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- REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS [Senate Hearing 119-508] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-508 REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 24, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-416 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan Rick Berger, Staff Director Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director (ii) C O N T E N T S ___________ february 24, 2026 Page Rebuilding American Critical Minerals Supply Chains.............. 1 Members Statements Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 1 Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 3 Witness Statements Cadenazzi, The Honorable Michael P., Jr., Assistant Secretary of 4 Defense for Industrial Base Policy. Frankston, Mr. Jeffrey, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 10 Defense for Industrial Base Resilience. Questions for the Record......................................... 29 (iii) REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS ---------- TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2026 United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Ernst, Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Banks, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, Warren, and Kelly. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER Chairman Wicker. The Committee meets today to discuss the State of our country's critical mineral supply chains, and what can be done to make them stronger and more resilient. It's no exaggeration to say that America's resilience [sic] on Chinese critical minerals represents one of our greatest strategic vulnerabilities. Twice last year, Chinese Communist Party Leader, Xi Jinping, threatened to cutoff exports of Chinese rare earths. This would've brought American defense manufacturing to its knees and deeply damaged the United States economy. Our advanced weapon systems and key parts of our civilian economy rely on critical minerals materials that are largely imported from China. Specifically, America imports over 70, 70 percent, of our rare earths from China. These elements are the backbone of permanent magnets, and perhaps the most important component for phones, cars, and military systems. More than 60 percent of American antimony comes from China. Antimony is a necessary ingredient for many explosives, electronics, and batteries. I could go on with other examples, but the simple point is this: The scale of China's critical minerals domination is wholly unprecedented. The situation is untenable for America's national security and economic prosperity. The good news is that the U.S. Government is forming a plan which will simultaneously reestablish critical minerals as a global free market, and significantly increase American mining and production of these key elements. This effort will take more than a decade. They will face setbacks. It cannot be achieved without leaning on our allies and partners, and it will be expensive, but it is a necessary risk. The Pentagon has been and will be at the center of these efforts, given the centrality of critical minerals to our weapons manufacturing, and that brings us to the committee's interest in this matter. Joining us today are two Pentagon officials, Mr. Mike Cadenazzi, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, and sir, I hope I pronounced your name exactly correct. Mr. Cadenazzi. You did. Absolutely, sir. Chairman Wicker. Cadenazzi. Okay. Assistant secretary of defense--oh, and then Mr. Jeff Frankston, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience. Both Mr. Cadenazzi, and Mr. Frankston, and the teams they lead have done important work. They performed a deep analysis of both our military's requirements for critical minerals, and the State of industrial production from mining to refining across the globe. That data-driven approach is leading to new investments by the Industrial Base Fund, the Defense Production Act (DPA), and the National Defense Stockpile. It's also driving interagency investments from the Development Finance Corporation, the Department of Commerce, and others. It is imperative that our investment strategy remain closely tied to the areas of greatest military need. Rebuilding America's critical mineral supply chains will require additional investments. Last year's Defense reconciliation bill included $5 billion for the Industrial Base Fund, $2 billion for the National Defense Stockpile, and a $100 billion loan limit for the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Those appropriations have already paid dividends. Last year, the Pentagon signed deals with MP Materials and a consortium of Vulcan, ReElement, and Corning for magnet production. Another investment went to ElementUSA, which will be making progress on obtaining gallium and scandium from a recycling process. We have brought Australia, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia into deals where mining or refining opportunities do not exist here in the United States. The good news is that we do not need to outspend Communist China on this effort. We can leverage our private capital markets, one of our few remaining comparative advantages against Beijing. Many of our allies and partners have incredible mining and refining opportunities. Dozens of countries are poised to ditch the predatory debt trap diplomacy Beijing has foisted upon them in this area. As to private capital markets, I appreciate the Pentagon's use of innovative financial tools to power these deals. In some cases, Congress has spoken clearly on these tools. The committee created the Office of Strategic Capital Loan Program 3 years ago during the Biden administration. Since then, we have remained intimately involved in amending its legislation. In other cases, such as the use of equity-based investments, little law currently exists. I believe these equity-based investments make good strategic sense in many cases, particularly where no free market exists and where we've seen aggressive Chinese economic warfare. However, opinions range wildly between and within our two political parties. While not public, Ranking Member Reed and I had a long series of discussions with our House counterparts last year about legislation regarding equity investments. I anticipate that conversation will continue in earnest this year. This legislation is both important and urgent because rebuilding America's critical mineral supply chains will take more than a decade. We must give the free markets confidence that America's approach will stand the test of time and succeed in unshackling the world from Beijing's market domination. To do that, we need effective government tools built on a solid foundation of law and bipartisan support. This year, the committee has much work to do in this endeavor. We will discuss equity as an investment tool. We will examine the need for continued multi-billion-dollar investments in this area. We'll consider further improvements to the National Defense Stockpile authorities, and we will expect improvements in communication from Pentagon leadership on our investment strategy. Congress understands the need to execute quickly, but that cannot excuse a lack of communication and partnership between the Congress and the Administration. I hope today's hearing is the beginning of a historic year in which this committee and the Trump administration work together to rebuild America's supply chain. So, thank you to our witnesses for being here today. It should be very interesting, and I turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Reed. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to our witnesses. Thank you for appearing today on a matter that is of great importance to this country, and, indeed, the free world. Over the past several decades, the United States has steadily lost its leadership in critical minerals from World War II, through the 1980's, we led the way in critical mineral production and lithium-ion battery manufacturing. But over time, American industry shifted from that production overseas, primarily to Asia, in pursuit of savings. The consequence of those decisions are now very apparent. Today, China dominates the processing and refining of the materials that make our most advanced weapon systems function, from the rare earth elements, and radar, and missile guidance systems, to the battery chemistry powering the next generation of drones. The Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for less than 1 percent of total U.S. critical mineral demand, but an enormous range of critical military platforms depend on it. Congress has worked to address this issue through successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). We have increased resources for the National Defense Stockpile, encouraged end-of-life recycling of weapon systems, qualified domestic vendors, and restricted procurement from unreliable foreign entities. Those efforts matter, but what has been missing is a coherent, overarching national strategy that aligns the Department of Defense, Commerce, Energy, and Interior, as well as our allies around a common framework. Without that, we risk patching holes rather than building something durable. I'd like to know how our witnesses regard such a strategy and what efforts are currently underway. I do have one major concern regarding the Defense Department's current strategy, and that is the use of equity investments under the Defense Production Act. In July of last year, the Department announced that it acquired a 15 percent equity stake in MP Materials, a rare earth mining company in California, at a cost of $400 million, making the U.S. military one of that company's largest shareholders. Since then, the Department has made equity investments in a number of critical mineral companies. I have questions about the legal basis, financial terms, and strategic rationale for these transactions. The legal basis in particular appears questionable. The Department has argued that the Defense Production Act provides the authority for these investments. However, while the Defense Production Act does authorize the purchase of industrial resources for government use, it does not mention equity investments at all. The fact that the Trump administration's Office of Management and Budget has subsequently requested a legislative proposal to explicitly authorize equity investment, suggests that the Administration itself recognizes the current authority is uncertain, and that should give us pause. Further, the Department committed to purchasing magnets from MP Materials at $110 per kilogram for 10 years beginning in 2028, the committee has not received an explanation of how that price was determined or why that duration was appropriate. We have also heard from other domestic producers that this arrangement affects their ability to compete, which raises broader questions about market effects and unintended consequences of government intervention. Finally, I understand that a small team was dispatched to evaluate the MP Materials' transaction, including outside consultants, but this committee has had very limited visibility into that review. I have concerns about potential conflicts of interest given the financial interest that certain stakeholders appear to have in this transaction. The committee's interest is straightforward. We want to understand whether this transaction, and the equity investment model, and use of price floors more broadly represent the most effective and legally sound way to rebuild domestic critical minerals capacity, and I look forward to a substantive discussion with our witness today. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. Now, Secretary Cadenazzi, we will begin with you. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. CADENAZZI, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY Mr. Cadenazzi. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of War (DOW) strategy and actions to secure resilienT supply chain for critical minerals. This issue is fundamental to our national security, and the technological superiority of our military. I'm joined here today by Mr. Jeff Frankston, our acting deputy assistant secretary of war for industrial base resilience. A career member of the Senior Executive Service, Jeff is my technical expert on supply chain resilience, the Defense Production Act, and the Industrial Base Fund. We are thankful for the talents and selfless patriotic service of Jeff and our entire civilian workforce. Thank you, Jeff. As the assistant secretary of war for industrial base policy, I'm responsible for guiding the Department's efforts to cultivate and sustain industries that meet America's needs, and the growing demand for U.S. capabilities from our allies and partners around the world. The strength of the United States Armed Forces built upon a foundation of advanced technology, our fifth-generation aircraft, precision-guided munitions, satellite constellations, and next-generation naval vessels, all depend on a reliable supply of rare earth element, and minerals including; gallium, antimony, germanium, and dozens of others. For decades, we have outsourced and offshore mining and processing, creating a strategic vulnerability of the highest order. Today, our primary strategic competitor, China, controls the global supply chain for numerous critical minerals. On heavy rare earths alone, China controls 95 percent of global output, with the United States importing almost 100 percent of what we use, 90 percent of that coming from China. This control provides Beijing with the ability to weaponize these supply chains, threatening to disrupt our defense industrial base (DIB), and compromise military readiness in a crisis. This is not a theoretical risk; it is a clear and present danger to our national security. The Department of War considers the reclamation of our critical mineral independence a strategic imperative, and calls it out as such, and the Acquisition Transformation Strategy, published this past November, Congress also clearly recognizes the need as the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, classified critical minerals as strategic assets vital for national defense and economic security. Since the beginning of the Administration, the Office of Industrial Base Policy has been at the very center of these initiatives. The team is working night and day to rebuild American critical mineral supply chains. In this time, we have invested $975 million in minerals through Title III of the Defense Production Act and the Industrial Based Fund. The Department of War has developed a comprehensive multi- year strategy to address this vulnerability head on. Our approach is founded on four key pillars designed to create a secure, resilient, and sustainable supply chain ecosystem. Pillar one, is our commitment to reshore and onshore the production of critical minerals. We continue to map Defense industry to independent--or dependence on China, and are focused on removing those dependencies from our supply chains. Congress providing $5 billion in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, specifically for critical minerals, is a significant investment and one we very much appreciate. We are also leveraging authorities granted by Congress, particularly under Title III of the DPA and the Industrial Base Fund, to catalyze investment in domestic exploration, mining, and processing. We partner with our colleagues in the Office of Strategic Capital to offer loans, loan guarantees, and debt financing options. This expands our collaboration and cooperation with the interagency and international partners on bringing mineral supply chains to friendly shores. Through these tools, we're sending a clear and sustained demand signal to the industrial base. We are working across the entire value chain, from mine to frontline, to build our resilience. For example, the MP Materials deal helps secure a domestic source of rare earth elements, and the Department continues to take action in concert with our interagency partners to decisively secure the U.S. rare earth supply chain. The Korea zinc effort will build a smelter in the U.S. to produce 13 different non-ferrous metals, including; germanium, gallium, and antimony-metals used in space, power generation, advanced optics, and munitions, among other uses. Additionally, $184 million in prior investments will provide high performance magnets, germanium, crystal, and other critical mineral derivatives and capabilities. Next, while we prioritize domestic production, we recognize that no single nation can achieve complete self-sufficiency. Therefore, our second pillar focuses on building robust, transparent, and reliable supply chains with our closest allies and partners. This friend-sharing approach diversifies our sourcing away from high-risk geopolitical areas and compliments our pillar one efforts to build new end-to-end sources of supply, foster secure, and reliable transport and logistics networks, and transform the global market into one that is secure, diversified, and resilient. We are actively working with partners to jointly invest in secure supply from responsible mining and processing operations across the globe. For our third pillar, the Department is aggressively investing in research and development to mitigate demand for the most heavily contested minerals. Our scientists at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and other service research labs are pioneering the pioneering the development of next generation materials and novel manufacturing techniques that can reduce or eliminate the need for certain rare earth and other critical inputs. Simultaneously, we are funding the development of advanced recycling technologies. For example, we invested $29.9 million in ElementUSA to recover gallium and scandium from waste residue left over from alumina refining. By creating a robust circular economy, we can reclaim valuable materials from our own waste streams, from spent batteries, to decommissioned electronics, turning our liability into a strategic asset and a secure domestic source of supply. As our final pillar, we are modernizing the National Defense Stockpile to ensure it serves as an effective buffer against near-term supply chain shocks. We are conducting a rigorous data-driven analysis of our strategic requirements for a 21st century contested environment, and are taking action to acquire materials that face the most acute supply chain risks. Congress stepped up to help us with this effort, providing $2 billion in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. This modernized stockpile will provide the insurance we need as we execute our long-term strategy of rebuilding the domestic industrial base. The committee asked for an update on recent and planned deals, and I am pleased to report significant progress. I will highlight two recent examples. We have finalized a landmark agreement with a Canadian partner to secure a long-term supply of gallium derived from new non-traditional mining techniques, reducing reliance on Chinese sources for this critical semiconductor material. The Department also recently entered into a joint research and develoment (R&D) agreement with Australia to co-fund the development of substitutes for dysprosium, and terbium, and high-performance magnets. In closing, I want to emphasize that establishing secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains is a generational challenge, but it is a challenge we must and will meet. The era of complacency is over. The Department of War, in concert with industry, our allies, and partners, and with the vital support of this committee, is committed to executing this strategy with urgency and resolve. Securing these supply chains is not merely an economic issue, it is a foundational element of our national defense. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your questions. [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston follows:] Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Michael Cadenazzi and Mr. Jeffrey Frankston, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to address a matter of profound importance to the United States: the security and resilience of U.S. Supply Chain's Critical Minerals. The very foundation of our National Defense, our economic prosperity, and our technological leadership rests upon a reliable supply of essential materials. For decades, we made the intentional decision to outsource these capabilities. This led to the erosion of our industrial strength and placed our security in the hands of nations that do not share our interests. Today, I am here to report that the Department of War, in concert with our partners across the Government and in the private sector, is taking decisive action to reverse this trend and restore American industrial sovereignty. The term ``Critical Minerals'' is not an abstract economic classification, it is a roll call of the essential building blocks of modern warfare. The neodymium iron boron magnets in the guidance fins of a Tomahawk missile, the cobalt in the high-performance alloys of an F-35's jet engine, the gallium arsenide in the advanced radar systems that protect our fleet, the nickel in the batteries that power our soldiers' communications gear--these are not commodities; they are capabilities. They represent the margin of victory in a potential conflict. For too long, we have treated these vital inputs as simple commodities, subject to the whims of global markets. We have watched as the complex, capital-intensive, and often challenging work of mining, separating, and processing these minerals has migrated overseas. The result, is a strategic vulnerability of the highest order. Today, the United States is over 90 percent import-reliant for around 25 critical minerals, and over 50 percent reliant on foreign sources for more than 50. A significant and, in some cases, dominant share of the global processing capacity for these and other minerals is consolidated within China's borders. This is not a hypothetical risk. China has demonstrated its willingness to weaponize its dominance of Supply Chains. Its temporary suspension of rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, was a shot across the bow for the entire industrialized world. The more recent export controls on gallium and germanium, and intrusive licensing requirements imposed on numerous other materials, are a stark reminder that Beijing views its control over these resources as a lever of geopolitical power, to be used to coerce and constrain its rivals. We cannot, and we will not, allow the operational readiness of the United States Armed Forces to be held hostage by the strategic calculus of an adversary. The challenge is immense, but so is our resolve. The Department of War has developed and is actively implementing a comprehensive, long- term strategy to mitigate these risks. Our approach is not one of autarky or isolationism, but of strategic resilience. It is built upon four mutually reinforcing pillars: first, aggressively revitalizing our domestic production capabilities; second, strengthening our alliances and ``friend-shoring'' Supply Chains with trusted partners; third, driving innovation in substitution and recycling to reduce demand; and fourth, modernizing the National Defense Stockpile to serve as a strategic buffer against disruption. Today, I will detail our progress in each of these areas, highlighting the powerful tools we are deploying--including the Defense Production Act (DPA) and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program--and the strategic investments we are making to secure our industrial future. The first and most crucial pillar of our strategy is the revitalization of a robust, end-to-end domestic Supply Chain. The U.S. is blessed with significant geological endowments of many critical minerals. The fact that we are import-reliant is not a consequence of geology, but of policy and economics. For decades, a combination of burdensome and under-resourced permitting processes, unfair competition from state-subsidized foreign entities, and a lack of sustained investment has hollowed out our domestic industrial base. We are now systematically rebuilding it. Our primary tools in this effort are the authorities granted under Title III of the DPA, the funding provided under the IBAS program, and the loan authorities granted to the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). These allow the Department to move beyond the role of a mere customer and act as a strategic partner with industry, de-risking private investment and catalyzing the development of capabilities that the market, on its own, has failed to provide. Additionally, we are working with interagency partners and key international partners and allies in addressing joint critical mineral opportunities. The MP Materials partnership that was signed last year for rare earth magnet Supply Chains, while transformational, is just one component of a much broader portfolio of investments aimed at onshoring critical mineral production: Gallium is an essential mineral for integrated circuits, solar cells, and radar systems, among many other key defense and industrial applications. Although we have more to do, DOW's recent $29.9 million award to recover gallium and scandium from alumina processing waste will help reduce our 100 percent dependency on foreign sources for gallium. Germanium is a major supply constraint in our defense optics Supply Chains. DOW's recent awards in this area will greatly improve capacity at multiple nodes of our domestic germanium supply chain to include recycling, metal refining, and germanium crystal growth. Graphite for Anodes: Batteries need anodes as well as cathodes. The U.S. is currently 100 percent import-reliant for battery- grade graphite, with most coming from China. To remedy this, we have invested $35.3 million to accelerate development of a vertically integrated graphite anode supply chain in Alaska, linking a large, high-grade graphite deposit with an advanced processing facility. Titanium for Aerospace and Armor: The U.S. has long been a leader in titanium technology but has become increasingly reliant on foreign sources for titanium sponge, the primary metal input. Our $47.1 million investment is supporting the scale-up of a breakthrough technology that can produce high-quality titanium powder directly from minerals or from scrap, reducing costs and energy consumption while strengthening the domestic supply chain for this critical aerospace and armor material. These are just a few examples. Since the beginning of the Administration, the IBAS program and DPA authorities have channeled $975 million into 15 projects aimed at expanding the domestic production of strategic and critical materials. We are also very grateful to Congress for the $5 billion provided for minerals in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA). We are actively seeking new opportunities to invest in everything from antimony and tungsten to manganese and beryllium, addressing vulnerabilities across the entire spectrum of the Department's needs. While our primary focus is on revitalizing domestic production, we recognize that complete self-sufficiency is neither achievable nor desirable. Our second pillar, therefore, is to build a resilient network of trusted international partners--a concept we refer to as ``friend-shoring.'' The goal is to create a collective industrial base among allied nations, diversifying our Supply Chains away from geostrategic rivals and ensuring multiple, redundant sources of supply. Our closest allies are also our most important partners in this endeavor. These are nations that share our commitment to free markets, the rule of law, and responsible and sustainable practices. Australia: Our partnership with Australia is a cornerstone of our friend-shoring strategy. Australia possesses some of the world's largest and highest-grade deposits of rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and other critical minerals. We are working closely through the Australia--United States Critical Minerals and Metals Taskforce to align our investment strategies, promote joint ventures between our respective companies, and accelerate the development of new mines and processing facilities in Australia that can directly feed into the United States Defense Industrial Base. Canada: The deep integration of the United States and Canadian Defense Industrial Bases makes Canada a natural and essential partner. The United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals, signed in 2020, provides a robust framework for collaboration on securing supply chains for a wide range of minerals, including nickel, potash, uranium, and cobalt. We are working with our Canadian counterparts to map our complementary geological resources and processing capacities and to identify opportunities for joint investment to create a more resilient North American industrial ecosystem. Our friend-shoring strategy is not just about securing raw materials, it is also about collaborating with downstream manufacturing partners like Japan and South Korea. These nations are world leaders in the production of advanced technologies like batteries, semiconductors, and permanent magnets. By partnering with them, we can ensure that as we and our other allies bring new upstream resources online, there is a secure and reliable downstream demand outside of the People's Republic of China, completing the ``mine-to- metal'' or ``mine-to-battery'' supply chain among trusted allies. The third pillar of our strategy focuses on the demand side of the equation. In addition to increasing the supply of Critical Minerals, we must also work to reduce our long-term dependence on them. We are pursuing this through a two-pronged approach: investing in the development of substitute materials and creating a robust circular economy through advanced recycling. Every material for which we can design a substitute is a material we no longer need to source from a contested supply chain. The Department of War, through its world-class research and development enterprise, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the O.ce of Naval Research (ONR), and the Air Force and Army Research Laboratories (AFRL, ARL), is at the forefront of this effort. The Environmental Microbes as a BioEngineering Resource (EMBER) program will develop a biotechnology-based separation and purification strategy for Rare Earth Elements (REEs) from under- utilized domestic sources such as phosphate mine waste, acid mine drainage, and electronics recycling processes. The program aims to deliver multiple capabilities such as the separation of REE mixtures into individual elements using aqueous processes; inter-conversion of REE salts/oxides to facilitate production of manufacturing-ready forms (e.g., halides, phosphates, nitrates); and new assays for high- throughput analysis of REE-containing cells and biomolecules. Cobalt-Free Battery Chemistries: The Department is a major investor in the development of next-generation battery technologies. A key focus of this research is reducing or eliminating the use of cobalt, a material whose supply chain is plagued by geopolitical risk and ethical concerns. We are supporting research into a range of alternative chemistries, from high-manganese cathodes to lithium-sulfur and solid-State batteries, that promise to deliver equal or greater performance without reliance on cobalt. Hypersonic Materials: The intense heat and stress experienced by hypersonic vehicles demand exotic materials and alloys. We are funding research into ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) and new superalloys that can withstand these extreme environments, reducing our reliance on traditional materials like tungsten and rhenium. The second prong of our demand-side strategy is recycling, or what is often termed ``urban mining.'' The accumulated stock of end-of-life military hardware, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment represents a vast, untapped domestic reserve of critical minerals. We are investing in the technologies and infrastructure needed to mine this resource. A past $4.2 million investment in Nebraska is a prime example. This project is developing and expanding production of terbium oxide from recycled fluorescent light bulbs. Terbium is a vital rare earth for many magnets in defense systems and is in short supply as it makes up less than 1 percent of total rare earth content in most deposits. By developing a recycling solution for this rarest of rare earths, this project is providing key and timely capability to the defense industrial base. Similarly, we are funding research and pilot projects to develop efficient and economical methods for recovering cobalt, lithium, and nickel from spent lithium-ion batteries, and for extracting rare earths from the permanent magnets in old hard drives, electric motors, and defense equipment. Our goal is to create a true circular economy, where the materials from today's systems become the feedstock for tomorrow's capabilities, and to complement the need for new mining. The final pillar of our strategy is the modernization of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS). The NDS was created in the aftermath of World War II to provide a strategic reserve of raw materials to sustain the Nation through a prolonged conflict. However, the nature of warfare and the structure of our industrial base have changed dramatically since the 1940s. Therefore, we are undertaking a fundamental reimagining of the NDS to make it a more dynamic and effective tool for 21st century national security. Our new approach to the NDS has several key elements: Moving Down the Value Chain: We are increasingly focused on the acquisition of higher-purity, processed materials further downstream in our supply chains. In the case of rare earths, for instance, this means ensuring the acquisition of separated high-purity oxides, metals, and alloys--and even finished components like magnets-- rather than just unrefined concentrates. This ensures we are stockpiling the materials that represent the true bottlenecks in the supply chain. Dynamic Requirements and Authorities: The list of materials and quantities required for the NDS must be a living document, constantly updated to reflect changes in military technology, geopolitical risk, and the status of the domestic industrial base. We are working with Congress to secure dedicated, no-year funding for the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund, and operationalizing the flexible authorities already granted by Congress to take advantage of time-sensitive acquisitions to better mitigate immediate risk and ensure as well as enable offtake agreements to send a reliable demand signal to industry to ensure we have the materials necessary to withstand the increasingly frequent shocks to the Defense Industrial Base caused by adversarial economic practices. We are grateful for the $2 billion provided for the NDS by the OBBBA and urge Members of this Committee to continue to support resourcing this national asset. A well-funded, modern NDS is one of the most cost-effective insurance policies our Nation can buy. The Committee has asked for an update to the `chiclet chart' that details how China's influence puts systems at risk--and shows graphically how the Department is addressing this. An updated copy of this chart is included with this written testimony. Our strategy and investments are focused on turning red into green on this chart. In concert with our interagency partners, we are actively progressing projects and negotiations related to all these minerals. It is clear we have a great deal of work to do to reverse thirty-plus years of counterproductive industrial policy. We do not have 30 years to resolve this issue. My team is working tirelessly to address this. I could not be prouder of their work. It is clear we must continue to accelerate our efforts. I look forward to working with the Committee on this vital issue. Rebuilding our Critical Minerals Supply Chains is a generational undertaking. It will not be accomplished overnight. It will require sustained investment, sustained focus, and a sustained partnership between the government, industry, and our allies. The investments we are making today will take years to mature into fully operational, at- scale capabilities. There will be setbacks along the way. Our adversaries will not stand idly by; they will continue to use their market power to try to undermine our efforts. But we will not be deterred. The security of our Nation and the future of our industrial strength are at stake. The Department of War is committed to this mission for the long haul. We are using every tool at our disposal to onshore, ``friend-shore,'' innovate, and stockpile our way to a more resilient future. We are making America a hard target for economic coercion and ensuring that our warfighters will never depend on the goodwill of an adversary for the tools they need to defend our Nation. I thank the Committee for its continued support of our efforts and for its leadership on this vital national security issue. I welcome your questions. Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Frankston, and you're recognized. STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY FRANKSTON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE RESILIENCE Mr. Frankston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to everything that Mr. Cadenazzi just mentioned, one of the things that I want to emphasize is the full and unified interagency cooperation on this effort. This is a subject area that is not new, but has been turbocharged in the collaboration and cooperation as we work together across each of the interagency partners to identify the gaps, to have common targets, common understanding of our both domestic challenges, and then, in particular, from our perspective, Department of War needs. We work together on a daily, if not hourly basis, across the interagency with our international partners, with industry, to identify the gaps and challenges here. Our office oversees the policy for the National Defense Stockpile, as Honorable Cadenazzi mentioned. This is a key aspect that is a direct opportunity for our country to build a resilient capability. The stockpile is one of the major statutory pieces that we have taken the funding to implement a direct challenge--or to address a direct challenge on how we're addressing critical minerals. I look forward to answering the rest of the Committee's questions. Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Well, Secretary Cadenazzi, you say the era of complacency is over. Mr. Frankston, you say that this issue is not new. I've been on this committee since 2008. Maybe I should be ashamed of myself. How is it that China, if they had persisted in their threat to cutoff exports, could've brought us to our knees? How do we get to this point, Mr. Secretary? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're engaged in a long-term competition with our primary strategic competitor in China. They've engaged in malign adversarial efforts to manipulate markets to secure control, change supply, and to undermine our own efforts to maintain a domestic market that's been coupled with natural economic incentives to outsource to the lowest supplier, the lowest cost provider, which China often is as a result of their lack of compliance with environmental and standard kind of work laws that we would have in the West, particularly in the States. Therefore, they've demonstrated a willingness to go ahead and create and invest these capabilities, undercutting our ability to sustain this. We've taken action in part, at times we've invested, but it's been inadequate to the scale of the threat posed by China in this time. Therefore, I think the issue, the opportunity we have before us today is to go ahead and take a demonstrated committed effort, well-resourced and aligned across both parties, with the support of this committee and the Congress, to go ahead and fundamentally reshape those markets. We believe our investments and efforts at this front are our starting point. Chairman Wicker. Well, I understand. We have no question of and no choice, but to go forward as quickly as we can. I'm not pointing the finger at anybody in particular, and I think I acknowledged that I'm a bit nonplussed about this, but we've been hearing for several administrations that China is our pacing threat. It just seems to me that collectively, we should have been tackling this a long time ago. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I can't speak to the previous efforts, but it's clear that the position we're in right now is inadequate to the needs of the Nation with regards to both our domestic economic performance and national security. Chairman Wicker. Okay. Now, you're going to be asked about this new approach. Of course, we deal with the industry a lot, but the idea of equity is something that there are going to be questions about on both sides of the dais. Why is it the way to go, in your judgment, on this issue of critical minerals? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, the issue of--or the opportunity that equity provides us is that it's a catalyst for private investment and a more aggressive way of reconciling what has been a failed market-based approach to address this national security need. We have invested small amounts of money. We provided grants, we've tried to incentivize through tax incentives and things like that---- Chairman Wicker. How far back did we start trying that? Mr. Cadenazzi. How far back--sorry, Senator? Chairman Wicker. You say we've tried other approaches. Mr. Cadenazzi. I believe we tried consistently for the past 10 or 15 years, if you sort of read the press. I'm sure there are more significant investments that I'm not aware of, but it's pretty clear that the things that have been done have been inadequate to the scale, and have not resulted in the outcomes that we've wanted. I think that's the measure is on an outcome basis. As of last year, and currently, our dependence on China for rare earths remains significantly high, and so, the acquisitions in the past have not met our needs. We think that the---- Chairman Wicker. But if conflict had broken out in the last couple of years, last year, between the United States and China, which of course we certainly hope we can avoid by being strong enough, it would've brought us to our knees. Well, could you help us understand--well, do you agree with my statement there? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it's very clear that the willingness of China to turn off the spigot on rare earths last year, represented a significant threat to national security, and would've been debilitating to both domestic industry and to the defense industrial base. Chairman Wicker. Specifically? Mr. Cadenazzi. I think there are many systems which are highly dependent upon rare earths and other elements, which would've been struggled to get access to those outside of the National Defense Stockpile, which thankfully, we have a significant amount stored away that probably would've carried us through for a period of time. Presumably, we would've engaged in aggressive action to unlock mining both domestically and with partners to mitigate those gaps. We would've fundamentally shifted the production curve in a way that would've prevented that for the long haul, but in the short term, there definitely would've been a crunch that would've impacted our ability to produce the weapon systems we need. Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Reed. Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you in holding this hearing, because as you've indicated, we have not paid the kind of attention in the Congress that we should have, nor have the Administration, so thank you. Mr. Cadenazzi, we've heard from various companies in the minerals market that an equity stake and a 10-year price floor for MP Materials, where the government literally picking winners and losers puts other companies at a competitive disadvantage. How can other domestic companies remain competitive when DOD invests so heavily in one company and provides that company a competitive advantage, like a guaranteed price floor. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, at the time, the MP Materials deal, we felt was necessary to meet the needs of the moment, that is to immediately stimulate rare earth's investment and demand. The company, MP, has been invested in by the government in the past for the past 15 years. We've, at various times, attempted to move the needle on domestic rare earth production using that particular firm and location. At the time, we felt the need to go ahead and move forward with a more aggressive model that would lock in the equity stake, and create the offtake agreements and the price floors. The price floors are determined by a set of open-market analyses reflecting our best understanding of what an open, Western market would look like, as opposed to the manipulated Chinese price floor. As we've seen since that time, prices domestically have actually increased to the point where they're roughly, in some reports, around $110 per kilogram, which is where the price floor is at. So, we think we've successfully created the mechanism to generate more transparent and market-based pricing mechanisms. That's to everyone's benefits. We've also crowded in additional investments, we've seen additional companies committed to spending in this space, and that all is a beginning point for us to create a more liquid and robust domestic market for rare earths. Senator Reed. I've also been informed that MP Material mines rely on in their production process on a heavy rare earth element or elements from an unknown third-party source. Can you tell us what that--who that third party is and what country it is located in? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're in the process of working through right now to go ahead and identify additional sources for rare earths to improve their processing capabilities. There's an optimal mix of light and heavy rare earths, and I think I defer to Jeff on this that we were working to go ahead and strike supply with. So, we've struck additional deals with a Brazilian company, and we're in discussions with a Saudi Arabian company to provide access to additional raw materials. Senator Reed. Who is providing the material to MP Materials now? What country, what third-party country? Mr. Cadenazzi. There's Serra Verde is the company in Brazil, we've struck an agreement with. We're in the process of negotiating that. Then, Modern, in Saudi Arabia, is the other company. Senator Reed. Thank you. As I requested yesterday on a phone call with the Chairman, could you provide us the term sheets for the deal? We'd like to look in detail at what has been transpired, and I think you indicated that it is winding its way up through the process, but if you could give it a little boost, I'd appreciate that. [The information referred to follows:] [Information has been retained in the Committee's files] Mr. Cadenazzi. Ranking Member, absolutely. We've submitted our request for it to be approved. It is in review now. Senator Reed. Now, China is going to try to triangulate, circulate, get around this. With the price level, could they simply reduce their prices and cause DOD to commit significant dollars to MP Materials or in general, how are they going to frustrate you? Mr. Cadenazzi. Ranking Member Reed, I think part of our approach is to create a more solid Western demand signal, so that's where something like the preferential trade zone, which is in a market zone willingly, voluntary commitment by our allies and partners to all operate in a way where we agree on price floors that essentially are set in a collaborative manner by countries that are worried about Chinese-maligned manipulation of markets, and that we collectively can agree on establishing price floors that will not allow them to manipulate it because we'll voluntarily agree to pay initially a higher price, but as demand decreases on their end and increases on ours, the prices should level into what we hope is a more transparent and reasonable global market pricing that will work to our benefits in the long haul. Senator Reed. Finally, the MP Materials deal relies on future appropriations which calls into the question of does it comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act? Have you analyzed that and determine it won't? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Reed, I've not personally conducted analysis in this. We've relied upon the Office of General Counsel and our legislative affairs teams to help us in moving forward. From an industrial-based policy standpoint, we've submitted requests for funds to go ahead and pay the quarterly payments that we expect are necessary to meet our offtake agreements. Going forward, we've planned that through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and we expect that we'll continue to barring any changes in policy. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Cadenazzi. Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you. Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Senator Sullivan. Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you calling for this hearing. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. Look, this issue is infuriating for me because so much of the challenges we face as a country are self-inflicted. I work in a bipartisan way on this committee a lot, but I will tell you part of the answer is how did we become so reliant on China and other adversaries of our critical minerals? One reason is that there's a huge difference in this town between Republicans and Democrats on who wants to develop our mines and processing that is a fact. My colleagues on the other side of the isle, and they need to look at--they need to look at this issue straight in the eye because so many of them are afraid of the far-left environmental groups. They have prioritized shutting down mining and not developing critical minerals in America, and especially in my State. Let me provide a few examples. My State is estimated to have 56 out of the 60 critical minerals our country needs. Let me repeat that. In Alaska, the U.S. Geological Survey has said 56 out of the 60 critical minerals that we need to compete for our industrial base, especially in the military, reside in my State. But a core element of the far left once they get into power, is to shut down Alaska. That's a fact. This is the Joe Biden 70 executive orders (EOs), what we call the last frontier lockup. When he got into power, he issued 70 executive orders. Let me list them right here, okay. By the way, 10 of were--10 of them were on his inauguration day. So, this was a plan, 70, many of which dealt with shutting down critical minerals. Crazy, crazy, okay? On this Committee, my colleagues probably remember the Ambler Mining District, the Road to the Ambler Mining District, one of the biggest critical mineral deposits in America. We debated it on this committee, and to my colleague's credits, and I want to thank them on this committee. We won that amendment, vote of mine, to have access to the Ambler Mining District, which Joe Biden shut down one of these. I think the vote was 21 to 6. Great victory, in the NDAA, 2 years ago. What happened? Chuck Schumer made it a priority, so did Hakeem Jeffries, and the Biden administration, to strip that provision out in the committee. So, this is not rocket science. The far left on the other side of the aisle has kept my State from producing what the country needs. It's not rocket science, and it still happens right now. So, let me ask and I appreciate the focus of this committee, but this frustrates the heck out of me because it's not just, of course, killing thousands of jobs in Alaska, which nobody seems to care about. It's empowering our adversaries. So, I appreciate the Trump administration's focus. By the way, the President, again, reversing Biden, who reversed the President in his first term, did issue an order on the Ambler Mining District. So, we're going to start working on that. But let me ask you two gentlemen on another topic that we're working on in the EPW Committee, major permitting reform, NEPA reform, to make it more efficient, timely, and certain to develop mines. Isn't that also important? By the way, it's another issue that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle blocked for decades. I've worked on that issue for more than 10 years. Is that important, Mr. Secretary, and how important would it be to get major NEPA permitting reform done? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Sullivan, absolutely. Environmental restrictions have been a major point of contention for mining development production. At every turn, we've looked at opportunities to develop resources on the industrial base, for example, on military land, which offers some alternatives for how we could implement environmental risk constraints. The Defense Production Act does provide some remediation efforts for application of environmental standards. We'd be keen to work with this committee and the Congress on opportunities, where appropriate, to go ahead and work on---- Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it's going---- Mr. Cadenazzi.--new environment reforms. Senator Sullivan.--to be really important, even though it's not directly in this Committee, for you guys to weigh in on the importance of the permitting reform. This matters to energy, it matters to everybody. We're doing a lot, and it's bipartisan so far. I'm going to submit for the record some questions on some of the investments the Department of War has made in Alaskan mining. I appreciate that very much. Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, one final quick question. I appreciated the 8(a) meeting. That's a very important issue for my constituents in terms of lethality, flexibility, warfighting, keeping the intellectual property (IP) that the Pentagon gets to keep when they do those kinds of programs. Limiting 8(a) opportunities, in my view, would be a gift to the primes, the big primes. Can you give me an update on how that's going? I appreciate the meeting, but that's a really important one for me. Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. 8(a) issues in the audit associated with that continue to be a major priority for the Office of Small Business Programs within industrial-based policy. We continue to focus on issues associated with fraud within the program primarily, and we're really excited about finding new opportunities to bring new entrants into the space, particularly through the 8(a) programs in the future. Senator Sullivan. Would you agree that a lot of them is particularly as we talked about, my constituents bring a focus on lethality, flexibility, and make the Pentagon more lethal as I presented to you guys. Mr. Cadenazzi. I agree, Senator Sullivan. Absolutely. Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wicker. Senator Sullivan, we probably need to put copies of those two posters in the record at this point. So---- Senator Sullivan. Gladly, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Wicker.--unless there's objection, that is so ordered. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen. Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't object to putting those in the record, but I do object, Senator Sullivan, to your blanket attack on Democrats as being the reason that critical minerals aren't---- Senator Sullivan. I said one of the reasons, one of the reasons. It is. Senator Shaheen. Wow. Senator Sullivan. There's no doubt in my mind. Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen is---- Senator Sullivan. I live it every day. Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen is recognized. We'll take a second round. Senator Shaheen. Well, I think a better way to address this issue would be forced to work together, and to not name-call, and try and educate people on why this is so critical, as you have been trying to do. So, I would hope that you---- Senator Sullivan. I would welcome the chance to. Senator Shaheen.--wouldn't just decide because I have a D after my name, I'm not going to be supportive of critical minerals. Senator Sullivan. I'm not saying everybody, and you've been great on this, Senator Shaheen. Senator Shaheen. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you both for joining us. I want to go back to the equity investment question that Senator Reed and Senator Wicker both raised because it's not clear to me what the criteria is that you're looking at and making an equity investment. So, can you outline what that is, and then explain whether you're focusing more on extraction or processing in terms of those investments? Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. There's no criteria in such that we're looking for equity investments as a deliberate approach. I think the way I would view it and describe it, ma'am, is that what we want to do is achieve the outcomes of improved investment, performance, and production within the mining space particularly. Therefore, we're talking to companies about what would make them more successful over the long haul. In some cases, we've taken equity associated with direct DOW investment through the Integrated Budget and Accounting System (IBAS) and DPA programs---- Senator Shaheen. I'm not being clear, I think. So, what determines whether you think a particular company is a good choice---- Mr. Cadenazzi. Oh. Senator Shaheen.--for that equity investment, and how do you determine that criteria? Then, how do you decide whether you've been successful or not? Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. So, thank you for clarifying that. So, we conduct a robust diligence process. So, we actually have brought in--we have an internal effort through our global investment and economic security team to do FOCI, and intelligence analysis, and counterintelligence analysis. We couple that with external market analysis to understand the production rates of this particular mine or whatever it might be associated with their place in the market. We then add in additional experts from both internal to the government within Jeff's team or within another, our partners with an OSC, and other agencies to determine whether or not we think this mine can meet the targets that we have. That is generally an increase in production from one number to another, and then-- ma'am, sorry. Senator Shaheen. Did you have something else you wanted add? Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I just want to say, then we couple that all together, and we make a reasonable business case analysis, we hope is, that determines what the right mix of direct investment and/or debt may be to meet those requirements for the country. Senator Shaheen. Then, can you answer the extraction versus processing question? Mr. Cadenazzi. We're not overly indexed on--our goal is to go ahead for every one of the critical minerals we've identified, which is 20-plus critical minerals, we're creating what we call a value chain, which goes from the mine all the way through production, refining, to recycling. The goal is to go ahead and provide an adequate number of investments at each of those places, whether directly through the DOW, through our partner agencies, or through private capital to make sure that we're investing appropriately in--across each of those elements. Senator Shaheen. Can you tell me, my understanding is that the biggest issue here is not China's control of the actual critical minerals themselves, it's the processing that they do that nobody else is doing. So, why--how are we focusing on the processing in ways that allow us to build that supply that we're going to need? Mr. Cadenazzi. I actually--I'll let Mr. Frankson weigh in on that one. Mr. Frankston. Thank you, sir. Senator, for each critical mineral that we look at, as Honorable Cadenazzi pointed out, we build a supply chain map across the board from the raw material to the finished product and look at each stage with a domestic focus specifically on Department of War requirements, but then building that into the broader domestic requirement piece. One of the key aspects is where does China or other competitors' control over their particular critical mineral? So, it's a different story for each one, but each one we target is how do we make this investment along the entire supply chain so that we're not making an isolated investment in one stage of the process, and that it has a feeding and receiving mode in terms of the rest of the supply chain, so that we build an integrated domestic and joint partner capability. Senator Shaheen. So, are we investing in any processing capability? Mr. Frankston. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, absolutely. The goal is to go ahead and work across the entire supply value chain, and that requires having raw material inputs, processing, and the ability to go ahead and move that further into the supply chain. Senator Shaheen. Can you tell us what companies are doing that processing and the difference between what they're doing versus what China's doing? Because again, my understanding is one of the challenges is that China is able to do the work without any requirements that affect their workforce. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, yesterday, we provided your offices, the whole Committee, a copy of an antimony value chain, which breaks that down in detail as an example of the type of analysis we're doing. It gets into the details of companies and production rates. We'll be happy to go ahead and provide additional insight into those value chains, which gets into that, and we'll provide specific comments on the companies that are performing that we're looking to invest in those sectors going forward. [The information referred to follows:] [Information has been retained in the Committee's files] Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wicker. Yes, Senator Kaine. Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our witnesses. I wish Senator Sullivan was still here. Just one comment about his concluding remarks that Democrats have been blocking permitting reform. For decades, I think Democrats have been working hand in hand with Republicans on permitting reform issues. My understanding from Democrats on the relevant committees were that those issues were closing, and there was a real possibility of finding a path forward that was bipartisan. But President Trump's decision to wage war on clean energy, especially a concerted effort to wage war against offshore wind projects, which have been repeatedly rebuffed in courts, but that has not stopped the President from attacking offshore wind, has caused the permitting reform efforts to grind to a halt. It seems to me in this area of critical minerals or energy, self-sufficiency, if we're going to be all of the above, we should be all of the above and not just all of the below: oil, gas, and coal. My State has been affected dramatically by President Trump's actions. We want permitting reform, but we don't want permitting reform that takes clean, American, domestic energy off the table. To my witnesses, thank you so much for being here today, and for your work, and for your testimony. I was in Australia last week for a visit connected to AUKUS, and appreciate some of the testimony earlier about AUKUS Pillar 1. Australia produces half, about half of the world's lithium, but historically, has relied on China for refining. What specific steps is the DOD taking to ensure Australia refining and separation capacity scales fast enough to reduce reliance on Chinese processing? This question builds upon a positive meeting that the President and the Australian Prime Minister had in October where they announced a bilateral partnership to escalate Australian critical mineral production and refining. Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. We're excited to be partnered with our Australian colleagues. We've invested in Alcoa in a partnership with the Japanese as well in Australia recently. Lithium is not something that we're terribly focused on within the DOW. It is not on our critical list there. There's too many problems, and so we've decided that we need to make some choices. That is something we believe we have adequate supply from global sources, from domestic production, from our partners, and allies, that for the moment, the DOW itself does not require as much focus on it. So, we've prioritized other minerals; vitrium, germanium, gallium within that. Senator Kaine. Let me build on that. Appreciating the comment you made about lithium, but the general issue of refining capacity is an important one. It's not just where the critical minerals, how can we extract them and get them to market? China has sort of locked up a lot of the world's refining capacity. So, in developing a critical mineral strategy that we can rely on, with a supply chain that we can rely on, what is the DOD doing to focus on the refining issue as a component of those minerals that you're concerned with? Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator. It's a major priority for us. We're working across, again, the value chain to make sure that for all of the critical elements that the DOW has identified, that we are investing adequately in each element to include mining, production, refining, and recycling, and in an adequate way. I'll turn it over to Jeff for any specific comments on refining. Mr. Frankston. Yes. Thank you, sir. Senator, Australia is a fantastic partner ally on multiple fronts, but especially when it comes to minerals, just given what their country is blessed with and what is in the ground. From a processing standpoint, we look for opportunities with all partners and allies to build a domestic capability through the Defense Production Act. Australia is actually considered a domestic source, and so we are working on a number of different fronts, as Honorable Cadenazzi mentioned, on Alco of Australia, that is a trilateral investment with Australia and Japan. But we have other open opportunities. Just 2 weeks ago, we held a Defense Industrial Base consortium call for submissions of papers and proposals from industry across the world that includes Australia, and it's at all stages of production, and we welcome any participation, any cooperation, any collaboration that directly aligns with the President's agreement signed with Australia last year. Senator Kaine. One last question, back to lithium. A few weeks ago, the DOD announced that 25 vendors had been invited to compete in phase 1 of a drone dominance program. Lithium-ion batteries are a critical enabling technology for drones, but China does control much of the upstream supply chain for processing battery materials. What are the requirements for the drone dominance vendors to source battery or other materials from the U.S. or allied suppliers? Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. The batteries issue is a critical one, not just for drones, but for the entire supply chain for the Defense Department, Department of War. So, minerals that go into those batteries are available, we think, for lithium, more or less. There's challenges associated with some of the alternatives. So, there are alternative chemistries for batteries. We have a large team that works within Industrial Base Policy on batteries issues. We convened a whole-of- government effort 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, to go ahead and look at batteries opportunities and the threat from China's control of markets on batteries. So, we're working with our colleagues to go ahead and identify alternative sources and chemistries, and then to work with the teams that are driving drone adoption to identify the right mix of controls on access to battery, raw materials, and on technologies going forward. Chairman Wicker. Senator Kelly. Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cadenazzi? Did I get that right? Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator. Senator Kelly. Mr. Frankston, thank you both for being here. I want to ask you about how we supply semiconductors to the defense industrial base. As you both know, semiconductors doing a lot of stuff used by our military and semiconductor technology advances rapidly Moore's Laws says processing power doubles every 18 months. The DODs procurement programs do not operate at that same kind of speed, and the end result is some of our most advanced weapon systems are relying on chips that are old sometimes outdated, sometimes decades behind the state- of-the-art technology. Historically, DOD has relied on a small number of trusted foundries which are fabs that not only serve--you know, they serve government customers. So, would you both agree that this approach has not succeeded at protecting DOD's access to the best chips in the world for its most important programs? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we've perennially under invested in the technology and the engineering necessary to migrate our systems to go ahead and leverage the most current state-of-the- art chips. As a result, we do have a legacy infrastructure, which produces a large number of the chips that meet our needs, which are essentially based upon older technology. So, I concur entirely. Senator Kelly. So, it sounds like an area where we could put some focus on and try to fix. Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator, it's a challenge. Senator Kelly. So, and we've worked on this committee for years to try to solve this issue by placing production lines that meet DOD security requirements in commercial fab facilities so DOD can get those leading chips without compromising in any security. These programs, there's a couple of them, one is the Secure Enclave, the other is the Microelectronics Commons, and these programs, they've been stood up, and they're fully funded, and they're getting ready to produce some chips. There's just one problem here. Major DOD programs are still choosing to have the old, outdated foundries produce the chips, not the new ones. So, would you both agree that there are meaningful strategic advantages to sourcing leading edge chips for our major programs? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I concur in the need for us to go and continuously improve the security of our chip infrastructure and the chips themselves, and that the tools that are in place under a Secure Enclave, et cetera provide us new alternatives to deliver upon that in the future. Senator Kelly. Why haven't we used those alternatives? Mr. Cadenazzi. So, there's price considerations and engineering considerations with migrating from the current chip infrastructure to new chips and new security models. I think inherently, it's a cost issue that programs have been incentivized to sort of, you know, go short shrift on this, and not pay the bill, and that we need to incentivize them to pivot to actually investing in the infrastructure changes necessary to take full advantage of this for the future. Senator Kelly. Can you give it--can you give an example of like how much more does a chip coming out of the Secure Enclave cost for like a weapon system, like percentage-wise? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I'm not sure I can comment thoughtfully on the cost of chip. We can get back to you on that. I think there's a bigger issue of the certification cost for these new systems. When you change the chips, you often have to requalify systems and their performance. It becomes a cost driver for tests, for engineering. There's a whole bunch of ancillary pieces that go into it, and the bill gets pretty large, millions of dollars, into the tens of millions of dollars to go ahead and make these changes, unfortunately. Senator Kelly. How about for new weapon systems? Something that's brand-new? Mr. Cadenazzi. The challenge we had is that, often, the firms that deliver these weapons systems are incentivized for ease of access and approval to leverage infrastructure that's already approved and tools that are already approved. So, therefore, to go ahead and launch a new weapons platform with a brand-new security or information technology (IT) infrastructure, whatever that might be, or microelectronics infrastructure, is often cost-prohibitive and not incentivized by the programs themselves. Senator Kelly. But we funded the Secure Enclave and the Microelectronics Commons. Are they not approved? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I believe that they are, and that we're in the process of migrating to that, those requirements over the next 5 years or so. However, I do think there's going to be a bit of a tail and a lag, and particularly a bill associated with how we make that migration work. Senator Kelly. Well, we could--what could we do to make that migration happen more quickly? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I think we'd be keen to work with you and the committee on authorities and changes to policy that would help us drive those changes, and an understanding of the costs associated with that to make it work going forward. Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my 6 seconds. Chairman Wicker. Quite generous of you. Senator Hirono. Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin my questions, I would like to note that we all acknowledge both the Democrats and the Republicans acknowledge the importance of critical minerals and our over reliance on China. At the same time, though, there are environmental concerns with mining these resources, and I just want to put on the record my opposition to this regime's attempt to reverse a 20-year ban on mining near Minnesota's boundary waters. While access to critical minerals supplies domestically are important, we can't just toss out the kinds of environmental concerns that have to do with contamination of local lakes and rivers, as is the case in the Minnesota situation. So, environmental requirements are important. We don't just toss those things out because we want to mine critical minerals. Oh, I--you've been asked, Mr. Secretary, a number of questions relating to the $400 million in equity that we have with MP Materials, and I made a note that you said that we pursued equity ownership to address failed marketplace efforts. I don't know what that means, because you can argue that there's failed market marketplace efforts to justify equity shares, and I suppose any number of private entities. It's really hard for us to determine whether that is an accurate depiction of the reasons for it or not, but this is very unusual for the government to acquire equity shares, and, you know, there are issues relating to competition or the lack thereof when we get an equity share in a private entity. So, I just want to raise my concerns. There's also an issue whether or not the Defense Production Act even gives the authority under the Act for the U.S. to achieve equity shares. There's a question if that authority is deemed not existent, I don't know what that does to the equity shares, $400 million. Does that mean that that deal has to be unwound? It reminds me very much of the Supreme Court's decision on the unconstitutionality of the tariffs and the billions of dollars that are--that there're going to be arguments about returning all of that. Let me turn to something that I think we--I think it is very positive on this issue of critical minerals, and that has to do with recycling of critical minerals from end-of-life equipment. So, I'm glad to see that in your testimony, you refer to recycling as one of the ways that we're going to address our need for critical minerals, and especially, obtaining critical minerals from spent lithium-ion batteries. I wanted to ask you, what progress are you making in this area of recycling, and are you preparing any demonstration projects to scale these recycling technologies up? Mr. Frankston. Thank you, Senator. A great example of our recycling capabilities is through the Defense Logistics Agency through their germanium recycling program. They have taken night vision optics that have been decommissioned after periods of use, and have been able to harvest back the materials. So, they have a ready supply of ready material for the warfighter, for the Defense Industrial Base as a reserve into our---- Senator Hirono. So, I'm sorry, I am running out of time, but I want to make sure that you are--both of you are very committed to shoring up the recycling aspects of critical minerals, and that you are spending the kind of money that we need in R&D for this purpose. Are you, one, committed to recycling, and, two, do you have--I had a question as to whether or not you have any demonstration projects to show us your progress in this area. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're absolutely committed. We recognize that recycling would be a critical source of supply for us for the long haul, and there are multiple demonstration projects underway within the Research and Engineering (R&E) portfolio, Research and Engineering portfolio. We'll go ahead and come back to you on the report what those projects are. [The information referred to follows:] [Information has been retained in the Committee's files] Senator Hirono. Are you making it clear to the private sector that they also can participate in the developing the kind of recycling of critical minerals from spent materials---- Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely---- Senator Hirono.--so they can put their energies and brain power to enabling us to recycle? Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator. We put out our requirements often to the market and hope that we can bring the best of breed capabilities back for us to leverage in these decisions, in these analyses. Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, can I just ask one short question about a provision we put in last year's NDAA? Chairman Wicker. Yes, ma'am. Senator Hirono. So, section 1412 of the fiscal year 2026 NDAA requires the Defense Logistics Agency to report to Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on best practices to expand the strategic material recovery and reuse program by March 1, 2026, that is right around the corner. Is that report on schedule? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, the Defense Logistics Agency is a separate agency, field agency within acquisition sustainment. I'll bring that request back to Honorable Duffy, who's the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and we will find out. Senator Hirono. This is an issue, you know. I mean, you recycling is a very important part of the testimony you gave, and yet, you're not the one that's able to tell us whether this report is going to be on time or not. But I appreciate your conveying it to the appropriate entity and DOD. Thank you. Chairman Wicker. Thank you for agreeing to do that, Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Banks. Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cadenazzi, can you speak to the specific importance of the Department of War's equity investments and how they played a role in supporting the Department's critical mineral supply chain security. In other words, what is uniquely helpful about equity stakes relative to other kinds of support that we would use? Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. We believe that given the frailty of many of our minerals markets, that equity is a necessary component to go ahead and drive alignment of the companies, make a clear commitment from the government that we're interested, and we're committed to not just the market but the company in question, hence the rigorous diligence that we conduct on that company and its performance that we can then crowd in private capital, which will allow us to go ahead and expand our operations, and leverage less taxpayer money to go ahead and achieve our ends, but also signal a real change in how we plan to operate and the demand signal for that particular component or mineral going forward. It's been vital. It's been very successful thus far. It forges a true partnership with the company in question, and allows us to plan for the long haul. Again, our goal in this is not equity outcomes for return on investment (ROI) for economic or financial returns. Those funds would return to the taxpayer. Our goal is to improve mineral production and the availability of those minerals to the Department of War, and more broadly, to the Nation. Senator Banks. Has the Department ever used equity investment tool before? Mr. Cadenazzi. Prior to the current Administration, I believe we used tools like warrants during, say, the 2008 financial crisis. Senator Banks. So, there is a precedent? Mr. Cadenazzi. It has happened in the past. Different format, but yes. Senator Banks. Yes. Can you talk about how we might use it in the future? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we believe that where opportunities exist for the government to supplement our spending with external capital, that equity is a powerful tool for us to incentivize the investment of our partners in industry, private capital markets, and to accelerate the pace at which we're able to go ahead and generate new production capacity. We'd anticipate using this as an alternative to other financing mechanisms where we've tended to offer grants to companies to facilitize, for example, where we might want to go ahead and offer an incentive for them to self facilitize, or alternatively, for us to take an equity stake going forward. Senator Banks. Are there additional authorities that you need as we head into NDAA season that might help you provide equity investments in other sectors, too? Mr. Cadenazzi. We recognize that there was a robust discussion last fall with regards to equity language in the 2026 appropriations, an authorization bill that did not reach fulfillment. We're eager to continue those discussions to make sure that we're all in alignment on the appropriate use and controls on the application of equity. Senator Banks. Can you walk us through consequences for the Department when the Chinese first expanded their rare earth export controls last October. What did that do to us. Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it was absolutely a crisis. I came in after that, and so I think having discussed with the team, the commitment to national security and the minerals front has been very vigorous since. I didn't discuss minerals at all with the committee when I was confirmed or my committee discussions last fall, but this has become a major topic. We spend a substantial amount of time and the Congress's money to go ahead and work on these minerals issues, and we're really excited about the impact we're having on the space. We believe we're--over the past 14 months, the Administration has already started to bend the needle substantially on availability, and we're looking forward to more impact over the next few years. Senator Banks. What does it mean to America and to the Department specifically to be reliant upon our biggest adversary? Mr. Cadenazzi. Well, it's unacceptable from a national security standpoint that our primary strategic competitor can go ahead and turn off the spigot on a mineral which we absolutely require for the production of nearly every weapons platform. Senator Banks. Mr. Chairman, that's all I have. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Reed, you're recognized. Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just two quick questions, if I may. Secretary Cadenazzi, we've talked about equity. This is an issue that's not going to go away but there are other tools that are available, direct grants many other tools. So, why was equity chosen above these other approaches? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we believe that, at this time, to go ahead and incentivize enough private capital, provide a clear signal to the market that the DOW itself is interested in solving these problems, which are outsized relative to our normal focus on it, that equity is a necessary tool for us to make that commitment. We also think it provides a tool to recoup our investment over time. That is, the taxpayer will be repaid through a successful investment if the market works out as we believe it will, which is we invest in a company, we solve our national security problem with access to that particular mineral, that our equity stake will actually pay back the taxpayer for that return. We think that's a great deal for the taxpayer as it's going to go ahead and meet both of our needs within the Department and the country's needs for the future. Senator Reed. Now, let me ask just another question. This is all critical in terms of the legal basis for all of these actions, and can we be assured that we will get, promptly, the DOD legal opinion on these equity deals that go through all the nuances we've spoken about this morning? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I believe that the Department's Office of General Counsel (OGC) has worked on providing those legal justifications to the Congress, and we'll go ahead and submit that request back again. Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Chairman Wicker. Do you have any idea how much longer that will take, Mr. Secretary? Mr. Cadenazzi. Chairman Wicker, I do not. I'm not a lawyer, and I'm not in OGC, but I will go ahead and ask the team there to give us a timeline. Chairman Wicker. Senator Reed. Senator Reed. No, I--you're just trying to claim the veil of innocence by claiming you're not a lawyer. Okay, I get it. The investments, the equity investments, are such that raise issues that I hope we can see analyzed in these legal opinions. For example, what obligation do you have as a shareholder to the company and to--versus what obligation to have to the United States? That's a key distinction. I know the present investments in the former or preferred stock that's convertible into common stock, but there's still that whole notion of distention between a stockholder and a government agent, and that's something I hope will be captured in these opinions. Have you seen that discussion? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, absolutely understand the concern. We've established these deals to provide for performance outcomes. Our goal is not economic returns. We're not trying to excise long-term ownership of these companies. The goal is not to have a stake forever. The goal is to achieve our outcome, execute some sort of exit strategy as appropriate to the moment, and then continue on with the next set of problems for the DOW. Ideally, we wouldn't be spending much time on minerals. We feel compelled to do so as a result of the situation in the market. Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Frankston, for your very, very clear and--testimony. I appreciate it very much. Do you have questions? Chairman Wicker. Let me ask you this Secretary Cadenazzi, are we expanding the--your workforce enough? We had understood that in your team they were working some of the longest hours in the building. How is that coming along? Mr. Cadenazzi. In the One Big Beautiful Bill, Chairman Wicker, we received several million dollars, $20 million, I believe, in funds for workforce expansion, specifically within Jeff's team, in industrial base resilience. We've worked incredibly hard to go ahead and fill those roles and begin the expansion. It's been taking some time for the money to flow in, but think I'll turn over to Jeff. Chairman Wicker. Well, the money didn't arrive quite as quickly as perhaps---- Mr. Cadenazzi. Not as much as I wanted Senator. Yes. Chairman Wicker. Right. Mr. Frankston. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just in the last few weeks, we've brought on about four or five people alone on my team to work across a number of key sectors. So, the resourcing provided from this committee, from yourself, from this team has been phenomenal. We are building our capability to grow across all sectors, but in particular, focus on critical minerals. We just brought in a third expert to help us, and we're going to be bringing in more to cover in some of these smaller sectors and some of the underlying sub-tier and enabling things like chemicals for leaching for critical minerals, looking at recycling, looking across all these areas. So, we are very much appreciative and looking forward to bringing on more personnel. Chairman Wicker. Well, I'm glad you're appreciative. Sometimes, those ponies going from one side of the river to the other are a little slow getting across the bridge. Senator Warren. Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, when you sign a contract, you expect to get what you paid for at the price and on the date that was spelled out in the contract. But not for DOD. When DOD signs contracts to buy equipment for hundreds of billions of dollars, giant defense contractors often deliver late, years late, and billions of dollars over budget. So, recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that in fiscal year 2024, DODs major weapons programs were 18 months behind schedule and would cost $50 billion more than budgeted just the year before. $50 billion in 1 year. That is not an oops. That is two times what the Federal Government spent on childcare that year. Now, General Dynamics oiler ship program, an extra $1 billion dollars, Raytheon's air and missile defense radar, another $6 billion, Northrop Grumman Sentinel Program, $36 billion over budget, and all are at least 3 years behind schedule. Now, DOD is ramping up investments in critical minerals, and you got to worry, are we just going to see the same thing again? So, Mr. Cadenazzi, you are the principal DOD advisor on industrial base policy. Does it help or hurt our national security when DOD signs a contract for the equipment it needs, and it actually gets it years later and for billions of dollars more? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it's absolutely brutal when that happens. I think everyone in the Department agrees that the performance of the industrial base and our contractors that are delivering weapon systems has been unsatisfactory overall for an extended period of time, hence the aggressive effort we've been making to go ahead and focus on manufacturing and the DIB, to make sure that we start to go ahead and get the outcomes which are expected for us to meet the requirements of the warfighter. Senator Warren. Yes. Well, I got to say unsatisfactory might be the understatement of the day. Look, if you bought something and then the company said pay us more and we'll give it to you a year later, you'd report them to the authorities. But Defense contractors are a year late and over budget, and what happens? They break in taxpayer dollars, and then they shell out billions of dollars to their shareholders and to their executives. So, in 2024, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman each spent $3 billion on stock buybacks and dividends. Their executives, you'll be happy to know, did just fine, too. Raytheon's, CEO earned $18 million, General Dynamic, CEO made $23 million, and Northrop Grumman made $24 million. So, Mr. Cadenazzi, does it help or hurt our national security when giant contractors spend billions of dollars on stock buybacks and CEO payouts at the same time that they are failing to deliver weapons on time and on budget? Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Warren, we agree that companies investing in share buybacks, dividends, and oversized executive compensation relative to their poor performance is a concern. We are not happy with it, hence the EO that came out regarding warfighter outcomes, hence our incredible focus on trying to drive and improve outcomes from these companies going forward, and making it clear that we think that the misalignment of capital and the unwillingness to invest first in warfighter performance and system performance and delivery rates readiness is a more important thing relative to these other financial incentives. We recognize that they're have market expectations to meet, their first expectation needs to be delivering for the warfighter. Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate this, but you know, we're just really reaching a point where enough is enough. A recent Trump administration executive order announced a plan to prohibit buybacks, dividends, and excessive compensation for companies that fail to deliver to our warfighters. It's a good start, but defense contractors are already bragging to their shareholders that they're not going to change. So, obviously, they're not very afraid of you at this point. When asked if Northrop Grumman would continue paying dividends, the CEO said, ``Yes, yes, 100 percent. Yes.'' Raytheon, which the President called out as a problem, said they, ``remain committed to the dividend.'' So, let me just ask, I'm out of time here so I can do this for the record, but Mr. Cadenazzi, would DOD benefit from changes in the law to give this executive order more teeth and show companies that we're actually serious? Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator. Senator Warren. Good. Mr. Cadenazzi. We appreciate the opportunity to work with you and the committee on that issue. Senator Warren. You know, I don't say this often, but I think the Trump administration has hit the nail on the head on the problem here, but Congress needs to codify these tools to ensure that contractors prioritize delivering on time and on budget, not just lining their own pockets. So, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, and I agree, Senator, with that sentiment. This concludes today's hearing. Questions of the record will be due within 2 business days of the conclusion. Chairman Wicker. We're adjourned. [Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the Committee adjourned.] [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton lithium 1. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, if lithium supply is disrupted, what specific mission impacts do you expect first: readiness rates, training throughput, spares availability, surge production? Secretary Cadenazzi. As demand for batteries continues to rise, lithium consumption and strain on upstream nodes of the battery supply chain will continue to increase. The U.S. currently lacks separation and processing capacity, and the increased demand for both raw and processed lithium products in the event of lithium supply chain disruption may first lead to impacts to surge production and spares availability, and eventually readiness rates. 2. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, which programs are most exposed, and what is the Department's current `days of supply' posture for defense-relevant battery inputs? Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW relies on lithium-ion batteries across all warfighting domains, meaning that no single program is the most exposed. 3. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the most fragile node: mining, conversion to battery-grade chemicals, cathode/anode materials, or cell manufacturing? Secretary Cadenazzi. The upstream segments of the battery supply chain continue to be at high risk to the Department. The mining and midstream segments are challenging as the U.S. does not currently have domestic production of critical battery materials (flake graphite, fluorspar, manganese oxide and sulfate, cobalt sulfate, and electrolyte salts and solvents). My team is working across the interagency to map and inform investments in critical nodes across the battery value chain to ensure a whole of government approach to securing the supply chain. 4. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, does the Department of War (DOW) have a defense qualification pathway for domestically produced battery-grade lithium chemicals so suppliers can become approved faster? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is exploring defense qualification pathways for domestically produced battery-grade lithium chemicals for faster approval of suppliers. 5. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you have a projected date DOW will be able to source battery-grade lithium chemicals from a trusted domestic supply chain? Secretary Cadenazzi. Using Defense Production Act Title III authorities, the DOW has invested in increasing lithium production capacity in the U.S. The Department is also closely coordinating with interagency partners who also support domestic lithium production. Gaps remain in the upstream, but my office is working on implementing Section 842 of the fiscal year 2026 NDAA, which prohibits the Department from procuring battery cells and cell components from foreign entities of concern beginning in fiscal year 2028. project vault 6. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, Project Vault is a key portion of the Administration's plan to address the vulnerabilities in our critical minerals supply chain. Establishing stockpiles is a necessary and critical step, but we will need to do more than just warehouse critical mineral to address the vulnerabilities across our defense industrial base. How does Project Vault plan to ensure that these purchases complement--not substitute for--domestic processing and manufacturing capacity? Secretary Cadenazzi. Project Vault complements domestic manufacturing by providing the stability needed for private investment. By guaranteeing a reliable reserve of raw materials, we reduce the risk of foreign supply disruptions that discourage investment in U.S. companies In short, Project Vault gives American manufacturers the confidence to build and expand processing and manufacturing capabilities here at home. 7. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you believe that Project Vault will prioritize defense needs ahead of commercial uses? If not, should it? Secretary Cadenazzi. Project Vault is designed to bolster our domestic industrial base. Its goal is to ensure that American manufacturers, both defense and commercial, have reliable access to the materials they need. By strengthening our overall economic security, we enhance our national security. supply chain 8. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, have you identified single points of failure for defense-critical minerals? If so, please provide them. Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively tracking single- source risks and other vulnerabilities across our critical mineral supply chains. Mitigating these potential single points of failure is a top priority, and we are using all available DOW authorities, from investment to stockpiling, and working with industry to support their own de-risking, to build a more resilient and secure industrial base. While risks vary from supply chain to supply chain, in general the Department is tracking numerous vulnerabilities in mid-stream processing of critical minerals. 9. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do we have an end-to-end trusted supply chain--separation, metal/alloy, and magnet manufacturing--at meaningful scale for rare earth magnets in the United States today? If not, what are the key areas of concern? Secretary Cadenazzi. While we have elements of that supply chain in the U.S., we are focused on developing a fully domestic, end-to-end capability. The Department is making targeted investments to ensure we can process rare earth materials and manufacture magnets entirely within the United States to meet our national security needs. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan unleashing alaska's extraordinary resource potential 10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, during his term, President Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted Alaska's ability to extract its own natural resources despite an acute need for them on both commercial and national security grounds. These executive actions have slowed down or completely hindered resource extraction and critical infrastructure projects important not just to the State but to the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his presidency, January 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order entitled Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. The order in part reads as follows: ``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps to: (i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to agency actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 2021, and January 20, 2025; and (ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG [liquefied natural gas] potential, including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated with such development . . . Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to initiation. Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall immediately review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in any way hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the State of Alaska.'' Will you commit fully to the intent of the President's executive order referenced above where the Department of the Army and the U.S Army Corps of Engineers will play a vital role? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Yes, the Department is fully committed to achieving the goals of the President's Executive Order, Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. One of the Department's fundamental goals is to ensure secure and resilient critical mineral and energy sectors. We are open to all economically viable opportunities that support that mission. This certainly includes the development of domestic resources, like those in Alaska, which are vital to our national security. We look forward to working with our partners across the government and with the State of Alaska to review all available options to achieve that goal, consistent with applicable law. 11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the Alaska LNG Project, a proposed 800-mile natural gas pipeline to transport natural gas from the Alaska North Slope to the Kenai Peninsula for the purposes of in-State energy security and the export of liquified natural gas (LNG) to our Asian allies is a priority of the President of the United States. Executive Order 14153 entitled ``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' in Section 2 Policy states, ``It is the policy of the United States to . . . prioritize the development of Alaska's liquefied natural gas (LNG) potential, including the sale and transportation of Alaskan LNG to other regions of the United States and allied nations within the Pacific region.'' Section 3(ii)(a) of President Trump's Executive Order 14153 entitled ``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' directs ``The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps to (ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG potential, including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and export infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated with such development.'' Furthermore, in President Trump's March 4, 2025 Address to a Joint Session of Congress he stated ``My Administration is also working on a gigantic natural gas pipeline in Alaska, among the largest in the world, where Japan, South Korea and other nations want to be our partner with investments of trillions of dollars each. It's never been anything like that one. It will be truly spectacular. It's all set to go.'' How do you see the Department of Defense's interest and role in this project? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. A resilient domestic energy sector is required for national security. In partnership with the interagency, the Department will support the President's goal of American energy dominance with all means at its disposal to include infrastructure development and support for expedited permitting. 12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, one of the results of President Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of my State through his executive orders is an energy emergency affecting our national security that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I have spoken with Secretary Hegseth about this issue and explained to him that there has been a number of instances where commanders of bases like Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage had to tell servicemembers and their families to turn-down their heat, unplug personal property, and turn-off certain critical systems that sustain the base. This was done to preserve electricity and avoid brown-outs in the region. Would U.S. national security be enhanced if there was a reliable source of clean-burning Alaskan natural gas available to supply the energy needs of these bases? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Warfighters and their families should have access to reliable, abundant energy, both for their well-being and the security of the Nation. Leveraging domestic energy resources enhances energy resilience and independence, reducing the vulnerability of military installations to disrupted supply chains or foreign energy dependencies. By ensuring a continuous, secure, and reliable power supply for base operations and critical infrastructure, local domestic natural gas can directly produce sustained operational readiness, force projection capabilities, and uninterrupted mission execution. 13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, will you commit to working with the State of Alaska and me to secure reliable resources, including energy resources and critical minerals, for Alaska military bases? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The resilience of our military installations, particularly in a strategic location like Alaska, is a key focus for the Department. We welcome any opportunity to work with you and the State of Alaska to explore options for enhancing the security and reliability of our energy and resource supply chains. 14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, a number of important military construction (MILCON) projects are held up by overly burdensome environmental regulations. My home State of Alaska is particularly hard hit by these regulations as the building season is very short and the costs to build there extremely high. Will you commit to reviewing environmental regulations put in place by the Department of Defense (DOD) to accelerate the pace of environmental reviews for critical MILCON projects and to let Congress know how it can help? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Yes, we are committed to working to accelerate the pace of environmental reviews for critical MILCON projects. To implement the president's Executive Order 14154, ``Unleashing American Energy,'' the Military Departments rescinded their National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations and OSW provided Department-wide guidance to expedite environmental review under NEPA of many MILCON projects. We strongly support efforts to speed up these reviews and are actively working on additional process improvements to do so. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work with Congress on this important issue. department of defense critical minerals strategy 15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, your joint written statement mentions the Department of Defense's strategy to revitalize domestic production of critical minerals. Given the immense critical mineral resources in Alaska and a number of critical mineral projects in State such as Graphite Creek and projects within the Ambler Mining District, can you explain how these efforts and the $2 billion investment in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund will translate into strategic success against China? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our strategy leads to strategic success by directly reducing China's leverage over our supply chains. We are pursuing a multi-pronged approach: the $2 billion for the National Defense Stockpile provides an immediate buffer against supply disruptions and market manipulation, while investments in domestic projects, like those in Alaska, build the long-term, secure production capacity we need for lasting independence. By combining stockpiling today with investment in domestic mining for tomorrow, we are building a resilient industrial base that is no longer dependent on a strategic competitor. 16. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how will the Department determine which domestic projects are mature enough to support the National Defense Stockpile, and how can Congress help ensure strategically important Alaska projects are not overlooked as these priorities are implemented? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department uses a rigorous due diligence process to determine project maturity. We assess factors like the project's technical readiness, the viability of its resource, its financial stability, and its path to permitting. We prioritize projects that are advanced enough to reliably deliver materials at scale. For Congress's role, your continued partnership is essential. By ensuring robust funding for our investment authorities and the National Defense Stockpile, and by continuing to highlight promising projects in strategically vital areas like Alaska, you help ensure we have the resources and awareness to act decisively and build the secure domestic supply chains our Nation needs. 17. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, establishing U.S. supply chains for critical minerals will require sustained investment over the next 5 to 6 years, if not longer. The Working Family Tax Cuts Act (H.R. 1) set aside $5 billion for investments in critical mineral supply chains through the Industrial Base Fund. The Department of Defense has already, and so wisely so, invested in Alaska. Why, in your professional opinion, is it strategically important for the Department to prioritize projects in Alaska as part of this push to reduce reliance on foreign sources? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is prioritizing critical mineral projects that will make significant progress toward mitigating supply shortfalls and foreign reliance wherever they may reside in our Nation. Alaska's wealth of minerals resources is certain to be an important part of these efforts. 18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, what are ways that the Department is looking at improving those supply chains? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is looking to use all authorities, including those available under Title III of the Defense Product Act and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, and all means at its disposal, including investments, equity purchases, loans, offtakes, and other strategic partnerships to improve mineral capabilities at all nodes of the supply chain. 19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, are there any authorities that you need that Congress can provide? How should Congress measure whether DOD's critical mineral investments are actually moving projects closer to production? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. We are grateful for the powerful and flexible authorities Congress has already provided, and we would welcome a more in-depth discussion on that topic in the future. As for how Congress should measure our success, we believe it must be based on tangible outcomes, not just dollars spent. The ultimate metric is the demonstrable increase in the capacity of U.S. and allied sources to meet U.S. national demand and defense demand, which directly translates to a measurable reduction in our reliance on adversarial nations for the materials critical to our security. 20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, one of the critical roles of your position is building relationships with Industry. What processes have you put in place to ensure that project sponsors receive timely communication from DOD regarding where their submissions stand, what additional information may be needed, and what the next step in the review process will be? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Office of Industrial Base Policy has a team dedicated to engaging with industry partners to ensure timely communication and coordination with all of our subject matter experts. 21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, will you commit to ensuring there is a clear point of contact for project sponsors and for congressional offices seeking status updates on pending matters? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. DOW's congressional Affairs team are committed to ensuring timely communication with Congress. 22. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, China's dominance in antimony production and processing (accounting for 36 percent of the world total in 2025 according to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)), combined with its willingness to use export restrictions as a strategic lever, underscores the national security risk posed by continued U.S. reliance on foreign sources for this material (reaching 91 percent according to the USGS). Antimony is essential for a range of defense and energetics applications, yet domestic supply and processing capacity remain limited. We have also heard from domestic developers that one challenge is not only securing support through existing authorities, but also determining where project submissions stand within the review process and which office is responsible for next steps. What steps is the Department currently taking to strengthen domestic antimony supply and processing capacity through available authorities, including the Defense Production Act (DPA) and National Defense Stockpile-related tools? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is aggressively tackling our antimony vulnerability on two fronts. First, we are bolstering the National Defense Stockpile (NDS), as shown by the recent $245 million contract between the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Antimony Corporation to replenish antimony metal ingots in the NDS. Second, we have used investment authorities like Title III of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to directly fund domestic mining and refining projects. 23. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, tungsten and tantalum are essential to a wide range of defense applications, including advanced munitions, armor systems, electronics, aerospace components, and high-performance alloys. Yet, the United States remains almost exclusively dependent on foreign sources-- particularly strategic competitors--for mining, processing, and refining capacity associated with these minerals. This dependence presents a clear vulnerability to the resilience of the defense industrial base and broader national security supply chains. Given the strategic importance of tungsten and tantalum to U.S. military readiness and technological competitiveness, please describe the Department's current strategy to strengthen domestic and allied supply chains for these materials. Specifically, what concrete steps has the Department taken to invest in domestic mining, processing, and refining capacity for tungsten and tantalum, including through DPA authorities, Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment programs, or other initiatives? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's approach to bolstering domestic tantalum and tungsten supply chains combines near- term risk mitigation with long-term industrial base development. For tantalum, we have already taken action to bolster our strategic reserve as evidenced by the Defense Logistics Agency's contract with Global Advanced Metals to purchase tantalum ingots for the National Defense Stockpile. The Department has also invested to support domestic tungsten mining and processing. These concrete actions are designed to systematically reduce our foreign dependence and build a secure, resilient supply chain for these essential defense materials. 24. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, to what extent is the Department coordinating with other Federal agencies--including the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce-- to support exploration, permitting, processing innovation, recycling, and workforce development relevant to these materials? Please provide specific examples of ongoing or planned programs, timelines for implementation, and any measurable outcomes demonstrating progress toward a more secure tungsten and tantalum supply chain. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. We work closely with our partners at the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce, among others, on the full spectrum of critical mineral challenges. This includes everything from streamlining the permitting process and funding innovative processing technologies to developing a skilled workforce. Our goal is to ensure a unified, whole-of-government approach to building a secure supply chain for critical materials like tungsten and tantalum, and we believe this close collaboration with our interagency partners is the only way to achieve lasting success. defense production act title iii projects in alaska 25. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, Graphite One's Graphite Creek project in Alaska is a proposed mine anchored by the largest known graphite deposit in the United States and one of the largest globally. In July 2023, Graphite One received a $37.5 million DPA title III award to accelerate its feasibility study and has since entered the FAST-41 permitting process, with environmental review and permitting currently targeted for completion by September 2026. Alaska Range Resources, another U.S. company in Alaska, was awarded $43.4 million in October 2025 to build a domestic antimony trisulfide supply chain in the State. Alaska Silver USA, another U.S. company in my State, holds a number of critical silver, zinc, gallium, and lead deposits. Do you recognize the immense strategic value of Alaskan natural resources, and particularly the importance of these project to the U.S. industrial base? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our support for these projects and continuing efforts to identify and facilitate Alaskan based projects demonstrates the Administration's recognition of the importance of Alaskan resources to U.S. industry and national security. 26. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, can you commit to supporting timely execution of existing DPA grants to onshore the production of U.S. critical minerals and reduce dependencies on critical mineral supply chains from adversarial nations and keeping my office informed of major milestones, delays, or changes in status affecting these projects? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department remains committed to making investments to onshore the production of critical minerals at the speed of relevance and will continue to provide information on the status and progress of such investments when appropriate. 27. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, we have heard from some developers of critical mineral projects in Alaska that, after submitting materials to the Department for DPA title III support, that they have had challenges determining the status of their submissions and whether additional information is needed. Can you commit to working with myself and my staff, to improve visibility into these processes by (1) identifying the appropriate point of contact for project submissions; (2) ensuring timely status updates to congressional offices upon request; and (3) providing general feedback on whether a project is advancing, requires additional information, or is no longer under active consideration? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Vendors that submit requests for DPA Title III funding are provided with points of contact regarding their submission, and the Department remains committed to providing status updates to vendors through these channels, as soon as such updates are available. The Department is also committed to providing timely status updates to the Congress whenever requested. defense production act and critical minerals 28. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, Alaska represents a wealth of critical minerals. In the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Secretary of Defense was tasked with providing a way forward to address all critical mineral shortfalls. This came after a 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that of the 99 materials for which there is a current shortfall, over 90 percent had either zero or one domestic supplier. In 2024, the previous Administration went to Australia and the United Kingdom and offered to purchase minerals from there rather than source them domestically. So, in 2024, I got an amendment into the NDAA that said that domestic sources, namely the U.S. and Canada, would be the primary source of development, and then, only if unable to source domestically, then we could go to those other countries. What are the risks to continued reliance on foreign, and often un-friendly, sources for these critical minerals? Mr. Frankston. Continued reliance on foreign nations can put the entire defense and industrial supply chain at risk, which is especially critical in times of conflict. We are moving to eliminate these risks to production which have resulted from offshoring manufacturing and raw material processing for so long. Building resilient domestic supply chains is a generational undertaking and will require sustained efforts and commitment across the government. 29. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, how can Congress help ``onshore'' or, at the very least, ``friendly shore'' some of these material sources? Mr. Frankston. We are fully committed to ensuring we onshore materials supply chains domestically or friend shore with trusted partners and allies. We appreciate Congress's supportive policy and resourcing. We will use these authorities and appropriations in combination with continuous assessment of domestic supply chain growth opportunities. Finally, we will combine the authorities we oversee, DPA Title III and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) funding, with interagency appropriations and authorities' instruments. This approach will succeed but will take time to rebuild lost industries and capacities. 30. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, I also got a provision in the 2025 NDAA that required the Secretary of Defense to consult with the head of any agency responsible for development of an ``environmental document'' for a project that would result in an increase in availability of strategic and critical minerals. These environmental impact studies have been weaponized against my State to block development and limit economic opportunity at a cost to our national security. Will you commit to me to ensuring the DPA stays focused on defense and on improving our domestic industrial base? Mr. Frankston. The Department reiterates its commitment to developing pathways to mineral and manufacturing security with the authorities at our disposal and funds appropriated by Congress. Permitting processes and environmental reviews have been accelerated and streamlined with additional expertise brought in-house to the Office of Industrial Base Policy. We will work to ensure each project receives appropriate expertise and attention in order to maximize success. 8(a) contracting 31. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the Small Business Act 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a contract vehicle through which sole source and set aside contracts can be awarded to small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations, Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships, not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System marks. Last many of these small businesses employ veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing our Nation's finest to continue to serve after they take off the uniform. Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a) contracting for the Department of the Defense? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric. 32. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, I recently toured a Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) contracting operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to the Federal customer in terms of cost and efficiency while delivering mission- critical solutions that increase our national security and warfighter readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best ``bang for the buck'' for taxpayers, giving contracting officers additional flexibility while also maximizing efficiency by reducing red tape. Do you see the value in increased efficiency in flexibility brought from initiatives such as the 8(a) program? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric. 33. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, rapid response capabilities are essential to enable our warfighters to win on the battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. military more lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program is one trusted way to do this. Please explain how you will ensure that proven, dependable, and cost-effective 8(a) programs remain in place and supported by the Department of Defense. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric. protecting the u.s. industrial base 34. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, the United States defense industrial base has always been a major target for foreign espionage-- especially by major adversaries like China and Russia. One concerning trend the last few years is the very real threat of sabotage of industrial base assets by foreign agents. We saw attempts attributed to Russia to sabotage critical defense industrial base infrastructure in North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries since 2022. Germany and the United Kingdom for instance both saw fires and explosions break out at ammunition and missile facilities linked to the War in Ukraine. We saw an assassination plot against the Chief Executive Officer of Rheinmettal, a major German arms supplier, and fires set by explosive devices that went off at DHL logistics hubs in Germany, England, and Poland bound for aircraft. If confirmed, will you commit to doing an assessment of the security of the U.S. defense industrial base against the types of plots I just described and report back to Congress as soon as possible about ways we could better protect these critical nodes? Mr. Frankston. The security of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) represents a paramount and enduring priority. The protective measures and threat assessments are integral components of the Department's security, counterintelligence, and law enforcement programs, which are executed in close partnership with other Federal agencies and with our industrial partners. We understand that our commercial sector DIB partners are also interested in more information on these issues. We are committed to working with the National Defense Information Sharing and Analysis Center to share and publicize lessons learned and best practices with DIB partners, including through DOW's role as DIB Sector Risk Management Agency. While our commitment is absolute, we are contending with an exponential growth in the criticality of the systems and technologies we must protect, while simultaneously confronting an unprecedented increase in the pace, scale, and sophistication of threats from our adversaries--challenges that will demand significant resources and reforms to address. With this hard truth in mind, I will commit to arrange for the appropriate officials to provide this Committee a briefing on our ongoing efforts. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer rare earth elements in north dakota 35. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, North Dakota has one of the world's largest deposits of lignite coal with 800 years of supply at current consumption. Industry is operating four mines today, producing 30 million tons annually. Collaborative efforts led by researchers at the University of North Dakota (UND) have identified and demonstrated high concentrations of desirable rare earth and critical mineral elements associated with these lignite deposits, including gallium, which according to public reporting the DOW has made some investments to develop, as well as others, such as dysprosium, germanium, neodymium, praseodymium, scandium, and terbium. Lignite is also highly suitable for making synthetic graphite. UND, in partnership, also made exceptional progress in how to extract rare earth elements which is substantially easier than other mineral resources. Are you familiar with UND's work aligned with President Trump's Executive Orders, including 14241 and 14156, to increase American mineral production? Secretary Cadenazzi. We are aware and appreciate of the important initiatives being conducted by the University of North Dakota. Developing unconventional resources and new processing technologies is a key part of our strategy to reduce foreign dependence and secure our supply chains. The Department is always looking to support promising efforts to unlock domestic sources of critical minerals, especially for materials like gallium, rare earths, and graphite. The Department is always interested in learning more about this type of work and how it can contribute to our national security objectives. We appreciate the important work being performed by UND and other universities and research institutions in the United States to further research and development in this technology area. 36. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department entered into an agreement at Mountain Pass (MP), recognizing the importance of domestic critical minerals and rare earths. Will the Department look at similar projects developing domestic lignite rare earths that complement MP well by supplying the heavy rare earths MP lacks for the production of the highest-value permanent magnets? Secretary Cadenazzi. We continue to identify domestic projects that address gaps along the mining to production continuum. Establishing and sustaining secure feedstock sources for both current investments and future efforts, as well as incentivizing private investment in these nodes, is key to the national strategy to ensure domestic content for mine-to magnet requirements. 37. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, given the extent of this domestic resource, relative ease of extraction, and ability to produce it without needing to permit new mines--where does North Dakota factor into your work building a robust and resilient critical minerals supply chain? Secretary Cadenazzi. Investment opportunities submitted to the Department are evaluated across the same criteria and potential to contribute to the solutions required at a given point in time. We invite all qualified vendors to submit to relevant funding opportunities and solicitations, including vendors based in North Dakota. 38. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do demonstration projects, working toward commercialization, fit into the Department's domestic critical mineral and rare earth acquisition strategies? Secretary Cadenazzi. Demonstration projects are a vital bridge in our investment strategy, connecting laboratory-scale innovation to the industrial-scale production our Nation needs. By using our investment authorities, such as Title III of the Defense Production Act and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment, to support these demonstration projects, we help prove out new technologies and de-risk the pathway for the much larger private investment required for full commercialization, ultimately turning promising concepts into reliable domestic supply chains. processing rare earth elements 39. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, North Dakota could also play an integral role in processing these minerals. Securely located in the middle of the North American continent, North Dakota continuously has the lowest electricity prices in the country, excess natural gas supply, ample water resources, and robust transportation networks. Talon Metals Corp, working to provide domestic nickel production has come to recognize this and identified North Dakota coal country for its new minerals processing facility. What is the Department looking for in deploying resources to develop the refining/processing piece of a domestic critical minerals supply chain? Secretary Cadenazzi. When deploying resources for domestic processing and refining, the Department prioritizes projects that demonstrate a clear, competitive, and sustainable path to commercial- scale production. Ultimately, our goal is to partner with projects that present a sound business case capable of attracting significant private investment, ensuring our support serves as a catalyst to build a resilient and economically viable domestic supply chain that will last for generations. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville china's refinement dominance 40. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi, as you are well aware, these critical minerals have become a key bargaining chip when it comes to geopolitical negotiations with China, especially during the mineral refinement phase. China controls the processing of 50 percent of the supply of 21 different minerals along with 90 percent of rare earth elements. We saw China display this economic power over a year ago when the Communist Party banned the export of several types of these essential minerals. Do you believe the United States has done enough to ensure China cannot continue to weaponize its dominance of critical mineral processing to disrupt our national security and halt our own production processes? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department's goal is to reduce, and where possible, eliminate our dependency on a strategic competitor. This is a generational challenge, and we are treating it with the urgency it demands. Through the Defense Production Act, the Office of Strategic Capital, and a revitalized National Defense Stockpile, we are using every tool at our disposal to invest in domestic production, de-risk private investment, and build a resilient supply chain from mine to magnet. We have made significant progress, but our work is far from over. domestic mineral processing supply chain capabilities 41. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi, I know we have the resources to compete with China; they are literally underneath my backyard. Alabama alone is home to deposits of over 50 different critical minerals that are essential for building next-generation military technologies. Decades of America Last policies resulted in our country losing the capacity to process critical minerals, with many of these refineries taking their capabilities and jobs overseas. Thankfully under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's leadership, the DOW is rebuilding refinement capabilities to support our military, bringing back American jobs, and breaking China's grip on critical minerals. How does the DOW plan to prioritize securing certain critical minerals that are used in important components of weapons like tactical missiles and interceptors that are built in Alabama? Secretary Cadenazzi. Our prioritization strategy is driven directly by the needs of the warfighter and the systems they depend on. We map critical mineral supply chains to pinpoint the exact mineral inputs that present the greatest risk. The minerals that are essential to high-priority weapon systems are, by definition, our highest priority for investment, stockpiling, and domestic development. By focusing on securing the supply chains for our most vital defense capabilities, we are inherently prioritizing the needs of key industrial hubs like Alabama. project vault 42. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Frankston, the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve will finally have the resources to store materials through ``Project Vault'' for American industries. This marks a significant shift. The U.S. is finally treating critical mineral supply chains as both a national security and industry priority rather than just another market issue. Mr. Frankston, given the urgency to bulk up the U.S.'s critical minerals, how quickly does Project Vault need to progress in order to have a secure and dependable supply of minerals outside of Chinese control? Mr. Frankston. The Department is moving with the urgency this national security threat demands. Project Vault is designed to provide an immediate buffer, insulating our domestic industry from Chinese market manipulation and supply shocks, while our longer-term investments in domestic mining and processing come online. Our goal is to secure a dependable supply of minerals as quickly as possible, and we are treating every day as critical in the race to eliminate this strategic vulnerability. reconciliation money allocated in july 43. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, investments in critical minerals are one of the single largest funding allocations in the One Big Beautiful Bill that the Senate passed in July. The total amount of funding for critical mineral production and capital assistance for supply chain development stands at over $7.5 billion dollars. That is $7.5 billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money that was allocated for critical minerals alone. President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and private industry are depending on the Federal Government to quickly and efficiently utilize these funds. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, do either of you have any idea when this reconciliation funding will become available or what the holdup is in making this funding available? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Those funds are available and the DOW has started obligating them and has submitted periodical obligation information to Congress. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd rare earth magnet supply chains 44. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, I was pleased to see the Office of Strategic Capital's conditional loan commitment with Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies, and I've been encouraged by Vulcan's efforts in North Carolina to build a fully domestic rare earth magnet supply chain. Can you walk us through what the Department is getting in return for this deal, specifically in terms of domestic capacity, timelines, and any other outcomes? Secretary Cadenazzi. The $620 million loan commitment to Vulcan Elements will enable the company to expand its production of rare earth magnets at their existing North Carolina facility and begin construction of a neighboring magnet production facility. The project will onshore critical rare earth magnet metallization and production capabilities with the capacity to produce 10,000 metric tons of neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) rare earth magnets by 2028. The Department uses high-purity NdFeB magnets in precision munitions and guidance systems and rare earth magnets also have a variety of commercial use cases in the semiconductor, automotive, energy, and robotics sectors. 45. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did the Department determine that a combination of a loan commitment from Office of Strategic Capital and support from Department of Commerce was the right balance to reduce supply chain risk for these materials? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department of War and the Department of Commerce's assessment of the importance of these investments were reached independently. As these transactions proceeded, the departments coordinated efforts. As a general matter, companies have diverse capital needs. Debt financing for specific projects can be paired with other forms of support, including Federal incentives and equity, that provide investment stability and additional capital without increasing the level of debt service for an early stage company. 46. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does this investment move us away from reliance on China for these rare earth magnets, and what metrics will the Department use to determine whether this partnership has been successful? Secretary Cadenazzi. Today, China has a 91 percent market share for rare earth elements feedstock, processing, and rare earth magnets. In October 2025, China also implemented strict export controls on supplies to the United States which presents a significant national security risk. The Department expects this project, at fruition, to guarantee a stable, reliable domestic source of rare earth magnets and therefore remove our reliance and allies' reliance on an adversary for these critical materials. The Department will reference Vulcan Elements' projected output from its new and upgraded facilities, as well as offtake of its rare earth magnets, as measurements of success in its investment in Vulcan Elements. allies and partners 47. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, I think we all want to reshore 100 percent of critical mineral production and processing, but we need our allies and partners in the near-term. Can you explain where our current gaps are and how we are leveraging allies and partners to fill those gaps? Secretary Cadenazzi. Robust international partnerships are essential to our strategy. To address critical mineral gaps, we are actively co-investing with trusted allies and partners to build diverse, secure, and reliable supply chains outside the control of our strategic competitors. This approach allows us to mitigate risk immediately while we continue the long-term work of reshoring these critical industrial capabilities here at home. The Department encourages Canadian, U.K., and Australian companies to participate in the Defense Industrial Base Consortium, which provides both solicited and unsolicited pathways for submitting projects for Industrial Base Policy funding consideration. 48. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is the Administration assessing deals with foreign partners in terms of their long-term viability versus being a stop-gap while we reboot domestic capabilities? Secretary Cadenazzi. Each potential investment or transaction with foreign partners is assessed on the contribution to solving gaps identified in the Department's review of strategic mineral requirements as well as the viability of the project and expected performance over time. We are holding investments and partnerships to the highest standards of financial and strategic due diligence to protect our current resources and future production potential. supply chain awareness 49. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, on supply chain transparency, does the Department know with a high degree of confidence which weapons systems and warfighting platforms have minerals or parts originating or processed in China? If not, what additional authorities, resources, or tools are needed to give the Department fully supply chain awareness? Secretary Cadenazzi. As the Industrial Base Policy office maps out the mineral supply chain nodes and shortfalls, we are developing further insight into the specific weapons systems and platforms most challenged by reliance on hostile nations' imports. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt critical minerals prioritization 50. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, does the DOW's evaluation criteria for Federal investment favor projects that can produce multiple critical minerals over those producing only a single critical mineral? If so, what level of preference do multi-mineral projects receive? Mr. Frankston. Investments are evaluated on their potential to address key shortages and requirements and, in some cases, production of a mineral as a byproduct will be a more efficient and cost-effective solution. In those cases, and others when it makes sense, multi-mineral production can make a project more attractive. However, single mineral production or processing is often important, especially to address a critical or immediate shortfall. DOW prioritizes its investments based on meeting defense requirements, not to the number of different minerals produced by any given project. 51. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, does the DOW's evaluation and assessment criteria for Federal investment give preference to projects with shorter timelines to production, and if so, what level of preference do these projects receive? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Timelines are a part of the evaluation and assessment process for each project, but are taken in context of technical merit, financial viability, and operator credibility. All else being equal, the faster time to production is likely to be selected. Usually, the evaluation requires weighing many aspects leading to the strongest overall contributor to national defense. 52. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, is the DOW coordinating with relevant Federal agencies to emphasize the importance of national security of critical mineral projects and how environmental regulations may be unreasonably preventing progress on reshoring domestic production? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. A whole-of-government approach is central to the Department's strategy. We are in constant coordination with our partners across the Federal Government to ensure that the national security imperative of building secure domestic supply chains is a shared priority. We have a streamlined path to execution that meets environmental regulatory intent while reducing administrative burden and delays. This includes rescinding DOW National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations and implementing Department-wide NEPA guidance that will accelerate or even exclude certain projects from environmental review. critical minerals hub 53. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, Herculaneum, Missouri has the potential to host an intermodal Mississippi River port that could function as a national critical minerals hub. Is a potential project like this something the DOW would consider partnering with the State of Missouri and local private equities to work on a project of this magnitude? Mr. Frankston. We encourage companies in Missouri to explore opportunities within DOW and other departments for partnership-- including joining the Defense Industrial Base Consortium and Cornerstone Consortium, both operated through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy. We closely review all proposals for optimal outcomes for the warfighter, the DIB, and the taxpayer. 54. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, is there any information you can share with me regarding potential DOW investments in Missouri that are being considered? If so, is there any information you can share on where the Department is in their evaluation and assessment of these potential projects? Mr. Frankston. The DOW recently closed a call for critical minerals proposals through the Defense Industrial Base Consortium. We received 533 submissions, which are undergoing review. Any submissions received from Missouri-based organizations as part of that call will be fairly evaluated alongside all other submissions. We are not aware of outstanding prior submissions through DPA Title III or Cornerstone. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Sheehy deep-sea mining 55. Senator Sheehy. Secretary Cadenazzi, both the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA included report language directing Defense Industrial Base Policy to complete a feasibility study for domestic refining of deep seabed critical mineral intermediates and develop a roadmap for the United States to source and process critical minerals sourced from deep-sea mining. Following these congressional directives, Executive Order 14285 instructed your department to support domestic processing capabilities for seabed mineral resources and explore the use of grant and loan authorities for this purpose. How does the Department, whether through the Industrial Base or Office of Strategic Capital, plan to deliver on these commitments to facilitate domestic nodule processing in support of American national mineral security? Secretary Cadenazzi We are fully committed to executing the directives outlined in the recent NDAAs and Executive Order 14285 as part of our broader mission to secure diverse and resilient supply chains for critical minerals. We will evaluate opportunities in the deep-sea sector using the same rigorous criteria and tools we apply to all potential critical mineral projects. This includes leveraging the full range of our investment authorities, from Industrial Base Policy programs to loans from the Office of Strategic Capital, to support promising domestic processing capabilities for these resources where it aligns with our national security objectives. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen recycling 56. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, earlier this month, I visited Phoenix Tailings in Exeter, New Hampshire, which is working to make critical minerals out of existing mining waste. Given the shortages we face in many of these materials, I think trying to work from existing supplies that are in the United States is valuable here. Can you explain why critical mineral recycling, in particular, is so valuable for national security? Secretary Cadenazzi. Critical mineral recycling is very valuable for national security because it allows us to create a new, domestic source of supply from materials that are already within our borders. By efficiently extracting essential minerals from existing waste streams, we can turn a liability into a strategic asset. This approach directly reduces our vulnerabilities by diversifying our supply base, shortening supply chains, and insulating us from the geopolitical risks associated with foreign mines and processors, strengthening our ability to produce what we need, when we need it. secure minerals act 57. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, China has successfully executed a long-term strategy to dominate global critical minerals markets giving China significant leverage over the United States and key industries. If the United States wants to elevate itself as a global leader in critical minerals, this will require a multi-faceted approach. In addition to their direct defense applications, critical minerals are also vital to other manufacturing industries like the automotive industry. Can you discuss why it's important for other industries to have access to reliable and secure critical minerals supply chains in terms of our national security? Secretary Cadenazzi. Our national security is inextricably linked to our economic security. The defense industrial base does not exist in a vacuum. It is built upon the broader commercial industrial base, including vital sectors like the automotive industry. These commercial markets provide the scale necessary to sustain domestic production, drive innovation, and support a skilled workforce that our defense sector can draw upon. If our key commercial industries are vulnerable to supply chain coercion by a strategic competitor, it weakens our entire economy, erodes our ability to surge production in a crisis, and ultimately compromises our ability to defend the Nation. Therefore, ensuring all our key industries have access to secure supply chains is a national security imperative. 58. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, my bill, the SECURE Minerals Act (S. 3659), which I introduced with Senators Young, Rounds, Sheehy, Cortez Masto and King, would establish a Strategic Resilience Reserve. That Reserve would invest in domestic and allied production capacity for critical minerals and supporting more secure and robust critical minerals supply chains for key industries, including autos, tech, energy and defense, thereby reducing reliance on China and strengthening our economic and national security. Do you think such an effort to invest in the long-term supply of critical minerals across the economy would be helpful for national security? Secretary Cadenazzi The Department agrees with the fundamental intent of the SECURE Minerals Act: a sustained, whole-of-economy investment in our critical mineral supply chains is essential for national security, and we must protect our domestic producers from adversarial price manipulation. While we share the goal, we do have concerns that the specific Reserve mechanism as drafted could introduce unintended market and financial risks that might undermine its effectiveness. The Department is already leveraging tools like direct investment and offtake agreements to achieve these ends, and we are eager to work closely with you and your staff to refine the approach and build the most effective and durable solution to this critical national security challenge. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand Defense Production Act Awards 59. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, under this Administration, the Office of the Deputy Secretary has been engaged in the process of DPA awards to an unprecedented extent. A single person does not have the ability to address all of the vulnerabilities in the defense industrial base. Therefore, how is the Department allocating funding and authorities between the DPA title III office, the Industrial Base Analysis & Sustainment Program, Office of Strategic Capital, and other relevant parties to address supply chain activities? Who is authorized to make decisions in cases of overlapping authority or interest? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department coordinates authorities and allocates funding in accordance with established chains-of-command. 60. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how is the Department using the offices responsible for the industrial base to conduct due diligence and oversee DPA awards? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department relies on its Industrial Base Policy (IBP) offices to run structured due-diligence and oversight for both Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) awards. In short, these offices provide the analytical backbone, financial vetting, and programmatic monitoring that ensure taxpayer funds strengthen critical supply chains rather than introduce risk. 61. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, the Department has dramatically expanded its involvement in private sector critical minerals activity through direct investments, expanded contracting, and funding vehicles through offices like the Office of Strategic Capital. How are you ensuring these investments have positive, diffuse effects across the entire industry so that the Department is not just ``picking winners'' and creating either monopolies or supply chain choke points? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is actively ensuring its investments in private sector critical minerals have broad, positive effects by leveraging flexible contracting and fostering a competitive environment. We utilize the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to engage a wide array of non-traditional vendors and small businesses, moving beyond a limited pool of incumbent contractors. Our process, facilitated through vehicles like the Defense Industrial Base Consortium (DIBC) and the Cornerstone Other Transaction Agreement, begins with competitively solicited white papers from vendors. These submissions are rigorously reviewed based on technical merit, ensuring that the most innovative and promising solutions are selected, which prevents the creation of monopolies and promotes a diverse industrial base. This merit-based selection is further strengthened by continuous market intelligence gathering by our Industrial Base Experts. These experts actively perform market research by attending conferences, conducting site visits, and networking with leaders in critical sectors. This proactive engagement guarantees the Department is not simply ``picking winners'' but is making informed decisions to select the best possible vendor for each award. This comprehensive strategy ensures our investments bolster the entire industry, creating a resilient and diffuse supply chain free of single points of failure. 62. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how can other domestic companies remain competitive when the DOD invests so heavily in one company and provides that company a competitive advantage like a guaranteed price floor? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's significant investments, which might include mechanisms like a guaranteed price floor, are not intended to ``pick winners'' or create monopolies. Instead, they are strategic actions taken to establish or reshore a critical industrial capability that is vital for national security but may be nascent, fragile, or non-existent domestically. In many cases, these capabilities are not commercially viable without initial government support, especially when competing against foreign entities that are heavily subsidized by their own governments. The investment serves as a catalyst to ensure a secure domestic supply, effectively creating a market where one might not otherwise exist. Our goal is to foster a self-sustaining ecosystem. The initial investment in one company is often a necessary first step to de-risk a sector and prove its viability, which in turn attracts further private capital and encourages other companies to enter the market. We use competitive solicitations for new projects and continually survey the market for emerging vendors. The success of an initial partner is designed to pave the way for a broader, more competitive industrial base, not to create a permanent sole-source environment. Interdepartmental Coordination. For example, since the start of fiscal year 2026, the Warfighting Investments, Resourcing, and Execution (WIRE) Office has invested in 31 (IBAS: 18, DPAP: 13) companies, including both new and continuing investments. This includes investments in 8 (IBAS: 2, DPAP: 6) companies specifically for strategic and critical materials projects. interdepartmental coordination 63. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how does the Department coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies investing in critical minerals, like the Department of Energy Loan Programs Office or the CHIPS Program Office? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our coordination is constant to ensure a unified, whole-of-government effort. This close collaboration allows us to leverage each agency's unique authorities and expertise to build comprehensive financial solutions for companies, combining loans, grants, and other investments to most effectively de- risk projects and accelerate the rebuilding of our domestic critical mineral supply chains. 64. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, are there certain parts of the supply chain where the Department of Defense is effectively competing with other cabinet agencies? If so, how do you each participate in the interagency to ensure strategic defense priorities are met without disadvantaging domestic-facing agencies? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War coordinates closely within the interagency process to harmonize our collective whole-of-government approach to this matter. trusted foundry program 65. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, commentary during the hearing suggested that the Department's Trusted Foundry model for microelectronics procurement is outdated. However, mature node microelectronics manufacturing remains purpose-built to address end uses and is essential to the majority of the Department's needs, including for advanced multi chip modules and leading edge systems for reasons that include technical capabilities, cost, performance, reliability, packaging requirements, and long term sustainability. Both the Trusted Foundry and the Secure Enclave programs should complement each other to strengthen trust based microelectronics production by identifying risks well beyond the wafer level, while also addressing the cost basis challenges that come from serving a relatively small national security customer base. Therefore, please explain, how the Department evaluates the continuing national security value of trusted manufacturing for mature node microelectronics, particularly where these nodes remain integral to best serve the majority of end uses, spanning traditional systems to advanced packaging architectures and modern heterogeneous designs. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department has continued to engage with industry to better understand our supply chains to help us identify risks. The work of the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) and its Trusted Access Program Office (TAPO) is of critical importance to ensuring warfighters have access to safe and secure microelectronics. DMEA's stewardship of the Department's Trusted Foundry network is a key enabler of this mission. For the rest of Fiscal Year 2026, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy's Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program will fund the Trusted Foundry. We also continue to engage with Secure Enclave to discuss microelectronics resourcing across the Department. We understand that secure access to microelectronics is important to national security. 66. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how does the Department assesses the technical interdependence and complementary solutions between leading edge nodes and mature nodes microelectronics components in current and next generation defense systems? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department assesses the technical landscape of microelectronics as a highly interdependent ecosystem where both leading-edge and mature nodes are not just complementary, but essential for the functionality of current and next- generation defense systems. The Department's strategy is not to prioritize one over the other, but to ensure secure and reliable access to the full spectrum of microelectronics technologies. 67. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, whether the Department believes the Trusted Foundry accreditation model should be updated, expanded, or modernized, rather than diminished, to support today's expanding semiconductor manufacturing base including modular and heterogeneous chip architectures, which mostly require the capabilities only available from mature node sizes. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's position is that the Trusted Foundry model must be updated, expanded, and modernized to support today's rapidly evolving semiconductor landscape. The Trusted Foundry model as we know it is being expanded through several key initiatives under the T&AM program. 68. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how does the Secure Enclave complements and strengthens Trusted Foundry by improving supply chain visibility, foreign ownership screening, and risk scoring for small node sizes across trusted and non-trusted suppliers? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Trusted Foundry, managed by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), establishes a foundation of trust by accrediting suppliers across the microelectronics lifecycle, from design to packaging and testing. This accreditation ensures a secure ``chain of custody'' and protects against tampering and unauthorized access. The Secure Enclave builds upon this foundation by providing substantial direct funding to expand domestic manufacturing of leading-edge, secure semiconductors for government and military applications. The Trusted Foundry provides the established framework and standards for trust, while Secure Enclave provides the critical investment to onshore and advance the manufacturing capabilities necessary to meet those standards. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono critical mineral recycling 69. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, I have consistently supported DOD efforts to increase recycling of critical minerals from end-of-life equipment, so I was happy to see this as a key pillar of DOD's larger strategy. Your testimony specifically references research and pilot projects to recover critical minerals from spent lithium-ion batteries and other end-of-life equipment. Are you coordinating with the Department of Energy, such as the ReCell battery recycling program at Argonne National Laboratory? Secretary Cadenazzi. Close coordination with our interagency partners is fundamental to our success, especially in a technology- driven area like recycling. We work closely with experts across the government, including at the Department of Energy and its national laboratories, to ensure we are aligned on strategy, leveraging the best available science, and avoiding any duplication of effort. This collaborative approach is essential to our shared national goal of building a secure, circular economy for these vital materials. ally/partner coordination 70. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, our allies and partners are critical to shoring up the critical mineral supply chain. While DOD's strategy acknowledges that point, unfortunately, this President continues to publicly berate our allies on the world stage, undermining important relationships. Secretary Cadenazzi, how have DOD's strained relations with traditional partners and allies hindered efforts at negotiating deals in this space? Secretary Cadenazzi. The President has given us a clear mandate to revitalize the U.S. industrial base with an America First approach. However, America First has always recognized that our allies and partners support and enhance our national security and economic resilience. Our allies share our deep concerns about the PRC's dominance of the world's critical minerals market, and our engagements on this topic have been positive and highly productive. We are actively working through multilateral frameworks like the Minerals Security Partnership and bilateral agreements and arrangements to diversify and secure our collective supply chains. These collaborative efforts demonstrate that our alliances are robust and essential to countering shared economic and security challenges. The Department continues to pursue outcomes-oriented cooperation with allies to improve the resilience of our collective defense industrial base and encourage meaningful burden-sharing, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy and Acquisition Transformation Strategy. 71. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, is the DOD working with the State Department or other interagency partners to facilitate coordination on critical mineral supply chains? If so, how? Secretary Cadenazzi. Close coordination with the State Department and our other interagency partners is a cornerstone of our entire strategy. The State Department leads our crucial diplomatic engagements, working with allies and partners around the world to build diverse, resilient supply chains for critical minerals. This international collaboration is an essential complement to our domestic investment and stockpiling efforts, ensuring we have a unified, global approach to securing the resources vital to our national security. investments in substitute materials 72. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, in addition to increasing supply and access to critical minerals, DOD must also invest in efforts to reduce our long-term dependence on them. New technologies like cobalt-free batteries and biotechnology-based solutions come to mind. Secretary Cadenazzi, what steps is the Department taking to reduce our dependence on critical minerals, and how can this Committee help you and your team? Secretary Cadenazzi. Developing new technologies and substitute materials is certainly part of the transition to more secure domestic sources. Many traditional investment programs focus on developing proven or producing assets into useful domestic suppliers. In the case of early stage technologies and substitute materials, which are typically lower on the ``Technology Readiness Level (TRL)'' and ``Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)'' measures, offices such as the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering engaging with federally Funded Research and Development Centers and National Laboratories help energize those pipelines via engagements with the private sector and academic institutions. fiscal year 2026 national defense authorization act requirements 73. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA contained section 842 that prohibits the Department of Defense from ``procuring advanced batteries and cells whose functional cell components and technology, whether as end items or embedded within warfighting and support systems, are not owned, sourced, refined, or produced from a foreign entity of concern'' starting in 2028. As we all know, Chinese domination of the critical minerals and materials market is not only an economic concern to the United States but a national security one as well. Reliance on advanced battery materials from China puts our security and war fighters at risk. What is the Department's plan to meet the requirements of section 842, and what policy or funding support can Congress provide to allow DOD to meet this goal? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department developed guidance and an implementation plan for Section 842, working closely with the Department of Energy to understand best practices for Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) policy implementation. The Department hosted an industry day to communicate the implementation plan and solicit industry feedback to ensure the DOW's implementation will be clear and effective. The Office of Industrial Base Policy is working with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Acquisition to implement Section 842 into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). section 303 authorities and criteria 74. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the DPA has historically been used to provide grants, loans, and advance- purchase commitments to support the domestic production of critical materials. However, in recent years, the DOD has used the Act to acquire sizable equity stakes in select companies, such as MP Materials and Trilogy Metals, marking a significant departure from past precedent. What specific criteria does the Department use to determine which companies qualify for equity investments under section 303 of the DPA? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes, regulations, and the purpose of the DPA--strengthening the domestic industrial capacity essential to national defense utilizing the most ``cost-effective, expedient, and practical alternative''--to meet the identified need. 75. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, is there a formal competitive process, and if so, what metrics are used to assess whether equity--rather than a grant or loan--is the appropriate tool? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. 76. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how does DOD evaluate market impact and potential distortion of domestic competition before selecting a single firm for preferential treatment? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. 77. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, what safeguards are in place to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure that political considerations play no role in these investment decisions? Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. industrial base policy--office of strategic capital coordination on critical minerals financing 78. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, at the hearing, you emphasized that rebuilding U.S. critical mineral supply chains requires coordinated action across Government and the private sector. In that context, the Department's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) has made major conditional loan commitments, including a joint $700 million conditional loan commitment to expand domestic NdFeB magnet production, as well as an earlier $150 million loan tied to DOD's agreement with MP Materials. What is Industrial Base Policy's (IBP) formal role (if any) in OSC's critical-minerals lending decisions (requirements setting, portfolio prioritization, diligence,etc) particularly for large conditional commitments like the Vulcan/ReElement package? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Industrial Base Policy collaborates closely with the Office of Strategic Capital on DOW critical mineral decisions. 79. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what standing governance bodies exist to align IBP, OSC Research and Engineering, and other relevant Office of the Secretary of Defense components on critical minerals investment priorities? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department and other relevant Agencies maintain regular coordination from the working level through Department and Administration leadership to weigh the technical, financial, and strategic merits of critical minerals investments, and to ensure use of the most expedient and beneficial funding streams and authorities that lead to a fair return to the American taxpayer. This level of interagency cooperation and investment analysis supports the best outcomes for efforts across the Government. 80. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, does IBP maintain (or participate in) a DOD-wide ``investment map'' of critical mineral nodes to identify the highest-leverage gaps for DOD loans and other programs? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively developing comprehensive supply chain maps for each critical mineral, from mine to end-use, and IBP is deeply involved in this process. The express purpose of this data-driven analysis is to identify the specific nodes and chokepoints that present the greatest risk to our defense industrial base. This detailed mapping forms the very foundation of our investment strategy, allowing us to precisely target our authorities at the highest-leverage gaps to build the most resilient supply chains possible. 81. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, does IBP have any role or engagement on how OSC loans are coordinated with other DOD industrial base and critical minerals authorities and funding streams (e.g., DPA title III, industrial base sustainment lines, service-level supply chain investments)? Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP leadership and staff--as appropriate--work directly and regularly with OSC both at strategic planning and committee meetings and in working teams for deal structuring and execution. We provide technical and subject matter expertise across a range of commodities, defense articles, and authorities to ensure smooth and effective coordination. aukus and industrial base policy support 82. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, the AUKUS [Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States] partnership is a critical enabler for a trilateral and interoperable industry base. Previously, IBP has played an important role is advancing the Pillar I and II deliverables, particularly for engaging with industry partners. What is IBP's formal role in AUKUS implementation for Pillar I and Pillar II (policy, strategy, execution support, governance), and what offices and teams within IBP are responsible? Secretary Cadenazzi. My team, primarily under the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for International Armaments Cooperation (IAC), is the A&S lead for AUKUS. Our formal role focuses on strategy, policy, and execution support for the trilateral industrial base. Strategy and Policy: We work with DOW stakeholders to develop and align policies that remove barriers to industrial collaboration and shape the strategic environment for AUKUS success. Execution Support: Our primary focus is enabling industry-to-industry collaboration. We engage directly with our trilateral industry partners to facilitate AUKUS projects through platforms like the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum (ACIF). IAC also oversees the 5 Points MOU, which enables the development of new cooperative projects arrangements to support AUKUS. Governance: AUKUS Pillar II oversight with the partners has been led by OUSW(Policy), in partnership with OUSW(A&S) and OUSW(R&E). 83. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are IBP's current top industrial base priorities for enabling AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II? Secretary Cadenazzi. AUKUS is a unique opportunity to drive acquisition acceleration and true partnership. Our top priorities are centered on creating a unified, resilient, and innovative trilateral industrial base. For AUKUS Pillar II, which my team focuses on, this means we are focused on: 1. Co-development, Co-production, and Co-sustainment: Moving beyond simply purchasing equipment to jointly creating and maintaining next-generation capabilities. 2. Integrating Multi-National Capabilities: Ensuring our systems are interoperable to act as a genuine force multiplier. 3. Accelerating Technology Transition: Using joint testing and evaluation to rapidly field promising solutions in the Indo-Pacific theater. Our overarching goal is to foster a well-informed trilateral industrial base that collaboratively solves operational problems and delivers integrated capabilities at speed and scale. 84. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is IBP coordinating across the Department and the services to advance the trilateral industrial base ecosystem between the AUKUS partners? Secretary Cadenazzi. We are in lockstep with the Department of State to message and implement export control reforms, which are fundamental to enabling the seamless collaboration required between our AUKUS partners' defense industrial sectors. We are at the center of a Department-wide effort to streamline AUKUS industry engagement and deliver capabilities more efficiently. We work closely with the Services to identify and resolve industrial base constraints for Pillar II priorities. 85. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the key challenges, and how can Congress provide support for continued industrial base development? Secretary Cadenazzi. Thank you for Congress' continued, robust support. Consistent with President Trump's direction for AUKUS to move ``full steam ahead,'' the Department is moving expeditiously to ensure its success. The primary challenge is ensuring that our regulatory framework matches our strategic intent. We have made a monumental leap forward with the AUKUS license-free environment, as established by ITAR exemption Sec. 126.7. Our main task now is maximizing its use by industry. We are actively messaging the significant opportunities this exemption creates. As we implement our Acquisition Transformation Strategy, we will continue to lean forward to ensure the Excluded Technologies List (ETL) remains narrowly focused on only the most sensitive technologies. This year's NDAA-required ETL review, which we are undertaking with the Department of State, is a key part of this effort. To illustrate the potential of the expedited AUKUS licenses submitted last year, about 80 percent would have been eligible for the exemption. The continued support of Congress in championing these reforms and encouraging industry adoption is the most critical support you can provide. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine domestic gallium supply 86. Senator Kaine. Secretary Cadenazzi, gallium is a critical input for advanced defense technologies, yet the United States remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for its supply. How are the Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency identifying and advancing execution-ready gallium projects with technical developers, academic and commercial partners, and what additional authorities, resources, or partnership models are needed to evaluate research and accelerate research-to-manufacturing efforts that can rapidly transition into domestic production? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is leveraging a whole-of- government approach to address our gallium vulnerability, working in close partnership with technical experts, interagency, and commercial partners. We actively identify and support promising projects, using our investment authorities to help accelerate them from the research and development phase into at-scale manufacturing. The authorities Congress has provided are powerful, but the speed and scale at which we can rebuild this critical supply chain and mitigate risk will always be a function of the resources available to execute our strategy. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr. china 87. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, my understanding is that China has acted aggressively to invest in supply chain nodes in the United States and our allies. How is China disrupting the tungsten molybdenum supply chain? Please provide an unclassified answer as well as a classified response. Secretary Cadenazzi. China leverages its position as the dominant global producer of materials like tungsten and a major player in molybdenum to disrupt supply chains. Through state-directed actions, including the strategic use of export controls and other non-market practices, it creates price volatility and supply uncertainty. This strategy discourages long-term investment in alternative sources and reinforces a global dependency that poses a clear and direct risk to our industrial base and national security. The Department is willing to provide the Committee with a classified response on this matter in the appropriate setting. tungsten 88. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, if our primary adversary restricted the export of tungsten or molybdenum tomorrow, what would be the impact on the Department's supply chain in terms of programs affected? Secretary Cadenazzi. An export restriction on tungsten or molybdenum would have a significant impact across a wide range of our most critical defense programs. Tungsten is essential for our kinetic capabilities, including armor-penetrating munitions, while molybdenum is a key alloying agent for the high-strength steels and superalloys used in advanced armor, rocket nozzles, and aerospace components. 89. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, if our primary adversary restricted the export of tungsten or molybdenum tomorrow, what would be the impact on the Department's supply chain in terms of months of supply? Secretary Cadenazzi. An immediate and total restriction from a primary adversary would pose a significant challenge. The National Defense Stockpile, combined with existing industry inventories, provides a near-term buffer against initial shocks. However, a prolonged, large-scale embargo would create difficulties for numerous defense industrial base partners and critical weapons programs. mining 90. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what steps can the Department of Defense take to support rebuilding the industrial base beyond just mining investments? Secretary Cadenazzi. Our approach is to evaluate the supply chain risk at each node of the minerals supply chain, including mid-and down- stream, to determine the most appropriate mitigation approach, including investments, loans, stockpiling, international partnerships, or another means. 91. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the ability for the United States to domestically convert tungsten powder into defense parts? Secretary Cadenazzi. The United States possesses a mature, though specialized, industrial base with the capability to convert tungsten powder into finished defense components. Several domestic companies can fabricate this powder into critical parts for a variety of applications, including armor-penetrating munitions and high- performance, wear-resistant materials. Our primary vulnerability, however, is not in this final manufacturing step, but further upstream. The domestic industry remains heavily reliant on foreign sources for the initial tungsten concentrates and intermediate materials needed to produce the powder in the first place. Therefore, the Department's strategy is focused on strengthening the entire domestic supply chain to ensure a secure, end-to-end capability. 92. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, would it benefit the Department to resource the defense industrial base in order to establish the ability to domestically process tungsten through the conversion of ammonium paratungState to tungsten carbide? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively using its investment authorities to bolster this exact capability because building a secure, end-to-end domestic tungsten supply chain is a national security imperative. list of critical minerals 93. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, section 844 of the Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA prohibits procurement of molybdenum, gallium, or germanium from non-allied foreign nations and authorizes production from recovered material. We also know that molybdenum is required for defense and kinetic systems. Would the Department of Defense support adding molybdenum to the USGS list of critical minerals? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department does not make the final determination for the U.S. Geological Survey's list. However, molybdenum is an essential alloying agent for the high-strength steels and superalloys that are foundational to many of our most advanced defense systems, including armor and aerospace components. Given its importance and the fact that potential adversaries have already demonstrated a willingness to use export controls on molybdenum products, we believe treating molybdenum as a critical input is a prudent step to ensure the long-term security and resilience of our defense industrial base. floor price guarantees 94. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, does the Department have a mechanism to provide `floor price guarantees' for domestic producers of critical minerals throughout the supply chain (not just mining) to protect them against intentional predatory pricing from foreign state- owned enterprises? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department reviews each investment to ensure that they will support the DIB and withstand adversarial actions and assesses all necessary measures. This is part of the larger whole- of-governmental effort to ensure viability and success of domestic critical minerals supply chains. workforce 95. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what can industry do with the Department to re-establish the domestic metallurgical expertise that we've outsourced for the last 3 decades? Secretary Cadenazzi. Ordinarily, outside the Organic Industrial Base (OIB), the development and maintenance of industrial skills, including metallurgical expertise, is the responsibility of industry, not the government. Nevertheless, because of government inattentiveness and misdirection over the last three decades, industrial skills across many key sectors within the defense industrial base (DIB) have atrophied. In response, the department has established many workforce development programs to assist in re-growing those skills including a coordinated effort from my organization. IBP's Workforce development efforts target four main gaps-- recruiting & awareness, training, hiring & retention, and data analytics--with metallurgical skills and training a key focus of a number of our efforts. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren critical minerals 96. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, you said in your written testimony that one of your office's primary tools are loan authorities granted to the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). OSC recently announced a $620 million loan to Vulcan Elements, a magnet company that is backed by 1789 Capital, a venture capital firm where Donald Trump Jr. is a partner. Were there any conversations or communications between any DOD officials and Donald Trump Jr. or individuals representing Mr. Trump, Jr. about Vulcan Elements specifically, or the production of rare earth and critical minerals generally, prior to OSC's decision to award the loan to Vulcan Elements? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is under the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research & Engineering (OUSW(R&E)). OUSW(A&S) and IBP work closely with OSC on a variety of transactions and investments in the industrial base. OSC is not aware of any conversations or communications between DOW officials and Donald Trump, Jr. or 1789 Capital, or individuals representing Mr. Trump, concerning the Vulcan Elements investment or concerning the production of rare earth elements and critical minerals generally. 97. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if you are aware of any conversations or communications referenced in the previous question, please detail the participants[s], date[s], and content[s] of the communications[s] or conversation[s]. Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC is not aware of any conversations or communications between DOW officials and Donald Trump, Jr. or 1789 Capital, or individuals representing Mr. Trump, concerning the Vulcan Elements investment or concerning the production of rare earth elements and critical minerals generally. 98. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did DOD's OSC office decide to award Vulcan Elements its $620 million loan for the production of magnets? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) export controls on magnets and other REEs have posed ongoing threats to American economic and national security that necessitate swift action to protect our supply chains. While President Trump's recent trade negotiations successfully rolled back the majority of the Chinese Communist Party's rare earth element (REE) restrictions, it is in America's best interest to build a stable, domestic magnet supply chain for our future economic and national security. OSC decided to approve a conditional loan commitment to Vulcan Elements based on the Department's analysis of opportunities to further secure domestic magnet production in a sector with limited domestic options. Vulcan's current rare-earth element processing and magnet production facilities provide it with the necessary foundation to quickly build and expand additional manufacturing to meet U.S. magnet demand in a short timeframe. OSC's assessments of national security impact, bankability, and credit risk were based on engagement with Department experts (in this instance, the Office of Industrial Base Policy, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, among others) and independent robust market standard legal, financial, environment, technical, operational and commercial due diligence informed its decision to proceed with the loan to Vulcan. 99. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for the OSC's loan to Vulcan Elements a competitive process? Secretary Cadenazzi. The selection of an individual company does not imply the rejection of another company since selection is based upon assessments of an individual loan applicant and/or project's creditworthiness and mission alignment rather than the type of competitive process governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In fact, OSC has provided or is in the process of providing loans to several other businesses in the magnet supply chain, some of which are competitors to Vulcan. This is all in an effort to bolster the domestic magnet supply chain. The process for offering a conditional loan commitment to a company depends upon eligibility and credit underwriting standards that follow guidance articulated in statute and overarching policies such as those laid out in OMB Circular A-129 (Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables). 100. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if so, what were the criteria used to determine which company would receive DOD's OSC $620 million loan? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 101. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many companies competed for DOD's OSC loan to Vulcan Elements? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 102. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was Vulcan Elements the highest rated competitor in the award process for DOD's OSC loan? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 103. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if Vulcan Elements was not the highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and why did they not receive the loan? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 104. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department of Commerce recently announced a $1.6 billion investment deal with USA Rare Earth to help produce a supply of critical minerals. What involvement did DOD have in the Department of Commerce's investment into USA Rare Earth? Secretary Cadenazzi. The investment letter of intent that was announced with USA Rare Earth plans to use DoC and DoE authorities to support the development of the project. The DOW works closely across the USG with interagency partners to align planned investments to best support supply chain security. There is no current plan to use DOW authorities to support this transaction. 105. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, reporting indicates that USA Rare Earth was also invited to an interagency meeting at the Pentagon prior to the award. What was the nature of DOD's involvement in this meeting? Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW closely coordinates with interagency partners on critical minerals deals. 106. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, please provide the date, list of attendees, and any transcripts, notes, or written material from the meeting between USA Rare Earth and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Energy. Secretary Cadenazzi. Engaging with industry participants is an instrumental part of IBP's analysis of critical mineral supply chains, and IBP regularly engages with existing and emerging critical minerals producers. The Department of War met with representatives of USA Rare Earth on August 19, 2025. The meeting purpose was to gain an updated understanding of USARE's plans for building a permanent magnet supply chain. 107. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, DOD's OSC office recently awarded rare earth company MP Materials a $150 million loan. How did DOD's OSC office decide to award MP Materials its $150 million loan. Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC provided its $150 million loan to MP Materials as part of a wider Department investment in the company to secure the domestic mine-to-magnet value chain which produces permanent magnets with numerous commercial and defense applications. The MP Materials mine at Mountain Pass, California, is one of the only domestic operational rare earth mines and central to the decision to approve a loan application for the company. This asset represents the best opportunity for the U.S. to inject light rare earths into the domestic market. There is no other operational rare earth mine in the Nation that can produce this material at the scale required for the U.S. industrial base. In addition to the OSC loan, a $400 million equity investment was funded through Defense Production Act funds, with offtake rights and a price floor for neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr), a key material used in magnet production. Additional sources of private capital also invested to support the expansion of MP's facilities. OSC's loan is intended to facilitate the expansion of MP's production facilities to provide for the processing and separation of samarium oxide, a heavy rare earth element. 108. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for OSC's loan to MP Materials a competitive process? Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC's statute does not require a competitive process to select borrowers for loans. The selection of an individual company does not necessarily imply the rejection of another company since selection is based upon assessments of an individual loan applicant and/or project's creditworthiness and mission alignment rather than the type of competitive process governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The process for offering a conditional loan commitment to a company depends upon eligibility and credit underwriting standards that follow guidance articulated in statute and overarching policies such as those laid out in OMB Circular A-129 (Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables). 109. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was MP Materials the highest rated competitor in the award process for DOD's OSC loan? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 110. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if MP Materials was not the highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and why did they not receive the loan? Secretary Cadenazzi. See above. 111. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, DOD has obtained equity stakes in MP Materials, ReElement Technologies, Trilogy Metals, and Vulcan Elements. Please provide the following information related to DOD support for the aforementioned companies: Transaction amount; The statutory authority and available funding DOD relied on to make the investment; Expiration of Federal support to these companies or projected timeline of DOD support; and Term sheet outlining the Federal Government's financial ownership Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. defense contractors 112. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does defense contractors' prioritization of stock buybacks over capital investments impact the warfighter? Secretary Cadenazzi. Prioritizing stock buybacks over capital investments can limit funding available for internal research, development, and production capacity expansion. This can ultimately slow modernization efforts, restrict supply chain resilience, and delay the delivery of advanced capabilities to the warfighter. 113. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you support providing contracting officers cost and pricing data they need to negotiate fair deals for the military? Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes. Ensuring contracting officers have access to accurate, timely cost and pricing data is essential to negotiating fair and reasonable prices, preventing price gouging, and responsibly stewarding taxpayer resources. 114. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does access to a program's cost or pricing data enhance DOD's readiness? Secretary Cadenazzi. Access to this data ensures the Department pays fair prices, which maximizes our purchasing power. By eliminating overpayments, we can use those funds toward acquiring more equipment, improving sustainment, and funding critical training, directly enhancing overall readiness. 115. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are DOD's most effective tools to enhance competition in the defense industrial base? Secretary Cadenazzi. We are focused on scaling up existing mid-tier companies so they can transition into competing for larger acquisitions. Through our umbrella organization, the Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are expanding and strengthening the defense industrial base for companies of all sizes. As a vital and unchanged part of this broader organization, our Office of Small Business Programs continues to actively grow the number of small businesses entering and advancing in the defense sector. By lowering barriers to entry and providing targeted support through our Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are cultivating a robust pipeline of small and other non-traditional companies that will drive long-term competition, innovation, and supply chain resilience. 116. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do antitrust agencies benefit from DOD's expertise in assessing potential mergers and acquisitions? Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes. The Department provides antitrust agencies with critical, specialized subject matter expertise regarding how potential defense-sector mergers could impact specific military supply chains, future competition, innovation, and overall national security. 117. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in April 2025 IBP told the GAO that ``their ability to conduct [Mergers and Acquisitions] (M&A) reviews is limited by resource and budget constraints'' but that if sufficiently resourced ``IBP officials intend to track . . . major defense suppliers to determine if any are engaging in M&A activity that needs to be reviewed and update the list annually.'' What is the status of IBP resources to track major defense suppliers engaging in M&A activity that needs to be reviewed? Secretary Cadenazzi. We are continuously evaluating Industrial Base Policy (IBP) resources and prioritizing existing funds to track critical defense suppliers. While resource constraints continue, the GIES team is identifying contractors of concern in real time. Overall, we are actively working within the current budget constraints to optimize our tracking capabilities while assessing long-term resource needs to fully execute this mission. 118. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in April 2025 IBP told the GAO that it was ``in the process of drafting and coordinating a new DOD Instruction, which would provide further guidance on conducting M&A assessments.'' What is the status of this instruction, and when do you expect it will be complete? Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP continues to work this draft instruction through the issuance process. The Department cannot provide a specific completion date at this time but looks forward to consulting with the congressional defense committees as the process advances. 119. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, when will IBP have sufficient staff to implement the GAO's recommendation to monitor the effects of concluded mergers or acquisitions in cases in which DOD identified risks during its assessment? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively assessing staffing requirements and working to align personnel within IBP to implement GAO's recommendations. We anticipate steadily improving our post-merger monitoring capabilities as we integrate these functions into our strategic resourcing plans over the upcoming budget cycles. 120. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what methods is DOD using to enhance competition in the defense industrial base? Secretary Cadenazzi. As stated on a previous question, we are focused on scaling up existing mid-tier companies so they can transition into competing for larger acquisitions. Through our umbrella organization, the Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are expanding and strengthening the defense industrial base for companies of all sizes. As a vital and unchanged part of this broader organization, our Office of Small Business Programs continues to actively grow the number of small businesses entering and advancing in the defense sector. By lowering barriers to entry and providing targeted support through our Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are cultivating a robust pipeline of small and other non-traditional companies that will drive long-term competition, innovation, and supply chain resilience. workforce 121. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does DOD benefit from defense contractors retaining a skilled workforce? Secretary Cadenazzi. The ongoing need for skilled workers requires defense contractors to retain those who are successful because that is the only way to attain production and maintenance goals while also supporting on-the-job training and skills capture for new workers, thereby reducing costs for both recruitment and training. All of these benefits improve the efficiency of the DIB. 122. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do defense sector labor and skill shortages impact military readiness? Secretary Cadenazzi. Labor and industrial skill shortages, in particular, affect every aspect of the defense industrial base, which manufactures and sustains every ship, aircraft, satellite, vehicle, and all the miscellaneous support equipment the Services rely on to win the next conflict. Although there are shortages in some engineering disciplines too, the greatest and growing need is in the skilled trades, like welders and machinists. research and development 123. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in 2020, DOD conducted a study that found the defense industry spent 5.2 percent of its revenue on R&D from 2010 to 2019, compared to the 6.2 percent it spent on R&D from 2000 to 2009. In contrast, the defense industry spent 6.4 percent of its revenue on stock buybacks and dividends from 2010 to 2019, an increase from the 3.7 percent it spent on buybacks from 2000 to 2009. Please provide updated estimates of defense contractors funds spent on buybacks, dividends, and research and development, from 2020 to 2025. Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is reviewing this matter and is working to prepare an updated response and will deliver when it is available. department of defense investments 124. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, you said DOD consults outside experts in determining which companies should receive DOD investments. Which outside companies and individuals has DOD consulted with on investments in 2025 and 2026? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department consults outside experts as needed in due diligence and other matters. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. 125. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, when DOD consults with outside experts in determining which companies should receive DOD investments, how does the department protect against receiving advice from experts that might have conflicts of interest? Secretary Cadenazzi. Maintaining the integrity of the investment process is paramount, and the Department employs a multi-layered approach to protect against conflicts of interest across its components, including within the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). For any experts or organizations engaged in a formal advisory capacity, robust safeguards are in place, including mandatory conflict of interest disclosures and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which are standard practice when handling sensitive proprietary data. OSC, in particular, mirrors the rigorous due diligence of the private investment community, ensuring its partners meet the same exacting standards for transparency and disclosure that are expected in venture capital. 126. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many DOD staff and contractors does IBP have to assess potential DOD investments? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Industrial Base Policy staff and contractors are not all directly assigned to assess potential DOW investments, but collaboration routinely occurs across the organization. Collectively, IBP has 110 civilian staff and 253 contractors. 127. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, is there a competitive process for assessing which companies should receive DOD investments? Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes. 128. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, is there a rating process for assessing which companies should receive DOD investments? What is that process, if so? Secretary Cadenazzi. Proposals are evaluated based on how a capability aligns with critical Defense Industrial Base (DIB) needs, the urgency of the investment to mitigate supply chain risks, and the strategic impact of the project, such as the need to onshore a capability or expand the domestic supply chain. 129. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, has your office been contacted by or consulted 1789 Capital or any of its employees or investors? Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact. 130. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does DOD advise the OSC and other procurement officials on their ethics obligations, including limits on engaging with companies closely tied to Presidential administrations? Secretary Cadenazzi. The integrity of the Department's investment process is the bedrock of our entire strategy. The Department of War is fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations. 131. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, were any DOD officials involved in contract or loan decisions related to companies owned by 1789 Capital or any other company in which Donald Trump Jr. has a financial interest? Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact. 132. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, please list all meetings, calls, and correspondence DOD officials have had with 1789 Capital employees from November 5, 2024, to present day. Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact. 133. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did DOD decide to award L3Harris a $1 billion direct equity investment for the production of rocket motors? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 134. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for L3Harris' $1 billion investment award a competitive process? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 135. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if so, what were the criteria used to determine which company would receive DOD's $1 billion direct investment for rocket motors? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 136. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many companies competed for DOD's $1 billion investment? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 137. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was L3Harris the highest rated competitor in the award process for DOD's $1 billion direct investment? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 138. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if L3Harris was not the highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and why did they not receive the $1 billion investment? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to Congress as soon as it is available. 139. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, would DOD benefit by having tools to ensure that investments into defense companies increase capabilities, and are not corporate giveaways? Secretary Cadenazzi. Every dollar invested, particularly through mechanisms like Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and the efforts of the Office of Strategic Capital, is tied directly to the development and delivery of specific, measurable capabilities. These are not ``corporate giveaways''; they are structured, milestone-driven agreements designed to achieve critical national security outcomes. 140. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, under current laws, is there any law or restriction that would prevent companies receiving DOD investment funds from using those funds toward stock buybacks and dividends? Secretary Cadenazzi. The core principle guiding every investment is that public funds must be used for their designated public purpose: to build, expand, and scale a specific capability critical to national security. OSC's investments, which often resemble private-sector loans or venture capital, are governed by detailed term sheets and investment agreements. These legal documents explicitly define the ``use of proceeds,'' restricting the funds to specific purposes like capital expenditures, research and development, and scaling operations. Any deviation from this, such as diverting funds to a stock buyback, would be a clear violation of the investment agreement, triggering default clauses and other legal remedies. 141. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if no law or restrictions exist, would you support restrictions on companies that receive loans or other DOD investment funds on stock buybacks? Secretary Cadenazzi. The core principle guiding every investment is that public funds must be used for their designated public purpose: to build, expand, and scale a specific capability critical to national security. 142. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what policy framework does DOD use to decide whether to use equity, debt, or competitive awards for financing critical industries? Secretary Cadenazzi. Our approach is to evaluate the supply chain risk at each node of the minerals supply chain to determine the most appropriate mitigation approach to address the risk, including investments, loans, stockpiling, international partnerships, or another means. 143. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, describe how deployment of equity investments for critical industries helps the U.S. defense industrial base and furthers national security. Please describe the drawbacks of equity investments compared to other financial tools available to DOD. Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department's careful use of equity investment is in furtherance of the overall mission to advance the defense industrial base. As with all authorities available to the Department, careful application of the use of this authority in conjunction with the overall mission is considered to ensure the overall policy goal is achieved. However, equity investments, like other financing, carry risks. Equity is a more patient capital that is more appropriate for early stage companies or ones in immature or limited markets and include a higher exposure to financial risk and potential loss of capital if a company underperforms. Risk mitigation begins before capital is deployed with (i) strategic sector targeting, (ii) enhanced due diligence including FOCI risk assessments, (iii) covenants and other contractual risk mitigant provisions. These risks are further mitigated by employing specialized and experienced staff to actively manage and monitor investment employing specialized and experienced staff to actively manage and monitor investment. 144. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in light of DOD's recent focus on critical minerals, what other critical and emerging sectors does DOD plan to deploy strategic capital toward? Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW intends to support the growth of the defense industrial base across all necessary sectors, including manufacturing, energy storage, and other industrial sectors. 145. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the current ethics and anti-corruption guardrails for political appointees that are decisionmakers in investment decisions such as support for MP Materials? Secretary Cadenazzi. Maintaining the public's trust is paramount, and every investment decision, including our partnership with MP Materials, is subject to a rigorous and comprehensive ethics review process. 146. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you support strong ethics and anti-corruption guardrails for political appointees that are decisionmakers in investment decisions such as support for MP Materials? Secretary Cadenazzi. The integrity of the Department's investment process is the bedrock of our entire strategy. Every decision made must be held to the highest and most rigorous ethical standards to ensure it is based solely on the strategic needs of the Nation. These guardrails are a fundamental requirement of public service and are essential for maintaining the public's trust and ensuring the responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 147. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, has the DOD consulted with the Federal Trade Commission regarding the Federal Government's investments in critical industries and impacts on long-term market competition? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department regularly engages with interagency partners on critical minerals matters. pharmaceutical supply chains 148. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in 2025 the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified six critical technology areas that would define the future of American military superiority, including biomanufacturing. Does OSC have any priorities related to biomanufacturing or pharmaceutical supply chain resiliency? Please describe them. Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC engages with companies in a number of the Under Secretary's critical technology areas, including those that focus on biomanufacturing and pharmaceutical supply chains. To date, its initial engagements have focused on companies seeking to scale the production of key starting materials and active pharmaceutical ingredients and have been conducted in close coordination with other offices in the Department and in other agencies tasked with this vitally important mission. OSC's statute lists biochemicals within covered technology categories eligible to receive investment from the Office. 149. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how can DOD leverage the OSC to invest in pharmaceutical supply chain resiliency to support the warfighter? Secretary Cadenazzi. In instances where the Department is best suited to lead efforts to support biomanufacturing, OSC is positioned to provide loan guarantees and direct loans to help companies scale production and attract private capital to facilitate further expansion in biomanufacturing (which is one of the Covered Technology Categories where OSC is approved to provide funding). Such investments, which would conform with OSC's mandate to invest in dual-use products made by companies with robust commercial customer bases, would support the warfighter by shoring up a robust ecosystem beyond the control of the Chinese Communist Party and other non-allied suppliers. 150. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the dangers of overreliance upon foreign suppliers for pharmaceutical products? Secretary Cadenazzi. Overreliance on foreign suppliers for essential pharmaceuticals creates a grave national security vulnerability. This dependence gives potential adversaries the ability to weaponize our supply chains, directly threatening the health of our military and the stability of our Nation in a time of crisis. Specifically, prolonged drug shortages directly degrade our ability to treat warfighters, return them to the fight, and maintain combat effectiveness. 151. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how would increasing the domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, including finished drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and key starting materials improve supply chain resiliency? Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW supports expanding domestic pharmaceutical production. To mitigate the strategic risk of foreign supply disruptions, the DOW advocates leveraging its purchasing power alongside other Government Agencies (OGAs) to rebuild onshore manufacturing, ensuring a resilient supply of critical medicines to sustain combat operations and provide routine care to beneficiaries. 152. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how would increasing the domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, including finished drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and key starting materials protect our national security and help ensure that service members have access to critical care? Secretary Cadenazzi. A secure, domestic pharmaceutical supply chain is a foundational element of national security. It guarantees that our servicemembers' access to critical care can never be held at risk or used as a weapon against us by a foreign adversary. Establishing a robust domestic manufacturing base would mitigate these risks by offering greater supply chain transparency, enhanced regulatory oversight, and the agility to scale production during national emergencies. 153. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do pharmaceutical supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals increase costs for DOD? Secretary Cadenazzi. Supply chain challenges and shortages directly increase costs by forcing us to purchase higher-priced alternative medicines and expensive emergency procurements. Moreover, the threat of unsafe pharmaceuticals adds significant expense through increased surveillance and the potential for direct medical and operational costs to the force. 154. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what other costs to DOD occur as a result of pharmaceutical supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals? Secretary Cadenazzi. Supply chain vulnerabilities present an unacceptable operational cost, directly degrading readiness and Service Member safety. Beyond direct readiness impacts, pharmaceutical shortages severely degrade clinical care by forcing the MHS to rely on less effective alternative therapies, which increases the risk of adverse outcomes. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth authorities 155. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department of Defense has national security waiver authorities in title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 4863 and title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 4872 to authorize use of samarium material from foreign nations, despite the inability to determine where it was mined in the 20th century. Why has the Department of Defense not used those authorities to date? Secretary Cadenazzi. The use of a national security waiver is an authority the Department reserves for extraordinary circumstances, and the Department is prepared to utilize this authority where necessary for national security. Our primary strategy is not to rely on waivers but to proactively build secure, resilient, and trusted supply chains. This approach provides a lasting solution to our supply chain vulnerabilities, rather than a temporary fix. coordination with u.s. geological survey and the department of energy 156. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, the USGS recently added ``metallurgical coal'' to its list of critical minerals. Given that U.S. consumption of metallurgical coal has declined for decades and most production is now exported, what is the Department of Defense's rationale for considering metallurgical coal critical to national security, and what specific defense needs justify its inclusion on the USGS critical minerals list? Secretary Cadenazzi. While the Department does not have oversight of the U.S. Geological Survey's final determinations, we support the inclusion of metallurgical coal as a critical mineral as it is essential for producing primary steel in a blast furnace. Our national security depends on our enduring capability to produce steel for our foundational defense systems, such as warships to tanks. The designation as critical is not merely about consumption volume but about the material's irreplaceability in a process fundamental to our defense readiness and the risk a supply disruption would pose. 157. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does the Department of Defense coordinate with USGS and the Department of Energy to ensure that designations of ``critical'' minerals reflect actual defense needs rather than market or export considerations? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department works closely with DOI, USGS, and DOE on the classification of critical materials and impacts for defense needs. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen 158. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Defense Logistics Agency has identified that war reserve materiel does not include sufficient batteries or tactical energy storage to support early phases of conflict, which becomes a readiness risk in contested logistics environments. How will the IBP office deploy its funding authorities to address supply chain constraints for minerals and raw materials necessary to scale domestic battery production for drones and other autonomous platforms? Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP is already heavily invested in minerals and materials for battery production. The increased use of drones and other autonomous platforms has heavily increased demand for batteries and tactical energy storage for these systems. More recently, IBP concentrated on utilizing investment authorities, such as Title III of the Defense Production Act and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS), for standardization and increased production capacity for batteries for small unmanned aerial systems (UAS)/drones and other autonomous platforms. 159. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the IBP office's role in supporting the build-out of small-scale critical minerals refineries on military bases? Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP is supporting the Presidential directive for promoting critical mineral processing on military bases in close coordination with the military services. 160. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, how will the Department of Defense solicit input from across the interagency and the private sector to prioritize critical minerals that need urgent U.S. Government attention due to supply chain constraints? Secretary Cadenazzi. Our prioritization is driven by a continuous and robust dialog with our expert partners across the interagency and with industry, ensuring we have the most current understanding of supply chain risks. We are now moving to formalize this collaboration by establishing the Strategic and Critical Materials Board of Directors. Once stood up, this Board will provide a dedicated forum for senior leaders from government and the private sector to advise the Department on prioritizing investments, stockpiling, and policy actions to address the Nation's most urgent material threats. __________ Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly permanent magnets 161. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department needs to move aggressively to identify and use non-Chinese sources of rare earth materials, especially heavy rare earths such as samarium. Some of our allies, notably the French, have stockpiled samarium materials for decades. However, this stockpile may contain a minute amount of Chinese material that was mined over 20 years ago and thus cannot be certified to be in compliance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 252.225-7009 and 252.225-7052. This stockpile is a critical resource that the defense industrial base needs to access to. Congress has given the Department the ability to waive requirements under these regulations for reasons of national security in both title 10 U.S.C. 4863 and 4872, and made those national security waivers cross-apply. Does the Department intend to use this authority to allow for use of French-stockpiled samarium in the near future? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department would like to thank Congress for providing us with the national security waiver authority, and we view it as a critical tool for ensuring our warfighters have what they need. As a matter of strategy, our primary focus remains on incentivizing and building new, fully compliant supply chains, as this provides the only true long-term security. However, we also recognize that we must be pragmatic in addressing the immediate needs of the industrial base. We are always evaluating how to best use all the authorities Congress has given us, especially when it involves strategic resources held by our closest allies. We will continue to balance the urgent requirements of today with our long-term strategy of building a resilient industrial base that is free from adversarial leverage. battery supply chain 162. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, advanced batteries are increasingly foundational to the performance and endurance of equipment used by the U.S. military. This includes drones, telecommunications equipment, energy storage systems (ESS), and other technology worn by the warfighter. While increased domestic production of critical minerals is desperate needed, the U.S. is ceding economic and national security advantages if the midstream of the battery supply chain is not developed. The critical minerals produced domestically will be shipped abroad for processing and production into anodes and cathodes. We must ensure that the Federal Government's support for critical materials translates into the growth of complete and integrated domestic supply chains, from mining and processing of materials through the manufacturing of derivative products. Secretary Cadenazzi, outside of critical minerals, how is DOD working to secure the full value chain for the domestic battery industry, specifically the midstream? Secretary Cadenazzi. We need to expand domestic capacity in the midstream of the battery supply chain. It is critical to establish domestic processing and component production capacity in conjunction with critical mineral production to avoid shipping our raw materials abroad only to import finished products. To achieve this, my team is using Defense Production Act Title III and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) authorities. In partnership with the Department of Energy, we will invest in anode, cathode, electrolyte, and separator production, along with cell and pack manufacturing. distressed vendors and supply chains 163. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, we all recognize how difficult it is to stand up domestic critical mineral processing and manufacturing capabilities. These are capital-intensive industries with high upfront costs. In many cases, private companies are operating at a disadvantage compared to foreign competitors--particularly Chinese firms that benefit from sustained State support. As a result, some of the firms we need to rely on to rebuild these defense-critical capabilities may be at risk for exiting the market. Does the DOD currently have visibility into which critical mineral suppliers are at risk of financial distress or exiting the market? Secretary Cadenazzi. Shortages of this type have come to the Department's attention. That is why we have been working across offices, suppliers and agencies to formalize efforts to identify these shortfalls and distress situations to respond appropriately. 164. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is the DOD identifying and supporting distressed or financially vulnerable vendors in critical mineral and defense supply chains? What mechanisms exist to prevent the loss of those capabilities before they create supply chain disruptions for essential components? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department maintains regular contact with a variety of vendors in the critical mineral and defense areas to ascertain and address current and future industry needs, including financial vulnerability and market distress. abandoned mine cleanup 165. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, one issue I've worked on for a long time is cleaning up abandoned hardrock mines--which are all over the western United States. Many of these mines were developed to serve the needs of the military--these sites are called Defense-Related Uranium Mine (DRUM) sites. Communities want these mines cleaned up. And there are now technologies available that can do that by taking the waste rock at these sites, removing the uranium and other hazardous, and leaving the safe, inert material behind. That material could then be used for DOD needs. Has the Department evaluated whether pairing remediation of these legacy DRUM sites with recovery of residual uranium could simultaneously protect communities from these hazardous mines and strengthen domestic supply chain resilience? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is always looking for creative ways to enhance our supply chain resilience, and the concept of accomplishing environmental remediation with reclamation of a strategic asset is compelling. We would welcome the chance to work with other agencies to explore the feasibility of such a synergistic approach. 166. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, has DOD or the Department of Energy conducted a formal assessment of the potential contribution of residual uranium in DRUM surface materials to long-term defense supply needs? If not, what steps would be required to undertake such an assessment? Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department would be an active and eager participant with DOE in such a study. [all]