one, we can get the cost down and number two, we can get the investor gets a return. Mr. Sardella. Correct. The return's so strong that our partners are going and getting their own loans to be able to expand facilities. The Chairman. What we got to do is go back to what Senator Warren said; we got to commit volume. Mr. Sardella. Correct. The Chairman. If just DOD and VA did it, and that's it. Mr. Sardella. It'd be transformational. Dr. Wosinska. Can I just add? It's in maybe 10 percent of total volume. I mean, it absolutely would bring some domestic manufacturing to the U.S., it would help secure supplies for VA, but it's too small of a fraction to really create change in the rest of the market. It's not to do it, I absolutely encourage you to do it. This is a perfect thing to that, you know, very sensible thing to do. We need to think beyond that because we need to sort of change the dynamics in the rest of the markets in the 90 or so percent, in the markets, to change how those markets operate and what they value. The Chairman. Just a caution, I ran a hospital company, and I was two percent of the entire healthcare dollar. I focused on, you know, I could move all the volume in the whole country, I could force everybody to change based on buying, based on quality. Everybody had to change. I would just even--because nobody would, there's no--I was the biggest committed buyer in the VA. I think you're--what you said makes sense, but reality is most people are not committed buyers. That's why if we have really committed buyers, then I think it'd have a bigger impact. Dr. Wosinska. I'm sorry that Senator Warren left because Senate Finance actually has a proposal on that that was put forward last year, that exactly does this; the idea for the most vulnerable supply chains, which are a lot of the generic sterile injectables is to create committed contracts, and then have add-on payments for choosing reliable manufacturers. Absolutely, the same concept. It really would be great to see movement on that side. The Chairman. Have any of you done business with the DOD or VA? Mr. Paquin. Yes, we've done business with the DOD and the VA. The Chairman. Did they care about quality? Mr. Paquin. No. You know, I was going to bring that up. I commented earlier about technically acceptable, and I think that's a mis defined term in this circumstance. They're not considering resilience. For example, they're not considering the benefits of supply chain, and they're viewing that drug overseas as equivalent to the drug domestically made. I think that's the big mistake. I would say that what we could use would be a DOD set aside requirement for American made for example. I completely agree that the VA could lead the charge. I think you'll find that private hospitals or the commercial hospital business that you're familiar with would actually follow that lead. I think they're ready to recognize the need for resiliency and stability in the supply chain. You need that big buyer to step up and start the process. I think that's the VA and the DOD. Mr. Sardella. I can confirm what Tony is saying, because we are aggregating demand with healthcare systems and retail pharmacies knowing that this is a national priority for our Nation. They are willing, as he said, and that would give a further indication to aggregate demand across their systems to procure U.S.-based supply for the benefit of the system. The Chairman. For each of you, if you had a choice, there's two different, same drug, and you had one little bottle that said, "Made in the United States," okay. The other bottle said, "Made in China." How many of you would buy same price? Look, they both look really nice. Same little, pretty bottle. How many of you would buy China? Mr. Sardella. I might want to disclose that my original background is as a toxicologist in this context, I would absolutely buy the U.S. medicine. The Chairman. Anybody buy China? No? What if it added on there that whether American or Chinese, that it's under an FDA violation, however small. There's some website that you can go to see what it was. Would that have an impact on you? Mr. Paquin. Yes. Clearly, we would avoid buying anything that had an FDA violation. You know, when you think about something so sensitive as a drug, right, we're not buying a toy or a vitamin. We're buying something that affects our health in a very personal way. We'd buy quality. The Chairman. The thing about the buyers in this country, Federal Government, hospitals, nursing homes, GPOs, doctors, pharmaceutical chains, have you known any of them that required--they did it based on quality? Mr. Paquin. No, I regularly do business with all those entities, and they don't really require--they may want to, but there isn't a method for them to assess that quality as we've been describing. There's really no independent way to measure a report. The Chairman. Good, but Tony, they could say, "I'm not doing it. If you haven't had an FDA inspection within three years, I won't do it." Mr. Paquin. They could do it for sure. Dr. Wosinska. Can I add something? The Chairman. Sure. Dr. Wosinska. I have studied generic sterile injectable shortages really for 15 years. Transparency often comes up that we don't know which manufacturer is reliable, but at the end of the day, it's the lack of incentives, and the fact that hospitals and GPOs do not fully internalize the harm that comes with it. The numbers that Andrew commented on---- The Chairman. Can you go through--when you say the harm, how would you define the harm? Dr. Wosinska. Yes. The amount of money that hospitals--and there was a study, $360 million from additional costs resulting from shortages. It seems like a large number. This comes out-- -- The Chairman. Just because of costs. Dr. Wosinska. Right. They have to have additional staff and whatnot that comes out to $60,000 per year. That's nothing for a hospital. That $60,000 is nothing for a hospital. If you look at how much for a day---- The Chairman. That's for a day, by the way, Dr. Wosinska. This is for a year, right? The Chairman. I know. Dr. Wosinska. If that's the level of the cost, you know, hospitals are very strongly incentivized to buy the cheapest. In a sense, it makes sense. These drugs are therapeutically equivalent. You're paying for quality, right? The Chairman. We're not paying for quality. Dr. Wosinska. We are not paying for quality. We're not paying for quality. I will say that I have to disagree with Andrew here. I don't think there's free lunch. If we want to have reliability, if we want to have resilience, if we have to want to have quality, we will have to pay for it. I think it's a--you know, we have to ask ourselves how much are we willing to pay for it? But there are ways to do it, but you have to change incentives. I think, you know, Civica Rx, I don't know if you're familiar with that organization, right? They do a lot of homework around where the drugs are made. They have stockpiles, they have long-term contracts. Hospitals are not signing up for these contracts. They're really wary about this because, oh, my goodness, they might actually end up paying more, right? We have to change the fundamental incentives, and shift sort of how hospitals are thinking about it. The Chairman. Well, the problem--I used to be in the business, I just say nobody came to my hospital because I served Pepsi over Coke. Nobody came because I did this, you know, I had this drug or that drug, or I bought my drugs in the United States, or I bought my drugs someplace else. Dr. Wosinska. There isn't accountability for hospitals either. If they have a shortage, they point as the manufacturer, right? It ultimately ends up with the patient, unfortunately. The Chairman. Andrew, when you say that it pays for it, have you been able to do a study of what the additional costs, additional hospitalization, blah blah blah, any of those things? Have you done that? Mr. Rechenberg. Yes. We're currently working on a study to get an exact number here. From all the research that we've done so far, looking at the productivity costs, the shortage costs, and as well as just the worst patient outcomes, whether it's delayed care, rationed care, or getting substandard treatment, the cost vastly outweighs. We're currently in the process of making a study to get an exact number on this, but it is clear already that the long- term cost is much, much more savings than it would be by paying the marginally more rates in the beginning. Then on top of that, I'll add for this buyer's side, for the hospital, because we don't have this mandatory country of origin labeling, the hospitals themselves often don't know what the supply chain risks are The Chairman. Even if they wanted to do the right thing. Mr. Rechenberg. Exactly. Especially when it comes back to the API. They have so little visibility into the quality side, they have to go for the price, and that inevitably pushes things more offshore. Dr. Wosinska. I can tell you that where it really does pay off is for the patient. There was one study that looked at one particular shortage, one shortage of a drug, and the fact that more patients ended up dying of septic shock because the alternative was not available. When you looked at the cost of life, and you calculated the number of patients that died, that single shortage cost over $13 billion. Senator Gillibrand. The hospital doesn't pay that cost. Dr. Wosinska. Exactly. The hospital does not pay that cost. There's a big gap between the---- The Chairman. It's worse. Senator Gillibrand. You pay the hospital. The Chairman. That's right. The worst is that we don't pay for results like we should pay. We should pay different. Like, if somebody doesn't do your car, fix your car, right, you don't pay, but every healthcare provider thinks, well, you still have to pay. Why? Senator Gillibrand. The problem is, you're talking about dynamic scoring, which is not how the hospitals balance their budgets. When you do your analysis, you say it's only costing them $60,000 a year because they're not obligated to factor in all the costs and harm caused to the patient, or to society, or to any other stakeholder outside of their bottom line. That's the problem. Like, the costs are spread to us. The profits are given to the provider. When they're doing their cost-based analysis, they're saying, "Well, we are going to go with the cheaper drug." The DOD is the same. Every purchaser in the system today has multiple factors, but cost is almost always the factor. I believe---- The Chairman. It's the decision today, not the long-term cost. Senator Gillibrand. Correct. No one does dynamic scoring. No one actually wants to bear the full brunt of the cost. I think part of this Committee's job is to really do all the pieces that you've all suggested; country of origin labeling, making sure we know the quality upfront, have an incentive as you say, to do the quality testing, make sure that the cost, as you've decided, Andrew is documented to the world, to the patient, to the United States. Then to the other piece of national security that's not even you calculable. You can't calculate what will happen if we're at war. The risk if we're at war with China and you can't get antibiotics into this country and how many millions of people die, the cost of that is trillions of dollars. It's incomprehensible. The truth is, this is a reason why no one's done this work before because the cost is incalculable. I'm really excited about the work this Committee's doing, and I think it's important. The Chairman. It seems like if you go through the process to make movement, the easiest thing is because they report to us, DOD and VA, right, if they started buying based on buying American, that would move the needle, right? That would move it the fastest. The other is why doesn't--we talk about these violations, FDA, or the FDA knowing that we only have one supplier. Why aren't they doing something? Mr. Sardella. In regards to diversifying? The Chairman. Yes, I mean, why wouldn't they? I mean if they're responsible for us staying safe, right? Mr. Sardella. Well, their mandate is to ensure that manufacturers comply with CGMP manufacturing practices, and that before they even produce those medicines, that they've been vetted through analysis of them. Going beyond as to managing the supply chain itself and saying how many, that would be outside their bounds in regards to what they would work on. I would also ask---- Dr. Wosinska. Yes---- Mr. Sardella. I would also say that--sorry Marta. Just one line. I would also say that that strategy also does something very different as well. It's a strategy of redirecting as opposed to countering, right, as opposed to countering and trying to counter India and counter China, which will be very resourceful, right? Being able to start with redirecting manufacturer through procurement U.S.-based requirements, U.S.- based prioritization. Which by the way, we're the only nation that does not prioritize their domestic manufacturing source over foreign. The ability to do that is a far more higher probability of success because you're redirecting, you're not countering, which is difficult. The Chairman. Did you want to say something? Okay. Just off the top of our head, we can think about the VA, DOD, we should have some sort of map. Even if we start, like you said, you can't start big, you should even if we start small and then we should have higher expectations for all of our buyers. Senator Gillibrand. Demand transparency, I definitely think that can require transparency. The Chairman. Sorry, go ahead. Senator Gillibrand. We should require transparency. We should require labeling. We should require information. Then, that also can move a market because you can shame people into not--like if they're not caring where their drugs are coming from, and they're not caring about the outcome to their patients, you can shame them into better participation. Then, if the DOD and the VA can be the standard bearer or the hallmark of success, and show that long-term their costs aren't going skyrocketing high, they can then make the case you should do these long-term investments, get the quality drugs you need. Then pushing Governors and pushing Presidents to invest domestically, because the other point you all raised up is that most of our adversaries and most of our competitors, they do domestic investment. I mean every company in China is wholly owned by China. Like, they will do all the baseline investments. We can create an investment fund that actually invests in domestic production to incentivize it. Even if we don't want to create a pot of money, we certainly can create massive tax incentives. There's many ways to create carrots. The Chairman. Well, and what if Tony said it's right, there's a three-year payback. I mean you don't have to invest a dime. Mr. Sardella. Especially, if you're using existing facilities, and that's the key. The Chairman. At least short-term, we have plenty of capacity. Mr. Sardella. We have over 30 billion doses of capacity. Senator Gillibrand. Also, you can use the Defense Production Act to require us to use that capacity. Mr. Sardella. That is correct. Senator Gillibrand. Once we map capacity, if you've already done that, we can publish that to say we will then ask the DOD, and the VA, and the President to ask each of these manufacturers to use all their capacity to begin to ramp up domestic production of the top 10 required generic drugs for our safety and survival. Mr. Sardella. You have facilities that are highly experienced at producing these medicines. They should be leveraged first and foremost because they're experts in these areas, like the companies that Tony brought up. Before even starting up new facilities, we will need, ideally--hopefully, we'll be able to open new facilities. Leveraging the incredible experience we already have in this industrial manufacturing base that is elite and being able to provide them new technologies, that's where the investment, I believe, is the greatest place. It's about investing and allowing for sustainable independence by these manufacturers. We don't want the government to continue to have to invest in them, modernize their facility, leverage their expertise. Let them invest themselves now that there's a market and allow them to be sustainable long-term economically to produce these medicines. You've created the demand. Demand investment in modernization so they can compete so long-term we don't have to revisit this and have to continue to fund it. The industries themselves can do it. The Chairman. Great. Okay, go ahead. Dr. Wosinska. Can I comment on transparency? I think it's really, really critical. The way I think about transparency is who needs what information and what are they going to do with it? I think it's really, really critical to ask that question because some transparency for the sake of transparency is not going to get you anywhere. Transparency can actually sometimes backfire. I am a very big proponent about the government having transparency. This is how you decide what to prioritize, where to invest. This is why it's important for FDA to know that manufacturers might have a problem and this buys them time. For example, hospitals really want an early warning system of shortages. You know what that means? That means that they basically have a sign to a stockpile really early, and then FDA actually has much less time to try to fix the problem. Where I get really nervous is transparency to consumers. I'll tell you why. I actually have a story very similar to Peter Baker's story, and it actually involves my mother, if I would be allowed to share this story. I've never shared it publicly. My mother was diagnosed with cancer in early 2020, and she needed to get radiation, and chemotherapy, and it was going to be oral chemotherapy. It was a 60-day supply of a pill, and it was going to be an old generic, and knowing what I know, I got very nervous. I started to--I basically thought; if my mom doesn't respond well to this therapy, I will never forgive myself because what if that product was not made to specification? I actually have access to a lot of information, and I looked at who the manufacturer is for this NDC, and I looked, you know, where it might be manufactured and what are the alternatives. It was really difficult for me, and I have access to really top information. You would think that I would be the first person to say, "We need to fix it." You know, what I learned from this experience is the complete opposite because of what happened next. I went to one pharmacy, and I said, "Can you dispense me this NDC?" They said, "No, we don't do special orders." I went to another pharmacy, I got the same answer. Pharmacies are reimbursed in exactly the same way. It's a low business margin. You have one option when you go to a pharmacy. Unless we were to fix how pharmacies are reimbursed and how pharmacies stock, the patient only has one choice; to pick it up or not pick it up. This is not like going to a store where you have five shirts and you get to choose one. They don't have a choice. By giving this information to consumers where there's absolutely no (financial) incentive for a pharmacy to do anything about it and respond, that is a recipe for a lot of non-adherence. Yes, I would prefer to choose the non-Chinese drug over a Chinese drug, but in a pharmacy, I'm not going to have that option. It's really, really, really important that we either fix the pharmacy reimbursement policy or look for solutions elsewhere. The Chairman. Let me give you my response. I really believe in transparency, and I'll give you a story. I've run a bunch of companies, and you know what every employee wants, they want every hospital in the network. That means you get no discounts, right? The reality is if I had two plans, and everybody's included in a plan that's cheaper with just one hospital, include a smaller network. Some people would pick one because they know it, but some people would pick a bit more expensive. I actually really believe that people, they'll look at it and look, is it going to be perfect? No. People buy bad, ugly sweaters sometimes, but I believe over time it'll force whoever the pharmacy is. If I walked in, and I had one, and it said if I would just--I'd start bugging them. We see it now. We see it with people buying America. You know, you can even get on Amazon, which still doesn't disclose all country of origin, but you go to Amazon now and they have sections. I can tell you, I've talked to people that make it America, they put the label on made the America, their revenues go up. I believe it's--I agree with you, it's not going to be easy. It's not going to be perfect. The information never is perfect, if we do it all, it will force people to change. They will change. I've seen it in too many businesses. Do you want to add anything? Senator Gillibrand. No, you can close us out. The Chairman. I want to thank everybody for being here today and participating. I look forward to continue working with members across the aisle, down the dais. If any Senator has additional questions for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. I want to thank each of you for being here, and if you have any suggestions for either one of us going forward, we are going to get this fixed. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] ======================================================================= APPENDIX ======================================================================= ======================================================================= Prepared Witness Statements ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Tony Sardella [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Tony Paquin [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Andrew Rechenberg [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Dr. Marta E. Wosinska [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= Questions for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Questions for the Record Tony Sardella Ranking Member Kirsten E. Gillibrand [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Questions for the Record Dr. Marta E. Wosinska Ranking Member Kirsten E. Gillibrand Question: You have written about how federal transparency initiatives will fall short of their goals if purchasers, such as hospitals, have no economic or institutional motivation to act on such information. How can hospitals be incentivized to consider quality and reliability over the cost of drugs?What are some of the potential downsides of transparency initiatives should they not be executed alongside other initiatives, such as reforming economic incentives? Response: Transparency initiatives in drug manufacturing often fail to achieve their intended goals-not because the information is wrong, but because they lack the right incentive structures to motivate action. Simply making information available is not enough; those who receive it must be both motivated and equipped to act on it in ways that align with broader economic incentives or institutional structures. Without this alignment, transparency efforts become costly nice-to-haves, and may even produce unintended consequences that worsen the very problems they were designed to solve. To understand which transparency approaches are most likely to succeed, it is useful to first examine the main types of transparency initiatives and how they interact with underlying economic incentives-which often diverge from what serves patients best. There are three main types of transparency initiatives: 1.Government-facing initiatives 2.Patient-facing initiatives 3.Institutional buyer initiatives Existing government-facing initiatives primarily focus on mapping supply chains to identify geopolitical exposure and with it identify which drugs require alternative sources in which production stages of supply chains. Incentives to act on this information will be driven, to a large extent, by Congress (by setting out the tools and directives as well as appropriating funds to follow through) and the administration (by identifying which existing tools they can deploy). Patient-facing initiatives include adding to the pharmacy label either the Country of Origin or a rating of product quality. The goal of these efforts is to shift markets through patients as they begin to shop for versions that presumably are less likely to have product defects. There are two intertwined reasons, however, why such initiatives could go astray. First, without reforms for how pharmacies are reimbursed, patients have limited options in how they respond to sourcing information, other than deciding not to fill the prescription. Second, neither measure is strongly correlated with actual product quality, making potential misinterpretation by patients particularly concerning. When it comes to institutional buyers, efforts have focused largely on creating transparency in the hospital and clinic sector, not the retail pharmacy sector (where the consumer- facing measures seem to have gotten more attention). In the hospital space, there are two main types of transparency initiatives: Supply chain reliability assessments and; Early warning systems. The data needed to support these transparency initiatives varies depending on the goal. Supply chain reliability assessments focus on evaluating the long-term dependability of a manufacturer's supply chain over the duration of a multi-year contract, using indicators such as plant redundancy, inventory controls, raw material sourcing, risk management practices, and historical shortage records. In contrast, early warning systems aim to detect abrupt risks or disruptions in the near term- drawing on real-time signals like new shortage posts on the ASHP website, reports of product discontinuations, sudden order limits from any wholesaler, newly announced adverse FDA inspection findings, recalls, or reports of supply interruptions in global logistics. The economic incentives for these two transparency approaches diverge sharply. Early warning systems enable hospitals to continue prioritizing low-cost procurement without regard for long-term supply reliability, only shifting tactics and rapidly increasing orders at the first hint of trouble. This dynamic offers clear advantages to well-resourced institutions equipped to act quickly, which in turn has driven commercial vendors to develop various rapid alert tools. Yet this competitive hoarding erodes the advance notice intended for regulators, limits FDA's ability to intervene, and accelerates the very shortages these transparency initiatives are supposed to help prevent. In turn, purchasing in times of relative stability-whether through spot buys or contracts-is dominated by the strong incentive to choose the lowest-cost option. There is little to push hospitals or group purchasing organizations toward factoring in supply chain reliability or resilience, as most do not directly bear the costs when a disruption occurs. While there are tools and frameworks available to inform more resilience-focused procurement, hospitals have options but typically lack a meaningful reason to use them, absent clear financial rewards or contractual requirements. Policymakers would be wise not to fuel early warning systems for hospitals but to support supply chain reliability efforts in two ways: by supporting the related transparency efforts and by creating economic incentives. Policymakers can promote supply chain reliability in drug procurement by ensuring purchasers have access to meaningful, actionable information. Changes to current reporting requirements-such as requiring suppliers to specify not only who a drug is "manufactured for" but also who it is "manufactured by"-would make it far easier to track products to facilities that do not have a good compliance record. Supporting FDA's Quality Management Maturity (QMM) initiative is another foundational step, as public disclosure of QMM ratings would highlight manufacturers that invest in robust quality and operational practices, allowing buyers to consider reliability and performance in addition to price during contract negotiations. Policymakers should complement transparency efforts by pursuing payment and contracting policies that create meaningful economic incentives for hospitals and manufacturers to prioritize supply chain reliability. Current proposals-such as those from the Senate Finance Committee and HHS-would authorize financial rewards or penalties based on a buyer's or supplier's record of ensuring supply continuity, product quality, or timely response during shortages. By tying payment rates directly to reliable performance-or imposing disincentives for repeated supply failures-these initiatives aim to move the market beyond cost alone, encouraging long-term investments in resilience throughout the supply chain. Question: In your research you recommend a broad strategy when it comes to deciding which drug supply chain resiliency efforts to prioritize and support. More specifically, you recommend that the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response shift from a fixed list of essential drugs toward a longer list that stratifies drugs by how critical they are, their reach, and how vulnerable they are to disruption. Could you say more about how this longer, stratified list would better enable the federal government to support resilience efforts? Response: When it comes to supporting drug supply chain resilience efforts, setting priorities is important because of the scale and complexity of the drug supply chain. There are well over 2,000 approved prescription drugs, spanning a large array of ingredients, manufacturing technologies, and production sites that collectively produced 187 billion tablets and capsules for American patients in 2024, not counting other dosage forms. The lack of economic incentives in the market coupled with the magnitude of what it would take to secure all drug supply chains requires that the government prioritizes where to engage. Prioritization is not only needed but possible because not all drugs are equally important. For example, some drugs are lifesaving in emergencies, such as epinephrine auto-injectors for severe allergic reactions or insulin for patients with type 1 diabetes. Others, like certain chemotherapy agents or antibiotics, are critical for treating serious infections and cancers. Drugs for chronic conditions, such as antihypertensives and statins, affect large patient populations but interruptions are not generally life threatening, especially in the short term. U.S. government prioritization began with the FDA's list, created under a 2020 Executive Order, which identified over 220 drugs and medical countermeasures most needed for immediate and life-saving medical use in hospitals. The Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) subsequently narrowed this to 86 drugs, focusing more tightly on those deemed essential for acute care. Most recently, at the direction of the administration, ASPR further narrowed the target to about 26 drugs, selecting those for strategic stockpiling initiatives. Budget and time constraints have made this narrowing process unavoidable. With limited new funds appropriated by Congress for comprehensive supply chain resilience, the administration's current efforts are focused on building and maintaining a six-month supply of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) for this small subset of drugs. If policymakers pursue costlier or more complex resilience strategies such as supporting new domestic manufacturing of API and all its inputs, not even all 26 may be covered, and prioritization within this short list would become necessary under a limited budget. A broader, stratified list would give policymakers flexibility to adjust investments as resources change. If Congress allocates additional funds, efforts could expand without reworking the prioritization framework. Such a list would guide readiness planning, clarify what additional money could achieve, and allow for a quick response as budget realities evolve. In practice, criticality and reach remain fairly stable for most products unless major therapeutic advances occur; vulnerability can change quickly. Initial reviews should focus on identifying drugs with the greatest health impact and reach. Detailed, regularly updated vulnerability assessments can then be reserved for a larger list of higher-priority drugs, concentrating resources where they matter most and avoiding exhaustive analysis of less critical products. To build a practical, ranked drug framework, it is also essential to factor in resilience-building cost and capacity constraints. The main cost drivers are often tied not to the price of the drug itself, but to the logistics of production- such as the potency of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (affecting how much can be handled in existing facilities if capacity is limited) and the specialization required of manufacturing processes. These realities can force tradeoffs, requiring policymakers to choose between covering more drugs that fit within common, flexible plant capacity, or prioritizing medicines that do not demand highly specialized production setups and supply chains. Question: Your work highlights why drug manufacturers outsource chemical synthesis for drug manufacturing to China. Chemical synthesis can create toxic materials and could be quite harmful to the environment. You recommend that the U.S. fund chemical industrial parks as part of onshoring efforts. Could you say more about how funding domestic industrial parks could help to reduce American reliance on chemicals synthesized in China? Response: Efforts to derisk pharmaceutical supply chains from China require developing alternative sources for critical chemical inputs. Diversification does not necessarily mean full onshoring; establishing production capacity in allied, cost- competitive countries can often achieve greater efficiency while mitigating geopolitical risk. However, for strategically sensitive or high-risk materials, selective onshoring can enhance national resilience. An important part of derisking supply chains from China is at the earliest, unregulated steps: key starting materials, intermediates, and auxiliary chemicals like reagents and solvents used in synthesis. This is where U.S. drug supply chain exposure is the greatest. The reliance is driven by Chinese firms' strong cost advantage through significant economies of scale coupled with lower labor, energy, and transportation costs. Historically, a lax regulatory framework allowed Chinese producers to operate with higher environmental and workplace risks than Western and Indian competitors, enabling their cost advantage. Following the Beijing Olympics, China began to reckon with environmental pollution and began raising standards and investing in greener manufacturing methods. The question is then, how should the U.S. respond if it chooses to onshore chemical manufacturing. Environmental deregulation alone will not succeed in shifting production to America because China will continue to hold an insurmountable cost advantage driven by lower energy, lower labor, and deep economies of scale. In fact, a race to the bottom on environmental standards would require the U.S. to set regulations lower than even India and China are willing to accept-countries that have already rejected the dirtiest manufacturing practices as economically and socially unsustainable. The future of chemical manufacturing lies in advanced green chemistry technologies that represent the next generation of global competitive advantage. These approaches are more efficient, create higher value-added products, and generate more skilled, higher-paying jobs than legacy chemical processes. Chemical industrial parks offer a more sustainable and scalable alternative to traditional one-company-at-a-time funding. By co-locating multiple manufacturers within shared infrastructure-centralized wastewater treatment, utilities, analytical testing facilities, and logistics-these parks significantly lower the per-unit overhead for each producer. This model is widely used in Europe, India, and certain U.S. states. Parks also create resilience: if one tenant exits, another can step in using the same infrastructure, protecting the government's investment and maintaining supply continuity. For policymakers working within budget constraints, industrial parks provide a mechanism to support multiple products and processes simultaneously, rather than betting on individual companies or isolated facilities. Centralized environmental controls-shared wastewater treatment plants equipped to handle toxic intermediates, air quality monitoring, and hazardous waste management-enable cost- efficient pollution control far more effective than individual facilities can achieve. This allows domestic chemical production to meet U.S. environmental standards without imposing prohibitive costs on each manufacturer, reversing the historical trend of exporting pollution alongside production. Senator Raphael Warnock Question: Rural health providers in Georgia rely on access to affordable drugs to treat patients, including older Americans. Due to financial vulnerability, rural providers have limited capacity to build a stockpile of drugs in preparation for supply shortages. How can Congress work to ensure rural hospitals and clinics can provide affordable and safe drugs to seniors in times of a drug shortage crisis? What kind of policy changes would incentivize domestic drug suppliers to develop generic drugs and improve aging rural populations' access to prescription drugs? Response: It is indeed the case that rural providers, especially those not part of a large health system, have severely limited ability to withstand supply disruptions. This stems partly from scale: they often lack staff dedicated to supply chain management, operate on thin financial margins that leave little room for inventory investment, and cannot leverage the purchasing power of larger systems. Independent rural facilities face a particularly acute challenge: unlike small hospitals within integrated systems that can at least access their parent organization's negotiating leverage and shared contracts, truly independent rural providers must navigate procurement entirely on their own. A 2023 STAT article illustrated this dynamic during the national shortage of carboplatin and cisplatin. Large health systems weathered the disruption easily, using their purchasing power and strong supplier relationships to stockpile supplies. Small, often rural, independent oncology clinics could not-they lacked these advantages and were sidelined by allocation systems favoring historical bulk orders. Many small clinics had to ration care, send patients to distant centers, or delay lifesaving treatment altogether, intensifying distress and risking poorer outcomes for vulnerable populations. The shortage exposed systemic flaws in drug procurement practices and underscored the urgent need for reforms to ensure more equitable access to essential drugs. Analytics and data systems play a major role in the disparities seen during chemotherapy drug shortages because large hospital systems typically have sophisticated analytics tools that allow them to monitor drug inventory, predict shortages, and swiftly respond by stockpiling or reallocating supplies across their networks. These systems provide actionable data on usage rates, inventory levels, and shortage signals, enabling proactive strategies like early purchasing or redistribution before official shortage notifications are issued. In contrast, small independent clinics often lack access to such analytics and automation, making it difficult for them to anticipate shortages or compete for limited supply- further widening the gap in access during crises like the carboplatin and cisplatin shortage. Expanding the use of advanced analytics with small providers has the potential to help these providers better anticipate drug shortages, optimize inventory, and negotiate more effectively with suppliers, reducing vulnerability during supply chain disruptions. However, the cost, technical complexity, and need for specialized staff pose significant obstacles. Many small clinics operate with tight budgets and limited personnel, making it difficult to adopt and maintain sophisticated data systems even if the technology itself is available. They will always be behind the curve and therefore last in line. For most small and rural clinics, greater resilience may come from direct preparedness strategies, such as regional stockpiling programs, collaborative purchasing efforts, and supportive policy reforms that redistribute essential drugs during crises. One such recent effort was CMS establishing a separate payment system for small independent facilities, many of them rural, to help them create and maintain a buffer inventory of essential medicines. This authority is based on the same legal mechanism used for N95 mask stockpiling during the pandemic. The program allows qualifying hospitals to receive targeted Medicare payments specifically for the costs of purchasing and storing a reserve supply of designated drugs, with eligibility focused on hospitals most likely to face financial and logistical barriers to stockpiling. However, this authority is limited by statutory language that restricts reimbursement to only "reasonable costs." The "reasonable costs" constraint ties reimbursement only to Medicare's share of a hospital's business, meaning that hospitals must maintain buffer inventory sufficient to serve their entire patient population-including Medicaid, uninsured, and commercially insured patients-but can only be reimbursed for the Medicare portion of those inventory costs. Additionally, the costs of tracking, monitoring, and reporting on buffer stock inventory are not reimbursed under the program. These limitations mean that the payments offered may not fully cover the financial and operational burdens of creating and maintaining a substantial buffer stock, limiting participation. To address these limitations, Congress should strengthen the existing CMS framework by amending the statutory authority that currently restricts reimbursement to "reasonable costs" tied only to Medicare's share of hospital business. Specifically, Congress should authorize CMS to provide full reimbursement for buffer stock costs regardless of payer mix, recognizing that hospitals must maintain inventory for all patients, not just Medicare beneficiaries. Additionally, the statute should be amended to support a fixed payment model rather than the current submit-a-bill approach, which would reduce administrative burden and make participation more attractive to resource-constrained rural hospitals. The fixed payment should also cover the costs of tracking, monitoring, and reporting on buffer stock inventory- costs currently excluded from reimbursement. Congress and CMS can also influence how wholesalers allocate scarce products during shortages. Wholesalers typically allocate based on historical purchasing patterns over a short lookback period (often 3-6 months), which systematically disadvantages small rural providers with variable ordering patterns. A rural hospital that orders 100 units of a critical drug every 12 months may receive zero allocation if the lookback period captures only the months between orders. Meanwhile, large integrated health systems have a significant advantage: they can bypass wholesalers entirely and purchase directly from manufacturers during shortages, securing supply outside the allocation system altogether-an option unavailable to small independent hospitals. To level the playing field, CMS could mandate that wholesalers use longer, smoothed lookback periods as a condition of participation in Medicare or Medicaid programs-for example, calculating allocations based on 12-24 month rolling averages rather than recent 3-6 month snapshots. Additionally, Congress could direct FDA or CMS to establish minimum fairness standards for allocation methodologies during shortages, similar to how other federal agencies regulate allocation of scarce resources. Finally, allocation formulas should be reformed to use objective metrics tied to patient population served, licensed bed capacity, or facility size, rather than pure historical purchasing volume. Beyond influencing allocation during shortages, Congress can also make the entire pharmaceutical supply chain more reliable by reducing the risk and frequency of supply disruptions themselves. Legislative actions may include requiring redundancy and diversification among manufacturers, strengthening federal oversight for manufacturing quality and inspections, incentivizing domestic production, and supporting proactive stockpiling at the national level. These measures would help prevent supply shocks from occurring and limit their scale, ensuring that small rural hospitals are not perpetually vulnerable to access disparities even when major disruptions occur. Question: Hurricane Helene shut down Baxter International's North Carolina facility and caused a nationwide intravenous (IV) fluid shortage. Hospitals across the country were forced to ration their IV fluids until the company restored its manufacturing capability. I sent a letter to the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services leadership pushing them to provide relief during this crisis. How could Congress leverage technology like predictive analytics to strengthen the resilience of domestic drug supply chains in times of natural disasters? Response: Predictive analytics can be an invaluable tool for monitoring supply chains and anticipating shortages, but their use during a crisis-such as the IV fluid shortage following Hurricane Helene-can compound existing vulnerabilities. When predictive analytics signal an emerging scarcity, large health systems often respond by accelerating stockpiling or bulk purchasing, which can deplete inventory faster and outcompete smaller hospitals for limited resources. This dynamic can leave rural and independent providers even more exposed, intensifying the very shortages that technology is aiming to mitigate. Better, real-time tracking of saline usage at both inventory and patient levels would significantly improve a hospital system's ability to allocate scarce resources during a shortage. Saline and other IV fluids are FDA-approved drugs, yet many hospitals treat them as supplies rather than medications. This classification outside the pharmacy system means administrations and usage are often not barcode-scanned or tracked like medications, making it difficult for health systems to know where the product is being used or how much. To address this tracking problem, CMS could require health systems to reclassify and track IV fluids as FDA-approved drugs rather than allowing them to be handled outside pharmacies as untracked supplies. Enhanced analytics could identify which units or patients have the greatest clinical need, optimize distribution, and reduce waste or unnecessary stockpiling throughout the network. While real-time tracking and robust analytics enable smarter, more equitable allocation of supplies during a shortage, hospitals also need practical and systemic strategies to prepare for major disruptions. For high-volume products like saline, maintaining a buffer inventory is particularly challenging given the heavy usage, physical volume, and cost of storage. Hospitals must adopt additional safeguards and diversify their approaches beyond stockpiling to prepare for potential shortages. For hospitals, avoiding sole-source contracts is a key step. Reliance on a single supplier for saline or other essential fluids can dramatically widen the impact of any supply disruption, whereas maintaining relationships with multiple vendors lessens vulnerability-enabling continued provision of urgent services even during supply chain shocks. Recent shortages have exposed disparities based on with which manufacturer a hospital contracts. During the 2024 saline shortage following Hurricane Helene, hospitals contracting with Baxter received only 40-60% of normal allocations, while those using B. Braun experienced minimal disruption as B. Braun's facilities were unaffected. Manufacturers can help by investing in more flexible or 'fungible' production systems that allow rapid pivots to different bag sizes or formulations as market demand and regulatory priorities shift. Facilities able to quickly change production lines or scale outputs for alternative product sizes improve overall supply chain resilience, reducing the risk and magnitude of shortages from specific disruptions. Encouraging manufacturers to adopt these adaptive capabilities can increase redundancy and responsiveness, ultimately protecting the entire healthcare system during crises. Congress and the administration can play vital roles in supporting alternative hospital preparedness strategies for saline shortages-using both regulatory "sticks" and financial "carrots." On the regulatory side, policymakers could strengthen antitrust enforcement and oversight to discourage anticompetitive practices, such as exclusive or sole-source contracts that undermine supply resilience and limit access during disruptions. On the incentive side, Congress could expand payment models or grant programs to encourage hospitals to diversify suppliers and invest in logistics for alternative sourcing. ======================================================================= Statements for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Association for Accessible Medicines Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record American Hospital Association Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record American Society of Health-System Pharmacists Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Continuus Pharmaceuticals Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Doctors For America Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Lupin Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Lupin - Coral Springs, FL Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record National Taxpayers Union Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Bad Medicine: Closing Loopholes That Kill American Patients" October 8, 2025 Statements for the Record Teva Statement [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]