THE DEPARTMENT'S CYBER FORCE GENERATION PLAN AND THE ASSOCIATED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Senate Armed Services Committee Senate January 28, 2026

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[Senate Hearing 119-550]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-550

 THE DEPARTMENT'S CYBER FORCE GENERATION 
 PLAN AND THE ASSOCIATED IMPLEMENTATION 
 PLAN
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 CYBERSECURITY

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 JANUARY 28, 2026

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
65-604 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================

 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
 
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan 

 John P. Keast, Staff Director
 Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
_________________________________________________________________

 Subcommittee on Cybersecurity

 MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota, Chairman
 
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
TED BUDD, North Carolina GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan 

 (ii)

 C O N T E N T S

_________________________________________________________________

 january 28, 2026

 Page

The Department's Cyber Force Generation Plan and the Associated 1
 Implementation Plan.

 Members Statements

Statement of Senator Mike Rounds................................. 1

Statement of Senator Jacky Rosen................................. 2

 Witness Statements

Sutton, Hon. Katherine, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber 4
 Policy.

Hartman, Lieutenant General William, USA, Acting Commander, 12
 United States Cyber Command/Performing the Duties of Director, 
 National Security Agency/Acting Chief, Central Security 
 Service.

Messer, Brigadier General R. Ryan, USAF, Deputy Director for 21
 Global Operations, J3 Joint Staff.

Questions for the Record......................................... 36

 (iii)

 
 THE DEPARTMENT'S CYBER FORCE GENERATION PLAN AND THE ASSOCIATED 
 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

 ---------- 

 WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2026

 United States Senate,
 Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
 Committee on Armed Services,
 Washington, DC.
 The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mike 
Rounds (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
 Committee Members present: Senators Rounds, Ernst, Rosen, 
and Gillibrand.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS

 Senator Rounds. I call this hearing to order. Welcome to 
today's Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing on the Department's 
Cyber Force Generation Model, known more commonly as 2.0. The 
purpose of this hearing is to discuss how the DOD [Department 
of Defense] seeks to generate and sustain the advanced cyber 
workforce necessary to confront the full range of adversaries 
in the cyber domain scale.
 I have about a five-page opening statement that I am going 
to submit for the record, because I want you all to have an 
opportunity to share with us how you are going to respond to 
this.
 I think the most important part that we want to share is 
this particular approach is designed to provide us with cyber 
professionals to meet the workforce needs of literally a domain 
which is in huge demand right now, and has been the focus of 
anything having to do with military operations.
 Today, as our witnesses, we have Katherine Sutton, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense; Lieutenant General William J. Hartman, 
United States Army, Acting Commander, United States Cyber 
Command and Performing the Duties of Director, National 
Security Agency, and Acting Chief of Central Security Service; 
and Brigadier General R. Ryan Messer, U.S. Air Force, Deputy 
Director for Global Operations, J3 Joint Staff. Welcome to all 
of you. We look forward to hearing your thoughts, 
recommendations, and answer questions that we have of you.
 With that I will turn to our Ranking Member, Senator Rosen.
 [The prepared statement of Senator Mike Rounds follows:]

 Prepared Statement by Senator Mike Rounds
 open session
 Good afternoon, and welcome to today's Cybersecurity Subcommittee 
hearing on the Department of Defense Cyber Force Generation Model, 
known more commonly as CYBERCOM 2.0.
 I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing before 
the Cybersecurity Subcommittee today. Your testimony comes at a pivotal 
moment as we examine the transformation necessary to guarantee our 
cyber forces can meet the demands of an increasingly competitive and 
hostile cyber domain.
 The threat landscape we face continues to grow in sophistication 
and scale. The People's Republic of China demonstrates aggressive cyber 
capabilities against our critical infrastructure and networks. We have 
witnessed advanced artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities being 
weaponized, including the use of Large Language Models like Anthropic's 
Claude to generate cyber threats through autonomous agents, as we 
discussed in our latest quarterly operations briefing. These represent 
the evolving reality of modern cyber warfare. In the face of these 
ever-growing threats, the status quo is not an acceptable option.
 We recognize the strides being made, even as significant work 
remains. Our cyber operators defend our Nation every day, typically 
working in the shadows without recognition or fanfare. Recently, 
however, the world learned what these skilled professionals can achieve 
when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly highlighted 
operations in Venezuela, showcasing the true potential that cyber 
operations provide to the joint force. These operations demonstrate 
what becomes possible when cyber capabilities are effectively 
integrated into joint operations and executed with precision and scale.
 The question before us now is how to make sure we have a force 
capable of conducting these operations at any time, at any place, and 
at scale--not as exquisite, boutique operations, but as routine 
capabilities.
 Congress has worked diligently with the Department and the services 
to provide needed authorities to advance our cyber forces. We have seen 
notable readiness improvements, but critical gaps remain. The 
Department promised a bold transformation under CYBERCOM 2.0. We are 
here to better understand its goals and implementation plan in order to 
determine not only what resources are needed to make it successful, but 
also if this transformational initiative goes far enough.
 Upon review, CYBERCOM 2.0 addresses some necessary priorities--
enhancing operator skill levels, implementing career field management 
reforms to develop technical expertise and leadership, and recognizing 
the critical role of our civilian workforce. While these are important 
steps, identifying gaps is not the same as closing them. The Department 
must now move from planning to execution, and that requires commitment 
to adequate resourcing--both in funding and manpower, particularly in 
organizations such as the offices of Principal Cyber Advisors that are 
essential to this transformation.
 We are eager to hear specifics of the plan, particularly given the 
$1.25 billion Congress allocated through reconciliation for offensive 
cyber operations and artificial intelligence capabilities. We look 
forward to understanding how the Department and the Command intend to 
realize these objectives through enhanced engagement with the services 
and their unique budget authority. We are particularly interested in 
how the generation of a more capable Cyber Mission Force will provide 
the foundation for follow-on assessments of how cyber forces are 
organized and presented to combatant commanders, as well as how those 
forces then conduct operations through improved force employment 
models. Ultimately, we must make sure operations like Venezuela become 
the norm rather than the exception.
 The American people deserve a cyber force that operates with the 
speed, agility, and effectiveness necessary to defend our Nation and 
support military operations worldwide. This subcommittee stands ready 
to support the bold transformation necessary to meet this moment.
 I'll now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Rosen, for opening 
remarks.

 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACKY ROSEN

 Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Rounds. I have a very 
short opening remark, so I am going to read those in and then 
we will get right to it.
 This hearing is so important, and I appreciate the way that 
the Chairman and I worked together, hearing from all of you 
about the Department of Defense, your Cyber Force Generation 
Plan, the associated implementation plan, United States Cyber 
Command (CYBERCOM) 2.0, and for the witnesses here, thank you 
for your service and your commitment, because now more than 
ever the United States needs a cyber workforce equipped with 
the acumen and expertise to defend our networks, to executive 
offensive operations in a rapidly--is not a fast enough word to 
even describe it--a rapidly changing battle space that achieves 
our national security objectives.
 I would point out, however, that the new National Defense 
Strategy (NDS), publicly released on Friday, only mentions 
cyber in three places. Cyber is everywhere. I am surprised at 
how little emphasis has been placed on cyber in comparison to 
other capabilities in the NDS. It does not engender much 
confidence that cyber is being treated with the necessary 
urgency or priority by this Administration that I think we 
would all agree that we need.
 The Department of Defense must take swift action to develop 
programs that enable our cyber warfighters to increase cyber 
domain mastery and operational readiness. It is critical. We 
have to promote standardized training across all of our 
services. We need a sustainable talent pipeline--I know you are 
going to talk about that--and we need effective initiatives for 
retention.
 Because in an era of persistent cyber threats from foreign 
adversaries like China and Russia and Iran, they are probing 
and testing and challenging our systems, I would say by the 
nanosecond. Not even enough to say daily. Every single second. 
They are seeking any opportunity they can to degrade our 
command control, disrupt our operations, steal our most 
sensitive information, and they are using sophisticated cyber 
tactics to disrupt military operations, spreading dangerous 
propaganda to American citizens, and denying access to 
lifesaving goods.
 Advancement in artificial intelligence (AI) by our 
adversaries, of course, they heighten the sense of urgency we 
must all feel right now, we must have to protect against AI-
orchestrated campaigns aimed at targeting, well, targeting us, 
our critical infrastructure, our supply chains. We cannot 
defend against these disturbing yet real threats without cyber 
professionals every step along the way, armed with the 
requisite skills and abilities to bolster the cyber enterprise.
 So for too long the approach to manning, training, and 
equipping our cyber forces, we have just lagged behind, and we 
need to really step that up, in my opinion. The Department of 
Defense, we know we struggle, continue to struggle with 
recruitment, retaining cyber talent, particularly against such 
a competitive private sector. This issue undermines our 
readiness across all domains, and it is a priority of this 
Subcommittee, and the Committee at large, to help the 
Department do everything that we can to fix it, because we 
cannot fight today's digital wars with the outdated 
infrastructure, with our inflexible personnel structures. We 
need a skilled, professional cybersecurity force. It is not a 
luxury; it is a foundational requirement for all of us.
 I am committed to work together in a bipartisan way, on 
this Committee, on the full Committee, with all of you, to be 
sure that we have the cyber force of the future that we need 
and will continue to need, going forward.
 Thank you again for your work and for being here. Mr. 
Chairman, thank you.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, Vice Chair Rosen. Let me just 
begin with Secretary Sutton. We welcome you back. She has been 
on this side for quite a while, and we all know you and 
appreciate what you do, and appreciate what you have already 
done in terms of providing for a lot of the language. But right 
now you operate under the National Defense Authorization Act 
that were implemented when you served on this side. So we 
appreciate having you back. We welcome you back, and we look 
forward to your opening comments.

 STATEMENT OF HON. KATHERINE SUTTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR CYBER POLICY

 Secretary Sutton. Thank you. Chairman Rounds, Ranking 
Member Rosen, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is 
an honor to appear before you today. As you mentioned, it is 
really quite the privilege to be on this side of the table, 
representing the Department and all of the efforts that we are 
working forward to tackle those challenges that Senator Rosen 
highlighted in her opening remarks.
 I am grateful for the opportunity today, in particular to 
discuss the Department of War's comprehensive efforts to 
organize, train, and equip our cyber forces to meet the complex 
changes the Nation faces in the 21st century.
 The subject of today's hearing, Cyber Command 2.0, 
represents what the Secretary of War, Secretary Hegseth, 
mentioned at the Reagan Defense Forum the most significant 
transformation of U.S. Cyber Command since its inception 15 
years ago. This initiative is the cornerstone of our effort to 
ensure American dominance in a rapidly evolving cyberspace 
domain, meeting the President's clear mission to the Department 
of War, achieving peace through strength.
 Cyber Command 2.0 is only one of the key initiatives we are 
to working to maximize our cyber forces. We are also working to 
validate, and if necessary, update our force design and force 
employment to ensure we are able to achieve the maximum 
outcomes.
 For many years, the Department has recognized that our 
approach to building and sustaining cyber talent was not 
keeping pace. Our adversaries are investing heavily in cyber, 
while we have been constrained by traditional force generation 
models which, while effective for conventional forces, failed 
to fully address the unique requirements of cyberspace 
operations. This has created significant challenges in 
recruiting the right people, retaining our best operators, and 
providing the agile specialized training needed to win.
 Our legacy force generation model is inconsistent, 
hindering our ability to adapt at speed and scale to counter 
threats like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, and quickly 
integrate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence.
 To address these systematic challenges head on, the 
Secretary of War approved Cyber Command 2.0, a fundamental 
reimagining of how we build and manage our cyber forces. At its 
core, Cyber Command 2.0 is founded on three essential, 
fundamental pillars.
 The first of those is domain mastery. We are shifting from 
a compliance-based paradigm to one that fosters deep, career-
long expertise. Our goal is to cultivate a cadre of cyber 
personnel who achieve true mastery through enduring operational 
experience rather than rotating through cyber assignments as 
generalists.
 Second is specialization. The cyber domain is not one size 
fits all. Cyber Command 2.0 establishes dedicated pathways for 
our personnel to become deep experts in fields like industrial 
control systems or space asset protection, resulting in 
specialized units aligned to our most critical missions.
 Third is agility. The cyber threat landscape evolves with 
unparalleled speed. We require a force that can adapt and 
employ new technology just as quickly. This model allows for 
dynamic allocation of talent, ensuring we maintain a proactive 
posture against the most pressing threats.
 To bring these pillars to life we are implementing seven 
core attributes. The first is targeting recruiting and 
assessment. We are shifting from general recruiting to targeted 
talent acquisition, beginning with an in-service recruiting 
pilot using validated instruments like a Cyber Assessment 
Battery to identify individuals with inherent aptitude and 
suitability for cyber warfare.
 Second are incentives for recruiting and retention. To 
remain competitive, we must implement robust incentive pay and 
retention bonuses that reward mastery, and we will standardize 
this pay across the services.
 Third is tailored and agile training. Through our Advanced 
Cyber Training and Education center we will focus mission-
specific skills on demand, ensuring our forces remain ahead of 
technological advancements and adversarial tactics.
 Fourth, tailored assignment management. We are engineering 
career pathways that enable sustained operator engagement, 
allowing operators to build a comprehensive portfolio of 
tailored experience rather than being forced to move on after a 
single tour. This approach generates domain mastery within the 
Cyber Mission Force while also providing greater operational 
effectiveness when warfighters return to their services and 
apply their developed talent to service mission sets.
 Fifth is specialized mission sets. We are developing 
dedicated units of experts focused on highly specialized 
missions, such as protection of space assets or the defense of 
critical infrastructure, making them the world's leading 
authorities in their fields.
 Sixth is integrated headquarters and combat support. Our 
tactical cyber teams will be presented with dedicated 
headquarters and combat support, ensuring they have the 
leadership and resources needed to execute their missions 
without the distractions they have today.
 Last is optimized unit phasing. To prevent burnout and 
sustain readiness, we are instituting a unit phasing model that 
creates a sustainable operational tempo, keeping our personnel 
focused and effective for the long haul.
 While each one of these attributes offers merit, the true 
power lies in their synergy, creating an exponential effect on 
our ability to generate and sustain cyber talent across the 
entire talent management lifecycle. These efforts are driven by 
the creation of three enabler organizations within Cyber 
Command, that General Hartman will talk about in his speech.
 As directed by the Secretary of War, I will oversee the 
Cyber Command 2.0 implementation, consisting of 97 tasks across 
26 lines of effort. This revised force generation model 
empowers the commander of U.S. Cyber Command to directly 
influence how our forces are manned, trained, and equipped, to 
deliver immediate warfighting outcomes while preserving 
decision space on future organizational constructs. The core 
attributes of mastery, specialization, and agility are 
indispensable, regardless of any future structural changes.
 Cyber Command 2.0 represents the beginning of a necessary 
journey and the Department's commitment to providing our cyber 
warriors with the careers, talent, and support they deserve. In 
addition to Cyber Command 2.0, the Department is undertaking 
several initiatives to enhance our warfighting capabilities in 
the cyber domain. They include validating and updating our 
cyber force design and developing a force employment model that 
ensures maximum lethality and operational outcomes.
 Importantly, Cyber Command 2.0's purpose extends beyond the 
cyber domain. It is a critical Joint Force capability that must 
be integrated across all warfighting domains. This sends a 
clear message to our adversaries: the United States is all in 
on achieving and maintaining cyber superiority in support of 
our national interests.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look 
forward to continuing to work closely with this Subcommittee on 
this critical national security priority, and I welcome any 
questions that you have.
 [The prepared statement of Secretary Katherine E. Sutton 
follows:]

 Prepared Statement by The Honorable Katherine E. Sutton
 introduction
 Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen, and distinguished Members of 
the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today. I am 
grateful for the opportunity to discuss the Department of War's 
comprehensive efforts to organize, train, and equip our cyber forces to 
meet the complex challenges of the 21st-Century strategic landscape. 
The subject of today's hearing, CYBERCOM 2.0, represents the most 
significant transformation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) since its 
inception over 15 years ago and is a cornerstone of the Department of 
War's strategy to ensure American dominance in the cyberspace domain.
 the strategic imperative and the challenge we face
 For several years, the Department has recognized that our approach 
to building cyber talent has not been keeping pace with the rapidly 
evolving and increasingly contested cyberspace domain. Our adversaries 
are investing heavily in cyber capabilities and building forces 
designed to operate in this domain. Meanwhile, we have been constrained 
by traditional Military Service (Service) models which, while effective 
for conventional forces, fail to fully address the unique requirements 
of cyberspace operations.
 This misalignment has created significant challenges for the 
Department in recruiting the right people with the right aptitude and 
skillsets, retaining our most skilled and experienced operators in the 
face of lucrative private-sector opportunities, and providing the 
hyper-specialized, agile training needed to win against our Nation's 
adversaries. The result has been a force-generation model that hinders 
our agility to adapt to evolving threats, like Volt Typhoon and Salt 
Typhoon, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and 
cloud computing. To secure the Nation's interests, we must have a cyber 
force equipped to operate with precision, agility, and lethality. 
CYBERCOM 2.0 is the vehicle for achieving that vision.
 cybercom 2.0: a fundamental reimagining of force generation
 To address these systemic challenges, the Secretary of War approved 
CYBERCOM 2.0, a fundamental reimagining of how the Department builds 
and manages our cyber forces. This initiative is not merely an 
incremental adjustment, but a deliberate and comprehensive overhaul 
designed to deliver greater operational outcomes for the Joint Force. 
CYBERCOM 2.0 efficiently synchronizes Commander, USCYBERCOM's 
authorities, as provided in Title 10, U.S. Code, section 167b (10 
U.S.C. Sec. 167b), with the authorities and activities of the Military 
Departments. At its core, CYBERCOM 2.0 is founded on three fundamental 
principles that will drive the Department's cyber forces for years to 
come.

 1. Domain Mastery: The Department is fundamentally shifting away 
from the traditional military rotational assignments to one that 
fosters deep, career-long expertise. Our objective is to cultivate a 
cadre of cyber professionals who achieve true mastery in specific areas 
of cyberspace, rather than rotating through cyber assignments as 
generalists. This approach builds a cyber force better capable of 
addressing emerging threats, such as exploitation of industrial control 
systems in critical infrastructure or cyberattacks automated by 
artificial intelligence. CYBERCOM 2.0 enables increased influence by 
the Commander, USCYBERCOM, in the talent management of our cyber 
forces. Instead of cyber operators rotating out after a basic 
qualification, they will have a career path that allows for extended 
tours in the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), followed by an assignment with 
a Service cyber unit to broaden their experience and bring their deep 
expertise back to their Service formations. This model cultivates 
experts who possess a deep portfolio of experience in specific, 
mission-critical areas.

 2. Specialization: The cyber domain is incredibly diverse; as 
such, a traditional one-sizefits-all approach to force generation is 
ill-suited to deliver the operational outcomes required. CYBERCOM 2.0 
establishes dedicated pathways for our cyber forces to develop deep 
expertise in highly specialized fields such as cloud security 
architecture, industrial control systems, and artificial intelligence. 
This will result in the formation of dedicated units of specialized 
experts aligned to critical missions, such as a team with deep 
expertise in space asset protection or another focused on securing 
critical energy infrastructure.

 3. Agility: The threat landscape in cyberspace evolves with 
unparalleled speed. As such, the Department requires a force capable of 
rapid adaptation and dynamic allocation of talent to ensure we maintain 
a proactive posture against emergent threats. In practice, this means 
that if a new vulnerability is discovered in a widely used cloud 
architecture, a specialized team with expertise in that area can be 
rapidly assembled and deployed to mitigate the threat, rather than 
pulling personnel from unrelated, mission-essential tasks.
 the seven core attributes of cybercom 2.0
 To achieve the foundational principles, CYBERCOM 2.0 is built upon 
seven foundational force generation attributes. While each attribute 
offers individual merit, their true power lies in their synergy, which 
creates an exponential effect on our ability to generate and sustain 
talent.

 1. Targeted Recruiting and Assessments: We are shifting from 
general recruitment to targeted talent acquisition by leveraging 
USCYBERCOM's operational insights to enhance the Service recruiting 
enterprises. By employing advanced tools like a Cyber Assessment 
Battery, we can better identify individuals who possess the aptitude 
and problem-solving skills for cyber warfare, ensuring the right people 
are matched to the right work roles. Our pilot initiative will be an 
in-Service recruitment effort to target in-service talent (across 
career fields) outside the CMF. This targeted approach ensures the 
Department matches the cyber talent with mission requirements.

 2. Incentives for Recruitment and Retention: To remain competitive 
with the private sector, we are implementing a robust system of 
incentive pay and retention bonuses designed to reward mastery and 
specialization. For instance, a master-qualified Cyber Operator might 
earn a significant monthly bonus, similar to the compensation of 
Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, we will standardize incentive 
pay across all Services, ensuring that operators performing the same 
mission with the same skillset receive equitable compensation.

 3. Tailored and Agile Training: The Advanced Cyber Training and 
Education Center (ACTEC) serves as our platform for advanced and 
specialized training. It delivers mission-specific skills and knowledge 
on demand, ensuring our forces remain ahead of technological 
advancements and adversarial tactics. For instance, if a new 
adversarial tactic is identified, the ACTEC can rapidly develop and 
deliver a training module--pulled from in-house expertise, industry, or 
academia--to relevant cyber forces, ensuring they are prepared to 
counter the threat. The ACTEC ensures our teams aligned against the 
most consequential targets have the advanced training resources pulled 
from the most cutting-edge capabilities at the Department's disposal.

 4. Tailored Assignment Management: The Department is engineering 
career paths, informed by USCYBERCOM, that enable sustained operational 
engagement to build domain mastery and specialization into the force. 
This will allow a cyber operator to build a comprehensive portfolio of 
experience across multiple mission sets, such as completing an extended 
tour on a National Mission Team, followed by an assignment with a 
Service's tactical cyber unit. This approach forges unrivaled domain 
mastery rather than forcing our best talent to move on after a single 
tour.

 5. Specialized Mission Sets: We are developing dedicated units of 
experts focused on highly specialized missions, such as the protection 
of space assets or the defense of critical infrastructure. These teams 
will constitute the world's leading authorities in their respective 
fields. For example, within CYBERCOM 2.0, we can cultivate teams 
trained specifically to defend satellite communications and GPS 
systems, while other teams specialize in protecting power grids and 
transportation networks.

 6. Integrated Headquarters and Combat Support: Our tactical cyber 
teams will be provided with dedicated headquarters and combat support 
elements. This structure ensures they have the leadership, resources, 
intelligence support, and institutional backing necessary to focus on 
and execute their missions effectively, without being pulled away to 
perform administrative or other ancillary functions.

 7. Optimized Unit Phasing: To maintain high readiness and prevent 
operator burnout, we are instituting a unit phasing model that creates 
a sustainable operational tempo. CYBERCOM 2.0 will create a rotational 
cycle, in which a team member spends a rotation on a mission set 
followed by a dedicated period for training and recuperation. This 
keeps our personnel fresh and effective over the long term and ensures 
their operational experience is reinvested in the force.
 the three enabler organizations
 The CYBERCOM 2.0 attributes are driven and supported by three 
critical enabler organizations:

 Cyber Talent Management Organization (CTMO): CTMO Serves 
as the main integration point between USCYBERCOM and the Service talent 
management organizations to discover, assess, select, and retain elite 
cyber talent. By embedding liaison officers with all Service branches, 
the CTMO will coordinate recruitment strategies and leverage data to 
identify and fill critical mission gaps across the force.

 Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center (ACTEC): 
ACTEC acts as the central delivery point for advanced, mission-specific 
training. It rapidly identifies emerging requirements, maintains a 
centralized catalog of cutting-edge training from both internal and 
external partners in industry and academia, and ensures our forces have 
access to the right knowledge at the time and place needed. The ACTEC 
will lead USCYBERCOM's effort to drive training and education 
partnerships with industry and academia, and to deliver those 
capabilities at the required scale to the operational force.

 The Cyber Innovation Warfare Center (CIWC): CIWC designed 
to deliver end-to-end solutions to the Cyber Mission Force at the speed 
of need. The CIWC serves as the focal point for our research 
partnerships and spearheads the development of not just technology, but 
operational capabilities that fully incorporate non-material aspects 
such as new tactics, techniques, and procedures and doctrine. By 
maintaining close ties to the operational force, the CIWC can identify 
requirements and deliver critical capabilities much faster than 
traditional military acquisition processes. By pairing rapid 
technological innovation (material and non-material) to critical 
operational requirements, USCYBERCOM will be able to adapt to meet the 
dynamic challenges of the cyber domain.
 the path forward
 These seven attributes and three enablers are integral to the 
success of CYBERCOM 2.0. As directed by the Secretary of War, I will 
oversee the implementation of 97 tasks across 26 lines of effort, 
executed by 17 key Department stakeholders. This revised model empowers 
the Commander of USCYBERCOM, under the authorities granted by 10 U.S.C. 
Sec. 167b, to directly shape how our cyber forces are generated. It 
establishes the processes, policies, and relationships that grant the 
operational commander appropriate input into how cyber forces are 
manned, trained, and equipped.
 CYBERCOM 2.0 is designed to deliver immediate warfighting outcomes 
while also preserving future decision space. We are implementing 
foundational force generation initiatives now--such as developing 
career paths, creating screening assessments, and establishing advanced 
training--that are essential elements of cyber force generation 
regardless of any future organizational decisions. The core principles 
of mastery, specialization, and agility are indispensable for meeting 
our strategic objectives, irrespective of which organizational model 
ultimately emerges.
 A cornerstone of my oversight, in lockstep with the DOW CIO and USW 
P&R, will be to forge the world's most capable and dominant Cyber 
Mission Force out of the broader DOW Cyber Workforce. To do this, we 
will apply DOW Cyber Workforce Management policies and aggressively 
utilize authorities granted by the Cyber Excepted Service to ensure we 
can out-compete our adversaries for and retain this elite, mission-
ready talent. Underpinning all these efforts is a commitment to a 
closer partnership with both industry and academia to secure our 
Homeland and harness America's unparalleled strength in talent and 
innovation.
 conclusion
 CYBERCOM 2.0 is the beginning of a necessary journey to build the 
cyber forces our Nation needs. As a cornerstone of the Departments' 
broader strategy, it works in concert with other initiatives--such as 
validating and updating our cyber force design and employment models--
to ensure maximum operational outcomes for the Joint Force. At its 
heart, CYBERCOM 2.0 is a commitment to our cyber warriors, providing 
them with the careers, training, and support they deserve. By 
addressing critical force generation challenges, CYBERCOM 2.0 will 
significantly increase the lethality and effectiveness of our cyber 
forces. Its purpose extends beyond cyberspace; it is a critical Joint 
Force capability that must be integrated across all warfighting 
domains, sending a clear message to our adversaries of our commitment 
to maintaining cyber superiority in support of our national interests.
 The true strength of our Nation lies in the potential of its 
people. With CYBERCOM 2.0, we are unleashing that potential to build 
and integrate a world-class cyber force across all warfare domains.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 
working closely with this Subcommittee on this critical national 
security priority, and I welcome any questions you may have.

 [The Cyber Force Generation Model slides follows:]
 
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, and I appreciate your comments, 
Secretary Sutton.
 General Hartman, welcome, and as you get started I just 
want to personally say thank you for your dedicated service to 
our country and everything that you have done to forward our 
security through implementation of these types of policies in 
the cyber domain. I appreciate that. Thank you, sir.
 Go ahead with your statement, please.

 STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM HARTMAN, USA, ACTING 
 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND/ PERFORMING THE DUTIES 
 OF DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/ACTING CHIEF, CENTRAL 
 SECURITY SERVICE

 General Hartman. Thank you. Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member 
Rosen, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you 
for the opportunity to discuss the future of our Nation's cyber 
force. Thank you specifically for the requirements in Section 
1533 of the fiscal year 2023 NDAA that brings us here today.
 The revised Cyber Force Generation Model approved by the 
Department is fundamental to a more lethal, agile, and enduring 
cyber force, capable of deterring, and if necessary, defeating 
our adversaries in cyberspace. CYBERCOM 2.0 directly addresses 
our national security challenges and fixes many of the issues 
facing our servicemembers. This is a significant upgrade in how 
we man, train, and equip the world's best cyber force.
 Since the standup of U.S. Cyber Command we have had 
challenges manning the cyber force and ensuring we had viable 
cyber-centric career models across all services. We face many 
challenges, ranging from duplicative training, uncompetitive 
and inconsistent compensation, excessive administrative 
burdens, and a high operational tempo that contributes to an 
unsustainable stress on the force.
 CYBERCOM 2.0 targets these problems through seven key 
deliverables that overhaul how the Department of War generates 
and sustains lethal cyber warfighters. These deliverables 
include overhauls in targeted recruiting, modernized 
incentives, specialized mission teams, and optimized 
operational tempos.
 This plan gives us what we need. It forges cyber warrior by 
building upon the warfighting culture and lethal capabilities 
of the military departments, harnessing their institutional 
mastery of sustained warfare, their capacity for precise global 
operations, and their core competency and expeditionary and 
agile power projection in denied environments.
 To lead this effort I have established three key enabling 
organizations. The Cyber Talent Management Organization is 
developing the cyber assessment battery test to better align 
incoming talent. To ensure we retain high-end warfighters, we 
are using our Title 10, Section 167b authorities to budget for 
standard skills pay and will next focus on retention 
incentives.
 The Advanced Cyber Training and Education and Center is 
tailoring training to specialize mission needs while 
eliminating training redundancy in areas like artificial 
intelligence, expeditionary cyber, and advanced tradecraft.
 Our Cyber Innovation Warfare Center will more rapidly equip 
our cyber forces with cutting-edge capabilities and game-
changing trade craft. We will build capabilities we need for 
the future, not focused on past requirements. This center will 
serve as the central point of collaboration for industry, 
academic, government partners, and the cyber operating force.
 These enabling organizations are being designed to be AI 
[artificial intelligence] by birth, built from the outset to be 
data centric, automated, and decision optimized. This means 
that data will be treated as a strategic asset, workflows are 
engineered for automation, artificial intelligence is embedded 
into planning, operations, and sustainment, not bolted on 
later.
 Artificial intelligence is no longer a future concept. It 
is an operational capability we are integrating today. In line 
with our Cyber Command 2.0 vision, we are transforming how the 
command is organized, enabled, and resourced to operate at the 
speed and scale required in the cyber domain. We are 
fundamentally changing how we bring Thank you into the fight. 
Rather than relying on long, bespoke government development 
cycles, we are aggressively leveraging commercial proven AI 
technologies, the same systems driving productivity, analytics, 
and automation across the global economy, and rapidly adapting 
them for military use, while also building classified and 
mission-specific capabilities internally, when required.
 This industry-first approach allows us to move at the pace 
of relevance. It enables continuous iteration, rapid upgrades, 
and alignment with the global AI innovation ecosystem, which no 
single government entity can replicated on its own. In a domain 
where our adversaries are already exploiting automation and 
machine learning and large-scale analytics, speed is not a 
luxury. It is a necessity.
 Importantly, we are no longer piloting AI for learning. We 
are operating AI for mission outcomes. Today AI is being used 
to accelerate cyber threat detection and response, prioritize 
and automate defensive actions across large networks, improve 
operational planning, targeting, and operations, and reducing 
analyst workloads so human expertise is focused on the highest 
value decisions. These are not experiments. These are 
capabilities already being delivered across the force.
 Because getting this right is so critical, we have aligned 
our Chief AI Officer as a direct report to me, outside 
traditional stovepipes. This ensure AI data architecture and 
operational design are integrated from day one, rather than 
competing for priority after the fact.
 CYBERCOM 2.0 strengthens our integration with other 
combatant commands. By building more proficient cyber forces, 
we provide more lethal and capable support to the Joint Force. 
When our cyber operators are expertly matched to their roles, 
receive cutting-edge training, and are freed from 
administrative burdens to focus on the fight, their operational 
effectiveness increases exponentially. This enhanced capability 
directly translates to delivering decisive outcomes for 
CYBERCOM and other combatant commanders at the timing and tempo 
our senior leaders require.
 In closing, I want to reiterate my appreciation for 
Congress' support and partnership over the past several years. 
Changes to our budget and acquisition authorities, as well as 
the fiscal year 2023 NDAA Section 1533 provided us the required 
tools and a clear mandate to address persistent readiness 
challenges and implement solutions across the Cyber Mission 
Force. We are using those authorities to implement CYBERCOM 
2.0.
 I assess implementing CYBERCOM 2.0 as the best path to get 
our cyber warriors and our cyber force where it needs to be to 
support the Joint Force, in crisis and conflict. The 
Secretary's direction is clear, and we have buy-in and 
participation with services. Alreqady we are leveraging the 
Army model for proficiency pay, and the Navy is implementing 
clear career progression for the maritime cyber warfare 
officers.
 Your continued support, both in sustained investment and 
providing flexible authorities to partner with the full 
spectrum of U.S. AI companies, from major defense primes to 
venture-backed startups, is what allow us to move fast, stay 
secure, and maintain our advantage. The success of this 
endeavor will depend on continued partnership with Congress and 
the Department to ensure adequate oversight and sustain funding 
to implement these necessary changes and maintain the world's 
premier cyber force. This is how we ensure that American 
innovation remains decisive in cyberspace.
 Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

 [The Cyber Force Generation Model follows:]
 
 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Hartman.
 General Messer, thank you. Welcome. I appreciate your 
service to our country, and with your statement, please 
proceed.

 STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL R. RYAN MESSER, USAF, DEPUTY 
 DIRECTOR FOR GLOBAL OPERATIONS, J3 JOINT STAFF

 Brigadier General Messer. Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member 
Rosen, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you 
for the opportunity to join this hearing and speak to the 
importance of cyberspace as an integral part of joint all-
domain military operations.
 Joint Operations are reliant on operators who are masters 
of their craft. For example, an aviation strike operation 
requires aircrew who are exceptionally skilled in aerial 
refueling, air intercept control, air-to-air warfare, and 
strike warfare. It takes years of specialized training to build 
a team who can succeed in such mission areas. The same is true 
for our cyber operations.
 At the same time, the demand for cyber forces across the 
Joint Force is steadily rising. As you will hear in combatant 
commander posture statements, our adversaries are using the 
cyber domain as part of their multi-faceted campaigns to 
degrade U.S. and allied interests. United States Indo-Pacfic 
Command (USINDOPACOM) has emphasized defensive cyber operations 
as the ``Joint Forces' first line in defense'' in their 
theater, and United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 
highlighted ``cyber espionage'' as a vector for both 
intelligence gathering and persuading audiences against U.S. 
interests in their theater.
 Amid these threats, demand for cyber capabilities is at an 
all-time high. Threats in cyberspace are currently growing 
faster than we can scale our actions. The size of the existing 
Cyber Mission Force requires us to prioritize some efforts and 
take risks in others, which could delay our response to meeting 
emerging threats.
 For all military operations, actions in cyberspace are 
playing an increasingly important role. That includes 
operations where the cyber element may not be self-evident. 
Whether protecting our forces from harm, complementing kinetic 
action, imposing costs on adversaries, or defending friendly 
infrastructure, cyberspace operations are critical to the 
successful employment of the Joint Force. To succeed, we must 
be proactive, not reactive. Cyber activities must be integrated 
into every phase of operations, starting with concept 
development.
 Military operations in every domain require specialists. 
Just as specialized aircrew support every air operation, 
specialized cyber operators are essential to ensure U.S. 
dominance in cyber and all-domain operations.
 CYBERCOM 2.0 will help us combat the adversary's ability to 
mass forces with domain mastery and advanced tools, extracting 
the greatest value from the force that we have. Training, 
experience, tools, and resourcing will give our operators what 
they need to prevail in this dynamic domain.
 On behalf of the men and women of the Joint Force, we 
appreciate your support for the Cyber Mission Force and for 
this vital initiative. With that we will open it up for 
questions.
 [The prepared statement of Brigadier General R. Ryan Messer 
follows:]

Prepared Statement by Brigadier General R. Ryan Messer, Deputy Director 
 for Global Operations, The Joint Staff
 Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen, and distinguished Members of 
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join this hearing, 
and speak to the importance of cyberspace as an integral part of joint 
military operations.
 Joint Operations are reliant on operators who are masters of their 
craft. For example, an aviation strike operation requires aircrew who 
are exceptionally skilled in aerial refueling, air intercept control, 
air-to-air warfare, and strike warfare. It takes years of specialized 
training to build a team who can succeed in each of these areas.
 At the same time, the demand for cyber forces across the Joint 
Force is steadily rising. As you have heard in combatant commander 
posture statements, our adversaries are using the cyber domain as part 
of their multi-faceted campaigns to degrade U.S. and allied interests. 
USINDOPACOM has emphasized cyber operations as the ``Joint Forces' 
first line in defense'' in their theater; USSOUTHCOM highlighted 
``cyber espionage'' as a vector for both intelligence gathering and 
persuading audiences against U.S. interests in their theater.
 Amid these threats, demand for cyber capabilities is at an all-time 
high. Threats in cyberspace are currently growing faster than we can 
scale our response actions. The size of the existing Cyber Mission 
Force requires us to prioritize some efforts and take risks in others, 
which could delay our response to meet emerging threats.
 For all military operations, actions in cyberspace are playing an 
increasingly important role. That includes operations where the cyber 
element may not be self-evident. Whether protecting our forces from 
harm, complementing kinetic action, imposing costs on adversaries, or 
defending friendly infrastructure, cyberspace operations are critical 
to the successful employment of the Joint Force. To succeed, we must be 
proactive, not reactive; cyber activities must be integrated into every 
phase of operations, starting from concept development.
 Military operations in every domain require specialists. Just as 
specialized aircrew support every air operation, specialized cyber 
operators are essential to ensure U.S. dominance in cyber and all-
domain operations.
 CYBERCOM 2.0 is our answer to adversaries who are massing in the 
cyber battlefield. It allows us to unlock the full potential of our own 
expert operators, turning their talent into a decisive advantage for 
our Nation.
 By providing our operators with continuous training, hands-on 
experience, advanced technology, clear career roadmaps, and stable 
funding, we are giving our cyber warriors the tools they need to win in 
this ever-changing environment.
 On behalf of the men and women of the Joint Force, thank you for 
supporting this vital initiative and the dedicated professionals of the 
Cyber Mission Force.

 Senator Rounds. Thank you, General Messer.
 Look, to begin with, we are in an open session right now so 
we have an opportunity to not only ask questions but to help 
educate, as well. Five domains--air, land, sea, space, and 
cyberspace. It appears that there will never be another kinetic 
activity that does on in terms of our Department of Defense or 
Department of War without having some cyber activity to the 
left of it, basically to make the field of battle a little bit 
safer for our young men and women.
 But in order to do that it has to be integrated and a part 
of the larger force. In order to make that happen, you need 
professionals that clearly understand their role. That is lot 
about what this discussion today is about. It is about the 
cyber force itself and how they actually provide the needed 
services to different COCOM commanders, combatant commanders, 
that we lay out throughout the world. In order to do that, we 
have got to make sure that the cyber operations can be 
integrated as quickly and as efficiently as possible.
 Ms. Sutton, part of the CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative recommends 
maturing the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy 
position to meet the demands of executing Section 167b 
authority for cyberspace operations peculiar activities. I just 
want you to describe what that maturation might look like in 
practice. Specifically, how would an enhanced Assistant 
Secretary for Cyber Policy, how would that office support the 
force generation objectives outlined in CYBERCOM 2.0, and what 
additional responsibilities or authorities would be necessary 
to effectively execute this expanded role? In other words, what 
specific resourcing would be required to enable that maturity 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) Cyber Policy 
Office?
 I know you are new in the role and so forth, but you have 
got a great deal of experience in the cyber domain and what we 
have done within the National Defense Authorization Act in the 
past. Your thoughts, please.
 Secretary Sutton. Senator Rounds, than you for that really 
important question. So as you mentioned, one of my top 
priorities going forward, and what I think one of the key 
responsibilities of my office, is to make sure that cyber is 
integrated into multi-domain operations. So having this role be 
fundamental and be embedded within the Under Secretary of 
Policies organizations allows that to happen on a daily basis, 
to bring the cyber domain to all of the policy discussions 
happening more broadly.
 I think historically we have seen cyber treated very much 
in a stovepipe, where the cyber people go off and talk about 
the cyber domain and do their things in a silo and in a vacuum. 
I see one of the primary roles of my office, both as the 
Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy as well as the principal 
cyber advisor in my role to be an advisor to the Secretary of 
War, is to be that coordinating function across the Department, 
to really bring cyber to all of the other domains of 
warfighting, to coordinate across the services, and to look for 
opportunities where resourcing is needed and where we need to 
really focus the Department's efforts to achieve these outcomes 
that are going to be critical to all future conflicts going 
forward.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, and just in order to make sure 
that all of our members get an opportunity to speak, and we are 
going to do several rounds of questions, I will defer right now 
to Senator Rosen.
 Senator Rosen. I am going to defer to Senator Gillibrand, 
because we are here the whole time and everyone has a lot of 
hearings going on. So Senator Gillibrand, you are recognized.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Madam Vice Chairman.
 General Hartman, since the fiscal year 2017 NDAA, CYBERCOM 
has had the authority over the training of assigned joint 
forces, conducting specialized courses of instruction, 
monitoring and promotion of Cyber Operation Forces, 
coordinating with the military departments regarding 
assignment, retention, training, education, and special and 
incentive pays for Cyber Operation Forces. The command has been 
the Joint Force trainer for almost as long. Much of CYBERCOM 
2.0 appears to be tinkering with this space rather than 
fundamental reimagining. Can you speak to why the command did 
not take these steps before and why you believe this is a 
dramatic transformation?
 General Hartman. Senator, thanks for your questions. As you 
point out, in 2017 we were given certain authorities. But what 
we did not have control of at the time was the funding, 
Senator. So as you are aware, in 2023, we were given enhanced 
budget control. There were a series of issues that actually 
caused us to not receive control of that funding until 2024. So 
when we had some authorities we really had no enforcement 
mechanisms, and we have started to execute those enforcement 
mechanisms, and we have seen benefit from that.
 Senator, CYBERCOM 2.0 does not intend to totally reinvent 
how we train the force, but what it does intend to do is make 
sure that the services are held to the standard of 1,000-level 
training. The CYBERCOM J7 will continue to execute 2,000-level 
training. So basic training by the services, qualification 
through CYBERCOM, which we have made a lot of progress on in 
the last 2 years. Then what CYBERCOM 2.0 is really going to 
bring is advanced and specialized training, moving at the pace 
of industry, that is really required, that will allow us to 
both compete and really plan to outpace China. That is the 
construct that we are laying out, Senator.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Secretary Sutton, while the 
services largely say cyber is important, it is not a top 
priority for any of them. Agreeing to a notional plan is easy, 
but the services are notoriously protective of their control 
over their recruiting, retention, and talent management. How 
will your office hold services accountable and ensure they do 
not steamroll CYBERCOM on career and talent management?
 I will just say that this Committee, we have had hearing 
after hearing, year after year, and we have drilled down to how 
many personnel you are getting from each service, and which 
services are slower than the other, and what level of staff you 
could acquire. Frankly, it is never good enough. So I just 
really want to know how you intend to succeed?
 Secretary Sutton. Senator, I appreciate your question and 
understand the frustration. I think you are really highlighting 
what is fundamental about Cyber Command 2.0, which is 
involvement at the Secretary's level to really coordinate and 
make sure that the services are all doing things consistently 
and that we rise everybody to the top bar.
 We see best practices in pockets across the services, but 
have historically lacked a coherent effort to bring all those 
together and rise all levels up. It is going to require hard 
discussions internal to the building. It is going to require 
prioritization. We have a clear direction from the Secretary of 
War when he approved this plan about the importance of 
increasing the lethality of our cyber warriors.
 I look forward to having all those internal battles within 
the Pentagon, because I think it is fundamental to what we owe 
our cyber warriors that come to work every day and do this 
mission, is to be able to train them and retain them in ways 
that allow us to maintain the world's most competitive cyber 
force.
 Senator Gillibrand. General Hartman, it was just reported 
that China improved the import of H200 chips to ByteDance, 
Alibaba, and Tencent. These companies all work closely with 
Chinese military, and just a few months ago reports indicated a 
White House memo raised concerns that Alibaba provides support 
for People's Republic of China (PRC) military operations 
against targets in the United States.
 If these sales go through, what impacted will this 
acquisition of H200's have on their ability to target U.S. 
military and U.S. critical infrastructure?
 General Hartman. Senator, I have not studied that question, 
so I will agree to get back to you with an answer.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, and just my last point. I 
would like to hear from each of you. I still do not understand 
why you do not want a Cyber Academy. I just do not know why you 
do not want a service academy that will just train the 
personnel you need, from top to bottom, consistently and 
regularly. We tried to create small pipelines for you through 
Cyber Academy for non-military personnel, but I still do not 
know why you do not want your own. I get why you are going to 
use existing services and try to do better training, but future 
war is going to be cyber, and I do not know why we are taking 
so long to do this.
 I think also in your testimony you said that your goal 
for--what is the group?--the ACTEC, the Advanced Cyber Training 
and Education Center, will not be fully operational capable to 
Q3 fiscal year 2031. I mean, that is a really long time for any 
bricks and mortar.
 But can you each talk about why you do not have this 
vision, and why is it so difficult?
 Secretary Sutton. So I really appreciate that question 
because I think how we get the right training to our people and 
what courses we have available and what mechanisms we have is 
really important.
 I really want to highlight the importance in Cyber Command 
2.0 of the ACTEC, the Advanced Cyber Training and Education 
Center. The intent of it is actually not to be a brick-and-
mortar institution, because what we see is having an internal 
developed training system is probably always going to be slow 
to need. As we look at the timelines it takes to get basic 
training updated, we are losing out to the best of breed that 
is happening in industry and academia. So that Advanced Cyber 
Training and Education Center model is really intended to 
figure out what our requirements are, where we have skills and 
key knowledge gaps that we need training on, and then to be 
able to go out to industry and academia, find the best of 
breed, if it is available out there, bring that in, and then we 
can have standards that we are trained to.
 So that is really the model that we are looking to move out 
on quickly. The timelines that we are talking about are to get 
it fully up and scaled across the entire force, across an 
entire curriculum. I will let General Hartman talk about some 
of the early pilots that we are aiming to get some quicks wins 
in.
 Senator Gillibrand. Again, the Chairman can take control of 
this, but honestly, we have been saying that for a decade, and 
it just does not work. We cannot compete. We do not pay enough. 
Our salaries are too low. So the benefit that the service 
academies have is it is free college for 4 years, or 2 years, 
or whatever it is going to be. So kids will choose to do that 
route because we can compete on that.
 Let's say you set your standard, every 6 months of the 
perfect person. They are not going to join you, because they 
are making $400,000 or $600,000 where they are. You are not 
going to get them.
 So you guys can answer the question if you want, but you 
can also take the time back if you would like, Mr. Chairman.
 Senator Rounds. I will allow the question, if you have got 
it, and if not we can bring it back in and you can respond with 
a written response. But I would be curious to hear what your 
thoughts are on it.
 Secretary Sutton. Just one thing and then I will let 
General Hartman also provide his answer. I am a firm believer 
in exactly what you mentioned. I am a Scholarship for Service 
recipient. My master's degree was funded through government 
funds with a service obligation, and over 20 years later I am 
still in government. I see it is a very powerful recruiting 
tool and something that we are continuing to look to 
opportunities to continue to leverage.
 General Hartman. Senator, I am not opposed to a joint cyber 
service training academy. I think there is great merit in that. 
What I do not think is the best answer right now is to divorce 
our cyber capability in the Department from the services. That 
is based on everything that we are doing from an operational 
standpoint. If I have got to build a cyber plan against an 
adversary's air defense network, the Air Force, as a service, 
brings tremendous capability to me that I do not believe we 
need to separate.
 Senator Gillibrand. Got it.
 General Hartman. Then the second piece is, the Advanced 
Cyber Training Academy, what we are trying to do is really 
marry the training to the operational elements of the command. 
So we learn things in an Ops Room, both offensive and 
defensively, that we immediately turn into a training 
requirement, that we train across the force. So each disparate 
element is not learning every time they get on keyboard in 
order to execute operations. We just think that is 
fundamentally important, but there is a huge institutional 
training environment, and I support your idea.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand, for the 
excellent questions. I appreciate that.
 Ms. Sutton and General Hartman, you are likely aware of the 
calls--and this follows the same line--for the establishment of 
a separate military service dedicated to the cyber domain or a 
cyber force. Like me, you are no doubt close with and respect 
many of those who are supportive of a cyber force. What would 
you say to those national security and cyber experts who are 
advocating for a separate cyber force? Step right into it.
 Senator Rosen. You knew he was going to ask that, didn't 
you?
 Secretary Sutton. I appreciate that question. I think this 
is a really important debate for us all to be having about the 
future of the cyber warfighting domain. I do think one of the 
most common misconceptions about Cyber Command is that it is a 
debate between Cyber Command 2.0 and a cyber force, and they 
are actually separate debates that I believe both need to be 
had, and we need to look closely at the pros and cons of both.
 Cyber Command 2.0 is inherently about building a talent 
model. It is looking across the entire talent pipeline from 
when we recruit someone, how we make sure we have the right 
talent, how we train them, how we retain them, how we build 
careers for them, how we really build our cyber warriors. We 
know how to do this. As Cyber Command has become operational we 
have built a set of very capable cyber operators. Now we need 
to do that at scale and have a system that supports that, 
rather than doing it in an ad hoc method.
 Cyber Command 2.0 is really that talent management model, 
and we have been very careful as we have built that model that 
it is agnostic to the organizational model and that it would 
support both the current model, where five services present, as 
well as other organizational models, such as the establishment 
of a cyber force.
 So I think they are both really important debates to have, 
but they are separate debates that we need to make sure that we 
are quickly moving ahead with Cyber Command 2.0. We have a lot 
of work done, and it is required regardless of what model we 
have. We have to build the talent. So that is our immediate 
focus, is working on all of these fundamental activities that 
we are going to need, going forward, that would enable any 
future decisions to be made about an organizational change.
 Senator Rounds. General Hartman?
 General Hartman. Chairman, I just would like to add three 
things to what Hon. Sutton said. I agree with her that this 
CYBERCOM 2.0 is certainly important regardless of any future 
decision.
 I do believe when we did the analysis for CYBERCOM 2.0 the 
timeline was fundamentally important, so we did view this 
through a 2027 lens. We viewed it through a resourcing lens. 
Through that lens, CYBERCOM 2.0 provided us the best 
opportunity in order to build the force that we needed on a 
2027 timeline. I think that is important.
 The second piece is, I fundamentally believe the ability to 
integrate across the Joint Force is best suited to the model 
that we are developing here in CYBERCOM 2.0, and that is 
fundamentally important. I did not answer the question that you 
asked earlier, but our ability to integrate not just left of 
conflict but during a conflict, in all phases of the operation, 
just like any other traditional military capability, is 
absolutely essential to us delivering the capability that the 
Nation needs. I think CYBERCOM 2.0 is really the best course to 
do that.
 Senator Rounds. I am going to be asking a question in a 
little bit about some of that, the cyber activity that might 
occur during an operation, as well.
 But I do want to followup a little bit. With CYBERCOM 2.0, 
where does a civilian workforce fit into a CYBERCOM 2.0 
concept?
 Secretary Sutton. So the scope of Cyber Command 2.0 is 
primarily focused on the Cyber Mission Force and it is enabling 
organizations, the headquarters, Cyber Command headquarters, 
the Joint Force, Cyber headquarters, which is a blended 
workforce of both military and civilian and contractor work 
roles. So as a result, within Cyber Command 2.0, the majority 
of initiatives do apply to both military and civilian 
populations, and we have sort of dedicated lines of effort that 
also target some things that are unique to both sides. So in 
short, we are addressing both issues for those elements that 
support the Cyber Mission Force.
 Senator Rounds. Plenty of room for Guard units to continue 
to participate?
 Secretary Sutton. Absolutely. The Guard and the Reserve are 
going to be critical on how we bring in some of that unique 
talent that has special expertise, and there are specific lines 
of effort in the implementation plan where we look at how to 
bring that in, as well as they will be a fundamental part of 
our cross-functional team that we are building to roll out the 
implementation.
 Senator Rounds. Senator Rosen.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Well, you actually set me up for 
my next question, you did not even know. But I want to thank 
you for the testimony so far, because cyber is not an add-on or 
service adjacent anymore. It has to be part of the fabric of 
everything we do, woven in.
 Talking about data, I always say this data tells a story if 
you know how to listen to it. I hope that we can maybe have a 
hearing to talk about how we think about data and its role in 
everything that we do going forward. That is a separate issue.
 But I actually want to talk about the servicemembers, to 
what Senator Rounds was talking about. So I have two questions 
for you, General Hartman. One is on the regular force and the 
second one is on the Guard and Reserve.
 The first one, can you talk a little bit how you build a 
fully qualified cyber operator? What does the training pipeline 
look like at service and joint level, and what kind of on-the-
job experience is required before they can be deemed full 
qualified, and how often do they, I guess, have their 
benchmarks taken, I guess if you think of it like that.
 General Hartman. Thanks, Senator. Each of the services 
produce a cyber operator, and that is a blanket term. We have a 
number of different specialties across the force. Then we, 
CYBERCOM, supervise what we call work role training. So if you 
are an interactive on-net operator you go to a specific 
training course. If you are an exploitation analyst or another 
specialty you would do the same thing. We work through a 
process that allows them to meet a series of benchmarks and 
then become fully qualified. Once they become fully qualified 
they execute a series of operations and move from basic to 
journeyman to master level of qualification.
 Historically, we have not produced a lot of operators at 
the master level, because the training and the certification 
process has taken too long. Part of CYBERCOM 2.0 is how do we 
reduce that training timeline and allow them to focus more on 
operations vice less on qualifications.
 So I think we have, over the years, reduced that benchmark, 
but you get trained, you get qualified, you execute operations, 
you become a noncommissioned officer, and then you supervise 
the next group of people that we are bringing up.
 It is a process that works, but it does not work fast 
enough, and that is really the focus of 2.0 and the ACTEC 
program.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I want to ask a similar question 
about the skills for our National Guard and Reserve members. 
They are not currently tracked, it is my understanding, at the 
same fidelity as the Active Force, so they are going to be a 
critical part, to your point, of bringing in the public sector, 
I guess, if you will, say it that way.
 So what specific steps, can you talk to us about how you 
are going to ensure that a Guardsman or Reservist with those 
high-end cyber skills, they might be doing it in the regular 
world, their civilian career, how can they be activated for 
special mission? How are you working with that? Because I do 
think that is a big part of our pipeline and training. So 
whatever, you both can answer, please.
 General Hartman. Thanks, Senator. We do have organizations 
in the National Guard that are exemplars that we are trying to 
really use to leverage it across the entire Reserve component. 
We have got the Delaware and the Maryland Air National Guard 
that is part of our Cyber National Mission Force. So one of our 
most elite organizations really for the last decade. We bring 
those servicemembers on Active Duty and they participate as 
full members of the team. To be honest with you, they bring 
deep expertise, because when they are not mobilized, as you 
highlighted, they go back to civilian jobs.
 We have an organization down in Texas supporting our Air 
Force cyber organization that, again, provides a significant 
amount of expertise, and we have the same model on the 
defensive side.
 What we have to do is scale that across the force. We have 
got to get them all in JCC2-R, our readiness tool, and we have 
got to be able to track them just like we are tracking our 
Active Duty servicemembers.
 Senator Rosen. Because you may, across the country, each 
State may have one or two that are working in this area in 
their civilian life, and so how do we pull them in?
 General Hartman. Senator, that is our plan. We are in the 
relatively early stages, but as we build this out, that is our 
intent.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. Senator Rounds.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you. General Messer, you have gotten 
off too easy so far. I am going to throw you the hard one now, 
and this is sitting in an unclassified setting. I want you to 
talk a little bit about successes, and I want to specifically 
talk Venezuela.
 It has been in the news, there has been a lot of discussion 
about the fact that this was a good example of what happens 
when you combine all of the Joint Forces, including cyber 
operations. Once again, I understand that this is an 
unclassified, but there are a lot of folks out there that might 
now have a curiosity about this, and they may very well want to 
be a part of a team in the future that you are going to have to 
try to recruit.
 Can you share with us--and I would open up to anyone else, 
as well here--can you share with us the types of operations and 
how this happened--it is not just at the national level or the 
international level or the big picture, strategically, but 
tactically, how critical cyber is when you are doing--and this 
was a law enforcement operation--but a required support of the 
armed forces of the United States. Can you share a little bit 
about what that meant for the cyber teams involved? A no answer 
is not acceptable.
 Brigadier General Messer. Senator, thanks for the question. 
What I probably will not do is go into specifics of the 
Venezuela operation. But what I will tell you is as has been 
mentioned by Honorable Sutton and General Hartman, the role 
that they play as leaders in pushing cyber to the forefront I 
think is critical. That is one of the things we have seen from 
Chairman Caine, is his emphasis on not just traditional kinetic 
effects but the role non-kinetic effects play in all of our 
global operations, especially cyber.
 So leading up to the events in Venezuela over the last 6 
months we have been developing something new on the Joint Staff 
called a non-kinetic effect cell. This is designed to 
integrate, coordinate, and synchronize all of our non-kinetics 
into the planning and then, of course, the execution of any 
operation globally.
 I think it is important to point out that one of the 
reasons that it has been successful is the emphasis that the 
Chairman has placed on the role of non-kinetics and, in 
particular, cyber, and then the coordination that has continued 
to grow and mature with CYBERCOM as we work through various 
operations around the globe.
 Senator Rounds. So in this particular case, not only was 
there a huge amount of work to be done beforehand, but then it 
had to be executed at the time, as we say, not just on the left 
side but during the operation itself.
 For young men and women that are out there and they want to 
be involved in a growing and very exciting field, can you talk 
a little bit about what that means in terms of why we want 
these folks to actually be a part of not just the large Cyber 
Mission Force but actually within their own branches, and the 
need to maintain that continuity and understanding of the big 
picture by individuals who are back in with their regular 
units, and how that gets integrated in terms of providing 
direct assistance on a unit-by-unit basis. How integrated is 
this? As a member of the Joint Forces, I just kind of wanted to 
hear you talk about how critical that is.
 Brigadier General Messer. Yes, sir. Cyber operations are 
critical to everything we do, whether it is just day-to-day 
operations of the functioning of the Department of War or it is 
actual execution and operations.
 One of the things that I will point out is growing up in 
the Air Force there was always a non-kinetic effect cell at an 
Air Operations Center, but it usually existed back in a back 
room, it was a very dark place, and usually we did not ask for 
many inputs from that team until we wanted to sprinkle what we 
called the lightning bolts onto some form of operation. The 
reality is that we have now pulled cyber operators to the 
forefront.
 So if I were talking to a group of young people who were 
considering a career, and joining General Hartman's team over 
at CYBERCOM, I would say, ``You are not just going to be 
integral to every option we are going to do, but you will be at 
the forefront of everything we do, both now and in the 
future.''
 Senator Rounds. So let's just say that there is a young man 
or woman out there, and they enjoy the keyboard work, and they 
are fascinated by cyber. They have seen what hackers do. Is 
there a place for the good guy hackers to be, and how would 
they be able to let you know that they want to go to work for 
you? What is the best way to get that word out?
 Brigadier General Messer. Sir, I think there would 
absolutely be a role for them to play, and I think that the 
targeted recruiting and assessments that will be a focus of 
CYBERCOM 2.0 will open up more of those opportunities to find 
those unique individuals. I wanted to see if General Hartman 
wanted to say more about that.
 General Hartman. There is a place for them to go, Chairman, 
absolutely. Our intent is part of CYBERCOM 2.0 is if you are a 
young person, a hacker, you want to come serve your country 
when you show up at your recruiting station, we want you to be 
administered a cyber aptitude test. If you score well on that 
test we would like you to be offered a contract to become a 
cyber operator in whatever your service of choice is. We would 
like you to then go through the pipeline and come to CYBERCOM. 
That is the first way.
 The second way is we are going to execute an in-service 
recruiting pilot. So if you are out in another specialty, the 
same way that you might attract a Delta Force operator in the 
Army, we are going to also give you an aptitude test, and if 
you meet a certain score on that aptitude test we are going to 
work with your service to have you move to the Cyber 
Operational Force.
 We believe those two areas are ways that we can really 
attract world-class talent.
 I do want to go back, if you allow me, to just address a 
little bit the question you asked the J39. I would tell you not 
just Absolute Resolve but Midnight Hammer and a number of other 
operations. We have really graduated to the point where we are 
treating a cyber capability just like we would a kinetic 
capability. We are not sprinkling cyber on. We are integrating 
cyber operations into the Joint Force Commander's plan, and we 
are executing it to achieve specific effects that are 
ultimately tied to what the commander is trying to achieve, and 
we are doing it in a repeatable, sustainable manner, across a 
number of different Combatant Commanders (COCOMs).
 So while we cannot go into detail here, Chairman, I would 
love to get an opportunity to brief you in some level of 
detail. I do believe it is fundamentally one of the reasons we 
created CYBERCOM, and I do believe we have achieved a certain 
level of integration that is really important for our Nation.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you for that. We will make 
arrangements to have a classified meeting, and we would invite 
you to come back and share that with the Members of this 
Subcommittee. Thank you for that. Senator Rosen.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you. I can tell you, the young woman 
who started her career in computer programming in 1980-
something could not dream of what is happening now and what 
have been so excited about all the things that you are doing or 
having even been recruited. Of course, these things did not 
exist in the same way they do now. So I can tell you all those 
folks are out there, because if the wayback clock, if you went 
back, that would have been something that would have excited 
me, and it still excited me to this day to think about it. 
Cyber is kinetic capability. It is in the fabric of everything 
we do. We use it the same as every bit of intelligence and 
every bit of capability, and it is really important.
 But I just want to ask, I think, the last question I am 
going to ask. How do we leverage security automation tools to 
defend our DOD networks? We are talking a lot about the 
pipeline. We know we have more to go to recruit and train and 
figure out how we are blending all of this together so it is 
seamless, in the same ways that we do a lot of our intelligence 
capabilities, right.
 But I want to just move for a second to security automation 
tools. General Hartman, you have to defend those DOD networks. 
It is fundamental, right? So I had a provision in the Cyber 
Defense Command to s subordinate unified command included in 
the fiscal year 2025 NDAA. It is a structural change that 
reflects the sophistication of the current threat landscape.
 So as our adversaries increasingly utilize AI, as we talked 
around the circle about AI, to execute cyberattacks at machine 
speed, the Department's ability to maintain real-time 
visibility over the DOD information network is being tested 
like never before. So detecting a vulnerability, it is only 
half the battle, right? You know you have a vulnerability, and 
now you have got to close the door. So it requires a speed that 
manual process may not be able to achieve.
 By deploying security automation tools, can we move from a 
reactive posture to a proactive defense that keeps China, 
Russia, other adversaries off our networks, and how you are 
factoring in this use of automation and AI into CYBERCOM 2.0 
for our developing cyber operators who defend the network?
 General Hartman. Senator, thanks for the question. First of 
all, thanks for the legislation as it relates to DCDC and a 
subunified command. I assure you, General Stanton has taken 
that legislation and is running with it, and certainly 
implementing that.
 Look, the use of automation, artificial intelligence in 
order to secure the Department of War information network is 
absolutely a part of CYBERCOM 2.0 and our plan for the defense 
of the DOD. It is not going to entirely take the human out of 
the loop, but what it is going to do is identify the most 
important data that our analysts need to look at in order to 
best protect our network.
 We have executed a number of pilots, one I think we 
previously briefed called an Optic Junction, that the Army 
executed down at Fort Gordon. We are looking at scaling that 
technology. It was specifically focused about how to find 
Chinese living off the land techniques, that we have seen 
repeatedly used.
 But the bigger piece, though, is really closing the loop 
between what we learn in our offensive capability and what our 
defensive teams are prepared to defend against, and literally, 
in real time, turning around that knowledge so that as we learn 
more, we use that information to drive our own defense of our 
networks, and artificial intelligence and automation is 
absolutely, 100 percent part of our plan.
 Senator Rosen. Thank you.
 Secretary Sutton. If you would not mind if I added in just 
one additional comment.
 Senator Rosen. Of course.
 Secretary Sutton. one of the things that I am really 
excited about with Cyber Command 2.0 is the Cyber Innovation 
Warfare Center, or the CIWC, which is really looking at how do 
we adopt all the innovation that is moving very rapidly in this 
domain, particularly AI and automation, and how do we 
operationalize that most effectively in the Department.
 So it is not just about acquiring a tool or a technology. 
There are a lot of non-material aspects that we will need to be 
successful. How do we need to train our workforce to most 
effectively use that tool? AI is going to change fundamentally 
what many of our work roles do in this domain, so how do we 
develop new training modules? What doctrine, what new tactics, 
techniques, and procedures do we need to develop to be able to 
fully leverage these new capabilities?
 So the model of the CIWC is to have an Innovation Warfare 
Center that can look at technologies that are going to have 
game-changing effects in our domain, bring in the operational 
input that General Hartman mentioned, and in a very short term, 
look at how we need to address everything we need to adopt that 
technology, both material and non-material, and then get that 
into our platforms as quickly as possible.
 It will be our tie to industry. It ties our operational 
force directly to industry, to allow this to happen at the 
speed at which we are seeing the capabilities come out.
 Senator Rosen. No, I could not agree more. Thank you for 
that answer. I do think artificial intelligence will potentiate 
what we can do, help us do it faster, maybe a little bit 
smarter. But it will help us pull it all together. Thank you 
for that.
 Senator Rounds. General Hartman, just a followup with 
regard to the response that you gave to Senator Rosen. One of 
the items that you talked about was kind of term of art when 
you say the Chinese are living off the land. Since this is an 
open meeting and it is going to be broadcast, can you share a 
little bit about what that means for folks that are out there, 
about how that works, what that means?
 General Hartman. It just means that the Chinese have 
executed a deliberate campaign in order to compromise United 
States networks, and they use negative commands and native 
features inside those networks to move around, to look like 
legitimate traffic that makes it difficult for us to find 
those.
 Senator Rounds. Is it fair to say, just confirm, they would 
be within our telecommunications systems today?
 General Hartman. So have seen them in telecommunications 
systems. We have seen them in critical infrastructure. That is 
the bad news. The good news is we see them, and we report them, 
and we execute operations to get them out of those networks. 
Increasingly, as we build expertise under the CYBERCOM 2.0 
program, it will allow us to do that more effectively.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you. I am just curious, as well, I am 
thinking now about universities across this country, and I am 
going to use an example in South Dakota, Dakota State 
University, where they produce, perhaps, 400 cyber 
professionals per year. They have jobs basically before they 
are out of school. They are in the Madison/Sioux Falls area in 
South Dakota. But a lot of them want to be a part of providing 
cyber protections.
 You have, and you need to be able to do not only cyber 
protection, defensive capabilities for the Department of 
Defense's programs, but you also then do offensive stuff, as 
well, and you need tools for both. Can you talk a little bit 
about what you have for capabilities in terms of getting young 
people involved in the development of those specific tools? 
These are tools that are not just traditional cyber tools but 
ones that have basically been agent-ized, for lack of a better 
term, using AI as a part of that process.
 Can you talk about the need for that and the availability 
for young people out there that want to be involved in this, 
who may not necessarily want to be directly involved full-time, 
but either through Guard units or through a civilian contract, 
and your interest in actually having them make contact with you 
along that line?
 General Hartman. Absolutely. So in the command, in our 
service components, each of those organizations have 
development organizations, and those development organizations 
work specifically with operational teams in order to produce 
capabilities. To date, that effort has not been as unified as 
we would like. It is one of the key work roles that we talk 
about. When Honorable Sutton talked about the CIWC, the CIWC is 
really going to be the organization that brings our service 
development units together and ensures that they have the 
absolute best training and they have access to the best 
development environments, they have modeling and simulation 
capabilities to really look at what are future capabilities. In 
each of those organizations we have both military and civilian 
members, and certainly there is an opportunity to work there. 
Across a number of our Reserve component units, we partner with 
them from a development standpoint.
 But I think that the latter part, Chairman, is where we 
really have to move forward with CYBERCOM 2.0, and it is how do 
we partner with cutting-edge, innovative, private companies 
that we can work with in order to produce capabilities that we 
need in order to execute operations. As I said in my opening 
statement, this probably is not the extremely large defense 
firms. It is these smaller organizations, often times made up 
of members that used to be in the Cyber Mission Force, or as 
part of the intelligence community. We are working with a 
number of those organizations right now in order to do that.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you. Senator Rosen?
 Senator Rosen. So you need the developers of the software 
for the end user, so this is where you are writing application 
software. This is where the collaboration between a software 
developer and your end user is, because we do not want to give 
you what we think you need. We want to give you what you 
actually need. So these are where the conversations about 
creating what you need, and the person goes to write that 
software for you, or however that gets done, or gives you the 
tools to let that happen dynamically with giving you the 
framework and they can put in certain particulars. So I am very 
excited about you doing this.
 That leads me to the question we always ask. What do you 
need from us? So you might need new authorities. You might need 
incentives--retention incentive payments, rotational programs, 
other legislation, things with the private sector, expedited 
clearance perhaps, if you are going to be using folks from the 
private sector.
 So we are going to be working. We are working on the NDAA, 
this next years, right, as we speak. So as you think about 
this, what are some things, off the top of your head, that will 
help us with readiness, workforce retention, private sector? 
What do you need from us as we go back and think about our next 
hearings, to get us ready for our good mark?
 Secretary Sutton. I will start out by saying how grateful 
we are for all of the things you have given us. I think there 
has been significant focus over the last 5 to 7 years on 
additional authorities, additional funding, additional pay. I 
think the Department, at this point, has a significant 
obligation to execute all of those, and I think we are on a 
good path to do that.
 At the moment, we have not identified any specific new 
authorities that are necessary. A lot of it is implementing the 
authorities and really maturing and fully leveraging the 
authorities that we already have. But do appreciate the offer, 
and intending that we will continue to work with you 
iteratively as we work through the implementation of Cyber 
Command 2.0, and identify things that we do need. You will be 
the first ones to know, and we will gladly get you that 
information.
 Senator Rosen. Anything else?
 General Hartman. I agree with Honorable Sutton. We 
appreciate all the additional authorities that we have been 
offered. We appreciate your advocacy for funding. It will be 
important as we implement 2.0, as we really build out the 
capabilities that we need from an artificial intelligence 
standpoint.
 I do believe there will be a discussion about how do we 
best fund the activation of our Reserve component forces, to 
ensure that we can do that in a sustainable, repeatable manner, 
that we are able to bring the talent to the Active Force in 
order to execute specific missions. There have been some good 
use case examples, but it is a system that is not optimized, 
and I do think we will work with the Department and Congress on 
how we might like to do that better in the future.
 Senator Rosen. So like my Civilian Cyber Reserve idea, 
perhaps.
 General Hartman. I think it is a great idea, Senator.
 Senator Rosen. General, you wanted to add something?
 Brigadier General Messer. Ma'am, I was just going to say 
thank you very much for the support that you have provided. I 
reflect what Honorable Sutton said of, you know, you have been 
exceptionally supportive. I think it is now time to fulfill 
CYBERCOM 2.0's objectives, and then from there continued 
support from Congress is much appreciated. Because as you both 
pointed out, this is a part of warfare in the 21st century, and 
will continue to be. So your support and advocacy, as well, is 
tremendous. So thank you.
 Senator Rosen. Well, I know I am thankful for your work and 
everyone that works with you, and I am especially grateful to 
be Ranking Member with Senator Rounds. Because on this 
Committee, we just see cyber on this Committee, right? It is 
really a pleasure to be able to think about these things in a 
meaningful way, going forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you, Senator Rosen. It is bipartisan, 
and it needs to stay that way. We need to look at how we fully 
mature this particular protection within this particular 
domain. I appreciate your help and the cooperation that the 
entire members on both sides have done in moving this forward, 
as clearly evidenced by the amount that we are getting done in 
each of the NDAAs over the last couple of years. So we 
appreciate that. Thank you.
 With that, this will conclude the open portion of today's 
Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing. Questions for the record 
will be due to the Committee within two business days of the 
conclusion of this hearing. General Hartman, I will take you 
up, at some point in the future we will set aside time for a 
classified hearing to learn a little bit more about the 
processes and the procedures that you did use so successfully. 
Thank you.
 General Hartman. Thank you, Senator.
 Senator Rounds. Thank you all for your sacrifice and 
service for our country. With that, this Committee meeting is 
adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]

 [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

 Questions Submitted by Joni K. Ernst
 cybersecurity
 1. Senator Ernst. Commanders today have more data than ever, yet 
decisionmaking timelines continue to compress. How do you turn 
information into actionable options that can easily be disseminated to 
the numerous headquarters/organizations you need to collaborate with in 
real time?
 Brigadier General Messer. There are a number of efforts ongoing at 
all times to acquire, implement, and employ systems to address the 
challenge of converting massive quantities of data into decision-
quality information. I would defer to the intelligence community and to 
combatant commands, including U.S. Cyber Command, to discuss these 
efforts in detail. From my position in the Joint Staff J-3, we work 
closely with combatant commands to make sure they have the authorities 
they need to move at speed, and we engage directly with their 
leadership to communicate vital information to decisionmakers in 
operationally relevant timelines.

 2. Senator Ernst. Given the widespread challenge of cybersecurity 
that cuts across all the military services and COCOMs, how do you 
improve shared planning, synchronization, and common understanding 
across organizations that operate on different timelines and systems 
and do so securely?
 Brigadier General Messer. The diversity of systems across our 
enterprise can indeed present challenges to cybersecurity, and U.S. 
Cyber Command and our cybersecurity ecosystem are focused on providing 
overwatch and continually improving that posture. The systems most 
relevant to current operations are those which feed leadership's 
decisionmaking. We interface directly with those leaders via secure 
means to eliminate any ambiguity, to pass guidance and priorities, and 
to receive information and updates. As we move into the future, the 
Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) effort seeks to 
tie together this information in a rapid, secure, and operationally 
relevant way.

 3. Senator Ernst. As operations become more distributed across 
domains and echelons, how must planning processes empower subordinate 
commanders while preserving unity of effort?
 Brigadier General Messer. Successfully orchestrating unity of 
effort across our 11 Combatant Commands blends strategic science with 
operational art. The ``science'' is our framework for global 
integration, where we translate strategic priorities into clear, 
executable campaign plans enabling subordinate commanders to 
confidently act within the intent of their senior leaders and 
policymakers. The Joint Planning Process plays a critical role in this 
framework, ensuring the Joint Force integrates effects across domains 
and aligns efforts with strategic objectives. The ``art'' is the 
seasoned judgment of our commanders, whose feedback ensures that our 
forces have the authorities, guidance, and intent required to take 
decisive action and maintain a competitive advantage.

 4. Senator Ernst. What role do digital planning tools and common 
operational pictures play in enabling distributed teams to plan and 
update the plan in near real time?
 Brigadier General Messer. The Joint Force must execute coordinated 
and synchronized operations across geographic regions, functions, 
domains, and time. Enabling distributed teams to plan and update plans 
in real time requires proper integration across the Department and with 
the wider U.S. Interagency. Digital planning tools offer the 
opportunity for the Department to better integrate planning functions, 
consume vast amounts of data, and compile decision-quality information, 
but they must be used correctly. Effective command hinges on agile 
leaders who can translate a deep understanding of the operational 
environment and a large volume of information into decisive action. A 
common operating picture provides the necessary battlefield clarity by 
ensuring the right information is available to the right decisionmakers 
at the right time. This enables commanders to identify and exploit 
fleeting windows of opportunity to achieve objectives.

 5. Senator Ernst. How does innovation in planning enable trust, 
shared understanding, and disciplined initiative across the force?
 Brigadier General Messer. To achieve the commander's intent in 
dynamic environments, subordinates must exercise initiative and 
innovate beyond existing orders. Leaders, in turn, must underwrite the 
calculated risks taken by their teams, empowering them to seize 
emergent opportunities and accelerate the operational tempo.

 6. Senator Ernst. What lessons have you learned about scaling 
planning across geographic distance, time zones, and classification 
levels?
 Brigadier General Messer. Crises can evolve over time or develop 
with little to no warning; early planning guidance is essential to 
inform later decisions. At the same time, modern technology has 
effectively collapsed the distance between decision and action. Near-
real-time global communications and collaborative systems empower a 
flattened, accelerated operational tempo. While multi-level 
classification can introduce initial friction, this is surmountable. By 
empowering teams to develop elements of the solution at the lowest 
possible level, we can enable distributed, parallel planning efforts 
that converge at the decisive point, ensuring security without 
sacrificing speed.

 7. Senator Ernst. How does technological interoperability--or the 
lack of it--affect our ability to plan and operate effectively with 
allies and partners?
 Brigadier General Messer. While the Joint Staff J-6 is the 
authority on technological interoperability, the operational 
consequences of its absence can be significant. Systemic gaps force 
manual data replication, leading to fragmented decisionmaking and 
slower action. While we can always improve, we have leveraged close 
relationships, bilateral liaison and exchange officers, and 
multilateral exercises to address these shortfalls to the maximum 
extent possible.
 During the recent United Kingdom Carrier Strike Group 25, Operation 
HIGHMAST, the United States and UK operationally demonstrated the 
effectiveness of modernized mission partner information sharing. 
Modernized zero trust and data centric information sharing capabilities 
are being further matured for demonstration in U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command's area of responsibility during an event called Olympus-FIRES 
(October 2026).

 8. Senator Ernst. What innovations have proven most valuable in 
enabling multinational staff to collaborate, plan, and make decisions 
together at speed?
 Brigadier General Messer. Planning and exercising with our allies 
and partners is vital. It allows us to foresee issues and encounter 
them in a training or planning context so that we can avoid surprise in 
a crisis or conflict. These are also potent venues for innovative 
thinking and problem solving.

 9. Senator Ernst. In coalition environments, how do shared planning 
tools contribute to faster consensus and more resilient decisionmaking?
 Brigadier General Messer. Planning in coalition environments brings 
additional complexities, such as additional time to approve plans by 
all participating international authorities. Key to any multinational 
operation is unity of effort among military leaders and emphasizing 
common objectives and shared interests. Shared planning tools can 
eliminate the information and data lags that could hinder multinational 
operations, preventing the need to manually move data between disparate 
partner systems.

 10. Senator Ernst. What challenges remain in aligning U.S. systems 
with allied capabilities, and where could targeted innovation deliver 
the greatest impact?
 Brigadier General Messer. From a Joint Cyber perspective, the 
primary challenge has evolved beyond simple network connectivity to the 
full synchronization of cyber effects at the speed of multi-domain 
operations. While our kinetic systems are achieving greater alignment, 
the underlying digital infrastructure remains fragmented by disparate 
architectures, policies, and legal frameworks.
 To bridge this gap, the Department is deeply engaged in numerous 
multinational standardization forums, including with NATO and other key 
coalition partners. The strategic objective is to dismantle these 
digital barriers and forge the unified architecture required for 
seamless, high-tempo coalition warfare.

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