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- FAA REAUTHORIZATION: ENHANCING AMERICA'S GOLD STANDARD IN AVIATION SAFETY [House Hearing, 118 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] FAA REAUTHORIZATION: ENHANCING AMERICA'S GOLD STANDARD IN AVIATION SAFETY ======================================================================= (118-2) HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 7, 2023 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house- transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/ transportation __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 59-791 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman Rick Larsen, Washington, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Ranking Member Arkansas Eleanor Holmes Norton, Daniel Webster, Florida District of Columbia Thomas Massie, Kentucky Grace F. Napolitano, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Steve Cohen, Tennessee Brian Babin, Texas John Garamendi, California Garret Graves, Louisiana Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina Andre Carson, Indiana Mike Bost, Illinois Dina Titus, Nevada Doug LaMalfa, California Jared Huffman, California Bruce Westerman, Arkansas Julia Brownley, California Brian J. Mast, Florida Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Puerto Rico Mark DeSaulnier, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota Salud O. Carbajal, California Tim Burchett, Tennessee Greg Stanton, Arizona, Dusty Johnson, South Dakota Vice Ranking Member Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey, Colin Z. Allred, Texas Vice Chairman Sharice Davids, Kansas Troy E. Nehls, Texas Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Lance Gooden, Texas Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Tracey Mann, Kansas Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Burgess Owens, Utah Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Rudy Yakym III, Indiana Marilyn Strickland, Washington Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Patrick Ryan, New York Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Menendez, New Jersey Eric Burlison, Missouri Val T. Hoyle, Oregon John James, Michigan Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York Mike Collins, Georgia Mike Ezell, Mississippi John S. Duarte, California Aaron Bean, Florida CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri, and Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 1 Prepared statement........................................... 2 Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 3 Prepared statement........................................... 4 Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening statement...................................................... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 7 Hon. Steve Cohen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening statement.............................................. 7 WITNESSES David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, oral statement........ 9 Prepared statement........................................... 11 Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board, oral statement.......................................... 14 Prepared statement........................................... 16 Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International, oral statement.................................. 23 Prepared statement........................................... 24 Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, oral statement............. 29 Prepared statement........................................... 30 Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association, oral statement.................. 37 Prepared statement........................................... 39 Kerry Buckley, Ph.D., Vice President, Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation, oral statement. 47 Prepared statement........................................... 48 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Submissions for the Record by Hon. Sam Graves: Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers......... 53 Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, Helicopter Association International.............. 55 Statement of Robert Rose, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, Reliable Robotics Corporation..................... 123 Submissions for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen: Statement of John Samuelsen, International President, Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO................ 62 Letter of February 6, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, from Sean M. O'Brien, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.. 125 Submissions for the Record by Hon. Scott Perry: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association et al. v. County of Santa Clara, California, FAA Docket No. 16-22-08........... 68 Article, ``Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid- Hillview Airport's soil. The results are bound to intensify debates around the closure of the San Jose airport,'' by Gabriel Greschler, Bay Area News Group, June 11, 2022, updated: June 13, 2022..................................... 69 Article, ``County study found lead within limits in soil around Reid-Hillview. Officials sat on results until journalists pressed for release,'' by Eric Blinderman, AOPA, June 15, 2022........................................ 71 APPENDIX Questions to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, from: Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford............................... 127 Hon. Colin Z. Allred......................................... 128 Hon. Troy A. Carter.......................................... 129 Questions to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board, from: Hon. Grace F. Napolitano..................................... 130 Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 131 Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 132 Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 132 Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 132 Hon. Patrick Ryan............................................ 134 Questions to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International, from: Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 134 Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 135 Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 135 Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 135 Questions to Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, from: Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr........................... 135 Hon. Greg Stanton............................................ 136 Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association 136 February 2, 2023 SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER TO: LMembers, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation RE: LFull Committee Hearing on ``FAA Reauthorization: Enhancing America's Gold Standard in Aviation Safety'' _______________________________________________________________________ I. PURPOSE The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, February 7, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in Room 2167 of the Rayburn House Office Building for a hearing titled, ``FAA Reauthorization: Enhancing America's Gold Standard in Aviation Safety.'' The hearing will focus on improving safety across the National Airspace System (NAS) in advance of Congress acting to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) statutory authorities which expire on October 1, 2023. Members will receive testimony from the FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), the MITRE Corporation, and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). II. BACKGROUND The primary mission of the FAA is ensuring civil aviation safety.\1\ The FAA has the responsibility to certify, monitor, and regulate the safety and operations of the civil aviation sector, including airlines, general aviation, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), airports, commercial space transportation, repair stations, and aircraft manufacturers, as well as establish licensing and training requirements for pilots and other aviation related professionals.\2\ Congress periodically reauthorizes the FAA and other Federal civil aviation programs through an FAA reauthorization bill. The FAA was last reauthorized when Congress passed and the President signed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which provisions expire on October 1, 2023.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Mission, FAA, available at https://www.faa.gov/about/mission. \2\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 106(g). \3\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Aviation safety in the United States has greatly improved over the last decade. Only three passengers on scheduled domestic passenger air carriers have died as the result of aircraft accidents since 2012 compared to the decade prior, which saw 140 passenger fatalities.\4\ In 11 of the last 13 years, there have been no passenger fatalities in scheduled United States passenger air carrier operations.\5\ This improvement in safety occurred despite increasing passenger enplanements, which grew by 50 percent between 2002 and 2019.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ NTSB, U.S. Civil Aviation Statistics (2021), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx, (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) [hereinafter Civil Aviation Statistics]. \5\ Id. \6\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- General aviation has also become safer, with the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents trending downward since 2000.\7\ Experts suggest this has been due to numerous factors, including advancements in aircraft equipment and technologies, improved pilot training, improved education programs, and advocacy efforts across the general aviation community.\8\ Preliminary general aviation safety data shows the fatality rate per 100,000 flight hours has steadily declined in the past few decades.\9\ The average rate from 2012 to 2020 was 1.07, while the preceding decades were 1.29 and 1.49 respectively.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Bureau of Transp. Statistics, U.S. General Aviation Safety Data, available at https://www.bts.gov/content/us-general-aviationa- safety-data (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) [hereinafter General Aviation Safety Data]. \8\ Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation & Operations of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 114th Cong., (Apr. 28, 2015) (statement of Margaret Gilligan, Assoc. Admin. for Aviation Safety, FAA); see also John Zimmerman, General Aviation Safety Trends: What Should We Worry About?, Plane&Pilot Magazine (Dec. 13, 2021), available at https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/news/pilot-talk/2021/12/13/general- aviation-safety-trends-what-should-we-worry-about/; see also General Aviation Safety Continues To Improve, Plane&Pilot Magazine, (Dec. 18, 2019), available at https://www.planeandpilotmag.com/article/general- aviation-safety-continue-improve/. \9\ General Aviation Safety Data, supra note 7. \10\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite these marked advancements, significant room for improvement remains. In 2021, the NTSB reported 1,157 general aviation accidents, 43 commuter and on-demand accidents, and 24 commercial air carrier accidents.\11\ An accident rate of 2-3 accidents per month for scheduled air carriers suggests there still exist potential safety risks that could result in injuries or fatalities if left unaddressed.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Civil Aviation Statistics, supra note 4. \12\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subsequently, the FAA and Congress, in partnership with industry, labor, and the travelling public, have fought to make air travel as safe as possible. Some efforts to improve aviation safety include the requirement for and implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMSs), the introduction of the FAA Compliance Program, and the Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative. In the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Congress included more than 90 safety-focused provisions, underpinning the fact that safety in the aviation industry is a top priority in the United States.\13\ As the Committee begins to draft the next FAA reauthorization bill, Members will have the opportunity to examine and evaluate FAA safety programs, guidance, and procedures to determine what legislative changes the Committee should consider in the ongoing effort to improve safety and uphold our Nation's gold standard for aviation safety in a global industry. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``THE GOLD STANDARD'' OF SAFETY The previous conventional wisdom for regulating aviation safety was a reactionary posture that focused on addressing safety concerns in the wake of aviation accidents. More recently, the FAA has sought to be more proactive with certain aspects of safety oversight and regulation by participating in programs and initiatives which would ideally prevent future incidents and accidents. Examples of these proactive preventative efforts include the introduction of SMSs, the FAA Compliance Program, Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), and the establishment of initiatives focused on specific sectors of aviation like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC). In aggregate, these safety efforts have fostered a more collaborative approach with aviation stakeholders, designed to improve communication and problem- solving when addressing potential safety hazards.\14\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ United States State Safety Program (SSP), FAA, available at https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/initiatives/sms/ reference_library/AVS-210503-001-Supporting- US_State_Safety_Program.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) An SMS is a ``formal, top-down, organization wide-approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls.'' \15\ In 2015, the FAA promulgated a rule requiring part 121 commercial aviation operators to develop and implement SMSs across their organizations and outlined the basic requirements for those systems.\16\ Subsequently, and partially in response to a Congressional directive in the Aircraft Certification Reform and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260), the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) requiring SMSs for large aircraft manufacturers, part 135 air carriers, and certain general aviation air tour operators.\17\ Additionally, the FAA is in the process of issuing a final rule requiring certain airports to develop and maintain an SMS.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Safety Management System (SMS), FAA, available at https:// www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms. \16\ Safety Management Systems for Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations Certificate Holders, 80 Fed. Reg. 1,307 (Jan. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 5 & 119). \17\ Safety Management Systems, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,932 (Jan. 11, 2023) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R., 14 C.F.R. 5, 21, 91,119, 121,135), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-28583. \18\ Safety Management System for Certificated Airports, 86 Fed. Reg. 47,266 (Aug. 24, 2021) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 139), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2021-17847. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMPLIANCE PROGRAM Users of the NAS are required to adhere to all applicable laws and regulations set forth by the Federal government, including applicable directives and orders issued by the FAA. As the aviation sector has evolved and become more complex however, the FAA has come to recognize that a purely punitive strategy can potentially hinder the reporting of serious problems.\19\ Therefore, to avoid and preempt serious safety risks, the FAA has incentivized the voluntary disclosure of mistakes, even inadvertent ones, by otherwise safe operators to improve aviation safety by stimulating self-improvement, information sharing, and expediting corrections.\20\ To advance this regulatory approach, the FAA established the Compliance Program, which emphasizes a culture of voluntary adherence to safety standards and self-reporting errors in order to receive fair consideration in return, and reserving legal enforcement actions for when absolutely necessary.\21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Compliance Program, FAA, available at https://www.faa.gov/ about/initiatives/cp. \20\ Id. \21\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND SHARING Because the United States has taken a systemwide approach to ensuring aviation safety, the FAA has prioritized the ability of all users of the NAS to share in collecting and disseminating pertinent safety information.\22\ To create a process for open and free information sharing, the FAA introduced the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system.\23\ This program is a comprehensive database of safety data and analysis from government and industry sources, including data from voluntary sources.\24\ Many stakeholders from the general aviation industry, aircraft maintenance and repair stations, manufacturers and universities participate in ASIAS, and more than 99 percent of the voluntary information has been provided by United States air carriers.\25\ The FAA intends to integrate more stakeholders into ASIAS, such as the corporate/business communities, light general aviation community, and the helicopter industry, as the system continues to evolve.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ See Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, FAA (Apr. 8, 2019), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/aviation- safety-information-analysis-and-sharing-program-1. \23\ Id. \24\ Id. \25\ Id. \26\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY TEAM AND GENERAL AVIATION JOINT STEERING COMMITTEE In 1998, the FAA launched an initiative known as ``Safer Skies,'' which was intended to reduce fatal accidents by 2007.\27\ To achieve this goal, the FAA established the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) \28\ and the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC).\29\ The CAST is comprised of representatives from the FAA, NASA, and industry stakeholders, and works to reduce commercial aviation fatality risks through data collection and analysis. As part of this effort, the FAA and NASA have the goal of transitioning to a ``prognostic safety analysis.'' \30\ As the aviation system's safety rates have greatly improved over the decades, CAST has moved beyond the ``historic approach of examining past accident data to a proactive approach that focuses on detecting risk and implementing strategies before accidents or serious incidents occur.'' \31\ The safety enhancements that were implemented as a result of the CAST contributed to reducing the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83 percent between 1998 and 2008.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO/RCED-00-1, Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps To Reduce Accident Rates by 2007 (2000), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/ rced-00-111.pdf. \28\ History, Commercial Aviation Safety Team (2022), available at https://www.cast-safety.org/apex/ f?p=102:1:8843473943394::NO::P1_X:history. \29\ General Aviation Safety, FAA (July 30, 2018), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/general-aviation-safety. \30\ Commercial Aviation Safety Team (2022), available at https:// www.cast-safety.org/apex/f?p=102:1 [hereinafter CAST]. \31\ Commercial Aviation Safety Team, FAA (Sept. 3, 2021), available at https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/commercial-aviation-safety- team. \32\ CAST, supra note 30. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The GAJSC ``works to improve general aviation safety through data-driven risk reduction efforts focused on education, training, and enabling new equipment in general aviation aircraft.'' \33\ The GAJSC, which is also comprised of representatives from government and industry, utilizes a consensus-based approach and safety data analysis to develop strategies for the reduction of fatal general aviation accidents.\34\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ About Us, General Aviation J. Steering Comm. (2022), available at http://www.gajsc.org/about-us/. \34\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ALASKA AVIATION SAFETY INITIATIVE Aviation in Alaska is a vital necessity given that 82 percent of Alaskan communities are inaccessible by road.\35\ However, aviation operators in Alaska face unique challenges compared to operators in the contiguous states--due in large part to the state's challenging geography, unpredictable weather, and relative lack of aviation and air traffic control infrastructure. In 2021, the FAA initiated the Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative (FAASI).\36\ In consultation with Alaska aviation community stakeholders, the FAA developed 11 initial recommendations to address safety hazards specific to Alaska. These include enhancing weather reporting capabilities by installing Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) at airports, promoting education and outreach regarding the benefits of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out (ADS-B Out) equipage in certain airspace, and maximizing safety collaboration with operators in Alaska.\37\ Attention to Alaska's unique circumstances is not new however; previous similar efforts have fallen far short of initial expectations, necessitating Congressional oversight.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ Statewide Aviation, Alaska Dept. Of Transp. And Pub. Facilities, available at https://dot.alaska.gov/stwdav/. \36\ FAA, FY22 FAASI Progress Report (2022), available at https:// www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-09/FY22-FAASI-Progress-Report.pdf. \37\ FAA, 2022 FAASI Roadmap (2022), available at https:// www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-02/FAASI%20Roadmap.pdf. \38\ Colleen Mondor, The FAA's latest Alaska aviation safety report harkens back to a whole lot of history, The Midnight Sun, (Nov. 18, 2021), available at https://midnightsunak.com/2021/11/18/mondor-the- faas-latest-report-harkens-back-to-a-whole-lot-of-history. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION, MAINTENANCE, AND OPERATIONS The FAA issues type, production, and airworthiness certificates to aviation manufacturers in the United States and aviation products, in order to ensure the safety of the aircraft that are operated within the United States by United States entities.\39\ The FAA also issues operating certificates, pilot certificates, and other credentials to much of the industry's workforce in order to ensure an acceptable level of safety.\40\ A vast compilation of laws and regulations dictates the standards necessary for safe aircraft design, operation, and maintenance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ See Licenses & Certificates, FAA, available at https:// www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates (last updated Nov. 15, 2022). \40\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2020, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260), which made several reforms to the certification process of large passenger aircraft in response to the 2018 and 2019 Boeing 737 MAX accidents.\41\ These reforms include requiring aircraft manufacturers to implement and develop an SMS, addressing how manufacturers present pilot training standards to their customers, and requiring manufacturers to better account for realistic pilot responses to non-normal conditions when designing aircraft, among other things.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 2309. \42\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The FAA also issued a final rule in 2016, which made changes to how it certifies small airplanes typically used for general aviation purposes.\43\ This rule was developed to foster innovation and reduce costs for small plane manufacturing, allowing for updates to aircraft design that improved safety.\44\ With this rule, the FAA transitioned from certain prescriptive-based standards to performance-based standards that were more flexible and encouraged innovation.\45\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ Revision of Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes, 81 Fed. Reg. 96,572 (Dec. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 21, 23, 35, 43, 91, 121, 135), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2016-30246. \44\ Press Release, FAA, New Certification Rules for Small Airplanes Becomes Effective (Sep. 5, 2017), available at https:// www.faa.gov/newsroom/new-certification-rule-small-airplanes-becomes- effective. \45\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ISSUES WITH FOREIGN VALIDATION OF U.S. AEROSPACE PRODUCTS In 2011, the United States and European Union entered into a bilateral aviation safety agreement (BASA).\46\ This bilateral agreement facilitated cooperation on airworthiness certification of civil aviation products imported and exported between the two regions. More specifically, it was intended to (1) promote reciprocal acceptance of safety findings and approvals and (2) leverage the resources and expertise of each certification system.\47\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \46\ Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Community on Cooperation in the Regulation of Civil Aviation Safety, U.S.-E.U., Dec. 6, 2013, available at https://www.faa.gov/ aircraft/air_cert/international/bilateral_agreements/baa_basa_listing/ media/EU-US-agreement-R0A5.pdf. \47\ ``The Aviation Safety Agreement Between the US and the EC'', FAA (Aug./Sept. 2011), available at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/ repair/media/EASA_EU_roadshows.pdf [hereinafter Aviation Safety Slides]. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In January 2021, the Director-General of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Mr. Peter Ky, appeared before the European Parliament's Committee on Transport and Tourism to discuss recertification of the Boeing 737 MAX.\48\ In his presentation, Mr. Ky stated, `` . . . we [EASA] will increase our level of involvement [and] our level of independent review of U.S. projects in order to build our own safety assessments.'' \49\ The US-EU BASA was developed and agreed to based upon the existence of certification systems that produce equivalent results (even though their processes and procedures may be different).\50\ Some Congressional leaders have expressed concerns that if EASA or other countries follow through on making certification and validation process changes that conflict with BASA's tenant of reciprocity, it would jeopardize the bilateral agreements and diminish the current trust and ability for the organizations to improve global aviation safety.\51\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ Cathy Buyck, EASA To Strengthen Safety Reviews of U.S.- certified Aircraft, AINOnline (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https:// www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2021-01-25/easa- strengthen-safety-reviews-us-certified-aircraft. \49\ Id. \50\ Aviation Safety Slides, supra note 45. \51\ Letter from Ranking Member Sam Graves, House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, Ranking Member Garret Graves, House Subcommittee on Aviation to Secretary Peter Buttigieg, U.S. Dept. of Transp. (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 2021-02-11_-_letter_to_buttigieg_re_easa.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent Federal investigator of transportation accidents, including all aircraft incidents and accidents, and commercial space accidents.\52\ The NTSB makes safety recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation and others based on the findings of these investigations. While Federal agencies are required by law to respond to all NTSB recommendations, the NTSB does not have regulatory authority to require agencies to adopt these recommendations.\53\ Additionally, the NTSB oversees pilot certification appeals \54\ and fulfills the important role of providing assistance to victims of transportation accidents and their families.\55\ The FAA and other stakeholders will often consider studies and recommendations of the NTSB to improve aviation safety. A recent example occurred when the FAA issued the proposed rule requiring commuter, charter, and air tour operators, as well as certain manufacturers to develop and maintain an SMS.\56\ This proposed rule was prompted in part by the NTSB issuing recommendations for aviation stakeholders to institute an SMS.\57\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1131. \53\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1135. \54\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1133. \55\ 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1136. \56\ Safety Management Systems, 88 Fed. Reg. 1,932 (Jan. 11, 2023) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R., 14 C.F.R. 5, 21, 91,119, 121,135), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-28583. \57\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The NTSB has several outstanding safety recommendations which have not been resolved, such as a recommendation to the FAA to require cockpit voice recorders (CVR) with a minimum 25- hour recording capacity to be installed on all newly manufactured aircraft.\58\ The NTSB noted in a 2018 report that 34 of their investigations since 2002 would have benefitted from a 25-hour capacity CVR had it been installed.\59\ This number has increased to 40 as of January 18, 2023.\60\ Additionally, the NTSB has made a number of other recommendations to improve aviation safety, including the installation of cockpit image recorders in commercial aircraft \61\ and establishment of a structured flight data monitoring program for Part 135 charter operators.\62\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-18-030 (2018), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-18-030-031.pdf. \59\ NTSB, ASR-1804, Aviation Safety Recommendation Report-- Extended Duration of Cockpit Voice Recorders (2018), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ ASR1804.pdf. \60\ E-mail from NTSB Gov't and Industry Affairs staff to Subcomm. on Aviation staff, (January 18, 2023, 10:52 a.m. EST) (on file with the Committee). \61\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-15-007 and A-15-008 (2014), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-15- 001-008.pdf. \62\ NTSB, Safety Recommendation A-16-035 (2016), available at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A-16-034-042.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. WITNESSES LMr. Dave Boulter, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety (Acting), FAA LThe Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Chair, NTSB LCapt. Jason Ambrosi, President, ALPA LMr. Pete Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, GAMA LMr. Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, NBAA LMs. Kerry Buckley, PhD, Vice President, Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation FAA REAUTHORIZATION: ENHANCING AMERICA'S GOLD STANDARD IN AVIATION SAFETY ---------- TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2023 House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sam Graves (Chairman of the committee) presiding. Mr. Graves of Missouri. I call the hearing to order. I would ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's hearing. And, without objection, it is so ordered. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to give an opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM GRAVES OF MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Mr. Graves of Missouri. Today, the committee obviously formally kicks off our work on the Federal Aviation Administration's reauthorization. A strong bipartisan reauthorization is my top legislative priority, and I look forward to working with Ranking Member Larsen to complete a bill on time. As a professional pilot and an active user of the system, I am extremely proud of our aviation system, including its safety record. In this committee, there continues to be a bipartisan commitment to safety and maintaining U.S. leadership and credibility as the gold standard for aviation safety. In 11 of the past 13 years, there have been no passenger fatalities on scheduled domestic passenger flights, despite the fact that passenger ridership has increased by 50 percent between 2002 and 2019, before the pandemic. General aviation is safer, with the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents trending downwards since 2000. Congress and the FAA, in partnership with industry and with labor and the traveling public, have fought to make air travel as safe as possible. And our safety record and safety culture are testaments to that. However, recently there have been some incidents that reemphasize why getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is so critical. On January 13, we had a runway incursion that occurred at JFK International Airport with two passenger planes nearly running into each other as one crossed an active runway. And just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a cargo plane was cleared to land on the same runway where a passenger aircraft was beginning its takeoff roll. It shows that even following the safest decade in our history, our aviation system is clearly in need of some urgent attention. As Mr. Boulter says in his testimony, ``complacency and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture.'' The previous conventional wisdom for regulating safety always focused on addressing concerns after an aviation accident. Now, the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen. In addition, the NTSB, National Transportation Safety Board, has several open safety recommendations that I think warrant review. The committee is going to be reviewing all such recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB as part of this FAA reauthorization. In conclusion, I want to assure you all, particularly those of us who are here today who have lost loved ones to aviation accidents, we all share the common goal of enhancing the United States gold standard in aviation safety, and that safety remains our top priority. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can further improve safety as we craft the bill this year. And I now recognize Ranking Member Larsen for his opening statement. [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Today, the Committee formally kicks off its work on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) reauthorization. A strong bipartisan reauthorization is my top legislative priority, and I look forward to working with Ranking Member Larsen to complete a bill on time. As a professional pilot and active user of the system I am extremely proud of our aviation system, including its safety record. In this Committee, there continues to be a bipartisan commitment to safety and maintaining U.S. leadership and credibility as the gold standard for aviation safety. In 11 of the past 13 years, there have been no passenger fatalities on scheduled domestic passenger flights--despite passenger enplanements increasing by 50 percent between 2002 and 2019. General aviation is safer, with the number of fatal and nonfatal accidents trending downward since the year 2000. Congress and the FAA, in partnership with industry, labor, and the travelling public, have fought to make air travel as safe as possible. Our safety record and safety culture are testaments to that. However, recently there have been incidents that reemphasize why getting an FAA reauthorization done on time is critical. On January 13th, a runway incursion occurred at JFK International Airport when two passenger planes nearly collided as one crossed an active runway. And just this past weekend, at Austin International Airport, a cargo plane was attempting to land on the same runway where a passenger plane was beginning to take off. It shows that even following the safest decade in our history, our aviation system is clearly in need of urgent attention. As Mr. Boulter says in his testimony, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture. The previous conventional wisdom for regulating safety focused on addressing concerns after aviation accidents. Now, the FAA seeks to mitigate risks before accidents happen. In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has several open safety recommendations that warrant review. The Committee will be reviewing all such recommendations while reauthorizing the NTSB as part of the FAA bill. In conclusion, I want to assure you all, particularly those with us here today who have lost loved ones to aviation accidents, that we all share the common goal of enhancing the United States' gold standard in aviation safety, and that safety remains our top priority. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on how we can further improve safety as we craft this year's bill. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, and good morning. And thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling today's hearing on aviation safety to kick off our efforts to develop and pass the next Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill. In this hearing, we will evaluate different policies, programs, and technologies that have led to the U.S. becoming a global leader in aviation safety and what improvements still need to be made. According to the FAA, commercial aviation fatalities in the U.S. have decreased by 95 percent over the last 25 years. While this downward trend clearly demonstrates the great strides made in U.S. aviation safety and should be applauded, clearly more work needs to be done. For instance, just last month, the FAA's safety notice system, also known as Notice to Air Missions, or NOTAM system, failed when a contractor inadvertently deleted a file on a NOTAM database, leaving the FAA to ground flights nationwide. Though the outage was initially caused by human error, the system's lack of redundancies and outdated technology were what allowed it to happen in the first place. While the FAA is in the midst a multiyear NOTAM modernization effort, we do need to strengthen the IT infrastructure that supports the National Airspace System. That is why I, along with Chairman Graves, supported the recent passage of Representative Stauber and DeSaulnier's NOTAM Improvement Act, to create a task force to evaluate and recommend improvements in the NOTAM system. Aircraft certification has also been a priority of this committee for the last several years. In the wake of the tragic Boeing 737 MAX accidents and crashes, this committee conducted a nearly 2-year investigation into the design, development, and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The results led to Congress passing the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act in 2020, to restore the integrity of the FAA's aircraft certification process and make air travel safer. I look forward to hearing from FAA Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Dave Boulter, on the status of these key reforms, the agency's progress, and any reasons for delay. Also of particular interest is how the new airspace entrants, such as advanced air mobility aircraft and drones, will integrate safely into the NAS. Manufacturers and operators need timely guidance and regulatory certainty from the FAA to plan for and meet the agency's new certification and operating requirements. And finally, aviation safety issues are not limited to just the FAA. It requires multiple industries and agencies to coordinate. For instance, just a year ago, the nationwide deployment of 5G wireless rightfully raised aviation safety concerns over potential interference with aircraft radio altimeters. Due to the actions of this committee, the FAA, and aviation stakeholders, the telecoms finally came to the table and coordinated with the FAA, the NTIA, and the FCC to develop a plan allowing for the deployment of 5G while maintaining aviation safety. A little later I will distribute the actual meanings of those acronyms, but to save time, I won't read them out loud here. In fact, the FAA is briefing this committee on its 5G efforts later today. The best way to address these and other critical aviation safety issues is through a bipartisan, long-term FAA reauthorization bill. The 2018 law was the first significant multiyear authorization since 2012, and the first 5-year authorization since 1982. According to the FAA, the signing of that long-term bill freed the agency from the uncertainty of more short-term extensions and authorized the reliable, predictable funding that the FAA needed to invest in critical priorities. I look forward to working with Chairman Graves and the members of this committee to ensure the FAA has the necessary funding and long-term certainty it needs. And I am glad to see the witnesses that we have today. I look forward to the testimony from all the witnesses. As this committee considers the upcoming FAA reauthorization, we remain committed to ensuring the highest level of aviation safety here in the U.S. to continue to be the global gold standard. So, thank you. I look forward to tackling these issues to ensure the safety of the flying public. [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Graves, for calling today's hearing on Aviation Safety--to kick off our efforts to develop and pass the next Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill. In this hearing, we will evaluate the different policies, programs and technologies that have led to the U.S. becoming a global leader in aviation safety and what improvements still need to be made. According to the FAA, commercial aviation fatalities in the U.S. have decreased by 95 percent over the last 25 years. While this downward trend clearly demonstrates the great strides made in U.S. aviation safety and should be applauded, more work still needs to be done. For instance, just last month, the FAA's safety notice system, also known as the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system, failed when a contractor inadvertently deleted a file on a NOTAM database, leading the FAA to ground flights nationwide. Though the outage was initially caused by human error, the system's lack of redundancies and outdated technology were what allowed it to happen in the first place. While the FAA is in the midst of a multi-year NOTAM modernization effort, we must do more to strengthen the IT infrastructure that supports the national airspace system (NAS). That is why I, along with Chairman Graves, supported the recent House passage of Representative Stauber and DeSaulnier's NOTAM Improvement Act, to create a task force to evaluate and recommend improvements to the NOTAM system. Aircraft certification has also been a priority of this committee for the last several years. In the wake of the tragic Boeing 737 MAX accidents, this committee conducted a nearly two-year investigation into the design, development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The results led Congress to pass the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act in 2020, to restore the integrity of the FAA's aircraft certification process and make air travel safer. I look forward to hearing from FAA Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Dave Boulter, on the status of these key reforms, the agency's progress, and any reasons for delay. Also of particular interest, is how new airspace entrants, such as advanced air mobility (AAM) aircraft and drones, will integrate safely into the NAS. Manufacturers and operators need timely guidance and regulatory certainty from the FAA to plan for and meet the agency's new certification and operating requirements. Finally, aviation safety issues are not limited to just the FAA; it often requires multiple federal agencies and industries to coordinate. For instance, just one year ago, the nationwide deployment of 5G wireless rightfully raised aviation safety concerns over potential interference with aircraft radio altimeters. Due to the actions of this committee, FAA and aviation stakeholders, AT&T and Verizon finally came to the table and coordinated with the FAA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to develop a plan allowing for the safe deployment of 5G while also maintaining aviation safety. In fact, the FAA is briefing this committee on its 5G efforts later today. The best way to address these and other critical aviation safety issues is through a bipartisan, long-term FAA reauthorization bill. The 2018 FAA reauthorization law was the first significant multi- year reauthorization since 2012, and the first five-year reauthorization since 1982. According to the FAA, ``the signing of that long term bill, freed the agency from the uncertainty of more short-term extensions and authorized the reliable, predictable funding the FAA needed to invest in critical priorities.'' I look forward to working with Chairman Graves and the members of this committee to ensure the FAA has the necessary funding and long- term certainty it needs. Finally, I'm glad to see the range of witnesses we have today. We have the FAA and NTSB, who are responsible for ensuring safe aviation and commercial space operations, and representation from aviation labor, manufacturers, operators, and technical experts. I look forward to hearing your testimony. As this committee considers the upcoming FAA reauthorization, we remain committed to ensuring the highest level of aviation safety. Thank you and I look forward to tackling these issues to ensure the safety of the flying public. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Rick. Due to the significance of today's kickoff hearing, I do want to recognize the ranking member and chairman of the subcommittee for opening statements, too. So, Representative Graves. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARRET GRAVES OF LOUISIANA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this timely hearing on aviation safety. First of all, if you look back over the past decade, we just had the safest decade in aviation history where, let's be clear, the goal is zero deaths, but in the last 10 years, we have had three fatalities on scheduled passenger airlines as compared to the previous decade--about 140. Now you look at what is happening in the news today, whether it is incursions and close calls, you have seen the failure of the air traffic control system, you have seen problems with airports and airlines, information systems including staffing and reservation systems. We need to all be very concerned about what is going on because, let's keep in mind, what we have on the horizon is a fundamental change or transformation in our aviation system with the entrance of various new technologies into the National Airspace System. We have to make sure that we are thinking ahead, making sure that the regulatory structure, the organizational structure of the FAA is one that is able to facilitate safely, facilitate safely these new entrants into the market. On the general aviation side, we have continued to see progress as well with roughly over 100,000 flight-hours, I believe, over the last decade. Preliminary data shows that we have had 1.07 fatalities. If you look in previous decades, it is 1.35 and 1.49. So, we are certainly moving in the right direction in regard to commercial and general aviation safety. Let me say it again. Coming back to what we have seen in just recent months, we all need to be alarmed by what is happening. We need to ensure that we not just can continue this trend in aviation safety on the commercial and the GA side, but that we can also continue to be the country that facilitates new technology and entrants into the market in a way that does not hinder the entrepreneurs that are investing in new technologies. Right now, the alarm bells should be going off across the aviation industry. Our system is stretched and stressed to capacity. Demand is projected to go nowhere but up. Exacerbating that, we are well aware of the increased demand that we are going to see with pilots, with A&P, and other types of aviation jobs or workforce. And we need to make sure, again, that we are able to be proactive and meet the growing demands. Part of that demand is going to be driven by new entrants. In the next 10 years, aerospace will involve an ever increasing number of drones; the introduction of electric aircraft, including electric vertical takeoff and landing, eVTOL; the reintroduction of civil supersonic aircraft; and expanded use of commercial space transportation vehicles. I wish my buddy, Mr. Babin, were here to hear that. Our regulatory organizational structure must adapt if we are going to safely integrate new entrants into the market. Safety doesn't mean eliminating risk entirely. The old joke about the safest airplane is the one that doesn't fly still applies. Our role and the FAA's role is to manage risk and ensure safety, but also ensure that we can continue to reap the incredible benefits of aviation and flight. Our global leadership in aviation begins with global leadership in aviation safety. And the only way to maintain our gold standard is to continue to enhance it. I am going to say it again. The goal is zero. We have an opportunity to rise to the moment and address the root causes of these recent incidents and safely integrate new operators, all while ensuring that our safety culture is as robust as possible. The aviation system is telling us something is wrong, and we need to listen. The only way we can ensure safety is by being proactive in our upcoming FAA reauthorization bill and fixing issues before they become problems. I look forward to working with the committee members and our witnesses on provisions in the 2018 FAA reauthorization bill that, let's make note, is still not fully implemented, to ensure America continues to lead the world in innovation and aviation safety. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the hearing, and I yield back. [Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves of Louisiana, Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this timely hearing on aviation safety. We just had the safest decade in aviation history. In the last 10 years, we've had three fatalities on scheduled passenger airlines as compared to the previous decade--about 140. On the general aviation side, we've continued to see progress as well, with a preliminary average fatality rate of 1.07 death per 100,000 flight hours, down from 1.35 and 1.49 in the last two decades, respectively. Now let's be clear--the goal is zero fatalities. Despite these improvements, alarm bells should be going off across the aviation industry. Just look at what's happening in the news today: runway incursions and close calls, failures in the air traffic control system, problems with airports and airlines' information systems (including staffing and reservation systems). Our system is stretched and stressed to capacity, and demand is projected to go nowhere but up. We're all well aware of the increased demand that we're going to see with pilots, mechanics, as well as other positions within the aviation workforce, and we need to make sure that we're able to be proactive about meeting growing demands because there are fundamental transformations on the horizon for the National airspace system. In the next 10 years, the aerospace industry will involve an ever- increasing number of drones, the introduction of electric aircraft, including electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL), the reintroduction of civil supersonic aircraft, and the expanded use of commercial space transportation vehicles. We must build on our record of improving aviation safety while being the country that facilitates new technologies and entrants into the market in a way that does not hinder the entrepreneurs that are investing in these new technologies. Our regulatory organizational structure must adapt if we're going to safely integrate new entrants into the market. Safety doesn't mean eliminating risk entirely. The old joke about ``the safest airplane is the one that doesn't fly'' still applies. Our role, and the FAA's role, is to manage risk and ensure safety while reaping the incredible benefits of flight. Our global leadership in aviation begins with global leadership in aviation safety. And the only way to maintain our gold standard is to continue to enhance it. I'm going to say it again-- the goal is zero fatalities. We have an opportunity to rise to the moment and address the root causes of these recent incidents and safely integrate new operators, all while ensuring that our safety culture is as robust as possible. The aviation system is telling us something's wrong, and we need to listen. The only way we can ensure safety is by being proactive in our upcoming FAA reauthorization bill and fixing issues before they become problems. I look forward to working with the Committee members and our witnesses on provisions in the 2018 FAA reauthorization bill, which is still not fully implemented, to ensure America continues to lead the world in innovation and aviation safety. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the hearing, and I yield back. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Mr. Cohen. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE COHEN OF TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I thank you and the ranking member for holding this important hearing today. I am deeply honored to serve as the ranking member of this Aviation Subcommittee and working with Chairman Garret Graves to formulate our next FAA reauthorization bill. In 2018, the FAA reauthorization law was passed with Chairman Shuster. Congress included more than 90 safety-focused provisions, ranging from flight attendant fatigue to secondary flight deck barriers on passenger aircraft, to the integration of uncrewed aircraft systems into our National Airspace System. It also included another important provision, that I authored, to require the FAA to establish minimum dimensions for passenger seats on airplanes to protect the safety of the flying public. Shockingly, even though the FAA was congressionally mandated to act on this provision within 1 year, the FAA did not even begin cabin evacuation testing until late November and December of 2019, well after the 1-year deadline. And during its testing, they limited their study to able-bodied individuals between the ages of 18 and 60. This means lap children, seniors, people with disabilities, non-English speakers, larger individuals, and more were not included, far from a representative sample of people who are on an airplane and would need to evacuate. The FAA itself acknowledged that the test relied on able- bodied adult subjects under the age of 60, and the result provided, quote, ``useful but not necessarily definitive information regarding the effects of seat dimensions on safe evacuations for all populations.'' It was flawed, and it was congressionally mandated to conduct a study, and it should have done an appropriate one. In August, the FAA finally initiated a public comment period to assist in its determination on whether minimum seat dimensions are necessary. The FAA received over 26,000 comments from the flying public, the majority of which articulated the miserably dreadful experiences these small seats provide. Probably the most miserable experience most Americans have in terms of comfort is when they are on an airplane. Mr. Garret Graves is right, it was the safest year yet. It was also the most uncomfortable decade. As we begin our work in our next reauthorization bill, it is imperative that this issue be reexamined. That is why Senator Duckworth and I will introduce our bill, the Emergency Vacating of Aircraft Cabin Act, a.k.a. the EVAC Act, the E-V-A- C. This bill would ensure that the aircraft evacuation standards do a better job of taking real life conditions into account to ensure all passengers can safely evacuate in an emergency. Our bill is supported by a wide variety of stakeholders such as AARP, Captain Sully Sullenberger, the Association of Flight Attendants, the Allied Pilots Association, and more. This committee should also look at establishing a moratorium on further seat shrinkage on airplanes and requiring the FAA to reconduct its testing before it promulgates a rule that could lead to even smaller seats. I look forward to continuing to work on this issue with Senator Blumenthal. In addition to this important passenger safety issue, I look forward to working on some other safety issues: Improving conditions for passengers with disabilities, including for individuals who use powered wheelchairs; updating the Air Carriers Access Act to close the service gap in air travel for passengers with disabilities; establishing airplane temperature standards on flights for passengers and crewmembers alike. How many times have we been freezing on airplanes? Implementing a longstanding NTSB recommendation, Jim Hall decades ago made this proposal and still says how important it is--and it is--addressing deficiencies in commercial aviation black box requirements. They can be made to float and be recovered without having to go to the bottom of the oceans, as we have had to do in other situations. Ensuring outdoor concerts are protected by the same temporary flight restrictions as sporting events and preventing air rage incidents is giving the FAA the necessary tools to enforce relevant civil and criminal penalties. While aviation safety has continued to improve over the last decade, we shall remain vigilant and ensure we consider all our airspace users as we craft the next reauthorization bills. Yes, we only had three deaths in the United States, but we had lots of deaths in Southeast Asia that were caused by an American company that built airplanes that were probably responsible for those crashes and the loss of those lives. I look forward to hearing from our esteemed witnesses today, and I thank you all for being here. And look forward to the next bill. I yield back. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I would ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements be included in the record. And, without objection, that is so ordered. And since your written testimony is going to be made a part of the record, the committee asks that you try to limit yourself to 5 minutes. And, with that, our first witness is Mr. David Boulter, who is the Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the FAA. Mr. Boulter. TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. BOULTER, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; CAPT. JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; PETER J. BUNCE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION; ED BOLEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION; AND KERRY BUCKLEY, Ph.D., VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR ADVANCED AVIATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, MITRE CORPORATION TESTIMONY OF DAVID H. BOULTER, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Mr. Boulter. Thank you, and good morning. Chair Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am David Boulter. I am the Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the Federal Aviation Administration, a role I have held for almost a year. During my career, I have been fortunate to serve in numerous aviation roles, both in industry and with commercial air carriers, and in Government. Over the past 25 years, my Government service includes positions in the FAA as an aviation safety inspector, a senior representative in Afghanistan, director of operations for multiple flight operations within the agency, and an executive for the FAA's flight program. My permanent position is the executive director of flight standards. I believe my breadth of real-world experience has given me a commonsense approach that focuses on safety and constantly moving forward. In my mind, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to safety. In December 2020, Congress passed the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, with more than 100 provisions for the FAA to implement. I thank the committee for its leadership in passing this important legislation, and we have completed more than half of its directives. The important work we have accomplished includes strengthening oversight of manufacturers that have delegated authority through the Organization Designation Authorization, ODA, program; instituting the Voluntary Safety Reporting program for FAA safety employees; and recently issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that would require aircraft manufacturers, on-demand and for-hire--part 135--and air tour operators to implement a safety management system. We remain focused on implementation of this legislation and continue to make significant strides in fulfilling its requirements. I also want to thank the families of the victims of Lion Air flight 610, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, and Continental flight 3407 for their tireless advocacy. The work on behalf of your loved ones has improved aviation safety for everyone. In recent months, the agency has made important headway in meeting additional mandated obligations aimed at improving safety and moved a number of rules forward. I am proud to say that in my 1-year tenure, we have published seven aviation safety rulemaking actions stemming from congressional direction. The commercial aviation system, as you have heard earlier, in the United States currently operates at an unprecedented level of safety, but we do not take that for granted. We achieved this safety record because we have made concerted effort to continually evolve how we approach safety oversight, both in detecting risks and responding to risks identified. The key to this approach is a commitment to sharing data through open and transparent safety culture to detect risk and address problems before accidents occur. We approach each day knowing we have big shoes to fill from the day before. Our mission is continuous improvement in safety, even as we see significant changes on the horizon to how people and packages might travel by air in our busiest cities and across the country. The FAA is rising to that occasion. We are taking steps to establish a regulatory framework that enables innovation and manages the identified risks commensurate with the desired operations. This ensures that all new entrants will benefit from 120 years of lessons learned since the Wright brothers made their first controlled flight. I would like to acknowledge my fellow panel members. I am encouraged that you have asked representatives from a wide range of aviation interests to speak today. As we all know, aviation safety is a team sport, and we all share the mutual goal of making the world's safest mode of transportation even safer. While we all have specific roles to play, we understand the solemn trust that the public has placed in all of us. Today, I want to briefly share some of the actions we are taking to fulfill our safety mission, which extends from general aviation to commercial and air carrier operations. Evolving our regulatory structure is necessary to enable new users of the airspace and to support innovation and new commercial operations with aircraft and technologies that are evolving at a pace not previously seen in our industry. Sustaining the agency's safety record will be dependent upon the ability to be agile in our regulations yet firm in our enforcement. And although we recognize the need to adapt new technologies, we must also manage risk and be deliberative when necessary. The FAA is using modern tools and philosophies to develop a regulatory environment that ensures aviation safety remains paramount. It is an exciting time in aviation, and we have a lot to look forward to. This also means there is no shortage of work ahead. Finally, we will continue to engage with the aviation community, our labor partners, and industry stakeholders on addressing the safety and sustainability challenges that face our industry. Our collaborative efforts with longstanding groups like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee, and the U.S. Helicopter Safety Team help us achieve our collective safety mission and continue to push the envelope in finding ways to enhance safety for all stakeholders. We look forward to continued support from the committee and subcommittee on maintaining the safest aviation system in the world during this time of rapid innovation. Thank you, sir. [Mr. Boulter's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration Chair Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am David Boulter, and I serve as the acting associate administrator for aviation safety at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a role I have held for almost a year. During my career, I have been fortunate to serve in numerous aviation roles both in industry with commercial air carriers and in government. Over the past 25 years, my government service includes positions in the FAA as an aviation safety inspector, director of operations for multiple legacy FAA flight programs, senior FAA representative in Afghanistan, and executive for the FAA's Flight Program. My permanent position is the executive director of flight standards. I believe the breadth of my real-world experience has given me a common-sense approach that focuses on safety--and on constantly moving forward. In my mind, complacency and stagnation are equal threats to a safety culture. In December 2020, Congress included the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act, with more than 100 provisions for the FAA to implement, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021. I thank the Committee for its leadership in passing this important legislation, and we have completed more than half of its directives. I also want to emphasize the efforts of the families of the victims of the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. This legislation would not have been possible without your tireless advocacy on behalf of your loved ones. The important work we have accomplished includes strengthening oversight of manufacturers that have delegated authority through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, instituting the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program for FAA safety employees, and recently issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that would require aircraft manufacturers, on-demand and for-hire operations (14 CFR Part 135), and air tour operators to implement a safety management system. We remain focused on implementation of this legislation and continue to make significant strides in fulfilling its requirements. In recent months, the agency has made important headway in meeting additional statutory obligations aimed at improving safety and has moved a number of those rulemaking projects forward. I am proud to say that in my one-year tenure, we have published seven aviation safety rulemaking actions stemming from congressional direction. At all times, the safety of the traveling public has been our top priority. The commercial aviation system in the United States currently operates at an unprecedented level of safety, but we do not take that for granted. We achieved this safety record because we have made a concerted effort to evolve in how we approach safety oversight--both in detecting risks and in responding to the risks identified. Key to this approach is a commitment to sharing data through an open and transparent safety culture to detect risks and address problems before accidents occur. Our mission is continuous improvement in safety--even as we see significant changes on the horizon to how people and packages might travel by air in our busiest cities and across the country. The FAA is rising to that occasion. We are taking steps to establish a regulatory framework that enables innovation and manages the identified risks commensurate with desired operations. This ensures that new entrant aircraft and operators--including those seeking to conduct advanced air mobility (AAM) operations--will benefit from 120 years of lessons learned since the Wright brothers made their first controlled flight. I would like to acknowledge my fellow panel members. I am encouraged that you asked representatives from a wide range of aviation interests to speak today. As we all know, aviation safety is a team effort, and we all share the mutual goal of making the world's safest mode of transportation even safer. While we all have specific roles to play, we understand the solemn trust that the public has placed in us. I think it is important to take a moment to recognize National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chair, Jennifer Homendy, and the important collaborative relationship between our two agencies. We work jointly on accident investigations, with the FAA providing support with real-time information, technical data, transportation to accident scenes, and aviation safety inspector/accident investigator support and cooperation. We also collaborate on safety priorities, to include FAA responses to NTSB safety recommendations. Since 2011, the FAA has annually closed more recommendations than it has received, and the number of open recommendations for FAA (222) is at its lowest point in more than two decades. The FAA takes the NTSB's role seriously and devotes a tremendous amount of time and attention to addressing their recommendations. Safety Highlights Today, I want to briefly share some of the actions we are taking to fulfill our safety mission, which extends from general aviation to commercial and air carrier operations. Evolving our regulatory structure is necessary to enable new users of the airspace, and support innovation and new commercial operations with aircraft and technologies that are evolving at a pace not previously seen in our industry. Sustaining the agency's safety record will be dependent upon the ability to be agile in our regulations, yet firm in our enforcement. Although we recognize the need to adapt to new technologies and enable their use, we must also manage risk and be deliberative in our decisions. The FAA is using modern tools and philosophies and incorporating performance-based regulation where possible to develop a regulatory environment that ensures aviation safety remains paramount. We have several recent examples of rulemaking that demonstrate our continued commitment to improving safety and providing flexibility to users of the National Airspace System (NAS). In November, we issued two final rules. The first requires a commercial balloon pilot to hold a valid second-class medical certificate when flying for compensation or hire (other than flight instruction)--a standard that aligns with what every other commercial pilot must hold. The second final rule requires applicants to demonstrate the integrity of the airplane structure in the presence of pilot-commanded rudder pedal reversals. Adopting the new load condition will protect the airplane from excessive loads on the vertical stabilizer. In December, we published a proposed rule that would revise standards for the design of proposed transport category airplanes. These standards would reduce the likelihood of potentially catastrophic risks due to undetected failures. For example, the changes would improve the likelihood that an operator discovers a failure before it develops into an unsafe condition. This would allow the FAA to address, and require an applicant to address, the more integrated nature of modern transport airplane systems. Beginning last month, flight attendants are now guaranteed additional and uninterruptible rest that aligns with what pilots receive, ensuring a crew is not fatigued when they report for duty. In January we also extended the duration of aircraft registration certificates from three to seven years--a benefit to all aircraft owners and the FAA. Both of these final rules were prompted by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. While these past few months have been busy, we have fully staffed additional rulemaking projects and expect great progress in 2023. The resulting rules will have important implications for certain aircraft, operations, and pilots as we look to enhance the safety of existing operations, continue to normalize certain aspects of operations with unmanned aircraft, and integrate new entrant aircraft into our national airspace. We issued a proposed rule for secondary flight deck barriers on certain airplanes used in commercial service last fall, took public comment, and are working to address comments and finalize the rule. This rule would protect the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is open. We have a project that will propose to modernize special airworthiness certification of piloted aircraft as well as a project that would define a regulatory process for determining airworthiness for certain unmanned aircraft. We are also developing rules to enable unmanned aircraft to be flown beyond visual line of sight. Finally, we have a special federal aviation regulation on powered-lift--or SFAR--for the integration of certain AAM aircraft into the NAS. This rule would enable a path forward for qualifying pilots as well as determining which operating rules apply to powered-lift. This proposal is a critical step for the United States to usher in the next era of aviation. Other Safety Initiatives Our work to improve aviation safety does not stop at our borders. As Congress has directed in section 243 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, we continue our efforts as a global leader in aviation, and much of the globe is watching in anticipation of our plans for integrating new entrant aircraft into the NAS and the desired operations envisioned by manufacturers and future operators. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Personnel Training and Licensing Panel is tackling pilot qualification for AAM aircraft and the U.S. has been leading this activity. At the ICAO Assembly this past September, the FAA proposed that ICAO establish an advisory group that would connect all aspects of the AAM ecosystem as the world works to enable this industry. The proposal was well-received and work has begun to stand up a study group. We look forward to supporting that effort. In addition to our important work on rules and the development of international consensus standards, we would be remiss to not mention how we support the aviation industry through the issuance of guidance and information to support rule implementation and operations by all airspace users. The FAA published one of the highly anticipated advisory circulars on flightpath management in November. This document provides both guidance and recommended practices for operators to implement operational procedures and training for managing the airplane's flight path, which includes manual flight operations and managing automated systems. Addressing pilot overreliance on automation through this guidance remains safety-critical. The foundation of its content originated from recommendations from our Air Carrier Training Aviation Rulemaking Committee and is a wonderful example of how industry and government can come together to address a challenge and achieve a common goal--enhancing safety. In October, we published a revision to our guidance that supports recreational operations of unmanned aircraft and aligns with the statutory permissions afforded to those flyers by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. Another huge accomplishment was the consolidation and updating of six-related advisory circulars into a single Aviation Weather Handbook that was published in November. This technical reference streamlines pilot access to all of the FAA's weather documentation and is designed to support everyone who operates in the NAS--from recreational pilots to commercial pilots and dispatchers. Having current technical information about weather is a critical component to safe flying and pilot decision making and it is important that the FAA continue to support airspace users with handbooks like this. Moving Forward It is an exciting time in aviation, and we have a lot to look forward to--this also means there is no shortage of work ahead of us. I am extremely proud of the work our staff is doing to address the breadth of aviation safety work we have in front of us. With innovation, it is important we continue to develop and train our workforce so we can continue to meet the regulatory needs of this industry and our safety mission. We are executing workforce strategies to do this while also onboarding diverse talent with the right expertise to strengthen our workforce. The development and expansion of the professional aviation workforce in general is also critical to our industry, and we are proud to promote exciting careers like being an aviation mechanic or a pilot through Aviation Workforce Development grants. Finally, we will continue to engage with the aviation community, our labor partners, and industry stakeholders, on addressing the safety and sustainability challenges that face our industry through our established committees and outreach events. Our collaborative efforts with long-standing groups like the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC), and the U.S. Helicopter Safety Team (USHST), help us achieve our collective safety mission and continue to push the envelope in finding ways to enhance safety for all stakeholders. Through the more recent establishment of the Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) team a year ago, we partnered with aviation stakeholders to find a safe and practical path to eliminate the use of leaded aviation fuel by no later than 2030 without adversely affecting the existing piston-engine fleet. Thank you for this opportunity to share information on some of our most important work. We look forward to continued support from the committee and subcommittee on maintaining the safest aviation system in the world during this time of rapid innovation. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Next, we have the Honorable Jennifer Homendy, who is Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board. Thanks for being here. TESTIMONY OF HON. JENNIFER L. HOMENDY, CHAIR, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ranking Member Larsen and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the NTSB's priorities with respect to aviation safety. This weekend will mark the 14th anniversary of the crash of Colgan Air 3407. And I want to recognize the families who have worked so hard to champion safety to avoid more tragedies. As you know, the NTSB investigates every civil aviation accident in the United States, participates in over 400 foreign investigations each year, and maintains all civil aviation accident data. In the 14 years since Colgan, there have been only 2 other years in which there was a passenger fatality as a result of an accident involving a U.S. air carrier. In that time, the number of deaths in the U.S. due to all aviation accidents have decreased by roughly one-third. This is an incredible safety record. And it is a testament to the efforts of this committee, Congress, the FAA, industry, labor, and families to take the lessons learned from our independent investigations to advocate for and make changes to improve safety. Yet tragedies still occur. We still investigate over 1,000 accidents every year. And we also see incidents like the near collision in Austin this past weekend, which could have been catastrophic. It is important the FAA reauthorization consider these challenges and how to meet them safely in general aviation, charter, commuter, and air medical operations, and for large passenger and cargo air carriers. My written statement details several areas where safety improvements are needed, but I want to briefly highlight a couple of priorities. First is the safety of commercial aviation operations governed under part 91, which carry paying passengers but are not subject to the same or similar standards as other commercial operations. This includes some air tour and sightseeing flights, parachute jump flights, and living history flights. We have investigated fatal accidents in these operations from Vermont to Hawaii, in Texas, New York, California, and Connecticut, impacting some of your States and your constituents. We are reviewing the FAA's recent actions to require safety management systems for part 135 operations and part 91 air tours. Their proposed rulemaking is a major step forward, but we remain concerned that other commercial operations aren't included, meaning not all paying members of the public on these types of flights will be protected. We should take this opportunity to strengthen safety for all passengers. Second, I want to thank the committee, and particularly Congressman Stauber and Congressman DeSaulnier, for your leadership in addressing problems with NOTAMs. This includes those identified in the 2017 incident where an Air Canada flight almost landed on four other planes on a taxiway in San Francisco. Another issue in that incident was the cockpit voice recorder was overwritten before it could be removed. We continue to have investigations, such as the incident last month at JFK and now Austin where the data isn't available to our investigators due to the current time limitation. We have recommended that the FAA require new and existing aircraft have 25-hour recorders that is consistent with standards of our European counterparts and adopted by ICAO, rather than the current 2-hour recording that is the standard in the United States. The ability to have accident data from cockpit audio, as well as image recorders, is critical for making sure that we, operators and flightcrew members, know why accidents and incidents occur and how to prevent them. Finally, emerging technologies already here and on the horizon. Commercial space, uncrewed aircraft, new and different power sources like batteries, and different kinds of fuels, bring new complex challenges that we must be prepared for. The NTSB will stand ready as always to investigate accidents and make recommendations to improve safety. I trust that as the committee works on FAA reauthorization, that you will consider these issues and that you will also consider the resources necessary to support the independent investigations of the NTSB and the mission we are able to carry out. To that end, we look forward to also working with you on NTSB reauthorization. The purpose of the mandate you have given us to conduct independent investigations is to improve safety. Investments made in the NTSB are investments in maintaining America's gold standard for safety. Thank you. [Ms. Homendy's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Good morning, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify before you today regarding America's place as the global leader in aviation safety. As you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in other modes of transportation-- highway, rail, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the probable cause of the events we investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we conduct transportation safety research and special investigations, and coordinate the resources of the federal government and other organizations to assist victims and their family members who have been impacted by major transportation disasters. We also serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the United States Coast Guard, and adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA. The NTSB does not have authority to promulgate operating standards, nor do we certificate organizations, individuals, or equipment. Instead, we advance safety through our investigations and recommendations, which are issued to any entity that can improve safety. Our goal is to identify issues and advocate for safety improvements that, if implemented, would prevent injuries and save lives. Over the last several decades, the critical efforts of operators, manufacturers, labor unions, private aircraft owners and pilots, the FAA, Congress, and the NTSB have led to significant advances in technology and important legislative and regulatory changes that have contributed to the current level of aviation safety. These efforts, many of which have been in response to the lessons learned from NTSB investigations, should serve as an example for industry, labor, regulators, and policymakers in other modes of transportation regarding the need for a collaborative approach to safety. However, we cannot become complacent. In my testimony today, I want to acknowledge the record of aviation safety over the last decade-plus, discuss the role of the NTSB in improving safety, and address the further work that needs to be done to implement some of the over 300 aviation NTSB safety recommendations that are currently open.\1\ Specifically, I want to highlight more work that needs to be done to: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ A report of all currently open safety recommendations related to aviation is available at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/ query-builder/route/?t=published&n=27 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- improve the safety of general aviation and passenger- carrying operations, improve the availability of recorder data to operators and investigators, improve turbulence avoidance and mitigation of injuries due to turbulence, reduce fatigue-related accidents, and learn from incidents that show the potential for catastrophic accidents. I also want to discuss emerging aviation technologies that may pose safety challenges. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity today, as we talk about aviation's incredible safety record, to mention the opposite direction we are going in for road safety, which affects the hundreds of thousands of employees in the aviation industry who travel to and from work every day at airports, airline facilities, manufacturing centers, federal buildings, trade association offices, and other places of work. A Record Level of Safety Since 2010, the US aviation system has experienced a record level of safety, as the number of deaths associated with US civil aviation accidents decreased from 541 in 2009 to 376 in 2021, a decrease of roughly one-third.\2\ Approximately 91 percent of aviation fatalities in 2021 occurred in general aviation accidents, with the remainder (27 total) in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 commuter and on-demand operations, which include charters, air taxis, air tours, and air medical services flights (when a patient or medical personnel are on board). A preliminary review of data for 2022 shows that 18 people were killed in accidents involving Part 135 operations last year. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2002-2021 civil aviation accident statistics. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ten of those fatalities were the result of one accident--the September 4, 2022, crash of a De Havilland Canada DHC-3 Otter into Mutiny Bay, near Freeland, Washington. The scheduled flight was operated by Northwest Seaplanes, which was doing business as Friday Harbor Seaplanes. Working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the University of Washington's Applied Physics Laboratory, the wreckage was located underwater at a depth of approximately 190 feet. The wreckage recovery operation was completed by the US Navy's Supervisor of Salvage and Diving on September 30, 2022, with about 85 percent of the airplane recovered from the seafloor. The operator's insurance did not cover the cost of the recovery, and, because examination of the wreckage was critical to our investigation, we paid $1.7 million for the operation from our regular appropriations. Examination of the wreckage indicated that a part of the airplane's pitch trim control system had separated into two pieces after becoming unscrewed. A lock ring, which was designed to prevent this from happening, was not recovered, and there was no evidence that the pieces separated due to the force caused by the accident. Our investigation is ongoing and, at this time, we do not know if the lock ring was present before the airplane impacted the water or why it was missing during the airplane examination. However, our findings raised concerns that a missing or an improperly installed lock ring on other DHC-3 airplanes could result in a catastrophic loss of control. As a result, we issued urgent safety recommendations to the FAA and Transport Canada to require all DHC-3 operators to immediately inspect the lock ring and report their findings.\3\ By taking such action, this identified safety issue could be addressed without having to wait for the investigation to be completed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ National Transportation Safety Board. Require Immediate One- Time Inspection of De Havilland Canada DHC-3 Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator. Rpt. No. AIR-22/08 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2022). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I want to acknowledge and thank the FAA for taking quick action and issuing an emergency airworthiness directive on November 2, 2022-- within a week of the recommendation being issued--requiring operators to inspect their aircraft lock rings. I highlight this accident because it is an example of how the investigative process works to compel prompt action for safety improvements. The use of a party system, in which we designate the regulators, operators, and manufacturers who have information relevant to the investigation to provide technical expertise during the fact- finding phase of the investigation, has been our practice for decades because it is the most effective way to investigate major transportation accidents. The party system also ensures that the appropriate regulatory agencies and the parties whose products or services were involved in the accident or incident will have access to factual information so that they can initiate any necessary safety actions without delay. Our investigation of the Mutiny Bay crash also shows the importance of working with foreign investigative authorities and organizations. In this case, once the safety concern was identified, the aircraft manufacturer, Viking Air Limited, a technical adviser to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, published a service letter recommending that all DHC-3 operators confirm that the lock ring is present and correctly engaged on their aircraft. NTSB's Role in Maintaining Safety The purpose of our aviation investigations is to find safety issues and identify trends that must be addressed to improve aviation safety, as well as to provide information to the flying community about lessons learned. Investments made in the NTSB to hire investigators and researchers, train them on emerging technologies, and provide them the technology needed to keep pace with advances in the industry, as well as to strengthen our cybersecurity efforts and data analytics capabilities, are investments that help maintain the nation's role in the world as the standard bearer for safety. Our Office of Aviation Safety currently consists of 115 employees, 83 of whom are accident investigators. The office handles over 1,300 accidents and incidents annually. These include investigations of aviation, uncrewed aircraft systems, advanced air mobility, and experimental aircraft accidents and incidents, as well as certain commercial space mishaps. We also participate in about 450 investigations annually of airline accidents and incidents in foreign countries that involve US carriers, US-manufactured or -designed equipment, or US-registered aircraft, such as the recent accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. Our current authorization expired at the end of the last fiscal year (FY). As you know, we transmitted a reauthorization proposal to the previous Congress, requesting resources and hiring flexibilities to increase the number of investigators throughout the agency.\4\ I testified on our goals to right-size our agency. I am happy to report that, since last April, we have already made great progress toward our goals to ensure that our employees have the right skill set, staffing up to our highest level since 2017 to 414 people on October 1, 2022. In FY 2022, we hired 57 people, the highest number in 10 years. Our reauthorization proposal anticipates adding roughly 15 new employees per year through 2027, in addition to filling the vacancies that will occur through retirements and separations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ National Transportation Safety Board Draft Reauthorization Act of 2022. Washington, DC: NTSB. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, since the start of 2022, we have significantly reduced the backlog of investigations open for more than 2 years by filling open investigative and technical review positions, reassigning investigations that could be expedited, using reemployed annuitants to broaden the pool of report reviewers in the short-term, enhancing employee performance standards, and developing quality metrics and a means to track them for all investigations. We will transmit an updated reauthorization proposal to Congress in the coming weeks, and I look forward to working with you on legislation that will allow us to hire professionals with the needed skills, purchase the equipment necessary for those skilled professionals to do their jobs, and invest in staff training and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset and is essential to our mission to make transportation safer and to maintain our status as a leader in safety-- here and internationally. Safety in General Aviation and Revenue Passenger-Carrying Operations The vast majority of our investigations involve general aviation accidents. Lessons learned from those investigations have contributed to the improved safety of general aviation over the years. In fact, since 2010, 96 percent of all NTSB investigations were in the aviation mode, and of those, 94 percent were in general aviation, meaning that general aviation investigations account for roughly 90 percent of our total investigations. Since 2001, the rate of fatal accidents in general aviation operations has largely trended downward. In 2001, the fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours was 1.274, and although it has been as high as 1.381 (in 2005) and as low as .935 (in 2017) over the last 20 years, in 2021, the rate was .951.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ National Transportation Safety Board, 2002-2021 civil aviation accident statistics. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although general aviation safety has improved in the last decade, we do see areas where additional effort is needed. Our general aviation accident investigations have exposed safety issues and identified trends that resulted in safety recommendations.\6\ Most general aviation operations under 14 CFR Part 91 are for noncommercial personal or business use, while most commercial operators are regulated under Part 135 or Part 121. However, the NTSB is particularly concerned about the safety of various revenue passenger-carrying operations that are conducted under Part 91, including the following: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ In 2022, we issued 10 recommendations as a result of general aviation accident investigations. These recommendations concern carbon monoxide sensors, hazardous icing conditions in Alaska, and technical issues with particular models of aircraft. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- certain nonstop commercial air tour flights, sightseeing flights conducted in helicopters and hot air balloons, nonstop intentional parachute jump flights, living history flight experience sightseeing flights, glider sightseeing flights, air combat/extreme aerobatic experience flights, and tour flights conducted under the premise of student instruction or training flights. In March 2021, we adopted a report to address the safety of these operations.\7\ We also included this issue on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for 2021-2023.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ National Transportation Safety Board. Enhance Safety of Revenue Passenger-Carrying Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Rpt. No. AAR 21/03 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2021). \8\ 2021-2023 Most Wanted List. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These operations, which carry thousands of paying passengers each year, are not held to the same maintenance, airworthiness, and operational standards as air carrier, commuter, and on-demand operations. Members of the public who pay to participate in such operations are likely unaware that these operations have less stringent safety requirements than other commercial aviation operations. As I wrote to you last summer, we issued recommendations to the FAA to apply greater safety requirements and more comprehensive oversight to revenue passenger-carrying operations.\9\ As detailed in that letter, these recommendations address four categories of identified deficiencies (which do not apply to personal or business use of general aviation aircraft where no charge is made): --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy. Letter for the record regarding the July 13, 2022, House Transportation and Infrastructure hearing, ``The State of General Aviation.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The need for an appropriate framework for Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations. The operating rules for Part 91 general aviation, which include revenue passenger-carrying operations, do not require operating certificates, operations specifications, FAA-accepted general operations manuals, FAA-approved training programs, or FAA- approved maintenance programs, all of which are required for Part 135 operations and address commuter and on-demand operations, such as most commercial air tours. Because Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators are not required to have initial and recurrent pilot training programs, the operators have no formal method to determine if pilots are adequately prepared for the responsibilities associated with the company's operations. The NTSB's review demonstrated that the FAA should be implementing one level of safety for all commercial air tour operators, especially given the longstanding safety concerns in this area. In addition, to address other Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations, the NTSB recommended that the FAA develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying operations that are currently conducted under Part 91. These standards, or equivalent regulations, should include, at a minimum for each operation type, requirements for initial and recurrent training and maintenance and management policies and procedures. The need to address regulatory loopholes and omissions. The FAA created certain exceptions to Part 91 rules that allow some operations to be conducted outside of the scope of regulatory and oversight requirements that apply to operations conducted under an operating certificate. However, some Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators have exploited specific exceptions in federal regulations by carrying revenue passengers for purposes other than the exceptions intended, allowing them to avoid more stringent regulatory requirements. For example, two of the accident flights we reviewed were inappropriately operating under the student instruction exemption, even with the knowledge of the local FAA office. The NTSB recognizes that other regulatory loopholes and omissions might also exist; therefore, we recommend that the FAA identify shortcomings in 14 CFR 119.1(e) that would allow revenue passenger-carrying operators to avoid stricter regulations and oversight and to address these loopholes as part of a new framework for Part 91 operations. The need for increased federal aviation oversight. Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators are not subject to the same level of FAA oversight and surveillance as Part 135 operators. The NTSB concludes that the FAA's oversight and surveillance of Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operations do not ensure that these operators are properly maintaining their aircraft and safely conducting operations. The FAA needs to provide its inspectors with sufficient guidance to pursue more comprehensive oversight of Part 91 revenue passenger- carrying operators. Such guidance and oversight could help ensure that these operators are properly maintaining their aircraft and safely conducting operations. The need for safety management systems. Operators need to establish a safety management system (SMS), which is an effective way to manage and mitigate risks in aviation operations. The FAA has described SMSs as a ``formal, top down business-like approach to managing safety risk.'' The four components of an SMS are safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. Only Part 121 air carriers (generally larger airlines and regional carriers, as well as cargo carriers) are currently required to incorporate an SMS into their operations; the FAA has only encouraged all other operators to voluntarily implement an SMS. Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying and Part 135 operators would benefit from an SMS to ensure that operational risks are sufficiently mitigated. In addition, it is critical that the FAA oversee these operators' SMSs to ensure that mitigations are in place to address potential safety hazards. On January 10, 2023, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to update and expand the requirements for SMSs and to require Part 135 operators and certain Part 91 revenue passenger-carrying operators to develop and implement an SMS. We are continuing to review the proposed rule and its relation to our safety recommendations, but we welcome the FAA's action on this issue. FAA oversight is critical to ensuring operators adhere to the principles and processes of an effective SMS. The NTSB has investigated many accidents involving operators whose deficient SMS failed to identify and mitigate the conditions that contributed to the accident. For example, the NTSB's investigation of the January 26, 2020, helicopter crash in Calabasas, California, revealed that although Island Express, the Part 135 operator, had implemented an SMS, its lack of a documented policy and safety assurance evaluations hindered its effectiveness of its SMS. We recommended that Island Express participate in the FAA's voluntary SMS program. Island Express responded that it was not going to implement our recommendation.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ See Island Express Helicopters Inc. responses to Safety Recommendation A-21-7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data Monitoring Programs Another issue on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements calls on the FAA to mandate crash-resistant recorders in all revenue passenger-carrying operations and to require flight data monitoring and analysis programs. However, operators should not wait for mandates to do so; they can realize the safety benefits of these technologies now. In aviation, data, audio, and video recorders capture and store critical information that can help investigators determine the cause of accidents while helping companies and operators take immediate steps to prevent accidents. However, many passenger-carrying commercial aircraft, such as charter planes and air tours (under Part 135 and Part 91), are still not equipped with these critical technologies, even though recorders are readily available, easily installed, and largely affordable. The availability of recorded data will also be critical for the operation of advanced air mobility aircraft, some of which will likely operate under Part 135 and are not currently required to have recorders. Recorders not only help determine the cause of an accident, they also help companies and operators establish effective safety management strategies. These operators should have flight data monitoring programs in place that analyze recorder data and use that information to adjust procedures and enhance crew training to prevent accidents from happening in the first place. Although some operators have implemented--or are in the process of implementing--recorder programs and systems, we are concerned that many will not do so without the FAA's action. In addition to the need for all revenue passenger-carrying aircraft to be equipped with recorders, we have also been concerned about current FAA requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs). Current FAA regulations require 2-hour CVR recording capability and provide guidance to the flight crew on how to safeguard CVR data after an accident or incident. Despite this, valuable CVR data continues to be overwritten and therefore unavailable for safety investigations, as happened in the 2017 incident in which an Air Canada flight overflew four other air carriers on the taxiway in San Francisco, as well as in the recent runway incursion incident involving two Part 121 operators at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Our ongoing experience with overwritten CVR recordings demonstrates the limitations of the current 2-hour recording requirement, particularly in cases where relevant data were overwritten due to the following: a delay in reporting a safety event that was not immediately recognized to be of a serious nature until further data review, a failure to immediately deactivate the CVR following arrival after a safety event, or the time remaining in the flight after a safety event, which exceeded the CVR's 2-hour recording duration. As a result of these concerns, in 2018, we issued recommendations to the FAA to address the need to install CVRs with a minimum 25-hour recording capability on all newly manufactured airplanes required to have a CVR, and to retrofit these CVRs on existing aircraft required to have flight recorders.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ National Transportation Safety Board. Extended Duration Cockpit Voice Recorders. Rpt. No. ASR-18/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Preventing Turbulence-Related Injuries Turbulence-related accidents are the most common type of accident involving air carriers, accounting for more than a third of Part 121 accidents from 2009 through 2018. Most of these accidents resulted in one or more serious injuries but no aircraft damage. Flight attendants were the most commonly injured in these accidents, accounting for 78.9 percent of all seriously injured persons. We are currently investigating a Part 121 accident that occurred on December 18, 2022, in which Hawaiian Airlines flight 35 experienced severe convectively induced turbulence at 40,000 feet, about 40 minutes from landing at Honolulu International Airport. Of the 291 passengers and crew, 25 were injured, 6 seriously. The airplane sustained minor damage. On August 10, 2021, we released a safety research report that examined the prevalence and risk factors of turbulence-related accidents in Part 121 air carrier operations; assessed the effectiveness of policies, programs, technologies, and other applicable safety countermeasures; and made 21 new recommendations to improve turbulence avoidance and injury mitigation.\12\ These recommendations call for improvements in the reporting and sharing of information regarding turbulence risks, the use of data to revise guidance on when flight attendants should be secured in their seats to prevent injuries, and efforts to increase the use of child restraint systems. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ National Transportation Safety Board. Preventing Turbulence- Related Injuries in Air Carrier Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Rpt. No. SS-21/01. (Washington, DC: NTSB 2021). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Reducing Flight Crew Fatigue Fatigue degrades a person's ability to stay awake, alert, and attentive to the demands of safely controlling an aircraft. The NTSB has investigated many air carrier accidents involving fatigued flight crews, including Colgan Air flight 3407. In 2006, we issued a safety recommendation to the FAA as a result of our investigation of the October 19, 2004, crash of Corporate Airlines flight 5966 in Kirksville, Missouri, to modify and simplify the flight crew hours-of- service regulations to take into consideration factors such as length of duty day, starting time, workload and other factors shown by recent research, scientific evidence, and current industry experience to affect crew alertness.\13\ Current FAA rules that prescribe flight- and duty-time regulations for all flight crewmembers and certificate holders under Part 121 exclude operators who conduct cargo operations.\14\ We disagree with this exclusion, as many of the fatigue-related accidents that we have investigated over the years involved cargo operators. We also believe that, because of the time of day that cargo operations typically occur, such operations are in greater need of these requirements. We continue to believe that the FAA should include all Part 121 operations, including cargo operations, under these requirements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ NTSB. Collision with Trees and Crash Short of the Runway, Corporate Airlines Flight 5966 BAE Systems BAE-J3201, N875JX Kirksville, Missouri. Rpt. No. AAR-06/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2006). NTSB Safety Recommendation A-06-10. \14\ Federal Aviation Administration, Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements, 14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wrong Surface Operations and Runway Incursions We also investigate numerous aviation safety incidents each year. In fact, we have completed more than 800 aviation incident investigations in the past 20 years, resulting in several safety recommendations. For example, our investigation of the 2017 Air Canada incident in San Francisco resulted in recommendations to the FAA regarding the presentation of information to pilots (such as through notices to air missions, known as NOTAMs) as well as technology to detect wrong runway or other surface landings. I want to thank Representatives Stauber and DeSaulnier for their leadership in the House passing the NOTAM Improvement Act 2 weeks ago, which will help address issues that we identified in our investigation. Several factors are considered when deciding which safety incidents merit an NTSB-led investigation. Safety risk and the possibility that a repeat event could lead to a catastrophic outcome are among the key considerations. The potential for findings related to regulatory standards or safety oversight that could lead to systemwide safety improvements, as opposed to local or isolated improvements, are also considered. By weighing these factors, we ensure that resources are applied to investigate incidents with the potential for greatest effect on public safety. Wrong surface operations and runway incursions are examples of such concerning incidents. For example, in June 2022, we initiated investigations into two wrong runway landings by Part 121 operators. On June 8, FedEx flight 1170 landed on the wrong the runway at Tulsa International Airport in Oklahoma.\15\ The captain and first officer were not injured, and the aircraft was not damaged. The flight was cleared for a visual approach and landing on runway 18L; however, the airplane landed on runway 18R. The airplane was operated as a Part 121 cargo flight from Fort Worth Alliance Airport in Fort Worth, Texas. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ NTSB. Preliminary Report for DCA22LA126. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On June 21, United Airlines flight 2627 was cleared for a visual approach and landing on runway 28C at the Pittsburgh International Airport in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, but instead lined up with and landed on runway 28L.\16\ None of the 174 occupants aboard the airplane were injured and the aircraft was not damaged. The regularly scheduled passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Part 121 from the Chicago O'Hare International Airport. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ NTSB. Preliminary Report for DCA22LA133. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Although there were no injuries or damages due to these two incidents, they, along with the Air Canada event already mentioned, illustrate the potential for a catastrophic accident due to wrong surface operations. Both the Tulsa and Pittsburgh investigations are ongoing, and preliminary reports have been issued. Emerging Transportation Technologies Advances in technology are transforming transportation and hold promise for improving transportation safety, but they also pose new challenges. The integration of high-volume drone operations, advanced air mobility aircraft, commercial airliners, general aviation aircraft, and commercial space vehicles all together in the National Airspace System is increasing the complexity of airspace operations and management and is also likely to increase our accident and serious incident investigation workload over the next 5 years. This diverse platform of operations will also require enhanced--and in some cases, all new--skill sets and capabilities as the complexity and breadth of operations grows. In addition, new technologies, such as autonomous systems, introduce more complexity to the traditional aviation workload as well as to operational functions, such as changes to the FAA's flight certification process. Our involvement in these emerging areas, with appropriate coordination with the FAA (particularly in commercial space mishap investigations), will support the growth of these industries by assuring the public that investigations are being conducted impartially and that safety issues are identified. Our Road Safety Crisis We believe that the only acceptable number of deaths and serious injuries in all modes of transportation is zero. We have more work to do in aviation to achieve that goal, as we will discuss today. However, the greatest risk to aviation employees and aircraft owners and operators is on our nation's roads, where about 95 percent of all US transportation deaths--nearly 43,000 in 2021--occur. Millions of people are injured each year. The following five of the ten items on our Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements are related to road safety: Implement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Speeding- Related Crashes Protect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe System Approach Prevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired Driving Require Collision-Avoidance and Connected-Vehicle Technologies on all Vehicles Eliminate Distracted Driving We are calling for a Safe System Approach for our roads that prioritizes the lives. A Safe System recognizes that human error is inevitable, but it should never cost someone their life or result in a serious injury. A Safe System addresses all aspects of road safety-- speed, road design, vehicles, road users, and postcrash care. We must make better safety investments, from road treatments to strong traffic safety laws and robust education efforts, to mitigate injury risks for all road users. I hope that we can continue to work together and take some of the lessons learned from the collaborative approach to safety in aviation to address our road safety crisis. Conclusion Thank you for the opportunity to further discuss these safety issues and recommendations with the Committee. We recognize the progress that has been made; yet, there will always be room for improvement. We stand ready to work with the Committee to continue improving aviation safety, which includes ensuring that the NTSB has the resources needed to carry out our mission. I am happy to answer your questions. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you very much. Next, we are going to go to Captain Jason Ambrosi, who is the president of the Air Line Pilots Association. Thanks for being here, Captain. TESTIMONY OF CAPT. JASON AMBROSI, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and the committee members. I am Captain Jason Ambrosi, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International, which represents more than 67,000 pilots in the United States and Canada. And I remain a current and qualified international captain on the Boeing 767. Like many airline pilots, I began my career flying for a regional airline. I was hired by Delta Air Lines in 2000, 18 months before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 would change our industry forever. The loss of Continental flight 3407 in which 50 people died near Buffalo, New York, also changed our industry forever. Later this week, we will mark the 14th anniversary of that accident. It was the final in a series of tragedies that led this Nation to commit to becoming the gold standard in aviation safety. The passage of the 2010 FAA bill played a critical role in our Nation's achievement of this goal. Because of it, U.S. air transportation benefits from landmark safety improvements such as pilot qualification, experience, and training requirements, and safety management systems based on enhanced Voluntary Safety Reporting programs. Through the bill, Congress also ensured U.S. pilots had science-based fatigue rules and training in areas such as mentoring and leadership, high-altitude operations, adverse weather, and stall prevention and recovery. These and other safety improvements in a 2010 FAA bill and the presence of at least two experienced and trained pilots working together on every airliner flight deck have been critical. Collaborative efforts by labor, industry, and Government have also been key. Safety programs like CAST and ASIAS have been game changers that apply state-of-the-art analytics to aviation and position the United States on the leading edge of safety analysis. Together, these advances have brought us to where we are today. It is no accident that the airline passenger fatality rate has dropped by 99.8 percent since the law was passed in 2010. We have set the gold standard. And I know we share a common goal in ensuring we never accept bronze or silver. This extraordinary record demonstrates that the current system is working in the way it was intended. The United States is creating thousands of new pilots each year who have the experience and training they need to ensure this Nation maintains its place as the global safety leader. As an airline pilot who has flown for more than 25 years and worked for both regional and mainline carriers, I can tell you that all U.S. passengers deserve one level of safety. In the upcoming FAA reauthorization, Congress has a historic opportunity to maintain and expand this country's global leadership in safety for all Americans, whether they fly out of major hubs or small rural airports. We thank the committee for passing the aircraft certification reform bill to improve the entire certification system. Continuing to modernize the air traffic infrastructure and NOTAM system is also important. We urge lawmakers to consider modernization funding that spans multiple reauthorization and appropriation cycles so that the FAA has stable, long-term resources to increase aviation safety and efficiency. The U.S. air transportation system's gold standard of safety has made this country a global leader. This Nation can never become complacent about aviation safety, especially as we work to integrate new and expanding users into the shared national airspace. Any new technology, system, or a change in procedure or regulation must maintain or improve the current level of safety. We know that this committee is interested in inspiring more young people to consider aviation professions, and we applaud you in your effort, because it is a great time to be an airline pilot. ALPA hopes the reauthorization process can also create more opportunities for people of all backgrounds to become airline pilots. Lawmakers can align Federal funding support for education required to become an airline pilot with that of other highly skilled professions and make aviation education more accessible to minorities and underrepresented groups. ALPA is ready to work with all aviation stakeholders to keep this country leading the world in aviation safety, open the doors of opportunity for everyone who aspires to fly, and ensure that communities large and small have the safe air service they deserve. Thank you. [Mr. Ambrosi's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to join you today to talk about FAA reauthorization and enhancing America's gold standard in aviation safety. We believe there's great opportunity for industry stakeholders to work together on new policy priorities, solve problems, improve the aviation system, launch new projects, and ensure our continued role as global aviation leader. We look forward to collaborating in this first reauthorization meeting through the successful passage of the bill. I'm a current international captain on the Boeing 767 and the president of the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA), which represents more than 67,000 professional airline pilots flying for 39 airlines in the United States and Canada. ALPA is the world's largest pilot union and non-governmental aviation safety organization. We are the recognized voice of the airline piloting profession in North America, with a history of safety and security advocacy spanning nearly 92 years. As the sole U.S. member of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique ability to provide airline pilot expertise to aviation safety issues worldwide, collaborate on global improvements, and to incorporate an international dimension to safety advocacy. The U.S. is the gold standard when it comes to aviation safety. We not only have the safest aviation system in the world, but it is also seen by others around the globe as the best. This perception has been tested in recent years, but U.S. aviation remains on top. While today is the safest period in air transportation, that outcome is not guaranteed moving forward. We must remain constantly vigilant and identify every opportunity for improvement and steadfastly advocate for implementation. Sadly, we are nearing the 14th anniversary of the Continental Connection, Colgan Air, Flight 3407 accident in Clarence Center, New York that fatally injured all 49 passengers and crew on board and one person on the ground. The Colgan accident was a turning point in the airline industry \1\--a point to which we must never return. Remarkably, since the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, triggered by this accident, was signed into law, more than 10 billion passengers \2\ have traveled safely in our skies to their destinations.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The Colgan Air accident was the last in a series of high- profile fatal regional airline accidents including Comair 5191, August 27, 2006 in Lexington, KY; Corporate Airlines 5966, October19, 2004 in Kirksville, MO; and Pinnacle 3701, October 14, 2004 in Jefferson City, MO, that highlighted deficiencies in pilot training and flight experience. \2\ According to the United States Bureau of Transportation Statistics. See, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ Data_Elements.aspx?Data=4 for passengers. \3\ While airline accidents are rare in the U.S., even one fatal injury is one too many. The U.S. airline industry has experienced two passenger fatalities since 2009. The first occurred in 2018 on a Southwest Airlines flight when the engine cowling failed and punctured the aircraft fuselage. The second occurred in 2019 when a PenAir flight, Alaska's second-largest regional/commuter airline, overran the runway on landing sending debris into the fuselage fatally injuring a passenger. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This remarkable safety achievement was not accomplished by chance or any one action. This success results from decades of industry-wide work and commitment to create the safest air transportation system in the world. There are numerous significant parts of aviation safety that have and continue to directly contribute to the gold standard and the benefits are immeasurable. Becoming the gold standard in aviation safety is the result of decades of stakeholder collaboration; data collection and analysis; hazard identification and risk mitigation; as well as critical changes and improvements to regulations, pilot qualification and training, airline operations and maintenance, technology, safety, security, and oversight. Prior to the passage of the Aviation Safety and FAA Reauthorization Act of 2010 (the ``Act''), the passenger airline industry lost approximately 1,100 passengers in airline accidents over a 20-year period. Since the unanimous passage of that landmark safety legislation, the airline passenger fatality rate has reduced by 99.8 percent. The numerous congressional mandates in the bill created comprehensive changes to how airlines do business and significantly raised the safety bar. The Act resulted in regulations that improved the collection of and access to pilot records to help provide employers a more complete picture of new hires; established a training requirement for crewmember mentoring and leadership to help captains more effectively mentor first officers; and forced government and industry to reexamine pilot fatigue resulting in science-based flight and duty limitations and rest requirements for all Part 121 passenger operations along with Fatigue Risk Management Plans for all airlines. Mistakenly, cargo operations were carved-out from these life-saving requirements and correcting this error remains one of ALPA's top priorities. In the years following the passage of the Act, the airline industry ushered in sweeping changes to pilot qualifications and training and aviation safety that have profoundly improved airline operations and directly contribute to the U.S. gold standard in aviation safety. One of the most significant changes was the requirement that each flight crewmember for a Part 121 air carrier hold an airline transport pilot certificate. The previous standard for first officers to possess only a commercial certificate was established decades prior and did not keep pace with the changes to and increased complexity of aircraft and airline operations. Congress recognized the critical importance for both pilots on the flight deck to possess an airline transport pilot certificate and the experience commensurate with the responsibility of transporting passengers.\4\ We are grateful for Congress's unwavering commitment to maintaining higher standards for first officers and rejecting attempts to return to a point in our aviation history when first officers were held to lower safety standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ The ``1,500 Hour Rule'' is a distracting misnomer. It is important to note that in parallel with the requirement that all airline pilots possess an ATP, Congress gave the FAA discretion to grant credit toward the 1,500 hours required for an ATP for certain academic training courses. As a result, the FAA created the ATP with restricted privileges (R-ATP), which allows first officers to fly airline operations with fewer than 1,500 hours. Military pilots are hired with 750 hours, pilots with four-year aviation degrees are hired with 1,000 hours, and pilots with two-year aviation degrees are hired at 1,250 hours of flight experience time. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Additionally, Congress directed the FAA to modify the requirements for an ATP to improve operating in a multi-pilot flight deck environment, in adverse weather and at high altitudes, stall and upset recovery training, and remedial training programs for flight crewmembers with a history of training deficiencies. Rule changes also required first officers to have a type rating for the aircraft they will operate, have additional flight time requirements, and complete an ATP Certification Training Program designed to prepare the applicant to operate safely in those operations which require an ATP. The same rulemaking that established the ATP/R-ATP requirements, also ensured minimum experience requirements for first officers before serving as pilot-in-command in Part 121 airline operations. The Act also required Part 121 airlines to establish a Safety Management System (SMS) that would include, at a minimum, an aviation safety action program, a flight operational quality assurance program, a line operations safety audit, and an advanced qualification program. SMS is used to identify, address, and reduce organizational and systemic risks. The goal of SMS is to identify active failures and inadequate defenses so that hazards can be contained while preventative measures can be reinforced. SMS adds value to an organization's safety structure by identifying hazards and mitigating risks before they develop into full accidents. The systems are complex and require assessments of human factors and their relation to other workplace components. A successful SMS incorporates a collaborative effort between the organization, labor, regulator, manufacturers, and other stakeholders to build a robust and diverse SMS team. The team's objective is to leverage data and knowledge to collectively build risk assessments, design systemic improvements, and support a positive safety culture. The U.S. airline industry is a leader in using data not only to understand what happened in a past event, but also to prevent that same event from happening again. The aviation industry expertly uses data to achieve long-term risk reduction and monitor emerging safety trends. A positive safety culture encourages and supports employees to report safety issues that may not otherwise be discovered. In the airline segment, we see safety culture driven by the FAA through compliance philosophy, which emphasizes compliance actions over enforcement for correcting unintentional deviations and its dedication to programs such as Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) program. SMS thrives on voluntary safety reporting programs that collect information on day-to-day operations. Voluntary safety reporting programs are the core of aviation safety risk management that provide critical data and unique information. These programs allow us to identify risk in the system before an accident occurs so that the changes necessary to mitigate the risks can be implemented. Analysis is done at individual organizations but the greatest value stems from large-scale industry-wide data sharing programs like ASIAS that has analyzed millions of reports and other data. The transition in ASIAS to use data fusion, matching data from multiple sources on the same event, has been an incredible advancement for safety analysis. The program is now able to thread together multiple data points from airlines, manufacturers, maintenance, in- flight, dispatchers, Air Traffic Control, airports, and various sectors of the FAA. Data points can be fused together to create a cohesive picture of the operating environment including pilot reports, ATC reports, flight data, and other external datapoints such as weather. There is risk in aviation and we must develop organizational resilience through proactive safety enhancements. The clear path to make these enhancements is through large scale collaborative data collection and analysis. In aviation, we focus on the safety of the complete system. By bringing all components of the operation together, we can develop better risk management techniques, effectively mitigating risks by designing the entire system to be safer rather than focusing on a single component. Last year marked the 25th anniversary of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which embodies the power and purpose of safety data collection and industry collaboration. ALPA is a proud founding member of and strong leader in CAST. CAST is the catalyst behind the industry transition from a forensic approach to safety to a data-driven, nonpunitive, risk-predictive model--a proactive approach that has changed the way safety work is conducted in the U.S. Analysis is done to identify opportunities for improvement within areas such as training, procedural designs, and other aspects of an operation. Voluntary safety reporting programs are the core of aviation safety risk management within the U.S. for the unique information they are capable of providing. The transition to data-based analysis and large- scale information sharing through ASIAS referenced above is due to the efforts in CAST. The collaboration between government, labor, and industry that CAST made possible has improved aviation safety and reduced the U.S. commercial aviation fatality risk by more than 83 percent. Data and collaboration--coupled with two experienced, highly-trained, and well- rested pilots--are keys to creating and maintaining the safest air transportation system in the world. These programs are built upon a collaborative model that differentiates U.S. aviation safety from the rest of the world. Government, labor, and industry share data and other information in a manner and at a level that no other country does. This is, in part, due to the protection of aviation safety data that has helped these programs thrive. In the U.S., there are legal protections regarding the use of safety related data. Protections need to be stronger and go further to protect today's data and for future evolution of data sharing programs, the U.S. is unique in protecting aviation safety data. An example of the critical work done by CAST and ASIAS is the Airplane State Awareness (ASA) report and studies. The goal of this initiative was to reduce Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I) accidents and incidents, historically one of the highest fatal accident categories. CAST chartered various working groups of experts to analyze a subset of accidents and incidents related to LOC-I events specifically involving attitude and energy complications. After thorough review, 11 actionable Safety Enhancements (SEs) were developed through the CAST process to reduce the risk of LOC-I events through training, operations, and design changes while adding redundancy to the overall system. By addressing risks and hazards through a systemic view, CAST has been able to help design a safer operational environment. This is only possible through the voluntary data submitted by front-line workers through programs like ASAP and FOQA. CAST takes a data driven approach to tackle risks like ASA and develop mitigation strategies based on real experiences from pilots. The safety enhancements are currently implemented at Part 121 airlines and primarily focus on enhancing training to include more real-world scenarios and nonstandard situations. Four of the SEs target training opportunities to verify that pilots have the skills necessary to recognize situations that may lead to undesirable aircraft states and ample experience correcting these scenarios in a training environment. Other enhancements focus on the design of visual displays and indicators on the flight deck to effectively communicate aircraft state to pilots to proactively prevent loss of control. Industry collaborated on these solutions to ensure they are not only effective but also can be realistically implemented. Other SEs were developed from this safety topic to look at the future of managing this risk through research and design initiatives. The goal of this work was to reduce the risk of these types of accidents in the U.S. by 70% in 2018 and 80% by 2025. Data from the NTSB can confirm that LOC-I is not a defining cause of an accident in 2021 and is no longer considered a leading defining cause of accidents for Part 121 air carriers in the U.S. CAST successfully leverages industry input and data to reduce risk. To effectively manage ASA and other risks, a structured, systemic approach is necessary, as one mitigation will not be a complete or failsafe solution. Equally important is input from industry during each phase of the development process to ensure that proposed solutions are realistic in the operating environment. Our pilots are the single voice for this part of the process. An oversimplification of this extremely detailed and complex work, but hopefully enough explanation that demonstrates how labor, industry, and government work together to develop safety solutions that prevent accidents. There are a multitude of factors that work in parallel and in conjunction with all other parts of system safety that brought us to where we are today. Removing or modifying requirements, without implementing an equivalent level of safety or higher, will disrupt the system and cause gaps where risks can slip through. Only changes that maintain or improve the current level of safety can be made to the aviation safety system we rely on today. Given the extraordinary safety track record we have achieved together, that should be the lens through which we evaluate any proposal to modify our existing gold standard safety system. The future of aviation holds many changes in aircraft, technology, new entrants, types of operations, etc. and there will always be pursuit of innovation, especially with the development of UAS, RPAS, and Advanced Air Mobility aircraft. We must ensure that any introduction of new technology, new systems, and changes in procedures or regulations result in an improvement to the current level of safety in our aviation system. One constant, above all, must remain--safety first. The airline safety system works and everything we do to change, modernize, be more innovative, or increase efficiency must be done with a commitment to safety first. Safety is not mutually exclusive from any of these endeavors. We have the foundation, experience, expertise, and tools to welcome the next generation of aviation without compromising on safety. One thing we know for sure is that aviation is fluid and often fragile in the wake of dynamic change as demonstrated during the pandemic. Despite the rapid changes to the industry, safety remained the first priority and CAST stakeholders quickly pivoted to focus on changes and what new risks might be introduced to the system. In short order, CAST created a new resource, ``Safety Elements to Monitor During a Period of Dynamic Change,'' that gave operators direction and support related to new risks caused by the pandemic while managing other operational risks. While the aviation safety system that we have developed over several decades remains unmatched, there will always be challenges and opportunities for improvement. Today is a very exciting time in aviation as we build for the future. Aircraft and product certification, as well as standards development in the U.S., will continue to be challenged by the number and types of projects to date and those expected consistently for years ahead. We acknowledge the importance of keeping pace with global aviation and the need to complete certification projects more efficiently, but that can never happen at the expense of safety. The FAA must be appropriately funded and resourced so that it is equipped to handle certification and crucial standards work without pressures to move faster. As the global aviation leader, other countries nip at our heels in efforts to assert a leadership role. Recent issues with our certification system left us vulnerable to those attacks. That's why we thank the Committee for passing the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) of 2020. ACSAA mandated changes to improve the entire aircraft certification system. While that work is underway, we must work together to ensure we do not move more quickly on certification projects simply to avoid criticism. Rather, we must work together to improve the system so that it is both safe and efficient. The ACSAA included safety improvements such as requiring aircraft manufacturers to implement SMS in their lines of business and therefore ensuring that any changes in process and design are thoroughly evaluated and risks are identified and mitigated. This requirement aligns with FAA proposals to expand SMS to other domains. The FAA is in the process of finalizing rules for SMS at our nation's airports, which we fully support, and recently proposed to expand the requirement to operators such as charter and on-demand operators, tour operators, and others. Congress can continue to help improve the safety level of our National Airspace. Continued modernization of our air traffic infrastructure and NOTAM system is critical. In the past, Congress has given direction on modernization but only provided partial funding for resources necessary to start but not enough to finish the modernization needed. Congress should consider modernization funding mechanisms that may span multiple reauthorization and appropriation cycles that would provide the FAA adequate resources needed to complete specific tasks such as modernization. Congress should consider whether use of the Airport and Airways Trust Fund may be such a funding mechanism. Congress has the authority to task and authorize the FAA to utilize the trust fund available as a funding source for a specific task independent of annual appropriations. Another challenge we face is continued attempts to solve market issues with solutions that negatively impact safety. For example, the most vital safety feature on any airliner is having at least two experienced, highly-trained, and well-rested pilots on the flight deck. Yet, some stakeholders actually try to claim that there would be no safety impact if one or both pilots were removed to lower operational costs. This is an absurdity that we will continue to fight. Additionally, business models and practices abroad impinge on our safety standards when carriers not meeting our safety threshold are permitted to enter U.S. airspace and land at our airports. Safety should never give way to competitive advantage. Similarly, here in the U.S., an air carrier is attempting to circumvent the regulations for a business advantage by setting up an alter ego operator to transport passengers under a different standard rather than remaining under the highest, most stringent standard under FAR Part 121.\5\ Collectively, we all must continue to call out these deceptive attempts to gain a competitive edge while sacrificing safety. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ See, application of SkyWest Charter, LLC for a Commuter Air Carrier Authorization at DOT-OST-2022-0071. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lastly, because we have become incredibly safe for so long, complacency is an ever-present risk. We must remain watchful, and safety-focused to prevent complacency and notions that we are ``safe enough'' from entering the system. Mass-scale information and data sharing helps prevent complacency from setting in. Awareness of issues in all parts of the system informs stakeholders that risks exist even if not experienced by a particular stakeholder. We all must be constantly reminded that our safety record could change in an instant by one event: that's why we must fight complacency just as fiercely as any other threat. Through hard, often tragic, lessons learned and cutting-edge safety data analysis, we have developed the global gold standard for aviation safety here in the United States. It is our solemn responsibility--lawmakers, pilots, and citizens--to ensure we enjoy this standing for decades to come. Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this important discussion today. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you very much. I have got to step out for a second to meet with the Missouri Adjutant General, but I will be listening in the antechamber. But I want to introduce Mr. Pete Bunce, who is the president of GAMA, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association. Thanks for being here. Pete. TESTIMONY OF PETER J. BUNCE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION Mr. Bunce. Thank you, Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen, for allowing me to be in front of you today. We have got a lot of work to do with the FAA reauthorization. I was very encouraged by yours last night and this morning about the bipartisan nature with which we are going to approach this, because we have to correct some things that are not going in the right direction, particularly in aircraft certification. We talk about the gold standard, and when you look at how we do rulemaking, it is the gold standard of how we started. We do an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to start with. We bring in experts from all over the planet, regulatory authorities, and the best from industry. And we go ahead and do rulemaking, talk about doing rulemaking, set the framework for it. And then what happens? It sits on the shelf. And a prime example of this is, as you all know, ACSAA that was passed just a couple of years ago. One of the primary tenets in that was safety management systems. We did that in 2014, and that rule sat on the shelf for manufacturers until recently, an NPRM, a notice of proposed rulemaking, was just issued. But it goes much further than that. We are at the 14th anniversary of the Miracle on the Hudson. We went and did the advanced Aviation Rulemaking Committee, talking about flocking bird tests. That has sat on the shelf now since 2015. But EASA, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, they promulgated their rule. These examples go on and on. To Mr. Boulter's credit, those rules that are in his purview because he is a man of action, and he is taking the reins and is actually making things happen, have been able to advance rules in his area. But some of these really large rules go up, and they sit at FAA legal, or they go into the black hole of DOT or get delayed in the transmission of OMB, and they just sit there and sit there. All the while, EASA promulgates the rules, as they should, because they were part of the rulemaking committee, and that becomes the world standard for the rule. There is something wrong with that process. But worse than that is, during that entire time, we have aviation specialists, mainly in Mr. Boulter's area, that have to focus on being able to do exemptions, special conditions, and what we call equivalent level of safety analysis each and every time because a rule is not out there that the manufacturers just simply have to say, we have complied with the rule and the FAA checks that. That sucks up resources that doesn't allow us to do the technology improvements that you talked about, Chairman Graves, in being able to move the ball forward, because the resources just aren't there. And that causes delay, after delay, after delay. Exacerbating that is the new people within the workforce in aircraft certification. Forty percent of that workforce has less than 2 years of experience. Now, that is in the aircraft certification branch. The way we used to do it prepandemic is we would train new specialists basically through on-the-job training from the older, what we called the old heads, that imparted their knowledge. One of the dispersed places where we live now where specialists are, that training isn't available. And I know that I have talked with Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Larsen about this, we have got to fix that. We can do joint training between industry and Mr. Boulter's regulators and aviation specialists, and we can do it. We can have Boeing people go train at Gulfstream on a different coast and vice versa, Pratt people up in Connecticut go to GE in Ohio. We can do that to have the safeguards in there, but we have got to fix the training, because only through that, then we can have accountability in the workforce with timelines that we can start bringing technology on board, like technology that will allow a pilot to see if somebody has been cleared for takeoff on the runway because they can actually see the pictorial display in the cockpit or a safe taxi route if somebody is on an active runway. And we can do that with color presentation. But we will never be able to certify that technology unless we have the technicians available and the rules to facilitate it. Lastly, international validations. Right now, and as you saw in the prep material that the chairman put out for this hearing, we have a system right now where we have people having great scrutiny across the Atlantic Ocean on equipment that we certify and vice versa. We're not implementing the bilateral safety agreement like it was meant to and what we do by the technical implementation procedures. We aren't measuring it. And we are hoping that this committee will demand from the FAA metrics and an ability and an annual report to be able to say how we are improving in the areas of validation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. [Mr. Bunce's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association Chairman Sam Graves and Ranking Member Rick Larsen, on behalf of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) and its member companies, thank you for convening today's hearing which focuses on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization and how to reverse current trends that are tarnishing the U.S. as the gold standard in aviation safety. All aviation stakeholders need to adopt ``an all-hands on deck'' approach as we work together to plot and navigate the industry's future path for safety and innovation. The goal should be to ensure a robust FAA oversight process that builds on the strength of every participant in the certification and regulatory process to deliver safety and technology improvements in the most effective manner possible. GAMA represents more than 140 of the world's leading manufacturers of general aviation airplanes and rotorcraft, engines, avionics, advanced air mobility aircraft, components, and related services and technologies. GAMA members are also providers of maintenance and repair services, fixed-based operations, pilot and maintenance training, and aircraft management companies. GAMA companies have facilities in 48 states and 27 countries. A recent economic impact study determined that the general aviation industry supports $247 billion in economic output and 1.2 million jobs in the U.S.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ General Aviation's Contributions to the U.S. Economy, 2018 Price Waterhouse Coopers Study on behalf of Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA), Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), Helicopter Association International --------------------------------------------------------------------------- We want to state the deep appreciation we have for this Committee and the U.S. Congress for their commitment to improving aviation safety and fostering innovation and growth in the aviation industry. Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen, we look forward to working with you, House Aviation Subcommittee Chair Garret Graves and Ranking Member Steve Cohen, and the entire membership of the full committee on these issues. We want to commend you for moving quickly on this hearing given the importance of reauthorizing the FAA by the September 30, 2023, deadline. Your timely work on reauthorizing the FAA is essential as this is a transformative time for the aviation industry and U.S. transportation system, the likes of which has not been seen since the dawn of the Jet Age. ACSAA and Safety Management Systems GAMA recognizes the congressional engagement and work that culminated in the December 2020 passage of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) \2\. In the aftermath of the Boeing 737 MAX accidents, GAMA engaged with aviation stakeholders to examine the issues raised by these accidents and find solutions to improve the safety and strength of the aviation system. Many of the provisions included in ACSAA bolstered efforts long championed by GAMA and were touted by GAMA when the legislation passed. These include increasing resources for the FAA safety workforce and oversight activities, improving safety decision-making for new technologies, and facilitating the FAA's international engagement in safety promotion and improvements in safety cooperation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (P.L. 116-260) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Of critical importance to GAMA was the ACSAA direction to FAA to promulgate a rulemaking to implement safety management systems (SMS) for manufacturers. For years, GAMA has been a strong supporter of the development of SMS standards for aviation manufacturers and maintenance organizations. We participated as the industry co-chair of the Part 21 SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which submitted its recommendations to FAA in 2014. Since then, SMS standards and best practices have been developed and voluntarily implemented by manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, including the European Union Aviation Safety Agency's (EASA) SMS rules for manufacturers that will become applicable in March of this year. SMS improves safety and fosters a robust and continuous safety and oversight culture that permeates from top to bottom in an organization and across lines of business which positively impacts a company's management, employees, products, and services. We strongly endorse appropriate implementation of SMS standards and look forward to reviewing and commenting on the FAA's long overdue, recently proposed SMS rule as it moves to final publication. As the Committee approaches FAA Reauthorization, GAMA believes that we can build on areas identified when the ACSAA legislation was being considered, and with it now law, ensure it is successfully implemented. Your work on FAA Reauthorization will play a crucial role in furthering the goals of ACSAA's intent by helping to address regulatory delays that are significantly hindering safety and industry innovation; strengthen the FAA's technical capabilities and leverage industry expertise; improve U.S. engagement and activity internationally; and provide the framework for continuous improvement in the FAA's certification process. Today, I want to outline each of these areas in more detail and show how FAA reauthorization can address them with some policy ideas for your consideration. Regulatory Process Improvement Unfortunately, despite the good work of thousands of dedicated FAA employees, delays in the promulgation of rulemaking, policies, and guidance have inhibited the progression of safety-enhancing aeronautical products through the certification system. Contributing to these delays is a large backlog of technical standards, policy memos, orders, and advisory circulars. Improvements are needed to the overall process to address development of safety standards such as those covered under ACSAA, cybersecurity and pilot training standards, as well as to facilitate advances in new technology. Another reminder of this backlog happened last month when the 14th anniversary of the Miracle on the Hudson was observed while the flocking bird test requirement developed in the aftermath of that accident still has not been issued as a final rule. Finally, the status of processing regulations and guidance for certification lacks the degree of transparency, including with other aviation authorities, and most importantly, the accountability within the FAA and the Department of Transportation (DOT), necessary to ensure progress in maintaining safety, security, and U.S. leadership and competitiveness. Industry actively supports the FAA and the Department of Transportation (DOT) through the development of industry standards and participation in federal aviation rulemaking and advisory committees (ARAC). The FAA's comprehensive consultative process should be the source of envy of all and the model for gathering comments from the public, industry, and safety experts. However, the FAA and DOT internal administrative process has resulted in significant delays to promulgate and implement the results of these consultative efforts which negatively impacts this collective strength. This has slowed progress in safety and innovation and forces the FAA and industry to go through administratively burdensome and time-consuming alternative processes such as exemptions, special conditions, and issue papers. Ironically, this also impacts the FAA's global leadership, as other aviation authorities move forward with promulgating and implementing the technical safety work completed by the U.S. advisory groups. This leaves the FAA and U.S. aviation industry behind due to these procedural delays. As an example, an FAA ARAC working group submitted recommendations to the FAA in 2016 for the establishment of aircraft system information cybersecurity and protection requirements. Pending rulemaking, cybersecurity is currently addressed by the FAA through project-by- project special conditions and issue papers whereas EASA promulgated and adopted cybersecurity requirements based on the ARAC recommendations in July 2020. Part of the delay for the cybersecurity rule is because it is part of a larger package focused on modernizing transport airplane requirements, which has not been able to move through the rulemaking bureaucracy. Ironically, this failure has led to more delays and heavier administrative burden on the agency and industry because rather than having updated rules that apply to all projects, every single certification project is instead subject to a series of rulemakings that consider the same special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent level of safety for each project again and again. GAMA proposes that the FAA, with DOT participation, immediately establish an internal regulatory process review team. The team should be tasked with developing recommendations within 90 days to improve the timeliness, transparency, and performance accountability in the promulgation of rules, regulatory policies, guidance, and other materials necessary for certification and approval of new aircraft, equipment, training, and operations. The team should base these recommendations on the comprehensive review of the regulatory processes referenced earlier, including consideration of streamlining processes and eliminating redundant or unnecessary review by certain FAA and DOT offices, and others given the apolitical and technical subject matter of these regulatory, safety, and compliance materials. The review should also consider the potential need for hiring additional FAA safety personnel and others whose focus is moving forward new and revised regulatory policy and guidance documents in a more expeditious fashion. The review team should also propose how to put in place quarterly scorecards on progress--to include data on the number of rules, policy, and guidance documents in process each quarter along with ``elapsed time'' from start to publish, as well as the number of documents still in the queue waiting to start the process. These quarterly scorecards could be used to measure actual progress and identify bottlenecks that need to be addressed to speed up the process moving forward. FAA should be directed to brief the Committee on these recommendations and an action plan to implement them within 30 days of completion of the review team's work. Looking forward to the emerging advanced air mobility (AAM) sector, it is critical that the FAA, DOT and the Office of Management and Budget complete the rulemaking they call the ``powered-lift'' special federal aviation regulation (SFAR) to establish the necessary regulatory requirements for commercial operations and pilot certification for electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) vehicles no later than December 2024. This is the FAA's announced completion date which is necessary to enable the expected entry into service of initial AAM aircraft. The Committee should hold the FAA to that commitment. However, as previously discussed, there are significant concerns about DOT's administrative process for rulemaking, so we also propose that Congress puts in place an interim solution that would allow for this new category of ``powered-lift'' aircraft (e.g., the new certification path for eVTOL) to operate commercially under specified existing regulations if the FAA fails to publish these rules by the deadline. This proposed interim path would not be used or go away once the FAA issues the final SFAR. Congress should also direct the FAA to continue activities and actions to enable certification and entry into service of other types of AAM vehicles and technologies and operations not addressed by the ``powered-lift'' SFAR such as simplified vehicle operations, autonomy, instrument flight rules, and airspace integration. FAA Technical Capabilities Tied closely to ACSAA's focus, the FAA needs a strong and capable workforce to meet the safety expectations of the flying public. According to FAA, 40% of the engineers in the FAA Aircraft Certification Office have less than two years of FAA certification experience, which underscores the urgency of the current workforce challenge. GAMA believes an emphasis must be placed on the workforce responsible for aircraft certification at the project level to ensure the FAA has an adequate level of staff resources, including for necessary training. There have also been recent departures in key certification management positions and those must be filled with strongly capable, effective managers with deep technical expertise especially given the overall inexperience in the workforce. Given these staffing challenges, the FAA should consider whether their current work from home policy is conducive to the successful training and integration of these new employees. Additionally, the FAA should detail their efforts to ensure the current policy does not present obstacles to timely agency decision-making. The FAA has recognized the ongoing challenge to identify and attract talent into key safety positions and has maintained an Aviation Workforce Plan in the hope of addressing these needs. However, the agency needs to continue to explore training opportunities and financial incentives as well as partnering with industry to facilitate the effectiveness of the FAA's safety workforce. This effectiveness can also be enhanced by holding FAA certification and flight standards employees accountable to agreed-upon certification and validation plans and processes. Finding highly qualified individuals to tackle evolving technology such as flight crew interface (human factors), system safety, autonomy, propulsion methods, software, and artificial intelligence is challenging. Other government agencies have addressed similar problems by establishing partnerships with industry without ceding or compromising, in any respect, their regulatory authority. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has a Professional Accounting Fellows Program that allows the appointment of highly qualified industry individuals to positions requiring specialized or unique skills within the SEC. In FAA reauthorization, the Committee should direct the FAA to conduct a new review of its engineering, pilot, and inspector staffing needs related to aircraft certification compliance and system safety and designee oversight activities, including a comparative industry compensation and benefits analysis to identify competitive salaries which will bolster retention and attract experienced industry engineers and inspectors to the FAA. This analysis should include consideration of special pay or hiring incentives for hard-to-fill positions such as flight test pilots, software experts, system safety engineers, and autonomous systems specialists and how personnel reforms the agency was given in the 1990s could help achieve this end. Additionally, the Committee should provide clear authorization for the establishment of a training exchange program for the FAA and industry workforce responsible for safety certification activities. This should facilitate the FAA providing detailed technical training to company employees and designees on aviation safety regulatory requirements, policy, and guidance. The program should also authorize the provision of detailed technical training by companies, without cost, to FAA employees on company engineering, analysis, test, modeling methodologies, compliance processes, and aviation products and technologies. The FAA should also establish a demonstration fellowship program like the one at the SEC, with appropriate safeguards, permitting the appointment of highly qualified individuals from industry to temporary positions within the FAA or from FAA to industry. We believe these initiatives can provide critical understanding about new technologies and processes while recognizing the need to ensure impartiality. The review should also consider the minimum training necessary for FAA employees who conduct examinations and tests, perform oversight, and determine technical compliance and approvals for the issuance of design approvals and certificates. Within both these exchange programs and other areas, to be successful in its safety and oversight mission, the FAA must rely on the best available expertise and experience. This expertise is facilitated by using industry professionals, where appropriate, to conduct examinations, perform tests, determine compliance, and issue approvals and certificates. The FAA delegation program makes available to the FAA the world's leading expertise and experience across all aviation technical disciplines and with FAA and global certification processes. In addition, this also includes industry involvement in technical boards to provide expertise and knowledge to support development of necessary safety standards and the better utilization of groups like the congressionally created Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC). Validation and International Engagement Aviation is a global industry and to promote safety and maintain U.S. leadership, the FAA must place a priority on working with other aviation authorities and policymakers. This includes engagement with key international partners at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as well as ensure compliance and strengthen the effectiveness of bilateral safety agreements. GAMA's membership faces impediments with validation in the international marketplace. Congress rightfully focused on international leadership and engagement in the 2018 FAA Reauthorization \3\, and we believe that a renewed attention is merited. The FAA certification office has created an International Validation branch to improve this activity, but the office has been slowly ramping up and lacks the full- time employees with the training, understanding and relationships necessary to effectively manage the implementation of validation programs under bilateral agreements with foreign authorities. It is critical that this branch be given the resources and tools it needs to be successful, and Congressional support will help ensure the effectiveness of bilateral agreements and validation programs essential for the global export of U.S. products. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- GAMA proposes that Congress requires an annual report from the FAA evaluating type validation program performance under bilateral agreements and outlining plans and recommendations for improvement. The report should include an evaluation of the following: outgoing and incoming validation program data such as number and type of projects, timeline milestones and related metrics; analysis of the use of implementation tools such as validation workplan and risk-based involvement safety emphasis items; stakeholder perspectives and data on validation performance to include FAA aircraft certification offices, FAA International Validation Branch, bilateral authority, and industry applicants; delineation of FAA training to employees on validation and outreach conducted to improve processes; and a description of engagement with international certification authorities to maximize safety cooperation and the use of another certifying authority's approvals. More broadly, the Committee should also direct the FAA to develop a plan, in proactive coordination with the aviation industry, to enhance U.S. aviation safety leadership and activities internationally on areas including but not limited to safety enhancing technologies, automation, general aviation innovation, uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and AAM. This plan should consider the future direction and strategy of U.S. engagement with ICAO; how to facilitate acceptance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) such as airworthiness directives and other safety documents; and promotion of standards harmonization and adoption. In addition, better alignment of FAA technical assistance and training in countries or regions with U.S. certified aircraft operations and industry activity to enhance aviation safety should be considered including resolution of any issues hindering the provision of this technical assistance. Reauthorization should also make it clear that the FAA Administrator has authority to approve any international travel requests for FAA employees to support these critical activities. Continuous Certification Improvement GAMA also believes emphasis should be placed on examining the future enhancement and continuous improvement to FAA certification processes. When the certification process is efficient, effective, and predictable, it fosters investment in safety innovation and strengthens the U.S. aviation system and economy. The current certification process was developed in the 1960s and reflects an era when aircraft were simpler. This process takes a document-centric approach that is very transactional in nature. In this traditional approach, each regulatory requirement is mapped to a document that demonstrates compliance. Each document ``shows'' compliance to individual airworthiness requirements and is then reviewed for an additional check, and compliance is ``found.'' In the 1960s, the processes did not envision the extent of computer modeling and simulation that the industry is capable of today. Nor did it envision the highly integrated complex aircraft that achieve today's safety standards. The use of modern computer systems would allow the regulator and industry to access models in real time as the project evolves, providing a more accurate and timelier picture of the program and better matching performance demands of today's complex aircraft. Similarly, in lieu of extensive flight-testing that may pose risks without compensating benefits, tools exist today that allow these activities to be conducted through integrated labs, and computational models and simulation. However, the FAA lacks the requirements, policy, and even a vision for a future state of aircraft certification where these capabilities are leveraged to their greatest extent. It is GAMA's recommendation that the Committee direct the FAA to contract with a federally funded research center or other qualified entity to evaluate how best to foster continuous improvements in the certification system. This should include examining model-based systems engineering techniques and new means to validate and verify aircraft designs, particularly with software. The study should also review other countries' certification processes to identify the best procedures, practices, and tools that could be adopted by the U.S. and evaluate policies to enable the increased use of simulators/integrated test facilities to reduce use of high-risk flight testing. The review should include input from FAA certificate holders and also be focused on fostering advancement of safety management systems. To further this critical review, the FAA should be directed to utilize the SOCAC to help facilitate implementation of ACSAA as well as look at other improvements for the certification process. While I have focused my testimony to this point on these critical certification issues and regulatory improvements, the Committee also can take action on the following issues that will benefit safety and the aviation system: Advancing Workforce Development in the Aerospace Sector An important complement to efforts to enhance FAA's technical workforce is to attract and retain a competent and capable workforce for the aviation industry and at our member companies. Our industry is currently struggling to fill technically skilled jobs to operate, maintain, and manufacture aircraft. This workforce challenge will become even more acute as aviation evolves through innovation, which will require a workforce that is more diverse and with broader competencies and new skill sets. We appreciate the leadership shown by the Committee in this area. The 2018 FAA reauthorization provided DOT with the authority to provide up to $10 million in grants to facilitate workforce development of pilots and maintenance providers.\4\ We appreciate and thank members of this committee and the Congress for the important funding provided to date. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254), Sec. 625 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our membership believes the scope and funding for these programs should be significantly expanded, particularly given our understanding that demand for this funding has been significant. We also believe the program should specifically include manufacturing workers as an area of focus to complement the prior focus on pilots and maintenance. In addition, the upcoming reauthorization should include a provision to measure results and provide feedback from participants, engage school counselors more directly in aviation workforce efforts, and facilitate training to teachers on how to start and conduct a successful aviation education program. Attention should also be paid to track how a program applicant will connect students with either jobs or the next step in the education process (for example, from high school to college or a technical school) to sustain a pipeline of talent to the industry long- term and emphasize activities that engage, educate, and equip participants to directly feed into the aviation sector and provide the next generation of safety-focused aviation professionals. Managing and Coordinating Spectrum Use Our membership utilizes spectrum and supports efforts to ensure its availability to meet aviation's operational and safety requirements. There has been a clear lack of coordination amongst industry and government stakeholders to consider all impacts of spectrum use and facilitate desired outcomes. This ultimately has significantly negative impacts upon aviation and broader stakeholders, including those in the telecommunications sector seeking to deploy and utilize spectrum. While we know there are limits to how this issue can be addressed in an FAA reauthorization bill, we believe that there are still some steps that can be taken in the legislation to ensure the protection of aviation safety and enhance coordination while efforts continue more broadly. We suggest policymakers require the FAA to coordinate with a reputable third party (such as the National Academy of Science) to report to the Committee on a strategy for protecting aviation equities in the radio spectrum. The strategy should include a process for the FAA and the aviation community to properly and thoroughly review proposed spectrum reallocations (including through auctions) to ensure that any comments, objections, or technical concerns from aviation stakeholders in any FCC proceeding are definitively assessed and addressed at a technical level to those stakeholders' satisfaction. The report should also develop an improved spectrum process and road map that could help meet the future needs of the aviation system in a way that also supports other private sector applications that are rapidly expanding and have societal value. Addressing Piston-Engine Aircraft Fleet Fuel The FAA has joined with aviation and petroleum industry stakeholders to work toward transitioning to lead-free aviation fuels for piston-engine aircraft by the end of 2030. The Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions (EAGLE) initiative will expand and accelerate government and industry actions and investments as well as establish the necessary policies and activities to permit both new and existing general aviation aircraft to operate lead-free, without compromising aviation safety and the economic and broader public benefits of general aviation. We recognize that this is very ambitious, and each of the organizations involved is fully committed to EAGLE's success with work well underway. The importance of this initiative to general aviation and U.S. transportation infrastructure cannot be overstated. There are more than 13,000 different airports which service a U.S. fleet of roughly 170,000 piston-engine general aviation aircraft. This year, the Environmental Protection Agency is moving forward with an endangerment finding which will trigger a process under the Clean Air Act for regulatory activity to eliminate lead emissions and ban the current 100-octane low-lead (LL). The clock is ticking, and we need to move quickly to facilitate deployment of a viable unleaded replacement fuel or fuels. The fuel or fuels should be FAA approved as meeting the safety requirements of the existing fleet of aircraft and should also be economically produced and distributed to reach the market of airports across the U.S. In the interim, the safety and viability of general aviation depend on ensuring the continued, uninterrupted availability of 100-octane LL fuel at airports until an unleaded solution is identified and widely available. Additionally, the EAGLE initiative is currently looking at areas for potential federal investment to facilitate this transition and we would like to work with Congress as these initiatives are developed. Aviation Funding Stability GAMA recognizes that this Committee has supported legislation in the past to provide targeted stability for the aviation system to function in the event of a U.S. government shutdown. This initiative is important for protecting the air traffic system and critical elements of aviation safety. Prior legislative efforts proposed enabling the FAA to tap into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) during a lapse in appropriations, to ensure no FAA employees are furloughed or work without pay. We know from experience that shutdowns are harmful to the FAA, the economy, small business, and safety. As a result, we encourage policymakers to work together in a bipartisan manner to ensure that FAA is sufficiently authorized and funded so it can provide, without interruption, its critical safety oversight and management and operation of the air traffic control system. Air Traffic and Strategic Plan The FAA should also be directed to revitalize their strategic plan and vision for the modernization of the air traffic control system. The past modernization effort placed a milestone in 2025, but this should not be the end of efforts to make the National Airspace System (NAS) safer, increase its capacity, or improve the efficiency of the NAS to realize environmental, operational, and financial benefits. The FAA needs to be challenged as part of the reauthorization to look to the future and present a clear plan. The new plan must continue to build on past successes in deploying Performance Based Navigation (PBN), especially for departures and arrivals; shifting strategic air-to-ground communication from voice to data communications; and deploying a second-to-none surveillance infrastructure. It must also address emerging challenges including the operation of new entrants like UAS and powered-lift aircraft or AAM, as well as commercial space operations. The FAA should collaborate with stakeholders on this long-term vision and strategic plan to develop the future flight plan but also ensure near-term initiatives for sustainment and modernization within the agency's budget horizon are fully addressed. Closing As I have discussed in this testimony, the aviation manufacturing sector's advancement of safety and substantial contribution to the U.S. GDP depend on the FAA functioning at 100% of its capability; the FAA's ability to undertake in a timely manner the regulatory actions, approvals, and engagement to bring aircraft, engines, avionics, and other new technologies and products to the U.S. and global marketplace; the FAA's effectiveness in working with industry to strengthen its safety oversight and technical expertise; and the FAA's global leadership and engagement to foster regulatory cooperation among aviation authorities. The actions of this Committee are essential in the success of these efforts, and we appreciate your consideration of GAMA's views on FAA reauthorization today. We look forward to working with you to ensure the FAA and the aviation industry represents the gold standard. Mr. Graves of Louisiana [presiding]. Thank you, Colonel. Next, we have Ed Bolen, president and chief executive officer of the National Business Aviation Association. You are recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF ED BOLEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Larsen and members of the committee. I think it has been stated today that the U.S., since the Wright brothers, has been the world leader in all aspects of aviation. And the foundation of our success in aviation has been safety. Working together, legislators, regulators, and industry, we have made aviation the safest mode of transportation. It is an incredible record of success. But I think everybody here knows a great threat to success is complacency. It takes constant improvement to get to be the best. It takes constant improvement to stay the best. If you are not constantly improving, you are not keeping up. And with this FAA reauthorization bill, we have an opportunity to remain the best, to constantly get better, to avoid complacency, and to make sure that we never fall behind. NBAA comes forward to this hearing today with 10 recommendations where we can provide targeted solutions to recognized challenges. And the first is: Let's get a bill done. Ranking Member Larsen talked about space between 2012 and 2018. We had over 20 continuing resolutions. CRs don't help us constantly improve. The second thing I would say is don't allow safety to ever be shut down. In the past we learned that Government shutdowns impact the FAA. It doesn't have to be that way. The FAA is a safety organization. We have a trust fund. We have unobligated balances. We can use those balances to make sure the important safety work continues to get done regardless of the environment. I would also urge us to encourage innovation. The FAA has got a mission to promote safety and efficiency. They can do that by enabling the technologies, the performance standards, the operations that enhance safety sustainability and allow us to have more air mobility, providing access for everyone. Digitization. My friend, Colonel Bunce, talked about how we would find ourselves at times in black holes. Digitization will help us understand where things are and how we can get them done quicker. This includes the registration, certification, permits of exemption, letters of authorization, even medicals. Digitization is something we need to make sure we are doing and we are doing well. Workforce is a critical part of our ability to stay the world's best. In the last FAA bill, we required a Women in Aviation Advisory Board, a youth task force. Recommendations are coming forward. What we need to do now is look at those recommendations and see what is actionable. We need to attract and develop and retain the best and the brightest. That means looking in new places, finding underrepresented communities and allowing them to populate our industry, our workforce, and the FAA itself. We also need to focus on ensuring privacy for people who are on general aviation aircraft. We know as recently as yesterday the DOT talked about the danger to security when people have real-time information where specific individuals are. We need to focus on SMS. A new notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued. SMS is a remarkable safety tool, but it has to be done right. The tool has to be sized for the job. You can't use a saw when you need a scalpel. We need to get the NOTAMs right. We talked about it today. This is something that we have been working on for a very long time. But in a world where there is a lot of data available, we have got to condense it to information and make sure it is always out there. We need to also address the 5G issue that we have been working on so hard. We have got to make sure that we have got alternative means of compliance or radar altimeter set for GA airports and make sure we are able to do that. And finally, we need to continue to work together: Congress, the FAA, and industry. Where we have seen dramatic advancement is when we share our information, when we collaborate, in the commercial world through CAST and in the general aviation world through our joint steering committees. Together we can ensure we remain the gold standard. Thank you very much. [Mr. Bolen's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for holding this hearing to address aviation safety. On behalf of the National Business Aviation Association's (NBAA's) 11,000-member companies, I am honored to testify at this hearing. NBAA's members, many of which are small businesses, rely on general aviation aircraft to meet some portion of their transportation needs. These aircraft provide connectivity to communities in every state and nearly every congressional district, which is especially critical to communities with little or no airline service. Business aviation is keeping small businesses globally competitive and bolstering our national economy with 1.2 million American jobs and $247 billion in economic output. The aviation industry overall--from commercial aviation, to general aviation, manufacturing, Advanced Air Mobility and other emerging technologies and associated businesses--accounts for more than five percent of the United States gross domestic product. Considering the vast challenges facing the FAA, and the opportunities that lay ahead, swift passage of a new 5-year, bipartisan authorization will help set the agency on a stronger path for the future and ensure continued success of the industry. The NBAA urges Congress to prioritize on-time passage of FAA Reauthorization before the current law expires on September 30, 2023. We applaud Chairman Graves for setting a goal of passing a bill through the House of Representatives by July 1, 2023, and for getting to work right away with today's hearing. A Legacy of Safety Leadership NBAA appreciates Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen for choosing safety as the topic for the Committee's first hearing on FAA reauthorization. Since the dawn of flight, safety has been integral to everything we do, on the ground and in the air. Since NBAA was founded in 1947, we have been intentional in developing partnerships with government leaders and other stakeholders to deliver the products, procedures and policies that continually increase the safety of flight. Because of this continued, comprehensive focus on innovative approaches to safety, aviation is the safest mode of transportation, and the U.S. stands as the global leader in aviation safety. Safety is not a destination, it is a journey and a practice that requires vigilance and a supportive culture to thrive. Although the business aviation community has built an impressive safety record, there is room for improvement and we will continue to strive to do better. An FAA reauthorization bill offers an opportunity to consider not only the innovations that have made America the world's aviation safety leader, but also the additional measures that will be needed to maintain this leadership position five, 10 and 25 years from now. General aviation (GA) has a strong role to play in shaping the future, in part because it is the proving ground for the industry. GA is where aviation was born, and it's the point of entry for many in the community, from the pilot's first hours of flight to the mechanic's first oil change. NBAA and the business aviation community greatly appreciate the opportunity to be an active participant in the development of this safety plan for the future through a new General Aviation title under FAA Reauthorization. Safety Leadership Through Pioneering Technologies As this committee knows, many of the technologies and solutions that have revolutionized aviation safety were born in the business aviation community. We led the way with GPS, a transformative navigation and safety technology. We led the way in development of airborne collision-avoidance systems that ensure situational awareness at all altitudes. We led the way in developing enhanced vision systems that can identify unanticipated ground obstructions in thick fog, and see through clouds to locate terrain while in flight. We partnered with the FAA in integrating the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) technology that has vastly increased the efficiency and safety of aviation system management. Similarly, we were the early adopters of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS- B), a cornerstone technology for ushering in the next generation aviation system's enhancements to safety, as well as efficiency and sustainability. Safety Leadership Through Data-Based Programs Of course, the deployment of world-leading technologies has been only one piece of the safety equation for aviation. The development and implementation of innovative programs that identify the root causes of safety threats, and offer proven ways to eliminate them, is also a key building block for a solid safety foundation. For example, 20 years ago, NBAA and its members joined with the International Business Aviation Council in developing the safety focused International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS- BAO), a set of best practices focused on safety management as a data- driven team effort, including pilots and cabin crew, schedulers, dispatchers, maintenance technicians and others. Since the program's founding, more than 700 business aviation operators in 35 countries have become IS-BAO registered, improving their safety risk profile. Today, the business aviation community is an active participant in a variety of government-industry programs that aggregate operational data to identify risks, capture behaviors that contribute to accidents, and pinpoint ways to mitigate those events. As just one example, we can point to the FAA's Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program, also known as ``ASIAS,'' in which more than 150 organizations capture and coordinate data and other information critical to avoiding a variety of unusual events, including bird strikes, mid-air collisions, course deviations and other aviation safety hazards. NBAA has promoted ASIAS through discussions at our National Safety Forum on specific aviation hazards, during the NTSB Roundtable discussion at NBAA Business Aviation Convention and Exhibition (NBAA- BACE), in articles published in NBAA's safety-focused Business Aviation Insider magazine, and through our ongoing engagement at the ASIAS Executive Board and GA Issues Analysis Team governance levels within the program. As part of Safer Skies, launched in 1998, the FAA and the general aviation community jointly pursue a goal of reducing GA fatal accidents. The General Aviation Joint Safety Committee (GAJSC) uses a data-driven, consensus-based approach to analyze safety data to develop specific interventions that will mitigate the root causes of accidents. The GAJSC focuses on proactively assessing data to identify new emerging issues and threats to general aviation safety, analyze them, and develop mitigation strategies to address and prioritize safety issues to prevent accidents. NBAA, a founding member of the GAJSC, has supported the valuable safety studies and analyses conducted by this group, and worked to educate our members on the tools created to address specific safety risks. The current goal is a safety improvement over the FY18 target of 1.00 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours to a FY28 target of 0.89 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Leadership in Safety Policy Development A comprehensive approach to safety involves not just an investment in new technologies, or simply the development of risk-mitigation programs, but also a continuing commitment to an effective and tailored policy framework that matches the size and operational realities of business aviation. For a safety mandate to realize the benefits it seeks, it must have flexibility to scale, to fit the largest commercial operation, or the smallest charter business. NBAA and its members have led the way in this area. For example, the business aviation community has most recently been focused on a policy proposal put forward by the FAA in January, which would extend the requirement for implementation of Safety Management System (SMS) programs beyond those for the airlines to many business aircraft operations. While NBAA and its members have always supported rigor in ensuring everyone involved in a flight maintains a premium on safety, we know that an SMS suited for the largest airline will not likely be transferable to a small operation with a single airplane. We can look outside of the United States to learn lessons as we review the FAA's new proposal. Our focus will be on ensuring that any resulting program is not only flexible, but also meaningful in driving safety, rather than confusion due to compliance burdens and other missteps that have been characteristic of the introduction of SMS for business aviation in Canada and elsewhere. Canada's SMS implementation in the mid-2000s created significant industry concerns due to lack of scalability and the government's poor transition from a historic view of prescriptive oversight to one where risk is defined by the operator. As a result, it has taken nearly two decades to modernize those initial regulations so that they reflect the vast diversity of operations subject to the mandates involved. A similar operator experience with the SMS rollout in New Zealand was recently publicly shared in AvWeb: ``We've gone through SMS in New Zealand . . . We were promised from the start that it would be scaled to the size of our operations, but in the end we had to do all the requirements, even if the CAA [Civilian Aviation Authority] guys acknowledged it made little sense for us . . . The hardest part of implementation was a lack of understanding from CAA about SMS, since they were quite new to it as well, so we had little effective guidance (despite a lot of effort on their part) and a lot of inconsistent directives.'' The U.S. aviation industry cannot afford to repeat the poorly developed SMS deployment we have seen elsewhere. We must get this right from the start in order to leverage the safety benefits that we know SMS can deliver. The business aviation community has experience partnering with the government in the development of effective, customized policies, and we enthusiastically welcome the same approach to the consideration of SMS requirements for our sector. A Culture That Recognizes Safety Achievement A key strategy for continually enhancing business aviation's safety posture is to cultivate and acknowledge excellence in safety leadership within the industry. Everyone--from the pilot, to the cabin crew, to the dispatcher, to the maintenance technician and beyond--has an important role in the safety of flight. With this in mind, NBAA in 2022 launched its Business Aviation Safety Manager Certificate Program. This completely online accreditation was designed to educate individuals to effectively manage a business aviation organization's proactive safety efforts. It includes an in-depth look at the four elements of an SMS, including Safety Policy, Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotion, as well as modules on Safety Leadership and Emergency Response. The effort goes beyond initial education, by connecting certificate applicants to each other, in a community of engagement through peer-to- peer learning that fosters continuous safety improvement across the board, while also meeting the specific operational needs of any given aviation operation. In just a single year since this program's launch, more than 300 people have completed the course, obtaining recognition for safety leadership, while building an enduring peer community of safety advocates in business aviation. NBAA honors safety leadership in other important ways. For several decades the association has annually issued its Flying Safety Awards, a standards-based honor that recognizes exceptional achievement in safe flying operations, and pays tribute to the skill of a company's management, maintenance, pilot and support-personnel teams. NBAA's Safety Committee, one of its oldest committees, administers the annually issued Dr. Tony Kern Professionalism in Aviation Awards, which specifically honor individuals for outstanding professionalism and leadership in support of aviation safety. The committee's newest honor, the Above and Beyond Award, is given to individuals whose application of safety best practices played a key role in avoiding injury, loss of life, or catastrophic aircraft damage in hazardous flying circumstances. Leveraging the Safety Benefits of New Technology A solid foundation of safety has been built over the last several decades through products that enhance safety, programs that ensure safety remains job one in aviation, policies that build on the many gains made in flight safety, and, promotion of leadership in the safety arena. That said, the aviation landscape is continually evolving, and the industry's approach to safety must evolve with it. Consider the continuing breakthroughs in aviation technology that are delivering a myriad of benefits--from speed, to fuel efficiency, to safety--and how those advances might offer an opportunity to update regulations to match the safety benefits they deliver. For example, current federal mandates require pilots to use supplemental oxygen at high altitudes in pressurized aircraft. If one pilot leaves the controls of an airplane while it is at high altitude, the remaining pilot at the controls is required to use an oxygen mask, to reduce the possibility of an accident caused by a decompression incident, until the other pilot has returned to the controls. The development of new technologies allow for the oxygen requirement to be reconsidered: specifically, advances made in pressurization and hull design have introduced multiple layers of safety not available decades ago, and have dramatically reduced the need for a supplemental oxygen mandate to address a depressurization event. We commend Congress for recognizing this reality by amending the rule on supplemental oxygen under the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018, for operations conducted under Part 121, to allow a crew to operate safely up to 41,000 feet without supplemental oxygen. The NBAA is urging Congress to apply the same standard to operations conducted under FAR Part 135. Accelerating Technology Upgrades to Improve Safety As important as new technologies are in offering game-changing ways of thinking about safety, it is equally important to ensure that critical legacy technologies receive the resources needed to stay at the cutting edge. As one example, the United States Notice to Air Missions System (USNS) is a critical aviation safety technology. The USNS is intended to provide always-up-to-date safety notices for pilots, with real-time information about airports and airspace to help ensure a flight is conducted safely. Unfortunately, needed upgrades to the technology that would provide for enhanced customization of information and other beneficial safety features are years behind schedule. As a practical matter, a pilot might be required to needlessly sift through reams of NOTAM information about a flight to ensure its safety. For well over a decade, NBAA has urged the FAA to modernize the NOTAM infrastructure and enhance the system to ensure pilots have ready access to machine-readable, filterable and useful information in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) format used by the rest of the world. In 2019, the FAA and industry formed the Aeronautical Information Reform Coalition, which has been working collaboratively on NOTAM reform, with NBAA leading the coalition on behalf of the industry. Under the coalition's guidance, the FAA has begun to transition the USNS to a new Federal NOTAM System (FNS), but the completion date has been met with repeated delays, and the needed enhancements have yet to be delivered. Unfortunately, as is typically the case with technological upgrades, delays ultimately come with a cost: on January 10, 2023, the FAA issued a nationwide ground stop due to the need for a USNS reboot, following a system outage. Not only did the ground stop impact all operators; it also created a cascading effect on aviation system operations that was incredibly difficult to recover from, despite the full outage lasting only a few hours. We applaud the leadership of the House of Representatives in passing the NOTAM Improvement Act of 2023; however, more must be done to bolster the system so that it utilizes the most updated technologies to best inform its users' decisions about safety and other aspects of a flight. As the administration and Congress investigate what caused the USNS outage, NBAA recommends the establishment of clear goals and accountability measures for the implementation of FNS, including implementation of an FNS with an enhanced capability to deliver machine-readable, filterable and useful information in the format used by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the completion of a robust, reliable backup system to FNS, and; an agreement to a deadline for the complete transition to FNS. We urge Congress to provide the FAA with the resources necessary to achieve these goals. Leveraging Technology the Right Way to Capture Safety Benefits Technology advancements can deliver undeniable societal benefits, but sometimes come with challenges that require mitigation. A recent breakthrough in telecommunications technology and the Federal Communications Commission's sale of frequency spectrum adjacent to bandwidth used by aviation equipment created a critical safety threat to aviation users. NBAA has been an active party in discussions with regulators and industry stakeholders to determine suitable mitigations that would enable such networks to safely coexist with critical aviation systems. Beginning in 2015, NBAA and a broad coalition of aviation stakeholders raised detailed safety concerns about the potential for 5G interference with radio altimeters. The mitigations to ensure that 5G power levels around many of the nation's airports remain lower than allowed by telecommunications providers were extended over the course of the past year but are about to expire. Currently, only some of the business aviation fleet have alternate means of compliance, allowing them to continue all-weather access to most airports. For a significant portion of our fleet, there is not yet an approved retrofit solution to upgrade the radar altimeter with filters to protect from 5G interference. Over the coming months, we respectfully recommend that the FAA dedicate the necessary resources to approve alternate means of compliance or the radar altimeter modifications needed for the general aviation fleet to safely operate across our nation's entire airport network. We appreciate the Subcommittee's continued attention to this critical safety matter. Similarly, when the FAA transitioned from ground-based radar to ADS-B, a real-time precision, shared situational awareness system for pilots and controllers, some unintended privacy and security concerns came with it. Through ADS-B, unencrypted signals that provide an aircraft's flight identification, precise position, and other detailed data are widely broadcast to the public. The real-time location positioning of aircraft has enabled flight stalking and harassment on the internet and in person, creating a serious safety and security threat. Individuals who have received threats are in danger because their real-time movements and travel plans are available to the public. Competitors and nation-states can track where a business aircraft is flying, presenting industrial security concerns. This means that to protect passengers and operators of general aviation aircraft, the FAA must do more to prioritize the development of additional security measures. For example, the FAA should expedite its work to improve the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program, which allows operators to obtain a random ``aircraft address'' code, which can provide additional security and is not tied to publicly available FAA aircraft registration records. The FAA should also explore the limitations of the PIA program. For example, currently the codes cannot be used for international flights or even extended for overwater operations in the United States. Also, the FAA should work internally and with international partners so that privacy addresses can be utilized for all flights. The FAA also must plan for the future by studying how to encrypt ADS-B signals from aircraft, developing relevant equipage standards, and engaging with affected stakeholders for a more effective privacy solution. We firmly believe that no one should be required to surrender their safety, security and business intelligence because they board an aircraft--just as people's movements aboard airlines, railroads, and other modes of transportation are not the business of cyber-stalkers. Addressing Human Factors to Strengthen Safety As noted earlier, technologies, and their implications for aviation, are a key element in the safety formula, but technology cannot replace the human element in the equation. That's why the business aviation community places a sharp strategic focus on human factors--how fatigue, stress, confusion and other influences can impact decision-making--in thinking about safety. Take, for example, the misperceptions that can lead a pilot to take off or land from a wrong taxiway, runway, or even a wrong airport. These incidents are known as wrong surface events. They often involve human factors, and reducing them is a top priority for FAA, NBAA and the industry. We are actively working with the FAA and other stakeholders in the Surface Safety Group focused on developing tools to increase situational awareness for pilots at airports with a high number of wrong surface incidents. The association recently participated in the FAA's Surface Safety Symposium, which brought together commercial airlines, ground vehicle drivers and general aviation pilots and operators to discuss and develop solutions to runway and surface safety challenges. NBAA also provided a platform to the FAA Runway Safety organization at its October 2022 NBAA-BACE, which included 20,000 attendees from across the industry, to have a booth presence in the Exhibit Hall and to engage with attendees during the Meet the Regulators session. NBAA is also working to reduce runway excursions, another event often driven by human factors, in which an airplane inappropriately exits a runway. Like incursions, these events require strategically driven mitigation planning, along with tools developed by experts for industry. To that end, the association has gathered some of the best expertise on excursions at events, including our National Safety Forum in 2022, and continues to publish resources, including our guide for Reducing Business Aviation Runway Excursions. Another important part of the work to address the impact of human factors on aviation safety lies in our sector's focus on mental health and fitness for duty. More than a small-bore approach to myriad, stand- alone psychological and physical symptoms, the work in this area looks at the whole person, recognizing that aviation is a physically and mentally demanding environment in which a clear mind and well-rested, healthy body is essential to safe business aircraft operations, maintenance and management. Studies confirm the prevalence of this concern, as well as the need for both action and compassion on the matter: one recent report \1\ concluded that nearly 60% of pilots avoid seeking health care due to the fear of losing their aviation medical certificate. NBAA is concerned that some aeromedical certification requirements may needlessly impede eligibility for pilot certification, severely dissuading pilots from seeking treatment for a troubling condition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Hoffman et al. 2022. Healthcare Avoidance in Aircraft Pilots Due to Concern for Aeromedical Certificate Loss. J Occup Environ Med. 64(4):e245-e248. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As with so many other aspects of aviation safety, partnerships between industry and government can produce solutions to the problem without compromising safety, and we have proven successes with such an approach. For example, we have worked with the FAA to develop multiple pathways for Aviation Medical Examiners (AMEs) to issue airmen medical certificates at the conclusion of an exam, thereby minimizing wait times for FAA reviews. We have also emphasized the need for AMEs to research and identify for aviators the full menu of pharmacological treatment options that can safely be used in the aviation environment to address a given condition, and to better define the criteria for requiring or deferring neurocognitive testing. We continue to be an active partner in educating the business aviation community on these policies; in the past year alone, NBAA hosted an interactive News Hour webinar and a National Safety Forum discussion with aviation mental health experts and the FAA Federal Air Surgeon. We have engaged with the aviation community on these policies at events such as the Experimental Aviation Association's annual AirVenture Oshkosh show, the University of North Dakota's yearly Aviation Mental Health Symposium, as well as regularly held FAA Human Intervention Motivational Study and InfoShare Conferences and FAA GAJSC meetings, among others. Collectively, these efforts will help address misperceptions about mental wellness and fitness for duty, while reducing barriers that interfere with obtaining treatment and healthcare, getting pilots the help they need, maintaining pilots' livelihoods, aiding employers in understanding the readiness of their workforce--and, most importantly, enhancing safety. Building an Aviation Workforce for the Future While safety is the cornerstone to the success of the aviation industry, the sector cannot thrive without a strategic approach to attracting and retaining the next generation of skilled professionals across all capacities. Aviation is currently facing a shortage of qualified pilots, technicians and other workers. According to the Boeing company, more than 600,000 new pilots and technicians are needed to address projected growth in the next 20 years. NBAA applauds congressional approval of the Promoting Service in Transportation Act, which was passed into law through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). Through targeted public service announcements authorized by the Transportation Workforce Outreach Program in the IIJA, we will start a new dialogue on transportation careers, focusing on the availability of advanced technology and good-paying jobs today. With continued growth and demand for STEM workers, we must remain competitive by educating students about the exciting innovations and technologies under development in the transportation industry. We support the full$5 million appropriation for this program and appreciate the efforts of this Committee with House Appropriators. We look forward to building on programs from the 2018 FAA bill, including grant programs to support the education of future aircraft pilots and the recruitment of much-needed aviation maintenance technicians. Carefully reviewing and adopting recommendations of the Youth Access to American Jobs in Aviation Task Force and the Women in Aviation Advisory Board will be an excellent starting point for additional workforce provisions. At our largest event, NBAA-BACE, we host a ``Careers in Business Aviation Day'' that provides workforce development programming as part of the ``Collegiate Connect'' initiative. We continue these efforts at NBAA's regional events and targeted educational programs by offering student-focused programming to educate young people about the many career opportunities in business aviation. Through partnerships with non-profit organizations, NBAA is also helping to expose, recruit and retain new professionals from underrepresented communities. These initiatives will help to ensure that the industry remains competitive and reflects a more diverse workforce. NBAA also actively sponsors targeted initiatives to attract, develop and retain underrepresented segments of the population. This includes our sponsoring partnership with The Red Tail Flight Academy, whose volunteer leaders focus on recruitment that bolsters diversity within the aviation industry, including free training for future pilots. We are pleased that this program, inspired by the Tuskegee Airmen, graduated its first class of future leaders last year. We are also a proud partner with Flying Classroom, a program launched by aviation pioneer Barrington Irving that aims to teach all students about careers in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. Meeting the Mission of Safety and Efficiency The FAA's mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. To meet that mission, the agency must continually review and improve its processes and systems. Over the last few years, a significant backlog has developed in a number of areas, including medical certification, aircraft registry, letters of authorization and other approvals. These delays slow commerce and detract from the agency's mission. There is an opportunity to enhance efficiency while at the same time providing new tools to FAA managers to improve work flows, troubleshoot and maintain accountability, by transitioning analog processes to digital platforms. Digitizing the application process for review and approvals of certification, registration, Petitions for Exemption and Letters of Authorization would greatly improve efficiency at the FAA. Moving to a digital environment would deliver processing efficiencies that would benefit both the workforce and industry services and increase transparency for both the FAA and industry. Under FAA reauthorization, the NBAA recommends that the Congress direct the Administrator to identify and execute three programs within the agency for digitization. Threats to the safety and efficiency mission of the FAA have taken on an even more profound meaning when the agency has been faced with the government shutdowns that have taken place in recent years. When such a scenario presents itself, several weeks and countless work hours prior to a looming shutdown are spent preparing each of the FAA's lines of business for the lapse in federal spending and the inevitable, devastating disruptions to the FAA's core functions. If a shutdown does come to pass, thousands of FAA employees are furloughed, delaying training, pilot certifications and safety authorizations, and halting the movement of new aircraft into service. In short, on several levels, an agency shutdown amounts to an alarming safety concern. Some steps have been taken to address this concern; for example, NBAA appreciates the committee's work in deeming the FAA's Aircraft Registry an essential service under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. That said, further steps need to be taken to provide for the continuity of business at the agency, and solutions are available. For example, during a shutdown, taxes continue to be paid into the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which could be used to continue operations, or pay FAA employees. NBAA urges Congress, under the FAA Reauthorization, to provide the agency with additional flexibility to use trust fund revenues to continue operations during a government shutdown. The United States has a treasured asset in the National Airspace System. It is unmatched around the world in its size, diversity of users, complexity of airspace and safety record. Our aviation system, as a public asset, is best overseen by the federal government and Congress to serve all Americans. Congress should codify that the U.S. aviation system should be managed efficiently, safely, and provide access for all stakeholders by leveraging proven tools and airspace-management techniques to address recurring challenges such as weather, congestion, equipment failure and national emergencies, even as we continue to transform the aviation system to meet the needs of the future. Applying the FAA's Gold Standard to New Entrants America has a unique opportunity to enhance its gold standard in aviation safety and export its approach to safety globally through the safe and efficient integration of new technologies including Advanced Air Mobility or electric vertical lift and takeoff (eVTOL), unmanned aircraft systems and electric aircraft, among other new technologies. Modern aviation was born on America's shores with the first powered flight in Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. We led the transition from piston engines to the jet age. We pioneered air traffic control technology and airspace policies that created the safest, most efficient and most diverse air traffic system in the world. Our robust aviation infrastructure is unparalleled and our workforce, while greatly affected by the COVID pandemic, remains the most agile, innovative and sought-after in the world. We have the potential to continue to lead the next phase in the evolution in aviation with AAM, the public demand is high, but competition with other nations to be first is fierce and rapidly advancing. Among other considerations, this means the FAA will need to keep pace with the type certifications and promised regulatory schedule, so that the first AAM commercial operations can occur as soon as 2024. Transparency, predictability and accountability are key markers on this path. The FAA should enable utilization of existing infrastructure to accommodate initial operations, and focus on hiring the workforce with the right technical expertise to facilitate the safe integration of new technologies. Achieving these milestones over the next five years will be critical, if we are to fully scale this promising new technology, and NBAA is pleased to know that this Committee will include a New Entrants title in FAA Reauthorization to help achieve this goal. In short, we stand at a pivotal juncture--the investments and policy decisions we make today will determine whether we harness the full safety, economic, environmental and national security potential of AAM and maintain our position as a global leader in aviation and aerospace. Aviation Safety in Focus on the Horizon The next FAA reauthorization will require new ways of thinking about aviation safety in order to prepare for ever-more complexity: new entrants, new technologies, new flight-mission profiles, new infrastructure needs. Here are three guiding principles for ensuring America's continued safety leadership in the global aviation system: 1. Strengthen and improve critical FAA systems to meet the agency's mission of safety and efficiency and maintain the America's position as the global leader in aviation through a strategic approach that includes: digitizing the aircraft registry and pilot medical certification systems; establishing clear goals and accountability measures for the implementation of the Federal Notam System (FNS); and coordinating the timely delivery of type certifications and regulations to enable the integration of Advanced Air Mobility and other new technologies; 2. Implement strategic solutions to bolster the workforce and attract and retain the next generation of skilled aviation professionals across the industry to ensure the nation's gold standard in safety; 3. Mitigate the serious safety and security threat that emerged with Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) by making improvements to the Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program. The general aviation community appreciates the work of this Committee on the 2018 Reauthorization, which set the stage for many of the next-generation developments we are witnessing. Our industry looks forward to continued engagement as we develop policy solutions that strengthen our unrivaled national airspace system, sustain vigilance across the industry on safety and maintain the role of the United States as the world leader in aerospace. NBAA appreciates this Committee's continued leadership and willingness to engage with all stakeholders on priorities for a long- term FAA reauthorization bill, and we look forward to a robust discussion about aviation safety. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Bolen. And thank you for your specific recommendations as we work on the reauthorization of the 2018 bill. Our final witness is Dr. Kerry Buckley, vice president of the Center for Advanced Aviation System Development with MITRE Corporation. Dr. Buckley, you are recognized for 5 minutes. TESTIMONY OF KERRY BUCKLEY, Ph.D., VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR ADVANCED AVIATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT, MITRE CORPORATION Ms. Buckley. Thank you. Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the past, the present, and the future of aviation safety. My name is Kerry Buckley. I am a vice president at the MITRE Corporation. It is a nonprofit corporation chartered to operate in the public interest, which includes operating federally funded research and development centers, or FFRDCs, on behalf of Federal agency sponsors. We currently operate six FFRDCs, including the FAA's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development. MITRE has supported the FAA for more than 60 years as a trusted and objective mission partner, providing technical expertise in air traffic management systems engineering, aerospace operations, airspace design, and systems automation and integration. The United States has achieved our excellent safety record through continuous world leading innovation, from automated collision avoidance systems half a century ago, to satellite- based position, navigation, and surveillance today. The aerospace community's shared commitment to safety has facilitated the trust and cooperation required for collaborative safety analysis and data sharing focused on detecting risks before they result in accidents. Participants in the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, or ASIAS, program, voluntary submit sensitive data, such as onboard flight operations, quality assurance data, and safety reports, to identify shared safety risks before they result in incidents. Over 45 airlines representing over 99 percent of domestic commercial operations, as well as general aviation and rotorcraft operators, benefit from their participation. ASIAS should build on this history of success by increasing the velocity at which data is collected and analyzed, advancing its predictive capabilities, and expanding research access to the shared data environment to enable collaborative analytics. Looking forward, we have a new set of challenges and opportunities: Software-intensive systems, autonomous aircraft, and cybersecurity to name a few, combined with developments in the UAS and commercial space industries. Many of these innovations cannot come to fruition without an effective FAA. As both the aerospace regulator and operator of the air traffic control system, the FAA is often a pacesetter in the development and implementation of new systems and technologies. On the operational side, its modernization programs establish the air traffic control infrastructure affecting not only safety but also capacity and efficiency. Delays in modernization programs increase both sustainment costs and the eventual cost of modernization, squeezing the FAA budgets from both sides. Ensuring that modernization plans begun under the NextGen are completed, especially those for trajectory-based operations, should be a priority. There is a risk to system reliability and safety if we do not accelerate the shift from sustainment to modernization. This will require both substantially reducing sustainment costs and prioritizing those modernization activities most critical to mass evolution. Today, the FAA assures safety for commercial and general aviation through a rigorous process of regulation, approvals, and compliance checking. These processes are appropriate for mature industry but are not agile in the face of innovation in an increasingly diverse landscape because they presuppose an ability to match legacy regulations to new vehicles and operational concepts. Congress and FAA should consider moving to a performance- based system which leverages safety management systems, including those in industry and in Government, to monitor overall safety-based outcomes. Working with Congress, the FAA can create an appropriate regulatory framework while retaining the authority to spot check compliance. Safety also means ensuring our systems are resilient and protected from cyber adversaries. Risks to the FAA from cyber attacks and cyber compromise are substantial. Modernizing its computer and automation systems addresses legacy risk, but there is a continuing need to assess FAA systems for vulnerabilities to emerging threats and to apply proven technologies and methodologies to prevent, detect, respond to, and remediate cyber risk. MITRE is a proud part of the aerospace community focused on innovation. We will continue to support the FAA and the aerospace community in the search for solutions to our most pressing challenges so we can all realize the benefits to a safe and modern aerospace system. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And I am happy to answer any questions the committee may have. [Ms. Buckley's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Kerry Buckley, Ph.D., Vice President, Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, MITRE Corporation Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and distinguished members of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the past, present, and future vision of aviation safety. My name is Kerry Buckley, and I am a Vice President at The MITRE Corporation, a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation. We are chartered to operate in the public interest, which includes operating federally funded research and development centers, or FFRDCs, on behalf of federal agency sponsors. We currently operate six FFRDCs. I am also the General Manager and Director of MITRE's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD), which is the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) FFRDC. MITRE has supported the FAA for more than 60 years as a trusted and objective mission partner, providing technical expertise in air traffic management systems engineering, aviation operations, airspace design, and systems automation and integration. The United States has the largest, most efficient, and safest aerospace system in the world. We have achieved this safety record through a shared commitment to safety by members of the aviation community, from ground crews deicing aircraft, to FAA inspectors, and from aircraft designers to mechanics. We have also achieved this safety record through continuous, world- leading innovation: from automated collision avoidance systems a half century ago to satellite-based position, navigation, and surveillance today. U.S. aviation continues to be a leader in, among other areas, the application of human factors and the development of simulator-based training. The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Innovation and Safety It was the aviation community's shared commitment to safety that facilitated the trust and cooperation required for the development of the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, or ASIAS program, a collaborative safety analysis and data sharing initiative focused on detecting risks before they result in accidents. The FAA, aviation industry, and MITRE launched ASIAS in 2007. ASIAS enables risk-based assessments of emerging systemic hazards as the foundation of decision-making to advance safety. This public-private partnership (PPP) is an active, robust example of how 15 years of dedicated collaborative data sharing can have a positive impact in advancing safety. Since its inception, ASIAS has completed over 150 studies, which have resulted in the voluntary adoption of systemic mitigations, including over 20 Commercial Aviation Safety Team, or CAST, safety enhancements, as well as numerous other localized mitigations to reduce aviation risk. One example is an ASIAS study that identified the reasons behind the higher-than-expected incidence of flap misconfigurations on takeoff. It concluded that the potential for takeoff misconfiguration events occurs most frequently when flights are running behind schedule and pilots feel rushed to complete their takeoff duties. In particular, freezing temperatures and deicing conditions can interfere with the normal checklist flow for departures. To reduce the risk of human error identified by ASIAS, the FAA issued Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 14005 to quickly raise awareness of the potential for flap misconfiguration during takeoff. It did so within weeks of the ASIAS findings to alert flight crews about the issue before it could become a more significant risk as the winter season approached and temperatures dropped. Three subsequent CAST safety enhancements were adopted to reduce the number of flap misconfiguration events on takeoff. In 2015, ASIAS received the Department of Transportation Safety Award, and in 2018 ASIAS and CAST received the Aviation Week Laureate Award, which recognized this unparalleled collaboration between government and industry to improve aviation safety. Having exceeded its first 10-year goal in reducing U.S. commercial aviation fatality risk by 83%, CAST now aims for further reductions in risk, leveraging industry data and analytical tools from ASIAS. MITRE is privileged to be the ASIAS Trusted Third Party, serving as the trusted bridge between government, industry, and other participants. MITRE serves as data steward, providing the secure data environment and related capabilities to protect and manage stakeholder data and results, while also executing technical work to answer partner-approved research questions. ASIAS information is used solely for the identification, monitoring, and mitigation of systemic safety issues. ASIAS stakeholders voluntarily submit sensitive data (e.g., on-board Flight Operations Quality Assurance data and safety reports), enabled by assurances in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 193 that the safety information they disclose will not be used punitively. While 14 CFR Part 193 provides protection from punitive action, participants in ASIAS are voluntarily providing sensitive data daily, and they must trust that it will be protected from other uses that could impact their business. Trust is the bedrock of the ASIAS program. When ASIAS launched 15 years ago, four commercial airlines agreed to participate and share data for the greater good. Today, there are over 45 participating airlines, representing over 99% of all U.S. domestic commercial operations. Ten years ago, the program expanded to include general aviation, and today MITRE has executed over 150 data sharing and participation agreements with general aviation operators and data aggregators. Most recently ASIAS expanded to include participants from the rotorcraft community. The ASIAS process starts with the intake and integration of various types of data to create a holistic ``flight story.'' Crucially, ASIAS processes require data de-identification (for example, the names or other identifying information for participating organizations and individuals), ensuring that the focus remains on addressing systemic safety issues in a non-punitive manner. This data is the foundation for studies and metrics that identify systemic hazards and their contributing factors. Study results are shared with safety teams, such as CAST and the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee, or GAJSC, to develop mitigation solutions, such as adoption of procedures, training, or equipment to reduce the likelihood of accidents in the future. Public-private partnerships like ASIAS ensure success by moving at the speed of trust. Trust has been a core value critical to the health and success of ASIAS since its inception. To endure, public-private partnerships like ASIAS require a foundation of trust in each partner's commitment, believing that each party will follow through in good faith according to their agreements. Trust underlies a public-private partnership's ability to adapt to changing circumstances and objectives. The ASIAS model has been so successful that it has been leveraged in other industries. One example is the Partnership for Analytics Research in Traffic Safety, or PARTS. PARTS applies the same collaborative principles we learned from ASIAS to the automobile industry, which is itself experiencing rapid innovation. MITRE has worked with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and nine original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs, that together represent almost 80% of the U.S. market, to increase safety for the American driving public. Moving at the speed of trust has enabled PARTS to rapidly move from initial exploratory meetings in 2017 to executing agreements and finishing an initial Phase 1 pilot study by 2019. Partners proved willing and able to transfer sensitive data including OEM build records, warranty records, and crash records, and work collaboratively to conduct safety research. They agree that this model offers an improved ability to gain real-world insights into the performance of safety technologies, offering opportunities to learn from each other and improve safety for all. This is particularly striking in an industry that competes on safety, often highlighting safety achievements in television advertisement and other marketing materials. PARTS recently released the results of the largest government- automaker study to date about the real-world performance of advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) in passenger vehicles. This study shows that vehicles equipped with forward collision warning (FCW) and automatic emergency braking (AEB) avoid approximately half of front-to- rear crashes and that AEB performs in all conditions--even when roadway, weather, and lighting conditions are not ideal. The study also shows that vehicles equipped with active intervention technologies to help drivers stay in their lane are effective in single-vehicle crashes that lead to serious injury. A key strength of the study was the scope of cross-industry data on which it was based, made possible by the PARTS collaboration. Participating auto manufacturers provided vehicle equipment data for 47 million passenger vehicles from model years 2015- 2020. Added to that was data from 12 million police-reported crashes from 13 states, provided by NHTSA. MITRE combined these data sources to analyze the effectiveness of six ADAS features in avoiding roadway crashes: FCW, AEB, and Pedestrian AEB (all designed to help prevent collisions) and lane departure warning, lane keeping assistance, and lane centering assistance--features designed to help ensure that drivers remain on the roadway. The report, prepared by MITRE, was published in November 2022. Another example leveraging the ASIAS model is the Railroad Information Sharing Environment (RISE), which is a voluntary, non- regulatory, non-punitive, data-driven safety partnership consisting of railroad stakeholders, including Federal Railroad Administration, to advance railroad safety. These examples illustrate how industry working together at the speed of trust can achieve great things for the American public. With the support of a trusted third party, like MITRE, this model could be applied to other safety-sensitive and critical areas like pipelines, supply chain, and more. That said, the National Airspace System (NAS) continues to expand and change both in capability, via FAA's Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) initiatives, and in operational tempo, with the advent of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and the continued growth of aerospace operations. New safety challenges demand rapid implementation of solutions to discover and prevent hazards before they become incidents or accidents. ASIAS should increase the velocity at which data is collected, processed, and analyzed to share safety intelligence more quickly with its stakeholders and the broader aviation community. Additionally, new entrants, such as UAS, offer new challenges to aviation safety. ASIAS should look to adapt to these emerging risks and create new tools to analyze previously unknown concerns. In the future, ASIAS must also advance its predictive capabilities. ASIAS already has tools to proactively identify and examine safety concerns that can lead to accidents; however, predictive capabilities could go further by anticipating the likelihood of future outcomes. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) would give safety teams and stakeholders the awareness and tools necessary to more rapidly inform decision makers of safety issues. Additionally, ASIAS can have an even greater impact by increasing external collaboration on analyses conducted by the program. ASIAS should identify ways to evolve shared data environments where internal program analysts, external stakeholders, and aviation safety researchers can come together to spur innovation while adhering to the program governance requirements. It is through this collaboration that the ASIAS program can continue to be a leader in the global adoption of a non-punitive safety culture. Modernizing and Integrating Safe National Aerospace Operations The FAA's NextGen modernization program has, over the past 20 years, achieved critical advances in efficiency and safety, including Performance-Based Navigation standards, satellite-based operations, and data analytics for accident prediction and prevention. NextGen has created a strong foundation for where we are today--at the precipice of a new and more challenging evolutionary leap. Looking forward, we have a new set of challenges and opportunities. Software-intensive systems, autonomous aircraft, and cybersecurity, to name a few, combined with developments in the UAS and commercial space industries. New approaches to addressing these challenges will continue to improve safety and facilitate the operations of all participants, from new entrants to the original entrant: America's general aviation. But many of these innovations cannot come to fruition without an effective FAA. As both the aerospace regulator and the operator of the air traffic control system, the FAA is often a pacesetter in the development and implementation of new systems and technologies. On the regulatory side, it determines what is allowed and what is mandated, and the processes and standards to do so must keep pace with the aviation environment. While safety is the overriding objective, the FAA has an essential role in increasing efficiency, capacity, and opportunities for growth in aviation. The FAA-published Charting Aviation's Future: Operations in an Info-Centric NAS outlines how the agency will build on NextGen and the foundations of Trajectory-Based Operations to create a more agile and flexible NAS for all airspace users. When NextGen implementation began in 2008, few could have predicted the multitude of new technologies, operations, and opportunities in aerospace and multi- modal transportation systems that the next 15 years would bring. This future requires more agile and scalable automation solutions that can extend to many more air traffic facilities, while also ensuring that these solutions are resilient to adversaries and system failures. The future NAS must safely accommodate these transformational changes, and the FAA's vision serves as an initial approach to do that. In addition, the Department of Defense's (DoD) airspace needs for readiness training and research continue to evolve, placing additional demands on the NAS as a shared resource. A cross-agency perspective is vital to safely accommodate these competing demands for airspace in a flexible and efficient manner. In this regard, I want to commend this Committee for supporting Section 1093 of the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the FAA and DoD to conduct a pilot program to explore new ways to manage special activity airspace to better meet the needs of both organizations. Enactment of a forward-looking FAA Reauthorization bill will better position and enable the FAA to deliver on its daily operations, its modernization efforts, and its role in research and development. Delays in modernization programs increase both sustainment costs and the eventual cost of modernization, squeezing the FAA's budget from both sides. Ensuring that the modernization plans begun under NextGen are completed, especially those for Trajectory-Based Operations, should be a priority. There is a risk to system reliability and safety if we do not accelerate the shift from sustainment to modernization. This will require both substantially reducing sustainment costs and prioritizing those modernization activities most critical to NAS evolution. Planning and carrying out the necessary streamlining and improvement activities poses a considerable strategic challenge for the FAA, involving many competing demands and priorities that FAA has historically struggled to balance. Moving Toward a Safe and Optimized Regulatory Framework Today, the FAA assures safety for commercial and general aviation through a rigorous process of regulation, approvals, and compliance checking. These processes are appropriate for a mature industry with aviation operations that have been standardized over decades of development. However, they are not agile in the face of innovation and an increasingly diverse fleet because they presuppose an ability to match legacy regulations to new vehicles and operational concepts. As a result, the FAA must issue numerous waivers and exemptions, and dedicate significant staff effort to adapt the traditional ``means of compliance'' regulatory approach to these new entrants. Within this system, the FAA's primary means of scaling to demand is to delegate authority to review compliance, but with new entrants and technologies, that option creates challenges and concerns around the FAA's limited familiarity with the new product or service. The scale and complexity of the NAS are compounded by the speed of change. We all are familiar with nearly daily updates to the software on our phones and computers. Under the current regulatory approach, changes to software on aviation systems on the ground and in the air require the same level of rigor and review as changing physical components such as engines. The current approval processes were not designed to support daily changes and an iterative product design process, and cybersecurity threats make the need for daily changes more necessary than ever. To keep pace with innovation while ensuring the safety of the NAS, a system is needed that scales by holding regulated parties accountable not just for compliance, but also for the safety performance of their products and services. The FAA describes this performance-based system in the U.S. State Safety Program (US SSP) submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It presents how the FAA will evolve its safety management practices in a holistic manner by building on safety management principles to proactively address emerging risk. Such a data-driven, proactive management of safety performance is possible through the collaborative efforts of all parties to monitor their safety mitigations and anticipate points of weakness in the system. Collaboration is different from more delegation, as a performance- based system leverages the safety management systems of operators, manufacturers, maintenance and repair stations, airports, the air traffic organization, and others to monitor the safety performance of the entire system from a 360-degree perspective. This focuses the approval and oversight functions on the highest risk areas based on performance data, and more importantly on predictions of growing areas of concern. Multiple perspectives provide independent verification of the data and events. A performance-based regulatory system, by combining ubiquitous data from the digital revolution with advanced analytics to manage safety performance, could work in ways that are more predictive, adaptive, and agile. Predictive: Advanced analytics such as AI could drive proactive adjustments to mitigations, inform holistic review strategies for organizations in greater need of oversight, and provide more timely safety intelligence to guide actions that resolve areas of higher risk. Adaptative: The emphasis on monitoring performance will provide FAA and the community with a basis for creating performance- based standards and regulations that are adaptable to innovations of the emerging fleets. The FAA needs authority to flexibly respond to the diversity of ideas from industry. Agile: Safety management systems manage risk by continuous, incremental adjustments and self-correction. This should shorten the time that risks remain in the system by creating a community effort to spot and correct issues from multiple perspectives--operator, OEM, maintainer, etc. By accelerating its transition to a data-driven performance-based agency, the FAA can significantly advance its goals of improving safety, increasing efficiency, and remaining world leading. To do so, the FAA needs the legislative authority to deploy this approach. Working with Congress, the FAA can create the appropriate regulatory framework focused on performance safety outcomes while retaining the authority to spot check compliance. In addition, the FAA must continue to build a robust safety culture across its workforce, including use of Safety Management Systems, and a program of continuous safety training. This includes applying objective and repeatable methods to ensure adequate staffing to meet operational needs while balancing emerging workforce trends, in addition to evaluating potential improvements to how to accomplish medical certification for key roles like pilots and air traffic controllers to enable a modernized and more human centered, data-driven risk-based approach. Achieving World-Class Cybersecurity Safety also means ensuring our systems are resilient and protected from cyber adversaries. NAS dependency on GPS is increasing. Risks to the FAA from cyber-attack and cyber-compromise are substantial. As the FAA continues to evolve its computer and automation systems, those risks grow. As cybersecurity adversaries become more sophisticated and threats increase, there is a continuing need to assess FAA systems for vulnerabilities to emerging threats. As digital transformation accelerates across private industry and government, new capabilities such as cloud, the proliferation of mobile devices, and a growing need for data sharing across the aerospace ecosystem, increase the need for a modernized cybersecurity approach that is built upon appropriate authentication and authorization. The infusion of proven cybersecurity technologies and methodologies into FAA operational capabilities must keep pace with modernization efforts. Closing Remarks Ensuring that the FAA retains its position as a global leader will require a collaborative partnership with industry to map the future. Industry, academia, international partners, and other associations, non-profits, and FFRDCs, must work with the FAA to innovate together. Likewise, interagency cooperation has never been more crucial than right now. At The MITRE Corporation, we are a proud part of the aerospace community focused on innovation. As many of you know, MITRE has been and continues to be involved in every safety innovation and safety challenge that I have mentioned today, and more. We will continue to support the FAA and the aerospace community in the search for solutions to our most pressing challenges so we can all realize the benefits of a safe and modern aerospace system. Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement. I am happy to answer any questions the Committee may have. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Dr. Buckley. I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. On behalf of Chairman Sam Graves, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record statements by the American Society of Civil Engineers and by the Helicopter Association International. Without objection, so ordered. [The information follows:] Statement of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sam Graves Introduction The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) thanks the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure for holding a hearing on aviation safety. ASCE has long advocated for investing in the safety and efficiency of our transportation network, including the aviation system. Aviation infrastructure allows people to travel to their destinations, facilitates the movement of goods, and plays a key role in the nation's economy. America's aviation infrastructure received a long-overdue boost in November 2021 with the enactment of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which ASCE strongly supported. The legislation includes an investment of $25 billion in airports through three programs, which concentrate on air traffic control facility improvements, ``airside'' projects such as runways, and terminal development and connections. This historic achievement--the largest investment in our nation's critical infrastructure systems in a generation--will be instrumental in generating economic growth and narrowing the infrastructure investment gap. Passage of the IIJA provides a unique opportunity to improve the safety and resilience of our nation's aviation infrastructure. As the 118th Congress gets under way, ASCE looks forward to working with the committee to build on the investments provided through the IIJA and urges a timely reauthorization of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) programs to ensure aviation safety and optimize investments from the infrastructure bill. ASCE looks forward to working with the committee to pass an FAA reauthorization bill. ASCE urges Congress to reauthorize FAA programs before they expire on September 30, as these program are critical to ensuring that our nation's airports receive robust and reliable funding over the upcoming years. ASCE's 2021 Report Card for America's Infrastructure Every four years, ASCE publishes its Report Card for America's Infrastructure, which grades the nation's major infrastructure categories using an ``A'' to ``F'' school report card format. The most recent Report Card \1\, released in March 2021, evaluated 17 categories of infrastructure and reflected an overall ``C-'' grade. This grade marks an increase from the ``D+'' recorded in 2017, indicating the country has made some progress in recent years. However, 11 categories remained in the ``D'' range, including aviation, which received a ``D+'' \2\. Often, it is these categories where we have failed to make investments needed to maintain the assets that were built 50 years ago or more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/ \2\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/aviation- infrastructure/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fortunately, the IIJA makes progress to reverse decades of underinvestment in many of these lowest categories and represents a significant down payment on the $2.5 trillion infrastructure investment gap that was identified in the 2021 Report Card. Efficient implementation of the IIJA will play a major role in raising the grades for infrastructure categories such as aviation and making our nation's infrastructure fit for the future. Under pre-COVID- 19 projections, our aviation system was set to have a 10-year, $111 billion funding shortfall. While the IIJA provides $25 billion for the nation's aviation infrastructure, Congress now needs to optimize these investments and ensure reliable funding going forward through the reauthorization of FAA programs. Failure to Act: Economic Impacts of Status Quo Investment Across Infrastructure Systems ASCE's report titled Failure to Act: Economic Impacts of Status Quo Investment Across Infrastructure Systems \3\ found that inadequate infrastructure--including in the aviation sector--significantly hampers economic growth. Failure to invest in aging infrastructure negatively impacts numerous aspects of the economy, including GDP, jobs, personal disposable income, and business sales. Declining airport infrastructure affects our nation's ability to import and export goods efficiently, driving up costs for American consumers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ https://infrastructurereportcard.org/the-impact/failure-to-act- report/ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Failure to Act's trends-extended analyses indicate that funding will be available to cover only 57% (approximately $3.5 trillion) of infrastructure needs through 2029, and 56.6% ($7.3 trillion) by 2039 for the aggregate of surface transportation, water transportation, airports, water, wastewater, and electricity systems. For airports specifically, funding will be available to cover only about 53% of needs through 2029. The report found that airports face a funding gap of $111 billion through 2029, a gap which is projected to grow to $281 billion through 2039. Underperforming infrastructure at our airports and coastal ports will have a negative impact on overall trade. Failure to Act estimated a cumulative export decrease of $2.38 trillion between 2020 and 2039. The decline in these logistics sectors will be driven by lower trade of manufactured, agricultural, and extracted products that require wholesaling and storage services. Effective implementation of the IIJA and close cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies can help improve deficient aviation infrastructure systems while strengthening the economy. As the nation continues to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, investments in airports can provide both immediate and long-term boosts to the struggling American economy and ensure the country remains globally competitive in trade and commerce. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Looking ahead, one of ASCE's legislative priorities for this year is reauthorization of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) programs before they expire. ASCE supports a multi-year bill that increases funding for aviation infrastructure, invests in resilience, and advances the safe and efficient delivery of projects. The FAA reauthorization funds programs that are vital for the safety and efficiency of the nation's aviation system. Timely passage of a reauthorization bill is key because FAA programs expire on September 30. Prior to the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, the FAA operated under a series of short-term authorizations, leading to costly delays in investment decisions. A prompt, multi-year reauthorization would prevent uncertainty with future projects and FAA programming. ASCE also urges lawmakers to protect airport infrastructure funding by increasing Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funding levels and eliminating the federal cap on the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC). The AIP and the PFC are two critical revenue mechanisms. The AIP, a major infrastructure investment program for airports, has had the same annual authorization level of $3.35 billion for over a decade. The PFC, which is levied on each enplaning passenger at a commercial airport, has a federally mandated cap of $4.50. PFC fees can be used to fund FAA- approved projects that enhance safety or capacity, reduce noise, or increase air carrier competition. With a federally mandated cap on how much they can charge passengers, airports struggle to keep up with infrastructure investment needs. Across all sectors of infrastructure, ASCE supports sustainability and resilience projects. Specific to aviation, ASCE asks Congress to dedicate funds for these types of projects and direct the FAA to work with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) on resiliency initiatives for coastal airports. Resilience to both natural and man-made disasters is key for airports. A strong cybersecurity network bolsters the resilience of the aviation system in the event of communication and passenger services issues. Because airports serve as gateways for critical supplies during and after natural disasters, it is important they develop facilities assessments and recovery strategies that can be implemented when these events occur. Additionally, ASCE recommends a reauthorization that accommodates alternative delivery and advanced construction methods that can expedite projects and reduce costs. ASCE also acknowledges the importance of aviation services to less populous communities. ASCE asks Congress to address the needs of small communities by supporting the Essential Air Service Program and the Small Community Air Service Development Program. Conclusion ASCE remains a staunch supporter of investing in aviation infrastructure and promoting safety. A safe and reliable aviation infrastructure system facilitates the movement of people to their destinations and goods to market. With the passage of the IIJA, the nation is on the precipice of a long-awaited period of infrastructure investment. The progress of this investment will be assisted immensely with the passage of a robust, multi-year reauthorization of FAA programs. ASCE thanks the committee for holding this hearing and stands ready to assist lawmakers working on effective implementation of the IIJA and successful reauthorization of the FAA. Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, Helicopter Association International, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sam Graves On behalf of the members of the Helicopter Association International (HAI), thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony. As the professional trade association for the international vertical flight industry, HAI represents more than 1,100 companies and over 16,000 industry professionals in more than 65 countries. Each year, HAI members safely operate more than 3,700 helicopters and remotely piloted aircraft approximately 2.9 million hours. HAI is dedicated to the promotion of vertical flight as a safe, effective method of commerce and to the advancement of the international vertical flight community. For more than 70 years, HAI has provided support services and set industry safety guidelines for the international vertical aviation community. There is no higher priority than safety for HAI. We appreciate the House Transportation and Infrastructure's continued focus on safety, and we look forward to continuing to work together on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization legislation. In this testimony, I will provide HAI's position on some of the most pressing safety issues facing the vertical aviation industry today. Leadership Strong FAA leadership is vital to ensure that the U.S. national airspace system (NAS) remains the envy of the world. Vertical aviation is on the cusp of major technological advancement with the entrance of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft and uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS). Recent progress on policy development is encouraging, but efficiency and interagency coordination remain an issue. We appreciate Congress for acknowledging this issue by passing the AAM Coordination and Leadership Act, and we encourage the committee to remain vigilant on implementation. FAA has not had a confirmed Administrator for far too long. There are more than two dozen leadership positions that remain vacant. It is imperative that effective leaders are appointed to those positions and that sufficient resources are provided. FAA Preemption Authority Uniform federal authority is an essential predicate to maintaining safe transportation in the nation's airspace. A critical element of safety in the National Airspace (NAS) is the standardization of aviation regulations--and therefore operational processes and procedures. Federal preemption of aviation regulation designates the FAA as the sole regulatory authority over US aviation. This clearly defined FAA authority has created an operating environment for US aviation that provides a system of safety for all operators of all categories of aircraft. Infrastructure FAA recently issued guidance that would limit access to infrastructure for both current and future VTOL aircraft. According to the guidance, AAM aircraft would not have access to heliports, nor would helicopters have access to vertiports. This contradicts previous plans that FAA made public less than a year ago, and it would undoubtedly limit the success of AAM in the U.S. since it will require all new infrastructure to be permitted for operations to begin. There is no inherent safety benefit to arbitrarily restricting access in this manner. Whether or not a VTOL aircraft can take off or land at vertiport or heliport should be based on performance of the aircraft. We urge the committee to ensure FAA maintains access to new and existing infrastructure for both current and future VTOL aircraft. Technology The FAA's recent Notice to Airman (NOTAM) system failure has illuminated an issue that has long been a major concern--FAA is working with antiquated technology and must be modernized. We appreciate the recent House passage of the NOTAM Improvement Act of 2023, and we are hopeful to see legislation introduced and passed in the Senate. As the committee continues its work on FAA Reauthorization legislation, HAI urges the prioritization of modernizing other systems and technology. UAS Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) Report HAI was pleased to serve on the BVLOS ARC, and we remain committed to supporting the safe integration of UAS in the NAS. However, the ARC report included several recommendations that, if enacted, will compromise aviation safety. Primary, among other concerns, were recommendations to establish ``Shielded Areas'' and to undermine foundational ``Right of Way'' rules that have protected airspace users for decades. For the sake of safety, we ask the committee to reject the concept of ``Shielded Areas'' as proposed in the BVLOS ARC Final Report and prevent the segregation of airspace and any fundamental changes to ``right-of-way'' rules. Performance-based detect and avoid requirements for UAS BVLOS operations is a practical solution that would maintain safety for helicopters and other aircraft that operate in low altitudes across this country. Performance-Based Requirements Mandating the use of specific equipment as an answer to industry- wide safety issues is ineffective, potentially hazardous, and prevents the industry from being able to realize the benefits of a holistic approach to safety. HAI supports the Vertical Aviation Safety Team (VAST) and the US Helicopter Safety Team (USHST) in the vision of a US helicopter community with zero fatal accidents. To support this vision, safety solutions need to be performance based and considerate of the diverse set of aircraft mission profiles, as well as the complexity of installation requirements for varying aircraft makes, current and future. Prescriptive legislation and regulations do not support the flexibility necessary for the industry to leverage the advantages of all safety technologies and may close the door to the development and implementation of future innovative safety technologies. As aviation is an international industry, it is also important to take into consideration the regulatory approach of other countries. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are changing to focus on performance-based regulation. Airspace Airspace congestion resulting in reduced access to low-level instrument flight rules (IFR) routes is of serious concern for current helicopter operations and future AAM operations. Aircraft, communication, and navigation technology advancement has far outpaced the development of vertical aviation IFR routes. Helicopter operators and pilots struggle to find direct, safe, reliable routes that address the specific needs and capabilities of rotorcraft. Increasing the number of low-level IFR routes will serve helicopters and future AAM and provide spacing from higher level IFR fixed wing traffic. Spectrum Policy Prior to deployment, safety concerns over 5G interference with radio altimeters were raised by industry, multiple agencies, and Congress. FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-23-13 places restrictions on rotorcraft operations that are required to have a radio altimeter. The restrictions apply to part 135 rotorcraft operations and part 91 night vision goggle (NVG) operations. FAA approved a petition for exemption submitted by HAI that enables NVG operations for helicopter air ambulances. Unlike part 121 operations, helicopter operators have not been required to retrofit or replace radio altimeters, but we understand that FAA may reevaluate the restrictions in the AD after July 2023 when additional 5G providers enter the market and power levels increase. We encourage the committee to ensure FAA has sufficient authority to provide waivers and exemptions. Should FAA determine that radio altimeter retrofits and replacements are necessary for rotorcraft, we request the committee consider funding for operators to cover related equipage costs. We would also request that the committee ensure that any equipage required by FAA is implemented in a manner that is respectful of the practical considerations of development, manufacturing and availability of instruments that are not affected by 5G cell tower signals. National Parks Overflights Advisory Group (NPOAG) HAI has grave concern with how the FAA and the National Park Service (NPS) is handling the implementation of the air tour management plans (ATMPs) for 23 eligible national parks areas. Our concerns relate specifically to the transparency of the completion process, operational safety, and lack of economic considerations. HAI firmly believes congressional engagement with FAA and the NPS is needed to ensure National Park Oversight and Advisory Group (NPOAG) involvement on the development of these plans. Industry is willing to work with other stakeholders, the FAA, and the NPS to develop a plan that benefits all involved. Workforce Development Due to pandemic-related economic disruptions, many seasoned pilots and technicians retired early over the past year. This has only exacerbated the shortage of the skilled personnel the industry needs to operate safely and efficiently. We appreciate Congress setting up the Aviation Workforce Development Grants programs in the 2018 Reauthorization Act and likewise express gratitude for the funds made available for the programs. The grants have encouraged collaboration between schools, aviation companies, unions, and government to find new solutions to overcome the existing skills gap and help more Americans pursue aviation careers. HAI strongly encourages continued support of the grant programs including expanding the eligibility of the program to include innovate state programs that enable outreach and education to students to get started in the aviation industry. Commitment to Safety Ensuring the safety of those who fly--whether pilots, crews, or passengers--is always HAI's top priority. HAI has worked with safety advocates worldwide to address continued safety improvements for the vertical flight industry. The following is an overview of the initiatives that HAI has established for the important work of safety. Safety Management System HAI's Safety Management System (SMS) Program allows operators and maintenance providers to elevate their safety--effectively and affordably. A SMS is a formal approach to managing safety and risk, including organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures to identify and control risk. The four components of an SMS--safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion--work together in providing a safety culture. An SMS is vital to reducing the number of accidents in our industry, ensuring that every person in an organization, agency, or business understands that they are responsible for safety. HAI's SMS Program services allow users to verify their compliance with current and future international and domestic regulations. While not all civil aviation authorities currently require SMS programs for all operators and maintenance providers, HAI and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) have recommended the development and adoption of safety reporting systems that allow for data to be collected and analyzed and corrective action taken where necessary. HAI has partnered with providers to offer scalable SMS solutions to member businesses. Additionally, the association supports requiring SMS programs for all operations carrying passengers for hire. HAI strongly recommends that all aviation operations, not just those carrying paying passengers, implement an SMS program. HAI is pleased to have expanded the scope of its SMS Program by partnering with the Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA) to provide the latter's SMS for aircraft maintenance at no additional cost to HAI members. Aviation Safety Action Program An ASAP helps flight operators identify and reduce possible flight safety concerns and mitigate risks. It's an easy, open, self-reporting initiative offering third-party facilitation, tracking, and recommendations for corrective action so operators can enhance their overall safety culture. HAI enjoys a partnership with the Air Charter Safety Foundation to make the foundation's ASAP available to HAI members. Flight Risk Assessment Tool When implementing a SMS, one of the most critical components to develop is a Flight Risk Assessment Tool (FRAT). Because every flight has some level of risk, it is critical that pilots can differentiate, in advance, between a low-risk flight and a high-risk flight, and then establish a review process and develop risk mitigation strategies. A FRAT enables proactive hazard identification, is easy to use, and can visually depict risk. It is an invaluable tool in helping pilots make better go/no-go decisions. HAI has a partnership with Swiss company NGFT Solutions to offer a FRAT module to HAI members. This safety tool's simple question-and- answer format is designed to help operators objectively and truthfully evaluate the potential risks of an upcoming flight and any aerial work sites. Once the possible risks are identified, mitigation prompts help operators think through strategies to reduce the risk and make flying safer. Land and Live HAI promotes the Land and Live program to encourage pilots to execute precautionary landings when continued safety of flight is in perceived or actual jeopardy. Examples of situations include, but are not limited to, deteriorating or unsafe weather conditions, uncertainty of aircraft integrity, or potential incapacitation of a required crew member. HAI worked with the US Helicopter Safety Team to produce the award- winning ``56 Seconds to Live'' education program. This program provides pilots with real world examples to encourage pilots to make precautionary landings when flight conditions deteriorate. Vertical Aviation Safety Team One of the most significant safety projects HAI undertook is co- leading the Vertical Aviation Safety Team (VAST). I'm honored to serve as a co-advisor for this group with Miguel Marin, representing the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). VAST is a public- private initiative to enhance worldwide flight-operations safety in all segments of the vertical flight industry. Team members comprise international regional safety teams; safety authorities, including civil aviation authorities (CAAs); and other industry stakeholders that work to improve global vertical flight safety. VAST's vision is a global vertical flight community with zero fatal accidents achieved through cooperation and collaboration. In the past, international aviation safety information has tended to stay within separate organizational and national silos. VAST intends to break down these silos so that aviation safety information can flow freely globally. To achieve this end, VAST is engaging its regional safety teams to receive, integrate, harmonize, and distribute aviation safety data, programs, and recommendations worldwide. Additionally, VAST serves as an arbiter between the regional safety teams to ensure collaboration on and coordination of these initiatives, as well as the sharing of final output. International regional safety teams, which consist of national and industry stakeholders, are formed to improve the safety of civil vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) operations in their respective national airspace systems. In addition to national civil aviation authorities such as the US FAA and the CAAs of the United Kingdom, Sudan, and Colombia, aviation safety authorities include jurisdictional agencies, such as ICAO and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and nationally recognized safety organizations such as the NTSB in the United States, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, and the Transport Accident Investigation Commission in New Zealand. Other industry stakeholders include original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), training providers, aircraft operators, service providers, and vertical flight industry associations such as HAI, the European Helicopter Association, and the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International. VAST has five chief goals: 1. Establish the organization as the world's most trusted source for vertical flight safety information and resources 2. Establish working groups to represent key segments and issues relevant to the global VTOL industry 3. Formalize leadership positions, working groups, and advisory roles for participating organizations and individuals 4. Identify, collect, harmonize, and deliver centralized access to safety information and resources from participating stakeholder entities 5. Provide and coordinate a forum where regional safety teams, safety authorities, and other industry stakeholders work together on vertical flight safety issues. Conclusion I thank the committee for the opportunity to provide the perspective of the vertical flight industry and look forward to continuing our work together on these important issues. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Prior to Member questioning, I want to let the Members and the panel know that votes are currently predicted to be about 1:30. If that happens, we may end up taking a brief recess and coming back. If this occurs, I just want the witnesses to be aware that we may have to take a break. With that, we are going first turn to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Webster, for questions. Mr. Webster, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate all this. I thank each one of you for your presentation. Lots of questions. I don't know where to start. Captain Ambrosi, we as a committee are continuing to conduct rigorous oversight on the issue of 5G C-band and what its effect is on safety. How are you and your organization engaged in this issue and keeping everybody up to speed? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question. ALPA is engaged on the issue. I am pleased to report that at most carriers, progress is being made towards the deadline in July. However, it is unfortunate that we got to where we are today on this issue. There should have been a better collaboration between the FAA and the FCC on this issue. It is something that this body should look at going forward. And we are happy to continue collaborating on the issue. Mr. Webster of Florida. So, going forward, what recommendations would you have to keep everybody engaged? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, the FCC obviously should have coordinated with the FAA on this issue early on in the process. So, we are behind the scenes now. We are trying to fix this after the fact. So, I can assure you that our pilots and our members are taking this very seriously and working to ensure that every flight is operated in the safest fashion possible. Mr. Webster of Florida. So, what are you doing to keep your members up to speed on the problems or whatever? Mr. Ambrosi. So, the airlines, individual airlines disseminate data to the members or to their pilots of where it is. The NOTAM system has information that says which airports have an issue, which airports may not. Individual fleets, some airlines have multiple different airplanes, so, some fleets have been converted sooner than others. And we as an association also disseminate safety messages to our members on an ongoing basis. But right now, progress is being made, but we do urge the FCC and FAA and the cell phone carriers to continue taking this issue very seriously. Mr. Webster of Florida. So, do you think it is better today as far as just keeping people up to speed? Mr. Ambrosi. It is better than it was. In my opinion--I have only been on the job for a month, but in my opinion, it is better than it was a year ago. Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, I had another question, and that was, do you think that those communications, especially with the FCC, is there some sort of snag that we could help with, improve, or change so that there would be more collaboration? Mr. Ambrosi. That is an important question, sir. And I would like to take that back to my engineering or safety team and find out specifically what they feel would be the best way forward. And I will have my team share that with your office and the committee. Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Thank you very much. Thanks, each one of you, for appearing today. We really appreciate it. It is very good information. I yield back. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Five minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. First question I have is for Dr. Buckley. And if you could just maybe briefly explain why the--you live on acronyms--no. Could you explain why the ASIAS system as a voluntary system works in terms of collecting data, using that data, dealing with it objectively as opposed to mandating this process? Ms. Buckley. Yes. Thank you for the question on the ASIAS program. Certainly as we have heard, commercial aviation is safer than it has ever been, and it really is through the collaborative engagements through CAST and data sharing through programs like ASIAS. We are learning more and more and taking proactive actions to addressing emerging issues faster than ever. Since the CAST's inception, the fatality risk in commercial aviation, as we have heard, has dropped 94 percent, resulting in the safest period in aviation history. Their work, along with new aircraft regulations and other activities, have virtually eliminated the traditional common causes of commercial accidents, which are controlled flight into terrain, weather, and wind shear. But having exceeded this goal, their 10-year goal of reducing fatality risk by 83 percent, they are looking for further risk reductions, and leveraging industry and data analytic tools from ASIAS. The ASIAS environment operated by the MITRE Corporation is a data environment in which we are the third-party trusted partner to bring in data from the operators themselves, as well as Government and other types of data, you can think about weather and other type of infrastructure data. What we use that data to develop are these models to understand systemic accidents or threats to accidents or issues, and the key to this is that all of the parties participating build their participation and collaboration on trust. So, we protect the privacy of those who provide it. It is a nonpunitive environment. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Can I pause you there? Ms. Buckley. Please. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Because I want to get to a different question with someone else. But do you think this process can flex to apply to the new entrants, the eVTOL drone users, or is it specific to the current system we have among carriers and other operators? Ms. Buckley. Absolutely. And we are very much encouraging that shift. So, we already have rotorcraft, and general aviation is part of that. Certainly UAS, AAM, and eVTOLs, we believe, could really benefit from the type of analytics and data sharing that ASIAS offers. And in fact, we see that in other modes of transportation as well. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Great. Thanks. Mr. Boulter, of course, we are doing the reauthorization coming up, and I appreciate your comments. We have heard the concerns in certification. To achieve what we want to do in the reform bill, we need people at the FAA. And we have, certainly over the pandemic and probably for other reasons, we have lost people at the FAA and other agencies, and we are trying to get new people in. But with new people comes less experience until they are more experienced. Do you have a comment on whether or not that is holding FAA back moving forward on certification reforms or on certification generally? Mr. Boulter. As Mr. Bunce said, it is probably a higher volume than normal for the number of folks with not a lot of experience inside of aircraft certification. But some of these people come from industry and others comes right out of college. We look at this as an opportunity. I agree with Mr. Bunce that we need to look for unique ways to train folks up and maybe accelerate their training beyond on-the-job training. But we think we have the right numbers of folks. Congress has been very generous to us. For 2023, we added 200 additional folks in aviation safety. A year before that I think it was another 20O. So, that is part of it as well. We have plussed up our numbers so that would put more new people in the system. We are confident that--we look at this as a real opportunity. The folks we are bringing on bring different skills to us. Obviously, engineering schools are way different today than they were 30 years ago. Having folks of all different backgrounds and different skills really will help us in the long run. It is going to be a little bit of pain in the short run, obviously, with that many folks in training, but I think some of these training opportunities we may have could accelerate that. Mr. Larsen of Washington. All right. Mr. Chair, just in the final moments, I want to as well recognize the presence of Colgan families who are here and thank them for their continued advocacy for aviation safety for the entire flying public. I appreciate you all being here. Thank you very much. And finally, I would ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement from the Transport Workers Union's president, John Samuelsen. Mr. Graves of Missouri [presiding]. Without objection. [The information follows:] Statement of John Samuelsen, International President, Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen I offer this statement on behalf of more than 155,000 members of the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU). The TWU is the largest airline union in the U.S. Our members include flight attendants, ramp workers, mechanics, dispatchers, pilot instructors, and other professionals who keep our national airspace operating safely across 17 airlines. The safety of America's airspace was built and is maintained by the frontline workers responsible for implementing our safety rules on a daily basis. Flight attendants, mechanics, dispatchers, ground workers, and pilots strive to sustain a culture of safety at our airlines while facing increasing headwinds. While many measures--including fatalities--continue to showcase the incredible safety possibilities in our system, several others--including unruly passenger behavior-- demonstrate the need for continued improvements and oversight. As Congress prepares to reauthorize the FAA before the current authorization expires on September 30, 2023, we urge you to directly address several issues currently undermining the safety of our air system. Reestablish one level of safety and security for aircraft maintenance FAA-certified aircraft maintenance and repair stations, regardless of location, are all statutorily obligated to the same safety standards. Despite this requirement (and despite twice being directed by Congress to ensure one level of safety for these facilities), the FAA continues to allow repair facilities located outside of the U.S. to operate on lower safety and security standards. The FAA exempts the aircraft maintenance facilities it certifies outside the U.S. from security background checks and drug and alcohol testing for safety critical workers, risk-based safety and security evaluations for facilities, unannounced FAA inspections, and certification standards for mechanics and technicians. The collective weight of these exemptions has created a structural disadvantage for U.S.-based maintenance workers which is incentivizing offshoring American jobs and increasing our exposure to security and safety threats. As the TWU has previously testified to before this Committee, we are reaching a tipping point where the amount of maintenance being performed out of the country cannot be controlled for by the maintenance performed domestically. Fewer than half of the 286,000 mechanics working on U.S. aircraft are in the U.S. The single largest beneficiary of this offshoring is the government of China, which owns and operates nearly 100 FAA-certified facilities employing more than 23,000 workers maintaining and overhauling U.S. aircraft. These facilities perform repairs deep inside of airframes and engines, often in places inaccessible in between repairs which may be as long as 10-years apart. And they are doing so without any meaningful oversight from the U.S. government. Last Congress, this Committee recognized the significant threat of unregulated maintenance facilities and passed the Global Aircraft Maintenance Safety Improvement Act by a wide, bipartisan margin. The bill enjoys the support of the Chairs and Ranking Members of the full committee and the Aviation subcommittee and went on to pass the House by 374-52 last October. We urge you to include this bill in its entirety in this year's FAA reauthorization. Prevent assaults on airline workers Assaults on flight attendants, gate agents, and other customer facing workers in the airline industry have reached a critical level. In 2021, the FAA recorded almost 6,000 unruly passenger events onboard aircraft and in airports. These incidents of passengers assaulting, spitting on, and harassing safety critical personnel pose a major threat to our airspace system. The threat of assault is also driving these workers out of the industry, as well as slowing recruitment efforts. While many of these incidents in 2021 were related to mask mandates, more than a third of the reported assaults had nothing to do with mask enforcement and we have not seen these numbers return to pre- pandemic levels since the mask mandate was lifted. Incidents of assault in our air system were on the rise before the pandemic and actions to- date have not slowed the trend. We must reduce the number of assaults onboard aircraft and in airports to ensure a safe workplace for cabin crews and gate personnel. Federal law already prohibits assaulting, interfering with, or intimidating air crews, TSA agents, and airport workers with security duties (49 USC 46503 and 46504). The penalties for these activities include fines and jail time; however, nothing prevents these assailants from immediately returning to the commercial air system. Airlines are forbidden by anti-trust laws from sharing information on potentially dangerous passengers--even those who have posed significant security threats. The Protection from Abusive Passengers Act would prohibit violent passengers from utilizing the national airspace after they have been convicted or fined for violating existing federal law. These assailants would also lose access to trusted traveler programs like TSA pre-check. This bill provides frontline aviation workers with a critical level of protection. This is a commonsense change that we urge the committee to support. Additionally, advanced self-defense training is a proactive step which would allow crew members to protect themselves in cases of an assault or security threat made against the aircraft. Advanced self- defense training is already offered as a TSAapproved optional training for pilots and flight attendants and provides comprehensive hands-on and traditional classroom style training in self-defense best practices and techniques, tailored to the passenger aircraft environment. This training should be mandatory for flight attendants. Specifically, this type of training will improve flight attendant capabilities in deterring attackers by providing appropriate and effective responses to an assailant, including the use of force and appropriate restraint techniques. To round out these protections, the previous FAA reauthorization included a requirement for airlines to develop Employee Assault Prevention and Response plans to address violence against frontline aviation workers. While most airlines have submitted these plans, the FAA does not believe they have the authority to enforce them or penalize airlines who ignore this requirement. The next FAA reauthorization must clarify the FAA's powers here to include these plans in each airline's safety management system. Ensure aircraft dispatching remains safe Aircraft dispatchers are FAA-licensed professionals who have operational control of all commercial aircraft on the ground. Dispatchers plan flights, handle weight and balance issues (including fuel consumption), and work collectively with pilots and air traffic controllers to safely move each flight from takeoff to touchdown. Each dispatchers is responsible for as many as 50 flights at a time. This function requires a significant level of focus, a large amount of highly interconnected infrastructure, and a high degree of security-- which is why the FAA had never allowed dispatchers to operate in remote locations away from a dispatching center. In August of 2020, without explanation or a protocol for safety oversight, the FAA authorized two airlines to remotely dispatch aircraft. While couched as an emergency pandemic response, the FAA has expanded this authorization several times without explanation or even direction to their safety inspectors on how to ensure these carriers are meeting minimum safety standards. Remote dispatching raises significant safety concerns. FAA rules require dispatching duties to be performed in a secure environment protected from physical and cyberattacks; that dispatching workstations be capable to handling massive amounts of weather, traffic, and other data up-to-the-minute; that dispatchers be subject to random and reasonable suspicion drug and alcohol testing; and that work sites have distraction mitigations, spot inspections, and other standards in place to prevent a degradation of safety. These requirements are difficult or impossible to apply in work-from-home conditions. Congress must act to ensure the integrity of these rules are not undermined in the name of convenience. Enable reliable tracking and reporting of toxic cabin air incidents To create breathable air at cruise altitudes, most aircraft pull oxygen from over their wings, warm this air over the engines, and compress it before venting the air into the cabin. This air is then filtered and a portion of it is recirculated. However, when engine or compressor malfunctions occur, engine oil, jet fuel, or other harmful fluids can gasify and leak into the cabin air supply. These ``fume events'' can produce potent nerve agents when inhaled or absorbed through the skin and can have severe, negative health effects for flight crew and passengers alike. The Cabin Air Safety Act requires air monitoring equipment and detectors be installed on commercial aircraft, the creation of a robust system of data collection and reporting requirements, and flight crew training on identifying and detecting fume events in real time. These measures will help ensure aircraft cabin air is safe for passengers and flight crew members. Set standards for the next generation of aircraft to be safely integrated into our existing structure New technologies must always be judged by their ability to meet existing safety standards and create good, high-quality jobs. As aircraft begin to be used in new ways--such air taxis and drone delivery--we must ensure that this new equipment is living up to the rules currently in place that have made the U.S. airspace the safest in the world. Additionally, to the extent that aircraft are entering spaces currently served by other modes of transportation, Congress must take steps to ensure that no mode is disadvantaged as a result of the federal government's actions. Continue to allow airline workers to benefit from state labor protections Airline jobs have been, historically, great jobs. This is a highly unionized sector with competitive pay and benefits for most crafts. However, in recent years, airlines have attempted to carve out their workers from state and local labor protections--including minimum wages, meal & rest breaks, and family and medical leave. Such a change would be disastrous for hundreds of thousands of airline workers who would instantly see their labor standards reduced. This would severely harm recruitment efforts in the industry and push the best and brightest of future generations into other jobs with better labor protections. Proponents of federal pre-emption in this area fail to account for workers' response should the airline industry suddenly become the worst employer in an area. It will not help recruit new pilots, mechanics, ramp workers, flight attendants, or others into the industry if they are guaranteed a higher wage, time off to care for their families, and opportunities for rest breaks at every other employer competing for their talent. Additionally, worker advocates would be forced to lobby for these protections at the federal level, splitting Congress' focus and undermining the safety goals of our system. Thank you for your work to enhance the safety of America's airspace. The TWU stands ready to support your work to quickly reauthorize the FAA and to make the reforms noticed above. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. And I yield back. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Garret. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. Mr. Boulter, I understand you are not the Acting Administrator, but I am sitting here listening to Colonel Bunce and Mr. Bolen express extraordinary concern about the FAA in terms of its, I guess I will use the term ``agility'', to respond to new entrants into the market. I will tell you, my personal opinion is that I think the FAA is using an antiquated structure that is based upon on a 737 rather than new entrants into the market. I think that both the regulatory and the organizational structure are not, I guess, structured in a way that is going to truly be able to facilitate new technology. I am concerned that we are actually going to lose our leading edge in technology in the United States to other countries that are more agile. And I have strong concerns about the lack of certainty or predictability that some of these entrepreneurs or investors are looking at as they are trying to make U.S.-based companies. Look, let's be clear, we have come in, this committee, this Congress has come in and banned foreign drones and others. We are trying to facilitate U.S. innovators and entrepreneurs. Could you comment on some of the concerns that were raised by other panelists about the FAA and just its ability to be agile and to facilitate some of the new entrants in the market as we are watching some other challenges happen in aviation? Mr. Boulter. We strongly believe, in working with Acting Administrator Nolen, that we owe a path to new entrants. We owe them a regulatory path. At the same time, that regulatory path needs to have safety as its foremost concern. When we don't get those paths out there, as Mr. Bunce said, then it causes us more work. And now we are into exemptions and other things where we could be doing rulemaking. I am absolutely focused on: Get those paths available. We have taken a tack on powered-lift, which is eVTOL, to be able to get those to market. We have made commitments to getting those there before the first eVTOL is certified. We will continue to do that. We are going to look at all of our regulatory pieces. We have pushed more actions through in the last 6 months than we have probably in the last 3 years. Anything we can do to get more agile. We have to be agile and safe. But we hear you, and I absolutely am concerned about the time it takes us, because at the end of the day, if we don't build those paths, then the applicants don't know what path to go down. And we need to build those paths, but safely integrate technology into the National Airspace System. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I just want to reiterate that I have very strong concerns about the current trajectory. I think that the panelists have legitimate concerns about predictability and agility at the FAA. It is going to be a key issue as we work on the reauthorization bill. But I also want to make note that we still have significant portions of the 2018 bill that haven't been implemented. And so, we are going to need the FAA to certainly show a higher degree of resolve in moving forward on the new legislation as we enact that. Dr. Buckley, MITRE has previously conducted research to help the FAA analyze aviation delays and improve upon the flight delays and I think just the overall passenger experience. Can you talk a little bit about the results of your research there and what should be taken away in terms of our ability to be able to improve efficiency of the aviation system? Ms. Buckley. Yes, thank you. MITRE, as the FAA's FFRDC, would have been looking at advanced both air traffic management and operations studies and efficiencies in automations for a number of years. We work in partnership with the operators of the ATO, as well as our associations and pilot members and bring them into our laboratory to really look at some of the new automated technologies that can help and ensure safety; but also, we look at capacity inefficiency as well. One of those that I mentioned earlier was trajectory-based operations. That is something that we feel is a priority. That is looking at the 4D approach that really helps the efficiency and the safety of understanding the trajectories and to help our controllers and our operators. I would say that the foundations that the NextGen program, of which many of these programs that you reference are part of, is a foundation for where we are going in the future, and that is around the info-centric NAS. So, again, that gets into understanding and modernizing the backplane and what some of these new approaches, these control approaches and modernization activities need to run on. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Dr. Buckley. I yield back. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Eleanor. Ms. Norton. This hearing is particularly important to me and my constituents. There are two airports in this region, in the National Capital region, and I am cochair of the Quiet Skies Caucus. I hear regularly from not only my constituents but from fellow members about airport noise. And this question is for Ms. Buckley. Airport noise is not only a nuisance; it can affect health and safety. Ms. Buckley, can airspace design be utilized to reduce aviation noise and increase safety? Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question. Airspace design does have a role in reducing noise and safety and sustainment as well. MITRE was involved in the execution of Metroplex, which was a large-scale FAA NextGen program that looked at congested high-traffic airports and was able to optimize the use of airspace in those Metroplex areas and save billions of dollars both on fuel and showed proven changes in terms of noise as well in those urban areas. So, yes, there are techniques that can be doing that. The FAA and MITRE have been looking at those through the Metroplex program and will continue to do so. Ms. Norton. I am pleased to hear that. Mr. Bunce, in 2021, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association committed to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. That, of course, is in line with the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This commitment to carbon neutrality is admirable given that communities of color and low-income groups in the United States are exposed to higher levels of air pollution. So, my question for you, Mr. Bunce, is what changes should Congress enact to the Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization in order to achieve a net-zero aviation future? Mr. Bunce. Representative Norton, if you look at our commitments, and it is business aviation working together with our commercial brethren to those net-zero commitments, one of the biggest wedges in that is sustainable aviation fuel; and this Congress and the last Congress actually helped us a lot with the blended fuel tax credit and some other initiatives that were in there to start building out more production capability for sustainable aviation fuel. That is going to be huge. But the other part of this is if you look at how we develop those for both commercial and general aviation, the wedge for technology starts to grow pretty dramatically in the 2030s. So, we need to be able to set the stage now to do what Mr. Boulter talked about and what a lot of us are pushing for is just being able to facilitate that rapid ability to certify new technology out there. So, think about electric augmentation of existing engines that we have that are out there burning traditional fossil fuel, hopefully soon a lot of SAF, but we have got that capability, a lot of, in the advanced air mobility capability that we can extend with better battery-powered density technology to be able to provide essential air service to a lot of rural communities out there. So, it is probably the most exciting time in aviation since the dawn of the jet age, as long as we can get this technology certified, and that is where this FAA reauthorization can really help us as a Nation and as a planet. Ms. Norton. Thank you. Captain Ambrosi, you mentioned a current U.S.-backed base carrier that is attempting to circumvent the FAA safety standards. By utilizing foreign-based flightcrews, airlines can evade the FAA safety standards--I was shocked to learn that-- safety standards for crews leading to decreased safety in American airspace. Is there currently any mechanism to prevent this kind of crude outsourcing that reduces safety in the name of corporate profit? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. Short on time, so, I will say quickly that the Department of Transportation looks at every foreign airline application to come into the U.S. So, Congress' pressure on the Department of Transportation to ensure that the public interest test that is currently in legislation is applied to that to prevent foreign airlines from undermining U.S. labor standards. Ms. Norton. I am pleased to hear that. I yield back. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks. Mr. Perry. Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Boulter, last July I raised the issue surrounding Santa Clara County's ban on 100 Low Lead. Unfortunately, the concerns I raised went unheeded. I have got an affidavit from a Reid-Hillview Airport business owner and the lack of 100 Low Lead, which has contributed to at least one misfueling incident that I am aware of and to one accident resulting from the aircraft running out of fuel. Can I ask unanimous consent to have the affidavit entered into the record? Mr. Graves of Missouri. Without objection. [The information follows:] Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association et al. v. County of Santa Clara, California, FAA Docket No. 16-22-08, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Scott Perry UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION, et al, Complainants, v. FAA Docket No. 16-22-08 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, CALIFORNIA Respondent. DECLARATION OF NIKNAM NICKRAVESH I, Niknam Nickravesh, being over 18 years of age and otherwise fully competent to testify state that: 1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 2. I am the owner of multiple businesses that operate at Reid- Hillview Airport (KRHV), including Nik's Aircraft, LLC and Flying S Aviation. I am also the Director of Maintenance for Nice Air Aviation. 3. I am aware of an accident that occurred on July 22, 2022, that involved a Piper PA-32-301 aircraft, registration number N300BH (the ``Aircraft''), shortly after it departed from RHV. 4. Prior to this accident, the Aircraft underwent maintenance at Flying S Aviation. When the maintenance on the Aircraft began, I estimated that the Aircraft had approximately 30 gallons of 100LL on board total. The maintenance performed on the Aircraft included engine run-ups. At the conclusion of maintenance on the aircraft, I personally observed the aircraft had little to no fuel remaining as a result of the engine run-ups in the left tank. 5. To the best of my knowledge, the Aircraft requires 100LL. 6. It is my understanding that the operator of the Aircraft was aware of the Aircraft's fuel status but was not able to obtain 100LL fuel at RHV. As a result, the Aircraft departed RHV with little to no fuel remaining. It is my understanding that the operator of the Aircraft intended to fly to San Jose International Airport (KSJC) to obtain 100LL. 7. After the accident occurred, I was told by an NTSB accident investigator that the Aircraft had run out of fuel. 8. I am personally aware of multiple instances involving transient aircraft that arrive at RHV anticipating to fuel with 100LL, unaware that it is not available at RHV. As a result of the lack of availability of 100LL, these aircraft depart without refueling. 9. I am personally aware of a misfuelling incident at a Santa Clara County airport, where the pilot mistakenly self-fueled their Christen Eagle aircraft with 94UL fuel, which cannot safely and legally use 94UL fuel. The error was identified before takeoff. I AFFIRM under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge. DATED: 1/6/2023 Niknam Nickravesh Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Boulter, can you tell us what is precipitating the ban and the drive to get rid of 100 Low Lead knowing that one-third of the gasoline fleet is powered by that fuel? What drives this decision? Mr. Boulter. Obviously, the harm in lead emissions from those aircrafts. Mr. Perry. So, I would agree with you that is what is driving it. And do you have knowledge of the fact that the county's study regarding Santa Clara County and Reid-Hillview in particular found that the lead found was within the limits but that that information was suppressed by the government there? Are you aware of that? Mr. Boulter. I am not. That is outside my area. Mr. Perry. Well, I want to make you aware of it. I have got a couple of articles here that outline that. I would like to ask unanimous consent to have them entered into the record. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Without objection. [The information follows:] Article, ``Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid-Hillview Airport's soil. The results are bound to intensify debates around the closure of the San Jose airport,'' by Gabriel Greschler, Bay Area News Group, June 11, 2022, updated: June 13, 2022, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Scott Perry Study finds no elevated lead levels in Reid-Hillview Airport's soil The results are bound to intensify debates around the closure of the San Jose airport by Gabriel Greschler Bay Area News Group, June 11, 2022, updated: June 13, 2022, at 4:49 a.m. https://www.mercurynews.com/2022/06/11/study-finds-no-elevated-lead- levels-in-reid-hillview-airports-soil/ [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] SAN JOSE, CA_January 18: Pilot Sal Khan of Hayward disembarks from a Cessna airplane at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose, Calif., on Jan. 18, 2022. (Dai Sugano/Bay Area News Group) A Santa Clara County-commissioned study released Wednesday found that soil samples taken at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose did not contain lead levels that exceed local, state or federal standards. The results paint a clearer picture of the extent to which lead has contaminated the Evergreen neighborhood airport since the release last August of an airborne lead study ordered by the county that concluded children who live around Reid-Hillview have elevated levels of the contaminant in their blood. The latest study examined soil from 32 locations spread across the airport. Scientists took samples from Reid-Hillview's surface up to six inches deep in the soil--and then from one foot to 18 inches deep. Similar research was conducted at San Martin Airport, the other county- owned airport 23 miles south of Reid-Hillview. ``Results of this study determined that total lead was not detected above San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Board Environmental Screening Levels, (Environmental Protection Agency) Regional Screening Levels, or California Total Threshold Level Concentration trigger values in any of the soil samples collected during investigations at either airport,'' the study states. The highest concentration of lead at Reid-Hillview was found in a dry soil sample on the corner of Cunningham Avenue and Capitol Expressway, at 46.7 milligrams per kilogram. The sample fell below local, state and federal danger levels which range from 50 to 800 milligrams per kilogram. Katharine Hammond, an exposure expert and professor at UC Berkeley's School of Public Health, said she isn't surprised with the soil sample results and that they don't contradict the August airborne study's findings. Particulate matter coming out of an engine like an airplane is so light, Hammond said, that contaminates will likely not settle on the ground but get blown outside of the airport's immediate vicinity. ``Imagine you took a handful of sand, which are fairly big particles, and you held your hand in the middle of a dining room table and threw the sand up in the air,'' Hammond said. ``Most of it would be on the table or around the table. But if you took a handful of smaller particles like flour and threw it up in the air, it is going to be all over the place, not just on the dining room table.'' Hammond said it is also likely there are some soil samples that exceed the ones found on the corner of Cunningham and Capitol Expressway. She explained that when sampling is conducted across a tract of land, there are usually areas that contain higher amounts of contamination not included in an analysis. The new soil study is bound to intensify debates surrounding the planned closure of Reid-Hillview Airport. Proponents of the closure claim that the airport's piston-engine airplanes, which still rely heavily on leaded fuel, present a health hazard to surrounding residents and that the area could be better and more safely used for much-needed housing. But opponents of the closure view the lead danger as overblown, saying the contamination is caused by other sources and that proposals for housing are simply a land grab. A copy of the soil report was provided to this news organization after a public records request asking for the study's results went unanswered for weeks. The contract for the report was $130,000, according to County Executive Jeff Smith. The research was conducted by Jacobs Engineering, a Dallas-based firm. District 2 Supervisor Cindy Chavez, who called for the August lead study and is a driving force behind closing Reid-Hillview, had not read the new soil study and was not immediately available for comment, a spokesperson said. In May, under the direction of Chavez, San Jose-based nonprofit group Latinos United for a New America began canvassing the surrounding neighborhood of Reid-Hillview to educate residents about the county's airborne lead study from August. In addition, the nonprofit's representatives will ``promote the importance of healthy habits for lead prevention, refer residents to lead testing resources, and identify residents interested in further information and future engagement opportunities.'' [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] SAN JOSE_April 27: An airplane descends past a row of palm trees at Eastridge Mall for a landing at Reid-Hillview Airport in San Jose, Calif., on Monday, April 27, 2020. (Randy Vazquez/Bay Area News Group) Efforts to close Reid-Hillview have been underway for decades. More recently, county supervisors voted in 2018 to stop providing federal grant dollars to the airport, which will lead to Reid-Hillview's closure in 2031. After the August lead study came out, county officials stopped providing leaded fuel at Reid-Hillview and San Martin at the start of this year in an effort to reduce further contamination, a move that was criticized by Federal Air Administration officials who felt that county officials hadn't consulted them. The county's airports now only sell unleaded fuel. However, many airplanes can only run on leaded, which has led to pilots refueling at surrounding Bay Area airports before landing at Reid-Hillview or San Martin. In February, county officials informed the Eastridge Little League that they had to leave their baseball diamonds at Reid-Hillview in response to the August blood lead study. The baseball league, which has been playing at the fields since 1972, will vacate the site June 28, according to league president Johnny Cisneros. Cisneros is currently in talks with the county to receive funding through 2025, but he said he's unsure whether he'll agree to the terms, putting the league's future in limbo. Article, ``County study found lead within limits in soil around Reid- Hillview. Officials sat on results until journalists pressed for release,'' by Eric Blinderman, AOPA, June 15, 2022, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Scott Perry County study found lead within limits in soil around Reid-Hillview Officials sat on results until journalists pressed for release by Eric Blinderman AOPA, June 15, 2022 https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2022/june/15/county-study- found-lead-within-limits-in-soil-around-reid-hillview The Mercury News of San Jose, California, reported that a study conducted by Santa Clara County found that soil samples taken at Reid- Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport contained lead levels below local, state, or federal safety limits. Reid-Hillview of Santa Clara County Airport. Photo by Mike Fizer. The soil report was released to the news organization on June 8 only ``after a public records request asking for the study's results went unanswered for weeks,'' according to the newspaper. The $130,000 study was conducted by a Dallas-based firm, which according to the newspaper, examined samples from 32 locations around the airport, taken at various depths into the soil. A similar study was also conducted at San Martin Airport. ``We all want lead out of aviation fuel, but the transition needs to be done safely and smartly,'' said AOPA President Mark Baker. ``The fact that the county sat on these findings, and then were essentially forced to release them, is telling. The county hid these findings and then turned around and prohibited the sale of certain aviation fuel required for thousands of aircraft. This prohibition significantly increases the risk of misfuelling and imposes serious safety concerns for pilots.'' On January 1, Santa Clara County banned the sale of 100LL Reid- Hillview and San Martin airports, citing a contested airborne lead study in 2021 ordered by the county. AOPA and other associations, pilot groups, and airport businesses quickly pointed out that many of the 200,000 aircraft in the current general aviation piston fleet require higher-octane fuel to fly safely, and that misfuelling can cause detonation and engine malfunction resulting in catastrophic engine failure. Pilots and aircraft owners in the county whose aircraft require higher-octane fuel are forced to find it outside the county before landing at their home airports. In addition, the Avgas Coalition led by AOPA sent a letter on May 6 to Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg and acting FAA Administrator Billy Nolen, outlining the need for 100LL fuel to be available at our nation's airports while the industry works with the Biden administration to find a fleetwide unleaded fuel solution as quickly as possible. The Avgas Coalition is a broad partnership of those who represent many facets of the transition to an unleaded avgas future. This coalition has a single-minded purpose of steering the GA industry to an unleaded future and advocating for a smart and safe transition that works for the entire GA fleet. Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Boulter, it seems to me, knowing that this airport was built in 1937, that most of the residents around it that now seek to have it closed are using this opportunity, so to speak, so contrived, to close what they don't like. I am wondering what the FAA is doing. And I understand that you have got now G100UL, which will replace 100 Low Lead. So, I get that. What is the cost of 100 Low Lead on the average, and what is the cost per gallon of the new replacement fuel? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am not aware of those numbers. Mr. Perry. Shouldn't you be aware of that? One-third of all gasoline engines use 100 Low Lead. Wouldn't that be something you would know? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am an Aviation Safety Organization. We are---- Mr. Perry [interrupting]. But this is about safety. We already had one plane that crashed because they didn't get fuel. The airport banned the fuel, even though it wasn't allowed to. What has the FAA done about the ban? Mr. Boulter. The FAA is continuing to work towards that. So, our airports division, which is outside my purview, is working that issue aggressively. Mr. Perry. They are working it aggressively. So, are other airports going to be allowed to ban it? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I would not know that. Mr. Perry. Well, who would know it? Mr. Boulter. I could certainly set you up with our airports division. Mr. Perry. It seems to me, sir, that if we are going to have a replacement fuel, and apparently we do, which is great, you have to make sure that it is widely available and that it is affordable. And if that is not the case, that we cannot allow airports to unilaterally ban it and have the FAA continue to sanction that type of operation. I am sure that you, or I hope, maybe you are not familiar, with the Grant Assurance or Grant Assurance 22. Are you familiar with that? Mr. Boulter. Somewhat familiar, sir. Grant Assurance is run by the division of airports in the agency. Mr. Perry. So, it says that if you are going to have a public airport, you have got to provide the fuel and other services, right. That is essentially what it says. Yet the FAA is allowing airports to ban the fuel for political reasons. Let's just face it. That is what it is. It is political reasons. It has nothing to do with science. The articles clearly show it has nothing to do with science. And what is the FAA doing about it? What are they going to do about it? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I do know that our airports division is working that very specific issue. Mr. Perry. Well, they don't seem to be very effective. I go back to the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Graves, in agility. They are working the issue. Here is what we know. We have a fuel that has worked for a very, very long time that is readily available and affordable, and we are allowing airports to ban it. And now there are crashes and misfueling incidents that are occurring, and the FAA is working on it very diligently. You know what I know? When you're up in the sky and it gets quiet unexpectedly, you are not concerned about the FAA working on it very aggressively and diligently. You have got a situation on your hands, sir. You are failing. I yield. Mr. Graves of Missouri. Mr. Cohen. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Boulter, in my opening statement, and I presume you heard some of it, I mentioned the problems we had with getting the FAA to look into seat size as far as safety, and they went way over their congressional mandate. You are familiar with all of that, aren't you? Mr. Boulter. Yes, sir. Mr. Cohen. It wasn't on your watch, though? Mr. Boulter. No. Mr. Cohen. Can you assure us that you will get a study? You will look at the comments, the 26,000 comments that were pretty strongly concerned about seat size and get some type of a resolution of that before you allow seats to be shrunk anymore? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I heard your opening statement. I fly a lot myself. I am not a small person. I understand the comfort level. You have my assurance that we will get through those comments, and we will look at next steps. Mr. Cohen. Well, can you assure me you won't allow the airlines to reduce the size of the seats of the pitch until you have gone through the comments and maybe even done another study? Because the last study was obviously--it was failed from the beginning. Whoever came up with that, not having anybody over 60 and not having any people with disabilities and no pets on the plane and no children on the plane and all of that, that was insane. That was not a representative sample. Mr. Boulter. Sir, we have some ethical standards we have to meet with human subjects. Most evacuations do cause injuries. So, any research around evacuations, we have to be very careful. We also looked at--we commissioned an Aviation Rulemaking Committee that looked at 300 actual evacuations. So, these are airplanes that evacuated. In those 300, they looked at did the people get out? Did seat pitch affect that? So, we think with the study we did and the follow-on, looking at 300 actual evacuations, and we'll look through the comments and then, sir, we will go from there. I can't promise the seat size until which time we get through the data. Mr. Cohen. Concerning the Boeing situation, has the FAA started to go back to what it should have never given up, is that review of the airplanes and not sub it out to the manufacturer? Mr. Boulter. We still have delegated oversight in every manufacturer in the country, but we have strengthened our oversight of those companies that have delegated authorities. We have created an office that reports directly to me, that writes the policy, looks at effectiveness of our delegation programs. And, sir, we are not afraid to pull back those delegations if they are not done to our standards. Mr. Cohen. You feel comfortable with the situation at Boeing now? Mr. Boulter. I think that it is a journey. As I said today, we can never sit still. I am comfortable where we are today. We need to continue to improve. We have reset that relationship, sir. Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Ms. Homendy, were you at the NTSB when Jim Hall was there? Ms. Homendy. I was not, but he calls me often. Mr. Cohen. Good. So, you know how interested he is? How smart he is? How outstanding he is? Ms. Homendy. Yes. He is phenomenal. Is he watching? Mr. Cohen. I hope so. Hi, Jim. No, I have no idea if he is watching. But he has been very insistent on this rule about the black boxes. Can you assure me that you will make Jim Hall and the flying public happy by getting some type of a change so that they don't have to go to the bottom of the ocean, but those things will float? Ms. Homendy. Sir, I don't have the authority to mandate that, but as the NTSB, we continue to work on that recommendation. That recommendation is critical. We issued a 2015 report on it. I will state that the recommendation to FAA currently is ``open--unacceptable.'' So, we will continue working with the FAA on trying to move them towards implementation. Mr. Cohen. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Crawford! Mr. Crawford [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I appreciate it. I will yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Boulter, the root cause of Notice to Air Missions system failure in January doesn't appear to be due to a cyber attack. And if I am repeating this, I apologize. This may have already been addressed. But we need to anticipate future attacks on the system that is meant to keep our industry, our aviation industry safe. With the increased prevalence of ransomware service across every sector of our economy, and since the ever-changing technology used in aviation safety is software based, does the FAA have a thorough cybersecurity plan? And are you working with CISA on a coordinated response should an attack happen? Mr. Boulter. I don't own those systems, and, obviously, my IT ability to turn the mic on. But anyway, we own some systems in aviation safety, obviously, and the agency has a robust cyber system. But when you talk about air traffic system, sir, the Air Traffic Organization, I can certainly have our Government affairs hook you up with the right people in that system. Mr. Crawford. Can you comment as to the nature of your relationship with CISA with regard to cybersecurity? I mean, that seems to me that would be integral in this environment. Mr. Boulter. Yes, I know our IT department has a relationship with CISA, but you would have to ask them how deeply that is. Mr. Crawford. All right. Thank you. Mr. Bolen, I am going to turn my attention to you for just a quick second. NBAA's advanced air mobility, or AAM, roundtable, is a forum for high-level policy planning with sector leaders to help chart a course for integrating AAM technologies in the Nation's airspace and infrastructure. What are NBAA and the roundtable doing right now to ensure AAM operation safety is paramount? Mr. Bolen. Well, clearly we believe that advanced air mobility is good for the United States and good for the world. It has the opportunity to create affordable, accessible, sustainable aviation for communities that don't have it to the level we can have it in the future. So, what we are doing is trying to build on some of the progress that was made in the last Congress, including the AAM Coordination and Leadership Act and the Advanced Air Mobility Infrastructure and Modernization Act. Beyond that, we are working to increase awareness on Capitol Hill and move toward what comes after the certification of the aircraft into the operations. We want to make sure that we have the appropriate air traffic and airport system so that we will have charging stations, be able to leverage airports and heliports and create vertiports for the infrastructure, as well as air traffic systems that are able to integrate aircraft above 400 feet. So, moving from certification of an aircraft into operations is the big focus as we move forward. Mr. Crawford. I directed this question to your colleague on the panel, Mr. Boulter, but is there any address of cyber in what you guys are dealing with? Mr. Bolen. Every manufacturer, everyone in the industry is very focused on cyber. It is, obviously, a front issue. We believe it can be done. We are able to operate today. We are able to operate across other industries. Banking and other things can be secure. We believe that it is important to build it in as we move forward and understand what the evolving threats are. Mr. Crawford. I mean, I will ask you, just in the 1\1/2\ minutes that I have left. Do you have a relationship with CISA so that you have the sharing up and down the chain so that you are more aware and they are more aware of the threats that may be prevalent in your space? Mr. Bolen. We are trying to work through that as an industry. We had an opportunity. Several of us in the industry have met with the White House and worked through conversations with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, with the National Security Council, with the Department of Defense to try to make sure that we stay on top of these important issues. Mr. Crawford. Thank you. I yield back and recognize Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes. Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two things I would like to focus on here. All of the questions that have been asked, all of the testimony that has been given, indicate that the FAA and all of its various parts of its organization has two fundamental problems: one, organization; two, an inability to get the job done for lack of resources. And so, for each and every one of you, if you could respond in writing to the committee and/or to me about what you need in terms of resources to carry out your task. Just listening to the testimony here, each one of you said, well, it is going to take too much time. We don't have the resources. So, I won't ask you to comment all the way down until I get past my second question. But it seems to me that as we do the reauthorization here, fundamentally we have to deal with the FAA that is not organized to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing aviation industry. All of you have testified to that already. So, I would appreciate that information back from you. What do you need to get the job done? Personnel? Resources? Organizational structure and the like? What are the shortcomings? What are your suggestions about how to properly organize and fund the FAA to carry out the multiple tasks? The question I want to get to deals with air cabin. We have carried a bill with Senator Blumenthal for the last 3, 4 years now, and it is the Cabin Air Safety Act. Right now there is, in most planes, no monitoring of the air quality. We have been at this a long time, and we do know from multiple incidents and testimony from pilots, as well as aircrew, that there is all too often fume events in airplanes. And so, I want to get to this. And Captain Ambrosi, if you could comment on this, on what you and your colleagues in the air experience. And then we will come back to, well, why can't we get this done. Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you, sir, for the question and on your support on this issue. We absolutely support your initiative. Pardon the pun, but smoke and fumes don't fly in an airplane. It is a problem, and we have far too many of these events. We do support and we need monitoring of this to get to the root cause. Basically, there is data that shows maintenance may be overservicing the auxiliary power unit, and it creates an issue where there is some smoke; but there are too many of these anecdotal of where it may be coming from. We need to truly get down to brass tacks and study it because it is not good for the health of the traveling public, but our fellow cabin crewmembers and pilots spend a lot more time in the air than anybody, and it is a concern for us. So, we support that initiative and are happy to collaborate. Mr. Garamendi. Would any of the other witnesses care to comment on this? I know that here in Washington, DC, if you want to rent out your house, you are required to put in smoke detectors and carbon monoxide detectors, and occasionally somebody will come along and check and see if it is done. I don't understand why the airline industry cannot and will not do this just routinely, but they won't. So, apparently we need a law. So, I think what I would like to do is to deal with this issue, continue to ask the committee here to pass this legislation out of this House and literally force the airline industry to get on with it and to provide the monitoring devices so that the cabin crews know what is going on. And I am going to go back to the first question. This is the larger question about the reauthorization of the FAA. It is our opportunity, in fact, it is our responsibility to write legislation so that the FAA is properly organized to carry out the multiple tasks, which all of you have talked about here today, and properly fund it. It is not presently that by your testimony and by the questions of many of my colleagues. And with that, I will yield back. Mr. Crawford. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Babin is recognized for 5 minutes. Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all, you witnesses, for being here today. I am thrilled to hear everyone highlight the successes of the past decade in terms of safety, and many of you in your organization should be celebrated just for that. However, there is a lot of room for improvement. An example is just 3 days ago in my great State of Texas, at Austin- Bergstrom International Airport, two planes were less than 100 feet away from a catastrophic collision that would have put more than 130 people's lives at risk, and that is unacceptable. As many of you stated, we can't take our eye off the ball. We have got to work together. We have got to keep getting better. We have to continue to innovate and improve, and I want to applaud all of you for being here, to being a part of that process with this committee. But from my perspective, recent disruptions and groundings appear to be due in large part to reliance on outdated technology and systems, some of which are built on software that is decades old, like the NOTAM system. The commercial connected aviation system sector has made major strides in leveraging the latest in cloud computing, predictive analytics, and inner link systems. These, aligned with all the current cyber standards, offer reliable and stable solutions to Government and to industry. It is striking to see that the failure to use or partner with the right software and service providers could directly result in a disruptive impact on our passengers, the airlines themselves, and shaking public confidence in our air operations. There are a number of examples of commercial connected software providers that have emerged over the last decade or so, but Houston is home to FlightAware, owned by Collins Aerospace's Connected Aviation Solutions business, which provides real-time data and services to airlines, airports, and the Government that would provide substantial benefit to the FAA and to operators. Other types of software include advanced flight profile optimization to help optimize flightpath based on real-time weather and traffic data to optimize routes, as well as new traffic management software systems that benefit from the innovative software advancements. So, Acting Director Boulter, thank you for being here. These questions are for you. How do we use this upcoming FAA reauthorization to accelerate the migration from outdated legacy software systems that are used by the FAA and industry to the best solutions available to date? And is this a matter of providing direction or are there other obstacles? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I think we all have the same interest that the systems be state of the art. My area in aviation safety does not own the air traffic systems, but we can certainly have our air traffic folks come in and brief you on their plans going forward on all of those. All of those you talked about are all air traffic systems. And as a safety organization, it is important that that technology continue to improve. Dr. Babin. OK. Then how do we support greater use of commercial data services by the FAA either as a replacement or a complement to current legacy systems? Mr. Boulter. Again, sir, I don't speak for the Air Traffic Organization on how to do that. I know that, in my previous job running the agency's airplanes, we did use commercial services in that. But you are talking about using those same commercial services maybe into the air traffic system. That would have to be something air traffic would have to look at very, very carefully. Dr. Babin. OK. Well, in the space sector, I represent Johnson Space Center, as an example. We have seen great success with the Department of Commerce leveraging commercial space data, and I believe this could be a successful model for the FAA to buy commercial aviation data to improve its capabilities. Is there anyone else would like to comment on that? Mr. Bunce. Mr. Babin? Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Mr. Bunce. I think if we look at the NOTAM system as a pilot, several of us are doing that, it is an antiquated system overall. One of the things that--we look at AI, artificial intelligence, and we look at a capability. It is very difficult to certify, perhaps, in an aircraft, but commercial services can go use AI to sift through the mountains of data that come in. Because we are talking about NOTAMs from airports across the world that use old systems, like teletype systems to be able to transmit runway closures and things like that. A perfect application for AI and FlightAware, as one of the leaders in this, is to be able to sift through that information and give us as pilots some very good data of what is pertinent to the mission that we are going on. And so, I think I would urge this committee to really look at that capability out there in the commercial sector. Dr. Babin. Thank you very much, Mr. Bunce, sir. I will just yield back since my time is just about out. Thank you. Dr. Van Drew [presiding]. Next I would ask Ms. Brownley to speak. Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Boulter, I am increasingly concerned about the FAA's oversight of aircraft maintenance facilities outside of the United States. The FAA is now more than 10 years overdue on a congressional mandate to close this gap with respect to drug and alcohol testing. Last year the House passed, and I will say overwhelmingly so, another bill directing the FAA to ensure that U.S. certified maintenance facilities meet the same safety standards regardless of where they are located. And I am hopeful this language will be part of the upcoming FAA reauthorization legislation from this committee. So, my question is when will the FAA complete its rulemaking on drug and alcohol testing at maintenance facilities outside of the United States? And what plans do you have to bring the safety standards at these facilities in line with those domestically? Mr. Boulter. We are in work as we speak on the notice of proposed rulemaking to push that forward into our rulemaking docket. So, we are working on building that rule for drug and alcohol testing of foreign repair stations. As far as other standards, we have robust international offices that look at those U.S. repair stations in foreign countries, and our data is showing us that they currently meet those standards; but we will absolutely make this rulemaking for that gap you identified. Ms. Brownley. Thank you for that. Ms. Homendy, the FAA does not conduct unscheduled inspections of the maintenance facilities they certify outside of the United States. The FAA does not require the mechanics at these facilities to hold any U.S. certification or undergo any background check before handling safety-sensitive work. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the FAA has conducted almost no in-person inspections of these facilities at all. The few that are happening are still done over video conference. Does the NTSB believe that the FAA's current oversight of the repair stations they certify outside of the United States is sufficient to protect the safety of our airspace? Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. The NTSB doesn't have any recommendations currently on foreign repair stations. Ms. Brownley. Absolutely none? Ms. Homendy. We do not. Ms. Brownley. But based on what I just laid out, based on those facts, do you think that there is a need to look into that? Ms. Homendy. Our recommendations are based on accidents and incidents that we investigate, and this has not come up in any of our accident investigations. Ms. Brownley. Mr. Boulter? Mr. Boulter. I do know we are traveling back to those repair stations outside of the United States, and also, in some cases, especially with our bilateral partners, we have them just like we do to theirs, inspect their repair stations. They inspect our repair stations that are in their countries as part of our bilateral agreement. Ms. Brownley. Well, it seems to me that this committee, as I said, overwhelmingly supported that these maintenance facilities outside the United States be brought up to the same safety standards as we have domestically. You are saying that it already is. We determined that it wasn't. So, I think that there is somewhat of a disagreement there. Mr. Boulter. I certainly can go back and look at the data and see where we are on our surveillance of those repair stations, but we have exactly the same goal that you do, ma'am, which is that if you are at a U.S. certificated repair station, that the safety is exactly the same. Ms. Brownley. And so, and you are also saying what I laid out in terms of NTSB and that questioning is that you are now undergoing all of these inspections and that is well underway? Mr. Boulter. We have started to return to the ones that we--we didn't travel due to COVID, but we are pushing out to do the ones that--we don't go to every repair station. Again, through bilaterals, we do have inspections from the host nation's CAA, but those that we do not, our folks are getting back on the road and will do those evaluations. Ms. Brownley. And so, can you give me a sense of what being back on the road means? Mr. Boulter. They will do the inspections in person in those foreign countries. Ms. Brownley. OK. I wanted to also ask you, Mr. Boulter, in terms of general aviation safety technology--I see that I don't have time for this question. So, I will yield my time back. Dr. Van Drew. Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I appreciate your testimony very much. In a previous life, I served in the Bush administration under W at a particular Federal agency, and so, it was my observation that a lot of Federal agencies share a lot of the same hurdles: dilapidated commuter systems, old equipment, a lot of stovepiping, not much communication within agencies, and I know that that can be a real challenge. It strikes me that given the important role of FAA and the safety of our air system, and if you look at it this way, too, business and investment goes where it is welcome. It doesn't go where it is not welcome. The regulatory modernization I think of the agency and the whole space, so to speak, is really important. Mr. Boulter, can you comment on that a little bit? And this is following up on some of the comments that Mr. Graves made, as well as, to some extent, Mr. Babin. What can we do as we reauthorize FAA? We have this reauthorization bill. What can we include in there to help encourage, to help facilitate the regulatory modernization that we need, if you can speak to that a little bit more? Mr. Boulter. Well, first and foremost is, we have the President's budget. We obviously need to be funded at that request level, and anything we can do to be more agile, whether it is how we work, all the hoops we jump through, anything we can do to bring our--the pace of technology, as we all know, has increased, but the pace of our processes has not. My number one goal in the Aviation Safety Organization is to get that speed without ever degrading safety but to build those paths for technology, to make sure that we don't leave people wondering what the path is to operation. What is operation going to look like? What are the certification standards of the aircraft going to look like? So, we are really focused on how do we move faster but, at the same time, deliberative enough, deliberative to the point of using our tools for risk analysis and keeping the level of safety or, frankly, we like to continue to improve safety and speed up the clock a little bit. Mr. Rouzer. OK. I have got a couple of other questions I want to make sure I get in. So, I'm going to move to those real quick, but related. So, what is FAA's plan for addressing aircraft avionics and ground system cybersecurity? And, specifically, how will responsibility and oversight be managed in partnership with the TSA? Mr. Boulter. Currently, we have standards for ensuring the aircraft are protected against lots of things, right, on the avionics, from interference, from any type of--if there is connection between the back end and, say, the systems that, when you are on your iPhone and on board, that those are separate from the avionics system. So, we already have certification standards, but we are always looking at those to make sure that those standards are appropriate for the current risk. Mr. Rouzer. So, what are you doing to address stovepiping in the agency specifically? Mr. Boulter. Well, as you know, every box is an opportunity to stovepipe. We know that we have to behave differently. We are looking at AAM. We are looking at across the organization: how do we do this, from vertiports, to aircraft certification, which, of course, is an Aviation Safety Organization, the operations, and air traffic integration, right. We are actually working together, sitting down as a team every 2 weeks with the Administrator and walking through what our plan is to be able to across the agency make available AAM in the airspace on delivery. Mr. Rouzer. Ms. Homendy, can you speak real quickly to the application and purpose of the NTSB's Most Wanted List, and has this list been a useful tool for enhancing aviation safety? Ms. Homendy. That is a great question. I worked on this committee for 14 years, and I was the biggest advocate for the Most Wanted List. It is fantastic for getting out what our priorities are. However, as the head of the agency, my priorities have changed. I feel that the Most Wanted List, which at the time was created in 1990 to communicate our most important safety issues, is negative. When you call something most wanted, you think of the FBI's top most wanted criminals. In addition to that, my biggest concern is that the Most Wanted List is taking resources from our investigator staff, and right now 50 percent of our Most Wanted List is on highway safety. Our recommendations don't change whether we have a Most Wanted List or we do have a Most Wanted List. Our recommendations will always be there. But to staff the 50 percent, that's highway safety, we are using seven investigators to help do that from our Office of Highway Safety. We can't continue to do that. We have to make sure that we are working to carry out our core mission of accident investigation. So, I have asked one of my colleagues to take a look at the Most Wanted List and to recommend something else, whether it is something on our website that communicates our recommendations; but currently it is not something I think we should continue to support. Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Sorry to go over. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Next would be Mr. Stanton. Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this outstanding hearing, a good start to our process for FAA reauthorization. An important aspect of improving aviation safety is incorporating new technologies, and we have seen those benefits take shape in the implementation of NextGen. On the other hand, aviation stakeholders have expressed concern that the FAA is falling behind other civil aviation authorities in utilizing a technology called space-based ADS-B, which gives pilots and controllers real-time surveillance and situational awareness. Space-based ADS-B was developed in the United States and is currently used in 41 countries for air traffic control, air traffic flow management, search and rescue, and data analytics. Chairwoman Homendy, as we work to reduce aviation accidents, has the NTSB looked at this technology? And shouldn't expanded use for search and rescue and accident investigations be part of the solution? Ms. Homendy. Thank you so much for the question. Space-based ADS-B is certainly more precise, and that will help in our investigations. We don't do search and rescue, but we do partner with other agencies when that does occur so that more precise information leads to a better outcome in an investigation. Mr. Stanton. Thank you. Mr. Boulter, small drones are playing an increasingly significant role in the inspection of America's critical infrastructure. I have seen firsthand the efforts of the Arizona Department of Transportation to inspect bridges that improves worker safety, decrease carbon emissions, and increase infrastructure resilience. However, some forms of infrastructure inspections require the small drones to fly outside the line of sight of the remote pilot while shielded by the infrastructure they are inspecting. The FAA waiver process can take months to complete and consumes significant resources for the FAA and operators, even for those low-risk, low-altitude infrastructure inspections. The FAA has stated that it intends to streamline and standardize the low-risk, beyond-visual-line-of-sight waiver process, which might include summary grants or pre-defined risk assessment. Can you commit to the committee today that the FAA will publish a streamlined process to enable low-risk, high-value inspections this year, consistent with the FAA safety and environmental goals? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I don't know if I can commit to this year, but I can absolutely commit to--that is important to us. It is work intensive to do the approvals you talk to, and we need those folks, frankly, to do--with those low-risk operations, if we can make those more automated and/or summary grants, then we can use--have those folks focus on rulemaking, which is what our next goal is, to get all of the--a lot of the recommendations from BVLOS, Beyond Visual Line of Sight ARC, into a rulemaking. So, we need to do it. The current process is not only labor intensive for industry but labor intensive for us. Mr. Stanton. Is there a timeline you are willing to commit to today? Mr. Boulter. Not today, sir. I would have to look into it a little bit more, but it is absolutely one of many priorities to get that done so that we can---- Mr. Stanton [interrupting]. We will follow up regularly with you on this important issue. Mr. Boulter. OK. Absolutely. Mr. Stanton. My question also for you. I would like to commend the FAA's efforts on 5G spectrum and finding a path forward to this point that ensures aviation is safe and uninterrupted while the telecommunications industry deploys 5G. However, I am still concerned about the upcoming deadlines and airlines potentially not being able to retrofit their aircraft in the heart of summer peak season, leading to operational issues for aviation. Additionally, I understand there are ongoing conversations with the telecommunications industry on long-term mitigations for the continued deployment of 5G without disruption to aviation. Can you provide us an update on the status of conversations with the telecommunications industry on long-term mitigations on 5G? Mr. Boulter. So, the current mitigations are voluntary. They are approved through their license with the FCC to raise the power to their limits, and that is our concern. With that, that introduces risk and, hence, getting the radar altimeters updated. So, we continue to bring all of the stakeholders together and work with the wireless companies to continue that, their voluntary---- Mr. Stanton [interrupting]. Thank you very much. I want to get one final question in here. Last year our colleague, Congressman Langevin, was denied boarding due to a lithium-ion battery which powered his wheelchair even though the battery met all FAA safety standards. Are there additional steps we should be doing right now in Congress as part of the FAA reauthorization to ensure that those who rely on mobility devices powered by lithium-ion batteries are not denied boarding? Mr. Boulter. Sir, we can certainly work with our Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and make sure that the current authorizations are well-known in the airline industry so that that does not happen. Mr. Stanton. OK. We will be following up regularly on this important issue as well. Thank you. I yield back. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. I yield 5 minutes to myself. First of all, very quickly, I wanted to just publicly thank the chairman for appointing me as vice chairman, and I look forward to working with all of you over these issues, both the Members, as well as people that are active participants. I want to welcome you to the first preparation for this year's FAA reauthorization. And, obviously, the United States of America led the world in 20th-century aviation, but we cannot take our leadership for granted. Congress must ensure that American aviation technology remains number one, the best in the world. I am concerned that the Federal Aviation Administration is falling short in this technological mission. The FAA is run by fine, hard-working folks dedicated to keeping the public safe. Often their jobs are made more difficult by a bureaucratic agency structure that was designed over 60 years ago, if we go back in time. This has led to disturbing trends of underperforming technology projects, including our drones, and even the Notice to Air Missions system. As Congress drafts authorization legislation for the FAA, we should examine how the agency's outdated organizational structure contributes to these recent technological disappointments. The FAA came to the Congress in 2021 asking for help with its organizational structure. The FAA claimed it needed new tools to coordinate the integration of advanced aviation technologies. This year's FAA bill is the opportunity to develop these tools and set the agency up for real success. I have introduced a proposal that solves the coordination problem by evolving the NextGen organization into an office of advanced aviation. I am actively working with colleagues across Congress and the aviation stakeholder community to prepare this proposal for the FAA reauthorization. We have been working on it for about 2 years. This hearing will provide valuable information for this effort. I direct my question to Mr. Boulter, the FAA's Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety. Mr. Boulter, the FAA came to Congress 2 years ago and said it was time to evolve the NextGen organization. This organization plays a vital role in overcoming our aviation technology challenge. May you please describe the FAA's current plans for NextGen? Mr. Boulter. Sir, I am not aware of what the agency's plans are for NextGen. Inside of aviation safety, I can just tell you what you talk about, we are committed to working across the agency to bring AAM forward. Dr. Van Drew. OK. Maybe you could next time we meet tell us a little more about your thoughts on NextGen. Thank you. I am also going to ask you, based on stakeholders being deeply frustrated with the FAA's approach to drone certification, do you all have a plan to change the drone certification process? And what role will aviation safety play in that process? Mr. Boulter. Sir, we issue hundreds of exemptions a month. I think it is hundreds a month right now on allowing drone operations, drones over 50 pounds because we do not have regulations in place. So, we are working on building a rulemaking set based on the Beyond Visual Line of Sight ARC, the great recommendations that our Aviation Rulemaking Committee gave us. We are building that out as we speak, and we will continue to work towards a rule set for the drones bigger than 50 pounds and certainly commercial operations and agricultural operations and drones. Dr. Van Drew. What is your timeframe for that? Mr. Boulter. The rulemaking system is not quick, but we expect to have what we need to have done here from an aviation safety perspective later this year or early next year. Dr. Van Drew. How do you feel you have done with drones in general and with 5G? Mr. Boulter. I think in 5G, I think bringing everybody together in a place that we don't hold a lot of authority--we don't hold any authority on the signal. I think the way we worked that collaboratively across the Government and with the industry should be commended. I think in the drone environment, I think we could have moved out with rulemaking much sooner than this rather than being in this exemption world. Dr. Van Drew. Which is one of the things I think we have to work on is just making things move faster, more efficiently, and more focused. I appreciate your time. Thank you. And I appreciate all your work. Our next gentleman up is Mr. Garcia. Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to all the witnesses at this hearing this morning. In Chicago, the city council lifted up standards specifically acknowledging the importance of addressing security and stabilizing the workforce. This year airport service workers, including caterers, de-icers, baggage handlers, wheelchair attendants, aircraft cleaners, and cargo workers, among others, will see their minimum wage pay increase to $18 on March 1st. I am excited that one of these frontline workers, Diana Ordaz Quezada, will be attending the State of the Union tonight as my guest. Diana makes air travel possible for the elderly and people with disabilities at Midway International Airport and ensures they are transported to their destinations safely. She is on her feet for nearly 10 hours a day, walking 30,000 steps while pushing passengers and handling their baggage. Diana is frequently told to stay for mandatory overtime, which is difficult for her as a mother of five to balance work and family needs. Diana is one example of the impacts of chronic turnover and wages that have barely improved in 20 years in these airport service jobs. This is a dangerous combination, not only to have experienced staff leave the industry, but there are few incentives to bring new people into the workforce who do difficult and essential work at airports. I am proud to be following that approach and reintroducing the Good Jobs for Good Airports Act with my colleague Congresswoman Norton to ensure our taxpayer dollars are advancing a safe, secure infrastructure inside and outside airports. To Mr. Boulter, given the significant investments of Federal money into airports throughout the country, do you agree that it will be important for us to look at the connection between security, establish strong wage and benefit standards for service workers at our Nation's airports, and when thinking about how to ensure the gold standard of safety and security in our aviation system? Mr. Boulter. Sir, safety is important to us in all aspects of aviation. The Aviation Safety Organization kind of ends as you get off the airplane and then into the airport's organization. I can certainly steer you to the airports folks and have you talk about your concerns with them, as they run the ground side in grants and safety standards of airports. Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Well, thank you for at least acknowledging their important role, since you don't have jurisdiction. Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection, I would like to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Cohen. Dr. Van Drew. No objection. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Mr. Garcia. I will be quick. When I was talking to Mr. Hall's favorite employee at NTSB, she kind of gave me an answer that allowed me to shift to Mr. Boulter, and he is responsible for seeing that there are improvements to the black boxes and that they don't sink to the bottom of the ocean. You are familiar that in 2015, NTSB issued a safety recommendation calling for all aircraft use and extended over water operations to be equipped with cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder whose recovery does not require underwater retrieval; but yet, nothing has happened with that. And it is listed as an ``unacceptable response'' by the FAA for their failure to act on this provision. Mr. Boulter, can you assure me that there will be an acceptable response and that response will be that the public is protected because we will have floating cockpit recorders mandated by the FAA? Mr. Boulter. I can assure you we will look at it. I am unfamiliar with that particular recommendation. We will look at that, sir. And I will have to take an IOU on that. Where we are on that I am not aware right this second. Mr. Cohen. Well, I appreciate your taking a look at it, but that is not a very good answer as far as I am concerned. And since Mr. Hall is one of the great heroes of aviation protections and safety, and this is his passion and desire to see this done to protect the public. I mean, it was a flight that was from South America to Europe, and it crashed somewhere there in the Pacific, and it took months. I think it was 6 or 7 months to find the flight recorder. Ms. Homendy, can you edify Mr. Boulter to that problem in 36 seconds or less? Ms. Homendy. Yes, I mean, I would just say that underwater recovery, especially when you have a very large debris field, is not only expensive but it can take significant time, and it is very difficult. So, that is why we recommended that we have them so that they would float. But it is ``open--unacceptable'' and hoping that FAA can take action. Mr. Cohen. So, the FAA can save a lot of money and maybe save some lives if they did this. Ms. Homendy. Save a lot of money and save a lot of time and get us to what happened after a significant tragedy sooner. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Boulter. I assume that will be a yes answer now? Mr. Boulter. As I said, sir, let me--I will give you that we were paying attention to every single ``open--unacceptable'' and every--we have a great relationship with the NTSB, sometimes harder to implement than the ``recommend,'' but we will take a look at that, and I will get back to you, sir. Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. And I will tell Mr. Hall. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. I was going to try to be humorous and ask if that included balloons, but let that sink into the ocean. I will let it go. Mr. LaMalfa. Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I am glad we are getting a good prompt start on our hearings for FAA reauthorization, so that we do this properly and thoughtfully as we wind through the beginning of the session. So, again, I just bounced from another committee, so, I hope I am not asking these too redundant from what has already been covered today. I have been concerned about pilot training and pilot availability and such. My information has that we are about 8,000 pilots short of a full complement nationwide. And, of course, that makes it much more difficult on the pilots themselves being asked to do even more. It affects routes. And my concern is especially of rural routes, small airports, things like that, in that it just makes it that much tougher for travel. So, the FAA has issued--I have here--9,500 certifications in the last couple of years. Pretty good. But they didn't quite keep up with the decrease for active pilots. It is noted today that the National Airspace System has become safer over time. Improvements and safety of our airspace, I believe, is prudent to reexamine the regulations requirements for what it takes to become a pilot. That is something we can look at. The training exam process to become a pilot in the U.S. can cost above $100,000. The FAA requires 1,500 hours of flight training, known as the 1,500-hour rule. Military pilots can do half that number. And some college graduates can have that number reduced to 1,000 or 1,250 hours. So, let me line this up for Captain Ambrosi. With improvements in the airspace system, do you believe we can be in a position to reconsider the minimum hours required for pilots, maybe especially military? Are there other requirements that can be reexamined, not to lower the level of safety or diligence, but that is reasonable within the context of what we are looking at here? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, thank you for your question. I can understand the plight of rural communities. But first and foremost, airlines make decisions on economics on where they allocate airplanes. It is not up to pilots. And I will tell you that, in the last year, there were 10,000 airline transport pilot certificates issued, more than pilots jobs in commercial airline business. So, we have a training backlog. COVID was obviously a major pandemic. It is great that we are all back in person here, but there is a training backlog. But there are more pilots today at major airlines than there were prepandemic, but they are flying less because they are all making their way through training. So, we have a situation where, when these pilots get back to where they belong, they will be more efficient and we will able to do more. But as far as rural communities, I would suggest that airlines use economics. They are flying many of those airplanes to more profitable cities now. They have upgauged over the last decade. And the smaller airplanes, when I started, were 30- passenger airplanes or smaller. Now, the smallest airplane was 50, and they are getting rid of the 50-passenger airplanes for economics. Mr. LaMalfa. Right. Mr. Ambrosi. Not because of a lack of pilots. Mr. LaMalfa. I wasn't saying, sir, that it was necessarily because of the pilots. It just might be an effect further down the chain that might see less. My focus mostly was on, would we be helping out the process if we had a harder look at the 1,500-hour rule or some other portion of the requirements that could be brought more into line with what is really needed. If you have--former military, if you have others, could some of these credits, for example, is there more ways to expand credits and get that number lower and still not reduce adequate training? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I will go back to we are at the safest period in aviation history right now, and a lot of that is because of these very rules. So, there is a significant credit for military, half of what the requirement is. There is a significant credit, as you mentioned, for the pilots that have gone to a 4-year college where they have gotten advanced academics. The system is working. There is a process in place. If someone has an alternate suggestion, the FAA has a process, that Congress has given that to the FAA, to review those and see what else is out there. However, again, I will reiterate, we are at this--this last decade is the safest in aviation history, and we should exercise caution---- Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Is my memory correct that before it got bumped to 1,500, the number was 250? Is that correct? Mr. Ambrosi. I don't recall there being a specific minimum. You had to have a specific licensing. So, it would have been about 250. And I can tell you from personal experience, sir, that I was a captain at a regional airline, flying that 30- passenger turboprop with pilots that had 250, 500 hours as new hires. And I could qualify that as on-the-job training. And the traveling public does not deserve to have on-the-job training in an airliner, regardless of whether you are flying in and out of a large city or a rural destination. Mr. LaMalfa. All right. Thank you. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Van Drew. Next, Mr. Allred. Mr. Allred. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of our witnesses for being here. Mr. Boulter, I am right here for you. I wanted to also discuss the NOTAM system, because FAA recently reported to us that it would take until 2030 to complete fixes and modernize the system. And given that you are relying on vintage technology, which I think is you all's term, that timeline seems unacceptably long to me if we want to maintain our edge in aviation safety. And so, I wanted to acknowledge that the FAA budget is the same at $3 billion the year that it was in 2009 for these kinds of improvements. There is no increase, taking into account things like COVID or other increased costs that you have had to deal with. I understand the FAA is seeking $29.4 million this year to modernize NOTAM. And I wanted to hear from you, Dave, what it would actually take in terms of funding for us to fix this. Because it is not just the breakdown that we had as we saw with I think the Canadian airline incident that it is difficult to understand, and it seems the NOTAM system doesn't really seem to be working. So, what is the actual number? What do we need to do to try and get by 2025 NOTAM updated? Mr. Boulter. My good friends in air traffic are responsible for the NOTAM system, but it is my understanding that there is a desire to go faster in that update to that system. And if that requires more funding, then they will come back to Congress and ask for that. Mr. Allred. So, you are comfortable with the $29.4 million that you are requesting? Mr. Boulter. $29.4 million? I am sorry? Mr. Allred. I think that is what--you are requesting that this year to modernize. Mr. Boulter. Yes. Again, not my---- Mr. Allred [interrupting]. Not your area? Mr. Boulter. Not my area, but certainly, if they need more than that, I would imagine they would make another request. Mr. Allred. OK. Well, we have also spoken previously about 5G implementation. Everyone here is talking a lot about it. But are we just urging manufacturers to develop electronic filters? Are there other processes in place? Where are we in your opinion? And, Captain Ambrosi, if you wanted to also mention what you think pilots are experiencing in terms of 5G. Because I have been reading some concerning reports indicating heads-up display anomalies, autopilot issues, autothrottle shutoffs that seem to be related to 5G. And obviously, while we want to implement this, we need do it in the correct way. Mr. Boulter. Yes. I do believe that looking at the data that we have that since the power reductions have been agreed upon, that we are in a good space as far as the risk goes. Not unusual that--my history, I ran the Flight Inspection Organization, so, chasing mike ramps around the sky was our business. And then research and development organizations as well at which we have done a fair amount of testing with the wireless companies on FAA airplanes to look at the signal, at the reduced power reductions we are confident that they are limited to--very, very limited on any interruptions. And we are getting reports from pilots, and we keep that open, and we look at every single one of those reports. So, I think we are very comfortable there. And we are comfortable with what we are doing to the poor-performing radar altimeters. Those are the ones that we are updating--or the airlines are updating currently. And then longer term, there are many more people entering that space. The power is going to go up in July. We are looking at what are the longer term standards for radar altimeters to be built in the future so they will be immune to any future work in the adjacent space, if you will. Mr. Allred. Captain, I have about 1 minute left, and I wanted to ask you to weigh in on that, if you can, just from what you are hearing from your colleagues. But also, diversifying the kind of pilot workforce, not just by race or by gender, getting more women into the workforce. Do you have ideas on how we could go about doing that? Would access to student loans or programs like that be something that you would find interesting? Mr. Ambrosi. Absolutely. So, on the 5G front, I share everyone's concern that right now that is a voluntary mitigation and that in July it is going to come back. Airlines are making good progress on updating their radar altimeters. Congress could consider in this rate authorization forcing collaboration between the FCC and the FAA so hopefully stuff like this doesn't happen again, because this is obviously a safety problem. As far as diversifying workforce, we absolutely support Federal loans. We are a profession. Other professions get Federal student loans for advanced degrees and, largely, we are not in that. So, by extending that financing--it is expensive to become an airline pilot, but we are trying to broaden our diversification. I personally am trying to turn our organization into embracing the next generation of aviators, and I think that is essential. So, we are happy to work together on whatever we can do to do that. Because we want our workforce to look more like the--or represent the communities we serve. I apologize. Mr. Allred. Thank you, Captain. I yield back. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. Next will be Mr. Westerman. Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I know that a lot of the Members on our side are my fellow colleagues on the House Natural Resources Committee. We had another hearing this morning, but we are back here in full force. And I look forward to working again on the reauthorization. And I was here in the last Congress under Chairman Shuster that reauthorized the FAA, and I know that there is a lot of work that needs to be done. And I also know that both Chairmen Graveses, the full committee Chairman Graves and the subcommittee Chairman Graves, have placed a strong emphasis on general aviation, which is important to my State and to my district. And, Mr. Boulter, I know that you are not in the air traffic control, you are not an air traffic control specialist. And I am hoping you can pass this along and have a colleague in the air traffic office follow up with me. I have a small airport in Mena, Arkansas. You may have heard of that. There was a movie made about it. It has a major problem with air traffic control. When planes dip below 4,000 feet, pilots lose contact with the Memphis Air Route Traffic Control Center. The folks at Mena have been trying to get a repeater installed so that the pilots aren't flying blind into the airport, but they haven't met with any success. We know that general aviation is critical to rural economies and small airports, and safety is always of paramount importance. I have spent more time than I probably needed to, or obviously not as much as I guess I need to but more than you would think, traveling to sites on top of mountains where these repeaters can be located, visiting with officials. And so far, we have just been able to get nowhere. Coming from--with an engineering background, this seems just atrocious. It should be easy do, not that expensive, and should have been done a long time ago. So, I would like to know what the FAA's plan is to provide reg coverage from the western edge of Memphis ARTCC to places like Mena that are currently cut off from radio contact due to mountains and other physical topography. Mr. Boulter. I certainly know Mr. Arel pretty well. My team is here taking notes, so, we will have Mr. Arel get back to you, who runs the Air Traffic Organization. I have flown into Mena myself, and I understand the issues with being able to pick up the center from Mena. Mr. Westerman. I am not going to ask what you were flying into Mena for, but---- Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. I was actually dropping an airplane off for the paint shop there. I don't know if it is still in business, but it was many years ago I dropped a Convair in there for paint. Mr. Westerman. It wasn't a black airplane in the nineties. Mr. Boulter. No, it was not. We did it in full daylight. Mr. Westerman. So, as you know, my understanding is when a pilot gets ready to take off from Mena, they have to get on their cell phone and call air traffic control. And there is also not the greatest cell phone coverage over there. So, I know that is just a frustration I see in one airport in my district. I know there must be others around the country, so, I appreciate you passing that message along. And I look forward to working on the reauthorization of the bill. And, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back 1 minute and 27 seconds. Mr. Nehls [presiding]. I thank you, Mr. Westerman. We will now have Mr. Auchincloss. You have 5 minutes, sir. Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman. I want to start, Captain Ambrosi, just by voicing my support for the high standards for pilot training that are in place now. The flying public, as you say, deserves to know that those piloting them are fully trained and are not learning on the job. I want to turn now to an area that I am going to be focusing on with FAA reauthorization, which is curb management at airports. And, Ms. Buckley, I turn to you. Beyond separating out departing and arriving passengers and creating more access points to the terminal, proposals to alleviate congestion at the curb and improve safety include deploying dynamic pricing models at curbs; addressing vehicular infractions through automated enforcement; creating offsite ground transportation centers with fast, automated people movers; and advanced spatial sensing technologies to monitor congestion and safety risks. What is MITRE doing now, if anything, on helping airports and Congress think about better curb management at our Nation's airports? And what might Congress do to partner with the work that you are doing? Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question. We certainly think about transportation from a citizen-centered view as well. It is a system of systems. So, we think about the continuous system of planes, trains, and automobiles really working together. And in terms of the technologies and the ways that we can model increasing efficiencies at curbside, I think the opportunities are tremendous. So, if we think about smart city-like sensors at curbs, understanding what is needed, all of the potential solutions that you just mentioned, we have the mechanisms and tools to be able to model out those solutions to see if any of them really will lead to the improved performance that you are looking for. So, I thank you for the question. I think it is an exciting area to pursue. Mr. Auchincloss. Well, I look forward to working with MITRE on that. And on a broader note, what do you think a trusting public- private partnership in aviation safety looks like between MITRE and the public sector? Ms. Buckley. I would really point to the ASIAS program for the aviation component, so, operating as a trusted third-party provider of data where we can bring in sensitive data from multiple parties and house that in a trusted manner. And as we mentioned earlier, I think that is a model to move on to other types of certainly advanced air mobility as well as surface transportation and modes of transportation, to continue to see the advantages that we have gotten from these Voluntary Safety Reporting solutions. Mr. Auchincloss. Well, I have had the pleasure of visiting your facility in Bedford and certainly can see the value that MITRE creates as being, as you said, the objective neutral site for data sharing and as a center of excellence for our industry. Ms. Buckley. Thank you. Mr. Auchincloss. Final questions are for you, Mr. Boulter. Some companies are talking about air taxi service which would compete directly with existing transit and rail service in our cities. Has the FAA coordinated its planning with the other modal agencies to ensure it is not preferencing air taxis over rail or bus service in these areas? Mr. Boulter. So, as part of our agency response, we coordinate closely with the Department, and that would be Department--Department is just now working an interagency group. So, the Department has the rest of those modes. We would fully expect the Department is working on that. I don't know personally, but I do know we are looking, not today, for getting them into the sky, but as a Department, making sure that we understand the infrastructure around them. Mr. Auchincloss. I would encourage that cross-modal collaboration to continue at the State and local level. And then finally, commercial aircraft are traditionally thought of as large jets or turboprops. If eVTOLs become a reality, that perception many change. In fact, many companies are already advertising for future commercial service through our cities in four- to eight-passenger planes. What steps is the FAA taking to ensure that these smaller aircraft provide the same level of safety that we have today in our skies? Mr. Boulter. So, the certification of those devices are under our current rule set. Obviously they have some unique characteristics that we are--but we are able to pull from rotorcraft, pull from fixed-wing aircraft, and then some unique standards for those so that the design is safe. And that is the rule we are building right now, the powered-lift. So, you have airplanes, you have rotorcraft. We are building an in-between category of things that can do both. And we are learning how those are working, right---- Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. This is the 10 to negative 9? Mr. Boulter [continuing]. But we are also not giving up what we have learned all these years---- Mr. Auchincloss [interposing]. Right. Mr. Boulter [continuing]. On how to build a good regulatory structure for operation. So, we are putting them in the middle, but they benefit from a little bit of both. Mr. Auchincloss. Right. And I know the Europeans are doing this as well. And I would just encourage the FAA to work from first principles on what we decide and not just fastball the Europeans, which I am not saying we are, but---- Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. No. We are going to fit that into our rule set. We expect to have that done in the fourth quarter of 2024. Mr. Auchincloss. I yield back. Mr. Nehls. I thank you, sir. I will give myself 5 minutes of questioning. I will just make an opening comment. I would like to thank everybody for being here. I like what I have heard so far. I thank everybody, what we have all heard. I like the gold standard, the safety that we have seen for the past several years. I am not going to ask you individually, but it would seem that you would all like to eventually have a boss. I mean, we don't have an Administrator with the FAA. You haven't had one for several months now. I believe you had one, but the nominee isn't going anywhere. It is being delayed in the Senate. And I think it would be very, very important that this administration would find a nominee that could actually get Senate confirmation, because I understand he has an interesting past. But that is just my point on that. I would like to start with you, Mr. Boulter. According to a recent study, nearly 70 percent of general aviation accidents could have been prevented if aircraft had advanced digital safety systems. I know industry is working hard to develop autolanding, autotakeoff, and advanced navigation systems for general aviation aircraft but are facing frustrating certification delays. A primary cause of delays is that various lines of business at the FAA must be engaged in reviews and often don't communicate effectively. So, what is the agency doing to ensure that FAA lines of business better coordinate and work towards performing concurrent reviews on these lifesaving technologies? Mr. Boulter. I can only speak for what I am doing and our team is doing, is that we are looking at these as projects. That is where we are with AAM, we are looking across the agency. If it requires cross-agency coordination as a project, we are going to treat it as a project. We are going to expect that it continue to move along, depending on its priority. These are lifesaving. Some of the autoland and some of those things, emergency landing systems that are being built, are really a game changer. And we agree with you that the general aviation accident rate is too high, even though it has been coming down. Even one death is too many, and that is a tragedy for whoever is involved. I can certainly look at where we are on that, but I know that with my colleagues at the management board in the FAA and the Acting Administrator, Deputy Administrator insisting upon that we do not act as we have in the past with stovepipes and that we work as teams to deliver for the American public. Mr. Nehls. Fair enough. Mr. Bunce, I want to thank you, Colonel, for your service in the Air Force. It is my understanding in your bio you are from Wisconsin. southern Wisconsin, where is that? Where are you from? Mr. Bunce. Milwaukee, sir. But I am a passionate Packers fan like you. Mr. Nehls. Yes. Got to get rid of that quarterback. He is no good anymore. Get rid of the quarterback. GAMA has significant experience working with companies seeking FAA certification for advanced safety systems. In previous testimony, sir, you explained that certification delays are often caused because the FAA doesn't have the correct group of technical experts engaged early in the process. Can you explain how this issue impacts the certification of new entrants and advanced safety technologies by the FAA? And how would you suggest, sir, this committee utilize the upcoming FAA reauthorization to address this problem? Mr. Bunce. Well, sir, I addressed in my opening remarks, when we go ahead and we have this delay in the rulemaking, we go ahead and require Mr. Boulter's people to be able to do all kinds of things, like special conditions, exemptions, things like that, that suck away all the specialists that we could have working on this new technology. So, to me, the most important thing that we could do is for this committee--and they have done so in the past in different reauthorizations--call for a 90-day review of the internal processes, not only within the FAA, but what then needs to go to the Department in rulemaking. And then when things do start getting delayed, then the process between the Department and the White House to be able to promulgate these rules. And what we are seeing is just we are delaying and delaying. And then we start to add more rules to that existing rule which further delays it. And it does have a negative impact on safety. Mr. Nehls. Fair enough. Thank you. I will finish with Ms. Homendy. I am looking at your budget. Fiscal year 2022 is $121.4 million. Fiscal year 2023 you have $129.3 million. Is that enough? Are we good? Ms. Homendy. It is not enough. The $129 million actually came down to $127 million because we had to pay for recovery of an aircraft because insurance didn't pay for it. So, we don't have the resources that we need. We have asked for $145 million for fiscal year 2024, which will help us improve training and get more people on board at the agency. Mr. Nehls. OK. Thank you. I now yield to Ms. Hoyle. You have 5 minutes. Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you. And I want to thank everybody for coming and testifying today. It is really interesting. So, in recent years, airlines have attempted to carve out their workers from State and local labor protections, including minimum wage, work and rest breaks, medical and family leave, arguing that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 preempted any of these labor protections that are below the Federal level. Such an act would severely impede airline worker recruitment, which there are already issues with. Federal preemption of State and local labor standards would also force workers to rely on Congress to intervene in labor disputes, as we saw with the recent rail strike. So, my question is for Mr. Boulter. Would you oppose enactment of any language that would preempt or lower airline labor standards? And if so, why or why not? Mr. Boulter. Thanks for the question. Unfortunately, that is way out of my lane of aviation safety. We are interested in certainly fatigue and other things for flightcrews. Other parts of the agency, our legal department, we could have Government affairs get back to you and answer that question for you. Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. I think it is important because, again, worker protections, making sure that people feel safe, that will help us in recruiting staff, which, again, I think is important. And to that end, we have also seen, since the COVID-19 pandemic, a lot more assaults of airline workers and flight attendants, significant rise in assaults. There were thousands and thousands of unruly passengers in 2021. There were 2,359 unruly passenger reports in 2022. So, as part of the 2018 FAA reauthorization, Congress mandated that air carriers develop employee assault prevention and response plans to address violence against frontline aviation workers. While most airlines have submitted plans, the FAA does not believe they have the authority to enforce them or hold airlines accountable if they do not submit these plans. So, again, Mr. Boulter, would the FAA support legislative language to clarify the FAA's authority to enforce mandatory employee assault prevention and response plan? Right now, crewmembers can receive voluntary advanced self defense training to ensure safety and integrity of the cockpit door. Would the FAA support mandatory self-defense training for all airline crewmembers? Mr. Boulter. Certainly, safety of the airline workers or any worker, frankly, in America is paramount. I am not sure where the FAA line is. I would have to probably talk to the legal department. On board the aircraft, once boarded, most of those outside of that are handled by law enforcement. But once boarded, then we have taken a zero-tolerance policy for in- flight. And the most egregious cases get referred to the Department of Justice. Thankfully, I believe the numbers are coming down, at least the last I saw, a little bit. But even one is unacceptable for treating in-flightcrew anything other than with respect and dignity. Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you. And final question, we have talked about trying to recruit more pilots, and there are barriers, whether they are financial barriers, and they are significant. And in Oregon, we have some pilot programs that have really worked well to get more representation from underrepresented communities, rural communities, people that aren't affluent, to get into to become pilots. So, happy to talk to you about that. But for right now, as you said, I personally don't believe we should lower standards, but you have a lot of people that are in training. What do you think about or would you support increasing the airline pilot retirement age, especially to have them mentor new pilots coming in, provided that they can show that they have competency to still fly the planes? Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you for the question. It is a solution that is in search of a problem. It puts an uncertain risk in the environment. So, it goes beyond just raising the retirement age, which hasn't had enough study. What does happen, though, is the most senior pilots fly international operations. So, those pilots will not be allowed to continue flying international operations past the age of 65. So, those pilots will be forced to come back and fly domestic flying on a smaller piece of equipment, thereby going through another training cycle, a very training cycle that could have been for a pilot that is coming up that has a longer term ability to fill that position. So, it is going to create a shorter term problem for the airlines and a training problem in that period of time, so, it is more of a problem than any solution that would offer. Ms. Hoyle of Oregon. Thank you. Mr. Nehls. Thank you. Now Mr. Mast. Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. I want to thank you all for your testimony. Good to see you all, many of you again. Some of us have spoken recently. Ms. Homendy, you and I have spoken already. My questions are reserved for you, so, the rest of you can relax for a couple of minutes. You are aware of the issue I am going to speak to you about, it is literally grave concern because of fatalities. In numerous communities in Florida, the only real tie to aviation is that they are planning to tie this train to Orlando International Airport. But I want to talk to you a little bit about NTSB, the Brightline train. And just try to understand something about NTSB is my goal in this conversation. NTSB reserves its investigations for crashes where you can learn something new about transportation world, something unique is happening. I have a pretty correct understanding there? Ms. Homendy. We have a specific statutory mandate. And on rail, it involves a fatality or a serious injury. It includes grade crossings, but it is--they are the ones that we believe have significant safety issues that we would like to weigh in on. Mr. Mast. So, to give some stats, we are talking about over the course of basically 5 to 6 years, some of that being test rail time, some of that being actual retail passengers, paying passengers, a total of about 75 miles of service, very short distance of train track running, an area that there has been freight rail running for many years and other passenger rails running for many years. In 2022, 22 fatalities; 2021, 7 fatalities; 2020, another 7 fatalities; 2019, 28 fatalities; 2018, 7 fatalities; 2017, 2 fatalities. At what point does the volume of incidents, some of them fatal, some of them nonfatal, many of them by suicide, many of them nonintentional, but at what point does volume of incident become something unique that needs to be looked at? And the reason this is very important to my community, the 75 miles that it is running largely doesn't run through my community right now. But they are expanding, doubling the length of this track to now run through my community up to the Orlando International Airport, and it has been captioned that this is the deadliest train in America per mile. I don't want it to be the deadliest train in America per mile, but now also running through the breadth of my community and my community now having those statistics. So, at what point does this become the instance, the amount of instances that we have there make it unique? Ms. Homendy. Well, I have shared with the staff that I believe that we should do a special investigation on the Brightline fatalities and injuries. We recently launched on one that we thought we could open up an investigation, but unfortunately it was a suicide, which we do not do investigations of suicides. So, we do continue to monitor safety on the line and work with FRA, who also has a responsibility to investigate those accidents as well. Mr. Mast. My understanding was there is--I know the incident you are talking about. There is one that happened just a couple of weeks prior to that one that was not a suicide. I think we made your staff aware of it. They were not tracking the incidents. Looking at this, I guess you could say--or I should rather ask it, I don't want to put words in your mouth. Is there anything, in your opinion, as we look at this to say that something has changed to indicate the statistics would be different in the expanded rail service? Has something changed to say that the stats will be different? They went back up again in 2022 to 22 deaths. The year before there were seven. So, it doesn't look like statistically there is a decline. Ms. Homendy. I am not aware of anything. But I will say, this occurred on the Northeast Corridor before Amtrak closed all the grade crossings. So, that is how Amtrak dealt with it. You do have a significant safety problem in Florida. I have pulled up in a car and almost ended up right on the tracks, because there will be a light right before and then a light right after and then you have no idea where you are supposed to pull up. So, it is a significant issue. Mr. Mast. One more quick--I don't think I got an answer to this. You said the incident you spoke of most recently, it was a suicide, you couldn't investigate it. Does the volume of incidents equal something that is unique, where there is something to be unusual and learn because there has been so many crashes? Ms. Homendy. I believe so, sir, yes. Mr. Mast. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate your testimony today. Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Mast. We will now go to Ms. Foushee. Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here with us today. I would like to turn our attention back to diversity in the aviation workforce. Congressman Allred touched a bit on this, but I would like to do some followup. In 2021, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that only 3.9 percent of pilots in the U.S. aviation industry were Black. This is an increase of 0.5 percent over the 2020 statistics, but it still does not compare to the 94 percent who identify as White. In my home State of North Carolina, Elizabeth City State University, an HBCU, hosts the only 4-year collegiate aviation education program in the State of North Carolina, offering students a bachelor of science degree in aviation science. With five different concentrations to choose from, graduates of this program go on to work for large commercial airlines, defense contractors, Federal agencies, and more. This program at ECSU is one of few aviation education programs offered at HBCUs across the Nation, but it is programs and partnerships like this one that are helping to diversify the aviation workforce. So, with that being said, my first question today is for Captain Ambrosi. Can you talk to us a little bit about how the Air Line Pilots Association is working with airlines to diversify training programs and the aviation workforce as a whole? Mr. Ambrosi. Well, Representative, thank you for the question. So, as I stated earlier, we absolutely believe in a more diverse workforce. I am from Delta. Delta Air Lines has partnered with universities to try to increase more diverse workforce and get more folks interested, trying to reach out to the community largely to get a more diverse workforce interested in it. It goes beyond that, though, because as we have spoken, there are hurdles to entry based on expense. It is very expensive to become an airline pilot. It is a great profession. Fortunately, we have negotiated some excellent contracts, and the regionals are starting to pay more. So, now people see a light at the end of the tunnel and say, if I am forced to spend this time and this effort to get there, I will get somewhere some day that I can have a means to pay back any kind of student loans that we get through this program. But we absolutely support Federal legislation to put student loans--our profession in line with other professions that allow student loans to become an airline pilot, thereby bringing more in from the communities we serve in a more diverse workforce. Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that. And a similar question to you, Chair Homendy. Your written testimony discusses your goal of hiring additional personnel and rightsizing your agency. Can you discuss any diversity efforts the agency plans to take when achieving these efforts? And also, what resources are needed from Congress to achieve this? Ms. Homendy. Absolutely. Thank you very much. We are working to implement the Executive orders that we have developed strategic plans to hire and recruit and maintain a diverse workforce. That means a great deal to us. I have appointed a chief diversity officer. In addition, internally we are working with HBCUs and others to hire, and looking to expand who we are working with to recruit employees to the agency. Mrs. Foushee. And one followup. And what are the consequences, in your estimation, of not investing in the NTSB's workforce now? Ms. Homendy. Yes. Our workforce is the same size as it was in 1997, and we have a great mandate. Every time we get an increase, most of that increase goes to the annual pay increase for Federal employees, which is also needed, but we need to expand our workforce, our training for our workforce, to accomplish the mission that Congress has tasked us to carry out. Mrs. Foushee. Thank you. And I yield back. Mr. Nehls. Thank you. We will now go to Mr. Stauber. Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I think that Chairman Graves opened this hearing up to talk about the bipartisanship, the opportunity you have. I truly believe that. And I have all the faith in both our chairman and the ranking member, have respect for both of them. So, I am looking forward to this healthy debate. Tim and Jordan are probably the only ones in this room that know this. It was about 6 years ago that I had my 43 hours of my pilot's license in my logbook. And I did a couple of landings, and my instructor was in the front seat, and I did them very well. And, Captain, you probably know this, that that first solo flight, I was so glad she didn't have me come to the ramp and get out and say I am on my own, because I haven't soloed yet. And unfortunately, a run for Congress and serving the people of the district have--my private pilot license has eluded me. But I have to say I am thrilled to be on the T&I Committee and the Aviation Subcommittee. We talk about the gold standard. Every witness here, in your testimony, it is all about safety, making sure that we bring the gold standard to America and then show the world as well. I really appreciate all of your testimony. As you know or some of you may know, and I am going to start this question out with Captain Ambrosi. The NOTAM system that we know has failed, Mr. DeSaulnier and I have championed that out of the House. It passed 424, I think, to 4 or 6. So, it is a high priority. And by the way, it passed out 4 years ago, too. It seems like this is more urgent. And I urge you all to contact your Senators to get this across so we can get that task force going to make it better. Can you just describe the current NOTAM system and some of the concerns? And how important is it that the Senate takes this up so we can get that task force up and running? We can do it very quickly. Mr. Ambrosi. Well, I thank you for the question, sir. First, go get that pilot's license. All right? Mr. Stauber. OK. Mr. Ambrosi. All right. So, the NOTAMs are essential. We have a very complex job, and getting information and processing information is essential. I fly internationally. I go across the ocean, going to Milan or Venice. I have information from not only the departure but the destination and every spot in between that we need to process. So, without NOTAMs and that information, we can't do our job. So, it is essential. Now, I support what action they took to restart the system. There is a system and a backup. I am not going to profess to be at an engineering level on how the actual systems work, but they did what they needed to do in that moment. But we do--it shows that there needs to be an emphasis put on funding and resources to make sure that that system is improved and reliable going forward so that we don't have a disruption like that. Mr. Stauber. I think that--you talk about funding, we can talk about funding, but we also need leadership at the senior levels and not just changing the name from Notice to Airmen to Notice to Air Missions. If we just have a name change, we are going to have the systemic failure like we did on January 10 and 11. So, I think it is important that we bring that up. So, Mr. Boulter, I want to ask you the same thing on the NOTAM system. What are some of the changes that you would like to see and some of the recommendations that have come to you already? Mr. Boulter. So, obviously as the captain has said, the NOTAM system is critical to operational control at an airline. We require an airline to have all information regarding that flight, both the dispatcher and the pilot to agree that that can be--you conduct it safely based on the information available, to which NOTAM is a huge part of that. So, everybody inside the agency understands the criticality of the NOTAM system. From a safety perspective, while it's unfortunate that that system caused us to go to a ground stop, allowing flights to go without appropriate information would--we wouldn't be living into our safety standard. Mr. Stauber. With just 30 seconds left, I think that we have to really understand that--and I am asking you to talk to your Senators, because we can get that task force up and running maybe before the FAA even reauthed. It is that important. We can't have another failure. And I just want to say in my last 20 seconds, I can't tell you how much I appreciate all of you and your input into making our aviation the safest. And we are going have robust debates, but I believe that we are going to continue to lead the world with the exceptional experience that we have. And I talk to my pilots friends all the time. It is about safety, safety, safety, both below the wings and above the wings. Thank you all. And I yield back. Mr. Boulter. Sir, as a former flight instructor, I hope you will get that solo done. Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. DeSaulnier. Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. I want to be able to jump in and thank my colleague for working on the NOTAM bill and the success we have had. Mr. Boulter, Jennifer, it is nice to see you. And thanks for recognizing our work. So, I want to talk about that. When Air Canada happened, you will remember, because it was at SFO, and I am a neighbor. Went to the tower, talked to the people who operated there, talked to the pilots, talked to many of your predecessors about the NOTAM system and why it was ignored in that instance. So, we have all talked about safety. I agree with you, we should really be proud of what we have done. But in that instance, we came within 59 feet, according to your investigation, Jennifer, of having the largest air disaster in the history of the country. Subsequent to that, in the last FAA, we worked together. We got a lot of good things in there to make sure some of the things that had that risk had been remedied. The thing I am concerned about is NOTAM and human factors and the fact that this keeps coming up. And I am haunted by the ghost of Richard Feynman, if you can remember who he was, and the minority report from the Challenger discovery where he called it institutional deviation, where NASA knew the O-rings were going to fail. Since we just had the anniversary of this, it is top of my mind. In his genius, Nobel prize winning physicist saying the institutions knew that it was going to fail, but they looked past it: institutional deviation. My frustration with dealing with FAA and your staff, to tell you the truth, to make sure they are doing what Congress told them to do. We just allocated $30 million to upgrade the system in the appropriations bill in the omnibus. So, Mr. Boulter, how can this committee and the two authors of the bill and the chair and the ranking member make sure that you are actually implementing this and sending the message out that the recommendations from NTSB are being done? Or we are going to have a disaster and all of the statistics will go away. All the public will remember was that we brought this up over and over again. We funded it, and I am worried that we are hoping it will go away. We need to make that exclamation. And, Captain, I would love to hear your response, if we have time. How do we make pilots who are highly trained make sure they have confidence in that system? Because we also know from the research that once highly trained people, whether it is in healthcare or aviation, start to question the system, they just by human nature don't pay attention. So, what are we doing, and how can we make sure that you are doing it right? Mr. Boulter. Safety obviously, sir, from the Administrator on down, is our North Star, as he likes to say. And we are doing everything we can, whether it be NOTAMs or whether it be these two events. Really the NTSB's teams are out on those two events, and we are looking at it from a pilot performance piece of that in aviation safety. And I know air traffic is looking at those last two events. No one takes it for granted that these are serious events, and we need to double down on what is it that is causing these. What did we miss in our voluntary systems? What have we missed in our data that would cause these. It always makes---- Mr. DeSaulnier [interrupting]. I am going to interrupt you. And I would love to follow up with you, but I understand how these hearings go. Ms. Homendy, could you comment? Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. And it was devastating what occurred--what could have occurred at SFO in 2017. From the human factor standpoint, our recommendation on NOTAMs--so, it is not just about the NOTAM system, it is what is in a NOTAM. And right now, for that specific flight, you had the runway closure, which was at the bottom of three pages of information. So, as a human being, as a pilot, you have to make absolutely sure that the flightcrew knows that what you are presenting to the flightcrew, how you are presenting it, and that you are presenting the most critical information that they need. Putting ``there is bird activity'' on the top--show me an airport where there is not bird activity. And then putting the runway closure at the bottom doesn't make any sense. They need to know what is most appropriate, what is most critical for their flight so they get there safely. Mr. DeSaulnier. Captain, do you have anything just briefly? Mr. Ambrosi. Well said. I couldn't agree more. It is not just the information, it is about how the information is laid out. But we are professionals, we look through the data. Not having the data is the biggest problem, so, we are not going to operate without it. But I couldn't agree more. Mr. DeSaulnier. Well, I want to follow up with all of you. And with all due respect, Mr. Boulter, we all believe in safety, but there is an urgency to this. And I am personally frustrated with your organization through multiple administrations and your lack of responsiveness to me. So, I would love to follow up with you with specifics, with all of you. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Nehls. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Edwards. Mr. Edwards, 5 minutes. Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chair. To all of you, thanks for being here this afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to work with you from this position. I am one of the newest members of this committee. I am really eager to get to know and work with you to provide an incredible service, a much needed service to all Americans. My first question is to Mr. Boulter. Our regional airport, Asheville Regional Airport, broke ground recently to rebuild a control tower that is 61 years old. We were all celebrating this and thought that it was a lot of money at $55 million for that particular project. And then I had a chance to hear from another major airport in North Carolina, the Charlotte Douglas International Airport. They are working to break ground on a new runway at a cost of about $1 billion. And that airport is about the sixth largest, I understand, in the U.S. or at least we are going to claim that for today. But it occurs to me in looking at this regional airport, 61 years old, probably the oldest in the country, and then I compare that to this huge airport that needs to improve capacity and safety and look at the price tag on that, that we need a way--I need to understand a way that we prioritize--as much as we would like to go out and pay for every project, we need a way to prioritize these projects. How are we going to go about doing that together? Do you put together a list and we arm wrestle over it? What does that look like for a new Member here? Mr. Boulter. So, air traffic control towers, for the most part, are--I am sorry. Air traffic control towers are prioritized by air traffic, and they have a whole set of criteria. We could certainly get the air traffic folks that do that in here to talk to you, sir. And then airports would be the runways piece, right? So, they are kind of--the air traffic equipment is the towers in the airports. I know airports obviously has a whole prioritization system built into theirs. My days in air traffic, they have a pretty robust system on facility condition. Obviously 61 years, it is probably time. So, obviously we could get them in to kind of tell you how they prioritize air traffic systems and how they prioritize airports, both of those organizations, be happy to do that. Mr. Edwards. And thank you. So, am I to assume now that there is a list of all of these needs in America in some prioritized order that we will be able to look at as a committee when we are looking at which ones come first, which ones could reasonably wait till somewhere down the road? Mr. Boulter. I believe air traffic has that information for facilities. And I am not familiar with the airports' version of that. Mr. Edwards. Thank you. It looks like what will be my last question is for Captain Ambrosi. Also looking at my district, NC-11, we have got two pilot schools in the entire district. They are only about 20 minutes from one another. And yet we have got some very rural parts of the district that don't have reasonable access to pilot schools. And with what I believe the shortage of air pilots that we are looking at nearing 80,000, and considering that rural parts of my district might very well have some up and coming pilots, what can we do? What are we doing to offer more opportunities for folks that maybe would want a career in aviation? Mr. Ambrosi. Thank you for the question. As I have said, we are encouraging Congress to take action to extend Federal loans to people of very diverse background and beyond those that just can afford it. It is very expensive to get into this profession. And there needs to be an ability for folks that don't have the money or have the ability to go to the military to be able to do that. So, absolutely we support legislation to diversify and offer Federal funding. Mr. Edwards. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield. Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Bunce, I know the development of better products and new technology plays an important role in reducing the aviation industry's impact on the environment. Will the steps you outline in your testimony to improve the regulatory and certification process help with progress in this area? Mr. Bunce. Absolutely, sir. What we are doing on sustainability is truly impressive. We are an aviation Nation. We lead the world. Just noticed the other day on the Mall, I was thinking, what other industry or what other transportation sector has not only one but two Smithsonian museums? We are the world leaders. So, on a sustainability front, we are doing incredible research on augmented thrust through using electric power generation in larger and larger aircraft. We are looking at hydrogen power. We are being able to go ahead and look at lighter and lighter capability using fly-by-wire technology that really leverages. As you make the airplane lighter, you extend range. And so, fuel efficiency really matters to us to be able to meet our sustainability goal. So, again, it is a very exciting time. And if we can get the certification process to be more agile, to be able to be responsive by implementing some of these recommendations, I think we can make some great strides. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Captain Ambrosi, looking through your testimony, I see that you have highlighted the changes to pilot training and qualifications, and that you also flew for regional airlines before becoming a captain at Delta Air. Can you explain to the committee how you built your flying hours and how pilots generally develop flight-hours prior to receiving their ATP certificate? Mr. Ambrosi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I, like everyone on this panel, love aviation, so, I was excited as a young man to go to a 4-year aviation school where I did an advanced aviation degree. And then I flight instructed. I flew helicopters for a lengthy period of time. We had flight instructing and doing commercial photography, exercising the privileges of my commercial certificate. I flew multiengine airplanes, teaching folks how to fly on that. I transitioned to Atlantic Southeast Airlines. Back in the day we called them commuters, now they are called regionals. But I flew a 30-passenger turboprop. I got hired probably 1,800 to 1,900 hours of time, of mostly commercial flying. At least 1,500 hours of it was commercial flying. And there I flew a 30-passenger airplane for a few years, upgraded to captain at the regional airline where, as I have mentioned previously, I flew with first officers that had been hired with 250- to 500-hour range. This was pre-2010 bill, and at times it was on-the-job training. So, it shouldn't be that way, but it is no fault of their own. We are in a more complex system now. Some would think that automation should make things easier. And as an operator, I can tell you that sometimes it doesn't. In the more complex airspace, as we welcome more users in, it is essential that we make sure that our pilots have the training and experience to safely carry our passengers. Mr. Carbajal. I can assure you all the young boys and girls watching this hearing are saying I want to be like him when I grow up, all those aircrafts you have flown. Administrator Boulter, we are in an exciting era in aviation with new advancements in technology like advanced air mobility, sustainable aviation fuel, and commercial space travel. We are poised to transform air travel. My district is home to Vandenberg Space Force Base, which also serves as a spaceport. I understand the FAA and the Air Force signed the commercial space agreement in June of 2021, aimed at protecting safety and better coordination. What resources does the FAA have to continue to promote commercial space infrastructure? And how are you continuing to prioritize safety? Mr. Boulter. Thank you, sir. I can have somebody from commercial space answer your question for you. Commercial space is a little out of my lane, but I will be happy to have them talk to you about how they can do that. Kelvin would be happy to do that, sir. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Nehls. Thank you, sir. I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Yakym, 5 minutes. Mr. Yakym. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all the witnesses for taking time to inform us on this important topic. I think this hearing is the best way to kick off our work on the FAA reauthorization because we must always keep safety at the forefront of everything we do in aviation. We must look at every aspect of this policy through the lens of safety in order to ensure that what we do maintains the sterling reputation that we know to be American aviation. Our goal 100 percent of the time, 1,000 times out of 1,000, is to get passengers, pilots, and flight attendants from point A to point B safe and sound. And the same goes for everyone on the ground, too, from mechanics to baggage handlers to air traffic controllers and gate agents. And in the unlikely event that something goes wrong, we must have expert investigators who are ready to get to the bottom of whatever issue transpired and make recommendations to prevent future incidents. With that, I want to turn to an issue that I have heard from a number of my constituents about in my short time in Congress. Our community, South Bend, Indiana, recently lost a feeder flight that connects families and businesses from South Bend and the surrounding area to the rest of the globe. What I am trying to figure out is how we bring these types of feeder flights back to secondary and tertiary markets. I know that there are probably a lot of things that contribute to this issue, but I want to focus today on the aviation workforce. So, as I survey this witness panel, I see a depth of knowledge but also a wide range of different facets within the aviation industry that are represented. So, my question is this: How do we attract more people into the aviation industry? Are there barriers from someone starting a career in aviation? And how do we increase the pool of people wanting to become pilots or mechanics and join other aspects of the aviation ecosystem? And I will start with Mr. Bunce. Mr. Bunce. Sir, as Mr. Bolen pointed out, in the last reauthorization, we really looked at youth in aviation and also women in aviation because, quite frankly, we have already talked about diversity, but the majority of our workforce is male dominated. And so, we are missing a great percentage of the population. So, our outreach and all of us have programs on board, whether you are in Government or in industry, that tries to reach out to youths and tell them be part of this incredible industry that we have out there; but there are things that we learned through that study that we hope we can expand upon in future reauthorizations to be able to say how we appeal to a young lady is different than how we appeal to a young man. And we are talking down in middle school. And if we talk about what you can do for the environment, we emphasize a sustainability theme, or what you can do in disaster response, that has a different appeal to a young woman than it does to a man. So, we have got to be able to adapt. We have also got to be able to look at demographics out there and say, OK, there are certain people and certain groups in our country that have a propensity toward mechanical skills. We talk a lot about the need for pilots, but I can tell you that we have an acute need for mechanics and line people and people to work in our factories. So, we have got to talk about this industry and the opportunities, the great pay that is in it, but also an ability that if you get into it, we will help you further your education. You work for a company, or a company will have programs to be able to let you, if you want to go to college or get a master's and develop those skills further, we will help you. Mr. Yakym. All right. Thank you. Ms. Homendy, same question. Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. Twenty-nine percent of those women who are passionate about aviation became passionate before they were 10 years old. So, we have to offer kids opportunities to really develop that passion for aviation. You can do that through air shows and education and partnerships. But I do want to highlight the Women in Aviation Advisory Board that Pete mentioned, which was required, which was tasked in the last authorization bill, and I hope we will continue its work, and they put out the ``Breaking Barriers for Women in Aviation'' report, which has a number of recommendations: 11 for Congress, 15 for FAA, including nursing accommodations, which exist in each of these buildings, and 14 for industry. We have an opportunity to encourage women in the workforce, but the greatest barriers are discrimination, lack of career opportunities, lack of flexibility, meaning work-life balance, and sexual harassment; and I am going to talk about that for one second. Seventy-one percent of women in aviation experience sexual harassment, 81 percent witnessed it, and 51 percent were retaliated against for reporting it. We have to address these issues because we want to encourage women. We want to encourage kids to come into aviation. It is a fact that I am only the fourth woman to serve as Chair of the NTSB since 1967, and we have a workforce of less than 3 percent of mechanics are women, less than 9 percent of pilots are women, less than 17 percent are air traffic controllers, 19 percent dispatchers; CEOs, 3 percent. We have an opportunity, and this aviation industry is so great for work, and I want to work with the industry and work with Congress to see how we can enable kids and women and others to really get excited about aviation because now is the time. Mr. Yakym. And as a father of two young girls, I could not agree more. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Owens [presiding]. Thank you. Ms. Peltola, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. Peltola. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to be here as the new vice ranking member for the Aviation Subcommittee. It is a real please to be here. I represent Alaska, and for Alaskans, aviation really is just the way that we get around, the way that we get our goods and services, the way we go to the doctor or the grocery store. It is really a critical enterprise, and we are always looking to ensure that we continue to improve aviation safety, as well as ensure a thriving aviation industry. These are essential to both the smallest villages and the biggest cities that I represent. The other thing, everybody knows this, but safety really is all about teamwork, and as we work towards an FAA reauthorization bill this Congress, I want to make sure that this committee recognizes that achieving safety means ensuring we have the right processes and standards in place, the right infrastructure investments, and the right leaders at the table both nationally and locally to advance aviation as a whole. And I will focus my question today on aviation safety efforts in the State of Alaska, also recognizing that the importance of aviation safety standards really is nationwide. There isn't anywhere really even in the world where this isn't critical, and I want to see that the FAA continue to be the gold standard safety regulator for the aviation industry. So, my first question is for Mr. Boulter. In 2021, the FAA, in consultation with Alaska aviation community stakeholders, developed 11 recommendations to address Alaska's unique safety hazards through its Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative, FAASI. And I was wondering what progress has FAA made in implementing these recommendations? And, more specifically, can you provide an update on the various weather observing system updates and installations that are needed and what the FAA is doing to make these updates in a timely manner? Mr. Boulter. I would be happy to do that. Having flown a little bit in Alaska and having responsibility at one point in my career for all the navigational aids in Alaska, it is a challenging environment. The agency has completed about half of those 11. In the Aviation Safety Organization, we are really working on two, which is authorization for some of those weather observing systems so that commercial and other operators can use those weather reporting systems in their commercial operations and synchronizing really some of the things we allow in the lower 48 on GPS routes and other GPS-type procedures in Alaska. So, the Aviation Safety Organization is working on those two diligently. Our Air Traffic Organization is really about the weather equipment. We can certainly get an update for you from them. Mrs. Peltola. And I would love to extend an invitation for your office to come to my office and briefing myself and my staff in more detail. Mr. Boulter. Absolutely. Mrs. Peltola. Thank you. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Mr. Kean, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. As we draft a new authorization, there are several major areas that this committee must look towards: technical advantages in aviation since the last reauthorization; passenger, pilot, and worker safety; workforce training programs; general aviation; manufacturing; drone policy; and information sharing to increase efficiency. It is important that this committee do that with your insights and advice on a long-term basis, and it needs to be bipartisan like the previous ones were. If we are looking at the FAA, Mr. Boulter, how can you lay out and would you lay out a regulatory framework to enable AAM? What do you view this industry looking like and how soon? And how is the FAA going to help facilitate that? Mr. Boulter. So, we look at operations. We look at the leading applicants being certified, the devices or the aircraft being certified at the end of 2024. That is the current schedule. That schedule is made by the applicant. We believe that--we have committed to the fourth quarter of 2024 having the operational rules in place and the operational infrastructure. So, operational infrastructure is not just a set of rules. It is training to our inspectors. It is the ability to add those on to commercial certificates, that environment. And then what we have learned from the industry, and we have had a fair amount of listening sessions with them, and we have been working with each of the applicants that are kind of in the lead here. What their expectation to do is, we expect VFR operations in 2025, in some major cities around America and a limited basis, in scale, moving along in scale as that grows. We are working with our air traffic colleagues so they can understand what that looks like, at least at first, and then what kind of systems are we going to need long term. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. When would you know of slippage of that timeline? Mr. Boulter. We will know--we have a series of goalposts, if you will. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. I understand that. I am asking you when will you understand the slippage in that timeline? Mr. Boulter. I do know that we have met our first three goals, and it is on time currently. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you. If I may, also, Dr. Buckley, what visions do you see that could help the FAA do its job and that we as Congress should know exists when we are looking at the regulatory framework? Ms. Buckley. What we really look for is what does it need to us to transition to this modernized environment so that we can operate a safe NAS. And what I would encourage Congress and the FAA to consider is what is that risk and dependency tradeoff as we move forward to adopt some of these new technologies. It is not easy. There are a lot of demands placed on sustainability, things we have to get right now but then transition where we need to be. And I think it is that thoughtful tradeoff at the enterprise level that I would encourage all of us to look at as we continue to think about the future. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you. And Mr. Boulter, how will the safety management systems requirement for part 135, operators and tour operators, improve safety for the passengers? Mr. Boulter. The safety management systems are a systematic approach, and it moves us in the oversight world to a looking at risk versus looking at strictly compliance. We want compliance and we want operators to holistically look at risk across their organization, identify that risk, and put mitigations in place for that risk. So, it will change the way--we have seen our relationship with the major carriers change, and it is a risk-based system. We keep asking them, what are you doing to identify risk? What are you doing to control risk? And it is really a change in the way we think. Now, the challenge for us, of course, in this is scaling it from the single pilot, single airplane person to large operations, and we are beginning to work through that as the rulemaking moves forward. Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you. And thank you, the other members of the panel. I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Mr. Moulton, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all our witnesses for sitting here so long. I know these are long hearings, but we appreciate you and all that you do. Piston-powered aircraft produce 70 percent of the total lead emitted into the air nationwide. There is no safe level for lead in our children's blood. The research on lead in aviation fuel is very clear. It is harmful to the health both of children and adults. We also know lead can have significant impacts on academic performance for children, as measured by end of grade test scores. And I am consistently hearing concerns from my constituents about leaded fuel. I understand that unleaded fuel for small piston engines is not yet cleared for use. The safety of the flying public is a top priority for the FAA, and we cannot risk prop planes having sudden engine failure because they are using a fuel that was not rigorously researched and tested. That is why the FAA's EAGLE initiative, that is Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions initiative, is critical. After a massive undertaking from the aviation industry last September, a new unleaded gas was finally approved for certain small planes. In 1973, before I was born, the U.S. began to phase out leaded gasoline in cars until it was fully banned in 1996. It is well past time we put safety first and stop endangering the health of our constituents with leaded fuel. So, Mr. Boulter, what is a reasonable timeline to fully eliminate leaded aviation fuel? Mr. Boulter. The goal of the EAGLE project is by 2030. As you said, we have already approved in a limited amount of airplanes a particular compound that does replace it only in those airplanes we have approved it in. We will continue to look at folks that come early to market. Without a drop-in replacement, though, then the whole infrastructure around fuel, whether it be--is very difficult if you have certain blends in certain places and doesn't meet all the airplanes' needs. So, while we have approved that, we continue to approve that fuel for others as it is safe in those particular aircraft engine combinations. We will continue to do that, and we will continue to work with EAGLE initiative with industry to not only find a replacement for 100 Low Lead but the infrastructure required to be able to deliver it to the airports. Mr. Moulton. And do you think the 2030 is a goal you are going to meet, or are you going to miss that? Mr. Boulter. Obviously, sir, if this was easy, we would have done it by now, but when you have engines from 1920 to 2023, it is a difficult problem. But I'm convinced that with industry, if we put our heads together and we really get the right experts in the room, I believe we will make 2030. Mr. Moulton. If we were to devote more resources to this, could we speed up the timeline, or you don't think that is realistic? Mr. Boulter. I would have to look into that, sir. Mr. Moulton. OK. Until the cost of unleaded fuel is cheaper than existing, it will be a hard sell to pilots and airlines. And is there a plan to actually bring down the cost of unleaded fuels to be more comparable to leaded fuels to help with this transition? Mr. Boulter. Pete, I don't know if you have anything on the economics of that, but I certainly don't. Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bunce? Mr. Bunce. Sir, one fuel has a supplemental type certificate. There are actually three other fuels in the testing process. So, up at the FAA Tech Center, we are testing two in what is called the piston aviation fuel initiative. So, they are going through that pathway. So, certainly Congress has funded that program, and we hope that that continues until they get through that testing process. Once we have more fuel out there, obviously, it is supply and demand. So, if we have got multiple refiners that are producing the fuel in different places in the country, the price will go down, but one of the big factors in the cost of the fuel is the transportation of it. If you have got to truck it a long distance, that adds costs. So, that is why it has got to be refined in different sections of the country. There is really, on the west coast, if you look at what is happening to get fuel up in Alaska, it comes from, actually, down in the lower 48 where we have got to ship it up there. So, transportation adds a lot of cost to it. Mr. Moulton. So, I understand this is challenging, but America put a man on the moon faster than this initiative is going to get done by 2030, from when President Kennedy said that is where we are going. So, I hope we can all work together to recognize and realize this goal for the safety not just of the flying public but for everybody else in America. So, thank you all very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Ms. Chavez-DeRemer, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. Thank you for being here toward the end of the day. I just have one question for Mr. Bolen in regards to the view of the National Business Aviation Association. What is the NBAA's view of FAA's safety management system in regard to the proposed rulemaking? Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you very much. As I indicated earlier, SMS is a powerful tool, and I think we all recognize the benefits that it has, and we want it to be something that works at scale for everyone. I think what we see with the new SMS rule, and it just came out recently, they have extended the comment period for 90 days, and we are going through it very carefully to make sure it actually is a tool that can be useful and not an impediment. So, we are right now looking at the SMS tools that we have used, including IS-BAO, something that was developed by the business aviation community, looking at the scalability, and we look to provide robust comments to that. We are in an education phase, and we know that it is imperative that we get an SMS tool but that it is done at the right scale. And so, that is really what we are focusing on. Mrs. Chavez-DeRemer. I appreciate that. As I was reading through the testimony, Mr. Ambrosi, I think, referenced it, and to scale is difficult sometimes with the collaboration of 121 airlines; and when you are trying to factor in labor, organization, regulation, manufacturing, I can see that it takes time, and so, I appreciate that comment on the rulemaking. And I just wanted to ask that question and how you all were feeling in referencing those rules. So, thank you for that answer. I don't know if you have any additional details on that; but if not, I thank you for answering. And with, I yield back. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about the important work done by this committee to reauthorize the FAA. These programs and priorities are critical to continue America's leadership of safety and innovation in the aviation industry, especially as China and our adversaries work to expand their presence. Mr. Boulter, the United States airspace industry is a key driver of economic growth. How does the FAA utilize the commercial sector to advance capabilities that have the potential to make aviation safer and more efficient? Mr. Boulter. Sir, we couldn't do this without a lot of the people that sit at this table. Our Commercial Aviation Safety Team where we have labor, we have everyone at the table, and we have open and frank dialogue; we look at data; MITRE is our trusted third-party in that. It is critical to our future that we do a couple things. One is that we continue to look for data sources throughout, and we work together, and we also build tools that can get more predictive. Our goal in the agency is not just finding what the issue was after the accident but could we find these issues in a predictive way. And I believe we are starting to shift to that in our CAST team. I know that team working together is going to do great things about moving to a more predictive environment. Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Things are always evolving. As technology continues developing and American companies innovate, the methods and materials used to manufacture civil aviation products can change. Can you speak about the importance of ensuring the regulatory environment keeps pace with the advancements in technologies? And how does this make aviation safer? Mr. Boulter. Whether it be advanced materials or advanced technology, avionics technology, as you know, has made huge leaps. It is always a challenge for us to keep refreshing our workforce, but that is why I look confidently towards the new hires that we have hired, because they have different skill sets. While they may need experience in our aircraft certification business, they come with a great set of skills that we can move forward. But I also think some partnerships with industry to learn more about these advanced materials so that we can--and use some aviation rulemaking committees to look at how do we certify some of these advanced technologies. Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Mr. Bunce, can you expand on that a little bit? And what do you think we need to prioritize to ensure that FAA can certify products in a timely manner? Mr. Bunce. Training. Sir, it is all about training and exactly what Mr. Boulter said. And I know there is a willingness to be able to work with us, but we have got to think in a way that looking at the new technologies, whether we are talking composites, whether we are talking fly by wire, whether we are talking about electric propulsion, that it is a team effort. And we have people that float back and forth between industry and the FAA, and that is very positive, and that is very healthy, but if we are able to train together, then we all have the latest and greatest. The other thing that also as we have new technology moving forward is the standards become very important. If we just stick with rulemaking, as we all know, it just locks us in, and we can't keep refreshed with the latest in technology. And I know Mr. Boulter is very committed to being able to use standards more and more where we get all the experts from the planet together, and we do it on a periodic basis to refresh. Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much. I would just like to say how much I appreciate all of you being here today. And being the last guy here, hopefully we will wind up here pretty quick. So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Mr. Williams, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Williams of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I also would iterate that I admire your endurance and patience. So, I come out of the nuclear Navy, and if there is any community that is more obsessed with safety, track record, procedures, followup, analysis, some of the most feared words I have ever heard is ``I am from naval reactors, and I am here to help.'' So, I appreciate that you are focused on safety. I think I can relate to that culture from Admiral Rickover. Mr. Boulter, I am concerned about this unusually close call on January 13th at JFK International Airport in my State, in New York. Two aircraft came within seconds of colliding on the surface of the airfield as they were transiting and moving. One aircraft missed the correct taxiway and began crossing an active runway just as another aircraft loaded with passengers and crew is on its takeoff roll. We are fortunate that multiple layers of safety systems, back to the culture of safety, alerted, and one of our fantastic air traffic controllers made an emergency call to the aircraft to abort a high-speed takeoff. The fact that we are talking about a close call and not a disaster demonstrates the success that you have had and validates the systems that you have had. I am proud that a company in my district has a long history of providing that kind of surface safety for the FAA, and they make surveillance systems that contributed to the controller's awareness, situational awareness and able to predict and interdict before an accident occurred. But my question, just very straightforward, are you confident, sir, that the FAA has the funding and the means to maintain the same level of safety that saved the lives at JFK where the margin of safety was just a few seconds? Mr. Boulter. Sir, certainly the President's budget supports an Aviation Safety Organization. I can't speak to all the air traffic pieces to that. That system you talk about is an air traffic system. But multiple levels of safety are always what we are looking for as an organization and what we ask of air carriers and other operators in the system; but, yes, we certainly could get you some more information on the funding of those systems, but the Aviation Safety and Oversight Organization, we support what the President has asked for in the President's budget. Mr. Williams of New York. OK. It was the ASDE-X system. Please. Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. We are leading that investigation and also the one in Austin, and it was the ASDE system. It was the Airport Surface Detection Equipment system that notified the air traffic controller that there was an impeding collision. That only exists at 35 airports across the United States. It does not exist in Austin. And so, we are going to take a look at that as part of our investigation, but certainly, that is something that we need to look at. Mr. Williams of New York. Well, my daughter lives in Austin, so, I have a vested interest. Ms. Homendy. That is right. Mr. Williams of New York. And that is safety. With the time I have remaining, I had the privilege of briefing the NASA ATM-X team for Next Generation air traffic management. They were looking at Next Generation technologies. In my case, my expertise in distributed computing or edge computing. The culture of safety is almost antithetical to innovation, and I know that from the nuclear Navy, and most of which is classified, but very, very difficult for that organization to adopt new technologies, but they have managed to do that and I think successfully over the last 30 years. Can you point me to any program or team specifically--not within NASA but within the FAA, Mr. Boulter--that really is tackling this conundrum between innovation and safety? Because we are not talking about a new technology. We are talking about an entirely new system of technologies, and I would just be eager to learn more. Mr. Boulter. Yes, our Next Generation air traffic system organization is looking at, what does the future look like? What does the data centric National Airspace System look like? We can certainly have them brief you on what they are doing, sir. Mr. Williams of New York. All right, thank you. We will follow up. Thank you. I yield back, sir. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Mr. Van Orden, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Van Orden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Boulter, thankfully, in your written testimony, amongst all of you, you have mentioned safety approximately 400 times, and it is critical because we need to make sure that safety remains paramount. But we heard the word security no more than 15 times. And, Doctor, I want to thank you. You did the best job I believe out of any of the panelists or the witnesses during your verbal testimony bringing out how incredibly important this is. So, Mr. Boulter, on January 26th, your colleague, Acting Director Nolen, presented a debrief to a bipartisan group from this committee referencing his decision to shut down all air traffic in the country for a period of approximately 2 hours on January 11th. During his remarks, he mentioned that the FAA had a two-person integrity, or TPI, for anyone who could potentially manipulate the software code in the legacy NOTAMs database. I asked him a very straightforward question and that being: Was the TPI policy pre-existing in relationship to this incident and was ignored? Or was the policy implemented following the incident to prevent it from happening again? Now, unfortunately, he chose not to answer this question and said that you had an ongoing investigation and that you would follow the facts. I asked him the question again. He refused to answer. So, immediately following this, my staff worked with the committee to discover that, in fact, you did not have a two- person integrity policy in place prior to this incident and that it was implemented following for mitigation purposes. Now, I laud your decision to do so, but I take exception that we had to find this out independently. So, by exhibiting a remarkable lack of forethought by not having a TPI policy in place prior to this instance, the FAA left our entire Nation's air industry in peril. So, I am thankful this was a case of poor management and delinquent policy standards, as opposed to a malicious actor targeting aircraft, our aircraft control system, because I don't know if our aircraft would be flying today if it were. So, I am going to ask you a question and a followup. Have you initiated a key nodal analysis of your NOTAM systems within systems, including the legacy database and the user and systems interfaces between these entities to identify any other single point of failure or vulnerability? Mr. Boulter. So, the Aviation Safety Organization has not, but my understanding is that the Air Traffic Organization is doing a deep dive on that system. Mr. Van Orden. OK. So, did you just tell me that the Federal--the FAA is not doing a nodal analysis for your NOTAM systems within systems? Mr. Boulter. No. The Air Traffic Organization would be doing that analysis, and I am sure, in their--they are currently in the middle of that investigation with our IT---- Mr. Van Orden [interrupting]. So, who is directly responsible for the NOTAM system itself? Is it the air traffic controllers or---- Mr. Boulter [interrupting]. The Air Traffic Organization owns the system, and, obviously, our IT organization is involved as well. Mr. Van Orden. So, you understand that they are doing this, but you don't know this for certain? Mr. Boulter. I do not. Mr. Van Orden. OK. Please do me a favor. Will you give them a call after you get out of this meeting? Because if there are more vulnerabilities and you have not taken the time to do a key nodal analysis for all of them, the potentiality of the destruction of our system for maintaining aircraft in this country is a real thing, especially if there is a malicious actor. So, I would think of all the things we talked about today, that this should be like number one on your list to take care of this. So, I would like you to report back at some point, in either written form or a phone call to me, I don't care, that this is being initiated, to what level it is going to be initiated, and when the anticipated completion of this investigation is, because this affects every single human being on the planet that flies an aircraft. Mr. Boulter. Sir, we will do that. Mr. Van Orden. Thank you. That's all I have. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Owens. Thank you. The chair has been notified that there is a series of votes occurring on the floor, the House floor. The committee will stand in recess subject to the call of the chair. [Recess.] Mr. Molinaro [presiding]. The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will reconvene the previously recessed hearing. I will yield myself 5 minutes and then we will get moving. Thank you. I joked on my way in. This is kind of like making it from the kid's table to the adult's table. So, we are grateful. I wanted to get started. So, I represent the 19th Congressional District in the State of New York, and we recognize, in particular, two-thirds of flight delays, and most of what concerns us exists because of issues in the Northeast where my district is located. Certainly, we recognize that the technology, of course, we use is terrifically, in many cases, outdated. I know that we have all touched on, and I don't want to rehash what has been discussed regarding NextGen and the system upgrades, but to Dr. Buckley, if you could, what other advancements in use of technology would be appropriate in particular to address what has been a chronic problem in the Northeast? Ms. Buckley. Thank you for the question. To your point, I think we have the technologies. I think we understand how to control the airspace. I think we understand what is needed from a controller perspective. It's moving toward the right way to implement those. I think it is training. A lot of it is around workforce when we look at those particular challenges, and it is making sure that we have the incentives to not only bring in the controllers and the training that we need in that area but also to make sure that we are, again, safety first and understanding the right way to maintain the presence that we need in that particular area and manage the very congested traffic that you are seeing in that airport. Mr. Molinaro. So, I spent the last 12 years of my life in local government where I was responsible actually for overseeing the busiest general aviation airport in New York, outside of the New York City metropolitan area, what is now the Hudson Valley Regional Airport. We focused a great deal on the pipeline to jobs, and I know that we have all discussed this. And, again, I am not used to rehashing for the sake of rehashing, but to Mr. Bolen, can you talk a little bit for us about what additional steps we could focus on to create that pipeline to the workforce? What we did in my home county was focus principally on air traffic--excuse me, on mainframe--I will get it--on mechanics and technicians directly from creating pipeline from K-12 to community college to actual hands-on work at our airport. There are too few of those opportunities. Perhaps, if you would, just talk a little bit about what steps we could be taking more broadly to address that pipeline Mr. Bolen. Well, thank you for the question, and it is an urgent issue for all of us. We have already talked a little bit about putting into action the recommendations from the Women in Aviation Advisory Board and from the FAA youth task force. Beyond that, I think we have all recognized that there are a number of untapped opportunities for us with underrepresented communities to bring them in. Some questions were brought up earlier about the Historically Black Colleges and Universities. I think there are a lot of programs as well where we are going at a local level to try to address it. In New York, for example, we are partnering with the RedTail Flight Academy to work with young people with the spirit of the Tuskegee Airmen to try to bring them into our community and provide scholarships to work them through that. Tomorrow I am going to be in Miami with Flying Classrooms, an effort that is being made specifically to bring technicians in and have them work at Opa-locka. I think a lot of what we want to do is targeting groups that may not be aware. So much of what we talk about is, do you have enough passion to be part of our industry? Have you wanted to be part of it forever? A lot of people don't know there are opportunities here. So, we have to get out and make them aware that this is a great industry and that there are pathways to go forward. And then as others have said, we need to find ways to provide those scholarships and pathways for them to be able to be part of this. Mr. Molinaro. Thank you for that. I would say in the 30 seconds I have left, just I do feel that we are not adequately tapping those regional airports and their connection to community schools, community colleges, et cetera, and I feel like that is a fertile ground to expand the access to the workforce in a safe and I think pretty productive way. I thank you for that. And for questions, I will yield to Mr. Burchett. Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I appreciate you all being here. As the unrepentant mama's boy, I feel I have to tell you all somebody said something earlier in the day at one of our pilots, male pilots of how little boys will see this and a lot of them will hopefully start flying. Well, a lot of little girls might see this, too. My mama flew an airplane during the Second World War. She was a pretty cool lady. I am very proud of her. Daddy was off fighting the Japanese, and mama lost her eldest brother Roy fighting the Nazis. And she did her part, 17-year-old girl. Didn't have electricity until she was a senior in high school, and she flew an airplane. I thought that was pretty cool. So, I just wanted to enter that for the record. You all get that one for free, as we say. But Mr. Bunce--I said that name correctly? Is that right? Bunce? Maybe you do or you don't know, but Cirrus is a plane manufacturer, and they are in the Knoxville area. They are out there at the airport, and they have got an important presence in my district. It is important that U.S. companies are treated fairly in terms of validation of U.S. products. I think even more now we see the influx. I mean, you can think about the Chinese balloon, but, dadgumit, every time you turn a label over it says made in China, and it sickens me. What specifically can we do to improve this situation? Mr. Bunce. Well, sir, I actually fly a Cirrus, and I trained down in Knoxville and everything. It's a great and expanding capability down there. Mr. Burchett. I will let you come buy me lunch one day. Mr. Bunce. I would love to. Mr. Burchett. But you can't because it wouldn't be ethical, but we will go ahead. Go ahead. Mr. Bunce. We will make it a cheap lunch. Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir. Mr. Bunce. Sir, if we look at foreign validations and everything, as a result of what happened during the pandemic, and particularly in the MAX, we had a breakdown in the confidence between some of our other authorities on what we do with certification. And what that did is it ratcheted up the amount of looking at basically the work that was done by FAA by other authorities as we go and try to validate the products. With bilateral safety agreements, we are supposed to trust each other's safety competencies. So, what happens? Well, then we reciprocate, and the Canadians reciprocate, and it goes back and forth, and it makes it very tough for us to validate product. So, what we would propose is that you, the Congress, ask for a report from the FAA, first of all, on what metrics they are using. First of all, if you can't measure it, you don't know if you are making progress. So, you can get a report to say how--are we making progress with validations? Are we working with our foreign authorities? But equally, or more importantly, is we have got to fully man with full-time employees the international certification office. Right now we get told by the FAA, well, we are fully manned, but they are temporary jobs. And everything is about relationships. We all know that. That is the way we operate and get things done up here. When you go and you have confidence with your counterparts in EASA, or ANAC in Brazil, or Transport Canada, and we know how each other's systems works, then we can use the bilateral to its max effect, and that is how we will make progress. Mr. Burchett. Are we making any progress? Mr. Bunce. Very slowly. Mr. Burchett. Very slowly. Is there something that we could be doing right now? Are there laws or rules we need to be passing to ensure that? Mr. Bunce. I think during the reauthorization, if you look for being able to get reports from the FAA using the metrics and timelines, how long it takes to get through the process in both directions, then that would be helpful. Mr. Burchett. I am always worried when I see a bill up here. I have been doing this political thing most of my life, and there are a lot of studies, and when I was mayor of Knox County, they wanted to do a study, and I would pay $5 million for some study and it ended up on a shelf somewhere. Do we have any assurance that that study will incur some positive results? Mr. Bunce. Well, I know that Mr. Boulter will attest, when you ask for something here in the Congress, the FAA needs to respond to it. And if it is a recurring request, then you can check the progress. And I know your staffs do a great job of being able to go and look at us. They will confirm with industry that it is correct. Mr. Burchett. My staff is probably watching this right now, and they will probably hit me up for a raise after you say that. Mr. Bunce. Yes, sir. Mr. Burchett. Well, all right. I appreciate it. And I appreciate all of you all. And I just wanted to throw that plug in there for some of our female aviators. That is pretty cool. There is a cool picture or a statue of Amelia Earhart upstairs, and it is really cool. I have got a picture on my phone of my mama in it, and it reminds me of that picture very much. Although, my mama didn't get lost flying across the Pacific. She did her part for the effort here and saved our country. So, thank you all so much for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I went over. Mr. Owens [presiding]. Thank you so much. Mr. Collins, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Acting Associate Administrator Boulter, the failure of the NOTAM system on January 11th was pretty much a wakeup call. And while we still don't have all the answers about what happened, preliminary reports about a single employee at the FAA causing a massive disruption and central disaster, it is very alarming. Now, I am a small businessman. When I identify a problem, I want to know what the problem is, I want to know what the solution is, and I want to know how to not have it happen again. With that being said, I want to figure out how to understand because I am new here. And I guess my first question is NOTAM is Notice to Air Missions. Correct? Is that what it has always been called? Mr. Boulter. It used to be Notice to Airmen. It has been changed to Notice to Air Missions. Mr. Collins. Was it changed for safety reasons? Mr. Boulter. I don't know why it was changed. Mr. Collins. Sir? Mr. Boulter. I was not involved in the name change, so, I don't know why it was changed. Mr. Collins. Do you know how much it cost to change it? Or better yet, can you tell me how much time the staff spent writing and implementing this 176-page rule instead of, say, working on IT or protocol improvements, improved safety in the National Airspace System? Mr. Boulter. That wasn't under my purview. I don't have any idea how much time or effort we spent on that. Mr. Collins. OK. Well, let's switch gears for a little bit then. Has the FAA studied or reviewed if there are any outdated regulations or standards on the books creating challenges for aviation workforce recruitment or aircraft innovation but that are not necessarily improving safety? Mr. Boulter. As far as--none that I am aware of recently, but any time we do rulemaking, we look at existing--when we open a section, we look for: Are all of these still relevant? Are they still mitigating the risks that they thought they would? So, for instance, we are opening up a big section for powered lift. There will be other things in there we look at to make sure they are still relevant. Mr. Collins. All right, thank you. It just seems to me that with the recent problems that we have seen, and there have been many, things like changing a name that you really don't even know if it was for safety or whether it was for gender purposes reasons or whatever, your time and money would have been a whole lot better spent on updating that 30-year-old IT system or improving actual safety protocols because, obviously, this wasn't even changed for safety. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have got. Thank you. And I yield back my time. Mr. Owens. Thank you. Are there any further questions from any of the Members of the chamber that have not been recognized? Before we gavel out, I just want to thank you not only for your service, for your collaboration. I understand that is the most powerful thing we can do is, first of all, find out where we are going and collaborate and work on that process. And I look forward to working with you to make sure that we have accountability, which, obviously, that is how we get progress. So, thanks for everything you are doing. Seeing none, I conclude our hearing for the day. I would like to thank each of the witnesses again for your testimony. And I ask for unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until such time as the witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may have been submitted to them in writing. Without objection, so ordered. Also, I ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 days for additional comments and information submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. The committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] Submissions for the Record ---------- Statement of Robert Rose, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, Reliable Robotics Corporation, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Sam Graves Chairman Sam Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee: Thank you for holding this hearing to discuss enhancing the safety of our aviation system. The United States has the world's largest and safest aviation system, and through the upcoming FAA reauthorization, Reliable Robotics is committed to working with this Committee to expand our Nation's leadership role. Based in Mountain View, CA, Reliable Robotics was founded in 2017 to develop and bring to market aviation safety-enhancing technologies, including auto-land, auto-taxi, and auto-takeoff, as well as high- precision navigation and remote piloting capabilities. These technologies can prevent many common causes of fatal aviation accidents and save lives today. Our company has more than 110 employees who have diverse backgrounds in commercial spaceflight, aerospace engineering and technology and air carrier operations. Through a wholly owned cargo airline operating under Part 135 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, we are operating piloted cargo flights utilizing the Cessna 208 Caravan on behalf of a major carrier. The Caravan is a single-engine turboprop that can carry more than 3,000 pounds of cargo and connects small towns and communities across the United States. More than 2,900 Caravans have been delivered to customers worldwide. The safety-enhancing technologies that Reliable Robotics is working with the FAA to certify include an advanced autopilot, actuators, fault-tolerant flight computer, and high-precision navigation. These technologies will bring significant safety improvements to the Caravan fleet and are designed to be adapted to other aircraft types. The ability to conduct safe auto landings in all weather conditions without additional ground-based infrastructure will be a game changer for the Nation's more than 5,000 general aviation airports. Achieving Transformational Safety Improvements We are at an inflection point for aviation safety, with many safety-enhancing technologies, including auto-land, auto-taxi, and auto-takeoff, within reach for smaller aircraft. While some of these technologies are available on large commercial aircraft, they are prohibitively expensive and require costly infrastructure at airports. With additional leadership and focus from the FAA, we can rapidly make these technologies available to thousands of aircraft without the need for additional ground-based infrastructure. Aircraft such as the Cessna Caravan, are a lifeline to small towns and communities. They deliver time-critical shipments like medical supplies and can access thousands of general aviation airports, only a fraction of which are served by major carriers. However, these aircraft have yet to benefit from the level of investments and innovation in safety technology that we have seen in larger cargo and passenger aircraft. Safety Technology Can Prevent Accidents To achieve transformational safety benefits and certify technologies that can prevent aviation accidents, Congress must use this FAA reauthorization to provide the agency with additional leadership and resources. While we applaud the dedicated FAA workforce and its commitment to aviation safety, the agency is not keeping pace with innovations in aviation safety. While major U.S. commercial air carriers have a strong safety record, we must do more to make aviation safer. Recent studies have concluded that general aviation operations are between 8 and 15 times more dangerous than driving, but that 68% of fatal accidents could potentially have been prevented with safety-enhancing technology.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ Hook (U. of Tulsa), Sizoo (FAA), Fuller. ``How Digital Safety Systems Could Revolutionize Aviation Safety.'' IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics Systems Conference. 2022. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Today, with technologies such as auto-land, auto-take-off, and the availability of real-time radar surveillance data to pilots, we can prevent loss of control in flight (LOC-I), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), fuel mismanagement, mid-air collisions, and many other causes of fatal aviation accidents. Also, since most nonfatal general aviation accidents occur during the take-off and landing phase and are caused by poor pilot decision-making and proficiency,\2\ these same technologies would bring significant safety gains. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA). (2020). ``32nd Joseph T. Nall report.'' 2020. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Principles for FAA Reauthorization As Congress holds additional hearings and examines the upcoming FAA reauthorization in detail, we believe the following principles will provide the agency with the tools to certify safety-enhancing technologies and integrate them into the National Airspace System: Identify a leadership-level position at the FAA empowered with the resources, decision-making authority, and technical expertise to identify a lead reviewing organization in the agency for safety technology certification projects and coordinate concurrent reviews by other offices. + This leader should assess regulatory, legal, and operational considerations for safety technology certification projects and engage relevant FAA stakeholders upfront. Leverage commercially available technology to create a secure FAA portal to track the real-time status of certification- related activities. + This portal would provide visibility to both applicants and the FAA on the status of a specific application or document under review, which offices are scheduled to review the submission, and timelines for completion of the process. Engage in robust workforce planning to account for the anticipated volume of new certification projects and identify the engineers and subject matter experts needed to manage the workflow efficiently. + The FAA must also evaluate the workforce needs and required skills for aviation safety inspectors and other professionals necessary to oversee the integration and operation of safety technologies and new entrants. United States Leadership Utilizing the FAA reauthorization to enact legislation that adheres to these principles will enhance our Nation's leadership role in aviation safety. These policies will also generate new high-technology jobs in the United States. The advanced air mobility industry, which includes enabling safety technologies, has the potential to create more than 280,000 new jobs. The time to act is now, as our competitors, including China and Europe, are dedicating significant financial and regulatory resources to aviation safety technologies, and the United States cannot afford to be left behind. We look forward to discussing the above principles in more detail through hearings and other engagements with you and your staff. Thank you for focusing on safety technologies as part of the FAA reauthorization and your commitment to the United States aviation industry. Letter of February 6, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, from Sean M. O'Brien, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen February 6, 2023. The Honorable Sam Graves, Chairman, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. The Honorable Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. Dear Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen, On behalf of 1.2 million members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, I write in response to today's Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Hearing entitled ``FAA Reauthorization: Enhancing America's Gold Standard in Aviation Safety''. The Teamsters Union is proud to represent members in every corner of our nation's transportation network, moving goods and passengers in each state and in international commerce. This includes tens of thousands of aviation employees, and hundreds of thousands who interface with, and rely on, a safe and effective aviation sector. In fact, the Teamsters represent the greatest diversity of aviation employees of any labor organization, including pilots, mechanics, passenger service agents, flight attendants, fuelers, flight dispatchers and more. On behalf of these members, we are enthusiastic that the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee is beginning the critical process of reauthorizing the Federal Aviation Administration through today's hearing. This reauthorization comes at an incredibly timely moment. The largely successful return of the industry from the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, changing economic conditions, new entrants and technologies into commercial aviation, and evolving safety and service issues present ample opportunities for the committee to draft impactful legislation. As the Committee hears from today's witnesses and begins to construct the reauthorization bill, the Teamsters call on the Committee to develop a bill that: Promotes aviation safety and high-quality training and certification regimes. Addresses critical safety loopholes and gaps in existing regulation and statute. Safeguards and creates good American jobs and ensures that future industry growth benefits the domestic workforce. Protects airline employees from occupational hazards, including those presented by unruly passengers. On these and other items, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters looks forward to working with your offices as well as those of Committee members, on a bipartisan basis, to craft an FAA Reauthorization bill that can be beneficial for the nation's aviation employees, consumers, and aviation safety. Signed, Sean M. O'Brien, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Appendix ---------- Questions from Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration Question 1. Has the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) or any other Federal agency provided recommendations to the FAA regarding vulnerabilities or potential vulnerabilities of FAA systems and hardware and has the FAA addressed those concerns? If not, do you have a roadmap to do so? Answer. The FAA is regularly audited and assessed by multiple federal entities, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CISA, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the DOT Office of Inspector General (OIG). These audits and assessments augment the scanning of systems performed by the FAA and assist in identifying any findings and recommendations related to vulnerabilities in FAA systems. An example of where this occurs is the DHS Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 19-02 cyber hygiene scans. The FAA receives notifications from CISA should a critical or high vulnerability be detected on an FAA internet-accessible system and then complies within the remediation timelines. A second example is the CISA Risk Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) process for identified high value assets pursuant to BOD 18-02 that requires the FAA to address or develop plans to address all CISA findings from completed RVA engagements. As of today, the FAA is in full compliance with these two BODs to ensure vulnerabilities are remediated or plans are in place to address the vulnerability in accordance with timelines. Question 2. How does the FAA work with CISA and other government agencies to monitor for and identify vulnerabilities of the systems and hardware of FAA's regulated entities? Answer. One goal of the FAA's Cybersecurity Strategy is continual efforts to build and maintain relationships with, and provide guidance to, external partners in government and industry to sustain and improve cybersecurity in the Aviation Ecosystem. Building trust between DHS CISA, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and FAA with respect to aviation cybersecurity stakeholders and FAA's regulated entities is critical to the success of building an aviation cybersecurity framework that enhances defense, response, and recovery from a cyber incident and improves resilience. The FAA is solely responsible for the safety of the civil fleet. FAA's regulatory authority for civil airplanes manages cyber risks through the application of design-specific ``special conditions.'' These special conditions carry the weight of regulatory requirements and mandate that critical airplane systems be protected from intentional unauthorized electronic interaction (IUEI). FAA partners with the TSA as their cybersecurity role is focused on airports, ground systems, airline support systems, and the physical security of aircrafts. The FAA is a tri-chair member of the Aviation Cyber Initiative (ACI). Chartered in May 2019 by the Secretaries of Transportation, Homeland Security, and Defense, the ACI is a forum for coordination and collaboration among federal agencies on a wide range of activities aimed at cyber risk reduction within the aviation ecosystem. Recently, the ACI has also begun partnering with CISA's Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC). Additionally, DHS and DOT collaborate on aviation cybersecurity in a number of other ways as Co-Sector Risk Management Agencies (co-SRMAs) for the Transportation Systems Sector. The TSA, FAA, and CISA co-chair the Aviation Government Coordinating Council (AGCC), a group chartered by DHS to plan, implement, and execute the Nation's critical infrastructure security and resiliency mission. The AGCC also coordinates with the Aviation Sector Coordinating Council (ASCC), which is chaired by industry. Both of these groups were formed under the auspices of the DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC). Question 3. Are FAA's regulated entities required to self-report cyber-attacks? If so, what does the FAA do after receiving such a report? Answer. The FAA requires manufacturers and operators to report any safety-related information and incidents. The FAA has established processes in place to respond to all reported safety issues. Question 4. Who is responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of the FAA's internal cyber policies and initiatives? Answer. The FAA Office of Information and Technology Services (AIT), led by the Chief Information Officer (CIO), oversees and delegates the responsibility to the Director, Information Security and Privacy Service, led by the FAA Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), to lead the development of FAA's information security program as outlined in FAA Order 1370.121B. Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration Question 1.a. Can you speak to how the FAA is working to ensure air traffic controllers have sufficient resources, training, and additional manpower to make sure we don't even come close to incidents like the narrow miss in Austin on February 4, 2023? Answer. Each year the FAA transmits a comprehensive controller workforce plan to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. The plan is the FAA's blueprint for ensuring that management of the national airspace takes into account the need to align controller resources with demand. Question 1.b. What role can Congress play in that through the FAA reauthorization process? Answer. The reauthorization process is an opportunity for Congress and the Administration to work together to address long-term agency modernization needs. Question 2.a. The FAA budget is the same at $3 billion dollars that it was in 2009, not even accounting for inflation. I understand that the FAA is seeking $29.4 million this year to modernize NOTAM.What resources would it take to actually fix the NOTAM system by 2025? Answer. The investment that is currently being implemented (Federal NOTAM System Sustainment) addresses two aspects of NOTAM modernization: the consolidation of the legacy NOTAM system (United States NOTAM System) functionality into the Federal NOTAM System and the transfer of the NOTAM system off of the outdated hardware platform onto an Integrated Enterprise Services Platform. The resources needed to implement the Federal NOTAM System modernization and enhancements on an accelerated timeline is underway. We will need to work internally and with Congress to determine how best to align resources with needs across the F&E Capital Improvement Program. Question 2.b. Is that a realistic goal given your current resources? Answer. The FAA will continue to work with the Administration and Congress to address NOTAM modernization resource needs. Question 3. As the transition to 5G continues, what steps is the FAA taking to ensure any related interferences, such as reports indicating heads up display anomalies, autopilot issues, and autothrottle shutoffs, do not lead to larger safety concerns? Answer. The FAA is working to ensure the safe coexistence of aviation and 5G C-band telecommunications systems in the United States. Safety remains the FAA's primary mission in this endeavor, and we are addressing safety concerns by establishing regulations to assure safety and monitoring operations to assure that those regulations are performing as intended. Since December of 2021, the FAA has issued several Airworthiness Directive (AD) regulations establishing aircraft performance requirements and operational limitations to address potential hazards associated with 5G C-band signals interfering with the proper functioning of aircraft radio altimeters. More recently, in January of 2023, the FAA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) AD providing longer-term radio altimetry system performance requirements enabling ongoing operations of transport category airplanes for scheduled passenger and cargo operations. We expect to finalize this AD soon, and we are already tracking the work airlines across the globe are doing to achieve compliance with these requirements through upgrades to aircraft radio altimetry systems. Question 4.a. I understand the FAA has set a deadline of December 2024 to complete the rulemaking related to the ``powered-lift'' special federal aviation regulation. Knowing that this rule will be instrumental in ensuring advanced air mobility companies can continue to drive innovation with clear guidance, can you speak further to the status of this SFAR? Answer. The FAA is working closely with the Department of Transportation and we expect to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking soon. Question 4.b. Does the FAA anticipate needing additional resources to complete it by the deadline you have set? Answer. The FAA will continue to dedicate the necessary resources toward promulgating the final rule. Question 5.a. As the sponsor of the Brian McDaniel Helicopter Safety Act, to honor my constituent who died in a helicopter accident in 2018, I was very glad to see the FAA's proposed rulemaking that will require all commercial air tour operators to have in place a safety management system (SMS). This proposed rule will make sure tragedies like Brian's death do not happen again, and I look forward to working with the FAA to implement this rule. Can you speak to the importance of this rule and how it will ensure fewer deaths? Answer. Safety Management System (SMS) is designed to reduce accidents and fatalities by guiding organizations to proactively identify potential hazards in the operating environment, analyze the risks of those hazards, and mitigate those risks to prevent an accident or incident. Historically, the approach to aviation safety was based on the reactive analysis of past accidents and the introduction of corrective actions to prevent the recurrence of those events. An SMS provides a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to proactively identify hazards and manage safety risk. Expanding SMS to commuter air carriers, air tour operators, and manufacturing organizations will provide these organizations with the ability to develop and implement mitigations that are appropriate to their environment and operational structure. Question 5.b. How does the FAA intend to incorporate stakeholder feedback into the rule? Answer. The FAA follows the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provide an opportunity for stakeholders and the public in general to provide feedback on a proposed regulation. In the past, the FAA has received valuable comments that resulted in changes that improved the final rule's efficiency and effectiveness. The FAA will consider each comment received. The final rule document will include a disposition of the comments received, which will include the FAA's rationale for its response to those comments. Question from Hon. Troy A. Carter to David H. Boulter, Acting Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration Question 1. I understand that the FAA is focused on safety and that the ASIAS program is a cornerstone of that. Similar to NOTAMS, we know it exists, but the value of such systems is understated, and we have little insight into how the FAA is prioritizing its funding. I would like to understand your commitment to the proper modernization of the ASIAS program. I see very little money being requested for ASIAS, and that raises concerns similar to NOTAMS that the FAA has not prioritized this vital safety system in it proper place. Does the FAA have sufficient funding to modernize the ASIAS program in a timely manner that keeps the FAA as the safety gold standard? Answer. FAA is committed to modernizing the ASIAS program, including expanding analytical support to the helicopter/rotorcraft community and improving its capability to process digital flight data. ASIAS modernization efforts are a key effort to advance more rapid and accurate predictive safety analysis, and we are working to accelerate this endeavor. The FAA appreciates the continued support of Congress. Question from Hon. Grace F. Napolitano to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. Chair Homendy, in most aviation occupations women make up less than 20% of the workforce--and for the last sixty years, the introduction of women into the industry has been largely stagnant. Having a robust female workforce is critical to the U.S. aviation industry's safety, sustainability, profitability, and ability to innovate. What needs to be done to attract, retain, and advance women in the aviation industry? Answer. I couldn't agree more. Unfortunately, women are underrepresented across transportation in every mode and nearly every job category, especially in roles that tend to pay more, such as upper management and highly technical positions. As you know, aviation is no exception. According to the Women in Aviation Advisory Board: ``In most aviation occupations, women make up less than 20% of the workforce. The largest gender gaps are in senior leadership positions, professional pilots, and maintenance technicians. Roughly 5% of airline pilots are women, and only 3.6% of airline captains are women. By comparison, women represent 47% of the total U.S. workforce and 26% of people working in STEM fields globally. ``For the last sixty years, the introduction of women into the aviation industry--in nearly every functional specialty--has been stagnant. For example, although the total number of women holding commercial pilot certificates has increased, the representation of women as a percentage of the total has changed only at a rate of about 1% a decade. For women in aviation maintenance, the rate of change is even slower. In sixty years, the percent of women in aviation maintenance has reached only 2.6%--marking one of the greatest gender gaps in the entire industry.'' [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Clearly, more needs to be done to attract, recruit, retain, and advance women in the aviation and aerospace industries. The Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115- 254, Sec. 602) established a Women in Aviation Advisory Board that was charged with developing and providing independent recommendations and strategies to the FAA Administrator to explore opportunities for encouraging and supporting female students and aviators to pursue a career in aviation, with the objective of promoting organizations and programs that are providing education, training, mentorship, outreach, and recruitment of women for positions in the aviation industry. The FAA bill (Sec. 601) also required the FAA Administrator to submit to Congress a report that describes the Administration's existing outreach efforts to elementary and secondary students who are interested in careers in science, technology, engineering, art, and mathematics to prepare and inspire students for aviation and aeronautical carriers and mitigate an anticipated shortage of pilots and other aviation professionals. The Women in Aviation Advisory Board and the Youth Access to American Jobs in Aviation Task Force both submitted recommendations pursuant to the legislative mandates. The Board and Task Force recommendations go hand-in-hand as research shows that early exposure to aviation and ongoing engagement are essential to the recruitment of women into the industry. The Women in Aviation Advisory Board report, Breaking Barriers for Women in Aviation: Fight Plan for the Future, offers 55 recommendations, including several recommendations to Congress that would transform aviation if implemented. These include a recommendation for Congress to increase the amount of available federal financial aid for careers in aviation. Extending the student debt repayment program beyond its current date of 2025 could also assist with financial barriers to entry. I am very familiar with financial barriers to entry. I have completed private pilot ground school and several private pilot lessons; however, the cost of each lesson was close to $200. Those aspiring to becoming a pilot should fly about 2-3 times a week, but many people, including me, cannot afford to spend $600 a week in flight lessons. I recommend that Congress review and consider including this and other recommendations in the report in the next FAA reauthorization bill. I also recommend reauthorizing both the Women in Aviation Advisory Board and the Youth Access to American Jobs in Aviation Task Force to enable them to continue joint efforts to implement their recommendations throughout the industry. Here is a link to the report: https://www.faa.gov/ regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ WIAAB_Recommendations_Report_March_ 2022.pdf Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. Chair Homendy, in your written testimony, you mention your goal is to ``right size [your] agency'' and highlighted various efforts to hire additional personnel in recent years. Question 1.a. As Congress considers the NTSB's reauthorization, can you specifically describe what resources the NTSB's needs to achieve this and the consequences of not investing in the NTSB's workforce now? Question 1.b. How will the NTSB ensure that its workforce reflects the diversity of the nation? Answer to 1.a. and 1.b. We have seen tremendous growth and technological advancements in transportation over the last two decades. We need the right people and the right training to keep pace. To accomplish this, we need an increase in our authorization levels, direct-hire authority, and flexible authorities to acquire training on emerging transportation technologies. Over the last 20 years, the NTSB has stayed virtually the same size--approximately 400 staff members. When I became Chair in August 2021, we had 399 staff members. This year, we have undertaken 62 hiring actions and aim to end the year with 435 people on board. This is being accomplished with the $129.3 million provided by Congress for fiscal year (FY) 2023. We need at least $145 million in FY 2024, with incremental increases to $185 million in FY 2028, to reach full staffing of 515 by 2028. We need Congress's continued support for the NTSB's mission and resources. Currently, 20 percent of our workforce is eligible to retire. Over the next 5 years, the number of employees eligible to retire will grow to roughly 50 percent of the agency. If we don't invest now, we will have fewer people to conduct more and more complex investigations, delaying findings and recommendations. Lack of investment will undermine transportation safety now and in the future. Diverse perspectives help us view an issue from multiple angles; that, by definition, improves safety. Diverse perspectives allow us to eliminate blind spots. Therefore, we have taken several steps to ensure that diversity and equity are central to our hiring goals. First, I have designated a member of the NTSB's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EEODI) as our agency's chief diversity officer. Second, the EEODI office hired a diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility program manager to support outreach to women, underrepresented groups, and persons with targeted disabilities. Third, as part of our strategic human capital plan, we hired a chief human capital officer to lead strategic workforce development and implement policies and procedures to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain a workforce with greater diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. Finally, the agency continues to participate in recruitment and other outreach activities at several historically black colleges and universities and partners with the Chickasaw Nation to host summer interns. Investing in and ensuring the diversity of the NTSB workforce, as planned in our reauthorization proposal, is essential to maintaining and improving safety in our transportation system. The resources requested in the NTSB's reauthorization proposal will support recruitment of talented and diverse investigators, engineers, attorneys, and support staff. Robust investment in recruiting is necessary to compete for the best and the brightest and to ensure that our workforce reflects the diversity of the nation. Question from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. In 2019, the GAO found that more than half of airline passenger service agents reported being assaulted over the previous year. In 2021, the FAA received reports of more than 6,000 verbal and physical assaults in our airspace. While the number came down in 2022, it is has not returned to pre-pandemic levels which were already trending upwards. What effect do these assaults have on the systemic safety of our airspace? Answer. Flight attendants play a crucial role in ensuring the safety of airline passengers. It is essential that passengers comply with instructions from flight attendants, such as raising seat backs to ensure safe escape paths, fastening seat belts, and donning emergency oxygen masks. Although we have not investigated any safety incidents resulting from recent assaults on flight attendants, we have numerous investigations showing the critical role flight attendants play in ensuring passenger safety during emergencies. Question from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. Even though the recent reported runway incursions avoided a serious accident, it's evident that there may be some safety gaps. Do you feel that the NTSB has sufficient resources and authorities to investigate these near misses? Are you running into any trouble getting access to the information you need? Answer. The NTSB has the authority necessary to investigate incidents; however, we need resources and additional data to keep pace with tremendous growth and technological advancements in the National Airspace System. Our Office of Aviation Safety currently has 113 staff working on 1,194 domestic and 132 foreign investigations. In the last year, we have reduced our backlog from over 440 cases open for more than 2 years to less than 40. However, we can do more with more staff and better training. Our reauthorization proposal is seeking to grow our aviation office to 135 staff members this year, and to 160 by 2028. For the entire agency, we need at least $145 million in fiscal year (FY) 2024, with incremental increases to $185 million in FY 2028, to reach full staffing. To ensure we are prepared for the future, our proposal also includes provisions to acquire training on emerging technologies, streamline hiring, and diversify our workforce. Regarding data: cockpit voice records (CVRs) currently only retain 2 hours of information. In some cases, an incident may not immediately be identified as meeting the reporting criteria, or a flight may be longer than 2 hours, and CVR data has been overwritten before we have an opportunity to secure the information. The resulting loss in data constrains an investigation. Within the last 20 years, the NTSB has investigated 39 incidents where this critical information was erased. We have recommended (Safety Recommendations A-18-30 and -31)--and the technology is available for--25-hour CVRs, ensuring critical data is available, safety issues can be identified, recommendations can be made, and we can prevent a tragedy. Questions from Hon. Greg Stanton to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. As you are well aware, aircraft cockpit voice and data recorders (affectionately known as ``black boxes'') play a critical role in assisting the NTSB in their investigations to determine with greater accuracy the cause of an accident. The data and voice recordings also play a critical role by helping to inform NTSB safety recommendations to prevent accident reoccurrence and to maintain the safety of our national airspace. Today's cockpit voice and data recorders in the US are only required to record for 2 hours and then re-write over themselves. In 2018, the NTSB issued a safety recommendation for the FAA to implement for both a forward fit and retrofit for 25-hour recordings. In 2015, EASA, the European Civil Aviation Authority, issued a requirement for extended recording times; and in 2017 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) issued a recommendation on Post Flight recovery of Data--to date, the FAA has not acted on the NTSB's safety recommendation. Could you discuss the importance of access to longer recording times from the NTSB's accident investigation perspective and how doing so would help enhance aviation safety in the United States? Answer. In September 2022, the FAA informed us that it had submitted a rulemaking project for fiscal year (FY) 2020 ``to determine the feasibility of requiring all newly manufactured airplanes, which must have a CVR, to be fitted with a CVR capable of recording the last 25 hours of audio.'' However, this project was not accepted by the FAA Rulemaking Management Council due to competing priorities and resources. The FAA told us that it was reassessing the scope of this project and planned to resubmit it for FY 2023 approval. Since January 1, 2022 (14 months ago), the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has required that all newly manufactured aircraft have a CVR that records at least 25 hours of data. The EASA did not implement a requirement to retrofit in-service aircraft. Within the last 20 years, the NTSB has investigated 39 safety incidents where needed information was not available to investigators because the CVR had overwritten the data related to the incident (i.e., there were at least 2 hours' worth of data recorded since the incident). Question 2. The NTSB has made multiple recommendations regarding safety equipment the Federal Aviation Administration should require to be installed and operational in turbine-powered rotorcraft certificated for six or more passenger seats in the aftermath of accidents: (1) flight data recorders (FDR) and (2) flight data monitoring and safety management programs. Back in March 2009 the NTSB recommended in Aviation Accident Report A-09-02 that all existing turbine-powered should have a crash-resistant flight recorder system that captures audio, a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system installation. In the report, the NTSB noted the long-standing concerns about the lack of recorded information to guide investigations, help determine accident causes, and develop recommendations to prevent recurrences. On January 26, 2020, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter collided with hilly terrain near the city of Calabasas, California. The pilot and eight passengers were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed by impact forces and fire. The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data monitoring (FDM) recorder or cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The synopsis from the pending NTSB's report recommends that FAA require all Part 121 and 135 operators to install FDM program, retrofit turbine-powered aircraft with crash-resistant flight recorders to record cockpit audio and cockpit images. Despite these calls to action, The FAA has not adopted NTSB recommendations for turbine-powered, helicopters to have flight data monitoring programs or flight data recorders for cockpit audio and images. Could you please tell us why this safety recommendation is so important and how it would benefit helicopter safety and save lives should the FAA take action? Answer. Regarding the January 26, 2020, accident involving a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter that collided with hilly terrain near Calabasas, California: that helicopter was initially equipped with a CVR when it was delivered from Sikorsky to the initial operator. The CVR was subsequently removed by the operator, as permitted by FAA regulation, during interior modifications. Recorders are invaluable in identifying safety issues that might not be known without the recorded data. Two NTSB investigations illustrate how important recorded data was in identifying important safety information that would not have been found without the recorders. We participated in the 2005 investigation of a Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopter, which experienced an upset and crashed into the Baltic Sea, killing all 12 passengers and 2 pilots. The helicopter was registered in Finland, which, unlike the US, requires recorders. This accident was the first time that the NTSB participated in a helicopter accident investigation in which a flight data recorder (FDR) was on board. Without the FDR data, investigators would not have been able to identify the cause of the crash--failure of rotor actuators. In our investigation of a Eurocopter AS 350 B3 helicopter that impacted terrain while maneuvering during a search-and-rescue flight near Talkeetna, Alaska, on March 30, 2013, we were able to identify an important safety issue because the operator (the Alaska State Police) voluntarily equipped the helicopter with an image recorder. The pilot became spatially disoriented as weather conditions deteriorated, then lost control and crashed. The loss of control occurred because the pilot exceeded the limits of the attitude indicator, which is necessary for safe escape from reduced-visibility conditions. Without the image recorder, this unsafe action and gap in pilot training would never have been identified. Subsequently, we would not have issued three recommendations to the FAA on training to prevent reoccurrence of this crash. Questions from Hon. Patrick Ryan to Hon. Jennifer L. Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Question 1. In the 1990's the NTSB recommended a ``One Level of Safety'' policy, which the FAA adopted in 1996. Under the 1996 ``One Level of Safety'' rule, the FAA required every passenger airline with ten or more seats with scheduled commercial service to follow the same minimum federal safety standards for Part 121 flights. Over time, the FAA has created exceptions to this rule. One of these exceptions allows an airline designated as a Part 380 Public Charter under FAR Part 135 with 30 seats or fewer to operate published scheduled flights with pilots having as little as 500 flight hours. Recently, SkyWest, applied for a commuter air carrier application DOT to allow its newly formed public charter subsidiary to utilize this method to have pilots with fewer flight hours than Part 121 flight standards. Question 1.a. Would this deviate from the ``one level of safety policy'' and create two levels of aviation safety for passenger airlines? Question 1.b. Should passengers who fly on a passenger airline in scheduled commercial service with 9-30 seats expect to have lower flight safety standards than passengers who fly a passenger airline with greater than 30 seats? Answer to 1.a. and 1.b. The NTSB has not done any investigations or studies that directly address this issue. However, we believe that passengers who pay for commercial transport expect the highest levels of safety and are not generally aware that, based on the operating rules, they may be subject to less stringent safety regulations. In our March 2021 report about the safety of revenue passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 91, we concluded the following: 1. The FAA has a responsibility to bolster regulations and oversight for all revenue passenger-carrying operations. 2. Some operators have been exploiting or inappropriately capitalizing on the exceptions contained in Part 119.1(e) to avoid the additional requirements and oversight intended to apply to the types of revenue passenger-carrying operations being conducted. Question 1.c. If SkyWest's petition is granted, do you believe that airline consumers should be made aware of this fact? Should the passenger airlines who operate flights under the Part 380 exception be made to fully disclose lesser safety standards to consumers at some point during the booking process? Answer. Although we do not have a position on the petition, in 2009, we recommended the FAA require Part 135 on-demand operators to provide their customers with a written document, correspondence, or ticket that expressly describes the terms of carriage, including the regulatory part under which the flight is operated (A-09-78), similar to what is provided to Part 121 passengers. This would eliminate uncertainty about the commercial intent of the flight. The FAA did not act on this recommendation, and it was closed unacceptably in 2013. Again, when passengers pay for commercial transport, they expect, and should receive, the highest level of safety. Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International Question 1. For the past few Congresses, I've led and plan to lead again in this Congress, the Minorities in Aviation Act, to take that critical step forward towards diversifying the aviation industry. I meet with a well renowned African American pilot, Mr. Omar Brock who goes around Georgia inspiring minority youth who look like him and might one day want to be just like him. It is great to see individuals like Mr. Brock take this responsibility upon themselves, however, we must do our part and that is what I plan to do. Question 1.a. Mr. Ambrosi, what has your association done to advocate on behalf of black pilots directly, who are clearly underrepresented in the industry you represent? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question 1.b. On your association's site, under your commitment to diversity and inclusion it states, ``We are focusing efforts to foster a future generation of commercial airline pilots that better reflects the composition of the communities we serve.'' Upon the introduction of the Minorities in Aviation Act, could I depend on your organization to support this legislation which would foster that future generation with diverse commercial airline pilots? Yes or no would suffice. Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question 2.a. This Committee has previously received testimony from flight attendants calling attention to cabin air quality, particularly regarding harmful air contents that can manifest through some aircrafts' ``bleed air'' systems. Are ALPA members observing or encountering similar cabin air quality issues? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question 2.b. Follow-Up: Are there key differences in issues with cabin air quality based on different types or generations of aircraft? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question from Hon. Dina Titus to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International Question 1. There is a considerable amount of news about the supply of pilots, and I recall a proposal from the Senate last year to raise the age of retirement for pilots to address the issue. I have heard, however, that the major constraint on flying is pilot utilization, rather than simple supply. Can you explain what is going on and any details on the training backlog that affects airline scheduling? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International Question 1. Captain Ambrosi, can you please speak to the current safety culture among flight crews and lessons that can be learned from the recent runway incursion incidents? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question from Hon. Greg Stanton to Capt. Jason Ambrosi, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International Question 1. Using space-based ADS-B would enable FAA to provide positive air traffic control in oceanic airspace. How significant is that for improving safety and efficiency in that airspace? Answer. A response was not received at the time of publication. Question from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association Question 1. In your written testimony you encourage the FAA to establish various private-public training exchange programs and aviation fellowship opportunities. Can you elaborate on how such programs would help boost and diversify the FAA's workforce? Answer. We believe that by encouraging more collaboration between FAA and industry will facilitate highly qualified individuals to tackle evolving technology such as flight crew interface (human factors), system safety, autonomy, propulsion methods, software, and artificial intelligence. In doing so, this would further stronger engagement between the FAA and industry, increase the technical expertise of the agency, and provide unique opportunities for the FAA's workforce which in turn will highlight career paths, boost morale and support diversity. We welcome further engagement with policymakers to facilitate these important objectives. Questions from Hon. Greg Stanton to Peter J. Bunce, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Aviation Manufacturers Association Question 1. I understand that the FAA has been working for years to develop a type certification for some drones models, some of which could be used by GAMA members. Where does the FAA stand among global peers in advancing drone technology? Answer. The drone industry is facing similar challenges as all other aviation industries and sectors when developing and introducing new technologies, new aircraft, and new types of operations--Current requirements and standards across aircraft certification, operations, maintenance, pilot licensing, aircraft control and airspace integration do not adequately address these new vehicles and operations and therefore require significant FAA activity and decisions at the policy level to establish the standards and processes necessary for safety. We believe GAMA proposals to improve the improve the timeliness, transparency, and performance accountability in the development and promulgation of regulatory materials will help address this issue as well for all of industry. If the FAA cannot meet these objectives, they risk losing standing to other aviation authorities which in turn affects industry competitiveness and U.S. leadership and, more broadly, aviation safety. Question 2. If type certification is not ultimately the best avenue and use of agency/company resources to establish airworthiness for small drones, is there not value for U.S. companies and their investors to see the FAA finish what it started on these initial certification activities and get to a place where type certificates can be issued for those who have been in the pipeline so long? Answer. GAMA strongly supports a safety continuum approach for FAA regulation, oversight and processes for the airworthiness and operations of drones across a broad range of size and types and locations of operations. This is consistent with the FAA safety regulation for all other types of aircraft such as airplanes and helicopters in recreational and commercial operations. It is critical that the FAA provide industry a transparent roadmap and clear set of risk-based guidelines for durability and reliability testing for the type certification of small drones. Clear guidelines are needed to ensure consistency in the process across small UAS manufacturers and will save considerable federal resources. Questions from Hon. Colin Z. Allred to Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association Question 1. I understand from your testimony you have concerns on the implementation of the proposed rule to require all commercial air tour operators to have in place a safety management system (SMS). How can we work with the small business aviation community to ensure these requirements are scaled appropriately? Answer. NBAA and the business aviation community recognize the value of Safety Management Systems (SMS) and the positive improvements these programs bring to an operator's safety culture. However, NBAA is concerned that the upcoming FAA mandate for Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 135 and Part 91.147 could take a ``one size fits all'' approach to SMS, be overly prescriptive, and not be scalable to smaller companies. Congress can help by directing the FAA, as part of its rulemaking process, to develop a mechanism to verify that an operator's existing SMS program, many of which are subject to extensive third- party audits, meets regulatory requirements under development. Question 2. As you know, Canada and New Zealand recently implemented similar SMS requirements. What lessons should the FAA and Congress consider from the implementation process in those countries? Answer. The SMS implementation challenges experienced in Canada and New Zealand resulted from two principal shortfalls: poor inspector preparation and training and insufficient guidance to the industry. Both issues created a lack of standardization across Canada and New Zealand, creating regional interpretations for compliance. As a result, it has taken Canada over two decades to develop the standards and training necessary to implement scalable SMS programs effectively. The U.S. aviation industry must find a way to avoid repeating the poorly developed SMS deployment we have seen elsewhere. We must get this right from the start in order to leverage the safety benefits that we know SMS can deliver. [all]