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[Senate Hearing 119-359] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-359 TRUTH IN LABELING: AMERICANS DESERVE TO KNOW WHERE THEIR DRUGS COME FROM ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ WASHINGTON, DC __________ JANUARY 29, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-23 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 63-403 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland ---------- McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1 PANEL OF WITNESSES John Gray, Ph.D., Dean's Distinguished Professor of Operations, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio................................................. 3 Michael Ganio, Pharm.D., Senior Director, Pharmacy Practice and Quality, ASHP, Bethesda, Maryland.............................. 5 Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D., Professor of Pharmaceutical Management & Economics, College Of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota................ 7 Stephen Colvill, Assistant Research Director, Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy, Washington, D.C................... 10 APPENDIX Prepared Witness Statements John Gray, Ph.D., Dean's Distinguished Professor of Operations, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio................................................. 28 Michael Ganio, Pharm.D., Senior Director, Pharmacy Practice and Quality, ASHP, Bethesda, Maryland.............................. 34 Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D., Professor of Pharmaceutical Management & Economics, College Of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota................ 42 Stephen Colvill, Assistant Research Director, Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy, Washington, D.C................... 71 Questions for the Record Michael Ganio, Pharm.D., Senior Director, Pharmacy Practice and Quality, ASHP, Bethesda, Maryland.............................. 85 Stephen W. Schondelmeyer, Pharm.D., Ph.D., Professor of Pharmaceutical Management & Economics, College Of Pharmacy, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota................ 87 Stephen Colvill, Assistant Research Director, Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy, Washington, D.C................... 109 Statements for the Record Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member......................................................... 115 Association of Accessible Medicines Statement.................... 116 TRUTH IN LABELING: AMERICANS DESERVE TO KNOW WHERE THEIR DRUGS COME FROM ---------- Thursday, January 29, 2026 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., Room 608, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senator Scott, Johnson, Moody, and Gillibrand. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN The Chairman. The U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging will now come to order. Last year, this Committee exposed the public health risk and national security threat posed by America's over-reliance on Communist China and India for generic drugs and the drug ingredients that make them, known in the medical industry as APIs. Together, Ranking Member Gillibrand and I led a bipartisan effort to demand accountability. We sent letters to the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Veteran Affairs, and key industry stakeholders, including large drug purchasers, distributors, and major pharmacies. The Aging Committee sounded the alarm and exposed the dangers in Americans' medicine cabinets. Our Committee also released a bipartisan report detailing the extent of these threats and held three hearings. In the first hearing, we heard from experts about the problems we face due to our massive over-reliance on foreign made generic drugs. We heard horrifying stories from a former FDA Inspector about how dangerous and unregulated these drugs from Communist China and India can be. We learned about the tragic deaths caused by failures to make sure the medicines Americans rely on to heal and treat them are actually safe. In the second hearing, we discussed solutions that create safer medicines, secure supply chains, so we aren't dependent on adversaries like Communist China for our medicines and create good paying American jobs by bringing back drug manufacturing back to America. In the third hearing, we heard from American drug manufacturers about the hurdles they face when they try to ramp up domestic production. What we uncovered during this investigation will shock you. Ninety-one percent of prescriptions in the United States are generic drugs. Of those drugs, almost 94 percent use APIs, produced and processed overseas in factories predominantly in Communist China and India that have little to no FDA oversight. When the FDA does make it abroad to inspect these facilities, they often warn them in advance, which gives them time to cover up any outstanding issues before inspectors see them. That is crazy. Somehow, even with all this time to prepare, we still see reports of skittering lizards and birds flying around foreign facilities. Does that sound safe and sanitary to anybody here? Absolutely not. Here is the deal, we face two problems that every American needs to understand. One is that foreign manufactured generic drugs are made with untested and dangerous APIs from countries like India and Communist China. That means we can't trust these drugs because we know they are less safe than those made in America. The second is that fixing that problem is made difficult by our own Government bureaucracy that blocks American drug manufacturers and fuels our over-reliance on Communist China and India to make generic drugs. We face not just a serious public health risk, but a massive national security risk as well. Think about it. If the government of Communist China, a self-described enemy of the United States, or India wants to stop the supply of prescription drugs to the United States, they can do so at any moment. If that happens, the United Sates has absolutely no plan to keep these generic, life-saving drugs needed by millions of Americans available. This may sound far-fetched, but we are seeing it play out in real time. Communist China has already limited exports of items like rare earth minerals during the COVID pandemic. India blocked the export of critical pharmaceutical ingredients, so, it can happen again. If we can't solve this problem, it is only a matter of time before more American lives are unnecessarily lost. We cannot allow that to happen. We must act now. This is why I am taking action to address these threats immediately with the introduction of my CLEAR LABELS Act. This bill will require country of origin labeling for pharmaceuticals so that physicians, pharmacists, and most importantly the American families taking these medicines know where these essential drugs are coming from. Every American deserves honesty and transparency about what they are putting into their bodies. We label food, clothes, and other products, but we don't require that same standard of medicines that Americans and especially our aging population rely on. Can anybody really disagree with that? It is wholly irresponsible that we are living in the dark when it comes to where our medicines are made. My bill changes that. Under my bill, finished drug products prescribed and sold in the United States would need to identify the name and location of each, including API's original manufacturer, as well as the packer or distributor, right on the label or through a searchable electronic portal. This is a simple and common-sense reform that will bring transparency and accountability to our generic drug industry. The fact is, most Americans would prefer to buy American when they can. Unfortunately, with drugs, too often the information about the country of origin isn't readily available. They want to know what they are taking is safe, and they want to support American jobs. By labeling these essential drugs, Americans will have more information to help them make well-informed decisions for themselves and their families. It will also encourage more domestic drug manufacturing, making sure generic medicines that our aging population and all Americans rely on are more effective and readily available. Country of origin transparency is not just a consumer right, it is a matter of national security, public health, and American pride. I invite all members of the Committee to join me and co- sponsor this legislation. We can get country of origin labeling done now to allow stakeholders at every stage of healthcare, especially the patient, to be confident, informed about the medications they take. I look forward to hearing from witnesses today on how we can empower patients to make the best choices for themselves and their families when it comes to where their medicines come from. Now, I am going to turn it over to Senator Moody. I have to go to a Foreign Relations Committee for a few minutes, and she will take over and she is my colleague from Florida and as a mom, she has to worry about not only the drugs she puts in her body, but what her kids are putting in their body. Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning. Thank you so much for being here. I would like to welcome all of our witnesses and everyone that is here today to witness this hearing. Our witnesses are leading experts on generic drugs and generic drug supply chains and can speak to how we ensure Americans have access to medications that are safe and high quality. I would now like to introduce our first witness and if you would like to, after I introduce you, go ahead and begin your introduction and we will go from there. We will begin with Dr. John Gray. Dr. John Gray is a Dean's Distinguished Professor of Operations at the Ohio State University's Fisher College of Business. Go ahead. Mr. Gray. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity, and thank you very much for bringing so much attention to this important---- Senator Moody. Well, I am not Chairman Scott. I have more hair than he does. [Laughter.]. Thankfully. You may go ahead. STATEMENT OF JOHN GRAY, PH.D., DEAN'S DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF OPERATIONS, FISHER COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, COLUMBUS, OHIO Dr. Gray. I want to start by saying I strongly support giving consumers, doctors, pharmacists, and other stakeholders' access to basic drug level information, including country of origin and some valid assessment of drug quality risk. This kind of transparency would allow generic manufacturers to compete on something other than price, and it could help slow or even stop the race to the bottom that has been present in this industry for the past several years. For many years, the FDA has emphasized that all generic drugs patterned after the same original drug are exchangeable. That may have been largely true decades ago, but today it is no longer a defensible assumption. There is now substantial evidence, both anecdotal and academic, that meaningful quality differences exist among generic drugs. Investigative reporting, academic research, and testimony to this Committee have made clear--have made that clear. These problems are the predictable result of intense cost pressure combined with a highly opaque supply chain, a product where quality is difficult to detect by touch or feel, and as mentioned, the exchangeability assumption. The FDA's traditional approach to ensuring quality is focused on inspecting manufacturing process to verify compliance with good manufacturing practices. That approach is necessary but has become much harder as manufacturing has moved offshore, especially when foreign inspections are often pre- announced. From my own experience, 8 years working as an engineer and manager in an FDA regulated manufacturing facility, I can say that consistent compliance is genuinely difficult. Day to day variability in materials, equipment, environments, and human decision-making creates constant risk. When firms are under pressure to deliver on time and compete on price, it can be tempting to overlook small compliance issues rather than investigate them fully. Over time, even well- intentioned organizations can go down that slippery slope. Indeed, in my research with co-authors over a decade ago, we found that pharmaceutical compliance tends to erode over time, absent a clear observable reason to refocus on quality. Transparency can help change this dynamic. A congressionally mandated National Academies Report in 2022 recommended country of origin labeling. In our research testing that recommendation, we found that both consumers and hospital pharmacists showed a clear preference for drugs manufactured domestically or near shore and away from drugs manufactured in India or China, even when told that all drugs were FDA approved. That same report also recommended public facing quality scores. When we tested quality scores alongside country of origin, we have found something important. While consumers preferred domestic drugs on average, high-quality offshore drugs were preferred over moderate quality domestic ones. This tells us that transparency can promote competition on quality, not just location or cost. While the industry remains opaque, some progress has been made, my co-authors and more recently ProPublica investigative journalists have been able to link many drugs to their finished dosage form manufacturing facilities using mostly public data. These efforts are valuable, but they are incomplete, difficult to maintain, and require enormous effort. In the case of ProPublica, even including a lawsuit of the FDA for some data. Critically, even with these efforts, we still lack reliable public data on active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturing locations. There is real momentum for broader transparency. The FDA has requested the authority to release manufacturing location information in its upcoming authorization. HHS has emphasized radical transparency, and the current FDA Commissioner was a leader in creating transparency in hospital quality years ago, as described in his book, Unaccountable. I am part of a Pentagon-funded team developing drug-level quality scores using existing data, while a parallel team is conducting laboratory testing of drugs in the market. These efforts have already identified meaningful variation in quality, and the resulting scores should be available later this year. Variation in manufacturing quality has real consequences for patient outcomes. Research in this area has been slow, not only because supply chains were long overlooked as a cause, but also because linking manufacturers to drugs was previously nearly impossible. As discussed in your September hearing, and in many recent news articles, low quality drugs have human consequences. My specific recommendation is this, require a QR code on all public facing drug packaging that links to a website searchable by NDC, showing the manufacturing locations of both the finished dosage form and the active ingredient, along with the drug level quality score. The site should also allow the same information for other exchangeable versions of the same drug, enabling informed comparison. For consumer facing use, quality scores should be designed carefully to avoid discouraging patients from taking necessary medications. One option would be a five-star scale where all marketed drugs are at least three stars. Transparency should be one part of a broader policy approach. I support stronger foreign inspections, increased testing, especially of imported drugs, and consideration of a legally accountable, U.S. based qualified person for imported batches. Federal purchasing decisions that incorporate quality and country of origin would send a powerful signal to the market. Transparency alone will not solve every problem, particularly in the complex private market, but is a necessary foundation. By allowing manufacturers to compete on quality and location and not just price, we can begin to reverse the race to the bottom and improve drug quality for patients. Thank you. Senator Moody. Technical problems]--can speak to drug quality and shortages. Dr. Michael Ganio is Senior Director of Pharmacy Practice and Quality with the American Society of Health System Pharmacists, or ASHP. ASHP is the largest association of pharmacy professionals in the United States, representing its 65,000 members in hospitals, ambulatory systems, and health system community pharmacies. ASHP also maintains a drug shortages list and has worked with Congress and a variety of stakeholders on supply chain resiliency. Thank you for being here, and you can begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GANIO, PHARM.D., SENIOR DIRECTOR, PHARMACY PRACTICE AND QUALITY, ASHP, BETHESDA, MARYLAND Dr. Ganio. Thank you, Senator Moody, Chair Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Senator Johnson, and members of the Special Committee on Aging. Thank you for the invitation to today's hearing. ASHP appreciates the Special Committee on Aging's comprehensive work over the past several months on creating a more resilient and reliable drug supply chain. For over 20 years, ASHP has worked to strengthen the drug supply change by publicly reporting drug shortages, providing resources to support patients and clinicians who are affected by supply disruptions, and advocating for policies that support a more reliable and resilient drug supply chain. Every American has a right to know where their prescription drugs are manufactured. Today, that information can be voluntarily provided by manufacturers, but it is not required. Drug labels may include a name and address for a company marketing a product, but not the name and the address of a manufacturing location. ASHP strongly supports transparency in the pharmaceutical supply chain, including manufacturer and country of origin labeling for prescription drugs. Research that Dr. Gray and I participated in, that he alluded to, and with other colleagues, has shown that patients and pharmacy purchasers prefer to buy drugs manufactured in the U.S. or Canada compared to products from India or China when the country of origin is made available. Disclosure of this information on the label has the potential to realign incentives in the supply chain away from price and may increase market share for products manufactured domestically. Research also conducted by Dr. Gray and other colleagues reveal there may be a correlation between drug quality and country of origin. These studies provide motivation to increase domestic manufacturing and manufacturing in countries with high reliability and FDA accessibility. However, country of origin alone is not a reliable proxy for drug product quality. There are many examples of manufacturers, both domestic and foreign, that have faced quality challenges in recent years. Our research also ignores key factors that affect purchasing decisions in practice. For example, patients will receive a product in an amber bottle that may not have the country of origin on the label. Choice is often an illusion. Patients who have received medications in hospitals and clinics and surgery centers are often--the drugs are often prepared and administered without a patient ever seeing the label. I do want to reiterate ASHP's support for this legislation. This is basic information that every American has a right to know. I urge the Committee to consider additional policies to directly incentivize domestic manufacturing, improve regulatory oversight or inspections of manufacturing facilities to ensure Americans have access to high quality pharmaceuticals. Chronic drug shortages, concern over drug product quality, and threats to national security are all related to the resilience and reliability of our pharmaceutical supply chain. Policies to address each of these risks and vulnerabilities can actually solve multiple root causes and result in a resilient supply chain of high quality pharmaceuticals that can withstand demand and supply shocks. There are two separate drug supply chains in the United States, brand name, single source products and older generic multi-source products. Financial incentives and challenges separate these two supply chains. Brand name manufacturers have a strong market incentive to invest in the resiliency of their supply chains and produce high quality drugs. However, price erosion and race to the bottom market dynamics result in a brittle supply chain for older generic drugs. For context, nearly every drug on the FDA's 2020 list of essential medicines is generic. With slim to negative profit margins, generic manufacturers are less likely to invest in resiliency and quality management. Generic manufacturers that are capable and willing to make those investments often lose market share due to drug price competition from manufacturers that unwilling or unable to invest in resiliency and quality management. The narrow profit margins also result in the offshoring of our drug supply chain, API manufacturing to countries with cheaper labor and less rigorous regulatory oversight. Without a public mechanism to evaluate quality and resiliency investments, purchasers have no information other than price to leverage when buying drugs. This reinforces the race to the bottom market dynamics and erodes market resiliency, resulting in a fragile supply chain, concerns about product quality, and chronic drug shortages. To strengthen the drug supply chain, ASHP also recommends additional policies that are available in the written testimony submitted to the Committee. These policies are focused on improving transparency into manufacturing quality, encouraging new manufacturers and new manufacturing sites, supporting economic stability by encouraging long-term guaranteed volume purchasing contracts, and diversifying the manufacturing base. ASHP greatly appreciates the Senate Special Committee on Aging's leadership in working to ensure America's seniors have access to safe and effective drugs. Thank you, and I look forward to today's discussion. Senator Moody. Thank you. Now, I would like to introduce Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer. Dr. Schondelmeyer is a Professor of Pharmaceutical Economics and Management at the University of Minnesota, as well as the Director of the PRIME Institute, which conducts research on policies related to pharmaceuticals. Through his decades of research experience as a published researcher on pharmaceutical economics and the pharmaceutical market, Dr. Schondelmeyer has conducted research for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the Food and Drug Administration, as well as this Committee. We thank you for being here today, and we ask that you begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF STEPHEN W. SCHONDELMEYER, PHARM.D., PH.D., PROFESSOR OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANAGEMENT & ECONOMICS, COLLEGE OF PHARMACY, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA Dr. Schondelmeyer. Thank you, Senator Moody, and Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Special Committee on Aging. I am pleased to be here today to talk about truth in labeling. It is an important topic to our marketplace and to consumers and to health care. Historically, we have had drug shortages in the U.S. market. We understand that. We have characterized them, and we are beginning to deal with that issue. Those shortages have occurred for a variety of reasons, including quality issues with drug products and concerns related to market economics. However, the advent of COVID-19 made us aware of and brought to the forefront another issue that causes drug shortages and lack of product in the market, and that is geopolitical risk--the behavior of other countries in the world can affect our access to supply of drugs and even some countries, in an effort to maintain sufficient supply for their own populations, prohibited export of drugs from their country to other countries during the COVID-19 process. Now we have seen now drug supply used as a weapon or as a leverage in the marketplace, and that could affect the U.S. dramatically. We are dangerously dependent on foreign sources for our drug supply in the U.S., with India and China dominating the market for active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials. The U.S. health care system is quite vulnerable to this geopolitical risk. If a dominant sourcing country decides to withhold drugs from our supply chain, we would face a major health care crisis precipitously. That brings us to the issue of how do we deal with this? We need to change our drug supply system and our drug shortage response process from a "find and fix" mentality--that is, we will wait till it occurs then we will fix it--to a "predict and prevent" approach. Let's predict where the shortages are going to be and prevent them from occurring in the first place, so we don't have people that go without necessary medications. I think "country of origin labeling" is an essential, foundational component of that process. It is standard practice for many consumer goods. As Chairman Scott pointed out, there is country of origin labeling for food and clothing and automobiles and other things in our consumer goods market. As you know, when an American goes to the grocery store to buy a T-bone steak, or they go to the department store to buy a T-shirt, there is a label on the product that tells them where the product was really was made, where it was sourced. Consumers do read and respond to that information and use it. I find it unconscionable though that we require transparency for our dinner and for our denims, but not for the critical drugs that save people's lives, cancer drugs, diabetes drugs, and a variety of other medications. Real country of origin labeling for pharmaceuticals must be clear, specific, and transparent. We should know where the drug product was actually made, not just where it was packaged, or warehoused, or marketed. Clear labeling must disclose two things, where the finished dosage product was made, and where the active pharmaceutical ingredient was made. Currently, finding information about where a drug was made, by the pharmacist who has to provide that information to the consumer, is very difficult, if not impossible. To find this information, a pharmacist can go to sources like the National Library of Medicine's DailyMed website, and if they dig around enough they can find, for some products, the country of origin. You can't find it for all products. It is not always there. It may take up to 30 minutes to find the answer for one drug, and pharmacists can't operate a pharmacy efficiently if they have to spend 30 minutes for each prescription chasing down what is the country of origin. Furthermore, manufacturers hide behind claims of confidentiality. FDA allows a drug company the option to declare that the information of where their product is made is confidential and a trade secret and I understand trade secrets are important, but a couple of things come to mind that suggest that this may not be as much of a trade secrets as we think. For example, the major blockbuster drugs today, like Mounjaro and Zepbound for weight loss and diabetes, are products that are labeled--if you look on the box or the package, it says "marketed by Eli Lilly," and that is good. It tells us who marketed it. It doesn't tell us who made it or where it was made. Lilly may well make these products, from other data bases I was able to find that Lilly really does make their products, For the Lilly case, and for many other drugs, the product labeling says who the product is "marketed by" but it does not tell you where it was made. However, if you go to Google, you can find press releases from the company announcing their investment in a new production facility, and they tell you where the product was actually made. What the company told FDA was confidential, they turn around and issue public press releases to say, look at what we are doing and I applaud Lilly for building a new plant in the U.S., but the point is it can't be confidential when you are giving it to FDA, and not confidential when the drug company puts out press releases on same product and the same plant where it is made. There is a little bit of duplicity in their approach to what confidentiality really is. There has been a recent change in the regulation of consumer product labeling. In June 2024, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued a new regulation, and they shifted their position. They said the consumer is really the patient at the pharmacy counter, not the pharmacy when it buys the product. They used to interpret that manufacturers had to represent to the pharmacy where the drug was made, and the pharmacy was viewed as the end consumer. I am a pharmacist. We work in the marketplace, and we know that the pharmacist is the last point at which the product gets to the patient. The pharmacist is the face of the drug product to the patient. I do think there is a proven transparency process, and that is in the country of New Zealand. New Zealand has a process, a public transparent online website that publishes the API source and the address where it was made in the factory, the finished dose form, and many other things. I encourage you to look. I have given references in my written testimony about where to find that and look at that and see what is there and New Zealand's experience has been that transparency has not harmed the commercial interest of companies. Three things I recommend to Congress. One, mandate country of origin transparency. We need to amend Federal statutes to require country of origins labeling for manufacturers at both the API and the finished dosage form level. Don't allow companies to hide behind that confidentiality claim. Senator Moody. Sir, if you could wrap up your testimony---- Dr. Schondelmeyer. I am---- Senator Moody [continuing]. in just 30 seconds, that would be great. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Yes. Senator Moody. Thank you. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Labeling for consumers is not an end unto itself. It is a foundational building block of a broader data base that helps the Government, and the country strategically plan for a secure drug supply and manage it. Labeling for the consumer is important, but building that broader supply is important. In other words, we need to build a market wide supply map, and I encourage you to look at the United States Pharmacopeia's Medicine Supply Map which does that and Congress needs to engage with, and fund building this and bring it within the work of the Government. Finally, empowering consumers. The consumer is the ultimate purchaser, and we need to make sure that this law is implemented and enforced, not just passed. Senator Moody. Thank you, sir. Thank you so much and I am sure that the questions will elicit a lot more of what you have to say today. We appreciate you. I am going to turn it over to Ranking Member Gillibrand now to introduce her witness. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairwoman Moody. I want to introduce Stephen Colvill. Mr. Colvill is an Assistant Research Director at the Duke- Margolis Institute for Health Policy where he leads the Duke- Margolis Revamp Drug Supply Chain Consortium and policy work on other supply chain and biomedical innovation topics. Previously, Mr. Colvill served in the White House Domestic Policy Council as Senior Policy Advisor for Medical Supply Chains. You may begin. STATEMENT OF STEPHEN COLVILL, ASSISTANT RESEARCH DIRECTOR, DUKE-MARGOLIS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Colvill. Thank you, Ranking Member Gillibrand, Senator Moody, and Chairman Scott, and members of the Committee for holding this hearing. I am Stephen Colvill, and as Ranking member mentioned, I lead the Revamp Drug Supply Chain Consortium at the Duke-Margolis Institute for Health Policy. I have seen the drug supply chain from many different angles. I have worked at one of the largest drug manufacturing plants in the U.S., and then on the commercial business side of that drug manufacturer. I co-founded a drug supply chain certification organization, where I worked with health systems to help them identify reliable suppliers. Then moved to the policy side where I have served in the White House Domestic Policy Council, and then my current role and throughout all this, one common thread has been obvious, we need to revamp how our supply chain works to better care for patients. Before discussing solutions, we need to identify the distinct yet overlapping problems in the drug supply chain. First, chronic drug shortages. These occur when a drug is simply not available, usually because of a supply chain breakdown like a manufacturing delay. Second, questions around pharmaceutical quality assurance. This is when a drug is available, but there are questions around if it was manufactured and tested appropriately. Then third, addressing geopolitical and national health security risks from foreign dependency and fourth, a desire to grow the economy through domestic manufacturing. As a Nation, we obviously need to address all of these. At the Revamp Consortium, we focus on policy solutions to the chronic drug shortages that have been causing devastating impacts to patient care for 20 plus years. We focus where shortages have been most prevalent, inexpensive generic sterile injectables, which are usually administered by healthcare providers such as in a hospital setting. Generic drug prices are on average about 33 percent lower in the U.S. than in other high income countries. Generics are cheap here, yet too frequently not available because the current provider payment system set by CMS and private insurers encourages providers to seek low cost generic drugs without enough consideration for reliable availability. Providers are not adequately rewarded when they take steps to prevent shortages. However, there is an alternative, aligning incentives to focus more on reliable availability for critical generics. I coauthored a proposal in October on how to make this happen. Our proposal offers up a simplified version of a Medicare incentive payment program originally outlined in the 2024 Senate Finance Committee discussion draft. The proposal would incentivize health care providers to do two things. One, purchase through committed contracting models. Second, identify and purchase drugs that meet reliability or resiliency benchmarks. Addressing chronic drug shortages in this way is clearly aligned with CMS's mission to improve health outcomes. CMS is also well positioned to move the needle, particularly in the inpatient setting where Medicare and Medicaid together account for about 75 percent of inpatient days. Since 2023, CMS has taken several actions to incentivize domestic production, including a notice earlier this week--just this week about a potential upcoming hospital incentive program. CMS actions should also encourage the reliable availability of critical generics by supporting committed contracts and reliability benchmarks. I encourage this Committee to collaborate with the Finance Committee on that. In the meantime, it is great that this Committee is considering legislation to make better information available about suppliers. My top priority here would be to kickstart reliability benchmarking pilots. Three prominent examples of such programs include the Healthcare Industry Resilience Collaborative's Resiliency Badging Program, U.S. Pharmacopeia's Resiliency Benchmarking Program, and FDA's Quality Management Maturity Program. These voluntary programs evaluate confidential data about various manufacturer supply chains. They then can communicate findings to the market about the reliability of those manufacturers. Uptakes of approaches like these has been relatively limited but could be significantly increased through HHS and DOD funding and support. This could also set a foundation for future CMS reform. Regarding pharmaceutical labeling, Americans deserve to know where their drugs come from, and effective labeling changes could, over time, possibly drive some more demand to domestic manufacturers. However, labeling reforms alone are likely to have a limited impact. Many decisionmaker already know where API and finished dosage forms are made, and patients have limited influence over what drugs are stocked. Also, just because a drug is made in the U.S. doesn't necessarily mean it is always the best choice. Some of the most significant shortages have resulted from manufacturing issues in U.S. plants. Other assessments are also needed, such as from reliability benchmarking programs, like I mentioned. My written testimony provides additional points on how potential unintended consequences of labeling reforms could be mitigated. Before I close, two specific considerations on labeling. Place of business may not be the best term to use in labeling requirements, as place of business is not necessarily the same as the location of manufacturing. It may be more beneficial as FDA requested in their legislative proposals under the prior Administration, and again in the current Administration, to require manufacturers to include in their digital labeling information unique facility identifier numbers for the original API manufacturer and original finished drug product manufacturer. Finally, to summarize, one, we need to clearly define the problems. Two, I would focus first and foremost on CMS payment reforms to support committed contracting models between purchasers and manufacturers that meet reliability benchmarks and third, consider requiring unique facility identifiers to be included in digital labeling information. Thank you, and I look forward to the discussion. Senator Moody. Thank you very much for your testimony and without any objection, I am going to let Senator Johnson kick us off with questions. Senator Johnson. Thanks, Senator Moody. I supplied plastic packaging materials to the medical device industry for about 30 years and, you know, fully understand good manufacturing process, GMPs, benchmark of that is traceability. You know, we need to know, you know, what rail car, what box of resin produced that roll of sheet stock that went into packaging that particular medical device, okay and that is just for packaging material. Dr. Gray, does the FDA not require that level of traceability on drugs, I mean, things we actually put in our bodies versus just a package that surrounds a medical device? Dr. Gray. My understanding is within the facility, they have requirements, and GMP requirements like you are talking about. The manufacturer itself does have to trace lots and things from its suppliers, but--and Mike can help me with this one--but when the hospitals receive the drugs---- Senator Johnson. They don't have the information. Dr. Gray. They don't have the information. The buyers don't have the information. Senator Johnson. Does the FDA require that traceability back to the precursor chemicals--to the API, to the actual compounding of the drug, to the marketer? Dr. Gray. My understanding is API, yes. Precursor chemicals, no, is my understanding. At least--and I am not 100 percent sure on that. Senator Johnson. Anybody who can answer that question to me. How critical would be for us to know where the precursor chemicals come from, or is it okay just to focus on API? Dr. Schondelmeyer. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Yes. Certainly, it is important to know where the KSM came from for purposes of, is it quality, is it a product that we want to put in human bodies in America, but it is also important to see how dependent we are on specific sources of supply and countries of supply so they may be putting quality product in there, but if we find that 30, 40, 50 percent of our API supply is from China, and China is an adversary---- Senator Johnson. I got to--so I understand the supply chain issue, the precursor chemical. What about a quality issue? I mean, do we need to know what the--you know, where that precursor chemical came from, or can we do the quality check on the API before it gets compounded into a drug? Dr. Schondelmeyer. Well, I would describe it this way. A lot of that is based on voluntary compliance with the Continuous Good Manufacturing Practices Act. It is not required, and FDA doesn't--it is not like a meatpacking plant where they inspect everybody, you know---- Senator Johnson. Mr. Ganio, you want to answer this again? Dr. Ganio. Sure. Senator Johnson. It is not required by the FDA? Dr. Ganio. The key starting materials, no and to answer your question about quality, I would be less concerned about the quality and more of the national security vulnerabilities associated with it. The API is tested by manufacturers. They will confirm that what they receive from an API manufacturer is suitable for production. Anything that is manufactured up to that point should be okay from a quality perspective, but the vulnerabilities that need to be revealed are important. Senator Johnson. We had the 2008 heparin contamination issue. Have we done anything to address what went wrong there? Dr. Ganio. Scientifically, United States Pharmacopeia revised the monograph for that to make sure that oversulfated chondroitin sulfate would be detected when testing. From a national security standpoint, that should address if the GMPs are being followed and record keeping is being followed. Senator Johnson. If we--you know, Mr. Colvill, you mentioned that U.S. generic drugs are about 33 percent less expensive than in other countries, you know, first world nation countries. Why is that? Is it just greater competition, or are there rules and regulations in place in those countries that increase that cost of drug? Mr. Colvill. It could be a result of incentives in the market. What are the purchasers incentivized to value? I think in the U.S., there is an emphasis on low cost, which is important, of course, but there is not enough emphasis on other things that are important too--reliable availability, quality, you know, everything else that goes into the full value proposition for these products. Senator Johnson. I mean, in general generic drugs are pretty cheap, correct? I mean, where we have problems with high drug prices in the patentable drugs that, you know, until they go off patent and become generic. When we are talking about--and I think, you know, what Senator Scott is proposing, labeling, I think that is an incredibly important first step. I think all the witnesses are saying that as well, but you know, there may be rules and regulations in terms of quality, and testing, and statistical sampling, and GMPs, and following those things and making those available as well, that would add a price to that. Anybody want to opine in terms of, would that increase prices by 33 percent? Which still, when you look at the total drug buy in the U.S.--you know, we don't have extremely expensive health care here because of drugs. It is a component of it, but it is a small component. If you want--I personally think most consumers would pay a little bit more to be assured of quality, so they don't get--so they won't die from a heparin contamination or something like that. Anybody want to opine in terms of what the right rules and regulations and laws to ensure quality, how much that would increase the price of generic drugs? Would it be the 33 percent? Would it double it? Mr. Ganio, you look like you want to answer. Dr. Ganio. I couldn't give you an exact number. That would vary by manufacturer, but as you mentioned, and as I mentioned in my testimony, the two supply chains--there is instances where we probably don't pay enough for generic drugs, and this is the result, the questionable quality, but all we have to value when we buy drugs is the price. Everything is pass, fail, which is clearly not sufficient. If additional information about quality is made available, then purchasers would have a reason to spend 10 percent, 15 percent more. We conducted a survey in 2023 and found our members are willing to spend about 10 to 15 percent on drugs. You have to look on the other side that the supply chain issues, the shortages, what they cost--over almost $900 million in labor expenses alone, according to a report from Vizien, a group purchasing organization. Our research also shows increased costs of drug supply chain concerns. If you make that tradeoff, pay a little bit more for guaranteed supply chain high quality drugs, it theoretically could pay for itself. Senator Johnson. By the way, I will say that having been a manufacturer, had to follow GMP, got ISO audits every 6 months, it costs a little bit more but not that much more. What you end up being is just a far better manufacturer. You have higher quality. You have higher level customer service, greater reliability, less scrap. You know, so I wouldn't believe any manufacturer or any of these marketers saying, well, it is going to increase our cost dramatically. It really shouldn't. It is just good manufacturing practices. That ought to be insisted on again. I really appreciate what Senator Scott is doing here with these hearings. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schondelmeyer and Dr. Colvill, we have been talking about, we talked about terms of art, that we have to get the terms of our correct. People say marketed for, distributed by, repackaged by. What is the best term of art for this labeling? I would like all the witnesses to answer this question, but starting with you, Dr. Schondelmeyer. Dr. Schondelmeyer. I think the simplest is "product of" or "made by" and then it should specify, are they talking about the finished dosage form or the API? Both should be disclosed. FDA may well have all of this information and other information on quality, but they either aren't authorized, or as a matter of policy don't choose, to release a lot of it. Just having the information at FDA doesn't necessarily improve the quality and the ability of decisionmakers to make decisions, whether it is the consumer, or the prescriber, or the pharmacist, or the purchaser. They need to know what FDA knows to make those decisions, so "made by" or "product of," and "API product of," "finished dosage form product of" and the country. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Colvill. Mr. Colvill. Dr. Schondelmeyer, you are referring to what is on the physical label, which is important, obviously. I think we also should think about the digital information. We live in a digital world. What is the information that is provided digitally? You can have a lot more information that is provided that way. There is limited real estate on these labels. Some of them are really, really tiny. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, unique facility identifier numbers could be considered to be required. Senator Gillibrand. I think that it would be very smart for the digital labeling to say exactly where the plant was in India or where the plan was in China. Mr. Colvill. If that was done, it would all be listed on DailyMed, the data base that several others have mentioned. Third parties could easily put together publicly available, user-friendly data bases where patients and others could easily look up where these drugs were made. Senator Gillibrand. Doctor Ganio. Dr. Schondelmeyer. I would quickly comment that I agree, the DailyMed is a great source, but if you look at their data_ they do sometimes have API manufacturer and finished dosage form manufacturer for some products, and they have an entity identifier on there for the ones that are named, but it is pretty complex, and consumers have a difficult time sorting out what is there. I included as an appendix to my written testimony printouts from the New Zealand MedSafe data base that report the same information, but it is much more easily understandable by a consumer if they look it up with a QR code or other things. I encourage you to look at the way it's presented in the New Zealand MedSafe data base. It is much more consumer and user friendly, and easier to follow. Senator Gillibrand. Okay, and Dr. Ganio. Dr. Ganio. Yes, I completely agree with both--I agree with both Dr. Schondelmeyer and Mr. Colvill. The physical label should be easy to understand and easy to read. It should say manufactured by the name of the facility. Having the unique facility identifiers in a searchable data base can help identify vulnerabilities, choke points, things where we are all relying on the same site, where right now might be under a contract and not necessarily easily discernible, but stakeholders could find out where those choke points are and invest. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Dr. Gray. Dr. Gray. Finished dosage manufacturing location, active pharmaceutical ingredient manufacturing location should both be on the label and then I agree with the searchable data, the easy to access data base that includes more details on that, and also as I mentioned in my testimony, quality ratings. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. In several of the testimonies today, there have been mentions of the data that is collected by the Customs and Border Protection and the Food and Drug Administration when pharmaceuticals are imported into the U.S. However, what is required to be listed on the label by CPB is different than what's required to listed on a label by FDA. There also been allusions to country of origin disclosures being voluntary provided rather than mandated by the current CPB regulations. At times, disclosure regulations required by CPB seem to be in direct odds with those by the FDA. For any or all of the witnesses, how should Congress work to harmonize the information gathered by the FDA and the CBP to ensure that the information received by them is not duplicative, but also provides consumers with clear understanding of a product's country of origin? Dr. Gray. I will just say quickly, and hopefully this will sort of answer your question, that FDA has requested authorization to be able to release a bunch of manufacturing location, API, active ingredient--API finished dosage form, excipients, critical excipient, etcetera--allowing them to do that. The FDA feels bounded to not be able do that by company confidential information. That would align them, I think. Dr. Schondelmeyer. I think as policymakers, you need to look across both the CPB and FDA, and what their regulations are, and integrate them. This--CBP is limited only to imports. They don't even require listing on the label "made in the USA" when it is made in the USA because that is not an import. Senator Gillibrand. I see. Dr. Schondelmeyer. That needs to be cleaned up. I think do it under one set of regulations, probably placed at FDA rather than CBP because of that and then make it really clear what the language is, you know, what goes--as important as the made or manufactured is the preposition that follows it. Made "by" is different than made "for." Senator Gillibrand. Yes. Understood. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Very different and so, clear that up and put clear definitions for it and then also, don't allow companies to declare that where it is actually made as confidential or trade secret. Senator Gillibrand. Correct. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Declare that is public information that needs to be disclosed. Senator Gillibrand. Understood. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Moody. Senator Moody. Thank you, Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Gillibrand for convening this hearing to examine what sounds like a very urgent need for transparency in our drug supply chain. Every day, millions of Americans rely on a wide range of medications to maintain their health and quality of life. As parents, we often take prescriptions to the pharmacy and get medications that we then tell our children to take, trusting that there are no quality control issues. I think this should be top of mind for every American and certainly every parent. Unfortunately, throughout the hearings that we have had on this issue and this Committee on drug supply transparency, it has become increasingly clear there's simply not enough transparency and what is worse, FDA import alerts routinely cite carcinogenic impurities, falsified batch records, and non- sterile conditions from manufacturers in China and India. Roughly one-third of all FDA import alerts target Chinese facilities, and another 16 percent target Indian producers. Just last year, I and many of my colleagues on this Committee sent a letter to the FDA raising the alarm at problems with drug quality due to poor foreign inspections in countries like China and in India who together account for 60 percent of APIs globally. That doesn't even include, as we have discussed already, the key starting materials. Many Americans who rely on prescription medications, particularly seniors, which is why this Committee is paying such close attention, have no reasonable way to determine where their medications are manufactured, effectively denying them an opportunity to choose American made drugs. What we found is that this failure stems from a combination of loopholes and insufficient FDA enforcement, which allows foreign adversaries such as China to exert control over the production of drugs that Americans depend on to stay alive. It is crucial, and what I am hearing from every witness today, that we take immediate action to increase transparency in our drug supply chain so that consumers can make informed decisions about the medications they use. Important, a study from 2022 found that 83 percent of top 100 generic drugs consumed by U.S. citizens have no U.S. based source of active pharmaceutical ingredients. With that said, I would like to turn to one of the witnesses that I had to cut short when we were getting to time limits on introductions. Mr. Schondelmeyer, in your testimony, you wanted to further explain, I believe, about how in New Zealand they have a model for providing drug supply chain transparency. That the New Zealand MedSafe program maintains updated information regarding active ingredients which is available to the public. What aspects of that model would you say are most crucial to be included if the United States were to ever enact transparency measures on our drug supply chain? Dr. Schondelmeyer. The New Zealand system collects all of the information we have talked about, where are the key starting materials from, what are the inactive ingredients, where is the active ingredient made, and the factory name and address, the finished dosage form, manufacturer name and address, who packages the product, and who labels it. Every step along the way is transparent and for every prescription drug on the market in New Zealand, it is put in a data base and any consumer in New Zealand, or the rest of the world, can look up those products at the product-specific level and identify where did it come from. We should have nothing less in America. In fact, these days the pharmaceutical supply system is really a global supply system. We talk about the U.S. drug supply, but if we take that, the same sources are probably 70 or 80 percent of the worlds global supply. It really is the same system. We need a system equivalent to New Zealand. I applaud FDA and the DailyMed website that is maintained, but it is not nearly as consumer friendly as New Zealand's system is and we need to look at, and emulate their process, and then make transparent the information that FDA does have. Senator Moody. Do you believe that the New Zealand model for transparency, the things that they have enacted, do you believe that has decreased the amount of contaminated drugs that are consumed by the public there? Dr. Schondelmeyer. I believe it has and I haven't seen studies from New Zealand about the number and types of shortages, but I think if they were at the same level as we see in the U.S., we would probably have seen studies of that type. I wouldn't draw a conclusion from it yet, but I don't think they have as severe a drug shortage problem as we do in the U.S. for a variety of reasons and I have talked with the officials at MedSafe in New Zealand, and they say they aren't aware of any commercial problems in the marketplace from making that information public. Senator Moody. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moody. I guess to start, maybe each of you, when we go to the pharmacy and we have a choice between a generic drug and a brand name drug, are they exactly--we are taking the exact same drug? If each of could respond. Dr. Gray. Yes. Generics typically do not follow the same production process. The excipients can be different, and there is a range of bioavailability that is allowed even upon approval. Generics do go through an approval process that is somewhat rigorous and includes in-vitro testing on a small number of individuals, but it is a lot less than the original drug and that is at approval. Then I think what I have researched most and thought about is after approval, when the manufacturing facility has been operating for years under light regulation, how things go, you know, how consistent is compliance, but no, it is not the same excipients necessarily. It is not same process and there is-- again, there is a range of availability. Dr. Ganio. I would agree that they are not the same. However, they should behave the same in the body. When I talk to my family, I myself, I have no problem taking a generic. I will tell you that if the label shows where it is made, I will opt for domestically manufactured, or "French," or "friend- shored" manufacturing because I am not sure the quality of where the product is made. However, I don't think there's any issue with generic equivalency. There are, as Dr. Gray mentioned, a battery of tests that are done to make sure that it behaves in the body the exact same way as the brand name product does. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Embedded in your question is, are they the same drug? What do we mean by drug? On the one hand, a drug can be the molecule, the active ingredient that causes the positive effects in the body that we are after in the healthcare system. We also use the word drug to mean the drug product. That is the active ingredients, plus all of the extra things we added in to make the tablet hold together and to preserve it. The excipients, as Dr. Gray described, so there may be differences in the excipients and other things. Think about it when you are baking cookies. You know, each cook has their own recipe, their secret ingredient in making their cookies and they may be a little bit different. They may all taste similar. They may be all chocolate chip cookies, but there are slight differences across them. They all have the same ingredients, they have chocolate chips in them, and they are chocolate chip cookies. The molecule, I think, is essentially the same in almost all cases. The other things you add into it may differ, and some of those may have an effect positively or negatively on the health of a patient. Our current process of inspecting and evaluating equivalency of products doesn't take into account all of those other things perhaps as well as it should. Mr. Colvill. Thank you for the question, Chairman. For myself, I don't have any problem taking generics. These two are pharmacists, so I, you know, would--I am very interested in, you know--glad that they shared their perspective. I think the most stark difference between a branded drug and a generic drug isn't the chemical properties themselves of the drug, but it is the supply chain, the robustness of the supply chain. A branded drug has every incentive to have redundancy, extra manufacturing capacity, backup plans, buffer stock. They take all these steps to make sure they avoid shortages. Whereas generic supply chains are very lean. If there is a disruption in the supply chain, frequently that leads to patient issues, and, you know, issues with patient care being impacted. I think that is the most stark difference. The Chairman. Dr. Gray, would you take--you don't care if it is a generic or branded drug? Dr. Gray. At the moment, I don't take any drugs, but I would generally take a generic drug if prescribed but would try to investigate where it is from, but again, some of my family do, and ProPublica's Rx Inspector, which came out just a month ago, allows you to find out where the finished dosage form of your drug is made easily, unlike the DailyMed approach. I would certainly investigate. I do pay more for brand over-the-counter drugs. I wouldn't take a generic eye drop. It kind of depends on what it is, right. If it is going directly into the bloodstream, or the eyes, or a tablet. The Chairman. Good. Dr. Ganio, so, do pharmacists know where the active ingredients of the drugs are made? If so, do they tell their customers? Dr. Ganio. No, in general, the pharmacist would not know where the active pharmaceutical ingredient is from. It is possible to research and find that and there is nothing on a prescription label that would tell the patient. I have never been asked as a pharmacist where the API was from by anyone that I have dispensed the medication to. Dr. Gray. Can I just say, I have asked my pharmacist, and they look at me like I have two heads, so. The Chairman. Oh, no, I ask them every time. Dr. Gray. Yes. The Chairman. I have done enough ads. They all know who I am, so and I have told them about our hearings. They now expect it. They actually have more information now than before. Mr. Colvill, why is supply chain mapping important to country of origin labeling? Mr. Colvill. Well, a few different reasons. Supply chain mapping would be important because you want to identify if there is redundancy in the supply chain or if there is concentration. If there is concentration, that can cause issues. For example, you know, from a natural disaster or any sort of disruption. Being able to identify where there is diversification versus concentration, and also just identifying vulnerabilities. There is different problems, like I mentioned earlier, different problems that we need to assess. If you are thinking about national security issues or geopolitical risks, then obviously mapping the supply chain to determine where drugs that are heavily reliant on more adversarial countries are coming from is important. The Chairman. Dr. Schondelmeyer, what county of origin labeling--would country of origin labeling encourage investment in U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturing? Dr. Schondelmeyer. Would it encourage what? The Chairman. U.S. manufacturing. Dr. Schondelmeyer. I think it will provide some encouragement for U.S. and for nearshoring manufacturing in Canada, perhaps Mexico, or our neighbors in Latin America may be encouraged. Issues that come to play--one reason why China and India have become dominant is because they had lower environmental regulations, lower labor laws, and lower pay, and many other restrictions are eliminated in those countries and the companies take advantage of that and make it--and they also have an economy of scale larger than the U.S. or the Western Hemisphere. I think we can overcome those though and with advanced manufacturing that is being developed in the U.S., they can make products leaner and greener and I think, we could get to a point where we could compete in the U.S. and in our nearshore neighbors and recall, Puerto Rico used to be a hotbed of production. It has declined over time, but I think that could be reinvigorated along with other neighboring countries. The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand, do you have any other questions? Senator Gillibrand. Just a couple more. Dr. Ganio, I want to explore a little bit more about your testimony about supply chain. You specifically mentioned fragile supply chains and the need for buffer inventory to insulate the United States from potential drug shortages in times of geopolitical conflict. Can you discuss some of the national security risks in more detail? Dr. Ganio. Yes, I think we have covered some of it today but thank you for the question. I keep forgetting to unmute my microphone. Thank you for that question. We know, based on data out of the United States Pharmacopeia, that we have an overreliance on China for key starting materials, API sources in China and in India also. In the event of escalating trade conflict, in the event an armed conflict, if China decides to make a move on the Taiwanese territory, for example, and that things escalate, we are extremely vulnerable to sources in China and they could hold those supplies from the United States, which would cut us off from essential medicines. Knowing exactly where those vulnerabilities are--the data and transparency only gives you enough to act, and we can't take action until we have that data. We think--we believe strongly that the transparency--to help the United States understand how much we rely on those sources and how to find alternative sources is critical to our national health care security. Senator Gillibrand. We have had a hearing on this topic before, but we talked a lot about FDA's ability to inspect foreign domestic manufacturing process very significantly, creating concerns about oversight and quality of imported drugs. Can you talk a little bit about that? That is same question for all the witnesses. Dr. Ganio. Yes. Thank you for the hearing in September. I cannot say that that hearing did not keep me up at night after hearing testimony about some of the inspections, but this is where I think it is important. Domestic manufacturing is great. FDA has the ability to walk in unannounced, but I also think in other countries that are considered allies, we should be investing in a diverse supply chain, both in the U.S., in other countries where--we have vulnerabilities, we have hurricanes here, we have other disruptions that can happen. More diversity geographically creates a more robust supply chain, so by incentivizing it in countries where the FDA has that ability to walk in unannounced, I think is important. Senator Gillibrand. Yes. Because it was interesting when asked by the Chairman, would you guys take generics? You all said, well, if I could figure out where it is from, I would maybe consider that. Obviously, for you as the most knowledgeable stakeholders, where things are manufactured is highly relevant to you and it is highly relevant to me because we don't have the same inspections. Just to close out the testimony, if each of the other witnesses could just add whatever you think is relevant to add on these topics. Go ahead, Dr. Gray. Dr. Gray. On the inspections, I would like to also add that one big difference is the legal ramifications for the individuals, the managers, the quality manager, the plant manager of sending adulterated drugs in the U.S., you can go to jail. If you are overseas, you can't, right. We can't prosecute. I think that is another incentive. I think the--you know, you heard a lot from Peter Baker on the unannounced inspection pilot, and that shows the need to do unannounced inspections globally. I think--I have a research paper now exploring the current pilot. I think you are aware that the Congress mandated an unannounced inspection pilot in India that began in late 2022, and we are finding three to four times more likely to issue a warning letter of the unannounced inspections relative to the pre-announced inspection, meaning things weren't being found. Some of the worst--the worst things you have read about the last few years were plants that had had clean inspections years prior to the unannounced inspection pilot. I was thinking about that. I will stop there. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Dr. Schondelmeyer. Yes. A couple of points I would make. First of all, India is our major supplier of generic pharmaceuticals and in India, certainly, there are good quality products that come out of India. Not all of them, but some of them. One of the issues is India does not participate in the International Council on Harmonization of Regulation, FDA type regulations. Most all of our other suppliers, including China, collaborate in that. We should begin to pressure and encourage India to participate in the ICH. Second, within India, they regulate manufacturing of drugs, not at the national level, but at the equivalent of the state level, and they have like 40 states. Even within India, they know that some states have pretty poor quality production and others have better quality. They differentiate internally in the country, yet we don't as a country when we buy from India. We need to encourage India to step up within their system, the quality, and make it more consistent and uniform. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Mr. Colvill. Thank you, Senator. Two thoughts from me. The first is, you mentioned location of production and that is an important thing to consider. I think the best thing to address that issue is leveling the playing field, and one of the best things that can be done to do that is ensure FDA has the resources to do foreign inspections at the level that is needed. Then second point is location of production is only one thing that should be considered. You also need to consider reliable supply chains and quality and so, you can do that through reliability benchmarking programs. I mentioned a few examples of programs that are early on in doing that and then also you could do independent quality testing to ensure a high level of quality assurance. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Well, I want to thank each of you for being here. It has been enlightening. Today's hearing made one thing unmistakably clear, Americans are being asked to trust a system that refuses to tell them the truth. We label our food, we label our clothes. When it comes to lifesaving medicine, patients are kept in the dark about where they are made. I mean, that doesn't make any sense. This isn't about banning drugs or raising prices. This could actually lower prices for American families, while delivering needed transparency and support American jobs. Manufacturing location matters. Oversight isn't equals. Secrecy doesn't protect patients. It protects the status quo and bad actors. Americans deserve to know what they are putting in their bodies and whether their medicine is truly made in America. Honesty and transparency strengthens markets, accountability, and national security. My staff will be reaching out to share the bill text with everybody's office in the coming days. I just want to thank Ranking Member Gillibrand. Her team has been great to work with, and this has been a great bipartisan effort to try to come up with a solution that is going to be workable. If any Senators have additional questions for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Thanks everybody. [Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] ======================================================================= APPENDIX ======================================================================= Prepared Witness Statements ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= Questions for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Truth in Labeling: Americans Deserve to Know Where Their Drugs Come From" January 29, 2026 Questions for the Record Dr. Michael Ganio There were two questions during the hearing that I'd like to expand on. The first was Chairman Scott's question about brand and generic being exactly the same. I would like to affirm my response during the hearing, but add that the question we should be considering is whether generic drugs, as originally approved by the FDA, are exactly the same as manufactured decades later. The generics approved under an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) must match the characteristics of the brand-name product approved under the new drug application (NDA), even if the inactive ingredients are different. What we have seen through recent research and from FDA inspections is that not all generics are manufactured to the same high quality standards, especially older generic drugs. The second was Senator Johnson's question about the 2008 heparin issue. Again, my response to the question is accurate- that specific issue has been resolved. However, I would like to add that the circumstances that led to that issue still exist today. If a manufacturer knowingly included an impurity or a false active ingredient in a pharmaceutical, it may not be detected immediately. Only regular testing of pharmaceuticals could catch or prevent that. To be 100% transparent, I'm not sure that a regular testing program would have caught the heparin contamination in 2008 -- the heparin test at the time was not designed to detect the oversulfated chondroitin sulfate contaminant. Regardless, the U.S. relies extensively on the manufacturer's own testing programs. Falsified results or knowingly contaminated products very likely would reach patients before detected. Senator Jon Husted Question: How do large purchasers of medicines such as hospitals, and health systems currently assess supply-chain risk when selecting drugs? Response: Large purchasers base buying decisions almost exclusively on price. Purchasing contracts can also influence decisions, but buying is still based solely on financial evaluation and not differences in the drug product. Occasionally, specific buyers may avoid a product due to past experiences, for example, problems with vial stoppers when inserting a needle. In most cases, generic drugs are all assumed to be the same. All are evaluated and approved through the FDA's abbreviated new drug application process. Because this is a pass-or-fail method of approval, there is no reason to expect differences between generic products. However, based on outcomes research and on FDA inspection reports, there are clearly differences in the quality of manufacturing. Question: Beyond transparent information on a medicine's country of origin, what other information would be meaningful to large purchasers as it relates to how a purchaser evaluates the resiliency of a manufacturer's supply chain? Response: Currently, the only information readily available to purchasers is the price. In the current environment, manufacturers compete on a pass/fail system with the FDA, so all products available on the market are assumed to be equal. That puts an overemphasis on price and will shift purchasers away from manufacturers able to invest in quality and resiliency and toward higher risk manufacturers. If purchasers had more information about a manufacturer's quality management and investments in resiliency, it could realign incentives toward reliability and away from buying the cheapest product. Question: Given the recent shortage of cancer drugs such as carboplatin and cisplatin, why did the market for these drugs end with such little redundancy despite the importance of these drugs for cancer patients? Response: With most generic drugs that have been around for decades, the manufacturer with the cheapest price is likely to win most of the market share. In the case of cisplatin, a single manufacturer had 50% of the market. Unfortunately, an FDA inspection revealed that manufacturer was cutting corners, leading to a halt in production and shortage of an essential cancer treatment. It's difficult for high-reliability manufacturers to compete with companies that cut corners or are subsidized by foreign governments. If they are continually undercut on price, they will eventually stop making a product, leading to less resiliency in the marketplace for that drug. This happens regularly with generic drugs that have been around for decades. Question: How does the low reimbursement for these drugs shape the supply chain fragility? Response: Hospitals and providers are not separately paid for older generic drugs by Medicare or Medicaid. When a hospital or provider submits a claim for older generic drugs, like decades- old chemotherapy drugs, the drugs are reimbursed as part of a bundled payment that is assumed to account for the cost of care. This type of reimbursement overemphasizes low price when determining which products to buy for patients. Buying the cheapest product generally results in a more favorable margin-a margin that is often negative, but less negative than buying and billing a more expensive version of that same generic product. Question: What vulnerabilities exposed by these shortages still exist today? Response: Several vulnerabilities - concentrated market share anywhere can be a vulnerability, both geographically (see Hurricanes Maria and Helene) or with quality-related disruptions (cisplatin). Concentrated market share in a country that can be challenging for FDA inspections is another vulnerability. The underlying market dynamics (described in previous answers) also still exist today and will continually reinforce purchasers buying the cheapest product. Additional vulnerabilities that may or may not exist related to the upstream supply chain (i.e. active pharmaceutical ingredients or key starting materials) for cisplatin and other essential drugs. Not knowing how much the supply chain relies on sources of API and key inputs that are in countries at risk of trade wars or geopolitical tensions is an unknown vulnerability. Question: According to recent reporting, the number of ongoing prescription drug shortages rose slightly in the last quarter of 2025, but remained significantly lower than the all-time high reached in the beginning of 2024. Moreover, the number of new shortages identified last year was just 89, the lowest figure since 2006, and considerably less than 130 medicines that were in shortly supply in 2024, according to a new report from the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP). And notably, long-standing shortages are beginning to resolve; 75% of all the active shortages started in 2022 or later. Could new mandates on companies with respect to either the label or labeling contribute to new drug shortages? Could any new requirements and their associated penalties for non- compliance create a situation in which certain manufacturers prematurely leave the U.S. market and, as such, create new drug shortages? Response: I don't foresee this being a significant contributor to future drug shortages. New mandates on label or labeling requirements should have realistic timelines for compliance. Otherwise, this should not result in manufacturers leaving the U.S. market. U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Truth in Labeling: Americans Deserve to Know Where Their Drugs Come From" January 29, 2026 Questions for the Record Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer Senator Raphael Warnock Question: Dr. Schondelmeyer, you emphasized the role of advanced data analytics in identifying vulnerabilities before crises and mitigating pharmaceutical drug shortages. How can Congress improve the employment of predictive analytics across federal agencies to forecast drug shortages for scenarios such as natural disasters or international trade disruptions? Response: The Current Landscape and Supply Chain Vulnerabilities The resilience of the United States prescription drug supply is a matter of critical national security and public health. Currently, the U.S. reacts to drug shortages rather than proactively forecasting them. Congress has the opportunity to authorize systematic changes across federal agencies, specifically by permitting data to be shared across agencies and by improving the employment of predictive analytics. Through comprehensive supply chain mapping and enhanced predictive analytics with data transparency, the U.S. can transition to a "predict and prevent" paradigm to forecast and mitigate drug shortages resulting from natural disasters, pandemics, or international trade disruptions. The U.S. pharmaceutical market is heavily dependent on foreign sources for key starting materials (KSMs), active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and finished dosage forms (FDFs). This geographically concentrated reliance introduces substantial vulnerabilities during geopolitical disruptions. Currently, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is tasked with reviewing and approving drug products to ensure they are safe and effective for the market. While the FDA possesses a tremendous amount of information regarding the clinical and safety profiles of these drugs, it has not been tasked with, or given resources for, managing economic and commercial data to conduct a comprehensive, market-wide analysis of the U.S. drug supply. While the federal government has the authority to collect certain types of information to assist in managing drug shortages, other critical intelligence gaps prevent the effective construction of a comprehensive drug supply database. Although the FDA can request details concerning the manufacturing processes, as well as lists of active and inactive ingredients used, it remains unclear whether the FDA actually receives all of this data or the extent to which this information can be integrated internally or with external datasets. Most alarmingly, the FDA acknowledges that it lacks the requisite information to assess how quickly U.S.-based manufacturers could scale up domestic production of APIs or finished dose forms if a primary supplying nation-such as China or India-were to suddenly cease supply to the U.S. market. For decades, the pharmaceutical supply chain has operated under a reactive "fail and fix" framework, leaving the nation vulnerable to disruptions stemming from manufacturing failures, natural disasters, or geopolitical tensions. To be sure, these "fail and fix" efforts are a necessary part of mitigating the impact of drug shortages, but they will not change the trajectory or magnitude of future drug shortages and their prevention. In order to shift toward a "predict and prevent" model, a multifaceted approach is required: (1) construct and maintain a dynamic and comprehensive national drug supply map; (2) overhaul data collection to ensure seamless coordination between all government agencies and appropriate private entities; (3) proactively manage market demand and use data and risk management plans on a market-wide basis; and (4) deploy advanced artificial intelligence and predictive analytics to forecast disruptions, implement structural changes, and circumvent the impact of potential new and recurring threats. To effectively employ predictive analytics, federal agencies require reliable inputs, inter-agency coordination, and comprehensive market visibility and strategic visioning. Congress should enact legislation to implement the following structural and data-driven improvements. A. Authorize, Fund, and Build an Ongoing, Comprehensive National Drug Supply Map Predictive analytics algorithms cannot forecast disruptions in a supply chain that is undocumented or poorly understood. To address this, an in-depth, comprehensive, and ongoing map of the U.S. drug supply chain is needed to pinpoint exactly where each drug product-including its key starting materials, APIs, and finished products-are manufactured. Congress should authorize and fund a national agency or entity responsible for: (1) building this comprehensive supply map; (2) making transparent to the public appropriate data elements; (3) linking to commercial sources with prescription drug use and expenditure data; and (4) analyzing the data to estimate the probability and risk of consequences of specific events that can lead to drug shortages. The foundation of a resilient pharmaceutical market is a comprehensive, real-time map of the drug supply chain. An in- depth mapping initiative is required to identify the precise manufacturing pathways and geographical origins of key starting materials (KSMs), active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and finished dose forms (FDFs). The USP Medicine Supply Map: The United States Pharmacopeia (USP) has developed a global Medicine Supply Map that aggregates insights from over 22,000 global sites. This tool successfully maps 91% of FDFs and 55% of APIs, calculating vulnerability scores to offer quantifiable risk metrics. The federal government should support, fund, expand, and utilize such initiatives to ensure that it has a real-time, comprehensive drug supply map. The government should collaborate with and build upon the USP Medicines Supply Map. Identifying Geographical Vulnerabilities: The U.S. market relies heavily on foreign manufacturing, particularly in China and India, which creates acute geographical vulnerabilities and "single points of failure". A robust supply map must pinpoint these dependencies to facilitate priorities for re-shoring, near-shoring, and friend-shoring among critical drug products. Adopting the "New Zealand Transparency Model": To maximize the utility of the supply map, the U.S. should adopt transparency standards akin to New Zealand's MedSafe, which maintains a public, searchable database of every approved manufacturing site for every drug product on the market. This transparency enables analysts to use product-specific, market- wide, real-time data to provide insight into the potential and real market impact of a quality failure, factory closure, climate disaster, trade barriers, or other market disruptions. B. Collect and Coordinate Data from Government and Private Sources A drug supply map is only as effective as the data supporting it. Currently, pharmaceutical data is highly fragmented across various federal and state agencies, including the FDA, DEA, CDC, Department of Defense (DOD), Veterans Affairs (VA), Department of Commerce, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and a variety of other government entities. Legislative Mandates for Data Collection: The CARES Act significantly expanded the FDA's authority to collect supply chain data. It expanded requirements for manufacturers to notify the FDA of permanent discontinuances or interruptions in manufacturing that could disrupt U.S. supply. Furthermore, Section 510(j)(3) mandates annual reports from drug manufacturers on monthly production totals for APIs and finished drug products, providing the FDA insight into national production capacity and output. Upstream Sourcing Transparency: Drug manufacturers must be required to report all sources of APIs and major excipients. When an FDF manufacturer utilizes APIs from multiple sources, they should disclose the percentage of the API originating from each distinct source to facilitate accurate utilization, excess capacity estimates, risk management, and remediation efforts. COOL and Technological Integration: To effectively utilize this data, the industry should integrate Country-Of- Origin Labeling (COOL) into the digital supply chain. By leveraging the 2D DataMatrix barcodes and Blockchain systems already implemented for the Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA), the origin data of every drug product can be tracked securely from the factory to the patient. While pieces of this data are known at various points in the market, it is not aggregated comprehensively across the U.S. market to analyze for structural and functional factors that can lead to market and supply disruptions. C. Prospectively Monitor and Manage the U.S. Drug Supply Data collection must be paired with proactive data management and interpretation. The U.S. government needs a centralized infrastructure to analyze, predict, and coordinate supply chain structure and function to minimize, prevent, and mitigate real and potential drug shortages. Establishing a Centralized Coordination Entity: The U.S. should authorize a dedicated entity-such as a new Strategic Pharmaceutical Policy Advisory Commission (Strategic PharmPAC), an independent commission, or a public-private hybrid model. This effort should work in coordination with the United States Pharmacopeial Convention (USP)-to oversee the market-wide health and security of the drug supply chain. This entity and its efforts would integrate data across the federal government and the private sector. Prioritizing Critical Medications: Management efforts should first focus on defining the set of "Critical Acute Drugs" (drugs necessary in acute care, where a lack of substitutes leads to severe health outcomes or death) and "Essential Chronic Drugs" (drugs necessary to prevent patients from seriously deteriorating from lack of therapy). The list of critical drugs also needs to be regularly maintained and updated. Mandatory Risk Management Plans (RMPs): Under the CARES Act, manufacturers of critical drugs and associated APIs are required to develop, maintain, and implement Risk Management Plans. Reporting of these RMPs to the FDA is mandatory for critical drug products and the data from these plans should be used to contribute to a comprehensive, ongoing data set and related analysis to proactively identify and mitigate hazards that could cause supply disruptions. Develop and Adopt an OSCR Model for Drug Products: The FDA's Office of Supply Chain Resilience (OSCR), which monitors medical device supply chains, uses a structural model that employs advanced analytics to identify risks, maintains a Critical Medical Device List (CMDL), and enacts proactive interventions to preserve availability. A similar, expanded approach to supply chain resilience is needed for prescription pharmaceuticals. D. Predictive Analytics to Prepare for Challenges and Threats The final pillar of a resilient supply chain is the employment of predictive analytics. Congress must fund public- private research programs to develop "sentinel systems" that can access and utilize big data to detect signals of strategic change and security threats in the pharmaceutical network serving the U.S. market. AI and Machine Learning for Demand Forecasting: Artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms are revolutionizing most industries by analyzing vast datasets of historical trends, real-time supply chain updates, changes in demand, and expected as well as unanticipated external factors. Used effectively these tools can accurately forecast medication demand, allowing companies and the market to anticipate seasonal variations and demand surges, thereby reducing or preventing stockouts. Network-Level Intelligence Platforms: Modern predictive analytics rely on massive, multi-enterprise data networks. Platforms like TraceLink analyze flow data from over 38 billion serialized units across 283,000 healthcare organizations to predict drug shortages up to 90 days in advance with high accuracy. Pharmacy-Level Data Modeling: Predictive models can also assess downstream vulnerabilities by evaluating data at the level of individual National Drug Code (NDC) and Drug Identification Number (DIN). Machine learning algorithms assess variables such as the average days of supply (DOS) per patient and month-to-month changes in the ratio of drugs dispensed within therapeutic classes to signal impending clinical shortages. Sentinel and Early Warning Systems (EWS): Advanced cognitive models can identify drugs at risk of shortage far earlier than manual reporting. For instance, Premier Inc.'s CognitiveRx AI model has reported an average accuracy of 75% in early shortage detection, identifying at-risk drugs by an average of 128 days before they were officially announced on the FDA shortage list. The federal government should encourage, fund, and develop sentinel models and systems based on historical drug shortages patterns as well as systems to detect new root causes for drug shortages such as geopolitical risk or other new sources of disruption. Summary Assuring the resilience and security of the U.S. drug supply requires an unprecedented level of data, transparency, and technological integration. By establishing a National Drug Supply Map, enforcing stringent upstream data reporting, centralizing market-wide analysis and oversight, and leveraging AI-driven predictive analytics, the United States can transcend the inherent vulnerabilities of the globalized pharmaceutical market. A framework for "Building a Strategic Pharmaceutical Policy Advisory Commission" to accomplish these tasks is presented in Appendix A. This integrated framework (when properly authorized, funded, and managed) can ensure that patients consistently receive life-saving medications, regardless of manufacturing and quality failures, natural events and disasters, or international trade disputes. Question: Dr. Schondelmeyer, you mentioned that transparency into where and how medicines are made is critical for both patient safety and supply chain security. How would requiring country of origin or manufacturing facility information on labels improve the security of our drug supply chain, particularly for seniors in states like Georgia? Response: Thank you for this important and relevant question. Everyone needs, or uses, prescription drugs at various points during their lifetime. The quality and security of the prescription drug supply in the United States is a critical part of the national infrastructure that assures the availability of effective drug therapy for all in America. Seniors and other vulnerable populations, in particular, rely heavily on daily medications to manage chronic conditions and to improve their health status. The U.S. drug supply faces serious challenges with respect to quality, recalls, and shortages affecting many critical medicines. In addition, the drug supply chain has become highly concentrated economically and geographically and is heavily dependent upon two countries, China and India, for key starting materials (KSMs), active pharmaceutical ingredients (API), and finished dosage forms (FDFs). A senior filling a prescription in Georgia for a generic blood pressure medication has no way of knowing whether their tablets were manufactured in a state-of-the-art facility in the United States or a sweat-shop facility in China or India with a history of FDA warning letters or "Official Action Indicated" (OAI) safety violations.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Schondelmeyer, S.W. (2026, January 29). Statement on Real Country-Of-Origin-Labeling (COOL) Transparency in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Market: Foundation for a Secure & Resilient Drug Supply. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging. See, also, Schondelmeyer, S.W. (2024, February 6). Statement on A Resilient U.S. Drug Supply: Current & Emerging Vulnerabilities. Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Ways & Means. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prescribing physicians and pharmacists in Georgia could actively choose to source drugs from manufacturers with superior safety records, if this information was reliably and publicly available. Thus, protecting seniors from recurring risk due to economically-motivated adulteration or contamination-such as the deadly global recalls of tainted heparin from China or the generic blood pressure medications (e.g., valsartan) made in India that were found to have carcinogenic impurities.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Schondelmeyer, S.W. (2025, June 5). Designing A Resilient U.S. Drug Supply: Efficient Strategies to Address Vulnerabilities. Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under the current opaque system, when a foreign manufacturing plant suffers a catastrophic failure, quality breach, or natural disaster, the U.S. market often experiences cascading, panic-driven shortages. The exact origin of the drugs dispensed to the patient are invisible to the physician, the pharmacist, and the patient. Therefore, an FDA recall of a drug product from a specific plant in China or India can cause a nationwide panic, as pharmacists struggle to identify which of their drug products are actually affected. Mandatory country of origin labeling (COOL) transparency helps to correct this market failure. By making a product's origin visible, it allows group purchasing organizations (GPOs), Medicare plans, physicians, pharmacists, and consumers to actively prefer and reward resilience. This can provide the financial incentives necessary for companies to "re-shore" or "near-shore" their manufacturing, ultimately reducing the U.S. supply chain's dangerous over-reliance on geopolitical rivals for life-saving drugs. With clear labeling of the manufacturing source, pharmacists could pull the tainted batches while confidently dispensing the safe, unaffected batches to seniors, thereby preventing substantial risks and disruptions of care. U.S. law\3\ currently requires that "all products of foreign origin imported into the United States must be marked with their country of origin."\4\ The intent of this requirement is to compel the manufacturer to disclose to the public the country where their drug product is made. On June 14, 2024, a ruling by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Headquarters in a letter (HQ H283420) to CVS Health\5\ declared that the `consumer at retail' is the `ultimate purchaser', rather than the previous interpretation that it is the `manufacturer selling to a pharmacy' This change makes sense; however, it means that pharmacists are now responsible to report the `country of origin' on the prescription label when the medication is dispensed to a patient.\6\ Although this is a good policy on its surface, its weakness comes because the pharmacist is held responsible for labeling a prescription with the `country of origin' which is information that must ultimately come from the manufacturer who may, or may not, report that information to the FDA, the pharmacist, or the public. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ U.S.C. 1304 and 19 C.F.R. 134.11. \4\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "Fact Sheet: Marking of Prescription Medication for Retail Sale." CBP Publication No. 3812- 0824. Accessed on January 24, 2026 at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/ default/files/2024-08/ FACT%20SHEET%20Marking%20Prescription%20Medication%20for%20Retail%20Sale .pdf. \5\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Letter from Yuliya A. Gulis, Director, Commercial and Trade Facilitation Division to JoAnne Colonnello, Center Director, Pharmaceuticals, Health, and Chemicals, Center of Excellence and Expertise, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 6747 Engle Road, Middleburg Heights, OH 44130, dated June 14, 2024; HQ H283420, OT:RR:CTF:CPMMA H283420 RRB, CATEGORY: Marking; RE: Internal Advice; Country of origin marking requirements for repackaged prescription medication sold by CVS Health; ultimate purchaser; 19 U.S.C. 1304; 19 C.F.R. 134.1(d)(1); 19 C.F.R. 134.25. Accessed on January 24, 2026 at: https:// rulings.cbp.gov/ruling/H283420. \6\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Letter to Yulia A. Gulis, June 14, 2024. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When a customer in Georgia fills a prescription at their retail pharmacy such as CVS or their independent community pharmacy, the pharmacist must provide the `country of origin' for the drug product on the prescription label. This process sounds simple enough; however, not all drug companies marketing prescription drugs in the U.S. report the `country of origin' identifying where their drug product is actually made. And, some manufacturers report this information only to the FDA who may, or may not, make the data public. If the manufacturer does not report the `country of origin', the pharmacist is still responsible to find and report the `country of origin' to their patients. The large chain pharmacies such as CVS can assign staff at their corporate office to research and compile this information across the 70,000 to 100,000 drug products on the market, so that their in-store pharmacists can comply with this requirement. However, for an independent community pharmacy, the process to search for the "country of origin" for each prescription drug product may take the pharmacist 10 minutes to 30 minutes or more per prescription to search for this information. And, the pharmacist may not be able to find the `country of origin' if it is not made public by the manufacturer. While this policy appears workable in theory, it simply is not practical. First, this process is dependent upon the importer (i.e., manufacturer) to publicly report the `country of origin' to the FDA as required and in a clearly understood manner. Second, it is dependent upon the FDA passing the information on to the public in a useable format. Third, the search process by a pharmacist, at the store level, to find the `country of origin' for many thousands of drug products so it can be included on the prescription label is very time consuming and is clearly not sustainable economically. Even though the FDA may have this information for each specific prescription drug product in its files or in electronic data sets, if the data is not made public, the pharmacist cannot report what he or she does not have and cannot obtain. Clearly, this policy-no matter how well intended-will have a severe differential negative impact on independent community pharmacies and their patients. In a state, like Georgia, where more than one-third of its pharmacies are locally and independently owned, the economic burden of chasing `country of origin' data that manufacturers may, or may not, have reported to the FDA or the public is overwhelming. Absence of this information will mean that physicians, pharmacists, and patients cannot make purchase decisions that take into account the geographic origin of a drug product. This impact will be especially noticed by Georgians in rural and distressed urban areas which often have a higher share of independent pharmacies. This will also have a greater impact on seniors and other vulnerable populations served in these communities. While chain pharmacies dominate the overall share of pharmacies in Georgia, especially in densely populated metro areas (like Atlanta), independent pharmacies carry the vast majority of the burden in rural and stressed regions of Georgia. According to Georgia's Rural Center, 25% of all Georgia counties (42 counties) have no corporate [chain] pharmacies and rely entirely on local, independently owned community pharmacies for their prescription drug access.\7\ Other types of pharmacies (such as Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), hospital outpatient pharmacies, and specialized clinics) are expected to have `country of origin' labeling problems similar to those experienced by independent community pharmacies. When these other pharmacy types are taken into account, nearly one-half of all Georgia pharmacies could be impacted by these short-comings and lack of public data on `country of origin' information needed to support the prescription labeling requirements. Only with two pre-requisite obligations can community pharmacies meet the otherwise impossible task of placing the `country of origin' on each prescription label. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\Georgia's Rural Center. Rural Pharmacies and Patients at Risk: PBM Practices Pose Risks to Independent Pharmacies, Updated Feb. 6, 2025. Accessed on February 12, 2026 at the website: https:// www.ruralga.org/post/rural-pharmacies-and-patients-at-risk-pbm- practices-pose-risks-to-independent- pharmacies#:text=the20National20Community20Pharmacy20Association,a20phar macy20(Figure%201). (1) Manufacturers (and marketers) should be required to report to the FDA the `country of origin' for both the active pharmaceutical ingredients and the finished dose form for all --------------------------------------------------------------------------- prescription products marketed in the United States. (2) The FDA should be required to compile this `country of origin' information into easily machine-readable digital files and publicly report the data through online web sites. In summary, Georgia and other states, would benefit from publicly disclosed `country of origin' on prescription labels. This information can: (1) empower prescribers, pharmacists, and patients to make wise purchase decisions based on the quality history and geographic origin of drug products; (2) enable rapid and targeted identification and removal of drug products made in specific locations with known quality or contamination problems; (3) support market-based incentives intended to encourage and reward domestic or friend-shored production of pharmaceuticals; and (4) utilize existing infrastructure and data that has been reported in an opaque system including the data collected under the Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA). Routine provision of "country of origin labeling" for prescription medications would greatly improve transparency for physicians and pharmacists, as well as purchasers and payers, and most importantly for patients. Transparency regarding where one's medications are actually being made is not merely a matter of consumer preference; it is a matter vital to public health and national security. Knowing where a drug comes from can build trust in the quality and dependability of our U.S. drug supply. That trust begins with "truth and openness" from CLEAR LABELS. Question: What steps can Congress take to enforce existing reporting requirements and ensure greater transparency overall? Response: A number of recommendations are reported in my written comments provided to the Senate Special Committee on Aging at its Hearing on: "Truth in Labeling: Americans Deserve to Know Where Their Drugs Come From" on January 29, 2026.\8\ Those recommendations, and others, are re-stated and further described here. Many of these recommendations can be implemented as administrative actions and regulatory guidance, while other recommendations may require statutory revisions or additions. The Senate Special Committee on Aging members and their staffs should work with FDA to identify the necessary and most efficient way to accomplish the intent of the recommendations described herein. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Schondelmeyer Stephen, "Real Country-Of-Origin-Labeling (COOL) Transparency in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Market: Foundation for a Secure & Resilient Drug Supply, presented at the Senate Hearing on Truth in Labeling: Americans Deserve to Know Where Their Drugs Come From, Statement before the Special Committee on Aging United States Senate, Congress of the United States, Thursday, January 29, 2026, Washington, DC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The overall intent of the recommendations provided here is to require country of origin labeling that provides the ultimate purchaser-the American patient-with pharmaceutical product labeling that clearly indicates where their prescription medication was made. The term `country of origin' may be abbreviated as COO, while the term `country of origin labeling' may be abbreviated as COOL. As noted in my written testimony, `country of origin labeling' has emerged as a critical element in the contemporary landscape of consumer goods, in general, and prescription pharmaceuticals, in particular. COOL involves marking the drug product received by the end-consumer with the name of the country in which the product was actually manufactured or made. For some industries, and in some trade agreements, the concept of COOL is the place where the product was "manufactured, processed, or substantially transformed." The definition of where a pharmaceutical product is made is critical and should be carefully and clearly defined. For pharmaceutical products, the primary essence and value of the drug product is embodied in its active pharmaceutical ingredient(s) (API), and not necessarily in how or where it was processed or packaged. For prescription drug products, the `country of origin' for the API should be clearly defined as "the country which contains the geographical location where the API is actually made." Similarly, the `country of origin' for the finished product should be clearly defined as "the country which contains the geographical location where the finished product is actually made." First, Section 502 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 352) should be reviewed and revised, if necessary, to ensure that it includes a requirement that "the country of origin for the API and the country of origin for the finished drug product must be clearly marked on the label of the container in which the finished product is sold in the U.S. market." Both the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product are required. This requirement for labeling of a drug product with both the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product should apply to any drug product at the National Drug Code (NDC) level being sold by any labeler in the U.S. market. Recall that a `labeler' "may be either a manufacturer, including a repackager or relabeler, or, for drugs subject to private labeling arrangements, the entity under whose own label or trade name the product will be distributed."\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ U.S. Food & Drug Administration. NDC Package File Definitions. Content current as of July 21, 2022 and found on February 12, 2026 at the website: https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/ ndc-package-file-definitions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Failure to include the country of origin for either the API or the finished product should render a drug product as `misbranded' and it should be subject to any and all remedies available including, but not limited to, civil penalties and fines, product seizures and destruction, injunctions to stop manufacturing or distribution, refusal to import, voluntary or mandatory recalls, and criminal prosecution including misdemeanor to felony charges against the corporation and its executives. In particular, misbranded products with respect to lack of COO for either API or finished product on the end product label should result in refusal to import to the U.S. or recall and removal from the market for product originating in, or otherwise being sold in, the U.S. market. The intended net effect of the `country of origin labeling' policy is that: Any labeler of a prescription drug product at the NDC level being marketed in the U.S. is responsible for placing the COO for the API on the label of the end product container. Any labeler of a prescription drug product at the NDC level being marketed in the U.S. is responsible for placing the COO for the finished product on the label of the end product container. The FDA or the Department of Justice may pursue civil penalties and fines, product seizures and destruction, injunctions to stop manufacturing or distribution, voluntary or mandatory recalls, and criminal prosecution including misdemeanor to felony charges against the corporation and its executives of labelers not complying with the COO labeling requirement for either the API or the finished product. The Customs and Border Protection agency may refuse to import any drug product not complying with the COO labeling requirement for either the API or the finished product. The requirement to comply with COOL for the API and COOL for the finished drug product applies not only to a prescription drug product manufacturer, but also to any labeler, repackager, relabeler, marketer, distributor, or private labeler of a drug product at the NDC level. Simply reporting another drug product's NDC or FDA approval number does not suffice for providing the COO for the API or the finished product on the actual label for the container holding the end product. FDA sponsors, manufacturers, labelers, repackagers, relabelers, marketers, distributors, private labeler of products, or any other firm responsible for a prescription drug product at the NDC level in the U.S. market is responsible to report the COO for the API and for the finished product to the FDA and its Structured Product Label (SPL) electronic listing file system. The COO for the API and the COO for the finished product are required public information for marketing a prescription drug product in the U.S. market, and this information may not be declared as "Confidential Commercial Information". The requirement for COOL for the API or the finished product is not met by a manufacturer, labeler, marketer, distributor, repackager, relabeler, or private labeler who reports only the location of: (1) the warehouse shipping the product; (2) the corporate headquarters of the firm labeling, marketing, selling, or distributing the product; (3) the U.S. address of a subsidiary of a foreign- owned company operating in the United States; (4) the facility repackaging or relabeling the product; or (5) the pharmacy or healthcare entity dispensing the medication. Second, the labeler of any drug product at the NDC level in the U.S. market should be required to report to the FDA, the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product. The FDA should be authorized, and required, to collect in text form the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product. FDA should add, or include data variables, if not already present for reporting this required information in text form in its Structured Product Labeling (SPL)\10\ electronic file for each drug product at the NDC level. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ U.S. Food & Drug Administration. Structured Product Labeling Resources. Content current as of January 8, 2025 and found on February 12, 2026 at the website: https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-data- standards-advisory-board/structured-product-labeling-resources. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FDA has traditionally treated the specific factory location of an Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) as "Confidential Commercial Information" (CCI).\11\ FDA Regulations (21 CFR 20.61) define "Confidential Commercial Information" (CCI) as valuable data that is "customarily held in strict confidence." As noted in my testimony, there are numerous examples of drug firms (i.e., manufacturers and labelers) issuing public press releases about building new facilities for production of specific API and finished products to be sold as prescription drugs in the U.S. market. The public and widespread disclosure of such information clearly contravenes the current FDA definition of "Confidential Commercial Information". This regulation, and related FDA guidance, regarding "Confidential Commercial Information" should be reviewed and revised, if necessary, to exclude COO for the API and COO for the finished product from the definition of CCI. Both the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product should be defined as `required public information' that must be disclosed at the NDC level for any prescription drug product marketed in the United States. Consequently, labelers reporting prescription drug product information to the FDA's SPL electronic file system should not be permitted to declare the COO for the API and the COO for the finished product as "Commercial Confidential Information" resulting in this information being suppressed or withheld from the public. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ U.S. Food & Drug Administration. FDA Fact Sheet: Information Sharing: 20.88 Agreements & Commissioning. Content current as of February 12, 2026 and found on February 12, 2026 at the website:https:/ /www.fda.gov/media/109437/download. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The data submitted by labelers to the FDA's SPL electronic file system is used by the National Library of Medicine (NLM) to populate a drug profile on the consumer-facing DailyMed website.\12\ The `About DailyMed' section on the website describes that it provides to the public "the most recent labeling submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by companies and currently in use (i.e., "in use" labeling)."\13\ As of February 12, 2026, the DailyMed database contained 154,834 products with labeling information submitted to the FDA by the product's labeler.\14\ For each drug product, with related NDC numbers grouped together, there are 17 enumerated sections as well as several other sections including: SPL Unclassified Section; Medication Guide; Package/Label Principal Display Panel; and Ingredients and Appearance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ National Library of Medicine, DailyMed. About DailyMed. Content accessed on February 12, 2026 at the website: dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/about-dailymed.cfm. \13\ The FDA-approved Prescribing Information (PI) for approved human prescription drug and biological products contains a summary of the essential scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the product. The PI includes boxed warnings, indications, dosage and administration, contraindications, warnings and precautions, adverse reactions, drug interactions, information about use in specific populations, and other important information for healthcare practitioners. FDA-approved patient labeling (e.g., Patient Information, Medication Guide, Instructions for Use) is directed to the patient, family, or caregiver. FDA-approved carton and container labeling communicate information that is critical to the safe use of prescription drug and biological products from the initial prescription, to procurement, to preparation and dispensing of the drug, to the time it is given to the patient. \14\ National Library of Medicine, DailyMed. Content accessed on February 12, 2026 at the website: dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/ index.cfm. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Looking on the DailyMed website for information related to `country of origin' for the API or the finished dose form is somewhat like playing `Hide and Seek'-the information may, or may not, be there but you have to look for it; and, it is not always contained in the same location for each drug product or DailyMed profile. The DailyMed website reports various types of information in each of the 17 enumerated sections of the FDA- approved Prescribing Information. Typically, none of the first 16 sections contain any country of origin (COO) information, and only sometimes do Section "17 PATIENT COUNSELING INFORMATION" or later sections contain country of origin information. If there is COO information in Section 17 it is usually found only at the very end of the FDA-approved Patient Labeling information where the `Medication Guide' is presented. The drug product, Revlimid (lenalidomide), was used as an example from the DailyMed website to show what information is provided with respect to the `country of origin' for the manufacturer of the API and the manufacturer of the finished product for this specific drug product\15\ (See Appendix B). At the very top of the DailyMed Profile is a heading that indicates the "Packager" of the Revlimid product is "Celgene Corporation" and no country is reported as the location for this corporate entity (Appendix B.1.). Eight different sections on the DailyMed website (i.e., Section "17 Patient Counseling Information"; "Medication Guide"; and six versions of the "Package/Label Display Principal Panel" with one label (as only a jpg image) for each of 6 different strengths of Revlimid) report that the product is "Marketed by: Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, Princeton, NJ 08543 USA" (Appendix B.2., B.3., and B.4). One additional place at the very end of the DailyMed website (i.e., the Ingredients and Appearance section) indicates that the "Labeler" for this product is "Celgene Corporation (174201137)" (Appendix B.5.). In the DailyMed profiles for other drugs, this section sometimes lists specific `Establishments' or companies involved in the supply chain for the specific drug product such as Revlimid. Among the `Business Operations' listed are `API Manufacture' and `Manufacture' (of finished dose form). There was no list of `Establishments' or manufacturing functions on the DailyMed website for Revlimid. This implies that the `Labeler' for Revlimid has indicated in the SPL electronic submission system that information on the API manufacturer and the finished dose form manufacturer were considered `Commercial Confidential Information' or that they were not reported at all, thus suppressing this information from being reported on the DailyMed profile. An example of a DailyMed profile showing business operation information is provided using the generic version of lenalidomide (Cipla USA Inc.) to illustrate what types of information are available and are sometimes reported (Appendix B.6.). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ National Library of Medicine, DailyMed, LABEL: REVLIMID- lenalidomide capsule. Content updated as of March 24, 2023 and found on February 12, 2026 at the website: dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/ drugInfo.cfm?setid=5fa97bf5-28a2-48f1-8955-f56012d296be. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The overall finding from examining the Revlimid profile on the DailyMed website is that the public information included identifies the `Packager' as Celgene Corporation; that it is `Marketed by' Bristol-Myers Squibb Company; that it is a `Product of Switzerland'; and that the `labeler' is Celgene Corporation. The Revlimid DailyMed profile did not identify the source of the API or the country of origin for the `API Manufacturer', although a generic version of this drug (lenalidomide) does identify both the source of the API and the country of origin for the `API Manufacturer'. Because there was no standardized location for the `country of origin' information in the DailyMed profile and there was a lot of text material to be reviewed, it took about an hour to read through and search the entire DailyMed profile of Revlimid to check for information on the `country of origin' for the API and the `country of origin' for the finished product. From experience reviewing DailyMed profiles and looking for country of origin information, the locations where this information is most likely to be found were: (1) near the end of the section titled "17 PATIENT COUNSELING INFORMATION;" (2) near the end of the section titled "Patient Package Insert", if present; (3) in the section titled "PACKAGE LABEL PRINCIPAL DISPLAY PANEL;" which may have jpg images of the drug product label; or jpg images of the outer carton surrounding the bulk package; or (4) near the end of the section under the heading "INGREDIENTS AND APPEARANCE" under the sub-heading titled "Establishment" and listing `Business Operations'. In contrast to searching for the `country of origin' information on the DailyMed profile and website, as described above, a similar search was performed on the New Zealand MedSafe website.\16\ The information found on the MedSafe website for Revlimid capsules 10 mg (Bristol-Myers Squibb (NZ) Limited is shown in Appendix C. Within 2 minutes this information was found and it reported not only the country of origin for API and the finished dose form, but also the name of each manufacturing company and its address. This MedSafe example demonstrates that the `country of origin' information can be provided in a more consumer-friendly and easy to find format. Also, the disclosure of the `country of origin' information is, and can be, made available in a public-facing environment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority. MedSafe. MedSafe Product Detail. Revlimid Capsule 10 mg. Accessed on February 12, 2026 at the website: https://www.medsafe.govt.nz/DbSearch/ ProductDetail.asp?ID=13399. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- One final comment on the information found in the DailyMed product profiles concerns the quality of the jpg images published on the site. The FDA and NLM rely on the product sponsor and/or labeler to provide jpg images of the container, carton, and label for prescription products listed in the SPL database and presented on the DailyMed website. Some of the jpg images are of such poor quality that they cannot be accurately read or understood. One such example is provided in Appendix D. Appendix D first shows the DailyMed listing for the Metformin Hydrochloride-Tablet, Extended Release (Appendix D.1.). In Appendix D.2. the jpg image of the product label is shown. Upon examining this label: Can you read the NDC number of the product? Can you find the Labeler Name? Can you find the Manufacturer for the API or the Finished Product? Can you find the `Country of Origin' for the API or the Finished Product? Not all of this information is on the label provided. However, even if all of this information was there, clearly one cannot read it. The point is, if the FDA SPL electronic data system is going to request label images (and they should), the images are of no value if they are not readable. At present, some information on the label images (such as `country of origin" for the API or the finished product) is found nowhere else in the data presented on the DailyMed product profile. The FDA should require submission of label images through its SPL electronic data system, and it should require that jpg images meet minimum readability and pixel density requirements. The FDA should address the following issues to facilitate making `country of origin' labeling publicly accessible including reporting of the information on the NLM DailyMed profiles of prescription products: The `country of origin' for the API should be required, publicly accessible, and reported in a text format in a standard place on the DailyMed website. The `country of origin' for the finished product should be required, publicly accessible, and reported in a text format in a standard place on the DailyMed website. The `country of origin' for API should be reported using the phrase: "API Made in ----------" immediately preceding the country where the API is actually manufactured and no variation in this preceding phrase is acceptable. The `country of origin' for finished product should be reported using the phrase: "Product Made in ----------" immediately preceding the country where the finished product is actually manufactured and no variation in this preceding phrase is acceptable. FDA should add a text field variable for the API `country of origin' to its National Drug Code Directory\17\ NDC product file\18\ list of variables. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ U.S. Food and Drug Administration. National Drug Code Directory. Content current as of February 5, 2026 and accessed on February 12, 2026 at: https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and- databases/national-drug-code-directory. \18\ U.S. Food and Drug Administration. NDC Product File Definitions. Content current as of March 12, 2024 and accessed on February 12, 2026 at: https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and- databases/ndc-product-file-definitions. FDA should add a text field variable for the finished product `country of origin' to its National Drug Code Directory --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NDC product file list of variables. FDA should encourage commercial databases such as MediSpan and First DataBank to add text variables for the API `country of origin' and the finished product `country of origin' in their drug product reference and dispensing system data files. FDA should require reporting of both API and finished product `country of origin' in a standard location in the FDA- approved Prescribing Information (PI). FDA should require reporting of both API and finished product `country of origin' in a standard location in the FDA- approved Patient Medication Guide. FDA should require reporting of both API and finished product `country of origin' in a standard location in the FDA- approved product carton labeling. FDA should require reporting of both API and finished product `country of origin' in a standard location in the FDA- approved product package labeling. FDA and NLM should report in the "Ingredients and Appearances" Section of the DailyMed profile the API Manufacturer firm name, the ID/FEI, and the `Country of Origin'. FDA and NLM should report in the "Ingredients and Appearances" Section of the DailyMed profile the finished product Manufacturer firm name, the ID/FEI, and the `Country of Origin'. The intent of the `country of origin' labeling (COOL) requirement is to provide the consumer (i.e., the patient) with easily accessible and understandable information about where their prescription medications were made. Both the country of origin for the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) and the finished product should be disclosed to the public so that they, along with their physician and pharmacist, can make a conscious selection of the medicines they choose and use. When a prescription medicine is made using API from a factory in China and a finished product prepared in India, that is then marketed by a business entity in the United States; it is misleading to give the impression that the product is made in the USA. Yet, this is the situation for many prescription products in the U.S. market, and they are assumed to be made in the USA when actually they are not. If all prescription products are not clearly labeled with the true `country of origin', consumers may lose trust in the quality and confidence in the effectiveness of the U.S. medicines supply. `Country of origin labeling' (COOL) serves as a mechanism to inform buyers about their product's origin and to inform their perceptions of quality, safety, economics, or even their presumed patriotism and support of free markets. With respect to pharmaceuticals, safety, efficacy, and quality assurance of the medication are paramount. Knowing the country of origin for the product can directly affect consumer trust in the regulatory scrutiny and oversight of pharmaceutical production. Furthermore, COOL indicates the regulatory frameworks, economic strategies, environmental conditions, political systems, and international trade policies that may have surrounded and influenced the making of the end-product. COOL is a tangible means to provide transparency, support consumer decision- making, and encourage a fair and competitive market. Knowing where a drug comes from can build trust in the quality and dependability of our U.S. drug supply. That trust begins with "truth and openness" from CLEAR LABELS. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLBE IN TIFF FORMAT] U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Truth in Labeling: Americans Deserve to Know Where Their Drugs Come From" January 29, 2026 Questions for the Record Stephen Colvill Senator Raphael Warnock Question: The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services launched an investigation into group purchasing organizations (GPOs) in 2024 to understand their potential contribution to generic drug shortages, which affected Georgians' access to cancer and rheumatoid arthritis medications. What role do GPOs play in the stability of the domestic pharmaceutical supply chain? Response: Distinguishing between various health care settings, including the health system setting, independent oncology clinic setting, and retail setting, is important to understand the roles of various types of GPOs and other entities in the generic drug supply chain. Drug reimbursement methodologies, contracting practices, and other market dynamics differ in each of these settings. In the health system setting, traditional GPOs (Vizient, Premier, HealthTrust) negotiate contract prices and terms between their member health systems and manufacturers. These traditional GPOs do not take possession of or title to the drugs and do not markup the drugs. Traditional GPO contracts impact drug usage in hospitals along with other sites of care. In the independent oncology clinic setting, wholesalers (Cencora, McKesson) and wholesaler-affiliated GPOs often negotiate contracts with manufacturers of oncology drugs used in community oncology clinics. Wholesalers take possession of and title to the drugs before distributing them. In the retail setting, retail GPOs (RedOak, Walgreens Boots Alliance, ClarusOne) negotiate contracts with manufacturers on behalf of retail pharmacies. Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are most influential in this retail setting, but PBMs are markedly different from GPOs. In all these settings, GPOs have significant negotiating power, in part due to consolidation, and they use that power to secure favorable contract pricing and terms from manufacturers. My professional experience has mostly involved the hospital and health system setting, where I have observed contract negotiations from both the manufacturer and GPO perspective. In this setting, I have observed traditional GPOs use their market power to pursue the interests of their health system members. The "Race to the Bottom" section of my full written testimony provides a detailed overview of the interests of health systems related to generic drug purchasing. In summary, for already-inexpensive generic drugs, resource-constrained health systems focus significant efforts on obtaining the lowest cost at a point in time without adequate consideration for reliable availability over time. These health system priorities shape the actions of their GPOs. In recent years, some limited progress has been made on better valuing reliable availability of critical generics. Some health care providers have begun entering into new committed contracting models that have been pioneered by new entities such as Civica Rx, and traditional GPOs and wholesalers also now offer committed contracting models. These committed contracting models are designed to offer greater assurance of demand for manufacturers and assurance of supply for providers. The committed nature of these models creates a greater incentive for purchasers to vet suppliers and for manufacturers to ensure reliable delivery of products over time. However, while such committed contracting models have demonstrated some success, they currently represent a small share of generic drug contracts in the U.S., and drug shortages persist. Many resource-constrained health systems opt not to participate in committed contracting models (or participate minimally) and instead continue to seek out the lowest cost short term suppliers. In addition, health systems and their GPOs could also take other important steps to identify and purchase from reliable manufacturers. For example, health systems and their GPOs could require manufacturers to be evaluated through third- party drug supply chain reliability benchmarking programs. However, uptake of such benchmarking programs has also thus far been limited. In the "An Alternative: Aligning Incentives Towards Reliable Availability" section of my full written testimony and the response to Question 2 below, I outline how Congress could address drug shortages by aligning health care provider incentives to better value the reliable availability of critical generic drugs. Question: How can Congress keep GPOs accountable and improve older adults' access to quality and affordable drugs? Response: Congress should enact Medicare payment reforms to incentivize health care providers to take steps to support the reliable availability of critical generic drugs. In a recent white paper, Duke-Margolis proposed a simplified version of the Medicare Drug Shortage Prevention and Mitigation Program originally outlined in a 2024 Senate Finance Committee Discussion Draft. Our proposal would reward health care providers when they 1) purchase through committed contracting models and 2) identify and purchase drugs that meet reliability benchmarks. If this proposal is implemented, GPOs would be well-positioned to support a shift towards a more reliable supply chain. Rather than focusing their negotiating power too much on obtaining the lowest cost, GPOs could instead use that same negotiating power to demand reliable availability and higher levels of quality assurance from manufacturers. The market could also use reliability benchmarking programs to observe the extent to which GPOs and health systems contract with reliable manufacturers. Lastly, healthy competition is essential for a well- functioning market. Congress should ensure that health care providers have the opportunity to select from a range of different competing GPOs and other service providers and that new entrants (both new GPO entrants and new manufacturer entrants) have an opportunity to succeed in a competitive market. Levels of market concentration and consolidation should be continually assessed. Senator Andy Kim Question: Current Requirements for Country-of-Origin Information There are current requirements for country-of-origin information involving multiple government entities, however, this could also lead to confusing or conflicting requirements. Currently drug manufacturers must comply with label and labeling requirements of the Food and Drug Administration, country of origin information requirements by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (which is further influenced by trade agreements such as the USMCA), and government procurement requirements. Can you detail the current regulatory environment and where there may be gaps and potential overlap? Response: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) generally relies on a "substantial transformation" standard to determine country-of- origin for the purpose of determining tariffs and other requirements that apply to U.S. imports. The final "substantial transformation" for drugs most commonly (but not always) occurs when the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) is produced. The Tariff Act of 1930 also requires that imported goods be marked with the country-of-origin in a manner visible to the "ultimate purchaser" in the United States. A controversial 2024 CBP ruling determined that the "ultimate purchaser" in the retail pharmacy setting should be the patient rather than the dispensing pharmacy. Direct federal procurement, such as purchases by VA and DoD governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), generally preferences pharmaceuticals that have a country-of-origin in a Trade Agreements Act (TAA) compliant country. Prior to the U.S. Federal Appeals Court decision in Acetris Health, LLC v. United States, federal agencies generally deferred to CBP's "substantial transformation" country-of-origin determinations for the purposes of direct federal procurement. However, following the Acetris decision in 2020, country-of-origin determinations for the purposes of direct federal procurement may now be based on where the product is "manufactured". This is different from CBP's standard and means that a product with an API from China that is "manufactured" into its final dosage form in a TAA-compliant country may now be considered TAA- compliant for the purposes of direct federal procurement, even if the most important production step occurred in China. FDA labeling requirements in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) currently dictate that a drug is misbranded unless its label includes the name and "place of business" of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor. In many cases, the "place of business" of the final manufacturer, packer, or distributor differs from the country-of-origin as determined by the CBP and direct federal procurement standards described above. The "place of business" may be a company's corporate headquarters and may not be a manufacturing site at all. The CLEAR Labels Act introduced by Sen. Scott and Sen. Gillibrand in February 2026 would require unique facility identifiers for both the original API manufacturer and the original finished drug product manufacturer to be listed in the drug's labeling information. This CLEAR Labels Act approach would provide much more useful public information regarding locations of production than the current FD&C Act requirements. Potential Next Steps on Labeling Requiring manufacturers to include unique facility identifiers in their labeling information would make it fairly straightforward for third parties to create user-friendly databases that allow patients, purchasers, researchers, and the public to identify where drugs are made. Congress should note that exempting manufacturers from the labeling requirements in the Tariff Act of 1930 may cause patients picking up a prescription at a retail pharmacy to not be able to see the country-of-origin on the physical drug label. That said, having one common set of labeling requirements through the FD&C Act (rather than divergent requirements from FDA and CBP) that enables the creation of user-friendly databases that patients and others can use to identify where drugs are made could be a common-sense approach. Ensuring the right information is available digitally may be more important than what is listed on the physical label. Country-of-origin determinations for the purposes of direct federal procurement would need to be addressed separately. Legislation could close the "Acetris loophole" by directing revision of the FAR definition such that country-of-origin would be determined only by where a drug is "substantially transformed" rather than where a drug is "manufactured". This would refocus country-of-origin determinations for the purposes of direct federal procurement on the most important production step. Question: Accessible Country-of-Origin Information Information about where prescription drugs are manufactured is not always visible to patients or policymakers, and purchasing decisions for prescription drugs are often made be entities other than the end user, including hospitals, pharmacies, and group purchasing organizations. These dynamics affect the potential impact of pharmaceutical labeling reforms in both provider-administrated and retail drug settings. Additionally, as we consider increasing transparency, we must also balance how we achieve more accessible information with security risks from sharing too much about key manufacturing sites. What practical changes should pharmaceutical labeling reforms be expected to achieve on their own? Beyond country-of- origin labeling, are there additional reforms we can focus on here in Congress to strengthen our domestic supply chain of quality active pharmaceutical ingredients and drugs and protect our national security? Response: Pharmaceutical labeling reforms, if effectively designed, could have a positive, yet limited, impact. Americans deserve to know where their drugs come from, and better availability of information about manufacturing locations of drugs might, over time, cause more drugs to be sourced domestically. However, for provider-administered drugs, impacts of labeling reforms are likely to be limited, as many decision makers already know where API and finished drug products are made or can acquire this information if desired. For retail drugs, impacts of labeling reforms are also likely to be limited, as patients have minimal influence over what drugs the retail pharmacies and retail GPOs decide to stock. The Committee should carefully weigh any negative consequences that may arise from labeling reforms and consider how to mitigate them. Just because a drug is made in the U.S. does not necessarily mean that it is the best choice - some of the most significant past shortages have resulted from manufacturing issues in U.S. plants. Site location alone is not necessarily indicative of reliability or quality. Other assessments of reliability and quality, such as through the benchmarking programs described previously, are also needed. Pharmaceutical labels also may illuminate certain stages of production while obscuring other risks, such as from upstream key starting material (KSM) dependencies. KSM mapping and vulnerability assessment exercises will remain critical. The Committee should also consider that any labeling reforms may impact the information that is ultimately available to institutional buyers, health care providers, and patients in different ways. Other potential negative consequences include increased regulatory burden, potential impacts to patient medication adherence, and potentially more easily enabling bad actors to identify potential targets. The Committee could consider whether FDA should be provided with the authority to exempt some drugs from a requirement to disclose unique facility identifiers if there is a compelling safety or national security reason to do so, such as for some controlled substances. Regarding other steps to more meaningfully improve the reliability of our domestic supply chain, financial incentives for purchasers is the most important area to focus. See more in the answer to Question 3 below. Question: Financial Incentives for Purchasers Purchasers of prescription drugs, including pharmacies and providers often, face financial pressure that influence which products are selected and stocked. Without targeted incentives, efforts to encourage the use of more reliable or domestic suppliers may be limited. Financial incentives for purchasers are a critical component of addressing drug shortages and maintaining a resilient supply chain. What limitations remain as we think through how to meaningfully reduce chronic drug shortages? Response: I agree that targeted financial incentives for purchasers are needed to meaningfully address drug shortages and create a resilient supply chain for critical generic drugs. In a recent white paper, Duke-Margolis proposed a simplified version of the Medicare Drug Shortage Prevention and Mitigation Program originally outlined in a 2024 Senate Finance Committee Discussion Draft. Our proposal would create new CMS incentives for health care providers to 1) purchase through committed contracting models and 2) identify and purchase drugs that meet drug supply chain reliability benchmarks. Costs from such a program would likely equate to <0.1% of total U.S. drug spending. An additional limitation to meaningfully addressing chronic drug shortages is that drug supply chain reliability benchmarking programs are not yet widely adopted. Supply chain reliability benchmarking programs can objectively assess aspects of manufacturer supply chains such as redundancies, available manufacturing capacity, buffer stock, risk mitigation plans, and commitment to quality culture. These programs can then communicate insights to the market regarding which manufacturers, product supply chains, and/or manufacturing facilities are more reliable than their competition. Unfortunately, these benchmarking programs are not yet widely adopted on the supply-side or the demand-side. Wide supply-side adoption would entail a substantial share of manufacturer supply chains for critical products being evaluated through the programs. Wide demand-side adoption would entail the incorporation of resulting program insights into a substantial share of purchasing and contracting decisions. To address this limitation, Congress could provide funding to HHS and DoD to de-risk the development, testing, and adoption of reliability benchmarking programs. This could set a foundation for future CMS payment reform that could target incentive payments to providers that purchase from reliable suppliers. ======================================================================= Statements for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International Scams" January 14, 2026 Statement for the Record Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member Chairman Scott, thank you for calling today's hearing and thank you to our witnesses for being here.I'm looking forward to continuing our conversation on how we can improve the quality and reliability of our generic drug supply chain, particularly the role of increased transparency. As we have heard in our previous hearings, these supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, and with decreased domestic manufacturing, we are putting ourselves in an increasingly perilous position. Given recent instability in geopolitics and international trade policy, this reliance on foreign drugs increases the risk that Americans may not have access to life-saving drugs in times of crisis, threatening our national security. However, we must approach strengthening and reforming this extremely complex supply chain thoughtfully and thoroughly. One piece of this puzzle is increasing supply chain transparency through country-of-origin labeling.Country-of- origin labeling is a common tool that is used on thousands of products, most prominently in textiles and food. It gives consumers clear information on the origins of their products, providing them with additional information that may influence whether they purchase an item. Pharmaceuticals are also required to disclose this information; however, it may be difficult for patients to track it down. As we will hear from our witnesses today, providing transparency to consumers is extremely important, but it is not the only solution to improve the reliability and quality of the drug supply chain. Country-of-origin labeling does not necessarily equate to higher or lower quality drugs, and there are additional steps that Congress can take to ensure that all drugs in our supply chain, both domestic and foreign, are of the highest quality. We must examine the underlying economic dynamics in the current marketplace and adjust incentives to fix the "race to the bottom" in generic drug pricing, which can create drug quality issues, drive manufacturing outside of the United States, or cause companies to stop production of certain drugs or chemicals altogether. Transparency must also be coupled with expanded supply chain mapping as well as quality benchmarking.Coupled together, these proposals will create a more resilient drug supply chain that can lead to improved stability for manufacturers and purchasers, increased consumer confidence in the quality of their medications, and a potential resurgence of domestic production. While the vast majority of the medications that patients use are both safe and effective, increased transparency and supply chain mapping will improve long-term decision making for manufacturers to invest in quality and reliability. I am excited to hear from our witnesses today as they are discussing policy proposals that can be undertaken by Congress. I look forward to working with Chairman Scott and other committees of jurisdiction as we work to increase the transparency and reliability of our drug supply chain. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]