Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.
- COUNTERING CHINA'S GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 118 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] COUNTERING CHINA'S GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN ======================================================================= HEARING before the CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ SEPTEMBER 12, 2023 __________ Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 53-487 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS House Senate CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Co-chair Chair STEVE DAINES, Montana JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts MARCO RUBIO, Florida BRIAN MAST, Florida TOM COTTON, Arkansas JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia ANGUS KING, Maine MICHELLE STEEL, California TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANDREA SALINAS, Oregon ZACHARY NUNN, Iowa RYAN ZINKE, Montana EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS DANIEL K. KRITENBRINK, Department of State MARISA LAGO, Department of Commerce THEA MEI LEE, Department of Labor UZRA ZEYA, Department of State ERIN BARCLAY, Department of State Piero Tozzi, Staff Director Matt Squeri, Deputy Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S ---------- Statements Opening Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1 Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from Oregon; Co- chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 3 Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from Massachusetts.................................................. 4 Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights................. 5 Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan, a U.S. Senator from Alaska....... 6 Statement of Hon. Andrea Salinas, a U.S. Representative from Oregon......................................................... 8 Statement of Hon. Ryan Zinke, a U.S. Representative from Montana. 8 Statement of Hon. Michael Chong, Member of Canadian Parliament, Wellington-Halton Hills, Ontario............................... 10 Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia, Research Director for Strategy and Design, Freedom House.......................................... 24 Statement of Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders. 26 Statement of Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, Campaign for Uyghurs........................................... 31 APPENDIX Prepared Statements Chong, Michael, Hon.............................................. 41 Gorokhovskaia, Yana.............................................. 47 Harth, Laura..................................................... 50 Abbas, Rushan.................................................... 54 Smith, Hon. Chris................................................ 58 Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 59 McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 60 Sullivan, Hon. Dan............................................... 60 Zeya, Hon. Uzra.................................................. 61 Submissions for the Record ``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques,'' New York Times, September 11, 2023, submitted by Senator Sullivan............................................... 63 Chapter 11, entitled ``A Law Firm on Every Corner,'' from ``Hard Drive: A Family's Fight Against Three Countries'' by Mary Todd and Christina Villegas, submitted by Representative Zinke...... 67 ``Involuntary Returns: China's Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home,'' a report by Safeguard Defenders...................................................... 77 Statement of Su Yutong, human rights advocate; Radio Free Asia journalist..................................................... 145 Statement of Levi Browde, Executive Director, Falun Data Information Center......................................................... 148 Statement of Zhou Fengsuo, Executive Director, Human Rights in China, and student leader at the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations................................................. 158 Statement of Anna Kwok, Executive Director, Hong Kong Democracy Council, and Mason L. Wong, research fellow, Hong Kong Democracy Council.............................................. 161 CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 182 Witness Biographies.............................................. 183 (iii) COUNTERING CHINA'S GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION CAMPAIGN ---------- TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2023 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Washington, DC. The hearing was held from 10:00 a.m. to 12:12 a.m., in Room 1100, Longworth House Office Building, Representative Chris Smith, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, presiding. Also present: Senator Jeff Merkley, Co-chair, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya, Senator Dan Sullivan, and Representatives McGovern, Zinke, and Salinas. STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Chair Smith. This is an important hearing. It's a hearing that we have been working on and working closely with Co-chair Merkley and, of course, Ranking Member McGovern on, because this is an issue that is getting worse, not better. And so we are trying to bring a focus on it. We've introduced legislation, totally bipartisan. Senator Merkley, Jim McGovern and I, and others, have sponsored it, which is now pending in both the House and the Senate. In June 2021 on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 student democracy protests, which as we all know ended in the horrific Tiananmen Square Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California to witness the unveiling of a sculpture made by artist Chen Weiming. It was a 20-foot-tall statue that morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a coronavirus molecule. And Chen named it the ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold work of art rightfully assigning blame to the CCP, and Xi Jinping in particular, for the horrific pandemic and all the mistakes that were made, especially in the early months, that shook the world. I was honored to attend and to see Chen's work, and to join him and other heroes of the Chinese democracy movement in speaking out against the atrocities committed by the Chinese Communist Party. Less than two months later, however, the sculpture was gone. It was vandalized and then burned to the ground, likely by a band of CCP agents targeting Chen and other Chinese democracy activists here in the United States to punish and scare them into silence. At the ceremony, there were Chinese Communist Party agents in attendance. Unfortunately, Chen's case is not a rare case. With us that day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest advocate for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few people know this, but in May of 2022 right here in Washington, a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked in front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars quickly fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that this was an attempt on Wei's life. This, incidentally, is the same tactic that I have heard used over and over against other Chinese individuals who have run afoul of the CCP. And the list goes on. Major Xiong Yan, who served in the U.S. Army and ran for Congress in New York City, was stalked and harassed by Chinese agents here in the United States. Pastor Bob Fu, whom I've known for over two decades, a leading advocate on behalf of Christians and human rights activists and defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at his home in Texas. The brave eight Hong Kongers, whose heads the authorities have placed bounties on, have been harassed along with their families just this past summer, solely for speaking out against the atrocities happening in their beloved Hong Kong. Indeed, I note that that group includes a number of individuals whose outspokenness has led them to testify here at the China Commission. So this is really personal for all of us on this panel. It also becomes personal when I hear about a fellow legislator from a sister democracy who has been harassed for speaking out about human rights in China. Member of Parliament Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is--genocide. And although Michael has been harassed, he is not in any way, shape, or form intimidated. And he is joining us today on the witness panel; he'll be the first to speak to us today. My friends, the Chinese Communist Party has waged a pervasive coercive campaign around the world against anyone who does not agree with the Party. They target Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students, journalists, or anyone who dares to state their unapproved opinions about the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist Party uses modern technology to digitally harass and surveil individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol system to punish and force the return of those who exercise their freedom of speech while abroad. They detain and harass dissidents' families and friends back in China, like the sister of Rushan Abbas, to unjustly attempt to coerce silence. Rushan will join us here this morning on panel number II. And they even use direct physical assaults beyond their borders to control what is said about their country and its wrongdoing. Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up shop right here in the United States, establishing illegal police stations here in New York City to surveil and harass Chinese immigrants on our soil. The Chinese Communist Party's strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded in far too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment of basic freedoms, even here in the United States of America-- students scared to speak out, journalists scared to write, free citizens scared to attend gatherings--all this happening beyond China's borders and within ours. Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as underscored in news just this past weekend from Great Britain-- where an alleged spy worked in Parliament--it is also happening within our legislatures. We cannot and will not let the Chinese Communist Party in any way intimidate us or scare us into submission through these tactics. Today, we will hear from experts and victims alike who have seen these stories up close. We must work to protect freedom of speech, assembly, and opinion, here in the United States as well as elsewhere, and including in the People's Republic of China. I'd like to yield to our distinguished co-chair, Senator Merkley. Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM OREGON; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA Co-Chair Merkley. Transnational repression is central to the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics of Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the Uyghurs, the Hong Kongers, the Tibetans, the human rights advocates, the journalists, and others this Commission works with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a chance to give a platform to some of the victims and experts from across the globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways we can address this vexing challenge. We know from past testimony that it isn't easy, as the Chinese Communist Party's sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and bring the power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents, members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family members in China. That's why it's so critical that we redouble the efforts to wrap our minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise awareness globally, to identify ways to build common cause with those who have been targeted--religious groups, activists, journalists, politicians--as well as governments sick and tired of the brazen violation of sovereignty that transnational repression represents. Last year I chaired another hearing on this topic to hear about what the Biden administration is doing about it. And I'm proud that one of the officials at the forefront of that work, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya, is now one of our commissioners. The State Department is dedicated to and is continuing to apply significant time and attention to developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of Justice make important strides in pursuing criminal charges against groups and individuals accused of engaging in transnational repression. But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting shows how far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing number of cases of transnational repression, both here in the United States and abroad, with the knowledge that countless others are taking place and likely not being reported on. I imagine that for every case we hear about, there's another 10 we don't know about. We have seen egregious harassment campaigns, even against legislators in the world, including the Honorable Michael Chong, who is here as a Member of the Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of young activists who have spoken out bravely against the increasingly repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have seen the unrelenting pressure that continues to be directed at Uyghurs around the world. We know this is, as Freedom House calls it, the most sophisticated global and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world. It relies on surveillance technology, spyware, threats to individuals through phone calls or face-to-face intimidation, and even harassment of family members and friends back in China. As Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report earlier this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at least 102 overseas service stations in at least 53 countries, breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora members to return to the PRC for criminal investigation. All of this requires that the United States, and as many other governments as possible--and we do need international cooperation to make this effective--make it a priority to address this issue. That's why earlier this year I introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan basis by my colleagues Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and Senator Hagerty, to hold foreign governments and individuals accountable when they stalk, intimidate, or assault people across borders. I appreciate Chairman Smith's work to lead the House companion to this legislation. If enacted, the Transnational Repression Policy Act would mandate additional U.S. Government reporting on the issue, required training for U.S. diplomatic and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence community efforts to track and share information on these incidents, and develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses. I'm working to get this bill passed. I think it's essential that we do. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today who are bringing their experience, their story to bear on this very important issue. Chair Smith. Thank you, Chairman Merkley. I'd like to now yield to the ranking member, Jim McGovern. STATEMENT OF JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS Representative McGovern. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I join my colleagues in welcoming the witnesses today, and the public, to see CECC's hearing on transnational repression. Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, including through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation. Our focus today is on the practices of the People's Republic of China. but transnational repression can be carried out not just by unfriendly governments, but also by strategic allies. It can target people anywhere they or their families reside or visit, even in democracies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and here in the United States. That's why I worked with Senator Merkley during the 117th Congress as he led the development of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, and why I'm proud to co- lead the same bill, H.R. 3654, in the House this Congress with Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make sure that the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this global challenge, both domestically and internationally. I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on transnational repression now includes information on 854 direct physical incidents committed by 38 governments in 91 countries around the world since 2014. China is an origin country for 253 of those recorded incidents, a stunning 30 percent. As we will hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations that it represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces have engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street assaults, digital surveillance, online harassment, and the coercion and intimidation of family members and friends of dissidents. We must be sure that we have the knowledge and the capacity to protect the people who are targets of these practices, especially those who are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must do a better job of engaging with partner countries and strengthening multi- lateral strategies to counter the PRC's actions, which violate international human rights, among them the right to freedom of expression, association, asylum, and freedom of movement, and the prohibition on arbitrary detention. So I look forward to this hearing today. I thank the witnesses again. And I look forward to hearing their recommendations. And with that, I yield back my time. Chair Smith. Thank you very much. It's my honor to--you know, this Commission, as I think all of you know, or most of you know, is not only bicameral and bi- partisan, it also includes distinguished members of the executive branch. We are joined by one of those members, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya. And I yield the floor to her. STATEMENT OF HON. UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS Under Secretary Zeya. Good morning and thank you, Chairman Smith, and Co-chair Merkley, and Ranking Member McGovern, and fellow commissioners. I'm honored to be with you all today for this important discussion on the increasingly pervasive and concerning use of transnational repression by PRC authorities. Transnational repression, or TNR, is a global phenomenon. But the PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and persistent. The PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs, Tibetans, members of other ethnic and religious minority groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens, and non-PRC citizens living abroad who seek only to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms. As we've heard from the co-chairs and ranking member, the PRC utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online harassment, exit bans, or imprisonment of family members of targeted individuals, the misuse of international law enforcement systems such as Interpol, and pressure on other governments to forcibly return targeted individuals to the PRC. The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored and should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront to national sovereignty and impacts people all over the world, including U.S. citizens and individuals residing in the United States. This is why, since 2021, the Biden-Harris administration has made combating transnational repression a global human rights priority. One way that we've sought to counter this scourge is through our diplomatic engagement and tools. We continue to engage the PRC directly, making clear in no uncertain terms that their conduct is unacceptable and must stop. We have not, and we will not, keep quiet in the face of these transgressions. We've used sanctions as an accountability tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022 we imposed visa restrictions on PRC officials responsible for or complicit in transnational repression. This administration energized the interagency to combat TNR in the United States as well. U.S. Government agencies have increased their domestic engagement with domestic communities targeted by the PRC. This outreach helps to create improved two-way communication, which both enhances our understanding of the threat and helps those affected more quickly access government assistance when they are targeted or even before this occurs. We've also jump-started international cooperation to drive a global response, because it's not only Americans and U.S. residents who have suffered abuse. Specifically, we deployed interagency teams to meet with foreign counterparts to raise their awareness of this threat and to share our own lessons learned. One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition will raise international awareness of the threat TNR poses to democratic values and deepen our shared commitment to countering it. The experiences and details presented by today's panelists will surely highlight the very real threat of the PRC's transnational repression activities, as well as the need for governments, legislators, activists, and others to continue to work even more closely together to counter it. Hearing your stories, and in some cases learning from what you have gone through personally, is vitally important as we advance our common cause. The administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership on these issues, and we look forward to further deepening our collaboration. Thank you again for this opportunity to speak. And thank you all for coming together today to confront this challenge. Chair Smith. Madam Secretary, thank you very much for your leadership and for joining us at this hearing today. It's now my honor to yield to Senator Sullivan, a new member of the Commission. STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, A SENATOR FROM ALASKA Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your outstanding leadership on this. It's great to see my colleague from the U.S. Senate and the Co-chair, Senator Merkley. This is such an important topic. The effort, often successful, of the Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its borders to target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the world, is outrageous. But let's face it, it's just one of many outrageous things Beijing is doing across the board. As this committee has done an excellent job of doing, we need to continue to recognize and highlight the brutal nature of the Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially under the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping. Look no further than the string of strange disappearances that we've seen in China in their government in the last couple of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former ambassador to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's right- hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of the PLA Rocket Force, gone. Now, apparently, the defense minister is gone. Who knows what's going on here? But to be clear, this is the sort of regime we're dealing with, a regime whose officials suddenly disappear without any explanation. They're probably somewhere in China, with bullets in their heads, in ditches. This is the way the CCP operates. And now Xi Jinping is trying to export this. Just a couple of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest warrants for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed National Security Law, specifically for people who no longer live in Hong Kong, or anywhere in China for that matter. Hong Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life. And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on grabbing them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United States aiding in their return, or the U.K., or Australia, or Japan, or other places where they now reside. But life is long. They all travel. One day they could find themselves in the hands of a government all too eager to burnish its credentials with Beijing. This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden administration to sanction the prosecutors, and judges, and other officials responsible for enforcing these unjust Hong Kong laws. The days of the independence of the Hong Kong judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are unfortunately long gone. Beijing has seen to that. Now we need to do what we can to try to even the scales up on behalf of the people of Hong Kong. Mr. Chairman, there's one more issue that I want to just raise in my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive actions are also targeting Americans directly. And even, remarkably, during times of tragedy. I'd like to submit for the record this New York Times story that just broke last night entitled ``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques.'' Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered. Senator Sullivan. This story, that just broke at the New York Times, talks about how when wildfires swept across Maui last month, killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its information warriors. They said on the internet the disaster was not natural, in a flurry of false posts and lies that spread across the internet. They said the natural disaster was the result of a secret weather weapon being tested by the United States military and intel agencies. To bolster this lie, they posted photographs that were generated by artificial intelligence programs. Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries around the world suffer natural disasters, even adversaries come together to help each other. Not under Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese Communist Party is now trying to sow discord among Americans as we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This is outrageous. And I call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States to formally apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't, because if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that. One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how honored I am to join this Commission. It is such a great--it has such a great history, especially under your leadership. At a time when many people are raising questions about Congress's decisions in the past relating to China--for example, extending MFN 20 years ago--it is good to remind Americans that at the same time the Congress also established organizations like this one to keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may be more Congress can do to live up to this Commission's mandate, perhaps even expand it. But as the new guy here, I'm eager to learn from my colleagues about how the Commission works. And I'm very honored to be part of that. With that, Mr. Chairman, I, again, am very glad to be here and look forward to working with you and all the members of this distinguished Commission. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Commissioner, for your very eloquent remarks. And welcome to the Commission. We're so glad that you're here. I'd like to now recognize Congresswoman and Commissioner Andrea Salinas. STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA SALINAS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OREGON Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can be brief. I just want to thank you, the co-chairs, for today's hearing, and Ranking Member McGovern; it is critically important. I want to thank the witnesses for coming here to testify. And like our newest member, I too am eager to continue to learn and really, hopefully figure out what some tools are to provide some accountability around this. This sounds like a global problem and something that is not just affecting human rights but also affects the way we do business around the world with trade. So I want to thank you all for conducting today's hearing. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much. I'd now like to recognize Commissioner Ryan Zinke. STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN ZINKE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MONTANA Representative Zinke. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and Senator Merkley for holding this hearing. And on this side of the aisle we have the Marine and Navy team. We'll try to do our best. But, Mr. Chairman, on June 24th, 2012, Dr. Shane Truman Todd, a young American engineer, was found hanging in his Singapore apartment a week before his scheduled return to the United States. Although Dr. Todd had repeatedly expressed fear about the work he was doing, from and to a Chinese company, authorities immediately ruled his death a suicide. His family initially didn't know what to believe. However, this started to change when they arrived in Singapore and evidence seemed to suggest murder and not suicide. The narrative changed when they discovered that what they had thought was a speaker was actually an external hard drive with thousands of backup files from Dr. Todd's computer. The data revealed by those files changed the narrative from a tragic suicide and loss of a son to an international story of deceit and cover-up. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to enter Chapter 11 of Mrs. Todd's book entitled ``Hard Drive: A Family's Fight Against Three Countries,'' into the record. Chair Smith. Without objection, so ordered. Representative Zinke. And if any member would like hard copies, we will certainly make those available, and I look forward to hearing your testimony, Minister Chong. And thank you, again, for holding this hearing. Chair Smith. Thank you very much. Before I introduce our very distinguished Member of Parliament, I just want to point out that a number of us met with the wife of Lu Siwei several weeks ago. He is in Laos, and it's not looking good. And my hope is that the Laotian government will rethink forcible repatriation of this amazing man back to China, where he faces a very, very terrible future. In meeting with his wife, and all the human rights organizations rallied behind him, there's total solidarity there, I'm happy to say. She couldn't have been more persuasive and loving towards her husband. And she made it so clear that if the West and all countries in democracies don't speak up, his future is so bleak. So our appeal would be to the Laotian government that they now cease and desist any kind of forcible repatriation. This Commission is very honored to welcome the Honorable Michael Chong here today, as he will testify to the depths the Chinese Communist Party has gone to in its transnational repression campaign, going so far as to attempt to coerce foreign Members of Parliament in countries with strong democratic roots simply for speaking out against human rights atrocities. Mr. Chong was first elected to the Parliament of Canada in 2004 and represents the riding [electoral district] of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and Vice Chair of the special committee on the Canada People's Republic of China relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong also served as chair of several House of Commons standing committees. It is a true honor and a privilege for us to have Mr. Chong join us today, though it's unfortunately due to the unacceptable and outrageous overreach of the Chinese Communist Party. After calling the CCP's treatment of the Uyghurs what it is--genocide--Mr. Chong received threats personally, and members of his family living in Hong Kong have been targeted as a result. The Chinese Communist Party not only seeks to silence its critics at home, it has gone so far as to harass thousands of people abroad for speaking the truth about their totalitarian regime. My colleagues and I are appalled at the attempts to censor you and others who have bravely spoken out. We welcome you, and please consume however much time you would like. STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL CHONG, MEMBER OF CANADIAN PARLIAMENT Mr. Chong. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith. Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley, Ranking Member McGovern, Senator Sullivan, Representatives Salinas and Zinke. Thank you very much for having me in front of your Commission today. I understand that you're interested in my experience of Beijing's transnational repression, or what we also call foreign interference. Like millions of Canadians and Americans, I'm the child of immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands and my father immigrated from Hong Kong. I have extended family in both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. I've been elected since 2004 to represent the district of Wellington-Halton Hills and have served in the federal Cabinet and chaired several parliamentary committees. In 2020, I was appointed the Official Opposition's Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since then, my criticisms of Beijing have increased in response to President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based international order and its repression in the PRC and abroad. In November 2020, I introduced a motion adopted by the House of Commons calling on the Canadian government to make a decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days and to develop a robust plan to combat China's growing foreign operations in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada. Several months later in February, I introduced another motion, which the House also adopted, recognizing Beijing's actions towards Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as genocide. In May this year, I learned that a PRC diplomat working out of the PRC consulate in Toronto had, since 2020, been gathering information to further target me and my family in Hong Kong. Last month I learned I was the target of a disinformation campaign in May of this year on the Chinese language social media platform WeChat. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs concluded that Beijing's role in this disinformation operation was highly probable. But my experience is but one case of Beijing's interference in Canada. Many, many other cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims suffer in silence. This has serious implications for the approximately 4 percent of Canadians--1.7 million--of Chinese descent. Beijing targets these diaspora groups using a variety of tactics. One tactic is to target the many Chinese international students in Canada, coaching them into participating in foreign interference threat activities on university campuses, such as targeting pro-Hong Kong democracy activists and Tibetan and Uyghur human rights campaigners. Other tactics include targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada, the establishment of illegal police stations in Canada, the wrongful arrest and detention of Canadians, such as Michael Kovrig, Michael Spavor, and the currently detained Huseyin Celil, whose whereabouts are completely unknown. And another tactic includes coercing Canadians on Canadian soil back to the People's Republic of China. Recently, the PRC has used a tactic of creating wanted lists and offering bounties for the arrest of those from Canada. These various tactics are a serious and concerted effort to interfere with democratic activity in Canada and leave millions of Canadians at risk of being intimidated, coerced, silenced, and unable to enjoy the basic democratic rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in our Constitution. These tactics cannot be tolerated in a free and sovereign country. Canada must work more closely with democratic allies, like the United States, in countering Beijing's efforts to interfere in our democratic life. Foreign interference is a serious national security threat to Canada. It threatens our economy, our long-term prosperity, social cohesion, our Parliament, and our elections. It requires a suite of measures to combat, including closer cooperation among allied democracies. Canada must work toward a stronger defense and security partnership with the United States and allies. We must look for every opportunity to strengthen this partnership to meet the challenge of rising authoritarianism and to preserve our fundamental freedoms, our democracy, and the rule of law. Thank you very much. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chong, for your excellent testimony and for your leadership. Just a couple of questions, then I'll yield to my colleagues for any questions they have. When you talked about closer cooperation, are you persuaded that we are cooperating now? Is it as robust as it should be? And what is being left undone and unaddressed? Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Chairman Smith, for that question. I think there are a number of ways in which we can cooperate in a better way. So, for example, the United States has long had a Foreign Agents Registration Act, since 1938. Australia more recently introduced one I think in 2019. The U.K. just adopted one two months ago in July. The government of Canada has announced that it's taking a look at introducing one in Canada to give law enforcement a tool to prosecute Beijing's agents operating on our own soil. And so I think there could-- one way in which we could better cooperate is to exchange information on legislative best models to see what works and what doesn't. We have similar judicial systems in our democracies. So that's one area of cooperation. Another area, for example, is how we use sunlight and transparency to counter foreign interference threat activities. Our security agencies and services, our experts, have told us that often foreign interference, transnational repression, doesn't rise to the level of a criminal prosecution. And so one way to counter it is to make it public and to go public with the intelligence to tell members of the public, Members of Congress, Members of Parliament, here's what exactly is going on. To arm citizens and elected officials with the information they need to protect themselves. So best practices on how to do that during elections, in between elections. Those are just two examples of where I think we could more closely cooperate. Chair Smith. You know, I mentioned the list of things that they'd done to people who have been outspoken that I know of, that we know of as a Commission. I would point out that Anna Kwok, who is here today with us in the back, she has testified in the past here, this year, on behalf of Hong Kong. She has a bounty on her head. I mean, there's no let-up on the repressive tactics employed by Xi Jinping. And even Chen Guangcheng, who I worked to help release years ago, they--he assumes it was the Chinese Communist Party--in order to send the message that they were watching went into his home when he and his wife and family were out and rearranged everything. They didn't destroy anything. They just re- arranged it, to let him know, We've been here. Rebiya Kadeer, the great Uyghur human rights activist, similarly has had one instance after another. And I'm wondering, you know, looking at you--here you are, high profile, you know, Member of Parliament. And yet they're doing this against you. You know, I was put on the hit list by Global Times a couple of years ago. I was briefed by the FBI; it nowhere near comes to what you're going through, believe me. But they said, Watch out for social media. Watch out for other things that they may do. They refused to give me a visa. I've been trying to put together a trip there--we'll go to Xinjiang--since their foreign ministry said, We have nothing to hide--anybody wants to come, come. We sent a letter to the embassy and said: I want to come. Please approve it. And we have not heard back from them since. But we're going to keep trying. I say this because, you know--the level of angst directed against you, and you have family members at risk, you know, we need to rally behind you and others like you who have family especially. They could do a lot here, but to people in Hong Kong or anywhere else in the PRC they can do a lot more. So that's why redoubling our efforts, passing this legislation, sharing best practices, is so important. You know, in reference to the PRC's disinformation campaign against you on WeChat, could you elaborate on what that looked like? Mr. Chong. Thank you, Chairman Smith. What happened with me is that in May of this year, while a big debate was going on in Canada about foreign interference, a number of narratives-- false narratives about me popped up on Chinese-language social media, particularly on the WeChat platform. And these narratives persisted for about a week, and the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs concluded that they emanated from Chinese Communist Party accounts. This is corrosive because WeChat in Canada has over a million users and some five million people globally--including many in Canada--saw that disinformation. They have weaponized Chinese-language social media, Chinese media such as CGTN, the state broadcaster. They're targeting radio stations and television stations. I know that in the U.K., just a couple of years ago, Ofcom, their broadcast regulator, pulled CGTN off the air, off of television, because of human rights violations and disinformation that was being spread. So that's something I think democracies have to grapple with. Best practices on how to do that I think is critically important, because one of the things we need to do is balance our fundamental belief in free speech, free expression, free media, and freedom of communication with the need to counter this disinformation. Chairman Smith, you also mentioned how the PRC is using money to corrupt our system. And I think that's another area for cooperation. Often transnational repression comes alongside corruption, alongside personal illicit gain, payments of monies or consideration, money laundering. And so I think countering that money laundering, countering the proceeds of illicit gain, I think is something democracies also need to work more closely on. And the United States, being the world's reserve currency and the U.S. dollar being the main means of transaction in our global economy, I think we can do a lot together to counter this repression that takes the form of financial corruption. Chair Smith. Before my time runs out, just two things. Is the Canadian government standing in solidarity with you and everyone else? Very briefly on that. And on the college campuses, what is the PRC doing vis-a-vis minority religions? Mr. Chong. Yes. Since the spring, the Canadian government has been standing up and supporting me. I think before that point in time, you know, there were issues that have popped up, but they are now, like many other democracies, reacting to the threat. You know, like I said, the U.K. just adopted a foreign agents registry two months ago,and the Canadian government has announced it will be introducing one. You know, democracies are often slow to react to the threat of authoritarian states, which can act much more quickly because it's one-person or a- few-people rule. So, yes, they have been supportive of me in recent months. On university campuses, what is going on is that there are, I believe, over 100,000 Chinese international students at Canadian--Canada's leading research universities. Often these students are coached and coerced into participating in foreign interference threat activities on Canadian university campuses. For example, just a couple of years ago there was a Tibetan human rights activist at the University of Toronto Scarborough campus. She had campaigned for president of the student council. She had won the election. And she was immediately targeted by students through a coordinated effort by the PRC consulate. A similar thing happened at the McMaster University campus in Hamilton, Ontario, where a Uyghur human rights activist was similarly targeted by students through a coordinated action of the PRC consulate. So these are the kinds of coercive activities taking place on university campuses. Chair Smith. Thank you. Co-chair Merkley. Co-chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And following up on that impact on university campuses, in your testimony you note that international students were compelled to demonstrate against pro-Hong Kong rallies after threats were made ``to withhold their government scholarships or harm their families back home.'' In your estimation, is this a--this is not just a one-off. This is a systemic strategy to use the Chinese students who are present to essentially create a pro-China force on campuses. Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it is a systemic, long-term effort to create fear on university campuses. I've just highlighted two examples of what has happened, but we've had many other-- we've heard about many other cases on university campuses. And often the Chinese international students who are conducting these activities are themselves being coerced into doing it. Not in all cases, but in many cases. And so, yes, it is a pervasive threat on university campuses. Co-chair Merkley. And I've also read about the strategies that China is using in which they essentially recruit some of the Chinese students to spy on other Chinese students who might be participating in critiquing China's policies or participating in protests against Chinese activities in Hong Kong or against Uyghurs, and so forth. Is that something that you've observed in Canada as well? Mr. Chong. Yes, we have observed that. At our committee in the House of Commons, we heard testimony from witnesses who highlighted exactly that going on. That these students were being coerced into spying on other students, threatening other students from the PRC who weren't toeing the PRC line. And doing so under threat of having their scholarships withdrawn, or their family targeted back home. Co-chair Merkley. Is there an effort to establish a channel through which students can report these strategies of coercion, so we can get a better grip on how widespread it is and ponder ways to address it? Mr. Chong. Well, there is a number, a center that Canadians can call to report foreign interference threat activities, but I don't think it's broadly made available to Chinese international students or promoted among that community. Again, it's an area where we could learn from each other on best practices on how to counter this threat, and where I think allied democracies can learn from each other on how to counter this. Co-chair Merkley. I'll shift gears here from the campuses. And thank you for those insights. You note in your testimony that there's significant influence in Mandarin-language news outlets. And, you know, I would have thought that often those news outlets in our democracies would be a place that would be particularly interested in reporting on China's abuses. But they're being co-opted. What is the strategy being employed there? Why is it effective? Mr. Chong. Well, I think the strategy is multi-pronged. So, for example, there are state broadcasters from the PRC that are on the airwaves in democracies, such as CGTN, the PRC's state broadcaster. It often promotes propaganda right out of the Chinese Communist Party. And those broadcasts are seen by millions of people around the world. People close to the Chinese Communist Party leadership have often taken ownership of newspapers and radio stations. And we've noticed that there's been a shift in the editorial stance of those newspapers. For example, Sing Tao Daily is the largest Chinese-language newspaper in Canada. Its former editor is Victor Ho and he has told us in testimony in front of our committee that the newspaper is largely now a vehicle for Chinese Communist Party propaganda and views, compared to when he was the editor, where it was truly an independent newspaper that operated free of any control from Beijing. Co-chair Merkley. I think that's a really important point. But is it the Chinese government that is buying these outlets? Is it Chinese corporations or affluent Chinese individuals? How are they securing ownership control? Mr. Chong. It's not directly owned by the state. These are assets that have been purchased by individuals that are close to the PRC. You know, for example, we've seen recently a couple of years ago that the South China Morning Post, the largest English-language newspaper in Hong Kong, changed ownership. And there are suggestions that its editorial stance has changed because of that. Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. Thank you very much. And I just want to close with the question as to whether any of your family back in China have ever been threatened as a result of your conversations? Mr. Chong. Well, my experience is, I think, illustrative of what is happening to many Canadians, and Americans, and other citizens of other democracies. Out of an abundance of caution, I've cut off contact with my family in Hong Kong in order to ensure that they are somewhat insulated from the work that I'm doing here. And I know in talking to members of diaspora communities across Canada and in the United States, that many, many other people have done the same thing. And so this is the consequence, one of the consequences, of the PRC's transnational repression. Co-chair Merkley. Thanks so much. Chair Smith. Senator Sullivan. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Minister, welcome. And thank you, again, for your courage in being here. What you're doing, even as we speak in terms of your testimony, takes an enormous amount of courage. And I just want to let you know how much we admire it and appreciate it, because it takes people like you to speak out even though you do so with threats and risks to your family. So we really appreciate that. I want to just touch on a couple points that I raised in my opening statement. Your point about sticking together as democracies, can you expand on this a little bit more, particularly in light of the fact that we've seen that the Chinese Communist Party's strategy is often to try to isolate and single out certain democracies? You know, they were really, really pounding Lithuania from an economic standpoint. In Australia, they undertook this big coercive economic, essentially, blockade. And can you tell just a little bit more on how important it is for all of us, as democracies, to push back together, stick together, and that brings us power and strength? Particularly when they try to pick off smaller countries, which I know is part of their strategy. Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Senator, for that question. I mentioned how we can work more closely together on translating intelligence into public disclosure. Our members of the public have talked a bit about working together to figure out how we counter disinformation during--targeting elected officials and our elections, while still upholding the fundamental freedom of speech. Foreign agent registry is another opportunity for cooperation. I talked a bit about how we can cooperate on transnational financial crimes, which often come alongside foreign interference, but another area for cooperation is combating repression within the People's Republic of China. For example, we know that much of the cotton and many of the tomatoes produced in Xinjiang province in western China are being produced through the forced labor of Uyghurs. And we know that those products are being exported around the world. I think the United States has done an excellent job in enforcing bans on the importation of products, like tomatoes and cotton, that have been produced using that forced labor. As I understand it, some 2,500 shipments from the PRC in the last two or three years have been seized by U.S. border officials and prevented from coming into the United States. In Canada, we've yet to seize one shipment. There was a single shipment that was seized, but later released. We have evidence that those products continue to flow into Canada. And I think that's an area where we should learn from U.S. best practices on stopping these products from coming into our country. We're part of the North American Free Trade Zone. We can't be the place where these products have a back door to come in. So that is another example of where I think we could work much more closely with a democracy like the United States to learn how to implement these sorts of bans. Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Let me follow up on your points on transparency, working together. I also believe it's important, particularly for regimes like this that often only recognize power and threats to their own viability. As you know, the Chinese Communist Party's number-one goal is to stay in power, way above anything else. The welfare of their people, they couldn't care less, as long as they stay in power. So here's another question I have for you. I also think it's important that we go on a little bit of offense. Covertly, overtly, collectively. A lot of the CCP leadership, we know, is corrupt. We know they steal from their own people. We know that they're very rich from their corruption. Don't you think it makes sense--the Chinese are trying to sow discord as people in Hawaii are literally burying our fellow Americans--just outrageous--that we should also go on offense? Let the Chinese people know how corrupt their leaders are, that they're all very rich because they steal from their people. Don't you think we should be going on offense covertly, overtly? You want to mess with us, Okay, we'll mess with you. And maybe we'll bring your leadership down. Don't you think we should be doing that? Mr. Chong. Well, I think that's a very good point you make, Senator. I think of past decades before the rise of the internet and modern communication technologies, where shortwave radio was often used as a way to ensure that people in authoritarian states were receiving news and information that wasn't the propaganda of the state. And I think in this day and age, we should be funding VPN technologies that will allow people behind great firewalls, like the one in the PRC, to access news and information from the outside world, so that they actually get the truth rather than propaganda. Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it's also very true--and I'm sure you would agree--that Xi Jinping's biggest weakness is that he fears his own people. That's why he's killing all of his close associates, or at least disappearing them. I don't know where they are. They're probably dead. Let me get back to this issue of the nature of the regime, because I think you understand it more than most. But it's often right in front of our faces, and we don't want to recognize it. Let me give you a broader example. You know, it's really interesting to me that you read Xi Jinping's speeches, you watch what he says publicly, you look at who he emulates. The guy emulates Mao Zedong. There's no doubt about it. He's trying to model himself on Mao Zedong. If you just do a little bit of reading of the history of Mao Zedong, he's one of the most brutal dictators in the history, maybe, of the world. ``The Black Book of Communism'' estimates that he killed probably 50 to 60 million of his own citizens. And the current leader of China emulates him. That would be like the chancellor of Germany emulating Hitler. So what does it say about the nature of the regime that the current leader of China emulates one of the most brutal dictators in the history of the world? Shouldn't we be concerned about that? But shouldn't it also be a lesson for us? Mr. Chong. Yes, I think it should be of concern to us. I think the rising prosperity of authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, over the last 20 years has given them the resources to export their model of authoritarianism around the world. Whether it's in the South China Sea, whether it's in the Indo- Pacific region, and I think we, as democracies, need to acknowledge that this is a very real threat. And I think we have slowly come to this realization over the last decade. You know, I think--beyond 10 years ago, I think we wrongly assumed that along with increasing prosperity in these authoritarian states that they would gradually improve their record on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. But the opposite has happened. All they have done is taken this newfound wealth and reinforced this authoritarianism, using technology, using other methods to repress their people. But going back to an earlier point you made about sunlight and transparency and disclosure, one of the things that we are based on is freedom of speech, freedom of expression, a belief in transparency and sunlight. That is not something authoritarian states are based on. They're based on the very opposite principles. So I think by naming and shaming bad actors, by using intelligence and making some of that public to name and shame bad actors, I think will go a long way in countering this threat. Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thanks again for your courage. Mr. Chairman, thank you again, sir. Chair Smith. I'd now like to yield to the ranking member, Jim McGovern. Representative McGovern. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. Thank you for being here. You know, the concern is that it's not just about social media outlets that China can control or has a greater influence on. I mean, you know, I just plugged into Twitter, ``Maui fire causes.'' And things come up, like from The Desert Review-- whatever the hell that is, I have no idea--but basically it echoes the stuff that China's been putting out, in a number of posts, that somehow there's some mysterious causes to these fires. And it doesn't say the Chinese government posted them. I mean, they obviously have sympathizers and people who promote conspiracy theories. But we have a problem, again, as a country that believes in free speech and freedom of expression. I mean, we have a problem on our own social media platforms with disinformation being put out there. And in the case of Twitter, now X, all the review procedures that used to be in place are gone. I mean, we're reading about the attacks on the Anti-Defamation League, who were raising issues about antisemitic posts being placed online--the response that really tried to destroy the integrity of the ADL is really quite, you know, stunning. And so how do you get these social media platform executives who oversee this to actually be more responsible? And it's not just about naming and shaming the Chinese government, which we ought to do because of what they're doing. But we have corporate leaders that tolerate this in countries like ours. I mean, how do you get--do we name and shame them a little bit more? Mr. Chong. Well, Representative McGovern, that's an excellent question. And this is where I think like-minded democracies could really learn from each other on best practices and different models. So, for example, the European Union has a model to counter disinformation. The European Commission has set up a unit within the EC to counter disinformation in real time that's springing up on social media platforms. On the other hand, a very different model is the Taiwanese model. Taiwan is ground zero for the PRC's disinformation operations. Both the PRC and Taiwan share a common language. And so they are ground zero for this disinformation and they've taken a very different approach. I was recently part of a delegation to Taiwan where I met with Audrey Tang, who's the new inaugural minister of digital affairs. And she told me about their policy, which is a very different approach. It's grounded in resiliency. It's grounded in the education system, the primary and high school education system, and in civil society--empowering civil society groups to counter this disinformation. So this is where I think we can learn from each other on best practices, on what works, what doesn't. But at the end of the day we have to balance two competing things. That is to counter this disinformation while upholding freedom of the media and freedom of speech. Representative McGovern. The level of disinformation that is being peddled on various social media platforms really undercuts our democracy and the very freedoms that we all care about. And it's always frustrating to me that we can't seem to come to a consensus on what disinformation is. And so we don't want to be in the business of censorship, but there ought to be some mechanism that clearly calls out lies and disinformation and conspiracy theories, and attacks on individuals, even if they're very subtle, for what they are. And so this is a real challenge. Some of it, you know, is putting pressure on China. Some of it is putting pressure on the platforms that allow people to traffic these lies and threats. As I said in the beginning, I'm worried about attacks against people on these various platforms. But I also, quite frankly, am very worried about the other forms of transnational repression, including assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, family intimidation, and Interpol abuse. I mean, the potential for the abuse of Interpol is well known and long- standing. Do you have any specific recommendations for reform of the Interpol system to combat transnational repression? Mr. Chong. Well, I think we do need to take a look at reforming Interpol. In light of the bounties and the demand for the arrest of eight pro-Hong Kong democracy activists who are abroad, I think we've got to make sure that Interpol isn't used as a tool by the PRC to arrest and detain these individuals. I think of a Canadian, Huseyin Celil, who was wrongfully arrested outside of the PRC, I believe in Turkmenistan, a number of years ago, and then extradited to the PRC. His whereabouts are completely unknown and the PRC won't tell the Canadian government where he is being detained, or even if he is alive. And his wife and children live in Burlington, Ontario, just a couple miles up from--north of the border, north of New York State. It's so corrosive, that kind of tactic, because it sends a message to the rest of the community in Canada, that if they dare to speak up, if they dare to stand up, they may be arrested abroad and taken to the PRC. Representative McGovern. Again, I think we need to do a better job of coordinating with other like-minded countries when another country has somebody who is seeking asylum, and yet China has a particular hold over the country where that person is seeking refuge and are thinking of deporting him or her back to China. I mean, we ought to be more coordinated in our efforts to try to provide a circle of protection around those individuals. This is an important topic. The abuse of these various platforms to target people, to discredit people, to spread conspiracy theories, has proliferated in a way that I don't think any of us could have imagined when social media first came into being. And it's hard to figure out how to put the genie back in the bottle, but maybe what we need--you know, are more truth tellers trying to influence on social media. And maybe we need to try to establish a group of people to set the record straight. But, again, I just thought it was interesting. When I googled ``Maui fires,'' when I plugged it in on Twitter, two conspiracy theories appear--both are being peddled by the Chinese government. But I appreciate your courage and I appreciate your advocacy. And I look forward to working with you in the months ahead. I yield back. Chair Smith. Commissioner Zinke. Representative Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to thank you for being here. It's not easy to stand up for freedom. And it takes a lot of courage. And thanks. I'd like to ask your thoughts on Chinese capabilities and priorities, perhaps, on industrial espionage, in particular the high-tech sector. Mr. Chong. Well, thank you, Representative Zinke, for that question. It's a very serious area of foreign interference. Our security services have told us that the PRC is a threat in two ways in five areas. They are a threat to our national security and they are a threat to us in the form of the theft of intellectual property. And that is, in particular, in five sensitive areas of research and development at our leading universities and in our leading Canadian companies. Those five areas are: telecommunications--5G telecommunications, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biopharma, and clean technologies. And so I think what we should be doing is banning any government funding of research in partnership with PRC entities in those five sensitive areas of research. And so whether it's the four Canadian granting councils, or in the United States here the National Institutes of Health and other granting councils, I think we need to make it clear that we won't fund research in those five areas that's in partnership with PRC entities. I think we also need to ban research in partnership with any entity affiliated with the People's Liberation Army. Represenative Zinke. And let me follow up. A concern when you talk about green technologies is EV. It sounds so nice. And I'm all for cleaner is better, etc. But I'm concerned about the supply chain. Because in order to power EV, it takes batteries. And just a cursory look at the supply chain, when you look at what is required for a battery: Well, lithium, cobalt. So who controls the mining of lithium, cobalt, and those other materials? And then the chips. Who's making the chips that run it and the production? And it goes on and on. And then, of course, the other side of it is, What do you do when the battery has ended its lifecycle? You know, in the U.S. 90 percent of the solar cells that are no longer useful because of the technology and different reasons, they're just thrown into a landfill someplace across the country. We have no plan on what the disposal of the toxic batteries and liability should be. So I'm concerned about the EV world because it seems like we're pushing an agenda without looking at the engine behind it, and the engine seems to be Chinese. Do you share that same concern? Mr. Chong. Yes, I share that concern. I think there's two ways in which Canada can be a stronger partner to the United States in that regard. I think, first off, we are a vast country with immense natural resources. We have critical minerals of our own that can be part of the North American automobile supply chain. And I think that's an area in which we can work more closely with the United States. I think the second area, though, is equally important. We're the fifth- largest natural gas producer in the world and we currently don't have an LNG export facility to get our natural gas to global markets. And if we can get those terminals built, if we can export natural gas to international markets, and more natural gas to the United States, we can accomplish two goals. First, we can help reduce global emissions because a fifth of global emissions come from coal-fired electricity plants in places like the People's Republic of China. We can cut those emissions in half overnight by transitioning those plants to natural gas. And, secondly, we can help displace oil and gas from authoritarian states and replace it with oil and gas produced here from democracies. And I think particularly when it comes to Germany and Japan, who are currently buying vast amounts of gas from authoritarian states--they should be buying their gas from Canada instead, and from the United States. And so those are two ways in which I think we can help the United States. We've got critical minerals of our own and we've got vast amounts of natural gas that we need to get to international markets. Representative Zinke. So it seems like on both sides we have hurdles for our natural gas exports. But you're actually right. I mean, no one does it cleaner, better than North America. And if you want to look at how not to produce energy, I'll take you on a tour of Russia or the Middle East. The other point that I think is important, you look at dependency, and who is dependent on whom, and for what. On critical minerals, as you mentioned, there's some critical minerals that they have the entirety of the supply chain. And it's not a secret. And one of them happens to be germanium. And it turns out germanium is needed for lenses, especially high- definition lenses, that you might want to put on military hardware, thermal optics, as a matter of fact almost everything we use. But critical metals are locked up and we can't get to the resources. We have germanium here, but the germanium permit is almost impossible to get. And while technology on the battlefield changes every two years, we're waiting 25 years for a permit. And I would agree absolutely that the TransCanada pipeline-- which is about 18 inches--would both reduce overall emissions and help us shore up our energy needs. Natural gas pipelines. Do you see any success in your current government on this issue? Mr. Chong. Well, I think you're exactly right. We need regulatory reform in Canada to reduce the regulatory hurdles to approving natural resource projects. In fact, the government of Canada itself has acknowledged that. Finance Minister Freeland was actually here in Washington last year and said that Canada needs to expedite the approval of these natural resource projects to get our resources to market to help our allies. She was very explicit about that. I await the Canadian government's plans in that regard. It can be done. I'll give you one example of how a democracy did it. Germany, after the war in Ukraine began, realized that it had complete reliance on Russian natural gas, and that those pipelines were being shut down. We know one of them was blown up in the Baltic Sea and the other one never came online. And so Germany had to scramble. Well, within days after last February's invasion, they approved six new LNG terminals in the Baltic and North Sea. One of them came online in a record roughly six months from approval to live operation in Wilhelmshaven, which is a port, I believe, in the North Sea. So democracies, like Canada, can expedite these projects. We just need the political will to do so. And I think it's critical that we do that. Representative Zinke. I look forward to working with you on that. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Chair Smith. Ms. Salinas. Representative Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chong, we've been talking a little bit about science and technology. And I serve on the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, where we frequently discuss issues around research security, especially in the context of economic competition with China. International research collaboration does have significant benefits, but reports suggest that our efforts to crack down on bad actors have actually caused many Chinese American researchers to leave positions at American universities. And I understand this. How can we balance protecting against real, legitimate, and dangerous threats from the Chinese government and their influence on college campuses and fostering a welcoming environment for students and researchers at North American universities, where we really want to make true advancements? Mr. Chong. Well, that's a great question. You know, we have to balance academic freedom with the need to protect national security in sensitive areas of research. And one critical element in doing that is being open and transparent about what research will be funded and what won't be funded. And I think that will clear the suspicion. I think, in the absence of clear policies about what the government will fund, and what it won't fund because it crosses a line, I think you clear a lot of the suspicion away. And so my view is in the Canadian context we should be clear that we will not fund research partnerships and research that is done in collaboration with PRC entities in the five sensitive areas of research that I identified and secondly, in research partnerships with the People's Liberation Army. I don't think there's any research that the Canadian government should fund that's done in collaboration with the PRC's military. So if we put those policies in place, and also then simply advise universities that we think that there are security risks--if they then on their own decide to fund those research partnerships, if they decide to do those partnerships in those five sensitive areas, then I think we empower our university community, our academics, to do the right thing. And I'm confident that they will, and that they'll know where the lines are. And I think that clears a lot of the suspicion about any research that's been conducted with researchers from the PRC. Representative Salinas. Thank you. I yield back. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much. Mr. Chong, thank you for your testimony. Without objection, your full statement and any materials you would like to include in the record will be made a part of the record. But thank you for your clarity, for your boldness, for your courage. It is greatly appreciated, greatly respected south of the border-- that is to say, the Canadian border. Mr. Chong. Well, thank you very much for having me. And we look forward to building a stronger defense and security partnership with the United States. Chair Smith. Yes. I appreciate it so much. Thank you. [Applause.] I'd now like to introduce our second panel. And beginning-- it is a very, very fantastic group of experts and leaders, including those who have unfortunately been victimized by China's transnational repression and those who have studied and witnessed it up close. First, I'd like to welcome Dr. Yana Gorokhovskaia, the research director for strategy and design at Freedom House. Yana has a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia and has been published in peer-reviewed journals and outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the Guardian, the Washington Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House, Yana oversees research that quantifies trends toward and away from global freedom and democracy, as well as monitoring transnational repression. She has co-authored two reports on the topic in recent years, ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022,'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression.'' Next, we will hear from Ms. Laura Harth, campaign director at Safeguard Defenders, a human rights NGO that protects human rights, promotes the rule of law, and works to enhance local civil society capacity in some of Asia's most hostile environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party around the world through its direct action, research, and advocacy efforts. Indeed, you may recognize the organization's name from a groundbreaking investigation they released exactly a year ago, entitled ``110 Overseas: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild,'' in which they expose the abhorrent lengths to which the CCP has gone to maintain control over people outside its borders, including the establishment of at least 54 police-run overseas police service centers across five continents to carry out Chinese police operations on foreign soil, including right here in the United States. Laura also covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and acts as an advisor to Hong Kong Watch. Then we will hear from Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American activist who has dedicated her life to championing the rights of the Uyghur people, and a great friend of this Commission. Rushan began her advocacy at Xinjiang University, where she courageously led pro-democracy protests in 1985 and again in 1988. After re- locating to the U.S. in '89, she co-founded the Uyghur Overseas Student and Scholars Association, that was in 1993, and played a pivotal role in establishing the Uyghur American Association in 1998 and was elected as vice president for two terms. In response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against the Uyghurs in 2017, Ms. Abbas cofounded the Campaign for Uyghurs, or CFU. In 2020, CFU released its report ``Genocide in East Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how the PRC's atrocities make it subject to strictures of the Genocide Convention. Notably, CFU received a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in February of 2022 for its tireless advocacy. Indeed, for the record, it was former Commissioner Tom Suozzi and I who made the nomination. Tom and I also launched the Uyghur Caucus here in Congress, and now co-lead that with Jennifer Wexton. And we hope to re-launch that again very soon. Rushan has a personal story to relate as well. In 2018 her family members underwent the unthinkable. After her first public speech in September of 2018, the CCP abducted and detained her sister Gulshan in China, in retaliation for her activism. She remains in custody. So I welcome our very, very distinguished witnesses. And now, Yana, I yield the floor to you. STATEMENT OF YANA GOROKHOVSKAIA, RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGY AND DESIGN, FREEDOM HOUSE Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished members of the Commission for the opportunity to share information about the scope and scale of the global transnational repression campaign carried out by the People's Republic of China. Today, I'll use my time to describe how the PRC tries to silence people living abroad, as well as how this campaign has evolved. I'll conclude with some suggestions about the ways that democratic governments can better protect people who are targeted by the PRC. I'll begin with this simple fact: The People's Republic of China today is one of the least-free countries in the world. It now ranks near the very bottom among 195 countries assessed in ``Freedom in the World,'' which is our global survey of political rights and civil liberties. The domestic situation is important to understand because, like other authoritarian governments, the PRC exports oppression abroad as a way of maintaining the regime at home. Even though Chinese officials routinely reference the government's policy of noninterference, Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through the use of physical force, the terms of free speech, association, movement, assembly, and even religious expression of individuals who are thousands of miles away. China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression using a wide array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to attempt to silence those views as a threat. According to a database that Freedom House maintains, the PRC is responsible for about 30 percent of all recorded physical incidents of transnational repression globally since 2014. It has conducted campaigns in at least 36 countries, including in democracies like the United States. As Chairman Smith and Co-chairman Merkley already noted, Beijing targets a very diverse array of people--pro-democracy activists, journalists, students, human rights defenders, artists, former insiders, civil society organizations, and whole ethnic and religious groups like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, as well as anyone else who is brave enough to criticize the Chinese Communist Party. It uses many different tactics to try to silence people. One of the most harmful and hard-to-address tactics is the intimidation of family or coercion by proxy. Harassment of family members still living in China can be psychologically devastating for people seeking to promote human rights and advocate for freedom. Commission members already noted how the PRC seeks to manipulate mechanisms of international cooperation like Interpol and extradition agreements. And I want to pause to point out two important cases. One is the case of Idris Hasan. Idris was detained in March of 2021 when he landed in an airport in Casablanca on a red notice that was issued by China. Two and a half years later, he's still in prison, despite the fact that the red notice was canceled shortly after his arrest. Idris is at risk of being deported to China every single day because Morocco and China have an extradition agreement. And worryingly, China is actively pursuing the ratification of more extradition agreements, as our colleagues at Safeguard Defenders and Oxus Society have well documented. Lu Siwei also, in Laos, faces imminent deportation. And his situation is also very worrying. The PRC's toolkit of repression is evolving in dangerous ways. For example, evidence has recently emerged that the PRC is co-opting former members of domestic law enforcement agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people living both in the U.S. and in Canada. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice, and their Canadian counterparts, have begun to examine these cases. However, I want to underline that the involvement of former law enforcement officials in transnational repression campaigns may amplify, rightfully, the fear that members of the diaspora feel--because it demonstrates that the PRC is able to deputize officials in democratic states to carry out its repressive schemes. The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom domestically. It employs digital tactics of transnational repression as well. These tactics, which include mass trolling, smear campaigns, threats and intimidation, spoofing of accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant to, first, intimidate, drown out reports of human rights abuses, and apply psychological pressure. I also want to note that these tactics are gendered. Women face not only violent but sexualized threats online in response to their work or their activism that shines a critical light on the PRC. The PRC's campaign of transnational repression is a threat to sovereignty, democratic institutions, and human rights. Building resilience and imposing accountability are key. I'd like to conclude today by sharing some of Freedom House's recommendations for how to better protect people. I'll start with one that I think many on this Commission are already working on--codifying a definition of transnational repression. This will facilitate the tracking of incidents, distinguish attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate interagency action in addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed. The second is training for government officials, including law enforcement, who may encounter transnational repression, to make sure that officials are equipped with matching and sufficient information to protect those who are at risk. The third is conducting strategic, consistent, and culturally sensitive outreach to communities that are at risk of experiencing transnational repression, in order to equip them with the resources they need to report these incidents. The fourth is using voice and vote to limit the ability of Interpol member states to misuse red alerts and other kinds of notices. And finally, deploying targeted sanctions against Chinese officials for the use of transnational repression, as well as screening Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing diaspora members while at their postings. I should note that several pieces of legislation to address transnational repression have been introduced or will be introduced in the near future. And I want to say, again, thank you to Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for your introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you to see that it passes into law. Addressing transnational repression committed by the government of the People's Republic of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative that Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those who are at risk and to defend democratic institutions. We appreciate the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much for your testimony and your recommendations. Ms. Harth. STATEMENT OF LAURA HARTH, CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR, SAFEGUARD DEFENDERS Ms. Harth. Thank you so much, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman Merkley, distinguished members of the Commission. Good morning. It is truly an honor to testify before you today on behalf of Safeguard Defenders. As was already said, most people will know us, if they know us, for the report released exactly one year ago today, which exposed the formal cooperation between public security authorities in China and United Front-linked groups around the world in the setting up and running of so-called overseas police service centers. Now, counter to what PRC authorities and their propaganda mouthpieces continue to say, even over the weekend and today, these stations are not just in open violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Open- source evidence exclusively from Chinese authorities and state party media links such stations directly to so-called persuasion to return operations, including video evidence from such an operation taking place in Spain. Now, as is often the case when yet another Chinese foreign interference story breaks--and we've obviously just heard from Canada with the Honorable Michael Chong--we're seeing the fallout over the weekend over an alleged spy in Westminster. The reports on police stations presented somewhat of a rude awakening for many democratic governments that have previously been very reluctant to engage on the issue of transnational repression coming from China. While overseas police stations definitely jump-started a growing series of conversations, these are clearly but the tip of the iceberg in what members of the dissident communities have long known, and what Freedom House rightly defines, as the world's most sophisticated, comprehensive, and far-reaching campaign of transnational repression. Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders focuses our direct action and documentation efforts on countering one of its most extreme iterations, that of involuntary returns. While these are not new, the scale on which PRC authorities are coercing individuals to return to China to face prosecution has exploded over the course of the past decade, with official, yet partial, numbers released annually under Operation Fox Hunt and Skynet claiming well over 10,000 returns from over 120 countries between 2014 and October 2022. And we will soon release additional evidence on such operations taking place around the world. The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been set in stone by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in a written legal interpretation to the 2018 National Supervision Law that vastly expanded this non-judicial body's reach. Extradition, repatriation, off-side prosecution, persuasion, luring and entrapment, and even kidnapping are among the official policies used by PRC authorities. The so- called persuasion to return method is the one used most frequently--threats and harassment, or worse, against family members back home, or direct threats and harassment of individuals overseas by covert agents, individuals linked to PRC embassies or consulates, private investigators and security firms, co-opted private individuals, rabid nationalists, or even victims themselves. The Chinese Communist Party has set up a true whole-of- society effort to exert control over diaspora communities worldwide and silence dissent. These efforts clearly undermine the most fundamental freedoms of targeted communities, severely infringe upon the rights and due process of individuals coerced into returning, and constitute a grave violation of the territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The climate of suspicion and widespread fear further isolates targeted communities and individuals from their environments. They may also expose individuals that have been co-opted or coerced into doing the CCP's bidding, to criminal liability. As has often been said, to effectively counter such a massive undertaking, democracies need to respond with a similar whole- of-government approach that recognizes transnational repression for the domestic threat it is, one that is inextricably linked to the CCP's influence operations. Now, speaking from a European perspective, we are really at the very beginning of such an endeavor and will need continued, concerted allied efforts to move beyond the stage of timid condemnation to effective and coordinated transnational counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards joint definitions, sharing of information and best practices, as well as the coherent application of set standards, are an essential step in this direction. It is, in our view, equally key to end the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through judicial and police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral but also at the multilateral level. It is no coincidence that the PRC has been pushing the signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate during the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns operations have exploded. Some may remember the example of the joint police patrols that seemed, at the very least, conducive to the pilot run of overseas police stations in Italy, something the Italian authorities have since recognized as being imprudent. But it doesn't end with such examples. Nor does it end with the examples of extradition agreements or Interpol abuse. In particular, I'd like to use this occasion to severely question the legitimacy of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime's MOU with the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection--that same body I mentioned before--as the Chinese focal point for all work under the Convention against Corruption. Not only does PRC propaganda adopt these types of agreements as a demonstration of the international community's trust in its judicial system, it directly contributes to a heightened sense of fear within targeted communities, gravely subverts the international rules-based order, and often acts as a gateway to similar agreements at the bilateral level, especially in the Global South. Ending such legitimization is a crucial part in rebuilding trust with the targeted communities that are key to understanding emerging threats and actors. Personally, I believe the biggest compliment we have received on our work is that of victims across Europe stating they finally found audiences eager for their stories and experiences. To them. I want to say: We need more of your stories. Authorities need to hear more of your stories. The U.S. and Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual, dedicated hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere, Safeguard Defenders has today released a pilot guide with reporting channels in a series of countries, which we will continue to update and hopefully grow with similarly dedicated hotlines. So if you or others have been the target of transnational repression, please report to the relevant authorities. Please report to the FBI if you're in this country. Only by coming together can we begin to effectively push back against the CCP's efforts. Thank you. Chair Smith. Thank you so very much. Senator Merkley has a vote pending over on the Senate side and has to run to make it, so I yield whatever time he needs. Co-chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize to our third witness. Thank you so much for your advocacy. As you know, I'm deeply engaged in efforts to highlight and address and create pressure regarding Chinese treatment of the Uyghur community and their enslavement practices, including stopping the export of products made, in order to create international pressure to change those tactics. Ms. Gorokhovskaia, I want to turn to your testimony, Freedom House, and I appreciate so much your organization's work. But I wanted to highlight one piece of your testimony about the use of retired police officers. Have you seen this as a significant, sustained strategy that is being employed by China? Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Thank you. We've seen a few instances of it. I think much of the issue is that people who retire from either law enforcement or even sometimes from the DHS have specific skills and networks of contacts that make them very valuable and employable as private investigators. And they take contracts which sometimes originate in China or Iran to collect information. And we've seen this. There were also prosecutions recently in New York. We've seen a case like this with the RCMP in Canada. And this is an extremely dangerous practice and probably speaks to the need for more regulation of private investigators and transparency about where that work is coming from and on behalf of whom they're collecting this information. Co-chair Merkley. And let me also turn to your mention of red notices. We've had hearings and testimony on this before this committee before, trying to draw attention and diminishing China's ability to use red notices, reducing the ability of countries to cooperate with them. Are we having any impact? Is it becoming harder for China to use red notices to detain people and use extradition agreements to return people home? Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think there's a great deal of attention to China's misuse of red notices, as well as misuse of red notices by other countries like Russia. However, as the case of Idris Hasan demonstrates, the problem is that even when the red notice is pulled back, when it's canceled, you can still be detained. The effect is that you are--you're still imprisoned. And then other mechanisms kick in, whether that's the police cooperation agreements, whether that's extradition agreements. And so the simple fact that this information is still shared and can be acted on is a serious problem. I hope that answers your question. Co-chair Merkley. Thank you. And Ms. Harth, you talk about ``110 Overseas.'' And I gather 110 is a reference to the emergency number that you would dial in China. Is that a name that all of you have given the Chinese tactic or is that one that China uses? Ms. Harth. I believe it was used by at least one of the authorities in the documentation we reviewed--``110 Overseas,'' a slogan to define these overseas services that they were offering. But it's not a consistent name used by all the public security authorities. Co-chair Merkley. So they're, on one level, advertising services to the Chinese diaspora--legitimate services--but using these service stations to coordinate transnational repression. Ms. Harth. Yes, I believe there were two issues with these overseas stations. They were offering administrative or consular services on site, which in many cases may well have been in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations because obviously private individuals are not allowed to establish consular services or others at free will. On the other hand, we found concrete evidence--and I wish to highlight, exclusively on the basis of open-source evidence from PRC sources--that these stations had indeed been used for, we found evidence of, 84 persuasion to return operations. And that evidence in one case included video evidence of such an operation taking place between a station in Spain and the public security authorities in China. Co-chair Merkley. And this is what you're referring to when you talk about China's patrol and persuade campaign, monitor what Chinese diaspora are doing and persuade them to stop or persuade them to perhaps report on others who are criticizing China? Ms. Harth. So in our case, we use ``persuade'' to refer to the persuasion to return operations, which is a term used by the PRC, their most preferred methodology to bring people back--to coerce people to go back to China. But the patrol obviously refers more generally to the potential control and harassment of people overseas. Co-chair Merkley. And that persuasion to return home to China, the main instrument used is threats to their family members back home should they not return? Ms. Harth. Absolutely. Co-chair Merkley. Threats to do what to the family members back home? Ms. Harth. Threats may include the detention of family members, interrogations, calling them into police stations, disappearing family members, taking away their jobs, taking away certain benefits, the threats or actually doing all those things, even prosecute family members instead of the target overseas. Co-chair Merkley. And you refer to Operation Fox Hunt, 2014 through 2022. I think the stat you have in here is 10,000 returns in your testimony. Is that the Chinese government saying that they've persuaded 10,000 people to return home through this strategy? Ms. Harth. Official numbers released annually by the CCDI, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, on Fox Hunt and Skynet lists close to 12,000 returns between 2014 and October 2022. And we're obviously waiting for the new data possibly at the end of October. Co-chair Merkley. So 12,000, I mean, they're kind of bragging about having persuaded people to return home, which sends a huge message. If the intimidation is that successful, threatening family members back home--I mean, this is not encouraging university students to return to use their education back home. This is encouraging people to return back home who have criticized China abroad? Ms. Harth. Who exactly they're going after under these campaigns is not always clear, especially when it comes to Fox Hunt and Skynet. These are people typically accused of corruption, financial crimes. Now, whether those accusations are correct, it is obviously very hard to say, knowing the Chinese system. Co-chair Merkley. Do we have any sense of that number? I think you corrected me that it's 12,000. Do they report on the distribution between countries of those numbers? No? Okay. Now, Operation Fox Hunt, that's the Chinese name for this operation, is that correct? Ms. Harth. Yes. Co-chair Merkley. Well, we have a lot of work to do to address this expanding strategy. And I appreciate, from Freedom House, the five recommendations that you mentioned. I did want to ask you, Ms. Harth, you mentioned that the United States has an exemplary dedicated hotline. We've been asking for a dedicated hotline from the FBI, but they keep telling us they want to keep using their general tip line. Are we unaware of something that has been established here in the United States? Ms. Harth. I was referring to the multilingual guides that they have put out describing transnational repression, making sure that when instances are reported that it is centralized, that it is looked at, that people that receive those calls or messages know what they're talking about. And coming from overseas, I can tell you that is exemplary, indeed. Co-chair Merkley. Okay. Well, it may be that in the international comparison we're doing well, but we are pushing for there to be a dedicated way for people to report transnational repression, including linguists appropriate to the countries that are the major offenders. But I don't think we're quite there yet. But I appreciate that at some level we're making some impact. But we're not where we want to get to. Thank you so much, all three of you, for bringing your expertise to bear on this really big issue that concerns the ability to have the freedom of speech and assembly that we cherish so much, yet is so directly threatened by these tactics. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Smith. I hope you make your vote. Ms. Rushan Abbas. STATEMENT OF RUSHAN ABBAS, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CAMPAIGN FOR UYGHURS Ms. Abbas. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, members of the Commission, and all the staff at the Commission. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to speak today. The Commission is well aware of the CCP's endless list of genocidal crimes being carried out against the Uyghurs and the other Turkic groups in East Turkestan, also known as Xinjiang. Today, I will speak about the Chinese regime's use of transnational repression to stifle defiance and hide their crimes. Beijing's tactics of intimidation and hostage taking to silence Uyghurs have global effect. Through these measures, the CCP violates the First Amendment rights of American citizens residing on U.S. soil. The totalitarian rule from China extends beyond its borders, oppressing U.S. citizens. In 2018, we received the news that 24 family members of my husband, Abdulhakim Idris, were missing and likely detained in the camps. On September 5th, 2018, I spoke about the growing mass detention and exposed the CCP's genocidal policies at the Hudson Institute here in Washington. Six days later, my sister, Gulshan Abbas, was unjustly detained by the regime in retaliation for my activism and my free speech as a U.S. citizen. Yesterday marks the fifth anniversary of her being taken from our lives. The Chinese regime has maintained silence about her situation, while their mouthpiece, Global Times Network, spread misinformation, accusing me of fabricating my claims about her disappearance. Later, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed her false imprisonment, all based on fabricated charges. My sister, Gulshan, has no political history and is a retired medical doctor, a mother, and a grandma who continues to suffer in a Chinese prison. For five long years, my niece, Zieba, has put her life on hold, relentlessly fighting for her mother's freedom. Witnessing her journey is incredibly painful as she navigates working and raising her 5-year-old daughter, while grappling with the overwhelming loss and the trauma of having her mother held hostage because of me. Recently, we just learned that my father-in-law, Abdulkarim Zikrullah Idris, passed away in January of this year. My husband lost contact with his family in April 2017. After over six years, all we know is that his father passed away seven months ago. The exact date and the circumstances surrounding his death are unknown. My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, is said to be outside the camps, but she's in poor health, alone, and has no one to take care of her because her four children and all her grandchildren are still missing and likely detained. The plight of my sister and my in-laws are one of many. Uyghurs in the United States are facing the most significant crisis of our lives. But many of us are afraid to speak out because of what might happen to our lives back in our homeland. Our efforts to raise awareness and advocate for change are targeted and undermined. Remember when we used to have this sort of hearing on the Hill before? A room full of Uyghurs used to join you, holding pictures of their missing family members. But today, you don't see many. They are afraid of coming to public events like this as a direct result of TNR. I face daily online attacks with hate and mis- information spread through the CCP bot accounts. Uyghur activists, including myself, are subject to libel and harassment, fostering mistrust and hatred. Platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube offer no protection. Today I urge you to protect Uyghur American citizens. This call is reinforced through my written testimony and policy recommendations. I returned from Almaty, Kazakhstan last night. We were there for a film festival featuring the documentary, ``In Search of My Sister,'' which highlights my story and my sister's detention. When we arrived there, the venue canceled the event. The supposed reasons for the cancellation vary. Some cite a visit by two Chinese diplomats to the venue the day before. Others point to the Kazakh government. Nonetheless, it's clear that the CCP is ultimately responsible for suppressing this event. The CCP is an evident threat to freedom and democracy in the world. China's international policing intimidation and harassment tactics extend to everyone, as highlighted by the Honorable Mr. Chong and the experts here. I am, as a female activist, personally experiencing everything that Yana described earlier. China's economic and technological power gives the government significant sway, causing self-censorship and silence in various American industries. The CCP influence undermines American values and global freedom. And as long as our families are detained in prison, concentration camps, forced into slavery with forced labor, forced into marriage, facing forced sterilization and forced abortion and kidnapping, all Uyghurs worldwide are direct victims of this genocide. Urgent action is necessary to protect not just my sister, my in-laws, and the millions of Uyghurs, but the entire world. Only through collective efforts can we safeguard Americans from China's infiltration and the normalization of TNR here at home. I ask that we work together to preserve democracy and freedom and human rights. If we do not stand to hold the CCP accountable today, we will most certainly lose the privilege tomorrow. Thank you. Chair Smith. Thank you very, very much for your testimony, for your incredible courage for speaking out, and for sharing about the agony you have suffered personally for your sister. I remember when Tom Suozzi did the showing of your documentary-- which you showed again--I believe it's the same one, yesterday. You know, it's very moving. And I think we ought to do it again here on Capitol Hill with the Speaker and others, so they can see just how barbaric and cruel the Chinese Communist Party really is in taking hostages of family members and friends of people who speak out, as you have done so bravely. So I would offer that to you. I thank you for traveling 25 hours on a plane to get here to testify. That is a personal sacrifice on behalf of your sister and all Uyghurs. And again, if we don't, as a country, and if the West and the democracies do not begin aggressively calling out the abuses of Xi Jinping, the abuses will only multiply. And so the idea behind this hearing, behind our legislation on transnational crimes that are being committed by so-called police and others on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party here and elsewhere, it's time to put a tourniquet on it all. It just has to happen, because it's only going to get worse. So I thank you. I do have a few questions, but I want to point out that I mentioned Lu Siwei earlier, who we're all concerned about in Laos. You know, yesterday, 164 Chinese nationals were renditioned from Laos to China. And there's fear that, of course, Lu Siwei may be part of a forcible return. You know, the whole idea of calling it ``persuasion to return'' or anything like that--these governments unwittingly or wittingly cooperate with a violation of refugee law, where you know people are going to be sent back and have a well-founded fear of persecution. And that's where they're going back to. So I would hope that all of us would reach out to the administration, ask Michelle Outlaw, who's our charge in Laos, to raise the issue of Lu Siwei. And perhaps some of you might want to make mention of that now. And some of the questions I have, you know, you, Laura Harth, mentioned the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime and the MOU with the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and what a farce it is. Such legitimization, as you point out, is a crucial part of--it legitimizes the illegitimate. And I'm not sure if you could speak about that--has our Department of State spoken out on that MOU? Have we done it effectively? Because we can't look the other way when agreements are entered into by governments like this. So maybe you want to speak about that a little bit-- or elaborate on that very poor MOU. Ms. Harth. Yes, maybe specifically on that agreement. That memorandum of understanding was signed shortly after the 2018 reform of the National Supervision Law, which created a state front for this internal CCP police--I think that is the best way to describe the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Now, that state front is not independent in any way. It does not have independent employees. It does not report independently. It sits in the same offices and all its representatives are the exact same people. So it is not a different body. As soon as that was set up--their body's powers were vastly expanded, both within China through the formalization of a system called Liuzhi, which is effectively an extrajudicial system for enforced disappearances, torture, and so on. They call it a special investigative mechanism. It has been denounced by U.N. human rights bodies. At the same time, the CCDI bodies have been in charge of overseeing all international, let's say, police repatriation efforts. So clearly a very worrying body. And as I said before, it does not surprise us that they also started pushing this body for all international law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Now, that included, famously, an agreement--the first one, I think--with the Australian Federal Police, which was signed only a couple of weeks after this reform. Luckily, the AFP has now a couple of months back recognized that that was a mistake that will not be made again. So that will not be renewed. In Denmark, a similar agreement existed that has also not been renewed. But a lot of agreements exist around the world, including this MOU. I think the most important thing that worries us is the fact that it has been appointed as a focal point. And one of the issues there is obviously that also it's not just Interpol; under this mechanism there are police cooperation mechanisms. So far as I know, there has not been any public statements by countries on the UNODC mechanism. We'll definitely be raising that issue more. I can tell you that the UNODC has been unwilling to release the contents of that MOU or to provide civil society organizations, such as us, with any further information. Thank you. Chair Smith. Now, is that something that Secretary Blinken and the U.S. Department of State should be raising? Have they done so in any fora that you know of? Ms. Harth. I don't know what--publicly, I haven't seen that happen. I don't know if that has happened privately. I definitely hope this would be something that allied countries in general--democratic nations in general--would be looking into more as they try to tackle the issue of transnational repression and the issue of the illegitimacy of what the CCP is trying to do here in really overturning the international rules-based order. Thank you. Chair Smith. It is something that we, as a Commission, will undertake further. We already have, but will do more. Perhaps this calls for a letter from commissioners, if they would be so inclined to sign, to our administration asking that this be raised. I mean, even the euphemism ``persuasion to return,'' you know, with broken bodies and broken hearts, especially of family members in order to effectuate that forcible return. I mean, it flies in the face of the Refugee Convention and all parts thereof--and China is a signatory to it. I know it doesn't really apply here, but it's that concept of coercing people to involuntarily repatriate. So if you could provide us any additional information you would think would be helpful. And we will ask Secretary Blinken to raise it. And I thank you for really bringing a spotlight to it today. I'd like to ask Rushan, in what ways should the U.S. Government be more helpful to the diaspora, like yourself, who are suffering so much? Is there outreach? Is there--I mean, does the FBI talk to you at all, and to others? You know, do we have enough resources deployed? Obviously, there's always the concern, Do you have enough people at the FBI and other agencies to do the work? Is the need not being staffed sufficiently? Or is there a lack of, you know, actual guidance coming from the administration? Ms. Abbas. Yes. We have been talking to the FBI and the State Department and the other law enforcement. And it seems like they are on it, paying attention. But it seems like there is not much they can do for people like us, seeing all this libel, harassment, intimidation, and the blackmail online especially; they are protected under the freedom of speech. It's interesting how these platforms are not open to the general public in China. The regular, ordinary Chinese people cannot use YouTube, or Twitter, or Facebook, and other social media platforms. Yet the Chinese officials, or Chinese state media, or those Chinese troll accounts, are constantly attacking us, harassing us. But when we reach out to the FBI and the others, they are in touch with us, and they are constantly communicating with us. But we don't see any tangible help. We are already facing so much agony. Our family members are suffering. Every day everything we do is at the cost of our family members' freedom. And I wake up every day with my sister's face and I go to bed with her face. And since her detention, my life completely changed. I quit my full-time job as a business development director. And every--you know, the dream or the ambition I had professionally for my life all evaporated overnight. I became a full-time activist. I doubled down on my efforts. Therefore, when I see those kinds of attacks, which is daily, I take these as the impact of my work. We are speaking to the power, and we have the truth, and the Chinese Communist regime is afraid of the truth. But at the same time, it frustrates me when I see absolutely nothing is being provided, other than just the interviews, or talks, or saying that they are doing something. But it seems like it's extremely slow. We have been talking to the FBI for over a year now. I don't see any kind of tangible action being provided. Chair Smith. Yana or Laura, do you have any sense as to how many Chinese operatives, police and others, are here in the United States? And how many they've deployed throughout the world to harass and intimidate? Ms. Harth. You know, I think it would be very hard to have a number on that. As I said before, the issue is that the number of actors is so wide, between those that are, you know, official agents that may have been deployed from China to come to other countries, those that may be stationed in embassies and consulates, and then, you know, the whole host of private actors, semi-private actors, that are being engaged. I think it's very hard to calculate. And I do want to make, if I may, a small note of caution, because, as I said, some of these people may be victims themselves. Now that does not necessarily excuse what they are doing, but it is important to keep it in mind that a lot of these people may not have a choice themselves. And again, I think that just demonstrates how evil this regime is because they do not care if those people will then go and face criminal charges, or anything else. Thank you. Chair Smith. Yana. Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I would agree with that. I think it's very hard to estimate. I think we see transnational repression and foreign influence play out in lots of different ways. There was discussion of what happens on university campuses. I think that's especially also something to watch. We saw a lot of students, Chinese students, taking up their own white paper protests last year in response to what was happening domestically in China. And frustratingly, a lot of those people were then--first of all, didn't get support from their universities, but also then faced reprisals, either threats on campus or threats to their families. And so I think the important thing is that every time we see pro-democracy, pro-human rights, pro-freedom activism by people outside of China, we see a very harsh and very immediate response. And although there is action to support people, like the FBI and other actions, there's still--many people who are facing this don't feel like they have anywhere to turn, and they don't understand necessarily that there is solidarity, that they can reach out, and that people in the U.S. Government and other democratic governments understand that this is a problem. Chair Smith. Has there been a better understanding? Several years ago, I did a series of hearings on Confucius Institutes and the malign influence that they're having on the student body, especially Chinese students that they surveil. And of course, the one-sided political tirades that come from those people that implement it, it's all the party apparatus. I mean, don't talk about the Dalai Lama. Don't talk about the Uyghurs. And many of our universities, our colleges--bought into it. Now, are you finding that this is part of that apparatus to this day, that they're becoming even more repressive using Confucius Institutes or like-minded entities? Ms. Gorokhovskaia. I think, while the influence of Confucius Institutes has waned, we've seen other facets of this be expressed. And I do think that one thing to caution against--this sometimes gets wrapped into a language of anti- Asian hate--is that this is sort of harassment or racial profiling. And that is--that's also to the PRC's advantage, because it pits people against each other, and it delegitimizes the voices of people who are speaking out for freedom. So I think that Confucius Institutes have become less of a problem, but I don't think that the influence has disappeared as a result of that. Chair Smith. Good point. Now on the red notices, those of us who have read Bill Browder's book--you know, he's testified many times before us. He's done an amazing job, especially with the Magnitsky Act and Global Magnitsky. I was the House sponsor of Global Magnitsky. It's just a tremendous tool for the administration. But concerning the abuse of red notices--what does Interpol do to mitigate that abuse, especially when it comes out of China, or Russia, or some other totalitarian country? Ms. Gorokhovskaia. Well, one thing that can be done is to be more transparent about the number and the origin of notices. We don't know where the notices are coming from. Often people don't know that they have a notice against them until they get arrested somewhere on a border. And that's something that Interpol can do. They do make some notices public. They can be more transparent, so that people have an opportunity to look it up--look up whether or not they are subject to a notice, and actually appeal for that notice to be rescinded or canceled, if there's grounds to do that. So that's one very concrete thing that Interpol can do. Chair Smith. Laura, could you just tell us how many countries--do you have any sense of how many countries have unwittingly signed agreements which allow for these illicit extraditions? Ms. Harth. I'd have to come back to you on that. But there's definitely a huge number of--it's not just extradition agreements--police, judicial cooperation agreements, it doesn't stop--but I'll get back to you on that. Chair Smith. Okay. Anything else you would like to add before we conclude the hearing? And Rushan, know that your sister will remain a high priority for this Commission, and you, and others who are in that similar situation. I do thank you especially, we all do, for your courage in coming forward. You know, injustice need not be forever. And, you know, the heroes of democracy and human rights are you and your sister, and others who are fighting so tenaciously, and paying for it with the loss of their freedom. So thank you for that sacrifice. I can't tell you how in awe I am, and my colleagues are, of what you have suffered and how you persevere to continue to bring the message to the world about what is happening under Xi Jinping. So thank you. Thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing ended.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X ======================================================================= Prepared Statements ---------- Statement of Hon. Michael Chong ______ My Experience with the People's Republic of China I was first elected to Parliament in 2004 and represent the electoral district of Wellington-Halton Hills in Ontario, Canada, where I was raised. Like millions of Canadians and Americans, my parents were immigrants. My mother immigrated from the Netherlands in the 1960s. My father immigrated from Hong Kong in 1952, and I have extended family living in both the Netherlands and Hong Kong. Today, tens of millions of North Americans have family living abroad and who are at risk of being targeted by authoritarian states. The ties between Canada and Hong Kong are longstanding and deep. During the Second World War, some two thousand Canadian soldiers of the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers defended Hong Kongers against a vicious, surprise attack that took place simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941; half the Canadian soldiers were casualties of the ensuing battle. Hong Kong is ``Canada's Pearl Harbor''. Today, some 300,000 Canadian citizens live in Hong Kong. During my time in Parliament, I have served in the federal cabinet as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport, and have chaired several House of Commons Standing Committees. In September 2020, I was appointed Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and have served in this role since. In our Westminster system of government, my mandate is to hold the Canadian government accountable on foreign policy and to serve as part of a ``government- in-waiting''. Several years after Xi Jinping became President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), it became clear the PRC was increasingly violating a number of international norms, laws, and treaties. This included violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration (which guaranteed Hong Kongers liberties and freedoms for fifty years from 1997), its detention of Western journalists, and its increased military belligerence in the South China Sea. At the time, I voiced my criticism of the PRC, which usually resulted in the PRC embassy requesting a meeting with me to exchange views. After my appointment as Shadow Minister, my criticisms of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) increased in response to President Xi's increasing violations of the rules-based international order and repression in the PRC and abroad, including the wrongful detention of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, increasing evidence of a Uyghur genocide, threats to national security, and theft of intellectual property. These criticisms were amplified following my September 2020 appointment because my position meant I was speaking and acting on behalf of my parliamentary party. On November 18, 2020, the House of Commons adopted a motion I introduced (Opposition Motion (Foreign policy towards China)), which called on the Canadian government to ``make a decision on Huawei's involvement in Canada's 5G network within 30 days'' and ``develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China's growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada.'' \1\ On February 22, 2021, the House of Commons adopted another motion I introduced (Opposition Motion (Religious minorities in China)), which recognized the PRC's actions towards Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims as a genocide.\2\ Both motions received support from members of every parliamentary party. In response to the second motion, and in coordination with the United States and United Kingdom, the Canadian government imposed sanctions ``in response to human rights violations in Xinjiang'' on March 22, 2023.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-23--Members of Parliament--House of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 18 November 2020. \2\ House of Commons, Vote Detail-56--Members of Parliament--House of Commons of Canada (ourcommons.ca), 22 February 2021. \3\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada joins international partners in imposing new sanctions in response to human rights violations in Xinjiang, 22 March 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In response, on March 27, 2021, the PRC sanctioned me for the Canadian government's imposition of sanctions on March 22, 2023, along with the Chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Gayle Manchin and Vice Chair of the USCIRF, Tony Perkins.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Announces Sanctions on Relevant US and Canadian Individuals and Entity (fmprc.gov.cn), 27 March 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subsequently, I concluded the PRC's sanctions on me and others were proof of our effectiveness and continued to speak up in defense of democracy, freedom, and the rules-based international order. On May 1st of this year, I learned through a report in a newspaper, The Globe and Mail, that a PRC diplomat working out of the consulate in Toronto had, since 2020, been gathering information to further target me and my family in Hong Kong.\5\ The source for the Globe report was an internal July 2021 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessment shared with the newspaper by an un- disclosed source. The Canadian government subsequently confirmed the existence of the CSIS assessment.\6\ In response to the public release of this information, the Canadian government declared the diplomat, Mr. Zhao Wei, ``persona non grata'' on May 8, 2023.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ The Globe and Mail, China views Canada as a `high priority' for interference: CSIS report--The Globe and Mail, 1 May 2023. \6\ The Globe and Mail, `No one person' responsible for Ottawa failing to warn Michael Chong he was being targeted, national-security adviser says--The Globe and Mail, 1 June 2023. \7\ Global Affairs Canada, Canada declares Zhao Wei persona non grata--Canada.ca, 8 May 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On August 9, 2023, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (Global Affairs Canada) informed me, and publicly revealed, that I was a target of a disinformation campaign on the Chinese social media platform WeChat between May 4 and 13, 2023. According to the Department's findings, large volumes of false and misleading narratives about me were shared, including on my ``background, political stances, and family's heritage'' and that the PRC's role in the information operation is ``highly probable.'' \8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Global Affairs Canada, Rapid Response Mechanism Canada detects information operation targeting member of Parliament--Canada.ca, 9 August 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These are the reported instances of the PRC's targeting of me to date. Transnational Repression vs. Foreign Interference Transnational repression and foreign interference are terms that are often interchangeable. Generally, transnational repression is defined as authoritarian governments' extraterritorial efforts to silence, deter, undermine, and threaten dissidents and activists who oppose them. Foreign interference is defined in Canadian law as foreign state ``activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person.'' \9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You, 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRC's Foreign Interference Threat Activities in Canada My experience is but one case of PRC foreign interference in Canada. Many other cases go unreported and unnoticed, and the victims often suffer in silence. CSIS continues to observe PRC foreign interference threat activities in Canada. CSIS has assessed that foreign interference ``poses one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada's national security.'' \10\ CSIS has stated that the PRC's foreign interference in Canada is a ``significant threat to the integrity of our political system and democratic institutions, social cohesion, economy and long- term prosperity, and fundamental rights and freedoms.'' \11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Public Safety Canada, Countering Foreign Interference, March 10, 2023. \11\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference-- Revised Speaking Notes, p. 2, February 9, 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Canada continues to be a target of the PRC, which is ``seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada's,'' and the threat is a ``growing concern.'' \12\ This has direct implications for the approximate 1.7 million Canadians of Chinese descent living in Canada (4.7 per cent of the country's population).\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Public Safety Canada, Foreign Interference and Hostile Activities of State Actors (publicsafety.gc.ca), 20 August 2021. \13\ Statistics Canada, The Daily--The Canadian census: A rich portrait of the country's religious and ethnocultural diversity (statcan.gc.ca), 26 October 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRC foreign interference activities target a variety of diaspora groups in Canada using various tactics. Some of these activities are documented in a report of the House of Commons Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship titled A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada- People's Republic of China Relationship. One tactic used by the PRC is to target Canadian university campuses. The Special Committee heard testimony from Chemi Lhamo, who was targeted by the PRC after she spoke up about Tibetan human rights and ran for the 2019 student elections at the University of Toronto's Scarborough campus. She told the Special Committee she ``received thousands of harassing comments on social media, including rape and death threats, because of her Tibetan identity'' and that they continued after being elected student president.\14\ Ms. Lhamo stated her threats were connected to the PRC's mission in Canada and that the Communist Party of China (CCP) ``coerces Chinese international students into following CCP party lines and protesting initiatives that are seen as threatening PRC interests.'' \15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada- People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 19- 20. \15\ Ibid, 19-20. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rukiye Turdush's experience is another example of the PRC's foreign interference on Canadian university campuses. Ms. Turdush is the Research Director of the Uyghur Research Institute. She testified at the Special Committee about the harassment she faced following her talk about the plight of Uyghurs at McMaster University's Muslim Students' Association in 2019. She stated that ``the McMaster Chinese Students' Association reported the event to the PRC embassy and published a statement condemning the presentation [ . . . and] that the PRC embassy in Ottawa later praised students who had protested her talk for their patriotism.'' \16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ Ibid, 20. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Many Chinese international students are coerced by the PRC into participating in the PRC's foreign interference activities on university campuses. Cheuk Kwan, past chair of the Toronto Association for Democracy in China, testified at the Special Committee, ``about Chinese international students who were `compelled' to `demonstrate against pro-Hong Kong rallies' '' after threats had been made ``to withhold their government scholarships or harm their families back home if they [did not] comply.'' \17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ CACN, The Breach of Hong Kong's High Degree of Autonomy: A Situation of International Concern (ourcommons.ca), February 2021, 41. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Other foreign interference tactics used by the PRC include targeting Chinese language media and social media in Canada, as well as the establishment of illegal PRC ``police service centres'' in Canada. CSIS has assessed that Chinese language media in Canada, including newspapers, radio and television broadcasters, are targeted by the PRC. In a 2021 briefing note to the Canadian Prime Minister, CSIS explained that ``Chinese-language media outlets operating in Canada and members of the Chinese-Canadian community are primary targets of PRC-directed foreign influenced activities.'' \18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference-- Revised Speaking Notes, p. 9, February 9, 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Special Committee's report on Hong Kong highlighted testimony from Guy Saint-Jacques, former Canadian Ambassador to the PRC, who was ``struck by the extent to which Canadian media publishing in Mandarin reflected the views expressed in Beijing during the Meng Wanzhou affair.'' \19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada- People's Republic of China Relationship (ourcommons.ca), May 2023, 47. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The report also highlighted the testimony of Victor Ho, former editor of Sing Tao Daily (Canada's largest Chinese language newspaper): [Mr. Ho] provided the example of a half-hour ``radio speech'' by China's Consul General in Vancouver on 23 July 2020. According to Mr. Ho, during the speech, which was ``programmed in newscast airtime,'' the Consul General asked Chinese Canadians to support the National Security Law while also suggesting that there were ``very few people in Canada trying to slander'' the law and ``attempting to cause trouble overseas as well.'' In Mr. Ho's view, the Consul General ``treats Chinese Canadians as Chinese nationals, when of course they are not.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ Ibid, 41. Chinese language social media is another medium for foreign interference. CSIS has observed ``social media being leveraged to spread disinformation or run foreign influenced campaigns designed to confuse or divide public opinion or interfere in healthy public debate.'' \21\ The Special Committee`s national security report concluded that: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ CSIS, Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process, July 2021, 6. Disinformation and influence campaigns designed to divide public opinion and interfere with public debate are increasingly being spread through social media. WeChat and other social media applications monitored by the PRC provide a powerful tool for the PRC to censor information, manipulate public sentiment, and to monitor and intimidate diaspora.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ CACN, A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada- People's Republic of China Relationship, May 2023. After assessing recent activity on WeChat in May of this year, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development concluded that it is ``highly probable'' that the PRC played a role in the information operation that was spreading disinformation about me.\23\ It is estimated that WeChat has over one million users in Canada and that the disinformation regarding me was viewed by between two and five million WeChat users globally.\24\ Clearly, the PRC is using social media channels like WeChat as a tool for foreign interference. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Global Affairs Canada, WeChat account activity targeting Canadian parliamentarian suggests likely foreign state involvement (international.gc.ca), 9 August 2023. \24\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As in the United States, the PRC has been documented to have established illegal ``police service centres'' in Canada, most notably, in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. The PRC describes them as ``service stations'' that were established during the pandemic to help Chinese nationals with administrative matters, such as driver's licenses and other documents, and that they are run by volunteers.\25\ These stations have been assessed by human rights groups as a tool to ``threaten and monitor Chinese nationals abroad.'' \26\ This includes coercing persons in Canada back to the PRC. For example, a U.S. indictment unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn, New York on October 22, 2023, revealed that an individual in Canada was coerced back to the PRC.\27\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Reuters, Canada police probe alleged Chinese `police stations' in Montreal, Reuters, 9 March 2023. \26\ BBC, Canadian police investigate Chinese `police stations' in Quebec--BBC News, 9 March 2023. \27\ DOJ, Six Individuals Charged with Conspiring to Act as Illegal Agents of the People's Republic of China, October 20, 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC foreign interference threat activities also target Canada's general elections. In the 2021 election, Kenny Chiu (former Member of Parliament for Steveston-Richmond East, British Columbia) was targeted and was the subject of disinformation. The G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development observed Chinese Communist Party media accounts spreading a hostile narrative about Kenny Chiu and the Conservative Party of Canada's election platform, saying inaccurately that anyone with ties to China would be ``considered a spokesperson for the Chinese government'' \28\ and that ``all individuals or groups with ties to China would be required to register.'' \29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ Unclassified, G7 RRM Canada. p. 1, Monday, October 18, 2021. \29\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC foreign threat activities have also targeted the fundamental right to peacefully protest in Canada. In response to a peaceful rally organized in August 2019 in Vancouver backing Hong Kong's anti-extradition protests, pro-PRC counter-protesters allegedly organized through the PRC consulate in Vancouver threatened those at the rally. Threats were made through social media and in person by pro- PRC counter-protestors.\30\ Co-founder Cherie Wong of the Pro-Hong Kong group ``Alliance Canada Hong Kong'' and other pro-Hong Kong activists received threats, including rape and murder.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ Ibid. \31\ CBC News, ``We know where your parents live'': Hong Kong activists say Canadian police helpless against online threats, September 10, 2020. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There have also been suggestions that the PRC paid protesters to support the daughter of Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, Meng Wanzhou, at her extradition hearing that took place in Vancouver.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ CBC News, The strange tale of the paid protesters supporting Meng Wanzhou at her extradition hearing, January 21, 2020. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recently, the PRC is utilizing a new foreign interference tactic by creating ``wanted lists'' and offering bounties for the arrest of those living overseas. Last year, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region placed Victor Ho on a ``wanted list,'' allegedly for violations of Hong Kong's National Security Law, but in fact for his speaking up in Canada in favor of Hong Kong's democracy and human rights. This year, the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region offered HK$1 million [USD$128,000) bounties for the arrest of eight democracy activists based overseas, all of whom are believed to be living in Canada, the United States, Britain and Australia. Out of the eight, at least two have ties to Canada (Dennis Kwok and Elmer Yuen). Responding to PRC Foreign Interference Threat Activities Foreign interference is a complex national security threat to Canada \33\ and requires a suite of measures to combat. CSIS has stated that foreign interference can be countered through investigating and monitoring, utilizing threat reduction measures, reducing PRC access to critical economic sectors, conducting stakeholder engagement, publicly ``calling out'' foreign state actors and prosecuting individuals and entities.\34\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ CSIS, Foreign Interference and You (canada.ca), 2021, 2. \34\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference-- Revised Speaking Notes, p. 11, February 9, 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Foreign interference also requires cooperation among allied democracies. The 2023 report from the Canadian government's National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians emphasized the need for ``cooperation with allies on foreign interference.'' \35\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ NSICOP, 2022 Annual Report, p. 17, July 19, 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- One area for cooperation should include the sharing of best practices among the Five Eyes intelligence alliance about when to release information to the public about the PRC's foreign interference threat activities. Often intelligence gathered about foreign interference does not meet the evidentiary standard required to commence a prosecution, yet still constitutes a serious threat that needs to be countered. In those cases, Five Eyes intelligence agencies have advised governments that sunlight and transparency is a tool that can be used. In 2021, CSIS provided a briefing to the Canadian Prime Minister on foreign interference stating, ``Canada can make use of a policy that is grounded in transparency and sunlight in order to highlight the point that FI [foreign interference] should be exposed to the public.'' \36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ CSIS, Briefing to the Prime Minister on Foreign Interference-- Revised Speaking Notes, 9 February 2021. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For example, in 2022 the U.K.'s MI5 went public about a PRC agent in the U.K. Parliament, Christine Lee. MI5 informed the Speaker about the security threat this individual presented, and in turn, the Speaker emailed all members of the U.K. House of Commons, identifying this individual as a security threat.\37\ Members took appropriate action, cut off contact with this individual, and the integrity of the U.K. Parliament was protected. Sunlight and transparency worked, and the integrity of U.K.'s democracy was ensured. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ The Independent, Christine Lee: Security warning to MPs over Chinese spying threat, The Independent, 13 January 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Transparency in party nominations (primaries) and general elections, including the disclosure of information regarding foreign interference, is particularly sensitive because of the impact these disclosures can have on party nominations and elections; the timely release of information about foreign interference while maintaining the confidence of all political parties and candidates are equally important if we are to protect democracies against foreign interference in the electoral process. Exchanging best practices in this area is another area in which democracies can learn from each other. Another area for cooperation is exchanging information on effective legislative measures that can be implemented to prosecute PRC agents carrying out foreign interference activities. A foreign agent registry can be a useful tool to combat foreign interference. Recently, the U.S. foreign agent registry was used to shut down a PRC ``police station'' in lower Manhattan and two individuals were arrested for acting as PRC agents.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \38\ DOJ, U.S. Attorney Announces Charges Against Co-Director of Think Tank for Acting as an Unregistered Foreign Agent, Trafficing in Arms, Violating U.S. Sanctions Against Iran, and Making False Statements to Federal Agents, July 10, 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The U.S. has had a foreign agent registry (Foreign Agent Registry Act) since 1938,\39\ while Australia adopted the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 in 2019.\40\ This past summer, the U.K. adopted the National Security Act 2023, which establishes a registry.\41\ The Canadian government has announced it will introduce legislation for a registry but has yet to introduce one. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Foreign Agents Registration Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act, Foreign Agents Registration Act (justice.gov), retrieved 30 August 2023. \40\ Australian Government, Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, April 11, 2019. \41\ U.K. Public General Acts, National Security Act 2023, July 11, 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If the threshold for a registry is too high, then it will not capture the activity needed to be countered. On the other hand, if the threshold for a registry is too low, then it will capture much activity unrelated to foreign interference. Exchanging information on effective legislative models for a registry is an area where democracies can learn from each other. Translating intelligence into evidence is often difficult but essential if individuals engaged in foreign interference are to be successfully prosecuted. A clear definition of what constitutes foreign interference and establishing clear evidentiary standards that are accepted by the intelligence community and law enforcement alike are critical if those engaged in foreign interference are to be successfully prosecuted. Foreign interference often takes place alongside corruption, including money laundering and covert enrichment. Enhancing financial transparency through a beneficial ownership registry covering corporations, trusts and real estate is critical to combatting the corruption that often accompanies foreign interference. In addition, freezing and seizing the assets of individuals engaged in foreign interference would serve as a deterrent and remove the profit motive. Best practices and coordination on financial transparency, asset freezes, and forfeiture should be shared among allied democracies. Foreign interference often takes place through the deliberate spreading of disinformation. Democracies should share best practices on how to combat this disinformation while upholding our cherished freedoms of thought, belief, opinion, and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. Recently, I was part of a parliamentary delegation to the Republic of China (Taiwan), where we met with Audrey Tang Feng, the Minister of Digital Affairs. Taiwan is ground zero for the PRC's disinformation campaigns, and Taiwan has a well- developed multi-faceted policy grounded in building resilience among Taiwanese society while protecting fundamental freedoms. Repression with the PRC can also be better countered through better coordination and cooperation among allied democracies. The North American and European Union free trade areas collectively comprise about 43 per cent of global GDP.\42\ This immense purchasing power should be used to counter repression and uphold human rights. Furthermore, Canada is a signatory, along with the U.S. and Mexico, of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Article 23.6 of the Agreement requires signatories to ban the import of products produced using forced labor. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ World Bank, GDP, 2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is evidence that the PRC is forcing the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang province to harvest cotton and tomatoes. Since CUSMA has come into effect, the U.S. has interdicted and seized thousands of shipments from Xinjiang from entering the United States. Canada, conversely, only stopped one shipment of cotton products from the PRC at the border, and these products were later released.\43\ The Canadian government can learn from best practices in the U.S. to counter repression within the PRC while upholding the rules-based international order. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ The Globe and Mail, Only shipment Canada has seized on suspicion of forced labour was released after challenge from importer, The Globe and Mail, 27 May 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Canada must work toward a stronger defense and security partnership with the United States, our Euro-Atlantic allies, and democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific region. Canada must look for every opportunity to strengthen these partnerships to ensure we meet the challenge of rising authoritarianism and preserve our fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions, and the rules-based international order. Statement of Yana Gorokhovskaia ______ Transnational Repression Committed by the People's Republic of China-- Evidence from Freedom House Thank you, Chairman Smith, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished members of the commission, for the opportunity to share information about the scope and scale of the global transnational repression campaign carried out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). I will use my time to first describe the ways in which the PRC intimidates, harasses, harms, and otherwise tries to silence critics, diaspora members, and exiles living beyond its borders and second, to explain how this campaign has evolved to threaten people in new ways. I'll conclude with suggestions for policies that can be adopted by democratic governments, including by the United States, to better protect people targeted by the PRC. The People's Republic of China is one of the least free countries in the world. Freedoms there have deteriorated rapidly over the last decade, and especially since 2017, under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The country now ranks near the very bottom among the 195 countries assessed every year in Freedom in the World, our global survey of political rights and civil liberties.\1\ Like other authoritarian governments, the PRC also exports oppression abroad as a way of maintaining its regime at home. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Freedom House, ``Freedom in the World 2023: China,'' https:// freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2023. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even though Chinese officials routinely reference the government's policy of noninterference, Beijing seeks to dictate, sometimes through use of physical force, the terms of free speech, association, movement, assembly, and even religious expression of individuals thousands of miles away. Today, China is carrying out the world's most sophisticated and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression, using a wide array of physical, digital, and psychological tactics to attempt to silence those it views as threats to the regime. Freedom House has compiled a database of direct physical incidents of transnational repression--including assassinations, abductions, assaults, detentions, and unlawful deportations--that spans 2014 to 2022 inclusive.\2\ After our last update, the database now includes 854 cases. This is a conservative estimate based only on public, verified cases of direct attacks which excludes incidents that are harder to confirm, such as the intimidation of family, digital surveillance, and online harassment. Even so, a clear picture of the PRC's role in this global phenomenon has emerged. China is responsible for 30 percent of the coded cases--nearly twice as many as Turkey, the second most prolific perpetrator in the database. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Yana Gorokhovskaia, Nate Schenkkan, and Grady Vaughan, Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022, Freedom House, April 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/ FH_TransnationalRepression2023_0.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This statistic tells only one part of the story. The PRC has targeted people in at least 36 countries, including those living in democracies. Among the victims are pro-democracy activists, journalists, students, human rights defenders, artists, former insiders, civil society organizations, as well as whole ethnic and religious groups like the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Falun Gong practitioners, and others who simply criticize the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing's transnational repression toolkit is diverse. It continues to rely on well-practiced tactics of intimidation such as forcing family members to call their relatives abroad in order to urge them to stop engaging in activities like protest or human rights activism, objectionable to the PRC.\3\ Members of the diaspora are sometimes recruited or coerced into informing on each other.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Sam Judah, ``China Using Families as `Hostages' to Quash Uyghur Dissent Abroad,'' BBC, July 31, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- 66337328. \4\ Gulchehra Hoja, ``With Threats and Intimidation, China Coerces Uyghurs in Turkey to Spy on Each Other,'' RFA, February 5, 2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-turkey- 02052023210957.html. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It also continues to abuse established mechanisms of international cooperation, like Interpol's notifications system and extradition agreements, which allow it to co-opt agencies of foreign states in order to repress. Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist, was detained on a Red Notice requested by China after he landed at the airport in Casablanca in March 2021.\5\ He has been in prison for more than two years. Despite the fact the that the Red Notice was cancelled shortly after his arrest, Idris is in danger every day of being deported because Morocco and China have an extradition agreement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Nicholas Muller, ``The Continued Imprisonment of Idris Hasan,'' The Diplomat, July 1, 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/06/the- continued-imprisonment-of-idris-hasan/; https://menarights. org/en/articles/2-years-detention-uyghur-activist-idris-hasan-must-be- released. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC menaces people living in democracies. In addition to the problem of overseas police stations that my colleague from Safeguard Defenders has described, China has sent police officers into foreign countries to surveil and intimidate targeted individuals, sometimes in cooperation with the government \6\ and sometimes clandestinely.\7\ Signaling a dangerous evolution of this tactic, evidence has emerged over the last year that the PRC is co-opting former members of domestic law enforcement agencies to harass, coerce, stalk, and surveil people living in the U.S. and Canada.\8\ The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice, as well as their Canadian counterparts, have begun to pursue these cases. There has been at least one successful criminal prosecution in New York state to date. However, it is worth underlining that the employment of former law enforcement officials by the PRC to act as proxies in the transnational repression campaign may amplify the fear that members of the diaspora feel, demonstrating that the PRC is able to co-opt officials in democratic states to carry out its repressive schemes. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Michael E. Miller and Matthew Abbott, ``China Hoped Fiji Would Be a Template for the Pacific. Its Plan Backfired,'' The Washington Post, August 21, 2023, https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/china-fiji-police-mou- pacific-islands/. \7\ Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg, ``Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight,'' ProPublica, July 22, 2021, https://www.propublica.org/article/ operation-fox-hunt-how-china-exports-repression-using-a-network-of- spies-hidden-in-plain-sight. \8\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Federal Jury Convicts Three Defendants of Interstate Stalking of Chinese Nationals in the U.S. and Two of Those Defendants for Acting or Conspiring to Act on Behalf of the People's Republic of China,'' U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York, June 20, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/ pr/federal-jury-convicts-three-defendants-interstate-stalking-chinese- nationals-us-and; Robert Fife and Steven Chase, ``Former Mountie Targeted B.C. Real Estate Tycoon for China, RCMP Allege,'' The Globe and Mail, August 21, 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/ article-rcmp-officer-charged-bc-entrepreneur/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC's toolkit of repression is growing, with each new tactic exploiting a previously undetected vulnerability and adapting to the responses of democratic countries. Wang Jingyu was a teenager when he fled China in 2019 after posting comments online critical of the CCP and supportive of pro-democracy protests. In 2021, he was detained in Dubai while on a layover on his way to the U.S. He was held in detention for weeks and the UAE authorities allowed Chinese embassy officials to interrogate the teen.\9\ His release was secured as a result of media attention and international pressure. But Wang continues to be targeted. Beginning last year, bomb threats were made in his name, and in the names of other activists and journalists, against Chinese embassies in the Netherlands and Norway.\10\ These threats predictably activated the security and public safety responses of European law enforcement, resulting in police investigations, questioning, and even the brief detention of some of the targeted individuals. Like the co-opting of former law enforcement agents working in democracies, ``swatting,'' or harassment carried out by alerting police or emergency services through false reporting, is meant to cause psychological stress and demonstrate the reach of the PRC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Voice of America, ``Teen, Fiancee Flee to Netherlands to Avoid Extradition Back to China,'' July 21, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/ east-asia-pacific_teen-fiancee-flee-netherlands-avoid-extradition-back- china/6208514.html. \10\ Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Alison Snyder, ``Fake Bomb Threats Used to Harass China Critics,'' Axios, April 2, 2023, https:// www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists-false-bomb-threats; Jemimah Steinfeld, ``Critics of Beijing Face Increasing Impersonation Attacks,'' New Lines Magazine, August 21, 2023, https:// newlinesmag.com/reportage/critics-of-beijing-face- increasing-impersonation-attacks/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The PRC is the world's worst abuser of internet freedom domestically; \11\ it also employs tactics of digital authoritarianism in its transnational repression campaign. These tactics, which include mass trolling, smear campaigns,\12\ threats and intimidation, spoofing accounts, and even doxing of personal information, are meant to intimidate critics and journalists, drown out reports of human rights abuses, and apply psychological pressure on the targets. These tactics are also often gendered; women face not only violent but sexualized digital threats in response to work that shines a critical light on the PRC.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Freedom House, ``Freedom on the Net 2022: China,'' https:// freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2022. \12\ Wang Gang and Liam Scott, ``Trolling of Female Asian Journalists on Rise as Beijing Seeks to Discredit Media,'' Voice of America, January 2, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/trolling-of-female- asian-journalists-on-rise-as-beijing-seeks-to-discredit-media/ 6898789.html. \13\ Albert Zhang and Danielle Cave, ``Smart Asian Women Are the New Targets of CCP Global Online Repression,'' Australian Strategic Policy Institute, June 3, 2022, https://www. aspistrategist.org.au/smart-asian-women-are-the-new-targets-of-ccp- global-online-repression/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CCP's campaign of transnational repression is a threat not only to the targeted individuals and groups but also to state sovereignty, democratic institutions, and the exercise of fundamental rights. Building resilience and imposing accountability are key to curbing the CCP's campaign of transnational repression. Steps to better protect against the CCP's campaign of transnational repression, both in the United States and abroad, include: 1. Codifying a definition of transnational repression, which will facilitate the tracking of incidents at home and abroad, distinguish attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate inter-agency action, in addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed. 2. Training for government officials, including law enforcement, who may encounter transnational repression. Several agencies, including the FBI, Department of State, and Department of Homeland Security, have begun instituting trainings, but they vary in consistency and content. Coordinated, mandated requirements across agencies could help ensure that officials are equipped with matching and sufficient information to help protect those at risk and to not unwittingly become a player in an authoritarian regime's campaign of transnational repression. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun this effort. 3. Conducting strategic, consistent, and culturally sensitive outreach to communities that are at risk of experiencing transnational repression in order to equip them with the resources to report these activities. 4. Using voice and vote within international institutions to limit the ability of Interpol member states to target individuals through the misuse of Red Notices and other alerts. 5. Deploying targeted sanctions against Chinese officials for the use of transnational repression and screening Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing diaspora members in their postings. More details about these recommendations, and additional recommendations, are available in our reports.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Freedom House, ``Policy Recommendations: Transnational Repression,'' https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/ transnational-repression#US. I should note that several pieces of legislation to address transnational repression have been introduced or will be introduced in the near future. Thank you, Co-chairman Merkley and Chairman Smith for your introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, which Freedom House supports. We look forward to working with you and your --------------------------------------------------------------------------- staff to see this passed into law. Addressing transnational repression committed by the government of the People's Republic of China is a matter of urgency. It is imperative that Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, come together with the executive branch and like-minded partners to protect those at risk and defend democratic institutions and fundamental rights. We appreciate the leadership of the Commission on this issue, and I look forward to your questions. Statement of Laura Harth Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished members of the Commission, it is an honor testifying before you today on behalf of Safeguard Defenders. Most people will know us for the report released exactly one year ago today, which exposed the formal cooperation between public security authorities in China and united front-linked groups around the world in the setting up and running of over 100 so-called ``overseas police service centers'' in more than 50 countries around the world. On the exclusive basis of open-source evidence from Chinese authorities and State/Party media, we were able to link at least three of these stations to ``persuasion to return'' operations that took place in Spain, Serbia and France. While the revelations of 110 Overseas and its follow-up Patrol and Persuade contributed to jumpstarting a conversation on the PRC's transnational repression in countries where that was not previously the case, in particular in Europe, we have and will continue to highlight how these are but the tip of the iceberg in what Freedom House rightly defines as ``the world's most sophisticated, comprehensive, and far- reaching campaign of transnational repression.'' Within this campaign, Safeguard Defenders has focused its documentation as well as its direct-action efforts on countering one of its most extreme iterations: involuntary returns. While not new, the scale on which PRC authorities are coercing individuals to return to China to face prosecution has exploded over the course of the past decade, with official--yet partial--numbers released annually claiming well over ten thousand returns from over 120 countries in the world between the start of Operation Fox Hunt in 2014 and October 2022. We will soon release additional evidence on such operations in targeted countries. The often-clandestine methods for these returns have been set in stone by the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in a written legal interpretation to the 2018 National Supervision Law that vastly expanded the non-judicial body's reach: ``extradition,'' ``repatriation,'' ``off-site prosecution,'' ``persuasion,'' ``luring and entrapment,'' and ``kidnapping.'' The so-called ``persuasion to return'' method is the one used most frequently. Threats and harassment--or worse--against family members back home or direct threats and harassment of individuals overseas by covert PRC agents, individuals linked to its embassies or consulates, private investigators and security firms, coopted private individuals, rabid nationalists or even victims themselves: the Chinese Communist Party has set up a true whole of society effort to exert control over diaspora communities worldwide and silence dissent. These efforts clearly undermine the most fundamental freedoms of targeted communities, severely infringe the rights and due process of individuals coerced into returning and constitute a grave violation of the territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations. The climate of suspicion and widespread fear further isolate targeted communities and individuals from their environment, and may expose individuals that have been co-opted or coerced into doing the CCP's bidding to criminal liability. To effectively counter such a massive undertaking, democracies need to respond with a similar whole of government approach that recognizes transnational repression for the domestic threat it is, one that is inextricably linked to the CCP's influence operations. Speaking from a European experience, we are but at the very beginning of such an endeavor and will need continued concerted allied efforts to move beyond the stage of timid condemnation to effective and coordinated transnational counteraction to match the CCP's efforts. Working towards joint definitions, sharing of information and best practices is an essential step in this direction. It is in our view equally key to end the legitimization of the PRC's illegal practices through judicial and police cooperation agreements, at the bilateral but also at the multilateral level. It is no coincidence the PRC has been pushing the signing and ratifying of such agreements at an accelerated rate during the same timeframe in which its involuntary returns operations have exploded. These agreements were often pushed through within economic and cultural cooperation packages, but the signing of similar agreements in particular by Western countries has equally acted as a most effective ``gateway'' for other countries to sign on, as we discovered firsthand during court extradition proceedings in a European country. As awareness on the overall human rights situation in the PRC grows, democratic nations are increasingly becoming aware of the intrinsic risks of these agreements. However, we continue seeing remarkable efforts by PRC authorities to expand their cooperation footprint in these fields in the Global South. In this regard I'd like in particular to severely question the legitimacy of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's MoU with the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection--and its State front the National Commission of Supervision--and its acceptance of this body-- that cannot be described but as the internal police force of the Chinese Communist Party--as the Chinese focal point for all work under the Convention Against Corruption. While PRC propaganda dubs these types of agreements as a ``demonstration of the international community's trust in its judicial system,'' they directly contribute to a heightened sense of fear within targeted communities and subvert the international rules-based order. Ending such legitimization is a crucial part in rebuilding trust with targeted communities. And allow me to conclude with an appeal to them. The question we receive time and time again from democratic governments willing to engage on the issue is: ``we need the victims to come forward.'' The U.S. and Australia have already set up exemplary multilingual dedicated hotlines to report transnational repression efforts, also anonymously. To encourage this best practice elsewhere, Safeguard Defenders has today released a pilot guide with reporting channels in a series of countries, which we will continue to update and hopefully grow with similarly dedicated hotlines. While we understand the personal toll for victims to come forward and the mistrust that may exist towards local authorities who, often and for too long, have maintained preferential channels of interlocution with those seeking to exert control at the behest of the CCP, the time to come forward and thus contribute to build a democratic whole of society effort to counter transnational repression is now. Please do so. * * * A report by Safeguard Defenders entitled Involuntary Returns--China's Covert Operation to Force `Fugitives' Overseas Back Home, appears under Submissions for the Record. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Statement of Rushan Abbas My name is Rushan Abbas. I am an Uyghur-American, a mother and a Uyghur rights activist. I am the founder and Executive Director of Campaign For Uyghurs (CFU). I currently live in Falls Church, Virginia but I was born in Urumqi, the capital city of the so-called `Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.' Xinjiang is a name that has been designated by the Chinese government and means the ``New Frontier.'' However, it is important to note that historically and geographically, this area has been known as East Turkistan. This name pays respect to the Uyghur and other Turkic groups who have inhabited the region for centuries. My activism is focused on the human rights and freedoms of the Uyghur people. The situation in East Turkistan has raised global concerns, as there have been multiple determinations by U.S. NGOs and other government entities of systemic discrimination against Uyghurs by the Chinese government amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide. By raising awareness and speaking out against these injustices, I hope to counter Chinese propaganda and contribute to the international dialogue and efforts to safeguard the rights and dignity of Uyghurs. Introduction to Transnational Repression (TNR) Thank you for giving me the platform to testify about China's transnational repression and long-arm policing of Uyghurs in the diaspora. It is essential to shed light on the various tactics employed by the Chinese government to intimidate and silence Uyghurs who live on American soil. Surveillance is an ever-present reality that we face collectively as Uyghurs in the region, and as diaspora members. The feeling of being constantly watched weighs heavily on my mind. There have been occasions where I have suspected the presence of Chinese agents within our communities, keeping a tight watch on our activities and reporting back to their superiors. The presence of online surveillance, including hacking attempts and strange online activities, as well as systematic hate speech dissemination through bot accounts, and libel targeted at myself and other Uyghur individuals, jeopardize the safety of Uyghur individuals by creating online echo chambers of hate and disinformation. However, it is the targeting of our families that has caused immense distress and anguish within the Uyghur diaspora. The Chinese government's ruthless approach extends to our loved ones who still reside in East Turkistan. We hear stories of harassment, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance, all meant to exert pressure on us and to deter any attempts to expose the truth about the atrocities being committed against the Uyghurs. These threats and intimidation tactics have created a suffocating atmosphere of fear, making it challenging for Uyghur diaspora members to speak out, testify in public, or participate in interviews. We are torn between our moral obligation to fight for the survival of our people, who are being systematically erased in the region, and our familial obligation of minimizing potential risk to vulnerable relatives. It is essential for the international community to understand the gravity of the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora and to support and amplify the courageous voices that speak out. By standing in solidarity with us, you send a powerful message to the CCP that we are not alone and at the very least, the United States stands for its constituents' safety. Together, we can shed light on the Chinese government's transnational repression and work towards bringing about justice and accountability for the countless victims of these heinous human rights abuses. Personal Story My family's personal experience serves as a harrowing testament to the grave repercussions faced by Uyghur activists and their loved ones who dare to use their freedom of speech to advocate for human rights. In 2018, we received news that 24 of my husband's family members had gone missing and were likely detained. I spoke up about the unjust arrests and highlighted the Uyghur genocide and crimes against humanity being committed by the Chinese government, on September 5, 2018. On September 11th, exactly five years ago, the authorities arbitrarily detained my sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, who, to this day, remains a victim of their unjust actions. It was only in December 2020 that we received indirect information through a third party, confirming her unfair sentencing on fabricated charges of `terrorism' and `social disruption.' The spokesperson for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs later verified these distressing revelations during a press conference. My sister is an apolitical person and the circumstances surrounding her abduction are direct retribution imposed upon my own activism, highlighting the Chinese Communist Party's utilization of transnational kin punishment and repression. This excruciatingly painful situation unveils the extent to which Chinese authorities resort to arbitrary detention, persecution, and a flagrant disregard for justice to quash dissent and promote their own political agenda. I also stand before you today to share a deeply distressing story that reveals another dark reality of China's transnational repression. In January 2023, my father-in-law, Abdulkarim Zikrullah Idris, tragically left this world at the age of 81. What is truly heartbreaking is that our family learned of his passing on August 15th, seven months after it occurred. The exact date and circumstances surrounding his death remain shrouded in uncertainty, leaving us in a state of anguish and longing for closure. In the era of instant communication, internet and advanced technologies like AI, Uyghurs encounter radio silence when seeking updates on the well-being of their loved ones. The last time my husband was able to communicate with his father was on April 25, 2017, and for the past 6 and a half years, we have been uninformed about his location and health, until recently. I must also add that my husband has not been able to see his father for more than twenty years, preventing him from bidding a final farewell or participating in a proper burial. My mother-in-law, Habibehan Idris, has been reported to be outside of the camps, while her children, Turanisahan Idris, Bu'Aisha Idris, Bu'Hadiqa Idris, and Abdurahim Idris, are missing and reportedly detained, and their spouses and children are also missing. She currently battles illness, which is made all the more challenging by the absence of the caregiving support that her children would have provided because they too have also been imprisoned by the Chinese government. The absence of closure and being forced to live in the unknown about the fate of our family members is a blatant violation of basic human rights by the Chinese regime, and underscores the ongoing suffering endured by the Uyghurs. CFU Program Director Arslan Hidayat's in-laws, his father-in-law Abdurashid Tohti, mother-in-law Tajigul Qadir, and two brothers-in-law Ametjan Abdurashid and Mohamed Ali Abdurashid have been missing since mid-2017. The Chinese government refused to provide any information about these detained individuals. The only information they have is that they have been given long-term prison sentences for fabricated charges of ``disturbing social order'' and ``preparing to commit terrorist activities.'' The Chinese government claims to be operating in accordance with the ``rule of law'' and commits to protecting ``the public's right to information'' in court rulings in our homeland. However, none of these assertions seem to hold true in the cases involving Uyghurs. China's Intimidation Tactics As mentioned before, due to China's transnational repression and intimidation tactics, Uyghurs are hesitant to speak out, testify, or participate in interviews. This reluctance stems from the threats issued by the Chinese government, which have created an atmosphere of fear and suppression. Consequently, Uyghurs refrain from sharing their experiences and knowledge, depriving the world of valuable insights and hindering efforts to shed light on the situation. Amnesty International's research, captured in the study ``Nowhere Feels Safe,'' involved interviews with individuals from Uyghur, Kazakh, Uzbek, and other ethnic backgrounds residing in 22 countries. An important revelation emerged: approximately two-thirds hesitated to link their names to the study, driven by concerns over potential consequences for themselves or their families stemming from Chinese authorities. The report `` `We Know You Better Than You Know Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' revealed that around two-thirds of Uyghurs surveyed have been directly threatened and experienced threats to their family while living in the U.K. and about 4 in 5 Uyghurs report being directly threatened or having their families threatened by Chinese authorities while living in Turkey. The Chinese government employs various methods, such as phone calls, emails, or social media messages, to intimidate Uyghur diaspora members. These tactics involve harassment, threats, or warnings that aim to instill fear and dissuade individuals from persisting in their activism or advocacy efforts. This direct form of communication can evoke intense intimidation, leaving Uyghur diaspora members feeling vulnerable and anxious. Instances in the United States exemplify these tactics. Uyghurs in the U.S. have reported receiving phone calls from Chinese authorities or even family members in the region, warning them that their online activities or activism could lead to the detention of or harm to their relatives. An illustrative case involves an Uyghur American who carried a photograph of his detained sister as a symbol of his advocacy against the CCP's abuses. When his parents contacted him, they delivered a distressing ultimatum: to ensure his sister's safety, he was pressured to suspend his activism. This situation underscores the extent of pressure and coercion exerted on Uyghur diaspora members to silence their voices. Safeguard Defenders' recent report ``Targeted in Turkiye, China's Transnational Repression Against Uyghurs'' further exposed China's tactics of threatening the Uyghur community into stopping activism work; producing pro-China propaganda; and/or spying on other Uyghurs. The report identifies how the CCP's patterns of harassment are organized by local Chinese police and state agents that are operating in collaboration with employees within Chinese embassies. They have formulated networks in East Turkistan that are structured around specific Uyghur neighborhoods or districts in China. Their networks involve cooperation among Chinese police, ``Neighborhood Working Groups,'' and Chinese police operatives. The Chinese police exploit intelligence gathered through these transnational networks, and information known by family members in the region, to exert control over Uyghurs in the diaspora. Although the report is on Uyghurs in Turkey, most of the tactics in the report being used by Chinese police are also being used against Uyghurs in China and share stark similarities to those used against Uyghur Americans. The specific repression tactics include threatening to harm their family in East Turkistan, using coercion to compel the Uyghur community into collaboration by refraining from processing their passport renewal requests, offering financial incentives, and even luring them with what they yearn for the most: reconnecting with their families. Uyghurs in the diaspora are coerced to become informants, remain silent about human rights violations in the Uyghur region, or take part in pro-CCP propaganda. The report `` `We Know You Better Than Yourself': China's Transnational Repression of the Uyghur Diaspora'' (2023) also indicates a significant shift in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach since 2017, with a heightened emphasis on deploying Uyghur informants, employing intimidation tactics to silence open discourse among Uyghurs, and enlisting them to contribute to the creation of favorable depictions of China. I have been a target of attacks and harassment by Uyghurs in the diaspora whose family members are in detention back home. They have used tactics such as hate speech, libel, and blackmail to discredit my advocacy and reinforce disinformation and propaganda by the CCP. They are being reported to the FBI. Uyghurs in exile are monitored closely, both physically and digitally. This surveillance can range from monitoring online activities and social media presence to physical surveillance, including tracking movements, infiltrating community organizations, and attending public events where Uyghur diaspora members gather. Chinese security agents or informants may be present within these communities, keeping a watchful eye on their activities and reporting back to authorities. The objective of conducting such surveillance is to keep tabs on Uyghur activists, advocates, and community members, instill a sense of constant scrutiny, and create a climate of fear. Furthermore, Uyghurs abroad frequently experience calls from family members or law enforcement personnel, pressuring them to disclose details about their current location, educational institution, and information concerning other Uyghurs hailing from the same hometown as the inquiring official, thus falling under their surveillance ``jurisdiction.'' It's essential to note that the Chinese Communist Party has no rightful claim to personal and identifiable information of Uyghurs living outside China; however, these individuals are compelled to provide information under duress. The Chinese government makes a point of using tactics that put immense pressure on diaspora members, instilling fear of potential consequences for their loved ones who remain in East Turkistan. This involves using family members as leverage to pressure, coerce, or silence Uyghurs abroad. Families experience harassment, arbitrary detention, and even forced disappearance, leaving Uyghur diaspora members torn between raising awareness about the atrocities and protecting their vulnerable relatives. By using these tactics, the Chinese government aims to suppress dissent, maintain control over the diaspora community, and discourage Uyghurs from advocating for the rights of their fellow Uyghurs. These actions create a climate of fear and vulnerability, making it difficult for Uyghur diaspora members to openly express their concerns, share information about human rights abuses, or support international efforts to hold China accountable for its actions. As such, it has become increasingly crucial to support and amplify the voices of the diaspora community, empowering them to share their experiences while ensuring their safety and protection. Legislative and Policy Recommendations In addressing China's transnational repression and supporting Uyghurs in the diaspora, there are several policy suggestions and legislative steps that can be considered. We recommend the United States introduce and pass legislation that explicitly condemns China's transnational repression tactics, focusing on the protection of Uyghur activists, advocates, and their families. The legislation can provide legal remedies for cases of harassment, intimidation, or threats faced by Uyghur community members, enabling them to seek justice and hold perpetrators accountable. It can also establish mechanisms for individuals to report incidents and receive support. The introduction of the Transnational Repression Policy Act (TRPA) on March 16th, 2023, by Senator Jeff Merkley, Senator Marco Rubio, Senator Ben Cardin, and Senator Bill Hagerty--members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is a good start. The TRPA, if enacted, would greatly assist Uyghurs facing transnational repression by China. This commitment from the United States would strengthen efforts to advocate for Uyghur rights and work towards a more secure and just global environment for all individuals affected by transnational repression. The U.S. Government should consider implementing targeted sanctions on Chinese officials and entities involved in transnational repression and human rights abuses against the Uyghur community. These sanctions could include freezing assets, restricting access to financial systems, and imposing travel bans. By targeting those responsible for human rights violations, the U.S. sends a strong message that such actions will have consequences and discourages other countries from engaging in similar behavior. The United States can engage in diplomatic efforts to mobilize international support in addressing the issue of transnational repression carried out by China. This could involve championing resolutions or joint statements at the United Nations and other international forums, urging countries to explicitly condemn China's actions and take a firm stance against transnational repression. Collaborating with like-minded countries, the U.S. could also establish multilateral initiatives aimed at investigating and countering China's repressive actions. The U.S. should work closely with its allies and partners to strengthen intelligence sharing related to transnational repression activities carried out by China. Enhanced collaboration allows for the identification of networks and individuals involved in such activities and helps build a comprehensive understanding of China's methods. The intelligence gathered could be used to expose tactics, support legal action, and strengthen advocacy efforts. The United States can take steps to raise awareness about China's transnational repression and the threats faced by the Uyghur diaspora. This could involve supporting media campaigns, hosting public events, and sponsoring educational initiatives that inform the public about the situation. Additionally, the U.S. Government can work with human rights organizations, media outlets, and Uyghur community representatives to create safe platforms for Uyghurs to share their testimonies, ensuring their voices are heard and their stories are documented. In an era of extensive surveillance, protection of digital rights is crucial. The U.S. could introduce policies and initiatives to strengthen online privacy, encryption standards, and cybersecurity practices, specifically focused on the Uyghur diaspora. These efforts could involve providing resources, training, and guidance on secure digital practices, while also advocating for international agreements and norms that condemn state-sponsored hacking and cyber espionage activities. By implementing these policy suggestions, the United States Government can take a proactive approach in addressing China's transnational repression, supporting the Uyghur diaspora, and fostering international collaboration to seek justice and accountability for Uyghurs. Conclusion It is crucial that we shed light on the plight of countless families torn apart by China's reprehensible tactics. By denying basic human rights and resorting to arbitrary detention, the Chinese government seeks to silence those who speak up for justice and challenge their oppressive regime. The agony faced by my family is not unique; it is a testament to the suffering endured by many others who fall victim to the same repressive tactics. As we remember my family members, my relatives, my loved ones, let us also advocate for the rights of those unjustly imprisoned, offer support to their loved ones left behind, and strive for a world where transparency, empathy, and justice prevail. Only through consistent and unwavering efforts can we hope to make a difference in the lives of those affected by transnational repression and bring an end to this cycle of suffering. ______ Statement of Hon. Chris Smith Today's hearing, ``Countering China's Global Transnational Repression Campaign,'' will come to order. In June 2021, on the 32nd anniversary of the 1989 Student Democracy Protests which, as we all know, ended in the horrific Tiananmen Square Massacre, I visited Liberty Sculpture Park in Yermo, California, to witness the unveiling of a sculpture made by the artist Chen Weiming. It was a 20-foot-tall statue that morphed Xi Jinping's skull with a coronavirus molecule, and Chen named it ``CCP Virus.'' It was a bold work of art, rightfully assigning blame to the CCP and Xi Jinping for the horrific pandemic that shook our world. I was honored to attend, to see Chen's work, and to join him and other heroes of Chinese democracy in speaking out against the atrocities committed by the CCP. Less than two months later, the sculpture was gone. It was vandalized and then burned to the ground, likely by a band of CCP agents targeting Chen and other Chinese democracy activists here in the U.S. to punish and scare them into silence. Unfortunately, Chen's is not a rare case. With us that day in Yermo was Wei Jingsheng, perhaps the greatest advocate for Chinese human rights and democracy of our time. Very few people know this, but in May 2022, while driving right here in Washington, DC, a car swerved in front of Wei's car and suddenly braked in front of him while another rammed him from behind. Both cars quickly fled the scene. Wei believes, and I also believe, that this was an attempt on his life. This, incidentally, is the same tactic that I have heard used against another Chinese individual who ran afoul of the CCP. And the list goes on. Major Xiong Yan, who served in the U.S. Army and who ran for Congress in New York City, was stalked and harassed by Chinese agents here in the U.S. Pastor Bob Fu, a leading advocate on behalf of Christians and human rights defenders trying to escape China, was threatened with a bomb at his home in Texas. The brave 8 Hong Kongers who had bounties placed on their heads just this past summer, solely for speaking out against the atrocities happening in their beloved Hong Kong, and whose families were harassed. Indeed, I note, this group includes a number of individuals whose outspokenness led them to testify here at the China Commission, so this is really personal. It also becomes personal when I hear about a fellow legislator from a sister democracy who has been harassed for speaking out about human rights in China. MP Michael Chong of Canada was harassed for what Senator Merkley and I have repeatedly done, calling the Chinese Communist Party's treatment of Uyghurs what it is: a genocide. And though Michael has been harassed, he is not intimidated, and he will be joining us here today to tell us his story. My friends, the CCP has waged a pervasive coercive campaign around the world against anyone who does not agree with the Party. They target Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, dissidents, activists, students, journalists, or anyone who dares to state their ``unapproved'' opinions about the PRC. The CCP uses modern technology to digitally harass and surveil individuals around the globe. They abuse the Interpol system to punish and force the return of those who exercise their freedom of speech while abroad. They detain and harass dissidents' families and friends back in China to unjustly attempt to coerce silence--like the sister of Rushan Abbas; Rushan will join us here this morning. And they even use direct physical assaults beyond their borders to control what is said about their country and its wrongdoings. Recently we've seen them go so far as to set up shop right here in the United States, establishing illegal ``police stations'' in New York City to surveil and harass Chinese emigrants on our soil. The CCP's strategy of trying to rewrite global norms has succeeded in too many cases. This has led to self-censorship and curtailment of basic freedoms even here in the U.S. Students, scared to speak out. Journalists, scared to write. Free citizens, scared to attend gatherings. All of this is happening beyond China's borders, and within ours. Indeed, as Michael Chong's testimony illustrates, and as underscored in news just this past weekend from Great Britain, where an alleged spy worked at Parliament, it is also happening within our legislatures. We cannot and will not let the Chinese Communist Party scare us into submission through these tactics. Today we will hear from experts and victims alike, who have seen these stories up close. We must work to protect the freedoms of speech, assembly, and opinion--both here in the U.S. and elsewhere. ______ Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. Transnational repression is central to the Chinese Communist Party's strategy of silencing critics of Chinese policy around the world. It affects so many of the Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, human rights advocates, journalists, and others this Commission works with on a daily basis. This hearing gives us a chance to give a platform to some of the victims and experts from across the globe who have been most engaged in trying to identify ways we can address this vexing challenge. We know from past testimony that it isn't easy, as the Chinese Communist Party's sophisticated tactics seem to know no bounds and bring the power of a ruthless state against individual dissidents, members of the Chinese diaspora, and, insidiously, their family members in China. That's why it's so critical that we redouble the effort to wrap our minds around the dimensions of this threat, to raise awareness globally, to identify ways to build common cause with those who have been targeted--religious groups, activists, journalists, politicians-- as well as governments sick and tired of the brazen violation of sovereignty that transnational repression represents. Last year I chaired another hearing on this topic to hear about what the Biden Administration is doing about it, and I am proud that one of the officials at the forefront of that work, Under Secretary Uzra Zeya, is now one of our commissioners. The State Department is dedicated and is continuing to apply significant time and attention to developing a more comprehensive strategy to counter, deter, and mitigate these threats. We have also seen the Department of Justice make important strides in pursuing criminal charges against groups and individuals accused of engaging in transnational repression. But despite these efforts, this Commission's reporting shows how far we have to go. We continue to track a disturbing number of cases of transnational repression both here in the United States and abroad, with the knowledge that countless others are taking place and likely not being reported on. I imagine that for every case we hear about, there's another ten we don't know about. We have seen egregious harassment campaigns, even against legislators around the world including the Honorable Michael Chong who is here, a member of the Canadian House of Commons. We have seen relentless targeting of young activists who have spoken out bravely against the increasingly repressive conditions in Hong Kong. And we have seen the unrelenting pressure that continues to be directed at Uyghurs around the world. We know that this is, as Freedom House calls it, ``the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive'' campaign of transnational repression in the world. It relies on surveillance technology, spyware, threats to individuals through phone calls or face-to-face intimidation, and even harassment of family members and friends still in China. As Safeguard Defenders revealed in an eye-opening report earlier this year, the PRC is also responsible for establishing at least 102 ``overseas service stations'' in at least 53 countries, breaching national sovereignty and coercing Chinese diaspora members to return to the PRC for criminal investigation. All of this requires that the United States and as many other governments as possible--and we do need international cooperation to make this effective--make it a priority to address this, difficult as it will be. That's why earlier this year I introduced the Transnational Repression Policy Act, joined on a bipartisan basis by my colleagues Senator Rubio, Senator Cardin, and Senator Hagerty in the Senate, to hold foreign governments and individuals accountable when they stalk, intimidate, or assault people across borders. I appreciate Chairman Smith's work to lead the House companion to this legislation. If enacted, the Transnational Repression Policy Act would mandate additional U.S. Government reporting on the issue, require training for U.S. diplomatic and law enforcement personnel, bolster intelligence community efforts to track and share information on these incidents, and develop a more effective tip line for victims and witnesses. I'm working to get this bill passed, I think it's essential that we do, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today who are bringing their experience, their stories, to bear on this very important issue. ______ Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern Good morning. I join my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses and the public to today's CECC hearing on transnational repression. Transnational repression occurs when governments reach across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation. Our focus today is on the practices of the People's Republic of China, but transnational repression can be carried out not just by unfriendly governments but also strategic allies. It can target people anywhere they or their families reside or visit, even in democracies like the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and here in the United States. That is why I worked with Senator Merkley during the 117th Congress as he led the development of the Transnational Repression Policy Act, and why I am proud to co-lead that same bill (H.R. 3654) in the House this Congress with Chairman Smith. It is critically important to make sure that the U.S. Government has the tools it needs to confront this global challenge both domestically and internationally. I turn now to China. Freedom House's database on transnational repression now includes information on 854 direct physical incidents committed by 38 governments in 91 countries around the world since 2014. China is an origin country for 253 of those recorded incidents, a stunning 30 percent. As we will hear today, the PRC targets abroad the same populations it represses internally, especially Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and Tibetans. State agents linked to the security and police forces have engaged in forced rendition of asylum seekers, street assaults, digital surveillance, online harassment, and the coercion and intimidation of family members and friends of dissidents. We must be sure that we have the knowledge and capacity to protect the people who are the targets of these practices, especially those who are within U.S. jurisdiction. And we must do a better job of engaging with partner countries and strengthening multilateral strategies to counter the PRC's actions, which violate international human rights-- among them the right to freedom of expression, association, asylum, and freedom of movement, and the prohibition on arbitrary detention. I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimonies and their recommendations. ______ Statement of Hon. Dan Sullivan Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your outstanding leadership on this. It is great to see my colleague from the U.S. Senate and Co-chair Senator Merkley. This is such an important topic. The effort--often successful--of the Chinese Communist Party to reach far beyond its borders to target critics in the diaspora communities throughout the world is outrageous. But let's face it, it's just one of many outrageous things Beijing is doing across the board. We need to continue to recognize and highlight, as this Commission has been doing, the brutal nature of the Chinese Communist Party regime we are dealing with, especially under the dictatorial rule of Xi Jinping. Look no further than the string of strange disappearances that we've seen in China in their government in the last couple of months. The Chinese foreign minister and former ambassador to the United States disappeared. This was Xi Jinping's right-hand man until recently. The commander and deputy commander of the PLA rocket forces--gone. And now, apparently the defense minister is gone. Who knows what's going on here. But to be clear, this is the sort of regime we're dealing with--a regime whose officials suddenly disappear without any explanation. They're probably somewhere in China with bullets in their heads in ditches. This is the way the CCP operates. And now Xi Jinping is trying to export this. Just a couple of months ago, authorities in Hong Kong issued arrest warrants for activists and lawyers accused of violating the CCP-imposed national security law, specifically for people who no longer live in Hong Kong, or anywhere in China, for that matter. Hong Kong has declared that it will pursue these people for life. And it's not unthinkable that they could one day make good on grabbing them. Of course, I'm not worried about the United States aiding in their return, or the UK, or Australia, or Japan, or other places where they now reside. But life is long. They all travel. One day, they could find themselves in the hands of a government all too eager to burnish their credentials with Beijing. This is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, I'm working with Representative John Curtis on a bill to press the Biden administration to sanction the prosecutors and judges and other officials responsible for enforcing these unjust Hong Kong laws. The days of the independence of the Hong Kong judiciary system and the rule of law in Hong Kong are unfortunately long gone. Beijing has seen to that. Now we need to do what we can to try to even up the scales on behalf of the people of Hong Kong. Mr. Chairman, there is one more issue that I want to just raise in my opening statement. These kinds of aggressive actions are also targeting Americans directly, and even, remarkably, during times of tragedy. I'd like to submit for the record this New York Times story that just broke last night entitled, ``China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques.'' This story that just broke in the New York Times talks about how, when wildfires swept across Maui last month killing over 100 Americans, the CCP unleashed its information warriors. They said on the internet that the disaster was not natural. In a flurry of false posts and lies that spread across the internet, they said the natural disaster was the result of a secret weather weapon being tested by the United States military and intel agencies. To bolster this lie, they posted photographs that were generated by artificial intelligence programs. Mr. Chairman, as we all know, when countries suffer natural disasters, even adversaries come together to help each other. Not under Xi Jinping's rule. The Chinese Communist Party is now trying to sow discord among Americans as we sadly bury our own dead in Hawaii. This is outrageous and I call on the Chinese ambassador to the United States to formally apologize to our country. But Mr. Chairman, he won't, because if he did, he'd disappear too. We all know that. One final thing, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how honored I am to join this Commission. It has such a great history, especially under your leadership. At a time when many people are raising questions about Congress's decisions in the past relating to China, for example extending MFN 20 years ago, it is good to remind Americans that, at the same time, Congress also established organizations like this one to keep a critical eye on human rights. I think there may be more Congress can do to live up to this Commission's mandate, perhaps even expand it. But as the new guy here, I'm eager to learn from my colleagues about how the Commission works and I'm very honored to be a part of that. With that, Mr. Chairman, I again am very glad to be here and look forward to working with you and all of the members of this distinguished Commission. ______ Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Co-chair Merkley, Ranking Member McGovern, and fellow commissioners. I am honored to be with you all today for this important discussion on the increasingly pervasive and concerning use of transnational repression by PRC authorities. Transnational repression--or TNR--is a global phenomenon, but the PRC's efforts are especially pervasive, pronounced, and persistent. The PRC uses TNR to harass and threaten Uyghurs, Tibetans, members of other ethnic and religious minority groups, Hong Kongers, and PRC citizens and non-PRC citizens living abroad, who seek only to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms. As we've heard from the Co-chairmen and Ranking Member, the PRC utilizes a wide variety of tactics, including online harassment, exit bans on or imprisonment of family members of targeted individuals, the misuse of international law enforcement systems such as INTERPOL, and pressure on other governments to forcibly return targeted individuals to the PRC. The sheer breadth and depth of their efforts cannot be ignored and should not be permitted to continue. It is a direct affront to national sovereignty and impacts people all over the world, including U.S. citizens and individuals residing in the United States. This is why, since 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration has made combating transnational repression a global human rights priority. One way we have sought to counter this scourge is through our diplomatic engagement and tools. We continue to engage the PRC directly, making clear in no uncertain terms that their conduct is unacceptable and must stop. We have not and we will not keep quiet in the face of these transgressions. We have used sanctions as an accountability tool as well. Specifically, in March 2022, we imposed visa restrictions on PRC officials responsible for, or complicit in, transnational repression. This Administration energized the interagency to combat TNR in the United States, as well. U.S. Government agencies have increased their domestic engagement with communities targeted by the PRC. This outreach helps to create improved two-way communication, which both enhances our understanding of the threat and helps those affected more quickly access government assistance when they are targeted--or even before this occurs. We have also jumpstarted international cooperation to drive a global response because it is not only Americans and U.S. residents who have suffered abuses. Specifically, we deployed interagency teams to meet with foreign counterparts to raise their awareness of this threat and to share our own lessons learned. One example of this effort is the recent launch of a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Working Group on TNR. This coalition will raise international awareness of the threat TNR poses to democratic values and deepen our shared commitment to countering it. The experiences and details presented by today's panelists will surely highlight the very real threat of the PRC's transnational repression activities, as well as the need for governments, legislators, activists, and others to continue to work even more closely together to counter it. Hearing your stories, and in some cases learning from what you have gone through personally, are vitally important as we advance our common cause. The Administration welcomes Congress's ongoing leadership on these issues and we look forward to deepening our collaboration. Thank you for this opportunity to speak and thank you all for coming together today to confront this challenge. Submissions for the Record ---------- [Reprinted from the New York Times, September 11, 2023] China Sows Disinformation About Hawaii Fires Using New Techniques By David E. Sanger and Steven Lee Myers When wildfires swept across Maui last month with destructive fury, China's increasingly resourceful information warriors pounced. The disaster was not natural, they said in a flurry of false posts that spread across the internet, but was the result of a secret ``weather weapon'' being tested by the United States. To bolster the plausibility, the posts carried photographs that appeared to have been generated by artificial intelligence programs, making them among the first to use these new tools to bolster the aura of authenticity of a disinformation campaign. For China--which largely stood on the sidelines of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections while Russia ran hacking operations and disinformation campaigns--the effort to cast the wildfires as a deliberate act by American intelligence agencies and the military was a rapid change of tactics. Until now, China's influence campaigns have been focused on amplifying propaganda defending its policies on Taiwan and other subjects. The most recent effort, revealed by researchers from Microsoft and a range of other organizations, suggests that Beijing is making more direct attempts to sow discord in the United States. The move also comes as the Biden administration and Congress are grappling with how to push back on China without tipping the two countries into open conflict, and with how to reduce the risk that A.I. is used to magnify disinformation. The impact of the Chinese campaign--identified by researchers from Microsoft, Recorded Future, the RAND Corporation, NewsGuard and the University of Maryland--is difficult to measure, though early indications suggest that few social media users engaged with the most outlandish of the conspiracy theories. Brad Smith, the vice chairman and president of Microsoft, whose researchers analyzed the covert campaign, sharply criticized China for exploiting a natural disaster for political gain. ``I just don't think that's worthy of any country, much less any country that aspires to be a great country,'' Mr. Smith said in an interview on Monday. China was not the only country to make political use of the Maui fires. Russia did as well, spreading posts that emphasized how much money the United States was spending on the war in Ukraine and that suggested the cash would be better spent at home for disaster relief. The researchers suggested that China was building a network of accounts that could be put to use in future information operations, including the next U.S. presidential election. That is the pattern that Russia set in the year or so leading up to the 2016 election. ``This is going into a new direction, which is sort of amplifying conspiracy theories that are not directly related to some of their interests, like Taiwan,'' said Brian Liston, a researcher at Recorded Future, a cybersecurity company based in Massachusetts. If China does engage in influence operations for the election next year, U.S. intelligence officials have assessed in recent months, it is likely to try to diminish President Biden and raise the profile of former President Donald J. Trump. While that may seem counterintuitive to Americans who remember Mr. Trump's effort to blame Beijing for what he called the ``China virus,'' the intelligence officials have concluded that Chinese leaders prefer Mr. Trump. He has called for pulling Americans out of Japan, South Korea and other parts of Asia, while Mr. Biden has cut off China's access to the most advanced chips and the equipment made to produce them. China's promotion of a conspiracy theory about the fires comes after Mr. Biden vented in Bali last fall to Xi Jinping, China's president, about Beijing's role in the spread of such disinformation. According to administration officials, Mr. Biden angrily criticized Mr. Xi for the spread of false accusations that the United States operated biological weapons laboratories in Ukraine. There is no indication that Russia and China are working together on information operations, according to the researchers and administration officials, but they often echo each other's messages, particularly when it comes to criticizing U.S. policies. Their combined efforts suggest a new phase of the disinformation wars is about to begin, one bolstered by the use of A.I. tools. ``We don't have direct evidence of coordination between China and Russia in these campaigns, but we're certainly finding alignment and a sort of synchronization,'' said William Marcellino, a researcher at RAND and an author of a new report warning that artificial intelligence will enable a ``critical jump forward'' in global influence operations. The wildfires in Hawaii--like many natural disasters these days-- spawned numerous rumors, false reports and conspiracy theories almost from the start. Caroline Amy Orr Bueno, a researcher at the University of Maryland's Applied Research Lab for Intelligence and Security, reported that a coordinated Russian campaign began on Twitter, the social media platform now known as X, on Aug. 9, a day after the fires started. It spread the phrase, ``Hawaii, not Ukraine,'' from one obscure account with few followers through a series of conservative or right- wing accounts like Breitbart and ultimately Russian state media, reaching thousands of users with a message intended to undercut U.S. military assistance to Ukraine. China's state media apparatus often echoes Russian themes, especially animosity toward the United States. But in this case, it also pursued a distinct disinformation campaign. Recorded Future first reported that the Chinese government mounted a covert campaign to blame a ``weather weapon'' for the fires, identifying numerous posts in mid-August falsely claiming that MI6, the British foreign intelligence service, had revealed ``the amazing truth behind the wildfire.'' Posts with the exact language appeared on social media sites across the internet, including Pinterest, Tumblr, Medium and Pixiv, a Japanese site used by artists. Other inauthentic accounts spread similar content, often accompanied with mislabeled videos, including one from a popular TikTok account, The Paranormal Chic, that showed a transformer explosion in Chile. According to Recorded Future, the Chinese content often echoed-- and amplified--posts by conspiracy theorists and extremists in the United States, including white supremacists. The Chinese campaign operated across many of the major social media platforms--and in many languages, suggesting it was aimed at reaching a global audience. Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center identifed inauthentic posts in 31 languages, including French, German and Italian, but also in less prominent ones like Igbo, Odia and Guarani. The artificially generated images of the Hawaii wildfires identified by Microsoft's researchers appeared on multiple platforms, including a Reddit post in Dutch. ``These specific A.I.-generated images appear to be exclusively used'' by Chinese accounts used in this campaign, Microsoft said in a report. ``They do not appear to be present elsewhere online.'' Clint Watts, the general manager of Microsoft's Threat Analysis Center, said that China appeared to have adopted Russia's playbook for influence operations, laying the groundwork to influence politics in the United States and other countries. ``This would be Russia 2015,'' he said, referring to the bots and inauthentic accounts Russia created before its extensive online influence operation during the 2016 election. ``If we look at how other actors have done this, they are building capacity. Now they're building accounts that are covert.'' Natural disasters have often been the focus of disinformation campaigns, allowing bad actors to exploit emotions to accuse governments of shortcomings, either in preparation or in response. The goal can be to undermine trust in specific policies, like U.S. support for Ukraine, or more generally to sow internal discord. By suggesting the United States was testing or using secret weapons against its own citizens, China's effort also seemed intended to depict the country as a reckless, militaristic power. ``We've always been able to come together in the wake of humanitarian disasters and provide relief in the wake of earthquakes or hurricanes or fires,'' said Mr. Smith, who is presenting some of Microsoft's findings to Congress on Tuesday. ``And to see this kind of pursuit instead is both, I think, deeply disturbing and something that the global community should draw a red line around and put off- limits.'' * * * David E. Sanger is a White House and national security correspondent. In a 38-year reporting career for The Times, he has been on three teams that have won Pulitzer Prizes, most recently in 2017 for international reporting. His newest book is ``The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age.'' Steven Lee Myers covers misinformation for The Times. He has worked in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad and Beijing, where he contributed to the articles that won the Pulitzer Prize for public service in 2021. He is also the author of ``The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin.'' [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Statement of Su Yutong Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for convening this meeting and inviting me to submit testimony. As an individual who has faced incredible abuse at the hands of the Chinese government's crackdown on independent voices and journalists, I can speak first-hand about my experiences and the treatment I have had to endure as a journalist, as an activist, and as a woman. Despite living outside of China, beyond its borders, I am still threatened and harassed by authorities--often with serious and harmful consequences. This relentless campaign that I have suffered is designed to scare and silence me.. But it is obvious that the same people who work to make my life a living misery are scared too. They fear me and people like me, who use our voices to draw attention to wrongdoing in a country that wishes to keep its people in the dark. I was born in Beijing. Early on, while still in China, I became an internet activist. Because my work was critical of China's human rights record, I was frequently placed under house arrest and invited for ``chats'' with the police. On June 3, 2010, I posted the diary of former Chinese Premier Li Peng on the internet, which details the suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen student demonstrations by the CCP authorities. As a result, my home was raided by the Chinese police, my belongings were confiscated and I was put under house arrest.\1\ With the help of activists and human rights lawyers I managed to escape to Hong Kong. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ campaigns/2012/05/china-for- activists-the-internet-is-like-dancing-in-shackles/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Once in Hong Kong, I started working as a journalist with the German news agency Deutsche Welle. With the help of the former human rights officer at the German embassy in China, I secured a German visa at the German consulate in Hong Kong. On August 11, 2010, I arrived in Germany, where I continued working for the Chinese department of Deutsche Welle. I wrote and published nearly 1,500 articles. Simultaneously with my work as a journalist, I continued with my work as an activist. In 2011, after the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was secretly detained by the Chinese police, I launched a solidarity campaign on social media. At that time, there was a Chinese-run website in Germany, called Anti-CNN. They published a photoshopped nude photo claiming it was me, and described me as Ai Weiwei's mistress. From that point on, I became a target of continuous harassment by the Chinese government. In July of 2014, a fellow journalist, Frank Sieren at Deutsche Welle, published an article in German and Chinese, in which he described the Tiananmen Massacre as ``a slip-up by the CCP.'' The piece sparked a public outcry from a number of pro-democracy activists and massacre survivors. I was a signatory to an open letter protesting this article and spoke out against the article on Twitter. On August 19, 2014, I was fired \2\ by Deutsche Welle for doing so. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/world/ europe/german-broadcaster-fires-chinese-blogger.html; RSF: https:// rsf.org/en/beijing-imposes-its-propaganda-beyond-its- borders; Der Spiegel: https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/ deutsche-welle-streit-um-twitter-nachricht-zu-tiananmen-massaker-a- 987085.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During this time and after, I was regularly smeared by the official Chinese media. In August 2014, the Chinese official media Global Times published two articles calling me an anti-China reporter. This put an extraordinary amount of pressure on my family in China, who worried that these attacks forecast their own mistreatment. Chinese Communist Party authorities did not limit their campaign to traditional media only. They spread rumors about me on Twitter (now known as X) and other social media platforms, too. The insults ranged from calling me a prostitute, to being a German ``dog''; I received death and rape threats, as well as anonymous messages stating they would kill me and my whole family. Sometimes, these messages were accompanied by extremely violent videos. CCP authorities also attempted to bribe me: unknown people have sent me messages promising me money if I stop my work, even offering me a passport to return to China. Threats and harassment of my family have continued. In November 2014, Beijing State Security called me directly, asking me not to participate in the protests in Germany. The official insisted that if I stopped protesting, he could be helpful in securing a chance to see my parents again. Although I am a Chinese citizen, I have no right to go back to my country. The State Security used my family to blackmail me into compliance. In 2016, I joined Radio Free Asia as a reporter, covering a variety of issues, including human rights abuses within and outside China. The harassment continued. In May 2018, someone sent me a private message on Twitter from a Chinese number, threatening to kill me and my whole family. Deciding that I needed to do something, I reported this threat to German authorities--making this instance the first time I had done so. Because it came from China, I reported the threat to the diplomat in charge of Chinese affairs of the German Foreign Ministry. I lived in relative peace until June 2022. Around that time, threats and harassment became more frequent and persistent. On June 4, 2022, I participated in a protest in front of the Chinese embassy in Germany, in support of Hong Kong after Beijing's national security laws had been put in place, completely changing its media and political landscape. A Chinese man arrived at the scene, and I later learned his name was ``Zhu Kenan.'' He took our photos and followed us. On the night of June 4th, he sent me a message via Telegram. He warned me against criticizing the Chinese government. When I asked him to stop texting me, he responded by posting a photoshopped nude photo of me that had first appeared in 2011, circulated on social media and the internet. I told him I would call the police. But his threats didn't stop online. He started following me in real life. Later, I found out that a Hong Kong activist was also threatened and followed by the same man. We reported the case to German police in Berlin on June 6, 2022. The case was later transferred to Germany's State Criminal Police Office, or Landeskriminalamt (LKA), for investigation. But unfortunately, in July last year, the investigation was suspended because Zhu Kenan left Germany and returned to China. In August he sent me a message via Twitter, saying that he was going to Beijing and wanted to visit my parents' house. When he sent this message, I learned that my parents and relatives were threatened by Chinese police and national security. In June 2022, different men rang the doorbell at my apartment every night, saying they were responding to a sex advertisement they had seen online. I told them that I was not a sex worker and I asked how they got my address and information. Some of them told me my information was posted on an underground porn website. These incidents continued throughout the summer. The last such incident was on August 20th, when I found a strange man waiting outside my apartment door. When I threatened to call the police, he left in a hurry. In October last year, I started to report on Chinese overseas police stations threatening dissidents in Europe; on November 22, I accompanied Chinese dissident Wang Jingyu in the Netherlands to report his case to the Berlin police station. Following my reporting on this issue, unknown people booked two hotel rooms in Berlin under my name, and I reported it to German police. Beginning on November 25, 2022, a man named Yilisen Aierken began to send me threatening and harassing messages. He said he would rape and kill me. He said there was a group that works for CCP in Europe, and the people in this group knew my address. He also said they had published my photos, name and information on porn sites. Yilisen Aierken continued sending me threatening messages until January, when the messages abruptly stopped. On the evening of February 11, unknown persons booked many luxury hotel rooms under my name in Hong Kong, Macau, New York, Houston, Los Angeles, Istanbul and other cities, and reported false bomb threats. I kept getting calls from the police everywhere.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ AXIOS: https://www.axios.com/2023/03/29/chinese-activists- false-bomb-threats; RFA: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/ harassment-03202023133743.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- At the advice of the police, I left my apartment in Berlin and stayed with friends for three months, unable to go home. During this period, I also received messages offering bribes to quit my work, which I reported to the police. There was nothing they could do, they informed me, because offering money to someone is not a crime. On June 16, 2023, I received a terrifying video from an unknown person in my Telegram of a person being dismembered. When I saw this video, I became physically sick. The unknown person also said that my head would be chopped off. On June 20, I participated in a protest in front of the German Chancellery, and I discovered that Chinese embassy staff and CCP agents monitored and secretly photographed the protesters. At the end of June, my parents and relatives in China were threatened by Chinese police and state security. They told my parents that I participated in anti-China activities and smeared China. They called me a criminal. Since the beginning of August, many newspapers and TV stations in Germany have reported the threats to me by Chinese overseas police stations. Chinese diplomats stationed in Germany monitored and secretly photographed Chinese protesters in Germany. After that, I suffered more serious online smears than ever before. Unknown people spread rumors and posted photoshopped nude photos on Twitter and other social media every day to humiliate me. They also insinuated that I have actually taken money from the Chinese government to discredit me in the eyes of other activists.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Women in Journalism: https://www.womeninjournalism.org/threats- all/germany-cfwij-calls-on-german-authorities-to-investigate- continuous-attacks-on-su-yutong --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I have lived with these threats and rumors for 12 years now. While the police protection helps me feel somewhat safer, those who harass me are still free. While many of my harassers are anonymous, some of them are known to law enforcement yet nothing is being done. Despite leaving China, I live under threat every day. Despite my personal pride and refusing to admit it, even to myself, I have been afraid. Authorities in Germany have been helpful. But it's unclear what power they have, given that this form of harassment--crossing borders, crossing continents and time zones--can target me, my loved ones, my friends, and my fellow journalists and activists at any given time, without warning. We don't have recourse and they are allowed to continue doing it with impunity. We can be living in places where human dignity is respected by the law, with strong civil societies, and be subject to the whims of a society that cares little for those things in pursuit of its own wish to bury the truth, no matter the cost. I have dedicated my life to lifting up the voices of others, so they can be heard. I want the world to know my story--and the stories of others like me--who dare to speak truth to power, and feel the force of reprisal no matter where we choose to live. My only consolation, though seemingly small, is that the people and government behind this campaign are also afraid. The intensity of their threats and harassment mirrors their own fear. Thank you. Statement of Levi Browde ______ The Chinese Communist Party's Transnational Repression Targeting Falun Gong Mr. Chairman, Co-chairman Merkley, and distinguished members of the commission, thank you for holding a hearing on this urgent issue and for allowing me to submit this written testimony. In this document, I would like to draw your attention to the following dimensions of transnational repression related to how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its proxies target believers of Falun Gong: The CCP and its proxies have been carrying out a campaign of transnational repression against Falun Gong for over two decades, expanding and refining the tactics, mechanisms, and apparatus that today target a far wider array of victim communities. CCP-backed individuals or misinformed Chinese nationals have physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioners in the United States and other countries who were trying to raise awareness about violations of freedom of belief in China; in several recent cases, the attackers have faced prosecution for their actions. Ethnic Chinese and non-ethnic Chinese Falun Gong practitioners on university campuses across the United States have reported incidents of surveillance, slander, and censorship by Chinese officials, CCP proxies, or other China-linked individuals. Dragon Springs, a campus in New York that houses the training facilities for Shen Yun Performing Arts, faces threats to strip its non-profit status by Chinese agents, two of whom were charged by federal prosecutors this May. The campus continues to face ongoing frivolous lawsuits and surveillance by the CCP. 1. A Two-Decade Campaign of Transnational Repression Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a spiritual practice in the Buddhist tradition that combines meditation and gentle exercises with a moral philosophy centered on the core tenets of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance.\1\ Descending from an ancient lineage and introduced publicly in China in 1992, Falun Gong is now practiced in more than 70 countries, although the largest contingent of believers-- numbering in the tens of millions--remains in China. Since July 1999, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has engaged in a systematic and illegal effort to eradicate Falun Gong, deploying arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings.\2\ This policy remains one of the most widespread campaigns of persecution in China today.\3\ Since the inception of this campaign, the CCP's attempts to intimidate, harass, and suppress Falun Gong practitioners have not remained within the borders of mainland China. For over 20 years, Falun Gong practitioners outside China--be they Chinese nationals, members of the diaspora, or non-Chinese believers--have been a primary target of transnational repression and other forms of harassment around the world. In a 2021 report, Freedom House found that the Chinese regime ``engages in the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world'' and that among its targets are Falun Gong practitioners. This is just one example of the documentation of this long-term effort, with other evidence including first-hand accounts by victims, leaked CCP documents, congressional testimonies from defectors, and third-party investigations. Since July 1999, Falun Gong practitioners outside China have faced break-ins, physical attacks in Chinatown, an assault on an anti- censorship technologist in his home in Atlanta, beatings by Chinese security agents accompanying officials visiting Latin America, and a shooting of Falun Gong activists in South Africa, among other incidents. As early as 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted H. Con. Res. 304, one of the first acts of Congress related to transnational repression that outlined various attacks on Falun Gong practitioners that had occurred in the United States and the intimidation of local U.S. officials supporting their right to freedom of belief, while requesting measures to protect U.S. residents who practice Falun Gong.\4\ These attacks have continued over the past 24 years. In a 2021 case study on transnational repression originating in China, Freedom House relayed its findings regarding cases of the CCP targeting Falun Gong since 2014: \5\ Practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in China, also face regular reprisals from China and from Chinese agents. These include frequent harassment and occasional physical assaults by members of visiting Chinese delegations or pro-Beijing proxies at protests overseas, as in cases that have occurred since 2014 in the United States, the Czech Republic, Taiwan, Brazil, and Argentina. Media and cultural initiatives associated with Falun Gong have reported suspicious break-ins targeting sensitive information, vehicle tampering, and pressure from Chinese authorities for local businesses to cut off advertising or other contractual obligations with them. Multiple Falun Gong practitioners in Thailand have also faced detention, including a Taiwanese man involved in uncensored radio broadcasts to China and several cases of Chinese refugees formally recognized as such by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In October 2017, a Falun Gong practitioner who had survived a Chinese labor camp and become a high-profile informant on CCP abuses--sneaking a letter into a Halloween decoration when detained and later filming a documentary with undercover footage--died of sudden kidney failure in Indonesia. Some colleagues consider his death suspicious, but no autopsy was performed. These incidents are not accidental. Behind them lies a deliberate policy, massive bureaucratic structures, and guidance from the highest levels of the CCP security apparatus. Two insiders who defected to Australia in 2005 offered a glimpse of this system. Hao Fengjun, a former officer in the extralegal 610 Office security agency in Tianjin, relayed: ``Falun Gong practitioners all over the world are under CCP surveillance. I personally received intelligence information about Falun Gong practitioners in Australia, the United States, and Canada.'' \6\ Chen Yonglin, a former officer in the Chinese consulate in Sydney, testified before Congress: In each Chinese mission overseas there must be at least one official in charge of Falun Gong affairs. The head and the deputy head of the mission will be responsible for the Falun Gong affairs. I am aware of there being more than 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants residing in Australia, and they have partaken in efforts to persecute the Falun Gong. The number in the United States should be higher. The United Front uses the overseas Chinese diaspora, including students, businesspeople, media, and so-called Chinese community groups to influence, manipulate, and pressure foreign citizens, politicians, and business leaders to toe the Party line on Falun Gong.\7\ More recently, in a 2015 speech to party cadres from the 610 Office, Meng Jianzhu, then a member of the CCP Central Committee and head of the Political Legal Affairs Committee that oversees the security apparatus, called on those listening to ``actively expand and deepen the overseas battlefield'' against Falun Gong and other banned religious groups. In the speech, which was leaked and published online by the Europe-based Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Religious Freedom, Meng further explains: The struggle against `Falun Gong' and other xie jiao organizations is actually a serious political struggle. It is a political contest with the anti-China forces in the West. . . . We must strengthen the top-level design, coordinate the domestic and foreign fronts, and treat the countries and regions with serious `Falun Gong' activities such as the United States as the main battlefield. . . . We must fully play our party's political and institutional advantages, and coordinate and urge all relevant departments to do a good job on intelligence information, crackdown control, and education transformation.\8\ One point of information to note is that unlike other ethnic minority and exile groups targeted by the CCP, the Falun Gong community does not consist solely of members of the Chinese diaspora or those who have fled China. In addition to the many practitioners outside China who are of Chinese or Taiwanese descent, there are tens of thousands, if not more, people from a wide range of ethnicities who practice Falun Gong and have no connection to the country other than practicing this Chinese spiritual and meditation practice. Many do not speak Chinese and have never been to China. From Cape Town to Cannes, Bangladesh to Berlin, Tel Aviv to Tehran, Falun Gong is practiced in over 100 countries and its spiritual teachings have been translated into 50 languages.\9\ Earlier this year, a small community of Falun Gong practitioners in the African nation of Togo celebrated the 10th anniversary of Falun Gong's introduction to the country.\10\ These and other believers are nationals of countries other than China and locally integrated into everyday society. Nevertheless, because of their faith and identity as Falun Gong practitioners, the CCP sees them as a threat and targets them as well. Non-ethnic Chinese adherents have been barred from parades, been beaten by Chinese thugs in Latin America, or been detained and deported from European countries when trying to peacefully demonstrate against visiting Chinese leaders. In Russia, under CCP pressure, Falun Gong's spiritual text was banned, a situation which the European Court of Human Rights recently ruled a violation of the charter.\11\ The Falun Dafa Information Center has been tracking these and other cases of transnational repression targeting Falun Gong, especially in the United States, although we are trying to expand our documentation efforts globally. Within the past three years, Falun Gong practitioners around the world have continued to experience the long arm of the CCP's persecution. This testimony highlights three key dimensions of this broader campaign. 2. Physical Assaults and Prosecutorial Actions Facing fierce persecution in China alongside systematic censorship, one way in which Falun Gong practitioners around the world have tried to counter the negative effects of the CCP's persecution has been to set up information booths, especially in Chinatowns or at sites frequented by tourists from mainland China. Volunteers and recent refugees take turns manning the booths, distributing information debunking CCP false propaganda about Falun Gong, exposing rights violations in China, and urging individuals to reconsider their affiliation with the CCP. These sites have emerged as a primary target for assault by individuals affiliated with CCP proxies, or deceived by Chinese state- run propaganda that demonizes Falun Gong. The attacks tend to be more frequent in cities where a Chinese embassy or consulate is present. Since 2008, volunteers at Falun Gong information booths in Chinatowns, including in New York and San Francisco, have faced such harassment, heckling, and physical attacks. In some cases, the attackers had clear links to the CCP and proxy entities like the China Anti-Cult Association (CACA) but in other cases, they may have been individuals who were simply incited by CCP propaganda.\12\ The most recent attack happened on February 16, 2023. Zhongping Qi physically assaulted Falun Gong practitioner David Fang unprovoked, injuring David's hand, neck, and chin. (The attacker has a history of verbally abusing Falun Gong booth volunteers.) He often cursed and made unprovoked slurs towards the volunteers at Falun Gong booths in Queens, New York. Later that week, police officers from New York's 109th Precinct arrested and charged Zhongping Qi with third degree assault.\13\ Mr. Fang, the victim of the attack, told the Falun Dafa Information Center on September 3: I was persecuted in China for my faith, and under immense pressure for years. Soon after I arrived in the United States this February, I was attacked and became fearful that the CCP will come to haunt me in New York. I was scared that I would never be free.\14\ A similar incident happened in 2022. Then 32-year-old Zheng Buqiu began vandalizing a Falun Gong booth outside Queens Public Library where he tore down a poster before being stopped by volunteers. Every day for a week, Zheng destroyed booths across Flushing by punching and kicking display boards, knocking over tables with informational booklets, and breaking volunteers' portable speaker by stomping on it. The attacks continued at three different information booth locations until NYPD officers arrested Zheng on February 15, 2022. Police charged him with criminal mischief in the fourth degree and a hate crime. One volunteer at the booth said that Zheng had been seen with Li Huahong, the president of the CACA, an entity linked to the 610 Office, who has herself been arrested four times since 2008 by NYPD for vandalizing Falun Gong booths, indicating Zheng may not have been acting alone.\15\ In 2019, an individual believed to be affiliated with the Chinese consulate pretended to be a Falun Gong practitioner for six months, collecting information and bringing his son to meditation sites in Hermann Park in downtown Houston. In the fall of that year, the individual attacked and attempted to sexually assault a female Falun Gong practitioner in the parking lot. Multiple practitioners witnessed the incident and after blocking his assault, discovered he was not actually a Falun Gong adherent. After that incident, this individual and his son were never seen again.\16\ Such attacks are not limited to the United States. In October 2022, Chinese nationals Kang Zhao and two accomplices (including Zhao's wife) in Canberra, Australia, were caught vandalizing signs attached to at least two Falun Gong practitioners' cars, one of which belonged to Nancy Dong. After being notified by witnesses, Dong arrived at the parking lot and tried to film Zhao and his accomplices, as they spray painted over the sign ``CCP % China'' atop her car. Zhao took Nancy Dong's phone away and elbow slammed her to the ground by her neck, proceeding to kick and punch her until she almost lost consciousness. The altercation led to bruising on her arms and injuries to her lower body. In December 2022, Zhao was arrested by police after trying to leave the country. He pleaded guilty in court to charges of common assault, property damage, and defacing property.\17\ In April 2022, a Westminster court in the United Kingdom sentenced a pro-CCP individual, Mr. He Renyong, to 16 weeks in prison for assaulting and harassing Falun Dafa practitioners in Chinatown. The court dealt the accused a deferred sentence of 18 months, 100 hours of community service, and over 1,000 pounds ($1,300 USD) in fines and fees.\18\ 3. Surveillance, Slander, and Censorship on University Campuses The Falun Dafa Information Center released a report analyzing how the CCP's persecution of Falun Gong impacts students and faculty who practice Falun Gong on university campuses in the United States, based on publicly available reports and a survey conducted in early 2023.\19\ The following are five key takeaways from that report: 1. At least 45 university campuses across the United States have students or faculty who practice Falun Gong. One-fifth of respondents to a 2023 survey reported feeling uncomfortable self-identifying as a Falun Gong practitioner due to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda or other influences. 2. Physical and digital surveillance of both Falun Gong practitioners and Chinese international students--and resulting Chinese government reprisals--are a major area of concern. One non-ethnic Chinese Ph.D. candidate studying in Minnesota reported, ``Whenever I and my club held a booth for our Falun Dafa student club, there was always a suspicious Chinese student wandering about and pretend[ing] to be on their phones and constantly checking on us. They never engaged with us but were just there to monitor us.'' The same student remarked that the presence of these individuals seemed to deter Chinese students from engaging in Falun Gong Club activities on campus. 3. Chinese Student and Scholars Associations (CSSA) have engaged in multiple attempts since 2017 to censor or penalize Falun Gong- related activities on U.S. university campuses, with long-term repercussions even when demands were not met. The associations are known to have ties to local Chinese consulates. In one case, a graduate student and Falun Gong practitioner in Illinois had joined the Chinese Student and Scholars Association (CSSA) to access the resources it offers to international students from China. He reported that Chinese diplomats in the United States caused his removal from the group: ``I was told by the then-CSSA President that the Chinese embassy in Chicago asked him to remove me from CSSA due to my involvement in Falun Gong activities. I had a personal website that published content about Falun Gong. I was later told that somehow the Chinese consulate of Chicago has noticed my connection with Falun Gong and asked the then-CSSA administration to remove me from the CSSA.'' 4. CCP propaganda demonizing Falun Gong causes apprehension among practitioners and university representatives. University representatives have appeared unprepared for false claims made about Falun Gong and have not always provided equal opportunity for Falun Gong Club representatives to respond. 5. Chinese-language textbooks being used at some U.S. universities contain inaccurate and damaging depictions of Falun Gong. Case Study: Reprisal Campaign for a Film Screening about Confucius Institutes A graduate student at a major university in Pennsylvania reported a month-long, coordinated campaign in March and April 2021 aiming to slander and delegitimize the Falun Dafa Club for co-hosting an online screening and panel discussion on the documentary film, In the Name of Confucius. The club had hosted the event with the Athenai Institute and Students for a Free Tibet, which the official student government body, the Graduate and Professional Student Assembly (GAPSA) had also helped advertise in their newsletter and social media. The film screening was relevant to campus discussions regarding Confucius Institutes, gifts to the university from China, and the presence of a CSSA club on campus.\20\ In the week following the event, at least 79 students and former graduates associated with the CSSA sent multiple emails to GAPSA, with complaints that the event promoted by GAPSA was too political. In the emails, the CSSA members claimed that the Falun Dafa Club, Students for a Free Tibet, and Athenai Institute were ``anti-China'' organizations with the mission to slander China and Chinese people. They petitioned the association to respond to the claims that the Falun Gong Club had violated university policies, and that the GAPSA promotion of this event was an act of marginalization against the Chinese community on campus.\21\ An investigation revealed, though, that many Facebook posts about the event from Chinese international students revolved around slandering Falun Gong and opposing the Falun Gong Club's right and eligibility to host events.\22\ Faculty members involved with GAPSA held a roundtable on March 30, 2021 to address the petition and the ``controversy,'' inviting groups including GAPSA representatives and CSSA members to attend; however, the Falun Gong Club president was not provided a similar presentation opportunity. During a second meeting, one CSSA member presented a slideshow that included CCP politicized propaganda against Falun Gong, falsely misrepresenting the faith as a ``cult.'' After a week of deliberation, the faculty members acknowledged that the Falun Gong Club and its president had not violated any university policies, but the incident nevertheless had a long-term impact. It is unclear if the CSSA members were acting of their own accord or under pressure from Chinese officials, but the attempt fits a pattern reported at other university campuses of Chinese students lodging complaints about events critical of the CCP, claiming they promote anti-Asian hatred.\23\ After this stressful and upsetting experience, the Falun Gong Club president went on to hold one last documentary screening of Letter from Masanjia about forced labor in China before her graduation that June, but reported experiencing ongoing trauma and anxiety from the harassment. The campaign against In the Name of Confucius also affected GAPSA, which did not promote this second documentary screening or future events held by the university's Falun Gong Club on their social media or in public event notices. 4. Campaign to Monitor and Slander Dragon Springs Beginning in the early 2000s, Falun Gong practitioners in New York built a campus with Buddhist-style temple buildings modeled on Tang Dynasty architecture. The campus is called Dragon Springs. Today, it also houses two accredited academic institutions--Fei Tian Academy of the Arts and Fei Tian College--and the training center for Shen Yun Performing Arts, an internationally renowned classical Chinese dance company.\24\ According to leaked CCP documents, targeting this campus for surveillance, espionage, and legal harassment is a priority for the regime. A 2017 document from the CCP's Henan Provincial Committee states: ``Tightly focus on the overseas xie jiao core backbones, the headquarters [Dragon Springs] base and foreign political figures, carefully organize strategies to strike and divide them. Pay close attention to the trend of overseas activities of Falun Gong . . . collect early warnings, forward-looking, action-oriented intelligence information, and thus serve the overall struggle situation.'' \25\ The campus has faced vandalism, frequent spying via drones, and localized social media campaigns spreading falsehoods about the campus. In an unprecedented case, federal prosecutors charged two men on May 26, 2023, with attempting to bribe an IRS official with tens of thousands of dollars in a scheme to help the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ``topple'' Falun Gong in the United States.\26\ Specifically, they were charged with manipulating ``the IRS Whistleblower Program, through bribery and deceit,'' in an attempt to strip an entity run by Falun Gong practitioners of its tax-exempt status. Given that the bribery targeted an IRS office in Orange County, New York, the intended target was most likely Dragon Springs or Shen Yun Performing Arts, both of which are headquartered in Orange County. Many who work at the Dragon Springs campus are refugees who escaped religious persecution or survived torture in China. Many have relatives back in China who have faced intimidation, harassment, and even arrest by security forces due to their having family members working at or attending Fei Tian Academy, Fei Tian College, or working for Shen Yun. One recent case is Aihua Liu, the mother of U.S. citizens Steven and Lydia Wang, who was sentenced to four years in prison in China last month. Steven Wang, her son, is a principal dancer for Shen Yun.\27\ A particularly damaging tactic that the CCP and its apparent proxies have used, has been to weaponize the U.S. legal system by filing baseless lawsuits to harm the reputation of Dragon Springs in the local community and force lengthy, costly legal cases. Since 2019, the campus or its residents have faced three lawsuits by an American national who spent 15 years in Tianjin and then moved to the area, and/ or by his associates. The lawsuits purport to relate to environmental protection but are based on mistruths, ultimately failing in court. All three of these lawsuits have been dismissed, but the plaintiffs seem poised to continue filing further suits. 5. Recommendations The CCP's ongoing campaign against Chinese citizens who practice Falun Gong remains one of the most severe human rights crises and sources of religious freedom violations in today's China. As described above, this campaign of persecution extends internationally. In this context, the Falun Dafa Information Center urges policymakers and members of civil society to take the following steps to condemn, deter, and prevent acts of transnational repression against Falun Gong believers in the United States and around the world. (A) Take action to protect Falun Gong communities from transnational repression 1. Punish diplomats who engage in intimidation, harassment, surveillance, or pressuring members of the Chinese diaspora to marginalize Falun Gong or take action against practitioners. Declare diplomats who commit transnational repression against Falun Gong targets persona non grata. 2. Investigate and prosecute anyone who assaults Falun Gong practitioners who were peacefully exercising their right to free speech, as authorities in New York City have done. 3. Investigate proxy groups, such as the 610 Office-linked Anti- Cult Association, that are at the forefront of harassing Falun Gong practitioners in locations such as Flushing, NY. 4. Investigate digital surveillance of Falun Gong communities and pressure China-based companies like Tencent or ByteDance to be transparent about moderation policies and data collection. Urge them to avoid censorship and surveillance of Falun Gong-related information on popular apps such as WeChat and TikTok outside of China. 5. Ensure that expanding activities to monitor and prevent transnational repression include Falun Gong. Relevant actions could include making sure that those working on transnational repression receive minimal education on Falun Gong, that engagement with vulnerable communities to collect incidents includes Falun Gong, and that transparency enforcement for foreign agents includes additional entities that demonize or harass Falun Gong believers. Ensure that local Falun Gong community representatives are aware of any available channels to report incidents of transnational repression. 6. Actively welcome and support Falun Gong refugees fleeing China, including by ensuring that asylum officers and others in the immigration system evaluating applications receive at least a minimal education on Falun Gong. 7. University faculty, administrators, and relevant U.S. Government agencies must take further action to preempt, monitor, deter, and counter CCP activities that undermine freedom of expression, freedom of belief, and non-discrimination for Falun Gong practitioners and for others on campus. 8. Representatives from relevant congressional committees and U.S. Government agencies--such as the National Security Council, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of State--should meet with Falun Gong representatives, torture survivors, victims of transnational repression, and relatives of jailed practitioners outside China. This will enable them to receive up-to-date information about conditions in China. Given the severity of the persecution in China and risk of reprisals, it is too dangerous for local adherents to meet with foreign government officials inside the country. As such, U.S. officials and diplomatic staff should make a particular priority of meeting with Falun Gong practitioners prior to their travel to China or during visits to their home country. High-level officials, including presidents, vice presidents, prime ministers, secretaries of state, and religious freedom ambassadors should also meet with Falun Gong torture survivors, victims of transnational repression, or relatives of jailed practitioners to better understand conditions in China and to signal support for their freedom. (B) Vocally condemn transnational repression against Falun Gong in public and private 1. U.S. officials should make public statements condemning incidents of transnational repression targeting individual Falun Gong practitioners and their families. 2. In meetings with Chinese counterparts, officials should call for the halt of transnational repression of Falun Gong practitioners, including at the highest levels of diplomacy. 3. When preparing to meet with consular officials, make use of publicly available resources or queries to the Falun Dafa Information Center to ascertain conditions of transnational repression. 4. Local, state, and federal officials should make public statements on key anniversaries, such as May 13 (World Falun Dafa Day) and July 20 (the date of the CCP's launch of its violent persecution)-- that express support for U.S. residents and citizens who practice Falun Gong and condemn ongoing transnational repression. 5. Members of Congress, the U.S. Ambassador to China, and human rights groups should advocate for the release of imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners, especially those with family members residing outside China. [ENDNOTES follow on next three pages.] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Statement of Zhou Fengsuo ______ The CCP's Transnational Repression of Emerging Activists After the White Paper Movement introduction My name is Zhou Fengsuo, and I am a former Tiananmen student leader and current Executive Director of Human Rights in China, a New York- based organization that advocates for a more just and democratic Chinese future. I am honored to provide testimony on the situation of Chinese students in the United States, which grows more and more precarious with each passing day. Due to my position as a long-time activist, I have been lucky enough to meet with hundreds of young overseas Chinese activists and hear their stories. Last year, frustration with the Chinese government's repressive policies finally overflowed and sparked the White Paper Movement, where individuals-- mostly students and young people--around the world protested against CCP censorship and repression. In the aftermath of these protests, the CCP has cracked down on anyone who was involved, and has especially targeted students on U.S. campuses. Chinese students in the United States played a critical role in the White Paper Movement. It was their mobilization that eventually forced the CCP to change their policies. The White Paper protests demonstrated that student activism abroad is a crucial method of putting pressure on the Chinese government. We believe that in the future, activism outside of China will continue to be highly influential, and it is imperative that we support emerging activism with the goal of promoting change in China. However, activism organizations and individual activists all over the world are now facing harassment and retaliation from the CCP because of their activities during the White Paper protests. This lack of security is the main obstacle they are facing. Pushing back on the long arm of the CCP and resisting its transnational repression is key to ensuring the future success of the organizations formed after the White Paper Movement. From those who have been brave enough to share their situations with us, we know that the CCP mostly collects information through online surveillance, as well as through pro-CCP student informants. We also know that the two most common strategies for suppressing activist voices are detaining them for questioning if they return to China, and holding their parents hostage until they agree to stop their activities or even become informants themselves. In the past year, I have traveled across the globe to meet with young activists who have been targeted in the aftermath of the White Paper Movement, learn their concerns, and discuss how to best support and protect them. Below, I will share just a few of their stories. the ccp harasses activists to instill fear I have interviewed dozens of activists in North America and Europe who became involved in the pro-democracy movement following the White Paper protests. Many of them are young college students or recent graduates who became involved in activism on their college campuses. Their level of ``activist'' activity ranges from those who merely post anti-CCP messages on social media to those who attend protests and try to rally their fellow students. Many students have told me similar stories of harassment from Chinese police. Often, there is some key moment of exposure--a phone number revealed online, a viral social media post, or a classmate turned informant. There are even cases of email addresses found by Chinese police through website accounts that should have only been visible to employees of a U.S. company, which suggests that CCP agents have managed to access some internal databases. Once an overseas activist is on the radar of the authorities, the Chinese police often use one of two strategies: hostage-taking or direct interrogation. The first strategy involves Chinese police going to the home of the activist's parents, calling the activist, and forcing their parents to ask specific questions about their activities and other contacts before demanding that they stop whatever anti-CCP actions they have been engaged in. There is, of course, an implicit (or explicit) threat to their parents if they do not comply. This strategy is especially common among young overseas activists because so many of them have parents back in China, who are an easy target for retaliation. The second strategy is to detain and question the young activists themselves, usually when they return home to see their families in China. Students have told me about being taken away by police and interrogated for over ten hours at a time. Especially for young people with little experience in this arena, such detentions are terrifying. The police threaten their families and tell them they will be thrown in jail for years in order to elicit a ``confession.'' Many were interrogated many times over the same kind of question in order to break their spirit and find inconsistencies. Some were put in a hotel and questioned for weeks. No matter which strategy the police employ, the intent is clearly to frighten the activist into stopping their activities, and to collect information about their networks. Police often demand that the activists themselves become informants and spy on other overseas students and organizations. I have heard similar stories from activists across the U.S., Canada, and Europe. In Europe, several activist organizations are all but dissolved after constant harassment from CCP agents made them too afraid to contact one another. Some told me they were even followed, despite living outside China, which made them so afraid they ceased their activities altogether and went into hiding. A student on an American campus was threatened with violence by a classmate, who told her he would hurt her so she couldn't continue to post anti-CCP content. conclusions From speaking with activists, I have learned several key facts about the CCP's tactics for transnational repression. First, the significance of the internet for surveillance purposes cannot be overstated. It enables direct surveillance by CCP agents and creates new platforms for self-censorship. Second, students who support the CCP pose a threat to Chinese students' freedom of speech. They may report on their classmates, or threaten them directly. Third, the fact that most Chinese students have family members back home makes them uniquely vulnerable to ``hostage''-style questioning and pressure from the authorities. So far, it seems that most of the information the Chinese police have on activists comes from online surveillance of social media and websites. But there are still real concerns about informants within the Chinese diaspora community. Even though the recent activities by U.S. law enforcement against informants have been widely positively received by the Chinese activist community, they need direct and concrete support from universities and the government in protecting their safety from the CCP's still-pervasive influence, both online and on the ground. From Chinese students' point of view, these are real, serious risks that create a chilling effect on activism and speech. The situation does not show signs of improvement; to the contrary, concerning cases have proliferated in recent years. We should seek to protect Chinese students and enable them to enjoy the freedom of speech that should be guaranteed in America. proposals 1. Universities should be proactive in protecting the right to free speech of Chinese students, especially against material risks: a. New students who arrive should be given some sort of rights training, with an emphasis on free speech; b. Students should be warned that they can be prosecuted for threats or for taking threatening action against other students; c. Chinese Scholars Associations (CSAs) have been an extension of the CCP's influence on college campuses. These organizations harbor student informants and create a chilling environment of fear for Chinese student communities. They should be required to disclose their association with the Chinese Embassy and other affiliates. 2. Students faced with CCP repression often feel confused and afraid, which renders them unable to resist under pressure. We need to establish channels to connect Chinese students with relevant government offices and institutions so that incidents can be understood quickly, and help can be provided in an effective, safe, and timely manner. 3. Online surveillance and data leaks should be a major concern for legislation and enforcement. 4. Facebook recently removed many accounts that are associated with disinformation. All major social platforms should crack down on these fake accounts. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Witness Biographies The Honourable Michael Chong, P.C., M.P., Member of the House of Commons, Canadian Parliament, Official Opposition Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vice Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada- People's Republic of China Relationship Michael Chong was first elected to the Parliament of Canada in 2004 and represents the riding of Wellington-Halton Hills. He is currently the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Official Opposition and Vice-Chair of the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship. Mr. Chong has served in the Federal cabinet as President of the Queen's Privy Council, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and Minister for Sport. Mr. Chong has also served as chair of several House of Commons standing committees. Yana Gorokhovskaia, Ph.D., Research Director for Strategy and Design, Freedom House Yana Gorokhovskaia is the Research Director for Strategy and Design at Freedom House, a non-profit and non-partisan organization devoted to the support and defense of democracy around the world. Yana has a Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia and has been published in peer- reviewed journals and outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Politico, the Guardian, the Washington Post, and Just Security. At Freedom House, Yana oversees research-related trends in global freedom and democracy as well as transnational repression. She has co-authored two reports on the topic in recent years: ``Still Not Safe: Transnational Repression in 2022'' and ``Defending Democracy in Exile: Policy Responses to Transnational Repression.'' Laura Harth, Campaign Director, Safeguard Defenders Laura Harth is the Campaign Director at Safeguard Defenders, a human rights NGO that undertakes and supports activities for the protection of human rights, promotion of the rule of law, and enhancement of local civil society capacity in some of Asia's most hostile environments. Focused on the PRC, it also works to counter growing transnational repression by the Chinese Communist Party around the world through direct actions, research, and advocacy efforts. Laura also covers external relations for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and acts as an adviser to Hong Kong Watch. Previously a contributor to Hong Kong-based Apple Daily's English edition, she is a contributor to Italian outlet Formiche and co-authored a Sinopsis report to expose and counter Chinese Communist Party foreign interference operations in Italy. Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, Campaign for Uyghurs Rushan Abbas, a Uyghur American activist, has dedicated her life to championing the rights of the Uyghur people. Beginning her advocacy during her time at Xinjiang University, she led pro-democracy protests in 1985 and 1988. After re- locating to the United States in 1989, her commitment to the cause only grew stronger. Co-founding the Uyghur Overseas Student and Scholars Association in 1993, she played a pivotal role in establishing the Uyghur American Association in 1998 and was elected as its vice president for two terms. In response to Beijing's escalating genocidal actions against Uyghurs in 2017, Abbas co-founded the Campaign for Uyghurs (CFU). This organization advocates for Uyghur human rights and democratic freedoms, rallying the international community against the atrocities in East Turkistan. She pioneered the ``One Voice One Step'' movement, orchestrating a global protest on March 15, 2018, across 14 countries and 18 cities against China's mass Uyghur detentions. Her sister's abduction followed her first public speech in September 2018, as retaliation for Rushan's activism. In 2020, CFU released the report ``Genocide in East Turkistan,'' meticulously detailing how China's actions align with the Genocide Convention. Notably, CFU received a Nobel Peace Prize nomination in February 2022 for its relentless advocacy. Rushan Abbas engages with global lawmakers, briefing them on East Turkistan's human rights crisis. Testifying before Congress multiple times, she sheds light on the Chinese regime's genocide and crimes against humanity. Rushan currently serves as a lived experience expert on the Inter-Parliamentary Taskforce on Human Trafficking and as the Advisory Board Chair of the Axel Springer Freedom Foundation. [all]