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[Senate Hearing 119-166] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-166 PRESCRIPTION FOR TROUBLE: DRUG SAFETY, SUPPLY CHAINS, AND THE RISK TO AGING AMERICANS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ WASHINGTON, DC __________ SEPTEMBER 17, 2025 __________ Serial No. 119-14 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 61-634 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland ---------- McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1 Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member......................................................... 3 PANEL OF WITNESSES Peter Baker, Former FDA Inspector, President, Live Oak Quality Assurance, Austin, Texas....................................... 4 George Ball, Ph.d, Associate Professor and Weimer Faculty Fellow, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana........................................................ 6 Brandon Daniels, CEO, Exiger, Washington, D.C.................... 8 Ronald Piervincenzi, Ph.D, CEO, U.S. Pharmacopeia, Washington, D.C............................................................ 10 APPENDIX Prepared Witness Statements Peter Baker, Former FDA Inspector, President, Live Oak Quality Assurance, Austin, Texas....................................... 42 George Ball, Ph.d, Associate Professor and Weimer Faculty Fellow, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana........................................................ 47 Brandon Daniels, CEO, Exiger, Washington, D.C.................... 55 Ronald Piervincenzi, Ph.D, CEO, U.S. Pharmacopeia, Washington, D.C............................................................ 61 Questions for the Record Peter Baker, Former FDA Inspector, President, Live Oak Quality Assurance, Austin, Texas....................................... 76 George Ball, Ph.d, Associate Professor and Weimer Faculty Fellow, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana........................................................ 80 Brandon Daniels, CEO, Exiger, Washington, D.C.................... 83 Ronald Piervincenzi, Ph.D, CEO, U.S. Pharmacopeia, Washington, D.C............................................................ 85 Statements for the Record AARP Statement................................................... 99 American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) Statement... 101 Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC Statement............................. 106 Association for Accessible Medicines Statement................... 109 Indian Pharmaceutical Allicance (IPA) Statement.................. 122 National Consumers League Statement.............................. 130 Partnership for Safe Medicines Statement......................... 132 PRESCRIPTION FOR TROUBLE: DRUG SAFETY, SUPPLY CHAINS, AND THE RISK TO AGING AMERICANS ---------- Wednesday, September 17, 2025 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:24 p.m., Room 216, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senator Scott, McCormick, Johnson, Moody, Gillibrand, Kim, and Alsobrooks. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN The Chairman. Nearly everyone will be prescribed a medication at some point. Whether it be an antibiotic for an infection or a treatment for a chronic condition, people depend on access to safe and high-quality medications. This is especially true for seniors. In 2021, a federal study found that 88.6 percent of older Americans surveyed reported having been prescribed at least one medication in the past 12 months. Ninety-one percent of prescriptions filled are for generic drugs. The problem is the United States relies disproportionately on foreign made generic drugs from communist China and India. The U.S. currently depends on overseas manufacturers for about 75 percent of its essential, essential drug supply. Communist China is not our friend. They are the world's largest producers of the active pharmaceutical ingredients, and India relies on Communist China for approximately 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients they use. A study from Washington University in St. Louis found that 83 percent of the top 100 generic drugs consumed by U.S. citizens have no U.S. based active source--U.S. based source of active ingredients. Not only is the U.S. over-dependent on foreign drugs, but these foreign drugs are often lower quality and more dangerous than drugs manufactured in the United States. Earlier this year, a study showed that serious adverse events like hospitalization and death were 54 percent more likely for foreign generic drugs compared to American made drugs. Bad drug quality doesn't just mean that a drug is less effective--it can kill. In 2007, 2008, the medication Heparin had contaminated ingredients from Communist China, killing nearly 100 people. Deaths from unsafe medications like these, contaminated Heparin, devastated families. LeRoy Hubley lost his wife of 48 years, Bonnie, and his son, Randy, just weeks apart. Bonnie and Randy died due to contaminated Heparin that they needed for their dialysis treatment. They were undergoing due to a genetic kidney disease. People who relied on their medication, and trusted that it was safe, died. This was an absolute tragedy and must never happen again. Almost 20 years later, we are still seeing many of the same problems and quality issues that existed back then. There is still no routine testing done by the FDA and no incentive for quality. In 2023, contaminated eye drops from India killed four people and caused adverse events in at least 55 patients. Foreign drug manufacturing plants simply aren't subject to the same level of oversight as manufacturing plants here in the United States, and Americans are--that doesn't make sense to any American. Inspections of drug manufacturing facilities in the Unites States--they are unannounced. In Communist China and India, many inspections are pre- announced up to weeks in advance, giving manufacturers time to present false conditions or conceal non-sterile and unsafe manufacturing practices. While many quality issues present an immediate threat to the lives of seniors and their loved ones, supply chain vulnerabilities presents an existential threat to the country. I know my remarks paint a very dark picture of the reality we face, but it gets much worse. Think about this, if Communist China or India want to shut down the supply of prescription drugs to the United States, they can do so at any moment, and currently the United State does not have a backup plan. Let me say that again. If the Communist China or India decide to stop supplying the United States with prescription drugs, we will run out of prescription drugs very quickly and people will die. Let that sink in. Millions of Americans will not have life-saving drugs available to them. Americans will get sick. Americans will die. We have seen China place expert restrictions on rare earth elements over trade negotiations, and there is no reason they can't do that for drugs. Additionally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, we saw India block the export of critical ingredients. Many of the disruptions were prompted by supply chain disruptions from Communist China, the birthplace of the COVID-19 pandemic. We simply cannot rely on other countries, especially those who want to destroy us like Communist China for something as vital as essential medicines. Yet, despite these dangers, we still depend almost entirely on Communist China and India for generic medications, and their grip on the market continues to grow. As of 2021, Communist China and India accounted for 85 percent of active drug master file submissions--85 percent--applications submitted to the FDA by companies that want to supply drug ingredients to another company. In 2000, that accounted for just 24 percent. The Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, the federal agency that oversees the Strategic National Stockpile, ensures the Nation has medical countermeasures ready for public health emergency, lacks the data to understand the supply chain of the key starting materials or critical building blocks for pharmaceuticals. Communist China has a stranglehold on antibiotics, with 90 percent of global antibiotics being of Chinese origin. While Communist China and India have dominated the market, American manufacturing has just withered away. A 2024 report from the API Innovation Center stated that in the past decade, the number of facilities located in the U.S. that produce active pharmaceutical ingredients has decreased by 61 percent. In 2024, the U.S. manufactured 37 percent of its consumed pharmaceuticals. Just over 20 years ago, in 2002, that figure was 83 percent. Over 40 percent of generic drugs sold in the U.S. have just one FDA approved manufacturer. I am a business guy. You would never rely on one supplier. This means in the event of a shortage, the FDA must scramble to find an alternative. In 2023, the chemotherapy drug Cisplatin went into shortage due to the FDA placing import restrictions on the manufacturer that accounted for 50 percent of the market. There was no FDA approved alternative, which forced the FDA to turn--unapproved Chinese drug company to fill in the gap. The supply chain is unacceptably vulnerable, and we can't just hope that shortages won't occur. If we can't solve this problem, our public health and national security are in grave danger and people will die. We will soon hold another hearing to discuss the solutions to these problems, but the American people deserve to know the dangers of bad quality medications and a vulnerable supply chain. Now, let me turn it over to the Ranking Member Gillibrand for her opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott, for calling today's hearing. I really appreciate it. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Combating drug shortages and supporting high quality generic drug production is one of the most important issues facing Congress today. In 2023, I heard from countless New York constituents who struggled with access to chemotherapy treatment due to shortages of essential generic cancer drugs, including Cisplatin and Carboplatin. When you are fighting a disease as devastating as cancer, the last thing you want to worry about is whether the life-saving drug you need is available. Another issue that is extremely concerning is the quality of generic drugs, especially those that we import from overseas. I have heard time and time again the difficulties the FDA foreign inspectors face when they are inspecting these foreign facilities. This can include basic logistical support or a third-party translator. When an inspector is abroad for months in a place where they may not speak the language, it can be very disheartening. Inspectors can also be put in a position where they must recommend the closure of a facility, but this can have a cascading effect of domestic generic shortages. The FDA needs adequate funding and support from Congress to ensure that they cannot only conduct these inspections but also enforce violations to protect the health and safety of the American public. We also need to work on solutions that promote transparency and quality benchmarks in the generic drug supply chain. The pharmaceutical supply chain can be very long and opaque, where several countries and companies are manufacturing various ingredients at various levels of quality. Purchasers need to be incentivized to purchase high-quality drugs that have proven reliability and a proven reliable supply chain. Hospitals and practitioners are spending millions of dollars a year due to drug shortages. Ultimately, it is the health and safety of our patients and our constituents that are being put at risk. I am looking forward to working on bipartisan solutions to promote safe and reliable supply chains for generic drugs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. I would like to welcome our witnesses, experts who are here to talk about why dangerous, low-quality drugs have been allowed to enter the U.S. market and just how reliant we are on foreign countries for the medications we need. First, I would like to recognize Peter Baker. Mr. Baker is a former FDA Inspector who spent time in both India and Communist China. As an Inspector, he witnessed firsthand the unsafe manufacturing conditions and tactics used by manufacturers to deceive and even obstruct the FDA from conducting proper investigations of manufacturing facilities. Mr. Baker, thank you for being here today and I look forward to hearing your testimony. STATEMENT OF PETER BAKER, FORMER FDA INSPECTOR, PRESIDENT, LIVE OAK QUALITY ASSURANCE, AUSTIN, TEXAS Mr. Baker. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I want to thank you for this bipartisan focus on enhancing the security of our generic pharmaceutical supply chain. When a patient, especially those most vulnerable, such as the young and old, fill a prescription which has a 91 percent chance of being generic here in the U.S., there could be no doubt about the safety and efficacy of the medicine, or if the generic will perform as well as the brand name. There are too many uncontrollable variables to allow this one to play any role. The FDA has a long history of protecting and promoting public health and performs extremely challenging work around the world on a daily basis to achieve that goal through site inspections, often in remote corners of the world that do not have internationally recognized regulatory bodies, which I will refer to as unregulated markets. FDA investigators often have to deal with demanding travel conditions and can fall ill due to other unsafe conditions, such as drinking untreated water, a contaminated meal, communicable and non-communicable diseases, or fall prey to other risks often present in still developing nations. The majority of our overseas pharmaceutical inspections are pre-announced, often up to two months in advance of our arrival. In my experience, upon arrival for the inspection, a strong smell of paint is in the air, fresh paint. The landscaping is immaculate. All garbage cans are empty. Potential problematic operations are all shut down, some employees are sent home, and critical operations are choreographed as if performing on a stage. Those of us who performed foreign inspections refer to this as the dog and pony show, which is frustrating because this is serious business. How do I know this to be true? Having spent seven years in three different FDA foreign offices starting in 2012, based out of our embassies strategically located around the world, we were tasked with developing inspection techniques capable of identifying if products exported to the U.S. from unregulated markets were really meeting our standards because things seemed too good to be truth. No rejected batches. No issues at all, really. We knew the quality of products being manufactured in Ohio but really had no idea what was happening outside of our borders, especially in unregulated markets. We spent countless hours reviewing computer records, dug through piles of garbage, and showed up at times unannounced. Booking our travel through Expedia versus the embassy travel portal to alleviate any concerns, someone would tip off the sites to our plans. What we found was terrifying. This testimony only addresses the tip of a massive iceberg. Fake laboratories pumping out hundreds of results a day that certified products as 100 percent pure when in fact the product was never tested. For those products that did get tested, any failing result was simply ignored and replaced by a fabricated passing value. We identified filthy registered shadow facilities that would funnel their drugs through modern and clean registered sites which we refer to as the show facility. We found fabricated manufacturing and quality records, painting a picture of a site in total compliance, when in fact substandard or fake medicines were being shipped to the U.S. by the tens of thousands a day. Following these experiences, I have no doubt that adverse events, including death happen on a daily basis here in the U.S. as a result of substandard generic products from unregulated markets. The true culprit of these preventable adverse reactions lies in shortcuts and fraud. Shocking inspection reports continue to roll in on a monthly basis. The bad players list is no secret, and they continue to avoid any significant consequences. Meanwhile, those most vulnerable in our society taking these drugs have no idea of the games being played and certainly no idea that the game as designed today can never be won. Personally, if I had a choice, I would never consume a drug product produced in an unregulated market, and any experienced FDA investigator will give you the same answer. When my 91- year-old grandma was alive, we would go pharmacy hopping around our rural Oregon hometown in hopes of finding a batch that was made by a reliable producer. Sometimes we succeeded and sometimes not. I remember one time having to settle for a product manufactured by Rambaxi, who had just settled with the DOJ for $500 million for faking countless data points used to demonstrate their products were safe. I tried to stay positive because causing her panic wasn't going to help, but inside I felt sick, and I was not the one receiving cancer treatment. I urge this Committee to consider these four points. One, harsher penalties for companies who engage in illegal practices via the existing authority within FDA and DOJ. Two, changes to labeling so that patients can see where their medications were made and put pressure on supply chain decisionmakers to prevent them from taking a pill made from an unregulated market. Three, independent third-party testing of every batch of every product arriving from an unrelated market. The European Union already does this, and it is a proven model. Four, resources to support the foreign pharmaceutical inspection program. The FDA has made great progress to increase the number of unannounced inspections they are conducting, but they need additional resources to be directed to expand the number and quality of unannounced inspections as already outlined by Commissioner Makary's public statements. Thank you for your time and attention to this important matter. I welcome your questions. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Baker. Next, I would like to introduce Dr. George Ball from Indiana University, where his teaching and research focus on operations, supply chains, and regulatory compliance in the drug industry. Dr. Ball has been at the forefront of generic drug quality research, analyzing the intersection of global manufacturing, FDA oversight, and patient safety. His work provides critical insights into how supply chain vulnerabilities translate into risk for American consumers. In a study published this past February, he and his colleagues found that generic drugs manufactured in India have higher rates of adverse events compared to those made here in the United States. This research highlights in measurable terms what other witnesses have seen firsthand. Weaknesses in oversight of foreign manufacturing can directly affect the safety and quality of medicines reaching American patients. Dr. Ball, thank you for being here. I look forward to your testimonie. STATEMENT OF GEORGE BALL, PH.D, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND WEIMER FACULTY FELLOW, KELLEY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA Dr. Ball. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee for the invitation to speak with you. As Chairman Scott mentioned, I am an Operations Management Professor at the Kelly School of Business at Indiana University. For the last 15 years, I have researched causes of product quality problems in FDA regulated industries. Prior to that, I spent a decade as a medical device manufacturing manager. Most recently, my research has examined generic drug quality and FDA policy. These topics are the focus of my detailed submitted written testimony, which I will briefly overview now. In my view, the root cause of the generic drug quality problem is the original design of the generic drug marketplace. While the Hatch-Waxman Act lowered health care costs via affordable generic drugs, it relies on an unrealistic assumption. That is, if an original drug is safe and of high quality, then its generic counterparts will be as well, requiring little quality verification and no transparency. Why is this unrealistic? The answer lies in operations research regarding cost and quality, as well as sources of defects. First, quality is not free. Higher quality products normally require higher production costs. Further, quality defects originate from two primary sources, design and manufacturing. While the design of a generic drug must be equivalent to that of the original, two equivalently designed drugs can be made in vastly different ways. One can use well-trained employees, sophisticated equipment, and mature suppliers that make premium raw materials. Another can be made using poorly trained employees, cheap equipment, and corner cutting suppliers. In a market where quality is assumed to be high, while it is unverified and opaque, the rational economic choice is to focus solely on cost. This will nearly guarantee poorly manufactured drugs. This assertion, however, has remained predominantly theoretical because identifying where a drug is made, which allows one to study plant, firm, or country level factors that may influence drug quality is quite onerous. As mentioned, a team of colleagues and I have recently published a study referenced in my submitted testimony that begins to address this gap. We exactly match generic drugs made in the U.S. against equivalently designed generic drugs made India. We find that generic drugs made in India, particularly older ones that have lower profit margins with greater incentives to cut costs, have significantly more serious adverse events than equivalent generics made in U.S. Two working papers that our team has under review, also referenced in my testimony, provide two policy changes that may help mitigate this problem. Transparency is first and foremost. In an experimental study with thousands of subjects, we find that consumers and pharmacists are unconvinced by FDA messaging that generic drug quality is to be trusted regardless of where it is made. We see a strong preference for U.S. and Canada made drugs over China and India made ones when we only reveal manufacturing location. However, when location and quality are both made transparent, quality tempers these location effects. High quality China or India made drugs are preferred over lower but moderate quality U.S. or Canada made drugs. When comparing equally high-quality drugs however, subjects continue to prefer U.S. and Canada over China and India. Drug quality and location transparency can enable market forces to reward firms for high quality regardless of where they are made while simultaneously incentivizing high quality onshoring and near shoring of generic manufacturing. Second to this is aligning FDA's inspection strategy across the globe. As has already been mentioned, the FDA inspects China and India plants after giving weeks or months of advance notice versus conducting them unannounced in the U.S. In another working paper that we have under review, we have examined newly available data from an FDA unannounced inspection pilot conducted in India. We conclude that pre-announcing inspections hinders the FDA's ability to assess the true state of quality at foreign manufacturing plants. We show that such inspection obscurity aggravates the cost only focused on harming generic drug quality. I advocate for drug quality and location transparency, as well as global FDA inspection parity. Our research indicates these two changes should help to meaningfully improve generic drug quality. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Ball. I would like to introduce Brandon Daniels. Mr. Daniels is the Chief Executive Officer of Exiger, a global leader in supply chain risk management, transparency, and compliance. With decades of experience in regulatory compliance and technology, Mr. Daniels has led efforts to help Governments and private industry strengthen the security and integrity of critical supply chains, including those in pharmaceuticals, defense, and healthcare. At Exiger, he has overseen the development of innovative tools that identify vulnerabilities, improve visibility, and help ensure that products and medicines reaching American consumers are safe, reliable, and free from hidden risk. Mr. Daniels, thank you for being here, and I look forward to your testimonie. STATEMENT OF BRANDON DANIELS, CEO, EXIGER, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Daniels. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. For 20 years, I have worked with pharmaceutical and medical device companies supporting them through some of the most significant crisis management and litigation matters affecting their product development, research, and supply chains. During the COVID-19 pandemic, I served on the White House's Joint Acquisition Task Force where I worked alongside federal partners to secure PPE, medical devices, and life-saving pharmaceuticals. That experience underscored for me the fragility of our pharmaceutical supply chains and the urgent need for reform. In my role at Exiger, I am leading the development of artificial intelligence to map supply chains down to their raw material origins. This work reveals, in precise detail, the vulnerabilities hidden in our healthcare system. The scope of this problem is enormous. America's medicine cabinet is no longer made in America. Nearly three-quarters of the essential medicines used in the United States are sourced overseas. India now supplies about half of the generic drugs we consume, but 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients that make those drugs possible come from China. In Fiscal Year 2024, Chinese firms supplied 77 percent of India's penicillin G and 94 percent of its 6-APA, which is the indispensable intermediate for penicillin-derived antibiotics. This concentration creates a dangerous single point of failure for drugs that every hospital, clinic, and pharmacy in this country depend on. That means a Medicaid prescription filled in Ohio, or a Medicare prescription processed in Florida can often be traced back to a Chinese supplier. The choke points for our most basic medicines are controlled by Beijing, and we are not just dependent, we are actively financing that dependency. In 2024, Medicaid reimbursed more than $150 million to a single generic drug company that sourced ingredients from at least six Chinese firms tied to forced labor and national security concerns. Dual eligible patients who represent just about 14 percent of Medicaid enrollment, but consume more than a third of its spending, are the most exposed to this fragile system. Every taxpayer dollar spent on these medicines strengthens the leverage Beijing has over our health care system. The consequences for seniors and all American citizens cannot be ignored. As Chairman Scott mentioned, contaminated eye drops from India have left American seniors permanently blind. Blood pressure and diabetes medications imported from Asia have been recalled after testing positive for carcinogenic impurities. These are not outliers. Over 30 percent of recent FDA import alerts involve Chinese producers, and another 16 percent involve Indian suppliers. These are the very countries we rely on most. Even more troubling, our data shows that forced labor is woven into these pharmaceutical supply chains. Chinese state- owned enterprises with documented links to Uyghur forced labor in Xinjiang supply raw materials and active ingredients that ultimately find their way into drugs consumed by Americans. This creates both an economic competitiveness barrier through labor arbitrage and a quality hazard for U.S. pharmaceutical supply chains. The weakness in our medicine cabinet is also a weakness in international security. More than 54 percent of the Department of War's pharmaceutical supply chain is classified as high or very high risk because of reliance on foreign suppliers. Chinese State media has openly suggested that drug exports could be withheld as a weapon in conflict. In that scenario, the most basic medicines in our hospitals, our pharmacies, our military stockpiles could become tools of coercion. No adversary needs to fire a shot if they can choke off our access to antibiotics or insulin. The path forward will not be simple, but it is clear. We must expand domestic production of critical medicines, particularly antibiotics and essential generics. We must diversify supply chains to trusted allies and ensure no federal program relies on a single country. We must enforce forced labor laws so that no American patient consumes medicine produced through coercion. We must demand transparency at every level, using modern mapping and monitoring to stress test these supply chains before they fail. The stakes could not be higher. Every time a senior fills a prescription, every time the service member receives treatment, every time our children and grandchildren need to fight an ear infection, there is a real chance the supply chain leads back to a potentially compromised source. Thank you for your time this afternoon. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Daniels. Now we are going to hear from the Ranking Member to introduce the next witness. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I want to move to introduce our next witness, Dr. Ronald Piervincenzi. As Chief Executive Officer of U.S. Pharmacopeia, Dr. Piervincenzi is responsible for providing strategic leadership to his global staff of over 1,300 employees. Dr. Piervincenzi has helped USP modernize and expand its operations, including in the areas of digital medicine, advanced biologics, quality manufacturing, consulting, and education. You may begin. STATEMENT OF RONALD PIERVINCENZI, PH.D, CEO, U.S. PHARMACOPEIA, WASHINGTON, D.C. Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and Chairman Scott, and members of the Committee for the opportunity to provide the testimony here today about the United States medicine supply chain that our Nation's seniors rely on. As CEO of the United State Pharmacopeia, sometimes I have to describe who we are, and USP is an independent scientific nonprofit organization founded on the 1st of January in 1820 when 11 physicians gathered together in the old Senate chamber concerned about the safety and quality of imported medicines to the then new United States. On that day, they formed the world's first national Pharmacopeia. Today, the 1,200 employees work with hundreds of scientific experts to set thousands of quality standards for medicines. USP also offers ingredient verification, product quality testing, and programs to advance the adoption of pharmaceutical advanced manufacturing technologies. USP works to strengthen medicine supply chains to ensure that patients, and especially older Americans managing their chronic conditions, can access the generic medicines they need, when they need them, and very importantly, to trust in their consistent quality. Low-cost generic drugs, which account for over 90 percent of the U.S. medicine supply, have grown quantitatively and increasingly vulnerable due to geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, pandemics, and importantly, market pressures. The globalization has expanded capacity and lowered costs, but it has also made the supply chains longer, more fragmented, and less transparent, jeopardizing both patient care and national security. Since launching the medicine supply map in 2019 to gain insight into an opaque supply chain, USP now analyzes 94 percent of U.S. prescription drugs, providing an unprecedented visibility into key public health and national security vulnerabilities. USP's work quantitatively points to four interconnected drivers of our vulnerability. The first is a continual downward pricing pressure on generic drugs that creates an unsustainable market for these essential medicines. The vulnerability number two, is manufacturing complexity, which is limiting capacity and causing an even greater risk. Third vulnerability is geographic concentration, exposing supply to single points of failure wherever those might be, and finally, the fourth vulnerability are quality disruptions, which destabilize the supply. These four factors combine to create an environment that undervalues resilience, constrains abilities to build redundancy, and discourages reinvestment in quality systems. This leaves patients, especially vulnerable seniors, at risk of delayed access or reliant on less effective secondary treatments. It is simply unacceptable when we know practical solutions exist. No one stakeholder is to blame for the current supply--for the current state of our supply chain, but our hurdle is rather our willingness to take this first step together. Solution must uphold quality, incentivize greater stewardship of our supplied chain, and preserve the savings that generic medicines have delivered to patients and seniors. I commend the chair and the ranking member for their holistic approach and respectfully urge the Committee to consider the following solution in three parts. Part one is to improve the supply chain visibility, identifying key vulnerabilities and updating this assessment continuously. Tools like the medicine supply map provide the intelligence needed for proactive risk management. Understanding risk starts with increasing visibility into our current blind spots such as the vulnerable essential medicines, widely used excipients, and single-sourced key starting materials. We recommend authorizing an annual assessment that provides insights into our most significant vulnerabilities and makes recommendations for mitigation. These insights could help guide commercial investment to shore up risky supply lines, certainly involve and inform policymaking, and direct agency attention and funding where it matters most. Part two of the solution is to create pathways for America to innovate and scale new methods for manufacturing essential medicines. Advanced manufacturing, alternative synthesis routes, and new biology-based methods are no longer theoretical. USP is partnering with ARPA-H today to explore wheat germ extract as a U.S. based method for producing a critical API, thymidine, an example of how the U.S. Government might leverage advanced manufacturing to reduce reliance on foreign sources for key ingredients, and part three, establish a benchmark for a stronger, more resilient medicine supply. The most important factor underlying the fragility of the U.S. medicine supply chain is the unsustainable U.S. generics market. Pricing pressure on low-cost essential medicines drives generic drug purchases below sustainable production costs, discouraging investment in quality systems and pushing manufacturing offshore. Shifting the paradigm to reward a more resilient supply of medicines is central to promoting an environment that values reliability, reinvestment in quality systems, and a competitive domestic industrial base. Specifically, we propose a resiliency benchmark for manufacturers of important medicines prepared with incentives for purchasers to prioritize those who need it, encouraging sustainable procurement and investment in quality systems, surge capacity, diversified supply, and greater domestic production. To help ensure that America's seniors have consistent access to quality, the Government should leverage Medicare's significant purchasing power, along with the DOD-NVA to incentivize the resilience. Strengthening the supply is a national security imperative and critical to millions of seniors. Together we can and must forge a more secure future for America's medicine supply. The well-being of millions depends on it, and I thank you for this opportunity. The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Piervincenzi. Now, we will go to questions. I will turn it over to Senator Ron Johnson. Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. This may be the most important hearing of this Congress, and maybe many Congresses. Now, it is not getting much attention, but it needs to. I first became aware of our vulnerability in February 2020, my first hearing as Chairman of Homeland Security about the pandemic, and I had Scott Gottlieb, Judy Gerberding there. I had no idea that we were so dependent on advanced--or API and the precursor chemicals on China and India's. Have we done anything about it? No. We passed a one and a quarter-trillion-dollar infrastructure bill and didn't even address it. I think the issue is how do you bring the manufacturing back to the U.S. where it can be inspected properly, right. It is not an easy task, but part of the problem is the precursors chemicals, that is refining and that needs permitting. That is expensive to do in America, which is why we have offshored it to China, so you know, how do we do it? What I like, and this was Mr. Ball's suggestion here, and I would love to co-sponsor this bill with you, just simply requiring labeling in terms of where the drug comes from. They are putting tremendous pressure on the companies to reshore these things. It is not going to happen overnight, but, you know, Government edicts--you know, spending money to bring, you know--what you could do potentially is just not tax somebody who brings a refinery over here, but you got to be able to permit it. I mean, there is so many impediments to this. This is a very complex issue, but we have got to start doing the basics first. But the first one is, again, understanding the problem, acknowledging we have it. Understanding how vulnerable we truly are. You know, things like Heparin. We have known about this for years and we have literally done nothing about it. Again, I am looking for really the most practical first steps we can take. I mean, we can talk about all kinds of, you know, complex solutions but would you agree that just the labeling itself--I mean, that would be a pretty easy bill to pass. It will be interesting to see if we could. I guess I want from all four of you, what is your number one single first step that we could take here to address this? By the way, first it starts with the information, and we need a lot more information. Again, there is all this--you have all mentioned the pricing pressure, right. You are all beating up on drug companies over pricing. Well, the fact is, on generics, it is probably underpriced is what you are telling us. Let's just go down the list and just give me kind of the one thing that you--you know, the first step we ought to take. Mr. Baker. From my perspective, I think enforcing the existing laws, as they are already written through the authority of the FDA and DOJ, would let the good players know that it is going to be a level playing field for them. Senator Johnson. We have laws that are not being enforced. Why? I mean, how would you enforce them? Mr. Baker. It is difficult to enforce them at the moment because of the issue of drug shortages. When issues are uncovered at some of these factories, they are allowed to--they carved out the ability to keep supplying these drugs, because if they were prevented from entering the U.S., then we would have a supply chain issue, a shortage issue, so it is going to have to be weaning off of that situation, but it is going to have to start with letting everybody know that the laws are going to be enforced, and it is going to---- Senator Johnson. You know, one thing Congress relies on is whistleblowers. I have been trying to pull information out of Government agencies for many years now. They don't give up their secrets very well. Will there be whistleblowers that would tell us of those instances where there is a quality problem here and FDA just looked the other way? I mean, we are going to need examples of that. Mr. Baker. Absolutely. FDA works with whistleblowers all over the world pretty much on a daily or a weekly basis. Senator Johnson. I guess I would encourage whistleblowers to come forward to this Committee or Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Tell us your story so we can highlight that, so we can expose it, so we actually start enforcing our laws. Mr. Ball, I already used yours, but if you got a better one. Dr. Ball. Well, I agree with you, obviously, because it was something I talked about. It is the only marketplace where firms do not reveal their quality and consumers that purchase a product cannot assess it. The marketplace is not allowed to work properly for generic drugs. If quality and location are transparent, the market would fix, in my view and from research we have done, quite a bit of the problem. Because market forces would then start to reward high quality manufacturers and punish low quality ones. It is a relatively inexpensive solution because it is-- somewhat the invisible hand of the market would fix this issue if the market was no longer opaque. When it is opaque, the market is broken, and we have thought long and hard about other comparable markets like this, and there are very few. I think transparency of both quality and location is the answer. Senator Johnson. I used that when I said it is about information. The consumers need information which we don't have right now. Mr. Daniels. Mr. Daniels. I think the biggest thing from my perspective is right now we have economic coercion on the other side that is keeping these key starting materials in particular at artificially low prices. That is not actually how much they cost to manufacture. They are significantly subsidized. They are in free economic zones. In many cases, they are using labor that is insufficient in order to conduct these operations. There has got to be an economic disincentive, some sort of ADCVD against the KSMs that China is dumping into the market in order to create a U.S. domestic market that is available and viable, and there are today, whether it is in fermentation for critical key starting materials for antibiotics or it is for drugs like Heparin, there are continuous flow manufacturing capabilities that we could bring to the United States. Everyone thinks it is going to take some huge delta between the current price and the future price to bring investment into a market. It is not. I mean, you remember in 2008 we had gas prices spike. IKEA brought Swedwood, furniture manufacturing, back to Danville, North Carolina because of the small additional cost that sat on the top of every piece of furniture. They brought their entire manufacturing capability back. Senator Johnson. As long as you can permit it. Mr. Daniels. Yes, the permitting is a big piece. Senator Johnson. I suggest to all of you, help us identify those drugs or drug that we need to start with. You start with one, you know, succeed in that and then move forward. Mr. Piervincenzi, actually--I think I got that right. Close? Dr. Piervincenzi. Perfectly. Thank you. I appreciate that. I would suggest a market based resiliency benchmark, which is a positive incentive. It would need to be market-based. It would absolutely require the Government to kick-start it, and this would reward the resiliency of having a secure facility with past inspections on a consistent basis. All the things we know, and in fact, we created a draft of these types of benchmarks and just about every factor that was shared, very much including location of production, your own supply chain, and from that, even if we were to start, let's say in hospital systems for hospital use drugs as a starting point, although I am not saying it is the whole solution, and then put a hook on that where hospitals have to reward this through a better contract, a slightly better price. These are the cheapest medicines, which means a better price is still not going to break the bank. Senator Johnson. I think hospitals are still going to be opaque. I think it has got to be consumers, and if you have too many elements in that benchmark, again, it is going to difficult to pass. That is why I am kind of looking at how much just country of origin as a starting point. Mr. Chairman, honestly, this is an incredibly important hearing. I want to work very closely with you and your witnesses and other experts on this, and we need whistleblowers. The only way this gets passed in Congress is the American public has to understand how vulnerable we are and what risk they are at, but thank you for this hearing. The Chairman. Thank you. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. I would like to turn it over to Senator Kim. Senator Kim. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member. I agree, this is an incredibly important issue, and I hope that this is something that can spur us to work in a bipartisan way. You know, certainly from my State of New Jersey, a lot of what we need to be thinking about in terms of what comes next when it comes to medicine, pharmaceuticals, but recognizing that we need to do a lot more when it come to the manufacturing and the supply chain side to make us more resilient. I think resilient is the right word, because we see not just with the national security side, but you know, a lot when it comes to just the economic competitiveness of the United States and understanding where we need to be going to on a number of different fronts. I would like to just pick up where my colleague left off. You know, Dr. Piervincenzi, I just wanted to get a little bit more of a sense of this market-based resilience benchmark I think you framed. Is there a comparable example or is there something that is being used in other industries or sectors that can help us kind of understand how this might come about and how it might be structured? Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you for that question, and yes, in fact, you don't have to leave the pharmaceutical industry. Let's take a sophisticated multinational company, generic or innovator, they do this themselves on the goods that they purchase. Let's say you are a large innovator pharma company, and you are looking to ensure that your multi-billion-dollar product is never short because you have a huge economic incentive to do so. What you do in your own supply chain is you would never buy all your key ingredients from one place. You will have two sources for every ingredient. In addition, you will send your team to inspect their facilities and make sure they meet your own quality standards. You will create a contract which is a long enough term that the supplier is committed to you just as you are committed to them. This is normal. Everybody does this. This is nothing innovative. That process I just described, it works. It is why innovator drugs are not on the shortage list except for unusual demand spikes, which we know are something entirely different. Senator Kim. Then, how do we then take that type of model though at a societal level? When we are not talking about just a company looking out for its own bottom line, and in particular, you know, what is the role of Government? What can Government do that others can't do so that we can understand how to fit this all together? Dr. Piervincenzi. The key here is that the buyer, in the case I just described, is one single company with a rational reason to create a resilient supply. The challenge we have in the U.S. is there are thousands and thousands of buyers who all wish this to be true, don't feel empowered to do so, and actually don't have the mechanism to even pay more money because they don't know what they are paying for. Then the answer would have to be both, the creation of the benchmark, so they no longer have the excuse that they don't know how to pay for quality, and once you have that, then you have to create an incentive, or perhaps force, there to be contracts that reward people from scoring high on those benchmarks. There are different parts of our drug supply which will be harder in some than others, but we believe that where you see the most drug shortages today, which are in hospital administered drugs, is actually probably one of the easier places for leverage, especially because the Federal Government has its own leverage for how it purchases medicines, and you see this in quality of care, the tools that can be used. I am not saying it is extremely easy, but it is not unprecedented, even in health care. Senator Kim. Thank you for that. Dr. Ball, I wanted to just pick up on something you said, which is about that quality assessment and being able to have that alongside the geographic. Can you give me a better sense of how that quality assessment could be done at the scale of what we are talking about here? Dr. Ball. Absolutely. The paper I referred to assumes that the FDA's site selection model scores, which are risk adjusted scores that the FDA uses both at the drug and plant level to determine when to inspect a plant, that some form of those would be amalgamated into a five-star rating on a drug, and that a five star would be the lowest risk facility, three star would moderate risk, and that is what we used in this study. The FDA has this data. They would be very resistant, I believe from my experience in discussing this with them, to give it out and use it, but it is at least a starting point, and it is a combination of adverse events, recalls, inspection scores. Anything that has happened at the plant or the drug that is a negative experience creates a higher risk drug and that would be used to put a score on the label. Senator Kim. I see. Mr. Baker, I just want to end with you here. You know, in your testimony, you highlighted how FDA investigators often have to deal with demanding travel schedules and conditions, can fall ill. How, you know, in many parts--and many of these inspections are taking place in locations where English may not be a primary language spoken, yet there is no requirement for independent translators. I wanted to just get a little bit more of a sense from you. What steps do you think Congress should prioritize to ensure that we are giving our FDA workforce the support that they need? Also just thinking through, are there other steps like better strengthening our collaboration with foreign regulators and other steps that we can do to try to address these needs? Mr. Baker. Yes, thanks for that question. I think one of the things that can be done is to increase the level of investment in the FDA investigators. A lot of disruption happened in the FDA during the COVID times where a lot of, for example, for onsite training and hands-on training was sort of moved to remote, and that isn't as effective. You know, prior to that, it would take two or three years to get qualified, so to speak, to do a foreign inspection. Whereas now, due to resource constraints, you may be tasked with doing those inspections, those challenging inspections that you just mentioned, in like two months after getting hired. You may not have the skills and the training necessary to do those effectively. It is very challenging. You will fly into an airport and then you get in it--especially if you are trying to do it unannounced. You are going to get in a car, taxi, with someone you don't know, and drive four to six hours to get to your hotel that may or may not air conditioning. It is very difficult and challenging. They need additional support to really enhance this existing program that they know works. Those unannounced inspections have about a four time greater chance of identifying a problem that is going to cause harm to a human versus an announced. That is what the data shows. They are very effective, so investment in that area is worth the effort. Senator Kim. Thank you, and with that, I will yield back. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kim. Mr. Baker, as a former FDA Inspector, are you confident in the quality and safety of generic drugs coming from foreign countries like China and India? Mr. Baker. Thanks for that question. The answer is going to be no. I am not confident about the quality. I am confident in the sites that I have been to, and I have seen world-class sites everywhere in the world, manufacturing drugs, and I am confident in taking those products. But for the majority, I would say no. The Chairman. Dr. Ball, what types of adverse events, deaths, did you find foreign medications caused in your research? Dr. Ball. We found examples of cardiac arrests, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, delirium, cellulitis, acidosis. Those were just a random sample I took this morning of the adverse events in our study. There are millions of adverse events that get reported to the FDA's adverse event reporting system. These are just a few. They are serious, and in this paper, we only counted those adverse events that were caused by the drug, reported by the manufacturer, mandatorily reported, and caused serious health outcomes, and there is still millions of those. The Chairman. Do you think they might be under-reported? Dr. Ball. I think underreporting is a problem for recalls and adverse events, and it leverages a lot of what Peter mentioned. The more FDA is present in a facility in an unannounced manner, the less likely an un-reporting will go, because you can discover unreported events in these inspections, but not if they are announced weeks or months in advance. Those are exactly the type of things that a firm is likely to hide if they have advanced notice. If they don't, it is very hard to hide those things. The FDA inspection strategy goes hand in hand with reducing these adverse events. The Chairman. Mr. Daniels, how much supply of drugs do we have if Communist China shuts supply off to the United States? Mr. Daniels. Thank you for the question, Chairman. The supply chains are interwoven, and I think that is the biggest issue because you will have specialty pharmaceuticals that are untouched for six or nine months. Then when you start to get to the end of that supply chain and that manufacturing process, you might have severe runs on the key starting materials or the precursors that are necessary to support that drug manufacturing. In the context of generics, and specifically critical generics like antibiotics, heart medications, insulin, you could see all supply outside of what is used in emergency rooms shut down within months if China decided to stop supply to the United States, especially if they decided to stop supply chains on a supply chain like sanction, like we have done on forced labor prevention in China. If they stopped the sort of intermediaries from selling us the goods that are manufactured utilizing their materials, it could be a severe constraint that would look cataclysmic. The Chairman. Dr. Piramvincenzi, USP is a global organization with labs and operations abroad. From your perspective, are foreign made drugs consistently meeting USP standards, or do you see widespread quality failures? Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you, Senator. I may also just maybe build a bit on Mr. Daniel's comment. The quantifying the if China were to cutoff supply, what would the impact be is challenging, but in the next two months or so, USP will issue a report that covers about 90 percent of our generic supply, so not all of it, but a vast majority, that will map down to the key starting material and location of origin. It will actually be the first time ever I will be able to answer it. A rough number though, just because we have to start with something. Half our medicines come from India. Seventy or eighty percent of their starting materials come from China. You start to do the math, it is not going to be a majority, but it is going to be a very large percentage of U.S. medicines that would become highly vulnerable. Some completely, but many highly, highly disrupted in short. The Chairman. Do you have any feel for how much is in the supply chain that is already in the United States? I mean, I can't imagine that people that--I used to run a hospital company. I don't think we sat there and said, let's have one year supply of drugs just in case something happens. Do you have any feel for what a typical doctor's office, a group purchasing organization, or hospital would have in inventory? Dr. Piervincenzi. At the very end of the supply chain is extremely little but if you were to say what is onshore in the United States at a distributor and such, of course it varies, but it is months, not years, and not weeks--it is months. If you continue down to your starting materials in your API, it gets a little longer, and that matters because it makes it hard for us to get signals. Something might happen, the manufacturer stops producing, and everything seems fine for a while. Nine months goes by and suddenly we have a shortage. It is not really sudden, but it appears sudden at the end because it takes a while for the chain, and since we don't have good transparency, we are not watching this happen as it comes along. Months is the answer. However, as soon as somebody knows it has been cutoff, hoarding behavior begins, and the shortage would take a matter of days in real life. In real life, you would know if a hurricane hit a plant and everyone knows there is a problem, everything would be bought up within hours. The Chairman. Those stores are empty in hours, actually. Yes. Dr. Piervincenzi. If nobody knows it happened, of course, then it would be months. But odds are it is going to leak, right. The Chairman. All right. Let me turn it over to Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. For Mr. Piervincenzi, what are the risks of relying solely on the United States for production of drugs, and what precautions can we take against such risks? Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you, Senator. One of the four drivers of resilience was the geographic concentration. That is agnostic to location. There are different issues about quality that we are also talking about. Some of the most acute drug shortages the U.S. has had in the last few years have been actually on the U.S. shores with an unfortunate hurricane and other things. Natural disasters--just things can happen, and they do. It is possible to create diversification even within the United States, as long as you don't have all your plants in one place, and so, there is a nuance to this, what geographic diversity looks like. If you have two plants in North Carolina across the street from each other, I would argue that is not very resilient. If one was on the West Coast and one on the East Coast, you might be in pretty good shape. Senator Gillibrand. In your testimony, you indicate the importance of aligning supply and demand forces so that American patients have more predictable, sustainable, and quality supply chain. How can the Federal Government promote a coordinated effort amongst different stakeholders to move toward a resilient supply chain? Dr. Piervincenzi. The simple answer is somebody has to pay for it. I think you have heard four different versions of that same thing here, is that somebody has to be not just willing to, but able to, so a willingness says, I am willing to pay $0.13 rather than $0.10 for a pill. Just about everyone is willing to do that. The problem today is no one has any evidence of how do I do that? If I can pay $0.13 for the same pill, I don't--it doesn't buy me more resilience, so this is where a large organization, including-- very much including the U.S. Government, has that power. To say, for now on, especially for a certain set of drugs as we know are vulnerable, we will only pay with resilience. Meaning, this is what we expect, and you will get this price. The market solution like that means if somebody doesn't meet those benchmarks, they will be less preferred, so the market can fill in. It won't force it because it is not a binary decision. Because margins are so small, just extending--having a small, tiny bit paying just a bit more or having a slightly longer contract could make an enormous difference. I think that is the benefit of this problem, is that it can be solved with much less money than if these were expensive medicines. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Daniels, in your written testimony, you recommend the Federal Government conduct regular stress tests of the pharmaceutical supply chain to stimulate worst case scenarios and identify weak points before failure. Can you speak a bit more about how the Federal Government could address identified weak points from these stress tests? Mr. Daniels. Absolutely, and thank you, Ranking member Gillibrand, so two things. One, just to speak about what Dr. Piervincenzi just mentioned. There are multiple ways to reduce the cost of these drugs as we reshore them. One of them is also relying on the innovation of our allies, right. I mean, there is a global market for pharmaceuticals, and as we start to look at that market, we do need to diversify both location, but also, we need to diversity end platforms, and so, in many cases, there are multiple areas in the supply chain where we are advising our customers, which are the Fortune 500, we are advising our customers to find two or three suppliers downstream to purchase metals, to purchase chemicals, to purchase goods from. They can do two things at that point. They can, one, utilize their purchasing power to actually reduce the cost of the underlying chemicals, precursors, whatever it might be, key starting materials. Two, they can give back some of that. Our customers, when they do what is called a directed or embedded spend program, they typically save between seven to twenty-two percent on landed cost on the end goods. They can actually share back some of that to get to a resilient supply chain and to get a supplier that is willing to agree to ethical quality standards, so these programs exist today. They exist in other industries. They are not as common in pharmaceutical supply chains, but there are pharma companies in Europe that we are working with today that are engaged in these activities, and they are doing it specifically to address CSDDD. To get to your second question, which is on these stress tests. We have been working across a number of different federal agencies, DLA, FDA, to map the 227 critical medicines within our supply chains and to understand what are the consequences of whether it is disruption, like the hurricane which knocked out our IV fluids capacity in the United States, or it is major shortages in war gaming due to conflicts with near peer adversaries, or if it is due to significant changes in availability of underlying materials. When we are doing this analysis, it is simple supply chain planning. Companies do this all the time. Now, what we have to do is we have to work probably across a consortium with companies like Exiger and Pharmacopeia to create a complete view of the supply chain, and that complete view the supply chain doesn't stop at sort of the specialty pharma or the innovative pharma company or the generic pharma companies and their suppliers. It has to go all the way down, and what we have to see is that reverberating impact. Because Dr. Piervincenzi said, it is true that many companies have 15 suppliers of the same product at that next year, and then they have four suppliers at the next year, and then it goes back to one. Just no one knows it. That is what happened with ventilators during the COVID-19 pandemic. All of our solenoid valves went back to one company in Italy, and so, even though Ford and GM and everybody stood up to make more ventilators, we couldn't truly make more because there was only one company that had that solenoids valve for the commodity ventilators. We actually have to make sure that mapping is complete, and then we have to makes sure that we are assessing all of the risks that can actually impact to that environment, whether it is geopolitical, it is natural disasters, or it is material shortages. The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McCormick. Senator McCormick. Thank you all for being here. Mr. Baker, can you describe what level of transparency already exists for American health care consumers with regard to what country a medicine or its APIs are from, and what improvements could be made to ensure Americans have better insight and understanding on the origins of their medicines? Mr. Baker. Yes. At the moment the transparency in the supply chain, as far as patients know about where their medications are made, is virtually nonexistent. There could be some improvements in the labeling. It is a complicated issue, because there is many players in the supply chain as outlined already, from the key starting materials all the way to the finished drug. We would have to take a risk-based approach, where the most critical step--like for example if it is an aseptically filled product that is intended for injection, the step in a supply chain at which that product was aseptically filled in a sterile environment would be on the label. It is not a perfect solution, but it is the best we can do to help increase transparency and let the market fix the issues as already outlined by my colleagues. Senator McCormick. Thank you. Mr. Daniels, how can technology and AI be deployed for hospitals and others to map their supply chains? I know you touched on this at some level, and what can be done to advance any reshoring or near-shoring of drugs and APIs? Mr. Daniels. Thank you, Senator McCormick, for the question, so first, hospitals are mapping their supply chains. We work with multiple hospitals across the United States to map their supply chains. They also, in large part, go back to large distributors, right, that are intermediaries between those hospitals and the actual drug manufacturers or medical device manufacturers or PPE manufacturers. The key first step is to use artificial intelligence to actually break down that bill of material of each of those pharmaceuticals and then tie those back to the literal suppliers that those pharmaceutical are coming from.s The thing is, you can't just map the products you are buying. You should be mapping the products you are not buying, and what I mean by that is, you should be--you should understand the spectrum or the panoply of alternative suppliers that you have available to you prior to a major disaster--the customers of ours--we are endorsed by the American Hospital Association as the key risk management technology company for all U.S. hospitals. The customers of ours that had our software deployed knew almost a month in advance that IV fluids would be subject to disruption due to Hurricane Helene, and so, that kind of visibility, of course, it can lead to the stockpiling point that we just made, but it also can save American lives, especially in operating rooms. The second question you had was on the reshoring. I mean, first, Senator Johnson brought up this point. One of the biggest issues we have is permitting. We have a huge backlog and delays in permitting of new facilities and capabilities. The other thing is a lot of this stuff is pretty dirty to make. Acetaminophen, just taking as an example, creates a waste broth that the EPA would not allow us to dispose of in the way that India or China does today. One of the things that we have to look at is that there are novel ways to actually manufacture these. These aren't novel ways that are not taken to scale yet through BARDA and multiple other programs that are looking for advanced research and development capabilities in emerging biotechnology. In BARDA, we have actually taken some of the continuous flow manufacturing capabilities to scale, so first, if we can permit, we can actually make it cost effective, and then the second thing is, with AI and automation in the actual manufacturing line, we take away the single and only differentiation between us and emerging markets in manufacturing pharmaceuticals at scale, which is labor arbitrage. Implementing AI and automation inside of the pharmaceutical manufacturing process--I mean, there are places in North Texas that are cheaper than places in Shenzhen, right. We can start building these factories and actually start, you know, competing on a global basis. Senator McCormick. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you for having this hearing. Great, great topic. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Alsobrooks. Senator Alsobrooks. Thank you. Thank you so much, Chair Scott. Thank you so much, Ranking Member Gillibrand, for hosting today's hearing, and thank you so much as well to our witnesses for being here. What we know is far too many seniors still face the cruel reality of needing medication that they can't reliably access or afford. High drug prices, unexpected shortages, and now Secretary Kennedy's policies are preventing Americans from accessing the medicine and vaccines that will keep them safe and healthy. This couldn't be a more relevant topic. In the past few weeks, I have heard from my constituents, so many seniors across our state who are eligible for the latest COVID vaccine, and they are now being turned away because of the confusion caused by Secretary Kennedy's new guidelines, and others are being told that their local pharmacy is struggling to stock the vaccine because of a lag between FDA approval and the forthcoming recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. When it comes to vaccines, we know that so much doubt is being cast on life-saving vaccines, as well as dismantling our public health infrastructure, and that is why this conversation is so critical. Seniors deserve not just reliable medications, but a health system that they can trust to put science and safety above politics. My first question is for Dr. Piervincenzi. I would like to ask you, when we see how fragile our drug supply chains can be when it comes to medicines that seniors rely on, and vaccines we know are no different, this is a time, as I have mentioned, when Secretary Kennedy, I believe, is really destabilizing public trust in vaccines. Older Americans can't afford disruptions to flu, RSV, or COVID. I would like to know, how has the confusion regarding vaccine approvals and recommendations this year made seniors across the country less safe? Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you, Senator. An interesting fact on the vaccines, as compared to many of the low-cost generics, there are quite a few manufactured in the United States. If you consider United States, Europe, Canada, there is a disproportionately high quantity, so there is the ability for FDA to do more robust inspections, including surprise for majority of vaccine sites, and so, the public should have more confidence, if anything, that they are able to rely on the quality of the vaccines. As a complex biologic, there are linkages to the complex generics that are the ones showing up on the shortage lists the most. Because they are the kind of medicines used in hospitals, just for that reason alone, they are impacting two groups the most--the most senior, especially in oncology, and the youngest, the pediatric population. Also tending to be oncology but not only, and these two populations have been most affected. There is an extra layer to this problem is that these are the medicines that are least substitutable--it is an art form to try to treat these cancers. We haven't cured cancer, so the best we can do is slow it down in many cases. But a small change from one chemotherapy to another and the progression advances, it is the person's life that is at stake, so the vulnerability isn't just about the medicine, but about the patient and essentially what the next best alternative is. From a quality standpoint, items like vaccines are very different because they are given, of course, to a healthy patient, so you are measuring it in two very different ways. However, a poor quality vaccine, you are only going to test that perhaps 30 or 40 years later when you are exposed to a disease. You think about when you need to rely on quality, I can't think of a medicine more important than vaccines. Thank you. Senator Alsobrooks. Thank you. Now, I have one other question regarding--or two actually. The next question is regarding transparency, and what we know is for seniors in particular, and this is for any witness, it is not just about how the drug or where the drug is manufactured, but it is whether or not they can trust that what is in their pill bottle is safe, effective, and available when they need it. Too often our system reacts after a crisis, instead of putting preventive measures in place, leaving seniors and their caregivers to find out too late that their medication is suddenly unavailable. How should we be thinking about transparency, not just as a tool for regulators and industry, but as a preventive measure that empowers patients, especially seniors, to make informed choices about their medications and avoid being blindsided by shortages? That is for any witness. Dr. Piervincenzi. I will be brief to allow others time as well. I would emphasize pharmacy, if I might, so there is a big gap to the patient in knowledge and understanding, but we have an army of hundreds of thousands of health care practitioners called pharmacists out across our country who are unusually close to patients, have access on essentially a prescription by prescription basis. That is a huge positive. There is an opportunity to have them play a more active role when it comes to supply chain and quality. It is not typically a topic that they touch. I think if we want to be able to help empower patients, we are going to have to solve this through partnership with pharmacy and pharmacy organizations that I know are very open and willing to have this conversation. Thank you. Senator Alsobrooks. Thank you. Dr. Ball. Thank you for the question on transparency, so this is something I have spent a lot of time working on, and when our paper that I talked about in my introduction got published, our author team started getting random emails from the public, scared emails about how can I find out where my drug is made? We know know how to figure this out, so this is something that we were able to do in this study we published, but it is very difficult, and this is why we advocate for forcing firms to put the country, the location on the label so that it is transparent for everyone. We have developed a website that we are hoping to launch where you can type in a national drug code number and a flag will pop up to tell the consumer this is where it is made. Even developing that website by this author team that we worked on this paper has been very hard for us because it is a difficult step to go from a national code, which is on every drug label, to a country manufacturer, which is very hard to find out. Senator Alsobrooks. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Alsobrooks. Mr. Baker, in your testimony, you mentioned that Indian generic drug manufacturers using fake labs to pump out fake results to show a product was never tested. Can you talk us through what is supposed to be happening, and what you found and how you found it? Mr. Baker. Thanks for the question. Yes, what is supposed to be happening is that the FDA publishes manufacturing standards and the Code of Federal Regulations that they are supposed to follow says when you test something, for example, you are supposed report all the results that you generate. You can't just pick one or two that you like and then use that as the data to release the product. That is what is supposed to happen. What we found when we started the unannounced inspection pilot back in 2012 and 2013 is that those standards aren't being always followed. Some players are following those standards, but some aren't. It is difficult because the ones that want to follow the rules oftentimes won't be able to win a contract to ship those products to the U.S. because they can't compete with the folks that aren't actually testing it. Because as already mentioned, it does cost a few more cents to do it right, but not a lot. That makes a difference when the margins are so small. The Chairman. Mr. Baker, in the book, A Bottle of Lies, it talks about how foreign companies plan guided tours, but you rejected that, instead wanting to go directly to the quality control labs. Can you talk about your experiences with foreign companies? Why did they start with the tour? Why did you decide to change things up and go directly to quality control instead? How has that changed the inspection process? Were you the only one doing that? Do other inspectors do similar things? Mr. Baker. I remember the moment that we decided to focus on the unannounced inspection pilot, and, you know, I had been trained to do inspections here in the U.S., and we did those before I got deployed into New Delhi. Fraud happens here, too, but it is much more limited, like one person or a small group. I remember that moment being over there, and I was with a co-inspector, and I just remember like we looked at each other and we thought, actually, this is-- everybody is involved in this. It is not just a single person or a small group. It comes from the top down, and it was kind of like an aha moment. It is like, have we got to do something about this. We went back and worked with folks at the embassy to develop ways where we could gain further insight into what is actually happening, and that involved showing up unannounced, which hadn't been done prior to that. We would arrive unannounced, and we would skip the conference room presentation and go straight to the lab, and what we found, like for example, I can think of one that really just sticks out, one of the larger aseptically filling sites in the entire world. I mean, some of these are the size of a small town, and instead of going to the conference room, we went straight to the microbiology laboratory where they do the sterility testing. I mean this is a life or death test. We walked in and there was only one microbiologist on staff. That was unusual, right. We walked into the chambers where they are supposed to be testing all these products, and they were all there, but they were all unlabeled, and so, we are like, well, where is the sample number on all these samples that you are supposed to be testing? All the paperwork was completed, you know, no growth, no growth, it is sterile, it is sterile, but in reality, none of the products were getting tested, and once we sort of caught on that this was happening, that program expanded and continues to today, and again, like I mentioned, when those inspections are performed, they result in an ability to find those problems that are causing these adverse events. About 40 percent of the time we find issues. Whereas on an announced inspection, where we show up and the dog and pony show continues, that is about a five to ten percent chance of finding those problems, because it is so much more difficult. We don't do announced inspections in the U.S. Why would you do that? You show up unannounced and you want to see what is the real quality of the product. You know, this is shown that maybe the playing field isn't so level. The Chairman. You mentioned that the bad players list is no secret, and these bad companies continue to avoid any significant consequences. That is telling me that the FDA knows which are the problem companies, but they aren't being inspected frequently enough or are still being allowed to import drugs. Does the FDA have a list of bad companies? What consequences should these companies be facing? Mr. Baker. Yes, that list exists. Yes, I mean, I could just look into the data base and see if which--if I was going to fill a prescription, which provider I would like to choose, and I will do that pharmacy hopping to find it, and--sorry, what was the second part of your question? The Chairman. Well, what consequences should they--? Mr. Baker. Oh, yes. The consequences should be, if you are caught breaking the law, you know, as outlined in the regulations, you should be prevented from shipping products to the United States. The Chairman. They have got a list---- Mr. Baker. Yes. The Chairman. There is no consequences. Mr. Baker. Very little consequences. When the FDA takes action, what they will do is they will just shift those products to another facility in their network, and so, it is this cat and mouse game, right. Then this facility gets shut down, so now they are shipping out of this one. Then FDA goes over here, but by this time--by that time, this one is already back in the market, you know, because they will go back two years later. It will sometimes be an announced inspection and the game resets. It is just I go here, I go here, and so, you know, just enforcing the law and saying, if you break the laws, you are not going to be allowed to participate, could go a long way. The Chairman. Then we put that in our bodies. Mr. Baker. That is correct, yes. The Chairman. Ranking Member. Senator Gillibrand. Very depressing. Dr. Ball, you have studied the impact of five-star quality ratings and country of origin labeling on consumer choice. As you know, not everybody has the skill set that Mr. Baker described of being able to know which vendor is actually safe. Patients don't have much choice in choosing which medicines their pharmacies or hospitals or nursing homes choose to stock, and they arguably don't have the level of sophistication they would need to be able to choose anyway. In hospitals and some nursing homes, patients may not have access to containers where the five-star quality rating or country of origin labels would be placed. How can a five-star quality rating system and country of origin label promote the use of high-quality drugs when patients often don't have much choice? How can this proposal incentivize hospitals and other purchasers to purchase high- quality drugs when institutions often face pressures to keep costs low? Third, how would you recommend that the FDA conduct inspections and update their five-star quality ratings? Dr. Ball. Thank you Senator for the great questions. Our solution that we have tested in our paper is a first step. The first step is--and I have had my parents and elderly family members ask me, how do I know where this drug is made and if it is safe. If you arm the person at the pharmacy desk or the patient to look at a bottle and say, now, why is this a three- star drug? That question in and of itself could make a big difference because groups like the AARP could all of a sudden have a voice to say, why are we selling three-star or two-star drugs to our constituents? You are correct that it wouldn't fix everything overnight. That hospitals, when they buy it in group packaging, may not have the stars on them until the solution get properly fixed there. That group purchasing organizations may be less sensitive. The notion is that if it becomes transparent for every level of the supply chain, the manufacturers are no longer able to hide, and they have to somehow figure out a way to compete on quality. It wouldn't fix the problem overnight, but it would also allow group purchasing organizations who change suppliers based on pennies, which is often the case that we hear in our research, to look at this and say, yes, we may save a penny, but this is going from a three star drug to a two star drug. That has consequences for the people that are in the insurance program that they serve, or the elderly person that picks it up at CVS and asks their pharmacist, why are you giving me a two-star drug? That conversation is the starting point to put pressure on firms. It is not perfect, but it is the beginning, and it is much better than what we have now. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Baker, off of Dr. Ball's answers, how should country of origin labeling be implemented to take into account the origins of a generic drug's components versus the manufacturing site of the generic in its final form? Mr. Baker. Yes, I have been thinking a lot about that because over the years, having seen the sites and thinking about transparency, that this would eventually come based on what we were uncovering. There is no real perfect solution, but there are some--for each different type of drug, if you are talking about a solid oral product or an injectable product, there are--at least one step that is very critical to quality, for the purity and in some cases, sterility. Putting that on the label would force companies to take that step seriously, and also possibly diversify supply chain for those critical steps to have those in areas that are reliable, and so, for example, an aseptically filled product, where is that bottle being filled? Because that is, again-- there are other players, but that one is the most critical. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Piervincenzi, your written testimony indicated the United States relies heavily on Indian and China, and I think the chairman's questions about those two countries have been very insightful. The majority of these KSMs are produced in China. You also highlighted how one KSM, thymidine, is produced only in China. Can you speak to why the United State is currently unable to produce certain key starting materials, beyond the environmental impacts of the manufacturing process? Dr. Piervincenzi. Yes, so thank you, Senator. The key starting material is a fancy term, I think Senator Scott you sort of said this earlier, that is only relevant to its use in a pharmaceutical arena. What the rest of the world will call them is chemicals. They are chemicals. The chemical industry left the U.S., for the most part, a long time ago, before pharma. In fact, that is how pharma started in the U.S. It followed the chemical industry in New Jersey--it became pharma. There is no mystery as to why it left the U.S.--for environmental reasons and just cost and all the reasons we know. There is something unique about medicines is that they are very light users of very expensive chemicals. What I mean is--and many of the chemicals used in drugs are used for lots of other industrial and other purposes, but in much, much larger quantities. That the chemical company--so they are very rarely to have a key starting material company, because most of them are chemical companies who sell some key starting materials. They therefore are a small portion of their business. This further complicates the supply chain, because later on--we are talking about medicines all the way along, API, finished dose, regulated by FDA, but these chemical companies, they are not even in the medical business, so the incentive or to think about how do we secure our key starting materials, it is not only in the area of greatest risk. It is what we least have in the U.S., or even among U.S.'s allies. It is also the hardest of the three pieces to solve, and we think we have to look at the KSM model, your chemicals, and think, well, how do we start to source it? Where else in the world--I think we need to be more flexible about the world and think about it. We may consider more onshoring on API, but we have to be pretty flexible on the key starting materials, but the current model is unsustainable, but we will have some real numbers in a couple of months. I think it is about even less than two months where we can start to look at them as tangible. Senator Scott, to your point earlier, we have to be able to have some data. Otherwise, it is very hard to get action going, and hopefully, this will be the first time we have data on specifically what key starting materials, where, and then we have the very important next conversation, is how else can we make them. Maybe just to wrap up there, but there are some cases we can make them a different way that doesn't follow the chemical industry but uses biotech processes, and that we could do in the U.S. Senator Gillibrand. That is good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Great hearing. The Chairman. Mr. Baker, you highlighted the story of your grandmother. What was your experience pharmacy shopping? How many pharmacies did you visit? Did you find that they had the same drug from the same company? Was there diversity in manufacturers? Mr. Baker. Yes, I come from a pretty small town in Oregon called Lebanon, and there is about three pharmacies in the area, and so, we went to all three, and each one actually had the same product by the same manufacturer, so we reluctantly made that choice, and I felt bad because already then--at the first pharmacy, I had already sort of hinted that this was not going to go well, and so, you know, it is an experience that is going to stay with me for the rest of my life because it shouldn't be like that. I think we can do better. The Chairman. How would you feel buying a drug from a company that just settled with the DOJ for faking lab data? Mr. Baker. Yes, it was a tough decision, and again, as I mentioned, trying to stay positive is the one thing because you don't want to cause unnecessary panic in someone, and, you know, a lot of people ask me before they will take it. They will give me a call or send me an email, like, hey, what do you think about this one? I will give them advice, and to be honest, over the years, sometimes I have to fake that advice because I know there is no alternative, and I will have to just send a positive email when in fact inside I know that that is not the truth. The Chairman. How do you do it when you buy drugs for yourself? Mr. Baker. For myself, I would do the same thing. I live now in Austin, so I have more choices there and try to do my best to shop around or even consider like an online pharmacy if I can call them and find out where--you know, what manufacturer they are going to use to fill that prescription. The Chairman. Do you believe Americans are dying because of poor oversight done at foreign generic drug manufacturing facilities? Mr. Baker. Not poor oversight, but poor enforcement, but again, it is complicated to enforce because of the drug shortage issue. Again, it is not one person or one organization's fault. It is just--it is the system. The Chairman. Why did the FDA set up this foreign surveillance system the way they did? Mr. Baker. It was a collaboration with embassy, and FDA, and folks at HHS to sort of evaluate--to tell the story. You know, what we were finding in our initial times when those foreign--you mentioned Heparin earlier. That was the reason, one of the reasons, but I think the main one why the foreign offices were established in strategic locations around the world was to be that sort of rapid response and gain further insight into what was happening with our supply chain. I think, you know, 15 years later, the picture is pretty clear. The Chairman. Dr. Ball, so what causes--if they are all FDA approved, what are some of the things that causes one to be different than the other one? Dr. Ball. I think the notion that if it has the same active pharmaceutical ingredient dosage form and route of administration, which is kind of what a generic equates to an original, if you match those, the drug will work. That discounts all of the manufacturing influence on quality. These are subtle changes, and my intuition is that they are often not on purpose. If I was in a market where I was only competing on cost, I would find the very cheapest place to make my product, the cheapest labor, the cheapest equipment, the cheapest suppliers. It is the rational thing to do. When Peter says it is the system, it truly is, because I believe these manufacturers are acting very rationally. If you cannot judge quality and it is opaque, cost is the only thing that matters, that will inevitably reduce quality. It actually must. It is like a scientific fact. If you cut the corner in every part of making a product, if quality doesn't suffer, something is wrong. You haven't cut corners enough, so quality will suffer eventually. It is in every aspect of the supply chain. The Chairman. Mr. Baker, when you did a foreign site inspection, did the FDA or the foreign facility pay for your translator? Is that a problem either way? Mr. Baker. Yes, so in my experience, most of the translation is provided by the sales department within that company, who oftentimes has the best English because of their job. They don't know much about manufacturing, but they know they are supposed to tell the story well. That is oftentimes what I experienced. Luckily for me, I had studied Mandarin for about 15 years prior to going to China, so I could sort of overcome those challenges, but yes, that is the norm. Not always. Sometimes they will provide an independent translator, but it is voluntary. The Chairman. Mr. Baker, when you went to China, did they let you just go anywhere you want? Mr. Baker. Yes. The Chairman. You could go, but the Government would let you go anywhere, and you could walk in any facility--and you can walk around any facility you wanted? Mr. Baker. Oh, yes. Yes, we had a very good working relationship with what they would call CFDA at that time, and they would shadow us on a lot of our inspections to learn our techniques. The Chairman. Why would they shadow you? Mr. Baker. To learn how we uncovered the issues that we were finding using forensic computer inspection techniques, things like that. The Chairman. What would be--what would--give me an example of a facility that you were most disappointed. Mr. Baker. Most disappointed, I think, are the ones where-- there is multiple, but you would show up at the show--I mentioned this in the five-minute testimony where you would up at show facility. This is the clean one. We knew, like showing up, you knew that there is no way they are making the amount of products that I can see on the customs import list, right. There is just no way, and so, what you will do is you will try to find--you will show up midnight and just watch operations, you know, from the outside and try to out what is going on, and then you will eventually uncover like a shadow facility. It could be like next door, or it can be somewhere else you will watch trucks come in, right. When you find that shadow facility, that is I think one of the most concerning things because those are totally off the radar. I mentioned the problems with announced inspections, but just exponentially worse when you don't do any inspections there, and so, that is the--and I think when we were there we probably figured that 10 percent of the API getting exported to the U.S. was from shadow facilities. I have no data to support that. That was just a rough number that we sort of came up with, and compounding pharmacies are really suffering as a result of this because they are importing products, and they really don't have any ability to determine where they are coming from. The Chairman. How long could the facility that was doing the wrong thing stay in business before they are shut down? Mr. Baker. A long time, especially if they had any drug that was on the shortage list, and so, you could prevent some of their products from reaching the U.S., but they would continue to ship a couple that we called them carve-outs, right, because we just couldn't prevent the supply, and then they will ask for a re-inspection in about one to two years. It will--FDA will go back, and oftentimes that will be announced because it is resource intensive to do unannounced all the time, and then that would be a choreographed inspection and the clock resets. They can hang on for years because we are addicted to these sites. The Chairman. Dr. Ball, you reviewed adverse event data that the FDA had cross-referenced to drugs made in India, right? Dr. Ball. Correct. The Chairman. Okay. Where does the adverse event data come from? What did you consider to be an adverse event? What conditions were eliminated as an adverse event? Dr. Ball. An adverse event--we used FDA's FAERS data base, and they make the determination. The manufacturer must report an event that occurs, that they hear about, where a consumer was injured, hospitalized, or died because of a drug, and then through the FDA's analysis of these adverse events, there are flags that are put on to the adverse event. Things like a drug characterization field. That field means that the drug is the likely cause of the event, and a de-challenged field. The de-challenged field means that if the patient was taken off the drug, the problem that is discovered went away. We tested just the de-challenged drugs, which was very convincing for us as an author team, we are really onto something here because our effects still hold on the de- challenged drugs on those that cause death, hospitalization, or injury. To answer your very first question, the firm must report it when they hear about it. It is mandatory. The Chairman. The firm, who is that? Dr. Ball. The manufacturer. The manufacturer hears about adverse events from patients, from physicians, from lawyers. The Chairman. There is no obligation that a patient says it? Dr. Ball. Correct. The Chairman. There is no obligation to the hospital, and there is no obligations that a doctor? Dr. Ball. Correct. In the order you just gave though, the nurses and physicians are much more attuned to how the system works than patients, and so, from our experience, like physicians and hospitals know that this FAERS data base is there and that they need to report what they have found, but there is no obligation. There is a selection bias there. It must be under-reported. It has to be because it is not forced, but this does come back to the FDA's enforcement authority because these reports come into firms, and these firms maintain complaint data bases. When you can access those complaint data bases on an unannounced inspection, you are going to get a real honest look into how the quality of the firm is operating, versus if you give them even a week's notice, the look may not be the same. The Chairman. How many--what is the total list of adverse reactions? Do you have a list of how many? Dr. Ball. I can get that to you. It is incredibly long. The Chairman. A half a million? Dr. Ball. I know it is in the thousands. It is a very long list. The Chairman. Why do you think it is different in the United States if it is manufactured in the United States versus India or China? Dr. Ball. This is speculation somewhat because in the study we were not able to get at that core mechanism. Theoretically it makes a lot of logical sense that when you source a product in the lowest cost place where you are furthest from the regulator, the temptation to cut corners that will affect quality just goes up and up, and then to accentuate that temptation, if quality is assumed to be high, as soon as you get FDA approval, you have that stamp of approval, you no longer have to worry about quality. The difference I think lies in the fact that in the United States, you are much closer to the FDA, their authority is much more felt, and the costs of the suppliers and the raw materials, they are more, and as soon you get that far away, the FDA's authority is more distant and the cost of everything is lower, and that lower cost will come through in lower quality. The Chairman. You don't have oversight. Dr. Ball. The oversight is much more distant. It is much more distant. I don't envy the FDA. It is much harder to enforce their standards there. The Chairman. If I understand correctly, according to your study, generic drugs manufactured in India have a 54 percent higher chance of an adverse event, which hospitalization, disability, and death compared, to similar drug made in the U.S., right? Dr. Ball. It is more precise to say that the predicted number of serious adverse events for older generic drugs made in India (those generics that have been on the market for eight years or more) is more than 54 percent higher than the number of serious adverse events for equivalent, older generic drugs made in the U.S. The Chairman. Let's say you are going to buy two of anything. Let's say, you are going to buy two cars. If you knew if you bought one of them, you bought like one car, you had a 54 percent chance of something bad happening to you, so, what would you do? Dr. Ball. Well, because cars have quality ratings, like J.D. Powers, I would buy the higher quality rated car, but that can't be done in drugs, but if I knew the difference, then I would spend the money to buy the higher quality product. The Chairman. You think the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration would let a car that was 54 percent more dangerous on the road? Dr. Ball. See, and the regulator--NHTSA doesn't have to worry too much about that because car quality is accessible to the consumer before they buy it, and that is the difference between that and the pharmaceutical industry. It is inaccessible before you buy it and oftentimes even after you buy. This adverse event increase is hidden in millions of adverse events. That is what makes studies like this so difficult. There is so many data points that it is easy for these types of increases to hide. The Chairman. What was the FDA's reaction to your study? Dr. Ball. While I have worked with the FDA before, since we published that paper, I have not had a lot of interaction with the FDA, and in the last several months, some of my contacts have left, and so, I don't honestly know what the FDA's reaction is. The Chairman. Did your studies show a difference in quality between generic drugs made in developed nations like Canada or the EU compared to India? Dr. Ball. There is an overall difference between emerging economies and advanced economies, but when we took that difference and we broke it out by country, the only country that showed a difference was India to U.S. No, there wasn't a difference between U.S and Canada. However, the volume of drugs in our study was overwhelmingly advanced economy drugs were U.S., and overwhelmingly emerging economy drugs are India. The volume helped make the difference findable, but it was something that we didn't see when we compared like us to Canada for instance. The Chairman. What was the landscape of generic drugs that you looked at? Did you limit it to sterile injectables, or did you try to look at everything? Dr. Ball. We looked at everything that we could get label data on. The Chairman. Statins, antibodies--antibiotics, and blood pressure medicine? Dr. Ball. All of those. Everything that had a label on the data base we used, we measured it. The Chairman. Why do you think the FDA doesn't put in, require, you know, country of origin of ingredients and country of origins of manufacturing? Why don't they do it? Dr. Ball. This is speculation, of course, but I believe that there is a few reasons. I have heard that through some of our discussions with them that if they were to put quality or country labeling, it could cause some unexpected market reactions. It could cause shortages, for instance, because if you look at a drug and there is---- The Chairman. People might buy American first? Dr. Ball. If the supply isn't there, then all of a sudden we have overnight shortages because we have made the market transparent. That is one of the concerns I have heard. The other is that I believe, and this is speculation, that the FDA doesn't think they have the authority to force the manufacturer to put the country on there. They believe that is company confidential information, and then the quality rating is something that we have taken from data that they possess, and we have come up with a measure that we believe they could translate it to, but it is not something that is immediately available right now. The Chairman. Mr. Daniels, I think you said that challenge supplies about 90 percent of antibiotic APIs consumed in the U.S. Can you talk about how you figured this out? Mr. Daniels. Yes. What we found was that 90 percent of the antibiotic APIs used by India, and India being the vast majority of the generic antibiotics that we were getting, were manufactured in China, and the way that we mapped this, we took every single, critical medicine that we had in our study. We built a bill of materials for each of them. Every single component of that pharmaceutical, of that drug, and what we did was we, once we had that bill of material, we identified each supplier, each supplier that was connected to every single one of those components. Once we identified the supplier, we knew how much of the active ingredient was in every dose, and we could see the doses that were being consumed in the United States. We mapped that up to supplier capacity, supplier volumes coming into those companies, which we have proprietary data and customs, trade, shipping, invoicing data that informs us as to what is happening between those two companies, and we can see where the next company was sourcing their key starting materials, excipients, whatever it might have been, at that next level. We just kept tracing down the line to the facility, so we knew which facility was actually producing which chemical compounds. Once we got down to that facility, we cross- referenced the data that we had pulled through with their certification levels, their employee information, their square footage to ensure that that capacity was visible and to identify things like shadow facilities, which there certainly is a significant volume of that kind of product coming through. Then we rolled that all the way back up to the supply chain and identified that essentially these manufacturers in India were using this significant cost differential between the locally made goods and what was being made in China and were utilizing that to accelerate and to expand margins and the goods being sent to the United States. The Chairman. Are there other drugs that you are aware of that we have such acute dependency on, on Communist China or another adversarial country? Mr. Daniels. Yes, about 50 percent of our critical medicines are in that category. The Chairman. Do you think this is a national security risk? Mr. Daniels. It 100 percent is. The Chairman. I am a grandfather. Kids usually get ear infections and strep throat, so if China were to drop liability and limit antibiotic-related APIs from being exported, would it impact us? Mr. Daniels. Yes. You would see at least 50 percent of the antibiotics that your kids have access to evaporate. In fact, the next time one of your grandchildren gets a strep throat or an ear infection, I encourage you to look at it. I bet you dollars to doughnuts, it is made by Aurobindo, which is an Indian manufacturer using Chinese KSMs and APIs. The Chairman. Do you think this could create a public health emergency? Mr. Daniels. It almost did during COVID. I experienced it. I was working with Ellen Lord, Honorable Ellen Lord and Jen Santos and Stacey Cummings, and when they said they were going to drown us in a sea of COVID--I mean, those calls really did happen. The Chairman. How long do you think--if they shut it off tomorrow, how long you think our supply is for? Mr. Daniels. I mean, it is months. As Dr. Piervincenzi said, it is months. It is month with severe constraints. I mean you would probably be treating--you know, you would be treating people in sepsis. Kids would have to weather through, and that could be very dangerous. The Chairman. Are there any sole source drugs, which, you know, there was only one supplier? Mr. Daniels. There are. The Chairman. They are relying on Communist China or India? Mr. Daniels. There are--I don't have the names off the top of my head, but I remember looking in the study, there were significant volumes. The Chairman. Let me make sure I got this right, 95 percent of ibuprofen is imported from China? Mr. Daniels. Ninety-five percent of ibuprofen, so there is a key starting material that is--that 95 percent of it I believe is pulled from China, is sourced from China, and that ingredient then goes into ibuprofen. There are other ways in which to source that same material. The same goes for acetaminophen. There are other ways to source that material, but they are not cost advantageous and so therefore are not used. The Chairman. Ninety-one percent of hydrocortisone is imported from China. Does that sound right? Mr. Daniels. That sounds right. The Chairman. Ingredients. Half of U.S. Penicillin and Heparin are imported from China? Mr. Daniels. Yes. The Chairman. The Federal Government knows this and has done absolutely nothing about it. Mr. Daniels. At the moment, after COVID, there was a huge fervor. It died. We started studying the problem and stopped executing against the reshoring and strategic activities, and, you know, I am hopeful that HHS, particularly the FDA picks this up, but as of right now, we are not actively policing these supply chains. The Chairman. Are you familiar with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act? Mr. Daniels. I am, Chairman, yes. The Chairman. Do you think that is being complied with? Mr. Daniels. I do not believe we are conducting significant or thorough investigations in this pharmaceutical space, and at the beginning of the year, there was a significant drop in detentions that would indicate a lower volume of enforcement. Those have since rebounded, Chairman Scott. I think we could significantly stiffen and significantly strengthen our policing of that law. The Chairman. Have you tracked the Department of Defense's reliance on China for drugs? Mr. Daniels. I have, yes. The Chairman. Do we have our own source, so our military is never dependent on China? Mr. Daniels. We do not. The Chairman. Why wouldn't we? Mr. Daniels. We, in many areas, are reliant on--it is kind of like we have in critical minerals and in magnets, Chairman Scott, where the commercial markets have so deeply been usurped by China that we don't have the investment capital coming in to offset it. Just like we are doing in MP materials and neodymium, iron, boron magnets and things like that for our weapons systems, we have to make those same kind of investments in our pharmaceutical supply chains. The Chairman. If China invades Taiwan or continues to attack the sovereignty of the Philippines and we go to their defense, do you think they will keep shipping us drugs? Mr. Daniels. I think Chairman Scott, it would be a key tactic to stop doing this. The Chairman. Do you think it would be safe for our military to continue taking Chinese drugs? Mr. Daniels. No, sir. The Chairman. Can you explain the role that Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army links play into the generic drug supply chain, and how federal programs like Medicare and Medicaid are paying for it? Mr. Daniels. Yes, Chairman Scott. The PLA is infused into the Chinese economy. It is called the military-civil fusion, and in many cases, and as we have pointed out in the Bitter Pill Report, several of the organizations that are producing these active pharmaceutical ingredients or KSMs are actually sponsored and funded by PLA-funded entities are directly by the PLA. Those situations create a significant amount of command and control, what we call foreign ownership control and influence risk, in those companies, and make them essentially beholden to not only the CCP, but the PLA. The Chairman. Would you say that the U.S. health care system is entirely beholden to the Communist Party of China? Mr. Daniels. At the moment, yes, sir. The Chairman. Dr. Piervincenzi, how many sole-sourced APIs come from Communist China? Dr. Piervincenzi. Thank you, Senator. We are aware of 11 that are directly coming from China, but that is not the real answer. The real answer is the APIs are coming from China to India, and we know that is where 95 percent of our challenges. I think antibiotics are a unique case, and it is real, and it was strategic. It was a choice in China many years ago, in fact, 15 years ago to have that as a strategic asset, and it was successful, while the world wasn't really paying attention, but that is a bit of an outlier. I think the vast majority of reliance on China is coming back to the starting materials, the chemicals, in some cases the excipients as well--less often, but in some case. The Chairman. How many generic drugs use key starting materials from China? Dr. Piervincenzi. We are going to have a real answer for that, but it is going to be somewhere in the range of 20 to 40 percent would be my guess, but give me about two more months and we will have a better answer for you. The Chairman. How about brand name drugs? Do they use APIs from India or China? Dr. Piervincenzi. Rarely, and it just goes to the different incentives. It is not that they couldn't. It is just that it is not necessary. The incentive is high value product. We need to have a very reliable supply chain. Their finished dose is rarely in those countries. They don't want to have a big, complicated supply chain halfway around the world, so they try to simplify, and so, therefore, you see the APIs manufactured mostly in U.S., Europe, Canada. If you think of those, that is going to be your majority. A bit more in Europe than the U.S. in this case. The Chairman. What sort of random testing of generics drugs happen in our marketplace? Dr. Piervincenzi. The U.S. market is a bit unique in the world today. There is a risk-based approach at FDA, which is taking into account known issues and that drives testing, and FDA has its own labs and of course can outsource testing as well. There is very little random testing, and currently today there really is no private sector solution to do so. This is relatively common practice in most markets including in Europe, but in middle-income countries as well. It is generally called post-market surveillance, which is a fancy way to say you buy something from the pharmacy and you test it. The Chairman. Does USP track how many drugs Americans are taking that rely on Chinese APIs? Dr. Piervincenzi. Yes. The Chairman. Does that present a risk to our supply chain? Dr. Piervincenzi. If you believe that China supplying our drugs is a risk, then the answer would be yes. The Chairman. How many of you would buy a generic drug made in India or China if you knew there was American-made drug available? Dr. Piervincenzi. Senator, if I have an offer, I would if I had the assurance on the front end of the system. The system as we described is tilted today and that is the issue, and that it is an important nuance to me because that is where the solution lies, is that un-tilting and I think that is a consistency that you hear from us. The Chairman. I think, if you listen today, based on the testimony, Americans, we have hospitalizations, we have illness and death because of adverse effects from some foreign-made generic drugs. Does anybody disagree with that? Bad drug quality doesn't just mean drugs are less effective, which it could be, right? Also make you sick or could kill you, so every American senior--see if you agree with this, every American Senior needs to look into their medicine cabinet and ask this question, am I confident that the generic drugs I am taking are truly safe? Do you believe today they could say that? Do they have any ability to say that? Do any of you think they have any ability to that today that if they look in their medicine cabinet, or they go to their pharmacy, they can say it is safe? I talked about LeRoy Hubley, lost his wife at 48 years, Bonnie and his son, Randy, just weeks apart due to contaminated Heparin that they needed for their dialysis treatment. It is horrible. This should never happen in this country. If Americans don't know where the generic drugs are taken or made, if there is no measurement system, there is nowhere they can feel confident, they can feel safe. It is clear that we have a big problem. I am from Florida. I was the Governor. We have hurricanes. At least in hurricanes, in contrast to some other things, at least you can get out of the way, or you should. I always tell people that you can rebuild a house, but you can't rebuild your life, and you tell people to get prepared. It seems like we are number one, even if we didn't have the concern about the way that Communist China acts, we say to ourselves, it is crazy that we are not focused on quality and focused on supply. On top of that, we know that we have Communist China that is threatening Taiwan and threatening the Philippines, and why in God's great Earth would we ever allow our country to be dependent, whether you are talking about anybody that takes a generic drug, including our seniors, or why would we ever, ever put our military in that position? It just doesn't make any sense. I think the bottom line is we have no choice, but we have to make significant changes. I hope the new head of the FDA will take this seriously and hope we will see change. I think we are going to see change is if the American public demands it. My experience as Governor of Florida, my experience in this job is that if people demand it, then it is going to happen. People continue to be complacent, it is not going to happen. I would like to thank everyone for being here today and participating. I look forward to continuing to work with members across the aisle. If any Senators have additional questions for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Anything else anybody wants to add? [No response.] The Chairman. Thanks, everybody. Thanks for being here. [Whereupon, at 05:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] ======================================================================= APPENDIX ======================================================================= Prepared Witness Statements ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Peter Baker [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Dr. George Ball [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Brandon Daniels [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Prepared Witness Statements Dr. Ronald Piervincenzi [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= Questions for the Record ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Questions for the Record Brandon Daniels Senator Elizabeth Warren Questions: How would requiring drug manufacturers to disclose the source of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and key starting materials (KSMs) used to make drugs consumed in the U.S. increase the supply of safe and effective drugs for U.S. consumers? During the hearing, you explained that supply chain mapping can help to anticipate supply chain disruptions and critical drug shortages. Would requiring pharmaceutical manufacturers to report API and KSM sources to the federal government improve supply chain mapping? Would a federal database with this information help avoid supply chain disruptions and critical drug shortages? Based on your experience at Exiger, which components of the pharmaceutical supply chain need the greatest scrutiny or investment to increase the supply of safe and effective pharmaceuticals? a.What are the most significant barriers preventing the United States from onshoring more pharmaceutical manufacturing that Congress should prioritize addressing? b.How would you suggest Congress address these barriers? In your testimony, you highlighted that there are national security risks to the Department of Defense (DoD) being overreliant on foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing. How do these risks undermine military readiness? How do U.S. national security risks increase with higher rates of unsafe, foreign pharmaceutical manufacturing? Which essential medicines should DoD prioritize securing safe, reliable access to for service members? As you noted in your testimony, DoD revealed that "54% of the DoD pharmaceutical supply chain is considered either high or very high risk, with dependency on non-[TAA] compliant suppliers, sourcing from China, or unknown." What would be the impact on the military readiness if DoD lost access to 54% of the supply chain? Can you provide examples of how DoD has been adversely impacted by pharmaceutical supply chain disruptions? Can you provide examples of how DoD has been adversely impacted by drug shortages? Can you provide examples of how DoD has been adversely impacted by unsafe pharmaceuticals? How do DoD pharmaceutical supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals result in direct additional health care expenditure? What types of indirect costs result from higher rates of illness if DoD experiences pharmaceutical supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals? What other costs to DoD occur as a result of supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals? How would DoD benefit from domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals? What are the dangers of DoD being overreliant upon a single supplier for pharmaceutical products? How would DoD benefit from government-owned, contractor- operated pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities? Please provide relevant examples. How would DoD benefit from government-owned, government- operated pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities? Please provide relevant examples. How would the civilian population benefit from government- owned, contractor-operated pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities? Please provide relevant examples. How would the civilian population benefit from government- owned, government-operated pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities? Please provide relevant examples. What are the dangers of DoD being forced to purchase drugs or medical countermeasures considered less secure under the Defense Logistic Agency hierarchy of drug security due to shortages or supply chain challenges? Please provide examples of when this has occurred. What are the dangers of DoD being forced to adjust dosages or dispensing of drugs and medical countermeasures due to shortages or supply chain challenges? Please provide examples of when this has occurred. What are the dangers of DoD being forced to pay a higher cost for pharmaceuticals and medical countermeasures due to shortages or supply chain challenges? Please provide examples of when this has occurred. What are the dangers of DoD being forced to use different, less-optimal medication due to shortages or supply chain challenges? Please provide examples of when this has occurred. What challenges could DoD face in finding enough adequate and cost-efficient suppliers for pharmaceuticals and medical countermeasures in instances where DoD represents all or nearly all of the U.S. commercial marketplace for that drug or medical countermeasure? Response: Responses were not available at the time of printing. Please contact the Committee if there are questions. Senator Raphael Warnock Questions: In your testimony, you emphasized the role of advanced data analytics in identifying vulnerabilities before crises occur as well as the importance of "stress testing" the pharmaceutical supply chain. Looking back at Hurricane Helene, could predictive modeling have flagged Baxter's IV fluid facility as a single point of failure for the U.S. health system, and how can Congress better leverage supply chain mapping to prevent similar crises? What would a meaningful stress test look like in practice, particularly for scenarios such as a natural disaster or international trade disruption, including a Chinese export ban? In Georgia, we have both a rapidly aging population and one of the nation's largest Veteran populations. Veterans represent a uniquely vulnerable population in the U.S. drug supply chain- not only because they are aging, but also because they often need a greater number of medicines to manage service-connected injuries, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other chronic conditions. When shortages occur, as we saw after Hurricane Helene with IV fluids, Department of Veterans Affairs facilities could be forced to ration care. How should Congress ensure that resilience planning and procurement contracts specifically account for the higher medication needs of Veterans, especially aging Veterans, so that this population is never left behind in a crisis? Transparency into where and how medicines are made is critical for both patient safety and supply chain security. How would requiring country of origin or manufacturing facility information on labels improve the security of our drug supply chain, particularly for seniors in states like Georgia? What steps should Congress take to enforce existing reporting requirements and ensure greater transparency overall? Response: Responses were not available at the time of printing. Please contact the Committee if there are questions. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= Statements for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record AARP Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record Association for Accessible Medicines Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record Indian Pharmaceutical Allicance (IPA) Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record National Consumers League Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Prescription for Trouble: Drug Safety, Supply Chains, and the Risk to Aging Americans" September 17, 2025 Statements for the Record Partnership for Safe Medicines Statement [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]