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[Senate Hearing 119-45] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-45 RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF RISK WORK- ING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NA- TIONAL LABORATORIES AND NECESSARY MITI- GATION STEPS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 20, 2025 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 60-021 WASHINGTON : 2025 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES MIKE LEE, Utah, Chairman JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho RON WYDEN, Oregon STEVE DAINES, Montana MARIA CANTWELL, Washington TOM COTTON, Arkansas MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii DAVID McCORMICK, Pennsylvania ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine JAMES C. JUSTICE, West Virginia CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, Colorado CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi ALEX PADILLA, California LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota Wendy Baig, Majority Staff Director Patrick J. McCormick III, Majority Chief Counsel Jasmine Hunt, Minority Staff Director Sam E. Fowler, Minority Chief Counsel C O N T E N T S ---------- OPENING STATEMENTS Page Lee, Hon. Mike, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from Utah............ 1 Heinrich, Hon. Martin, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from New Mexico......................................................... 2 WITNESSES Dabbar, Hon. Paul M., CEO and Co-Founder, Bohr Quantum Technology; former Under Secretary for Science, U.S. Department of Energy...................................................... 5 Puglisi, Anna B., Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University..................................................... 108 Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L., Presidential Chair in Science and Professor of Chemistry, University of Oregon; former Under Secretary for Science and Innovation, U.S. Department of Energy 118 ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED Dabbar, Hon. Paul M.: Opening Statement............................................ 5 Written Testimony with attached supplemental material........ 7 Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 151 Heinrich, Hon. Martin: Opening Statement............................................ 2 Lee, Hon. Mike: Opening Statement............................................ 1 Puglisi, Anna B.: Opening Statement............................................ 108 Written Testimony............................................ 110 Richmond, Hon. Geraldine L.: Opening Statement............................................ 118 Written Testimony............................................ 120 Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 155 RESEARCH SECURITY RISKS POSED BY FOREIGN NATIONALS FROM COUNTRIES OF RISK WORKING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND NECESSARY MITIGATION STEPS ---------- THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2025 U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mike Lee, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee's hearing on research security risks posed by foreign nationals from countries of risk working at the Department of Energy's national laboratories and necessary mitigation steps. I will give my five-minute opening statement here in a moment. Then, I will turn to Ranking Member Heinrich for his opening statement. Then, I will introduce witnesses and give them an opportunity to give their five-minute opening statements. The U.S. Department of Energy oversees 17 national labs. These labs have been instrumental in shaping America's technological and military competitive edge. From the Manhattan Project to cutting edge AI research, DOE's national labs have pushed the boundaries of innovation and strengthened our national security. But for those very same reasons, they have also become a prime target for espionage. Secretary Chris Wright, at his confirmation hearing just a few weeks ago, said, ``We must protect and accelerate the work of the DOE labs to secure America's competitive advantage and security.'' I could not agree more. And that is precisely why we are here today at this hearing to explore ways that we can secure American technology for the benefit of our economic and national security. For years, the Chinese Communist Party has worked to infiltrate our national labs, targeting top scientists and siphoning off American research to fuel China's military ambitions through programs like the Thousand Talents Program. The CCP systematically recruited elite scientists, nationals of the People's Republic of China, who were trained in the West, built their careers in American labs, and worked with American funding to develop American technology. And then, the CCP lured them back to China. It is a deliberate strategy to leverage U.S. taxpayer-funded expertise for the benefit of the Chinese military, and tragically, we are starting to see the consequences. Former DOE researchers are helping China develop hypersonic missiles, deep earth penetrating warheads, and advanced submarines. These are weapons designed to outmatch and deter the United States. Make no mistake, Beijing is actively exploiting weak security protocols, academic collaboration loopholes, and U.S. grant programs to advance its military capabilities, all on American taxpayers' dime. During his first term, President Trump tightened DOE's security protocols at the labs. He cracked down on CCP recruitment programs and ensured accountability at the DOE for those who approved a researcher from a country of risk working on DOE projects, making it clear that our national labs wouldn't be used to strengthen the Chinese military. But President Biden loosened those restrictions, and the door is once again open to the CCP, which compels its citizens, by law, to disclose information that they might have that can benefit China's strategic goals. That is unacceptable to the United States. Congress and this Administration must act immediately to close the gaps, tighten security, and ensure that American research stays in American hands. I am looking forward to understanding how the Department of Energy, under the Biden Administration, allowed foreign adversaries to infiltrate our most sensitive research institutions and exploring ways to ensure this never happens again. If we fail to protect our scientific leadership, our intellectual property, and our national secrets, we don't just lose our competitive advantage, we hand it directly to our greatest geopolitical rival. So I look forward, needless to say, to hearing from our witnesses today and learning more about this emerging problem. Now we will turn to Senator Heinrich for his opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN HEINRICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman Lee, and thank you to our expert panel of witnesses for coming to speak with us today. As Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and also a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, counterintelligence at our national labs is a matter that I believe we should all take very seriously. But first, I want to discuss another counterintelligence risk. Last week, the Trump Administration laid off 1,800 DOE employees. Many of our nation's top experts in fields essential to our economic and national security, such as critical and emerging technologies and nuclear safety, were let go. These employees had top security clearances and were dismissed without following legal protocol to end those clearances. And the Trump Administration is now trying to reverse course and reinstate some of these employees. But you have to ask, why would they want to go back after being treated this way? Our best experts have lost trust in the U.S. Government. President Trump is doing exactly what our adversaries want. They aren't losing their best experts, we are. This is a national security threat that will have lasting impacts on our country for decades to come. I sent a letter to the President urging the Administration to halt these mass firings, and I would encourage my colleagues to do the same. Turning back to the research security at our DOE national labs, this is a sensitive issue. We want to avoid telegraphing to our adversaries details on the research our labs are doing and what security protocols our national labs take to protect it. We don't want to give our adversaries a blueprint of any vulnerabilities. This is why we have always discussed this issue in a classified setting. And quite frankly, I am disappointed to read some of the witness testimony to which we cannot appropriately respond in this open venue. But we are here today, so let's do our best to take care with how we have this discussion in a public setting. Additionally, as no one on this panel is currently at DOE or any of the national labs, I think it's important that we be briefed by DOE and its Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence about how it is implementing recently passed legislation before using this hearing or any hearing as an impetus for future legislation. Most people think about the Department of Energy for its Manhattan Project beginnings or work advancing energy technologies. But DOE does much more than just nuclear weapons and energy. The Department is also the largest supporter of physical science scientific research in the Federal Government, conducting research and developing technologies across a range of fields, from artificial intelligence, to vaccine development, to astrophysics. The United States has been able to accomplish breakthroughs in space exploration, supercomputing, and the human genome project because of the work at the national laboratories. We have been able to accomplish so much and be the first to do it, in part because of the counterintelligence capabilities we possess that have kept our research safe and secure. The fact that DOE's Counterintelligence Office is under the umbrella of the intelligence community is a critical asset that we must leverage and strengthen. The threat of foreign espionage is becoming increasingly more complex and dangerous. We need to adapt. When scientists or students from other countries want to come and partake in our world-class research, we must take a serious look at the security risks involved, especially individuals from countries we have deemed a national security concern. On the one hand, we must recognize and embrace that much of America's science and technology expertise comes from abroad. Immigrants founded or co-founded nearly half of top startups in the U.S., and international students earn 60 percent of computer science doctorates. Between 1901 and 2023, immigrants have been awarded 36 percent of the Nobel prizes won by Americans in chemistry, medicine, and physics. The Department of Energy would not exist without the contributions of Enrico Fermi and Hans Bethe--two immigrants from World War II adversarial nations--to the Manhattan Project. So we must be sure that we have strong research security safeguards in place while ensuring we can be a home to the best and brightest from around the world. Striking this balance between international cooperation in science and technology and our national security is not easy. In the CHIPS and Science Act, and more recently in the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence Authorization Act, we authorized bipartisan and balanced research security improvements for the DOE that strengthen their capabilities in this space. So I look forward to hearing about how Congress can best support DOE's efforts in safeguarding our research for the sake of our country's national security. However, as we all know, not all threats come from foreign entities. Thorough background checks are required before any individual has access to sensitive information. In the past few weeks, we have seen multiple instances of staffers from the Department of Government Efficiency--which is not a department--or DOGE, gain access to information systems throughout the Federal Government. We have seen instances of staff being able to access federal payment systems at the Treasury Department, as well as trying to access personal details of Americans at the Social Security Administration. Jay Tilden, the Head of DOE's Office of Intelligence, even had to remind staff that DOGE employees could not have access to SCIFs without a clearance. All of this is concerning. Along with my colleagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I sent a letter to the White House demanding answers regarding DOGE operations and their seemingly unfettered access to sensitive information. These are unprecedented risks to our national security, and it is paramount that we address them immediately. With that, Chairman, I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heinrich. It is, of course, important to remember that the President, under Article II, is vested with the ``executive Power,'' and the President has the authority, constitutionally and statutorily, to decide who can see what within his Administration, and when he designates someone as having access to it, they do have access to that. I want to thank our witnesses here today. Let me introduce each of them quickly, and then we will turn to each of you for your opening statements. First, we have Mr. Paul Dabbar. Mr. Dabbar is the co- founder of Bohr Quantum Technology and former Under Secretary of Science at the Department of Energy under the Trump Administration. As Under Secretary of Science, Mr. Dabbar managed the national laboratory complex at the Department of Energy. Next, we have Ms. Anna Puglisi. Ms. Puglisi is a Fellow at the Hoover Institute, a public policy think tank housed at Stanford University. Ms. Puglisi has testified extensively on this topic we are discussing today. So we will look forward to hearing your thoughts as well. Finally, Dr. Geri Richmond is the former Under Secretary for Science and Innovation at the Department of Energy under the Biden Administration. Dr. Richmond currently serves as the Presidential Chair in Science, and is a Professor of Chemistry at the University of Oregon. Thanks to all three of you for your willingness to appear in front of the Committee. We will now turn to Mr. Dabbar for your opening statement, then to Ms. Puglisi, in order of introduction, and then to Ms. Richmond. STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL M. DABBAR, CEO AND CO-FOUNDER, BOHR QUANTUM TECHNOLOGY; FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Mr. Dabbar. Chairman Lee, Ranking Member Heinrich, it is great to be in front of this Committee yet again, and seeing many friends here. America leads the world in discovery and innovation. No one else comes close. One can see that in the Nobel Prizes referenced in the introduction. Examples include nuclear power, generation of chips, fusion, AI, quantum, solar PV, electric vehicles, gene editing, and chemistry of batteries of all types. And much of that was spearheaded at the DOE national labs. But our top adversary, China, puts tremendous pressure in appropriating this innovation and then manufacturing it. Examples include nuclear power stolen from Westinghouse, lithium-ion batteries at CATL, the LFP batteries at BYD stolen from MIT patents, electric vehicles, solar PV, GPUs, semiconductors, and they are trying to steal the future of quantum and fusion. Let me put this into historical context. When I took over the role of Under Secretary, I discovered that we had significant stealing of technology at the labs. Not only that, but our policy allowed our own researchers to legally be employed by Communist China at the same time as working at our national labs. After finding this out and going through the five stages of grief--I forgot from my academy days that NAVY is an acronym that stands for ``never again volunteer yourself''--I started mapping out security policy changes. We banned talent programs. We banned lab employees from working with countries of risk. We created the technology risk matrix to restrict engagement on frontier technologies. We restricted interactions with China and extended Communist China fundraising restrictions on university researchers who got DOE funding. All these felt like bringing back common sense. However, in the last several years, we have allowed that risk to increase. The Infrastructure Act funding was given to Communist-controlled entities in violation of the Act. As disclosed in the report at the Homeland Security Committee, Communist Chinese nationals who were employed at DOE labs stole inventions in violation of U.S. law, and took them to China for commercialization. They effectively created spy cells by recruiting new members, and they tried to recruit senior lab and former political officials. I wrote about that in the Wall Street Journal, and I submitted that as testimony. We must also remember that all PRC citizens are required by the Chinese National Security Law to hand over all information when directed by the Chinese state. In addition, DOE has restarted engagement with Communist China in sharing energy technologies. They have been proactively meeting with the Communist government to reestablish transfer of American invention to China. And what was interesting was that this effort was never publicly identified by DOE, but many were able to find that in meetings and articles in local Chinese newspapers, including pictures. And those officials in Communist China were hailing China technology appropriation. I do believe that there are plenty of people who think that this is important to share with Communist China for various different reasons, but I expect that the majority of the American people do not want us to turn over our technology to our adversaries. And I would venture to say that this is the view of this full Committee. New controls are needed for science and security, and I know that Secretary Wright is focused on that. While the current DOE orders on the DOE website provide a framework for security and counterintelligence, they provide too much flexibility and discretion for interpretation by politicals, careers, and lab employees. I recommend that the new DOE team roll out significant tightened controls, such as requiring lab under secretaries to be the sole authorizer, with no ability to delegate authority for all countries of risk, nationals hiring, visits by labs or meetings, and also create a list of the waivers that can be found by this Committee for its oversight. The Senate should consider legislation mandating security policies that require administrative policies that politicals would have little discretion in interpreting. I have also included in my written testimony an idea for DOE to recover stolen IP. And the Senate should consider extending the NNSA lab ban on adversary-nation nationals from the three NNSA labs to all the labs. America is the world's greatest superpower in both technology and in energy. As we invent the future, we should reengage on strong policies to protect our discovery leadership. [The prepared statement of Mr. Dabbar follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Dabbar. Ms. Puglisi. STATEMENT OF ANNA B. PUGLISI, VISITING FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Chairman Lee, Ranking Member Heinrich, distinguished members of the Committee and staff, thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing. It is an honor to be here alongside the esteemed experts on this panel. As was mentioned, I am currently a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and previously served as the National Counterintelligence Officer for East Asia. The views presented here though today are my own. My testimony will address why the DOE labs are targeted by China, and then discuss research security and potential mitigation strategies. Lastly, I will offer some lessons learned that include that this is a U.S. problem, not just a Department of Energy problem. China's government has explicit efforts to exploit its diaspora. While this must be addressed and countered, the rights of persons of Chinese ethnicity in the U.S. must be protected. Finally, we can't protect what we don't have. We have to invest in the future. The U.S. science and technology research enterprise, and especially the Department of Energy labs, set the global standard for discovery and innovation. Creating a climate to safeguard science will take a mindset change. Many in the research community see current policy changes as punitive. Because of this, it is important to discuss benefits of collaboration broadly, as they are not the same across the different stakeholders. An individual researcher can benefit from a specific collaboration because it brings them additional resources, prestige, or access to data or equipment, but it might not be to the benefit of the U.S. Government, national security, or the U.S. taxpayer. While China is not the only country that targets the Department of Energy labs, China's policies to target the Department of Energy complex are a deliberate state-sponsored strategy to save time and money. China uses non-traditional collectors--expert scientists, business people, and students--to acquire technology and technological know-how. Our current system is not designed to counter this kind of threat. Current mitigation tools are tactical and narrow by design because they are crafted to mitigate behaviors with the assumption that the actor fully participates in a laws-based/ rules-based system. They are basically designed for traditional counterintelligence threats that focus on intelligence officers, military end-use, and illegal activities. The protections in the CHIPS Act and NSPM-33, and as a result some of the individual programs that have been put in place by agencies, such as RTES and NSF SECURE Analytics, are a good start. However, in my written testimony, I provide some factors for consideration when determining access to the labs and funding decisions. Reviewing individual factors can help, but what we really need is a more comprehensive mitigation strategy. Piecemeal solutions will not have the desired outcomes. I cover these three suggestions in more detail in my written testimony, but briefly I put forth the following elements that would make up a national level program. First is establishing a national center for open-source information. This would provide detailed information at scale for our institutions and help them make informed decisions. Second would be to create a kind of pre-check for collaboration. It is important to establish an accepted framework of protections and make those clear--the standards, the norms, and expectations for visiting researchers, post-doctoral scientists, and students, and those that agree to those parameters have a fast- lane for collaborations. And finally, investing in the future-- the investments we make or don't make today will impact our future competitiveness tomorrow. So in conclusion, it is important to remember that China takes a holistic approach to development. It blurs civilian and military, private and public. This has deep implications for the DOE complex because it impacts the basis of entry for Chinese students and post-docs to U.S. labs. China's laws, which include the ability to compel citizens to share information, regardless of who owns it, also complicate the ability for individual researchers to act independently. So moving forward, I leave the Committee with the following thoughts. We really must decide what winning looks like, and this will take a comprehensive strategy. Extreme positions, such as closing our eyes or closing our doors, only benefit China. We either discredit all the efforts to address the problem or we deprive ourselves of the contributions of foreign-born students or scientists. And China is not a neutral actor. And why does this matter? Because China intimidates and harshly silences its critics. This has only grown in the past few years, and places individuals in untenable situations. We do our foreign students and colleagues a disservice by not highlighting this behavior. So I want to thank the Committee again for continuing to discuss this issue. These issues will make us uncomfortable because they challenge assumptions and established norms. However, we as a nation have to have these conversations if we are going to protect and promote U.S. competitiveness. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Ms. Puglisi follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Richmond. STATEMENT OF HON. GERALDINE L. RICHMOND, PRESIDENTIAL CHAIR IN SCIENCE AND PROFESSOR OF CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON; FORMER UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND INNOVATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Dr. Richmond. Thank you very much, Chairman Lee, Ranking Member Heinrich, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the important subject of protecting the integrity of the U.S. research enterprise from inappropriate foreign influence. As a lifelong scientist--working in science for 50 years now--and researcher, and also a devoted educator, I understand the critical importance of talking about this topic for maintaining the nation's competitive edge in science and technology and ensuring that our research efforts remain secure and beneficial to the American public. And may I add, in these 50 years I have seen dramatic changes in how we have interacted with countries of concern like China. I have seen them change. I have seen the threats become even stronger, and they are as much of a concern to me now as they were when I was Under Secretary. The United States has long been a global leader in scientific discovery and technological innovation. It is one of the reasons why we are able to attract the best and the brightest in the world. According to a 2024 report from the National Science Foundation, foreign-born workers make up 19 percent of the overall STEM workforce, as Senator Heinrich pointed out, and 60 percent of the doctoral level scientists and engineers in computer science and mathematics in the U.S. were born outside of this country. We are an open, innovative society. It is the key driver of our economic success. At the same time, I realize, as we had at the Department of Energy when I was there, the actions of certain foreign governments pose unacceptable risks to the scientific enterprise. During my tenure on the National Science Board under President Trump and now recently as Under Secretary for Science and Innovation at the Department of Energy under Biden, I saw firsthand the growing threats to the U.S. leadership in science and technology. As this Committee well knows, the U.S. enterprise would not function without foreign-born scientists and engineers, but we also cannot afford to have things stolen from us--properties stolen from us by nefarious acts that threaten our U.S. economy and our national security. We must strike a careful balance if we are to protect national security interests without stifling the innovation that has long been our nation's greatest strength. During my time as Under Secretary, DOE and its 17 national laboratories worked diligently to achieve the balance by aggressively strengthening research security through rigorous background screening, expert controls, and collaboration policies to mitigate risks of intellectual property theft and undue foreign influence. For example, DOE developed a science and technology risk matrix, as noted, to protect emerging technologies, and it continues to be updated. This matrix provides a guidance to address potential concerns associated with economic and international competitiveness by identifying the risks associated with a given topic and the resulting level of controls that are required. DOE also developed a comprehensive and rigorous approach to research, technology, and economic security--what I will refer to as RTES policy, established new procedures for reviewing financial awards and loans, and created a new RTES office to continue to evolve DOE's enhanced due diligence process, engage with external stakeholders, and review DOE national lab agreements involving foreign entities. These actions were supported by security directives from Congress--thank you--and administrative actions by the National Security Presidential Memorandum, which was worked on both in the Trump Administration and the Biden Administration--NSPM-33. Together, these measures are helping the Department and its partners mitigate risks that malign foreign governments pose to our research ecosystem, supply chains, and intellectual property. For most U.S. universities--research universities--the level of due diligence required by NSPM-33 and DOE's updated policies is a newer paradigm. I saw this when I was on the National Science Board and I have seen it now. Research universities serve a critical interface between government, industry, and academia, and since I am back in academia, I know this, going back to my home. That is why during my tenure as Under Secretary, DOE focused heavily on helping universities develop their own procedures for fostering secure, yet open scientific collaboration, and training researchers on best practices. I am proud of the way many university administrations have stepped up to this research security challenge, including my own at the University of Oregon. Security is in the DNA and the structure of our national laboratories. It has been historically at our national laboratories and in DOE. It has not been the case at universities. That's why it's so important for us to work with them. So as this Committee is evaluating research security measures of the U.S. science and technology research enterprise, I have offered several recommendations that are important to consider. While I cannot speak to the status of DOE activities in my current capacity, I can assure the Committee that regardless of the Administration, the Department of Energy and its national laboratories take the responsibility to protect the scientific integrity of our nation's assets seriously. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on this important issue, and I look forward to our discussion. [The prepared statement of Dr. Richmond follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] The Chairman. Thanks so much to all of you for your opening statements. We will now proceed to five-minute rounds of questions alternating between Republicans and Democrats, and I will begin that now. Ms. Puglisi, I would like to start with you, if that's all right? Last week, the New York Times published an article in which you were prominently featured. You were featured discussing how the CCP has used legal threats to intimidate American researchers, including yourself, in an effort to suppress research that exposes its influence operations. Now, if the CCP is brazen enough to do this, to try to pressure and influence American researchers, what does that say about the ability they have to exert pressure on Chinese nationals from the People's Republic of China working within U.S. national labs, and especially keeping in mind that those individuals, if they are residents of China, what does that say about their ability to have pressure brought to bear on them given that they are subject to Chinese laws that can compel them to cooperate with PRC intelligence-gathering operations? Ms. Puglisi. Thank you for that question, Senator. I think, you know, it really highlights a disturbing trend, right? I believe that, you know, we have talked a lot about how the hope was that as we moved forward with engagement and collaborations that China would change, and its laws and rules and norms would become more like our own. Unfortunately, that is not the case. And so, I think, as I mentioned in my opening statement and in my written testimony, the importance of talking about this behavior, and that if we ignore the pressures that these scientists and students are under, we really do them a disservice and we do our own society a disservice because then we become more like them. But it really, you know, I think, highlights as well that it's really hard, you know, for us to understand that kind of pressure and that we need to put in place those guidelines to both foster those collaborations, but also to protect that technology and to ensure that that does not happen. The Chairman. But needless to say, the pressure that could be brought to bear on Chinese nationals at these labs is immense. Ms. Puglisi. Yes, it is. And I think it highlights, as we have seen over the past year, the articles and stories about extralegal behavior, not only for scientists, but on different campuses of, you know, China's actions. The Chairman. Now, Mr. Dabbar, your testimony states that the Department of Energy under the Biden Administration restarted engagement with China to share U.S. energy technologies developed in our national labs. In at least one instance, in 2023, a Lawrence Berkeley National Lab scientist went to China, where he advised the Dean of the School of Energy, Power, and Engineering at--University, who also happens to be an affiliate of the foreign influence arm of the Chinese Communist Party on how best to construct an engineering lab for the school. Do you think U.S. national labs should be engaged in these efforts with our greatest global adversary, and should American taxpayers be funding such support that ends up benefiting our adversaries in this way? Mr. Dabbar. No, Senator Lee, I don't think we should. They have been very clear that they want to dominate the tech space. And as I listed in my testimony, there is a long series of technologies, including in energy, that were invented at the DOE national labs and invented by American companies that was stolen. And so, it is a long track record on this topic of much of which they are selling to the world was invented in America. And so, I think we need to be much more cognizant of this topic, and I think more controls are needed on this, as I mentioned in my testimony. The Chairman. So that's an expensive proposition, losing valuable research for which we have paid dearly, and having it go to our greatest geopolitical adversary isn't an ideal outcome. In fact, quite far from it. This can have devastating consequences. Now, Section 436 of the Fiscal Year 2025 Intelligence Authorization Act, which barred foreign nationals from adversarial nations from accessing our national laboratories received unanimous approval from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, by a vote of 17 to 0, but it was blocked from the National Defense Authorization Act due to opposition from the former Chairman of this Committee. The provision included a waiver process allowing exceptions when the Secretary of Energy determined the national or economic security benefits outweighed the risks. Now, given these strong bipartisan concerns, would you support enacting similar safeguards to protect our most sensitive research while allowing for limited high-level exceptions? Mr. Dabbar. I would, Senator. Obviously, it's a bipartisan topic. The way the current DOE order is written--that was done when I was Under Secretary--basically required sign-offs to have any Chinese interaction. I believe a lot of it was delegated down to lower levels, which basically opened the doors, as far as I could tell from my conversations with DOE. I think we need to potentially do exactly as the Intelligence Committee looked at, which is flip it. Instead of authorizing and sign-offs, is to do it the other way, where the base case is to ban that from adversarial nations, and to give waivers as required. I think that's a better way, given decades of Chinese infiltration and attempts. The Chairman. Leaving the default at ``on'' is dangerous, in other words. I see my time is expired. We will turn the time over to Senator Heinrich. Senator Heinrich. Thanks, Chairman. Ms. Richmond, you and I have interacted at some of our nation's most cherished national labs, places like Los Alamos. Do you have thoughts on what the current dismissals at DOE and NNSA could mean for our national security in the long term, and in particular for workforce morale? Dr. Richmond. Yes, Senator Heinrich. Thank you for that question. I agree, and you know, I hope you all know how committed I was in my position and now with regards to national security and the concern of China stealing our most valuable assets. But these cuts, particularly in the security area, but also having to do with our energy infrastructure, the cuts there, too, give me even greater concern because they are immediate, because to be able to work at NNSA, but also to be able to handle classified information, requires a tremendous amount of background checks, polygraphs. They ask all your neighbors, and so, my neighbors are sick of being asked for all these things I have done. But the point is that when we make these cuts, even if we say come on back after this weekend cut, what are the chances that we have increased the risk of someone being hired by China to come over and share what they have been doing? I, too, have been recruited. I got a letter not too long ago that was like, for one hour's work, I could take $40,000. Senator Heinrich. Yes. Dr. Richmond. Now, you know, I don't have a mortgage to pay, but there are other people that do. So I just have to say that these cuts, and especially how they are going to impact the energy infrastructure---- Senator Heinrich. Yes. Dr. Richmond [continuing]. I think it's time for us to go to the new Administration and to Secretary Wright and ask what was the process to decide how to do that, to make these cuts, because the process that we have at the Department of Energy to make cuts--and we do make cuts of our federal employees--is based on budget priorities. When we develop our budgets, we set the priorities, and if your part of DOE does not fit into those priorities of the White House and also the Secretary of Energy, then you eliminate those people, but you do it in almost a two- year process while you develop this budget. Senator Heinrich. Yes. Dr. Richmond. Because the priorities are changing all the time. Senator Heinrich. And one of the things that I think it's important to share with folks is that one of the--probably the leading red flag for someone being a risk with respect to recruitment is financial distress. So we just created a whole bunch of people with really important clearances, really important expertise, who are all under financial distress. We created a bunch of targets for the CCP. And I think, I just--I am aghast at how unthoughtfully this is all being carried out. Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again. I want to ask you to sort of walk us through what currently happens--well, talk about how the intelligence officers at the labs, the lab directors, and then DOE intelligence coordinate and then what happens when they don't all line up and agree. Mr. Dabbar. Yes, Senator. So obviously, this has been a big focus. There's a classified report from MITRE that's out there that has evaluated the details of that. I think that's kind of safe to say, and they have obviously had some recommendations on that particular topic. In general, what happens is that the intelligence component of the DOE has local officers at each of the labs for counterintelligence. They will do the screening of employees, if people are traveling, interactions, grant security clearances. And so, they do that interaction as part of that intelligence component with the lab complex. In general, that works quite well. DOE's intel arm is quite well-integrated with that effort. And I think the biggest challenge on this is not the structure of it, but as I was mentioning, who has the approval, right, to allow this interaction to happen. I will give an example. I have been told many times that any lab employee can actually do a recommendation and potentially, I have heard, even a sign-off on people coming to visit a lab. And so, if there is a PRC citizen who is employed at the lab, they could recommend another PRC group coming from China to enter the lab. And if the authority has been delegated down to the lab, sometimes these things are happening at a higher rate than maybe some people at headquarters might like. And so, who has authority in the sign-off and the interaction of that, I think that's the core practical issue that probably deserves to be raised to a more senior level than has, I believe, been delegated. Senator Heinrich. If you have specific examples of that, I would appreciate if you would share them with this Committee. Thanks. The Chairman. Senator Cotton. Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. From my work on the Intelligence Committee over the last 10 years, and now as Chairman, I can tell you this issue is of critical concern to me. Our national labs are where we develop some of the scientific research and capabilities that are the envy of the world, but they lack security measures. And I can say that it's not just me, it's many other members of the Intelligence Committee. Five members are on this Committee. There is a reason why we passed legislation last year, unanimously, that would have stopped scientists from China and Russia and even Iran and North Korea and Cuba from being in our labs. Mr. Dabbar, do you know how many Chinese and Russian scientists were in our labs in the last Fiscal Year for which we have data? Mr. Dabbar. If I have seen your past testimony, I think the number is around 8,000. Senator Cotton. Eight thousand. Out of a total of how many? Do you know? Mr. Dabbar. Well, total lab employees are probably---- Senator Cotton. No, total foreign visitors. Mr. Dabbar. Oh, I am not certain about that. Senator Cotton. Forty thousand. So one out of every five foreign scientists in an American national lab is Chinese or Russian. Do you know how many American scientists get to go to equivalent sites in China and Russia? Do you know, Mr.---- Mr. Dabbar. I think it's less. [Laughter.] Senator Cotton. If I put the over/under at 0.5, would you bet the over or the under? Mr. Dabbar. Maybe even under. Senator Cotton. Ms. Puglisi, how many American scientists get to go to the equivalent sites in Russia and China? Ms. Puglisi. Senator, I currently don't have that number. However, I think that's a point that I have made before this Committee and others is that it's not reciprocity. I mean, true collaboration comes from transparency and reciprocity. And that's one of the things that we are not seeing. Senator Cotton. I couldn't agree more. Ms. Richmond, do you think one out of every five foreign scientists at a Chinese or Russian equivalent site is American? Dr. Richmond. I don't know those numbers, I'm sorry---- Senator Cotton. Yes, there is zero reciprocity on this issue. Why would we allow Chinese and Russian scientists into our national labs, to say nothing of Iranians and Cubans and North Koreans, when they don't allow our scientists there? We have told the directors of these labs for a long time, the Intelligence Committee, that if they do not get a hold of this problem then the Congress will solve it for them. And the legislation that we introduced and passed through the Intelligence Committee last year, although it didn't get passed into law, will be brought back up this year. And I am going to champion that on this Committee and on the Intelligence Committee because we have to put an end to this threat. There are a lot of great people working in the Department of Energy, to include at our labs and at the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, one of the very best of our small intelligence offices around the government, but there are too many people that have this ``open science'' mindset, this naive ideological commitment that we have to allow these foreign adversary scientists into our labs, no matter what the risk. Mr. Dabbar, who has the final word on allowing such a foreign visitor to visit his or her lab? Mr. Dabbar. So the order is flexible on who has the authority. Previously, when we instituted it, when I was Under Secretary, it was required to be up at my level, and we were able to squash a lot of the thousand talents programs. We found many, many people working for China, including joint nuclear weapons work. That's a pretty stunning comment I just gave that we found at one of the labs. I believe--I was told in my conversations with DOE recently that a lot of that has been delegated down to the individual lab level, and I am not exactly certain---- Senator Cotton. And again, we have great people working at our individual labs, but by and large, the directors of these places tend to come from a scientific background, is that correct? Mr. Dabbar. Yes, sir. Senator Cotton. They are not coming from the intelligence community. They are not coming from law enforcement. If a foreign national is excluded from one lab, is he therefore excluded from every other lab? Mr. Dabbar. I am not certain how it's currently being executed. Senator Cotton. I think the answer is no. Mr. Dabbar. Yes. Senator Cotton. If one of our lab directors says no, this guy from Russia is too dangerous a risk and can't be here, he can just turn around and try to go to one of the other labs as well. Is it fair to say that sometimes there is a little bit of competition between these labs for money or prestige or talent? Mr. Dabbar. Senator, in one of my times, one of my many times of uncovering things with intelligence, counterintelligence at the labs, we found a Chinese national who had been hired at one of the DOE labs and then they used that to shift to NIST in Colorado and use the--of having been hired at a DOE national lab to join a very important quantum effort at NIST. And as soon as we found that out, we had to reach out to Commerce very quickly and point out that we were sorry that this person had gotten that role and basically, we allowed them to end up at another lab. Senator Cotton. Thank you. I just want to thank the Chairman for having this hearing. This is not something that we discuss much in a public setting. We have examined it very closely for years on the Intelligence Committee. But it is a grave national security threat. It is a threat to our prosperity as well because so much of these technologies end up getting commercialized. And to be clear, what we are talking about here, again, is foreign nationals. There has been a lot of testimony, or a lot of statements from members and the witnesses about the history throughout American life of foreign-born, naturalized scientists. We are not talking about that. We are not talking about someone who has raised their hand and taken the oath of affirmation to become a citizen or even a legal permanent resident. We are talking about foreign nationals coming to our lab. This is a grave threat and we can't allow it to continue. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wyden. Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to have all our guests, and especially good to be able to welcome Dr. Geri Richmond, who is a long-time expert in security and also a long-time University of Oregon Duck, and we welcome you. Dr. Richmond. Go Ducks. Senator Wyden. Let me, if I might, ask you about what we learned at DOE in the Pacific Northwest here very recently. There were abrupt and significant workforce reductions last week in the office that carries out the critical work to keep our electric grid reliable. My take is that this raises national security issues. It raises fundamental issues for our economy. What are the implications of something like that, Dr. Richmond? Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator Wyden, it's good to be here with you too. I think that in terms of our power, our energy infrastructure, and particularly the cuts at BPA, as well as the 1,800 people that were just cut off at the Department of Energy with no clear understanding of the procedure, or why, it really is going to--I believe as a citizen, that it's going to not only compromise the safety of our grid, but also will drive up energy prices. I believe that it will delay current projects in communities and that it will disrupt our supply chains. These are, again, my personal opinions, having served as the Under Secretary for three years, but I think it also is sowing confusion and chaos among the federal workers because they are learning about things in the news, and I can't confirm what's in the news either. But the point is that it's just leading to a lot of confusion. For example, with BPA, there were a number of employees that were cut. And as a Pacific Northwesterner, like you, that's really chilling because BPA is so important. Senator Wyden. Let me see if I can get a couple of other questions in real quickly. When you went through the process of getting your security clearance, did you have to disclose all of your foreign financial conflicts of interest and contacts with government officials? Dr. Richmond. Yes. In fact, because I have worked in so many different countries--over two dozen developing countries, in particular--I had to list all the countries I had been to, whether they had paid for my travel support--which most of them did not--whether I had any kind of a conflict of interest with them, with any type of financial support from them continuing, what all my finances are with regards to all of the investments that we have. We had to declare all those. We had to be cleared for a general counsel. I had to get a polygraph test. Senator Wyden. I think I got the drift. Dr. Richmond. Okay. Senator Wyden. If a U.S. Government official had significant business dealings with the government of China or failed to disclose all of these contacts with Chinese government officials, could that derail their access to sensitive Department of Energy secrets or classified information? Dr. Richmond. Yes, and in fact what happened in the laboratories, during my time, was you had both the IN and also the lab leaders talking about when there is a concern about a person being in the laboratory. And what they go through is, who is going to come onsite, what is their background, what kind of access would be controlled if they did come onsite, and this is for visitors also, and what projects can they work on, and what partnerships do they have? If there is a disagreement between those two entities in the laboratory, then it gets sent up to me. I did not have any concerning ones that came up to me. And the laboratory said this at the HSST hearing, the director said this last week. Senator Wyden. Thank you, Dr. Richmond. Colleagues, I am asking these questions for several reasons, and one of them is, according to public reporting, Mr. Elon Musk is running DOGE while remaining Tesla's largest shareholder. And according to that public reporting, Tesla has invested billions in China and makes one million cars a year at a factory in Shanghai on land owned by the Chinese government. Finally, according to public reporting, Tesla's contract allows the Chinese government to revoke Tesla's lease on the land at any time if it determines doing so is in the public interest. Now, on this Committee, every one of us works for the American public interest, and given that as our highest priority, I intend, colleagues, to come back and ask further questions about this in the days ahead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wyden. Senator McCormick. Senator McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our panel. Grateful to the witnesses for coming to discuss such an important issue for our national security, but also for Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh is the home of the National Energy Technology Laboratory. Many employees from the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory commute across the Delaware River to call Pennsylvania home. And we must ensure that this critical national research and these wonderful assets are secure from foreign adversaries, and that America remains the global leader on energy and other advanced technologies. So I really share the concerns raised by so many today about the continued theft of American research and innovation by the Communist Chinese Party. It is a huge national security risk for all the reasons we have talked about, but it's also the stated goal to dominate the commanding heights of technology and to use that technological supremacy to undermine America's economic might, its geopolitical position, our very way of life, and that research and technology theft is a well- documented key pillar of the CCP strategy. So with forced technology transfers, IP thefts, scientific espionage, not only providing the CCP with advantages in economic and environmentally important technologies, it's also undercutting American workers in Pennsylvania and in other places. We are essentially paying for the R&D that China steals to beat us in the market space. How can American companies compete in that environment? So let me start with you, Ms. Puglisi. You pointed out that because the CCP does not play by the same rules in science and technology, that our often-narrow research security tools are outmatched by China's efforts to steal American technology and know-how. How can we make the jump from piecemeal solutions, some of which we have discussed here, to a national strategy for mitigating these threats? Ms. Puglisi. Thank you, Senator, for that question. I think it's important to highlight, first, and the reason why--what creates this challenge is China takes a very hybrid approach. It takes a very holistic approach to its S&T development. And so, oftentimes, you know, we try to separate things out into complete buckets. And so, to have a national approach, what we need to do is recognize how different this system is, and to look at the individuals and the companies that we are dealing with holistically, and acknowledge those ties to the Chinese government, and in moving forward, how policies that are across both our infrastructure and in commerce that recognize that these are supported, that they oftentimes don't have to make market-based decisions, that individuals--and we know this--are sent to study here, to work in the laboratories for a purpose. And we just have to be much more deliberate about the way we look at people's backgrounds. And to begin with, I think putting in place very clear guidelines, because, you know, our system has been built on trust, right? And I have been in the lab. I have worked in the lab, and no one wants to believe that their collaborator is stealing their technology or the student that they are supporting is doing that or has some other alternative motives. And so, we must make it very clear. Senator McCormick. And yet, we know they are. Ms. Puglisi. Yes. Senator McCormick. In many cases they are. Ms. Puglisi. And unfortunately, this has been the case, and it is well documented. I know the other witnesses have talked about this. I, myself, have written a lot about this. And so, I think the starting point is being very clear--what are those assumptions that we are making? Senator McCormick. Yes. Ms. Puglisi. And you know, sometimes we can't get to yes with some of these collaborations. Senator McCormick. Yes. Ms. Puglisi. And that's why we have to engage, you know, with the research community to really make clear on that and-- -- Senator McCormick. Thank you. I am going to just move on to one more question here if I can. Ms. Puglisi. Okay, sorry. Senator McCormick. Thank you. Ms. Puglisi. Yes. Senator McCormick. Mr. Dabbar, good to see you again. Many research institutions, just following up on this question, including the national labs, are engaging in research collaboration with third parties--I don't think we have talked about that much--here in the United States and overseas, and those third parties can also be exploited by our adversaries to steal sensitive research, particularly the CCP. What policies should DOE put in place to ensure that the research collaborations and joint research projects that may be outside the labs don't create additional security vulnerabilities? What authorities and directives can Congress use to help on that mission? Mr. Dabbar. So that certainly happens. Let me give you an example. We do accelerator technology with our European friends, where they ship us some accelerators sometimes and we ship them some equipment sometimes. We generate IP in some of these very large pieces of equipment that could have dual-use points, and sometimes the Chinese go into Germany, to a lab in Germany, to try to appropriate IP that we invented at one of our national labs. I know that happened. I have specific examples of that. So I do think of any of our collaborations with our allies, we need to push the ball. I think we have pushed a ball of awareness of them in Germany, France, and whatnot, that China is trying to steal stuff, and that if they want to work with us, and if we are going to share technology with them, they have to meet the same sort of standards that we have for ourselves. Senator McCormick. So I think it's fair to say, regardless of how tight our security is in our own labs, if we have third party research efforts underway that are not equally strong in the security measures, then there is a back door where some of the same challenges of IP theft and so forth can occur. Mr. Dabbar. Absolutely, Senator. I will pick on one thing that Senator Risch has been doing on fusion. America is about to break some major bounds on fusion in this next four years. There is going to be some major examples. They are trying to steal it from us and our international collaborations on fusion. And so, that's something that historically was more open science, and I think very clearly both domestically as well as international, that needs to be greatly enhanced since we are about to accomplish quite a bit. Senator McCormick. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Gallego, you are up next. Senator Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perfect timing. And thank you to our Ranking Member, also. Our national and energy security should always be, of course, top-of-mind. And I was proud to be a leader in passing the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA. Among many other things, that bill enhanced vetting and limited the entrance of certain foreign nationals to DOE lab facilities to protect national security. But as former Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, I also know exactly how important it is to be deliberate in the way we discuss sensitive operations, especially in open settings. As we do our duty to oversee national labs in this Committee, we must not give away information that our adversaries could use against us or actively gather. So I have a couple questions for Dr. Richmond. In United States military operations, our armed forces work with interpreters and local allies who make our operations more secure and successful. I certainly experienced that in Iraq in combat with local nationals, as well as foreign nationals, and third-party companies. And so, we have talked a lot about the risks of foreign infiltration in our DOE labs. Can you expand on the risks of siloing ourselves too much and missing vital information from our allies and foreign-born scientists? Dr. Richmond. Yes, thank you, Senator, and thank you for your service also. I think that we cannot closet ourselves. I have to say that before the wall came down in Europe, I was actually in East Germany and I got to see--it was weeks before the wall came down--and I could see what a closeted country looks like and I have also done the same in Cuba. We have to rely on intelligence from other countries too. We have to decide whether we trust it or not. We have to decide what we are going to do with it. But I am going to go back to your comments, ma'am, because we need a coordinated effort across all agencies and universities if we are going to use what intelligence we have in order to move forward. And the armed forces play a critical role in that, and as you know, if we did not have that outside information, those partners with us, it would be tough to go forward. Senator Gallego. And even along the kind of siloing of information and sharing of information, from my experience, kind of, as the past Chairman of Intel/Special Operations, I even had complaints from our Five Eyes nations, people that we are supposed to share our most intricate and sophisticated intelligence with, that we still are in such a silo that we couldn't really share our intel across platforms fast enough for them to actually use it as actual intelligence. When it comes to sharing with our close Five Eyes partners or other intelligence treaty nations, do you see that also still being a problem in terms of some of the research that's found in maybe the UK, for example, not being as quickly transferable or easily shared for us to actually consume, use, or effectively continue the research on? Dr. Richmond. Well, I think it's important--thank you for that question. I think it's important for us to add to this conversation this issue of open science. Open science is science that's going to end up in literature, it's going to be published together. That kind of collaboration happens at the laboratory because it's natural to do that, whether it be in fields like I have worked in with lasers and optics and other fields too. We have to have that open science. So what I fear is the discussion of really restricting the labs to even things in personnel, even things that are truly open science, then my concerns are there. So I don't know if that went to your question, but it's a point I feel is really important for this Committee, many who are not scientists, to understand what the open science is as opposed to something that is truly an economic threat to us. Senator Gallego. And your testimony outlines multiple measures, including a risk matrix to protect emerging research and tech at DOE. Are you also concerned that any of those security measures will be disrupted or dismantled under new agency leadership that does not really understand the goal and intent of that matrix? Dr. Richmond. As a citizen myself, yes, I am concerned because when you have--what we have always found, and when I have gone into the SCIF--and we are not going to divulge any classified information--first of all, we do have people from other countries that are helping us in the intelligence for some of these countries. But the point is that we really have to be able to go forward in a manner that allows us to share the information that we need and be able to go forward. I am not sure if that quite went to your point. Senator Gallego. Thank you. I yield back. The Chairman. Senator Risch. Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this meeting. Look, this is a really, really important issue that gets almost no attention. I have been 17 years on both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intel Committee, and we have watched this cancer grow over those years, and it's not going away. It's getting worse and worse. So I am going to start at 50,000 feet and bring this down. In 1983, I traveled in China. I left China thinking, you know, we are never going to have to worry about this. They had no plumbing. They had no toilets. They had no phones. They had nothing. It smelled. It was terrible. That was in 1983. If you go there today, it's like America. Now, it took us over 200 years to get where we are. And it has taken them only a handful of decades to get where they are. Are they that much smarter than we are? We all know better than that. They stole every good idea that we have, except for democracy and respect for human rights. So how did that happen? Well, it happened because America is so open and so free that we just open the flood gates. And today, this problem of the people coming into the labs is joined with the question of people that come into the colleges and universities. They are identical problems, and the numbers are stunning. Americans have no idea that there are hundreds-- hundreds of thousands of Chinese students studying in America, and we have a tiny fraction of that. And as Tom Cotton pointed out--he went and dug out the figures--of the thousands of Chinese people who visited our labs, and zero Americans have visited their labs. I am intimately familiar with the INL, of course, you know, the birthplace of nuclear energy on the planet. And I talk to those people all the time. I have never met a person who has set foot in a Chinese laboratory. So this is the problem--we have given away the farm. And I would disagree with Ms. Richmond about open science. We should never have given them that, but that ship has sailed. The open science is there. It's all over the internet. It's everyplace. But they have used it to bootstrap themselves up where they are. So let's change lanes for just a second and talk about who we are dealing with. A student who comes here, or for that matter, an engineer who comes here and goes to one of the labs, may have no malign ideas whatsoever. But for a person who lives in a communist, autocratic country, nothing belongs to them. Their property doesn't belong to them, their thinking doesn't belong to them, their intellectual knowledge doesn't belong to them. It belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, because in those states, the state doesn't exist for the people as it does in a democracy like we have, people exist for the state, and the state always comes ahead of the people. And so, they take these people--when the students go home, they are debriefed by the Chinese Communist Party, and every scintilla of information they have then belongs to the Chinese Communist Party. And I mean, it's two different systems. There is absolutely no question about it. But again, it's really time to slam the door on this thing. I have preached about this for years. And with all due respect to the scientific community, I can't get it through their head that this is a national security issue. They say, well, we are all on this planet together. The knowledge we have helps everybody. Well, yeah, to a degree. If we are fighting polio, that's true. But not when we are designing quantum computers. It's not like that at all. And we shouldn't be sharing that information at all. So, and by the way, I get real pushback from the colleges and universities. Why? There are millions of dollars being transferred from China to the colleges and universities. And those colleges and universities get very defensive of the grants and that that they get from the Chinese Communist Party. Anyway, that's where we are. Folks, how do we get the word out to the community, and how do we get the word out to Americans that this is a huge problem? And I have only got a few minutes left. Start down here and give me your 30-second take on that. Ms. Puglisi. Okay, thank you, Senator. First, I just want to add that the whole issue of basic science comes up quite a bit, but it's important to note that collaborations are very important, and I, myself, have been a proponent for open science. However, I think what is lost in that conversation is that not everything is shared. And that is the challenge because what is happening is that the time and resource-intensive parts of that basic research, oftentimes, the data, the know-how, the access to how do I actually do something, and oftentimes what doesn't work is what is stolen. And so, those are the kinds of things, I think, that we really need to focus on and have that conversation. Senator Risch. Ms. Richmond, I am almost out of--I am out of time--give me a short shot and I am going to give you---- Dr. Richmond. Yes, let me say, I am glad to meet you. I have been through Chinese laboratories, back in 2010. Senator Risch. I have met somebody, finally. All right. [Laughter.] Senator Risch. I have met one. How many people in America, 330 million? All right, I've got one. Dr. Richmond. Yes. But the point is, things are changing-- -- Senator Risch. By the way, did you get into the Wuhan lab, because we are really interested---- [Laughter.] Senator Risch. Probably not. Dr. Richmond. You know, I can't read Chinese, so I have no idea what lab I was in. Okay? But the point is, you raise a very important point. Things are changing. Your issue about the open science is right, but on the other hand collaborations are really important too. But again, I believe that we need to have a full discussion of this out in the open. Universities need to--and faculty at universities need to understand that they could be involved in the areas of high-performance computing, AI, quantum, bioscience, biotech, accelerator science, battery science, that we at the labs consider to be extraordinarily high-risk, so that they can understand that they are---- Senator Risch. You got that exactly right. Dr. Richmond. Yes. Senator Risch. Paul. Mr. Dabbar. Senator, I think this is a big but narrow topic. America is the bright light to recruit people from all around the world who want to work at the DOE national labs and people want to become Americans. And I think that's good. When I was there, we had four lab directors who were naturalized citizens from the UK and Canada and Germany and so on, and that is excellent, right? They came here. They became American citizens. We are still a very small percentage of the world in terms of population in the big scheme of things, and I think doing that, and all the other people underneath them, with citizens from all over. China is the topic---- Senator Risch. China is a problem because those people can't stay here. We all know what happens to their families if they say, hey, we are giving up China, and we are going to become a U.S. citizen. They will start--well, anyway, I don't want to go into that. They do bad, bad things to their families. So my time is up. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cortez Masto. Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I appreciate the panel discussion today. It's good to see some of you again. Let me start off with the Nevada National Security Site. Most people don't have it in their backyard. I do. Most people don't grow up next to it. I did. Most people don't have family and friends that work there. I have and still do. So this is an issue that is important for us in Nevada, and I appreciate the conversation today. Dr. Richmond, let me start with you. In your testimony you outlined various legislation like the CHIPS and Science Act and the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act that address research security concerns that we have talked about, right, that are getting ready to go into effect. Specifically, though, you mentioned that DOE was getting prepared to implement Section 3112 of the NDAA, which would ban foreign nationals from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran from accessing the national laboratories operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration without secretarial waivers. So given the enhanced research security measures outlined in the Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, how do you think these new regulations will affect the mission at Nevada's national laboratories, such as the Nevada National Security Site, which we know is essential for maintaining our nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. Dr. Richmond. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question. As you may know, Director Hruby--Jill Hruby--was the one that oversaw NNSA while I was in my position, so I don't have all the depth of knowledge that she would have, but I do think that the lab directors that spoke last week at HSST, even Dr. Kim Budil was there, and she does oversee Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. And all five directors that were there-- three or four of them were NNSA labs--they are ready to do it and have accepted it and we will have it done by April 15 or whatever the deadline is. Senator Cortez Masto. Okay. Dr. Richmond. What impact that has, I can't speculate on it, but I think they are ready to take it on. The concern is, though, that they are now going to have to fire, I think, a number of people. I think it was close to a thousand or something like that, and that, again, compromises our security because those people could easily be picked up by our adversaries. Senator Cortez Masto. Can I touch on that, because I only have so much time, and that was my next question because we are now implementing legislation to address foreign nationals coming into our labs, but what we are not doing is addressing the workforce that is necessary. Now, I have heard all of you, and we have had this conversation before about STEM, making sure our kids are exposed to it, that they want to go into that area of science. We want to make sure that they are now stepping into, as they graduate, jobs like we have at the test site. What does it say to them that we have just done this wholesale firing of people, particularly in my state. People are paying attention--their family members, their friends, they know what is going on. What does that say to our ability to develop that workforce for the future in these STEM courses? Dr. Richmond. Okay, I will put my academic hat on now. People are scared. Students are scared. Parents of students are scared. Spouses are scared about paying mortgages, that all the energy that they have put into this passion they have for science is now being questioned for its value. It's very personal. Senator Cortez Masto. Let me touch on one final thing. We have talked about foreign nationals, and I agree that we have to address it. We have passed legislation to do just that, but there are other security challenges we are not even talking about--cyber threats. Where are we talking about cyber threats here? And should we be addressing that as Congress as well? And let me open it up to any of the panel members: talk to me about cyber threats. What should we know that we are not talking about today that is the next step for us to implement when it comes to our national labs? Ms. Puglisi or Mr. Dabbar. Ms. Puglisi. That's a very important point and that's why I advocate that we really need a holistic, comprehensive program that looks across the board, and cyber would be one of those, and also, both external and internal to understand, okay, who's sharing what with whom. So that's one. And I just want to pull the thread on the collaborations because that's an important point and why we really need to demand that reciprocity and transparency because it can't be a one-way street, right? And we talked about how many people are in our labs, how many people in their labs, I mean, these are serious topics and serious countries do serious things. And so, we need to ensure that there is that reciprocity of, not only people, but information. And one of the challenges, I think, with China is they are coming down on open science--access to their data, access to academic papers, you know, that does not demonstrate to me a place that has a serious desire to do true collaborations. Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. I know my time is up. Mr. Dabbar, do you have anything? Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, this is a university example, but not a lab example. This just goes to show you that you need to have strict controls, and sometimes things can go wrong. We found a cybersecurity effort that was funded by DOE at a university in which all the principal investigators were PRC nationals. Electric grid cybersecurity funded by DOE at a university with PRC nationals developing the software for cybersecurity for the electric grid. We stopped that as soon as we found out that that had been done, and I won't go through the details, but it's an example that people were not thinking, okay, at the Department, when they were issuing funding of something that I think is pretty commonsense. So I think this comes back to rules and proper oversight so that people down below don't do things that wouldn't pass, you know, kind of commonsense for, I think, anyone in this room. Senator Cortez Masto. But if we don't have the staff to catch it. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator King. Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The focus today has been on national security, as well it should be. That's one of our jobs around here. On the other hand, there is an opportunity cost of excluding talent that could be important in furthering our own interest in terms of technological development. Ms. Richmond, talk to me about that. It seems to me what we really need to do is try to find a path between total exclusion and not being cognizant of national security risk, but not exclude people who can make a significant contribution to our national welfare. Do you see what I am trying to find? Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, Senator King, thank you for that question. There are so many examples of where Chinese citizens have made--I would be happy to give the Committee many examples, especially of Chinese researchers who continue to contribute in our laboratories and also our universities. It is a balance. And particularly for our universities, we have, while I was Under Secretary, we started the RTES Office, which is Research for Technology and Economic Security. And that is basically to make sure that we don't have things happen like happened in your Administration, which would check every one that's a PI going in for a grant. In the FOA that goes out, it is checked to make sure that it is very clear that we are going to ask this kind of information when you apply for a grant. Then, when the selections are made, look to see who the PIs are, are they ones that are safe to go forward with? Is the topic one--what about the topic, because the security for some topics---- Senator King. But universities don't have the security clearance apparatus---- Dr. Richmond. No. Senator King [continuing]. That the national labs have. I believe that there may be more risk, frankly, on the university level than there is at the national labs because at the national labs you have a whole--you have counterintelligence at Department of Energy and you have those kinds of examinations. Dr. Richmond. And that's why we are working with them and that's why we are sharing the risk matrix with them as well. I was on a video call recently to talk about what they need to do in proposals with their PIs to give them guidance on making---- Senator King. Mr. Dabbar, how do you think we should strike this balance? Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so, one of the orders that we also implemented was banning giving money to university researchers if they were also taking money under the Thousand Talents Program. We had found out that during the previous Administration, that they had allowed that, so that literally a researcher could be getting money from the Chinese state at the same time as from DOE. We decided that was a bad idea. We actually spent a bunch of time with university presidents explaining that. They had a lot of worry about that. And then, at the end of the day, they reached a conclusion that the Federal Government can decide what to do its money. I know it's a simple kind of conclusion. But one of the big things that they found, as a part of our pushing on this topic, was they found out that they had researchers who were spending significant time in Communist China and basically taking their research--it had nothing to do with DOE, it could have been from anyplace. And they didn't even know it was happening. I found out at Stanford, for example, there was a professor who was supposedly full time, who spent nine months a year in China. And the university didn't even realize it was going on, even though they were paying that professor. So I think awareness with the university system, that they need to address their own problems, but I do think additional controls around how the Federal Government money is given to PIs, the principal investigators---- Senator King. Let's go back to the national labs. Mr. Dabbar. Yes. Senator King. If there is a total ban, no Chinese researchers whatsoever, is that a good policy or would that cost us some good scientific breakthroughs that would otherwise be useful? I am trying to find the right line between national security and opportunity cost of brilliant researchers from anywhere in the world. Mr. Dabbar. I think, Senator, given that there has been, literally, a whole generation of successful efforts by Communist China in stealing stuff, the Los Alamos Club, but then the thousand talents. They keep coming at us. I think the better way of doing it is this proposed legislation from the Intel Committee that was referenced, which is a ban with Chinese nationals at the national labs, which are at the very highest level of the United States with the ability of the Department of do a waiver. And so, this flexibility---- Senator King. So the default would be no. Mr. Dabbar. The default should be no, is my recommendation, which was the Intel Committee's unanimous vote, with the ability of the Department to grant waivers. So there is still flexibility in the idea, but once again, I think the DOE national labs are at the top of the security worries. Senator King. I understand. Quick follow-up question. Who is Chinese? There are a lot of Chinese Americans. Are they swept into this? What's the definition? Mr. Dabbar. Yes, so the way the orders are written is, it's citizens. Senator King. Chinese citizens. Mr. Dabbar. Citizens. Senator King. Okay, so a Chinese American who has been here 50 years or a couple of generations would not be included? Mr. Dabbar. Citizens is the way that the order is currently written. Senator King. Okay, thank you. Mr. Dabbar. Or Russians, or, I mean, we had an Iranian trying to get hired, like an Iranian citizen, and we had concerns on the type of technology and we decided not to let them in. Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cassidy [presiding]. Thank you. And I have taken the gavel, just for everybody's information, while Senator Lee goes to vote. Let me follow up on that. I don't know the particulars of it, but by the way, I have been elsewhere, so if I ask something which is a repeat, I apologize, but I am going to pick up where Senator King left off. There were two folks who apparently were American citizens, but who were passing information to the Chinese Communist Party, that were recently arrested from the DOD. And I want to say it's out in San Diego. I am a little vague on all of this, but suffice it to say that this occurred. So if the restriction is on Chinese citizens, and by the way, I am Irish American, right? So I am not saying we have this kind of prohibition upon Chinese Americans. I am trying to understand this kind of interface where there has been an infusion of people who now are naturalized U.S. citizens, but in some way still might pose a security risk. And so, we want fairness. We want to capitalize upon incredible human talent, but we don't want to be someone's sucker. So take into account these naturalized citizens, and how would we do that, as a follow up to what Senator King asked in terms of establishing security? Yes, ma'am, would you like to go? Dr. Richmond. Yes, so, I think that's a really good question. So we have, just to put some data out there, of the Chinese citizenship at graduation. After they have been here for five years, 88 percent have stayed, and after ten years, 81 percent have stayed. So some--I mean, a lot of them are going to stay. And the question is, which ones are the ones that you need to be concerned about? So I think what we have done with working with the universities and NSF and certainly, Paul, with your administration work on this too, is the Department of Energy, back in 2019, and then 2021, every PI, every one that wants money, has to put down all their connections, okay? And with regards to money, visits, financial support, all of that has to be there if you are going to get DOE money. And I have been in the SCIF where I have been talking to our intelligence people about someone that may arise that causes them concern. And those people are also working with our vetting--RTES group--in order to figure out who those people are because they--I tell university PIs that if you don't disclose, and we find out that something is wrong, you are out of here. Senator Cassidy. So let me ask you this, though, because I once read about how the Chinese missile program began because there was a Chinese American who was doing fabulous work, but because of a security issue, was not given clearance to continue and he just wanted an outlet for his intellect. And so, he returned to Communist China and helped develop their program. So I guess that brings to mind, is there a way to discern between those people who are more loyal to China and those who are more loyal to the United States, but if we shut off opportunity, they will go where they have opportunity. Do you follow where I am going there? Dr. Richmond. Well, Senator Cassidy, that's exactly what we have been talking about here, is the concern about all the cuts that are happening in the Department of Energy--300 employees at NNSA, 1,800 across the Department, and those people have an incredible knowledge, scientific background, and if they are just really upset, shall I say, they may decide to do that. So it concerns me that---- Senator Cassidy. Well, people have got to eat. So they have got to have a job. Dr. Richmond. Yes, you have to pay the mortgage. You have to eat. You can take that contract that I, you know, asked that I--the letter that I got recently that said $40,000 for an hour's worth of work in China. We will pay all your expenses. And you know, for somebody that is mad, is angry at the government or for---- Senator Cassidy. But that's not actually, that's not my fundamental question though. I am going back to this person in the 1940s or 50s who was really seeking opportunity. So is there a way to discern between those who might be a security risk and those who are, you know, they are just, they may leave, but they are going to leave because of opportunity or other circumstances, not because of their security risk, fundamentally? Dr. Richmond. So in the case of the people, again, we go through with the RTES program and also the risk matrix at the laboratories, we go through as much information as we can that they will give us with regards to when they are employed at the university or, excuse me, employed in the Federal Government to find out whether they could possibly be a risk. Senator Cassidy. And of course, this would apply to people of multiple nationalities. I think I heard you mention as I walked in, because there are talented people coming into the United States for graduate school from the world over, right? Dr. Richmond. Yes, but you don't have to only worry about if someone has Chinese background. Senator Cassidy. I get that. Dr. Richmond. There are American scientists that have decided they needed the money so they went over to China. Senator Cassidy. I am a little suspicious about some of the Canadians---- [Laughter.] Dr. Richmond. I don't know, I think it's Irish Americans we need to worry about. [Laughter.] Senator Cassidy. You don't have to worry about Irish Americans for much. Senator Hickenlooper. Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of you for being here. I appreciate this. I grew up in a time back in the 60s, where at the height of the Cold War there was a continuing cartoon series in Mad Magazine where it was Spy vs. Spy, and there was a white spy and a black spy, and they were constantly doing tricks with each other in a comical competition. We are way beyond that. And I think, you know, when I was just getting--I got a master's in earth and environmental science, and we had a number of foreign students within our program, and it was embryonic in that sense of how much they added from their educational system to things that we didn't emphasize or didn't understand as well and vice versa. I got a great appreciation with that. I taught field geology for a year down in Costa Rica while I was still a graduate student and saw that culture and got those exchanges. It's incredibly powerful. I mean, look at the number of our largest companies that have been started by immigrants. The amazing innovations and breakthroughs that have come from people that came to this country because they wanted to live in a free country. To be quite honest, that magnet is still very powerful. But I want to ask each of you, I mean, are we doing enough? Is the current system sufficient to protect our classified research from foreign espionage? Mr. Dabbar. So Senator, I do think, as we have been discussing, I think a heightened level of awareness because there has been generation after generation of Chinese just adapting to try to steal. I would make a broadening point to your question, which is not just classified, I mean, the leading renewables lab in the world is in your state. It's not even close, okay? No other country comes close to that. And so, just to pick on a topic: perovskites for thin-film solar may be the next big thing. We don't want that to be in Xinjiang, produced by coal and slaves, literally slaves, right, because they are the wrong religion. I thought we were over that in 1945, but the Chinese are doing that. Senator Hickenlooper. Right. Mr. Dabbar. And I am certain they are trying to steal it from your lab--or your nation's lab. Senator Hickenlooper. I view it as my lab. Mr. Dabbar. Yeah, yeah--in your state. And so, I think as a broadening point--not just classified--it includes both economic impact technologies as well as classified. Senator Hickenlooper. I would agree. Dr. Richmond. Dr. Richmond. Yes, I agree with that. And I think what we are talking about here is an evolving situation, and it will continue to evolve. So we have to have a system together that is adaptable, can quickly move---- Senator Hickenlooper. But is our system now sufficient, is the question, right? We have got to be adaptable, but there are all kinds of things we can do to improve it, but---- Dr. Richmond. It can always be improved. It can always be improved, but I think, certainly under the Biden Administration, we took what we got from the past administration, heightened it up even more. And as we go through, we are going to have to look to see how much it needs to be heightened any more. Senator Hickenlooper. That's fair. Dr. Richmond. But again, it's not just classified information. It's also the AI and many of the other areas. Ms. Puglisi. And I am going to foot-stomp that. It's beyond--it's more than the classified information because it's really a lot of the technologies of the future--it's AI, it's biotech, it's the new materials in manufacturing. And so, I think what is really important is to focus on the behavior. And I think that a lot of the new regulations and rules that are being put in place are a start and are beginning to do that, but I think it's going to take time to implement those. And again, I think we have to take that really holistic look. And we can't set and forget, right? This is dynamic. The technology is changing. The vectors--the threat vectors are changing. And so, it's going to require a constant dialogue. Senator Hickenlooper. The magnitude of those threat vectors has never been greater. Ms. Puglisi. Right. Senator Hickenlooper. And I think we have to maintain that sense of urgency that you guys all have shown. Ms. Puglisi. Yes. Senator Hickenlooper. So I appreciate that. Several of you have talked about foreigners coming into our universities and being more motivated or adding a great deal to innovation. I think we have got to get back, also, to how do we get our kids in this country--I mean, the reason universities are receiving and open to receiving these foreign students is because we don't have a pipeline that is sufficient to provide the technology and the STEM kids. We have got to get to them in elementary school. Do you guys have, do you realize--do you connect that problem and the solution of it with this issue about our national security? Start at this end, this side. Ms. Puglisi. That's an excellent point. I mean, STEM education, we should start at K-12 and really do things to support---- Senator Hickenlooper. K-3. Ms. Puglisi. Yes, actually, the earlier parts, I mean, because you hear kids, by the time they are in middle school, they are saying---- Senator Hickenlooper. Absolutely. Ms. Puglisi [continuing]. I can't do math. But that's going to take an effort, and we want to make sure that we draw from the wide swath of Americans from all over the country. And so, that starts, you know, with support from the undergraduate and make people understand what the possible is and also, I want to--it's the technically proficient workforce---- Senator Hickenlooper. We are out of time. Dr. Richmond. So do you realize that our country has the lowest retention rate in the world for kids that decide they want to be a scientist at 18 and don't end up being a scientist at 24? Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous. I totally--I do know---- Dr. Richmond. Lowest. Senator Hickenlooper. Outrageous. Senator Cassidy. Senator Justice. Senator Justice [presiding]. Oh, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. You know, I have said this a bunch of times, but I am probably a new kid on the block, but I am not a kid, you know, I have got a lot of white hair and I have been around, and around, and around. I can tell you just simply just this--I truly believe that energy, absolutely, is the key to just about every single thing that we have got going. That's all there is to it. Now, and if it's that level of key, I have just got to share with you just a couple things, real quick. First of all, we have one of these 17 labs in Morgantown, West Virginia, and we are really proud of that. And I can tell you that I have just gotten through being the Governor of the great State of West Virginia for eight years, and to be perfectly honest, we were able to do lots and lots and lots of good stuff. And little West Virginia, that a lot of people told a lot of bad jokes about, to tell you the truth, along the way, became a diamond in the rough that everybody missed. And with all that being said, successes like you can't imagine. And we are really, really proud of exactly what we did. Now, with that being said, along the way, there was a gentleman that I ran into way, way, way before I ever became Governor, and he was a PRC national and just the most legitimate-speaking gentleman that you could ever be around. And then, all of a sudden, as I became the Governor, we found out things that were going on with him in his life and everything that tied right back to his homeland that absolutely astounded us. I mean, absolutely a gentleman that--as a guy that is suspicious of almost everybody a lot of times, but absolutely trusting in everybody--I believed with all in me that this guy was the real deal. A guy that absolutely we trusted in every way. And we were astounded with what we found. That's all there is to it. Now, energy is, I think, so important it's off the chart right now. It's off the chart how important energy is. Do you realize if you are a business guy--and that's me--do you realize that we can't cut our way out of these messes? We can't. We can mind the store and we can surely do a lot better, but at the end of the day, we got to find a way to grow. And the way to grow, absolutely, hands down, is energy, period. That's all there is to it. So if it is the most important--and it is, it truly is, you know--then we have got to be on guard and we have got to do better because the world is trying to absolutely discover or steal our inner-most secrets all the time--all the time. So with all that being said, I would say to everybody, from the guy that's the white-haired guy from West Virginia that's a business guy, not a politician--I am a guy that talks to you just with common sense and logic. I would say beware. And absolutely, we got to do better. And these folks right here are the key to us doing better in a lot of ways. So I do have one question, and it just parallels everything that I have already said because, you see, I really believe that President Trump, because I am a real friend with the family, and I am proud of that, and absolutely, I am trusting of the family, and he is our President and he is now saying to all of us, look, we have got a problem here. We need to do better. And so, let's get at doing better. But my question real fast is just this, and this is to Ms.--is it Puglisi? Did I get that halfway close? Ms. Puglisi. Puglisi, yes. Senator Justice. Okay, you know, and my question is just this, given your expertise in counterintelligence or research security, can you provide insight into the extent of collaboration between DOE national laboratories and the Seven Sons universities in China, please? Ms. Puglisi. Thank you very much. Well, I, myself, have not done empirical research to be able to give you the exact numbers. There have been a number of articles that look at those kinds of collaborations. And for those who are not aware, the Seven Sons are universities that work directly with the military. And so, you know, this is very concerning because, you know, China says that it will--it's civil military fusion. It will use anything that it acquires and apply it to its military. And so, those are affiliations and collaborations that we really need to take a closer look at. Senator Justice. Well, thank you so much. And I know my time is expired, but I would say just this--I will do anything and everything I can do to help all of you in every way at any time. We have got to become safer and we have got to become more protective, in my book. Thank you so much. The Chairman [presiding]. I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. This really has been a great hearing, and we are going to keep the record open until close of business, 6:00 p.m., tomorrow, February 21, for the submission of written questions for the record for our witnesses and items included in the hearing record. I do, before we gavel out, I want to just correct the record on some things that have been said today. Over the last week there has been a lot of fairly misleading and poorly sourced reporting regarding dismissals at the U.S. Department of Energy, and here are some facts that I think are relevant and significant, but often omitted. President Trump and the Department of Energy are committed to making government more accountable, efficient, and restoring proper stewardship of the American taxpayer dollar. And the previous Administration was not a responsible steward of that, and we are paying the price for it heavily in the form of inflation. In just four years, the Biden Administration expanded the Department of Energy's federal workforce, and it did so by more than 20 percent, adding more than 3,000 federal employee positions. In the last year alone, the Biden Administration increased the size of the Department of Energy federal workforce with 1,000 new employees. Delivering on President Trump's mandate, supported by more than 77 million American voters, the Energy Department began on Thursday dismissing a portion of recently hired federal employees classified in the Federal Government as probationary employees. Across the Energy Department, less than 700 probationary employees have been dismissed. These dismissal numbers pale in comparison to the total amount of positions the Biden Administration hired over the last four years. They are also less than the total positions added by the Biden Administration in the last year. Now, contrary to many news reports, the Energy Department's nuclear weapons production plants and nuclear laboratories are exempt from these dismissals. So those aren't part of it. At the Energy Department's Power Marketing Administration, PMA, fewer than three percent of total employees were dismissed and were primarily administrative roles. Of the more than 70,000 contractors and federal employees at the National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, fewer than 50 employees were dismissed. These employees held primarily administrative and clerical roles. The Energy Department will continue its critical mission of protecting our national security and nuclear deterrents in the development, modernization, and stewardship of America's atomic weapons enterprise, including the peaceful use of nuclear technology and non-proliferation. So it is important that we keep the facts aligned. When people are crying that the sky is falling, it usually is not, and that certainly is the case here. In any event, I thank the witnesses for being here today. It has been a good, informative discussion. We have laid a good record and I very much appreciate your help. The hearing stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.] APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED ---------- [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]