SABOTAGE IN THE BALTIC SEA, IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND LESSONS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senate April 30, 2026

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[Senate Hearing 119-520]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-520

 SABOTAGE IN THE BALTIC SEA,
 IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY,
 AND LESSONS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION
 __________

 APRIL 30, 2026

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-579 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================

 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

 JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho, Chairman 
PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DAVID MCCORMICK, Pennsylvania CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
STEVE DAINES, Montana CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
TED CRUZ, Texas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
MIKE LEE, Utah CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
RICK SCOTT, Florida TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
 Suzanne Wrasse, Staff Director 
 Naz Durakoglu, Democratic Staff Director 
 John Dutton, Chief Clerk 

 (ii) 
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page

 Statements

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, Chairman.......... 1

Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, Ranking 
 Member......................................................... 2

 Witnesses

Schmitt, Benjamin, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Department of Physics 
 and Astronomy, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy, and Perry 
 World House, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA...... 6

 Prepared statement........................................... 9

O'Brien, Hon. James C., Distinguished Visiting Fellow, European 
 Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC................... 17

 Prepared statement........................................... 19

 Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Statement Submitted by David Coughlan, Chief Executive Officer, 
 SubCom......................................................... 3

 (iii)

 
 SABOTAGE IN THE BALTIC SEA,
 IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY,
 AND LESSONS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC

 THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2026

 U.S. Senate,
 Committee on Foreign Relations,
 Washington, DC.
 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James E. 
Risch, chairman of the committee, presiding.
 Present: Senators Risch [presiding], Ricketts, McCormick, 
Daines, Hagerty, Barrasso, Lee, Paul, Cruz, Scott of Florida, 
Curtis, Cornyn, Shaheen, and Murphy.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
 U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

 The Chairman. With that we will close that part of this 
meeting and proceed to a hearing that we have set today 
regarding sabotage in the Baltic Sea and the implications for 
European security and lessons for the Indo-Pacific. So I am 
going to make a few opening remarks. I am going to give it to 
Senator Shaheen to do likewise. We will hear from our 
witnesses, and we will then open it to a round of questioning 
for members of the committee.
 As we sit here today, thousands of miles of cables and 
pipelines running under the sea power the global economy. 
Subsea cables carry more than 95 percent of the world's 
telecommunications traffic and transmit more than $10 trillion 
in financial transactions every day. Let me say that again, $10 
trillion in financial transactions. These more than 20,000 
miles of underwater oil and gas pipelines and electrical 
transmission cables are vulnerable to attack by our 
adversaries, and that has become obvious in recent years.
 Since 2022, there have been at least eight undersea 
sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea, and likely they are the 
responsibility of Russia. Russia has developed high-end 
undersea warfare capabilities, as well as low-tech options that 
mimic the effects of an anchor dragging on the sea floor to 
hide its behavior. It maintains a specialized fleet of so-
called ``research vessels'' run by a Russian military unit 
masquerading as a research agency known by its Russian acronym, 
GUGI.
 Just 2 weeks ago, the U.K. revealed it found Russian 
military submarines working together to map out subsea 
infrastructure in the North Atlantic, likely to prepare for 
future sabotage operations. And in 2024, a Russian shadow-fleet 
tanker attempting to evade oil sanctions was seized by the 
Finnish Coast Guard after it cut four subsea internet cables 
and a power cable.
 In response to these incidents, NATO and the EU have 
stepped up their efforts, particularly through the NATO 
Shipping Center, the Maritime Center for Critical Undersea 
Infrastructure, and military patrols in the Baltic. But as 
always, more needs to be done.
 Russia is not the only bad actor. China's military has 
conducted research into cable cutting technologies, and Taiwan 
has reported five incidents of likely sabotage in only the last 
2 years--that is not just bad luck. Like Russia, China also 
uses commercial vessels to hide its sabotage. Additionally, 
Chinese companies like HMN Technologies leverage State 
subsidies to dominate the subsea cable market.
 Allowing one of our foremost adversaries to operate in such 
a matter creates significant risk. We cannot allow this.
 To end undersea sabotage we need to call it out when it 
happens and say publicly who did it, if possible. We also need 
a concerted international effort to improve the resiliency of 
undersea infrastructure and prevent or mitigate the impact of 
these attacks when they happen.
 I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses about how 
we can address the growing threat of undersea sabotage.
 Senator Shaheen.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, 
 U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

 Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to 
our witnesses. Thank you both for being here today.
 Last winter, damage to a telecommunications cable between 
Finland and Estonia was detected. Finnish authorities looked at 
maritime traffic in the area and found one ship stood out. It 
was a cargo ship dragging its anchor, and it was from St. 
Petersburg, Russia. I am sure that comes as no surprise to 
either of you. They seized the boat, they gathered evidence, 
and they opened a criminal investigation, but as we know, it 
was not an isolated incident.
 As the Chairman has said, multiple undersea cables in the 
Baltic were cut this year, each time involving civilian 
vessels. This is a strategy that I fear is being carried out by 
Russia's shadow fleet and by other adversaries of the United 
States. And it extends beyond the Baltic, to undersea cables 
near the United Kingdom and oil and gas installations in the 
North Sea.
 Putin is testing a model of conflict, and the question is, 
are U.S. sanctions keeping pace with how Russia is operating? 
In my view, they are not keeping pace, and Russia is exploiting 
the gap. Russia continues to generate billions through its 
shadow fleet, exploiting gaps between U.S., European, and U.K. 
enforcement. And at a moment when pressure should be 
increasing, the signal from the U.S. has been mixed. Ships keep 
moving, revenue keeps flowing, and Russia keeps pushing the 
boundaries. This allows Russia to sustain its war in Ukraine 
and these kinds of activities in the Baltic.
 The infrastructure targeted in the Baltic is not unique to 
Europe. Similar vulnerabilities exist in the Indo-Pacific, 
including around Taiwan, as we saw from our visit there. A 
bipartisan delegation including three members of this committee 
visited there in April.
 Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter a statement into the 
record from SubCom, which is a U.S. company that is based in 
New Hampshire that builds and maintains undersea cables, as 
well as a report from the International Connectivity 
Coalition,\1\ for the record. If that is OK.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ https://www.internationalconnectivitycoalition.com/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Chairman. It will be admitted into the record. Thank 
you.

 [The information referred to follows:]

 Statement Submitted by David Coughlan, Chief Executive Officer, SubCom

 Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and distinguished members 
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to convey to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee some of the important issues to consider 
regarding undersea communications cables and the importance of 
maintaining the security of this form of strategic infrastructure. 
These networks are at the heart of global connectivity and economic 
stability, serving as the backbone for countless critical operations. 
It is essential that we address both the challenges and opportunities 
in safeguarding these cables, ensuring their reliability for 
generations to come.
 As you may know, subsea data cables carry 95 percent of the world's 
internet traffic. There are over 600 cables active worldwide, with a 
combined distance of some 1.5 million km that connect the continents. 
These cables carry everything from everyday materials like emails and 
social media feeds, but more importantly, they carry bank transactions, 
engineering documents, financial information, and the information that 
makes the global economy work. The Federal Reserve has estimated that 
$10 trillion of transactions are carried across undersea networks every 
day including 15 million SWIFT transactions across 195 countries.
 Upwards of 100 of these major subsea data cables land in the United 
States from overseas, connecting with our domestic telecommunications 
networks via dozens of landing stations. These cables connect our 
country with the major hubs of Europe, South America, East Asia and 
Australia--with many networks extending further into Africa, the Middle 
East and every corner of the globe. Beyond the major networks, there 
are numerous smaller cable systems that provide connectivity to more 
remote or specialized areas, including along the Alaskan coast, the 
island networks of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and to Greenland and 
the Arctic.
 With perhaps the exception of our national electrical grid, the 
subsea fiber optic networks are our country's most important commercial 
infrastructure allowing our modern economic system to work in an 
efficient and effective manner.
 Despite the vast expanse and incredible importance of these 
systems, there are actually very few companies in the entire world that 
design, manufacture, install and maintain these networks. SubCom is the 
only domestic company that provides this high level of capability. 
Located in New Hampshire, Maryland and New Jersey, SubCom designs, 
engineers, manufactures the electronic systems, builds the cables, 
integrates the systems, lays the networks across the seven oceans, and 
has the capability to maintain and repair these networks on behalf of 
our customers. It has installed over 1 million km of fiber optic 
undersea cables and remains the global leader in this industry.
 SubCom is unique in that we have the capabilities and experience to 
install end-to-end solutions--from landing stations into near shore 
water, across continental shelfs, through entire oceans, and back to 
landing stations located thousands of miles from the initial 
connections. We operate nine ships throughout the globe, laying new 
systems and maintaining existing ones. Our ships are specially designed 
for fiber optic cable installation and maintenance and utilize advanced 
plows and remote operating vehicles (ROVs) to service the cables. 
SubCom's investment in these industry-leading ships and tools is 
testament to its commitment to serving its customers and our nation in 
building and maintaining this vital infrastructure.
 With the increasing importance of these networks to global commerce 
and government activity, there is also a growing need to ensure cables 
are secured and properly maintained. This has become more of a priority 
as we have seen cable disruptions--accidental, natural, and malicious--
become more prevalent over the past 10-20 years. Additionally, the rise 
in digital dependency has amplified the consequences of cable failures, 
affecting everything from internet connectivity to financial 
transactions.
 In order to address the needs for securing and repairing these 
systems it is important to understand the extent and scope of the 
problems. Cable faults happen, but 70 percent of most faults are due to 
fishing vessels and ships dragging anchors. Environmental factors like 
earthquakes also contribute to damage. Less common are subsea component 
failures such as repeaters, or cable integrity issues. Deliberate 
sabotage, while a real threat, is still exceedingly rare, but when it 
does happen it can generate significant headlines. Regardless of the 
reason for a cable fault, depending on the location and the options to 
reroute the cable traffic, the impacts can range from inconvenient to 
debilitating.
 Despite most faults not being caused by malicious intent, it does 
not mean SubCom feels that these issues are not relevant to this 
committee or important to address. On the contrary, these issues are 
critical to consider in terms of protecting this type of strategic 
infrastructure and maintaining our country's connectivity with the rest 
of the globe. SubCom wants to ensure the members understand the extent 
of the problem in order to develop good policies that improve on the 
security and sustainability of these subsea networks.
 The reason the majority of cable problems occur due to fishing/
anchor drags is that the cables nearshore are in shallower waters. 
These are where the cables are most vulnerable, especially cables which 
are in areas that do not allow burial. It should also be noted that the 
landing points for these cables are typically chosen in more densely 
populated areas which have extensive telecommunications 
infrastructure--providing the vital interconnectivity for the systems. 
But more dense urban areas are also where you have more boat traffic--
shipping, pleasure craft, commercial fishing, etc.
 The general location of subsea data cables, especially near-shore, 
are well known, and choke points around important landing stations 
could allow for rapid and near simultaneous attacks using minimal 
resources that may be difficult to identify in areas that naturally 
have high maritime traffic. This is where the threat exists from a 
national security standpoint. Asymmetric actions from hostile state and 
non-state actors can be coordinated to cause substantial damage to our 
subsea data networks. The world-wide cable repair capacity (and to some 
extent the domestic capacity) is not equipped to rapidly repair 
multiple, simultaneous breaks along major cable routes. These repairs 
typically take 1-2 weeks or more, depending on the location, depth and 
type of repair.
 Over the years there has been severe competitive pressures to 
reduce O&M costs which has led to the reduction of the number of cable 
maintenance ships. The majority of repair ships are owned and operated 
by foreign entities and crewed by foreign mariners, which effectively 
increases response time and increases the foreign influence over these 
issues. The number of ships that can handle mid-ocean deepwater repairs 
is also a much smaller subset of the global cable ship fleet. As you 
consider how to optimize our nation's ability to respond to cable 
breaks--especially those from bad actors--the makeup and sophistication 
of the cable fleets need to be weighed as you make policy.
 Recent cable disruptions in the South China Sea and the Baltic have 
brought cable security issues to the forefront. We commend the Senate 
and Congress as a whole for wanting to better understand the importance 
of these networks and possibly develop better policies and programs to 
improve security and repair response. We also want to work with you and 
the administration on making sure that any legislation or 
administrative changes are effective, efficient, do not overburden the 
industry, and do not impair the country's domestic capabilities which 
we all rely on to install, maintain and repair these networks.
 For example, policies that can address the accidental cable faults 
which typically occur near shore may not be ideal for other failures. 
When midocean problems occur--whether from environmental factors or 
component failures--they require specific platforms and skillsets which 
few companies have, and SubCom is the only domestic company that can 
provide this type of service. In order to repair deep ocean systems you 
have to actually identify the cable located several miles below the 
surface in pitch black depths, raise the cable to the surface, splice 
and/or repair the cable and components and return the cable safely to 
the ocean floor. Our marine capabilities enable us to mitigate risks, 
effectively and efficiently make repairs, and quickly restore 
operations.
 While we are all learning firsthand about critical chokepoints with 
respect to global energy resources, we have to consider that there are 
several key telecommunications chokepoints related to undersea cables. 
The Red Sea, the Straits of Malacca, and the Persian Gulf are all 
bottlenecks for numerous cable systems. When faults occur in these 
areas--possibly multiple cables being attacked by bad actors--there are 
global communications issues that affect all the other networks. These 
are areas where rerouting traffic is more difficult and often repairs 
could take much longer if hostilities are ongoing. These are located 
far from United States territorial waters, but the implications of 
cable failures in these regions impact US systems, US companies and the 
US economy.
 So, what can be done to improve upon how SubCom and the United 
States as a whole protects and maintains these subsea data systems?
 One aspect to consider is what other nations do--including France, 
Japan and China--to support and enhance their undersea cable industry 
which protects their undersea networks. In many cases those countries 
heavily subsidize their national ``champions'' in the industry though 
direct support, tax advantages, and other mechanisms.
 The United States Cable Security Fleet was established with a fleet 
of two active, purpose-built commercially viable cable vessels which 
meet national security requirements. Two of SubCom's vessels were 
reflagged to the US and crewed with US maritime personnel to fulfill 
the CSF requirements. This helps ensure a US presence in the 
international submarine cable market and keep a broad US deep-water 
maritime labor base. Most importantly, the CSF allows the United States 
to quickly re-establish critical undersea networks the keep our country 
connected to the global economy in times of crisis.
 While SubCom does contract with MARAD to supply ships under the 
Cable Security Fleet, the company does so at a disadvantage. The 
structure of the CSF contracts doesn't account for the specialized 
nature of the ships which are used to repair and maintain cables under 
the program, nor does it account for the large and specialized crew 
required to operate these ships. It also neglects the shore-based 
expertise often required to reconstitute these complex networks and 
restore them to their maximum capacity. The CSF was structured in a way 
that mirrored the Maritime Security Program (MSP) which provides for 
transport services during times of war or other national emergencies. 
Unfortunately, the funding structure does not account for the real 
world cost structure of operating a cable repair ship vs a transport 
ship, nor the expertise necessary to complete the repair. One area for 
Congress to consider with respect to undersea cable security would be 
ensuring adequate funding for the CSF that reflects the specific 
requirements of the program, and provide that funding on a long-term 
basis so that we can make sure these ships and expertise can be 
available when needed.
 Along with the support of our domestic cable ship capabilities, 
there is growing pressure to have the federal government subsidize 
additional cable ship construction--both here and overseas. While there 
may be short-term advantages to do so, the longer-term implications 
should be considered. As mentioned earlier, SubCom is the only 
vertically integrated supplier of these systems in the United States. 
Undercutting our ability to compete with foreign service providers by 
subsidizing the construction of additional cable ships that will 
compete against our commercial services will have a detrimental impact 
on the company. For over 100 years, SubCom and its predecessor 
companies have pioneered undersea cable manufacturing and technologies 
while competing against the likes of Alcatel, NEC, and Huawei. SubCom 
wants to continue in its role to help maintain our domestic 
telecommunications industrial base, as well as our maritime base. We 
hope that the Congress and administration would work with us before 
considering any programs that would alter the competitive dynamics of 
the industry.
 Finally, one area to consider is important cable systems for 
national defense and security locations around the world. Many of these 
places are remote, are served by a single cable, have limited 
alternative communications options, and are serviced by outdated 
systems. Some of these networks need to be upgraded and some of the 
networks likely need redundancy to maintain uptime if there is a cable 
fault. Continued diligence is necessary to ensure reliable connectivity 
for these important locations.
 SubCom has worked for 100 years designing, building and maintaining 
our undersea communications networks. It has worked with the US 
Government to provide important services and connect remote regions. We 
look forward to continuing to provide guidance and support to you and 
the administration to ensure the security and reliability of these 
subsea data networks on a national and global level.

 Senator Shaheen. Thank you. As we know, much of this 
infrastructure for undersea cables is privately owned and is 
unevenly protected. Repair capacity is limited, and it takes 
time to fix breaks. So attribution for attacks still takes 
weeks, and even then, intent is hard to prove. So, we need to 
recognize that that infrastructure is national security.
 I am sure we are going to hear lots of good recommendations 
from our witnesses this morning about how we can impose costs 
when attribution is slow and intent is hard to prove, and what 
we should be doing in terms of ensuring the security of these 
undersea cables.
 Again, thank you both for being here and I look forward to 
your testimony.
 The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Shaheen. We now 
are going to hear from our witnesses. First we have Dr. 
Benjamin Schmitt, who is a Senior Fellow at the University of 
Pennsylvania, where he holds a joint academic appointment with 
the Department of Physics and Astronomy and the Kleinman Center 
for Energy Policy. He also serves as the Director of the Perry 
World House Graduate Program at Penn.
 Mr. Schmitt recently completed a 2-year investigation into 
suspected sabotage incidents in the Baltic Sea, and is 
currently researching sabotage activity near Taiwan.
 Dr. Schmitt, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN SCHMITT, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, DEPARTMENT 
 OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY, KLEINMAN CENTER FOR ENERGY POLICY, 
 AND PERRY WORLD HOUSE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
 PHILADELPHIA, PA

 Mr. Schmitt. Thank you Chairman Risch, Ranking Member 
Shaheen, and distinguished members of the U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. My name is Dr. Benjamin L. Schmitt, and I 
previously served as European Energy Security Advisor at the 
U.S. Department of State, and I am currently a Senior Fellow at 
both the University of Pennsylvania and the Center for European 
Policy Analysis, and I am honored to speak with you all today.
 The world is at war. We meet 525 days since the 
Putin regime unleased its full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and 
now, this year, the Iranian regime has learned from Russia's 
air war in Ukraine and launched kinetic drone and missile 
strikes against the energy infrastructure of many of the United 
States' partners and allies across the Middle East.
 And for the first time in decades, these ground and air 
wars have spread across the global maritime domain, and all 
with dire costs. The IRGC has fomented a global energy crisis 
by recklessly blockading the Straits of Hormuz, while its 
proxies in Yemen threaten to multiply the damage by resuming 
attacks in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
 For its part, the Kremlin continues to work overtime on the 
high seas, standing up a tanker ``shadow fleet'' to evade 
transatlantic oil sanctions. Besides dodging Western trade 
restrictions, some of these very tankers may be dual-use 
platforms for espionage, sabotage, and drone launches.
 Meanwhile, there is another war being waged, a shadow war 
in Europe against energy and critical infrastructure 
undermining the security of NATO member states not only on 
land, but offshore, roiling the depths of the Barents and 
Baltic Seas. European partners have confidently attributed to 
Russia attacks on such onshore facilities as rail and telecoms 
installations. The Kremlin's strategy includes recruitment of 
non-Russian nationals, including Ukrainians, to damage critical 
infrastructure to sow panic and undermine support for Ukrainian 
victory across the West.
 While attribution for onshore attacks has been common, 
technical and political challenges have remained for offshore 
sabotage attribution, despite data-driven evidence suggesting 
the Kremlin's role.
 Unfortunately, our partners across the Indo-Pacific now 
face similar seabed subterfuge. There have been several 
instances of Taiwan's subsea cables being severed, suggesting 
sabotage carried out at the behest of the People's Republic of 
China.
 The Senate needs to use today's hearing to catalyze further 
action that makes it clear to both Moscow and Beijing that 
their subsea sabotage sprees end here.
 And while the Senate must drive the policy conversation, I 
believe academia has a role to play as well. For 3 years, I 
have led the University of Pennsylvania's Underwater Mayhem 
research project, focused on analyzing how Russia and the PRC 
now brazenly conduct physical sabotage attacks against seabed 
energy and critical infrastructure across the NATO Alliance and 
beyond.
 Four key case studies from our research include the 
following:

 No. 1, Svalbard. My travel to the Norwegian island of 
Svalbard, just 400 miles from the North Pole, supported our 
assessment that it is highly probable that in January 2022, a 
Russian fishing trawler was responsible for severing a vital 
subsea fiber optic cable transmitting commercial satellite data 
from the SvalSAT ground station to the European mainland. Such 
commercial data would prove vital in Ukraine's defense just 
weeks later, leading to our conclusion that this was likely a 
``shaping operation'' before the full-scale invasion.

 No. 2, Nord Stream. Official attribution of the September 
2022 Nord Stream 1 and 2 sabotage remains absent, and despite 
continued public debate, our research team assesses as probable 
that the Russian Federation was involved in this high-profile 
sabotage incident, and assesses as improbable the media 
narrative that a so-called ``pro-Ukraine sailboat'' launched 
from a marina next to a Nord Stream logistics hub was to blame. 
We arrived at this assessment after exhaustive open-source AIS 
and satellite data analysis, interviews with first responders 
and experts across Europe, and a technical counter-analysis of 
competing theories of the case. I also chartered a vessel from 
Denmark's island of Bornholm to travel to the blast site itself 
and gathered seabed sonar data in 2024.

 No. 3, the Baltic Sea. We have heard a little bit about 
this already. I sailed on vessels offshore in the Gulf of 
Finland and the Central Baltic near the sites of several 
extended anchor drag incidents by Russia-and China-connected 
vessels which crippled seabed installations, including the 2023 
Balticconnector gas pipeline break, the 2024 C-Lion-l and BCS 
telecoms cable cuts, and the 2024 Estlink 2 electricity cable 
cut. The circumstances of these incidents suggest sabotage, not 
accidents.

 And fourth and finally, Taiwan. This month, I traveled to 
Taiwan near the site of the 2025 cut of the Trans-Pacific 
Express telecoms cable, which links Taiwan with the United 
States. I also visited locations close to the sites of the 2023 
and 2025 cuts of telecoms cables linking Taiwan's Matsu and 
Penghu Islands to the main island of Taiwan. All of these 
incidents involved PRC-linked vessels, and thanks to Taiwan's 
actions, a PRC Chinese captain is now sitting in a jail cell 
for sabotage. I also conducted research near the center of the 
Taiwan Strait itself, going in the Strait, donning a wetsuit to 
view subsea cables running through a coral reef between the 
southern Penghu Islands.

 Senators, it is time to turn the tables on the Putin and Xi 
regimes and restore deterrence against maritime sabotage. And 
to this end, I leave you with three very brief recommendations:

 No. 1, the Senate should support the invocation of NATO's 
Article 4 consultative mechanisms by concerned Member States 
whenever there are sabotage incidents attributed to Russia or 
its agents, which is essential to solidify political and 
operational support to counter these threats.

 No. 2, this committee should revive the statutory sanctions 
against Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 that were allowed to 
sunset in 2024, key steps to ensure that no investor, American 
or otherwise, can work to resurrect these symbols of Russia's 
energy weaponization and strategic corruption.

 And finally, Congress should pass S. 3249, the 
comprehensive Strategic Subsea Cables Act of 2026, and S. 2222, 
the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Act, both that 
have been prudently passed already by this committee. Through 
these actions, we can deter further Russian and Chinese 
sabotage, support our partners and allies worldwide, and make 
it clear to those that would think otherwise, there can never 
again be a return to so-called ``business as usual'' with 
regimes that continue to attack the physical foundations of our 
economy, prosperity, and freedom.

 Thank you so much, and I look forward to your questions.

 [The prepared statement of Mr. Schmitt follows:]\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Dr. Schmitt appended an additional report to his opening 
statement--Underwater Mayhem: Countering Threats to Energy and Critical 
Infrastructure Across the NATO Alliance and Beyond, Volume 01.'' That 
report can be viewed by clicking on the following url:
 https://upenn.app.box.com/s/wvrobfk9j1h34agng36chj73ibtkcx0h
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Prepared Statement of Dr. Benjamin Schmitt

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 The Chairman. Great remarks and recommendations. We will 
now hear from Mr. O'Brien. Mr. O'Brien is the Distinguished 
Visiting Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, 
where he focuses on efforts to strengthen the transatlantic 
relationship. Previously, Mr. O'Brien served as Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in the 
Biden administration and as head of the Office of Sanctions 
Coordination.
 Mr. O'Brien, the floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES C. O'BRIEN, DISTINGUISHED VISITING 
 FELLOW, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC

 Mr. O'Brien. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and 
Senator Ricketts from my home State. Your statements made the 
case. Undersea infrastructure is critical for America's 
prosperity and security. Russia and China are attacking it. We 
at least have to plan as though they will attack it in a time 
of greater tension.
 I can't compete with Dr. Schmitt's field activities, 
especially the wet suit, so I am going to focus on the policy 
implications of this.
 What is the first?
 The first is we can deter now or pay later. It is just a 
simple, timeless lesson. Russia and China are testing. They are 
testing where they can. They are doing it undersea. They are 
doing it on the surface. They are doing it on land in a wider 
sabotage campaign. And if we do not call them out and respond, 
we are going to face increased pressure.
 And I note how that cuts against basic objectives of this 
administration. Diplomats are now out trying to get European 
countries to sign up to long-term American LNG contracts. That 
has to be delivered through terminals that have large undersea 
exposure. Why are they going to sign up to that if we are not 
acting robustly to protect the infrastructure? So that is an 
important point.
 There is a real risk of escalation with our current posture 
because all the tinder is laid. You have European countries 
facing pressures at home to answer Russian threats. You have 
Russia and China seeking if they can push things further. And I 
think you need to have a strong U.S. hand to demonstrate that 
there is no escalation edge to Russia and China if they 
continue down this path.
 So this is the way of getting more peace by moving now. And 
that is especially because the group of countries most affected 
in the Baltic are the fighting flank of NATO. They are going to 
be the ones who spend enough, who stand with us, who go with 
us, who protect the Arctic. If we do not help defend them, 
Russia and China will believe we will not help defend anyone. 
It is very simple.
 Now, what is it that we should do? One lesson is that 
solidarity works. Mr. Chairman, you laid out many of the steps 
that have been taken by NATO and the European Union and others, 
with really strong bipartisan support from this committee and 
members of other committees. It has been a great effort. When I 
speak to colleagues in the Baltic states or across the nine 
countries that are on those waterways, they say that these NATO 
missions, air and sea, have made a tremendous difference. The 
transparency of where the infrastructure is and how to track 
the ships is very helpful.
 And this carries to the Indo-Pacific. We have built very 
strong, across administrations, very strong ties between 
European countries and the Asian countries who are most 
dependent on undersea infrastructure, and that has to continue 
so that the lessons can be learned.
 Second, we need to name and sanction the ships, 
individuals, and institutions responsible, and I strongly 
support the two bills this committee is putting forward that 
include sanctions authority. It helps a great deal to have 
authority that is tied to disruption of undersea 
infrastructure.
 We could use maybe some of the sanctions authorities 
pertaining to Russia, but there will be those, particularly in 
this administration, who say that we do not want to name and 
shame particular Russians. We can do this with a sanctions 
authority that is targeted to undersea infrastructure, and I 
think we can do it in a way that avoids raising gas and oil 
prices.
 The third thing is we have to confront the Russian shadow 
fleet. This is between 400 and 900 vessels. Two hundred of them 
were designated by January 2025, none since by the United 
States. This is the deniable weapon that Russia and China use 
to attack undersea infrastructure.
 Now, let me talk about a second lesson. We need stability 
in our partnerships. I believe the future of the United States, 
our prosperity, depends on innovative sections like life 
sciences, technology, energy, and defense. Operating in a 
marketplace of more than 1 billion rich consumers, they will 
provide us--these are our traditional partners, and they will 
provide us with the materials, the supply chains, the markets, 
and yes, the competitors, but ones who operate under rules that 
we all share. That is the future for us. It will work only if 
undersea infrastructure is protected.
 And the problem we have is that it is like any shopping 
center. Somebody has to provide basic security, has to make 
sure it is cleaned up, has to make sure that the place is 
reasonably attractive. That has always been the United States. 
Middle powers cannot provide these public goods against 
predatory superpowers like Russia and China. The U.S. has to 
organize and sometimes has to be the one to provide them.
 And you do not do that on a pay-as-you-go basis, by saying 
this country uses this waterway more and this country uses that 
waterway less, so we pay differently. You have to do that with 
a certain amount of stability and an understanding that America 
will benefit with the stability of having a relationship that 
extends from Australia, up across northeast Asia, across North 
America, into Europe. That set of friends and partners will 
guarantee us prosperity and security in the future, but only if 
we commit to providing the public goods that make it possible, 
and the undersea infrastructure this committee is calling our 
attention to is the first, along with space, communication, and 
a few other things.
 But this is the place to begin work, so I thank you for 
your attention to it.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Brien follows:]

 Prepared Statement of James C. O'Brien

 Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shaheen, thank you for inviting me.
 I am Jim O'Brien, currently a fellow at the European Council on 
Foreign Relations and completing a term as a fellow at the Institute 
for Human Sciences in Vienna, where I worked on several of the themes 
discussed below. I have served in the U.S. Government at various times 
since 1989, most recently as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 
and Eurasian Affairs and as the Secretary of State's coordinator for 
sanctions, a post created at the urging of this committee. I have also 
spent half my career working with private sector and civil society 
groups. I have no financial interest in the topics raised today, nor do 
I work for any entity with a commercial or advocacy interest.
 Thank you to the committee for highlighting the importance of the 
Baltic Sea and the infrastructure under its surface. The committee--and 
my fellow witness, Dr. Schmitt--have laid out the factual context very 
well. Simply put, the globe's 500 or so cables carry more than 99 
percent of the world's digital traffic, and undersea infrastructure 
will be increasingly important for the transmission of energy and 
electricity. Over the last decade undersea infrastructure has become a 
site of considerable investment by America's largest companies, adding 
another strong U.S. interest in its protection. There are 100-200 
outages in a typical a year. Most are accidental, but there is a 
growing and troubling pattern of disruption by Russian and Chinese 
ships.I will focus on some policy implications of this last point. The 
first lesson is timeless: we can deter now or pay later. Russian and 
Chinese ships have been involved in multiple attacks in the Baltic over 
the last several years, and those countries are learning how and 
whether the U.S. will answer. The Allies affected directly by sabotage 
in the Baltic--Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Germany through to Belgium, France, and the UK--are NATO's 
fighting flank. They are critical to defending the Arctic as well as 
Russia's northern sea routes to the globe. If we do not stand with them 
potential adversaries will believe that we will not stand with anyone.
 Also, our current posture poses a risk of escalation. Russia is 
reported to be placing armed personnel on shadow fleet vessels, raising 
the cost of stops intended to ensure that the ships do not threaten 
lives, other ships, and the environment. Ukraine is targeting Russian 
export infrastructure used in the region, arguably because without 
further U.S. action in the Baltic it is difficult to stop Russia from 
earning funds from oil exports. Our NATO Allies may face strong 
domestic pressure to answer Russian provocations. In short, the 
conditions are ripe for miscalculation or error to lead to more 
violence. A stronger U.S. presence can persuade everyone that 
escalation is in no one's interest.
 Finally, the Baltic Sea presents a test case of an issue that will 
face U.S. administrations for decades: how can the U.S. ensure that the 
basic conditions of prosperity and security--including undersea cables 
and pipelines, freedom of navigation, and assets in space--are provided 
and protected?
 These global public goods benefit the U.S. but also many countries, 
with the exact balance shifting over time and in different places. This 
leads some to suggest that the U.S. should treat each of these goods as 
reason to have a separate negotiation. This ignores how intertwined 
U.S. security and prosperity is with others and how quickly the ratio 
of benefits can shift. For decades the U.S. and our longtime partners 
have adjusted our respective roles and responsibilities in providing 
these goods. In the late 1940s, when the U.S. economy was half of 
global GDP and more than half of global manufacturing, it may have been 
fair for the U.S. to organize the provision of these goods and even to 
provide them by ourselves (although I will let others debate that).
 That allocation has changed and will always be under negotiation. 
As just one example of increased commitment from our partners, in July 
2024 NATO approved regional defense plans (including undersea needs) 
that require members to spend approximately 3-3.5 percent of GDP on 
defense priorities, along with an additional amount on infrastructure. 
Under the current administration this commitment has been made both 
more specific and very public, in the form of a targeted cap of 5 
percent of GDP. The publicity is helpful politically, but the 
priorities are decided by planning. A commitment to continue the 
planning as situations change lies is essential to success.
 In addition, by early 2025 NATO had prepared a center focused on 
undersea threats in the Baltic, and a mission at sea had been launched. 
The EU in 2024 approved a program to improve civilian resilience for 
undersea cables, and civilian consortia such as the International Cable 
Protection Coalition (ICPC) offer venues for doing more, particularly 
by addressing normal business of laying, maintaining, and repairing 
cables (where more capacity is urgently needed).
 As we agree with our partners on a new allocation of 
responsibilities and costs we should not hide from a basic fact: middle 
powers cannot ensure the conditions of prosperity, especially against 
predatory superpowers. The U.S. has to be the long pole in the tent, 
and our partners need to understand that we are in one long struggle to 
ensure that our societies control the conditions of our own prosperity 
and security.
 Getting this partnership right is fundamental to America's 
prosperity and security for the next generations. Innovative sectors 
such as life sciences, artificial intelligence, new defense 
technologies, and energy developments will grow more quickly and in 
ways that benefit our people with reliable markets, sources of 
materials, supply chains, partners, and--yes--competitors who will play 
by the same rules as our companies. We have spent 80 years building 
exactly this community with our traditional partners in Europe, North 
America, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and now across the Indo-
Pacific.
 Now we can choose to hang together, or to hang separately. It is 
simple arithmetic. Together, the U.S. and our partners offer markets, 
supply chains, and partners with more than a billion, well-off 
consumers, more than capable of meeting a challenge from Russia and 
China. If we go it alone, smaller countries will waver against the 
superpowers, and America will be 350 million people facing more than a 
billion. I believe in America's ingenuity and determination but size 
helps, too.
 Undersea infrastructure provides the connective tissue to make this 
work. With our partners we can find fair allocations of responsibility 
to protect it. Or we can spend more to do more ourselves and be just a 
bit poorer as we lose opportunities from partnership.
Policy Recommendations
 First, the administration should acknowledge Russia's role 
explicitly. Clarity and action will set expectations that can make 
negotiations more successful. Having nice conversations with Russian 
investment advisers does nothing to change the calculations of the 
Russian security apparatus, which knows that the country is bound to 
China for now. Russian activity seems to have stepped up since 2025, 
and the U.S. response--preferably with our partners-- is being watched 
closely in Moscow and Beijing.
 Second, the administration should act against the Russian shadow 
fleet. As we have seen, these ships are the perfect, deniable assets 
for Russia to use in threatening the undersea infrastructure of the 
Baltic Sea. Russian shadow fleet vessels tend to travel through the 
Baltic Sea, carrying as much as 2/3 of the Russian oil exports that 
finance the invasion of Ukraine. The administration's use of sanctions 
and seizures against shadow fleet vessels elsewhere show that it still 
has the toolbox open. It just needs to use the tool.
 By January 2025 the U.S. had designated nearly 200 vessels in the 
Russian shadow fleet (around half of the Russia-only shadow fleet known 
at the time), and our partners in the U.S. and EU have since designated 
more. States bordering the Baltic Sea and other waterways have taken 
strong measures to ensure that these ships comply with regulatory 
requirements. As a result, and due to lower oil prices starting in 
2024, by the spring of 2025 many of these ships were no longer 
operating regularly. Sadly, U.S. efforts against the shadow fleet 
serving Russian exports seem to have declined over the 15 months. With 
the increase in global oil prices, those ships are again active.
 Third, the bill proposed by Ranking Member Shaheen and Senator 
Barrasso is a good step toward ensuring that the U.S. Government has 
the knowledge it needs, venues to coordinate with others, and tools to 
respond when the infrastructure is threatened.
 The bill's sanctions authority is also welcome. Existing sanctions 
authorities would allow action due to the benefit that Russia receives 
from these disruptions, but the current administration seems to find it 
difficult to target Russian entities. This sanctions authority would 
offer an alternative approach that might be more palatable to people 
concerned about linking U.S. action to Russia's ongoing invasion of 
Ukraine, and its global reach would be useful.
 If the opportunity arises, the bill's sanctions authority should be 
extended to allow designations for foreign persons who participate in 
commercial activity in undersea infrastructure projects linked to 
Russian energy exports. There has been much speculation about a 
possible reopening of the NordStream 2 pipeline, for instance. The 
prospect of U.S. sanctions, now or under a future administration, could 
depress interest in this and other projects. I am not implying a link 
between current disruptions and any commercial plans. Still, without 
this authority it might be tempting for someone to pick up 
infrastructure at prices lowered by the prospect of violence against 
others in the neighborhood.
 I look forward to your questions.

 The Chairman. Well, thanks to both of you. One of the most 
important things you said is this is bipartisan. We do not hold 
a lot of hearings that are absolutely, totally, 100 percent 
bipartisan, but this is certainly one of them.
 One of the questions I have is I think both of you made 
reference to the fact that countries--well, the two obvious 
violators are Russia and China--that they are still testing. 
Why would they be testing? Maybe they are testing us. But, I 
mean, this is not rocket science. You do not need engineers. 
You need a salty, old captain who is a lousy boat driver, it 
seems to me, and you can disrupt these cables and find where 
they are in relatively shallow water.
 Why do these continue to happen? Is it a test of our 
response? Is that what they are looking for? Why are they 
continuing to test? Because this really riles people up. I 
mean, it gets people fired up. There is no question about it. 
Why don't you start, Dr. Schmitt.
 Mr. Schmitt. So I would say you have referenced and we have 
heard already the incidents that have taken place in the Gulf 
of Finland.
 First I want to make it clear. The Baltic Sea is center of 
these sort of incidents, in part because it is strategic for 
the Russian Federation and for NATO, but also because it is a 
relatively shallow body of water that has a high density of 
subsea infrastructure to begin with. So that is why I think 
statistically we are seeing more in the Baltic Sea than in 
other locations.
 But one of the things I want to say is that in 2024, on 
Christmas Day, the ``EAGLE S'', a Russian shadow fleet vessel, 
dragged its anchor through both telecoms cables and the Estlink 
2 electricity interconnector, connecting Finland and Estonia. 
And when it broke those, the Finnish authorities came out in 
helicopters and their special police forces descended 
dramatically on the deck, and seized the vessel and brought it 
into port.
 Part of the reason, I believe, that this specific 
infrastructure was targeted was because the Baltic states were 
trying to synchronize with the EU grid, their electricity 
infrastructure and finally throw off the yoke of the Russian 
and Belarussian electricity grid. So by severing that 
electricity in their connector it increased the risk of that 
operation just planned for about 4 or 5 weeks later.
 But the other thing is the response, and that is, to your 
point, Senator Risch, I think the biggest thing here. The Finns 
put the captain on trial, put part of the crew on trial, and at 
the end of the day they let them go because they said they did 
not have the jurisdiction because they were in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and not the territorial waters of Finland. So 
that is a problem, but we saw a solution in Taiwan. I visited 
the prosecutor in Tainan City, Taiwan, just 2 weeks ago, and 
had a long interview with him, who put this PRC captain of the 
``HONG TAI 58'' in jail after sabotaging the Penghu island 
cable. And the reason for that was something called the 
``Results Principle,'' basically saying that no matter where 
these cables go, outside of the territorial waters, Exclusive 
Economic Zone or beyond, that the Taiwanese Government can 
prosecute and put away these folks for doing this because it 
has impact on their society. And that is a lesson I think 
Finland can take from here, and the EU can.
 The Chairman. You brought up something that has been really 
important to me, and that is I was really disappointed when I 
heard what happened in Finland. You know, this jurisdictional 
question is just nonsense. I mean, we prosecute people all the 
time who send drugs into the United States but have never set 
foot in the United States. A good example of that is a guy 
sitting in jail right now in New York.
 So I do not know what Finland has to do to change its laws 
to grab jurisdiction, but like you say, the causation factor 
seems to me to be very easy. I hope they will do it. I hope 
everybody will do it. So I appreciate you underscoring that; 
and like I said, it was incredibly disappointing.
 How many other countries do you think are in that same 
boat? I cannot imagine we would have that problem. If somebody 
did that to us, we would [unclear] easily under the causation 
doctrine.
 Mr. Schmitt. Yes. I mean, I think this is a great point. 
You mentioned Maduro being in jail in New York. Obviously that 
is a precedent that the Taiwanese pointed out to me, like if 
there was a scam artist in Cambodia that was preying on 
citizens in Taiwan, they would indict that person. They might 
not be able to extradite him, but they could at least indict 
him. And we certainly do the same thing against corrupt actors 
around the world and sanctions on Russian oligarchs and all 
these sort of thing.
 The Chairman. Let me interrupt you for a second. 
Extradition is an entirely different issue than jurisdiction. I 
mean, extradition is simply putting the ``habeas grabus'' on 
the guy and getting hold of him. The jurisdiction is a legal 
principle that is entirely different than that. And again, I 
think the causation issue was resolved decades ago, if not 
centuries ago.
 Go ahead and finish up.
 Mr. Schmitt. I want to say the problem that you mention for 
Finland, so the first thing I had, my reaction in November of 
last year when that was dismissed because of jurisdiction, I 
said this is going to happen again. And sure enough, on New 
Years Eve, just 6 weeks later, last year, the ``FITBURG'', 
another Russia-connected vessel, did another sabotage run 
through that same water. So we are going to have to find out 
what the Finns do this time to get that right.
 Mr. O'Brien. Mr. Chairman?
 The Chairman. Do you want to comment on that?
 Mr. O'Brien. If I may. It would help to have some U.S. 
assertion of jurisdiction. If we were using our sanctions 
authority then you would be able to maybe apply some material 
support, criminal investigative capacity to this, and not get 
into arguments with--I used to be a Law of the Sea lawyer, 
briefly, at the State Department, and it gave me a headache. 
But I think you could avoid this not by just calling out others 
but by asserting U.S. jurisdiction.
 We have something in common. The Law of the Sea treaty has 
given me many, many, many headaches.
 [Laughter.]
 The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
 Senator Shaheen. Well, yes, I was just going to try and 
followup on that a little bit, because if Taiwan was able to do 
that, was it under existing law that Taiwan has, and why do we 
think--I guess this is for both of you--why do we think that 
that would be an issue in Europe?
 Mr. Schmitt. So yes, Senator Shaheen, it was Article 4 of 
the Taiwanese Criminal Code that says that basically wherever 
these crimes happen, if they impact Taiwanese citizens or the 
government they have jurisdiction.
 Senator Shaheen. And do either of you have any insights 
into why this would not apply to Finland or to other European 
countries?
 Mr. O'Brien. I think I would be happy to do a little 
research and find it. The key is we are seeing this now in the 
Straits of Hormuz. There are a lot of these waterways that were 
sources of warfare for a long time, so the European states 
reached agreement to say the Straits off Copenhagen, the 
international waterways through these narrow areas, like the 
Baltic Sea, nobody is going to put their hands on them. And 
that sort of hands-off thing has been a basis of peace in the 
region. But it is fraying, and they need to take a look at it, 
but the exact sort of rule that they should adopt, I don't have 
a quick recommendation.
 Senator Shaheen. So you were talking about sanctions and 
the idea that we should be thinking about sanctioning more 
vessels, which I totally agree with. Senator Risch and I have a 
shadow fleet bill that would virtually sanction the shadow 
fleet, wherever it exists.
 But one of the things that I am concerned about right now 
is the decision by this administration to lift the sanctions on 
Russia's shadow fleet, basically, so that they can continue to 
gain revenue from oil in the war in Iran. So can you talk about 
what that may mean for Russia and their ability to continue to 
operate, both in Ukraine and with respect to other nefarious 
activities that they are engaged in?
 Mr. O'Brien. Yes, it is a windfall for Russia in a couple 
of ways, and then I will talk about the rationale for what the 
administration did. It is a windfall, just factually. Russia, 
in the first few weeks it was making $150 million a day in tax 
revenue off the extra sales, off the general license. Oil 
prices have gone up since then. We have extended the general 
license so more ships have loaded and are heading to sea, so 
they will be selling at whatever the price is when they land.
 So it is going to produce, I don't know, multiple billions 
of dollars by the time we work our way through this, assuming 
that the Iran conflict ends soon.
 Russia spends between $150 and $200 billion a year on the 
war in Ukraine, and if they make, say, $40 billion, $50 billion 
as a result of this, that goes right to the bottom line. That 
is not a good thing.
 There is a long-term benefit to Russia. They have had some 
difficulty locking in long-term supply arrangements with China 
because the Chinese do not really want to be tied down. But now 
with difficulties in the Straits of Hormuz and the difficulties 
elsewhere, there is a possibility that Russia and China will 
tie up with a great infrastructure, including a gas pipeline 
and an oil pipeline. That will mean U.S. sanctions will be even 
less effective next time we want to use them. So both of those 
things are a real cost.
 Now, the administration was doing it to alleviate the 
concerns of specific partners about a rapid increase in oil 
prices. I think the cost-benefit analysis is difficult to make. 
For the oil that was already at sea at the time the Straits 
were closed, I think you could see something. But then allowing 
the ships to reload and emerge again is a real problem.
 And this gets to the nature of the shadow fleet. It is 
outside our normal tools for stopping shipping. Because of the 
initial sanctions, and the 600 ships that the EU and U.K. have 
designated, more than half of the Russian shadow fleet really 
was not operating. But now with a general license from the 
United States, more of those ships can set, so the numbers I 
gave earlier are going to underestimate the benefit that they 
are going to get.
 There were ways to provide relief to the global oil market 
that would have involved just allowing Russia to load up and 
sell, and I think there is a real cost that ought to be 
examined.
 Senator Shaheen. Well, I could not agree more, and I think 
that cost also goes to benefit Iran. Because if we look at the 
drones that Iran is using in this war and the number of those 
drones that they are still getting from Russia, and Russia's 
ability to produce those drones, they are getting a huge 
benefit that we are basically providing to a country that is 
targeting not just our servicemembers in the Middle East, with 
intelligence information, but our allies in the Middle East. I 
mean, it makes absolutely no sense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Senator Ricketts.
 Senator Ricketts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Schmitt, you 
have been tracking the disturbing pattern in the Baltic. 
Russian research vessels and tankers coincidentally stop over 
critical infrastructure right as it fails. The Indo-Pacific has 
this problem, only it is magnified. You are not just seeing the 
actions of a few rogue ships, but you have got the Chinese 
Maritime Militia, which as a fleet of thousands of civilian 
fishing vessels, which are just CCP proxies. These dual-use 
vessels provide Beijing with a perfect screen for their ICAD 
activities--illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive 
operations that target these subsea cables and threaten the 
digital life blood of the regional countries like Taiwan, which 
we have already talked about, but also Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Singapore.
 And you also talked about the core problem being 
attribution. When a fishing boat snags a cable, Beijing calls 
it an accident.
 Given the difficulty in attribution, how can the U.S. and 
our partners move from this posture of reactive concern to one 
of rapid attribution?
 Mr. Schmitt. Well, that is a big focus of our Underwater 
Mayhem project, Senator Ricketts. And I will just give a few 
examples, maybe of a couple of the case studies that we have 
done.
 No. 1, you mentioned fishing vessels that just kind of snag 
a cable. The cable in the case of the Svalbard cable cut was 
the Russian fishing vessel, the ``MELKART-5''. And we saw in 
AIS that it traced its line and basically dragged its fishing 
equipment 126-some-odd times, maybe a few more, a few less, but 
126-some-odd times, for one of the two cables. Unless there is 
incredibly good fishing in that very specific spot, in the 
middle of the Barents Sea, that is a sabotage operation.
 In terms of Nord Stream, we know that there were Russian 
seabed warfare vessels over the Nord Stream 1 blast site 3 days 
before the blast, 3 months before the blast, and in addition to 
that, the Nord Stream 2 blast site, south of Bornholm, had 
Russian construction vessels where there were Russian vessels 
sitting directly at the eventual blast site for almost 18 
months ahead of that.
 You also had a situation in which one of the so-called pro-
Ukrainian sailboat operatives, the person that actually helped 
rent this so-called sailboat, was a person that had a passport 
that showed that they lived in Kerch and that they were posting 
live tweets and social media messages from the Russian 
Federation after the incident took place. And what's more, this 
sailboat went from a marina that was physically adjacent to a 
Nord Stream 2 logistics center.
 All of these together, again, need to be taken into account 
and use a data-driven approach to looking at each of these 
cases. That is why we thought it was probable in our study that 
the Russians were behind the Nord Stream case.
 The last thing I will say is on all of these incidents, 
whether it be in China or in Russia, these two countries may or 
may not be officially cooperating in this case, but they 
definitely are learning from each other. And there a few cases, 
including the Balticconnector pipeline that was broken in 2023, 
in which a Chinese-flagged cargo ship, the ``NEWNEW POLAR 
BEAR'', was being escorted a few meters away by the Russian 
nuclear-class icebreaker, ``SEVMORPUT''.
 We have also seen these same vessels show up inside of the 
Antarctic Treaty System as Russia breaks that treaty, looking 
for oil and gas, and they are stopping above cables as they go 
up and down.
 So this is a global phenomenon, both for China and for 
Russia, and we need to do more to basically have a little more 
political courage to call out and call a spade a spade as 
quickly as possible.
 Senator Ricketts. So are there technical or regulatory 
things we need to change, or is it more just a matter of us 
trying to determine the attribution quickly and then just 
calling them out?
 Mr. Schmitt. I think the biggest thing that we can do is 
increase our level of satellite geospatial imagery from 
commercial actors because the time that it takes to declassify 
military and intelligence satellite data is simply too long. 
And even though we eventually may get there, if you have 
commercial data, that can be--I mean, it is never classified, 
so it is ready to go right away, and investigators can use 
this.
 I saw a case in which the OFAC, the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, of the Treasury Department was able to 
basically quickly sanction Russian vessels that off-took LNG 
from a facility near Murmansk that was under sanctions because 
that was out in the press because there was commercial 
satellite data. So supporting these and supporting the sort of 
regulatory oversight and NATO operations that it needs to take, 
in Europe's case, to get attribution.
 Senator Ricketts. So would you say that Russia and China 
are relatively less dependent on undersea cables than our 
allies and the United States? Is this an asymmetric advantage 
they have?
 Mr. Schmitt. No. There is no asymmetric advantage that I am 
aware of. Ninety-nine percent of the global internet runs 
through those cables, and it impacts Russia and China just as 
it does with us.
 Senator Ricketts. So if somebody was cutting the cables to 
Russia and China that would also potentially impact them, as 
well.
 Mr. Schmitt. Absolutely.
 Senator Ricketts. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
see my time is up.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Let's go back for a minute to that 
jurisdictional question. It seems to me, my impression is we do 
not have a statute that is directly in point as far as a 
causation statute that gives us jurisdiction. Am I right on 
that? I suppose some U.S. attorney would have to stick his nose 
in the books and maybe find some way to do that. It would be 
easier if we had a direct statute that prohibited this kind of 
conduct, because again, you get in front of a judge and they 
get goosey too, on stuff that is not direct. Do you have----
 Mr. O'Brien. I do not know about a direct criminal statute. 
I do know that if we use a sanctions authority, that then that 
does provide for criminal investigations subsequent to that. 
And that is why I think both using the authorities we currently 
have, which tend to be Russia-based as they apply here, but the 
new authorities you are proposing would help address some of 
this gap.
 The Chairman. I guess criminal investigation is a long ways 
away from a criminal prosecution. It seems to me we probably 
need a direct statute here, that would make it a lot easier. If 
nothing else, it would allow an indictment, even if you could 
not get your hands on the person and underscore it, that this 
was going on.
 Mr. O'Brien. If I may, just as a policymaker, what I would 
hate to see is these cases disappearing into a legal process 
that takes years and years.
 The Chairman. And I agree with that. I agree 100 percent, 
that disappearing is a problem. As long as that warrant is 
standing out there, it is not going to disappear.
 Mr. Schmitt. I just want to point out that I totally agree 
on the sanctions point. The U.N. Law of the Sea can only go so 
far. We saw, in the case of a Russian shadow fleet vessel, the 
``KIWALA'', it was interdicted and brought into Muuga Bay, 
Estonia. I actually went and saw this vessel as it was being 
interdicted, I believe it was in April 2025.
 They could not keep that vessel there, even though it was 
under EU sanctions, because of the authorities that they had. 
And guess what? Just 6 months later or so, in September, that 
same vessel, that had been reflagged and renamed the 
``BORACAY'' or the ``PUSHPA'' or a number of these other names, 
was the one that was suspected of launching drones, military 
drones, from the Russian Federation that, as it was passing 
Denmark, shut down the Copenhagen Airport. And I flew from the 
Warsaw Security Forum directly to Copenhagen to work with 
investigative journalists to look at the satellite data, and we 
found that vessel.
 So ultimately the French Navy was able to interdict that 
vessel, and during the proceedings that have taken place 
legally, they have admitted that there are Russian security 
personnel, unaccountable to the captain or the crew, that are 
on those vessels. So that is something we need to really, 
really be concerned about.
 The Chairman. Thank you.
 Senator Shaheen.
 Senator Shaheen. Well, that is a really frightening point.
 Mr. Schmitt. Sorry.
 Senator Shaheen. And as we think about how do we do that, 
obviously sanctions are one option that we have. But what else 
should we be thinking about? I was in Copenhagen and I met with 
the person in their government who is working on this issue, 
their head of infrastructure. And one of the things that she 
said to me, I was asking her about this whole issue of how are 
you all dealing with this, because this is more of an issue for 
you than it is for us, and she said, ``Well, the EU is working 
on the idea of having ships that can do the repairs in a timely 
manner.''
 Because the options, as I understand, are the CODEL that 
went to the Indo-Pacific met with a Japanese company that does 
subsea cables, and we were talking to them about how do you 
deal with cable breaks. And they said, ``Well, we track those, 
but we don't repair them. That has to be done by whoever owns 
the cables.'' And in order to do that they said there are 
basically two options. One is you need a bunch of ships that 
can do the repairs, and you need to have duplicate cables so 
that if one goes out you have got another one that can replace 
it.
 But it seems to me, based on your testimony and sort of the 
conversations that I have had, that that is not the answer to 
the problem. The answer to the problem is to figure out how we 
can put in place ways to go after the vessels and the countries 
that are trying to disrupt these subsea cables. And clearly, to 
date, the U.S. Government has not been willing to sanction the 
vessels that we seem to be aware of, and, in fact, as we 
discussed earlier, Mr. O'Brien, we are actually giving a 
windfall to Russia so they can do more of this in the future.
 So what should we be thinking about, if we are really going 
to address this? Dr. Schmitt, is the data that you have made 
public?
 Mr. Schmitt. Yes, Senator, it is. We have a first volume in 
Underwater Mayhem Volume 1, that is already out. We will have, 
in the next few months--and it is like don't ask when a Ph.D. 
dissertation is going to be submitted--but we will say in a few 
months Volume 2 is coming out, as well.
 There are two points I want to make, Senator. First of all, 
in the case of repair vessels, there has to be more redundancy. 
There has to be more put on the water. Two years ago, when I 
was in Taipei, the interlocuters that I talked to asked me 
specifically, ``Should we have a domestic repair capability in 
Taiwan?'' and I said yes. Two years later, just a few weeks 
ago, they asked me the same question. I said, ``Absolutely 
yes.''
 The Matsu Island cables that were cut, these islands of 
Taiwan that are near the PRC coastline, those had an internet 
outage of weeks and weeks, which could have been much shorter 
if they were not waiting for consortia vessels to come in. And 
I told them, in a case of a quarantine or an invasion of 
Taiwan, it is going to be very difficult. We saw this in the 
Straits of Hormuz situation with commercial vessels. They will 
not take that risk. Maybe governments will, but they will not 
take that risk in a time of war.
 So that is No. 1. We need, obviously, as you said, 
consistent sanctions policy, having sanctions, your shadow 
fleet bill, that you and Senator Risch. We had Senator 
Whitehouse at the University of Pennsylvania a few weeks ago, 
that I hosted, talking about this. Those are essential. That 
will deprive the Putin regime of these oil windfalls. And we 
need consistent sanctions policy, whether it be no waivers in 
the previous administration for Nord Stream 2, and no waivers 
for Russian oil today. It has got to be consistent to keep the 
Putin regime in check.
 Senator Shaheen. I agree, and I am sure, Mr. O'Brien, you 
are going to add to this. But not only would it have an impact 
on Putin but it would have an impact on Xi in China, and what 
they are doing, because obviously, they are benefiting from the 
oil that is being delivered by the shadow fleet, below market 
prices. Yes, go ahead.
 Mr. O'Brien. Yes, I think two things: One is the 
information that is available now, I think, increases the 
responsibility of U.S. policymakers. If I had had access to the 
kind of information Dr. Schmitt is providing, we would have 
designated everybody he just listed in the Svalbard incident.
 So that and the fact that it is public makes it easier to 
bring other countries on board. And that is the main point. We 
need the U.S. to organize a very active coalition. So I focused 
on sanctions, but I think it also means some physical presence 
at sea. The straits off Copenhagen are a particular point of 
concern, and there are examples of the U.S. doing this, based 
on the kind of authorities we already have, as long ago as the 
W. Bush administration. They organized a really effective 
voluntary coalition to address North Korea's activities. And I 
think that kind of thing is available in this area if we put 
our effort in.
 Senator Shaheen. Well, I could not agree more, and thank 
you both. I am actually headed down to an Armed Services 
hearing where I will raise the same question. So thank you 
both.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
 Senator Barrasso.
 Senator Barrasso. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very 
much for your attention to this very critical matter. We are 
seeing undersea infrastructure is central to the functioning of 
our economies, our militaries, our alliances all around the 
world.
 There is a very interesting book called ``The Web Beneath 
the Waves,'' that outlines all of the damage that has been 
done. And you look at some of the undersea cables, in terms of 
where they are, we intentionally wanted to map them when they 
were laid so there would not be accidental injury to that 
method. So people know where they are, but it does seem that 
there is ongoing sabotage.
 We discussed the situation of where cables are cut. I want 
to know if there are backups that exist within the networks to 
ensure communications can continue if cables are cut.
 Mr. Schmitt. Senator Barrasso, thank you. That is an 
incredibly important point. I will just say, No. 1, just to 
remind everyone, since this is for the record, there is no 
satellite-based panacea for all of the global internet that is 
going beneath the sea. I think everyone hears of Starlink and 
says, ``Oh, if the cable is cut I will just use that.'' Well, 
in the case of Taiwan they have built 700-some-odd satellite 
uplink stations as backups. That is not for all of society. 
That is for government, emergency use. They have microwave 
links from their outlying islands of Penghu and Matsu to the 
main island of Taiwan. So that is important.
 I think, Senator Barrasso, what you raised is, yes, there 
are maps. That is on purpose, so these actors do not cut it. We 
need to make sure that some of these cables in the future are 
buried, deliberately buried below the seabed, to make sure the 
anchor drags can be mitigated, to some extent. These are the 
sorts of technical measures and monitoring. Of course, we need 
subsea drones and underwater unmanned vehicles, as well.
 Senator Barrasso. Which leads to my next question. What is 
accidental and what is not? And I do not know. Do you have an 
assessment yet of how much of these so-called accidental 
patterns are truly accidental and what is deliberate gray zone 
testing?
 Mr. Schmitt. I will give you a preview of Underwater Mayhem 
Volume 2, which is coming soon, just to let you know. We will 
look and have talked to ship captains, technical experts, 
subsea divers, all sorts of the technical people that actually 
work in this industry, not just think tank experts. And what we 
have found is that there is no chance, in a lot of these cases, 
that these are, quote/unquote, ``just accidents.''
 Dragging an anchor for one nautical mile because you lost 
steerage, that is possible. Dragging it at full speed through 
the Gulf of Finland for 200 nautical miles, severing cables and 
pipelines along the way, that is not normal action, and that is 
not what we should be accepting.
 I will say one last thing. We are conflating the issue of 
the shadow fleet with some of these vessels, and people are 
saying, ``Oh, well, the shadow fleet is really in low grade of 
repair. They have bad captains. Of course, they are 
accidentally cutting these.'' The truth is only one or two have 
been cut by shadow fleet vessels. Most of these are vessels 
that are in good repair.
 Senator Barrasso. So I think of our two newest NATO allies, 
Sweden and Finland. What is happening in that area? Have there 
been discussions about NATO members possibly coming together 
and invoking Article 4 to force a formal consultation on these 
emerging shadow of war, if you will? What are your thoughts on 
this in terms of the Article 4?
 Mr. Schmitt. I have briefed the North Atlantic Council's 
energy security version. They do this once a year. And I called 
on member states to invoke Article 4. My understanding is that 
one or two member states have pushed back on this.
 Look, Senator, we have seen Article 4 used this year when 
drones flew from the Russian Federation into Polish airspace. 
We have seen it in Estonia last year, when Russian fighter jets 
went into their airspace. Why haven't we seen it for subsea 
cables? And I think part of the reason is this is something 
that some political actors in Europe and possibly in the United 
States do not want to, quote/unquote, ``escalate.'' So we need 
to say, look, we need to raise this to the political level, 
because what that does, it also unlocks operational support to 
build out things like Operation Baltic Sentry, which has, I 
think, been quite successful to deter some of these actions.
 Senator Barrasso. You know, a couple of years ago the 
United States established a cable security fleet to subsidize 
some commercial cable repair ships, to help address the risk. 
In your opinion, are the current capabilities for repair 
sufficient for the level of sabotage that we are seeing?
 Mr. Schmitt. No. Absolutely not. We have very limited 
capabilities in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan does not have a 
domestic capability. They have a domestic deployment capability 
but not repair capability. And in a time of war, that is 
insufficient.
 And we also see that there are consortia of cable repair 
vessels in Europe, but not enough. You need more redundancy of 
the cables, more redundancy of the repair capabilities, and 
that can start to make bad actors think, well, maybe it is not 
so useful to do this, because, guess what, we are not going to 
get away with it.
 Senator Barrasso. Are there important steps we ought to be 
taking now to reduce the leverage that Russia is gaining from 
these attacks?
 Mr. Schmitt. Yes. I think that we need to be absolutely 
increasing sanctions, especially through the shadow fleet bill 
that has come up through this committee, and make sure that we 
are holding the Putin regime to account for these sorts of 
activities. And also name and shame. I know that is not the 
biggest and flashiest thing, but that is important, sanctioning 
all of the shadow fleet vessels.
 I know that the Subsea Act that has been passed out of this 
committee also says that the U.S. intelligence community and 
the State Department need to send a list, publicly, and list 
out all of the GUGI vessels, this subsea mission directorate 
that does these sorts of heinous acts. They need to list those 
publicly so that we do not just say, oh, it is probably a 
shadow fleet vessel or it is probably an intelligence vessel. 
This is a vessel specifically built by Russia to inflict pain 
on global democracies, and we need to know this early and often 
so that then states can take action to bar them from their 
ports or issue sanctions and other things like this.
 Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 The Chairman. Thank you.
 Senator Curtis.
 Senator Curtis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
witnesses. This committee recently passed a bill that I have 
with Senator Rosen, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure 
Resiliency Act. The bill contains an initiative to harden and 
monitor Taiwan's undersea cables and proposes new sanctions.
 I am going to jump into a few questions, but I want to pick 
up where my colleague left off. I was in Taiwan with the 
ranking member just a couple of weeks ago. We visited one of 
the factories that actually produces the cable. We were all 
very curious about what they were doing to prevent breaks, 
whether it is undersea monitoring or cameras. And what we found 
is zero motivation because they produce cables. Their answer 
was to just lay more cables.
 And I am curious what your experience is. Do we have a 
motivation problem here, and it just feels like there was very 
little effort to put in equipment that could monitor and see a 
problem coming before it got there. What is your experience?
 Mr. Schmitt. Well, look. I actually visited the Walsin 
Lihwa factory in Kaohsiung. I didn't go in because the back 
half of the building is still under construction. But that is 
for electricity cables, so this is an energy security question 
for Taiwan, as well, as these cables connect to their offshore 
wind and can interconnect to their outlying islands.
 One of the things, and this is more from a physics 
standpoint, if you put a fiber optic cable on the seabed you 
can start to monitor the vibroacoustic environment, the 
vibrations of subsea vessels, sea surface vessels, and things 
like this around it.
 So this is actually what happened in the case of the 
Chungwa Telecom line, when last year the ``HONG TAI 58'', this 
vessel from China, cut the cable. The Taiwanese Coast Guard was 
alerted by Chungwa Telecom right before that cable cut took 
place, because they knew this vessel was sitting there. And 
then they acted just a few hours later when they got their kind 
of armada together, to seize this vessel.
 And what they found, this was an empty Chinese vessel that 
was a bulk carrier that had no bulk on it. Its cargo doors were 
actually rusted shut, so that it could not be used for that. So 
it was only used as a sabotage vessel, and the prosecutor that 
I talked to likened it to a pawn sacrifice from the PRC. In 
other words, Xi is sending out a vessel that he does not care 
if he loses. I wanted to see that vessel, but it has already 
been deconstructed and scrapped. So I asked for a piece of it, 
and I do not know if I am going to be able to get one.
 Senator Curtis. It would be a good paperweight.
 I know I am late to this hearing, and if you have already 
discussed this please indulge me. But give me a sense of if 
there is major disruption to Taiwan with multiple cables, the 
impact militarily and economically that potentially could 
happen.
 Mr. Schmitt. So there is often a discussion of, OK, Taiwan 
does have redundancies. There is something like 14 cables 
connecting out to the global internet. There are also cables to 
the Penghu Islands, Matsu Islands, and Kinmen, and others like 
this.
 I have often been asked, ``We have this redundancy, so 
China couldn't possibly cut all 14 cables.'' I said, ``You've 
got another thing coming, because guess what? If they can cut 
one or two cables by dragging an anchor pretty easily, in an 
all-out military assault or invasion, or even a blockade or a 
quarantine, those can be cut pretty quickly.''
 What that will have is an immediate impact on the global 
economy. It is kind of like the Straits of Hormuz closure by 
the IRGC for the internet. And it means that all of our 
economic trade with Taiwan, which is significant, will be 
cutoff, not just for us but for our partners and allies. And I 
will tell you, it will make military coordination more 
difficult. It will not stop it, because there is satellite 
backup, but it is something that we really need to think of.
 And I have talked with folks in Taiwan that are in the 
military. I think that it needs to be part of the military's 
doctrine in Taiwan that rapid cable repair, under fire, is 
important, as well, to deter this.
 Senator Curtis. Yes. So another question. We have learned a 
lot from Taiwan, what is happening there. What lessons can be 
applied to the Baltic, and what should we be doing in the 
Baltic that we have learned from the Indo-Pacific?
 Mr. Schmitt. Sure, yes. I think that one of the biggest 
things is, again, repair capabilities. We need more repair 
capabilities in Europe. We need a legal system that allows for 
attribution and jurisdictional questions, we have mentioned 
already in this hearing. And again, just like in Taiwan, where 
they are aware of this, we need European democracies to be 
ready to act, and have that capability through NATO to do so.
 Senator Curtis. Mr. O'Brien.
 Mr. O'Brien. I will just add, Senator, and thank you for 
your bill, the motivation problem, I think, is with the U.S. 
Government. All of the undersea infrastructure, separate 
companies, others, they are all doing their work. It is 
unrealistic to expect them to monitor the activities of a 
predatory superpower.
 The same thing with middle powers. They do not have the 
ability to stand up. So this is for the U.S. Government to say 
the future of our economy depends on this infrastructure. We 
have to make sure that we have enough of it, and that we can 
repair it, but that we can protect it. And that involves both a 
more robust sanctions program, I think more physical presence, 
and coordinating with others who are affected so that they are 
able to operate effectively.
 Senator Curtis. It feels to me like the technology is not 
that difficult. It is the will, right, to put it in. And along 
these lines, and let me defer to you, you mentioned the one 
incident in Taiwan where they were able to find the actor. How 
prepared are we to find the bad actors, just generally 
speaking?
 Mr. Schmitt. I mean, we are prepared. I think the U.S. 
geospatial intelligence is strong. I think we need more 
commercial data to make sure that satellite data can be 
released quickly, so that these sorts of indictments can happen 
rapidly.
 But the other thing I want to point out, and I am going to 
bring it back to the Nord Stream case really briefly, and say 
we need to listen not only to policymakers--no offense--but 
technical experts like those that work in the industry----
 Senator Curtis. I am so offended.
 Mr. Schmitt [continuing]. People that build the cables, 
people that are captains of these ships, people that actually 
dive to the bottom of the seabed. We talked with many of these 
experts, and they said that the idea that using a rental 
sailboat to blow up Nord Stream is not technically impossible, 
but that it would never be used in this way. And they said it 
is an insufficient platform. It would have a large radar 
profile to begin with, because of the sail, obviously, and that 
you would use a drone, a cheap drone.
 And I will tell you what, there is a lot of media that have 
gone out there and put a drone in the seabed and looked at the 
damage site, and they have proven you can put a drone down 
there. You can put one down there with a camera. You can put it 
down there with explosives. I went out and actually got seabed 
sonar data at the Nord Stream 2 blast site, and you can just go 
out there.
 So again, listening to the experts in a way that is 
integrated not only into our policy but our media and 
discussions of these, because it takes so long for attribution 
that disinformation can be sowed. And obviously in the case of 
Nord Stream, Russia pointed the finger at the U.K., Poland, the 
United States, of course, and all these different directions to 
sow chaos right after this happened. Again, a disinformation 
campaign that seems kind of precooked to me.
 Senator Curtis. Yes.
 Mr. O'Brien. I will just add, we know much more today than 
even 2 and 3 years ago. The NATO efforts, the EU efforts 
provide information very quickly, and having the access to the 
work that Dr. Schmitt and others are doing in the public 
sphere, it increases the responsibility of policymakers to act 
quickly, because we can no longer say we do not know or we 
cannot share.
 Senator Curtis. Thank you both.
 Mr. Chairman, I yield.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Curtis.
 Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Incredibly 
interesting and important, and it has really spurred some 
ideas, I think, amongst the committee here, which Jeanne and I 
are already talking about.
 With that, I will leave the record open until close of 
business tomorrow for further submissions. Again, thank you so 
much for being here. And with that the committee is adjourned.

 [Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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