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[Senate Hearing 119-200] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-200 23 AND YOU: THE PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 23ANDME BANKRUPTCY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ JUNE 11, 2025 __________ Serial No. J-119-22 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] www.judiciary.senate.gov www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 61-889 WASHINGTON : 2025 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, JOHN CORNYN, Texas Ranking Member MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware THOM TILLIS, North Carolina RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri ALEX PADILLA, California KATIE BOYD BRITT, Alabama PETER WELCH, Vermont ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California Kolan Davis, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Joe Zogby, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- OPENING STATEMENTS Page Grassley, Hon. Charles E......................................... 1 Durbin, Hon. Richard J........................................... 3 WITNESSES Cohen, Glenn..................................................... 6 Prepared statement........................................... 33 Gotberg, Brook................................................... 8 Prepared statement........................................... 43 Klein, Adam...................................................... 9 Prepared statement........................................... 53 Selsavage, Joseph................................................ 5 Prepared statement........................................... 61 APPENDIX Items submitted for the record................................... 75 23 AND YOU: THE PRIVACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 23ANDME BANKRUPTCY ---------- WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2025 United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m., in Room 226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Grassley [presiding], Cornyn, Hawley, Blackburn, Britt, Moody, Durbin, Klobuchar, Coons, Padilla, and Schiff. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IOWA Chairman Grassley. Good morning, everybody. Genetic data is the blueprint to a person. It is sensitive, it is personal, and in the wrong hands, it can be dangerous. As technology and biotechnology rapidly expand, they bring new and serious challenges. Consumers deserve to know how their data is going to be used, and Americans deserve protection from foreign threats. That is why we are here today. The 23andMe saga has unveiled serious and concerning issues regarding consumer protection, data privacy, and national security. We have explored these issues in these hearings, but today's hearing focuses upon genetic data. 23andMe collected genetic data from roughly 15 million people, and when it did, it told the consumers that their data would be safe. They said it would be protected under their privacy policy. But now, 23andMe is in bankruptcy, and it is selling off its data, Americans' genetic data, your data, to the highest bidders, bidders who consumers never consented to giving their information to, bidders who could manipulate and repurpose the genetic data, bidders who could be loyal to or controlled by foreign adversaries. Without any Federal law governing genomic data privacy, the only protection for the American consumer was 23andMe's own privacy policies. Even putting aside whether consumers read or understood the privacy policy, they were required to sign it as-is, or they couldn't use the service. And now that 23andMe is in bankruptcy, whichever company buys them can change the privacy policy on a whim, however they see it. That's why, just yesterday, 27 States sued to block the sale of this data. Though the bankruptcy code requires a consumer privacy ombudsman to be appointed when personally identifiable data is being sold in violation of a privacy policy, that simply is not enough. On the one hand, the bankruptcy code doesn't include genetic data within the definition of these three words, personally identifiable information. So even if a company sold genetic data in violation of their privacy policy, the code doesn't require an ombudsman to be appointed to protect consumer privacy interest. On the other hand, even if an ombudsman is appointed, the timeline for on which they operate and the efficacy of their role must be further interrogated. Before Americans' genetic information is sold, they should be able to decide whether, when, and how that data is going to be used. In addition to consumer rights concerns, the national security implications of 23andMe bankruptcy are significant. In 2019, the Department of Defense issued guidance that servicemembers refrain from using direct-to-consumer DNA testing kits. When a consumer genetics company accumulates the personal genomic blueprint of millions, many of whom are U.S. citizens, government employees, or military personnel, it becomes a strategic intelligence asset. In the wrong hands, this data access isn't just a privacy breach, it is a potential weapon. Foreign governments can design targeted biological weapons and wage pathogenic warfare. They can identify health vulnerabilities and conduct tailored attacks on key military and government personnel. In light of the serious evidence that COVID-19 was created in a Chinese laboratory, the weaponization of biologics and the military application of genomic data are no longer far-fetched fantasies of science fiction. They are tenable threats to the national security. The threat from China is particularly acute. The Chinese have invested heavily in their military-civil fusion strategy where they seek to erase the line between private property and military assets. The Chinese Communist Party aggressively integrates development of artificial intelligence, biotech, and computing into their military efforts. They seize and acquire corporate assets to engage in unconventional and asymmetric warfare. Just this week, for example, two Chinese nationals were charged with smuggling a dangerous pathogen used for agricultural terrorism into the United States. The Chinese Government paid for one of the nationals to research this pathogen, and a search of their electronics revealed information linking them to the Chinese Communist Party. Data is a weapon, and genetic data is particularly a potent weapon. Americans' genetic data must be zealously defended and jealously protected. The 23andMe bankruptcy is a massive threat to the protection of the genetic data of so many Americans. Congress has yet to enact sufficient protection on these important issues. There is no data privacy law that protects genomic data, no provision in the bankruptcy code that prevents this data from being compromised through bankruptcy auction, and no sufficient remedy for consumers. I recently co-sponsored Senator Cornyn's Don't Sell My DNA Act, which aims at filling some of these gaps, but there is a lot more work to do. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we can advance legislation that better protects Americans' genetic security. With that, I will open things up to Senator Durbin to give an opening statement. Then, we will hear from our witnesses. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Senator Durbin. Thanks, Senator Grassley, good and timely hearing as far as I am concerned. 23andMe has a data base containing the genetic information of about 15 million people. If your genetic information is in their data base, a researcher can tell you who your relatives are, what your ethnicity is, what your eye color is, and whether you think cilantro tastes like soap. They can also determine a lot of information about your health. Are you at risk of developing type 2 diabetes? How about celiac disease, chronic kidney disease, Parkinson's? In short, 23andMe has access to deeply personal information about you and your health, information that you would normally want to keep private, I guess, between you and your family and your doctor. Yet no federal law, no federal law, prevents 23andMe from sharing this data with others, including insurance companies, future employers, and law enforcement. Rather, a patchwork of State laws, privacy policies are the only things protecting the genetic information of millions of Americans. If 23andMe's customers are anything like fellow Americans, they likely did not read this privacy policy. According to a survey by Pew Research, more than half Americans say they always--well, almost always--often agree with privacy policies without ever reading them. Who can blame them? Whether you are activating your cell phone, setting up your Facebook account, accessing a number of services, Americans are bombarded with countless privacy policies to which they must agree, and virtually all of us do. One company who studied the issue found that Americans would have to spend, get ready, 47 hours a month to read the privacy policies of the most visited websites. That is more than a full 9 to 5 workweek every single month. Get real. When 23andMe filed for bankruptcy on March 23, a lot of people suddenly became interested in privacy policy because buried in the fine print of their privacy policy is the following. Listen closely. ``If we are involved in a bankruptcy, merger, acquisition, reorganization, or sale of assets, your personal information may be accessed, sold, or transferred as part of the transaction.'' Remember that clause? Probably not. So 23andMe's 15 million customers are left wondering, who is going to get access to my genetic information? What are they going to do with it? What rights do I have to stop it? That is why we need this hearing. Thankfully, 23andMe's privacy policy gave its customers the right to delete their data upon request, and millions have done so, so many, in fact, that 23andMe's website crashed with the traffic. Again, this wasn't required by Federal law. There are very few federal guardrails to protect the most sensitive personal data, including your DNA and who can share it. It is time for Congress to put some protections in place for Americans. In the right hands, a genetic data base could help researchers unlock lifesaving medical cures and make incredible discoveries. But in the wrong hands, in the wrong hands, it could enable dystopian discrimination, and surveillance could be used by our adversaries. You were turned down for that job? Why did they turn me down? Turns out they knew a lot more about you than you knew about yourself. The American people deserve to have faith that their sensitive information will be and stay in the right hands before they agree to share it. Yet nearly 20 years after 23andMe came on the scene, and at least that long since the surveillance industrial complex started taking over the internet, America still lacks a comprehensive federal law to protect our privacy. Like other areas, including kids' online safety, to which this Committee has dedicated a lot of time, there is bipartisan consensus that something needs to be done about our privacy. There have been signs of hope, including in 2022 when the American Data Privacy and Protection Act passed the House by a broad bipartisan vote of 53 to 2. This is the Energy and Commerce Committee. But the American people are still waiting. I think we can get together and pass a bipartisan bill. This hearing might help. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Grassley. Thank you. This is a consensus hearing, so I am going to go ahead and introduce all the witnesses that have joined us today. Then, I will swear them in. Mr. Joseph Selsavage serves as interim CEO, CFO, CAO, 23andMe, joined 23andMe in November 2021 through the acquisition of Lemonaid Health. At Lemonaid Health, he was chief financial officer. Mr. Selsavage received a BA in economics and financial management and his MA in accountancy from Catholic University. He also received his MBA from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a certified public accountant. Next, we have Mr. Glenn Cohen, professor of law at Harvard Law School and the faculty director of Harvard Center of Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics. Professor Cohen is an elected member of the National Academy of Medicine and has spoken to NATO, OECD, and members of the U.S. and Korean Congress on medical and biotech issues and policies. He previously served as a lawyer for the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, where he handled litigation in Court of appeals and U.S. Supreme Court. Next, we have Ms. Brook Gotberg, professor of law, Brigham Young University. Professor Gotberg teaches bankruptcy, contracts, secured transactions, and other commercial law subjects. Her scholarship focuses on debtor and creditor relations and various impacts on the bankruptcy code and business reorganization. Professor Gotberg earned her BA in political science magna cum laude, Brigham Young University, and her JD cum laude from Harvard Law School. Mr. Adam Klein is a senior lecturer at UT Austin School of Law and director of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law. Previously, Mr. Klein served as chairman and CEO of the United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, overseeing counterterrorism programs at the NSA, FBI, CIA, and the Department of Homeland Security. Before entering government, Mr. Klein was a senior fellow at the Center for the New American Security and National Security Think Tank. Earlier in his career, he served as a law clerk to Justice Scalia of the Supreme Court. Would you please rise so I could administer the oath? [Witnesses are sworn in.] Chairman Grassley. Thank you. And I think we will go my left to my right, so you start, Mr. Selsavage. STATEMENT OF JOSEPH SELSAVAGE, INTERIM CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER, 23ANDME HOLDING CO., SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA Mr. Selsavage. Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Joseph Selsavage, and I am the interim chief executive officer of 23andMe, a mission- driven organization founded on the simple yet transformative belief that individuals have the right to access, understand, and benefit from their own genetic information. From the very beginning, 23andMe's purpose has been clear, to help people live healthier lives through direct access to their own DNA, to accelerate scientific discovery, and to contribute meaningfully to the future of personalized medicine. We recognize that with this vision comes immense responsibility to the millions of individuals who have chosen to participate in something larger than themselves. We are here today not only to answer your questions, but to reaffirm our deep commitment to data privacy and security, transparency, customer choice, data stewardship, and scientific integrity. Founded in 2006, 23andMe is a personal genomics and biotechnology company that pioneered direct-to-consumer genetic testing. We are named after the 23 pairs of chromosomes in every human cell. Our mission has always been to empower consumers by providing access to information about their personal genetics based on the latest science so that they can make their own informed decisions about their healthcare journey. Our services allow customers to gain DNA insights about their genetic risk for dozens of conditions like type 2 diabetes, Alzheimer's disease, and certain cancers. They can also learn about their carrier status for inherited conditions like cystic fibrosis or Tay-Sachs disease, or wellness factors like lactose intolerance or deep sleep intolerance. 23andMe customers have consistently reported taking positive health actions after learning about their genetics through 23andMe's services. Eighty-two percent of our customers with an actionable genetic result were previously unaware of their health risks. The value of personal genomics goes beyond the insights people learn about themselves. Customers who register for our services also have the option to allow their data to be shared for research purposes, and over 80 percent of our customers have chosen to consent to research. Consent is a central tenet of 23andMe's research program. We have separate research consents beyond our consents to processing sensitive data, a privacy statement and terms of service that customers must review and agree to if they want to participate in our research program. We remove all identifying information before any genetic data is shared with third parties. Any customer who affirmatively consents to participate in our research program can easily opt out at any time through their account settings and have always been able to do so. Customers are also free to delete their account and data at any time. Our customers who have affirmatively consented contribute to more than 230 studies on topics that range from Parkinson's disease to lupus to asthma and more. We collaborate with advocacy organizations, universities, and biotech companies to bring customers opportunities to participate in research. Since 2010, 23andMe has published 293 papers that help advance scientific research in a wide range of fields. Due to circumstances that I discuss in more detail in my written testimony, 23andMe is currently conducting a sales process supervised by a United States bankruptcy court. That process has been a success to date. We have two remaining bidders, both American enterprises, that will conduct a final round of bidding later this week before the sale of the winning bidder is presented for approval by the bankruptcy court. Because this proceeding is ongoing, I am unable to speak about the merits of either bid or the ongoing sale process. Let me assure the Committee that 23andMe remains committed to protecting customer data. We are requiring that anyone bidding for 23andMe must agree to comply with our privacy policies. We recognize the vital importance of protecting every individual's right to access and control their own genetic information. Empowering people with the knowledge about their DNA is not only a matter of personal autonomy, it is a gateway to proactive and personalized health, informed decisionmaking, and greater engagement in consumer and scientific progress. At 23andMe, we believe that when consumers are trusted with their own data, they become partners in advancing medicine and not just patients of it. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee today, and I welcome your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Selsavage appears as a submission for the record.] STATEMENT OF I. GLENN COHEN, DEPUTY DEAN AND PROFESSOR, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS Professor Cohen. Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, other distinguished Members of the Committee, my name is Glenn Cohen. I'm a deputy dean and professor at Harvard Law School. I work on the legal and ethical issues in medicine and the biosciences, including genetics. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. Genetic data requires special protection because it is immutable, it inherently identifies us, it reveals information about our blood relatives, and because many health conditions have significant genetic components, so knowing about someone's genes is knowing about their health. If one's genetic information was accessed, it might reveal information on prognosis for breast cancer, Alzheimer's disease, and many other health conditions. It might let people identify you, including reconstructing your face and vocal characteristics. You might face discrimination in life, disability, and long- term care insurance, and it might reveal misattributed paternity. There are additional risks to our servicemembers. Indeed, the Pentagon warned that our enemies might use the 23andMe data for ``mass surveillance and the ability to track individuals without their authorization or awareness.'' And that's just today's risks. The development of polygenic risk scores may further reveal our risk for various diseases, and some have begun using 23andMe data to create scores to predict behavioral traits like risk tolerance and even educational attainment. Since 2006, through its direct-to-consumer genetic tests, 23andMe has amassed a vast data base that includes the genetic and personal information of more than 15 million consumers. For many, it also holds physical specimens like saliva samples. The main privacy protection for those customers is just a promise the company has made in its privacy statement not to share personal information voluntarily with insurance companies, employers, or public data bases, or with law enforcement agencies without a valid subpoena, search warrant, or court order. But if you read more closely, the privacy statement provides much less protection than it appears to. Few customers read or understand privacy statements or terms of use. 23andMe reserves the right to alter the terms customers have relied on, and moreover, the company explicitly reserves the right to transfer customer personal information in the event of the sale of the company or a bankruptcy. The company has announced as part of the bankruptcy process it will ``require anyone bidding for 23andMe to agree to comply with our privacy policies and all applicable privacy laws.'' Well, that's all well and good, but even if that becomes a condition of the sale, nothing prohibits Regeneron, TTAM, or another buyer of the data from altering that privacy policy just as there's nothing to stop 23andMe from doing so tomorrow. It's also unclear to me what's going to happen to the saliva samples, raising additional privacy concerns. Trust is all about a relationship. Customers who chose 23andMe entered into a particular kind of relationship with a particular kind of company. They shared their genetic and other personal information, recognizing there was some privacy risk to obtain potential ancestry and health-related insights, and for some of them to help enable research and the development of potential new drugs or other therapeutics. Upon bankruptcy or sale of the assets, consumers may find themselves in a relationship with a very different kind of company with goals they may not support and policies that have changed while they weren't looking. Privacy statements and customer acquiescence have a role to play, but private ordering solutions can only go so far to deal with these concerns. And Federal law is not currently up to the job. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, HIPAA, our main health privacy law on the Federal level, will not apply to 23andMe because it's not a covered entity. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 protects individuals from genetic discrimination for employment or health insurance, but unlike its equivalent in many of our peer countries, it doesn't cover life, disability, and long-term care insurance. It excludes military personnel and excludes protection for individuals on the basis of conditions that have already manifested in the individual. In my written testimony, I've analyzed a series of possible alternatives for you to consider, but I want to focus on two here, two that I think are particularly promising. First, the Don't Sell My DNA Act introduced by Members of this Committee, Chairman Grassley, Senators Cornyn and Klobuchar, which would introduce a strong model of affirmative consent upon bankruptcy. We've heard a lot about consent from the company, and the question is, why aren't they getting consent at this moment for the transfer? Why not go back and ask people to affirmatively consent to that transfer? And that is what your act would help do. I would like to see it extended, in fact, beyond the bankruptcy to other forms of sale or transfer of genetic data and more explicitly cover the biospecimens. The second complementary model I want to highlight is from Florida, which in 2020 became the first U.S. State to ban insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information in areas not covered by GINA, life, long-term care, and disability insurance. I would like to see a similar effort on the Federal level because when it comes to--I respect federalism, but when it comes to genetic discrimination, really, all Americans should have this protection. Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, and Members of the Committee, I'm appreciative of your focus on this important issue, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Professor Cohen appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Grassley. I am going to open up the Senate. Senator Cornyn, would you Chair while I am gone? I will be gone about 15 or 20 minutes. Thank you. Go ahead, Professor Gotberg. STATEMENT OF BROOK GOTBERG, PROFESSOR OF LAW, BYU LAW SCHOOL, PROVO, UTAH Professor Gotberg. Okay. Thank you for the opportunity to present to you today. Chairman Grassley. Push the button. Professor Gotberg. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to present to you today. I'm happy to provide some perspective on the sale of personal consumer data in bankruptcy. And the main message that I'd like to convey is that the concerns that you've raised are not inherently bankruptcy issues. I'd also like to advise against passing bankruptcy-specific prohibitions on the sale of data, and I'll explain. Bankruptcy provides a vital public policy role in the smooth running of our economy. Bankruptcy is not inevitable when a company becomes insolvent, but its primary purpose is to mitigate and manage the losses caused by a debtor's insolvency. When a company becomes insolvent, the creditors of that company are obligated to engage in a competition for those debtors' limited assets. This competition looks like a race to recover their legal rights. This is the metaphorical or actual race to the courthouse. The race imposes costs on creditors who have to expend resources, sometimes fruitlessly, because they have gotten there too late after the money has run out. Also, a piecemeal liquidation of the debtor's assets frequently devalues those assets or destroys value so that creditors are ultimately paid less. That's why we want parties to choose bankruptcy when the debtor is insolvent. Bankruptcy isn't a haven for any party to avoid the enforcement of outside laws. This is a primary issue in the 23andMe bankruptcy right now to determine if there are State laws that would prohibit the sale of assets in that bankruptcy. But we also don't want parties to avoid bankruptcy because of specific laws that arise only in those instances. If a company cannot sell assets in bankruptcy, it will simply do so outside of bankruptcy, without the benefit of court oversight or the transparency provided by bankruptcy proceedings and probably for a lower price. This won't actually protect consumers from the sale of their data. It will just deny them these protections that bankruptcy is intended to give. The primary advantage of bankruptcy is its efficiency and its ability to maximize the value of debtor's assets. Federal law shouldn't protect consumer data only in bankruptcy proceedings. To the extent that Congress wants to prohibit the sale of personal consumer data, it should do so both inside and outside bankruptcy to prevent the strategic use of bankruptcy for reasons that have nothing to do with the efficiency of the proceedings. I'm happy to answer any questions about this or any bankruptcy-related issues, but I would really encourage the Committee to consider holistic and universally applicable prohibitions to the extent they exist. Thanks. [The prepared statement of Professor Gotberg appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn [presiding]. Mr. Klein. STATEMENT OF ADAM KLEIN, DIRECTOR AND SENIOR LECTURER, ROBERT S. STRAUSS CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW, (UT AUSTIN), AUSTIN, TEXAS Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. Before joining the University of Texas, I served as chairman of the United States Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an agency that Members of this Committee oversee and know well. Many of our oversight projects revolved around the insights that intelligence agencies can gain from personal data. That is because data is not just another commodity. When our adversaries buy or steal sensitive American data, they use it to harm the United States. China, in particular, has used American data to strengthen its military, conduct hostile intelligence operations, and help its companies displace American competitors. Genomic data, like the DNA profiles held by 23andMe, presents several distinct national security risks. First, China could use DNA profiles to identify and track people of interest, such as American intelligence officers and critics of the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, who live in the United States. China has already built a genetic data base to track and identify members of its Uyghur minority. With our genomic data, it could do the same for Americans. Second, access to American genomic data could help Chinese biotech companies gain an unfair advantage over American companies. It could also help China train specialized AI models for biomedical research. Now, China has domestic AI datasets, but its population is far less genetically diverse than ours, so American genomic data would hold great value for them. Third, China could use American genomic data for bioweapons research. Now, that risk is speculative, but it can't be dismissed. My written testimony lists several clues that China might be open to this kind of research. For example, a Chinese military textbook speculated about bioweapons designed for specific ethnic genetic attacks. Access to American DNA profiles with their greater genetic diversity could facilitate research into ethnically targeted bioweapons. There is a disturbingly high chance, as Members of this Committee know, that we will find ourselves in an armed confrontation with the People's Republic of China before the decade is out, most likely over Taiwan. If so, we should expect China to target our homeland with unconventional, asymmetric tactics, which could include biologic attacks. Next year, this Committee will once again consider Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As you do so, I respectfully encourage you to keep in mind that law's vital role in detecting adversarial plots against our homeland and stopping cyber intrusions into sensitive systems, potentially including systems like 23andMe's that store Americans' data. I'd like to conclude on a positive note. In recent years, Congress, including this Committee and Members of this Committee and the executive branch, have done a great deal to protect Americans' data from hostile foreign powers. And as this hearing illustrates, leaders are now vigilant about the security risks of letting adversaries buy our data. For those reasons, I'm confident that the executive branch would block and could block an adversary-controlled entity from buying 23andMe. But the attention of this Committee and others in Congress is vital to help ensure an outcome to this bankruptcy that protects the privacy and security of Americans. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Klein appears as a submission for the record.] Senator Cornyn. Thank you all very much. We will start with the 5-minute rounds of questions, and I will begin. So back in 1990, Congress authorized something called the Human Genome Project, which was designed to map the human genome, which gave rise to an incredible amount of information about the human genome, which is what makes us who we are. And it has had enormous positive benefits in terms of law enforcement, for example, being able to use DNA as an essential part of regular criminal investigations to identify an assailant. For example, in a forensic analysis of a rape kit, it can identify with virtual certainty the perpetrator of the crime. But at the time, it was also recognized that there could be tremendous abuse of that information. And indeed, we have touched on some of those, for example, discriminating against people based on their genetic profile for insurance purposes. For example, if you apply for life insurance or something of that nature and someone had access to your genetic profile, they could basically deny you because of perhaps some indication, some evidence of a genetic defect that would lead you to contract a disease or the like. And then, of course, employment, where there could be discrimination by employers against people based on their genetic profile. So all of this is something we have anticipated to some extent, but I don't think we have been able to predict the extent to which this genetic profile, this genome data can be subject to not only beneficial use, but also use by our adversaries and for improper purposes. Mr. Selsavage, did 23andMe do the actual testing of the saliva samples that were submitted by the people who engaged your company and your product? Mr. Selsavage. We contract with LabCorp, which is an American-based testing company to do the testing of the DNA samples for 23andMe. Senator Cornyn. For all of it? Mr. Selsavage. For all of our testing, yes. Senator Cornyn. And to your knowledge, is LabCorp--are there efforts to attack or to basically do cyber attacks on the data base that LabCorp maintained of 23andMe genetic samples and data? Mr. Selsavage. I am not aware of any particular cyber attacks on LabCorp. However---- Senator Cornyn. Well, you are not saying that LabCorp was somehow immune from cyber intrusions or cyber attacks, right? Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. No, I'm not, Senator. Senator Cornyn. So can you tell us, as you sit here today, whether any of the genetic material that LabCorp tested that was collected by any of our adversaries or by criminal organizations, can you tell us with certainty that all of it was protected? Mr. Selsavage. To the best of my knowledge, you know, that data has been protected by LabCorp, and there has not been any breaches at LabCorp which has affected our data. Senator Cornyn. Professor Cohen, generally speaking, if there is genetic information supplied along the same lines as 23andMe, what is to protect individuals from outsourcing of some of that testing to, let's say, labs in China? Mr. Cohen. I don't think there's much, Senator. Senator Cornyn. And Professor Klein, you said this is a national security vulnerability. Why is that? Why would China, the Chinese Communist Party, want the genetic information on Americans? Mr. Klein. Well, there are several potential uses, none of which are good. One is to use genetic information as a means of tracking and identifying people, something that every intelligence service and law enforcement agency---- Senator Cornyn. And that could include the active-duty military? Mr. Klein. Active-duty military, intelligence officers working for the United States, Chinese dissidents who are living here and have come here to enjoy freedom and freedom of speech but whom the CCP is tracking. But then looking forward into the age of AI, having large datasets with genetically diverse populations represented in them is very attractive for training specialized AI models. We know we're in a fierce competition with them, and we need to keep these advantages for American companies and for the U.S. Government. Senator Cornyn. And would each of you agree with me that the genetic information that is collected through one of these saliva samples by a company like 23andMe doesn't just tell you something about the person who provides that saliva sample. It tells you something about their parents, about their children, and about their grandchildren, and anybody who might be a genetic relative of that individual. Professor Cohen. That's right, Senator. When we say 15 million, that is kind of an underestimate when you think about all of these generations of people who are affected. Senator Cornyn. Senator Durbin. Senator Durbin. So it seems to me that 23andMe tried, Mr. Selsavage, to come up with a policy to protect its consumers, but there is little to guarantee that the next buyer or the one after that won't abuse that policy, is there? Mr. Selsavage. Senator and Ranking Member, 23andMe has required as part of the sale of the assets of the company that any buyer of the company must comply and adopt the privacy policy and consents that 23andMe have in place today. Senator Durbin. So I didn't think I would ever say this in this room, but does the rule against perpetuities apply? [Laughter.] Mr. Selsavage. Congressman, can you clarify that for me? [Laughter.] Senator Durbin. I have tried to forget every aspect of that course in law school, but what I am suggesting to you is two or three buyers removed, your best intentions don't mean much, do they? Mr. Selsavage. Senator and Ranking Member, you know, my understanding is that, you know, 23andMe is doing everything we can to ensure that the next buyer adopts the policies and consents of 23andMe, and, you know, while I can't actually testify to their future intentions, both are, you know, American institutions with experience in genomics, and, you know, are committed to protecting that data and continuing---- Senator Durbin. Unless we have a Federal law relative to this issue that applies to future transactions, your best intentions don't mean much, as far as I am concerned. And don't take it personally. So, Professor Cohen, there was a best-selling book a few years ago called The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, fascinating book, story of an African-American woman who died in 1951 of cervical cancer in Baltimore if I am not mistaken. A sample of her tumor generated what is known as the HeLa cell line. That cell line was mass-produced and sold to laboratories all over the world. It has been used in scientific research, including research into cancer, the human genome, and the development of the polio vaccine. It is still being used today. Famously, Henrietta Lacks never consented to the use of her cells in this way, and despite the vast sums of money the cell line has generated, her family has never seen a dime of profits. Part of what is being sold by 23andMe is a collection of biological samples submitted by consumers who wanted their DNA examined. They may have consented to some use of their samples, but I question how informed it actually was. And there is no guarantee a new owner won't change how the samples are used. Are you familiar with this story? Mr. Cohen. I am, Senator. Senator Durbin. Is there anything we can learn from it in this application? Professor Cohen. I think to learn for the importance of affirmative consent, and again, affirmative consent that can explain as much as possible what you want to do with material. And again, we still haven't heard an answer why at this stage they're not going back to all of their customers and asking, can you consent to the transfer of your data to this new buyer? It's a very simple thing that the company could do. Why aren't they doing it? Senator Durbin. Mr. Selsavage, why aren't you doing it? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, 23andMe believes we've obtained the consent from our customers, and when the customer signed up to our--to the service, they have agreed affirmatively to consent to our privacy and terms of service, which specifically says that we--in the event of a bankruptcy sale, that we can actually transfer their data. Senator Durbin. I think what Professor Cohen is suggesting is that there is more that could be done to protect your consumers. Would you consider it? Mr. Selsavage. I can take that suggestion back to our team, Senator. Senator Durbin. I hope you will. Professor Gotberg, I guess my conclusion from your testimony was the bankruptcy code really didn't envision what we are talking about here. Professor Gotberg. So the bankruptcy code treats--it respects law that exists outside of bankruptcy just the same in bankruptcy proceedings as outside, so any legal prohibitions that apply outside bankruptcy also apply inside bankruptcy. So in a way, the bankruptcy code did anticipate that. It just doesn't introduce new substantive law when a company files for bankruptcy. There's not new prohibitions that exist. Senator Durbin. But what you say is, in your testimony, current bankruptcy law provides some oversight that can prevent the worst privacy policy abuses in a bankruptcy sale, but it does not prohibit the sale from taking place. Placing a prohibition on bankruptcy sales would simply push them outside bankruptcy proceedings where there are fewer protections. The best policy would make any restrictions on the sale of personal consumer data universally applicable. It is time for us to legislate, isn't it? Professor Gotberg. I would say if you want to protect consumers from having their personal consumer data bought and sold, you need to do that. Senator Durbin. Amen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cornyn. Senator Durbin, we have seen history made today because in your long and distinguished career in the U.S. Senate, I know you have been waiting to use the phrase rule against perpetuities in a question, so congratulations for that. [Laughter.] Senator Cornyn. Senator Blackburn. Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Selsavage, I want to ask you--let me say this. We all know that China is hard at work trying to build a virtual you of each and every one of us, and this is why we need to have a Federally preemptive online privacy law, which we do not have. And whether it is 23andMe and genetic information or whether it is data security, this is something that we need. But you seem a bit naive to think that you haven't had any breaches or any attacks, cyber attacks. Our critical infrastructure in this country is hit many times a day. So what I want you to do--and you can submit this in writing--is to go into detail about how you anonymize and how you mask consumers and their information. And you can submit that during the QFR period. But I think it is important that you lay this out so that individuals know what level of protection that they are going to have. You all may sell, and then there may be an immediate buyer. You sold to 23andMe. You thought that would be a longer-term relationship. It is not. And then there may be three or four subsequent buyers, so some certainty and some awareness would be a good thing. And I want that in writing. Thank you. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, thank you for that. And I will take that back to our team as well. I do want to note that, you know, I'm clearly aware that, you know, basically there are many cybersecurity threats. And at 23andMe, security and our customers' privacy is top of mind. And, you know, basically, we, you know, at 23andMe, do have cybersecurity threats from our foreign adversaries and others. And I will take your concerns back. Senator Blackburn. Thank you. I thank you for that clarification because we deal with that issue repeatedly and the severe threats that exist each and every day. Okay. Mr. Klein, I want to come to you. Talking about a privacy standard, there are some States, including my State of Tennessee, who have stepped forward. And Tennessee, in 2023, enacted the Genetic Information Privacy Act. That requires companies to protect consumers' private information and to provide them with the ability to access their data, to delete their data and their account, and to destroy their biological sample. However, not all Americans enjoy this protection. So in that regard, is the Tennessee law a model for moving forward? Mr. Klein. Well, I haven't studied that law closely, Senator, but it certainly sounds appealing to me as a citizen, as a consumer. And I've been following the saga of the general Federal privacy law that everyone seems to want for many years now. And the Committee understands better than I do the challenges that have arisen in coming to an agreement on something that everybody seems to want. I think what the bill that Senator Cornyn and the other Members have introduced demonstrates is that even as--and the Tennessee bill is that even as we wait for a general law, there is possibility of making progress on sector-specific issues. And in my testimony, I highlighted some of the very good things that the Committee and other parts of the Congress has done on this specific threat from hostile foreign actors. And I do think, to Congress' credit, we've tightened that up considerably in the past few years. Senator Blackburn. Mr. Selsavage, the Tennessee attorney general issued a statement after you all filed for bankruptcy, issued a statement notifying Tennesseans of their right to request a deletion. So talk to me about how you were moving forward with these deletion requests. Mr. Selsavage. At 23andMe, any one of our customers at any time can delete their data. For our customers, it's a simple process. All they need to do is log into their account at 23andMe, go to their settings, and request their account to be deleted. That process is automatic. We do ask for their date of birth just as an additional verification measure. And we've complied with those deletion requests and over--you know, through--you know, through the bankruptcy process and prior to that. Senator Blackburn. And when they delete their account, they are also deleting their biological sample. Is that correct? Mr. Selsavage. If a customer has consented to--for us to biobank their saliva sample, we will also delete and destroy that saliva sample---- Senator Blackburn. Thank you. Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. Upon their request to delete their data. Senator Blackburn. I yield back. Senator Cornyn. Senator Klobuchar. Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I think I will start by following up with Senator Blackburn's good questions. And by the way, thank you, Mr. Klein, for mentioning the need for a general privacy bill, which we badly need. So on this deletion issue, it is my understanding that 1.3 million consumers asked 23andMe to delete their genetic data. Many faces technical issues. So how long is the backlog right now? And what are you doing to make sure all the requests are fulfilled? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, the good news is that today there is no backlog, that we are current on all of the deletion requests. What did occur, you know, is when we filed for bankruptcy and, you know, many State attorneys general requested--or suggested to consumers that they delete their data at 23andMe. We did receive a significant amount of deletion requests. We quickly added additional staff and, you know, basically were able to reduce that backlog. Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. And will you commit to ensuring that consumers will retain their right to have their genetic data deleted after the bankruptcy sale is completed by making deletion rights a condition of the sale? Mr. Selsavage. Both of the bidders and, you know, the bankruptcy sale of 23andMe, both Regeneron and TTAM Research Institute, have agreed to adopt the policies of 23andMe, the privacy policies---- Senator Klobuchar. So the answer is yes? Mr. Selsavage. So, you know, the answer is yes. Senator Klobuchar. Okay. During the bankruptcy process, how is 23andMe ensured consumers could decide how information is used and for what purposes since that is what your website has promised consumers? Mr. Selsavage. Our consumers consent not only to a terms of service, a privacy policy, there are also separate consents for our customers to--if they so choose, to engage in research at 23andMe and yet a--and then a separate consent to allow us to engage with research with third parties. And, you know, we make sure that customers have the right to actually opt in. We don't default those. Customers are actually clicking yes, they will want to conduct--or enable their data to be used for research purposes. Many customers understand these are important for understanding disease and genetic conditions and lifesaving medical treatments. Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. Professor Cohen, it is my belief that the privacy policies aren't meeting the privacy needs of consumers during bankruptcy. That is why I have worked with Senator Cornyn. I appreciate his leadership, and Grassley, to give consumers control over their genetic data with our bill, Don't Sell My DNA Act. Why is it so important that we require consent from the consumer before their genetic data is sold to another company with which they have no prior relationship? Professor Cohen. People are engaged in a trust relationship. You know, if my father gave me access to his medical records and says, son, I want you to look at this and be careful with this, and I went ahead and said, let me give it to somebody else without asking my dad, you'd look askance at what I was doing. The same thing is happening here. They're essentially transferring data and transferring a trust relationship to a new entity, and people have the right to know who they're dealing with and the right to consent to it. Senator Klobuchar. Do you believe that the right to control one's personal genetic information should take precedence over maximizing returns for creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding? Professor Cohen. Well, I think that it would be nice for the creditors to get paid, Senator. In this instance, I think this information is so sensitive and so important, it's really important to protect people's information. Senator Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. And Professor Gotberg, do you believe that the current consumer privacy ombudsman system in bankruptcy proceedings is sufficient to protect consumers' most sensitive information? Professor Gotberg. So the consumer privacy ombudsman is appointed to help the court in weighing the costs and the benefits of any particular sale of assets. If you permit consumer--privacy--personal consumer data to be sold outside of bankruptcy, it's permissible inside of bankruptcy as well. And so the consumer privacy ombudsman is just trying to weigh what would be the negative effects of that sale. Without an understanding of the price of privacy, so to speak, that's a very hard balancing act to perform. To my knowledge, there's been no final litigation to determine what the damages would be for an individual to have their privacy violated in that way, so it makes it really hard for the consumer privacy ombudsman to have an effective role there. Senator Klobuchar. Okay. And sort of to end where I began with Mr. Klein's point, why is it so important that Congress enact a comprehensive privacy law? By the way, the same companies that were lobbying against one, because I am also on the Commerce Committee, say 10 years ago now want one because of the patchwork of laws that we now have in our States, which is very predictable, which I hope people will realize that we need some AI rules of the road in place and tech rules of the road in place. And it is just the worst, that people just think they can lobby against things, and then all of a sudden they are like, oh no. So tell me why we need a privacy law and how that would have helped here. Professor Gotberg. So a greater predictability for companies when they're entering into agreements with consumers would be--is always beneficial. So if companies know what the legal limitations are, then they can take that into account and creditors can take that into account whether an asset will be available before lending to the debtor. So it's important to have that law in place inside and outside bankruptcy. Chairman Grassley. Oh, I am sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you. I thought you were done. Senator Klobuchar. Well, good. No, I am not going over my time. Done. Chairman Grassley. Senator Moody. Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you for conducting this hearing and for all of our witnesses that have taken time to be here. These are complex issues and certainly we appreciate your expertise on the matter. I think any American sitting at home when they learned of this bankruptcy that had submitted information to 23andMe was probably, you know, terrified and had never thought about what would happen to their information. So it is not just policymakers that are worried about this. I think people all around the United States are now concerned of what happens to their very sensitive personal information. And I think this is going to affect everything from data privacy to national security to potential biotech threats. And we cannot overState the threat to this Nation and to people individually. I think it is both going to be from a national security concern, but also private companies getting access to some of this data. I appreciate the shoutout to Florida. Florida does lead in many of these policy areas. We are not afraid to diligently dig in and take action quickly to protect people and their rights, and thank you for acknowledging that. In fact, right now, as we sit here, it is not illegal for insurance companies, life, disability insurance to inquire about, get access to your genetic information in all 50 States except Florida, and so we appreciate that. And I think it is going to be imperative that this body, as we are presented with the sale of companies that have access to this information--and it is not just 23andMe. There are going to be other companies that get access to genetic information to be used in business models, to develop strategies to maximize profits, whether that is from their everyday course of business or whether that is selling of assets. We are going to have to deal with how the exchange of genetic information of Americans is protected and whether it can even be treated as an asset. And I want to start first, sir, we appreciate you being here, and I know you have the best of intentions, you have said, as it relates to the assets. And you consider the genetic information of Americans to be assets? Mr. Selsavage. The genetic information belongs to the consumers and--you know, basically, and it is a very valuable asset to those consumers, yes. Senator Moody. But to 23andMe, you considered that to be an asset? Mr. Selsavage. It is an asset to 23andMe, yes. I mean---- Senator Moody. And in terms of valuing your business moving forward or valuing your particular parts of your assets in a bankruptcy, that is one core asset? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, we did not value that asset, you know, per se as part of the bankruptcy. However, the bidders are looking at that and placing a value on it. Senator Moody. A bidder wanting to buy your company is assessing whether or not they can buy that data as part of how much they are going to pay you? Mr. Selsavage. Yes. Senator Moody. And the more customers that delete their information, the less of that asset is available to transfer is what you are telling us today? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know, for us at 23andMe, we've let the buyer---- Senator Moody. Yes or no. And you are deleting that data, and once you sell an asset off, will it be less of an asset to sell? Mr. Selsavage. There will be less customers with genetic information in our data base as people delete them, yes. Senator Moody. So the customers that don't get this notice across the United States, the warnings from the attorneys general that this is a problem, you need to delete your information, if they have moved and they don't get the notice and they don't delete it, they are part of the asset group that goes to the other country, right? Mr. Selsavage. Senator---- Senator Moody. Or goes to the other--could be the other country, I am sorry, the other business. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, we have provided notice to all of our customers of the bankruptcy proceedings. And this week, we will be providing notice of the sale of the company to either Regeneron or TTAM Research Institute. And at all times, our customers have complete control over their data. They have the right---- Senator Moody. Except for the ones that didn't get notice and don't know about the sale, right? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, with all due respect, we are doing everything we can to make sure all of our customers get that notice of the bankruptcy and of the sale. We are--we've emailed them---- Senator Moody. I heard that you have the best intentions. So I am also hearing that we might need to modify Federal law to address these intentions because when you are talking about the sale, you list that you will not sell to any countries of concern on your website. But I guess all other foreign nations could presumably offer to buy, right, if they're not a country of concern in your mind? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know---- Senator Moody. Yes or no? Your limiting the exclusion of those to countries of concern. Mr. Selsavage. We are limiting the sale of assets to any foreign adversary to the United States, any companies in those countries. Senator Moody. But another foreign adversary could buy this information--or excuse me, another foreign nation-state could buy this information and sell it to a foreign adversary. Nothing prevents that, right? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, with all due respect, we have only two bidders left here, and both are American enterprises. Both Regeneron is a public pharmaceutical company here based in the U.S. and TTAM Research Institute also is an American foundation, you know, founded by the former CEO and co-founder of 23andMe---- Senator Moody. At the core of it, I understand you are saying right now there are only two bidders left, but under Federal law and under what your best intentions are permitting, it could have allowed for a foreign State to buy these assets, nothing would have prohibited that, and selling it to a foreign adversary, correct? Nothing in federal law would have prevented that. Mr. Selsavage. Senator---- Senator Moody. Correct? Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. I am not a lawyer, but I do believe there are regulations, and there would have been different oversight if any of the assets were sold to anyone outside of the United States. And---- Chairman Grassley. [Off mic.] Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman Grassley. Chairman Grassley. [Off mic.] Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Grassley, and thank you to each of the panelists for coming here today and testifying on this important issue. It is particularly valuable that you are here to shed light on two issues important to our Nation, to our families, and frankly, also to my home State of Delaware, namely, bankruptcy and data privacy. As I am sure some of you know, Delaware is the most popular State in our Nation for corporate incorporation, which also makes it a prominent bankruptcy jurisdiction. Delaware also is one of a small handful of States that has enacted robust data privacy protection laws, making it a potential model for federal legislation on data privacy, particularly in the context of bankruptcy. I do think it is critical that we strike the right balance between safeguarding data and personal information and maintaining a bankruptcy system that makes creditors whole and gives debtors a fresh start. If I might, Professor Gotberg, is a prospective buyer in bankruptcy legally required to follow 23andMe's current privacy policy? Professor Gotberg. So the privacy policy is a contract---- Senator Coons. Right. Professor Gotberg [continuing]. So contracts are enforceable as between the two parties. In law school we like to teach that a contract is a promise to perform or to pay damages. So a company that undertakes a contract, if they don't perform, would open itself up to a lawsuit for damages. That's true for 23andMe, and it would be true for any subsequent buyer. Whatever the buyer agreed to do would just be a contract. It wouldn't be--there would be no enforcement mechanism to force them to comply. They could just choose to breach. Senator Coons. Nothing other than damages enforces that contract. And is there anything in the bankruptcy code that specifically addresses the transfer and use of highly sensitive personal data? Professor Gotberg. In that situation, that is where the consumer privacy ombudsman could be appointed. Senator Coons. Could be. Professor Gotberg. Right, but in that situation, their role is primarily to advise the bankruptcy judge to weigh the costs and benefits of any potential breach of a privacy policy. So again, without being able to put a number on what that--those damages are, what the cost is for a violation of privacy, it actually becomes a pretty difficult weighing exercise. Senator Coons. Is there any relevant precedent? Professor Gotberg. I don't know that it's ever been litigated. I haven't seen anything. Senator Coons. Me neither. Professor Cohen, Delaware and a few other States have enacted strong data privacy laws designed to regulate entities that control sensitive data, give individual consumers the right to access, correct, or delete certain data. How can my colleagues and I do something similar at the federal level and specifically in the bankruptcy context to ensure sensitive data doesn't end up in the hands of the wrong people or the wrong country as a result of a bankruptcy proceeding? And what is your view on the Don't Sell My Data Act where I have joined Senators Grassley, Cornyn, and Klobuchar as a co-sponsor? Professor Cohen. So I think the Don't Sell My Data Act is exactly the right idea here. I will say that I think that the-- what's important is this idea of affirmative consent. That's what is central to the bill upon the transfer. And again, we still really haven't heard a good reason why we can't go back to all of these people and ask them, can you affirmatively consent to the transfer of your data to Regeneron or TTAM? So I would love to see Congress push that and push it beyond bankruptcy to other kinds of sales of information as well. Senator Coons. Let me ask you a question about affirmative consent. Part of the market value of 23andMe is a service that is individually genetically identifying that gives you information about, honestly, one of the most private things there could be, which is whether or not you are susceptible to certain diseases, what is your genetic ancestry, that sort of thing. Would it not stand to reason that although logistically challenging, going back to every individual who has given their personally identifying genetic information to 23andMe and affirming their consent would actually, in the end, build their market value by reinforcing that this kind of a service is something where people can count on it to protect their data privacy, regardless of whether there are damages available? Professor Cohen. I think if you build your company on a reputation of trust and a reputation of autonomy and empowering people, this is exactly the thing you want to sell to customers to say, we believe so much in what we say that we're even going to do this upon sale or bankruptcy. Senator Coons. And I understand how it might be complex or expensive, but in the end, I think it ultimately serves the entire segment of personally identifying genetic consult because it builds trust. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for a chance to question. Chairman Grassley. I will take my turn now. I am going to start with Mr. Selsavage. In 23andMe's March 23 press release, the company indicated that data privacy would be ``an important consideration in any potential sale.'' But when there was a motion to appoint a consumer privacy ombudsman in the bankruptcy, 23andMe first opposed the appointment of an independent ombudsman to ensure that genetic data was protected in the sale. Why did the company oppose appointing a privacy ombudsman? Mr. Selsavage. Yes, Mr. Chairman, 23andMe was the first to suggest that the bankruptcy court appoint a customer data representative, which would look at the privacy issues in this particular bankruptcy case. 23andMe, at the time, did not believe that a consumer privacy ombudsman was needed. And the reason--the differentiation there is a consumer privacy ombudsman is required in bankruptcy when, you know, there's a change in the privacy policy from one company to the next. In this particular case, you know, we, as part of the bidding process for 23andMe, were requiring that any company that was considering acquiring 23andMe's assets, including its data base and our customers, would be required to retain the privacy policies and consent going forward. Chairman Grassley. I think that answers that question. So is 23andMe's priority to sell consumer genetic information to the highest bidder or to ensure that the genetic data it has collected will be protected according to existing privacy policies? Mr. Selsavage. Mr. Chairman, our customers' data and privacy is, you know, a top priority in this process, you know, at 23andMe and for the special committee overseeing this process. It is not just the highest bidder. We are--have required that, you know, basically any bidder, as I said, and the two remaining bidders have affirmatively said that they would actually continue those privacy policies and consent and put that in writing in their asset purchase agreements or contracts to buy the company. Chairman Grassley. Also to you, the point of bankruptcy is to ``marshal assets in a way that maximizes their value for the benefit primarily of creditors and then once creditors are paid for owners.'' And in your written testimony, you agree with the aim of maximizing the value of the business for stakeholders, but placing as little restrictions on the customer data as possible makes the data more valuable to the buyer. Would you characterize genomic data as a bankruptcy asset? Mr. Selsavage. Mr. Chairman, you know, I believe that the genomic data is an asset and, you know, we have--23andMe is treating it--and not only maximizing the value for our creditors and our shareholders, but also, you know, one of the most important pieces--parts of 23andMe is our customers and our customers' trust, and we are putting their privacy and their security as part of that process and it is top of mind for the company and special committee overseeing this process. Chairman Grassley. Okay. Based upon your ``yes'' answer, isn't your duty to protect consumer data in tension with your duty to maximize the value of the estate asset? Mr. Selsavage. I think we are looking at both of those duties combined, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Grassley. So I think you are saying that consumer data doesn't have a higher value than the estate. So aren't you a little bit in conflict with some other things you said here? Mr. Selsavage. You know, basically protecting our consumers' data and their privacy and their consents as part of this process is a large consideration and, as I mentioned, it is not just accepting the highest dollar amount for the assets. Chairman Grassley. My last question will be, Mr. Klein, in 2019, the DOD advised members of the armed services not to use direct-to-consumer genetic testing devices. The guidance noted the risk of mass surveillance and the ability to attract individuals without authorization. How could foreign adversaries use either the personalized or the aggregated genetic information of U.S. servicemembers to harm U.S. interest in military operations? Mr. Klein. Thank you, Senator. Well, we know that intelligence services and police agencies like the FBI use genetic data to identify people of interest, and foreign adversaries certainly have a great interest in members of our military, where they go, what they do. So that would certainly be a concern for me, and we can be assured that they are looking at that and trying to use our servicemembers' genetic data. You also mentioned aggregate. Large datasets have great value today for training AI models. China is trying to build large datasets in every conceivable area, but they have some gaps. One of those gaps is that their population is not genetically diverse, and so they may have a large number of DNA profiles in their country, but they don't have the diversity that we have. And that genetic diversity is very helpful if you want to train a model that is predictive for things benign, like biomedical research, but also things malevolent, like bioweapons research. We don't want them to build out their data base of DNA profiles with the diverse and rich datasets that we have here in America. Chairman Grassley. Senator Schiff. Senator Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Professor Gotberg, California has already passed legislation that went into effect in 2022 requiring direct-to- consumer genetic testing companies like 23andMe to obtain Californians' express consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of their genetic data. Under this law, Californians are also able to delete their accounts and genetic data and to destroy the biological samples they provided to these companies. In the context of 23andMe's bankruptcy, can Californians still exercise these deletion rights, or does the bankruptcy process somehow interfere with, override, or otherwise affect our State's privacy protections? Ms. Gotberg. Thank you. Bankruptcy proceedings do not override any applicable law. So State law and Federal law are recognized in bankruptcy proceedings. Whatever rights your consumers have outside bankruptcy, they'll have inside bankruptcy in terms of their legal rights. Senator Schiff. And if the data base, 23andMe's data base, is sold as a bankruptcy asset, what obligations would the acquiring company have under Federal or California law to maintain those same security standards? Ms. Gotberg. So the same laws that would apply now to 23andMe would presumably apply to any buyer. Senator Schiff. And so even if this is not a California company operating in some other State, they would still be bound post-bankruptcy to California's privacy standards? Ms. Gotberg. To the extent that California privacy standards apply, yes, they would. Senator Schiff. And is a commitment made by an acquiring company somehow enforceable, apart from California's law, vis- a-vis residents of other States, is a promise made by an acquiring company somehow legally enforceable, or is it only as good as the person's intention to comply with that commitment? Ms. Gotberg. So contractual promises are enforceable up to the point that they can be enforced. That's not a great answer, but again, our statement is a contract is a promise to perform or to pay damages. It's possible for parties to breach that agreement, in which case the party that--on the other side of it would be entitled to damages for the harm that they've experienced. But without---- Senator Schiff. You know, let's say I am acquiring 23andMe's dataset. I commit to maintaining the deletion provisions, et cetera, complying with California law even if it is not required somehow. I acquire the dataset, I don't comply---- Professor Gotberg. Right. Senator Schiff [continuing]. Has my offer to comply or my commitment pre-bankruptcy, has that somehow turned into a binding contract with the owners of the genetic data, the people who have the genetic data? Professor Gotberg. So it would depend on who you were in privity with, I guess, in terms of the contract, to use, I guess, a fancy legal term. A contract is between two parties, and so you have to have an agreement between those two parties. And I guess the question in those situations, if you were promising to abide by the commitment, who would be on the other side of that promise? Who would be able to enforce it? Senator Schiff. Right. Well, it would sound like the consumer would not be on the other side of that promise. It would be more one of the parties to the bankruptcy, which then we would be then relying on them to enforce that promise. Does that analysis make sense? Professor Gotberg. That makes sense to me. Senator Schiff. And what controls are in place, Mr. Selsavage--maybe I can ask you this question. What controls are in place to prevent any unauthorized access or misuse of information during the bankruptcy proceedings? Mr. Selsavage. 23andMe is--you know, basically places data security and data privacy as top of mind. You know, we basically have continued to maintain a strong system of security, making sure all of our data is encrypted. You know, the genetic data is stored separately from any consumer identifying information identifying who that genetic data belongs to. We have enhanced our security processes, especially around bankruptcy, understanding that there is additional threats. And, you know, basically from--on the consumer side, you know, we have since enacted two-factor authentication to access--so basically, there is a second level of either an SMS text message or an email verification when somebody is trying to access their account and then placed additional restrictions if sensitive---- Senator Schiff. If I could just interrupt with one last question because my time is going to expire. How do we know that an acquiring company or entity or person would maintain the same security standards that you have over privacy and even those standards were subject to hack? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, the good news here is there is two potential buyers at this point for 23andMe. The first is Regeneron, an American $55 billion market cap pharmaceutical company who actually has data security over genomic data today. And TTAM Research Institute would be--which would be maintaining the same security standards as 23andMe. Senator Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Grassley. Senator Britt. Senator Britt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To followup on the Senator's question, so would you commit today to the same privacy standards that you have demanding those of the company that purchases 23andMe? Do not sell unless they keep the same privacy standards that you have? Mr. Selsavage. Yes, that is a requirement, you know, basically of any--of the two buyers, and they have put that in their asset purchase agreement. Senator Britt. Excellent. And tell me, what all do you test for? Mr. Selsavage. You know, 23andMe tests for, you know, basically a significant level of, you know, genetic traits, ancestry, and health conditions. We actually, as part of our process, test over 600,000 variants through our testing process. Senator Britt. Okay. So you are able to tell somebody maybe it is predictability of potential disease and other things? Mr. Selsavage. And while we can't definitively say that that person will get the disease, we can highlight risk--and basically when people are at higher risk for certain diseases. Senator Britt. And so do you test for sex? Mr. Selsavage. You know, as part of our testing, we do identify if the DNA showed that the--if the individual is male or female. Senator Britt. And male is XY chromosome? Mr. Selsavage. That is correct. Senator Britt. And female XX? Mr. Selsavage. Correct. Senator Britt. On your data base though, you go into saying that if people self-identify of another gender, that you will attempt to give them a prognosis of the gender that they identify with versus the gender that they test for? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, I'm not aware of that---- Senator Britt. Oh, yes, you do. So it says, ``We understand that sex is not always binary and the words male and female may not accurately reflect an individual's identity. We also recognize that being categorized by birth sex may be an uncomfortable or triggering experience to some, and we do not mean to delegitimize anyone's gender identity or expression. We use your self-reported sex to customize your health and trait reports. For example, genetic risk and what they may mean differ between men and women.'' So men and women are different, right? I mean, you say that here. We just talked about the genetic testing. But then you go on to say, ``If you tell us you are female, your reports will contain information that is relevant to genetic females XX. If you tell us you are male, your reports will contain information that is relevant to genetic males XY. Additionally, there are some sex-specific reports that are available on individual selected profile sex such as male hair loss or bald spot. That is because either we are not able to build out an acceptable model for both genders or because the trait is actually sex-specific.'' And so I guess I am wondering, did you test--like if it is a genetic female that identified to you as a male, would you test them for male pattern baldness? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know, we--as you mentioned, we actually do--the customer does report to us, you know, what they believe their sex is, and we test against that, as well as what we found in the DNA as--testing as well. Senator Britt. I think probably the DNA is what is best for predicting actual future disease or harm or what may come, good or bad, for the individual. On that note, you have about 15 million customers. Is that right? Mr. Selsavage. That's correct. Senator Britt. Okay. Of that, how many are kids? Mr. Selsavage. How many are kids? Senator Britt. Yes. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, I don't know that number. Senator Britt. So you don't know. From what I read on your website, obviously, parents can agree to have their child's DNA tested. Is that correct? Mr. Selsavage. That is correct. Senator Britt. So you don't know? Of the 15 million people, you don't know how many of those profiles are under 18? Mr. Selsavage. I don't have that information with me today, but I'd be happy to take that back for---- Senator Britt. Do you have a guess? Mr. Selsavage. I don't have a reasonable guess, Senator. Senator Britt. Sir, I think we have to be vigilant when it comes to children and their DNA. We have talked today about all of the potential risks that can occur from privacy to security risk, obviously, blackmail, amongst a number of things. Would you commit to me today that in the sell, you will sell no child's DNA under the age of 18, that you will delete that account? Mr. Selsavage. Congressman--or Senator, I will take that back and will review that. Senator Britt. I think you absolutely should. And on that note, when it comes to bankruptcy, Professor, tell me, you know, when you look at a privacy ombudsman in this space, when you are looking at minors, children, what type of protection is currently in place, and what do we need to be doing as Congress? And actually, I would like to open this up to everybody to ensure that children are protected in this space. Professor Gotberg. My understanding is that there are specific laws protecting children's information. I'm not an expert on those laws, but whatever laws exist outside of bankruptcy are enforced inside of bankruptcy as well. Senator Britt. Do you all have another--I would love your thoughts. Professor Cohen. You know, for human subjects research, we have special rules for the children population, and that might be a place to look for some comparisons. Senator Britt. Do you have anything, Mr. Klein? Mr. Klein. Well, as a father, I can say that I think we all struggle with how much of our children's data or how much of our children's lives to digitize, and so there's also a degree of parental responsibility. And when it comes to health, these are very tough choices sometimes for all of us. Senator Britt. Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Senator Hawley [presiding]. Senator Padilla. Senator Padilla. Thank you. Now, colleagues, the witnesses today have explained that our bankruptcy process is primarily designed to maximize creditor payouts and ensure that a business, where possible, can continue to operate. It is not designed for other goals, but it is often called upon to fulfill other goals. Here, the bankruptcy process is not just required to protect consumer privacy, but also to protect our national security interests. Professor Klein, what protections are built into the bankruptcy process to prevent foreign adversaries from taking advantage of the process to access sensitive information? Other concerns are generally raised, but, you know, we are talking about a specific area of the law, bankruptcy law here, whether we are talking about personally identifiable information or national security sensitive information? Mr. Klein. Thank you for the question, Senator. And this is one area where there actually have been encouraging changes. We are not defenseless. In the FIRRMA law back in 2018, the Congress did give the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. the ability to reach into the bankruptcy process and block sales and transactions, something that it previously hadn't had within its jurisdiction. As you all know, that body in the executive branch is one of our main protections against key intellectual property, sensitive data, and so forth, slipping out the back door to foreign adversaries. Senator Padilla. And how much of the sensitive information, if any, can potential buyers access before a sale becomes final? They are obviously doing due diligence in the process of making these decisions. Mr. Klein. That is a great question, Senator. I would refer that to the bankruptcy experts on the panel. Senator Padilla. Anybody? Professor Gotberg. So can you repeat your question? Senator Padilla. How much access to this very sensitive information, whether it is personal sensitive information or national security sensitive information can a potential buyer access before a sale becomes final? Or is this an area where-- -- Professor Gotberg. So there---- Senator Padilla [continuing]. Legislative action is needed? Professor Gotberg. Within a bankruptcy proceeding, there is an allowance for due diligence. I think the procedures for that will be determined by the bankruptcy court and may differ from case to case. To the extent that there is no protections outside bankruptcy law, I don't know that there's--you know, bankruptcy law does not produce additional protections that wouldn't otherwise exist. Senator Padilla. So a potential area for needed congressional action is what I am hearing. Since we have an expert before us, at what point in a bankruptcy process can CFIUS get involved? And do you have any recommendations about whether they should be involved earlier in the process? Professor Gotberg. So I'm afraid you will have to explain what CFIUS is to me. Senator Padilla. All right, Then we have an expert here. It is okay. It is okay. We will do a followup with you because my time is limited. I want to get to another topic, which is national security and biotechnology. I recently served as a member of the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology, and our findings in a recent report found that the United States has historically not treated biological data as a strategic asset like our agricultural base, our oil reserves, despite its importance in advancing biotechnology and AI. Back to Professor Klein. What is your assessment of the CCP's effort to sweep up as much biological data that they can of Americans and of our allies and partners abroad to advance their own domestic biotechnology ambitions? Mr. Klein. Well, I think we've seen, Senator--and thank you for the question--their ambitions are comprehensive. They want to dominate in critical sectors. They want to use information like this to enhance their military prowess, and potentially, and very worryingly, given the tension between our countries, to conduct asymmetric, unconventional attacks, potentially including biologic attacks. I'm sure you all saw that just in the past 2 weeks, the Eastern District of Michigan U.S. Attorney's Office has indicted two separate sets of Chinese national defendants on smuggling biologic materials into the United States. We've also seen the report on the Reedley Biolab out of the House Select Committee where a person of Chinese nationality, citizenship, was in California running an unregistered biolab. We don't know exactly what was going on there. Some of these reports are very disturbing. We don't have a complete picture, but we know that the system, as the 9/11 Commission put it, is blinking, if not red, at least dark orange, and we need to have the imagination--and I'm glad this Committee's doing it, to foresee how they might conduct unconventional attacks against our homeland in the event of an armed conflict. Senator Padilla. Do you have any recommended actions for this Committee or Congress as a whole to take to better protect our biological data while striking the important balance of promoting scientific research that depends on these datasets? Mr. Klein. Yes, thank you, Senator. And bankruptcy is one vector. We're all covering down on that today. Cyber security, cyber attacks is another major vector. We know that it is very hard for companies to defend against a nation-state level attack, but we can at least make it harder for them. We can at least force them to expend their very best, most exquisite exploits to try to get in and spread those techniques that they have as thin as possible. But I will also flag one other vector, insider threat. This is something that those of us who have led organizations in the Government dealing with classified material worry about every day, but it's also true in the private sector. Companies do not have the same comprehensive security clearance standards or personnel vetting standards that government organizations are supposed to. There are some private sector actors that are starting to help, for example, defense industrial-based companies do this, but if an insider who has authorized credentials inside a company wants to take out a bulk dataset, whether it's genomic data or weapons designs, what does that company have in place to prevent that exfiltration? That's another very problematic vector. Senator Padilla. Okay. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Senator Hawley. Mr. Selsavage, if I could just start with you. So how many customers do you have approximately? Mr. Selsavage. Between 14 and 15 million customers. Senator Hawley. Between 14 and 15 million. I think you told Senator Britt just a minute ago that a goodly number of those are minors. Is that correct? Mr. Selsavage. What I said was I don't have the number of customers that are---- Senator Hawley. You have the genetic data of a good many minors. Is that correct? Mr. Selsavage. We have genetic data for a particular number of minors, and I will be providing--happy to provide---- Senator Hawley. People under the age of 18. Is that correct? Mr. Selsavage. That is how I am defining a minor. Senator Hawley. So your customers--I just want to make sure I understand your business model. Your customers give you their genetic information for you to run various tests on. Is that right? Mr. Selsavage. Yes, that is correct. Senator Hawley. And I mean, that is pretty sensitive stuff, isn't it, somebody's genetic information? Is there anything more personal than that? Mr. Selsavage. I would agree with you, Senator, that genetic data is sensitive information. Senator Hawley. And so now you are just going to sell all of it, 15 million people, bunches of kids, maybe millions. It is just going to be sold in the open market? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know, the good news, as I mentioned, is that the two bidders are buyers for the company. One is Regeneron, which is an American company. Senator Hawley. That is the big pharma company? Mr. Selsavage. Big--it is a---- Senator Hawley. It doesn't make me feel any better. Mr. Selsavage. It is a large pharmaceutical company. Senator Hawley. All right. So you are going to take 15 million Americans' genetic information, and you are going to sell it to somebody. And your message to us is today, trust us, it will be fine. Maybe it is a big pharma company. Maybe we will get lucky. Maybe they will treat it right. I thought your privacy code, your privacy commitment said that consumers had a right not to have their information shared with anybody else without their consent. I mean, I have got your privacy statement right here. It says that without their consent, you can't share their information. You are about to sell it. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, that consent is, you know, essentially for, you know---- Senator Hawley. Not real? Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. Not shared for research purposes, and we are not selling it for research purposes. Senator Hawley. Ah, so when you tell the consumer, give us your personal information, and we will take money from you, and we won't give it to anybody without your consent, it is not real. It just means, you know, maybe kind of depends on the day. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know, I will say that our customers' data is their own. They have the right at all times to access that information. They can edit it---- Senator Hawley. Well, sure they can, but you are about to sell it to who knows who. They can't control it. You said to Senator Moody that consumers have complete control of their data, complete. How can they have complete control if you are about to sell it without their consent? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, they can delete that data anytime up until the sale and after. Senator Hawley. Oh, Okay. Okay. They can delete the data. Have you fixed the ability of customers to go on your website and delete it? Because right after you announced your sale, your deletion page went down. I hold in my hand here an article from The Wall Street Journal. ``23andMe's site goes down as customers struggle to delete their data.'' Can they even get onto your site to delete their data? Mr. Selsavage. They can, Senator, and---- Senator Hawley. You fixed this? Mr. Selsavage. That was an issue that--yes, we fixed immediately after---- Senator Hawley. It is up and running now? Customers can go on? Mr. Selsavage. Customers can go on, and they can delete their data---- Senator Hawley. What happens when they go onto your site to delete their data? Mr. Selsavage. When a customer logs into their account at 23andMe, they go to their settings page, and they--there's a section there where just click ``delete my data.'' It confirms that they want to delete their data, and it's deleted automatically. Senator Hawley. Is that true? Let's take a look. Let's take a look. Mr. Selsavage. Okay. Senator Hawley. When they go onto your page, they get an opportunity. It says ``permanently delete the data.'' So they click the button that says ``permanently delete the data,'' and then they get a notification that says ``Your account is no longer accessible.'' If they can't access their account anymore, how do they know their data has been deleted? [Poster is displayed.] Mr. Selsavage. Because we send them a notification that their information has been deleted. Senator Hawley. You send it once. And how long does that take? Mr. Selsavage. You know, our policies State that, you know, we will delete their data within 30 days, and in most cases, we--it is automatic and happens much more quickly. Senator Hawley. And when you deleted it, it is deleted, deleted. It is gone forever? Mr. Selsavage. All the genetic data is deleted forever, and--yes. Senator Hawley. Really? Because that is not what your privacy statement says in the fine print. Let's read it. What your statement says is ``We retain personal information for as long as necessary to provide the services and fulfill the transactions you have requested to comply with our legal obligations, resolve disputes, enforce agreements,'' et cetera, et cetera. And then it goes on, ``23andMe and/or our contracted genotyping laboratory will retain your genetic information even if you choose to delete your account.'' Mr. Selsavage. Senator, you know, 23andMe, it does not retain any genetic information regarding the consumer once they delete their account. We do---- Senator Hawley. It says right here that you will retain genetic information, including date of birth and sex, even if you choose to delete your account. This is your privacy policy. I am just quoting from it. Mr. Selsavage. I'm--Senator, you know, to the best of my knowledge, we do not maintain any genetic information. Senator Hawley. It says, ``Even if you choose to delete your account, we will retain.'' ``We will retain your genetic information, date of birth and sex, even if you choose to delete your account.'' Mr. Selsavage. There is some information that we do retain---- Senator Hawley. Aha. Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. But not related to the genetic information. Senator Hawley. Right. Mr. Selsavage. But that--you know, such as name, email address---- Senator Hawley. Oh. Mr. Selsavage [continuing]. And other---- Senator Hawley. Ah. So even if--ah. Even if you delete the account, you retain their name, you retain their email address, you retain their date of birth, you retain their sex, and you retain their genetic information even if they choose to delete your account. So in other words--don't talk to your suit behind you, talk to me. He is not testifying, you are. You do not allow consumers actually to delete permanently their data. And when you said a minute ago to Senator Moody, at all times consumers have complete control of their data, that is just not true, is it? By the terms of your own agreement, that just is not true. Mr. Selsavage. Senator, with all due respect, all of the genetic data is deleted. We are only maintaining---- Senator Hawley. With all due respect, what you are telling me is in direct contravention to what your own policy states. ``Even if you choose to delete your account.'' In fact, what you do is you allow your consumers to delete their account settings, but their data isn't deleted. You still have it. The laboratory still has it. You have their name, you have their date of birth, you have their sex, and now you are going to sell it. Here is my point. It is a pattern. Your consumers actually aren't in control of anything. You are. You control their data. You control their genetic information. Now you are about to sell it. You promise them we won't ever sell it without your consent, but you are doing it. You promise them we will allow you to delete it, but you don't. In fact, you have lied to them, have you not? Mr. Selsavage. Senator, we have not. We--I assure you that we are deleting all of our customers who have requested---- Senator Hawley. No, you are not. You are not because your policies say they are not, and you are not deleting it because if you were, your company wouldn't be worth $300 million. No, don't read from what your guy behind you is shoveling talking points to you now. I don't want your talking points. I have read your policies. I have seen what they are, and I tell you what, it is amazing to me you are not getting your socks sued off by your customers. I hope they will. I hope they will rush to the courthouse, even as we are here today, to sue you into oblivion for lying to them and taking their most personal, identifiable information and selling it for a profit and lying to them and to the American public. Quite frankly, Mr. Selsavage, what you are doing here has all kinds of implications, national security implications, all of it, but nothing is worse than taking the personal, identifiable information of American consumers and keeping it and lying to them about it while you make a huge profit off of it. It is unbelievable to me. It is absolutely unbelievable. This concludes our hearing. I want to thank each of the witnesses for taking the time to share your experience, your expertise, and your perspectives. Written questions can be submitted for the record until Wednesday, June 18, at 5 p.m. I will ask the witnesses to answer and return questions to the Committee within 2 weeks. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [Additional material submitted for the record follows.] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] A P P E N D I X The following submissions are available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-119shrg61889/pdf/CHRG- 119shrg 61889-add1.pdf Submitted by Chairman Grassley: Professors, testimony............................................ 2 Submitted by Ranking Member Durbin: Center for AI and Digital Policy (CAIDP), letter................. 10 Professors, testimony............................................ 2 [all]