REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure · Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation House June 12, 2024

Witnesses (2)

  • Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard
  • Shelby S. Oakley, Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, oral statement

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 

 
 REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

=======================================================================

 (118-60)

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON
 TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 JUNE 12, 2024

 __________

 Printed for the use of the
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
 transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
 transportation
 ______

 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 57-027PDF WASHINGTON : 2024 
 
 
 

 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

 Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking 
 Member
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
 District of Columbia Arkansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California Daniel Webster, Florida
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Thomas Massie, Kentucky
John Garamendi, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaian Babin, Texas
Andre Carson, Indiana Garret Graves, Louisiana
Dina Titus, Nevada David Rouzer, North Carolina
Jared Huffman, California Mike Bost, Illinois
Julia Brownley, California Doug LaMalfa, California
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Puerto Rico
 Vice Ranking Member Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Vice Chairman
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Patrick Ryan, New York Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Eric Burlison, Missouri
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Mike Collins, Georgia
 Mike Ezell, Mississippi
 John S. Duarte, California
 Aaron Bean, Florida
 Celeste Maloy, Utah
 Kevin Kiley, California
 Vince Fong, California
 ------ 7

 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

 Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
 Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member
Brian Babin, Texas John Garamendi, California
Brian J. Mast, Florida Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
 Puerto Rico Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice Vice Ranking Member
 Chairman Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
Aaron Bean, Florida Officio)
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

 CONTENTS

 Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v

 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
 of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
 Maritime Transportation, opening statement..................... 1
 Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
 Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
 Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 4
 Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
 State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
 Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement........... 7
 Prepared statement........................................... 8

 WITNESSES

Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission 
 Support, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...................... 10
 Prepared statement........................................... 11
Shelby S. Oakley, Director, Contracting and National Security 
 Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, oral 
 statement...................................................... 15
 Prepared statement........................................... 17

 APPENDIX

Questions to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for 
 Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Daniel Webster.... 45

 June 7, 2024

 SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

 TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
 FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
 RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Review of the 
Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard''
_______________________________________________________________________

 I. PURPOSE

 The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet 
on Wednesday, June 12, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 Rayburn 
House Office Building to receive testimony on the ``Review of 
the Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard.'' The 
Subcommittee will receive testimony from the United States 
Coast Guard (Coast Guard or Service) and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) on Coast Guard recapitalization 
efforts, specifically focusing on major surface assets 
including the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) and Polar Security 
Cutters (PSC), rotary wing aircraft, shoreside infrastructure, 
and Information Technology (IT).

 II. BACKGROUND

THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM

 Recognizing that many of its assets were nearing the end of 
their service lives or were technologically insufficient, in 
2007 the Coast Guard approved a program of record to modernize 
its surface, air, IT, and shoreside infrastructure, which has 
subsequently been updated.\1\ The Coast Guard is more than 15 
years into this recapitalization program and though significant 
progress has been made, two major cutter acquisition programs 
remain behind schedule and one has no agreed upon timeline or 
cost estimate. In addition, one of the Coast Guard's two rotary 
wing aircraft is aging out, and one of its medium-range fixed-
wing aircraft is being retired.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-654T, Coast Guard 
Recapitalization: Matching Needs and Continued Resources To Strain 
Acquisition Efforts (2017), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/
690/685201.pdf.
 \2\ Budget Hearing--Fiscal Year 2025 Request for United States 
Coast Guard: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Security of the H. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 118th Cong., (2024) (statement of Admiral 
Fagan, United States Coast Guard).
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 While the Coast Guard has successfully undertaken some of 
the steps outlined in its original recapitalization vision, 
such as the procurement and deployment of the Fast Response 
Cutter (FRC), programs such as the Offshore Patrol Cutters 
(OPC), Polar Security Cutters (PSC), rotary wing aircraft, 
shoreside infrastructure, and Information Technology (IT) 
remain dangerously behind schedule due to inadequate funding 
requests, and equally inadequate appropriations, mismanagement, 
poor processes, and a lack of long-term planning on the part of 
the Coast Guard. These shortcomings have created serious 
capability gaps in the ability of the Service to field the 
assets required to fulfill its mission demands.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ GAO, GAO-17-654T, Coast Guard Recapitalization: Matching Needs 
and Continued Resources To Strain Acquisition Efforts (2017), available 
at https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685201.pdf.
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 Most notably in 2014, the GAO estimated that a roughly $800 
million gap existed between the Coast Guard's recapitalization 
needs and the President's budget request--a trend that has only 
worsened in subsequent years.\4\ In an effort to address the 
funding constraints it has faced annually, the Coast Guard has 
been in a reactive mode, limiting its capability through the 
annual budget process by delaying new acquisitions and failing 
to develop a plan to realistically set forth affordable 
priorities.\5\ These shortcomings have seriously jeopardized 
Coast Guard capabilities across several vital areas, including 
shoreside infrastructure and surface assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ Id. at 12.
 \5\ Id. at 13.
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of authorization levels, appropriations levels and 
 request levels for the Coast Guard's PC&I account over the last ten 
 years (created based on analysis done by Committee staff).

 Demonstrating this reality, the President's budget request 
for fiscal year (FY) 2025 includes $1.56 billion for the 
Procurement, Construction, and Investment (PC&I) Account, which 
funds the Coast Guard major acquisition and capital investment 
projects.\6\ This number is insufficient to support Coast Guard 
mission readiness and is less than half the amount authorized 
for PC&I in H.R. 7659, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 
2024.\7\ If the Coast Guard PC&I account is not substantially 
increased to at least $3 billion per year, more in line with 
the Committee's authorized amount, the funding shortfall will 
be compounded in future years as the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
Program moves to two hulls per year, and the Polar Security 
Cutter Program requires additional investments which could 
amount to 100 percent of two years of current PC&I levels.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ United States Coast Guard, FY 2025 Congressional Budget 
Justification (2024), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/2024-04/2024_0322_us_coast_guard.pdf [hereinafter Budget 
Justification]; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, Pub. L. No. 118-
47 [hereinafter 2024 CAA].
 \7\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2024, H.R. 7659, 118th Cong. 
(2024) (noting this legislation was passed out of the House of 
Representatives on May 15, 2024) [hereinafter CGAA 2024].
 \8\ Review of the Fiscal Year 2025 Maritime Transportation Budget 
Requests, Pt 2: The Coast Guard: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transp. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (May 23, 2024) (response from Admiral Linda 
Fagan, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard).
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 III. COAST GUARD SURFACE ASSET ACQUISITION

OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC)

 The Coast Guard has stated that the acquisition of the OPC 
is its highest investment priority, as it will be the work 
horse of the Coast Guard's offshore presence.\9\ The Coast 
Guard intends to replace its 28 medium-endurance cutters, all 
of which have far surpassed their planned service lives and are 
becoming increasingly expensive to maintain and operate, with 
25 OPCs.\10\ The OPCs are designed to provide the majority of 
offshore presence for the Coast Guard, bridging the gap between 
the open ocean National Security Cutters and the close to shore 
Fast Response Cutters. At 360 feet long, the OPCs are 
considerably larger and more technologically advanced than the 
legacy 210-foot and 270-foot medium-endurance cutters they are 
replacing, necessitating shoreside infrastructure upgrades to 
adequately support them.\11\ Contrary to initial estimates, the 
OPCs cannot use existing medium-endurance cutter homeports or 
Navy bases due to pier space and personnel limitations.\12\ 
This has created ancillary shoreside acquisition costs, 
including pier extensions, upgraded shore-ties, new maintenance 
buildings, and most notably a new floating dry dock lift at the 
Coast Guard yard since fewer commercial shipyards will be able 
to accommodate an OPC sized vessel for repairs and the Coast 
Guard yard currently lacks a sufficiently long pier.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Offshore 
Patrol Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/
Offshore-Patrol-Cutter/.
 \10\ Cong. Rsch Serv. R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: 
Background and Issues for Congress 1 (last updated June 21, 2023), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42567/162 
[hereinafter CRS Background].
 \11\ GAO, GAO-23-105805, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol 
Cutter Program Needs To Mature Technology and Design 28 (2023), 
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105805.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO OPC].
 \12\ Id.
 \13\ Id.
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 The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding 
Group (ESG) of Panama City, Florida.\14\ In 2019, ESG sought a 
cash infusion from the Coast Guard in order to maintain 
operations at their yard.\15\ The Department of Homeland 
Security subsequently authorized up to $659 million in relief 
for the yard, including up to $65 million for costs not related 
to OPC construction, in order to shore up the yard's financial 
position.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \14\ CRS Background, supra note 9, at 10.
 \15\ Id. at 7.
 \16\ United States Coast Guard, Offshore Patrol Cutters 
Acquisition: Extraordinary Relief (FY 2022, Fourth Quarter) Report to 
Congress (on file with Comm.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced that it had 
awarded the phase II fixed-price incentive contract to Austal 
USA of Mobile, Alabama, to produce up to 11 OPCs.\17\ The Coast 
Guard's proposed FY 2025 budget requested $530 million in 
procurement funding for the construction of the seventh OPC, 
the procurement of long lead-time materials (LLTM) for the 
eighth OPC, and other program costs.\18\ In FY 2024, the Coast 
Guard was appropriated $579 million in procurement funding for 
the OPC, which was the amount it requested.\19\ Starting in FY 
2026, the Coast Guard plans to increase the acquisition cadence 
of OPCs to two per year, or almost two thirds of the PCI amount 
appropriated in FY 2023 and FY 2024, raising concerns about the 
feasibility of the long term acquisition plan for the OPCs.\20\
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 \17\ Id. at 13.
 \18\ Budget Justification, supra note 5.
 \19\ 2024 CAA, supra note 5.
 \20\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, FY 2024 
Quarter 1: Quarterly Acquisition briefing (Dec. 15, 2023) (on file with 
Comm.) [hereinafter Briefing].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 On October 27, 2023, the Coast Guard christened the first 
OPC, USCGC ARGUS in Panama City, Florida.\21\ Following the 
christening, ESG launched the cutter into the water for the 
first time.\22\ As of September 2023, the Coast Guard estimated 
hulls 1-4 could be delivered with the funds already 
appropriated and the construction completion rates were: OPC 
#1: 84 percent, OPC# 2: 69 percent, OPC# 3: 47 percent, OPC# 4: 
20 percent.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \21\ United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard christens first 
offshore patrol cutter (Oct. 31, 2023), available at https://
www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
Acquisitions-CG-9/Newsroom/Latest-Acquisition-News/Article/3574259/
coast-guard-christens-first-offshore-patrol-cutter/.
 \22\ Id.
 \23\ Briefing, supra note 19.
 
 
 Figure 2: Offshore Patrol Cutter

 Although the OPC has been labeled as a key priority for the 
Coast Guard, serious program mismanagement has led to long 
delays, cost overruns, and the emergence of a gap in the Coast 
Guard's offshore medium endurance capabilities. A June 2023 GAO 
report found the OPC's total acquisition cost estimate 
increased from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 
2022.\24\ The program attributes the 40 percent increase to 
many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract [for 
OPCs 1 through 4], recompeting the stage 2 requirement [for 
OPCs 5 through 15], and increased infrastructure costs for 
homeports and facilities.\25\ In addition, the program incurred 
a one and a half year delay in the delivery of the first four 
OPCs due to issues related to manufacturing the cutter's 
propulsion system.\26\ GAO also found indicators that the 
shipbuilder's significant level of complex uncompleted work may 
lead to further delays.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \24\ GAO OPC, supra note 10.
 \25\ Id.
 \26\ Id.
 \27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GAO also attributed these delays and cost overruns to 
fundamental flaws in the Coast Guard's design and construction 
process. GAO found the Coast Guard has been undertaking a high-
risk approach to the acquisition of the OPC that attempts to 
concurrently overlap the acquisition phases of technology 
development, design, and construction.\28\ While some overlap 
is common in the industry, the Coast Guard has exceeded 
industry standards.\29\ Specifically, the Coast Guard does not 
require completion of basic and functional designs or maturity 
of all critical technologies, nor does it require completion of 
the design of distributive systems--systems that affect 
multiple zones of the ship--prior to construction of the lead 
ship.\30\ These approaches result in the need for significant 
design rework late in construction, further increasing costs 
and delays.\31\ This will subsequently extend the Coast Guard's 
dependence on its current fleet of medium-endurance cutters, 
further straining the Coast Guard's budget with increased 
repair and maintenance costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \28\ Id.
 \29\ Id.
 \30\ Id.
 \31\ Id.
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POLAR SECURITY CUTTER (PSC)

 Figure 3: Design Mockup of Polar Security Cutter

 The Coast Guard anticipates the need for enhanced arctic 
capabilities in the coming years to support United States 
economic, security, and scientific interests.\32\ The Polar 
Star is currently the Coast Guard's only operational heavy ice 
breaker and is barely able to meet the ever-increasing mission 
requirements in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. Commissioned 
in 1976, the Polar Star has far surpassed its regular service 
life and has been dependent on constant service life extension 
programs to allow it to function--heavily straining Coast Guard 
resources.\33\ Despite this, the vessel is currently undergoing 
substantial overhaul to further extend its service life into 
the next decade. The Coast Guard also operates one medium 
icebreaker, USCGC HEALY, and received appropriations in FY 2024 
for the acquisition of a commercially available icebreaker.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \32\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Polar 
Security Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker/.
 \33\ Id.
 \34\ 2024 CAA supra note 5.
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 The Coast Guard is working to replace and expand its fleet 
of heavy icebreakers with at least three PSCs.\35\ 
Additionally, the Service is considering the acquisition of 
additional medium icebreakers through the Arctic Security 
Cutter Program.\36\ In 2019, the Coast Guard and United States 
Navy, operating through an integrated program office, awarded 
VT Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price 
incentive contract for the detail, design and construction of 
the lead PSC.\37\ The yard was subsequently purchased by 
Bollinger Shipyards, LLC. Construction on the first PSC was 
planned to begin in 2022 with contract delivery planned for the 
mid-2020s.\38\ Design delays have plagued the program, and 
despite repeated requests from the Committee, the Coast Guard 
is unable to commit to a timeline or cost for the first 
PSC.\39\ While the Coast Guard is in the process of 
renegotiating the contract with the yard to arrive at a new 
contract price and timeline, the first hull is likely to be 
substantially delayed and come in significantly higher than the 
original estimated cost.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \35\ Ronald O'Rourke, Cong. Rsch Serv., RL34391, Coast Guard Polar 
Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress (July 31, 2023), available at https://www.crs.gov/reports/pdf/
RL34391/RL34391.pdf [hereinafter CRS PSC Report].
 \36\ Id.
 \37\ Id.
 \38\ Id.
 \39\ Review of Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the Coast Guard: 
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. of 
the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 118th Cong. (April 18, 
2023) (response from Admiral Linda Fagan, Commandant of the United 
States Coast Guard).
 \40\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Committee, January 11, 
2024
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Coast Guard faces many hurdles in building the PSC, 
including building the first heavy ice breaker in the United 
States in more than 50 years.\41\ Icebreakers have substantial 
design and construction differences from traditional vessels, 
including hulls with thicker steel and dense framing 
structures.\42\ A GAO study found that the program suffers from 
unreliable schedule and cost estimates, and the complexity of 
the design has led to a substantial schedule delays.\43\ To 
date, the final design is still incomplete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \41\ GAO, GAO-23-105949, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security 
Cutter Needs To Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and 
Improve Schedule Oversight: (2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-23-105949.
 \42\ Id.
 \43\ Id.
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 The Coast Guard has received appropriations for PSC hulls 
one and two.\44\ However, because of subsequent cost increases, 
it's unlikely the appropriated money intended for the first two 
PSCs will be sufficient to cover the cost of one PSC.\45\ The 
Coast Guard did not request funding for the PSC program in the 
President's FY 2025 Budget, but will require substantial 
additional funding in future years.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \44\ 2024 CAA, supra note 5.
 \45\ Supra note 40
 \46\ Budget Justification, supra note 5.
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WATERWAYS COMMERCE CUTTER (WCC)

 The Coast Guard maintains a fleet of inland tenders 
responsible for maintaining more than 28,200 marine aids to 
navigation throughout 12,000 miles of inland waterways, on 
which 630 million tons of cargo move annually.\47\ The current 
fleet of inland tenders has been in operation for an average of 
more than 57 years, far exceeding their design service 
life.\48\ The Coast Guard established the WCC Program to 
replace the capability provided by the inland tender fleet with 
16 River Buoy Tenders, 11 Inland Construction Tenders, and 
three Inland Buoy Tenders. To increase efficiency, these 
vessels will be self-propelled monohulls instead of the current 
tug-and-barge configuration.\49\ The contract calls for the 
first vessel to be delivered in the middle of 2026.\50\
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 \47\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Waterways 
Commerce Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/WCC/.
 \48\ Id.
 \49\ Cong. Rsch Serv., IF11672, Coast Guard Waterways Commerce 
Cutter (WCC) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (2024), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11672.
 \50\ Briefing, supra note 20.
 
 
 Figure 4: Renderings of WCC

 The initial contract for the WCC was awarded to Birdon 
America, Inc. (Birdon) located in Denver, Colorado, in October 
of 2022.\51\ However, after the contract was awarded, 
challenges to the contract award were made based on the small 
business set aside requirements (FAR 52.219 14). Even though 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) initially determined 
that Birdon met its small business requirements during its pre-
decision evaluation, on May 26, 2023, the SBA informed the 
Coast Guard that Birdon, under its WCC proposal, does not meet 
the status of a small business. The Coast Guard's legal 
analysis concluded a new size determination does not prevent 
the Service from continuing contract performance.\52\ While the 
small business set aside issue has been overcome, a new issue 
arose when the prime subcontractor exited the project, leaving 
Birdon without a shipyard in which to complete the 
contract.\53\ On January 31, Birdon notified the Coast Guard of 
its intent to purchase Metal Shark Alabama, a shipyard where it 
would plan to build the WCC.\54\ The Coast Guard is evaluating 
the ability of the new facility to execute the project, and any 
potential impact the change to a new shipyard will have on the 
project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \51\ Supra note 47
 \52\ Email from Earl Potter, Commander, United States Coast Guard, 
to Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. Staff (May 30, 2023, 
17:07 EST) (on file with Comm.).
 \53\ Email from Earl Potter, Commander, United States Coast Guard, 
to Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. Staff (Feb. 6, 2024, 
16:00 EST) (on file with Comm.).
 \54\ Id.
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 IV. COAST GUARD AIR ASSET ACQUISITION

MH-65 REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

 The MH-65 currently makes up the majority of the Coast 
Guard's rotary-wing fleet, and the Coast Guard is the largest 
single operator of the platform in the world. However, in 2018 
Airbus Helicopters announced that it would be stopping 
production of the civilian variant of the MH-65, impacting the 
supply chain and resulting in shortages of critical parts for 
the fleet.\55\ The Coast Guard is part of the Department of 
Defense's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program, which is expected 
to reach foreground initial operating capability by the late 
2030's and full operating capability by the late 2040's.\56\ 
The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the MH-65 will 
not be able to cover this gap, leaving the Coast Guard with a 
critical air capability shortage.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \55\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Coast Guard 
Rotary-Wing Fleet Transition, January 2023 (on file with Comm.).
 \56\ Id.
 \57\ Id.
 
 
 Figure 5: A Coast Guard MH-65 in the background and a MH-60 in the 
 foreground

 The Coast Guard intends to replace its existing fleet of 
MH-65s with MH-60s, a platform the Service currently operates. 
Furthermore, the Coast Guard plans to replace them on the basis 
of flight-hour parity.\58\ Since the MH-60 has a higher 
endurance than the MH-65, the Coast Guard believes it can 
downsize its current fleet of 146 helicopters to 127 units 
without losing mission capability.\59\ Further clarifying this 
risk, a recent GAO review determined that the Coast Guard has 
failed to determine the type and number of helicopters needed 
to meet its mission demands.\60\ At the same time, questions 
remain about the suitability of the larger MH-60 for critical 
missions traditionally accomplished by the smaller MH-65, such 
as cutter deployment and other specialized air missions.\61\ 
The introduction of a folding-tail design used on the Navy's 
variant, which is needed to allow the MH-60 to deploy on Coast 
Guard vessels, also has the potential to introduce increased 
maintenance and operational challenges.\62\
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 \58\ Id.
 \59\ Id.
 \60\ GAO, GAO-24-106374, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation 
Workforce Assessments Needed (2024), available at https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-24-106374.
 \61\ Id.
 \62\ Supra note 55
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HC-130J ACQUISITION

 The Coast Guard uses fixed wing assets to provide heavy air 
transport and long-range maritime patrol capability.\63\ Each 
aircraft is capable of serving as an on-scene command and 
control platform or as a surveillance platform with the means 
to detect, classify, and identify objects and share that 
information with operational forces across multiple 
domains.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \63\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, HC-130J 
Long Range Surveillance Aircraft, available at https://
www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Air-Programs/LRS-HC-130J/ [hereinafter HC-
130J Long Range Surveillance Aircraft].
 \64\ Id.
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 The Coast Guard has a Program of Record to acquire a fleet 
of 22 new, fully missionized HC-130J aircraft to replace its 
legacy HC-130Hs.\65\ However, the Coast Guard has not requested 
funding for these aircraft in their annual budget requests, and 
the appropriators did not provide funds to purchase any C-130Js 
in FY 23 or FY 24. The program has stalled out at 19 airframes. 
Advances in engine and propeller technology incorporated in the 
HC-130J provide a 20 percent increase in speed and altitude and 
a 40 percent increase in range compared to the outgoing HC-130H 
platform.\66\ This will increase the Coast Guard's ability to 
respond to emergencies, conduct long range search and rescue 
missions, and counter illicit operations \67\. H.R. 7659, the 
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2024 authorized $138,500,000 
for the acquisition or procurement of 1 missionized HC-130J 
aircraft in FY 2025.\68\
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 \65\ Briefing, supra note 20
 \66\ HC-130J Long Range Surveillance Aircraft, supra note 63.
 \67\ Id.
 \68\ CGAA 2024, supra note 4
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 V. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) AND SHORESIDE INFRASTRUCTURE

 The Coast Guard requires enhancements to its shoreside and 
cyber infrastructure to facilitate new assets and more complex 
mission sets. Currently, limitations in existing physical and 
data infrastructure have hindered newer platforms from 
utilizing the full scope of their capabilities. H.R. 7659, the 
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2024 authorized $36,300,000 to 
modernize the Coast Guard's IT systems, and $1.1 billion to 
fund maintenance, construction, and repairs for Coast Guard 
shoreside infrastructure in FY 2025 and FY 2026.\69\ Of this 
amount, $350 million is authorized for the improvements to 
facilities at Training Center Cape May, $160 million for 
improvements at the Coast Guard Academy, $170 million for a 
floating drydock at Coast Guard yard in Baltimore, $80 million 
for a HC-130J Hangar at Air Station Barbers Point in Hawaii, 
and $180 million for waterfront improvements of Base 
Seattle.\70\ The measure also provided additional funds for the 
Coast Guard to update the Merchant Marine Credentialing System, 
which will improve recruitment and retention efforts for 
Merchant Mariners.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \69\ Id.
 \70\ Id.
 \71\ Id.
 
 
 Figure 6: Tarp protecting helicopter simulator from water damage from 
 leaking roof

 The Coast Guard estimates that there is a $1 billion 
deferred shore facility maintenance backlog, while GAO 
approximated that number at $2.6 billion in February 2019 
(likely higher today).\72\ As of 2018, the deferred maintenance 
backlog included more than 5,600 projects, while the 
recapitalization and new construction backlog included 125 
projects.\73\ GAO's analysis of Coast Guard data found that as 
of November 2018, there were hundreds of recapitalization 
projects without cost estimates--representing a majority of 
recapitalization projects.\74\ Coast Guard officials told GAO 
that these projects were in the preliminary stages of 
development.\75\ From that report, GAO recommended that the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard employ models for its asset lines 
to predict the outcome of investments, analyze trade-offs, and 
optimize decisions among competing investments.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \72\ GAO, GAO-19-711T, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Actions 
Needed To Better Manage Assets and Reduce Risks and Costs (2019), 
available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-711t.pdf.
 \73\ Id.
 \74\ Id.
 \75\ Id.
 \76\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 VI. WITNESSES

 LVice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy Commandant for 
Mission Support, United States Coast Guard
 LMs. Shelby Oakley, Director, Contracting and 
National Security Acquisitions, United States Government 
Accountability Office

 REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

 ---------- 

 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 12, 2024

 House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
 Transportation,
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
 Washington, DC.
 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:17 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
 I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
 Without objection, show that ordered.
 I ask unanimous consent that Members not on this 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee on 
today's hearing and ask questions.
 Without objection, show that ordered.
 As a reminder, if Members wish to insert a document into 
the record, please also email it to [email protected].
 I now recognize myself for the purpose of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

 Mr. Webster of Florida. Today, our subcommittee will 
receive testimony from the Coast Guard's efforts to 
recapitalize its surface, air, IT, and shoreside assets.
 I would like to welcome the witnesses: Vice Admiral Paul 
Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, and Shelby 
Oakley, Director of Contracting and National Security 
Acquisitions at the United States Government Accountability 
Office.
 Vice Admiral Thomas, I understand this is the last time you 
will be at this hearing, which may be a great joy to you. And 
so, we are thankful for you, glad you did what you did during 
your nearly 40-year career. And we really appreciate it. On 
behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for your 
service to the Nation. In the spirit of today's hearing, we all 
wish you fair winds and following seas as you embark on this 
new chapter.
 But, before we let you go, sail off into the sunset, we are 
here today to discuss the Coast Guard's slow, multidecade 
recapitalization program campaign. The Service can count 
significant successes, including the near completion of its 
National Security Cutter and Fast Response Cutter programs, 
though we hope to squeeze in a few more Fast Response Cutters. 
The Coast Guard has made substantial investments into the 
shoreside facilities necessary to homeport these new assets.
 Unfortunately, challenges remain. Despite clearly 
articulated needs, the administration's yearly budget requests 
consistently fall short of the resources needed to carry out 
the Service's own recapitalization plans. Now, the Coast Guard 
is left with the lowest appropriation for its procurement 
account in a decade and is facing a Grand Canyon-sized hole in 
its future-year budgets.
 This subcommittee has repeatedly warned the Coast Guard 
that it is approaching a fiscal cliff. Now it has arrived. The 
Offshore Patrol Cutter moves from one to two hulls per year, 
starting in fiscal year 2026, and the substantial need will 
grow even more, as soon as fiscal year 2026, to keep the Polar 
Security Cutter program moving forward. The current budget 
request cannot sustain the Service's program of record without 
a significant increase. In contrast to meager appropriations 
and budget requests, this committee has consistently authorized 
levels to provide at least a bare minimum needed to keep the 
Service from losing even more ground.
 The Commandant appeared before our subcommittee 3 weeks 
ago, and while she was unable to commit to a timeline or cost 
for the Polar Security Cutter, the subcommittee commended her 
for recognizing the Service requires at least $3 billion in 
procurement funding to move its programs forward. While I don't 
expect you to commit to a Polar Security Cutter timeline, I do 
look forward to learning what progress is being made on the 
Coast Guard's major acquisition programs, including the Polar 
Security Cutter, Offshore Patrol Cutter, and Waterways Commerce 
Cutter.
 Aside from surface assets, the Coast Guard's aging aviation 
fleet requires modernization. As the Service phases out the C-
27 platform and replaces its no-longer-manufactured MH-65s with 
more capable MH-60s, funding needs only grow. I remain 
concerned with the plan to reduce the total number of 
helicopter assets, as well as the suitability for the larger 
MH-60 platform for specialized Coast Guard missions and cutter 
operations. I assure you that the committee will continue to 
track these transitions very closely.
 Finally, the Coast Guard's IT and shoreside infrastructure 
are in dire need of repair and modernization. The Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2024 provides $1.1 billion in fiscal years 
2025 and 2026 to modernize the Coast Guard's shoreside 
infrastructure, including substantial investments at the Coast 
Guard Academy and the Coast Guard's sole enlisted accession 
point at Cape May, both of which are literally crumbling.
 To our witnesses, thank you for participating today.
 Vice Admiral Thomas, as this is your last hearing before us 
before you retire, I encourage you to provide us with your 
full, unvarnished view of how we ought to right the ship.
 [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
 Today our subcommittee will receive testimony on the Coast Guard's 
efforts to recapitalize its surface, air, I.T. and shoreside assets. 
I'd like to welcome our witnesses--Vice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy 
Commandant for Mission Support, and Shelby Oakley, Director of 
Contracting and National Security at the United States Government 
Accountability Office.
 Vice Admiral Thomas, I understand you will be retiring at the end 
of this month after a nearly 40-year career in the Coast Guard. On 
behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for your service 
to our nation. In the spirit of today's hearing, we all wish you fair 
winds and following seas as you embark on your next chapter.
 But before we let you sail off into the sunset, we are here today 
to discuss the Coast Guard's slow multi-decade recapitalization 
campaign. The Service can count significant successes, including the 
near completion of its National Security Cutter and Fast Response 
Cutter programs--though we still hope to squeeze in a few more Fast 
Response Cutters. The Coast Guard has also made substantial investments 
in the shoreside facilities necessary to homeport these new assets.
 Unfortunately, challenges remain. Despite clearly articulated 
needs, the Administration's yearly budget requests consistently fall 
short of the resources needed to carry out the Service's own 
recapitalization plans. Now, the Coast Guard is left with the lowest 
appropriation for its procurement account in a decade and is facing a 
Grand Canyon-sized hole in its future-year budgets.
 This subcommittee has repeatedly warned the Coast Guard that it is 
approaching a fiscal cliff. Now we have arrived. The Offshore Patrol 
Cutter moves from one to two hulls per year starting in fiscal year 
2026. And the substantial need will grow even more, as soon as fiscal 
year 2026, to keep the Polar Security Cutter program moving forward. 
The current budget request cannot sustain the Service's program of 
record without a significant increase. In contrast to meager 
appropriations and budget requests, this committee has consistently 
authorized levels to provide at least the bare minimum needed to keep 
the Service from losing even more ground.
 The Commandant appeared before our subcommittee three weeks ago, 
and while she was unable to commit to a timeline or cost for the Polar 
Security Cutter, the Subcommittee commends her for recognizing the 
Service requires at least $3 billion in procurement funding to move its 
programs forward. While I don't expect you to commit to a Polar 
Security Cutter timeline, I do look forward to learning what progress 
is being made on Coast Guard major acquisition programs, including the 
Polar Security Cutter, Offshore Patrol Cutter, and Waterways Commerce 
Cutter.
 Aside from surface assets, the Coast Guard's aging aviation fleet 
requires modernization. As the Service phases out the C-27 platform and 
replaces its no-longer-manufactured MH-65s with more capable MH-60s, 
funding needs only grow. I remain concerned with the plan to reduce the 
total number of helicopter assets, as well as the suitability for the 
larger MH-60 platform for specialized Coast Guard missions and cutter 
operations. I assure you that the Committee will continue to track this 
transition very closely.
 Finally, the Coast Guard's I.T. and shoreside infrastructure are in 
dire need of repair and modernization. The Coast Guard Authorization 
Act of 2024 provides $1.1 billion over fiscal years 2025 and 2026 to 
modernize the Coast Guard's shoreside infrastructure, including 
substantial investments at the Coast Guard Academy and the Coast 
Guard's sole enlisted accession point at Cape May, both of which are 
literally crumbling.
 To our witnesses--thank you for participating today. Vice Admiral 
Thomas--as this is your last hearing before you retire, I encourage you 
to provide us with your full unvarnished view on how we can right the 
ship.

 Mr. Webster of Florida. Now, I will recognize--actually 
recognize the----
 Mr. Larsen of Washington [interrupting]. Recognized, sir?
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, I think so.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. OK.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. So, Representative Larsen, you are 
recognized.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
 MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thanks. I thank the chair.
 I want to start by recognizing Admiral Thomas' service and 
his retirement, as well, later this month. Congratulations and 
thank you for your service.
 I also want to recognize Lieutenant Iia Carter who is 
moving from the Office of Leg Affairs, or whatever you-all call 
the Coast Guard and will be the CO at Station L.A. So, then you 
will just have to deal with Carbajal directly instead of all of 
us.
 So, today's hearing is an opportunity for this committee to 
receive an update on the Coast Guard's now 17-year-old 
recapitalization plan. Included in this plan and subsequent 
update in 2017 is the acquisition of National Security Cutters, 
Fast Response Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, Polar Security 
Cutters, Waterways Commerce Cutters, and the HC-130J.
 Many of these acquisition programs have experienced 
significant delays and budgetary issues.
 For instance, the Coast Guard awarded the contract for the 
design and construction of three Polar Security Cutters in 
2019. And, now 5 years later, the shipyard that won that 
contract has been sold, the design is only 60 percent complete, 
and the Coast Guard has not determined the delivery date or 
final cost for these vessels.
 The Coast Guard awarded the contract for 25 Offshore Patrol 
Cutters in 2016, and the program is currently behind schedule 
and over budget. Four cutters are currently under construction, 
and the Service has amended the contract to move production to 
another shipyard after these four are delivered.
 The contract to build 27 Waterways Commerce Cutters was 
awarded in 2022 but has been delayed due to a Small Business 
Administration determination. Further, the contractor has 
recently purchased a new shipyard to complete construction.
 These three acquisition programs are the largest currently 
underway in the Coast Guard, utilizing nearly all the 
procurement, construction, and improvements account. And they 
have a few things in common. They are all over budget, delayed, 
and construction will not be completed in the shipyard that was 
awarded the initial contract.
 Additionally, while the delivery of HC-130J aircraft has 
been well-received by Coast Guard aviators--providing better 
range, speed, and technology than its predecessor--the program 
is stalled at 19 airframes due to a lack of funding. This, 
coupled with the unplanned retirement of the C-27 fleet, 
creates a large gap in Coast Guard aviation capabilities.
 While it is appropriate to scrutinize the Coast Guard's 
decisions, we in Congress must consider our own actions and the 
structural impediments facing the Service. The Service is 
dealing with inadequate resources and an inadequate industrial 
base.
 U.S. shipyards are having a hard time competing in the 
global marketplace. This is not because our yards and workers 
are any less capable, but because foreign shipyards receive 
large direct subsidies. For instance, between 2010 and 2018, 
the Chinese Government provided $132 billion to its shipping 
and shipbuilding industry.
 While I support the Small Shipyard Grant Program, the Title 
XI Shipbuilding Program, and the Capital Construction Program, 
collectively these programs pale in comparison to the support 
other nations provide to their shipbuilding industries. 
Government shipbuilding becomes much more costly without a 
robust domestic commercial shipbuilding industry.
 I am pleased that Secretary Del Toro of the Navy has 
directed the Navy to lead the newly formed Government 
Shipbuilders Council. Working with the Coast Guard, the 
Maritime Administration, and NOAA, the council seeks to bolster 
the commercial shipbuilding industry.
 Congress must strengthen U.S. shipyards, the merchant 
marine, and the Jones Act to ensure commercial business for 
U.S. shipyards.
 While I am confident the Coast Guard will complete the 
ongoing recapitalization effort, I am concerned that Congress 
and the administration are not prepared to provide the 
appropriate level of resources.
 Before this subcommittee 3 weeks ago, the Commandant 
testified that the Coast Guard PC&I account would need to be 
funded in excess of $3 billion annually in order to adequately 
cover each acquisition program. Unfortunately, that number does 
not include the shoreside infrastructure needs, such as piers, 
hangars, and repair facilities, to support those new assets.
 Finally, we can't forget about the women and men who will 
be operating the new cutters and aircraft once they are 
delivered. The growing shoreside infrastructure backlog has 
real-world consequences for the women and men of the Coast 
Guard.
 I have visited numerous Coast Guard stations across the 
country and have seen firsthand the unacceptable living 
conditions. No servicemember should be asked to live with mold 
or asbestos. They deserve better. Congress needs to do better.
 As Congress funds the construction of assets, we need to 
ensure that servicemembers get the shoreside support that they 
deserve. This includes workstations, housing, healthcare, and 
childcare.
 With that, I want to thank the chair and the ranking member 
for holding this hearing and look forward to the testimony 
ahead.
 Thank you. I yield back.
 [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
 I'd like to start by recognizing Admiral Thomas' service and 
retirement later this month. Congratulations and thank you for your 
service.
 I also want to recognize Lieutenant Iia Carter, who is moving from 
the Office of Legislative Affairs and will be the Chief Officer at the 
Station Los Angeles. Then you'll just have to deal with Carbajal 
directly instead of all of us.
 Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Committee to receive an 
update on the Coast Guard's now 17-year-old recapitalization plan.
 Included in this plan, and the subsequent update in 2017, is the 
acquisition of National Security Cutters, Fast Response Cutters, 
Offshore Patrol Cutters, Polar Security Cutters, Waterways Commerce 
Cutters and HC-130J aircraft.
 Many of these acquisition programs have experienced significant 
delays and budgetary issues.
 For instance, the Coast Guard awarded the contract for the design 
and construction of three Polar Security Cutters in 2019.
 Now, five years later, the shipyard that won the contract has been 
sold, the design is only 60 percent complete and the Coast Guard has 
not determined the delivery date or the final cost for the vessels.
 The Coast Guard awarded the contract for 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters 
in 2016, and the program is currently behind schedule and over budget. 
Four cutters are currently under construction, and the Service has 
amended the contract to move production to another shipyard after these 
four are delivered.
 The contract to build 27 Waterways Commerce Cutters was awarded in 
2022 but has been delayed due to a Small Business Administration 
determination. Further, the contractor has recently purchased a new 
shipyard to complete the construction.
 These three acquisition programs are the largest currently underway 
in the Coast Guard, utilizing nearly all the Procurement Construction 
and Improvements (PC&I) account, and they have a few things in common.
 They are all over budget, delayed and construction will not be 
completed in the shipyard that was awarded the initial contract.
 Additionally, while the delivery of HC-130J aircraft has been well 
received by Coast Guard aviators--providing better range, speed, and 
technology than its predecessor--the program has stalled at 19 
airframes due to a lack of funding.
 This, coupled with the unplanned retirement of the C-27 fleet, 
creates a large gap in Coast Guard aviation capabilities.
 While it is appropriate to scrutinize the Coast Guard's decisions, 
we in Congress must consider our own actions and the structural 
impediments facing the Service. The Service is dealing with inadequate 
resources and an inadequate industrial base.
 U.S. shipyards are having a hard time competing in the global 
marketplace. This is not because our yards and workers are any less 
capable but because foreign shipyards receive large direct subsidies. 
For instance, between 2010 and 2018, the Chinese government provided 
$132 billion dollars to their shipping and shipbuilding industry.
 While I support the Small Shipyard Grant Program, the Title XI 
Shipbuilding Program, and the Capitol Construction Program, 
collectively these programs pale in comparison to the support other 
nations provide to their shipbuilding industries.
 Government shipbuilding becomes much more costly without a robust 
domestic commercial shipbuilding industry.
 I am pleased that Secretary Del Toro has directed the Navy to lead 
the newly formed Government Shipbuilder's Council. Working with the 
Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, the Council seeks to bolster the commercial 
shipbuilding industry.
 Congress must strengthen U.S. shipyards, the merchant marine and 
the Jones Act to ensure commercial business for U.S. shipyards.
 While I am confident the Coast Guard will complete the ongoing 
recapitalization effort, I am concerned that Congress and the 
Administration are not prepared to provide the appropriate level of 
resources.
 Before this Subcommittee three weeks ago, the Commandant testified 
that the Coast Guard PC&I account would need to be funded in excess of 
$3 billion annually in order to adequately cover each acquisition 
program. Unfortunately, that number does not include the shoreside 
infrastructure needs, such as piers, hangars, and repair facilities, to 
support the new assets.
 Finally, we cannot forget about the women and men who will be 
operating the new cutters and aircraft once they are delivered. The 
growing shoreside infrastructure backlog has real world consequences 
for the women and men of the Coast Guard.
 I have visited numerous Coast Guard stations across the country and 
seen firsthand the unacceptable living conditions. No servicemember 
should be asked to live with mold or asbestos. They deserve better and 
Congress needs to do better.
 As Congress funds the construction of assets, we need to ensure 
that servicemembers get the shoreside support they deserve. This 
includes workstations, housing, healthcare and childcare.
 Thank you, Chairman Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal, for 
holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.

 Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
 I now recognize Representative Carbajal.
 Ranking Member, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
 RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
 TRANSPORTATION

 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
 And congratulations, Iia Carter, on your upcoming post in 
the State of California, what many call paradise. We only 
accept the best of the best. So, you are going to fit right in. 
Congratulations.
 And, to Admiral Thomas, thank you for your service to our 
Nation. I wish you the best in your upcoming retirement and 
really appreciate all the contributions you have made to the 
Coast Guard over the years. So, congratulations on your 
upcoming retirement, as well.
 Before we get started into the substance of today's 
hearing, I am compelled to express my disappointment again with 
the newest account of the Coast Guard's handling of Operation 
Fouled Anchor. The latest disturbing revelations by the former 
sexual assault and response coordinator at the Coast Guard 
Academy details a disturbing and blatant disregard for victims 
in an effort to protect the reputation of the Coast Guard.
 If the Coast Guard wants to mend its reputation, it must 
commit to real transparency and real accountability, which 
includes the senior leadership. The Coast Guard is a great 
organization, but those who have dedicated their lives to 
service deserve better.
 The Coast Guard is in the midst of recapitalizing cutters, 
boats, airplanes, helicopters, shoreside infrastructure, and 
information technology. In recent years, in almost every case, 
the procurements have been over budget and over schedule.
 While it is important to recapitalize and modernize Coast 
Guard assets, we must address the ongoing production issues to 
ensure timely and cost-effective delivery.
 The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, has reported 
several times that the acquisition of new Coast Guard assets 
routinely comes in delayed and over budget. This is a 
concerning trend, particularly for a small and underresourced 
Service that is forced to rely on aging and obsolete assets to 
conduct its missions.
 Improving the acquisition program requires investment so 
the Coast Guard can bolster its oversight and create internal 
capabilities. It also requires investing in U.S. shipbuilding 
to ensure we have shipyards capable of building the assets we 
need.
 U.S. shipyards depend on contracts from the Navy and Coast 
Guard to support their business. The Coast Guard is oftentimes 
outbid by the size and value of Navy contracts. Recently, this 
has forced the Coast Guard to rely on the lack--or should I 
say, on shipyards that lack experience with Government 
contracts.
 We cannot rely on the Coast Guard to be the subsidizer for 
the ship industry. Time is of the essence to bring on new 
cutters, shoreside infrastructure, and IT systems. Not only do 
modern assets mean improved mission readiness, but they also 
mean better quality for life for our Coasties.
 Servicemembers want their families to live in the best 
quality housing and want to work in buildings that are not 
falling down around them. That starts with investing more in 
shoreside infrastructure and eliminating the estimated $3 
billion backlog.
 Ultimately, servicemembers deserve to live and work in 
places that are not on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast 
Guard leadership owe it to the personnel to deliver this. I 
have visited countless Coast Guard stations where buildings are 
either damaged, outdated, or completely unusable.
 I have said it before, and I will say it again: We must 
fund the Coast Guard at the levels significantly higher than 
requested and appropriated in recent years. I welcome the 
Commandant's push to be a $20 billion agency by 2030, including 
a need to more than double the procurement, construction, and 
improvements account, otherwise known as PC&I.
 Even GAO has recognized that the funding typically 
requested by the Coast Guard underestimates their need for 
recapitalization by more than $800 million each year. All signs 
point to the need to fund the Coast Guard at higher levels.
 I was heartened to see the House appropriations mark 
included a $500 million above-the-budget request for the PC&I 
account. That is a step in the right direction, but future PC&I 
funding must match or exceed $3 billion per year, as reflected 
in the Coast Guard Authorization Act and the Commandant's 
recent statements.
 I hope this hearing continues to shed light on the growing 
resource gap, and this serves as a wakeup call.
 With that, I yield back with 1 second to spare.
 [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
 Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
 Before we get into the substance of today's hearing, I feel 
compelled to express my disappointment with the newest account of the 
Coast Guard's handling of Operation Fouled Anchor.
 The disturbing post by the former Sexual Assault and Response 
Coordinator at the Coast Guard Academy details a blatant disregard for 
victims in an effort to protect the reputation of the Coast Guard.
 If the Coast Guard wants to mend its reputation, it must commit to 
real transparency and real accountability--which includes the senior 
leadership. The Coast Guard is a great organization, but those who have 
dedicated their life to service deserve better.
 The Coast Guard is in the midst of recapitalizing cutters, boats, 
airplanes, helicopters, shoreside infrastructure, and information 
technology. In recent years, in almost every case, these procurements 
have been over budget and over schedule.
 While it is important to recapitalize and modernize Coast Guard 
assets, we must address the ongoing production issues to ensure a 
timely and cost-effective delivery.
 The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, has reported several 
times that the acquisition of new Coast Guard assets routinely comes in 
delayed and over budget. This is a concerning trend particularly for a 
small and under-resourced service that is forced to rely on aging and 
obsolete assets to conduct its missions.
 Improving the acquisition program requires investment so the Coast 
Guard can bolster its oversight and create internal capabilities. It 
also requires investing in U.S. shipbuilding to ensure we have 
shipyards capable of building the assets we need.
 U.S. shipyards depend on contracts from the Navy and Coast Guard to 
support their business, but the Coast Guard is often outbid by the size 
and value of Navy contracts. Recently, this has forced the Coast Guard 
to rely on shipyards that lack experience with government contracts.
 We cannot rely on the Coast Guard to subsidize the shipbuilding 
industry.
 Time is of the essence to bring on newer cutters, shoreside 
infrastructure and IT systems. Not only do modern assets mean improved 
mission readiness, but they also mean better quality of life for our 
Coasties.
 Servicemembers want their families to live in the best quality 
housing and want to work in buildings that are not falling down around 
them. That starts with investing more in shoreside infrastructure and 
eliminating the estimated $3 billion backlog.
 Ultimately, servicemembers deserve to live and work in places that 
are not on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast Guard leadership 
owe it to the personnel to deliver this. I have visited countless Coast 
Guard stations where buildings are either damaged, outdated or 
completely unusable.
 I have said it before and I will say it again, we must fund the 
Coast Guard at levels significantly higher than requested and 
appropriated in recent years. I welcome the Commandant's push to be a 
$20 billion agency by 2030 including a need to more than double the 
procurement, construction and improvements account, otherwise known as 
PC&I.
 Even GAO has recognized that the funding typically requested by the 
Coast Guard underestimates their needs for recapitalization by more 
than $800 million each year.
 All signs point to the need to fund the Coast Guard at higher 
levels. I was heartened to see the House appropriations mark included 
$500 million above the budget request for the PC&I account. That is a 
step in the right direction, but future PC&I funding must match or 
exceed $3 billion per year as reflected in the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act and the Commandant's recent statements.
 I hope this hearing continues to shed light on the growing resource 
gaps and this serves as a wakeup call.
 With that, I yield back.

 Mr. Webster of Florida. With 1 second to spare, yes.
 I would now like to welcome our witnesses and thank them 
for being here today.
 Briefly, take a moment to explain our lighting system. 
Green means go; yellow means slow down; and red means stop. 
That's it.
 I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
 Without objection, show that ordered.
 I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may have been submitted to them 
in writing.
 Without objection, show that ordered.
 I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments or information 
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record 
of today's hearing.
 Without objection, show that ordered.
 So, as your written testimony has been made a part of the 
record, the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks 
to 5 minutes.
 And, with that, we are going to stop, and so, we are going 
to adjourn until the votes are done. If you-all can come back, 
that would be fantastic.
 And we are in recess.
 [Recess.]
 Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will reconvene the previously recessed 
hearing.
 We will now turn to our witnesses. Your written testimony 
has been made a part of the record. The subcommittee asks that 
you limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes.
 And, with that, Vice Admiral Thomas, you are recognized for 
5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
 MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND SHELBY S. OAKLEY, 
DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. 
 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
 MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD

 Admiral Thomas. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Webster and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee.
 My testimony, I believe, has been entered into the record.
 Thank you for this opportunity to update you on the Coast 
Guard's ongoing activities to recapitalize the Service's assets 
and capabilities and continue to meet the increasing mission 
demands across the Nation and around the world.
 On behalf of the Commandant and the entire Coast Guard 
workforce, I express my sincere appreciation for your oversight 
and for your support of our Service.
 In response to ever-increasing demand for the Coast Guard's 
unique capability, we anticipate a need over the next two 
decades to field new, more capable assets and expand our 
enduring presence in critical areas like the Arctic and the 
Indo-Pacific without reducing our domestic capabilities. We 
must also build new C5I infrastructure and grow our workforce 
to operate and maintain these assets.
 To do this, the Coast Guard must continue investing in a 
multibillion-dollar acquisition portfolio to meet mission needs 
of today and tomorrow. The Commandant requested that I 
reiterate the Service's sincere thanks for this committee's 
support of her efforts to become the Coast Guard the Nation 
needs with an authorization of $3.4 billion in PC&I funding. We 
greatly appreciate your support.
 This subcommittee has been a great advocate for the Polar 
Security Cutter, one of our Service's top two acquisition 
priorities. The PSC acquisition continues to move forward, and 
I am optimistic that the design will mature to the degree the 
Service can authorize start of construction later this year.
 The Service's other top acquisition priority is the 
Offshore Patrol Cutter, and the OPC celebrated a milestone last 
year with the launch of OPC 1 Coast Guard Cutter Argus. There 
is still much work to be done before Argus is delivered, but we 
are eager to deploy these new cutters to replace the aging 
Medium Endurance fleet.
 In addition to those major cutters, our oldest cutters are 
our inland tenders, some of which were built during World War 
II and all of which need to be recapitalized. The Waterways 
Commerce Cutter will replace those ships, and we recently 
ordered long lead-time material for the initial WCC.
 The Service is also keenly focused on continued investment 
in our aviation fleet to meet the mission demands of today and 
tomorrow. The expansion of the MH-60T fleet is critical as the 
MH-65 approaches end-of-service life.
 The HC-130J is the Coast Guard's largest and most capable 
aircraft, and the Service recently took the delivery of our 
17th HC-130J. Number 18 and 19 are still in the acquisition 
process, and we need your support to complete our existing 
program of record of 22 aircraft.
 As the subcommittee is well aware, the Coast Guard has 
significant needs across our shore infrastructure portfolio. We 
are focused on conducting the planning necessary to make well-
informed requests in future years to address concerns across 
the Service, including at our critical accession points: the 
Training Center Cape May and the Coast Guard Academy.
 The Service remains committed to building the fleet of the 
future and delivering systems capability that will maximize 
return on investment. To advance the Service's recapitalization 
efforts and properly plan to meet mission requirements, we must 
have stable, predictable funding. Our Commandant has stated our 
Coast Guard must be a $20 billion organization by 2033. And, in 
line with your recent $3.4 billion PC&I authorization, we need 
at least $3 billion annually in recapitalization dollars. 
However, we are constrained by fiscal limits, and increasing 
operating and sustainment costs restrict our ability to invest 
in recapitalization.
 As the Commandant has said, most of our recent funding 
increases have gone to running the Service of today, not to 
building the Service for tomorrow.
 The Coast Guard recognizes your efforts to change that 
paradigm, and we look forward to working with you to ensure the 
Service continues to field the capabilities and the personnel 
necessary to meet our Nation's demands.
 Congressman Carbajal mentioned yesterday's hearing and the 
recent revelations by our former sexual assault response 
coordinator at the Coast Guard Academy.
 Congressman, I just wanted to take this opportunity to 
speak directly to the victims who may be out there or folks who 
may know victims out there, because the most concerning part of 
that report was the potential that some victims have not been 
able to access healthcare that they need through the VA. And we 
have and we continue to stand ready to assist any victims' 
access to healthcare efforts. And I personally am ready to do 
that, but we also have an enterprise victim advocate that can 
help any victims out there.
 So, thank you for your support. I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
 [Admiral Thomas' prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant 
 for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard
 Introduction
 Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your continued 
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. I am honored to appear 
before you today to update you on our ongoing efforts to recapitalize 
our aging surface and aviation fleets; Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C5ISR) systems; and shore infrastructure.
 Our Commandant speaks regularly about the need to adapt to the 
ever-increasing pace of change. To keep up with the changing world 
around us, we must provide our total workforce with modern assets, 
systems, and infrastructure to support mission execution. In line with 
this direction, the Service needs continued Congressional support to 
invest in a multibillion-dollar portfolio of acquisition programs that 
will deliver the right capabilities for the Service. At the same time, 
the Coast Guard continues to prioritize investments in shore 
infrastructure, where every mission begins and ends: the facilities, 
piers, runways, and buildings that are as necessary for operations as 
our ships, boats, aircraft, and C5ISR systems.
 Indeed, the Service's largest recapitalization effort since World 
War II remains a top priority for the Commandant. Today's efforts to 
invest in tomorrow's needs will shape the Coast Guard and impact 
national security for decades. This Subcommittee's continued support 
has helped us make tremendous progress, and it is critical that we 
continue to deliver assets to the field that improve mission execution 
and provide the capabilities the Nation needs. Simply put, we must act 
today to be prepared for tomorrow.
 The Coast Guard Acquisition Enterprise
 As the Chief Mission Support Officer of the Coast Guard, I lead a 
talented team of professionals dedicated to building and maintaining a 
modern force of assets, infrastructure, and systems that meet the needs 
of the Service. Acquisitions require executable strategies that 
consider the need to plan and scope acquisitions before work begins; to 
oversee the design and production processes; and to prepare future 
crews and the maintenance community for the delivery and future 
operation of new capabilities.
 To bolster acquisition oversight, the Coast Guard has developed an 
acquisition governance structure, continues to refine that structure, 
strengthen processes, institutionalize the roles of our technical 
authorities, and focus on recruiting and retaining a highly capable 
acquisition workforce. We continue to implement initiatives to minimize 
risks and maximize affordability within our complex acquisition 
programs. We leverage the experience and expertise of our partners to 
perform key functions and guide Coast Guard decision-makers throughout 
the acquisition life cycle.
 Status of Key Acquisition Efforts
 The Coast Guard continues to make progress in our efforts to 
recapitalize the fleet and support systems. The Service is taking 
delivery of new cutters, aviation assets, boats, C5ISR capabilities, 
and upgraded shore infrastructure, and investing in critical mission-
enabling service life extensions, major maintenance, and key upgrades 
of the legacy surface and aviation fleet to enhance mission readiness 
and performance.
Surface Programs:
 With the strong support of this Subcommittee, we are moving forward 
with the acquisition of the Nation's first new heavy polar icebreakers 
in over four decades. The United States is an Arctic nation, and we 
have both sovereign rights and responsibilities to safeguard our 
interests in the Arctic. Similarly, the United States has strong 
interests in the Antarctic region. Coast Guard polar icebreakers are 
the foundation of U.S. operational presence and influence in the polar 
regions. These multi-mission cutters provide assured, year-round access 
not only for Coast Guard missions, but also in support of critical 
activities that protect key U.S. interests in the high latitudes.
 Along with the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), the Polar Security 
Cutter (PSC) is the Coast Guard's top acquisition priority. When fully 
operational, the three PSCs the nation requires will provide the global 
reach and icebreaking capability necessary to project U.S. presence and 
influence, conduct Coast Guard missions in the high latitudes, and 
advance our national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
 The Coast Guard and Navy have established an Integrated Program 
Office (IPO) to leverage each service's experience and expertise in 
large, complex vessel acquisition programs. Both services remain 
committed to attaining the necessary design maturity prior to beginning 
production activities. This approach ensures shipyard readiness and 
mitigates overall schedule risk. Detail design activities are ongoing, 
and long lead-time material for the lead ship have been delivered to 
the shipyard. The IPO has adopted an innovative and incremental 
approach to support early production, Prototype Fabrication Assessment 
(PFA), which is based on Navy best practices. By prioritizing and 
starting construction on up to eight low-risk modules, PFA allows the 
shipbuilder to progressively build workforce capability, test new 
processes and equipment, and reduce production risk. To date, four 
modules have been authorized for construction. These modules have 
achieved near 100 percent design maturity and present very low risk of 
re-work. These modules, unlike work done under special studies 
previously authorized, will be part of the first PSC.
 Earlier this year and in accordance with statutory and policy 
requirements, the Coast Guard notified Congress that the PSC program 
would exceed cost and schedule thresholds. The program is in the 
process of reviewing cost and schedule projections provided by the PSC 
prime contractor to formally establish new cost and schedule parameters 
in the acquisition program baseline. This work is occurring in parallel 
with ongoing program activities to support delivery of the PSC fleet as 
quickly as possible.
 The OPC also remains a top acquisition priority for the Service and 
is vital to recapitalizing the capability provided by our legacy fleet 
of 210-foot and 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters (MEC). The program is 
progressing, with production of OPCs 1-4 underway with the Stage 1 
contractor. The lead OPC, Argus, was launched and christened October 
27, 2023, and production activities continue with delivery of OPC 1 
scheduled in Fiscal Year (FY) 2025. Additionally, the Service is 
continuing with design activities on the Stage 2 contract, which will 
lead to the future production of up to 11 additional OPCs.
 As a bridging strategy to maintain mission capabilities until the 
OPCs are delivered, the Coast Guard has begun 270-foot MEC service life 
extension program (SLEP) activities that address key systems and 
component obsolescence on board the MECs, the first of which just 
exceeded 40 years in service. Two SLEP prototypes have been completed 
to date, including CGC Harriet Lane, which recently returned to the 
operational fleet, was designated as the Indo-Pacific Support Cutter 
and is currently providing additional mission capability in that 
critical region. The first full 270-foot MEC SLEP is currently underway 
at the Coast Guard Yard.
 In 2022, the Coast Guard awarded a contract for the design and 
future production of the river buoy tender and inland construction 
tender variants of the Waterways Commerce Cutter (WCC) fleet. The 
contract includes options for production of up to 27 cutters, and a 
separate effort is planned to deliver three inland buoy tenders to 
achieve a total fleet of 30 WCCs. The program recently established the 
required cost, schedule, and performance parameters to allow the 
Service to proceed with the initial purchases of long lead-time 
material to support construction of the first two WCC variants.
 Investment in our inland fleet is critical to the continued 
operation of the Marine Transportation System, which facilitates more 
than $5.4 trillion in annual economic activity. The legacy fleet is 
approaching obsolescence, maintenance costs are rising, and the vast 
majority of these cutters do not support mixed-gender berthing. 
Continued progress toward delivering these new assets and replacing the 
legacy fleet, which has an average age of over 55 years, is critical to 
maintaining the Coast Guard's capability to execute this important 
mission.
 The Service continues to deliver National Security Cutters (NSC) 
and Fast Response Cutters (FRC) to the fleet, providing game changing 
capabilities to operational commanders and supporting expanded mission 
demands around the globe. The Coast Guard commissioned the tenth NSC, 
CGC Calhoun, into service this April and has commissioned 55 FRCs into 
service. Last month, with the support of the Administration and 
Congress, the FRC program used an available contract option to order 
two additional FRCs (hulls 66-67) to further the Indo-Pacific Strategy 
of the United States. The FRCs have demonstrated unmatched capacity to 
support engagement with partners throughout the Indo-Pacific, and the 
President's FY 2025 budget request includes additional investments to 
increase meaningful presence in the region. These investments are 
absolutely essential to support the rules-based international system, 
enhance partner capabilities, deter malign actors, and combat the 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that threatens economies 
throughout the Indo-Pacific.
 The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2024 
provides funding for the acquisition of a commercially available polar 
icebreaker (CAPI). The Service has completed market research and, in 
large part due to Congressional support to streamline the acquisition 
process, the Coast Guard is moving forward with an acquisition strategy 
to procure and begin initial modifications of a CAPI for future service 
in the Arctic on an accelerated timeline.
 In concert with our efforts to acquire new assets, the Service is 
also focused on sustaining and improving our existing fleet through the 
In-Service Vessel Sustainment (ISVS) program. The Service is 
approaching the completion of Major Maintenance Availability activities 
for the 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders at the Coast Guard Yard in 
Curtis Bay, Maryland; the last cutter is scheduled to leave the Coast 
Guard Yard in FY 2025. Planning is underway in advance of future ISVS 
efforts to conduct a major maintenance availability on the 175-foot 
Coastal Buoy Tender fleet and the CGC Healy SLEP.
 CGC Healy is the Service's medium polar icebreaker and will begin 
its SLEP in the near future. That SLEP will be modeled after the phased 
approach the Service used for our only heavy polar icebreaker, CGC 
Polar Star. Like CGC Polar Star's SLEP, CGC Healy's SLEP will include 
five phased availabilities around CGC Healy's annual operations.
 The Coast Guard is also making investments across the boat fleet, 
producing the next generation of cutter boats to enhance interdiction 
capabilities of parent cutters. Additionally, the Coast Guard continues 
to perform SLEP activities to extend the useful service life of the 
Service's 47-foot motor lifeboats by replacing obsolete, unsupportable, 
or maintenance-intensive equipment, and standardizing configuration 
across the fleet.
Aviation Programs:
 The Coast Guard has formally established a program baseline to 
govern SLEP activities on the existing MH-60T fleet and to continue the 
transition of the rotary-wing fleets to a single airframe through new 
fleet growth increments. These efforts will be accomplished using a 
combination of converted low-time U.S. Navy helicopters and newly 
manufactured hull components. When combined with structural fitting and 
dynamic component replacements through the SLEP, the new hulls will 
extend the service life of the Coast Guard's vertical lift capability 
into the 2040s. Service life extension work also continues on the H-65 
fleet, including critical avionics upgrades.
 Acquisition of new HC-130J airframes is significantly enhancing the 
Coast Guard's capabilities to conduct airborne surveillance, detection, 
classification, and identification of vessels and other aircraft 
missions in coordination with the surface fleet and shoreside 
facilities. Later this year, we plan to take delivery of the 18th and 
final HC-144B following the completion of Minotaur missionization and 
Ocean Sentry Refresh activities. In light of the clear signal from 
Congress in FY 2024's appropriation, the Service is transitioning away 
from the HC-27J--we have ceased missionization activities and will 
retire the remaining un-missionized HC-27J aircraft over the next 
several years. In the near future the Coast Guard will be providing a 
brief on the way ahead for our medium range fixed wing capability, 
including consideration for unmanned systems.
 The Coast Guard is delivering standardized missionization packages, 
based on the U.S. Navy's Minotaur Mission System Suite, that improve 
system performance, address obsolescence concerns, improve cyber 
security of the mission system, and increase compatibility with 
Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security assets and 
systems.
 Additionally, the Coast Guard continues to leverage the use of 
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capabilities to support the surveillance 
and maritime domain awareness capabilities of the NSC fleet. Nine 
operational NSCs have been equipped with UAS infrastructure and 
equipment and routinely deploy with UAS capabilities as part of the 
cutter's total force package that dramatically enhances their ability 
to gain maritime domain awareness and interdict smugglers.
C5ISR and Information Technology Programs:
 The Coast Guard continues to acquire C5ISR and information 
technology (IT) systems that enhance the mission capabilities of new 
and recapitalized Coast Guard assets to operate in challenging 
environments. The systems provide standardized capability to major 
cutters and aircraft, enabling assets to receive, evaluate and act upon 
information, and facilitate interoperability and information sharing 
inside and outside the Coast Guard. IT efforts like the Cyber and 
Enterprise Mission Platform program address the need to replace and 
modernize obsolete support systems to improve mission readiness and 
operational effectiveness.
Shore Infrastructure:
 As Coast Guard leadership have repeatedly noted in testimony before 
this Subcommittee, shore facility maintenance and recapitalization are 
critical to mission success. New, more capable assets must be paired 
with investments in our infrastructure needs. The Coast Guard is 
committed to taking a leading-edge approach to project planning to 
ensure the Service is able to effectively execute and deliver the 
modern and resilient infrastructure required to meet the operational 
demands of today and tomorrow.
 Conclusion
 Since 1790, the Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation's maritime 
interests and natural resources on our rivers, in our ports, on the 
high seas, and around the world. Each day, the Coast Guard carries out 
its missions to protect lives, protect the environment, secure our 
maritime borders, facilitate commerce, and defend our national 
security. Our mission support and acquisition enterprises are, 
likewise, working each day to plan and deliver the assets and 
capabilities needed to support these critical missions.
 The cutters, boats, aircraft, C5ISR systems, and shoreside 
infrastructure we acquire today will provide vital capability for 
decades to come. We are committed to maximizing the Nation's return on 
these important investments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before you today and for all you do for the women and men of the U.S. 
Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your questions.

 Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you for your testimony.
 Now we turn to Ms. Oakley.
 You are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF SHELBY S. OAKLEY, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
 OFFICE

 Ms. Oakley. Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee.
 Thank you for the opportunity to talk about challenges with 
Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio affordability.
 My testimony today should not be a shock to anyone. The 
Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio is unaffordable, given 
historic and predicted budgetary levels. We have been 
consistently reporting this for over 10 years.
 The Commandant recently testified that, while the Coast 
Guard's budget request included nearly $1.6 billion to 
recapitalize assets, in fact, up to $4 billion is what is 
actually required.
 While the Coast Guard has the lion's share of 
responsibility for the budget predicament they are in, others 
play an important role, too. This includes OMB and DHS, as well 
as congressional decisionmakers.
 As a result, my statement today will focus on two main 
areas. First, I will cover the actions the Coast Guard can take 
to improve the portfolio's affordability. Second, I will raise 
key questions that decisionmakers need to address if they want 
to begin tackling these challenges.
 From where I sit, I see two main areas the Coast Guard 
needs to improve. First, Coast Guard needs to do better when it 
comes to managing cost growth and schedule delays on its major 
acquisition programs. This includes the high-priority PSC and 
OPC programs.
 These programs are now collectively costing $13 million 
more than initially planned and are 4 to 5 years behind 
schedule. These outcomes make affordability challenges worse. 
They extend the need for resources and prolong the wait for new 
and necessary capabilities.
 Second, Coast Guard needs to better articulate the full 
scope of its funding needs and identify tradeoffs that will be 
necessary when and if those needs cannot be met. The Coast 
Guard and DHS have consistently kicked the can down the road 
and have not taken steps to realistically lay out a plan for 
meeting its mission needs outside of the constrained budget 
process.
 Ten years ago, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop 
a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all assets 
necessary to meet its missions and the funding needed for those 
assets. Similarly, in 2019, we recommended the Coast Guard 
include supporting details about tradeoff decisions and 
congressional budget requests and related reports. Coast Guard 
has yet to address these recommendations in part because of 
limitations imposed by OMB and DHS.
 I want to be clear. I am not suggesting that the Coast 
Guard operate in its planning without constraints. That is 
necessary. What I am suggesting is that, without the Coast 
Guard identifying what it needs to fund the ships, aircraft, 
and infrastructure it needs to meet its missions now and in the 
future, decisionmakers are left with limited insight. This 
precludes them from making tough decisions to prioritize and 
fund programs essential to the Coast Guard's missions or to 
advocate for additional resources.
 Speaking of decisionmakers, that brings me to my next 
point. Coast Guard does not make budget requests in a vacuum. 
It must align with the President's topline budget numbers, 
which are set by OMB and DHS. Congressional decisionmakers have 
tried to help by consistently funding programs on the Coast 
Guard's unfunded priorities list. The Coast Guard has come to 
rely on this as a way to get more resources, and this can take 
decisions about priorities out of the Coast Guard's hands.
 Decisionmakers will have to eventually address difficult 
decisions about the affordability of the Coast Guard's 
portfolio.
 First, what can the Coast Guard do to improve management of 
its acquisition programs and achieve better cost and schedule 
outcomes?
 Second, when will the Coast Guard develop a long-term plan 
that can inform tradeoff decisions?
 Third, which programs may need to be cut, reduced, or 
deferred?
 Finally, what gaps or reductions in mission capability will 
operators and the public face due to these challenges?
 We have 16 open recommendations to the Coast Guard that 
could help answer some of these questions, and the Coast Guard 
should prioritize implementing them.
 For example, holding programs accountable to stabilizing 
ship designs before proceeding with construction is in line 
with leading practices and will result in better cost and 
schedule outcomes. That is a decision that is facing the PSC 
program in the near future.
 Again, none of these questions are new, but they are even 
more critical today as the Coast Guard's budget will be 
increasingly consumed by programs like OPC and PSC in the 
coming years.
 Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of 
this subcommittee, this completes my oral statement. I am happy 
to answer any questions that you have.
 [Ms. Oakley's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Shelby S. Oakley, Director, Contracting and 
 National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office
 Coast Guard Acquisition: Actions Needed to Address Affordability 
 Challenges
 Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
 The U.S. Coast Guard employs a variety of vessels and aircraft, 
several of which are approaching the end of their intended service 
lives. Consequently, the Coast Guard plans to invest billions of 
dollars to acquire several high priority assets. These include three 
Polar Security Cutters, 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters, and 79 additional 
MH-60T helicopters.
 This statement addresses (1) challenges with the affordability of 
the Coast Guard's portfolio of major acquisitions, and (2) key 
questions that the Coast Guard and Congressional decision-makers will 
need to address because of these challenges. The statement also 
highlights GAO's prior recommendations and matters for Congress which, 
if implemented, would help address the challenges. This statement is 
largely based on GAO's prior work on Coast Guard acquisitions issued 
from 2012 through 2024, including GAO-18-454, GAO-23-105805 and GAO-23-
105949. Information about the scope and methodology of prior work on 
which this statement is based can be found in those products.
What GAO Recommends
 Since 2012, GAO has made 48 recommendations (16 of which remain 
open) on how to better manage the Coast Guard's major acquisition 
programs. GAO will continue to monitor the agency's progress in 
addressing these recommendations. GAO has also made matters for 
congressional consideration to improve Coast Guard acquisitions. Two of 
these matters remain open.
What GAO Found
 The Coast Guard plans to spend over $40 billion to modernize its 
vessels and aircraft. But it faces persistent challenges managing its 
major acquisition programs--generally those with life-cycle cost 
estimates of at least $300 million. These challenges include:
 Cost growth. Coast Guard's planned investments for its portfolio of 
major acquisitions increased by $8.2 billion since 2018. The increase 
is primarily related to cost increases on the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
program and additional investments in MH-60T helicopters. This problem 
increases the cost pressure on the overall portfolio.
 Lack of long-term planning. The Coast Guard makes short-term budget 
decisions that obscure the trade-offs needed to balance the long-term 
affordability of the portfolio. In 2014, GAO recommended that the Coast 
Guard develop a long-term plan to manage its highest priority efforts. 
The agency agreed and statute directed the Coast Guard to develop such 
a plan. But the Coast Guard, as of June 2024, has yet to produce one.
 Affordability. The Coast Guard's short-term budget decisions have 
resulted in a buildup--or bow wave--of near-term unfunded acquisitions. 
These decisions could negatively affect future acquisition efforts and 
operations.
 Program uncertainties. Further, the Coast Guard faces 
uncertainties--such as unrealistic schedules and cost estimates--on two 
of Coast Guard's highest priority programs: the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
and Polar Security Cutter. These uncertainties will likely exacerbate 
portfolio affordability challenges.
 GAO has made several recommendations and matters for Congressional 
consideration that, if implemented, would inform key questions for 
decision-makers, such as:
 How can Coast Guard manage its acquisition programs to 
achieve better cost and schedule outcomes?
 Which programs will decision-makers cut, reduce, or defer 
to balance the affordability of the Coast Guard portfolio?

 __________
 Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
 I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's 
management of its acquisition portfolio, including key challenges with 
the affordability of this portfolio. The affordability of the Coast 
Guard's portfolio has consequences affecting its ability to accomplish 
its vitally important missions. These include search and rescue; ports, 
waterways and coastal security; migrant interdiction; drug 
interdiction; aids to navigation; and ice operations. Having the right 
assets to accomplish these missions relies, in part, on being able to 
afford them within expected budgets, and, if necessary, make hard 
decisions about what to prioritize. However, the Coast Guard continues 
to rely on the annual budget process and its 5-year Capital Investment 
Plan for long-term acquisition planning, processes which we found have 
contributed to affordability problems.
 My statement today will address (1) challenges with the 
affordability of the Coast Guard's portfolio of major acquisitions, and 
(2) key questions that decision-makers will need to address because of 
these challenges. I will also highlight areas where our prior 
recommendations, if implemented, would help the Coast Guard address 
these challenges. This statement is based on our extensive body of work 
examining the Coast Guard's acquisition efforts spanning more than a 
decade.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address 
Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 24, 2018); Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on 
Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450 
(Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014); and Coast Guard: Portfolio Management 
Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-12-918 
(Washington D.C.: Sept. 20, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For the reports cited in this statement, among other methodologies, 
we analyzed Department of Homeland Security acquisition management 
policy and Coast Guard guidance, data, and documentation. We 
interviewed Coast Guard officials at its headquarters and selected 
field units to determine the total cost of the Coast Guard's 
acquisition portfolio and how the Coast Guard manages its acquisition 
portfolio. Further detailed information on our scope and methodology 
can be found in the reports cited in this statement. For this 
statement, we obtained some updated information from the Coast Guard on 
program costs and funding.
 We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 Cost Growth, Short-Term Planning, and Uncertainty about High Priority 
 Programs Exacerbate Affordability Challenges of the Coast Guard's 
 Portfolio
Major Acquisition Portfolio Increased $8.2 Billion from 2018 to 2024
 From 2018 to 2024, the Coast Guard's planned investments for its 
portfolio of major acquisition programs increased from $32.3 billion to 
at least $40.5 billion, or by 25.5 percent.\2\ This represents an $8.2 
billion increase over the 6-year period. For some of these programs, 
however, the Coast Guard is developing or updating its cost baselines, 
which may reveal additional estimated costs. Additionally, the Coast 
Guard currently estimates that it will need about $18 billion to 
complete development and acquire the assets. See table 1 for details on 
the increased estimated cost and remaining investment required of each 
major acquisition program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ The Department of Homeland Security generally defines major 
acquisition programs as those with life-cycle cost estimates of at 
least $300 million.

 Table 1: Total Estimated Acquisition Cost and Remaining Investment Required for Coast Guard Major Acquisition
 Programs in 2018 and 2024
 (then-year dollars in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Total estimated Remaining
 acquisition cost \a\ investment Estimated date
 Program -------------------------- required program
 ------------- completes
 2018 2024 2024 acquisition \b\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Cutter................................ $6,135 $7,831 $421 2027
Fast Response Cutter.................................... $4,243 $3,779 \c\ ($296) \d\ 2027
Offshore Patrol Cutter.................................. $12,101 $14,576 \e\ $10,691 2038
Polar Security Cutter................................... $3,207 $3,121 \f\ $1,539 TBD
Waterways Commerce Cutter............................... n/a $1,075 \g\ $871 TBD
Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC-144B/HC-27J)..... $2,507 $2,397 $552 2032 \h\
Long Range Surveillance Aircraft (HC-130J).............. $3,038 \i\ $2,644 $616 2032
Short Range Recovery Helicopter (MH-65E)................ $1,070 $1,070 $209 2024
Medium Range Recovery Helicopter (MH-60T)............... n/a $4,034 \j\ $3,269 2030
 -------------------------------------------------------
 Total................................................. $32,301 $40,527 $17,872 n/a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO presentation of and analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-24-107584
Legend: n/a = not applicable.
\a\ Total estimated acquisition cost is the threshold cost from the acquisition program baseline, which
 establishes a program's costs, schedule, and performance parameters. The acquisition program baseline is the
 agreement between the acquisition program, component, and department-level officials that establishes how
 systems being acquired will perform, when they will be delivered, and what they will cost. In accordance with
 DHS policy, the acquisition program baseline for a program establishes objective (target) and threshold
 (maximum acceptable costs, latest acceptable milestones, and minimum or maximum acceptable performance)
 parameters for a program.
\b\ As provided by the Coast Guard's 5-year Capital Investment Plan, dated fiscal year 2022, estimated
 completion dates can reflect the completion of different activities depending on the program and are based on
 funding levels in the 5-year plan.
\c\ The 2024 acquisition program baseline cost estimate does not include costs associated with personnel and
 shore infrastructure for the Fast Response Cutter. The prior estimate in 2018 includes these costs. The Coast
 Guard estimates that personnel costs are $184.8 million and shore infrastructure costs are $267.2 million in
 base year 2008 dollars.
\d\ The Fast Response Cutter program of record was increased in 2020 by six and again in 2022 by one, for a
 total of seven additional cutters beyond the program of record. The program was subsequently rebaselined to
 account for this change in quantities. In 2024, the Coast Guard received $220 million for two additional Fast
 Response Cutters. According to the Coast Guard, the Fast Response Cutter program is rebaselining to address
 the recent increase to the program of record.
\e\ The Coast Guard has yet to develop an acquisition program baseline that covers the entire duration of the
 program. It plans to have the updated acquisition program baseline for the Offshore Patrol Cutter program
 approved in late fiscal year 2024.
\f\ An updated acquisition program baseline that will include an updated cost estimate is expected in the first
 quarter of fiscal year 2025. In April 2024, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of the three
 Polar Security Cutters to be $5.1 billion.
\g\ This reflects the cost estimate in the preliminary acquisition program baseline for the Waterways Commerce
 Cutter program. As of May 2024, the initial acquisition program baseline had yet to be approved.
\h\ Date applies to the completion of the HC-27J program. The acquisition effort for the HC-144B aircraft is
 close to completion, with full operational capability expected in 2024.
\i\ The 2018 total estimated acquisition cost included funding for the HC-130H program. This program was
 canceled in the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act and the acquisition program baseline was updated in March
 2020 to reflect this change. The 2024 total estimated acquisition cost is only for the HC-130J acquisition.
\j\ MH-60T includes three increments. Increments 1 and 2 both have a current acquisition program baseline with a
 current cost estimate. Increment 3 has a preliminary acquisition program baseline with a preliminary cost
 estimate.

 The $8.2 billion increase is primarily related to cost increases on 
the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program and the addition of the medium 
range recovery helicopter or MH-60T to the portfolio, which we discuss 
in greater detail below. This problem increases the cost pressure on 
the overall portfolio.
Lack of Long-Term Planning Hinders the Coast Guard's Ability to Make 
 Necessary Trade-offs
 For over 10 years, we have repeatedly found two main challenges in 
how decision-makers, including the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Coast Guard, 
budget for the Coast Guard's portfolio of acquisitions (1) the expected 
cost of the Coast Guard's portfolio does not align with its plans and 
funding levels; and (2) OMB, DHS, and the Coast Guard have made short-
term budget decisions that obscure the trade-offs needed to balance the 
long-term affordability of the portfolio.\3\ For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ GAO-12-918; GAO-14-450; and GAO-18-454.
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 In 2012, we found that the Coast Guard's approach of 
relying on the annual budget process to manage portfolio affordability 
did not provide the best basis for making decisions to develop a more 
balanced and affordable portfolio in the long-term.\4\ To help provide 
decision-makers with current information to determine budgets, we 
recommended that the Coast Guard conduct a comprehensive portfolio 
review to develop revised baselines that reflect acquisition priorities 
as well as realistic funding scenarios. DHS agreed with the 
recommendation. However, as part of our recommendation follow-up 
procedures, we found that the Coast Guard's efforts to implement the 
recommendation did not include significant trade-off decisions needed 
to improve the affordability of the portfolio. We eventually closed the 
recommendation as not implemented. However, we continue to believe that 
a comprehensive portfolio review that reflects acquisition priorities 
as well as realistic funding scenarios would aid the Coast Guard in 
managing the affordability of its portfolio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ GAO-12-918.

 In 2014, we found that the Coast Guard's annual budget-
driven trade-off approach created constant churn as program baselines 
had to continually realign with budget realities instead of budgets 
being formulated to support program baselines.\5\ This resulted in 
trade-off decisions between capability and cost being pushed into the 
future. At the time, OMB, DHS, and the Coast Guard took steps to 
address the affordability challenges of Coast Guard's acquisition 
portfolio. For example, OMB conducted annual performance and mission-
based reviews of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio as part of the 
annual budget process. OMB officials told us at the time that they made 
little progress in identifying the trade-offs that would make the 
portfolio more affordable, such as adjusting the quantities or 
capabilities of assets needed to meet mission needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \5\ GAO-14-450.

 To help the Coast Guard improve the long-term outlook of its 
portfolio, in 2014, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a 20-
year fleet modernization plan that identified all acquisitions needed 
to maintain its current level of service and the fiscal resources 
necessary to build the identified assets. The Coast Guard agreed with 
the recommendation. Subsequently, in 2016, the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2015 directed the Coast Guard to complete a 20-
year Long-term Major Acquisitions Plan, to be submitted to 
congressional committees as part of a report on the status of the Coast 
Guard's major acquisition programs.\6\ In November 2017, Coast Guard 
officials told us they were developing a 20-year long-term plan that 
specifically focused on their highest priority recapitalization and 
sustainment efforts to meet the intent of the 2016 congressional 
mandate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5103(a), the broader status report 
on the Coast Guard's major acquisition programs is to be submitted to 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 
Senate and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
every 2 years. See the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-120, Sec. 204(e) (2016) (codified at 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5103(e), 
formerly numbered Sec. 2903, adding the long-term major acquisitions 
plan). In addition, the Commandant of the Coast Guard is to submit the 
long-term major acquisitions plan to the House Committee on Homeland 
Security. Pub. L. No. 114-120, Sec. 101(f).

 In June 2021, however, as part of our recommendation follow-up 
procedures, Coast Guard officials told us they did not yet have an 
approved 20-year plan. According to officials, the plan must be 
approved by relevant agencies, including OMB and DHS. In 2021, we 
closed the recommendation as not implemented, since we had no evidence 
that this plan was imminent. As of June 2024, the Coast Guard has yet 
to submit a 20-year plan to Congress. We continue to believe that a 20-
year plan identifying all acquisitions needed to maintain the current 
level of service and the fiscal resources needed to build the 
identified assets would help decision-makers take informed steps to 
improve the long-term outlook of the Coast Guard's portfolio of major 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
acquisitions.

 In 2018, we found the Coast Guard continued to manage its 
acquisitions through its annual budget process and a statutorily 
mandated 5-year Capital Investment Plan.\7\ Coast Guard officials said 
the Capital Investment Plan reflected the highest priorities of the 
department and that trade-off decisions were made as part of the annual 
budget process. However, the effects of those decisions, such as which 
acquisitions would take on more risk so others could be prioritized and 
adequately funded, were not communicated in the Capital Investment Plan 
to key decision-makers. This was because including such information was 
not statutorily required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ GAO-18-454. See 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5102 (formerly numbered Sec. 
2902). Since 2012, the Coast Guard has been required to submit its 
Capital Investment Plan with the President's budget in any given year. 
The Capital Investment Plan is approved by DHS and the Office of 
Management and Budget and, as we have reported in the past, is subject 
to significant change each year.

 We recommended, in 2018, that the Coast Guard include in the 
Capital Investment Plan a discussion of how it prioritizes acquisition 
programs and describe how its trade-off decisions could affect other 
acquisition programs. This would provide decision-makers with the 
information needed to see how annual trade-offs were affecting other 
current and future programs. DHS agreed with this recommendation and 
the Coast Guard included limited trade-off information in its Capital 
Investment Plan, starting with the fiscal year 2021-2025 document. We 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
closed the recommendation as implemented.

 More recently, in April 2023, in response to congressional 
direction, the Coast Guard completed a fleet mix analysis of its 
cutters.\8\ The analysis determined the number and types of cutters the 
Coast Guard needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \8\ 168 Cong. Rec. H1709, H2404 (Mar. 9, 2022) (explanatory 
statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2022, Pub. L. No.117-103, div. F); 168 Cong. Rec. 
S8553, S8564 (explanatory statement accompanying the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, div. 
F. (2022)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 These include enforcement and security cutters, seagoing and 
coastal aids to navigation cutters, inland aids to navigation cutters, 
polar icebreaking cutters, and domestic ice operations cutters. The 
Coast Guard noted that the analysis was not constrained by any 
projected budgetary levels. As such, the fleet mix results did not 
mirror the Coast Guard's current program of record, which is reflected 
in the Capital Investment Plan. For example, the study showed that the 
Coast Guard's desired fleet level includes more cutters than the Coast 
Guard is currently planning to acquire. The extent that this analysis 
will be incorporated into annual budget requests for the Coast Guard is 
unclear.
 Further obfuscating the outlook of the Coast Guard's portfolio 
affordability is that amounts received for certain programs in recent 
years has exceeded what the President's annual budget request requested 
for the Coast Guard. This has included funding for HC-130Js, three 
additional National Security Cutters not included in the original 
program of record, and additional new airframes for the MH-60T 
helicopters. These additional funds have allowed the Coast Guard to 
purchase or field assets sooner than planned. However, this process 
also contributes to the Coast Guard's affordability problem as it 
allows the Coast Guard, DHS, and OMB to avoid making tough trade-off 
decisions that would otherwise be necessary to include these items in 
the President's annual budget requests.
 Additionally, as required by statute, the Coast Guard submits an 
annual Unfunded Priorities List after its budget is submitted.\9\ The 
list includes program or mission requirements that were not selected 
for funding in the proposed budget but that are deemed necessary to 
address operational needs. For instance, the Coast Guard has included 
post-delivery activities for the 11th National Security Cutter in the 
last three Unfunded Priorities Lists. These activities are essential 
for each cutter to reach full operational capability, yet the 
President's annual budget request did not include funding for them. The 
Coast Guard's five most recent Unfunded Priorities Lists have averaged 
$1.1 billion in procurement, construction, and improvement activities, 
which adds 75 percent to the Coast Guard's already stated needs in the 
annual President's budget submission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ 14 U.S.C. Sec. 5108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard Faces Bow Wave of Unaffordable Acquisitions in Both the 
 Near-Term and Long-Term
 For over 10 years, we have reported that the Coast Guard's short-
term term budget decisions have resulted in a buildup--or bow wave--of 
near-term unaffordable acquisitions. This bow wave of funding needs 
negatively affects future acquisitions efforts and potentially affects 
future operations.\10\ This bow wave consists of new acquisition 
programs and recapitalization efforts, as well as maintenance projects, 
which continue to put pressure on available resources. Further, the 
Coast Guard has been asked to conduct additional missions in recent 
years, placing greater strain on operational assets. For example, the 
planned Arctic Security Cutters will fulfill a mission that the Coast 
Guard is not currently executing due to a lack of available assets. 
Figure 1 provides aggregate projected funding for various major Coast 
Guard acquisitions from fiscal years 2023 through 2027 Capital 
Investment Plan, along with average budget requests and funding 
received from fiscal years 2020 through 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \10\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Limited Strategic Planning 
Efforts Pose Risk for Future Acquisitions, GAO-17-747T (Washington, 
D.C.: July 25, 2017); Coast Guard Recapitalization: Matching Needs and 
Resources Continue to Strain Acquisition Efforts, GAO-17-654T 
(Washington D.C.: June 7, 2017); GAO-18-454; and GAO-14-450.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 1: Coast Guard's Procurement, Construction, and Improvement 
 Funding Projections as Depicted in Its Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Capital 
 Investment Plan for FYs 2023 through 2027

 Note: The ``other'' category depicted in the graphic contains funding 
projections for the National Security Cutter and Fast Response Cutter, 
 among other programs.

 As reflected in the figure, the Coast Guard's projected needs from 
fiscal years 2023 through 2027 exceed the average amount requested from 
fiscal years 2020 through 2024. Also, the Coast Guard's average funding 
received exceeded the average budget request for the Coast Guard by 
$300 million over the last 5 years. Further, the Commandant of the 
Coast Guard recently stated, during a Congressional hearing in May 
2024, that the agency will need up to $3 billion in annual funding to 
support its planned acquisitions.
 The cost growth and uncertainties on two of the Coast Guard's 
highest priority programs--Polar Security Cutter (PSC) and Offshore 
Patrol Cutter (OPC)--are not fully reflected in the figure above and 
will likely exacerbate the affordability concerns of Coast Guard's 
portfolio.
 PSC. In November 2023, the PSC program declared a cost 
breach.\11\ The program determined it required additional funding in 
excess of its $3.1 billion cost threshold, based on updated cost data. 
The program plans to submit its updated life-cycle cost estimate to DHS 
for approval by September 2024. The program also plans to submit its 
revised acquisition program baseline to DHS by the end of 2024.\12\ 
While the cost estimate is not complete, the program's remediation plan 
indicated that updated costs exceeded 20 percent of the previous 
baseline threshold of $3.1 billion, or at least $600 million. 
Additionally, as noted above, in April 2024, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated the cost of the PSC program to be about $5.1 billion, 
or 63 percent more than what is reflected in the program's cost 
baseline. This gap raises further questions about the affordability of 
this program in a constrained budget environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ According to DHS policy, a program that has not met or will 
not meet any of its cost, schedule, or performance thresholds approved 
in its acquisition program baseline will be considered in breach 
status. In other instances, if an acquisition program cannot meet an 
approved cost, schedule, or performance parameter due to a change in 
scope, resulting from circumstances beyond the program's control, it 
may be approved for an administrative update as an alternative to being 
considered in breach status.
 \12\ According to DHS policy, programs in breach status are 
required to develop a remediation plan that outlines a time frame for 
the program to either return to its parameters, rebaseline (i.e., 
establish new cost, schedule, or performance parameters), or have a 
DHS-led program review that results in recommendations for a revised 
baseline.

 OPC. In June 2023, we found that, since the OPC program's 
inception in 2012, the program had experienced cost growth of over 40 
percent.\13\ The program attributed its cost increase to several 
factors, including damage caused by Hurricane Michael in 2018; 
additional costs incurred by the decision to split the program into 
multiple stages and award stage 2 to a new shipbuilder; and increased 
infrastructure costs.\14\ However, we found indicators that other 
problems also pose additional risk to OPC's costs, such as the 
shipbuilder's quantity of complex work remaining. Further, the program 
has yet to set a cost baseline for the entire program, which currently 
consists of 2 stages. The updated baseline is expected to be approved 
in late fiscal year 2024. Given the program's troubled past with cost 
growth on stage 1 and uncertainties surrounding stage 2, the estimated 
costs for the program could be greater than the $14.6 billion reflected 
in its current baseline. The pressure on the affordability of the 
portfolio will likely worsen towards the end of the 5-year window of 
the 2022 Capital Investment Plan. The OPC is projected to begin 
requiring almost 50 percent of the Coast Guard's total acquisition 
budget starting in 2026 to fund the planned two cutters per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \13\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program 
Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 20, 2023).
 \14\ After Hurricane Michael devastated the original shipbuilder's 
facilities, the Coast Guard split the program into two stages, with 
stage 1 covering OPCs 1-4 and stage 2 covering OPCs 5-15. The Coast 
Guard plans to acquire OPCs 16-25 under a separate stage.

 Further, in May 2024, we found that the PSC and OPC have struggled 
with achieving a stable design to support construction, as called for 
by the shipbuilding leading practices that we identified in 2009.\15\ 
We previously found that, when a program proceeds into construction 
with an unstable design, it increases the risk of completing out-of-
sequence construction and rework, which can result in further increased 
cost growth, as it already has for the OPC program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \15\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Shipbuilding Outcomes, GAO-24-107488 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Coast Guard also faces a bow wave of unfunded acquisitions 
beyond the 5-year window of the current Capital Investment Plan. Figure 
2 shows the current and future acquisitions that, based on current 
Coast Guard programs and requirements, need to be addressed for the 
Coast Guard to meet its statutory missions, along with the backlog of 
shore infrastructure projects.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \16\ See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 468 (defining the Coast Guard's statutory 
missions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 2: Notional Depiction of Coast Guard Acquisition's Priorities in 
 Constrained Budget Environment

 This bow wave of longer-term programs brings with it significant 
uncertainty around the total funding the Coast Guard will need in the 
future. These programs include the PSC, OPC, shore infrastructure, and 
the MH-60T helicopter:
 PSC. The PSC program has experienced significant schedule 
delays that have affected the timing of its funding needs. In July 
2023, we found the program did not have a realistic program schedule 
and experienced an approximate 3-year delay in maturing the PSC's 
design--which, as of May 2024, is now almost 4 years behind.\17\ 
According to program officials, the delay was attributable to several 
factors, including U.S.-based designers and shipbuilders generally 
lacking experience with heavy polar icebreakers, the complexity of the 
ship design, shipbuilder design errors, design changes to meet 
government specifications, and COVID-19 effects. The delay led the 
program to declare a schedule breach in November 2023. The program is 
in the process of updating its schedule estimates to develop a new 
schedule baseline. The PSC program originally planned to complete the 
design and start lead ship construction by no later than June 2021. 
However, as of May 2024, Coast Guard officials stated they were 
assessing the decision on when to start lead ship construction as part 
of the ongoing breach remediation process.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \17\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security Cutter Needs to 
Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and Improve Schedule 
Oversight, GAO-23-105949 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023).
 \18\ The PSC program adopted an unrealistic schedule at the outset 
of the program. In September 2018, we found that the PSC's planned 
delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of 
shipbuilding activities. We recommended that the program develop a 
schedule in accordance with leading practices for project schedules to 
set realistic schedule goals for all three PSCs before the contract 
option for construction of the lead ship was awarded. However, we 
closed the recommendation as not implemented because the program 
proceeded with the award in April 2019 without developing a realistic 
schedule. See GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program 
Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 3: The Coast Guard's Polar Security Cutter

 Source: Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding. GAO-24-107584

 It is unclear when and to what extent the anticipated PSC cost 
growth--which could be as high as $2 billion, as noted earlier--will 
require funding given the delays and the unrealistic program schedule. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this growth will exacerbate the concerns 
about the affordability of the Coast Guard's portfolio.

 OPC. The Coast Guard is in the midst of fielding the most 
expensive acquisition program in its portfolio--the OPC. As noted 
earlier, it is uncertain whether the OPC will cost more than the $14.6 
billion reflected in its most current acquisition program baseline for 
25 OPCs. The Commandant of the Coast Guard has previously called the 
OPC the agency's top priority. As such, the Coast Guard is likely to 
prioritize the OPC in its budget requests over other acquisition 
programs.

 Figure 4: The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter

 However, since 2020, we have found that Coast Guard has allowed 
the OPC program to repeatedly move forward through key acquisition 
decisions, despite significant risks with the program.\19\ To help 
mitigate some of the risks, in October 2020, we recommended that the 
program mature technology for the davit--a crane that lowers and raises 
a ship's small boats--for stage 1 ships prior to moving further through 
construction.\20\ DHS concurred with this recommendation. In June 2023, 
the program had not yet developed a plan to mature the technology.\21\ 
As of August 2023, the Coast Guard said that it was still tracking two 
remaining high-risk issues with the davit--one of which may have 
implications for completing the design of a portion of the ship. 
Further, the Coast Guard awarded a detail design and construction 
contract for the stage 2 ships without adequately maturing the stage 2 
davit. It remains to be seen how the Coast Guard will manage stage 2 of 
the program and the consequences this will have on the longer-term 
affordability of the portfolio.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \19\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce 
Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 28, 2020); GAO-23-105805; and GAO-24-107488.
 \20\ GAO-21-9.
 \21\ GAO-23-105805.
 \22\ The Coast Guard plans to start lead ship construction for OPC 
stage 2 by September 2024. We will continue to monitor the program's 
stage 2 progress and status.

 Shore infrastructure. In February 2019, we found that the 
Coast Guard is confronted with a costly backlog of shore infrastructure 
projects--related to piers, docks, boat stations, air stations, and 
housing units--that is contributing to concerns of affordability for 
its recapitalization and related sustainment efforts.\23\ This backlog 
totaled at least $2.6 billion at that time. We also found that Coast 
Guard budget requests did not provide accurate information about its 
shore infrastructure needs. Specifically, Coast Guard targets for 
recapitalization of shore assets exceeded $290 million annually. 
However, budget requests for fiscal years 2012 through 2018 ranged from 
about $5 million to about $99 million annually. Further, at various 
points during this period, the Coast Guard received more funding than 
requested for shore infrastructure needs, ranging from about $5 million 
to about $130 million annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \23\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6 
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 5: Damage at Station Port Aransas in Texas, Resulting from 
 Hurricane Harvey in 2017

 We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting details 
about competing project alternatives and report trade-offs in 
congressional budget requests and related reports. In 2019, DHS agreed 
with our recommendation, but the Coast Guard noted, in 2021, that 
addressing this recommendation is challenging due to limitations such 
as budget caps imposed by OMB and DHS. As of January 2024, the Coast 
Guard was working toward publishing some related information on its 
website, according to officials, such as its shore infrastructure 
annual report. Without such information about Coast Guard's realistic 
budgetary requirements, Congress will lack critical information that 
could help to prioritize funding to address the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure backlogs. This situation could worsen as the Coast Guard 
will likely require additional infrastructure upgrades for the three 
PSCs and future Arctic Security Cutters. We continue to believe that 
implementing this recommendation will aid decision-makers and the Coast 
Guard in making better trade-off decisions.

 Further, since identifying the $2.6 billion in shore 
infrastructure costs in our February 2019 report, we found additional 
shore infrastructure costs related to the Coast Guard's plans for 
increasing its fleet of MH-60T helicopters. The Coast Guard estimates 
that this expansion will require $1.3 billion in air station 
infrastructure upgrades. It is unclear how the Coast Guard intends to 
pay for these upgrades given the large backlog of infrastructure 
projects previously identified.

 MH-60T. In January 2021, the Coast Guard decided to 
consolidate its helicopter fleet to an all medium-range (MH-60T) fleet 
and phase out its short-range (MH-65D/E) fleet. This would grow the MH-
60T fleet by 79 aircraft. According to Coast Guard documentation, it 
made this decision because the MH-65D/E helicopter manufacturer ended 
production of the helicopter in 2018. The Coast Guard noted that this 
led to an increased difficulty in obtaining critical parts, such as 
gearboxes, which decreased fleet availability. As a result, the Coast 
Guard had to reduce flight hours for the MH-65D/E fleet. The Coast 
Guard plans for its future helicopter fleet to be comprised of at least 
127 MH-60T helicopters.\24\ Once implemented, the Coast Guard's fleet 
size would be 13 percent smaller--moving from its current 146 units to 
at least 127 units.
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 \24\ As stated above, the Coast Guard estimates that, as part of 
growing the MH-60T fleet, it will require $1.32 billion for air station 
infrastructure changes to accommodate the larger MH-60T aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 6: The Coast Guard's MH 60T Helicopter

 However, as we found in April 2024, the Coast Guard has not 
assessed whether the MH-60T helicopter best meets its mission needs 
under its plans to consolidate its fleet.\25\ This is because the Coast 
Guard did not assess alternatives to support this approach. Coast Guard 
officials stated that the MH-60T helicopter is more capable than the 
MH-65D/E. However, questions remain on its ability to meet certain 
mission demands, particularly those operations that require helicopters 
to operate and be secured on a cutter. We recommended that the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard assess the type of helicopters the Coast 
Guard requires to meet its mission demands, as part of an analysis of 
alternatives. DHS agreed with this recommendation but noted that the 
Coast Guard had already assessed the type and number of helicopters it 
needed to meet its mission demands, based on a 2020 RAND study.\26\ DHS 
noted that, based on that study, the Coast Guard should move towards 
greater medium-range helicopter recovery capacity, as those aircraft 
provide favorable cost solutions and increased capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \25\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce 
Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2024).
 \26\ RAND Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, Meeting 
U.S. Coast Guard Airpower Needs: Assessing the Options, (2020). The 
Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center is a federally funded 
research and development center operated by the RAND Corporation under 
contract with the Department of Homeland Security.

 However, as we stated in our April 2024 report, the RAND study 
also supported the Coast Guard maintaining a mix of helicopter types. 
Specifically, the RAND study identified a benefit to the Coast Guard 
having a fleet composed primarily of MH-60T helicopters along with 
sufficient short-range helicopters to complete certain missions, such 
as drug interdiction. However, the Coast Guard did not assess 
alternative helicopters to the MH-60T that may meet its cutter 
deployment demands. Notably, during our review, Coast Guard 
headquarters officials stated that they could benefit from assessing 
different helicopter types to guide their acquisition approach and 
address capability shortfalls before the introduction of the MH-60T 
program's successor. As we stated in our April 2024 report, the Coast 
Guard can benefit from further analysis as it examines how its 
helicopter fleet can best meet its mission demands in the coming 
decades. We continue to support our recommendation that an analysis of 
alternatives would help the Coast Guard make the best use of its 
resources.
 Key Questions Remain About the Affordability of the Portfolio
 Decision-makers, including Congress, OMB, DHS, and Coast Guard will 
have to make difficult decisions to address the affordability concerns 
surrounding the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio.\27\ Key questions 
to inform those decisions include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \27\ In May 2024, we testified on steps that Coast Guard could take 
to improve its acquisition outcomes, including implementing GAO's prior 
recommendations and considering adoption of ship design leading 
practices. See GAO-24-107488 and GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Increased Use 
of Leading Design Practices Could Improve Timeliness of Deliveries, 
GAO-24-105503 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 What steps can Coast Guard take to better manage its 
acquisition programs to achieve better cost and schedule outcomes?
 When will Coast Guard, in coordination with OMB and DHS, 
develop a long-term plan to inform the affordability of Coast Guard's 
acquisition portfolio?
 Which programs will decision-makers cut, reduce, or defer 
to balance the affordability of the Coast Guard portfolio?
 What capability gaps or reductions in mission capability 
will Coast Guard operators and the public face because of the 
unaffordable portfolio?

 Our prior recommendations and matters for Congress, if implemented, 
will help inform actions to address these questions.
 In conclusion, the Coast Guard's persistent challenges in managing 
its programs within established cost and schedule goals highlight the 
need for the Coast Guard to reexamine how it manages its acquisition 
portfolio. Since 2012, we have made 48 recommendations to DHS and the 
Coast Guard on how to better manage the Coast Guard's portfolio of 
major acquisition programs. Currently, we have 16 recommendations that 
the Coast Guard has yet to fully address and eight others that we 
closed because of Coast Guard's inaction or because they were overcome 
by events. Fully addressing the remaining recommendations will help 
position the Coast Guard to make hard decisions about its 
portfolio.\28\
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 \28\ GAO-23-105949; and GAO-23-105805.
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 Additionally, I wanted to note how important your oversight has 
been to help the Coast Guard make difficult trade-off decisions. 
Ensuring that decision-makers answer those key questions I posed 
earlier should help provide you with better information moving forward 
to provide oversight of the Coast Guard's budget. Similarly, over the 
last 13 years, we have made four matters for congressional 
consideration to improve the management of Coast Guard acquisitions, 
including the affordability of the portfolio.\29\ Congress has yet to 
act on two of these matters, including that the Coast Guard update its 
acquisition policy to establish that all shipbuilding programs should 
1) mature critical technologies to a technology readiness level 7 prior 
to a program's contract award for detailed design and construction, and 
2) achieve 100 percent completion of basic and functional design prior 
to the start of lead ship construction.\30\ Another matter was closed 
as not implemented when it became overcome by events due to changes the 
Coast Guard made to the information included in the Capital Investment 
Plan. I encourage you to consider these matters as you deliberate the 
Coast Guard's current budget request.
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 \29\ GAO, Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program 
Remains Unachievable, GAO-11-743 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011); 
GAO-14-450; and GAO-23-105805.
 \30\ Technology readiness level 7 occurs when a system prototype 
demonstration occurs in an operational or realistic environment. Basic 
and functional design include key tasks such as routing all major 
distributive systems (electricity, water, and utilities), providing 
information on the position of piping, and includes a 3D model of the 
ship structure and major system, with vendor-furnished information 
incorporated to support understanding of final system design. Leading 
practices indicate that completing basic and functional design leads to 
design stability.
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 Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

 Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you for your testimony. I 
really appreciate that.
 And now comes questions. I yield myself 5 minutes for 
questions.
 Admiral Thomas, prior to the hearing, this committee 
requested an updated 5-year capital improvement plan, but we 
were told basically don't expect it.
 As a result, we are kind of relying on an old one from back 
in 2022. As we explore throughout this hearing, circumstances 
have changed since fiscal year 2023. Why can't the Coast Guard 
produce an updated capital investment plan?
 Admiral Thomas. Mr. Chairman, we owe you an updated CIP. We 
are working through the Department right now. We expect to have 
a 2024 CIP to the committee by this summer, and we have already 
begun work on the fiscal year 2025 CIP. So, we have that for 
action, sir.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Will it be before you leave?
 Admiral Thomas. Not much is going to happen between now and 
when I leave, but it will happen this summer.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. Oakley, anything you would like 
to add, why the CIP is important to the acquisition planning 
process?
 Ms. Oakley. Yes, I mean, the CIP at least provides some 
information beyond the current budget year in terms of what the 
Coast Guard's priorities are and what it is looking to fund. 
But it doesn't provide the necessary information that matches 
what is realistically going to be attained in the budget. And 
so, the CIP is kind of the perfect example of looking at that 
kind of bow wave of funding that is going to be required in the 
outyears.
 And so, I think we have some open recommendations to the 
Coast Guard to really take a look at improving the information 
included in the CIP that includes better information on the 
risks that are being accepted by the decisions and then 
identifying realistic resources that are needed to address the 
acquisition program priorities.
 And I would encourage the Coast Guard to incorporate those 
as they are working on the future CIPs.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Admiral Thomas, Coast Guard 
reported challenges in meeting mission demands, including the 
$1.77 billion that is there in the backlog.
 What is the minimum amount of annual funding needed for the 
Coast Guard to prevent the growth of the total shoreside 
infrastructure backlog?
 Admiral Thomas. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this 
committee's continuous focus on our shore infrastructure 
because it is as critical to our mission success as anything 
that floats or flies.
 We have a shore infrastructure portfolio valued at about 
$24 billion. Industry standards would say you need to invest 2 
to 4 percent of your infrastructure portfolio each year to 
maintain it. For us, that would mean steady, regular O&S 
funding of around a half a billion dollars. That would allow us 
to get after our maintenance backlog. And then, of course, we 
would need the PC&I money to do the recapitalization and new 
infrastructure that we need.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Do you have a long-term plan to 
modernize your shoreside infrastructure? Does it include 
efforts to modernize the process by which the Coast Guard 
plans, designs, and builds shoreside infrastructure?
 Admiral Thomas. We do. We are currently in the midst of 
modernizing our civil engineering program, and one of the key 
aspects of that is to ask Congress for more money to do survey 
and design work so that we can then come back with more 
realistic requests for what it is going to take to do our shore 
infrastructure upgrades and maintenance.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Do you think that will live within 
the confines of the President's overall total?
 Admiral Thomas. I am sorry, Congressman. I didn't quite 
catch that.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Do you think that all you just said 
will live within the confines of the President's overall 
request?
 Admiral Thomas. I think the--our Commandant has said we 
need to be a $20 billion Coast Guard. And, until we are there, 
we are not going to be able to get after any of these backlog 
numbers.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. Oakley, would you like to 
respond to that also?
 Ms. Oakley. I mean, $2.6 billion is quite a significant 
backlog, and I think that only includes costs of projects that 
have cost estimates.
 And there are about 200-plus more projects that still to be 
estimated that continue to add to that backlog, not to mention 
additional shoreside infrastructure that will be required for 
new mission sets like in the Arctic that need to be considered 
as they are making decisions about how to fund and how to dig 
out of that hole and build for the future.
 It is important work, and I know we are doing some work for 
you all to update some of our work from 2019 and provide you 
new data on what those numbers are from a shoreside 
perspective. So, look for that in the coming months.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, my time has run out.
 So, Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
 Ms. Oakley, the Polar Security Cutter and Offshore Patrol 
Cutter programs are both behind schedule and over budget. On 
both programs, complications have arisen due to an immature 
level of design.
 While the Coast Guard generally follows the Navy's 
standards for design completion before moving to production, 
what is the effect of starting construction before obtaining a 
mature design?
 Ms. Oakley. Put simply, the lack of knowledge leads to 
decisions to move forward that aren't well-informed about what 
the resources or risks are going to be associated with the 
effort.
 And so, when you think about it from the perspective of you 
wouldn't start building your house before it has been designed, 
right? And so, very simply, those are the kinds of decisions 
that we are talking about.
 And so, we have been recommending for many years to both 
the Coast Guard and the Navy to put in that early effort, put 
in that early time to really understand that basic and 
functional design, what the structure is going to look like, 
where the major systems are going to be, how the piping is 
going to run through the ship, to be able to then have 
confidence, as you are stepping into the construction period 
for those ships, where it becomes more expensive to make 
changes that might be necessary as the design continues to 
evolve.
 And I think that, unfortunately, when you see bad outcomes, 
it is a result of continuing instability in the design that is 
leading to changes that become increasingly expensive as you 
move through the construction process.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. It sounds like the F-35 in the 
House Armed Services.
 Admiral Thomas, each of the new assets we have discussed 
today will require experienced Coast Guard servicemembers to 
operate and maintain them. It is critical that we pair these 
investments with initiatives to address the 10-percent 
personnel shortage that the Coast Guard is facing.
 How will the new assets and investments in infrastructure 
further Coast Guard's efforts to recruit and retain a diverse 
cadre of personnel? And what else is the Coast Guard doing to 
ensure its workforce is sufficient to manage these assets and 
carry out its missions?
 Admiral Thomas. Well, thank you for that question, Ranking 
Member Carbajal.
 Absolutely, the workforce is what makes these assets come 
to life and get the mission done.
 One of the things that we can do to improve our retention 
and recruiting is to provide world-class shore infrastructure 
for our forces to work in.
 I think Congressman Larsen mentioned he has visited a 
number of areas where the conditions that we are asking our 
people to work in are just substandard. That doesn't help us 
retain our workforce.
 I am happy to report we are making progress with our 
recruiting. We are at record numbers this year; numbers we 
haven't seen since prior to COVID. And our retention is up, as 
well. So, we are working on closing that workforce gap.
 But the fact of the matter is we do not currently have the 
capacity at our accession points to meet the future workforce 
demands of our Service. We cannot get enough people through 
Cape May each year without building infrastructure there, and 
we cannot get enough people through the Coast Guard Academy 
each year for our future needs without improving infrastructure 
there.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
 Ms. Oakley, the Polar Security Cutter program is now over 5 
years behind its initial schedule in part due to challenges 
associated with its shipbuilding programs. These delays are 
associated with $2 billion in cost increases.
 How important are investments in commercial U.S. shipyards 
and shipbuilding to ensure cost efficiency for the Coast Guard 
and the Navy, and how else can the Coast Guard improve its 
shipbuilding outcomes?
 Ms. Oakley. Well, in general, supporting the U.S. 
shipbuilding industrial base is critical, given what both the 
Coast Guard and the Navy are trying to do in terms of building 
up their fleets to meet their increasing mission demands.
 One thing that I would like to comment on that is I see 
this as needing to be a whole-of-Government approach to 
supporting that industrial base. And, in preparing for this 
hearing, I am reviewing the Navy's 30-year fleet shipbuilding 
plan. And it talks a lot about industrial base and supporting 
the naval industrial base and the commercial industrial base, 
but the Coast Guard isn't mentioned in there at all.
 And so, I think that is one thing that the Navy and the 
Coast Guard need to think about is how they can kind of 
approach and attack this holistically, because there is a lot 
of money right now being thrown at the shipbuilding industrial 
base through the Navy and through the Department of Defense, in 
particular.
 And so, I think that the Coast Guard will benefit from 
that, but I would like the Coast Guard to be a little bit more 
strategic in directing those benefits to things that will 
support them in the long run.
 And then, just to quickly answer your question about 
improving outcomes, the Coast Guard should really look toward 
the practices that we have identified by going out and looking 
at commercial shipbuilders and buyers and how they go about 
getting ships done on time and on budget and on predictable 
cycle.
 And I don't mean done in 10 years. I mean done, designed to 
launch in less than 4 years sometimes for very complex ships. 
There is a reason why they can do that, because they take 
disciplined approaches. They put in place the right kinds of 
tools. They have the right kinds of expertise to be able to 
oversee these programs and execute these programs, and that is 
where I direct both the Coast Guard and the Navy to begin 
looking to, to improve their outcomes.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
 And I will be following up, sitting on House Armed 
Services, on this collaborative shipbuilding issue.
 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 I yield back.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Thank you both for being here today. We appreciate it.
 Our priorities are the same. They were the last time we had 
our hearing here. Congress must do all it can to help the 
shipbuilding industry by ensuring efficiency and transparency, 
bolstering the workforce, and incentivizing domestic 
shipbuilding.
 Ms. Oakley, what are the three top actions that Congress 
can take to help address the affordability challenges the Coast 
Guard is facing now?
 Ms. Oakley. There are a couple of things.
 First, the Congress should really enforce what it has asked 
the Coast Guard to do, develop a 20-year fleet modernization 
plan so that you-all have the ammunition to be able to advocate 
for additional resources for the Coast Guard to be able to meet 
its increasing mission needs. So, that is one thing.
 The Coast Guard has yet to develop that type of plan. The 
Navy develops one every year. So, I don't see that there should 
be any reason why the Coast Guard couldn't follow suit to 
provide you-all with that information.
 The second thing I would say is that the Congress should 
demand the Coast Guard to push forward with disciplined 
programs. And, when I say ``disciplined programs,'' I mean 
following those practices that I was talking about from the 
commercial ship buyers and builders, not making decisions to 
proceed with construction with a design that is not even 
remotely finished to be able to support informed decisions in 
that regard, and really push the Coast Guard to think about 
what it needs and how it is going to effectively prioritize and 
assess the risks associated with its future portfolio.
 And it can do that in that long-term plan or it can do that 
in that CIP that we talked about earlier, that capital 
investment plan. So, those are just some quick things that I 
think you-all could do.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much.
 Admiral Thomas, how do you respond to the claims that the 
Coast Guard has a lot of redtape? And can you describe some of 
the changes you are making to make more people want to bid on 
these contracts? Help us get here.
 Admiral Thomas. So, Congressman, I would say that the 
redtape in the Coast Guard is the redtape that is in Federal 
law, regulations, and requirements from our Department.
 The Coast Guard is one of the premier agencies in all of 
Government that does business with small businesses, and I am 
proud of that fact. We work hard to ensure that we can send our 
business to small businesses.
 Mr. Ezell. Very good.
 How can this committee better equip the Coast Guard with 
the tools it needs to provide detailed and accurate information 
relating to communication and transparency in the acquisition 
process? How can we help you?
 Admiral Thomas. I would have to have a conversation with 
you, Congressman, to understand where you think there is a lack 
of communication and transparency.
 I think the key is in our budget requests.
 Mr. Ezell. OK.
 Admiral Thomas. And that is where your frustration lies.
 And our budget request for fiscal year 2024, particularly 
in our PC&I was, you know, we asked for more than we got.
 Mr. Ezell. OK. Got it.
 In your testimony, you mentioned a recent acquisition of 
the Nation's first heavy polar icebreakers in over four 
decades. How do you plan to navigate this process and meet 
deadlines since no shipyard has built an icebreaker in all 
these decades?
 Admiral Thomas. Yes, so, that is a very key point, and I am 
glad that you brought it up. The polar icebreaker is not like 
any commercial vessel ever built, and it is not like any vessel 
built in the United States ever.
 So, it is a complex vessel, and it is a complex--we are 
currently working with the shipyard. They have put in what is 
called a Request for Equitable Adjustment to kind of rightsize 
the contract.
 That, combined with the work we are doing to understand 
their overtarget budget, overtarget schedule analysis, I think 
will allow us to report to this committee a good estimate in 
both cost and schedule by this fall.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
 We toured down there recently a few months ago, and it was 
really neat to see the innovation that is going on in Bollinger 
down there. So, thank you very much for that.
 The last question is for the panel, if we have time. This 
committee has heard that one of the challenges in building a 
PSC is the support of the local industrial base, that is, 
finding enough workers.
 What can we do to try to help everybody, I guess you would 
say? Because we hear that all over the place, we are having 
problems finding people. What can we do to help that?
 Admiral Thomas. So, I think there are two things that we 
need to do. One is we need to invest in our shipyards. And we 
need to understand that the Polar Security program will result 
in ships that our Nation needs, but it will also result in a 
shipyard that our Nation needs.
 And the second is we need to really invest in STEM 
education. We are finding that the engineers, the scientists, 
the technicians that are required to put a ship that complex 
together, both in terms of design and construction, just don't 
exist in our Nation. So, we need to focus on that.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
 And thank you for all your testimony and your hard work.
 Mr. Chairman, yield back.
 Dr. Babin [presiding]. Thank you.
 And now I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from 
Michigan, Ms. Scholten.
 Ms. Scholten. Thank you so much, sir.
 And thank you to our witnesses for being here, Vice Admiral 
Thomas, for your service to our country.
 I have a number of questions today. So, I am going to get 
right into it.
 First, the Great Lakes play a vital role not only in our 
local communities and back home in west Michigan, but within 
the U.S. economy as a whole. These waterways are critical to 
ensuring reliability of supply chains and the integrity of our 
country's maritime border.
 As such, I want to be as helpful as I can to support 
adequate icebreaking in the Great Lakes to allow for free 
movement of cargo in the region year-round. While we have had 
minimal ice this particular year, next year is a different 
story.
 Vice Admiral, despite receiving $20 million in fiscal year 
2024 and over $19 million in previous years, the Coast Guard 
has not officially designated a new heavy Great Lakes 
icebreaker as acquisition in this program of record.
 Given the importance of the region, is there anything 
preventing the Coast Guard, sir, from accelerated acquisition 
of an additional icebreaker beyond access to funding?
 Admiral Thomas. Congresswoman, I share your passion for the 
Great Lakes. It is a national treasure, and we are committed to 
recapitalizing our system of icebreakers there. We think we 
need 2 heavies, about 11 mediums, and about 7 of the smaller 
ones so we can essentially plow the highways, the side roads, 
and the parking lots.
 We are moving forward. We are at AD1, Access Decision 1, 
with the GLIB, the Great Lakes icebreaker. The money that was 
appropriated in fiscal year 2024 will allow us to move forward 
with the analyze-and-select phase.
 We are going to need additional appropriations to move 
forward with that particular acquisition, but it is a program 
of record. We have a program office, and we are moving forward.
 Ms. Scholten. Thank you. I appreciate that, sir.
 I appreciate this discussion, and frankly, I had a lot more 
questions today that I was hoping to talk about with respect to 
the GLIB program. But, unfortunately, the U.S. Coast Guard is 
once again in the headlines for horrible mishandling of sexual 
assault cases related to Operation Fouled Anchor. I would be 
remiss if I didn't ask some questions here.
 First and foremost, sir, while the Coast Guard has been 
before this committee and other committees many times, talking 
about the tragedy and the impact on these victims, sir, is the 
Coast Guard leadership aware of the impact on everyday citizens 
that distractions like these continue to have over and over 
again?
 The subject matter of today's hearing is where we are 
behind on so many of these different programs. And I can't help 
but notice we are not able to get to the questions that we need 
today because we are also talking about yet another scandal.
 Does the Coast Guard appreciate the lack of fiscal 
responsibility, as well, that scandals continue to have on the 
program itself?
 Admiral Thomas. First, Congresswoman, let me just offer you 
an in-person brief on GLIB so we can answer all your questions.
 Ms. Scholten. Thank you, sir.
 Admiral Thomas. I appreciate your recognition that the 
ongoing disclosures regarding sexual assaults and unacceptable 
behavior in the Coast Guard can be a distraction, not just for 
our Service and our servicemembers, but for the Nation because 
they lose focus on all the good news that is in our Service.
 That is why we are really focused hard on improving and 
strengthening our Service culture, providing all the support 
that we can to victims. I had mentioned earlier that I stand 
personally ready to help victims access the healthcare that 
they need at the VA, and we have an enterprise victim advocate 
to do that.
 But you are absolutely right. It can be a distraction, and 
it can take away from the good story of the Coast Guard.
 Ms. Scholten. Sir, I appreciate your comments. As everyone 
here knows and as we heard in the testimony in the Senate, 
unfortunately, these most recent allegations were about how 
these instances are continuing to be ongoing.
 And I am wondering what the Coast Guard is doing to ensure 
transparency in the process so that the American public can 
trust that what you are saying now is true; that, even as we 
speak, that there are not coverups like this happening.
 Admiral Thomas. Our Commandant has testified--and you can 
choose to assess the veracity of her testimony--that we are, 
she is absolutely committed to being transparent.
 I am personally responsible for our sexual assault 
prevention and response program. I spend a lot of time working 
on it, and we are being as transparent as we possibly can.
 Ms. Scholten. I don't mean to interrupt you, sir. I have 
one more very important question and I just--I would ask you 
that, you know, we have heard a lot of words.
 And I think the American public and this committee--I know 
I personally am going to need a lot more than words to assure 
us of the veracity of these assurances that these will continue 
to be taken seriously.
 One of the most horrifying details I think to come out of 
this is that victims were not provided with the CG-6095 that 
would ensure access to VA health benefits. I think it goes 
without saying, sir, that survivors should never be denied 
benefits in an attempt to help the Coast Guard protect its 
reputation.
 What are you doing to ensure that every survivor, both in 
the past and in the future, even those we don't yet know about, 
is provided with a CG-6095, ensuring their access to benefits?
 Admiral Thomas. So, I have a CG-6095 right here. We do 
provide them.
 Ms. Scholten. Do the survivors have it, sir, is the 
question.
 Admiral Thomas. So, we have an enterprise victim advocate 
that is available to survivors who can get access to this form. 
Our sexual assault response coordinators around the Coast Guard 
have access to the form.
 And this week, I will recommunicate both internally and 
externally through social media where victims can go to get 
these forms so that we can assure that they get the care that 
they deserve and that they need.
 Ms. Scholten. I would ask that you provide a more proactive 
approach to make sure that these survivors have actually access 
to these forms, sir.
 Admiral Thomas. We will, Congresswoman, including outreach 
to known victims. We have done that over the course of the last 
year.
 Ms. Scholten. Our personnel, our Coasties across the 
country are the most precious resource that the Coast Guard 
has, sir, and we ask you to look out for them in every possible 
way.
 I yield back the remainder of my time.
 Dr. Babin. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Thank you 
very much.
 Admiral Thomas. It is my greatest privilege to look out for 
our workforce.
 Dr. Babin. I want to thank the witnesses for being here 
today.
 First off, I would like say how much southeast Texas, where 
my district is, appreciates all the hard work that the Coast 
Guard has been doing in responding to our recent storms in 
southeast Texas. I have five or six of my counties have been 
declared disasters, as well as several other congressional 
districts.
 My question is to you, Admiral. As the Coast Guard looks to 
transition to the MH-60 rotary-wing fleet, I understand that 
the Coast Guard is slowly phasing out many of its aging MH-65s 
with the intention of reducing the overall rotary-wing fleet.
 Air Station Houston currently hosts three MH-65 Dolphin 
helicopters, and I understand that the current plan is to phase 
these three helicopters out and replace them with just two MH-
60s. And, while I recognize that the MH-60 is a very capable 
platform compared with the MH-65, I have concerns that reducing 
the number of airframes in service may impact the Coast Guard's 
operational capabilities.
 Presumably with just two aircraft at Air Station Houston, 
it would be more challenging to respond to multiple search-and-
rescue missions, storm responses, or providing support to the 
Houston ship channel, given that a single helicopter can only 
be in one place at one time with the reality that individual 
helicopters are often stuck in the hangar, dealing with 
maintenance issues.
 In addition, for Air Station Houston, I understand there 
may be some issues regarding the hangar size and space and 
ability to facilitate the 60s. Do you have any information 
available on the plan moving forward at Air Station Houston's 
air assets? Briefly, if you would.
 Admiral Thomas. Yes, so, Congressman, I will just say I am 
familiar with high-water events in southeast Texas. I was in 
command in Galveston when Allison hit, and I was in command of 
the eighth district when Harvey hit. And we saved tens of 
thousands of people using aircraft from Air Station Houston and 
surged in aircraft. In the most recent event, Air Station 
Houston was able to medevac a 12-hour-old baby to neonatal care 
who was isolated by the floods. So, Air Station Houston is an 
asset for that area, and we will continue to fly our aircraft 
out of there.
 We will have to make some modifications across the country 
to our hangars in order to accommodate the 60s. It is another 
reason why we need a $3 to $3.4 billion PC&I budget so we can 
build the aircraft and the hangars.
 Dr. Babin. So, it is a funding issue.
 Admiral Thomas. Absolutely.
 Dr. Babin. You just don't have the funds to get more than 
three.
 Admiral Thomas. Right now, we have a program of record of 
127 60s. If we are going to grow that, it is going to require 
more funds.
 Dr. Babin. OK. Considering the pending polar icebreaker 
construction program, I understand the construction contracts 
for the polar program and the Great Lakes program require all 
United States laws to be followed.
 Has the question of propulsion arrangement and patent 
rights been resolved in the case of the polar program, and, if 
not, why not? And how do you propose to resolve that question 
so that lawsuits and further delays do not occur?
 Admiral Thomas. So, to date, there have been no official 
raising of patent issues associated with the polar icebreaker. 
So, we haven't taken any actions to resolve those because there 
just haven't been any claims.
 Dr. Babin. OK. As the Coast Guard explores ways to make the 
most of its limited funding, operation and procurement of long-
range air assets presents a significant challenge. The Coast 
Guard currently collaborates with CBP regarding the use of 
long-range autonomous systems including the use of Coast Guard 
pilots and the use of systems in key areas of Coast Guard 
operation.
 Given the ability of these systems to expand the Coast 
Guard's ability to monitor large areas in a cost-effective 
manner, the fact that the HC-130J program appears stalled at 19 
airframes and the apparent shift away from the C-27 program, 
does the Coast Guard plan to explore the acquisition of its own 
long-range UAS systems? And what sort of unmanned systems could 
provide the Coast Guard with more complete persistent marine 
domain awareness?
 Admiral Thomas. Yes, we absolutely need to move into 
unmanned systems, particularly for our maritime patrol 
missions. In fiscal year 2025 budget, we have about $100 
million aimed just at doing that. We do operate the MQ-9s with 
CBP. We think that is probably the platform that we need as we 
build out our fleet, but we are also going to need to build 
more than our current program of record of C-130s because we 
are sunsetting the C-27s.
 Dr. Babin. OK. Thank you, and I appreciate you very much.
 We certainly need to up our ante on--I know you need the 
funding, but we have got to have enough airframes to get things 
done.
 So, with that, I will yield myself back and recognize the 
gentlewoman from Alaska, Mrs. Peltola.
 Mrs. Peltola. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 My first questions are for Admiral Thomas. Thank you for 
being here. Thank you for your service to our country.
 The Coast Guard has previously said that the acquisition of 
the Polar Security Cutter, which you mentioned a little bit 
ago, is the Coast Guard's top acquisition priority.
 And ensuring that the program stays on track and that the 
Coast Guard has the resourcing it needs to oversee that 
program, while staying on top of recapitalization priorities in 
all your other places, is one of my top priorities, as well, as 
a Member of the House.
 In a Homeland Security hearing a few weeks ago, the Coast 
Guard indicated that the design for the Polar Security Cutter 
was about 65 percent completed. And I am wondering when you 
estimate being able to begin the construction phase. And do you 
have an updated estimate for when the first Polar Security 
Cutter will be off the assembly line, in the water, and ready 
to go?
 Admiral Thomas. So, we are in the process of getting much 
greater clarity on both cost and schedule, and I think we will 
have that this fall. We are working with the contractor both in 
terms of renegotiating portions of the contract but also at 
analysis they are doing to look at their cost and schedule.
 That said, we have seen an increase in design maturity that 
leads us to be optimistic about being able to authorize start 
of construction by the end of this year.
 I will say that I don't think we will be at 90 percent 
design maturity. That term ``design maturity'' is defined 
differently in different places. But we will certainly be at 
the level of maturity that we need to start the modules that we 
start. So, we are optimistic we will start this year.
 Mrs. Peltola. OK. That is good news.
 And are you able to provide an update on the acquisition of 
the commercially available icebreaker that the Coast Guard 
received funding for in the fiscal year 2024 appropriation 
cycle?
 Admiral Thomas. Well, first of all, we appreciate the 
support of Congress to get the money to acquire a commercial 
icebreaker that will increase our ability to be present and to 
match presence with presence in the Arctic, and particularly 
off of Alaska.
 The next step is the request for proposal that we are 
working on. There is one sole source. We are going to see what 
we can actually buy for the $125 million that we got.
 But, critical, we asked for about $20 million in O&S 
funding so that we can outfit and operate that vessel. And, in 
fiscal year 2024, that was reduced to $1 million.
 So, we are going to need an additional appropriation fiscal 
year 2025 so that we can operate what we buy.
 Mrs. Peltola. OK. That is a very good heads-up.
 And one of the things my office is tracking are the three 
major homeporting projects currently in Alaska.
 And I like to remind people that, if Alaska were a country, 
we would be the 18th largest country, and we have more 
coastline than all of the lower 48 combined. At low tide, 
Alaska could fit three Texases inside of us. So, we are 
enormous.
 And really, you are our presence. And we know that we have 
had foreign adversaries practicing war drills in our waters off 
our shores, and we really appreciate you being there and the 
presence of the Coast Guard.
 And that is not even to mention the search-and-rescue 
operations that you provide, it seems like every week or 
multiple times a week. As Alaskans, we are very dependent on 
you. Our fishing industry is dependent on you. Our tourists are 
very dependent on you.
 So, regarding the three major homeporting projects, there 
is a Fast Response Cutter headed to Seward, there is a Fast 
Response Cutter headed to Sitka, and the commercially available 
icebreaker will be homeported in Juneau.
 And I am wondering if you could give us an update on how 
those projects are going.
 Admiral Thomas. Absolutely. I've been focused on our Alaska 
projects. Our crews love to work and live in Alaska. In Seward 
in particular, we have acquired the property that we need. We 
requested about $42 million to build out the FRC facility 
there. We've been appropriated about $25 million. We think we 
can put a pier there. We probably can't put the support 
buildings there that we need for that. So, we're going to need 
additional appropriation there.
 The challenge in Seward is that we need to build housing as 
well, and though we've gotten appropriated about $13 million to 
do that, that will get us property and utilities. It won't 
actually build us homes. We're working with a community there 
and community builders.
 In Sitka, we have enough money to build the FRC pier and 
recapitalize the buoy tender pier but not enough yet to build 
the buildings ashore, and we're still working our way through 
negotiations with regard to acquiring land.
 With regard to Juneau, there's not been any appropriations 
to build a home port in Juneau. So, we haven't even begun the 
planning process there.
 Mrs. Peltola. OK. Thank you for that update. In Admiral 
Fagan's state of the Coast Guard speech last year, she said 
that the American taxpayer won't find a better return on 
investment than the U.S. Coast Guard, and I agree with her. I 
have a continued frustration by the size of the Coast Guard's 
budget year after year. I am a big proponent of making 
investments where they need to be made. I've heard some say 
that the Coast Guard should be about a $20 billion organization 
as you mentioned earlier. In a world where the Coast Guard were 
to receive a major uptick in funding, what are some of the 
acquisitions or initiatives that the additional funding would 
be spent on?
 Admiral Thomas. So, I've said that the Coast Guard is a $20 
billion organization on a $13 billion diet. The Space Force is 
a $40 billion budget. The Space Force has a $10 billion PC&I 
budget. If we had a $3.4 billion PC&I reliable current year 
dollars, we could get after all the home port work that we just 
talked about, all the shore infrastructure recapitalization, 
and our current program on record with regard to ships and 
aircraft.
 Mrs. Peltola. OK. I apologize for going over time, Mr. 
Chairman. Thank you very much.
 Admiral Thomas. Thank you.
 Dr. Van Drew [presiding]. The gentlelady yields back, and I 
recognize myself for 5 minutes. Thank you for being here.
 Vice Admiral, Training Center Cape May has many projects in 
urgent need of completion, as you know, especially the 
barracks. I'm glad to see that $225 million is authorized in 
FY25 for the improvements to facilities at the training center 
and an additional $60 million for the barracks for phase 2. 
However, I've been getting mixed messages about the status of 
phase 1, and I'd really like to clarify that. Vice Admiral 
Thomas, thank you again for being here today. We do appreciate 
you even when we are giving you tough questions. That's part of 
the deal, right?
 Admiral Thomas. It's part of the deal.
 Dr. Van Drew. You didn't expect to come here for the easy 
questions. Can you provide an update on the progress for phase 
1 of the barracks? Are there any problems in the bidding, the 
contracting process, and when can we expect construction to 
actually begin?
 Admiral Thomas. We have not encountered any problems. We 
are just about to issue the request for proposal. I think, just 
to be honest with you, we asked for money in FY22, and it's a 
totally different market than what we have now. So, we will do 
a design-bid-build RFP, and we will get what we can get for the 
$55 million that we have. I think that the phase 2 will be more 
than $60 million if we are truly going to build what we need to 
build there. And then we need to continue to invest in Cape 
May, because as I've said earlier, the size of our future 
workforce, we cannot support it right now with the capacity 
that we have at Cape May.
 Dr. Van Drew. I'd love to know those numbers, and I 
understand what you're saying about phase 1, and originally, 
actually, I understand it was going to be enough. Inflation, 
God knows we know what inflation is doing to the country in 
general.
 Secondly, we then had approached you-all and said, ``Do you 
need more money?'' Originally yes, and then you said, ``No, 
we're going to be OK. We're going to live with this amount. 
We're going to live under that budget,'' and I assume that's 
where you are now.
 Admiral Thomas. As I said, we're going to do a design-bid-
build, and we're going to get what we get for the money that we 
have.
 Dr. Van Drew. OK. I have to think on that a little bit. And 
you assume--obviously, you're going to get what you're going to 
get, but it has to be adequate. It has to be appropriate. It 
has to fulfill the needs that we have.
 Admiral Thomas. Congressman, if we can't get--if we can't 
get something that will be functional and suitable, then we 
will come back and ask for more money.
 Dr. Van Drew. Right. Which we approached you on that, and 
you said you didn't think you would. I want to be clear. If 
it's not good and it's not the right thing--and believe me, I 
don't like spending money. We've got a lot of debt. But we also 
have to take care of what's most important, which is our 
military, which includes the Coast Guard, which includes you-
all, which includes the biggest training center in the country, 
which is Cape May. If we need to do that, then we need to know 
that. We need to open those lines--if I sound--we need to open 
those lines of communication.
 Admiral Thomas. I'm committed to keeping you informed, 
Congressman, on where we stand, and we will know more as we put 
out that RFP this summer.
 Dr. Van Drew. So, I'm really looking forward to the RFP, 
and we should know a lot more, period, whether we need more 
money, et cetera. And the real timeframe. We'd love to really 
get a start date here. We hope to have that definitely by this 
summer.
 Training Center Cape May has prepared a draft strategic 
development plan which identifies potential projects over a 25-
year horizon, and I know you're familiar with it. I've 
previously requested this information, and the Coast Guard has 
referred me to the traditional budget process through the 
Office of Management and Budget, OMB, which is fine, but let's 
be clear. Congress is a co-equal branch of Government. It is 
essential as the oversight branch, and that we are, that we're 
able to communicate directly with agencies, and we absolutely 
appropriate to do so on the budgetary matters that this 
Congress oversees.
 From my and this committee's legislative goals, it's 
important that we're able to see this plan, this 25-year plan, 
and work to provide for the proposed projects as the Coast 
Guard outlines them. It's a relatively simple request I'm 
making, Vice Admiral. It highlights, quite frankly, what's 
wrong with this Government--not with you--the Government in 
general. We have to plan more. We can't just plan for the year 
or 2 years. It's good to have a 25-year plan. It doesn't mean 
that it doesn't change, but we need a plan.
 Congress has been missing a long-term outlook, and it's why 
we're in a terrible fiscal position. We, as Congress, should be 
able to see what such a critical asset as the Training Center 
Cape May needs over the next quarter of a century, and it's 
unclear to me--this is what's unclear, why the Coast Guard 
deflected this request to OMB.
 I want to make this real simple. I do. Will you commit to 
me and this committee, because it's important to the committee 
as well, that you will provide a copy of the strategic 
development plan of Training Center Cape May as soon as 
possible? We need to look at it. I know there will be changes 
in a quarter of a century, but it gives us an overview. It 
gives us a vision. Please respond.
 Admiral Thomas. I can commit to providing you our area of 
development plan for Training Center Cape May and all the 
planning documents that go with it.
 Dr. Van Drew. Which would include the 25-year plan. Part of 
it--it's there. We know for a fact. So, can you commit to that?
 Admiral Thomas. You know for a fact that we have a 25-year 
plan?
 Dr. Van Drew. That is my understanding, yes. That's what 
we've been told when we asked, yes. We didn't make that up. We 
asked you folks. That's what I was told.
 Admiral Thomas. Absolutely. If we have it, I don't know why 
we wouldn't share it. I'm not personally aware of it.
 Dr. Van Drew. This is what I would ask. If you can 
personally look into that. If you have it, share it, and you've 
made that commitment already. If you don't have it, please 
explain to me what planning documents you do have and why we 
received that incorrect information so that we know how to move 
forward.
 Admiral Thomas. Specific to Cape May, happy to do that.
 Dr. Van Drew. Specific to Cape May. I think it's a good 
idea in general, but I am going to be a little parochial here. 
So, we're going to start with Cape May and hopefully expand it 
on.
 Admiral Thomas. I'll tell you, Congressman, I kind of share 
your frustration. One of the last decision memos that I have 
signed is one that will establish a shore infrastructure 
project office in our contracting shop so that we start buying 
shore infrastructure like we buy ships and airplanes, and that 
will give us the level of discipline that we need and that you 
expect.
 Dr. Van Drew. And I hope--that's a great goal. It's a great 
goal for you, for this committee, for all of us. I thank you. I 
thank you for being here. I yield back.
 Are there any further questions from any members of the 
subcommittee who have not been recognized? OK.
 Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today. I would 
like to thank both of you for being here. I appreciate it. I 
would like to thank each of the witnesses, which are you-all, 
for your testimony. This subcommittee stands adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

 Appendix

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Questions to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission 
 Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Daniel Webster

 Question 1. In your testimony, you stated that industry standards 
call for a two to four percent yearly investment to properly maintain 
the Coast Guard's shoreside infrastructure. Based on the Service's $24 
billion property portfolio, that would equate to approximately $500 
million a year in shoreside maintenance costs. However, the two to four 
percent maintenance estimate assumes the facilities to which the 
estimate applies have received regular ongoing maintenance. The reality 
is that many shoreside assets have not received such maintenance and 
already need significant investment in addition to the two to four 
percent of value.
 Question 1.a. To that end, what is the projected yearly cost to 
prevent the Coast Guard's shoreside maintenance backlog from growing 
when you factor in work that currently needs to be done to the 
Service's shoreside facilities for which ongoing maintenance has long 
been deferred?
 Answer. Annual infrastructure maintenance funding needs are 
estimated at $490M to $980M, assuming the industry and government 
standard of investment at 2 to 4 percent of the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure plant replacement value (currently $24.5B). Additional 
funding is only part of the solution. It must be coupled with increased 
staffing to appropriate levels and divestiture of unnecessary property, 
in order to reduce the size and severity of the Coast Guard's shore 
maintenance and repair backlog.

 Question 1.b. What is the total size of the Coast Guard's current 
shoreside maintenance backlog?
 Answer. The Service's current shore maintenance backlog is 
estimated at $2.7B, which includes depot-level and organizational-level 
maintenance projects.