LIABILITY OR DENIABILITY? PLATFORM POWER AS SECTION 230 TURNS 30

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Senate March 18, 2026

Witnesses (4)

  • Daphne Keller, Director of Platform Regulation, Program in Law, Science, and Technology, Stanford Law School
  • Nadine Farid Johnson, Policy Director, Knight First Amendment Institute
  • Matthew Bergman, Founding Attorney, Social Media Victims Law Center
  • Brad Carson, President, Americans for Responsible Innovation

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- LIABILITY OR DENIABILITY? PLATFORM POWER AS SECTION 230 TURNS 30

[Senate Hearing 119-507]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-507

 LIABILITY OR DENIABILITY? PLATFORM POWER 
 AS SECTION 230 TURNS 30

=======================================================================

 HEARING

 before the

 COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
 SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION
 __________

 MARCH 18, 2026
 __________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 
 
 
 
 Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
 
 ______
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-395 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
 

 SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 TED CRUZ, Texas, Chairman
 
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, 
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi Ranking
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee GARY PETERS, Michigan
TODD YOUNG, Indiana TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CURTIS, Utah BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
BERNIE MORENO, Ohio JOHN HICKENLOOPER, Colorado
TIM SHEEHY, Montana JOHN FETTERMAN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia ANDY KIM, New Jersey
CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware

 Brad Grantz, Republican Staff Director
 Nicole Christus, Republican Deputy Staff Director
 Lila Harper Helms, Staff Director
 Melissa Porter, Deputy Staff Director
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page
Hearing held on March 18, 2026................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cruz........................................ 1
Statement of Senator Schatz...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 97
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 98
Statement of Senator Schmitt..................................... 101
Statement of Senator Baldwin..................................... 103
Statement of Senator Curtis...................................... 105
Statement of Senator Lujan....................................... 107
Statement of Senator Capito...................................... 109
Statement of Senator Rosen....................................... 111
Statement of Senator Hickenlooper................................ 112
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 114
Statement of Senator Blackburn................................... 116

 Witnesses

Daphne Keller, Director of Platform Regulation, Program in Law, 
 Science, and Technology, Stanford Law School................... 4
 Prepared statement........................................... 6
Nadine Farid Johnson, Policy Director, Knight First Amendment 
 Institute...................................................... 9
 Prepared statement........................................... 11
Matthew Bergman, Founding Attorney, Social Media Victims Law 
 Center......................................................... 14
 Prepared statement........................................... 15
Brad Carson, President, Americans for Responsible Innovation..... 88
 Prepared statement........................................... 90

 Appendix

Hon. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator from Oregon, prepared statement..... 119
Brandon Arnold, Executive Vice President, National Taxpayers 
 Union, prepared statement...................................... 120
Laura Chadwick, President and CEO, Travel Technology Association, 
 prepared statement............................................. 120
Letter dated March 17, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz and Hon. Maria 
 Cantwell from Linda Moore, President and CEO, TechNet.......... 121
Letter dated March 17, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz and Hon. Maria 
 Cantwell from Shae Gardner, Director of Policy and Research, 
 LGBT Tech...................................................... 122
Letter dated March 17, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz and Hon. Maria 
 Cantwell from Sarah O'Quinn, U.S. Director of Public Affairs, 
 Center for Countering Digital Hate............................. 123
Letter dated March 17, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz and Hon. Maria 
 Cantwell from Kinsey Fabrizio, President, Consumer Technology 
 Association and Michael Petricone, Senior Vice President, 
 Government Affairs, Consumer Technology Association............ 126
Letter dated March 18, 2026 to Hon. Ted Cruz and Hon. Maria 
 Cantwell from Arthur D. Sidney. CEO and Principal, The Sidney 
 Group.......................................................... 128
Response to written questions submitted to Daphne Keller by:
 Hon. Eric Schmitt............................................ 129
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 132
 Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 135
 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 136
 Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 138
Response to written questions submitted to Nadine Farid Johnson 
 by:
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 140
 Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 141
 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 141
Response to written questions submitted to Matthew Bergman by:
 Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 143
 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 143
 Hon. Ben Ray Lujan........................................... 146
Response to written questions submitted to Brad Carson by:
 Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 163
 Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 166
 Hon. Brian Schatz............................................ 167

 
 LIABILITY OR DENIABILITY? PLATFORM POWER 
 AS SECTION 230 TURNS 30
 
 ---------- 

 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 18, 2026

 U.S. Senate,
 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
 Washington, DC.
 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in 
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Cruz, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
 Present: Senators Cruz [presiding], Fischer, Blackburn 
[presiding], Schmitt, Curtis, Moreno, Capito, Schatz, 
Klobuchar, Baldwin, Rosen, Lujan, Hickenlooper, and Markey.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED CRUZ, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS

 The Chairman. Good morning. The Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation will come to order. 
Welcome to all the witnesses.
 Within our lifetimes, the Internet has impacted nearly 
every aspect of the world and our daily lives, especially how 
we communicate. It was only a short time ago that speech and 
newsworthiness was controlled by a handful of TV networks and 
giant newspaper publishers. If you held a position they didn't 
want to print or wasn't consistent with their political views, 
it didn't get said.
 The Internet changed that, allowing anyone to bypass these 
gatekeepers and shape public opinion with their own views. The 
Internet also created a new way to communicate anonymously and 
at greater scale through blogs, message boards, and comment 
sections. But with opportunity came legal questions.
 The law wasn't written for the internet's ease and 
anonymity. Holding a platform liable for the illegal speech of 
another person threatened potentially to overwhelm early 
Internet companies with ruinous lawsuits that would predictably 
result in less online speech. So Washington explicitly adopted 
a light touch regulatory approach with the enactment of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
 Congress included Section 230 to ensure that online 
platforms would not be liable for the illegal speech of another 
person. It did so to preserve a competitive free market, and 
the text of Section 230 explicitly recognized that the Internet 
provided a ``forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse.''
 But 30 years later, it seems that Big Tech has now become 
the new gatekeeper, the new speech police. If you disagree with 
a particular view, Big Tech doesn't answer that with more 
speech. They do not try to persuade. They do not debate. They 
simply make the view they disagree with disappear, and they 
silence you.
 That should scare everyone. What is even more concerning is 
how the Government hijacks Big Tech's powers to shape online 
discourse and to suppress dissenting views and undermine free 
speech. This isn't fiction.
 As I detailed in my report and hearings last year, the 
Biden Administration weaponized the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency to bully Big Tech to censor 
lawful speech on COVID and on elections, disproportionately 
muzzling conservative voices. We should recognize and celebrate 
how the free market can cause a course correction against Big 
Tech censorship.
 Elon Musk's purchase of Twitter was one of the most 
important steps for free speech in decades. It showed that the 
censorship regime is not inevitable, and it can be challenged 
in the marketplace and shifted to allow the kind of diverse 
viewpoints that Section 230 envisioned. Congress must also 
consider every Constitutional tool we have to ensure and to 
prevent social media from harming Americans, especially 
children, while not incentivizing Big Tech censorship.
 The Take It Down Act, which I led together with Senator 
Klobuchar, demonstrates that Congress can pass targeted 
legislation to protect children and adults online. The law 
prohibits non-consensual intimate images, including such images 
created with artificial intelligence, and it creates a process 
to provide notice and takedown for victims, all without 
amending Section 230 or chilling lawful speech protected by the 
First Amendment.
 I have also introduced several other legislative reforms to 
actively support free speech online, including the Terms Act, 
which stops online platforms from weaponizing their terms of 
service to silence Americans and deny them access to essential 
products and services. And I will soon be introducing the 
Jawbone Act to stop Government agencies from bullying platforms 
into silencing the American people.
 The same reasons why Congress enacted Section 230, to 
prevent liability for a different person's speech, are still 
relevant. And I am concerned that a full repeal or sunset would 
lead platforms to engage in worse behavior, to engage in more 
censorship, to protect themselves from litigation.
 I also don't believe, as some of my colleagues have 
suggested, that we should use Section 230 reform to silence 
more lawful speech or to turn the Government into the arbiter. 
But we should consider whether reform of Section 230 is needed 
to encourage and to protect more speech online and to stop Big 
Tech censorship.
 No Government official, regardless of party, should have 
the power of censorship. I agree with John Stuart Mill that the 
best solution for bad ideas and for bad speech is better ideas 
and more speech. We don't need to use brute Government force, 
because the truth is much more powerful. I turn to Ranking 
Member Schatz.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

 Senator Schatz. Thank you, Chairman Cruz, and thanks to our 
witnesses for being here today. It has been 30 years since 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act, which included 
Section 230. But since then, everything has changed. In 1996, 
the Internet as we know it today was still taking shape.
 We were still using dial-up modems, and pagers, and paper 
maps. DVDs weren't even available yet, much less smartphones, 
social media, and AI. The world was a totally different place, 
and our laws reflected that. In the years since, we have all 
come to rely on the Internet in virtually every part of our 
lives. We have learned about its benefits and harms from 
personal experience.
 And we have had to keep up with every new iteration of 
ever-changing technology. And yet, even as people have adapted 
to the technology, tech companies have demanded that our laws 
don't change. There is this idea that Section 230 was somehow 
perfectly written 30 years ago, as if it is a Constitutional 
provision--as if it is the only Federal statute that must not 
be touched.
 That is preposterous. How we reform the law matters, of 
course, but to suggest that any reform would be catastrophic 
makes no sense. We are the Commerce Committee. We reform laws. 
Second, nobody thinks the internet, as it currently functions, 
is without problems. Whether you are a young person who has 
grown up with the Internet or you are an older user still 
figuring your way around, the Internet can often be a terrible 
place.
 It is chaotic, and depressing, and confusing. And given the 
chance, people would love something better. But really, the 
main reason to be having this conversation about Section 230 is 
that Congress can and should respond to changing circumstances. 
We do it all the time. For instance, we reauthorize the FAA 
every 5 years, even though the concept of flying has changed a 
lot less in the last 5 years than the Internet has changed in 
the last 30.
 Similarly, we amend and update laws to protect consumers 
from scams. For so long, tech companies have used Section 230 
as an excuse to avoid taking meaningful action to protect 
users, but especially kids, from egregious harms, harassment 
and abuse, frauds and scams. It is not that they don't know 
what is happening or even why it is happening, it is that to do 
something about it would be to hurt their bottom line.
 And so long as Federal law provides a shield, why even 
bother? But this committee is not powerless here. We don't 
simply have to accept the terrible outcomes as a fact of modern 
life. We can work together and fix the law. I have a bipartisan 
bill called the Internet Pact Act. The Chairman, Senator 
Klobuchar, and others have amendments to Section 230. Section 
230 is not one of the Ten Commandments.
 It is not a Constitutional provision. It is a Federal 
statute, and we are lawmakers. And this idea that we can't 
touch it, otherwise Internet freedom incinerates, is 
preposterous. And so, I am looking forward to a good, 
constructive, bipartisan discussion about what reforms are 
possible. Thank you.
 The Chairman. Thank you. And I would like to 
enthusiastically reiterate what Ranking Member Schatz just 
said, that Section 230 is not one of the Ten Commandments--or 
for fans of the history of the world, it is not one of the 15 
commandments either. I would now like to introduce our 
witnesses for today.
 Our first witness is Daphne Keller. Ms. Keller is the 
Director of Platform Regulation at Stanford Law School's 
Program in Law, Science and Technology. She previously served 
as Associate General Counsel at Google, and her writing has 
been widely featured in both law journals and popular 
newspapers.
 Our second witness is Nadine Farid Johnson, Policy Director 
at the Knight First Amendment Institute. Ms. Farid Johnson was 
formerly an American Foreign Service Officer and today teaches 
at Columbia University School of International and Public 
Affairs.
 Our third witness is Matthew Bergman, Founding Attorney of 
the Social Media Victims Law Center. As an attorney, Mr. 
Bergman has worked extensively in product liability law, and 
his firm has filed lawsuits against several major social media 
companies, alleging addictive design flaws.
 Our final witness is Brad Carson, President and Co-Founder 
of Americans for Responsible Innovation. Mr. Carson served as 
the Representative for Oklahoma's 2nd Congressional District 
from 2001 to 2005 and was Acting Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness under the Obama Administration. Ms. 
Keller, you are recognized for your opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF DAPHNE KELLER, DIRECTOR

 OF PLATFORM REGULATION, PROGRAM IN LAW, SCIENCE,

 AND TECHNOLOGY, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL

 Ms. Keller. Thank you very much. Chairman Cruz, Ranking 
Member Schatz, and members of the Committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to speak today. I am a lawyer with over 25 years of 
experience in practice and as an academic in the field of 
platform regulation, working in the U.S. and around the world.
 I am also a native Seattleite. I am, alas, not a native 
Hawaiian. Married to a Texan. And I firmly believe that some of 
the most fundamental issues before us today are nonpartisan, 
and I heard a lot of similar sentiments from the two of you, 
which I find encouraging. We are here to talk about a law that 
is deeply unpopular today, Section 230. But it may still be, as 
Churchill said of democracy, the worst option except for all 
the other ones.
 I agree, 230 is not sacrosanct. It is not even well 
written. But it happened to strike a balance that has served 
its purpose, and I do not see other options that I think would 
be an improvement so far. Any proposed legal change, no matter 
how well-intentioned, should be vetted for two things.
 First, is it Constitutional? Second, would it make things 
worse? I will speak to the Constitution first. The Internet is 
full of speech that most of us in this room would find 
offensive and likely consider harmful or dangerous, but a lot 
of that speech is also protected by the First Amendment, 
including a great deal of hate speech and mis- or 
disinformation.
 Lawmakers cannot tell platforms to remove or demote this 
speech, and eliminating Section 230 wouldn't change that or 
give them an obligation to remove the speech. The Constitution 
also limits important details about laws attempting to hold 
platforms liable for users' genuinely illegal speech--things 
like fraud, or defamation, or obscenity. In a mid-20th Century 
case, the Supreme Court rejected strict liability for 
booksellers because incentivizing them to purge their shelves 
would harm us, the reading public. It was not about the rights 
of the booksellers.
 It was about the analogs of those of us today who depend on 
the Internet to share our messages, to post our book reviews, 
to read restaurant reviews, to engage in political dissent. 
This is about our rights. Now, let's talk about the second 
constraint. Would changes to the law make things worse? This is 
a question about what would actually happen, what platforms and 
users, and importantly, governments would predictably do in a 
world without Section 230.
 That legal change would very likely make the Internet worse 
for users' speech rights without, I believe, actually making it 
any safer. And it would impose legal uncertainty and expense 
that today's incumbent giants could survive, but their smaller 
rivals could not. We have a lot of data to predict what happens 
when speech--sorry, when platforms are held liable for the 
speech of their users.
 Platforms receive huge numbers of false allegations under 
laws like the DMCA here or the Digital Services Act in Europe 
from people demanding removal of perfectly legal speech. 
Governments do this. Companies do this against their 
competitors. And platforms have strong incentives to simply 
comply.
 The idea that the First Amendment alone would cause 
platforms to stand up for their users' lawful speech when doing 
so is expensive and inconvenient is simply wrong. We can also 
make informed predictions about harms to users from things--
from bad content, from things like pro-eating disorder content 
or pro-suicide content.
 Platforms take down enormous quantities of this material 
now under their own voluntarily adopted rules. The point of 
Section 230 was to encourage them to do so and make sure that 
they could look at the content and make editorial decisions 
without risking liability.
 In an alternate timeline without Section 230, platforms 
that moderated content at all would have reason to purge 
anything remotely risky, and the other option would be to leave 
everything up and tolerate all kinds of harmful or illegal 
material. Finally, losing Section 230 would, I believe, be 
catastrophic for competition. I wrote in my testimony about VO, 
a platform that was very similar to YouTube, that got sued on 
similar grounds, won on similar grounds, but went bankrupt in 
the process.
 And so, now we don't have this, what could have been a 
major competitor to YouTube. In a 230 list world, we should 
expect years or decades of legal uncertainty and litigation 
expense, the kinds of things the giants can withstand, and 
their smaller rivals can't. None of this is to say that 
Congress's hands are tied.
 There are ways to make the Internet a better and safer 
place without setting new state imposed rules for speech. 
Robust Federal privacy protections would be a great start. My 
fellow witness has written about how middleware and 
interoperability could offer the exciting promise of a more 
diverse and competitive Internet in which speech preferences 
are controlled by users themselves.
 Section 230 can help make that a reality. Section 230 has 
proven value, and Congress should not abandon it for proposed 
solutions that have every chance of making things worse. I 
thank you for your time today and look forward to your 
questions.
 [The prepared statement of Ms. Keller follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Daphne Keller, Director of Platform Regulation, 
 Program in Law, Science, and Technology, Stanford Law School
 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
Committee:

 Thank you for the opportunity to appear at this hearing and discuss 
the legal backbone of today's online speech environment: the law known 
as Section 230.\1\ Section 230 is widely maligned. But we should be 
realistic about the significant value it provides, and the harms that 
we would almost certainly face without it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ As Blake Reid explains, the law is technically Section 230 of 
the Communications Act of 1934.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 I speak today based on twenty-five years of experience in platform 
regulation as both a practicing lawyer and a legal scholar. For ten 
years, I experienced the impact of platform laws firsthand as counsel 
for Google, including as legal lead for web search. For another ten 
years at Stanford, I have studied and written about the practical and 
policy alternatives to Section 230--including laws proposed or enacted 
around the world and here in the United States. Based on this 
experience, my take on Section 230 is much like Winston Churchill's 
take on democracy:

 Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in 
 this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is 
 perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is 
 the worst form of Government except for all those other forms 
 that have been tried from time to time[.]

 Churchill was addressing the UK Parliament in 1947, with the 
horrors of World War II and the Holocaust fresh in memory. He did not 
speak lightly of sin, woe, or the imperfection of human governance. We 
should not speak lightly of the very real dangers in the world today, 
or of the Internet's role in facilitating them. But Section 230, 
despite its flaws, has proven its value in achieving the very goals 
that will be discussed in this hearing. Experience here and in other 
countries illustrates the foreseeable damage threatened by many 
alternatives to Section 230.
 Congress could repeal or amend Section 230, but two major things 
would not change. First, the U.S. Constitution protects the vast 
majority of the hate speech, disinformation, and other offensive or 
dangerous ``lawful but awful'' speech online. Lawmakers cannot tell 
platforms to remove online speech if they have no constitutional power 
to restrain that speech in the first place. The idea that eliminating 
Section 230 would make platforms liable for users' constitutionally 
protected speech is simply false.
 Congress could write a law to punish platforms for carrying 
defamation, fraud, obscenity, or other truly unlawful speech. But if 
laws like that go too far in incentivizing intermediaries to suppress 
legal expression, they can also violate the First Amendment. This is 
the lesson of Smith v. California, a 1959 Supreme Court case. The law 
at issue in that case imposed liability only bookstores--but, the Court 
noted, a ``bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would 
be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for 
being privately administered.'' The whole public is affected by today's 
platform regulations, too. Those laws must respect ordinary Internet 
users' rights to receive and comment on news, share text messages and 
family vacation photos, read restaurant reviews on Yelp, and post book 
reviews on Amazon.
 The second constraint on lawmakers' options is practical. Well-
intended regulations will succeed or fail based on what platforms and 
users actually do in response to changed legal rules. A law that aims 
to prevent violence but in fact incentivizes major platforms to 
prohibit all discussion of world events or politics is not a success--
particularly if the same speakers simply migrate to other platforms and 
foment even more violence. Neither is a law that aims to protect 
political speech but in practice would turn every platform into an 
identical, unrestricted cacophony.
 In the remainder of my testimony, I will discuss the important work 
that Section 230 is doing today, and question the likelihood that 
alternative proposals would yield better results. I will also 
distinguish viable approaches to regulating platforms' ``design'' from 
approaches that are constitutionally suspect.
Section 230 is doing important work today
 Every platform speech regulation, including Section 230, represents 
a prediction--and a gamble--about the real-world behavior of platforms 
and Internet users. Section 230s prediction was based on what is now 
known as the ``moderator's dilemma.'' Its drafters were motivated by 
two court rulings. Together, the rulings told nascent Internet 
platforms that attempting to moderate content would put them in an 
editorial role, with legal responsibility for users' unlawful speech--
but that they could avoid this risk by refusing to intervene, and 
tolerating all manner of unlawful or harmful posts. Section 230 was 
designed to avoid the resulting perverse incentives. It sought to 
encourage platforms to create and enforce editorial policies, and 
protect them from the very real risk that doing so would lead to 
liability.
 Americans need not look far for evidence that Section 230s 
prediction was correct. The law has produced an ecosystem of small, 
medium, and large platforms that can all afford to exist, and to adopt 
diverse approaches to content moderation, because they can't easily be 
sued out of existence. Comparing claims that are not immunized by 
Section 230--federal crimes, intellectual property, trafficking, and 
prostitution--as well as foreign laws tells us a lot about the benefits 
Section 230 provides today.
Encouraging moderation and avoiding the moderator's dilemma
 The experience of the video hosting platform Vimeo illustrates the 
moderator's dilemma in action. Vimeo employed content moderators in an 
effort to weed out both illegal uploaded content, such as obscenity, 
and content that violated the platform's own rules, such as hate 
speech. That choice to moderate is precisely what Section 230 
encourages. But because copyright law does not offer the same immunity, 
Vimeo was drawn into litigation for well over a decade about whether 
those moderators might have seen and recognized, but failed to remove, 
copyright-infringing content.
 Vimeo has to date prevailed in court and survived the expense of 
litigation. Another smaller platform, Veoh, provides a more sobering 
example. Veoh and YouTube offered very similar services, and were sued 
on very similar copyright claims. Both ultimately won their cases, on 
nearly identical grounds. But being legally in the right was not enough 
to save Veoh. It went bankrupt in the process. YouTube, by contrast, 
was able to weather over $100 million in legal fees, and remains a 
behemoth today. Protection from devastating litigation costs, which 
accrue even in meritless lawsuits, is one of the most important 
benefits of Section 230.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ One study found that in 28 percent of cases in which platforms 
raised Section 230 defenses, courts found plaintiffs' claims invalid 
and resolved the cases without needing to consider Section 230. Courts 
relied on Section 230 as the primary basis for ruling in only 42 
percent of cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Without Section 230, most platforms would have two safe courses to 
avoid liability for claims like defamation. They could moderate so 
thoroughly that only the blandest and least controversial material 
remains; or they could avoid moderation entirely and leave users to 
face the resulting glut of scams, pornography, dangerous diet advice, 
advocacy of violence, and more. This would not be an overall safer or 
better Internet than the one we have now.
Discouraging over-removal of lawful speech
 Abundant evidence shows that under the ``notice and takedown'' 
systems established by many non-230 platform liability laws, platforms' 
safest, cheapest, and easiest course is simply to honor every claim. 
This makes users' online expression vulnerable to a ``heckler's veto,'' 
and gives individuals, companies, and governments an avenue to silence 
speech simply by complaining about it.
 Even under the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act--a law that 
attempts to protect speakers by allowing for appeals, reinstatement of 
lawful content, and penalties against bad faith takedown demands--
improper claims are extremely common, and far too often successful. 
Governments have used takedown demands to silence critical journalism 
and suppress video evidence of police brutality. Businesses have used 
them to target competitors. Activists and discredited scientists have 
used them to suppress inconvenient truths. Improper takedown claims are 
even more common under Europe's Right to Be Forgotten laws. Among 
claims targeting 7.8 million webpages for removal from search results, 
Google reports that nearly half were legally invalid.
 In theory, platforms should feel free to ignore complaints that 
target speech protected by the First Amendment. In practice, this is a 
pipe dream. Fighting is expensive, and platforms have little motivation 
to do it. They also often simply lack the information to know whether 
content is actually illegal. For example, they cannot know, and have 
little motivation to find out, whether allegedly defamatory news 
reporting about local political corruption is true or false. Even if 
platforms do have all the facts, the legality of speech often depends 
on complex doctrines like copyright fair use, or on nuanced, 
jurisdiction-specific precedent about who counts as a public figure in 
defamation cases. Litigating in the face of such uncertainty would be 
daunting even for more dedicated defenders of speech.
 That mix of bad platform incentives and legal uncertainty would 
define a world without Section 230. In such a world, we should expect 
platforms to regularly yield to takedown demands regardless of their 
merits. When platforms are forced to litigate, we should not expect a 
clear body of rules to emerge. There are simply too many varying legal 
questions to resolve. Even beyond the First Amendment issues, every 
state offers its own wide variety of tort claims, and every platform 
presents slightly or significantly different facts against which those 
claims may be tested. The room for plaintiffs to argue that a new case 
is not governed by precedent would be vast.
 Section 230 helps platforms resist improper pressure from the 
government, too. Without it, state and Federal officials could credibly 
threaten retaliation through, for example, targeted use of agencies' 
civil enforcement powers. Recent incidents in which broadcasters have 
yielded to what Chairman Cruz called ``mafioso'' tactics from FCC 
Chairman Brendan Carr illustrate the problem. Chairman Carr's threats 
temporarily drove comedian Jimmy Kimmel off the air. When CBS declined 
to air Steven Colbert's interview with Senate candidate James Talarico, 
the interview remained available on a Section-230-immunized platform, 
YouTube. The same dynamic could just as well arise with a liberal 
regulator and a conservative comedian or politician. As I tell my 
students, protecting lawful but unpopular speech from government 
``jawboning'' is not a partisan issue. Everyone has reason to fear 
state power over their speech, whether under a current administration 
or a future one. History suggests that those who are societally 
marginalized or politically powerless are the likeliest victims of such 
abuse. It also suggests that when incumbents with close ties to and 
dependencies on government become too accommodating, it is the 
independent players who may show more spine. Section 230 is critical in 
allowing them to do so.
Encouraging competition and diversity of online platforms
 A persistent myth in policy discussions holds that Section 230 only 
protects the biggest platforms. Nothing could be farther from the 
truth. Today's incumbents would survive the turbulence and uncertainty 
of a world without immunities. Their smaller competitors, like Veoh, 
very likely would not. This is the real backdrop when large incumbents 
``come to the table'' and embrace changes to immunity. They are 
signaling that they can live with the consequences. If lawmakers want 
the Internet to evolve past its current state--if they want to 
constrain the power of today's tech giants--the law must enable new and 
niche competitors to thrive.
 Real-world defendants in Section 230 cases include newspapers, 
universities, libraries, employers, bloggers, and providers of spam 
protection and anti-fraud tools. They also include Internet 
infrastructure providers like domain name registrars. For the many 
smaller companies and non-profits the law protects, litigation costs 
remain daunting even with Section 230 in place. For early-stage 
startups, with a reported average $55,000 per month to cover all 
expenses, they may simply be insupportable. Section 230 gives the next 
generation of competitors a fighting chance against today's giants.
Section 230, speech, and ``design''
 A current trend in Section 230 litigation and legislation focuses 
on concepts like ``design'' and ``risk mitigation.'' Those words can 
mean many things. Some are perfectly fine and even promising. Others 
are in profound tension with both Section 230 and the First Amendment.
 In the ``perfectly fine'' category, design regulation can advance 
uncontroversial consumer protection or privacy goals. Limits on data 
collection and use generally do not implicate either Section 230 or the 
First Amendment. Neither do requirements to accurately disclose privacy 
practices or label options offered to users. More ambitiously, 
``middleware'' and interoperability requirements could potentially give 
people more control over their online experiences--letting them choose 
among competing providers of content moderation without sacrificing the 
``network effects'' of connections with friends and contacts. As I have 
argued, such an approach would avoid the major First Amendment problems 
that arise when lawmakers attempt to impose new, state-defined speech 
rules on Internet users. (Aggressive versions of middleware legislation 
would likely bring First Amendment objections from platforms, but those 
may not be insurmountable.) Remarkably, Section 230 itself anticipates 
and supports the development of such user controls. In the 
underappreciated subsection (c)(2)(B), the law immunizes providers of 
``technical means to restrict access'' to unwanted material.
 In a far more problematic category, laws or claims that are 
nominally about design or data management can indirectly force 
platforms to change their rules for speech. Neither courts nor 
legislators may avoid the First Amendment by this sleight of hand. When 
California attempted to do that under its Age Appropriate Design Code, 
the Ninth Circuit correctly affirmed an injunction against relevant 
portions of the law, saying that they ``deputize[d] covered businesses 
into serving as censors for the State.'' The court reiterated its 
conclusion just last week. For similar reasons, lawmakers may not 
bypass the First Amendment by regulating algorithmic amplification, 
requiring platforms to promote or demote lawful speech based on state 
preference.
 In between these two extremes are a handful of features that are 
increasingly central in current litigation. These include autoplay for 
videos, infinite scroll, and notifications. Questions about whether and 
when such features legitimately lie outside of Section 230 or First 
Amendment protection are currently before courts. So, too, are 
questions about whether these features, divorced from the content they 
convey, violate any laws. Congress should not act prematurely, before 
this process plays out.
Conclusion
 Section 230 has proven value. It gives platforms the freedom to set 
and enforce their own editorial policies, and protects them when they 
stand up against abusive takedown demands--including from the 
government. This is a difficult balance. Section 230 may not be, in 
Churchill's words, ``perfect or all-wise[.]'' But Congress should not 
abandon it for proposed solutions that have every chance of making 
things much worse.

 The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Farid Johnson, you are 
recognized.

 STATEMENT OF NADINE FARID JOHNSON, POLICY DIRECTOR, KNIGHT 
 FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE

 Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member 
Schatz, distinguished members of this committee, thank you 
again for the opportunity to testify today. The issues before 
this committee today are immensely important ones.
 All of us here agree that the digital public sphere is not 
working for Americans or for our democracy, and the question is 
what to do about it. Section 230s protection is vital to free 
speech online, even if there are difficult questions about how 
far its protection should extend, questions that the courts are 
working through right now. While Section 230 should not be 
treated as sacrosanct, repealing it would do little to address 
the problems that all of us are most concerned about.
 And in some ways, it would make those problems worse. The 
better approach would be to pass structural regulation that 
would protect users' privacy, allow them to engage with 
platforms on their own terms or leave them more easily, and 
make the platforms more transparent and accountable to the 
public.
 If Congress is going to amend Section 230, it should make 
its protection conditional on platforms' compliance with 
transparency, privacy, and interoperability requirements. 
Section 230 effectively gave platforms the ability to moderate 
user content without having to fear that doing so would give 
rise to liability.
 With that protection, platforms now moderate content in 
many different ways, including by filtering or suppressing 
spam, pornography, and to varying degrees, hateful speech. 
While there is inevitably disagreement about what speech 
platforms should moderate and how, it is indisputable that the 
platforms would be unusable if they did not engage in 
moderation in ways that Section 230 was meant to protect.
 Some of the speech on the platforms is seriously harmful, 
denigrating, dangerous, polarizing. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment to deny to the Government the 
ability to punish hateful and dehumanizing speech or speech 
that promotes outrage. So it is important to recognize that the 
platforms would be protected for publishing most of this 
speech, even in the absence of Section 230, because the First 
Amendment would most likely be understood to protect it.
 Without Section 230, because the First Amendment protects 
harmful, outrages, and sensational speech, the platforms will 
not be required to remove it, but they would be motivated to 
take down speech that might plausibly give rise to liability, 
especially potentially defamatory speech.
 Rather than risk liability for such content, they would 
almost certainly remove it, including allegations that turn out 
to be true, thereby depriving users of access to socially 
valuable information critical to our public discourse.
 There is an opportunity now for Congress to act by putting 
forward legislation that is aligned with First Amendment rights 
and would foster a better online environment for people who use 
social media platforms, simultaneously minimizing the harms of 
social media while liberating users from the monopoly control 
over and suppression of their online speech.
 We have three proposals. First, lawmakers should establish 
legal protection for those who study the platforms in the 
public interest. Understanding the online experience of users, 
how algorithms target content, and how these decisions shape 
public discourse and ultimately our democracy is a necessary 
step toward informing the public about how the platforms 
operate.
 But today, those who studied the platforms are under the 
threat of serious legal liability. Passing a researcher safe 
harbor would improve public understanding of how the platforms 
are shaping society. One model for doing so is the Knight 
Institute's safe harbor proposal, a modified version of which 
was incorporated into the Platform Accountability and 
Transparency Act.
 Second, legislators can address several data privacy 
related issues that affects users' experience online. Platforms 
are successful in maintaining user engagement because they use 
the extensive information they gather about a user to recommend 
content. Legislators could require platforms to clearly inform 
users as to what data the platforms collect about them, how 
they use that data, and with whom they share it, and could also 
limit what information platforms collect.
 Congress can also pass legislation that prevents platforms 
from selling user information to data brokers. These privacy 
enhancing efforts would be a monumental step forward to protect 
all Americans, but especially minors, who engage online. Third, 
Congress can and should attack the platform's monopoly control 
over public discourse. The platforms have been extremely 
successful at maintaining control over the social media 
industry.
 In practice, this denies users meaningful choice over the 
platforms they use, and it makes it nearly impossible for new 
platforms to compete with the incumbents. The most direct way 
to address this problem would be to establish a requirement of 
interoperability, which would enable users to take their data 
and social networks with them when they leave a platform.
 We support these mandates as standalone bills. We also 
believe that conditioning Section 230 protections on these 
mandates can be done in a way that not only respects the 
limitations of the First Amendment, but actually promotes the 
values that underlie it.
 Thank you again for the opportunity to testify this 
morning. I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Nadine Farid Johnson, Policy Director, 
 Knight First Amendment Institute
 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and distinguished members 
of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My 
name is Nadine Farid Johnson, and I am the Policy Director at the 
Knight First Amendment Institute. The questions before this Committee 
today are immensely important ones: How can we protect and strengthen 
free speech rights even as technology evolves? How in this context can 
we protect other individual rights and democratic interests that are 
also fundamental? All of us here agree that the digital public sphere 
is not working for Americans or for our democracy. The question is what 
to do about it.
 As I will explain, Section 230s protection is vital to free speech 
online, even if there are difficult questions about how far its 
protection should extend--questions that the courts are working through 
right now. While Section 230 should not be treated as sacrosanct, 
repealing it would do little to address the problems that all of us are 
most concerned about, and in some ways it would make these problems 
worse. What I will explain today is that the better approach would be 
to pass structural regulation that would protect users' privacy, allow 
users to engage with platforms on their own terms or leave them more 
easily, and make the platforms more transparent and accountable to the 
public. If Congress is going to amend Section 230, what it should do is 
make Section 230s protection conditional on platforms' compliance with 
transparency, privacy, and interoperability requirements.
 Let me begin with the role that Section 230 plays in protecting 
free speech online. In the 1990s, when the Internet was in its infancy, 
two court decisions addressed whether efforts by platforms--in those 
days, bulletin board services--to curate their users' posts would 
subject the platforms to liability for any unlawful speech that they 
failed to take down. The decisions, Cubby v. CompuServe and Stratton 
Oakmont v. Prodigy, each assessed the potential liability online 
services might face for distributing user content. Taken together, 
those cases indicated that the more service providers curated the 
content posted on their platforms, the more likely they would be to 
face liability for that content. Had that regime of liability been 
allowed to go into full effect, it is easy to predict how the early 
platforms would have responded, because they would have had only two 
realistic options for avoiding crushing liability for the posts on 
their sites. They would have had to either allow everything to be 
published without moderation or aggressively take down any post that 
could conceivably provide a basis for liability. The first path would 
have turned the early Internet platforms into cesspools of pornography, 
hate, and spam; the latter would have turned them into sterile channels 
of play-speech, devoid of any allegations of wrongdoing--including 
truthful ones--by those with the means to sue.
 Section 230 effectively gave platforms the ability to moderate user 
content without having to fear that doing so would give rise to 
liability. The first part of the provision, codified in Section 
230(c)(1), limited the liability of online service providers for 
content posted on their sites by third parties. The second, codified in 
section (c)(2), shielded online service providers for good faith 
efforts in content moderation. With the protection provided by Section 
230, platforms now moderate content in many different ways, including 
in ways that are important to their users and to the public more 
broadly. The most popular social media platforms filter or suppress 
spam, pornography, and (to varying degrees) hateful speech directed at 
racial, religious, and other minorities. While there is inevitably 
disagreement about what speech platforms should moderate, and how they 
should moderate it, it is indisputable that the platforms would be 
unusable if they did not engage in moderation in ways that Section 230 
was meant to protect.
 Although the very large online platforms dominate much of the 
conversation around Section 230, Section 230s protections reach the 
online experience far beyond social media. We often use ``platforms'' 
and ``social media'' interchangeably, but Section 230 applies to 
everything from news and entertainment aggregators, to community-driven 
encyclopedias and comment sites, to forums for artistic and cultural 
exchange. Section 230 protections have enabled features of our online 
lives that many of us take for granted, such as web search results.
 None of this is to deny that some of the speech on the platforms is 
seriously harmful. Some of these harms result from the publication of 
users' speech--the third-party content that platforms host--and some of 
these harms result from platform design. Some of the content that the 
platforms publish denigrates minorities; some of it is dangerous 
misinformation about public health; some of it is defamatory. 
Platforms' recommendation algorithms sometimes amplify this content; 
and sometimes they amplify other forms of polarizing content that are 
intended to generate engagement and outrage.
 It is important to recognize that the platforms would be protected 
for publishing most of this speech even in the absence of Section 230, 
because the First Amendment would most likely be understood to protect 
it. Even without Section 230, the platforms would not be liable for 
publishing the speech of their users that falls outside of the few, 
narrow exceptions to the First Amendment. Without Section 230, the 
platforms could perhaps be held liable for hosting defamation, or true 
threats, or incitement to imminent violence (at least so long as they 
had knowledge of the posts in question). But the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the First Amendment to deny to the government the ability 
to punish hateful and dehumanizing speech, or speech that promotes 
outrage. Even without Section 230 immunity, then, the platforms could 
rely directly on the First Amendment in responding to lawsuits over 
this kind of ``lawful, but awful'' speech.
 It is also important to recognize that Section 230 does not 
preclude platforms from being held liable for design decisions that are 
harmful--at least if those design decisions are not themselves 
expressive. The First Amendment has properly been understood to protect 
platforms' content-moderation decisions. Courts have, rightfully, 
upheld the platforms' First Amendment right to exercise traditional 
editorial functions--such as when they choose to feature or demote 
certain content, when they specify and enforce ``community standards'' 
that restrict what categories of content users can post, or when they 
attach warning labels to user content. That protection stems from a 
line of Supreme Court cases starting with Miami Herald Publishing 
Company v. Tornillo, which involved a statute concerning newspapers' 
editorial functions. Just two years ago, the Supreme Court made clear 
that this long line of cases applies to social media platforms when 
they ``decide which third-party content th[eir] feeds will display, or 
how the display will be ordered and organized.'' Moody v. NetChoice, 
LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 740 (2024).
 Neither Section 230 nor the First Amendment would protect platforms 
from liability, however, for design decisions that are not expressive 
and that cause harm. For example, in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., bereaved 
parents sued the company behind the social media platform Snapchat for 
its allegedly negligent design of a ``Speed Filter'' that encouraged 
users to drive at excessive speeds. In reversing the district court's 
dismissal of the parents' complaint, the appellate court noted that a 
platform could still face liability for its provision of ``content-
neutral tools'' where the liability stemmed from the platform's own 
acts--such as designing and making available to users the ``Speed 
Filter'' and corresponding reward system--and not the content posted by 
its users.
 There are of course hard questions around whether any particular 
design decision is expressive and for that reason implicates the First 
Amendment. Courts are addressing these questions in the product 
liability lawsuits recently filed against the social media platforms. 
Similar questions are also being adjudicated in the realm of generative 
artificial intelligence, specifically with respect to large language 
model-driven chatbots and minors' use of and engagement with those 
chatbots. As these and other relevant cases move forward, they may 
provide further insights into how Section 230 and the First Amendment 
apply in these contexts.
 If Congress eliminated Section 230, however, the main result would 
be to incentivize the platforms to take down speech that is socially 
valuable. As discussed above, because the First Amendment protects 
harmful, outrageous, and sensational speech, the platforms would not be 
required to remove it, even without Section 230. But they would be 
motivated to take down speech that might plausibly give rise to 
liability. That category would include, most significantly, potentially 
defamatory speech, such as speech that alleges wrongdoing by a specific 
individual. The First Amendment does not protect defamation. Truth is 
of course a defense to defamation liability, but the platforms do not 
have the ability to determine--definitively and at the scale that they 
operate--whether any particular allegation is true or not. This means 
that, absent Section 230, the platforms could face liability for 
leaving up such factual allegations about real people, and so they 
would almost certainly remove them, including allegations that turn out 
to be true. Needless to say, true allegations of wrongdoing--
particularly by government officials and powerful private actors--are 
socially valuable and important for public discourse.
 For all of these reasons, eliminating or substantially narrowing 
Section 230 has little demonstrated upside and dramatic potential 
downsides. Doing so would not address the harms that result from the 
platforms' publication of user speech, and it would create a 
significant incentive for the platforms to take down socially valuable 
speech. And even with Section 230 in place, the platforms are already 
potentially liable for harms that result from their own design 
decisions, at least to the extent that those design decisions are not 
protected by the First Amendment.
 If Congress is going to amend Section 230, what it should do is 
make Section 230s protection conditional on platforms' compliance with 
transparency, privacy, and interoperability requirements. These are 
challenging issues, but there is an opportunity now for Congress to 
act. Few believe that our system of free expression is working in a 
manner that best serves our democracy. Members of this Committee who 
want to address concerns about online harms should put forward 
legislation that is both aligned with First Amendment rights and would 
foster a better online environment for people who use social media 
platforms.
 Sunsetting Section 230 will not achieve that. The better course 
would be for Congress to enact structural changes that would better 
align the incentives of the large platforms with the interests of their 
users. Doing so holds the promise of simultaneously minimizing the 
harms of social media while liberating users from the monopoly control 
over--and suppression of--their online speech. Specifically, Congress 
should enact new mandates in transparency, privacy, data portability, 
and interoperability.
 First, lawmakers should establish legal protections for journalists 
and researchers who study the platforms in the public interest. 
Understanding the online experience of users--how algorithms target 
content, and how these decisions shape public discourse and, 
ultimately, our democracy--is a necessary step toward informing the 
public about how the platforms operate. These efforts are integral to 
holding the platforms accountable, and to ensuring that consumers have 
the information necessary to make informed choices about the social 
media networks they join. But today, researchers and journalists are 
stymied in their study of online platforms. The companies' terms of 
service generally ban the use of the tools necessary to study the 
platforms at scale, subjecting researchers to the threat of civil and 
potentially even criminal liability for public-interest investigations. 
Congress can and should address this problem by establishing a legal 
safe harbor for those who study the platforms in ethical and privacy-
preserving ways to improve public understanding of how the platforms 
are shaping society. One model for doing so is the Knight Institute's 
safe-harbor proposal, a modified version of which was incorporated into 
the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act.
 Second, legislators can address several data privacy-related issues 
that affect users' experience online. Platforms are successful in 
maintaining user engagement because they use the extensive information 
they gather about a user--their viewing habits, interests, friends, 
likes, dislikes, beliefs--to recommend content accordingly. To 
facilitate transparency efforts, legislators could require platforms to 
clearly let users know what data the platforms collect about them, how 
the platforms use that data, and with whom they share that data. To 
protect users' privacy online, legislators can limit what information 
platforms collect. Prohibiting the collection of certain personal or 
behavioral data or circumscribing the uses of that data would limit the 
amount of information that is gathered by platforms and fed back into 
their algorithms, thereby lessening some of the algorithms' targeting 
ability. This would be a monumental step forward to protect all 
Americans but especially minors who engage online. And to further 
shield social media users from the misuse of their data, Congress can 
also pass legislation that prevents platforms from selling user 
information to data brokers, whose $270 billion-dollar business model 
involves the sale of Americans' sensitive data to businesses and 
governments.
 Third, Congress can and should attack the platforms' monopoly 
control over public discourse--directly. The platforms have been 
extremely successful at holding off their competitors and maintaining 
control over the social-media industry. They have been able to do so in 
large part because of the ``network effect''--the phenomenon by which 
the value of a product or service increases as more people use it. 
People want to be on the platforms their friends and families use, but 
once there, it becomes very difficult for users to leave, because the 
platforms do not allow them to take their social networks with them or 
to communicate with their old contacts from competitor services. This 
lock-in is anti-competitive, it denies users meaningful choice over the 
platforms they use, and it makes it nearly impossible for new platforms 
to compete with the incumbents. There are multiple ways to address this 
problem, but perhaps the most direct would be to establish a 
requirement of ``interoperability,'' which would enable users to take 
their data and social networks with them when they leave a platform. 
Competitors could be immunized for interoperating with other social 
media platforms, and large platforms could be required to facilitate 
this interoperation through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). 
To be sure, any interoperability mandate would need to be carefully 
designed to avoid creating privacy risks, but this can and should be 
done.
 The Knight Institute notes that these mandates would benefit more 
Americans if enacted directly, so that they apply more broadly and even 
in situations and to actors not covered by or relying on Section 230. 
But we also recognize that there is logic in requiring actors that 
benefit from Section 230--especially platforms whose scale is made 
possible by its expansive immunity--to comply with a broader and 
stronger range of mandates meant to ensure that the platforms do not 
exploit that scale in ways that harm their users or public discourse. 
Conditioning Section 230 protections on things like researcher access, 
data privacy, and user controls can be done in a way that not only 
respects the limitations of the First Amendment, but actually promotes 
the values that underlie it. Whether these mandates are enacted 
directly or as a condition of Section 230 immunity, the opportunity 
exists to improve upon the current information landscape to protect the 
free flow of information while improving the user experience online.
 Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, and members of the Committee, I 
thank you again for the opportunity to testify this morning, and I look 
forward to your questions.

 The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bergman, you are recognized 
for your opening.

 STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BERGMAN, FOUNDING ATTORNEY, SOCIAL MEDIA 
 VICTIMS LAW CENTER

 Mr. Bergman. Thank you. Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member 
Schatz, and esteemed members of this committee, it is an honor 
to be here to address the current state of Section 230. We 
appreciate the bipartisan leadership of this committee in 
addressing the carnage that is being inflicted on American 
young people through the deliberate design decisions of social 
media companies to target kids to enhance their profits over 
the safety of kids.
 And we commend this committee for its successful reporting 
out of the Kids Online Safety Act last session, which passed 
the Congress, and passed the Senate with 91 votes. As Justice 
Thomas observed, courts have interpreted Section 230 to confer 
sweeping immunity on some of the largest companies in the 
world.
 And in order to convey the human cost of this expansive 
definition, I have asked three families who have been directly 
affected by Section 230 to come before this committee and for 
you to hear their stories. Sitting to my left is Tammy 
Rodriguez of Enfield, Connecticut. She is the mother of Selena 
Rodriguez, forever 11.
 In the words of her sister, Destiny, ``Selena could light 
up a room as soon as she walked in. And you knew the second she 
walked in because the light came--with the light came a lot of 
noise''. Selena was so addicted to social media that she became 
physically violent when there was any effort to turn off the 
machine or take it away.
 As depicted in the written testimony, she was targeted 
through the deliberate design decisions of these companies with 
online sexual abusers and predators, and you can see the 
conversations that they had with her that would make any parent 
blanch. She developed such despair and depression that she took 
her life on Snapchat and recorded a song that was provided to 
her on Snapchat, Forever 11.
 Tony and Brandy Roberts are from New Liberia, Louisiana. 
They are the parents of England Roberts, age 14, forever. 
England was the youngest of five children. She was vivacious, 
charismatic, and sassy. In the words of her father, ``Tony, she 
made every day seem like Christmas''. Tony thought that he was 
monitoring his daughter's online content. He just didn't know 
how to do it. She was being pulled in a dark world, and as you 
can see in the written materials, developed more and more 
suicidal ideation based on the deliberate design decisions.
 And additionally, in the materials that we have submitted 
to this committee, you can see a chart showing on a daily basis 
how much she was being targeted after hours when her parents 
thought she was safe in her home and sleep. But she took her 
life by mimicking a depiction of suicide online that was 
targeted to her. And as recently as this morning, that material 
is still on Instagram.
 Jenny Cenario is the mother of Mason Edens, forever 16. In 
the words of his stepdad, ``Mason was an all-American football 
player, but there was a whole other side to him, with a gentle, 
loving, positive energy about him''. As a young high school 
boy, he broke up with his girlfriend and sought affirming 
content on TikTok to mend his broken heart.
 And instead, without asking for it, he was targeted with 
suicidal videos, encouraging him to take his life with a 
shotgun, which is what he did in his parents' home. And I have 
included clips to those things that TikTok targeted him with, 
and I would ask every parent in this room to look at those 
videos and ask whether a company that targets children with 
this content should be accorded unfettered immunity from basic 
principles of liability and human decency.
 Every parent in this room needs--these cases have nothing 
to do with protecting speech. They are about the deliberate 
design decisions of companies to prioritize profits over the 
lives and safety of their children. Yet in every one of these 
cases, social media has tried to dismiss these cases based on 
Section 230. Section 230, as written, sought to maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals.
 The statute explicitly sought to empower parents and 
embolden law enforcement. And yet, this original intent has 
been thrown by the wayside by these interpretations. In the 
words of Justice Thomas, ``in the platform's world, they are 
fully responsible for their websites when it results in 
Constitutional protestations, but the moment that 
responsibility could lead to liability, they can dis-blame any 
obligation and enjoy greater protections from suit than nearly 
under any other industry''.
 We ask that this committee reform Section 230 to conform to 
its original intent to require that companies follow--that tech 
companies follow the rules that every other company in America 
follows, and that the duty of reasonable care not be a duty 
that is immune from only one segment of our economy. Thank you.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Bergman follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Matthew Bergman, Founding Attorney, 
 Social Media Victims Law Center (SMVLC)
 Chairman Cruz and Ranking Member Cantwell, I am honored to appear 
before this Committee with these distinguished panelists to discuss the 
relationship between Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and 
the youth mental health and safety crisis that is currently ravaging 
our country. I look forward to discussing legislative reforms to 
restore the important statute to its laudatory purpose and to better 
protect America's kids and teens. Under your bipartisan leadership, 
this Committee has been at the forefront in changing the national 
dialog on social media, youth mental health, and the quest for online 
accountability.
 Since 2022, I have had the privilege of working with Republican and 
Democratic members of this Committee and their staffs on seeking 
legislative solutions to ameliorate the clear and present danger that 
social media poses to American's children. Every time I'm invited to 
discuss these issues there is one fundamental question that arises: how 
did we get here? How are technology companies able to design apps with 
such an indisputably corrosive impact on the mental and physical health 
of kids, earn billions of dollars in profit, and evade legal 
accountability? The answer boils down to two words: Section 230. In 
considering legislative solutions to better protect the public from 
unreasonably dangerous social media apps, it is therefore appropriate 
that 30 years after its enactment, this Committee take a fresh look at 
Section 230 and evaluate where the statute has been effective in 
promoting commerce and the free exchange of ideas and where reforms are 
desperately needed to incentivize companies to prevent harm to kids and 
teens before parents have to suffer immeasurably through the 
unimaginable consequences of congressional inaction.
 I have asked three parents who have been deeply impacted by the 
Section 230s expansive interpretation to join me in the hearing room 
today.
 Tammy Rodriguez from Enfield, Massachusetts is the mother of Selena 
Rodriguez who died of suicide in June 2021 at the age of 11 after being 
sexually abused on Instagram and TikTok. In January 2022, Tammy filed 
the first product liability claim against social media company 
involving an injured child.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Toney and Brandy Roberts live in New Iberia, Louisiana and are the 
parents of Englyn Roberts who took her life in 2020 after becoming 
addicted to social media and receiving unsolicited suicidal material in 
Instagram and TikTok.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Jennie DeSerio, from Centerton, Arkansas, is the mother of Mason 
Edens who shot himself to death in November 2022 at the age of 16. 
Mason had sought out affirming content after breaking up with his high 
school girlfriend but instead was deluged with a steady stream suicidal 
videos promoting suicide by shotgun.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Later in my testimony, I will provide more details on these tragic 
and several other cases in the context of Section 230.
 I believe it is imperative that any discussion of Section 230 
reform focus on the individuals most impacted by legislative decision 
making: our children.
 I hope that my experience as a legal advocate for families whose 
children were injured or killed because of the deliberate decisions of 
social media companies to prioritize profits over the lives of their 
children will provide a helpful perspective to this Committee as it 
undertakes this critical task.
A. Background
 As someone who was dragged kicking and screaming into the computer 
age, I am an unlikely candidate to opine on the intersection of law and 
technology. However, in retrospect, it cannot be mere coincidence that 
my first legal job was working for Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Diarmuid O'Scannlain, author of the Barnes v. Yahoo decision, which set 
forth the boundaries of Section 230 immunity. I parlayed this 
experience into a two-year judicial clerkship for Judge Bobby Baldock 
on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals before commencing my legal 
practice with a large national law firm repressuring companies facing 
environmental liabilities. I spent the next 25 years representing 
veterans and retired construction workers suffering from lung cancers 
and other illnesses caused by unnecessary toxic exposures in product 
liability actions throughout the Pacific Northwest.
 My career trajectory changed in the fall of 2021, after Frances 
Haugen's heroic and historic testimony before this Committee revealed 
that social media companies had been deliberately disregarding the 
severe mental and physical health harms that their apps have been 
inflicting on American kids for years. The leaked documents disclosed 
in the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post revealed a level of 
outrageous corporate misconduct that made every case I'd previously 
worked on pale by comparison. Yet virtually every effort to hold social 
media companies legally accountable had been thwarted through Section 
230s misapplication, with most actions not even allowed to proceed past 
the pleading stage. After reading the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Lemmon v. Snap, my colleagues and I charted a very narrow legal theory 
that might legally permit certain cases brought by parents to proceed 
despite Section 230.
 It was then that I formed the Social Media Victims Law Center in 
November 2021 to try against all odds to hold social media companies 
accountable for the veritable carnage their platforms are inflicting on 
America's kids. Currently, we are the only law firm exclusively focused 
on representing children and young adults injured or killed by social 
media apps or AI chatbots.
 In the ensuing 3.5 years, I have met with hundreds of parents who 
have lost children to suicide, accidental death, and drug overdose 
instigated by defective social media apps; children who almost died 
from eating disorders after being deluged with algorithmic designs 
meant to target and manipulate young brains with anorexic content; kids 
who have suffered both physical and online sexual abuse from adult 
predators facilitated by social media design; and children who have 
been treated for severe depression, anxiety and body dysmorphia because 
of cold, calculated decisions made by social media companies to keep 
these kids online no matter what the human cost. I am incredibly 
privileged to know and represent these families, and I'm constantly in 
awe of their passion and dedication. They are selflessly dedicated to 
ensuring that no other family must live through their nightmare of 
burying their own children. On their behalf and inspired by their 
steadfast grace in the face of unimaginable pain, I beseech you to take 
action to reform Section 230 so that that attorneys like me are no 
longer needed because harm is stopped before it can occur. These 
parents don't want more lawsuits, they want our kids to be happy, 
healthy, and safe online.
B. Section 230 and its Critics
 ``The twenty-six words that created the Internet.'' In the three 
decades since its passage, Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act has achieved a degree of legend that far outpaces both the plaint 
text of the law itself and the express purposes underpinning it. The 
law mandates that ``[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider,'' 47 U.S.C. 
Sec. 230(c), and requires that ``[n]o cause of action may be brought 
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.'' 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(e)(3). At the same 
time, Section 230 explicitly provides that ``[n]othing in this section 
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law 
that is consistent with this section.'' 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(e)(3). There 
are no references to sweeping immunity anywhere in the text.
 Instead, the current dismal state of the law is owed almost 
entirely to judicial interpretation. The Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. 
America Online, Inc. was the first court to suggest any form of Federal 
immunity under the ``plain language'' of Section 230. Ironically, the 
court cloaked its analysis in the language of free speech:

 The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to 
 discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based 
 lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning 
 Internet medium. The imposition of tort liability on service 
 providers for the communications of others represented, for 
 Congress, simply another form of intrusive government 
 regulation of speech. Section 230 was enacted, in part, to 
 maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, 
 accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a 
 minimum. In specific statutory findings, Congress recognized 
 the Internet and interactive computer services as offering ``a 
 forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
 opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
 intellectual activity.'' It also found that the Internet and 
 interactive computer services ``have flourished, to the benefit 
 of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.'' 
 Congress further stated that it is ``the policy of the United 
 States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
 market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
 interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
 regulation.''

 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
 Despite these laudable ideals, courts have expanded upon the Zeran 
analysis throughout the years, to the point that Section 230 has become 
utterly unrecognizable to either the text or the context in which it 
was passed. And predictably, tech companies have seized upon this trend 
to evade all possible legal accountability simply because third-party 
content is found somewhere in the causal chain of their misconduct.
 In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated that ``what 
matters is not the name of the cause of action . . . [but] whether the 
cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as 
the `publisher or speaker' of content provided by another.'' From this, 
social media companies insist that because everything they do involves 
third-party content, then every cause of action must necessarily treat 
them as publishers or speakers. In M.P. by and through Pinckney v. Meta 
Platforms Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that claims of products 
liability and negligence were barred by Section 230 because the claims 
at issue were ``inextricably intertwined with Facebook's role as a 
publisher of third-party content'' and that ``a newspaper company does 
not cease to be a publisher simply because it prioritizes engagement in 
sorting its content.'' From this, social media companies insist that 
every type of products liability and negligence claim must necessarily 
be foreclosed by Section 230, even where the basis arises from 
targeting children with deliberately addictive design features to 
prioritize engagement over user safety. And in Force v. Facebook, Inc., 
a split majority of the Second Circuit held that ``the text of Section 
230 should be construed broadly in favor of immunity'' and that the use 
of algorithms for ``arranging and distributing third-party information 
inherently forms `connections' and `matches' among speakers, content, 
and viewers of content, whether in interactive Internet forums or in 
more traditional media.'' From this, social media companies insist that 
every algorithmic design must necessarily be exempt from liability no 
matter how they are designed or optimized.
 That said, there is a growing chorus among appellate courts pushing 
back on Zeran's original sin of reading Section 230 far beyond its 
plain text. Chief Judge Katzmann's partial dissent in Force is widely 
cited as the more persuasive interpretation of Section 230 and a better 
analytical framework for adding additional free speech priorities while 
holding companies accountable for weaponizing platform design features. 
Judge Katzmann recognized that the expansion of Section 230, ``a 
provision that was designed to encourage computer service providers to 
shield minors from obscene material,'' was instead being used to 
immunize companies that target and prey on vulnerable children. 
Instead, Judge Katzmann emphasized the law does not grant publishers 
Section 230 immunity ``for the full range of activities in which they 
might engage,'' only for claims faulting the defendant corporation for 
``deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.''
 ``As is so often the case with new technologies, the very qualities 
that drive social media's success--its ease of use, open access, and 
ability to connect the world--have also spawned its demons.'' Judge 
Katzmann believed that ``claims regarding the algorithms are a poor fit 
for statutory immunity'' because social media companies could ``stop 
using the algorithms altogether'' or ``modify its algorithms'' to 
remove the dangerous defects in their design--all without modifying or 
removing a single piece of content. Considering the ways in which 
social media companies, with judicial approval, had manipulated the 
Communications Decency Act to avoid any accountability, Judge Katzmann 
suggested that Congress ``revisit the CDA to better calibrate the 
circumstances where such immunization is appropriate and inappropriate 
in light of congressional purposes.''
 In the seven years since Force, Congress has declined to take Judge 
Katzmann up on his suggestion. However, jurists have increasingly begun 
to resist the allure of Zeran's overreach and embrace Judge Katzmann's 
more restrained reading of Section 230. Most notably, Justice Thomas 
has repeatedly castigated the judicial expansion of Section 230s plain 
text. In Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma software Group USA, LLC, Justice 
Thomas' statement upon the denial of a writ of certiorari recognized 
that when Congress first enacted Section 230, ``most of today's major 
Internet platforms did not exist,'' and that since that time many 
courts have ``construed the law broadly to confer sweeping immunity on 
some of the largest companies in the world.'' Indeed, Justice Thomas 
decried contemporary interpretations that would permit a company to 
``solicit thousands of potentially defamatory statements, `selec[t] and 
edi[t] . . . for publication' several of those statements, add 
commentary, and then feature the final product prominently over other 
submissions--all while enjoying immunity.'' Paring back this sweeping 
immunity, Justice Thomas explained, ``would not necessarily render 
defendants liable for online misconduct. It simply would give 
plaintiffs a chance to raise their claims in the first place.''
 In 2024, Justice Thomas again sounded the alarm, again in the 
context of the high court declining to take up review of Section 230. 
Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Doe Through Roe v. Snap, 
Inc., a case where Section 230 was held to immunize online platforms 
for facilitating child sex trafficking, Justice Thomas urged the Court 
to at least ``address whether social-media platforms--some of the 
largest and most powerful companies in the world--can be held 
responsible for their own misconduct.'' Moreover, Justice Thomas 
recognized that ``there is danger in delay.'' He articulated, in stark 
terms, how social media companies alternately rely upon either the 
First Amendment or Section 230 to evade accountability: ``In the 
platforms' world, they are fully responsible for their websites when it 
results in constitutional protections, but the moment that 
responsibility could lead to liability, they can disclaim any 
obligations and enjoy greater protections from suit than nearly any 
other industry.''
 Other courts have begun follow Justice Thomas' criticisms. In A.B. 
v. Salesforce, Inc., the Fifth Circuit agreed that the law does not 
mandate immunity ``solely because a cause of action would not otherwise 
have accrued but for the third-party content.'' There, the court that 
companies may be held liable for conduct `` `that is properly 
attributable to them,' even if third-party speech exists somewhere 
upstream.'' In Anderson v. TikTok, Inc., Judge Matey of the Third 
Circuit remarked that Section 230 ``rides in to rescue corporations 
from virtually any claim loosely related to content posted by a third 
party, no matter the cause of action and whatever the provider's 
actions.'' The result, of course, is that current judicial 
interpretations of Section 230 ``immunizes platforms from the 
consequences of their own conduct and permits platforms to ignore the 
ordinary obligation'' of reasonable care and safe product design. 
Additionally, in Calise v. Meta Platforms, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
found that claims based on fraudulent third-party advertisements posted 
in violation of Meta's terms of service were not barred by Section 230, 
holding that ``it is not enough that a claim, including its underlying 
facts, stems from third-party content for Sec. 230 immunity to apply.'' 
Id. at 742.
C. How Social Media Hurts Kids
 In order to consider the real-world impact of the courts' overly 
expansive interpretation of Section 230, it is essential to understand 
the causal nexus between social media company's deliberate design 
decisions and the current mental health crisis plaguing America's kids. 
I am therefore providing the Committee with a synopsis of what we have 
learned from national experts on child neurology and development, 
internal company documents and testimony from company personal in the 
four years since we began litigating with the social media giants. 
Shockingly, the most compelling evidence on the causal on the 
relationship between social media and youth mental health is contained 
in social media companies' internal documents made public for the first 
time in the trial completed last week in Los Angeles.
 In 2023, Surgeon General Vivek Murthy issued a stark advisory on 
youth mental health, observing that, ``[t]he great irony of social 
media is that the more you immerse yourself in it, the lonelier and 
more depressed you become.'' Pre-teens and teens are particularly 
vulnerable to problematic use of social media and the resulting 
negative health outcomes. Social media causes or contributes to mental 
health harms such as addiction, problematic usage, anxiety, depression, 
body dysmorphia, eating disorders, poor sleep, suicide, and self-
injury. The paths by which media use in general, and social media use 
in particular, are related to these mental health outcomes are complex 
and inter-related.
D. The Psychology of ``Flow''
 Humans bring innate and acquired skills to the challenges they 
face. When skills are high and challenges are low, the task at hand is 
sufficiently easy that it can induce boredom. Conversely, when 
challenges are high and skills are low, the task is sufficiently hard 
that it can induce anxiety. The psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi 
introduced the concept of ``flow'' as that mental state where the 
challenges and skills are sufficiently balanced that the experience is 
engrossing, engagement is easy, enjoyment is high, and time passes 
effortlessly. Flow states result in dopamine release and are inherently 
pleasurable.

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 In the ``real world,'' flow can be achieved by such things as well-
timed promotions at work so that one feels deployed at the limit, but 
not beyond, their skill set, or in gaming contexts such as chess clubs 
by finding players that are worthy opponents. Both of those examples 
take time and effort and maybe even luck to achieve. Job promotions are 
rarely ``perfectly timed'' if they happen at all, and finding the 
``right'' chess player can be challenging. With effort, some people can 
find flow in art, sports, music, and even work. Although 
Csikszentmihalyi maintained that ``flow'' was the key to a happy and 
fulfilling life, he cautioned that is not inherently or universally a 
``good'' thing. He argued it could be misused in business and war, and 
that ``mountaineers'' and ``gamblers'' could become obsessed with it to 
the point of neglecting other aspects of their lives.
 Structured by algorithms as opposed to real world constraints, the 
online experience can create flow instantaneously and effortlessly and 
maintain it indefinitely. Consider the simple game of ``Candy Crush,'' 
which launched in 2012 and continues to command the attention of 
hundreds of millions of players. It requires no skill to play for the 
first time and so anxiety is low. In fact, reading the rules is 
unnecessary. The game is intuitive and there is no barrier--no 
friction--to beginning. Once a player begins playing, the game quickly 
and seamlessly ratchets up its difficulty in accordance with a player's 
skill and engagement: never so hard that it becomes frustrating, never 
so easy that it becomes boring. Two players starting at the same time 
play different games, but each is likely to find theirs enjoyable. 
Keeping people in a flow state is an engagement strategy that many 
social media sites actively deploy.
 People in a state of flow are, by definition, deeply engaged in the 
experience and less mindful of outside distractions or perturbations: 
it is an ``escape.'' This explains in part why people with underlying 
mental health conditions, or particularly disturbing realities (e.g., 
challenging socioeconomic circumstances), are more susceptible to the 
allure of a flow state and at greater risk for becoming addicted to 
what provides it to them--whether this is alcohol, drugs, gambling, or 
social media. To that end, Yao Qin and other researchers specifically 
investigated if flow (which they parameterized as enjoyment, 
concentration and time distortion) was associated with problematic 
TikTok use and found a strong correlation.
E. Pre-Teen and Teen Brain Development
 Pre-teens and teens are particularly vulnerable to mental health 
harms from social media use due to their biological and psychological 
development. Children are not simply small adults, and the impact of 
any experience or exposure must be understood in the context of their 
ongoing biological and psychological development. Because of their 
brain development, they are particularly vulnerable to experiences such 
as ``FOMO'' (``fear of missing out'') and social contagion. Human 
brains develop throughout adolescence into early adulthood. Different 
regions mature at different rates.
 At birth, the brainstem and cerebellum are highly developed, 
supporting vital functions such as breathing, heart rate, and basic 
motor control. During infancy and early childhood, the limbic system, 
particularly the amygdala and hippocampus, rapidly develops, 
facilitating emotional responses and memory formation. Later, the 
cerebral cortex, responsible for higher cognitive functions, undergoes 
significant growth, with sensory and motor areas maturing first, 
followed by language centers, which develop rapidly in early childhood. 
As demonstrated in the attached illustration from Meta's internal 
documents furnished to this Committee by Frances Haugen, the prefrontal 
cortex, often referred to as the ``CEO of the brain'' because it is 
essential for decision-making, impulse control, and complex reasoning, 
is the last to fully mature, and typically completes development at 
around age 26.

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 During adolescence, synaptic pruning strengthens important neural 
connections while eliminating less commonly used ones, refining 
cognitive abilities. Myelination, the process of insulating nerve 
fibers to improve communication between brain regions, progresses 
throughout childhood and adolescence, with the prefrontal cortex again 
being the last region to complete the process. This prolonged 
development explains why teens and emerging adults may struggle with 
long-term planning and impulse control compared to fully mature adults, 
and why social media can have significant impacts on children and 
adolescents.
 The figure below from the University of Cambridge shows when 
different brain regions reach 100 percent capacity. White matter volume 
(shown in dark blue) is the part of the brain that plays a crucial role 
in memory, attention, and decision making. The blue vertical line has 
been added to age 13, corresponding with the current ``minimal'' age 
for social media usage set by industry:

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 ``Executive Function'' is a foundational construct used by 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience to describe a set of skills that 
emerge as the brain develops. It is comprised of several key 
capacities. All these play essential roles in human development and 
function and underpin both reactions to and effects of environmental 
stimuli. Children's developmental trajectories are highly 
individualized, which is to say there is considerable variability in 
the age at which these capacities are fully present. When we say that 
the ``typical'' 5-year-old can do X it means that as many as 1/2 to 1/3 
cannot do it yet. Further, cognitive capacity is modulated by 
inhibitory control or ``self-monitoring.'' What this means is that even 
if a child ``knows'' the right thing to choose or to do, their lack of 
impulse control might make them get it wrong or not act appropriately. 
Optimal executive involves a titration of latency (delay) and accuracy, 
and executive function is essential to sound decision making. This lack 
of fully developed executive functioning makes adolescents particularly 
vulnerable to the harmful effects of social media.

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 This is something that the platforms appear to realize. For 
example, TikTok found that even among those that enabled their screen 
management tools, they saw no benefits (i.e., screen time use was not 
reduced) for their <18-year-old users, which they explained by saying 
``minors do not have the executive function to control their screen 
time.''
F. Addiction
 Addiction is a based on directly measurable psychological and 
physiological attributes related to reliance on and/or withdrawal from 
a substrate. It is a complex condition characterized by compulsive 
engagement in rewarding stimuli despite adverse consequences. It often 
involves substances like drugs or alcohol. Teenagers and young adults 
who biologically lack higher cortical functioning including impulse 
control are more vulnerable to potentially addictive substances and 
behaviors. Epidemiological studies have shown that earlier onset of 
drug intake is associated with greater likelihood of development of 
substance use problems. In fact, the majority of problematic substance 
users (e.g., tobacco and alcohol) begin usage before the age of 21.
 Addiction can also be due to tolerance and withdrawal from certain 
behaviors. Not all behavioral addictions are currently recognized in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, Fifth 
Edition, (DSM-5) which is the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) 
guide to mental and brain-related conditions. However, there is an 
increasing recognition of the need for the DSM-5 to do so. To date, 
only a single behavioral addiction, gambling, is officially recognized 
by the DSM-5. The DSM-5 considered including ``gaming disorder'' in its 
2013 edition but determined it was ``in need of further study.'' Meta 
has rightly recognized in an internal document that ``medical diagnoses 
change definitions over time based on new evidence.'' In 2022, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) did recognize the existence of ``gaming 
disorder'' as a clinical entity, and it is included as a diagnosis in 
the International Classifications of Disease 11 (ICD-11) which is the 
manual that physicians use to diagnose patients.
 Recently, the American Psychiatric Association has recognized 
``technology addiction'' as ``excessive and compulsive use of the 
Internet or online activities [that] can lead to negative consequences 
in various aspects of an individual's life.'' Social media addiction is 
recognized as its own condition, characterized as ``involv[ing] 
problematic and compulsive use of social media; an obsessive need to 
check and update social media platforms, often resulting in problems in 
functioning and disrupted real-world relationships.'' The APA further 
recognizes that ``children and adolescents are particularly vulnerable 
to technological addiction because their brains are still developing'' 
and ``excessive problematic use of social media'' has the potential to 
develop into a behavioral addiction for children and adolescents.
 Because of the increased risks of social media to youth, several 
national associations and reports have been published with 
recommendations for actions that can be taken to help reduce the risk 
of mental health injury. Some of these reports include recommendations 
made in the textbook, Handbook of Children and Screens, as well as the 
``Social Media and Youth Mental Health'' Report by the U.S. Surgeon 
General in 2023; ``Social Media and Adolescent Health'' by the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in 2024; ``Health 
Advisory on Social Media Use in Adolescence'' by the American 
Psychological Association in 202358; and a report by the Jed Foundation 
in 2024.
 The American Academy of Pediatrics also recognizes problematic use 
and social media addiction and advises parents that ``[i]t's also 
important to recognize that it's not something wrong with the teen 
using the platform causing them to feel this way; many interactive 
technologies are specifically designed to capture and hold a user's 
interest. It can be hard for children and teens to overcome those 
design features.'' The National Eating Disorders Association also 
recognizes that ``research is increasingly clear that media does indeed 
contribute and that exposure to and pressure exerted by media increase 
body dissatisfaction and disordered eating.'' Taken together, these 
consensus statements leave little doubt that leading professional 
medical and psychological organizations recognize that social media and 
its problematic and addictive usage is harming children and teenagers 
today.
G. Validated Social Media Addiction Scales
 A variety of screening instruments for what has been called 
``Social Network Use Disorder'' have been developed. A systematic 
review of the scales revealed that two of them have the best validation 
data to support them: the Social Media Disorder Scale (SMDS) and the 
Bergen Social Media Addiction Scale Short Form (BSMAS-SF). Both measure 
features of substance abuse disorder including: salience, tolerance, 
preoccupation, impaired role performance, loss of control, and 
withdrawal symptoms. These features are consistent with those 
considered by the DSM-5.
 Validation of scales includes collecting normative data from a 
large and diverse sample of people and then developing a clinical 
cutoff. One might rightly ask if this usage pattern constitutes 
pathology or simply enthusiastic usage. To test this, researchers 
assess ``convergent validity.'' Specifically, how does the measured 
construct correlate with other outcomes we would expect it to predict. 
For example, we would predict that people with problematic social media 
usage would have increased risks of other mental health disorders (as 
is the case with other addictions). To that end, a recent metanalysis 
of 18 studies that assessed ``problematic social media usage'' with 
anxiety and depressive symptoms found a correlation of .348 
(``medium'') and .273 (almost ``medium'') respectively.
H. The Mechanism of Addiction
 Addiction (both behavioral and substance-based) is grounded in the 
brain's dopamine reward system. Exposure to a stimulus is processed in 
the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) of the mid-brain that releases 
dopamine. When that stimulus is ``favorable,'' the VTA signals the 
nucleus accumbens (the pleasure center of the brain) which in turn 
signals the Pre-Frontal Cortex (the executive center of the brain as 
discussed before) effectively saying ``I liked that'' so ``do it 
again'' or ``get more of it.''

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 This is a generic pathway; it is activated for example when parents 
praise children for behaviors (e.g., saying ``thank you'') thereby 
increasing the probability (hopefully) that they will act that way more 
often. In pathological circumstances, given prolonged exposure to 
intensely pleasurable stimuli, the brain's natural reward pathways can 
be altered, making it increasingly difficult to experience pleasure 
from other activities. At a neurobiological level then, behavioral and 
substance-based addictions have a final common pathway. Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated that social 
media usage (and Facebook in particular) activates the accumbens. 
Indeed, Meta documents acknowledge that Facebook ``does activate the 
brain's reward system.'' Moreover, a three-year longitudinal study of 
6th and 7th grade students found changes in functional activation of 
the brain based on reported habitual checking of social media sites at 
baseline. Specifically, habitual checkers' brains demonstrated 
differential activation of specific regions in anticipation of social 
cues compared to non-habitual checkers. This suggests that their brains 
may be being conditioned as a result of repeated activation (a feature 
of addiction).
 The causes of addiction are multifaceted, involving a combination 
of genetic, environmental, and psychological factors. Although not 
determinative, genetics may predispose individuals to addiction, while 
environmental factors such as peer pressure, stress, or trauma can 
trigger problematic substance use or behaviors. Mental health 
conditions like depression and anxiety are also linked to addiction, as 
individuals may turn to substances or behaviors as a form of self-
medication. Early exposure to addictive substances, particularly during 
childhood, increases the likelihood of addiction later in life.
I. Dangerous Features
 Social Media platforms embody numerous design features that promote 
addiction, problematic use, and attendant harms. This includes design 
features that exploit intermittent reward, social comparison metrics, 
and ``flow'' state. Each of these may discussed in turn, but they all 
work in tandem to keep users hooked and have their foundations in 
behavioral psychology, the ``father'' of which is BF Skinner.
 Skinner (1904-1990) was an American psychologist and the Edgar 
Pierce Professor of Psychology at Harvard University until 1974. He 
conducted foundational research related to how behaviors are reinforced 
through the ``Skinner'' box he invented. Briefly, rats were placed in a 
box that had a light, a loudspeaker, a response lever, a food dispenser 
and an electrified grid. The lights and the loudspeaker provided 
stimuli. These conditioned the rat to pay attention and press the lever 
when they were activated. Pressing the response lever would in turn 
dispense (or not dispense) food. The electrified grid could be used to 
``punish'' failure to press the response lever when a stimulus had been 
delivered. Skinner found that rewarding reaction to the stimulus, by 
dispensing food if the rat pushed the lever when the light flashed, 
made the rat more attentive to the light. Conversely, ``punishing'' the 
rat for failing to respond to the stimulus by delivering a low-level 
shock via the grid also made it more attentive. Neither of these 
results are especially surprising (at least not now) to us. But the 
most interesting of Skinner's findings were that intermittent 
unpredictable rewards were more effective at inducing the rat to stay 
focused on the light than predictable ones. In other words, the rat 
became more attentive to a stimulus if not every reaction yielded a 
reward.
 This unexpected finding was long ago incorporated into such things 
as slot machines, where gamblers cannot predict which pull will result 
in payouts, and as they play, they are constantly hearing others around 
them win, reminding them that their next pull might be a jackpot. All 
three of these addictive design features are ``built in'' to social 
media sites and are reflected in the ``hook model'' studied by Meta's 
researchers:

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 This figure, which is taken from a book by Nir Eyal titled Hooked: 
How to Build Habit Forming Products, also appears in Snap's documents. 
The figure is annotated as follows:

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J. Likes, Comments, and Other Metrics
 Scientists have found that receiving ``likes'' on social media 
platforms are very similar to the ``rewards'' that researchers have 
associated with addiction research for decades. Likes can include the 
``like'' button on Facebook and YouTube but can also include ``hearts'' 
on Instagram and TikTok. Similar metrics include the number of shares 
on a post, number of comments, and number of followers or friends for a 
user. While seemingly innocuous, users' quest for these publicly 
visible ``rewards'' has been linked to a number of secondary harms such 
as reduced sleep efficiency and duration due to ``routine check[ing]'' 
behaviors during the night. They have also been associated with 
reinforcing addictive behaviors in order to encourage users to spend 
more time on these platforms. They have even been linked to increased 
feelings of depression, anxiety, and negative social comparison since 
receiving ``fewer likes'' is viewed as a form of ``negative peer 
feedback.''
 Comments are similar to likes in that they provide users with 
``quantifiable (and qualitative) feedback'' about their experiences on 
the platform. For teens, this means that they are able to quantify the 
``success'' of their posts with many teens reporting that they post 
``self oriented images on social media with the goal of obtaining likes 
and other forms of feedback such as comments.'' Other studies have 
found that comments are often seen as a mechanism for ``gaining 
[social] status'' and reflect a degree of ``digital social approval.'' 
As a result, other studies have linked comments to negative social 
comparison since ``not receiving enough likes on one's pictures can 
negatively affect appearance esteem and prompt delet[ion] of a post.''
K. Algorithmic Recommendations
 At the heart of every social media platform's engagement strategy 
is their proprietary recommendation algorithms. These algorithms are 
optimized to maximize time on the platform rather than healthy 
interactions with a person's social network. They accomplish this in a 
variety of ways. One way they drive time spent on social media is by 
inferring the interests of the user (which may or may not be expressed 
by the user in any direct way) and feeding them an aggregation of posts 
that, while most likely to keep them engaged, may lead the user down 
problematic rabbit holes.
 Regarding TikTok, these problematic rabbit holes were also known as 
``negative filter bubbles.'' A 2021 TikTok presentation entitled 
``Negative Filter Bubble Project Sharing'' noted that ``Algorithms 
lead[] people into a feed filled with continuous similar negative 
videos that are hard to escape.'' What's more, another internal 
document notes that ``minor creators [fall] into higher density of 
negative comment filter bubbles.'' To its credit, TikTok did set as a 
2023 safety goal to ``be more transparent to the public and trusted by 
teen users and parents,'' in addition to building ``industrial leading 
teens safety and well-being features.'' As discussed below, these 
aspirations of transparency and improved safety features that were 
noted approximately six years after TikTok launched in the United 
States were too little and too late for many children and teens.
 Another way recommendation algorithms drive time spent on social 
media is by utilizing the intermittent variable reward mechanism that 
Skinner discovered (e.g., likes, notifications, comments that appear 
unpredictably), which contribute to addiction to the platforms 
themselves. The addictive power of an engagement-optimized algorithm is 
recognized within the medical and academic literature. In the Handbook 
of Children and Screens, under the chapter regarding ``Problematic 
Internet Use,'' the authors' consensus was that ``Attention focused 
designs intended to generate, or possibly exploit, potentially 
addictive features (e.g., `likes') and conditioned responses (e.g., 
notifications) alongside powerful algorithm-based technologies may lead 
youth to stay online longer than either intended or recommended.''
L. Auto-Play
 Academics recognize that autoplay is a feature that is designed to 
prolong engagement at the cost of displacing important developmental 
opportunities for young children and is even associated with greater 
child behavioral difficulties. It has also been linked to difficulties 
controlling device use more broadly. The latter phenomenon has even 
been observed in social media companies' own research. For example, 
Meta's researchers learned that clinicians regarded autoplay as not 
having any ``beneficial'' role while ``detract[ing] from patients' 
ability to control amount of time spent'' using their platforms.''
M. Infinite Scroll
 Like autoplay, the Infinite or Endless Scroll feature has also been 
linked to prolonging engagement at the cost of displacing children's 
developmental opportunities. This feature is also linked to behaviors 
that create a user-sided ``time distortion'' that results in users 
spending more time on social media platforms than they originally 
intended. Some studies cited (and commissioned) by the social media 
companies have found that these effects are mitigated by ``active'' use 
of their platforms--e.g., generating content or posting content. 
However, this hypothesis has not been widely accepted, particularly 
since there is evidence that children are more likely to ``watch, play, 
or scroll through content created by others than they are to use their 
devices to produce their own content.''
N. Notifications
 Meta studied notifications and the ability for this feature to 
induce habitual or addictive behaviors. For example, one internal 
document supports the basic addiction principle that ``experiencing a 
reward (or reinforcement) can increase learning and motivation. This 
contributes to repeated, potentially habitual behaviors.'' The document 
included the following figure:

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 It is not surprising then, that among the many metrics Meta tracks, 
the ``success rate'' of their notifications, defined as increasing 
daily usage, is a key one. Darius Kilstein, a Director in Data Science 
at Instagram, reports:

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 This is to say that Meta is monitoring (and presumably modulating) 
the intermittent reward mechanism to ensure that engagement is 
maximized.
O. Beauty Filters
 Despite being a relatively new social media feature, Augmented 
Reality (``AR'') filters--commonly referred to as ``Beauty Filters''--
have been thoroughly studied due to the outsized negative impact they 
could have on users by exacerbating a socio-psychological phenomenon 
known as ``social comparison.'' Prior to the advent of these Beauty 
Filters, researchers had already identified that social media may 
exacerbate social comparison and lead to increased body dissatisfaction 
and/or disordered eating. However, with the introduction of Beauty 
Filters--many developed by social media companies--users are now 
exposed to ``manipulated'' photos that depict unrealistic (and in some 
cases impossible) body image Standards.
P. Internal Company Documents Show They Knew What They Were Doing
 Notably, many of the features recognized in the literature as 
addictive and/or harmful were likewise identified in research conducted 
by Meta and presented in 2021. A Mixed Methods Clinicians study 
identified product features and pathways impacting mental health, 
including the following:

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 Of these features, several were identified as ``primarily 
negative,'' including Video/Photo filters, location sharing, 
automatically playing videos, and pop-up notifications.
 Internally, social media companies' documents recognize that they 
could increase engagement by changing the design of the social media. 
As early as 2016, Meta (then Facebook) was exploring ways to keep teens 
on its site and posting content:

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 As Max Eulenstein, Vice President of Products, said in a Meta e-
mail on January 26, 2021, ``No one wakes up thinking they want to 
maximize the number of times they open Instagram that day. But that's 
exactly what our product teams are trying to do.'' One mechanism that 
appears to be especially effective at engaging teens (and adults) is 
the use of ``reels'' or short videos that repeat. Meta adopted reels 
from TikTok after seeing how effective they were at promoting usage. 
Below are Instagram's metrics on the viewing of such reels by teens:

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 The data demonstrated that active daily U.S. teen Instagram users 
viewed on average almost 105 reels per day on the platform for a total 
of 22.5 minutes per day or an average of 20 seconds per reel per day. 
Briefly watching a short snippet algorithmically curated to one's 
interest is gratifying via the dopamine reward pathway. Further, their 
internal research identified the following ``Triggers for Problematic 
Use on Facebook'' that were later included as part of a ``Problematic 
Use Journey Map'' in 2020:

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 Each ``opportunity'' for a reward represents a potential algorithm 
tweak, and many--if not all--of these were eventually incorporated in 
some form into the platform. For example, a Facebook presentation 
contained following:

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 Meta's more recent documents depict a Venn diagram portraying one 
way to conceptualize the usage experience from a design perspective:

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 ``Dark Pattern'' is a user experience term referring to 
interactions that are deceptive, or that trick you into doing something 
you didn't want to do. Again, this diagram acknowledges that Meta uses 
``addictive'' design features and that some of them are set to 
``default.'' Meta documents from Project ``Plato,'' intended to study 
and mitigate ``dark patterns,'' state that ``[s]ome UX [user 
experience] patterns rob users of their agency.'' Included among them 
are:

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 Meta's researchers also knew that being too critical of these 
design choices could lead to criticism from internal stakeholders. For 
example, Jennifer Guadagno noted that her wellbeing team's efforts to 
study Facebook addiction as part of Project Plato could ``get heavy 
pushback internally'' and added that she was not ``sure if it'll even 
be allowed to happen'' because ``if we now know all these things that 
are potentially bad and then we don't do anything to fix them'' it 
could lead to problems for the company externally. Arturo Bejar 
testified, in deposition at in open court, that Meta did not do enough 
to warn parents or curtail problematic use of their products and that 
the word addictive is `radioactive.' ''

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 Despite learning of these problems as early as 2018, Meta had not 
made meaningful changes to the platform nearly two years later. A Meta 
presentation from 2020 arrived at nearly identical conclusions as the 
Project Plato researchers, including the connection between design 
features and problematic usage. One slide from that 2020 presentation 
stated that research participants reported ``10+ triggers contributing 
to [problematic use] habits'' including:

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 Meta was not the only social media company to reach these 
conclusions about its platform features. For example, YouTube describes 
``finding a video on YouTube search'' as a ``predictable reward'' 
compared to ``unpredictable rewards'' such as ``finding a new favorite 
song while in a mix,'' which the company described as 
``disproportionately [more] delightful compared to predictable rewards 
because they're unexpected or exceed expectations.'' YouTube's 
researchers explaining the reason for this dichotomous design have 
stated:

 When thinking about habit building around YouTube, it is 
 important that we reliably fulfill their goal pursuits 
 (reliable reward) while also providing surprising nuggets of 
 reward (variable reward). Ultimately, you're giving people more 
 reasons to come back until they can't even remember why they 
 did. When is the last time you had a goal in mind when you went 
 to Facebook?''

 Internal documents also reveal that Instagram is tracking usage/
engagement by teen users. An e-mail from Darius Kilstein, on February 
5, 2022, states that Meta ``looked into the long-term decline of feed 
imp[ressions] for Teens,'' discovered that ``teens aren't relying on 
Feed for interest consumption as much as they used to,'' and 
hypothesized that this shift might explain ``why teens now consume 
fewer Reels than adults.''

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 The reported ``headwind'' for the ``cohort'' points to Instagram's 
business need to redesign features to better engage younger children 
and keep up with their competitors (particularly TikTok), as Kilstein 
explained later in the same e-mail.
 The ``infinite feed'' invented at Facebook was exported and adapted 
to Instagram. In her deposition, Dr. Alison Lee stated:

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 The quote begins with the scenario whereby someone has been 
``scrolling'' all day (itself an implicit acknowledgement of overuse) 
and exhausts their ``connected'' feeds at which point a new, end of 
feed algorithm is triggered.
 Aza Raskin is widely considered to have invented the infinite 
scroll. This feature allows a user to scroll indefinitely through their 
feed, receiving endless posts and intermittent variable rewards. Raskin 
testified that infinite scroll was like ``digital cocaine'' for the 
user. One of the technology leads for Instant Articles on Android at 
Facebook reported ``we only care about things like time spent, open 
links etc. That's what we optimized for. That's what we defined as 
success and failure.''
 In 2022, Meta launched Project MYST, a prospective, longitudinal 
study to follow 4000 teens (13-17 years of age) using the highly 
respected National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of 
Chicago for survey data and Meta logs of activity on their platform. 
Using validated measures for a variety of outcomes and actual usage 
patterns on their platforms, MYST appeared by all accounts to be a 
robust, well-designed longitudinal study--the kind that only industry 
could conduct based on their access to actual social media use data. 
Among other things, MYST intended to test the following negative 
hypotheses:

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 While the initial plan for the study contemplated its results being 
released publicly, there has been no evidence that Meta ever publicly 
acknowledged that the study was conducted or released any results prior 
to it being produced in the course of litigation and revealed to the 
public as part of the K.G.M. civil trial in Los Angeles just this past 
month. Indeed, as the study moved forward, Meta employees seemed to 
become explicitly fearful of it being publicly released. Leaders 
directed researchers to refer to the study only by its full name, 
because they would ``really prefer not to have a cute acronym (MYST). 
That makes things sound more interesting when/if it leaks. Can we 
please keep our names as boring and uninteresting as possible.''
 Perhaps more illustrative is the tension that is recognized in 
Meta's internal documents discussing MYST, which reflect that ``there 
is a fundamental tension between doing rigorous research to identify 
whether there are potential opportunities for change/intervention and 
advancing external/narrative goals.'' This tension with external goals 
is reflected in Meta's many decisions to not share publicly what their 
research or outside experts conveyed internally. External goals 
included the goal to ``[a]dvance the credibility of research that finds 
small or null correlations between social media well-being and/or well-
being relative to other factors,'' and to ``deflate the conversations 
about research claiming causal connections between social media and 
mental health and well-being.'' Perhaps most critically, Meta's stated 
external goal was to ``[m]ake the issue bigger than social media. 
Research should be designed in a way that provides a holistic 
understanding of the relationship between youth well-being and 
technology and other factors (e.g., cultural and environmental factors 
that lead people to use technology and their use of technology, rather 
than focusing on Meta-specific product offerings.'' Thus, the impetus 
for their research appears to be advocacy or public relations rather 
than scientific discovery or public safety.
 Unfortunately for Meta, Project MYST revealed two key findings. 
First, the study found that children who had adverse events in their 
lives were more vulnerable to ``potential problematic use'' (i.e., a 
gentle euphemism for social media addiction). Second, researchers found 
that parental supervision made no difference whatsoever to the 
addictive impact of Meta's social media platforms. The study found 
there was no relationship between a parent setting time limits or 
useful safety tools and whether their child became addicted. It is 
little surprise, then, that Meta buried the data and prohibited the 
study's results from ever seeing the light of day--until litigation in 
California State by private plaintiffs thrust the evidence into open 
court.
 YouTube documents also provided evidence of problematic usage by 
virtue of design. In 2015, YouTube launched Autoplay on desktop 
(followed by a launch in 2016 to app), which automatically and 
continuously played the next video--without any need for user action. 
Autoplay set to on be default because it generates more watch time. 
Autoplay watch time doubles at night. As one YouTube employee 
explained, ``This was the single most impactful launch in YouTube 
history, with +8 percent desktop watch time, +4 percent overall watch 
time increase.''
 In YouTube's own documents, making the platform ``addictive'' was a 
core design feature. This was consistent with the aspiration of the 
same presentation of ``Building the world's most powerful and 
delightful video consumption experience.'' YouTube internally 
acknowledged the potential negative effects of digital videos in a 2018 
presentation entitled ``Literature Review: Effects of watching digital 
videos and viewer well-being,'' which called out problematic Internet 
use in particular:

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 The slide calls out problematic Internet use and states that it 
overlaps with ``addiction'' consistent with my belief that the entire 
continuum to the right of casual use (Figure 20) can be viewed as 
problematic. Furthermore, it highlights how ``autoplay,'' a key feature 
of YouTube, drives the ``just one more video effect.'' Slide 10 
summarizes data from an internal survey of ``265 respondents'' that 
calls out the ``stickiness'' of the app and states that its 
interactivity and notifications ``causes users to feel that they must 
be aware of what is happening on the platform'' which ``keeps users on 
the platform longer.''
 A 2018 YouTube presentation exploring the ``negative effects that 
video watching has on user's wellbeing'' included an express reference 
to addiction:

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 TikTok's engagement algorithm, meanwhile, is frequently viewed as 
the most effective in the industry: ``more personalized,'' ``more 
accurate,'' and ``more diversified.'' The company emphasizes its 
effectiveness in its marketing presentations and touts that more than 
53 percent of suggested videos are ``viewed.''
 An internal memo citing the company's ``vulnerabilities'' reports: 
``In a user survey of 2,300 users in February of 2020, when respondents 
were asked to give a score of 5 to indicate strength of agreement with 
the statement `I spend too much time on TikTok,' the average response 
was a 4.0.'' It goes on to say, ``some elements of persuasive design 
may be unique to TikTok; for instance, the fact that when you click the 
back button on your phone to leave the For You Feed/all, you get a 
prompt saying, `Tap again to exit,' which can be seen as increasing 
friction for users seeking to leave the app.'' And still later 
concedes, ``TikTok is particularly popular with younger users, who are 
seen as more vulnerable to online harms and the negative impacts of 
compulsive use.''
 In a ``2021 TikTok for Good Business Plan and Vision'' document, 
the following is stated:

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 Notably, the plan acknowledges that ``addiction to technology is a 
ubiquitous problem.'' At the same time, comment [82] notes that 
``addiction'' could be ``considered a very positive metric in our 
field.'' In other words, for all of its public posturing seeking to 
discredit or minimize the existence of compulsive or addictive use of 
screens, TikTok's internal documents acknowledge its existence and even 
allude to its ``value'' to the industry.
 TikTok's algorithms are widely considered the ``best in the 
industry'' because of its effectiveness at driving engagement. In 
pursuit of that end, TikTok made leaving the app more difficult than 
others. And for those times when people did succeed in leaving, TikTok 
refined its ``push'' approach to, among other things, get people back 
onto the company's platform. TikTok's ``push methodology,'' like every 
change they make to their platform, was subjected to A/B testing where 
rapid cycle experiments were performed comparing one version to another 
with users randomized to experience one or the other (i.e., no 
confounding) and with an eye to ensuring that core metrics were not 
adversely affected.
 Finally, Snap--the makers of Snapchat--innovated on the FOMO 
[``fear of missing out''] concept of maintaining ``streaks'' by 
developing the Snap Streaks feature, which it specifically designed to 
gamify its platform and drive usage and engagement. Streaks are built 
and maintained by two people ``snapping'' back and forth on consecutive 
days. The quality or content of the snap is irrelevant--it's all about 
ping-ponging back and forth consistently. Streaks were extraordinarily 
effective. Less than a year after they were launched, 22 percent of 
users had at least one streak, and the average highest streak value was 
76.243. Snap Streaks were also particularly popular with younger users, 
as 47 percent of Streak users were under the age of 17.244. Of course, 
the true number was likely even higher, given how easy Snap--and every 
social media platform--has made it for children to lie about their age.
 Snap Streaks' importance to users was also tied to Snap Scores. 
While streak counts are private to the participants, every user of Snap 
has a numerical Snap Score displayed on their profile. The way that 
this score is generated is opaque, but broadly speaking it reflects how 
much they engage with the app and how much engagement they receive from 
others, including Streaks. For users, high Snap Scores are a way to 
``show off their popularity.''
 Snap's research found that ``users mainly used Streaks as a social 
status measure (to increase Snap Scores, have as many Streaks as 
possible) rather than a communication tool.'' This is consistent with 
Snap's conclusion that once users knew how to increase their score, it 
``may make user care about (if not become addictive to) their [] 
score.'' However, Snap saw this as a positive feature of Snap Scores 
because it would ``encourage [users] to produce and consume more 
snaps.''
 But at the same time that Snap was chasing the engagement increases 
offered by streaks, worries about the addictive effect of Streaks on 
children were growing. For example, focus groups results forwarded by 
the Senior Director of Corporate Communications and Public Affair to 
the Vice President of Global Public Policy found the following:

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 Another employee put it even more bluntly: ``we seem to have tapped 
into some mass psychosis where 17 million people must keep the streaks 
going.''
 A 2017 study of Snap ``Power Users,'' commissioned by Snap to 
better understand features that drove usage, found that ``[f]or some, 
streaks have become a ``compulsive behavior'' and that they feel they 
are ``in too deep.''

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 Similarly, an internal presentation on streaks tried to spin them 
as a positive tool for building friendships but nonetheless was forced 
to observe that Streaks can be ``really stressful'' and ``make[] it 
impossible to unplug for even a day.'' To better assess the harms of 
streaks, in 2018 Snap commissioned a survey of 790 users aged 13-24 
(its core demographic):

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 In Snap's telling, this study showed that that only a minimal 
number of users found streaks stressful. If these charts seem familiar, 
it is because Snap presented this same conclusion to the United States 
Senate, writing that the study showed ``the majority of our community 
did not indicate Streaks were a significant source of stress--but six 
percent did.''
 However, both the methodology and Snap's spin on the results were 
deeply flawed. Given Snap's millions of users, 6 percent still 
represents hundreds of thousands if not millions of users. And to get 
to 6 percent, Snap disregarded the ``moderate'' stress responses 
entirely. Snap also, without justification, combined those who found 
streaks a little stressful with those who found they caused no stress 
at all. A more accurate assessment of stress levels might be that 21 
percent of users experience at least moderate stress because of snaps. 
A more holistic statement of the survey's results would be that 54 
percent of streak users found streaks at least a little stressful. The 
other problem with sampling ``users'' to assess experiential stress is 
what in epidemiological terms is called the ``survivor effect.''
 Many people who found streaks intolerably stressful would have left 
the platform or opted not to participate in a study about how stressful 
they are. In other words, this approach leads to a biased sample. Much 
like asking people still in a baseball stadium when the game has gone 
into 13 innings if games take too long will underestimate the true 
proportion of fans who think they do, asking regular users of an app 
how stressful it is underestimates the unease it induces. The study 
also depended on self-reporting from young people. But as Jennifer 
Stout, Snap's Global Vice President for Public Policy, pointed out, 
``Kids like a lot of dumb things and parents are always trying to 
regulate their activities for their own safety!''
 Snap's spin on the 2018 study is further undermined by the fact 
that Snap employees, including CEO Evan Spiegel, continued to express 
concern that streaks were addictive and harmful for users:

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 A 2023 document containing suggested answers for an employee Q&A 
with Speigel is clear that Streaks ``can cause confusion and/or 
anxiety. We know this from the millions of support tickets we get every 
week from people asking us to restore a streak they accidentally 
lost.'' Users themselves make clear that they found streaks addictive. 
As the Q&A answer explained, users' frantic commitment to streaks could 
be tracked in part by tickets seeking to restore lost streaks. But the 
answer actually understated how desperate users were to have their 
streaks restored.
 By 2021, Snap was receiving an average of 400,000 streak restore 
requests each day, making up 95 percent of the total volume of customer 
service contacts. In some cases, individual users reach out directly to 
Mr. Spiegel to express the harms of streaks. Snap also explicitly 
embraced the idea that social rewards were key to keeping users coming 
back for more, conducting research that ``confirmed the hypothesis that 
Posters are motivated to post because audience feedback is their ROI 
reward.''

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 Indeed, Snap's research ``confirmed the causal relationship between 
receiving feedback (views and replies) and the poster propensity to 
post again.'' Following these conclusions, Snap's product team proposed 
tweaking ``Story reactions'' and replies to generate more engagement 
and posting.
 And just as feedback made users feel good, Snap's user research 
team found that not getting feedback was ``discouraging.'' Snap 
researchers found that 44 percent of Snapchat Story posters didn't 
receive any feedback on a given day leaving them more anxious and worse 
off than not having posted at all. Senior Snap employees were clear-
eyed about the consequences of manipulating users' basic neurobiology 
and socioemotional responses. Responding to suggestions for ways to 
increase feedback rewards on Snapchat, Mr. Spiegel chimed in to say:

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 Similarly, when reviewing proposed changes to the way that streaks 
operate, Stephen Collins, a Director of Public Policy, expressed a 
similar sentiment, observing that ``[r]ewards are known to drive 
compulsive/addictive behavior among some vulnerable groups.'' Of 
course, Collins's solution to this was not to reduce the role that 
rewards-maximizing play in Snap's design but just avoid using the word.
 Snap also used other forms of notifications to drive engagement. In 
2023, Snap decided to implement an ``always on badge'' to get more 
users to try Spotlight. This badge was a red dot that was always 
present on the spotlight icon, visually drawing users to it. It would 
only go away once a visitor clicked on Spotlight and would reactivate 
every 60 minutes, regardless of whether there was any new content or 
other change to actually notify a user of. This one design change 
raised the daily active use of Spotlight from 53 million to 71 million, 
the single biggest increase in daily active use ever seen in an A/B 
test. Snap was not only made aware of the risks of these features, but 
they were also told to remove them by outside social media experts 
(SME's) they consulted.
 In sum, nearly every social media company adapts addictive and 
harmful design elements from their competitors. Separate and apart from 
the third-party content underpinning the platforms, these design 
elements insidiously work to keep users--typically children and 
adolescents--glued to the screens for longer and longer periods of 
time. Yet social media companies routinely turn to Section 230 to 
shield themselves from liability for these design choices.
Q. SMVLC Clients Impacted by Section 230
 Courts' expansive interpretation of Section 230 beyond its 
statutory language or legislative intent has turned the Internet into a 
lawless no man's land. The best way to illustrate the real-life 
consequences of the expansive interpretation is to see how it impacts 
real people. I am therefore going to discuss 10 of the cases I have 
prosecuted where Section 230 has been invoked by social media 
defendants to claim absolute immunity from victims' claims and seek 
dismissal as a matter of law.
a. A.S. v. Meta

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 A.S. was born on June 22, 2002, and grew up in Yaphank, New York. 
A.S. was a confident and happy child, who loved reading, writing, and 
helping people and animals. She dreamed about becoming a veterinarian. 
She was active in singing competitions and theater, enjoyed being in 
the spotlight, and looked for opportunities to shine.
 A.S. got her first internet-enabled tablet device for Christmas in 
2012, when she was 10 years old. She did not have access to social 
media, however, as her parents regularly checked her device and took 
other steps to make sure that she was not accessing inappropriate 
content. They also had a house rule that all devices were to be kept in 
the hallway at night. A.S. did not initially mind these restrictions 
because she used her tablet primarily to play Webkinz and make Webkinz 
videos. Webkinz are stuffed animals that come with a code you can use 
to play Webkinz games electronically. But in 2013, everything changed.
 Meta purchased Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion dollars and, by the 
time A.S. started fifth grade, the Instagram social media product was 
rapidly increasing in popularity and rapidly evolving in terms of its 
design and product features. Meta made some of the most significant, 
and harmful, changes to its Instagram product from 2012 to 2016, 
including targeted advertising features, Explore, algorithmic changes 
promoting engagement over integrity, Reels, Stories, Live, the ``like'' 
button, view counters, easier access to multiple accounts, and direct 
messaging, to name a few. A.S. was exposed to and harmed by those 
changes without her parents' knowledge or consent.
 As A.S. approached fifth grade, it seemed like all her friends had 
Instagram accounts. She started getting teased for not having one, and 
her friends told her that she needed to open an account and could open 
one even if her parents said no. Instagram designed its product to 
provide access to as many people as possible, without regard to age or 
safety, and this was well known among children her age.
 It was also understood that Instagram wouldn't close your account 
for being under 13; you just had to say you were 13 when opening an 
account and could then put your real age in your bio. In fact, this is 
something many kids do even to this day. It was also understood that 
Instagram did not object to kids using more than one account, which 
made it easier to hide more personal content and the existence of 
secondary accounts from parents and family--which accounts Instagram 
and its young users refer to as FINSTAs (short for ``fake Instagram'').
 In 2013, A.S. was 11 years old and in the fifth grade. She opened 
her first Instagram account, without her parents' knowledge or consent. 
She could not access the account often since her parents monitored her 
tablet and did not allow social media. Nonetheless, on November 6, 
2013, she wrote in her private journal,
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 Instagram had every reason to know that A.S. was under the age of 
13. A.S.'s first bio (which was often publicly viewable) read ``11 
years young'' and when A.S. turned 12, she changed it to ``12 years 
young.'' She also regularly published her real age including, for 
example, in comments she left on other users' posts and/or pages:

 ``Hello, I'm 12 years old and love webkinz . . .''

 ``I'm 12 and love them . . .''

 ``I'm almost 13''

 A.S.'s secret use of and developing addiction to Instagram 
coincided with a steady, but severe, decline in her mental health. As 
A.S. became more dependent on Meta's addictive-design social media 
product, she began to resent her parents for not allowing her to have 
an Instagram account and her inability to access that account at home. 
She also began engaging in harmful social comparisons, of the types 
identified by Meta in its studies. In November of 2013, she was 
starting to show signs of depression and her parents sought mental 
health treatment--they started her in counseling. They did not know 
that A.S. was using social media, and A.S. refused to continue seeing 
the counselor after a couple sessions.
 In May of 2014, Instagram provided A.S. with a solution to her 
access problem. Instagram featured user content advising A.S., and 
other children like A.S., on how to bypass parental controls. A.S. saw 
content from other users explaining how to obtain your parents' 
passcode as well as applications you would need to download to hide 
Instagram once you were able to get it onto your device. A.S. did just 
that. She used the information obtained from Instagram to get an 
application that enabled to her to make the Instagram application icon 
look like a calculator, which she then moved next to other utilities 
applications. A.S.'s parents continued with their periodic checks of 
her electronic devices but never realized that what appeared to be a 
calculator was really the Instagram social media product.
 As a result of Instagram's addictive design and A.S.'s addiction to 
the Instagram social media product, she lied to and tricked her 
parents. She felt guilty for her actions but also felt like Instagram 
was something she needed and that her parents were being unreasonable 
in denying her access.
 On May 23, 2014, A.S. opened her second Instagram account. She was 
still only 11 years old. Meta provided A.S. with access to this second 
account through a school-issued e-mail address, to which A.S. did not 
even have inbox access. That is, Meta has designed its product to not 
require identification or age verification and, also, Meta purposefully 
does not verify or check e-mail account authenticity, at least in part, 
so that it can claim plausible deniability as to the millions of young 
children using its application that are below the age of thirteen and/
or lack parental consent. In fact, when opening one of her later 
FINSTAs, A.S. got tired of creating fake accounts so she hit the 
keyboard randomly and used [email protected] as her account 
opening e-mail address, and Meta allowed her to open the account. Had 
Instagram not designed its product in this manner, A.S. would not have 
had access to multiple, secret accounts.
 Less than a month later, on June 9, 2014, A.S.'s parents caught her 
with her tablet in her bedroom. A.S. denied that she was doing anything 
wrong, and wrote about it in her journal,

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 At all times relevant, Meta knew that A.S. was under 13 and that 
she was opening multiple accounts under different usernames yet failed 
to restrict her access or notify A.S.'s parents, Kathleen and Jeffrey, 
of their daughter's account status.
 Meta also knew or should have known that A.S. began accessing her 
multiple Instagram accounts in the middle of the night and for several 
hours at time, which addictive and unhealthy behavior foreseeably 
compounded the harms to A.S. and her family and caused additional 
harms. Once again, Instagram did not notify A.S.'s parents or take any 
other step to restrict her access to its social media product. On the 
contrary, Instagram is aware of FINSTAs and considers the opening of 
multiple accounts by its teen users as a primary source of engagement 
and growth.
 For every minute A.S. spent on Instagram in the middle of the 
night, Meta earned more money. In fact, Meta is fully aware as to the 
times of day when users are on Instagram, how long they are on 
Instagram, and even that middle of the night usage is a significant 
indicator of addiction (which Meta prefers to call ``problematic 
use''). Meta simply doesn't care enough to do anything about it, and 
Meta's leadership has taken the position internally that engagement and 
retention are the top priorities, with user safety coming in distant 
third.
 Through her use of Instagram, A.S. also received explicit sexual 
communications and images from adult users and was messaged and 
solicited for sexual exploitive content and acts on numerous occasions 
by adult users of Instagram. These adult users are encouraged to use 
Instagram to sexually solicit and abuse minors due to Meta's refusal to 
verify identity and age for new users or implement feasible safeguards 
to protect minor users from receiving inappropriate sexual content.
 At all times relevant, Meta knew that some of its Instagram users 
would become addicted to Instagram (or, in Meta's words, would engage 
in ``problematic use''). Meta also knew that children and teenagers 
would be particularly susceptible, and Meta knew or should have known 
what an addiction like this would do those children and teenagers and 
their families. To name only a few examples, A.S. spent increasing 
amounts of time consuming the unhealthy content and product features 
Instagram served up to her. This meant waiting up and sneaking her 
device from the hallway after her parents went to sleep. It meant lying 
about what she was doing on her devices. It meant accessing Instagram 
even where her parents were in the same room, by pretending that she 
was playing Webkinz or similar, age-appropriate games--which required 
her to always be on high-alert to not get caught. The harm caused by 
this Meta-engineered addiction was made worse by the fact that A.S. was 
only 11 years old when she was first exposed to Meta's inherently 
harmful and addictive product.
 Once again, however, Meta didn't care. For years, Meta has been 
conducting studies meant to help increase usage and dependency by 
children under 13, like A.S.
 As a result of the social media addiction Meta fostered and 
encouraged, A.S. spent increasing and unhealthy amounts of time on 
social media, became sleep deprived, became anxious, and felt guilty 
about what she was doing to her family. Her mental health and 
relationship with her parents suffered greatly as a result.
 For example, any attempt by her parents to restrict device usage 
was met with extreme anger, including one time when A.S. punched a hole 
in the wall. And what had always been a close relationship with her 
mother rapidly evolved into one where A.S. began to see her mother as 
overprotective, irrational, and wrong.
 Instagram's addictive design and product features led to A.S. 
feeling like it was her and her devices against her parents, which only 
worsened her depression and anxiety.
 But also, and as Meta knows, the amount of time a user spends on 
Meta's social media products can correlate to worsening depression and 
other harms.
 In December 2013, A.S. got her first cell phone, but her parents 
got her a slide phone and not a smartphone. She had a lead part in the 
school play, which required her to stay late after school, so her 
parents wanted to make sure she could contact them if needed. Then in 
December 2014, A.S. begged her parents for a smartphone because her 
friends had one. They were able to get one cheap or for free through 
their phone carrier, so they agreed. But they took steps to install 
parental controls and did not allow her to take the phone in her room 
at night. Kathleen and Jeffrey also put parental controls on their home 
computer, again to make sure that A.S. was only using age-appropriate 
applications and features. A.S. used what she learned on Instagram to 
bypass those protections too and obtained even more access to Instagram 
because now she could use Instagram all day while at school on her cell 
phone.
 In April of 2015--just four months after getting her first smart 
phone--12-year-old A.S. drew an image of herself next to her phone with 
the words ``stupid ugly fat'' on its screen. She had a similar image on 
her computer, and these same types of words reflected in her thoughts,

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 A.S.' social media use coincided with a steady, but severe, decline 
in her mental health. She was addicted to Meta's product and spent 
increasing amounts of time on social media, specifically, perusing 
content recommended and/or made available to her by Meta, which 
increasingly included underweight models, unhealthy eating, and eating 
disorder content.
 From 2012 through 2015, Meta developed and implemented technologies 
and features designed to increase engagement (and its own profits), but 
which were harmful to users, including A.S. This included but is not 
limited to things like new advertising features, which allowed 
advertisers to target A.S. based on her age, location, gender, and 
other characteristics. Meta failed to exercise reasonable care to 
ensure that the advertisements were safe. Meta profited from its 
advertising practices and product features, while A.S. was exposed to 
and harmed by harmful advertising content. For example,

 a. A.S. was only 11 years old when she opened her first Instagram 
 account and, as such, was particularly vulnerable and the 
 impact of her developing addiction to Instagram was made worse 
 as a result.

 b. Meta designed its Instagram product to default minors to public 
 profiles, exposing 11-year-old A.S. to inappropriate sexual 
 content and serving her up for access to complete strangers who 
 Meta knew posed the risk of bullying and exploitation.

 c. Instagram's product design, including things like search and 
 explore and photo editing and filtering features, and 
 Instagram's emphasis on advertiser content, caused A.S. to 
 question her appearance and worth, and made her increasingly 
 anxious and depressed.

 d. Because Meta does not limit the time young users spend on 
 Instagram, A.S. began stealing her tablet out of the hallway at 
 night to access her Instagram account, resulting in severe 
 sleep deprivation, which only made things worse.

 In 2016, Meta added several additional product features that Meta 
knew or should have known would be harmful to minor users of its 
Instagram product. For example,

 a. In February 2016, Instagram started enabling users to easily 
 switch between multiple accounts. A.S. opened at least three 
 more FINSTAs (secret Instagram accounts) in 2016 alone and Meta 
 exposed A.S. to addictive design, harmful advertising, and 
 other, Meta-backed content through those accounts too.

 b. In February 2016, Instagram added view counters to videos, 
 increasing the social comparison harms already caused to A.S. 
 by Instagram.

 c. In March 2016, Meta switched its feed from chronological to 
 algorithm-driven ordering. A.S. no longer simply saw posts made 
 by ``friends'' in the order they were made but, instead, Meta 
 prioritized and escalated certain posts and content in A.S.'s 
 Instagram feed. More specifically, it promoted and prioritized 
 harmful content based on the determination that such content 
 was more likely to keep A.S.'s attention, thereby increasing 
 her use of its product and its resulting revenue. While Meta's 
 prior product design was pushing constant social comparison and 
 eating disorder content to A.S., the new design bombarded her 
 with it and A.S.'s exposure to super thin models and eating 
 disorder content increased exponentially.

 d. In August and November 2016, Instagram implemented Stories and 
 Live product features, respectively, which again increased 
 A.S.'s exposure to harmful content, as well as her social 
 pressure to participate and engage with Instagram.

 e. In December 2016, Instagram implemented the ability to mark 
 comments as ``liked,'' which was initially available only on 
 the mobile application, which is how A.S. accessed Instagram 
 most of the time by 2016--via her cell phone. The ``like'' 
 feature was particularly harmful to young users, as Meta 
 discovered, and this product feature resulted in increased 
 feelings of depression, anxiety, and low self-worth.

 The more A.S. accessed and used the Instagram social media product, 
the worse her mental and physical health became, which eventually 
included a life-threatening eating disorder and suicidal ideation.
 A.S. had always been slender, but after Instagram's algorithm and 
design started pushing extreme weight loss content and bulimia purging 
instructions, and recommending pages featuring excessively thin models, 
A.S. became obsessed with her weight. From the outset, A.S.' Explore 
page was filled with nothing but overly thin models and thigh gaps.
 A.S. started looking into diets and healthy eating, which led to 
more harmful content. Eventually, Instagram's algorithms led her to the 
terms ``ana'' and ``pro-ana'' in hashtags Meta permitted in its 
Instagram user Stories. Pro-ana refers to the promotion of behaviors 
related to the eating disorder anorexia nervosa. As made clear through 
internal Meta documents, Instagram's provision of that material to A.S. 
was both harmful and the result of a design defect.
 Meta amplified and pushed A.S. toward harmful content through 
various recommendation mechanisms built into its Instagram product. For 
example, Meta sent A.S. recommendations to eating disorder and self-
harm themed pages and groups. Meta also sent A.S. recommendations for 
``friends'' who were, in fact, adult Instagram users either suffering 
from these mental health issues themselves or using the Instagram 
product to find and exploit young girls; and, likewise, Meta 
recommended A.S. to these same types of adult users, who then sought to 
connect with her. As made clear through internal Meta documents, these 
product features are harmful to a significant percentage of Instagram 
users, particularly teens and young women.
 Meta directed A.S. to other Instagram users such as ``skinny88,'' 
``thinnfaerie'' and ``wannabe-s-kinny'' and sites such as ``#thinspo,'' 
``#skinny arms,'' ``#skinny girl'' and ``#skinny body.'' A.S. did not 
seek out these individuals or sites but was rather directed to this 
content not based on her preference, but rather through Instagram's 
algorithmic feature explicitly designed to select the content that 
would trigger the greatest dopamine reaction in her adolescent brain. 
Content promoting unhealthy body images and anorexic behavior triggered 
a greater dopamine response in A.S.' frontal cortex than content that 
was healthy and benign, so Instagram affirmatively directed her to 
content it knew was harmful to maximize the time she spent on its 
platform and the corresponding advertising revenues Meta received. 
These are just two examples of the thousands of dangerous and harmful 
connections, recommendations, and recommended content Meta pushed to 
A.S. via its Instagram product:

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 Meta also harmed A.S. through specific product features like direct 
messaging and group chat. For example, Instagram's Direct Message and 
group chat features allowed adult users to message A.S. directly, and 
to create eating disorder and self-harm themed group chats, exposing 
A.S. (a child) to several of these adult users at one time. As made 
clear through internal Meta documents, these product features are 
harmful to a significant number of underage users. They also are not 
necessary to Instagram's operation and are features Meta can restrict 
and/or disable--but Meta makes calculated and economic-based decisions 
to keep them in place because Meta knows that restricting or disabling 
them would negatively impact engagement and revenue.
 At some point A.S.'s mother also discovered that she had an 
Instagram account, which resulted in more fighting and separation 
between A.S. and her parents. Ultimately, it was clear that Instagram 
would provide A.S. with means to access its product no matter what 
A.S.'s parents did and, by then, A.S. was already over the age of 12. 
There was nothing A.S.'s parents could do, other than to keep an eye on 
her account usage and to remind her that she still had to abide by the 
house rules relating to electronic devices.
 However, A.S. only disclosed the existence of one account--the 
account she considered to be her ``personal'' account--and none of her 
secret accounts. Instagram's provision of multiple accounts ensured 
that A.S. was able to continue hiding her most harmful Instagram 
activities from her parents. This is precisely what she did, and A.S.'s 
continued addiction and sneaking around led to even more arguments and 
even greater anxiety and depression.
 At one point, Kathleen started trying to catch her daughter so she 
could find out what was wrong and why her daughter's mental health was 
not improving. On one occasion she thought she saw A.S. sign out of her 
one Instagram account and onto another. But again, A.S. vehemently 
denied it:

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 Meta was providing A.S. with constant, harmful access to multiple 
Instagram accounts, and had designed and was operating Instagram in a 
manner that ensured that there was nothing A.S.'s parents could do to 
stop it. But also, Meta was concealing from the public what it knew 
about addictive design and its own efforts to addict young children and 
what it was learning about the harm its specific product features were 
causing to children and teens--the precise types of harms that were now 
happening to A.S. because of Instagram.
 A.S.'s parents had no way to even determine Instagram's role in 
A.S.'s ongoing battle with severe depression, anxiety, self-harm, and 
eating disorders and as a direct result, could not obtain the 
information that they needed to enlist professional help.
 By early 2018, A.S.'s parents were aware of the self-harm and had 
just started to become aware of the eating disorder. They were getting 
medical treatment for A.S. and rearranging their schedules to make sure 
they could help her in any way she needed. To help A.S. further, they 
purchased her a therapy dog, Draco, and got him trained--at 
considerable expense--so that he would alert A.S. and her family if 
A.S. engaged in harmful behavior. Draco has helped A.S. in so many ways 
and saved her life on more than one occasion.
 Then, on May 8, 2018, A.S.'s school contacted Kathleen and told her 
to come to school immediately. Kathleen was on her way to work, turned 
around, and called her mother and asked her to meet her at the school. 
Kathleen and her mother met with someone in the school guidance 
department, who told them that another student had sent some photos of 
messages A.S. sent and Instagram posts expressing a desire to commit 
self-harm and suicidal ideation. The guidance department employee 
showed Kathleen some of the documents but not all, and she still did 
not have the usernames on A.S.'s secondary Instagram accounts. 
Moreover, at that time, Kathleen's only priority was to keep her 
daughter alive, so she contacted Stony Brook Children's Hospital for a 
referral and took A.S. to Mather Hospital.
 Mather did not have an available bed but was the only viable option 
for the treatment A.S. required. As such, A.S. and her parents, 
Kathleen and Jeffrey, stayed in the psychiatric wing of Mather for five 
days, while waiting for an available bed.
 As documented in hospital records, A.S. was hospitalized for a 
total of ten days in connection with ``Anorexia Nervosa and associated 
habits of purging, as well as major depressive disorder and anxiety. 
Since outpatient treatment has begun, A.S. has continued to struggle. 
Over the past weeks these struggles have intensified including suicidal 
ideation. She was seen today after school alerted parents of various 
social media posts, including suicidality.'' (Referral letter from 
Stony Brook Children's Hospital, dated May 8, 2018).
 The following are just some examples of information that had been 
provided to the school. To the best of Kathleen's recollection, these 
specific examples were not provided in 2018 but were obtained from the 
school years later (in 2022),

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 In May 2018, A.S.'s parents did not have access to A.S.'s 
``personal'' Instagram account and did not know of the several other 
accounts to which Instagram provided her with access--or the harmful 
content contained in those accounts. A.S.'s parents were still 
struggling to understand what was happening and how they could help 
their daughter.
 After A.S.'s release from Mather Hospital, on May 18, 2018, she 
received home teaching for the remainder of her 10th grade year. A.S. 
had always done well in school and wanted to go to college and have a 
career, so her parents did everything they possibly could to prevent 
these events from derailing her education. They worked with teachers to 
get her assignments and tutoring, and enlisted family to help with home 
schooling. A.S. was able to finish 10th grade and keep her grades up 
only because of the incredible support and resources her family was 
able to provide.
 A.S. graduated from high school in June of 2020 and started St 
Joseph's University in September of 2020. Shortly after the start of 
the school year, however, A.S. relapsed and engaged in extensive 
outpatient treatment. A.S. is aware of the challenges ahead and works 
hard every day to not slip back into her eating disorder. A.S.'s 
addiction and resulting mental health disorders were the result of the 
unreasonably dangerous Instagram product Meta made accessible to her 
and that she used. Meta's products were not reasonably safe due to 
their defective design and inadequate warnings.
 To this day, Meta has actively concealed the fact and has ``sought 
to stonewall and block this information [information about the 
dangerousness of their products, especially to young users] from 
becoming public.'' \1\ Meta ``intentionally'' \2\ hid vital information 
in its possession from the public, the U.S. government, and foreign 
governments, including information relating to the safety of children 
and the role of its algorithms and other Instagram product features in 
causing addiction, depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and other 
harms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ October 5, 2021, Senate Hearing Transcript, Mr. Chairman 
Blumenthal at 00:05:21.
 \2\ Id. at 00:29:25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Meta made false statements to the press and public, designed to 
cover up the inherent dangers of their products and, even when asked 
direct questions as to how those products ``impact the health and 
safety of our children, they choose to mislead and misdirect.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ October 5, 2021, Senate Hearing Transcript, Ms. Francis Haugen, 
at 00:32:20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The family did not discover, and could not have reasonably 
discovered, that A.S.'s addiction, depression, anxiety, eating 
disorders, and other harms were caused by Meta's unreasonably dangerous 
products until September or October of 2021.
 As a result of A.S.'s social media addiction and the harmful 
content and features Instagram relentlessly promoted and provided to 
her in its effort to increase engagement, she had to undergo 
professional counseling, in-patient programs, outpatient programs, and 
eating disorder programs, and she will likely require help in the form 
of a service dog for the rest of her life. She must stay in constant 
contact with her doctors, and fights to stay in recovery every day. 
A.S. will suffer permanent mental and emotional damages because of what 
Instagram has done. A.S.'s doctors have also advised that long term 
physical damage is likely.
 A.S. also requires the support of her parents and her service dog, 
Draco, and cannot live the independent and successful life she planned 
for herself. This situation is a direct and result of the social media 
addiction Instagram fostered and encouraged for its own financial gain 
and harms that resulted therefrom.
b. Rodriguez v. Meta, et al.

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 When she was nine years old, Selena Rodriguez was given a computer 
tablet to access the internet. Shortly thereafter, she downloaded 
Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat, and made multiple accounts without the 
knowledge or consent of her mother Tammy. Selena quickly became 
addicted to these apps and spent increasing amounts of time on social 
media. By mid-2021, she was on social media at all hours of the day and 
night and would get as little as two hours of sleep. She communicated 
with 2,500 users, all but a handful complete strangers and many of whom 
were adults. Tammy made multiple attempts reduce or limit Selena's use 
of social media which resulted in extreme anxiety and volant outbursts. 
When Tammy tried to confiscate Selena's devices, she would engage in 
self-harm or run away from home in order to access social media 
products on other devices.
 Selena's social media use coincided with a decline in her mental 
health and academic performance. As a result of her addictive use of 
these social media products, Selena developed numerous mental health 
conditions including an eating disorder, self-harm, and abusive 
behaviors toward her mother and sister. By the spring of 2021, she was 
experiencing severe sleep deprivation caused the constant 24-hour 
stream of notifications and alerts sent on these platforms.
 Through her use of Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat, Selena was 
repeatedly messaged and solicited for sexual exploitive content and 
acts on numerous occasions by adult male users of Instagram and 
Snapchat, who are encouraged to use these platforms due to the social 
media companies' refusal to verify identity and age for new users. 
Prompted in part by Snapchat's ``disappearing'' message feature, Selena 
sent sexually explicit images using Snapchat. Based solely on the 
single Instagram account available, we have identified 25 specific 
instances in which Selena exchanged sexually explicit content with 
adult users of these social media platforms.
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 On June 23, 2021, in response to a request from an adult Instagram 
user, Selena sent a video of her masturbating which my law firm 
reported to the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children.
 Tammy repeatedly sought mental health treatment for Selena, and one 
therapist told her that she had observed a patient as addicted to 
social media as Selena.
 On May 1, 2021, Selena wrote a friend on Instagram that ``I am 
crying i wanna die i feel everyone hates me i fight myself every day 
not to kms because i remember some people love me.'' On May 20, 2021, 
she wrote to another Instagram user, ``I hate my life baby I am sorry I 
almost left.'' Selena became suicidal and was hospitalized for 
emergency psychiatric care on May 26, 2021. Between May 26 and June 3, 
2021, Selena was hospitalized for suicidal ideation. Her treaters 
observed excessive social media usage as a factor in her mental 
distress. Upon her return from the hospital, Selena told Unknown User 
No. 30 on June 9, 2021, ``Sorry just got home from Connecticut 
children's hospital for trying to kms.''
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 On the afternoon of July 21, 2021, Selena accessed her mother's 
supply of Wellbutrin, placed her phone on a table in her bedroom and 
turned on the video camera. Holding two Wellbutrin pills between her 
fingers, she looked straight in the camera, tilted her head back, and 
placed the pills in her mouth. She then took a gulp of soda out of a 
bottle, looked into the camera, made the ``Peace Out'' hand gesture and 
playfully stuck out her tongue. Minutes before she died, Selena posted 
her six-second video on Snapchat with audio from the NF song 
``Paralyzed:''
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c. Nasca v. TikTok
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 Chase Nasca was a 16-year-old junior at Bayport High School. He was 
an honor student and star athlete with no outward signs of mental 
distress. Chase opened a TikTok account and was involuntarily subjected 
to thousands of extreme and deadly videos advocating violence against 
others, self-harm, and suicide. These videos including material 
accompanied by audio chosen and/or recommended by TikTok. Although 
Chase was searching for uplifting and motivational content, TikTok, by 
design, directed thousands of suicidal videos into his ``For You'' 
page.
 The TikTok product directed Chase to videos co-created by TikTok 
that recommended suicide and were accompanied by dark, suicide-themed 
songs.

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 Some of the videos TikTok directed to Chase suggested that young 
people should end their lives by stepping in front of a moving train.

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 On the evening of February 18, 2022, Chase rode his bicycle to 
railroad tracks near his home at Fairview and Railroad Avenue in the 
Town of Islip and had the following text exchange with a friend.
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 At 6:35 PM, Chase was struck and killed by a Long Island Railroad 
locomotive while standing on the tracks at Fairview and Railroad 
Avenue.
 Following his death, Chase's parents accessed his cell phone and 
discovered hundreds of TikTok videos promoting suicide, depression, and 
self-harm. Chase's father, Dean Nasca, launched an online campaign 
entitled ``TikTok is Terrorism'' to publicize the pernicious role the 
Chinese Communist Party exercises over TikTok's parent company 
ByteDance and the financial impetus that allowed ByteDance to propagate 
its deadly business model. Dean also wrote this song to commemorate his 
son's memory and posted it to his website. See below and at https://
chasenasca.com/.
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d. DeSerio v. TikTok, et al.
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 Mason Edens was born on April 13, 2006, and lived in Centerton, 
Arkansas. Mason was an outgoing and happy young man. He was a good 
student and loved playing football. Mason began using the Snapchat and 
TikTok platforms around the age of 13. His mother Jennie actively 
monitored his social media use and limited his phone use.
 Following a breakup with his high school girlfriend on October 31, 
2022, Mason sought out affirming material on TikTok. He specifically 
sought content on how to mend a broken heart. Instead, on his TikTok 
account in the ``For You'' feed, Mason had been shown video after video 
of depressing content. Before this point, his search history mainly 
included sports and outdoor content. At one point following the 
breakup, Mason looked up ``positive affirmations'' on TikTok and liked 
a video that featured sad music. Instead of showing Mason positive 
affirmations, TikTok's algorithm showed him depressing content that he 
did not search for. For example, Mason had liked a video with the 
audio, ``I wanna put a shotgun to my f---- mouth and blow my brains 
out''. Another described a plan to die by suicide. Another video he 
liked asked ``what are your plans for the future?'' and showed the 
video of a firearm discharging.
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 TikTok targeted Mason with AI driven feed-based tools. It collected 
his private information, without his knowledge or consent, and in 
manners that far exceeded anything a reasonable user would anticipate 
or allow. It then used such personal data to target him with extreme 
and deadly subject matters, such as violence, self-harm, and suicide 
promotion. TikTok did not target Mason with this because he sought it 
out or even because TikTok thought he wanted to see it, but instead, 
because TikTok determined based on its collection and use of his 
personal and private data that he would not be able to look away. 
Likewise, Mason did not ask for these experiences or even want to see 
them. Because of the harmful dependency TikTok engineered and fostered, 
however, he was unable to look away.
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 Jennie noticed Mason's mental health deteriorating. He was often on 
his phone all night. She noticed an increase in the frequency and 
intensity of his anxiety. After weeks of him not getting enough sleep, 
she confiscated his phone on November 14, 2022. An argument broke out. 
Mason rushed up to his room and locked himself in his room. As his 
stepfather tried to get in to talk to him, Mason retrieved his 
brother's shotgun and shot himself in the head using the same method 
that TikTok had recommended and foisted on him. He was 16.
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e. Roberts v. Meta, et al.
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 Englyn Roberts was born on July 21, 2006, and grew up in New 
Iberia, Louisiana. She was the youngest of eight children. Englyn was a 
bubbly teenager. She loved spending time with family, eating at 
different restaurants, and traveling to different places. She enjoyed 
dancing, with hip hop and lyrical dance being her favorites, and had 
dreams of going to college and becoming a choreographer with her own 
dance studio someday.
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 When Englyn was eleven years old, she was given her first cell 
phone and, shortly thereafter, she downloaded social media products. 
Her parents provided her with the cell phone so that she would have 
Internet access, could take photos, and could stay in touch with family 
and friends. Not for social media. Her parents required the access code 
to Englyn's phone and said that anytime Englyn changed that code she 
needed to provide them with the new one, which she did. Her father 
Toney regularly monitored Englyn's social media use, or so he thought.
 What Toney and Brandy did not know is that social media companies 
make sure that underage children can access their social media 
products, including by marketing to children, failing to verify age or 
identity (even when the children openly admitted to being underage on 
their public profile and/or in posts and comments), and permitting the 
opening of multiple accounts. It was understood among children that 
Meta wouldn't close your account for being under 13. You just had to 
say you were 13 when opening an account and could then tell people your 
real age. In fact, this is something many kids still do. It also was 
understood among children that Meta did not object to kids using more 
than one account, which made it easier to hide more personal content 
and the existence of secondary accounts from parents and family--often 
referred to as a SPAM account or, in Instagram's case, a FINSTA (short 
for ``fake Instagram'').
 Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat were designed to frustrate and 
prevent parents like Brandy and Toney Roberts from exercising their 
rights and duties as parents to monitor and limit their child's use of 
their social media products. Tony and Brandy were not aware when 
Englyn's social media usage started, nor did they ultimately know which 
products she used or how many accounts she opened without their 
knowledge or consent.
 Englyn's social media use coincided with a gradual decline in her 
mental health. Englyn became addicted and spent increasing amounts of 
time communicating on social media, and engaged in the video, games, 
and reward features of the social media products.
 Shortly after Englyn got her phone, her mother realized that Englyn 
was staying up at night on her cell phone. Her parents thought she was 
watching videos on the Internet and chatting with friends, as they 
still did not know about Englyn's social media use. Englyn had always 
been a well-behaved child, so her parents trusted her to use the phone 
responsibly. When they realized she was staying up on the phone, 
however, they instituted a 10:00 p.m. rule for all devices: Englyn's 
phone had to be turned off by 10:00 p.m. each night.
 Englyn agreed and told her parents that she would make sure her 
phone was off by 10:00 p.m. Unfortunately, she was already addicted to 
social media by that point--which addiction her parents had no 
knowledge of--and which caused her to break the 10:00 p.m. rule to use 
social media. One night, Englyn's mother couldn't sleep and caught her 
awake with the cell phone on in her room. Brandy and Toney Roberts now 
believe that Englyn had been regularly staying awake and was suffering 
from sleep deprivation due to her use of social media, and Meta, Snap, 
and TikTok's failure to verify age and identity. These companies should 
not have been providing Englyn with access to their social media 
products at all as she was under the age of 13.
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 Regardless, from that point forward, Brandy Roberts took Englyn's 
phone downstairs with her each night when she went to bed. Englyn then 
started waiting until Brandy or both of her parents were asleep and 
would retrieve the phone so that she could use social media throughout 
the night. She was always careful to replace the phone before Brandy 
woke up in the morning and never got caught.
 Occasionally, Brandy Roberts would restrict Englyn's cell phone 
access, though usually not for more than a few hours or a day. 
Nonetheless, these efforts at exercising parental rights and authority 
caused severe reactions in Englyn. Because of Englyn's social media 
addiction, she would panic without her cell phone and beg to get it 
back. She would tell her parents that they could do anything, except 
take her cell phone away. She would promise to do her chores, bring up 
her grades, or anything else that might get her the cell phone back--
she said that she could not live without it. During these times when 
Englyn did not have social media access she would get anxious and 
depressed and would cry and sleep until she got her cell phone back. 
Once she had her phone back, everything seemed fine again. In 2019, 
Englyn was photographed at a family event using the Instagram social 
media product:
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 What no one knew at that time was that, while Englyn appeared to be 
doing fine to her parents and family, in fact, she was being bombarded 
by Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok with harmful images and videos 
(ranging from harmful social comparison content to violent and 
disturbing content glorifying self-harm and suicide). She was also 
receiving sexual and exploitative direct messages from strangers, which 
are allowed and enabled by all three of the social media products at 
issue, along with harmful connection and content recommendations--all 
of which would eventually kill her.
 These social media companies were not providing fun and safe photo 
sharing services, but rather, were dealing in incredibly addictive 
product features and pushing harmful algorithmically driven content, 
intended to keep Englyn hooked on their products by any means 
necessary. Meta, Snap, and TikTok's social media products also made 
harmful recommendations to and about Englyn Roberts, connecting her 
with strangers to increase their own engagement and thereby their own 
profits, which recommendations had nothing to do with any communication 
or informational aspects of social media.
 Meta, Snap, and TikTok's social media products also provided other 
users with unfettered access to Englyn through public profiles and 
features (in the case of Meta and TikTok), recommendation systems (in 
the case of Meta, Snap, and TikTok), and features that provided direct 
messaging access to Englyn regardless of her minor status, regardless 
of whether other users were on her ``friends'' list or equivalent, and 
regardless of duration, time of day, or frequency (Meta, Snap, and 
TikTok).
 In 2018 and 2019, Englyn began interacting with and then sharing 
content about depression, suicidal ideation, and self-harm via social 
media, unbeknownst to her parents and teachers. Meta, Snap, and TikTok 
also utilized algorithms and/or similar technologies to steer Englyn 
towards and otherwise promote and amplify harmful and unsolicited 
content. These companies are not only aware of their promotion and 
amplification of harmful content but knew or should have known that the 
harms caused by their marketing and amplification systems would be 
exacerbated by Englyn's sleep deprivation. These algorithms and similar 
technologies are designed to exploit these vulnerabilities caused by 
social media.
 In September 2019, Englyn and her friend began exchanging links to 
incredibly harmful and violent page and users they had found because of 
Instagram's algorithm and recommendation systems, which content 
Instagram hosted on its platform for years while young users, like 
Englyn, continued sharing and viewing the incredibly harmful and 
violent content with alarming frequency. The content can no longer be 
found on Instagram, as Meta finally enforced its own Terms of Service 
and deleted the account in December of 2021--but not before Meta's 
algorithms recommended this content to any number of children.
 In September of 2019, Englyn and her friend messaged each other 
with the harmful content recommended and/or promoted by Instagram. The 
posting person's username was gasstati0nparty though this user's 
content is posted under more than one username. In one of the videos 
exchanged on September 19, 2019, the woman hung herself with an 
extension cord attached to a door:
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 This is the kind of material Instagram's algorithm was recommending 
to 13-year-old girls in September of 2019, and it remained in Englyn's 
Instagram messages until December of 2021, more than a year after 
Englyn's death, when Instagram finally deleted this account.
 The sleep deprivation caused by addiction and amplification of 
harmful content to which Englyn was exposed through her addiction to 
social media products was a cause of her depression, anxiety, self-
harm, and suicidal ideation. On June 13, 2020, Englyn wrote to 
Instagram username brayreggiontae_, ``right just think people be 
suicidal for no reason.'' brayreggiontae_ replied, ``And people still 
wouldn't understand.''
 On July 15, 2020, Englyn wrote to Instagram username lexy.paull, 
``but if i ever hurt myself tell my parents that it wasn't their fault 
it's my problems with finding love.''
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 Around this same time, Englyn kept a list of mental health numbers 
(including a suicide hotline) in her ``private story'' feature on 
Instagram and was exchanging pictures showing self-harm with one or 
more of her ``friends'' on Instagram. Meta knew that Englyn was a minor 
and said and did nothing to alert her parents or teachers to what was 
transpiring on its platform and because of the harms caused by social 
media--harms Meta itself was already studying and knew about as being 
among the impacts and effects of use of the social media products at 
issue in this case.
 On August 11, 2020, Englyn typed an ``emotional description'' 
relating to her social media use into her cell phone's note pad 
application.
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 On August 29, 2020, at 3:30 a.m., Englyn took an extension cord and 
attached it to her door--just like she has seen in the Instagram video 
viewed countless times by herself and other young children--and 
attempted to choke herself--just like she had seen in the Instagram 
video viewed countless times by herself and other young children. 
Englyn texted her boyfriend (with corrections and as taken from police 
report):

 I just want to die.

 I can't satisfy anyone.

 In the closet choking myself, wonder if I'm good enough to stay 
 on Earth, because it's never enough, for anybody, nobody calls 
 me, to check in on me, nobody, not even you, I have no reason 
 but to die, call or I'm stepping off this stool, and I'll be 
 done just like you wanted, never mind, see, take too long, 
 dropping phone, so I won't get what you're saying, bye love 
 you.

 She then used her phone and took a video of herself crying, in 
which the extension cord can be seen.
 Brandy and Toney Roberts received a text message from Englyn's 
boyfriend's mother at 3:30 a.m., asking them to check on Englyn. They 
found their daughter hanging from the extension cord moments later. 
Toney picked her up and laid her on the floor, and Brandy began doing 
CPR, which she continued until the ambulance arrived. The medics were 
able to get a pulse, and Englyn was rushed to the hospital, where she 
stayed on life support for nine days.
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 Her parents stayed by her side every possible moment, singing to 
her, playing music, and holding her hand. On September 7, 2020, they 
made the difficult decision to take Englyn off life support and 
continued to stay by her side as she left them.
 Englyn's death devastated her entire family and her friends. She 
was a bright light and loved by everyone who knew her, and Toney and 
Brandy had no choice but to assume that her death was caused by some 
sort of mental illness no one knew about and with no outward symptoms. 
They became active and vocal on issues of teen mental health awareness 
and made a commitment to help other families and children if they 
could. They also tried to reach out to Englyn's friends and other 
children on social media through postings and messages of positivity 
and hope.
 Then, one week after the anniversary of Englyn's death--the week of 
September 13, 2021--Toney Roberts was watching the news and learned 
about the Facebook Whistleblower, Francis Haugen. He began looking for 
and listening to news on this topic, learning about what Instagram's 
leadership knew about the harms its products are causing to teen users. 
To name only one example, Meta recognized that a significant percent of 
its users are addicted to its products, that children open multiple, 
secret accounts (referred to by Meta as a ``unique value 
proposition''), and that use of Instagram increases thoughts of what 
Meta calls ``SSI'' (Suicide and Self-Injury) in a percentage of teen 
girls who use it. Englyn was nothing more than a statistic to these 
companies, and Meta, TikTok, and Snap chose profits and growth over the 
health and well-being of unsuspecting teen users like Englyn.
 That was when Toney Roberts charged Englyn's old cell phone to see 
whether the things they were describing on TV were what happened to his 
daughter. He was able to access some of her social media accounts from 
her phone and began scouring those with the information now in his 
possession. What became clear in September of 2021 is that Englyn's 
death was the result of injury caused by her addictive use of 
Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok.
 What her parents also did not know at that time was that, as a 
result of her use of Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok, specifically due 
to the intentionally addictive nature of these products as well as the 
harmful content they were promoting and amplifying to Englyn via 
various algorithmically drive product features and harmful social 
comparison features, Englyn Roberts had begun to suffer from 
depression, anxiety, self-harm, and suicidal ideation.
 Toney and Brandy had no way of knowing what social media was doing 
to their child. In sharp contrast, Meta, Snap, and TikTok knew or 
should have known that they were causing this harm to Englyn, including 
based on her age, usage information, and usage patterns that were 
repeatedly exposing her via unsolicited methods, such as push 
notifications and algorithmically driven recommendation systems. 
Without Meta, Snap, and TikTok's failure to conduct a reasonable age 
verification, Englyn Roberts would not have been exposed to the harmful 
features and design of their respective social media products. Without 
the algorithmic discrimination contained in all three of the social 
media products at issue, including recommendation systems as well as 
content promotion and display systems, Englyn Roberts would not have 
been targeted and overwhelmed by disproportionately violent, sexual, 
and other harmful content. Without the endless feed and explore 
features characteristic of all three of the social media products at 
issue, Englyn Roberts would not have experienced the harmful 
dependencies that these features were designed to promote.
f. V.V. v. Snap, et al.
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 V.V. opened her first Instagram account and at age 10 and her first 
Snapchat account at age 12, both without her parents' knowledge or 
consent. V.V.'s parents believed she was using her iPad for games, kid-
appropriate videos, and educational purposes. They would never have 
allowed Instagram in and Snapchat their home had they known she was 
using those apps. By the time V.V.'s parents learned she was using Snap 
and Instagram, she had learned how to open multiple accounts to thwart 
their exercise of parental authority.
 V.V. used fake e-mail accounts to open new Instagram and Snapchat 
accounts and provided inconsistent birthdate information across related 
accounts. Meta and Snap do not verify phone numbers, e-mails, or other 
information users provide, making it easy for underage users such as 
V.V. to open accounts and for predatory adults to use false identities 
to exploit vulnerable minors with anonymity and impunity. Meta and Snap 
knew or should have known that V.V. was underage and did not have 
parental consent to use their products; yet continued to provide her 
with new accounts profiting handsomely as a result.
 V.V.'s parents tried to stop her from using Snapchat and Instagram 
and, when that failed, opened their own accounts to monitor and protect 
their child. They understood that Snapchat was a silly photo app for 
users to interact with people they already knew; and Instagram was a 
product kids used to keep in touch with friends and family. V.V.'s 
parents had no idea that Instagram and Snapchat were connecting their 
12-year-old daughter with strangers and sexual predators.
 Shortly after opening her Instagram and Snapchat accounts, V.V. 
began having trouble sleeping and, over time, experienced severe sleep 
deprivation and related harms such as anxiety, depression, moodiness, 
and inability to regulate her emotions. While V.V.'s parents did not 
realize she was using Meta and Snap's products during sleeping hours, 
Meta and Snap track the hourly usage of their products on a per-user 
basis.
 Meta and Snap specifically designed their products to hook young 
users such as V.V., utilizing a variety of extended use designs--which 
designs were known to Meta and Snap, but not ordinary consumers. Meta 
and Snap inundated V.V. with push notifications, which had the intended 
effect of pulling her back onto their social media apps at the expense 
of her mental health and wellbeing. V.V. became dependent on Meta and 
Snap's features, including gamification features and rewards, and often 
found herself losing track of time while using Instagram and Snapchat 
due to their pull to refresh and endless scroll features.
 Shortly after the opening of these accounts, Meta and Snap also 
began targeting V.V. with harmful content and advertising. Meta made 
available to her certain product features that were known to cause 
social comparison harms in teen girls. As direct and result of Meta and 
Snap's actions, V.V. experienced increased anxiety and depression, as 
well as devastating harms to her sense of self and self-esteem. These 
harms made her even more vulnerable to outside influences than she 
otherwise would have been by reason of being a child.
 V.V. also began to suffer harms resulting from Meta's ``like'' 
product and the volume of unsolicited health and beauty content 
Instagram sends to young girls. V.V.'s Explore page often was filled 
with images beautiful and skinny models and advertisements for beauty 
products and weight loss tips--not just a few of these, but an 
unlimited feed filled with them, to the point where it was hard to see 
anything else. Like millions of teens who use Instagram, V.V. worried 
and judged herself based on the ``Like'' button. She would spend hours 
trying to create the perfect photo and once posted, her self-image 
would rise or fall on how many likes it received. V.V. judged herself 
and believed others were judging her by these Instagram-set standards, 
and her self-esteem declined while her vulnerability increased as a 
result.
 Snapchat and Instagram target underage girls for unsolicited 
advances by predatory adults. When V.V. first started using Snapchat, 
she did not have her own account and used her grandmother and aunt's 
accounts. When V.V.'s Snapchat profile was of an adult woman, she was 
not approached by strangers, no one attempted to exploit or abuse her, 
and no one sent her explicit Snaps and messages. However, once V.V. 
opened her own Snapchat account and identified herself as a teenage 
girl everything changed. She immediately began receiving sexually 
explicit images and solicitations from predatory strangers.
 Through Meta's public profile features, V.V.'s profile was made 
viewable and available to complete strangers (including adults) also 
using Meta's products. User recommendation systems--known as ``People 
You May Know (PYMK)'' on Facebook, ``Suggestions for You'' on 
Instagram, and ``Quick Add'' on Snapchat--also immediately began 
sending V.V.'s profile to adult male users, and encouraged those 
complete strangers reach out and connect with V.V.
 Snap has gamified its platform to incentivize and encourage 
children to accept friend recommendations from predatory adults. For 
example, a user's Snap score--a matter of social prestige and pressure 
among minors--goes up with each new connection accepted and the 
Snapchat product previously allowed and encouraged minors to accept all 
Quick Add requests via a single click of a button. Snap and Meta have 
designed their products to not only make these connections, but to 
ensure that their youngest users accept them. Yet V.V.'s parents had no 
reason to suspect that Meta and Snap were trafficking their daughter 
through complex and proprietary algorithms, profile settings, and other 
features.
 As soon as she opened her Instagram account, adult male strangers 
began finding V.V. through Meta's ``Suggestions for You'' feature and 
then would try to add her and/or would send her direct messages to 
connect. When V.V. was 11 years old, Meta directed and connected her to 
one such predator--a user whose real identity is still unknown. This 
Instagram predator seemed harmless at first, but his messages quickly 
turned explicit and he coerced V.V. into sending him explicit photos of 
herself. This was something that she couldn't tell her parents about, 
especially because they did not know about her use of Instagram. When 
V.V. tried to suspend contact with this Instagram predator, he 
threatened to upload the photos to an Internet site unless she 
continued to engage with him and sent him more photos. V.V. was 
terrified of her parents finding out, and of her photos being published 
online, so she sent him more explicit photos. V.V. felt trapped, and in 
December of 2018, she tried to commit suicide in the hopes of finding 
some escape.
 V.V.'s parents did not know the reason behind her suicide attempt 
at the time because V.V. was still afraid to tell them the truth. When 
she finally did, they attempted to report the exploitation to the 
police, who informed them that Meta's Instagram product was designed in 
such a way that they could not identify who was behind the account that 
was used to abuse her, and a case was never opened.
 Through this incident, V.V.'s parents learned she was using the 
Instagram social media product and took away her electronic devices to 
prevent such use. They noticed that when V.V. did not have access to 
electronic devices, she began sleeping better, would engage with her 
family, and participate, and was less anxious. Unfortunately, however, 
they were unable to prevent V.V. from using electronic devices 
indefinitely, and as soon as she was able to gain access again, she 
resumed using Meta and Snap's social media products.
 After V.V. opened her own Snapchat account (instead of using the 
one belonging to her grandmother and aunt), male strangers started 
sending her photos of their genitals. The way the Snap product is 
designed, V.V. could not discern what the photo contained until opening 
it. When this first started happening, V.V. reported these incidents to 
Snap. She forwarded Snap the explicit photos she was being inundated 
with, but Snap did nothing in response. On the contrary, often the same 
male user would continue sending V.V. explicit photos which she would 
report, but again, Snap never responded.
 On July 15, 2019, when V.V. was still 12 years old, Snap connected 
her to Reginald Sharp. V.V. did not know Sharp in real life and Snap 
directed him to her via its Quick Add and/or Public Profile product 
features. Sharp, a registered sex offender, went by the username 
JASONMORGAN5660.
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 After Snap connected V.V. to Sharp, he quickly began engaging V.V. 
in sexually explicit communications and promised her money in exchange 
for sending him explicit photographs or meeting in person. After V.V. 
sent Sharp explicit photographs, he threatened to post those on 
Snapchat unless she had sex with him. On July 23, 2019, Sharp coerced 
V.V. into sneaking out of her home in the middle of the night to meet 
him and raped her. V.V. was 13 at the time of her rape.
 V.V.'s mother knew something was wrong immediately the next 
morning, found out what had happened, and reported it to the police who 
investigated. Detectives identified the Snapchat predator as Reginald 
Sharp and served a subpoena on Snapchat. Nevertheless, even though 
Sharp is a known sex offender who raped a 13-year-old child, as late as 
2023 Sharp's Snapchat account was still active, as shown below.
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 V.V. has suffered serious mental, emotional, and physical harms and 
been hospitalized as result of Meta and Snap's marketing, design, 
distribution, advertising, and programming decisions. She has isolated 
herself socially, suffered from anxiety and depression, thoughts of 
self-harm and suicide and feels tremendous pain and guilt for the 
turmoil her social media dependency has inflicted on her family.
g. Arroyo v. TikTok
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 TikTok relies heavily on the amount of time users spend watching 
videos to steer users toward more videos and continuous scrolling. This 
process sometimes steers younger users toward material promoting self-
harm and/or suicide. In December 2021, an anonymous TikTok employee 
publicly shared an unauthorized, internal document because they were 
disturbed by TikTok's push toward ``sad'' content that could induce 
self-harm. The internal communication called ``TikTok Algo 101,'' 
revealed that TikTok's goal was to keep users on the app as long as 
possible. The document indicated that one solution to getting a bored 
user to continue watching, is through ``forced recommendation in users' 
``For You'' feeds.''
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 A deadly ``blackout challenge'' on TikTok was linked to the deaths 
of at least 20 children between January 2021 and November 2022. 
Children around the world received the blackout challenge in their 
``For You'' feeds, encouraging children to choke themselves with 
household items until they become unconscious and film the adrenaline 
rush once they regain consciousness. TikTok knew children were dying 
from this challenge that was delivered to children via its algorithms 
and reaching those too young to understand the dangerous risks involved 
with participation. At least 15 of the 20 children who died while 
filming the challenge were aged 12 or younger; one of them was nine-
year-old Arriani Arroyo.
 Arriani Arroyo lived with her parents, Heriberto and Christal 
Arroyo, and her brother, E.A., who was three years younger. Arriani 
enjoyed playing basketball, kickball, and riding her bicycle. She loved 
to dance and was enrolled in a ballet class at school.
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 Arriani began using TikTok at around age seven. She used TikTok 
multiple times a day, including watching videos of other people dancing 
and singing and posting videos of herself dancing and singing. Arriani 
gradually became obsessive about posting dance videos on TikTok and 
became addicted. She began receiving from TikTok challenges on her 
``For You'' page. She sometimes discussed these challenges with her 
parents and because all the challenges they discussed involved eating 
and drinking, they seemed harmless to Arriani's parents. They 
understood that TikTok was a family-oriented social media product, 
which was marketed to and safe for children to use.
 On February 26, 2021, while her mom was attending a church event 
and her dad was working on a project in the basement, Arriani played 
with then five-year-old brother, E.A., upstairs in Arriani's room. E.A. 
went downstairs and told his father that Arriani was not moving. 
Heriberto rushed upstairs and found Arriani hanging from the family 
dog's leash, which she had affixed to the door to her room. Heriberto 
Arroyo called 9-1-1 and Arriani was rushed to Children's Hospital where 
physicians placed her on a ventilator and were able to restore her 
pulse. However, testing revealed that Arriani had permanent, 
irreversible, and complete loss of brain function and life support was 
withdrawn.
h. Neville v. Snap
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 Alexander Neville was born on May 4, 2006, and lived in Aliso 
Viejo, California. He loved skateboarding, videogames, and playing with 
his little sister, E.N. He had a keen interest in World War II and the 
Civil War and often shared with his family and friends his dream of 
becoming a historian when he grew up.
 Alexander got his first cell phone in the 5th grade. He started 
attending the YMCA for afterschool care and his parents wanted him to 
have a way to reach them if needed. They talked about responsible cell 
phone use with Alexander and told him that it was okay for him to play 
age-appropriate games. His parents also required Alexander to provide 
both his device pin and passwords to them for any applications he put 
on the device, so they could check in on him.
 Alexander's mother, Amy Neville and her husband Aaron Neville 
believed that Snapchat was a social media product made for kids. They 
understood that it was made for 13-year-old kids, and that it was a fun 
and silly product where you could take goofy photos and share those 
with friends. They knew that most 13-year-old kids already had a 
Snapchat account; in fact, the director of the YMCA said that she had 
opened a Snapchat account so that she could keep tabs on her YMCA kids. 
Snapchat was advertised as and appeared by all accounts to be harmless 
and age appropriate.
 In retrospect, Amy and Aaron now believe that Alexander began using 
Snapchat sometime just prior to starting the 8th grade, if not earlier. 
This was around this time when they first observed Alexander's trouble 
sleeping. For example, Amy would find him awake in the middle of the 
night, in his room and on his phone. Throughout 8th grade, Alexander 
struggled more than usual. He was often tired, and his parents resorted 
to the threat of turning off wi-fi to get him to sleep.
 Alexander's use of Snapchat coincided with a steady decline in his 
mental health. As a result of Snap's products and features, i.e. push 
notifications, user recommendations, interface and operational extended 
use designs, rewards and gamification features, etc.--Alexander began 
suffering from severe mental health harms, including, but not limited 
to, social media compulsion, sleep deprivation, increased anxiety, and 
depression.
 Snap also began directing and recommending drug advertisements to 
Alexander and connecting him to Snapchat drug dealers via its 
recommendations and mapping and location features, as it does to 
millions of underage Snapchat users. He received multiple Quick Add 
requests from other Snapchat users he did not know in real life and, 
because of Snap's gamification and other features that encourage kids 
to accept those requests, he accepted them. Among the strangers to whom 
Snap connected Alexander were nearby Snapchat dealers--persons 
Alexander did not know in real life and would not have met but for 
Snap's product design, programming, distribution, and operational 
decisions. Snapchat designed and programmed its user connection systems 
to increase engagement at any costs which, in the case of minor users, 
included affirmatively identifying and directing predators and drug 
dealers to those minor users.
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 On June 21, 2020, just a few days before Alexander died, Amy 
Neville asked him what was wrong, as she could see that something was 
off. Alexander told his mother that somebody on Snapchat had sold him 
an Oxycodone pill which he'd taken. He said that he was curious about 
it but now, he said, he was scared because he already wanted more, and 
that he needed help. Amy called a drug treatment center on the morning 
of June 22 to get help for her son. On the morning of June 23, 2020, 
Amy went to Alexander's room to wake him up for an orthodontist 
appointment. She opened the bedroom door and found Alexander's body 
laying lifeless on his bedroom floor. Alexander died of fentanyl 
poisoning at the age of 14. Amy was made aware that the pill that had 
been sold to Alexander was 100 percent fentanyl, and that he obtained 
the pill through Snapchat dealer AJ Smokxy.
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 The authorities subpoenaed Snap for documents, and it took Snap 
nine months and multiple subpoenas to finally answer. Once Snap finally 
responded, there was enough information to confirm that Alexander met 
with the Snapchat sealer AJ Smokxy. Even after being served the 
subpoena, Snap continued to let AJ Smokxy sell drugs on Snap. They did 
not disable or block the Snapchat dealer who sold Alexander counterfeit 
Oxycodone, despite knowledge that AJ Smokxy was selling deadly fentanyl 
pills to minors via and because of its Snapchat product.
 In August of 2020--two months after Alexander's death--Snap was 
still facilitating the drug deals for AJ Smokxy. AJ Smokxy was also 
publicly denying his role in Alexander's death while publicly admitting 
that he did deal ``jars'' and ``bud.''

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 Snap allowed AJ Smokxy to keep marketing and distributing his drugs 
through its platform--and Snap continued to profit from its casual 
partnership with him. Snap caused the deaths of at least two more 
individuals after Alexander because of drugs distributed by AJ Smokxy 
on Snapchat. Snap knew AJ Smokxy was under investigation for drug-
related homicide but continued to let him market and distribute his 
drugs through their product, failing to delete his account even after 
they were on notice that he was killing kids.
 To name only one example, AJ Smokxy went on to use the Snap drug 
network to supply counterfeit pills to the Snap dealer, Arnoldo_8286, 
who found and contacted Daniel Elijah Figueroa (``Elijah'') via Snap 
and sold him a counterfeit pill. Elijah died three months after 
Alexander, in September 2020. AJ Smokxy's account remained active for 
roughly a year after Alexander's death and when Snap would have 
received subpoenas relating to that death.
 Snap knew that AJ Smokxy was using its Snapchat product to sell 
drugs to young Snapchat users. Snap knew or should have known that AJ 
Smokxy was using its Snapchat product because of its unique product 
features like disappearing messages and My Eyes Only. Snap knew that it 
was benefitting financially from his Snapchat activities and from its 
refusal to deactivate his account. Snap made the choice to take no 
action in connection with these illegal activities, and to disregard 
its promises as per its terms of service. It did not de-activate the 
Snapchat Dealer account or warn users or their parents of known illegal 
and potentially lethal harms arising from such use and other Snapchat 
users were harmed and/or died a result of those decisions.
i. N.M. v. Meta et al.
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 N.M. was born into a devout Irish-Catholic and tight-knit family 
that never misses Sunday mass or lunch with her grandparents afterward. 
N.M. was a happy and fiercely intelligent child. She enjoyed and did 
well in school and sports and dreamt of attending college on a field 
hockey scholarship and studying to become a pediatrician. She has 
always lived, except while attending college, with her parents, E.M. 
and P.M., and three siblings.
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 N.M. got her first cell phone in 8th grade, after saving up and 
purchasing it herself. She was active in sports, a straight-A student, 
and a responsible individual who gave her parents no reason to think 
that she could not handle the responsibility of a cell phone. Her 
parents discussed with her the importance of safety, of not sharing 
personal information with strangers, and of being careful with what she 
posted with the knowledge that once she put something out there, she 
could never take it back.
 One of the first things N.M. did after purchasing her phone was to 
open an Instagram account. It seemed like all of her friends already 
had Instagram, and she opened the account to keep in touch and 
communicate with her friends and family members. Around late 2019, N.M. 
opened a TikTok account.
 N.M.'s use of Instagram and TikTok coincided with a steady and 
severe decline in her mental and physical health. N.M. was not looking 
for and did not want fitness, weight loss, exercise, or any similar 
content or advertisements from Instagram and TikTok. She was athletic, 
engaged in several sports, and had a good sense of self and self-
esteem--then Instagram and TikTok happened.
 Instagram sent push notifications 24 hours a day designed to lure 
N.M. back to the app every time she tried to log off. Within a matter 
of months, she found herself regularly checking her Instagram at night, 
at first in response to push notifications Instagram sent her and, 
eventually, as a matter of compulsion. She intended to spend only a few 
minutes on the product but would get lost in Instagram's endless scroll 
and other extended use product features, lose track of time, and 
ultimately spend hours passively viewing content on the app, causing a 
lack of sleep, anxiety, and depression.
 N.M.'s posting experience quickly changed, going from something she 
enjoyed to something she obsessed over and, at times, dreaded. She 
worried relentlessly over the number of likes, comments, and shares her 
posts received, would check her account multiple times after posting, 
and would remove posts if she felt they did not garner enough 
responses. Instagram created a perfect storm of social comparison, 
which left N.M. feeling anxious, vulnerable, and often unsure or 
insecure about herself. These harms were caused specifically by Meta's 
product designs, harms in which Meta knew about and opted to inflict on 
a significant number of Instagram users (specifically, teen girls) to 
ensure increased engagement. Over the course of those first few months, 
Instagram began selecting and connecting N.M. with harmful users and 
content. This included random strangers who Instagram would recommend 
to N.M. via its ``Suggestions For You'' user recommendation algorithm 
as well as random strangers who were somehow about to find N.M.'s 
profile and direct message her even though she was a minor with a 
profile set to private. These product features were either defective or 
inherently dangerous in that they were serving up a minor to predatory, 
adult users. Instagram likewise began selecting and connecting N.M. to 
massive amounts of advertising that made her feel like she wasn't 
pretty enough or skinny enough. At first, this included makeup 
advertisements, then it became advertisements for workout products, 
exercise products, and fat burning and/or low-calorie food products. 
These were advertisements Meta either directly approved or assisted in 
the creation of, then purposefully targeted at N.M. due, at least in 
part, to her age, gender, and other perceived vulnerabilities, and from 
which Meta profited each time. N.M. did not search for these product 
advertisements and did not understand why Instagram was targeting her 
with them; however, she then began asking her parents to buy these 
products.
 Instagram then started targeting N.M. with large amounts of Health 
& Beauty connections and content, including influencer and other third-
party videos focused solely on health and beauty, and similar subject 
matters. These were subject matters N.M. did not search for and did not 
want, but that Instagram began pushing to her Explore and other app 
surfaces in excessive amounts each time she opened Instagram. As with 
the advertisements Instagram directed to N.M. via its product design 
and programming decisions, Instagram began by targeting her with 
bathing suit photos and videos, then cooking recipes and ideas, and 
over time, Instagram started filling her feed surfaces with overly 
skinny models, more make-up products, and diet products and tips.
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 Instagram targeted N.M. via its product design and programming 
based on her age and gender, and the decisions Instagram made for N.M. 
caused incredible harm, including but not limited to harmful social 
comparisons, depression, anxiety, and, eventually, disordered eating as 
N.M. began buying the products and following the diets Meta told her 
she should buy and follow.
 Like Instagram, TikTok also sent N.M. push notifications 24 hours a 
day, designed to and successfully did persuade her log back on to the 
TikTok app every time she tried to log off.
 N.M. found herself opening her TikTok app regularly and at all 
hours due to extended use designs utilized by TikTok, including not 
limited to auto-play, endless scroll, and time manipulation techniques. 
What N.M. meant to be a few minutes on TikTok almost always turned into 
hours, which developing dependency led to increased sleep deprivation, 
anxiety, and depression.
 N.M. began watching TikTok for its cute dance videos, but within a 
matter of months--if not quicker--the TikTok algorithm product also 
began to turn deadly. Like with Instagram, TikTok started by flooding 
N.M.'s For You Page with advertisements for makeup and health and 
beauty brands. Then it began sending N.M. skinny influencer content, 
encouraging and pushing her to try new workout routines--which, 
ultimately, she did; then TikTok targeted N.M. with extreme content 
like ``What I Eat In a Day'' and dangerous workout routines.
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 TikTok also materially contributed and participated in the creation 
of most if not all of the influencer (referred to by TikTok as 
``creator'') content it then directed to N.M., including by encouraging 
and paying those creators to post more, telling them where to post, 
when to post, and how to post, providing them with tutorials and 
coaching them on how to get more views and make their posts more 
interesting, suggesting songs to match their themes, and other tools, 
communications, and actions in which TikTok routinely engages 
specifically with those users its refers to as Creators in order to 
make more money via engagement.
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 When N.M. opened her TikTok account, she provided her actual 
birthdate. TikTok knew or should have known at all times that it was 
directing these advertisements, creator content, and other harmful 
subject matters to a minor. Meta also knew or should have known that 
N.M. was a minor, including based on information it had in its 
possession, its age estimating technologies, and N.M.'s stated birth 
year, which, while not accurate, still identified her as a minor when 
Instagram began targeting her with harmful advertisements, connections, 
and subject matters.
 Shortly after the pandemic began is when N.M.'s parents noticed 
something was wrong. N.M. was home more due to quarantining and was 
engaged in more physical activities than usual. At first, her parents 
thought it was boredom, but then they noticed that she was losing 
weight and no longer enjoyed social situations. Specifically, she began 
focusing on calories, limiting the times she could eat, and asking for 
special foods with a precise degree of knowledge she should not have 
had. N.M. was being fed an arsenal of very specific information about 
foods, eating, and exercise, and despite her parents' diligent efforts 
to find out the source, they could not.
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 To N.M.'s parents it felt like someone else had come into the 
picture and was significantly influencing their child who was changing 
before their eyes, but they could not figure out who, how, or why. This 
is one of the greatest harms Meta and TikTok have caused to users, 
families, and medical providers. Specifically, they concealed the harms 
only they knew their products were causing, which harms related to 
their product design decisions, programming, distribution, and 
operational choices within their sole knowledge and control. N.M.'s 
parents could have intervened and obtained N.M. the help she needed 
sooner and before the worst of the damage was done had these companies 
simply come forward and told users and their parents the truth.
 In September of 2021, N.M.'s mother, E.M., took her to the doctor 
to get checked out. The doctor said that something was wrong. N.M. was 
not getting enough calories, but that it was not out of control and her 
parents needed to start supervising her at meals.
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 N.M. was then sent to an eating disorder specialist in the practice 
three days later, and N.M.'s parents noted the sharp decrease in her 
BMI, which coincided with the period of increase in her use of the 
TikTok product.
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 E.M. then made the difficult decision to pull N.M. out of the 
private high school she was attending, so that she could better monitor 
and help her daughter get better, including by being able to bring her 
home at lunch each day to eat. This was the high school N.M. and her 
parents chose because of the opportunities it offered for her future, 
including a global exchange program through which N.M. planned to spend 
a semester in Ireland and specialized introduction to the medical 
career courses N.M. wanted to take in preparation for becoming a 
doctor.
 N.M. also participated in a field hockey league in preparation for 
a college scholarship and eventually she had to quit the league and 
competitive playing due to harms caused to her by Meta and TikTok.
 Unfortunately, N.M. did not get better. What E.M. did not know and 
had no way of knowing at that time was that Instagram and TikTok were 
causing the harms to her daughter. N.M. was dependent on their products 
and that they were fostering, connecting, and enabling harmful 
connections for their own gain.
 Instagram and TikTok were targeting N.M. on the basis of gender and 
other perceived vulnerabilities, while at the same time marketing 
themselves as fun and safe products for teens. Instagram and TikTok 
knew about the harms their products and programming decisions were 
causing and made the calculated business decision to keep the rest of 
the world in the dark. Millions of American children, including N.M., 
were harmed as a result.
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 In October 2021, N.M. began having chest pains. E.M. took her to 
urgent care, thinking it was a muscular issue. Instead, urgent care 
rushed N.M. to the hospital where she was admitted for a week with 
bradycardia and anorexia nervosa.
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 Shortly after N.M. was admitted to the hospital, E.M. went home to 
grab some things and quickly returned. When she returned, N.M. was in 
tears. She asked her mother how her phone knew what she was doing and 
said that she felt like someone was watching her. Then she showed her 
mother her TikTok For You Page and the videos TikTok had only just 
started aiming at her--videos that were focused on how she could 
convince doctors that she was eating and that she did not need to be 
sent away for treatment.
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 This included things like encouraging her to drink water before a 
weigh-in and other tips and tricks. N.M. had never received these 
videos on the TikTok product before, but TikTok began sending them 
moments after she was admitted to the hospital and left in her hospital 
room.
 TikTok and Meta collect thousands of data points on every user, 
from device ID to browser history, IP address, estimated age, 
education, consumer preferences, health history, and other categories 
that are incredibly invasive and inherently harmful--particularly given 
the manner in which these Meta and TikTok choose to use that 
information. While it is unknown how precisely TikTok determined that 
N.M. was in the hospital and seeking treatment for her eating disorder, 
TikTok knew and decided to target her with specialized subject matters 
aimed at helping her hide the eating disorder TikTok helped cause in 
the first place. All N.M. could think about was being released so that 
she could lose the weight she was forced to gain.
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 N.M. began intensive therapy but was hospitalized again three 
months later, in April 2022.
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 This time, she was admitted to a facility that made clear things 
were now out of her parents' hands and that the level of care she would 
need if she did not make more progress would require a rehabilitation 
facility. N.M. committed to making more progress and was allowed to 
return home, where she worked to stay in recovery.
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 As a result of her compulsion to interact with the Instagram and 
TikTok products, and specifically due to recommendations and content 
Instagram and TikTok selected and showed to N.M., a minor user of their 
products, N.M. subsequently developed injuries including, but not 
limited to, social media compulsion, sleep deprivation, anxiety, 
depression, body dysmorphia, anorexia nervosa, and significant hair 
loss among other harmful effects, which may cause or contribute to 
additional harms.
 Meta and TikTok designed their products to promote social 
comparison and body dysmorphia by providing beauty filters that 
encouraged users to present as having slimmer faces, smoother skin, 
bigger eyes, larger lips, and more.
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 Meta and TikTok designed their products to frustrate parents like 
E.M. from exercising their rights and duties as parents to monitor and 
limit their children's use of Meta and TikTok' products.
 Meta and TikTok designed their products to allow minors to use, 
become addicted to, and abuse their products without the consent of the 
users' parents, like E.M. Meta and TikTok designed their products to be 
attractive nuisances to underage users but failed to exercise the 
ordinary care owed to underage business invitees to prevent the 
rampant, foreseeable, and deleterious impact on minor users that access 
Meta and TikTok' products.
 N.M. and E.M. were not aware of the addictive and mentally harmful 
effects of Meta and TikTok' Instagram and TikTok products when N.M. 
began using those products. Meta and TikTok not only failed to warn 
them of the dangers of social media compulsion, sleep deprivation, and 
problematic use of Meta and TikTok' products, but misrepresented the 
safety, utility, and non-addictive properties of their products. 
Executives at both Meta and TikTok made public statements about the 
safety of their products and testified under oath before the U.S. 
Senate as to the same even though they knew or should have known of the 
harms their products were causing.
 As a result of N.M.'s extensive and problematic use of the 
Instagram and TikTok products she developed numerous mental and 
physical health conditions. The long-term physical harms caused by her 
anorexia remain unknown, but she has been informed by doctors that it 
is possible her long-term health will suffer, including but not limited 
to things like bone density, her ability to have children, and heart 
health. N.M. lost large amounts of hair that still has not grown back. 
She still suffers from anxiety, depression, anorexia nervosa, and 
social anxieties she did not have before her use of Meta and TikTok' 
products.
 N.M. attends college but her dreams of attending a top tier college 
with a sports scholarship were destroyed when Meta and TikTok 
weaponized their products and exploited her for their own gain. She no 
longer plays field hockey and still struggles with addiction to 
Instagram and TikTok.
j. Patterson v. Meta et al.
 On May 14, 2022, 18-year-old Payton Gendron entered Tops Friendly 
Markets supermarket on the East Side of Buffalo and murdered ten Black 
citizens in a heinous act of racist brutality. As Gendron's attorney 
acknowledged, ``the racist hate that motivated this crime was spread 
through on-line platforms.'' Gendron did not grow up in a prejudiced 
household and did not hold racist beliefs until he began using and 
became dependent on social media. Gendron wrote that ``when I was like 
12, that was when I didn't dislike American blacks and liked listening 
to black music.''
 Gendron became addicted to social media products when he was a 
minor under his parents' legal control accessing his social media 
accounts multiple times per hour and at all hours of the night. He did 
not initially seek out racist material, but because social media apps 
were expressly designed to maximize engagement over his psychological 
and ethical well-being, they foisted upon him unsolicited material 
promoting racist hate and violence. Exploiting Gendron's incomplete 
frontal lobe development, they targeted him with increasingly extreme 
and violent content and connections which promoted racism, 
antisemitism, and gun violence. This was no mere accident or byproduct 
of poor software engineering; rather, these algorithms were functioning 
as designed and intended.
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 The material force-fed to Gendron progressed from white supremacist 
screeds to livestream videos of mass shootings and other extreme 
depictions of racist violence. This material inspired Gendron to move 
forward with his murderous plan. He explained:

 Knowing that so many other attackers like myself are out there 
 rooting for me gives me quite a bit of confidence. Every single 
 White man has everything to lose by doing nothing, and 
 everything to gain by taking action. Yes I do find inspiration 
 from other attackers.

 Gendron's ability to livestream his racist murder furnished the 
final motivation to carry out his evil plan. With haunting insight, 
Gendron explained how Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant's 
livestreaming of his March 2019 massacre increased the power of his 
racist message exponentially over the written statement released by 
Charleston shooter Dylann Roof:

 Dylann Roof's manifesto is not that bad Livestreaming this 
 attack makes a 1000x greater impact I most likely wouldn't even 
 know about the real problems in the world if Brenton Tarrant 
 didn't livestream his attack.

 Gendron wrote that livestreaming the attack would help him overcome 
his fear and any lingering sympathy for human life that could dampen 
his murderous intent.

 It is very difficult for a normal person even with all the 
 information to carry out an attack that will kill another human 
 being, or the fact that you may die that day I think that live 
 steaming this attack gives me some motivation in the way that I 
 know that some people will be cheering for me.
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 The New York Court sentenced Gendron to life without parole, and he 
currently faces Federal death penalty charges. At his sentencing 
hearing, he acknowledged the web-based source of his radicalization:

 I cannot express how much I regret all the decisions I made 
 leading up to my actions on May 14th. I did a terrible thing 
 that day. I shot and killed people because they were black. 
 Looking back now, I can't believe I actually did it. I believed 
 what I read on-line and acted out of hate.

 Gendron's rampage was neither an accident nor a surprise. 
Teenagers' incomplete neurological development makes them ideal targets 
for Respondents' addictive algorithms and highly susceptible to 
radicalization. In the case of young male adolescents such as Gendron, 
social media platforms' addictive features (autoplay, infinite scroll, 
notifications, and social validation features including ``likes''), 
when paired with engagement-maximizing algorithms, actively encourage, 
assist, and facilitate the spread of racist, antisemitic, and terrorist 
propaganda. Taking full advantage of the incomplete development of 
Gendron's frontal lobe, Instagram, YouTube, and Snapchat maintained his 
product engagement by targeting him with increasingly extreme and 
violent content and connections which, upon information and belief, 
promoted racism, antisemitism, and violence. Because the Instagram, 
YouTube, and Snapchat algorithms were designed with the singular goal 
of maximizing Gendron's product engagement over his psychological, 
emotional, and ethical well-being, they directed him to sites and other 
users promoting hate and violence. As evidenced by this internal Meta 
document, these products were functioning as designed and intended.
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 The social media companies and streaming companies that Gendron 
used not only could have foreseen the significant radicalization risk 
posed by their apps--they actually saw the risk. Meta personnel aware 
that its recommendation algorithms ``are prone to recommending harmful 
content.'' In one experiment from 2019, found that in just 3 weeks by 
following just this recommended content, the test user's News Feed had 
become a near constant barrage of polarizing content, misinformation, 
and violence. Google recognized, anticipated, and even rebuked internal 
attempts to mitigate harms to their young users. Facebook's Director of 
Content Policy explained that not ``not only did we anticipate murders 
and suicides on Live, we anticipated far worse (all of one of our top 5 
predictions have played out).'' When it acquired Twitch, Amazon knew 
that the product was used by criminals to livestream criminal activity 
and that the ability to livestream acts of violence using Twitch's 
product motivates criminals to follow through with their plans.
R. First Amendment Concerns
a. Companies Need Not Remove Content to Design Safe Products
 ``At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each 
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs 
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.'' These words, 
written by Justice Kennedy over 30 years ago, represents the bedrock 
essence of the First Amendment. Importantly, the protection applies 
both to speaker and listener: it defends not only the right of the 
speaker to be heard but also the right of everybody in the audience to 
listen. The First Protection is a most important repudiation of the 
censorious instinct of those in power, taking refuge in the false 
security of consensus, to stifle the voices of those with whom they 
disagree.
 What it does not protect, however, is misconduct. Social media 
companies regularly insist that they are immune from liability under 
every possible circumstance: that Section 230 protects them from 
liability arising from third-party content while everything else 
associated with their platforms should be treated as first-party 
speech. But as the ongoing, nationwide litigation against these 
companies has demonstrated, these companies can manifestly conform 
their conduct to the standards of a reasonable business without 
removing, editing, deleting, or moderating a single piece of content.
 History has consistently shown that censorship by the state is 
never the panacea so envisioned by those in power. The challenge before 
us is that emergent and miraculous technologies run into human 
tendencies as old as civilization itself: greed, power, ego, and 
control. Our ingenuity at designing social media platforms, complex 
algorithms, and artificial intelligence is despoiled by the inexorable 
need to maximize profits over safety or to serve other ignoble ends. We 
simply cannot help ourselves, and so the law must step in as a bulwark 
to protect society from the excesses and appetites of the few.
 Let me sharpen the point plainly: Congress should take no action to 
remove or moderate lawful content from any social media platform, no 
matter how deplorable, reprehensible, or offensive it may seem. After 
all, esteemed and learned Senators: to whom shall you award the right 
to decide which speech is harmful and who is the harmful speaker? To 
determine in advance for you what you can read, to relieve you of the 
responsibility of hearing what you might not wish to hear? What 
Congress should endeavor to do--and what my law firm has fought to do 
over these past four years--is hold social media companies (indeed, all 
companies) to the same standard of reasonable care and safe product 
design as every other industry. Such bedrock standards of care, 
referred to as a ``common law'' duty, are fully compatible and 
consistent with our first and most important Amendment.
b. The First Amendment Protects Speech, not Conduct
 It is axiomatic that the First Amendment protects speech, not 
conduct; but crucially, it is also true that conduct is not 
automatically shielded by the First Amendment simply because it 
involves speech. Federal case law makes clear that generally applicable 
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement 
has an incidental effect on speech. When a bookstore sells a book, 
there can be no liability for the substance and content of that book. 
But when a publisher targets your children, constructs a bookstore like 
a casino, interrupts your children's school and sleep hours with 
notifications of new books, and deluges your children with a force-fed 
feast of psychologically discordant material for the express goal of 
ensuring your children never leave--in these circumstances, the First 
Amendment offers no refuge for outrageous misconduct.
 Throughout the country, in lawsuit after lawsuit, SMVLC has sought 
to hold social media companies accountable to a civil jury for the 
design of their products: the decision to include intentionally 
addictive platform features like infinite scroll and engagement-
optimized algorithms, the manipulation of social validation principles 
such as ``likes'' and ``FOMO'' to hook children, and the use of ``dark 
pattern'' designs that frustrate the ability of both users and parents 
to realize the danger and take steps to protect themselves. Neither 
these lawsuits nor any act by Congress should seek to limit any 
platforms' capacity to engage in content moderation--to filter, 
prioritize, or label various messages, videos, or other content their 
users wish to post. Indeed, presenting third-party content is a key 
component of social media, but how they do so is the key issue.
c. AI-Driven Algorithms and Chat Bots are Not Speech
 ``Speech is expressive. Speech communicates ideas. Speech has a 
message even when the message is not clear or is open to 
interpretation.'' This observation, made last year by District Court 
Judge Anne C. Conway in Garcia v. Character Techs., Inc., encapsulates 
why artificial intelligence is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection. Simply put, the First Amendment protects the freedom to 
think and speak as an inalienable human right. Indeed, leading scholars 
have explained the deeply concerning consequences of assuming machine 
speech is legally equivalent to, and deserving of, the same 
constitutional rights as human speech.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1495, 1496 
(2013); Helen Norton, Manipulation and the First Amendment, 30 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 221, 223 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 By contrast, the ``editorial decisions'' for which social media 
companies seek constitutional protection consist of electronic impulses 
of artificial intelligence-driven algorithms designed to exploit the 
neurological immaturity of minor users and maximize their engagement by 
deluging them with psychologically discordant material that they are 
not seeking but from which they cannot look away. These artificial-
intelligence driven algorithms are software, lines of code designed and 
written by software engineers to respond to specific variables without 
any underlying cognitive process or communicative intent. And once 
designed, these algorithms go forth and act in accordance with their 
marching orders and design parameters. In this regard, social media 
companies exercise no editorial discretion whatsoever--they designed 
recommendation algorithms that act based on data analytics and user 
metrics, not upon any editorial judgments by the companies as to 
desirable or undesirable content. Their algorithms could be designed to 
optimize a user's content recommendations for happiness, optimize for 
wellness, optimize for education--or, in the case of social media 
companies, optimize for screen time and engagement.
 Of course, there is also the point of what happens when social 
media companies let their AI algorithms off the leash. As Justice Amy 
Coney Barrett explained:

 Consider, for instance, how platforms use algorithms to 
 prioritize and remove content on their feeds. Assume that human 
 beings decide to remove posts promoting a particular political 
 candidate or advocating some position on a public-health issue. 
 If they create an algorithm to help them identify and delete 
 that content, the First Amendment protects their exercise of 
 editorial judgment--even if the algorithm does most of the 
 deleting without a person in the loop. In that event, the 
 algorithm would simply implement human beings' inherently 
 expressive choice ``to exclude a message [they] did not like 
 from'' their speech compilation.

 But what if a platform's algorithm just presents automatically 
 to each user whatever the algorithm thinks the user will like--
 e.g., content similar to posts with which the user previously 
 engaged? The First Amendment implications of the Florida and 
 Texas laws might be different for that kind of algorithm. And 
 what about AI, which is rapidly evolving? What if a platform's 
 owners hand the reins to an AI tool and ask it simply to remove 
 ``hateful'' content? If the AI relies on large language models 
 to determine what is ``hateful'' and should be removed, has a 
 human being with First Amendment rights made an inherently 
 expressive ``choice . . . not to propound a particular point of 
 view''? In other words, technology may attenuate the connection 
 between content-moderation actions (e.g., removing posts) and 
 human beings' constitutionally protected right to ``decide for 
 [themselves] the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 
 consideration, and adherence.'' So the way platforms use this 
 sort of technology might have constitutional significance.

 Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 746 (2024).
 Certainly, algorithms could be designed to act upon specific 
editorial judgments, such as to rank or prioritize certain types of 
content over others based on the substance of that content (e.g., 
emphasizing pro-Ukrainian content over pro-Russian content or pro-
Israeli content over antisemitic content). In fact, both President 
Trump and Congress previously recognized the power and danger of 
content-based algorithms in the hands of massive tech companies. In 
August 2020, President Trump issued an Executive Order finding that 
``the spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and 
owned by companies in [China] continues to threaten the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.'' President 
Trump determined that TikTok raised concerns, noting that the platform 
``automatically captures vast swaths of information from its users'' 
and is susceptible to being used to further the interests of the 
Chinese Government.'' Against this backdrop, Congress passed the 
Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act 
(PAFACA), which sought to respond to concerns that TikTok--whose parent 
company is subject to the control of China--could use its sophisticated 
algorithm to harm U.S. national interests. Lawmakers recognized that a 
foreign adversary could use content-recommendation algorithms to 
emphasize and spread polarizing, misinforming, or otherwise 
destabilizing content throughout the U.S. The Supreme Court rejected 
TikTok's challenge of the Act under the First Amendment, holding that 
while ``laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny 
when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content 
preference,'' such scrutiny is ``unwarranted when the differential 
treatment is `justified by some special characteristic' of the 
particular [speaker] being regulated.'' TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 
U.S. 56, 72 (2025).
 In sum, the social media companies' artificial intelligence 
algorithms cannot be fairly characterized as constitutionally protected 
``editorial judgments;'' they serve no communicative purpose, are not 
``speech,'' and are not entitled to First Amendment protection.
d. Not All Speech is Protected Speech
 Even if social media algorithms and artificial intelligence 
chatbots are to be considered expressive speech, the question remains 
whether they depict protected speech. The First Amendment historically 
permits restrictions upon the content of speech in several limited 
areas. For example, it has never been deemed an abridgement of free 
speech to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct 
was carried out by means of language. Speech integral to illegal 
conduct--e.g., defamation--cannot excuse the wrongful conduct 
underpinning it.
 Another example includes speech obscene to minors. On this point, 
little elaboration is necessary: the First Amendment does not protect 
adults from preying on and directing sexual communications toward 
minors. Yet time and time again, social media platform features and 
recommendation algorithms make it much easier to connect children 
directly to adult predators. And there have been countless instances of 
AI chatbots engaging in, and promoting, sexually explicit 
``conversations'' with minors. This is no mere thought experiment or 
future problem. This ever-present danger to children is here among us 
right now.
 And finally, there has always existed some categories of speech 
that have been historically unprotected yet have not yet been 
specifically identified or discussed in the case law. A growing number 
of scholars have called for an exception to the First Amendment for 
``manipulative expression,'' which functions more akin to content than 
speech. Indeed, the First Amendment already recognizes a special 
category for commercial speech, motivated by the impact of 
comparatively powerful speakers' comments on comparatively vulnerable 
listeners' rights. The recognition within the First Amendment of the 
disparity in power and information between speakers and listeners in 
certain circumstances, and the resulting frustration of listeners' 
rights, compels carving out efforts to regulate manipulative speech.
 Thank you all again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify 
before this Committee and I look forward to answering your questions.

 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Bergman. And thank you for 
telling your client's story. And I want to say to the moms and 
dads who are here, thank you for being here. Thank you for 
standing up and remembering and fighting for your kids.
 I will say, as the father of two teenage girls, you are 
living every parent's nightmare. And I don't know a parent of 
adolescents or teenagers who is not terrified of the tragic 
forces that targeted your children. So, thank you. Mr. Carson.

STATEMENT OF BRAD CARSON, PRESIDENT, AMERICANS FOR RESPONSIBLE 
 INNOVATION

 Mr. Carson. Chairman Cruz, Senator Schatz, and members of 
the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify 
as we mark the 30th anniversary of Section 230. I also want to 
give special thanks to Chairman Cruz for his determined and 
prescient work to pass the Take It Down law, a law which ARI 
supported, and which will make a difference in the effort to 
hold Big Tech platforms accountable.
 As we discuss harms to children online in the wake of 
Section 230, the Take It Down Act is a commendable effort to 
correct the historical course. Thirty years ago, Congress 
passed Section 230 to address a narrow problem, whether online 
platforms could moderate content without assuming publisher 
liability.
 Today, the law is widely criticized for enabling unchecked 
harms online. As we confront artificial intelligence, we should 
ask ourselves a simple question, will we repeat the mistakes of 
Section 230, or will we learn from them? There are two 
competing interpretations of how Section 230 went so wrong.
 One view is that Section 230 was ill-conceived from the 
beginning, and that ordinary Tort and First Amendment case-by-
case development through the common law would have produced a 
more nuanced and flexible body of law. Rather than allowing the 
development of rules through our legal system, however, Section 
230 froze answers in place to questions the law had not yet 
fully considered, much less answered.
 Another view is that the statute was defensible, but courts 
interpreted it far beyond what Congress intended, providing 
platforms with legal immunity, not only for user content, but 
extending legal protections to include significant algorithmic 
amplification and product design choices.
 Regardless of which is more accurate, both assessments 
recognize that the resulting legal regime has been unable to 
hold platforms accountable in proportion to the harms they have 
enabled. Families whose children were exploited online or 
harmed by algorithmically amplified content have too often 
discovered that the law offers them little recourse.
 Section 230 may be the 26 words that created the internet, 
but they also are the 26 words that have visited irrevocable 
harm to generations of children. I recount the history of 
Section 230 because Congress now faces a structurally 
equivalent moment regarding artificial intelligence.
 Some have suggested freezing State law developments while 
enacting no comprehensive Federal regulation of the technology. 
Section 230 is what I would call a meta law. A law that 
determines who governs an emerging industry, rather than how 
that governance would occur. Enacted when the Internet was 
still in its infancy, Section 230s consequences have proven 
extremely difficult to correct once the industry matured.
 In practice, the very first meta law on technology often 
becomes the last major law, because it determines who has the 
power to resist future corrections. I should be clear that 
Section 230 should not be interpreted to immunize the provider 
of a generative AI system for harms caused by system outputs.
 Section 230 protects platforms from liability for content, 
as the statute says, provided by another information content 
provider. That framework assumes active users and passive 
hosts. Generative AI systems do not fit that model. A user 
provides a prompt, but the company designs the model, selects 
the training data, fine-tunes the system, and deploys it with 
parameters of its choosing.
 The resulting output is not third-party content. It is the 
product of the AI system that the company created. Even though 
that answer does seem obvious, Congress should clarify the law 
before lower courts extend immunity further than the text 
permits. The most relevant lesson of Section 230 is that 
Congress should not establish broad, essentially unchangeable 
immunity for an industry that it does not yet understand, and 
its future development can scarcely be charted.
 The Federal preemption of State laws related to artificial 
intelligence would be a repeat of Section 230s tragic history, 
replete with all the errors of the former and without any of 
the latter's corrective measures. There are many forms of legal 
stagnation that Section 230 has caused.
 I would urge the Committee not to repeat these same 
mistakes as we embrace new technologies yet again. Thank you 
for your time. I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Brad R. Carson, President, 
 Americans for Responsible Innovation
 Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
Committee:

 Thirty years ago, Congress passed Section 230 to address a narrow 
but critical problem: whether platforms could moderate content without 
assuming publisher liability. Today, that law is widely- and rightly-
criticized for enabling unchecked harms. As we confront artificial 
intelligence, we must ask, ``Will we repeat the mistakes of Section 
230, or will we learn from them?''
 Some believe that Section 230 was ill-conceived from the very 
beginning and that ordinary tort and First Amendment case-by-case 
development through the common law would have produced a more nuanced 
and flexible body of law than did the broad statutory immunity of 
Section 230. On this view, Section 230 did, it should be acknowledged, 
accomplish one important task.
 Subsection (c)(2) of Section 230, which grants immunity to 
platforms for good faith content moderation decisions, directly 
addressed a real concern created by cases such as Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy. In Stratton Oakmont, a trial court held that a platform's 
attempt to curate content exposed it to liability as a publisher, thus 
penalizing the responsible content moderation. In correcting this 
erroneous court ruling, the protection provided by Section 230(c)(2) 
was very reasonable. However, subsection (c)(1) of Section 230, the 
broad immunity for third-party content, was not necessary. The common 
law and First Amendment were capable of producing the rules governing 
liability for third-party content, and the courts could have developed 
those rules over time in response to actual harm caused. Rather than 
allowing the development of these rules to occur, Congress in Section 
230 froze the existing answers to questions that the law had not yet 
fully considered.
 Another view is that Section 230 was defensible as enacted, however 
the courts interpreted it far beyond what Congress intended. On this 
view, the primary error occurred in the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. 
America Online in 1997, where the court eliminated the long-standing 
distinction between publishers and distributors. Publishers are those 
entities that exercise editorial control over content and therefore 
bear full liability for the publication of that content. Distributors, 
on the other hand, are those entities that merely transmit content 
knowing its character and bear a limited liability based upon their 
role. Before the enactment of Section 230, a distributor that knew of 
particular harmful content and failed to take action against that 
content could be held liable for failing to act to prevent the 
distribution of the content. The Fourth Circuit interpreted Section 230 
to eliminate that distinction altogether, holding that the statute 
granted platforms immunity from liability even when the platform had 
actual notice of the existence of specific harms and chose to take no 
action to prevent the continued distribution of the harmful content.
 Following the decision in Zeran, subsequent decisions extended that 
immunity further still, to include algorithmic amplification, product 
design, and to business decisions that had nothing to do with the 
hosting of user-generated content. The statute was not the problem, 
according to this analysis, but rather the interpretation of the 
statute went awry.
 Regardless of which is more accurate, both assessments of Section 
230 recognize that the resulting legal regime has been unable to hold 
platforms accountable in proportion to the harms they have enabled. 
Families whose children are victimized by predators have been denied 
access to the courtroom. Parents whose teenage child experienced years 
of self-harm associated with foreseeable algorithmic targeting and 
engagement-optimization design choices discovered that the law too 
often offers them no realistic path to accountability. The social media 
platforms have borne few of the costs of the harms they have 
facilitated. Rather, those costs have fallen to the individuals that 
have sadly learned that the law affords them little protection when 
technology goes wrong.
 I recount the controversial history of Section 230 because Congress 
now finds itself facing a structurally equivalent moment regarding 
artificial intelligence. Many have suggested that we freeze state law 
developments while enacting no comprehensive Federal regulation of the 
technology. No matter whether the fault rests with the statute itself 
or with the interpretations that followed, the ultimate result of 
Section 230 was a meta-law--a law that determines who will govern an 
emerging industry instead of how that governance will occur--enacted 
for an industry that was in its infancy and whose consequences proved 
nearly uncorrectable once the industry matured. That is the error that 
Congress is being encouraged to repeat with respect to artificial 
intelligence. In practice, the first meta-law often becomes the last 
major law because it determines who has power to resist future 
corrections.
I. Section 230 Should Not Be Interpreted To Immunize Generative AI 
 Outputs
 I would like to make clear that Section 230 should not be 
interpreted to immunize the provider of a generative AI system for 
harms caused by the system's own outputs. Section 230(c)(1) grants 
immunity to platforms for the content ``provided by another information 
content provider.'' Platforms receive this immunity because the content 
posted by users originates with the user; the platform is merely the 
host, not the author. The statute contemplates a world in which there 
exist active users and passive platforms. The latter are generally 
immunized from the actions of the former. (Of course, when a platform 
merely hosts content posted by users--including content those users 
generated with AI tools--Section 230 may still protect that hosting 
function. But the company that designs, trains, and deploys a model 
should not be treated as a passive host of the model's own speech-like 
outputs.)
 A large language model does not provide third-party content in the 
way contemplated by Section 230(c)(1). A user provides a prompt to the 
model. The model, having been trained on a dataset selected by the 
company, having been fine-tuned by the company, and having been 
deployed with parameters determined by the company, produces the 
output. Therefore, the company is responsible, in significant measure, 
for the creation of the content. Pursuant to the statute's literal 
text, the immunity of Section 230 does not apply to artificial 
intelligence; the output of Claude or ChatGPT is not the ``information 
content'' of ``another.'' I believe, though, that Congress should 
clarify this before lower courts, following the Zeran precedent, extend 
immunity further than the text of Section 230 permits and establish an 
erroneous precedent that will require yet another generation to 
correct. Legislation introduced by Senators Hawley and Durbin would 
make clear that Section 230 does not apply to generative AI, and I 
would urge Congress to move swiftly to enact it.
 I ask Congress to act even though the textual answer seems plain. 
The lesson of Section 230 is precisely that textually plain answers do 
not always survive contact with courts under pressure to resolve novel 
cases quickly and in the absence of congressional guidance. Zeran was 
not an unreasonable decision given the legal vacuum in which the Fourth 
Circuit found itself. It was, however, a consequential one. Congress 
should not again create the conditions in which courts are forced to 
improvise and then spend a generation arguing about whether the 
improvisation was correct.
II. Congress Should Not Create An Industry-Wide Immunity For An 
 Emerging Industry That It Cannot Yet Predict
 While the question of whether Section 230 applies to AI can be 
clearly answered in the negative, the more relevant lesson of Section 
230 is that Congress should not establish broad, essentially 
unchangeable immunity for an industry that it does not yet understand 
and whose future development can scarcely be charted.
 When Congress passed Section 230 in 1996, it could not have 
imagined that a few websites would soon control virtually all public 
communication, influence election results, and have market 
capitalization larger than many countries' entire GDPs. Indeed, in 
1996, just 7 percent of Americans had access to the internet, Netscape 
was the dominant browser, Google did not exist, and Facebook's launch 
was eight years away.
 Yet Section 230 shielded an entire infant industry from legal 
responsibility. The immunity has been difficult to repeal as the infant 
industry has grown beyond anyone's imagination. In retrospect, creating 
broad immunity for an emerging industry should be seen as a category 
error disguised as prudence. We do not permanently exempt a child from 
the law because the child appears harmless today; we calibrate 
accountability to capability and impose it consistently as capability 
grows. That is what a responsible legal system does. Section 230 did 
not do that.
III. Preemption Without A Federal Framework Would Repeat Section 230s 
 Mistakes
 The discussion regarding Federal preemption of state laws related 
to artificial intelligence is worthy of separate treatment here, 
because it is not merely analogous to the historical development of 
Section 230; it is a repeat of Section 230s history, replete with the 
errors of the former, and without any of the latter's corrective 
measures.
 Section 230 created two types of legal stagnation. The first was 
interpretive. Because Section 230 created a broad immunity, courts 
never developed common law governing platform liability for actual 
harms. The second type of stagnation was legislative. Once Section 230 
became entrenched, amending or replacing it required a political 
consensus that proved nearly impossible to assemble. State legislatures 
found their efforts preempted before they could be tested. For its 
part, Congress could not create new legal structures without first 
eliminating an existing statute that had become a ``third rail'' 
politically. As such, Section 230 remains frozen in place as technology 
continues to revolutionize the world.
 Similarly, a Federal immunity toward AI--which is what the 
preemption proposals offered in Congress to date really are--will lead 
to the same stagnation, but more rapidly, and for a technology whose 
potential implications are much larger than those of social media. 
Consider what preemption without a Federal framework actually 
accomplishes. It removes a state's authority to apply its tort law, 
consumer protection statutes, and civil liability regime to AI systems. 
It prevents plaintiffs from having access to courtrooms prior to the 
development of a Federal alternative to receive them. It informs courts 
that they are under no obligation to develop a body of common law 
regarding AI liability, while providing no alternative for them to 
apply. In short, it is a legal vacuum created by Congress to which 
neither the courts nor the legislative branch can respond. This is the 
Section 230 model, deliberately reproduced.
 If Congress wishes to preempt state laws governing AI, then the 
cost of that preemption must include a genuine Federal framework that 
replaces the space that the preemption vacates. This Federal framework 
could include, first, a flexible Federal structure that assigns 
liability standards to agencies based on categories of risk, allowing 
those standards to evolve as the technology does rather than locking 
them into statute. Second, the framework could help develop markets for 
independent AI auditing and safety certification, established through 
procurement preferences and safe harbors conditional on third-party 
review, to create accountability incentives in the marketplace. Third, 
the framework could insist on mandatory liability insurance calibrated 
to a system's capability and risk profile, compensating victims while 
creating pricing disciplines that accumulate with experience. None of 
these approaches require Congress to forecast the nature of AI in ten 
years. To the contrary, that is one of the advantages they possess over 
broad immunity. Such a Federal framework establishes accountability 
proportional to capability, rather than immunity inversely proportional 
to foresight.
IV. Conclusion
 Section 230 was an understandable, if lamentable, case of poor 
foresight exacerbated by a failure to permit the law to evolve as the 
technology evolved. The people who have suffered the most as a result 
of that failure have been the families, the teenagers, and the 
individual victims who discovered that the law offers them nothing when 
technology harms them.
 We should not repeat that story with artificial intelligence. Meta-
laws and broad immunities for emerging industries rarely age well, and 
the lesson of Section 230 is that they age worst of all for the people 
least able to protect themselves. Congress has better tools available, 
including frameworks that scale with capability, standards that evolve 
with the technology, and accountability that grows as power grows. The 
choice is between mechanisms that establish accountability proportional 
to capability and immunities that are inversely proportional to 
foresight.
 Thank you. I am happy to respond to your questions.

 The Chairman. Thank you to each of the witnesses. Let's 
start off for Ms. Keller and Ms. Farid Johnson. With the 
benefit of 30 years of hindsight, what is the worst or most 
offensive use of Section 230 as a liability shield that you 
have seen?
 Ms. Keller. So, I will give you two answers. One is about 
racial discrimination. The second is about Government 
censorship. So the first is a case called Vargas. That was the 
one decision out of a cluster of cases.
 And the general allegation was that Facebook was offering 
racially based targeting, gender based targeting, et cetera, 
for ads for housing and employment and credit, which is 
prohibited by Federal law. And what makes that a--not a 230 
case, in my mind, is that the user uploaded something totally 
legal, just an apartment listing, and Facebook added the thing 
that made it violate the law, which was the racial targeting.
 So, that is my Exhibit A. And I should repeat, Facebook 
alleged that, you know, we don't know exactly what happened. 
But the second is a case called Sikhs for Justice v. Facebook. 
This was an American court plaintiffs alleging that Facebook 
had silenced them based on pressure from the Indian government. 
And the court ruled that under Section 230, the platform had 
the right to do that, which I think is doctrinally correct. But 
it is very sad, right?
 Section 230 exists to protect users. It is there to give a 
spine to the spineless if they want one. And having platforms 
back down when they could have done better is unfortunate. But 
thanks to Section 230, hopefully another platform can come 
along and do better.
 The Chairman. Ms. Farid Johnson.
 Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. I am actually going to use 
the example of a case that I think demonstrates both some of 
the cynicism in seeking 230 protection when it is unwarranted, 
and that demonstrates as well the limitations of the provision.
 There is a case called Lemon v. Snap in which a bereaved 
parent sued the company that is the parent company of Snapchat 
for its allegedly negligent design of a speed filter. That 
speed filter encouraged users of the app to drive at excessive 
speeds. Snap responded to the complaint by seeking 230 
immunity.
 And the appellate went to the appellate court. The 
appellate court noted that a platform can still face liability 
for its provision of content neutral tools, where the liability 
stemmed from the platform's own acts, such as designing, here 
in this case, and making available to users the speed filter 
and the corresponding reward system.
 And it wasn't about the content posted by the users. It was 
about the actions of the platform itself.
 The Chairman. So, let me ask a follow up. A key motivation 
for Congress passing Section 230 was to incentivize a 
flourishing marketplace of ideas online. As I explained in my 
opening statement, I want to find ways to curb Big Tech 
censorship so that we have more speech, not less speech in 
online platforms. For Ms. Keller and Ms. Farid Johnson, how 
could Congress constitutionally modify Section 230 to protect 
or incentivize more speech, not less?
 Ms. Keller. Well, here again, I have two answers. And the 
first is about jawboning and pressure from Government. The 
second is about empowering users and diversifying our options. 
So I will get through the first one, and you tell me if you 
still have time for a second one. So, I didn't love the Biden 
Administration pressure that was illustrated in the Murthy 
case.
 That said, having been on the receiving end of pressure 
like that, the tone in that record looked like the tone that 
Government officials from all parties sometimes take in high-
handed demands that platforms conform to their content 
preferences. So in that case, the plaintiffs got unprecedented 
discovery and still couldn't establish any actual causation 
that led to their speech being suppressed.
 And this led to the Supreme Court issuing a really 
problematic ruling on standing that for the real victims of 
real jawboning in the future, it is going to be harder for them 
to get into court because of that. We are in an era right now 
of jawboning that is unprecedented in my lifetime. Brendan Carr 
is at it again.
 We see him pressuring news outlets now. We are seeing 
highly politicized enforcement at the FTC of laws that are 
supposed to be neutral consumer protection and antitrust laws. 
All of this leads to unprecedented vulnerability of our speech 
and communication to this kind of pressure, because as you 
pointed out, Chairman, as both of you pointed out, all of our 
speech is very dependent on these big private companies right 
now.
 So, you know, we are seeing this playing out on the screen 
in front of us with platforms. Maybe it is also taking place in 
back rooms. But you know, right on TV, we can see back in 
August 2024, President Trump threatened to jail Mark 
Zuckerberg.
 In January 2025, Zuckerberg very publicly announced changes 
to Facebook's and Instagram's speech policies to conform with 
the current Administration's preferences. He did this in this 
like hostage video. It was very strange. And also in January 
settled a $25 million lawsuit that Facebook was going to win 
and paid that out in a suit from President Trump.
 And when President Trump was asked if these changes were a 
result of his threats to jail a CEO of a platform, he said, 
probably. This is crazy. This should not be possible in today's 
America. The First Amendment should preclude it.
 The any work that you can do, or you perhaps are doing, to 
make it more possible to get into court and to get past the 
standing restrictions from Murthy, I think would be extremely 
important. But in the meantime, as I mentioned, Section 230 can 
give smaller platforms more of a spine.
 The Chairman. And Ms. Farid Johnson, you can answer briefly 
because our time has expired.
 Ms. Johnson. I would just say briefly, Senator, that the 
way we see the best way to amend 230 is to condition its 
protections on the transparency, limited data privacy, and 
interoperability requirements we suggest.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Ranking Member Schatz.
 Senator Schatz. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to all of 
the testifiers. I just wanted to say, at the risk of getting 
the Chairman in trouble in his home state, he is doing an 
extraordinary job of leading this on a bipartisan basis, and 
also specifically on the question of jawboning.
 I think without his leadership, there would have been fewer 
guardrails on the current jawboning. But I also take your 
point, Ms. Keller, that the jawboning occurred in the previous 
Administration as well. And the fog of war, the urgency of 
protecting people from the COVID-19 pandemic does not entirely 
justify the way that Federal Government officials interacted 
with private sector companies.
 So I am just glad that we now have, in three dimensions, in 
real time, examples of both parties doing this. And so, it is 
no longer theoretical that the door swings both ways in 
Washington, and this is going to bite us all in the butt, and 
we have to fix it. We now know it. And so, I am just pleased 
that Senator Cruz has set the platform for us to work on this 
on a nonpartisan basis, not a bipartisan basis.
 Mr. Bergman, your lawsuits are interesting to me. I am not 
a lawyer, but I am particularly interested in the kind of 
expansive view of what the platforms view as 230 providing them 
a shield. And what I think is your theory of the case, which 
is, no, the AI, the design choices, all of those are a product 
and they are subject to regular product liability. And I would 
like you to kind of articulate how that distinction is made and 
whether there is anything that we can do statutorily to kind of 
constrain the regular 230 immunity.
 Someone uploads some content. They can't be sued for libel. 
That is fine. But now we are in an age where half the stuff on 
these platforms is AI anyway. A lot of it is harming kids. And 
it seems to me that we need to clarify either through the court 
system or through the legislature or both what we actually 
originally meant by 230. So, I am interested in your thoughts.
 Mr. Bergman. Well, yes. And I think Section 230 remains an 
important protection for online communication and for the free 
exchange of ideas. I think what is important is that Section 
230 adhere to its original intent, which was to immunize 
publishing activity.
 And, you know, the impetus for this came from my mentor, 
Judge O'Scannlain, on the Ninth Circuit in Barnes v. Yahoo, 
where he established a distinction between where an individual 
is seeking to hold the company liable for traditional 
publishing activity, bad content moderation, having bad stuff 
online, putting bad stuff online, and that is and should remain 
subject to Section 230.
 But as the court held in Barnes, even if the same harm 
results from a different theory of liability--in the case of 
Barnes it was promissory estoppel. In the case of Lemon v. 
Snap, it was negligent design. That is a separate source, it is 
a separate duty, and that that should be allowed to proceed. 
Our cases are based on the premise that these platforms are 
products, that they are designed based on deliberate design 
decisions.
 They target children not with material that they want to 
see, but material that can't look away from. They take 
advantage of the fact, and they exploit the underdeveloped 
frontal cortices of young individuals, the need for FOMO, fear 
of missing out, the social anxiety that adolescents have, and 
they use intermittent reinforcement techniques and very highly 
sophisticated AI to addict them to their platforms.
 And the research is showing that it is actually physically 
addictive. So I think that it is possible--and we have seen 
this. We just completed a trial and are awaiting a jury verdict 
as we speak, where we brought a case to the conclusion of 
trial, where we were able to cleave that important distinction 
between content moderation, which is protected by Section 230, 
even if the platforms aren't doing a good job of that, and the 
deliberate design of defective products.
 Senator Schatz. Perfect. Now, I am always a little cautious 
about writing a statute, a new statute, if I think that the 
existing statute already provides the pathway. Because I don't 
want to stipulate to us needing to change the law if your 
essential point of view is that actually the law just needs to 
be interpreted properly. And I think you have got it right.
 But I would like your advice over time about whether there 
is anything we can do in terms of clarifying legislative 
intent, or to include modifying the existing statute? But 
again, I don't want to stipulate to the idea that the original 
law provides such a broad immunity to the platform.
 So, what are your thoughts about the need for the 
legislature to take action, or should we wait for the court 
cases to win their way?
 Mr. Bergman. Well, if we wait for court cases to work their 
way, more kids are going to die, so I think things have to 
happen.
 I think that clarifying the original legislative intent to 
encourage the development of technologies, which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, to 
remove disincentives to the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children's access, and to ensure vigorous 
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking and obscenity, stalking, and harassment.
 I think that those--if this committee were to reaffirm 
those objectives, along with the very important objectives of 
preserving the free marketplace of ideas, I think we could go a 
long way.
 Senator Schatz. So, one final thought. I agree with almost 
everything you said. But Senator Cruz and I have a bill on a 
bipartisan basis, the Kids Off Social Media Act.
 And the basic idea behind that, besides the obvious, that 
there is no real use case for a 9-year-old to be on Instagram, 
or TikTok, or Snap, or whatever it may be, is also that this 
idea of empowering the user to kind of turn the dials and the 
settings is a fantasy. If you are a parent, that is a fantasy.
 You are not going to get access to your kids' phone all the 
time. The tech companies, the platforms will work around 
whatever statutory framework we have. And that is why we need a 
sort of there is no safe cigarette point of view as it relates 
to kids, as you are pointing out. Brains and bodies are not 
fully developed.
 So, kids off social media app. I don't have any objection 
to empowering users, but I do not think that is going to 
actually protect kids.
 The Chairman. And I very much concur with what Ranking 
Member Schatz has said, that the Kids Off Social Media Act is 
one. This committee has already passed it in a bipartisan way, 
and I hope we pass it on the floor of the Senate and get it to 
the President's desk for signature.
 I will tell as a brief story just how helpless parents are 
in dealing with this. Several years ago, our eldest daughter 
was in trouble, and we grounded her and took away her phone for 
a month, which as parents of teenagers will tell you, is truly 
a draconian punishment. Two weeks into it, Heidi gets a random 
e-mail from Verizon that didn't make any sense.
 So we went and dug down more deeply, and it turned out that 
before she had handed her phone over to us, she had taken the 
SIM card out of it and had gotten a burner phone and put the 
SIM card on the phone. And we went to confront her, and at age 
14, she sat with her arms crossed in her room. She said, ``Dad, 
you said I couldn't have my phone. You didn't say I couldn't 
have my SIM card''.
 And I have to admit, I was both annoyed and really proud at 
the same time. But it does show just how completely outmatched 
parents are trying to keep up with teenagers with these issues. 
Senator Fischer.

 STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

 Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The challenge 
before Congress is ensuring that we have both accountability 
and the environment for free speech expression online. And 
Section 230 was designed to meet both of those goals.
 Ms. Farid Johnson, could mandated transparency about 
content moderation decisions improve accountability without 
chilling speech? And what is--really, what is the line here 
between protecting free expression and systematic harassment 
online?
 Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. As my institute has argued 
in various briefs in this topic, transparency requirements, 
including disclosure and reporting requirements, are generally 
upheld under the Zauderer standard, so long as they are not 
unduly burdensome with respect to speech.
 So what that means in kind of plain terms is that there can 
be laws that require the disclosure of factual and 
uncontroversial information from a platform about the terms on 
which a service is offered, for example, as what you are 
mentioning. And these can be considered Constitutional if they 
are not unjustified.
 So essentially what it comes down to is if Congress can 
craft a provision that demonstrates there is not an undue 
burden on speech, but also provides a transparency that you are 
hoping for, that could meet--that could pass scrutiny.
 Senator Fischer. Is the problem here that we are looking 
at--in the statute itself, or is it with how the courts 
interpret that? Ms. Keller, we will start with you.
 Ms. Keller. Sorry about that. I am trying to think through 
the how the courts interpret it piece, because right now the 
courts are all over the place. You know, there are rulings----
 Senator Fischer. Do we need to drill down and be more 
specific in a statute, which is kind of contrary to what 
Congress usually does?
 Ms. Keller. I actually think that the courts are in the 
process of working toward some answers. So for example, on this 
question of design liability and figuring out like what you 
would consider to be the platform's own doing and distinct from 
user speech, there are a bunch of child safety cases going on, 
including in multi-district litigation, where courts are 
saying, well, maybe autoplay of videos counts as design, and 
that is not immunized, and it is--you know, it is something 
platforms could be liable for.
 Maybe sending notifications counts as design. Maybe 
infinite scroll counts as design. And so, they are moving 
toward answering these questions that I think actually would 
play out kind of similarly under the First Amendment and 230 
also.
 Senator Fischer. Do you think we need to look at Section 
230, and should it be able to protect platforms when their 
algorithms are really actively amplifying some really harmful 
content, or only when they host it? So, are they--do we have a 
distinction out there between hosting and creating?
 Ms. Keller. So, I think the first question is, are we 
talking about content that is in the lawful but awful category, 
as so much of the pro-anorexia, just like terrible content is. 
If Congress doesn't have the power to prohibit that, they also 
don't have to power to tell platforms to change their 
algorithms and down rank it.
 The Supreme Court has been very clear in saying that a 
direct ban on speech and something that just burdens speech by 
making it harder to distribute get the exact same scrutiny from 
the court.
 Senator Fischer. If we would carve out algorithms out of 
Section 230, does that create a workable law, or is it just 
going to create a lot of litigation?
 Ms. Keller. So, this is the question that went to the 
Supreme Court in Gonzales, and then didn't get resolved. So 
there are a stack of briefs of very smart people arguing every 
side of this issue.
 But what I think is that it would cause the most important 
real estate on platforms, the places that most users actually 
go, to be Disney-fied, you know, to be purged of anything with 
any risk. For example, says, at the time of that case, at least 
70 percent of YouTube views were from the recommended videos.
 And it would mean that in that area, YouTube has an 
incentive to definitely not have any, you know, anti-ICE 
videos, not have any accusations of wrongdoing by powerful 
people, not having new voices breaking in and have that be 
extremely safe. And I think that would be harmful for the many, 
many people, creators, advocates, who rely on platforms to get 
their word out.
 Senator Fischer. OK, thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Klobuchar.

 STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

 Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Cruz, and 
thank you for holding this important hearing. And of course, 
our work together on the Take It Down Act couldn't be more 
important. I think I will start with you, Mr. Bergman. Can you 
talk about how the just blanket Section 230 immunity has shut 
the courthouse door to so many parents seeking justice for 
their children?
 Mr. Bergman. Yes. We have a case involving a 12-year-old 
girl who through Snapchat's friendship recommendation algorithm 
was connected to an online sex predator who was able to utilize 
the Bitmoji process to groom this child into sextorting her, 
meeting her, and he raped her.
 And we brought suit against Snapchat saying that the 
technology that allowed an unprotected--that failed to provide 
protection to a 12-year-old girl and allowed a sex predator to 
operate at scale and disguise his malevolent intent was a 
design decision. That case, unfortunately, was struck down or 
was dismissed. The court said, it is offensive to our 
conscience, but I have to do it.
 Senator Klobuchar. And how would repealing it or making 
changes to Section 230 create real incentives for platforms to 
be designed in a way that are safe for users? I just think of 
like an exploding washing machine. That wouldn't be protected 
from immunity. So, you know, they get sued, and then they make 
changes.
 Mr. Bergman. Senator, that is the exact point. We just want 
social media companies to follow the same incentive structure 
that every other company does. It is reasonable care.
 Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Carson, should we continue to think 
of these companies as merely neutral distributors, as they 
would like, as opposed to publishers picking and choosing what 
users view and when? Because the whole idea originally was 
distribution.
 Mr. Carson. I think the idea that they are in neutral 
platforms is normatively persuasive to me but runs 
Constitutionally afoul of how the Supreme Court approaches 
First Amendment law these days. I do think in kind of an answer 
to your question and to what Senator Fischer said, a great 
reform of Section 230 would be to remove the algorithmic 
optimization that the platforms do from being seen as another's 
speech.
 So right now, it doesn't protect your own speech, only 
another's speech. So if you were to define, say, what Facebook 
does to their optimization programs as Facebook's speech, it 
would still have First Amendment protections, and you would 
have to litigate those kind of questions. They would no longer 
be--it would be their own speech, and therefore not subject to 
230 immunity.
 So there is a way to get after what is a very serious 
problem, which is the use of algorithms, which the Supreme 
Court has suggested does have some Constitutional protection. 
But these ones are just about optimization, that don't actually 
have any expressive value. I am not promoting speech about 
different causes, right.
 Senator Klobuchar. I understand. So, could the Take It Down 
Act--just as we look at beyond Section 230, is there some model 
we could use? We have the No Fakes bill to protect people's 
identities on the AI front and the like. Is that some kind of 
model we could use?
 Mr. Carson. That is the right model, the Take It Down Act. 
The DMCA, Section 512, similar, are both, I think, promising 
avenues.
 Senator Klobuchar. OK, very good. Thank you. Professor 
Farid Johnson, we need these commonsense rules of the road.
 And Senator Grassley and I have the American Innovation 
Choice Online Act, which we actually got through the Committee 
with a very good vote, to pry open competition online as 
another way to look at this by stopping anti-competitive self-
preferencing. In your testimony, you argue that Congress should 
attack the platform's monopoly control over public discourse.
 Can you talk about how increasing competition and choice 
online, especially through interoperability, can help address 
some of the problems that we are talking about today?
 Ms. Johnson. Yes, Senator, thank you. What we are hoping to 
do here with this type of legislation is to give users more 
control over their experience.
 Right now, what happens is when someone logs on to, let's 
say, Facebook, for example, they are given a feed, and that 
feed is what comes to them because of the information that 
Facebook collects about them and Facebook is making 
recommendations accordingly.
 If somebody wanted to log on to Facebook and be able to 
talk with certain friends, or their grandmother, or whatever it 
might be, but doesn't want to deal with all of that, if we had 
a robust interoperability mandate, that person would be able to 
use third-party software called middleware to be able decide 
how they want to view that feed.
 So, it is one example of it.
 Senator Klobuchar. OK. Could I just go to you quickly, Ms. 
Keller. You previously said that middleware, that Ms. Farid 
Johnson just referred to, software can give users more control 
over what they see online. Talk about one solution created that 
could help with Section 230, but almost no major platform 
allows it. How would opening up these platforms mitigate online 
harms?
 Ms. Keller. I am so glad you asked because I actually, I 
wish that Senator Schatz were still here to respond to his very 
valid concern that parents don't want a bunch of choices, they 
just want their kids to be safe. Part of what middleware would 
make possible, or interoperability, is competitors who have 
figured out a better way to protect children to offer a one-
click option for parents.
 Bringing in interoperability is a way for innovators to 
find new and different ways to do these things. So, I think it 
is extremely promising. Right now, people are scared to build 
interoperable projects because they can get sued and shut down. 
This happened to a company called Power Ventures 10 or 15 years 
ago. They offered a very basic service to aggregate your social 
media feeds from multiple platforms in one user interface, and 
Facebook sued them under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
which is this anti-hacking law from the 80s, and got them shut 
down.
 Similarly, Section 1201 of the DMCA, which is intended to 
prevent hacking through encryption on copyrighted DVDs, gets 
weaponized this way. So, I think there are a lot of 
opportunities to reform existing laws in ways that open the 
door to interoperability.
 Senator Klobuchar. OK, these were great answers. Maybe I 
will do a few more on the record, but thank you all for your 
thoughtful work, and I really hope we can press ahead with some 
of these changes. Thank you, Senator Cruz.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Schmitt.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHMITT, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

 Senator Schmitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Keller, I 
assume as a First Amendment advocate you would agree that the 
Government shouldn't be censoring American speech, correct?
 Ms. Keller. Correct.
 Senator Schmitt. And the Government can't outsource that 
censorship to private actors either, can it?
 Ms. Keller. I hope not.
 Senator Schmitt. Right. Now, you are the Director of the 
Stanford Cyber Policy Center, which oversees the Stanford 
Internet Observatory, correct?
 Ms. Keller. No, I am not the Director.
 Senator Schmitt. OK. Do you have a role in that 
organization?
 Ms. Keller. I have a role in the organization, but my main 
placement now is in the law science technology program at the 
law school.
 Senator Schmitt. OK. Did you have anything to do with that 
observatory participating in the Election Integrity Project of 
2020?
 Ms. Keller. Not really, but I fully support their First 
Amendment right to do so, you know.
 Senator Schmitt. Well, let's walk through that. So their 
role with the Biden Administration was to flag content that 
they thought was offensive, that may have--didn't line up with 
the Biden Administration's view of the origin of the COVID 
virus, or on the vaccine, or on people's opinions on how the 
2020 election went down.
 And so, their--what their job was to do, which was to flag 
content that the Biden Administration didn't like, feed it back 
to the Biden Administration, and then put pressure on social 
media companies to take that content down. Is that consistent 
with your view of the First Amendment?
 Ms. Keller. No, I haven't--excuse me, that version of the 
facts is not consistent with my understanding. I don't think 
they were doing the Biden Administration's bidding.
 Senator Schmitt. What were they doing?
 Ms. Keller. They were exercising their First Amendment 
rights to go talk to the Government and say what they thought 
should happen.
 Senator Schmitt. What is it that they thought should 
happen? That content should come down?
 Ms. Keller. Probably, in some cases, as is their First 
Amendment right.
 Senator Schmitt. Are you defending that, that the 
Government should take that content down and put pressure on 
social media companies?
 Ms. Keller. There is no Government in this scenario.
 Senator Schmitt. Oh, there is. Absolutely. The Government 
outsourced to your university the job of flagging offensive 
content that they didn't like. And in this country, the 
Government doesn't get to decide what people see, or they hear, 
or what they get to say. And your university was right in the 
middle of all of this. And what I hear you saying is that you 
actually think that is OK.
 Ms. Keller. I think--again, academics exercising their 
First Amendment rights to say what they think and say it to 
Government are absolutely protected by the First Amendment.
 Senator Schmitt. That is not what was happening. That is 
not what was happening. The Biden Administration charged them 
with the duty of, we can't do this all ourselves. We wanted to 
start a disinformation governance board, but it got so much 
pushback, we can't do that.
 So we are outsourcing to Stanford to flag the stuff that 
the Government agency won't do now because we don't have one. 
Tell us what is offensive by way of these guidelines, and then 
we will tell the tech companies, that is a nice tech company 
that you have got there. It would be a shame if something 
happened to if you don't throttle these people, or take down 
RFK Jr., or take down Jay Bhattacharya, who is now the head of 
NIH.
 So I find it a little rich that you are here lecturing us 
about and espousing the virtues of the First Amendment, and 
then on the other hand defending your university's role in the 
censorship regime that we lived through for four years.
 Ms. Keller. I wasn't there. I can't tell you how those 
conversations went. But I do know the people----
 Senator Schmitt. I wasn't there, and I can't----
 Ms. Keller. I can't imagine them doing the Government's 
bidding.
 Senator Schmitt. Well, I can tell you can read all about it 
in Missouri v. Biden, the lawsuit that went to the Supreme 
Court.
 Ms. Keller. The one that you lost?
 Senator Schmitt. No, it is actually back. It was sent down 
to lower court for standing issues. So, we didn't lose the 
case. And I think it is telling--I actually have no idea why 
you are here today. You have embarrassed yourself. Your 
university has embarrassed itself. It is part of this 
censorship regime, which by the way is a cautionary tale for 
the future. And so, yes, it is a cautionary tale.
 So Mr. Bergman, I want to ask you. Since Section 230 was 
enacted, are there features that exist now that weren't 
contemplated maybe with Section 230 that are worth taking a 
look at? I happen to believe having an open platform for people 
to share their points of view is very important in this 
country, but there have been obviously outcomes that are 
terrible that we are talking about today.
 Are there certain things that protecting that open platform 
for people to add that pressure release valve to speak their 
mind, but especially as it relates to kids, or other things 
that maybe weren't contemplated in the early or the late 1990s 
that we could address?
 Mr. Bergman. Absolutely. You know, Netscape was the biggest 
online platform when Section 230 was enacted. But yes, Senator, 
there are specific features, the infinite scroll, the like 
feature, the streaks, the push notifications that are designed 
to addict kids. And again, not by showing them what they want 
to see, but what they don't want to look away from.
 If a 12-year-old girl really wants to access anorexic 
content, God forbid, that is a very sad situation, but I don't 
think it gives rise to liability. On the other hand, if the 
platforms, only in order to maintain an addictive relationship 
to sell more ads, feed that child information she is not 
looking for, I think that is a distinction that can be drawn 
and can preserve the vibrancy of the Internet as a free 
marketplace of ideas.
 Senator Schmitt. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would just 
point out that I filed the COLLUDE Act, which would say 
basically that if you are a social media company, and you get 
into the content moderation business and you violate somebody's 
First Amendment rights, there would be a private right of 
action, and you would lose your Section 230 protections. I 
think that would be a very important reform for us to consider. 
Thank you.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Baldwin.

 STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

 Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So jawboning is 
informally defined as informal, often coercive efforts by 
Government officials to pressure private companies into 
moderating or removing content that they cannot legally censor 
directly. I was listening with interest of the previous 
Senator's questioning, and certainly feel like there is 
examples we can draw upon from multiple Administrations, 
including this one.
 President Trump has attempted to rewrite history by forcing 
museums to remove content. Brendan Carr, the head of the FCC, 
has threatened broadcasters' licenses, including very recently 
who air unflattering news about this Administration and this 
President. If used properly and validated by experts, the 
Internet can be a place that people turn when information is 
being limited or attempted to be censored by the Government. 
Think about now and recent events.
 It might be where somebody accesses information on 
abortion, or LGBTQ identity, or scientific research on climate 
change, or your rights against discrimination in the workplace. 
So, I want to talk about the upsides. I also want to talk about 
the downsides of Section 230. But Ms. Keller, can you explain 
whether and how Section 230 works to protect access to 
information that people rely on to make informed decisions?
 Ms. Keller. Section 230 is essential in protecting that 
access. You referenced information about reproductive health 
care and abortion. Under current Texas law and under a bill 
that I believe is still pending there, it would be very easy 
for someone to sue a platform because a young woman researched 
this information. So, I think you are completely right to 
connect those two issues.
 Senator Baldwin. Mr. Bergman, your testimony and the work 
that you do clearly highlight the harms that can come from the 
Internet and technology, especially for children. I want to 
thank the parents who have brought their stories and their 
children's stories here with them today and are actively taking 
on these social media companies.
 Your stories clearly highlight the immediate need to remove 
harmful content, especially content directed toward children 
from these sites. So I would like to just, first of all, go 
down the line and ask all of the witnesses, does Section 230 
prohibit platforms from engaging in content moderation? Ms. 
Keller?
 Ms. Keller. No.
 Senator Baldwin. Ms. Farid Johnson?
 Ms. Johnson. No.
 Senator Baldwin. Mr. Bergman?
 Mr. Bergman. It does not.
 Senator Baldwin. Mr. Carson?
 Mr. Carson. No.
 Senator Baldwin. All right, so Ms. Farid Johnson, in your 
testimony, you highlight that Section 230 does not protect 
platforms from harmful design decisions they make. When is a 
design decision expressive, and when is it not?
 Ms. Johnson. Senator, that question is being worked through 
with the courts right now. And it is an incredibly challenging 
question. I think one of the reasons that we have at the Knight 
Institute been looking to structural changes and structural 
regulation is because, as Ranking Member Schatz said earlier, 
you know, the law doesn't always keep up with technology.
 And as we try to figure out what is expressive and what is 
not, and we are waiting for the courts to help us with that, it 
is almost like a game of whack-a-mole, right. When--if we can 
actually look at some of the root causes of this, where we know 
these terrible things are happening and people are being drawn 
in because the platforms know so much about them, they kind of 
know what we are going to do before we know we are going to do 
it kind of thing, right?
 But if we have more research into what is happening, if 
researchers are protected, if we have specific data privacy 
protections, understanding how what is being collected and how 
it is being used, those are the issues that are going to help 
us, I think, try to solve this problem as quickly as possible.
 Senator Baldwin. It seems that part of the problem here is 
that every platform uses different algorithms to push content 
to users and have different protections in place for children 
on their platforms and have different policies on content 
moderation. I want to stick with you, Ms. Farid Johnson.
 How transparent are online platforms about their use of 
algorithms and granular moderation decisions? Would it be 
beneficial if Congress required increased disclosure and 
explanation for these practices and their uses?
 Ms. Johnson. So, I think there is a way to ensure 
additional transparency into the platform's practices. What we 
have said is that any kind of required transparency, any kind 
of disclosure should not be seen to be an undue burden on 
speech. But those can be crafted, certainly.
 I think in terms of whether we look at having additional 
understanding of what the platforms are doing would also 
benefit from allowing independent researchers in the public 
interest to conduct that research online so that they have 
access.
 And right now, they are really thwarted from doing so 
because the terms of service of these platforms are so onerous 
that they could be subject to civil and even criminal liability 
for their efforts.
 Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Curtis.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CURTIS, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

 Senator Curtis. Thank you, and especially thank you, Mr. 
Chairman, for this hearing. It means a lot to me, and it means 
a lots to these parents. So, thank you. Mr. Bergman, you 
started your firm, I think, in reaction to what you were seeing 
out there from some of these parents that are here today.
 Section 230 was intended to protect us. And it is clear 
that other things get in the way. Maybe it is profits, whatever 
it is, from that. And you look for ways to hold companies 
accountable, and we have talked about these product features 
several times. They enlisted them, and I will come back to them 
in a minute.
 But I agree with that approach, and that is why I entered 
the Algorithm Accountability Act to clearly define that a 
platform who doesn't uphold a duty of care should not be 
protected by Section 230. So the question is, does Section 230 
reform, does it come in conflict with the Second Amendment?
 And before you answer that, I will ask you to answer it, 
but I want put this in context with my second question. And 
Section 230, as I understand, was originally designed to 
protect platforms from the liability of a third party message 
or a third-party search, if that makes sense.
 And the best analogy I have been able to think of is the 
Post Office. So imagine for a moment that I mail a letter to 
you and the Post Office delivers that letter. We would never 
dream of holding the Post Office accountable for the content of 
that letter. But I think we do acknowledge that there are 
certain things that the Post Office would be justified in 
withholding that letter--child pornography or perhaps a bomb, 
right, or something that we give them that license in certain 
cases.
 And my experience after eight years here in Washington is 
that we all stop right there and say, how does the Post Office 
define whether or not they should deliver that letter. Let's 
suppose, hypothetically, they could read every letter. And so, 
we hear the Chairman say, and I totally agree with him, is we 
would want the Post Office to not stop any more letters than 
they have to.
 We would want as many letters to get through as possible. 
And we are in this--what I would call this foolish cycle of 
trying to define what should be delivered and what should not 
be delivered. And everybody has their own definition. You hear 
some, like the Chairman, say almost everything should be 
delivered.
 And then I hear other of my colleagues argue and say, well, 
why would you deliver that letter? But I want to take us past 
that point to the mailbox. Now, when that letter gets to the 
mailbox, imagine if the Post Office had opened that letter and 
read it, and then designed features for the homeowner of that 
letter, that they then sent not the letter to that person, but 
they sent it to 100 million people.
 That same letter, we said, oh, we like the content of that. 
We are going to send it to 100 million people. We like the 
contents because we think they will use the Post Office more if 
they read this letter. And then they design, and now we come 
into the features, push notifications, the automatic scroll, 
and all these things that we have been listed, that the Post 
Office is doing to get those 100 million people to read that 
letter.
 And later on top of that, the fact that we know that they 
are far more likely to distribute a letter that is sensational, 
that is--that does what we have talked about today. And so, you 
have defined that, and we are trying to define that as product 
liability.
 So, now let me come back to the question of, can we 
approach this without damaging the Second Amendment if we go to 
the end, right to the mailbox, where it is being opened up 
instead of this decision about, are they censoring? And we are 
talking about now the liability of their actions.
 And can you define the legal distinction between holding a 
platform liable for speech, which is like in the middle there, 
versus the platform liable for the way it distributes that 
speech?
 Mr. Bergman. Yes, Senator. And just to follow up on your 
analogy, it would be as though the letter had cocaine attached 
to it and the person would become addicted. But listen, in 1996 
when Section 230 was enacted, the First Amendment had been 
around for 205 years and had protected the rights of free 
expression.
 The fact that Section 230 imposed a blanket liability--if 
that were to be modified, we would still have a robust body of 
law to protect free expression and the free exchange of ideas. 
And there is two elements to that. Number one, the question is, 
to what extent does AI constitute speech?
 And that is a very esoteric question. And the answer is 
sometimes yes, sometimes no. So, you know, algorithmic 
recommendations may or may not have a free speech component. 
The second question, though, Senator, and this is very 
important, is that even if something is speech, it doesn't mean 
that it is necessarily protected. The vile material that Selena 
Rodriguez received was speech, but it was online grooming, and 
it is clearly not protected. Libel isn't protected.
 And our courts have a very robust jurisprudence, and you 
know, there is nothing more, I think, impressive than Chief 
Justice Roberts' analysis in Snyder to analyze where a Tort 
action imposes speech and where it doesn't.
 So I think that if--if cases were allowed to go back, if 
cases that would be barred by Section 230 were allowed to 
proceed in the court system, the jurisprudence that we have on 
the First Amendment, I think, would draw that vital distinction 
between free speech and--protection.
 Senator Curtis. I agree with you. But let me point out, and 
a lot of my colleagues would point out, and you are lawyer, you 
would love this, right--there would be lots of lawsuits. So 
walk through with me the advantage of the legal system deciding 
this versus a Senator placed in a moment of time trying to say 
this is OK, but this isn't OK.
 Mr. Bergman. Well, the laws evolve over time, Senator. And 
you know, particularly defining what is or isn't protected 
speech is something that is conferred on the courts. I think 
that were Section 230 to--and I don't favor the repeal but 
allow cases such as these families to go forward, courts would 
still have the opportunity to apply time tested First Amendment 
jurisprudence to determine the extent to which those claims 
implicate protected speech and which cases don't.
 Senator Schatz. Versus us taking a point in time and then 
30 years later decide if we got it right. Now--and I am out of 
time, but let me just conclude with this, a quote from Section 
230, ``encourage the development of technologies which maximize 
user's control over what information is received by individuals 
families and schools.'' Are we meeting that standard of Section 
230?
 Mr. Bergman. Unfortunately not, Senator.
 Senator Curtis. Yes, I wish you had more time. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. I yield.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Curtis. Senator Lujan.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BEN RAY LUJAN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

 Senator Lujan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carson, one 
question raised by the introduction of generative AI products 
is the extent to which companies should be held liable for 
illegal content generated by their products. As legal scholars 
point out under the current Section 230 regime, while platforms 
enjoy immunity, plaintiffs can still sue the original creator 
of illegal content.
 But AI generated search results that may cause harm could 
injure parties--could leave injured parties without recourse. 
Mr. Carson, what is your view on whether generative AI search 
engines fit into existing Section 230 framework?
 Mr. Carson. I don't believe that Genitive AI should be 
under Section 230 at all.
 Senator Lujan. Do you think platforms will need to verify 
that posts are authored by a human to benefit from Section 230 
protection?
 Mr. Carson. No, if they are hosting someone else's use of 
AI, like say I make an AI image, and then post it on Facebook, 
that is clearly covered by Section 230 today. But the AI system 
itself, if they were to use--what ChatGPT creates for me 
personally, that is not covered by 230. That is their own 
speech and therefore not covered by 230.
 Senator Lujan. So Elon Musk using Grok to put a face on--
your face on a naked body is OK?
 Mr. Carson. No, definitely not OK in any way. And he 
probably has some 230 immunity for that. I wouldn't give him 
that immunity. I would make him subject, as Mr. Bergman said, 
to the common law on those kind of questions. But he would 
certainly claim 230 for his own posting, since he owns Grok 
today and X. So that would be an interesting legal question.
 Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. I hope it gets tested. 
Ms. Keller, in 2023, I authored an amicus brief in Moody v. 
Netchoice where I argued that social media companies have a 
First Amendment right to curate and moderate content on their 
platforms.
 Discussions regarding Section 230 often focus on the laws, 
liability, protections, but your testimony--in your testimony 
you write that, ``the choice to moderate is precisely what 
Section 230 encourages.'' And that, ``the law has produced a 
variety of platforms that have adopted diverse approaches to 
content moderation.''
 Ms. Keller, you also filed an amicus brief in Moody v. 
Netchoice where you argue that Texas and Florida laws at issue 
burden the speech of the platforms. Can you explain to us the 
role Section 230 plays in the First Amendment rights of 
platforms to engage in content moderation?
 Ms. Keller. Certainly. So Section 230--platforms have 
rights to engage in content moderation, as the majority in the 
Moody case decided under the First Amendment.
 Section 230 basically gives an additional layer of 
procedural protection around that, so that if they are sued 
over these things, they can get the cases dismissed quickly, 
which if you are a startup, is incredibly important. These 
cases can get extremely expensive. Sorry, I feel like I am 
missing the other part of your question. It was about Gonzalez 
and----
 Senator Lujan. I think you touched on it. I was getting 
more to the area that you included, the burden from the Texas 
and Florida law, which was in the same case.
 Ms. Keller. I see. And to be clear, the thrust of that 
brief was really about the rights of users being affected. 
About the State Governments coming along and saying, hey, if 
you want to use the Internet and look at--you know, hear the 
podcast that you want to hear, you have to navigate through all 
of this garbage that otherwise would have been weeded out by 
the platform.
 So, we were concerned with the rights of users, and we 
proposed that a less restrictive means than the state setting 
the rules would be middleware and interoperability, and 
something that allows users themselves to take control.
 Senator Lujan. Ms. Farid Johnson, a similar question to 
you. Do platforms have a First Amendment right to engage in 
content moderation?
 Ms. Johnson. Yes.
 Senator Lujan. In your testimony, you state that--again, 
Ms. Farid Johnson--your testimony states that Section 230 does 
not always provide liability protection. For example, certain 
platforms may be held liable for harms that arise from content 
neutral tools.
 Unfortunately, as Mr. Bergman points out in his testimony, 
social media companies will argue that every algorithmic design 
must be exempt from liability. And while there are certainly 
gray areas, it is hard for me to believe that a design feature 
solely in place to get and keep kids addicted to social media 
is immune from all liability.
 My question is, when does a design feature cross over from 
being an editorial decision immune from liability to a content 
neutral tool outside of Section 230 protections?
 Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Senator. That is a question that is 
actually making its way through the courts right now. We are 
seeing a number of cases that are asking the question about 
when a design is expressive, such as it would be protected 
under the First Amendment. And we just don't have the answers 
yet. I will say that in terms of algorithmic amplification, 
decisions that amplify are going to be quite difficult to 
distinguish from decisions to publish.
 So for example, if a newspaper were to put a particular 
headline, they are amplifying a particular piece of news 
because they are trying to get someone to read that news. So I 
think that it is important to look at the fact that there are 
going to be these decisions there that are going to seem 
editorial.
 And from our perspective, the way to address this is not 
necessarily to wait out the courts in terms of trying to figure 
this part out and not try to legislate on that, because you 
can't legislate around the First Amendment, but rather to say, 
we know what some of the structural issues are with respect to 
people having--the people's engagement online.
 And if we know that they are being targeted because of the 
information collected about them from these platforms, then the 
way to go about it is to address the data privacy issue rather 
than trying to circumvent the First Amendment.
 Senator Lujan. Let me ask you this, yes or no follow-up. 
Should social media companies provide the public with 
transparency regarding targeted algorithms and data collection?
 Ms. Johnson. Yes. I do believe that transparency 
provisions, if appropriately drafted, can certainly be 
Constitutional, yes.
 Senator Lujan. I appreciate that. And Mr. Chairman, I will 
submit this question to the record. Mr. Bergman, I was going to 
ask a question about through your litigation experience, how 
are social media companies weaponizing design decisions to keep 
kids addicted to social media? I will submit that into the 
record, and I look forward to hearing your response as well. 
Thank you for the time, Mr. Chair.
 Mr. Bergman. I will finish--thank you.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Capito.

 STATEMENT OF HON. SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

 Senator Capito. [Technical problems]--thank you, Mr. 
Chairman, and thank all of you for your testimony today. Very 
interesting. I would like to address the parents of the three 
children. I think when we think of 30 years ago, when Section 
230 was written and enacted, we could have never imagined that 
we would see three young people at such a young age take their 
own life through what we thought was a magnificent discovery in 
the 90s.
 And so, I want to thank them for what they are doing, 
because what you are doing is helping other parents as we see 
these kinds of things. You are so brave to do this. And we just 
had an instance of this. I live in West Virginia. An instance 
that you might have read about it. A 15-year-old boy took his 
own life very quickly in a sex-torsion case, and his parents 
have come forward.
 So, I know it can't be easy. And it leads me to my other 
thought. So we are sitting here. We have got Kids Online 
Safety. We had a hearing on the addictive nature of social 
media. We had four information sessions on what AI, and what 
does that mean, and how good is it, and how bad is it, but we 
haven't done anything.
 And so, I think part of our problem is if we legislate 
today in this area, we are not going to pick up what I learned 
day before yesterday, the new thing that is coming, which is 
super intelligent AI that is smarter than anybody in this room 
and all of us put together. And so, we are going to still have 
those gaps, I think, that are still going to be able to catch 
our young people and others into the entrapment to do damaging 
things to themselves.
 And so, I feel frustrated by that we can't figure out a 
better way to protect. And I understand the pushes and pulls of 
the First Amendment, but when I look at the families, I think 
we got to do better here. We can't just keep having hearings 
and wondering.
 And I know the Chairman--and there is lots of good 
legislation out here, but we really need your help as a 
professional panel to help us weave those challenges. And so, 
if you look at the companies, this just struck me. I thought if 
you looked at the company, why would they pursue this line of 
algorithm?
 Well, you know, it is advertising. It is money. And I 
started thinking about Chick-fil-A. You know what, Chick-fil-A 
has a belief system that they don't want to be open on Sundays. 
And that is to their own economic detriment, although I think 
they smoke all the other fast food places on 6 days than most 
of them do it on 7 days.
 So, it can be done. You can self-select. You can self-
regulate and still be extremely successful in a competitive 
environment. So my question is, am I right to be concerned that 
whatever we could do today--I am just going to go down the 
panel--whatever we can do today, we are going to come back in 
10 years and be obsolete? And so, I will start with the first--
Ms. Keller.
 Ms. Keller. The risk of obsolescence is indeed high. 
However, for AI, there is the backdrop of common law and tort 
law. Anything that is unprotected by Section 230, as some 
people have said, the output of generative AI would be, has 
this more flexible set of tools.
 Senator Capito. Yes, but aren't these companies using AI to 
generate their algorithm, or am I wrong there?
 Ms. Keller. I think they are using a mix of AI and other 
editorial inputs that the court told us were immunized in the 
Moody case.
 Senator Capito. Ms. Johnson.
 Ms. Johnson. I agree, the risk of obsolescence is high, 
which is why I think that looking at these foundational 
questions is critically important. If we have--even from now, 
if we were to establish an AI regulatory framework that was 
promoting independent research into the AI developers, if we 
understood more about what was happening on the platforms, if 
we limited the data they were collecting about us, those are 
the things I think could help move the needle in a way that 
would not run up against what happens next in terms of the next 
Big Tech thing.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. Mr. Bergman.
 Mr. Bergman. Yes, Senator. In MacPherson v. Buick, Justice 
Cardozo famously said the law changes--the laws of the 
stagecoach adapt to the age of the automobile. The common law 
of the states does provide the ability to adapt and apply 
traditional concepts of responsibility, of negligence, and 
products liability to ever-expanding technologies.
 So, the first and foremost thing that I believe Congress 
can do is allow the legal system to operate. And basically to 
use its economic function that Judge Posner said to internalize 
the cost of safety and impose on social media companies the 
same rules that every other company has. I think that would be 
a good start.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. And my former colleague, Mr. 
Carson.
 Mr. Carson. Senator, more than most on the panel, I think 
Section 230 was a mistake. And mostly, it is not because we 
don't need laws. It is both because, as Justice Thomas so well 
said, ``it is a get out of jail free card.''
 And those are the kind of things you can't put in place 
before you actually understand how an industry is going to 
develop. So you need flexible laws. You shouldn't just freeze 
it in place at a time when the Internet was hardly developed.
 Senator Capito. Thank you. And again, thanks to the parents 
for being here.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Rosen.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JACKY ROSEN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

 Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Cruz. Thank you to the 
witnesses for being here. And I just want to build on a point 
that Senator Capito made. And you know, I just don't believe we 
can allow just self-regulation and our common law to be our 
guide just because technology moves quickly. It doesn't mean 
that we here in Congress shouldn't legislate or regulate where 
necessary and adjust where needed.
 We can't cede our power because things move quickly. The 
world has always moved quickly to your point about the 
stagecoach to the car to, well, autonomous vehicles maybe soon. 
And so, I just want to make that comment for the record. But I 
want to talk about a risk of Section 230 protection for AI. 
Because last summer, I led a bipartisan task force--I led a 
letter with the bipartisan task force for combating 
Antisemitism to xAI, calling for accountability after their AI 
chatbot, Grok, went on multiple antisemitic tirades on X and 
spread conspiracy theories about the Holocaust.
 So, to reiterate what Senator Lujan asked Mr. Carson, 
should chatbots like Grok, when integrated into a social media 
platform, be protected by Section 230? And what are the risks 
if AI chatbots, which are sometimes seen as less biased and 
more accurate, are integrated on platforms and are protected 
under Section 230?
 Mr. Carson. I don't believe that you should have generative 
AI be considered as speech at all, and therefore it should not 
be protected by Section 230. In the case of Grok, in the 
example you gave, those companies should be liable under some 
kind of product liability theory, some kind of design defect 
theory for making products that are engaging in this kind of 
behavior.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move on and talk 
about speech then because Congress and the courts have 
determined that commercial speech by companies is not the same 
as free expression by an individual. Companies are liable for 
harm when they release unsafe products, like an unsafe car 
seat, an unsafe energy drink that causes heart attacks, and 
they can be held accountable for lying about their products.
 So Mr. Bergman, I am going to ask you this time, do you 
think a social media platform failing to enforce its own 
content moderation policies makes its products unsafe? And are 
these platforms marketing themselves as one thing by explaining 
their policies online, but then failing to create the online 
environment that reflects their policies?
 Mr. Bergman. I think that is very much the case. We just 
completed a trial in Los Angeles, and because we could get past 
Section 230, we were able to elicit and present documentary 
evidence that these companies intentionally have addicted 
children, knowing that children are being hurt because of it.
 This evidence directly contradicted the testimony of the 
executives before this very committee, and we think that that 
is a very important development and a reason why Section 230 
should not preclude these cases from going forward and let the 
truth be heard.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. And then we will move on to 
impact on other platforms, because some websites, like 
Wikipedia, Reddit, they rely on decentralized content 
moderation. It is partially why their communities are so 
vibrant and why people use their websites.
 So there is a concern that eliminating Section 230 could 
jeopardize their entire model. So Ms. Johnson, we will move 
down to you. How can Congress hold the largest social media 
companies accountable, while protecting novel content 
moderation approaches and smaller websites that operate 
differently from the big players?
 Ms. Johnson. Senator, you are exactly right that Section 
230--when we say platforms, we often mean social media. But it 
really, it applies to quite a broad swath, which is why when 
the Knight Institute has considered this question, we have come 
up with three proposals looking at researcher access, data 
privacy, and interoperability as possible means of conditioning 
to Section 230 protection for the very largest platforms, and 
thereby allowing others to continue to thrive.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I am going to move back to you, 
Mr. Bergman, and ask you this. Some larger platforms would 
distinguish, again--many of which have designed their products 
to maximize engagement over all other metrics.
 Keep those eyeballs on. They have fired content moderation 
staff and are some cases no longer taking down content that 
violates, again, their own policies, and they still claim 
Section 230 is necessary. So should there be a different 
standard for our larger platforms?
 Mr. Bergman. I think everyone should have the duty of 
reasonable care. And I think Section 230 does provide important 
protections. And some should stay, but it should not be 
interpreted outside of what Congress intended when it enacted 
the statute in 2000--I am sorry, 1996.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you, I yield.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hickenlooper.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKENLOOPER, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

 Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank 
each of you for being here today and for all your work on this. 
This is obviously an issue of great complexity but of almost 
unimaginable importance as we really look at how deeply this 
damage goes. And I know this issue around broad immunity and 
230, you guys are already debating pretty well.
 I am not going to opine on it. I am not sure Government is 
smart enough or can move fast enough to regulate AI at the 
speed it is going. And I don't see another way to deal with the 
situation without allowing or compelling the industry to 
regulate itself, which is really what 230 gets in the way of.
 In other words, if tort law can take actions against 
damages done to groups of people, history shows us that that is 
the way you create standards and you create the evolution of 
standards to meet the needs of that moment. In terms of my time 
with you now, I will give my own little speech. I want to talk 
a little bit about supply chain designations. And this is a 
little obscure, but I think no less important.
 Really, for the first time ever, the United States has 
designated an American company as a supply chain threat and 
blacklisted it from working with the U.S. Government. This is 
the same level that has been given to China's Huawei, Russian 
cybersecurity firms like Kaspersky.
 It is ironic to see that our Administration that fears 
censorship under Section 230, and claims to want a smaller 
Government, is now trying to weaponize Federal Government law 
to force a company to dismiss their own policies and prevent AI 
from being used for conducting mass surveillance against 
Americans, for lethal targeting that is done autonomously.
 So, Ms. Keller, why don't we start with you, but I would 
like to go down the list of just, what message does it send to 
a supply chain risk designation--what is that message to an 
American company--that is given to an American company--what is 
the message it sends to the rest of the innovation economy, 
let's put it that way?
 Ms. Keller. It sends a message that the Government is 
willing to bully and retaliate and make improper uses of laws 
to punish those who dissent, or disagree, or attempt to hold 
reasonable limits.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
 Ms. Johnson. I think to the extent that this type of action 
is taken in retaliation for speech, it sounds an incredibly 
challenging--chilling message. It is very chilling.
 Mr. Bergman. It is really not in my ambient to opine on 
that.
 Mr. Carson. Senator, we have worked a lot on that issue. It 
is an indefensible decision that will chill the innovation 
economy and an attempt to murder one of the leading instruments 
of national power that our country has, which is an incredible 
AI lab at Anthropic.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Right. It is certainly something that 
is a place of power that we are giving away, in a way. Let me 
switch there. Ms. Johnson, thank you for being here and your 
advocacy of the First Amendment rights--your ability to defend 
the First Amendment. Some have argued that the way an AI model 
responds to a prompt from a user is a form of editorial 
discretion.
 In this case, that is certainly protected by the First 
Amendment. But if we imagine a scenario where Section 230 
liability shield projections for AI outfits were removed, when 
we think about that, Congress, as we debate about how to 
establish AI accountability and an accountability framework, 
how could this be done without violating the First Amendment--
the protections on speech?
 Ms. Johnson. It is an incredibly challenging question, 
Senator, and it is something that is being worked through--
working its way through the courts now. I think I will respond 
in two ways. One is that if you are looking at Section 230 
protections specifically, Section 230 insulates platforms from 
liability for publication of third party content.
 So, to the extent that AI output, is that of AI companies? 
It does not fall under that provision. In terms of crafting a 
durable piece of legislation that would help with AI 
accountability, I think what is important to start with are 
transparency provisions.
 If we had provisions that promoted and protected 
independent research into these AI developers to really 
understand how they operate, to understand what is going on 
behind the scenes, that would provide Americans with 
information that they can use in the public interest that could 
ultimately then lead to additional accountability.
 Senator Hickenlooper. Right. I agree. Thank you. I yield 
back the floor. Thank you. Senator Markey.

 STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

 Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 
having this hearing. And again, I just want to recognize the 
parents who are here, who have lost their children. It is 
almost unimaginable, the loss which you have suffered.
 And thank you for being here. Thank you for bearing witness 
to this mental health crisis in our country amongst teenagers 
and children. It is just very important that you are here. It 
is almost impossible to fully understand the grief you must 
feel right now, and it is my honor to stand with you in 
fighting to protect other families from the same thing that you 
have gone through, because those harms underscore the 
importance of the issues before us today.
 And I am glad that we are having this hearing, because it 
is obviously very controversial, and it just raises so many 
important issues of online safety, and privacy, and free 
speech. As the different views are being laid out here today, 
we can see that this is a subject that we should be talking 
about.
 So I would like to--Mr. Bergman, if you could. I know that 
your firm has done a lot of thinking about this issue and how 
to protect young people online while working within Section 230 
in the lawsuits which you are bringing.
 Can you explain further to the Committee how your firm is 
bringing cases against the platforms and avoiding dismissal on 
Section 230 grounds?
 Mr. Bergman. Well, avoiding the dismissal sometimes, not 
other times. But yes----
 [Inaudible.]
 Mr. Bergman.--avoiding dismissals sometimes, not other 
times. But we follow the theory enunciated by the Ninth Circuit 
in Barnes v. Yahoo, and then Lemon v. Snap, that we focus on 
the design, and that it is not the content. It doesn't matter 
what the algorithm--the algorithms don't care what they show 
the kids.
 Whatever addicts them to the platform. It could be 
moonbeams and rainbows, as long as a kid becomes addicted to 
this platform through operant conditioning. So we focus on the 
addictive design. We focus on infinite scrolls. We focus on the 
likes and the streaks features.
 We focus that these companies, as we have learned in this 
litigation, deliberately target kids, knowing that their brains 
are not fully developed and that they are very susceptible as 
adolescents to peer pressure.
 Senator Markey. So you are saying the conduit itself?
 Mr. Bergman. That is correct. The platform itself is 
dangerous.
 Senator Markey. It is dangerous, yes. And I do--I 
appreciate your approach to this work to protect kids online. 
Because ultimately, you know, we are going to have to try to 
deal with this issue.
 And this committee, with the Chairman and the Ranking 
Member, were very instrumental with Senator Cassidy and I in 
passing COPPA 2.0, Child Online Privacy Protection Act, through 
the Senate floor just two weeks ago, unanimously.
 Could you talk a little bit about how important COPPA 2.0--
do you agree it is important for us to pass the Child Online 
Privacy Protection Act in order to guarantee that they can't 
target kids with ads, that your parents can demand that 
everything be erased, that we raise it up to age 17 and under 
17? Do you do agree that should become a law in our country, 
Ms. Keller?
 Ms. Keller. Can adults have that too, please?
 Senator Schatz. I am with you. And I actually passed that 
on the House floor in 1995. I am going to go take a note in the 
conference committee with the Senate, but I did pass it for 
adults as well.
 Ms. Keller. Thank you.
 Senator Markey. Across all platforms I got that passed 30 
years ago. It was highly anticipatable. Yes, Ms. Johnson.
 Ms. Johnson. Yes. Yes, robust protection for children 
online in terms of private protections is critical--yes.
 Senator Markey. Thank you.
 Mr. Bergman. Absolutely, Senator. And the bipartisan 
leadership of this committee has been instrumental. This 
committee really has been the fulcrum of bringing these issues 
to the fore over the last five years under the bipartisan 
leadership. And on behalf of the families, you have really 
already saved a lot of lives.
 Senator Markey. Thank you. And then Mr. Carson.
 Mr. Carson. It would certainly be a great improvement. 
Congratulations to the Committee for their leadership on this.
 Senator Markey. And I am right now working on AI chatbots 
legislation. Does anyone want to talk about that and the 
importance for us to legislate in there? Mr. Bergman.
 Mr. Bergman. Our firm brought the first case involving AI 
chatbots, involving a 14-year-old boy who was goaded into 
suicide through an online chatbot. And we successfully overcame 
a First Amendment challenge and were able to move forward.
 We are bringing the first cases against OpenAI for the same 
thing. And again, this is basically a design flaw. We know that 
AI is here to stay, and it does a lot of good. But companies 
need to take proactive measures to think about safety.
 Senator Markey. These kids are becoming emotionally 
dependent upon AI chatbots. And so, we need to move in that 
area as well, passing legislation. Mr. Carson, would you like 
to add on to what Mr. Bergman just said?
 Mr. Carson. Yes, I think it is a critical issue. I think it 
comes to Congress making clear, and this addresses Senator 
Hickenlooper's issue as well, the outputs of ChatGPT, or Grok, 
or Gemini are not protected speech under the First Amendment at 
all and are not worthy of the protections of the First 
amendment as expressions of human creativity or human autonomy. 
And that yes, the rules around those chatbots are very 
important for children especially, but for the broader society.
 Senator Markey. Yes. As technology moves, we have to move 
as well. The technology is inanimate. It is only as good or bad 
as the human values that we instill into those inanimate 
objects. And we have to continue this conversation on chat--
this new area is absolutely something that we should be 
discussing and moving on in this committee as well. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Blackburn.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

 Senator Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 
to each of you for being here today. It has been a wonderful 
discussion, and we appreciate your insight. And to the parents, 
I want to say thank you for once again being here and for the 
advocacy that you bring.
 I appreciate that Senator Markey talked about COSA and Kids 
Online Safety, and Senator Cruz has been such an advocate for 
protecting children in the virtual space. And indeed I wish 
that our friends in the House were as committed to getting some 
of this legislation across the finish line as we are here in 
the Senate.
 Mr. Bergman, I want to come to you. As I have listened to 
the hearing today, thinking back through where we were in the 
mid-90s and the advent of Section 230, which seemed like a 
really great idea for something that was going to be an 
unknown, if you will, with the virtual space and giving 
companies a chance to get their sea legs under them, but what 
we have seen is massive abuse of Section 230.
 And the way that these social media platforms and Big Tech, 
as they have grown, they have become more given to making 
excuses for their actions and blaming it on Section 230, that 
it allows them to do this, that, and the other.
 As I have thought through this--and one of the reasons I 
have grown to be in support of sunsetting and removing 230 is 
because Big Tech has proven they are incapable of regulating or 
policing themselves. They will not do it.
 They are like an errant child who keeps pushing, and 
pushing, and pushing, and trying to move away any kind of 
responsibility, any discipline, and they fight it every single 
day. And we have seen it as we have worked with parents.
 We have seen it as we talk to pediatricians and principals 
who talk to us about behavioral issues in school that all find 
what happens online and the online platforms do nothing. So 
talk for me a little bit about Big Tech's refusal to take an 
action to protect, and the need that that puts on Congress to 
take an action to force them to protect?
 Mr. Bergman. Well, Senator, first of all, thank you from 
the bottom of my heart for your steadfast, emphaticable efforts 
on this issue. The kindness and the compassion and the 
commitment is an inspiration to all of us and thank you for 
that. We just finished a trial in which we saw--and we have now 
been able, because we got over Section 230 at least a little 
bit, to be able to see the internal documents from these 
companies.
 And we see that indeed there are people of conscience 
within these companies sounding the alarm bells. And time and 
time again, their calls go unheeded because any time a design 
change would impair profitability or engagement, they say no. 
How many times have the executives been excoriated before your 
committee and they don't change their behavior?
 How many times have they had bad press? The only thing that 
is going to change their behavior is when they have to bear the 
economic costs of their deliberate design decisions.
 As, you know, Richard Posner or Milton Friedman would say, 
you have to internalize the cost of safety. If they have to 
bear the cost of their dangerous platforms instead of these 
families, instead of clergymen, and policemen, and doctors, and 
psychologists, and insurance companies, then they will have the 
incentive to change their behavior. But right now, there is no 
way.
 If they actually had to bear cost through a civil lawsuit, 
their behavior would change. And I think unless--and through 
the imposition of civil liability, we can change their economic 
calculus. And we are not talking about, you know, imposing a 
special duty. We are just talking about imposing the same rules 
that every other company has.
 Every other company in America operates under a duty of 
reasonable care. We are asking the same thing for social media.
 Senator Blackburn. Well, and I think it is important to 
note that every industrial sector in the United States has 
safety standards. They have that duty of care. The only one 
that does not is the virtual space. There are no safety 
standards. That is why COSA is a safety by design.
 It is a product safety bill to protect children in the 
virtual space. And it is unseemly to me that we have this 
growing industrial sector, and they have zero safety standards. 
And honestly, they don't give a rip and flip.
 When you have got somebody like Mark Zuckerberg who says 
each kid is worth $270 to him, that is one of the most 
offensive statements I think I have ever heard come out of the 
mouth of a U.S. corporate CEO, to put a value on the head of 
every child that is using their product. It is just unseemly.
 We are hard at work, and I have just released the Trump 
America AI Act framework. The President asked me to take a shot 
at drafting this as just a guideline as to where we start on 
the discussion about a framework for AI.
 My hope is we are going to move forward on this more 
quickly than we did other components of the virtual space. And 
I would like for you to respond for just a minute about why you 
think it is important, Mr. Bergman, to have an AI framework as 
we begin to move forward with more AI concepts moving into 
commercialization.
 Mr. Bergman. Well, because we continue to see families that 
have buried children because AI chatbots encourage suicide. One 
would have thought after two and a half years, I could never be 
shocked.
 But when I saw what Sewell Setzer was provided, encouraged 
to kill himself, when I saw that Zane Shamblin was given a how-
to manual--we have to do something, Senator. And your 
leadership is such an inspiration, and I am just so grateful. 
On behalf of all the people I represent, but also as a father 
and a grandfather, thank you.
 Senator Blackburn. Well, we appreciate you all. I want to 
thank each of you for being here today and for the spirited 
debate that you have brought to the issue. I will remind you 
that members of the Committee have until March 25 to submit 
their questions.
 You all will have until April 8 to respond in writing to 
those questions that will be coming to you. And with that, it 
concludes our hearing. Committee adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

 A P P E N D I X

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator from Oregon
 Thank you, Chairman Cruz and Ranking Member Cantwell, for inviting 
me to submit a statement for the record for this important hearing on 
Section 230. For the past three decades, Section 230 has allowed 
critics, organizers and activists to use the Internet to make their 
voices heard. Online communities large and small, from knitting message 
boards to firearm enthusiast forums to neighborhood ICE Watch Facebook 
groups, are all only possible as a result of Section 230.
 Section 230 is best understood as the embodiment of a simple 
principle: speakers are responsible for their own speech. Absent such a 
rule, the incentives to host speech, especially controversial speech, 
disappear. No competent business would let users post freely on its 
websites if any single post could land it in court. If 230 were 
repealed, only the deepest-pocketed online platforms in the world could 
survive the avalanche of frivolous litigation that would follow. And on 
those platforms, only anodyne or low-value, likely AI-generated, 
content would pervade.
 However, because of 230, digital library platforms can host 
comments about books being read in their communities; individuals can 
buy domains and host online forums for their niche special interests; 
individuals can sell homemade goods through online marketplaces; and 
people with interesting ideas about how to remake social media can 
raise money to fund projects like Bluesky and Mastodon.
 What is more, 230s text explicitly protects users of platforms. 
Section 230 protects users of services like e-mail from facing lawsuits 
for forwarding article links. It protects Reddit moderators and 
Wikipedia editors from getting sued by members of their online 
communities or the subjects of their articles, respectively. And it 
protects anyone who `retruths,' `reskeets,' or otherwise reposts 
content on a platform. The ability to rapidly reshare information 
online is only possible because of 230.
 Critics of 230 often misunderstand that while the statute provides 
a great deal of immunity, it does not create a `get out of jail free' 
card to online services. 230 only protects companies when a lawsuit 
seeks to treat a company as the speaker of the post they find offensive 
or harmful. Courts can and have held companies liable for their own 
speech and business practices. For example, Amazon has tried and failed 
to use 230 to avoid lawsuits about dangerous batteries it helped sell. 
Meta also tried and failed to use 230 to dodge responsibility for 
helping place discriminatory ads.
 This logic extends to AI. Chatbots like Claude and ChatGPT are 
services that create content. While users might request a chatbot's 
output, the bot's response is the company's own speech. When a company 
creates or materially contributes to illegal content, the plain text of 
230 says the company is responsible for it. When claims go to trial, 
230 is no barrier to holding AI companies accountable.
 Section 230 is not perfect. There may be reasonable reforms worth 
pursuing that do not pressure services into censorship or invasive 
monitoring. However, changing the rules of the road for online speech 
would increase the power of Big Tech and billionaires who want to crowd 
out competition and censor critics.
 A far better path to a healthier online ecosystem is to focus on a 
few long overdue policy priorities. We must pass a baseline privacy law 
that would make it harder for platforms to target users, including 
children, with harmful content. And we must reform our antitrust laws 
to make sure that smaller platforms and services have a fighting chance 
to give users more choices on where to consume content and host their 
speech. Implementing these two reforms, and taking a close look at 
proposals to foster more transparency and interoperability, would 
drastically improve the online experience without endangering online 
speech.
 Instead of starting with the question ``How should Congress change 
Section 230?'', I'd urge lawmakers to ask, ``How can the Senate make 
the Internet work better for all users?'' This body has plenty of work 
to do on that front.
 ______
 
 Prepared Statement of Brandon Arnold, Executive Vice President, 
 National Taxpayers Union

 Section 230 Is Essential for Preserving a Thriving Internet

 As the ``Voice of America's Taxpayer,'' National Taxpayers Union 
(NTU) is a strong supporter of Section 230 of the Communications Act of 
1996, which, for 30 years, has helped hundreds of millions of Americans 
amplify their voices on the internet.
 Section 230 has long been a lightning rod for criticism. While by 
no means perfect, it provides an important liability shield that 
protects online platforms of all sizes--not just ``Big Tech,'' as its 
detractors often claim. Section 230 has been called ``the Twenty-Six 
Words That Created the Internet,'' because, broadly speaking, it 
insulates platforms acting in ``good faith'' from undue litigation.
 The need for such a protection is clear. The Internet has created 
an unbelievable amount of opportunities for education, 
entrepreneurialism, entertainment, and other endeavors. It has, 
unfortunately, also created many dangers and risks, especially to young 
people. It has become a forum for heated debate over politics, 
religion, sports, and pretty much any conceivable topic. As these 
debates devolve, they have too often given rise to harassment, 
bullying, and even physical threats.
 For platforms, this has created tremendous challenges. Policing 
online behaviors, taking down inappropriate comments or posts, and 
responding to phenomena like ``review bombing'' have become critical--
and costly--functions for platforms. These functions expose companies 
to criticism. For instance, taking down a politically charged post 
could invite accusations of censorship, while allowing unsavory 
comments to remain on a message board could suggest that a company 
endorses that viewpoint.
 Some have suggested that repealing Section 230 would solve the 
problem. In actuality, it would make the situation substantially worse.
 Repealing Section 230 would completely alter the manner in which 
online platforms monitor and respond to reviews, comments, and posts. 
This would harm social media sites like Nextdoor, X, and Truth Social; 
review sites like Yelp and Rotten Tomatoes; video game platforms such 
as Steam and Roblox; and many, many more.
 To avoid litigation, platforms would likely respond by aggressively 
censoring a much larger quantity of user input. This could reduce the 
amount of information available to a consumer shopping for a new 
refrigerator, prevent a reader from posting comments about an op-ed he 
just read, or stop an aspiring musician from sharing her new song. A 
vastly more restrictive Internet would undermine creativity, stifle 
innovation, and harm public discourse.
 Additionally, Section 230 preempts many state laws, so its repeal 
could create a patchwork of state statutes governing liability related 
to online content. This would create confusion, complexity, and higher 
costs for all platforms, but would be especially burdensome on smaller 
companies that lack the resources to comply with dozens of regulations 
and an untold number of lawsuits. This could result in higher levels of 
consolidation of online companies and higher costs for end-users.
 Section 230 is essential for preserving a thriving Internet and 
this hearing provides an excellent opportunity to highlight that fact. 
It is incredibly important for members of this Committee to utilize 
this opportunity to share their views on Section 230 with the American 
people. At the same time, it is even more important for the hundreds of 
millions of Americans who are not members of this Committee to be able 
to continue to share their views on the topic of their choice in the 
Internet ecosystem. The latter would not be possible without the 
prudent protections established by Section 230.
 ______
 
 Prepared Statement of Laura Chadwick, President and CEO, 
 Travel Technology Association
 On behalf of the Travel Technology Association, I submit the 
following written statement for consideration ahead of the ``Liability 
or Deniability? Platform Power as Section 230 Turns 30'' hearing. The 
Travel Technology Association (``Travel Tech'') represents travel 
technology innovators ranging from dynamic startups, small and midsize 
businesses, to leading Online Travel Agencies, metasearch engines, 
short-term rental platforms, Global Distribution Systems, and Travel 
Management Companies.
 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act plays a critical role 
in enabling modern online travel platforms to function safely and 
effectively by taking proactive steps to protect consumers. It allows 
platforms to host user-generated content--such as reviews, ratings, and 
photos--without facing liability for content posted by third parties, 
while also empowering them to manage and remove material that risks 
consumer safety.
 These protections make it possible for millions of travelers to see 
information shared by other travelers when planning a trip. Reviews, 
photos, and listings on online travel platforms help consumers compare 
options, evaluate quality, and make informed decisions about where to 
stay, how to travel, and what experiences to book. Together, these 
tools form a foundational part of today's travel marketplace.
 Because of Section 230, travel platforms are encouraged to take 
proactive steps to reduce the risk of harm to consumers. They can 
remove fake listings, potentially misleading reviews, and inappropriate 
content that could expose travelers to potential increased risk. They 
can display real-time user-generated information that helps travelers 
assess the quality and reliability of travel services. And they can ban 
or block users who engage in scams, harassment, or other behavior that 
undermines consumer trust.
 The importance of this information to consumers is clear. Surveys 
consistently show that 90 percent of travelers rely on information 
posted on platforms, such as online reviews, before making a booking. 
Nearly all travelers--approximately 95 percent--read reviews during the 
planning process, and many spend weeks researching options before 
finalizing travel decisions.
 Travel Tech members helped pioneer the use of user-generated 
content in the travel industry in the early 2000s, fundamentally 
changing how travelers research and book trips. Community-driven 
reviews and listings created a more transparent and competitive 
marketplace, where quality and service are visible to consumers and 
where small businesses can reach a global audience.
 As Congress considers Section 230, it is important to recognize the 
role these protections play in supporting consumer safety and 
transparency in travel and how, broad or sweeping changes could have 
unintended consequences.
 Weakening Section 230 protections may hamper platforms' ability to 
invest in proactive efforts to remove fraud, scams, bad actors, and 
misleading content. It may also force platforms to restrict or remove 
user-generated content in a more sweeping way, leading to fewer 
reviews, less transparency, and fewer tools for travelers to evaluate 
safety and quality before they book. In short, Section 230 helps create 
an environment where platforms can responsibly manage the information 
travelers depend on. Preserving that balance is essential to 
maintaining consumer trust, protecting the travel experience, and 
supporting a competitive travel marketplace.
 Thank you for your consideration.
 Laura Chadwick,
 President and CEO,
 The Travel Technology Association.
 ______
 
 TechNet
 Washington, DC, March 17, 2026

Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Cruz and Ranking Member Cantwell:

 In advance of the Senate Commerce Committee's hearing titled 
``Liability or Deniability? Platform Power as Section 230 Turns 30,'' I 
am writing to share TechNet's perspective on the continued importance 
of intermediary liability protections and the principles that should 
guide any reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996.
 TechNet is the national, bipartisan network of technology CEOs and 
senior executives that promotes the growth of the innovation economy by 
advocating a targeted policy agenda at the Federal and 50-state level. 
TechNet's diverse membership includes over 100 dynamic American 
businesses ranging from startups to the most iconic companies on the 
planet and represents over five million employees and countless 
customers in the fields of information technology, artificial 
intelligence, e-commerce, the sharing and gig economies, advanced 
energy, transportation, cybersecurity, venture capital, and finance.
 As Section 230 marks its 30th anniversary, TechNet urges the 
Committee to reflect on what these protections have made possible. 
Section 230 has been a cornerstone of the modern internet, enabling 
American innovation, supporting millions of jobs, and allowing 
businesses of all sizes to connect with customers, share ideas, and 
grow online. It has helped fuel the economic growth and global 
competitiveness that define the U.S. technology sector. These 
protections do not provide ``total immunity'' from wrongdoing. Rather, 
they ensure that bad actors, not the platforms they misuse, are held 
accountable for their own conduct, while preserving the legal certainty 
that has allowed decades of innovation to flourish.
 As the Committee examines potential reforms, TechNet urges members 
to be guided by the following principles:

 First, the First Amendment cannot exist in the 21st century without 
protections for the intermediaries that provide opportunities for user-
generated speech. Making interactive computer services liable for 
content created by their users would force providers to censor broadly 
to protect themselves, reducing access to information, fundamentally 
changing how people communicate online, and making it more difficult to 
protect users, including children and vulnerable communities. This 
outcome would be bad for users, bad for innovation, and inconsistent 
with our Nation's commitment to free expression.
 Second, any reforms to Section 230 must not create uncertainty that 
disproportionately harms entrepreneurs and makes it harder for startups 
and emerging companies to compete. The large platforms that critics 
most often target have the legal and financial resources to absorb 
sweeping liability changes. It is the small businesses, startups, and 
new entrants that cannot, and it is those innovators who would be most 
harmed by repeal or poorly designed reform. Policymakers should hold 
bad actors accountable for their own actions rather than shifting 
liability to the platforms that host them.
 Third, algorithms are not publishing decisions. Automated systems 
that organize and surface content, whether recommending a product, a 
video, or a route, do not constitute an endorsement of that content. 
Treating algorithmic tools as editorial judgments subject to publisher 
liability would threaten the core functionality of search engines, 
social media platforms, online marketplaces, and countless other 
services that consumers rely on every day.
 Fourth, any reforms should support reasonable processes and systems 
for managing illegal content based on industry best practices, rather 
than imposing one-size-fits-all mandates that disadvantage smaller 
platforms and new entrants. Liability protections allow interactive 
computer services to set their own rules for content moderation in ways 
that best serve their users, and that flexibility is a feature, not a 
flaw.
 TechNet urges Congress to reject efforts to repeal Section 230 
without a clear, workable alternative that protects consumers, 
preserves free speech, and ensures the United States remains the global 
leader in innovation. We stand ready to work with the Committee toward 
targeted reforms that hold bad actors accountable, protect vulnerable 
users, and preserve the legal certainty that allows new companies, 
technologies, and ideas to thrive.
 Thank you for the opportunity to submit these views for the record. 
Please do not hesitate to reach out if we can be a resource or if you 
have any questions.
 Sincerely,
 Linda Moore,
 President and CEO.
 ______
 
 LGBT Tech
 Tuesday, March 17, 2026

Hon. Ted Cruz,
Majority Leader,
United States Senate.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Minority Leader,
United States Senate.

Dear Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Senate 
 Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation:

 On behalf of LGBT Tech, thank you for the opportunity to submit 
this statement for the record in support of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.
 LGBT Tech is a national nonprofit working at the intersection of 
the LGBTQ+ community and technology. Our work focuses on digital 
equity, privacy, online safety, and ensuring LGBTQ+ people can access 
the tools and spaces they need to thrive.

 Section 230 is a core protection that makes online speech and 
community spaces possible, and is essential to protecting LGBTQ+ 
people's ability to speak and connect online.

 We recognize that online harms are real and any policy response 
must be carefully tailored to those harms. However, eliminating or 
destabilizing the current legal framework, including Section 230, that 
allows online services to host and moderate lawful user content is not 
the tailored response users need. It is a structural change with 
predictable harms that will be borne first and hardest by communities 
that already face censorship, exclusion, and disproportionate barriers 
to information.
 That is why LGBT Tech is especially concerned that the debate is no 
longer limited to targeted reform proposals that ``update'' Internet 
law but is increasingly focused on proposals to sunset or repeal 
Section 230 altogether.
 For LGBTQ+ people, that would have immediate and foreseeable 
effects. At a time when attacks on LGBTQ+ people are intensifying in 
schools, legislatures, courts, and other physical spaces, digital 
platforms increasingly function as lifelines. They are places where 
people seek identity-affirming information, connect with peers, find 
crisis support, access health and safety resources, and participate in 
public discourse. If Section 230 were repealed or dramatically 
weakened, many platforms, especially smaller services, nonprofits, 
forums, and community-based spaces would likely respond by narrowing 
what users can post, restricting discussions on topics deemed 
controversial or high risk, or suppress entire categories of content 
altogether--including LGBTQ+ issues--rather than risk being sued and 
incur expensive litigation.
 That chilling effect would not fall evenly across communities. In 
the current political climate, LGBTQ+ identity and even the mere 
existence of affirming resources are frequently characterized as 
inappropriate or harmful, especially when minors are involved. If 
liability risk increases dramatically as a result of the dilution or 
elimination of Section 230, LGBTQ+ content and resources would be among 
the primary categories pushed toward over-removal and exclusion from 
platforms.
 Our concerns are also reflected in the community we serve. LGBT 
Tech's 2025 polling of LGBTQ+ people in the United States found that 78 
percent were concerned about the removal or restriction of LGBTQ+ 
content by social media platforms, rising to 97 percent among 
transgender respondents. 76 percent of respondents (and 94 percent of 
transgender respondents) reported concern about losing access to online 
LGBTQ+ community spaces because of platform policy decisions. Weakening 
Section 230 would significantly increase the risk of censorship and 
isolation that our community members already fear.
 For LGBTQ+ people, especially those living in hostile or isolated 
environments, access to digital spaces is essential to safety and 
community. As Congress considers the future of Section 230, we urge the 
Committee to recognize that weakening or repealing it will not simply 
increase accountability. It will predictably narrow access to some of 
the last remaining spaces where LGBTQ+ people can safely speak, 
connect, and be seen.
 Respectfully,
 Shae Gardner,
 Director of Policy and Research.
 ______
 
 Center for Countering Digital Hate
 March 17, 2026

Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate.

Re: Committee Hearing on Section 230 Reform

Dear Chairman Ted Cruz and Ranking Member Maria Cantwell:

 I write to you as the U.S. Director of Public Affairs for the 
Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), a watchdog organization that 
researches the societal harms associated with social media and 
artificial intelligence platforms. I was a child, growing up in Central 
Minnesota, when Section 230 was signed into law. I witnessed the 
Internet's transformation from early message boards and instant 
messaging to today's large-scale social media platforms. What began as 
relatively simple online communities has evolved into sophisticated 
systems that track users' behavior, relationships, and preferences to 
maximize user engagement and advertising revenue.
 Alongside the rest of the nation, we are closely following ongoing 
litigation against Meta in New Mexico and Los Angeles. In New Mexico, 
prosecutors allege Meta violated consumer protection laws and failed to 
address addiction and child-exploitation risks on its platforms. In Los 
Angeles, a bellwether youth-addiction case has proceeded on product-
design theories, and Mark Zuckerberg testified before a jury in 
February 2026.
 Section 230 issues may remain central on appeal, particularly where 
courts are asked to distinguish between liability for third-party 
speech and liability for product design or platform conduct. While 
Congress does not have authority over the confines of the First 
Amendment, it does very much have authority over Section 230. As we 
detail below, policymakers need only examine court rulings from the 
past three decades to see the growing shortcomings of Section 230 as 
the United States' primary legal framework for governing the modern 
Internet. Courts, even within the same circuit, are increasingly 
divided over how the law should apply. Justice Elena Kagan suggested 
during Supreme Court oral arguments that Congress may be better suited 
than the courts to address questions about Section 230s scope.
Big Tech Needs to Come to the Table to Negotiate
 To be clear, we are not calling for a repeal of Section 230, but 
rather a thoughtful congressional review of potential reforms that 
better address Americans' expectations for justice and accountability. 
In that spirit, we support the Sunset Section 230 Act (Graham/Durbin) 
as a mechanism to force tech companies to engage Congress and 
stakeholders in good-faith negotiations towards meaningful reform. 
Members of this very Committee have put forward legislative solutions 
that deserve thoughtful consideration.
 The need for legislation such as the Sunset Section 230 Act 
reflects the technology industry's limited engagement with Congress on 
meaningful reform. Major companies and their trade associations--
including NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry 
Association--have often resisted proposals to revisit the scope of 
Section 230. Meanwhile, Americans continue to face serious risks 
online, including scams targeting seniors and safety threats affecting 
children and teens.
The Broken ``Good Samaritan'' Compromise
 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was originally 
enacted with a straightforward goal: to encourage Internet companies to 
moderate harmful content on their platforms. In 1996, Representatives 
Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden also sought to address a controversial 
New York state court ruling that threatened the ability of online 
platforms to host user-generated content in good faith. Early message 
board operators justifiably needed safeguards to remove posts that were 
irrelevant or objectionable (for example, posts unrelated to dog care 
on a dog care forum) and to prevent being held liable for user-
generated content, such as defamatory restaurant reviews, that platform 
operators had no reasonable way of knowing were unlawful or protected 
speech.
 In exchange for these ``Good Samaritan'' actions, Congress granted 
the then-nascent Internet industry a degree of immunity from liability 
for user-generated content. The highly sophisticated social media 
business model and technological capabilities that exist today were not 
envisioned by the original proponents of Section 230. Over time, 
however, the Good Samaritan compromise has been undermined by judicial 
interpretations that now permit the world's largest and most profitable 
corporations to harm its own users with impunity.
Section 230 Raises Significant Federalism Concerns
 The current debate surrounding artificial intelligence regulation 
illustrates another important concern. Americans overwhelmingly oppose 
Federal policies that preempt states from protecting their residents 
from the harms of the tech industry. According to a poll conducted by 
the Institute for Family Studies, three-to-one of polled Americans 
opposed the proposed inclusion of AI preemption in the NDAA. Yet 
Section 230 represents the earliest and most sweeping example of 
Federal preemption benefitting Meta, X, and other tech companies who 
are dominating in both the social media and AI sectors. In our large 
and politically diverse nation, states are often the laboratories of 
democracy. Federal lawmakers should remember that the Framers of the 
Constitution intended for most governing authority to remain with the 
states.
 Section 230 has often prevented states from pursuing remedies for 
harms including scams, fraud, deepfake pornography, sexual 
exploitation, harms to children and teens, defamation, and other harms 
facilitated through social media platforms. Two dozen state Attorneys 
General filed an amicus brief in the Gonzalez v Google case before the 
Supreme Court, arguing that Section 230 violated sacrosanct principles 
of federalism and was preventing states from allocating ``losses for 
Internet-related wrongs'' amongst private parties.\1\ State Attorneys 
General know from personal experience that social media companies have 
the most power and resources to mitigate harms in the first place. It 
is time for Congress to address the flaws of Section 230 once and for 
all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Brief for the States of Tennessee et al., as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 9, Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 143 S. Ct. 762 
(2023) (no. 21-1333).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restore Judicial Authority to Enjoin Illegal Activity
 In Hassell v Bird (2018), the California Supreme Court held that 
Section 230 prevents courts from ordering platforms to remove illegal 
content--in that case, defamatory material. While it is important not 
to place platforms in the impossible role of judge and jury on the 
First Amendment, it is quite another matter to allow a platform or any 
company to ignore a lawful court order. It is essential for Americans 
to have certain protections online to protect their reputations, 
careers, finances, and personal safety. As the dissent correctly notes, 
the order sought to enforce a defamation judgment against the speaker 
and protect a victim of unlawful defamation, not to punish Yelp for 
publishing third-party content. Society is not served by allowing 
defamatory material to continue to spread.
 This holding has particularly acute consequences for the Jewish 
community, which has long been the target of defamatory conspiracies 
and incitement. Anti-Jewish hate frequently manifests through false 
allegations (e.g., modern forms of blood libel) against prominent 
Jewish individuals and institutions, as well as coordinated campaigns 
to spread disinformation that portrays Jewish people as malicious or 
criminal actors. When courts are unable to compel the removal of 
content that has already been adjudicated as defamatory, these 
narratives are allowed to persist, amplify, and reach wider audiences, 
increasing the risk of real-world harassment and violence. Leading 
voices in the space of combatting antisemitism have all warned that 
online platforms are amplifying anti-Jewish hate at scale. The 
continued circulation of defamatory content, despite any legal findings 
of its illegality, undermines both accountability and safety, leaving 
Jewish individuals especially vulnerable. Attacks on synagogues in the 
United States have been preceded or accompanied by the spread of 
conspiratorial and defamatory narratives online, underscoring how 
unchecked digital amplification of hate can translate into offline 
threats and physical danger for Jewish communities.
 Congress should clarify that Section 230 does not prevent courts 
from enforcing lawful judgments and ordering the removal of adjudicated 
illegal content.
Hold Big Tech Accountable for Algorithm-Fueled Proliferation of Scams, 
 Fraud, Misleading Advertisements, and other Harms
 What began as a modest protection meant to address the 
``moderator's dilemma'' has evolved into a doctrine that courts often 
interpret broadly in favor of sweeping immunity. For example, in Force 
v. Facebook, the Second Circuit held that Facebook's use of algorithms 
to match posts and information to users based on their interests 
constituted a traditional ``publisher'' function, allowing the company 
to claim Section 230 immunity. Similarly, in Calise v. Meta Platforms, 
the Ninth Circuit granted immunity to Meta for the proliferation of 
user-targeted fraudulent third-party advertisements placed on its 
platform, reasoning that if a duty owed by the platform would require 
it to moderate content, Section 230 immunity applies.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ 103 F.4th 732 (9th Cir. 2024). Note, the contract claims 
surrounding Meta's terms of service were not barred by Section 230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 These legal interpretations risk insulating platforms from 
responsibility even when their systems actively contribute to the 
spread of something as harmful as scams, fraud, and misleading 
advertisements. Certain courts have gotten it right. In Anderson v. 
TikTok, the Third Circuit held that algorithmic recommendations that 
curate and amplify content can constitute a platform's own conduct to 
be ineligible for the protections of Section 230.
 At a minimum, Congress should consider a ``deliberate indifference 
to harm'' standard that addresses situations in which platforms possess 
knowledge that harmful content is causing real-world harm but fail to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate it.
Mitigate the Harms of Design Features
 Congress should clarify that Section 230s liability shield applies 
to third-party, user-generated speech, not to a platform's own conduct, 
product design and interface choices.
 The Federal circuits have not reached a consistent standard on this 
issue. The Ninth Circuit has taken steps to avoid creating what it 
called a ``lawless no-man's-land on the Internet,'' however, the Second 
Circuit, by comparison, has favored broader Section 230 immunity 
regarding design features immunity.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ HomeAway.com v. City of Santa Monica, 918 F.3d at 683 (9th Cir. 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
the Ninth Circuit held that platforms are not entitled to Section 230 
immunity when their design choices materially contribute to the 
unlawfulness of third-party content.\4\ Similarly, in Lemmon v. Snap, 
the Ninth Circuit allowed claims to proceed against Snapchat's speed 
filter, concluding that the case concerned the negligent design of a 
product with a potential defect rather than liability for user 
speech.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
 \5\ 995 F.3d 1085, 1091-94 (9th Circ. 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Clarifying that Section 230 does not shield harmful platform design 
decisions would preserve protections for user speech while ensuring 
companies remain accountable for the systems they build.
Conclusion
 It is well past time for Americans to receive a legislative process 
that fully considers both the benefits and the harms produced by 
Section 230. Congress should do better in reassessing how this 
framework from three decades ago fails to function in today's vastly 
different technological environment.
 Section 230 was not covered by the nightly news or debated in the 
newspapers at the time. There is little legislative record to suggest 
that the members of this Committee in 1996 contemplated a future in 
which children would spend hours each day on platforms designed to 
track their online activity, addict them for higher engagement quotas, 
and push harmful self-harm content to them within minutes of creating 
an account. The legislative history is noticeably thin for what is now 
called the ``Twenty-Six Words that Created the Internet.''
 We at CCDH respectfully urge this Committee to continue its 
examination of Section 230, seek input from a broad range of 
stakeholders, and consider meaningful legislative reforms.
 Sincerely,
 Sarah O'Quinn
 U.S. Director of Public Affairs.
 ______
 
 Consumer Technology Association
 March 17, 2026

Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

Dear Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the 
 Committee:

 This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Communications Decency 
Act, enacted on February 8, 1996. Section 230 of that Act laid down a 
simple principle: liability for speech rests with the speaker, not 
platforms hosting third-party content. Section 230 supercharged 
American tech leadership by creating clear rules and legal protections 
allowing innovators to build. Over the past 30 years, those 26 words 
helped power the modern Internet and cemented American global 
leadership in the digital economy.
 Since then, American Internet companies have generated trillions of 
dollars in market value and created millions of jobs. Today, American 
tech companies account for roughly one-third of the S&P 500s total 
market value. The United States also produces more venture-backed 
startups than any other country and attracts the largest share of 
global venture capital investment. Seven of the ten largest tech firms 
globally are American. We have the world's most dynamic digital 
economy, and Section 230 made that possible.
 Section 230 provided legal certainty allowing innovators to invest 
and take risks. Without it, every website that hosts a comment, review, 
rating, forum, or marketplace listing would face constant lawsuits over 
user speech, creating a crippling litigation tax on the internet. 
Certainty matters most for startups and early-stage companies. Large 
companies can hire teams of lawyers. Startups and smaller businesses--
like 80 percent of the Consumer Technology Association's more than 1200 
member companies--cannot.
 Section 230 is not a subsidy for large platforms. It is the legal 
infrastructure that allows thousands of startups, creators, and small 
businesses to launch platforms, grow communities, and attract 
investment. Weakening Section 230 protections would not discipline 
large platforms. It would entrench them, making it nearly impossible 
for the next generation of competitors to thrive.
 Many of the companies and technologies that debut each year at 
CES, our annual globally tech event, would not exist without Section 
230. CES features over 4000 exhibitors introducing new products, 
platforms, and services to the global market, showing vibrant 
competition in the technology sector. Section 230 helped create the 
legal environment that allows those innovations to emerge and scale.
 Section 230 also helped enable the greatest expansion of speech in 
human history. Before the internet, reaching a large audience required 
owning a television or radio station, a newspaper, or another printed 
publication. Section 230 provided the legal certainty allowing 
platforms to host user-generated content at scale. Millions of 
Americans can now publish their ideas, grow audiences, launch 
businesses, and participate in public debate online. Creators, 
educators, entrepreneurs, artists, journalists, and small businesses 
all benefit from this open and competitive ecosystem.
 Section 230 also protects platforms ability to moderate and remove 
objectionable content in good faith. That flexibility allows different 
communities to develop different norms. LinkedIn operates differently 
from X. Yelp operates differently from Truth Social. That diversity 
reflects marketplace competition and innovation as companies tailor 
their content moderation practices to their users' needs and 
preferences.
 Section 230 does not protect illegal conduct. If something is 
illegal offline, it is illegal online. Fraud, trafficking, threats, and 
exploitation remain fully subject to criminal law enforcement. Major 
platforms invest billions of dollars each year in detecting and 
removing illegal content, and Section 230 enables that proactive work 
by ensuring that good faith content moderation does not become a 
liability trap.
 As with every significant new technology, the expansion of online 
participation and speech also creates new challenges. Protecting 
children online is, can and should be a priority. Thankfully, practical 
solutions exist. For example, the Digital Safety Shield proposed by 
NetChoice outlines steps that strengthen online safety while preserving 
free expression and innovation.
 Finally, Section 230 has renewed importance in the age of 
artificial intelligence (AI). Modern AI systems rely on vast amounts of 
third-party information and operate on top of the open Internet 
ecosystem that Section 230 helped make possible. AI systems summarize, 
organize, recommend, and interact with information created by millions 
of users across the internet. Without the protections Section 230 
provides for hosting and organizing user-generated content at scale, 
the data and interaction layers that power modern AI would face 
enormous litigation risk. Weakening that foundation would slow American 
AI innovation precisely when global competition is accelerating.
 The United States won the first era of the Internet because 
Congress created clear rules for innovation. At a moment of intense 
global competition in AI and advanced technology, Congress should 
preserve the legal framework that made that leadership possible. We 
look forward to working with the Committee to ensure the United States 
remains the world's leading home for innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
free expression online.
 Sincerely,
 Kinsey Fabrizio,
 President,
 Consumer Technology Association.
 Michael Petricone,
 Senior Vice President, Government Affairs,
 Consumer Technology Association.
 ______
 
 The Sidney Group
 March 18, 2026

Hon. Ted Cruz,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.

RE: Statement for the Record for the Hearing, ``Liability or 
 Deniability? Platform Power as Section 230 Turns 30''

Dear Chairman Cruz, and Ranking Member Cantwell:

 On behalf of The Sidney Group,\1\ I respectfully submit this 
statement for the record for the Committee's March 18, 2026 hearing, 
``Liability or Deniability? Platform Power as Section 230 Turns 30.'' I 
submit this statement to flag one underexamined issue in the current 
Section 230 debate. Section 230 was built for a world in which 
platforms hosted third-party speech. Today, digital systems 
increasingly rank, shape, and generate the content at issue. That shift 
raises liability questions Congress should take seriously before 
litigation forces the issue first.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ The Sidney Group is a Washington, D.C.-based law firm with a 
focus on public policy advisory, technology policy, artificial 
intelligence governance, digital regulation, and regulatory risk in 
Federal and state policy environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 I do not believe Section 230 should be repealed. Blunt repeal would 
do more harm than good. It would create legal uncertainty, chill 
innovation, and discourage lawful online speech and moderation. But if 
Congress continues to debate Section 230 only as a content-moderation 
statute, it risks missing the next pressure point: how intermediary 
liability frameworks apply when systems increasingly help produce the 
content at issue.
A Changing Technological Environment
 Platforms today do more than host content. They rely on 
recommendation systems, ranking systems, automated moderation tools, 
and increasingly generative AI systems that shape what users see and, 
in some cases, generate the content itself.\2\ The core issue is no 
longer only whether platforms host harmful content, but whether 
existing liability frameworks can still map cleanly onto systems that 
increasingly help produce it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U.S. (2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Section 230, however, was drafted with the assumption that the 
relevant speech at issue would be provided by another ``information 
content provider,'' that is, a source distinct from the platform 
itself.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Generative artificial intelligence systems complicate that 
structure. Large language models and related systems can generate text, 
images, audio, and other forms of content directly in response to 
prompts or system inputs.\4\ Once integrated into digital services, 
they may participate in producing the very content users encounter 
online.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ National Institute of Standards and Technology, Artificial 
Intelligence Risk Management Framework 1.0 (Jan. 2023); Exec. Order No. 
14110, Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial 
Intelligence Sec. 3 (Oct. 30, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emerging Liability Questions
 As generative AI systems become more widely deployed, courts are 
beginning to confront new questions about liability frameworks 
originally designed for human-generated content.
 At bottom, these cases raise a common question: when the system 
helps generate the content at issue, existing intermediary doctrines 
may no longer fit as neatly as they once did.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \5\ Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 U.S. (2023) (considering whether 
claims arising from platform recommendation algorithms are barred by 
Section 230); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1311 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 That is not a theoretical problem anymore. Cases involving 
recommendation algorithms have already tested the boundaries of Section 
230 where platform systems play an active role in shaping information 
flows.\6\ More recently, lawsuits involving generative AI systems 
themselves have begun to emerge. For example, a Florida mother sued 
Character.AI and Google after her 14-year-old son died by suicide in 
2024, alleging that a chatbot portraying itself as a therapist and 
romantic partner worsened his mental state; a Federal judge later 
allowed key claims in the case to proceed.\7\ Another wrongful-death 
lawsuit alleges that Google's Gemini chatbot contributed to the suicide 
of a 36-year-old Florida man after the system allegedly fostered an 
emotional attachment and encouraged self-harm.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding 
that Section 230 barred claims based on Facebook's use of algorithms to 
recommend and amplify third-party content); Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 598 
U.S. (2023) (addressing whether Section 230 applies to claims arising 
from algorithmic recommendation of third-party content).
 \7\ Garcia v. Character Technologies, Inc., complaint filed Oct. 
2024 (M.D. Fla.); Katie Paul, Google, AI firm must face lawsuit filed 
by a mother over suicide of son, U.S. court says, Reuters (May 21, 
2025).
 \8\ Lawsuit says Google's Gemini AI chatbot drove man to suicide, 
Reuters (Mar. 4, 2026) (reporting wrongful-death allegations that an AI 
chatbot fostered emotional dependency and encouraged self-harm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Courts are being forced toward this question whether Congress is 
ready for it or not.
 Not all of these cases arise directly under Section 230. But they 
illustrate the kinds of AI-enabled harms, and the kinds of content-
generation questions, that increasingly place pressure on legal 
frameworks originally designed to address harms arising from online 
speech and platform-mediated content. Related litigation over AI 
training data and outputs also shows courts beginning to examine how 
existing legal frameworks apply to systems capable of producing new 
content from large training datasets.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ Andersen v. Stability AI Ltd., No. 3:23-cv-00201 (N.D. Cal.) 
(alleging that generative AI models were trained on copyrighted works 
and produce outputs derived from protected material); Getty Images 
(US), Inc. v. Stability AI, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-00135 (D. Del.) 
(asserting claims arising from the use of copyrighted images in AI 
training and output generation); see also Getty Images (US), Inc. v. 
Stability AI Ltd. (U.K. High Court) (raising similar claims concerning 
training data and AI-generated outputs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In that sense, the next pressure on Section 230 may come less from 
abstract calls for repeal than from the practical difficulty of 
applying a hosting-era statute to systems that rank, shape, and 
generate content.
What Congress Should Focus On
 Congress need not resolve that question fully in this hearing. But 
it should recognize that the Section 230 debate is no longer only about 
hosting, moderation, and repeal. It is increasingly about whether a 
liability framework built for platforms hosting third-party speech can 
still map cleanly onto systems that rank, shape, and generate content. 
If Congress waits, the issue may be shaped first by fragmented 
litigation and diverging judicial opinions rather than by deliberate 
legislative judgment. Because this use case is still new, Congress has 
an opportunity to examine it early and with a scalpel.
 In practical terms, Congress may wish to examine three related 
issues:

 how intermediary liability doctrines apply when automated 
 systems generate content;

 how responsibility should be allocated across developers, 
 platforms, deployers, and enterprise users; and

 how emerging AI systems are placing pressure on legal 
 frameworks designed for an earlier Internet architecture.

 Section 230 was written for a world where platforms hosted speech. 
The next legal questions arise in a world where systems increasingly 
help produce it.
 Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the 
record.
 Sincerely,
 Arthur D. Sidney.
 CEO and Principal,
 The Sidney Group.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Eric Schmitt to 
 Daphne Keller
 On March 18, 2026, during the Senate Commerce Committee's hearing 
on Section 230, you and I had an exchange concerning Missouri v. Biden, 
the Stanford Internet Observatory, and the Election Integrity 
Partnership. In that exchange, you stated that my description of 
Stanford's role was ``not consistent with [your] understanding,'' said 
that Stanford actors were ``exercising their First Amendment rights,'' 
later acknowledged, ``I wasn't there. I can't tell you how those 
conversations went,'' and added that you ``can't imagine them doing the 
government's bidding.'' When I referenced Missouri v. Biden, you also 
asked: ``The one that you lost?''
 Since that hearing, the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana has entered a consent decree in Missouri 
v. Biden imposing restrictions on certain Federal agencies' ability to 
coerce or pressure social media companies to suppress protected speech, 
and the government agreed that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties. In 
light of that development, please answer the following questions.

 Question 1. During the hearing, after I referenced Missouri v. 
Biden, you responded: ``The one that you lost?'' I replied at the time 
that the case had been remanded on standing grounds and that ``we 
didn't lose the case.''

 a. Do you retract your statement suggesting that Missouri v. Biden 
was a case Plaintiffs ``lost''?
 Answer. I do not retract that statement. In Murthy v. Missouri, the 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, despite extensive discovery, 
failed to marshal enough evidence to establish standing to seek a 
preliminary injunction. As Justice Barrett wrote, plaintiffs' claims 
``cannot rest on `mere allegations,' but must instead point to factual 
evidence.'' The Murthy plaintiffs did not meet this standard, the Court 
concluded, because they did not show ``any concrete link between their 
injuries and the defendants' conduct[.]'' The Court also noted that 
many of the district court's factual findings ``appear to be clearly 
erroneous.'' I believe this constitutes a loss before the Supreme 
Court.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ As stated in my testimony, I consider Murthy to be a 
problematic ruling that may harm future plaintiffs with legitimate 
claims against the government. Some commentators, such as the Wall 
Street Journal editorial board, have criticized the ruling more 
harshly, but recognized the bottom line: ``President Biden won[.]'' A 
Supreme Court License for Social-Media Censorship, Wall Street Journal 
(June 26, 2024), https://www.wsj.com/opinion/murthy-v-missouri-supreme-
court-censorship-social-media-facebook-covid-samuel-alito-amy-coney-
barrett-1ea4feda; see also Amy Howe, Justices side with Biden over 
government's influence on social media content moderation, SCOTUSBlog 
(June 26, 2024), https://www.scotus blog.com/2024/06/justices-side-
with-biden-over-governments-influence-on-social-media-content-
moderation/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In subsequent proceedings, as I understand, this evidentiary 
shortcoming was never redressed. Instead, the plaintiffs and current 
Administration reached and received district court approval of a 
settlement by consent decree.

 b. Do you acknowledge that the case has now resulted in a binding 
Federal court order restricting certain Federal agencies' conduct and 
in the government's agreement that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties?
 Answer. After my March 18 testimony, the plaintiffs and current 
Trump Administration defendants in Murthy ``reached an agreement 
resolving all claims'' and moved to enter a consent decree.\2\ The 
parties attached a draft order reflecting their agreement.\3\ In it, 
the government ``agree[d] not to contest that Plaintiffs are prevailing 
parties for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)[,]'' the Federal statute 
governing attorneys' fees. The settlement specified that ``except as 
stated explicitly in the text of the Agreement, it shall not be 
construed as evidence or as an admission regarding any issues of law or 
fact, or regarding the truth or validity of any allegation or claim 
raised in this action or in any other action.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ Consent Motion to Enter Consent Decree (March 24, 2026), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/
docket/63290154/477/missouri-v-biden/.
 \3\ Exhibit A to Consent Motion to Enter Consent Decree (March 24, 
2026), https://www.court
listener.com/docket/63290154/477/1/missouri-v-biden/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The district court approved the settlement, adopting the parties' 
own negotiated language as a consent decree and order.\4\ As described 
by one expert observer, the order essentially re-stated the 
constitutional standards described by the Supreme Court in NRA v. 
Vullo, a successful jawboning claim heard the same day as Murthy.\5\ As 
its resolution of Murthy makes clear, the Court saw no sufficient 
evidence that defendants in Murthy had violated those standards in the 
first place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (March 25, 2026), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/
docket/63290154/478/missouri-v-biden/.
 \5\ Morgan Wilsmann, Public Knowledge, Murthy v. Missouri 
Settlement Does Nothing to Combat Illegal Jawboning (March 30, 2026), 
https://publicknowledge.org/murthy-v-missouri-settle
ment-does-nothing-to-combat-illegal-jawboning/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 This negotiated settlement document is not a court holding. It does 
not reflect a judicial determination that any party prevailed. At the 
time of settlement, there was little meaningful adversity between the 
two parties, given the change in administration since the case was 
filed. Indeed, in light of a Trump Administration Executive Order 
titled ``Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship,'' 
the 5th Circuit had remanded Murthy's consolidated Kennedy v. Biden 
claim ``for the district court to consider mootness'' given the risk 
that the ongoing case failed ``the Article III requirement that there 
be a live case or controversy.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ Unpublished Opinion on Petition for Rehearing en Banc (5th 
Circ. January 30, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63290154/
429/missouri-v-biden/

 Question 2. During the hearing, when I described Stanford's role in 
the relevant censorship ecosystem, you stated: ``That version of the 
facts is not consistent with my understanding. I don't think they were 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
doing the Biden administration's bidding.''

 a. What specific facts did you rely upon in concluding that 
Stanford was not ``doing the Biden administration's bidding''?

 b. Please identify whether those facts were based on personal 
knowledge, secondhand representations, public reporting, institutional 
affiliation, or some other source.
 Answer. My understanding of these facts is grounded in publicly 
available information and my personal knowledge of the people involved 
in the Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO). Stanford's brief to the 
Supreme Court in Murthy describes SIO's operations in detail, as well 
as identifying numerous factual errors in the district court's 
findings. I cannot personally attest to that brief's level of detail, 
but I am confident of my assertion about the core question regarding 
the independence of people involved. As I stated in testimony, ``I 
can't imagine them doing the government's bidding.''

 Question 3. In the same exchange, after expressing confidence that 
Stanford was not doing the government's bidding, you also stated: ``I 
wasn't there. I can't tell you how those conversations went,'' and ``I 
can't imagine them doing the government's bidding.''

 a. If you were ``not there'' and ``can't tell how those 
conversations went,'' on what basis were you able to express confidence 
that Stanford was not acting in support of government censorship 
objectives?

 b. Do you wish to revise any portion of your March 18 testimony in 
light of your admitted lack of firsthand knowledge?

 c. Looking back, do you agree that your testimony conveyed greater 
certainty than your personal knowledge supported?
 Answer. I stand by my testimony and do not wish to revise it. As 
explained, my confidence comes from knowing the people at SIO. As I 
also testified, I fully support their First Amendment right to say what 
they think, including in speech expressed to the government. This is a 
broad principle, and applies to my colleagues' and others' First 
Amendment protected speech regardless of my personal agreement with any 
particular positions they may advance.
 The Fifth Circuit recognized this First Amendment concern in 
vacating aspects of the initial district court injunction that barred 
officials from ``collaborating, coordinating, partnering, 
switchboarding, and/or jointly working with the Election Integrity 
Partnership, the Virality Project, the Stanford Internet Observatory, 
or any like project or group[,]'' and in declining plaintiffs' 
subsequent request to reinstate this portion of the injunction.\7\ Such 
an injunction, the Fifth Circuit noted, ``may implicate private, third-
party actors that are not parties in this case and that may be entitled 
to their own First Amendment protections.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ Plaintiffs-Appellees' Petition for Panel Rehearing, Case 23-
30445 (September 22, 2023).
 \8\ Missouri v. Biden, 83 F. 4th 350, 396 (5th Cir. 2023).

 Question 4. During the hearing, you rejected my description of 
Stanford's role as ``not consistent with [your] understanding,'' while 
also making clear that you were ``not really'' involved in the Stanford 
Internet Observatory's participation in the Election Integrity 
Partnership and that you were ``not there'' for the conversations at 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
issue.

 a. Before offering that testimony, did you review any internal 
Stanford Internet Observatory or Election Integrity Partnership 
communications concerning requests, referrals, escalations, or 
coordination with government officials?

 b. If not, why did you present your understanding with confidence?

 c. If so, please identify the categories of materials you reviewed.
 Answer. My preparation for this testimony was focused on Section 
230 and on what I consider to be very serious threats to the First 
Amendment posed by the current administration. It did not include 
review of materials of the sort described in the question. My 
confidence stems from my familiarity with the character of individuals 
involved in SIO, as well as public information including the record and 
resolution of the Murthy case.

 Question 5. Because your testimony addressed not only legal 
doctrine but also the factual character of Stanford's role in the 
censorship debates surrounding the 2020 election and COVID-era speech, 
the Committee would benefit from understanding whether your views have 
changed.

 a. Does the March 24 consent decree in Missouri v. Biden cause you 
to reassess the constitutional risks associated with coordinated 
relationships among Federal agencies, outside researchers, 
universities, and platforms in the content-moderation context?

 b. If your answer is yes, please explain how your views have 
changed.

 c. If your answer is no, please explain why the entry of a binding 
Federal consent decree does not alter your assessment.
 Answer. My views have not changed. The current Administration's 
decision to settle the case through consent decree does not involve a 
court ruling on the merits.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Daphne Keller
Claims of Anti-Conservative Censorship:
 Some of my colleagues frequently claim that tech companies 
systematically censor conservative viewpoints, pointing to moderation 
decisions around January 6th or COVID-19.
 But treating content moderation purely as a partisan grievance 
ignores a fundamental reality of the internet--platforms must have the 
ability to make moderation decisions to create the kinds of communities 
their users actually want.
 We are seeing the demand for this right now with the rapid growth 
of heavily curated spaces like Bluesky.
 That is not to say platforms always get it right. In fact, they 
frequently make terrible decisions.
 We've seen catastrophic failures of moderation--like Grok and X 
allowing non-consensual intimate imagery to proliferate, or TikTok's 
algorithm feeding self-harm videos to children.
 Moderating content at scale is incredibly complex and often deeply 
flawed. But forcing platforms into a ``must-carry'' model to appease 
political complaints doesn't fix those severe harms--it makes them much 
worse.

 Ms. Keller, if Congress forced platforms to carry all speech 
regardless of their own community standards, what happens to their 
ability to address harmful content targeting children or that promotes 
self-harm or eating disorders?
 Answer. If Congress forced platforms to carry literally all speech, 
they would be unable to remove even worst-of-the-worst unlawful content 
such as child sexual abuse material. I believe that most proposals 
would not go so far, but would instead leave platforms able to enforce 
legal standards without being able to enforce their own discretionary 
standards. In that case, under the recent FSC v. Paxton ruling, 
platforms could conceivably be compelled to remove or age-gate 
pornography. But FSC would not support a legal mandate for age-gating 
non-pornographic material, including promotion of self-harm or eating 
disorders. Accordingly, we should assume that such content would be 
readily available to both adults and minors, regardless of their own 
preferences, under such a law.
 To predict what content would confront users in this situation, we 
must understand the wide array of ``lawful but awful'' speech protected 
by the First Amendment.\1\ The Supreme Court has held that the First 
Amendment protects lies,\2\ hate speech,\3\ and hurtful messages 
directed at grieving families which I believe would deeply offend most 
Americans regardless of political alignment.\4\ Lower court cases tell 
us that the First Amendment also protects diet advice\5\ that led to 
the death of a plaintiff's family member, and mushroom-collection\6\ 
advice that led plaintiffs to consume poisonous mushrooms that nearly 
killed them. All of this content--along with spam, scams, pro-terrorism 
content, barely-legal threats or incitement to violence, and more--
would remain on platforms under a legal standard of this sort. Content 
that people want to see would be harder to find, or visible only after 
navigating this tide of garbage. Few constituents would, I believe, 
thank their elected representatives for such a change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Daphne Keller, Lawful but Awful? Control over Legal Speech by 
Platforms, Governments, and Internet Users, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online 
(June 28, 2022), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/
2022/06/28/keller-control-over-speech [https://perma.cc/5ZYJ-YLHC].
 \2\ U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012).
 \3\ Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
 \4\ Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) (protestors at a 
soldier's funeral with signs saying ``God Hates You'' and ``Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers'' along with homophobic slurs).
 \5\ Smith v. Linn, 386 Pa. Superior Ct. 392 (Pa. 1989).
 \6\ Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Separately, if I may respond to one point from the Senator's 
introductory observations about Bluesky, I would like to call attention 
to what I believe to be that platform's single most important 
attribute. While the current primary interface may be heavily curated, 
Bluesky is revolutionary in that it can be flexibly curated. As an 
example, one Bluesky variant is Blacksky, a project focused on African 
American users, which enforces its own independent rules.\7\ I discuss 
the promise of this decentralized and interoperable approach in 
responses to Senator Schatz's questions, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ Blacksky Terms of Use, https://blacksky.com/blacksky-terms-of-
use/.

 President Trump has sued multiple news organizations for coverage 
he claims is biased against him. If Section 230 were repealed, would 
those kinds of lawsuits have an even greater chilling effect on what 
platforms and media organizations are willing to publish?
 Answer. Platforms are now a news source for a majority of 
Americans, as well as a major forum for discussion of current 
events.\8\ Both users' access to news and their ability to discuss and 
debate its significance would be deeply threatened in a world without 
Section 230. Platforms would face legal and economic pressure from both 
the government and private claimants, such as business or political 
leaders discussed in news coverage. If those individuals claimed that 
coverage was false and defamatory, for example, platforms would have 
little ability or incentive to judge whether those claims are 
legitimate. President Trump has successfully targeted news 
organizations both in his capacity as a private plaintiff and through 
Federal agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \8\ Nieman Lab, For the first time, social media overtakes TV as 
Americans' top news source (June 2025), https://www.niemanlab.org/2025/
06/for-the-first-time-social-media-overtakes
-tv-as-americans-top-news-source/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Section 230 enables platforms to resist this pressure. Tellingly, 
when CBS's fear of FCC retaliation led to the elimination of a Colbert 
Report interview with a political candidate, the show's online 
version--on YouTube, a Section-230-immunized platform--was able to air 
the footage.\9\ Major platforms' courage in the face of such state 
pressure has clearly faltered in some cases, as I discussed in my 
testimony. But those concessions would surely be far greater without 
Section 230s immunities. Section 230 also ensures that, even if major 
platforms with more state entanglements yield, smaller and braver 
platforms can preserve access to news reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ BBC, Stephen Colbert says CBS spiked interview with Democrat 
over FCC fears (February 2026), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/
cze0dk3yd5eo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carr Pressure and Jawboning:
 Earlier this month, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr once again threatened 
to revoke broadcast licenses for press coverage that the President does 
not like. This time it was because the press is reporting the facts 
about the Iran war.
 What's unsettling is that we have seen this type of behavior from 
Chairman Carr before--whether it's political commentary on late-night 
or reporting about ICE raids in a community.
 I agree with Chair Cruz that this type of coercion is ``dangerous 
as hell.'' It is a threat to free speech and the freedom of the press.

 Do you agree that a sitting government official using the threat of 
license revocation to suppress news reporting he and the President 
don't like represents one of the most serious threats to the First 
Amendment and free speech that we face today?
 Answer. I agree. Chairman Carr's outrageous behavior threatens a 
key institution of our democracy, and is one of the most serious 
assaults on the First Amendment today. Even before the most recent 
episode, eleven former FCC officials, including President Reagan's 
Chairman of the FCC, voiced their alarm that ``the current FCC Chairman 
has asserted the power to do precisely what the Supreme Court and 
Congress have forbidden'' by acting as a ``self-appointed, free-roving 
arbiter of truth in journalism.'' \10\ The FCC's current abuses of 
authority are unprecedented and profoundly dangerous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \10\ Petition for Special Relief In the Matter of Repeal of the 
News Distortion Policy (November 2025), https://protectdemocracy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2025/11/News-Distortion-Petition-for
-Special-Relief-1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 230 Liability Protection:
 Section 230 was adopted thirty years ago on a simple idea: 
platforms hosting user speech should not be treated as publishers of 
every post, and those that moderate harmful material should not be 
punished for doing so.
 That framework has been critical for startups, small businesses, 
and online communities that depend on the ability to host user content 
without being sued over every post. But thirty years of experience have 
also shown that the largest platforms used these protections very 
differently from how Congress intended.
 They built business models around algorithmic amplification, 
addictive design, and pervasive data collection.
 They hid behind Section 230 while their products harmed children 
and disrupted elections.
 As we consider Section 230 at thirty, I want to understand what has 
worked well and what hasn't.
 Specifically, what these protections have meant for free speech and 
for the smaller platforms that depend on them the most. But also how we 
hold tech platforms accountable for their harms.

 Ms. Keller, how has Section 230 enabled online discussions about 
contentious but constitutionally protected topics, such as abortion, 
LGBTQ rights, or speech critical of the government?
 Answer. I am old enough to remember a pre-Internet media 
environment, in which a small handful of gatekeepers permitted only a 
trickle of speech to be widely shared. On broadcast TV, for example, 
experiences and perspectives of minority or marginalized groups were 
almost nowhere to be found.
 That profoundly limited account of the world existed for two major 
reasons. First, bandwidth was limited, and networks could make the most 
money with ``lowest common denominator'' content--material that would 
be appealing to the most people, but almost definitionally disserved 
marginalized groups. Second, that content needed to be reviewed by 
lawyers.
 Networks risked liability for any mistakes, and were incentivized 
to play it safe. Offering bland sitcom pabulum was cheaper and simpler 
than giving the microphone to speakers from diverse groups and 
perspectives, or carrying out investigative journalism about topics 
like police mistreatment, bias in hiring and workplace policies, or 
government misconduct.
 The Internet changed that, with Section 230 playing a crucial role. 
Section 230 ensures that gay and transgender teens in small towns can 
connect with broader communities and seek important information online. 
As one acute example, it protects platforms from the campaign against 
transgender identity that today's FTC is actively pursuing.\11\ It 
permits frightened and vulnerable pregnant teenagers to learn about 
options for abortions or even basic medical care outside their own 
states.\12\ It provides the most fundamental infrastructure for 
political organizing and dissent, which may rely on mundane 230-
protected services like Dropbox, Microsoft 365, Google Spreadsheets, 
online e-mail, calendaring tools, chat groups, and more. Organizers of 
the Tesla protests explained this in a letter begging Congress to 
``leave Section 230 alone.'' \13\ As they put it, without Section 230, 
the social media platforms we used to share information would have 
deplatformed us, for fear of being sued by Elon Musk or his supporters. 
And the web hosting companies and tools we relied on to allow anyone 
anywhere to create their own protest would have taken us offline. Being 
able to organize online together is a source of our strength and 
resilience. Don't destroy it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ Nate Raymond, Reuters, Medical groups sue over U.S. FTC 
launching gender-affirming care probe (February 2026), https://
www.reuters.com/legal/government/pediatricians-group-sues-
over-us-ftc-launching-gender-affirming-care-probe-2026-02-17/; 
Punchbowl News, As chair, FTC commissioner touts he'd pull back on AI 
and fight trans care (December 2024) (linking to leaked document, 
https://punchbowl.news/wp-content/uploads/FTC-Commissioner-Andrew-N-
Fergu
son-Overview.pdf, stating intention to ``[f]ight back against the trans 
agenda''), https://punchbowl.news/article/tech/ftc-commissioner-
artificial-intelligence-trans-care/.
 \12\ Lizzie Presser and Kavitha Surana, ProPublica, A Pregnant 
Teenager Died After Trying to Get Care in Three Visits to Texas 
Emergency Rooms (November 2024), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/nevaeh-crain-death-texas-abortion-ban-emtala.
 \13\ Sheridan et al, Tesla Takedown Organizers Letter: ``Democrats, 
don't kill the tools we need to organize!'' (April 2025), https://
www.fightforthefuture.org/news/2025-04-15-tesla-takedown
-organizers-letter-democrats-dont-kill-the-tools-we-need-to-organize/.

 Do you agree that large platforms need to be held accountable for 
their actions and the harms they are causing to society--particularly 
harms to children and data privacy?
 Answer. Let me start with data privacy. I absolutely agree that 
platforms should be accountable for their use of personal data. Our 
country is--as Senator Cantwell knows far better than I do--long 
overdue for Federal privacy legislation. To the extent that children's 
harms genuinely sound in privacy and are caused by misuse of personal 
data, it is appropriate for Federal law to provide them with even 
broader protection. An update to COPPA that achieves this goal would be 
commendable.
 The cause of children's privacy is not advanced, however, by laws 
that cause platforms to implement age assurance or age verification 
measures. Such laws may cause platforms or vendors to collect anything 
from biometric data to behavioral profiles to copies of government 
IDs--from both children and adults. That information is at risk of data 
breaches, which have already happened and will surely continue.\14\ 
Perhaps more alarmingly, they are exposed to disclosure demands from 
governments and law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \14\ Josh Taylor, The Guardian, Proof-of-age ID leaked in Discord 
data breach (October 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/games/2025/oct/
07/discord-data-breach-proof-of-age-id-leaked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 This privacy and surveillance risk is the reason that Supreme Court 
case law prior to 2025's politically divided 6:3 ruling in FSC v. 
Paxton rejected such measures. Research shows that Internet users 
significantly change their behavior when they fear state 
surveillance.\15\ American journalists concerned about surveillance in 
the wake of the Snowden revelations, for example, engaged in ``levels 
of self-censorship . . . approaching the levels reported by writers 
living in authoritarian'' regimes.\16\ Google search queries dipped, 
including for purely personal queries about topics like health.\17\ 
Platform laws that impose this burden and risk on children and adults 
are extremely difficult to justify, both ethically and 
constitutionally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \15\ Alex Marthews and Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance 
and Internet Search Behavior, (2014) (examining changes in Google 
search queries), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2412564; Jonathan W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online 
Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BTLJ 117 (2016) (examining changes 
in Wikipedia page views), https://
btlj.org/data/articles2016/vol31/31_1/
0117_0182_Penney_ChillingEffects_WEB.pdf.
 \16\ Summer Lopez, PEN America, Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass 
Surveillance on International Writers (2015), https://pen.org/report/
global-chilling/.
 \17\ Marthews and Tucker, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
 Daphne Keller
Areas of Agreement on Section 230:
 Platform design decisions like autoplay for videos, infinite 
scroll, and constant push notifications may not be protected by Section 
230 and could be areas ripe for reform.

 Do you believe these are areas that Congress could effectively 
create safeguards without implicating speech issues?
 Answer. These are difficult and important questions. I am honestly 
uncertain of the answers, and glad that careful jurists in U.S. courts 
are currently reviewing evidence and arguments to resolve them.
 I will start with the question about speech. Regulation of such 
features would not be without First Amendment implications. For users, 
it would mean that state intervention made their speech less likely to 
reach an audience. As I examined in a law review article, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that ``burdens'' on distribution of protected 
speech trigger the same First Amendment review as outright bans.\18\ 
Such measures would also restrict platforms' own speech, by preventing 
them from sharing precisely the sort of curated feeds at issue in 
Moody.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \18\ Daphne Keller, Amplification and Its Discontents, 1 J. Free 
Speech L. 227 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 A court might conclude that restrictions on autoplay, infinite 
scroll, or notifications are not content-based, and hence are subject 
only to comparatively lenient intermediate scrutiny. On the other hand, 
both the intention and the consequence of such laws would likely be to 
burden certain speech based on its content. Lawmakers would not be 
inspired to act if social media feeds primarily featured dry academic 
lectures or CSPAN footage. Platforms would likely argue that in their 
case, the restriction is both content-based and unfairly targeted to 
disfavored speakers--hence meriting strict scrutiny.
 The other question is about the effectiveness of such measures. 
Would significant harm truly be avoided just by eliminating autoplay, 
infinite scroll, and notifications? It is unclear how real-world 
platform usage would change with these design alterations. Scientists 
remain divided about the causal link between social media use and 
mental health harms to teenagers.\19\ Addiction specialists question 
whether excessive social media use truly fits the ``addiction'' 
rubric.\20\ Some advocates for the rights and wellbeing of children 
champion legal restrictions on social media,\21\ others oppose 
them.\22\ Imposing restrictions solely for children would introduce 
privacy and surveillance risks, with the serious downsides discussed 
above. I am not an empiricist, and can't claim authority to unravel 
this jumble of potential positives and negatives. But I do think that 
Congress should not act without solid grounds to believe that doing so 
would actually achieve lawmakers' goals, while avoiding 
disproportionate harms to speech. Congress would also be wise to 
prioritize measures, like basic privacy protections, that can protect 
users from harm without engaging these fraught and difficult First 
Amendment questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \19\ Mike Masnick, TechDirt, Two Major Studies, 125,000 Kids: The 
Social Media Panic Doesn't Hold Up, https://www.techdirt.com/2026/01/
21/two-major-studies-125000-kids-the-social-me
dia-panic-doesnt-hold-up/ (January 2026) (reporting on studies in JAMA 
Pediatrics and The Journal of Public Health).
 \20\ Ian Anderson and Wendy Wood, Nature, Overestimates of social 
media addiction are common but costly (November 2025), https://
www.nature.com/articles/s41598-025-27053-2.
 \21\ Common Sense Media, In Victory for Kids and Families, Newsom 
Signs Online Safety Protections into Law (2025), https://
www.commonsensemedia.org/press-releases/in-victory-for-kids-and-
families-newsom-signs-online-safety-protections-into-law.
 \22\ Student Press Law Center, Amicus brief in NetChoice v. Bonta 
(N.D. Cal. 2023), https://splc.org/2023/05/amicus-brief-in-netchoice-v-
bonta-n-d-calif-2023/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
 Daphne Keller
Section 230s Impact on Censorship:
 Some experts have raised concerns that repealing Section 230 could 
result in platforms over-moderating content, which may 
disproportionately impact content deemed ``controversial.'' What 
content would be most vulnerable to over-moderation and censorship? How 
might these online harms translate to the real world? What has history 
shown us?
 Answer. Section 230 plays an essential role in protecting 
controversial speech and marginalized groups and viewpoints, as I 
discussed in response to Senator Cantwell's question above. As 
historical examples, I would offer several instances involving 
documentation of violence and state abuse of power. First, filmed 
evidence of police abuses of Black Americans in the past decade has 
profoundly changed broader public understanding of this problem. 
Narrative accounts of such abuse, of course, go back centuries. But 
Section-230-immunized platforms allowed for filmed evidence of violence 
against Philando Castile, George Floyd, and other individuals to reach 
a worldwide audience, and to inspire demands for change.
 A second example involves platforms' removal of videos documenting 
police under non-230 legal regimes. To simplify compliance with U.S. 
copyright law, major platforms may automatically block some uploads 
containing music at the request of copyright holders--even if the 
uploads do not infringe copyright. This has led to multiple reported 
examples in which police played popular songs while being filmed, in 
order to ensure that footage could not be posted on social media.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \23\ BBC, US officer plays Taylor Swift song to try to block video 
(July 2021), https://www
.bbc.com/news/technology-57698858; Dexter Thomas, Vice, New Video Shows 
Beverly Hills Cops Playing Beatles to Trigger Instagram Copyright 
Filter (February 2021), https://www.vice.com/
en/article/new-video-shows-beverly-hills-cops-playing-beatles-to-
trigger-instagram-copyright-filter/; Dexter Thomas, Vice, Is This 
Beverly Hills Cop Playing Sublime's `Santeria' to Avoid Being Live-
Streamed? (February 2021), https://www.vice.com/en/article/is-this-
beverly-hills-cop-playing-sublimes-santeria-to-avoid-being-
livestreamed/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The final example involves documentation of human rights abuses 
from the 2010s in Syria. Internet platforms including YouTube, 
responding to pressure from governments around the world, adopted crude 
methods to identify and automatically remove potentially terrorist 
content. Those filters presumably caught and removed a great deal of 
legitimately harmful and illegal material, including ISIS recruitment 
videos or images. But they are also widely understood to be the reason 
for major erroneous removals, including hundreds of thousands of videos 
collected by the non-profit Syrian Archive as evidence of human rights 
abuse and war crimes.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \24\ Syrian Archive, Removals of Syrian human rights content: May 
2020 (May 2020), https://syrianarchive.org/en/lost-found/removals-of-
syrian-human-rights-content-may-2020/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In these examples, history teaches us that platforms will resort to 
content moderation efforts that are at best imperfect, and at worst 
highly dangerous to the voices of victims and marginalized groups. 
Lawmakers should be cognizant of this risk in considering legal 
changes.
Interoperability:
 How can interoperability and a middleware ecosystem promote a safer 
online environment for children or protect users from online 
censorship?
 Answer. Interoperability or middleware-based tools for Internet 
platforms can introduce user control and competition into the online 
speech ecosystem. I described the basic concept--and some practical 
constraints on implementation--in a short article.\25\ In the time 
since that article was published, technical advances have meaningfully 
lowered some of the barriers to making middleware a reality. 
Importantly, AI can dramatically lower the costs of content moderation 
for new market entrants, and can support better models to protect user 
privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \25\ Daphne Keller, The Future of Platform Power: Making Middleware 
Work, 32 J. of Democracy 168 (2021), https://
www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-platform-power-
making-middleware-work/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Middleware also offers a more constitutionally viable way forward 
than many other legislative proposals. A legislative approach that 
started by lowering current legal barriers to middleware under laws 
like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or DMCA Section 1201 would, to my 
mind, create no First Amendment issues at all.\26\ A more drastic 
intervention that actually mandated interoperability would be more 
complex, but is certainly more constitutionally viable than proposals 
for top-down state intervention in online speech. As co-counsel and I 
discuss in a brief to the Supreme Court, interoperability rules would 
pose far fewer risks to Internet users' First Amendment rights, 
compared to laws imposing top-down state speech preferences.\27\ Harms 
to platforms' First Amendment rights would also be reduced, since such 
laws would not prevent them from setting their own editorial policies 
for content moderation and ranking. Platforms would likely still 
argue--correctly--that compulsory interoperation and support for 
alternate feed offerings are a form of compelled speech, and burden 
their constitutional rights. But carefully crafted, content-neutral 
laws might, like the one in the Supreme Court's Turner cases about 
cable television, still survive a First Amendment challenge in court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \26\ See generally Corynne McSherry, EFF, Want More Competition in 
Tech? Get Rid of Outdated Computer, Copyright, and Contract Rules 
(2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12
/want-more-competition-tech-get-rid-outdated-computer-copyright-and-
contract-rules.
 \27\ Amicus brief of Francis Fukuyama, Moody v. NetChoice (2023), 
https://www.supreme
court.gov/DocketPDF/22/22-277/292730/20231207155250803_22-277%20-
555%20Fukuyama%
20Amicus%20Brief%20Final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 As Senator Schatz raised in the hearing, many parents in particular 
do not want to deal with complicated controls. They just want a simple 
way to protect their kids. I think middleware stands a far better 
chance of actually achieving that goal than many other approaches. As a 
parent, I share lawmakers' dissatisfaction with the controls currently 
offered by major tech companies. The best way to fix that is to allow 
competitors to do better. At its simplest, this could mean offering 
parents a one-click option to automate selection among platforms' hard-
to-navigate existing controls. That is very much like the middleware 
product recently created by Professor Ethan Zuckerman to automate user 
selections among Facebook controls. Zuckerman and the Knight First 
Amendment Institute argued in court that this tool should be immunized 
from legal opposition by Meta under Section 230s toolmaker 
protections.\28\ Far more ambitious tools are also possible, and could 
offer parents a range of options as well as simplicity of use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \28\ Paul M. Barrett, Lawfare, A Zuck Takes on Meta (2024), https:/
/www.lawfaremedia.org/
article/a-zuck-takes-on-meta.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 I do want to be clear on one thing, however. Middleware and 
interoperability are a way to put users in control of their information 
diet, instead of governments or platforms. They would not and legally 
could not prevent those users from choosing to consume lawful 
misinformation, hate speech, and other harmful material. The hope is 
that most users would make considered choices, and opt for healthier 
feeds than the ones they have today. But that is not guaranteed. What 
is more certain, though, is that viable alternatives would reduce 
current incumbents' power over discourse. In so doing, it would reduce 
their resulting grave vulnerability to state cooptation and coercion.
Consumer Protections and Privacy Considerations:
 How would addressing gaps in kids' online safety promote broader 
consumer protections for all users, regardless of age?
 Answer. As discussed above in response to Senator Cantwell, I would 
see grave concerns in legal mandates that require privacy-invasive age 
assurance or verification. That approach would reduce protections for 
all Internet users, regardless of age. By contrast, legal reforms that 
allow middleware and interoperability to address gaps in kids' online 
safety would benefit adults as well.
 I do not claim sufficient expertise in U.S. privacy and consumer 
protection law to weigh in meaningfully on most other current gaps or 
their potential corrections. To the extent that consumer protection 
means basic non-content-related privacy protections or the avoidance of 
unfair and deceptive practices, however, I do not see Section 230 or 
the First Amendment as barriers. Problems would arise, however, if such 
laws became a de facto mechanism for state control over online speech. 
That could happen, for example, if Federal agencies were called upon to 
interpret inevitable disputes or gray areas in platform content rules. 
It could also happen under well-intentioned transparency laws that 
inadvertently unleashed similar state power over speech. I discuss a 
few brief examples of that problem and analyze First Amendment issues 
in footnoted materials.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \29\ Daphne Keller, CIS Blog, State Abuse of Transparency Laws and 
How to Stop It (2022) (examples), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/
2022/09/state-abuse-transparency-laws-and-how-stop-it/; Daphne Keller, 
Platform Transparency and the First Amendment, 4 J. Free Speech L. 1 
(2023) (legal analysis).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to 
 Daphne Keller
Section 230 and Jawboning:
 Republicans have argued that the Biden administration coerced 
social media platforms to take down misinformation, hate speech, and 
other content with which it disagreed. I strongly disagree with those 
claims. In making these arguments about jawboning, Republicans 
conveniently ignore the yearslong campaign among congressional 
lawmakers to pressure social media platforms into changing their 
content moderation policies to be ``fairer'' or ``less biased'' against 
conservatives.

 Can a member of Congress violate the First Amendment by using their 
legislative authority to coerce a third party to take action against 
speech of a private citizen?
 Answer. This is a complicated question. Members of Congress could 
certainly cross the line into unconstitutional coercion, including 
through pressuring platforms. They could also violate the First 
Amendment by a means raised in circuit court precedent but not 
discussed in the recent Supreme Court jawboning cases: by giving 
instructions to a fully compliant platform, which willingly silences 
user speech at state behest. Such state cooptation of platform power is 
just as big a threat as state coercion.
 At the same time, as I have discussed elsewhere, not every 
government communication--and not even every heated or angry 
statement--is jawboning.\30\ Open and frank discussion between 
platforms and those in government is essential for sound policymaking. 
It would defeat key functions of democracy if our representatives, once 
in office, could no longer express the beliefs and policy preferences 
that got them elected in the first place. I believe that the 
constitution gives Members relatively wide leeway to criticize 
platforms and argue for changes. Notably, individual Members also have 
limited ability to credibly threaten legislative change, since no 
Member can--acting alone--follow through on that threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \30\ Daphne Keller, Knight First Amendment Institute Blog, Six 
Things About Jawboning (2023), https://knightcolumbia.org/blog/six-
things-about-jawboning.

 Could an open-ended congressional investigation, including through 
the use of subpoenas and other compulsory tools, into third-party 
entities because of their speech or others' speech that they distribute 
or publish constitute unconstitutional jawboning?
 Answer. Abuse of Congress's investigatory powers, through subpoenas 
and other means calculated to chill speech or retaliate against 
speakers, can violate targets' constitutional rights. The precise legal 
tests are unclear, however, and recent precedent on this legal issue is 
sparse.\31\ Intermediaries ranging from platforms to law firms to 
universities to broadcasters can have powerful incentives to comply 
with government demands and appease those in power. Relatively few take 
legal measures to resist Congressional inquiries and create new case 
law.\32\ Victims of this appeasement strategy are likely to be unaware 
of the government's role in depriving them of legal representation, 
publication channels, and other means of exercising First Amendment 
rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \31\ Christopher Dunn, NYCLU Blog, Constitutional Limits on 
Congressional Investigations Into Palestine-Israel Advocacy (2024), 
https://www.nyclu.org/commentary/column-constitutional-limits-on-
congressional-investigations-into-palestine-israel-advocacy.
 \32\ See Emma Llanso and Taylor Moore, CDT, Senate Inquiry into 
Backpage's Content Moderation Practices Would Set Dangerous Precedent 
for Free Speech Online (2016), https://cdt.org/insights/senate-inquiry-
into-backpages-content-moderation-practices-would-set-dangerous-
precedent-for-free-speech-online/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Attention to Congressional abuse of investigatory powers was acute 
during and immediately after the mid-twentieth-century McCarthy era. 
Professor Seth Kreimer, in his seminal 2006 Censorship By Proxy 
article, pointed to these Congressional excesses as major drivers of 
the same mid-century Supreme Court rulings that inform our 
understanding of jawboning and platform censorship today.\33\ These 
include New York Times v. Sullivan (about newspaper liability for a 
third party advertisement by civil rights activists), Bantam Books 
(about state pressure on booksellers), and Smith v. California (about 
bookseller liability under law). The throughline Professor Kreimer sees 
is a judicial rejection of claims that ``indirect'' state pressures 
were ``immune from constitutional scrutiny because their impact was 
mediated by private implementation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \33\ Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, Penn Law 
School Public Law Working Paper No. 06-45 (2006), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=948226.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In cases about that era's legislative abuses, the Supreme Court 
noted that ``[t]here is no doubt that legislative investigations, 
whether on a Federal or state level, are capable of encroaching upon 
the constitutional liberties of individuals.'' \34\ As a result, the 
``power of compulsory process [must] be carefully circumscribed when 
the investigative process tends to impinge upon such highly sensitive 
areas as freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, 
and freedom of communication of ideas, particularly in the academic 
community.'' In another case, it observed that the threat of compelled 
legislative testimony might chill potential witnesses from expressing 
any but the ``most orthodox and uncontroversial views[.]'' \35\ The 
fact that such pressure came not directly from legislators but from the 
``glare of publicity'' and resulting ``public stigma, scorn and 
obloquy'' did not, the court held, relieve state actors of their own 
constitutional responsibilities. Today's victims of pressure campaigns 
may not know the word ``obloquy,'' much as the justices who authored 
these rulings would likely not have recognized words like ``doxing.'' 
The fundamental constitutional concerns, however, remain unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \34\ Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
 \35\ Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178 (1957).

 To be more specific, congressional Republicans have repeatedly 
suggested that Congress should pass legislation to reform Section 230 
so that only platforms that meet a standard of ``neutrality'' will 
receive Section 230 immunity. Could such legislation or the threat of 
passage of such legislation, especially by members or leaders of 
congressional committees with jurisdiction over Section 230 and the 
Telecommunications Act, encourage or pressure platforms to modify their 
content moderation practices? If so, would this conduct constitute 
unconstitutional jawboning?
 Answer. I do not believe that current law provides a clear answer 
to this question. My best take--which other experts might dispute--is 
that the behavior described would typically not constitute 
unconstitutional jawboning. Predicating Section 230 immunity on 
``neutrality'' would, to be clear, be a catastrophically bad policy 
choice. It would likely face a First Amendment challenge as an 
``unconstitutional condition.'' But threatening to pass flawed or even 
unconstitutional laws is a Congressional prerogative. Ideally, bad 
legislative proposals are one step in a deliberative and iterative 
process leading to good ones.
 The scenario described raises some red flags, but nonetheless does 
not involve some of the key indicia of unconstitutional jawboning.

 Members are not offering a bargain in which they will stay 
 their hands if platforms suppress particular speech. By 
 contrast, the behavior held unconstitutional in the Supreme 
 Court's recent Vullo ruling involved an explicit quid pro quo.

 The Members do not suggest that platforms are violating 
 existing laws, or threaten to carry out or instigate 
 enforcement, as was the case in both Vullo and Bantam Books.

 Any implied threat of retaliation is weakened by the fact 
 that individual Members cannot unilaterally enact new laws, as 
 the Ninth Circuit noted in a jawboning case brought by Robert 
 F. Kennedy Jr. against Senator Elizabeth Warren.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \36\ Kennedy v. Warren, 66 F.4th 1199 (9th Cir. 2023).

 The threats are made publicly, which somewhat reduces the 
 suggestion of a backroom deal or coercion, and enables public 
 review and accountability--whether in court or at the ballot 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 box.

 I wish I could offer a single crisp legal test for jawboning, but I 
do not believe one exists or is likely to. The potential variables in 
each situation are too great.\37\ But I think this is the answer that 
hews most closely to existing case law, and that preserves adequate 
room for trial, error, and debate in the legislative process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \37\ I list those factors, as I see them, in the final section of a 
blog post, Daphne Keller, Knight First Amendment Institute Blog, Six 
Things About Jawboning (2023), https://knightcolum
bia.org/blog/six-things-about-jawboning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Nadine Farid Johnson
Carr Pressure and Jawboning:
 Earlier this month, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr once again threatened 
to revoke broadcast licenses for press coverage that the President does 
not like. This time it was because the press is reporting the facts 
about the Iran war.
 What's unsettling is that we have seen this type of behavior from 
Chairman Carr before--whether it's political commentary on late-night 
or reporting about ICE raids in a community.
 I agree with Chair Cruz that this type of coercion is ``dangerous 
as hell.'' It is a threat to free speech and the freedom of the press.

 Question 1. Do you agree that a sitting government official using 
the threat of license revocation to suppress news reporting he and the 
President don't like represents one of the most serious threats to the 
First Amendment and free speech that we face today?
 Answer. Chairman Carr's threats of regulatory reprisal in 
retaliation for constitutionally protected expressive decisions, 
including editorial decisions about how to report on factual 
information concerning a matter of national security, appear to be 
government censorship--an unconstitutional effort by the government to 
use coercion to suppress speech it disfavors.
 The government may not seek to suppress speech it disfavors, 
including by jawboning--an act of government pressure to suppress 
constitutionally protected speech. As the Supreme Court held in Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the First Amendment bars the government from 
coercing private speech intermediaries into suppressing speech it 
disfavors. The point at which government efforts to pressure a speech 
intermediary cross the line into unconstitutional coercion is a vitally 
important question. This is because some efforts by government actors 
to engage with speech intermediaries are legitimate as an aspect of 
governance, including a manifestation of the public's right to hear its 
government's position. Efforts to coerce, however, are 
unconstitutional, because they leverage the power of the state to 
censor public discourse. Put simply, the government may not indirectly 
restrict speech that it may not restrict directly.
 This problem of government coercing private entities to revise 
their speech-related practices is extensive and continues to broaden, 
encompassing not only media outlets but also technology platforms, 
universities, and more. Irrespective of the entity targeted, and 
irrespective of the Administration responsible, government coercion to 
suppress speech is unconstitutional and presents an existential threat 
to the ability of the public to say what they wish and to hear what 
their fellow citizens say. Congress should act to make sure that 
governmental efforts at coercion do not evade public and judicial 
scrutiny.
Section 230 Liability Protection:
 Section 230 was adopted thirty years ago on a simple idea: 
platforms hosting user speech should not be treated as publishers of 
every post, and those that moderate harmful material should not be 
punished for doing so.
 That framework has been critical for startups, small businesses, 
and online communities that depend on the ability to host user content 
without being sued over every post. But thirty years of experience have 
also shown that the largest platforms used these protections very 
differently from how Congress intended.
 They built business models around algorithmic amplification, 
addictive design, and pervasive data collection.
 They hid behind Section 230 while their products harmed children 
and disrupted elections. As we consider Section 230 at thirty, I want 
to understand what has worked well and what hasn't.
 Specifically, what these protections have meant for free speech and 
for the smaller platforms that depend on them the most. But also how we 
hold tech platforms accountable for their harms.

 Question 1. Do you agree that large platforms need to be held 
accountable for their actions and the harms they are causing to 
society--particularly harms to children and data privacy?
 Answer. Outside of a few narrow exceptions, the First Amendment 
protects even speech that many would deem outrageous, harmful, and 
dangerous. That is why, even without Section 230, the platforms likely 
could not be held liable for the vast majority of speech that they host 
that has been the focus of public concern. The better path to platform 
accountability lies in legislation that is both aligned with First 
Amendment rights and would foster a better online environment for 
people who use social media platforms, including children.
 Congress should enact new mandates in transparency, privacy, and 
interoperability. Legislation focused on such structural changes--
including comprehensive data privacy legislation--would serve to 
minimize the harms of social media and liberate users from the monopoly 
control over their online speech.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
 Nadine Farid Johnson
Platform Accountability and Transparency Act:
 I support the Platform Accountability and Transparency Act, with 
Senator Coons, which would require social media companies to share data 
with researchers and the public.

 Question 1. Why is it so important to give researchers access to 
information and data from platforms to understand how they shape 
society?
 Answer. The Knight Institute greatly appreciates your support of 
the bipartisan Platform Accountability and Transparency Act led by 
Senator Coons. Since 2018, the Knight Institute has been advocating for 
a safe harbor for public-interest research and journalism focused on 
social media platforms. The Institute published a white paper proposing 
a safe harbor for platform research in 2022, and supported the 
introduction of a previous version of the Platform Accountability and 
Transparency Act that same year.
 Independent research into and public understanding of social media 
platforms is vitally important because of the ways these communications 
platforms have transformed our digital public sphere and the outsized 
role they play in our democracy. Without this transparency, the 
public--and policymakers--are left with only the information about the 
platforms that is provided by the platforms themselves. But journalists 
and researchers who study the platforms and their black-box algorithms 
continue to do so under the threat of serious legal liability. This is 
because the companies' terms of service generally ban the use of the 
tools necessary to study the platforms at scale, subjecting researchers 
to the threat of civil and potentially even criminal liability for 
public-interest investigations. A legal safe harbor for those who study 
the platforms in ethical and privacy-preserving ways is critical to 
improving public understanding of how the platforms are shaping 
society.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
 Nadine Farid Johnson
Section 230s Impact on Censorship:
 Question 1. Some experts have raised concerns that repealing 
Section 230 could result in platforms over-moderating content, which 
may disproportionately impact content deemed ``controversial.'' What 
content would be most vulnerable to over-moderation and censorship? How 
might these online harms translate to the real world? What has history 
shown us?
 Answer. Because the First Amendment protects harmful, outrageous, 
and sensational speech, the platforms would not be required to remove 
it, even without Section 230. But they would be motivated to take down 
speech that might plausibly give rise to liability. That category would 
include, most significantly, potentially defamatory speech, such as 
speech that alleges wrongdoing by a specific individual. The First 
Amendment does not protect defamation. Truth is of course a defense to 
defamation liability, but the platforms do not have the ability to 
determine--definitively and at the scale at which they operate--whether 
any particular allegation is true or not. This means that, absent 
Section 230, the platforms could face liability for leaving up factual 
allegations about real people, and so they would almost certainly 
remove them, including allegations that turn out to be true. Needless 
to say, true allegations of wrongdoing--particularly allegations about 
government officials and powerful private actors--are socially valuable 
and important for public discourse and a healthy, accountable 
democracy. Incentivizing platforms, many of which use LLMs or other 
automated tools for content moderation, to remove anything potentially 
defamatory, would in that sense result in a less informed citizenry and 
less accountable powerful actors.
 There is a clear analogy to the implementation of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which requires that platforms remove 
content that infringes on copyright. In practice, without the ability 
to review every takedown request from self-described copyright holders 
for fair use or other exemptions, platforms have erred on the side of 
removing any material for which they receive a takedown notice--often 
through automated processes--which has frequently resulted in the 
removal of non-infringing content.. There is good reason to think that 
platforms would approach potential legal liability for defamation the 
same way, playing it safe by casting a very wide net on what they take 
down, almost certainly removing not just legal but also socially 
valuable speech in the process. Powerful actors are likely to retain 
well-resourced legal counsel specifically to pressure platforms to 
remove allegedly defamatory content about them--making this problem all 
the more acute.
Transparency:
 Question 1. Please elaborate on how an approach that conditions 
Section 230 on strong accountability measures can reform platform 
behavior without suppressing speech.
 Answer. Because Section 230 affords protections above and beyond 
what is required by the First Amendment, the Knight Institute believes 
it would be consistent with First Amendment principles to condition 
those protections on large platforms' compliance with certain mandates, 
so long as the conditions are themselves constitutional.
 There are important First Amendment limitations on the government's 
ability to restrict disfavored speech by either the platforms or their 
users, and the Institute would oppose any attempt by Congress to 
legislate around those limitations at the expense of constitutionally 
protected speech. We believe it is possible, however, to enact 
structural reform that is consistent with the First Amendment and that 
would serve to better align the incentives of the large platforms with 
the interests of their users.
 Specifically, Congress should enact new mandates in transparency, 
privacy, data portability, and interoperability. Doing so holds the 
promise of simultaneously minimizing the harms of social media and 
liberating users from the monopoly control over--and suppression of--
their online speech. This can be done in a way that not only respects 
the limitations of the First Amendment, but actually promotes the 
values that underlie it.
 While we believe these mandates could and should stand alone (so 
that they extend to actors not relying upon Section 230), Congress 
could also condition Section 230 protections--at least for the largest 
companies with the resources necessary--on compliance with mandates 
such as researcher access, data privacy, and user controls. This is 
particularly so for the largest social media companies, whose growth 
has been made possible in large part by Section 230s expansive 
protections. Conditioning those protections on transparency, privacy, 
and interoperability mandates would protect the speech rights of 
platforms and of their users, while also incentivizing the platforms to 
adapt to a more competitive landscape.

 Question 2. How can improved transparency measures, such as what is 
included in the Internet PACT Act, enhance trust between users and 
platforms?
 Answer. Independent research into and public understanding of 
social media platforms is vitally important because of the ways these 
communications platforms have transformed our digital public sphere and 
the outsized role they play in our democracy. Without this 
transparency, the public--and policymakers--are left with only the 
information about the platforms that is provided by the platforms 
themselves. Giving users the information they need to make informed 
decisions about which platforms to use, what personal data to share, 
and what their options are should they encounter harmful or illegal 
content, could help to promote a more functional digital public square.

 Question 3. How can safe harbors for researchers promote positive 
outcomes for online safety and transparency?
 Answer. Journalists and researchers who study the platforms and 
their black-box algorithms continue to do so under the threat of 
serious legal liability. This is because the companies' terms of 
service generally ban the use of the tools necessary to study the 
platforms at scale, subjecting researchers to the threat of civil and 
potentially even criminal liability for public-interest investigations. 
A legal safe harbor for those who study platforms in ethical and 
privacy-preserving ways is critical to improving public understanding 
of how the platforms are shaping society.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
 Matthew Bergman
Section 230 Sunset:
 Question 1. How would repealing Section 230 create real incentives 
for platforms to design their platforms in a way that they are safe for 
users?
 Answer. Repealing Section 230 is neither necessary nor appropriate. 
Rather, Congress should simply reaffirm its original intent set forth 
in the plan language of Section 230 that
 It is the policy of the United States--

 (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
 interactive computer services and other interactive media;

 (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
 presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
 computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;

 (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
 control over what information is received by individuals, 
 families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
 interactive computer services;

 (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of 
 blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
 restrict their children's access to objectionable or 
 inappropriate online material; and

 (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter 
 and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment 
 by means of computer.

 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(b). The expansive application of Section 230 is 
not the product of statutory intent but of judicial interpretations 
that ignore Congress' express policy.
 With this broad construction of Section 230, Internet providers 
have been protected from liability even though they republished content 
knowing it might violate the law, encouraged users to post illegal 
content, and changed their design and policies for the purpose of 
enabling illegal activity. And, predictably, tech companies have seized 
upon this trend to evade all possible legal accountability simply 
because third-party content is found somewhere in the causal chain of 
their misconduct.
 The expansive interpretation of Section 230 far beyond 
Congressional intent has allowed tech companies to escape 
accountability for decisions that harm the users of the very platforms 
they design, market, and operate. Change will only come when they must 
bear the economic costs of their deliberate design decisions. Restoring 
Section 230 to its original intent would accomplish just that. These 
companies would be forced to internalize the cost of safety when 
designing their platforms and may finally opt for safety instead of 
growth. If the designers of the dangerous platforms face the 
consequences instead of the families of those who use them, then they 
will have the incentive to change their behavior. Through the 
imposition of civil liability, we can change their economic calculus. 
For example, safer designs, effective age verification to prevent 
children from accessing their platforms, and parental controls that 
allow parents to effectively protect their children may outweigh 
maximizing time spent at all costs.
 Conforming Section 230 to its original purpose would not to impose 
any special duty on tech companies. Instead, it would even the playing 
field and require these companies to abide by the same rules that ever 
other company is subjected to and follow the same incentive structure 
that every other company must assess when designing their products. 
Every other company in America operates under a duty of reasonable 
care. Social media and AI companies should be held to that same 
standard.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
 Matthew Bergman
Design Choices and Product Liability:
 Question 1. Please elaborate on how harmful design choices fall 
outside of the scope of Section 230 protections.
 Answer. Although Section 230 presents a substantial barrier to 
seeking justice for harms done by technology platforms, some courts 
have recognized the protections of the law should not extend to some 
design decisions that are completely separate from third-party content.
 For example, filters created by the social media platforms do not 
involve third-party content and are thus outside the scope of the vast 
protections of Section 230. The same is true for notifications sent to 
users, often throughout the night and during school hours, in an effort 
to pull them back into the platforms. Features such as likes or 
subscriber count hook the user, especially minors, often creating a 
lack of self-worth if the user doesn't receive enough. Ephemerality 
creates a sense of ``fear of missing out'' for young users, prompting 
them to get back on the platforms more often so as to not miss 
anything.
 Many of these features were designed in furtherance of the 
companies' overall goal to addict users, including children, to their 
platforms. Indeed, increasing the time spent on the platform was at the 
forefront of the social media executives' minds, without regard to the 
cost in may extract from young users. In fact, addicting children 
wasn't just a byproduct, it was the goal. As a Meta internal document 
shows, ``tweens'' were sought out as users, in an effort to hook them 
while they are young and ensure they use the products into their 
``teen'' and adult years.
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 In 2015, Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg instructed company executives 
that he hopes to accomplish an increase on 12 percent in the amount of 
time users spent on the platforms.
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 One internal e-mail states that Mark Zuckerberg ``has decided that 
the top priority for the company in 2017 is teens[.]''
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 In a 2016 internal presentation, YouTube declared that the 
``vision'' for the YouTube Kids platform was to ``create the next 
generations of Youtube Users'' and to make using YouTube a ``part of 
the daily routine for all kids under 13.''
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 Despite vehemently arguing that Section 230 is an all-encompassing 
safeguard (it is not), big tech companies may be held liable for 
creating dangerous social media products, purposely addicting children 
to these dangerous platforms, and failing to warn about the harms that 
may result therefrom.

 Question 2. Do social media companies have a responsibility to 
prioritize the wellbeing of children through their design choices? What 
are the consequences of inaction?
 Answer. When it was introduced, the primary purpose of the Section 
230 was to protect children from sexually explicit Internet content. As 
the late Chief Judge Katzmann of the Second Circuit recognized, ``The 
text and legislative history of [Section 230] shouts to the rafters 
Congress's focus on reducing children's access to adult material.'' 
Congress' express purpose in enacting Section 230 was ``to encourage 
the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools . . . 
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or 
inappropriate online material; and ensure vigorous enforcement of 
Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.'' 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 
(b)(2)-(4). Congress further sought to provide ``[p]rotection for `Good 
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material,'' by providing 
that ``no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether such material 
is constitutionally protected.'' 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230 (c)(2)(A).
 However, despite the purpose of Section 230, companies have 
continued to ignore the wellbeing of children when designing their 
products, hoping to escape any potential liability by using Section 230 
as a shield. The overly expansive interpretation of Section 230 among 
some courts has led to the dismissal of meritorious cases, further 
supporting these companies' belief that they may continue to design and 
operate their platforms in a dangerous manner, leading to the harm and, 
in some cases, death of children. And they may continue to do this 
without fear of liability without major reform to the law they have 
hidden behind for thirty years.
 We must remember that Section 230 was created in the early days of 
the internet. before social media and before AI. The consequences of 
the text could not be seen at that time, as it was the age of chat 
forums and message boards, but they can be seen now. The consequences 
are borne by the children who use these platforms and their families, 
who are burdened with the realities of attempting to help a child who 
has been harmed by some of the most powerful companies in the world. 
Without change, families will continue to be torn apart while powerful 
executives reap the profit gained by harming children.

 Question 3. Late last year, the public learned in unsealed court 
briefings that social media companies may have delayed design changes 
that could have protected children sooner. How would the 
reinterpretation of Section 230 by courts change incentives for social 
companies to put children first?
 Answer. Consider the recent verdict coming out of a Los Angeles 
courtroom. My firm's client, known by K.G.M., was awarded $6 million 
dollars by a jury based on harm done to her by Meta and YouTube, in 
association with her use of Instagram and YouTube. The jury found that 
both companies had been negligent in their design and operation of each 
respective platform, and that their conduct warranted an award of 
punitive damages. However, throughout years of litigation in that case, 
the social media companies insisted that Section 230 protected their 
conduct. And although the court there rejected the companies' arguments 
that every single action was protected by Section 230, it did find that 
some particular conduct by the defendants or features on the social 
media platforms could not serve as a basis for liability because of 
Section 230. K.G.M.'s verdict is the first of its kind and may serve to 
help incentivize these social media companies to put children first on 
occasion, as they have to consider that some cases may pass the Section 
230 hurdle.
 However, a reinterpretation of Section 230, would further balance 
the scales and incentivize companies to change their behaviors and 
practices. Social media companies, without the version of Section 230 
that exists today, would no longer be allowed to needlessly protract 
litigation and delay plaintiffs' getting their day in court.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ben Ray Lujan to 
 Matthew Bergman
 Question 1. In your litigation experience, how are social media 
companies weaponizing design decisions to keep kids addicted to social 
media?
 Answer. Social media platforms embody numerous design features that 
promote addiction to their platforms. This includes design features 
that exploit intermittent reward, social comparison metrics, and 
``flow'' state. Each of these may discussed in turn, but they all work 
in tandem to keep users hooked and have their foundations in behavioral 
psychology.
 Think of slot machines, where gamblers cannot predict which pull 
will result in payouts, and as they play, they are constantly hearing 
others around them win, reminding them that their next pull might be a 
jackpot. All three of these addictive design features are built in to 
social media sites and are reflected in the ``hook model'' studied by 
Meta's researchers:
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 In a 2015 internal presentation, Google employee Tristan Harris 
noted that ``[i]ntermittent versus predictable rewards are the most 
addictive and hardest to stop. It's why slot machines make the most 
money at casinos'' and that ``[t]hese are attention casinos[.]'' He 
proposed instead that Google design its platforms to ``minimize the 
presence of intermittent variable rewards and, and reduce addictions'' 
but his concerns were ultimately disregarded by the company.
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 This figure, which is taken from a book by Nir Eyal titled Hooked: 
How to Build Habit Forming Products, also appears in Snap's documents. 
The figure is annotated as follows
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A. Likes, Comments, and Other Metrics
 Scientists have found that receiving ``likes'' on social media 
platforms are very similar to the ``rewards'' that researchers have 
associated with addiction research for decades. Likes can include the 
``like'' button on Facebook and YouTube but can also include ``hearts'' 
on Instagram and TikTok. Similar metrics include the number of shares 
on a post, number of comments, and number of followers or friends for a 
user. While seemingly innocuous, users' quest for these publicly 
visible ``rewards'' has been linked to a number of secondary harms such 
as reduced sleep efficiency and duration due to ``routine check[ing]'' 
behaviors during the night. They have also been associated with 
reinforcing addictive behaviors in order to encourage users to spend 
more time on these platforms. They have even been linked to increased 
feelings of depression, anxiety, and negative social comparison since 
receiving ``fewer likes'' is viewed as a form of ``negative peer 
feedback.''
 Comments are similar to likes in that they provide users with 
``quantifiable (and qualitative) feedback'' about their experiences on 
the platform. For teens, this means that they are able to quantify the 
``success'' of their posts with many teens reporting that they post 
``self oriented images on social media with the goal of obtaining likes 
and other forms of feedback such as comments.'' Other studies have 
found that comments are often seen as a mechanism for ``gaining 
[social] status'' and reflect a degree of ``digital social approval.'' 
As a result, other studies have linked comments to negative social 
comparison since ``not receiving enough likes on one's pictures can 
negatively affect appearance esteem and prompt delet[ion] of a post.''
B. Algorithmic Recommendations
 At the heart of every social media platform's engagement strategy 
is their proprietary recommendation algorithms. These algorithms are 
optimized to maximize time on the platform rather than healthy 
interactions with a person's social network. They accomplish this in a 
variety of ways. One way they drive time spent on social media is by 
inferring the interests of the user (which may or may not be expressed 
by the user in any direct way) and feeding them an aggregation of posts 
that, while most likely to keep them engaged, may lead the user down 
problematic rabbit holes.
 Regarding TikTok, these problematic rabbit holes were also known as 
``negative filter bubbles.'' A 2021 TikTok presentation entitled 
``Negative Filter Bubble Project Sharing'' noted that ``Algorithms 
lead[] people into a feed filled with continuous similar negative 
videos that are hard to escape.'' What's more, another internal 
document notes that ``minor creators [fall] into higher density of 
negative comment filter bubbles.'' To its credit, TikTok did set as a 
2023 safety goal to ``be more transparent to the public and trusted by 
teen users and parents,'' in addition to building ``industrial leading 
teens safety and well-being features.'' As discussed below, these 
aspirations of transparency and improved safety features that were 
noted approximately six years after TikTok launched in the United 
States were too little and too late for many children and teens.
 Another way recommendation algorithms drive time spent on social 
media is by utilizing the intermittent variable reward mechanism that 
Skinner discovered (e.g., likes, notifications, comments that appear 
unpredictably), which contribute to addiction to the platforms 
themselves. The addictive power of an engagement-optimized algorithm is 
recognized within the medical and academic literature. In the Handbook 
of Children and Screens, under the chapter regarding ``Problematic 
Internet Use,'' the authors' consensus was that ``Attention focused 
designs intended to generate, or possibly exploit, potentially 
addictive features (e.g., `likes') and conditioned responses (e.g., 
notifications) alongside powerful algorithm-based technologies may lead 
youth to stay online longer than either intended or recommended.''
C. Auto-Play
 Academics recognize that autoplay is a feature that is designed to 
prolong engagement at the cost of displacing important developmental 
opportunities for young children and is even associated with greater 
child behavioral difficulties. It has also been linked to difficulties 
controlling device use more broadly. The latter phenomenon has even 
been observed in social media companies' own research. For example, 
Meta's researchers learned that clinicians regarded autoplay as not 
having any ``beneficial'' role while ``detract[ing] from patients' 
ability to control amount of time spent'' using their platforms.''
 A YouTube study found that autoplay contributed to increased 
nighttime watchtime between the hours of 12:00AM and 6:00AM and that 
``autoplay does affect watch behavior at night and is potentially 
pushing users into bad sleep habits.''
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 It specifically noted that ``disabling autoplay late into the night 
could potentially help in adding 1M hours in sleep time in California 
everyday!'' However, no such disabling ever occurred.
D. Infinite Scroll
 Like autoplay, the Infinite or Endless Scroll feature has also been 
linked to prolonging engagement at the cost of displacing children's 
developmental opportunities. This feature is also linked to behaviors 
that create a user-sided ``time distortion'' that results in users 
spending more time on social media platforms than they originally 
intended. Some studies cited (and commissioned) by the social media 
companies have found that these effects are mitigated by ``active'' use 
of their platforms--e.g., generating content or posting content. 
However, this hypothesis has not been widely accepted, particularly 
since there is evidence that children are more likely to ``watch, play, 
or scroll through content created by others than they are to use their 
devices to produce their own content.''
E. Notifications
 Meta studied notifications and the ability for this feature to 
induce habitual or addictive behaviors. For example, one internal 
document supports the basic addiction principle that ``experiencing a 
reward (or reinforcement) can increase learning and motivation. This 
contributes to repeated, potentially habitual behaviors.'' The document 
included the following figure:
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 It is not surprising then, that among the many metrics Meta tracks, 
the ``success rate'' of their notifications, defined as increasing 
daily usage, is a key one. Darius Kilstein, a Director in Data Science 
at Instagram, reports:
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 This is to say that Meta is monitoring (and presumably modulating) 
the intermittent reward mechanism to ensure that engagement is 
maximized.
 An internal YouTube presentation noted that YouTube's 
``stickiness'' was, in part, attributable to receiving a notification 
about likes and comments on a video. It noted that a likes and comments 
notification ``causes users to feel that they must be aware of what is 
happening on the platform'' and it ``keeps users on the platform 
longer[.]''
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 In fact, YouTube noted that ``notifications are a critical part of 
YouTube and contribute to addiction.''
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F. Beauty Filters
 Despite being a relatively new social media feature, Augmented 
Reality (``AR'') filters--commonly referred to as ``Beauty Filters''--
have been thoroughly studied due to the outsized negative impact they 
could have on users by exacerbating a socio-psychological phenomenon 
known as ``social comparison.'' Prior to the advent of these Beauty 
Filters, researchers had already identified that social media may 
exacerbate social comparison and lead to increased body dissatisfaction 
and/or disordered eating. However, with the introduction of Beauty 
Filters--many developed by social media companies--users are now 
exposed to ``manipulated'' photos that depict unrealistic (and in some 
cases impossible) body image Standards.
 In an internal e-mail chain, Meta executives discussed a decision 
to reverse the ban on Instagram beauty filters that resembled cosmetic 
surgery. In one e-mail, an executive urged others to rethink this 
decision, stating that it would be putting growth over responsibility.
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G. Internal Company Documents Show They Knew What They Were Doing
 Notably, many of the features recognized in the literature as 
addictive and/or harmful were likewise identified in research conducted 
by Meta and presented in 2021. A Mixed Methods Clinicians study 
identified product features and pathways impacting mental health, 
including the following:
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 Of these features, several were identified as ``primarily 
negative,'' including Video/Photo filters, location sharing, 
automatically playing videos, and pop-up notifications.
 Internally, social media companies' documents recognize that they 
could increase engagement by changing the design of the social media. 
As early as 2016, Meta (then Facebook) was exploring ways to keep teens 
on its site and posting content:
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 As Max Eulenstein, Vice President of Products, said in a Meta e-
mail on January 26, 2021, ``No one wakes up thinking they want to 
maximize the number of times they open Instagram that day. But that's 
exactly what our product teams are trying to do.'' One mechanism that 
appears to be especially effective at engaging teens (and adults) is 
the use of ``reels'' or short videos that repeat. Meta adopted reels 
from TikTok after seeing how effective they were at promoting usage. 
Below are Instagram's metrics on the viewing of such reels by teens:
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 The data demonstrated that active daily U.S. teen Instagram users 
viewed on average almost 105 reels per day on the platform for a total 
of 22.5 minutes per day or an average of 20 seconds per reel per day. 
Briefly watching a short snippet algorithmically curated to one's 
interest is gratifying via the dopamine reward pathway. Further, their 
internal research identified the following ``Triggers for Problematic 
Use on Facebook'' that were later included as part of a ``Problematic 
Use Journey Map'' in 2020:
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 Each ``opportunity'' for a reward represents a potential algorithm 
tweak, and many--if not all--of these were eventually incorporated in 
some form into the platform. For example, a Facebook presentation 
contained following:
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 Meta's more recent documents depict a Venn diagram portraying one 
way to conceptualize the usage experience from a design perspective:
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 ``Dark Pattern'' is a user experience term referring to 
interactions that are deceptive, or that trick you into doing something 
you didn't want to do. Again, this diagram acknowledges that Meta uses 
``addictive'' design features and that some of them are set to 
``default.'' Meta documents from Project ``Plato,'' intended to study 
and mitigate ``dark patterns,'' state that ``[s]ome UX [user 
experience] patterns rob users of their agency.'' Included among them 
are:
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 Meta's researchers also knew that being too critical of these 
design choices could lead to criticism from internal stakeholders. For 
example, Jennifer Guadagno noted that her wellbeing team's efforts to 
study Facebook addiction as part of Project Plato could ``get heavy 
pushback internally'' and added that she was not ``sure if it'll even 
be allowed to happen'' because ``if we now know all these things that 
are potentially bad and then we don't do anything to fix them'' it 
could lead to problems for the company externally. Arturo Bejar 
testified, in deposition at in open court, that Meta did not do enough 
to warn parents or curtail problematic use of their products and that 
the word addictive is `radioactive.' ''
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 Despite learning of these problems as early as 2018, Meta had not 
made meaningful changes to the platform nearly two years later. A Meta 
presentation from 2020 arrived at nearly identical conclusions as the 
Project Plato researchers, including the connection between design 
features and problematic usage. One slide from that 2020 presentation 
stated that research participants reported ``10+ triggers contributing 
to [problematic use] habits'' including:
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 Meta was not the only social media company to reach these 
conclusions about its platform features. For example, YouTube describes 
``finding a video on YouTube search'' as a ``predictable reward'' 
compared to ``unpredictable rewards'' such as ``finding a new favorite 
song while in a mix,'' which the company described as 
``disproportionately [more] delightful compared to predictable rewards 
because they're unexpected or exceed expectations.'' YouTube's 
researchers explaining the reason for this dichotomous design have 
stated:

 When thinking about habit building around YouTube, it is 
 important that we reliably fulfill their goal pursuits 
 (reliable reward) while also providing surprising nuggets of 
 reward (variable reward). Ultimately, you're giving people more 
 reasons to come back until they can't even remember why they 
 did. When is the last time you had a goal in mind when you went 
 to Facebook?''

 Internal documents also reveal that Instagram is tracking usage/
engagement by teen users. An e-mail from Darius Kilstein, on February 
5, 2022, states that Meta ``looked into the long-term decline of feed 
imp[ressions] for Teens,'' discovered that ``teens aren't relying on 
Feed for interest consumption as much as they used to,'' and 
hypothesized that this shift might explain ``why teens now consume 
fewer Reels than adults.''
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 The reported ``headwind'' for the ``cohort'' points to Instagram's 
business need to redesign features to better engage younger children 
and keep up with their competitors (particularly TikTok), as Kilstein 
explained later in the same e-mail.
 The ``infinite feed'' invented at Facebook was exported and adapted 
to Instagram. In her deposition, Dr. Alison Lee stated:
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 The quote begins with the scenario whereby someone has been 
``scrolling'' all day (itself an implicit acknowledgement of overuse) 
and exhausts their ``connected'' feeds at which point a new, end of 
feed algorithm is triggered.
 Aza Raskin is widely considered to have invented the infinite 
scroll. This feature allows a user to scroll indefinitely through their 
feed, receiving endless posts and intermittent variable rewards. Raskin 
testified that infinite scroll was like ``digital cocaine'' for the 
user. One of the technology leads for Instant Articles on Android at 
Facebook reported ``we only care about things like time spent, open 
links etc. That's what we optimized for. That's what we defined as 
success and failure.''
 In 2022, Meta launched Project MYST, a prospective, longitudinal 
study to follow 4000 teens (13-17 years of age) using the highly 
respected National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of 
Chicago for survey data and Meta logs of activity on their platform. 
Using validated measures for a variety of outcomes and actual usage 
patterns on their platforms, MYST appeared by all accounts to be a 
robust, well-designed longitudinal study--the kind that only industry 
could conduct based on their access to actual social media use data. 
Among other things, MYST intended to test the following negative 
hypotheses:
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 While the initial plan for the study contemplated its results being 
released publicly, there has been no evidence that Meta ever publicly 
acknowledged that the study was conducted or released any results prior 
to it being produced in the course of litigation and revealed to the 
public as part of the K.G.M. civil trial in Los Angeles just this past 
month. Indeed, as the study moved forward, Meta employees seemed to 
become explicitly fearful of it being publicly released. Leaders 
directed researchers to refer to the study only by its full name, 
because they would ``really prefer not to have a cute acronym (MYST). 
That makes things sound more interesting when/if it leaks. Can we 
please keep our names as boring and uninteresting as possible.''
 Perhaps more illustrative is the tension that is recognized in 
Meta's internal documents discussing MYST, which reflect that ``there 
is a fundamental tension between doing rigorous research to identify 
whether there are potential opportunities for change/intervention and 
advancing external/narrative goals.'' This tension with external goals 
is reflected in Meta's many decisions to not share publicly what their 
research or outside experts conveyed internally. External goals 
included the goal to ``[a]dvance the credibility of research that finds 
small or null correlations between social media well-being and/or well-
being relative to other factors,'' and to ``deflate the conversations 
about research claiming causal connections between social media and 
mental health and well-being.'' Perhaps most critically, Meta's stated 
external goal was to ``[m]ake the issue bigger than social media. 
Research should be designed in a way that provides a holistic 
understanding of the relationship between youth well-being and 
technology and other factors (e.g., cultural and environmental factors 
that lead people to use technology and their use of technology, rather 
than focusing on Meta-specific product offerings.'' Thus, the impetus 
for their research appears to be advocacy or public relations rather 
than scientific discovery or public safety.
 Project MYST revealed two key findings. First, the study found that 
children who had adverse events in their lives were more vulnerable to 
``potential problematic use'' (i.e., a gentle euphemism for social 
media addiction). Second, researchers found that parental supervision 
made no difference whatsoever to the addictive impact of Meta's social 
media platforms. The study found there was no relationship between a 
parent setting time limits or useful safety tools and whether their 
child became addicted. It is little surprise, then, that Meta buried 
the data and prohibited the study's results from ever seeing the light 
of day--until litigation in California State by private plaintiffs 
thrust the evidence into open court.
 YouTube documents also provided evidence of problematic usage by 
virtue of design. In 2015, YouTube launched Autoplay on desktop 
(followed by a launch in 2016 to app), which automatically and 
continuously played the next video--without any need for user action. 
Autoplay set to on be default because it generates more watch time. 
Autoplay watch time doubles at night. As one YouTube employee 
explained, ``This was the single most impactful launch in YouTube 
history, with +8 percent desktop watch time, +4 percent overall watch 
time increase.''
 In YouTube's own documents, making the platform ``addictive'' was a 
core design feature. This was consistent with the aspiration of the 
same presentation of ``Building the world's most powerful and 
delightful video consumption experience.'' YouTube internally 
acknowledged the potential negative effects of digital videos in a 2018 
presentation entitled ``Literature Review: Effects of watching digital 
videos and viewer well-being,'' which called out problematic Internet 
use in particular:
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 The slide calls out problematic Internet use and states that it 
overlaps with ``addiction'' consistent with my belief that the entire 
continuum to the right of casual use (Figure 20) can be viewed as 
problematic. Furthermore, it highlights how ``autoplay,'' a key feature 
of YouTube, drives the ``just one more video effect.'' Slide 10 
summarizes data from an internal survey of ``265 respondents'' that 
calls out the ``stickiness'' of the app and states that its 
interactivity and notifications ``causes users to feel that they must 
be aware of what is happening on the platform'' which ``keeps users on 
the platform longer.''
 A 2018 YouTube presentation exploring the ``negative effects that 
video watching has on user's wellbeing'' included an express reference 
to addiction:
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 TikTok's engagement algorithm, meanwhile, is frequently viewed as 
the most effective in the industry: ``more personalized,'' ``more 
accurate,'' and ``more diversified.'' The company emphasizes its 
effectiveness in its marketing presentations and touts that more than 
53 percent of suggested videos are ``viewed.''
 An internal memo citing the company's ``vulnerabilities'' reports: 
``In a user survey of 2,300 users in February of 2020, when respondents 
were asked to give a score of 5 to indicate strength of agreement with 
the statement `I spend too much time on TikTok,' the average response 
was a 4.0.'' It goes on to say, ``some elements of persuasive design 
may be unique to TikTok; for instance, the fact that when you click the 
back button on your phone to leave the For You Feed/all, you get a 
prompt saying, `Tap again to exit,' which can be seen as increasing 
friction for users seeking to leave the app.'' And still later 
concedes, ``TikTok is particularly popular with younger users, who are 
seen as more vulnerable to online harms and the negative impacts of 
compulsive use.''
 In a ``2021 TikTok for Good Business Plan and Vision'' document, 
the following is stated:
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 Notably, the plan acknowledges that ``addiction to technology is a 
ubiquitous problem.'' At the same time, comment [82] notes that 
``addiction'' could be ``considered a very positive metric in our 
field.'' In other words, for all of its public posturing seeking to 
discredit or minimize the existence of compulsive or addictive use of 
screens, TikTok's internal documents acknowledge its existence and even 
allude to its ``value'' to the industry.
 TikTok's algorithms are widely considered the ``best in the 
industry'' because of its effectiveness at driving engagement. In 
pursuit of that end, TikTok made leaving the app more difficult than 
others. And for those times when people did succeed in leaving, TikTok 
refined its ``push'' approach to, among other things, get people back 
onto the company's platform. TikTok's ``push methodology,'' like every 
change they make to their platform, was subjected to A/B testing where 
rapid cycle experiments were performed comparing one version to another 
with users randomized to experience one or the other (i.e., no 
confounding) and with an eye to ensuring that core metrics were not 
adversely affected.
 Finally, Snap--the makers of Snapchat--innovated on the FOMO 
[``fear of missing out''] concept of maintaining ``streaks'' by 
developing the Snap Streaks feature, which it specifically designed to 
gamify its platform and drive usage and engagement. Streaks are built 
and maintained by two people ``snapping'' back and forth on consecutive 
days. The quality or content of the snap is irrelevant--it's all about 
ping-ponging back and forth consistently. Streaks were extraordinarily 
effective. Less than a year after they were launched, 22 percent of 
users had at least one streak, and the average highest streak value was 
76.243. Snap Streaks were also particularly popular with younger users, 
as 47 percent of Streak users were under the age of 17.244. Of course, 
the true number was likely even higher, given how easy Snap--and every 
social media platform--has made it for children to lie about their age.
 Snap Streaks' importance to users was also tied to Snap Scores. 
While streak counts are private to the participants, every user of Snap 
has a numerical Snap Score displayed on their profile. The way that 
this score is generated is opaque, but broadly speaking it reflects how 
much they engage with the app and how much engagement they receive from 
others, including Streaks. For users, high Snap Scores are a way to 
``show off their popularity.''
 Snap's research found that ``users mainly used Streaks as a social 
status measure (to increase Snap Scores, have as many Streaks as 
possible) rather than a communication tool.'' This is consistent with 
Snap's conclusion that once users knew how to increase their score, it 
``may make user care about (if not become addictive to) their [] 
score.'' However, Snap saw this as a positive feature of Snap Scores 
because it would ``encourage [users] to produce and consume more 
snaps.''
 But at the same time that Snap was chasing the engagement increases 
offered by streaks, worries about the addictive effect of Streaks on 
children were growing. For example, focus groups results forwarded by 
the Senior Director of Corporate Communications and Public Affair to 
the Vice President of Global Public Policy found the following:
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 Another employee put it even more bluntly: ``we seem to have tapped 
into some mass psychosis where 17 million people must keep the streaks 
going.''
 A 2017 study of Snap ``Power Users,'' commissioned by Snap to 
better understand features that drove usage, found that ``[f]or some, 
streaks have become a ``compulsive behavior'' and that they feel they 
are ``in too deep.''
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 Similarly, an internal presentation on streaks tried to spin them 
as a positive tool for building friendships but nonetheless was forced 
to observe that Streaks can be ``really stressful'' and ``make[] it 
impossible to unplug for even a day.'' To better assess the harms of 
streaks, in 2018 Snap commissioned a survey of 790 users aged 13-24 
(its core demographic):
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 In Snap's telling, this study showed that that only a minimal 
number of users found streaks stressful. If these charts seem familiar, 
it is because Snap presented this same conclusion to the United States 
Senate, writing that the study showed ``the majority of our community 
did not indicate Streaks were a significant source of stress--but six 
percent did.''
 However, both the methodology and Snap's spin on the results were 
deeply flawed. Given Snap's millions of users, 6 percent still 
represents hundreds of thousands if not millions of users. And to get 
to 6 percent, Snap disregarded the ``moderate'' stress responses 
entirely. Snap also, without justification, combined those who found 
streaks a little stressful with those who found they caused no stress 
at all. A more accurate assessment of stress levels might be that 21 
percent of users experience at least moderate stress because of snaps. 
A more holistic statement of the survey's results would be that 54 
percent of streak users found streaks at least a little stressful. The 
other problem with sampling ``users'' to assess experiential stress is 
what in epidemiological terms is called the ``survivor effect.''
 Many people who found streaks intolerably stressful would have left 
the platform or opted not to participate in a study about how stressful 
they are. In other words, this approach leads to a biased sample. Much 
like asking people still in a baseball stadium when the game has gone 
into 13 innings if games take too long will underestimate the true 
proportion of fans who think they do, asking regular users of an app 
how stressful it is underestimates the unease it induces. The study 
also depended on self-reporting from young people. But as Jennifer 
Stout, Snap's Global Vice President for Public Policy, pointed out, 
``Kids like a lot of dumb things and parents are always trying to 
regulate their activities for their own safety!''
 Snap's spin on the 2018 study is further undermined by the fact 
that Snap employees, including CEO Evan Spiegel, continued to express 
concern that streaks were addictive and harmful for users:
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 A 2023 document containing suggested answers for an employee Q&A 
with Speigel is clear that Streaks ``can cause confusion and/or 
anxiety. We know this from the millions of support tickets we get every 
week from people asking us to restore a streak they accidentally 
lost.'' Users themselves make clear that they found streaks addictive. 
As the Q&A answer explained, users' frantic commitment to streaks could 
be tracked in part by tickets seeking to restore lost streaks. But the 
answer actually understated how desperate users were to have their 
streaks restored.
 By 2021, Snap was receiving an average of 400,000 streak restore 
requests each day, making up 95 percent of the total volume of customer 
service contacts. In some cases, individual users reach out directly to 
Mr. Spiegel to express the harms of streaks. Snap also explicitly 
embraced the idea that social rewards were key to keeping users coming 
back for more, conducting research that ``confirmed the hypothesis that 
Posters are motivated to post because audience feedback is their ROI 
reward.''
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 Indeed, Snap's research ``confirmed the causal relationship between 
receiving feedback (views and replies) and the poster propensity to 
post again.'' Following these conclusions, Snap's product team proposed 
tweaking ``Story reactions'' and replies to generate more engagement 
and posting.
 And just as feedback made users feel good, Snap's user research 
team found that not getting feedback was ``discouraging.'' Snap 
researchers found that 44 percent of Snapchat Story posters didn't 
receive any feedback on a given day leaving them more anxious and worse 
off than not having posted at all. Senior Snap employees were clear-
eyed about the consequences of manipulating users' basic neurobiology 
and socioemotional responses. Responding to suggestions for ways to 
increase feedback rewards on Snapchat, Mr. Spiegel chimed in to say:
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 Similarly, when reviewing proposed changes to the way that streaks 
operate, Stephen Collins, a Director of Public Policy, expressed a 
similar sentiment, observing that ``[r]ewards are known to drive 
compulsive/addictive behavior among some vulnerable groups.'' Of 
course, Collins's solution to this was not to reduce the role that 
rewards-maximizing play in Snap's design but just avoid using the word.
 Snap also used other forms of notifications to drive engagement. In 
2023, Snap decided to implement an ``always on badge'' to get more 
users to try Spotlight. This badge was a red dot that was always 
present on the spotlight icon, visually drawing users to it. It would 
only go away once a visitor clicked on Spotlight and would reactivate 
every 60 minutes, regardless of whether there was any new content or 
other change to actually notify a user of. This one design change 
raised the daily active use of Spotlight from 53 million to 71 million, 
the single biggest increase in daily active use ever seen in an A/B 
test. Snap was not only made aware of the risks of these features, but 
they were also told to remove them by outside social media experts 
(SME's) they consulted.
 In sum, nearly every social media company adapts addictive and 
harmful design elements from their competitors. Separate and apart from 
the third-party content underpinning the platforms, these design 
elements insidiously work to keep users--typically children and 
adolescents--glued to the screens for longer and longer periods of 
time. Yet social media companies routinely turn to Section 230 to 
shield themselves from liability for these design choices.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to 
 Brad Carson
AI and Section 230:
 There's bipartisan agreement that, despite the benefits of Section 
230 in helping create the robust Internet ecosystem we have today, we 
have done too little to mitigate the harms of social media, especially 
to children. In 1996, Congress wanted to ensure that small websites 
wouldn't be sued for everything their users said. But Congress had no 
idea that Section 230 would shield all kinds of social media practices, 
like algorithms that hook kids.
 It's been thirty years, and we still don't have basic Federal 
protections for kids online or data privacy. Now, some want to take the 
model of Section 230--preemption or nullification of state laws without 
a Federal regulatory framework--and apply it to artificial 
intelligence.

 Question 1. What does the history of the last thirty years of 
Section 230 tell us about regulating AI today?
 Answer. The thirty-year history of Section 230 teaches a single, 
sobering lesson: broad immunity granted to an emerging industry during 
its infancy is extraordinarily difficult to correct once that industry 
matures. When Congress passed Section 230 in 1996, just 16 percent of 
Americans were online, Google did not yet exist, and Facebook was 
nearly a decade away. No one anticipated that a handful of platforms 
would come to control virtually all public communication, accumulate 
market capitalizations exceeding the GDPs of many countries, and 
engineer products deliberately designed to maximize engagement at the 
expense of user wellbeing. The immunity that followed those platforms 
as they matured was never seriously revisited, because the industry had 
grown powerful enough to resist correction and because the meta-law 
that Section 230 created determined who would govern AI rather than how 
strong that governance would be.
 The danger Congress now faces with artificial intelligence is 
structurally identical. Right now, there are voices urging Congress to 
freeze state laws without enacting comprehensive Federal regulation. In 
other words, those same voices are asking Congress to repeat the 
Section 230 model for a technology whose potential implications dwarf 
those of social media. The lesson of Section 230 is not merely that bad 
outcomes follow from a broad immunity; it is that the first major legal 
framework tends to become the last, because it allocates power to those 
who are most likely to resist future reform. As it relates to AI 
regulation, Congress should avoid creating the conditions for courts to 
improvise in a legal vacuum, so that it doesn't have to spend a 
generation debating whether the improvisation was correct.

 Question 2. Mr. Carson, AI agents now post, moderate, and curate 
online content. None of this existed when Congress wrote Section 230. 
How should the law apply when platforms generate and deliver content 
using AI, rather than simply hosting it?
 Answer. Section 230(c)(1) grants immunity to platforms for content 
``provided by another information content provider.'' The statute 
contemplates a world of active users and passive platforms wherein the 
latter merely hosts what the former creates. That model does not 
describe how generative AI operates. When a user submits a prompt, the 
output is produced by a model that was designed, trained, fine-tuned, 
and deployed by the company that built it. The company made the choices 
that determined what the model would say. The output of a large 
language model is not the ``information content'' of ``another'' within 
the meaning of the statute. It is, in substantial measure, the product 
of the company itself. The same analysis applies to AI agents acting 
autonomously; they are not third-party users posting content, but 
rather automated expressions of design decisions made by their 
developers.
 Although I believe this textual answer is clear, I urge Congress to 
codify it. The lesson of Zeran v. America Online is precisely that 
textually plain answers do not always survive contact with courts under 
pressure to resolve novel cases quickly and in the absence of 
legislative guidance. Congress should clarify that Section 230 does not 
apply to generative AI outputs, and it should do so before lower 
courts, following the Zeran precedent, extend immunity beyond what the 
statute's text permits.

 Question 3. Mr. Carson, should Congress be cautious when providing 
immunity to a fast-changing technology?
 Answer. Yes, and the faster the technology changes, the more 
cautious Congress should be. Broad immunity provisions are difficult to 
repeal precisely because the industry they protect grows powerful 
enough to resist intervention. When Congress granted near-blanket 
immunity to the early internet, it could not have foreseen that a few 
platforms would come to control virtually all public discourse and 
command market capitalizations exceeding the GDPs of entire countries. 
The immunity that followed those platforms into dominance proved nearly 
impossible to reclaim. Creating broad immunity for an emerging industry 
should be recognized as a category error disguised as prudence; we 
should not permanently exempt an entity from legal responsibility 
because it appears harmless today.
 The better approach is to calibrate liability to capability and 
allow it to scale as the technology and its demonstrated harms develop. 
This is precisely what Section 230 failed to do, and it is what a 
responsible legal framework for artificial intelligence should 
accomplish. Flexible structures that assign liability standards to 
agencies, mandatory safety certification markets, and liability 
insurance calibrated to risk profiles are all examples of possible 
mechanisms that will grow with the technology rather than locking in 
protections derived from a moment wherein we have no clear conception 
of how this technology will evolve.
Kids Online Safety:
 We heard at a hearing earlier this year on kids and screen time 
that AI poses new and complex threats to kids online. Kids are 
increasingly interfacing with chatbots that are shaping their social 
development and relationships.
 These AI companions, so-called virtual girlfriends or boyfriends, 
were not designed with kids or teens in mind, yet they are warping 
kids' development and their understanding and appreciation of healthy 
human relationships.
 Mr. Carson, your testimony highlighted the dangers that preemption 
of state AI laws poses to kids online. Yet Senate Republicans and the 
White House have made repeated attempts to preempt state AI laws, while 
there is no Federal standard in place.
 Given the risks new technologies like AI pose to kids' safety, we 
cannot ask states to stand down from protecting children--especially 
when Congress has yet to establish Federal standards.

 Question 1. Mr. Carson, how are states stepping up to protect kids 
from AI in the absence of a Federal standard?
 Answer. In the absence of Federal standards, state lawmakers have 
moved to fill the void and protect vulnerable constituencies in the AI 
era. Unfortunately, their efforts have been met with hostility from the 
White House. Earlier this year, Utah lawmakers introduced legislation 
that would require AI companies to publish child safety plans and to 
prevent chatbots from engaging in inappropriate conversations with 
minors. The White House then successfully lobbied the Utah legislature 
to kill that legislation. Florida this year considered an AI Bill of 
Rights that would affirm protections against explicit AI images, 
including those featuring minors, and that would provide parental 
controls on AI for minors. Again, the White House pressured state 
lawmakers, this time Florida, to drop the effort.
 What we're seeing from states is bipartisan interest in 
thoughtfully advancing AI safeguards, especially for minors, but those 
efforts have been repeatedly stymied by Administration officials who 
have prioritized a rules-free approach for the AI industry. Last month, 
over 50 state lawmakers from impacted states wrote to the White House, 
urging the Administration to stop its pressure campaign on state AI 
laws. The bottom line is that state lawmakers are working to respond to 
constituent concerns, but there's growing frustration with Federal 
efforts to preempt their legislation without a substantive replacement.

 Question 2. What risk does preemption of AI laws pose to children 
without meaningful Federal standards?
 Answer. Preemption of state AI laws in the absence of a meaningful 
Federal standard creates a legal vacuum that leaves children entirely 
unprotected. It removes states' authority to apply their tort law, 
consumer protection statutes, and civil liability regimes to AI systems 
that harm minors. It prevents injured families from legal redress 
before a Federal alternative is established. And it signals to courts 
that they are under no obligation to develop common law protections, 
while providing no alternative framework to fill that space. This is 
the Section 230 model, deliberately reproduced, and we should remember 
that children paid the highest price for that model's failures. The 
White House's recent pressure to block state-level protections in Utah 
and Florida, while offering no Federal substitute, illustrates the 
precise dynamic that Section 230 created: industry-friendly preemption 
dressed up as Federal uniformity.
 The cost of preemption must include a genuine Federal framework 
that replaces the protections it displaces. Congress cannot in good 
conscience instruct states to stand down from protecting children and 
then fail to enact the Federal protections that would justify asking 
them to do so. If preemption is to occur, it must be accompanied by 
legally enforceable Federal standards that give children at least 
equivalent protection to what the states would have provided and 
already are providing in many cases.
Section 230 Liability Protection:
 Section 230 was adopted thirty years ago on a simple idea: 
platforms hosting user speech should not be treated as publishers of 
every post, and those that moderate harmful material should not be 
punished for doing so.
 That framework has been critical for startups, small businesses, 
and online communities that depend on the ability to host user content 
without being sued over every post. But thirty years of experience have 
also shown that the largest platforms used these protections very 
differently from how Congress intended.
 They built business models around algorithmic amplification, 
addictive design, and pervasive data collection.
 They hid behind Section 230 while their products harmed children 
and disrupted elections. As we consider Section 230 at thirty, I want 
to understand what has worked well and what hasn't.
 Specifically, what these protections have meant for free speech and 
for the smaller platforms that depend on them the most. But also how we 
hold tech platforms accountable for their harms.

 Question 1. Do you agree that large platforms need to be held 
accountable for their actions and the harms they are causing to 
society--particularly harms to children and data privacy?
 Answer. Yes, unequivocally. The thirty-year saga of Section 230 is 
a story about what happens when powerful platforms are permitted to 
externalize the costs of the harm they enable. All the families whose 
children were victimized by predators, parents whose teenagers 
experienced years of self-harm linked to engagement-optimization design 
choices, and individuals whose reputations were destroyed by 
algorithmically amplified falsehoods quickly discovered that the law 
offered them little or nothing. The platforms bore few of those costs. 
That asymmetry is not an accident of technology; it is the predictable 
consequence of a legal regime that removed any meaningful form of 
accountability as a check on corporate behavior. Large platforms must 
be held responsible both for preventing foreseeable harms and for 
compensating those harmed when prevention fails.
 It is worth noting that the harm enabled by large platforms extend 
well beyond children and other vulnerable populations, as serious as 
those are. Platforms have served as vectors for foreign influence 
operations, the coordination of political violence, and the rapid 
dissemination of content that has facilitated real-world harm including 
exploitation of infrastructure vulnerabilities. As AI dramatically 
amplifies the speed and scale at which content can be generated and 
targeted, the gap between the policies we need and the policies we have 
will widen unless Congress acts. The question is not whether platforms 
should be held accountable, but whether Congress will build the legal 
architecture to make that accountability real before AI makes the cost 
of inaction far greater than it has already been.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
 Brad Carson
State AI Preemption:
 You wrote that attempts to preempt state AI laws was ``essentially 
version 2.0 of Section 230, the liability shield that has allowed 
social media platforms to escape accountability for over a decade.''

 Question 1. What lessons have we learned from giving social media 
platforms near-blanket immunity and how should we apply those lessons 
to AI?
 Answer. The thirty-year history of Section 230 teaches a single, 
sobering lesson: broad immunity granted to an emerging industry during 
its infancy is extraordinarily difficult to correct once that industry 
matures. When Congress passed Section 230 in 1996, just 16 percent of 
Americans were online, Google did not yet exist, and Facebook was 
nearly a decade away. No one anticipated that a handful of platforms 
would come to control virtually all public communication, accumulate 
market capitalizations exceeding the GDPs of many countries, and 
engineer products deliberately designed to maximize engagement at the 
expense of user wellbeing. The immunity that followed those platforms 
as they matured was never seriously revisited, because the industry had 
grown powerful enough to resist correction and because the meta-law 
that Section 230 created determined who would govern AI rather than how 
strong that governance would be.
 The danger Congress now faces with artificial intelligence is 
structurally identical. Right now, there are voices urging Congress to 
freeze state laws without enacting comprehensive Federal regulation. In 
other words, those same voices are asking Congress to repeat the 
Section 230 model for a technology whose potential implications dwarf 
those of social media. The lesson of Section 230 is not merely that bad 
outcomes follow from a broad immunity; it is that the first major legal 
framework tends to become the last, because it allocates power to those 
who are most likely to resist future reform. As it relates to AI 
regulation, Congress should avoid creating the conditions for courts to 
improvise in a legal vacuum, so that it doesn't have to spend a 
generation debating whether the improvisation was correct.
Section 230 and AI:
 As on social media platforms, we've seen generative AI systems 
provide harmful content to children.

 Question 1. You argue that Section 230 should not apply to 
generative AI. What are the key differences between social media 
platforms and generative AI systems when it comes to the application of 
Section 230?
 Answer. The fundamental distinction lies in authorship. Section 
230(c)(1) immunizes platforms for content ``provided by another 
information content provider''. In short, content that originates with 
a third-party user, not with the platform itself. A social media 
platform that hosts a post written by a user is, in the statute's 
terms, a passive conduit. A generative AI system is something 
categorically different; it produces its own outputs in response to 
user prompts, based on training data selected by the company, fine-
tuning choices made by the company, and deployment parameters set by 
the company. The output is not the speech of ``another'' by any 
reasonable standard. It is, in substantial measure, the product of the 
developer's own design decisions. Section 230s passive-host immunity 
simply does not map onto an active content-generating system.
 A secondary, and more nuanced, question is whether AI companies 
qualify as ``interactive computer services,'' which is the threshold 
category that Section 230 protection requires. In my own view, there is 
a credible argument that a generative AI provider, unlike a traditional 
platform, does not provide a service through which users access content 
from others, but rather a system that itself generates content on 
demand. If that argument prevails in litigation, AI developers would 
fall outside Section 230s scope on both textual grounds simultaneously. 
Rather than leave the issue to serendipity, Congress should clarify the 
law before courts are forced to resolve these questions in a vacuum, 
producing precedents that may prove as difficult to correct as Zeran 
vs. AOL.
 ______
 
 Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
 Brad Carson
AI Chatbots:
 Question 1. Do you believe that content produced by AI chatbots is 
protected by Section 230?
 Answer. No. Content produced by AI chatbots should not be protected 
by Section 230, and I do not believe that the statute's text, properly 
read, extends that protection. Section 230(c)(1) immunizes providers 
for content ``provided by another information content provider.'' A 
chatbot's output is not provided by ``another,'' but rather it is 
generated by the system that the company designed, trained, and 
deployed. The user supplies a prompt; the company's model supplies the 
response. The company is, in meaningful and legally significant 
measure, the author of that response. In my view, this is not an 
``umpire call'' on a close textual question, but I urge Congress to 
codify the answer before courts, under pressure to resolve novel cases 
in a legal vacuum, extend immunity in ways that will result in an 
entire generation of children being harmed before we can correct it.

 Question 2. If AI companies can claim immunity from harmful AI-
generated content, what consequences do you predict for users and 
platforms?
 Answer. The consequences would be both serious and predictable. AI 
companies shielded from liability for harmful outputs would face no 
legal incentive to invest in safety measures beyond what their 
commercial interests already demand. Victims of AI-generated harm, 
whether that harm takes the form of defamation, non-consensual intimate 
imagery, content that facilitates self-harm in vulnerable users, 
instructions enabling real-world violence, or outputs used to 
manipulate individuals in ways that damage their financial or physical 
wellbeing, would be denied access to legal remedies. The legal system 
would have no mechanism through which to send price signals to AI 
developers about the externalized costs of their systems' failures. And 
the absence of liability would remove one of the most powerful 
incentives for independent safety auditing, since companies would have 
little legal reason to surface risks they are not required, by law, to 
remedy.
 More generally, broad immunity would entrench a two-tier system: 
well-resourced actors who can absorb the harms AI inflicts on them, and 
everyone else, who cannot. The families, teenagers, and individual 
users who have already suffered under Section 230s regime are the same 
populations most vulnerable to AI's harms. Congress has a choice 
between mechanisms that establish accountability proportional to model 
capability, and immunities that are inversely proportional to 
foresight. The story of Section 230 makes clear which choice ages 
better.

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