REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS

Committee on Armed Services Senate February 24, 2026

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- REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS

[Senate Hearing 119-508]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-508

 REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS

=======================================================================

 HEARING

 before the

 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 FEBRUARY 24, 2026
 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov 
 ______
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

64-416 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 

 

 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island 
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 
JONI K. ERNST, Iowa RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota TIM KAINE, Virginia 
RICK SCOTT, Florida ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine 
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 
TED BUDD, North Carolina TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 
ERIC SCHMITT, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 
JIM BANKS, Indiana MARK KELLY, Arizona 
TIM SHEEHY, Montana ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
 
 Rick Berger, Staff Director
 Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

 (ii) 

 C O N T E N T S
 ___________

 february 24, 2026

 Page

Rebuilding American Critical Minerals Supply Chains.............. 1

 Members Statements

Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker............................. 1

Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 3

 Witness Statements

Cadenazzi, The Honorable Michael P., Jr., Assistant Secretary of 4
 Defense for Industrial Base Policy.

Frankston, Mr. Jeffrey, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 10
 Defense for Industrial Base Resilience.

Questions for the Record......................................... 29

 (iii)

 
 REBUILDING AMERICAN CRITICAL MINERALS SUPPLY CHAINS

 ---------- 

 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2026

 United States Senate,
 Committee on Armed Services,
 Washington, DC.
 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Roger Wicker 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
 Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Ernst, 
Sullivan, Scott, Tuberville, Banks, Reed, Shaheen, Blumenthal, 
Hirono, Kaine, Warren, and Kelly.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER WICKER

 Chairman Wicker. The Committee meets today to discuss the 
State of our country's critical mineral supply chains, and what 
can be done to make them stronger and more resilient. It's no 
exaggeration to say that America's resilience [sic] on Chinese 
critical minerals represents one of our greatest strategic 
vulnerabilities.
 Twice last year, Chinese Communist Party Leader, Xi 
Jinping, threatened to cutoff exports of Chinese rare earths. 
This would've brought American defense manufacturing to its 
knees and deeply damaged the United States economy. Our 
advanced weapon systems and key parts of our civilian economy 
rely on critical minerals materials that are largely imported 
from China. Specifically, America imports over 70, 70 percent, 
of our rare earths from China. These elements are the backbone 
of permanent magnets, and perhaps the most important component 
for phones, cars, and military systems. More than 60 percent of 
American antimony comes from China. Antimony is a necessary 
ingredient for many explosives, electronics, and batteries.
 I could go on with other examples, but the simple point is 
this: The scale of China's critical minerals domination is 
wholly unprecedented. The situation is untenable for America's 
national security and economic prosperity. The good news is 
that the U.S. Government is forming a plan which will 
simultaneously reestablish critical minerals as a global free 
market, and significantly increase American mining and 
production of these key elements. This effort will take more 
than a decade. They will face setbacks. It cannot be achieved 
without leaning on our allies and partners, and it will be 
expensive, but it is a necessary risk.
 The Pentagon has been and will be at the center of these 
efforts, given the centrality of critical minerals to our 
weapons manufacturing, and that brings us to the committee's 
interest in this matter. Joining us today are two Pentagon 
officials, Mr. Mike Cadenazzi, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Industrial Base Policy, and sir, I hope I pronounced your 
name exactly correct.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. You did. Absolutely, sir.
 Chairman Wicker. Cadenazzi. Okay. Assistant secretary of 
defense--oh, and then Mr. Jeff Frankston, Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Resilience.
 Both Mr. Cadenazzi, and Mr. Frankston, and the teams they 
lead have done important work. They performed a deep analysis 
of both our military's requirements for critical minerals, and 
the State of industrial production from mining to refining 
across the globe. That data-driven approach is leading to new 
investments by the Industrial Base Fund, the Defense Production 
Act (DPA), and the National Defense Stockpile. It's also 
driving interagency investments from the Development Finance 
Corporation, the Department of Commerce, and others.
 It is imperative that our investment strategy remain 
closely tied to the areas of greatest military need. Rebuilding 
America's critical mineral supply chains will require 
additional investments. Last year's Defense reconciliation bill 
included $5 billion for the Industrial Base Fund, $2 billion 
for the National Defense Stockpile, and a $100 billion loan 
limit for the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC).
 Those appropriations have already paid dividends. Last 
year, the Pentagon signed deals with MP Materials and a 
consortium of Vulcan, ReElement, and Corning for magnet 
production. Another investment went to ElementUSA, which will 
be making progress on obtaining gallium and scandium from a 
recycling process. We have brought Australia, Brazil, and Saudi 
Arabia into deals where mining or refining opportunities do not 
exist here in the United States.
 The good news is that we do not need to outspend Communist 
China on this effort. We can leverage our private capital 
markets, one of our few remaining comparative advantages 
against Beijing. Many of our allies and partners have 
incredible mining and refining opportunities. Dozens of 
countries are poised to ditch the predatory debt trap diplomacy 
Beijing has foisted upon them in this area.
 As to private capital markets, I appreciate the Pentagon's 
use of innovative financial tools to power these deals. In some 
cases, Congress has spoken clearly on these tools. The 
committee created the Office of Strategic Capital Loan Program 
3 years ago during the Biden administration. Since then, we 
have remained intimately involved in amending its legislation. 
In other cases, such as the use of equity-based investments, 
little law currently exists.
 I believe these equity-based investments make good 
strategic sense in many cases, particularly where no free 
market exists and where we've seen aggressive Chinese economic 
warfare. However, opinions range wildly between and within our 
two political parties. While not public, Ranking Member Reed 
and I had a long series of discussions with our House 
counterparts last year about legislation regarding equity 
investments. I anticipate that conversation will continue in 
earnest this year.
 This legislation is both important and urgent because 
rebuilding America's critical mineral supply chains will take 
more than a decade. We must give the free markets confidence 
that America's approach will stand the test of time and succeed 
in unshackling the world from Beijing's market domination. To 
do that, we need effective government tools built on a solid 
foundation of law and bipartisan support.
 This year, the committee has much work to do in this 
endeavor. We will discuss equity as an investment tool. We will 
examine the need for continued multi-billion-dollar investments 
in this area. We'll consider further improvements to the 
National Defense Stockpile authorities, and we will expect 
improvements in communication from Pentagon leadership on our 
investment strategy. Congress understands the need to execute 
quickly, but that cannot excuse a lack of communication and 
partnership between the Congress and the Administration.
 I hope today's hearing is the beginning of a historic year 
in which this committee and the Trump administration work 
together to rebuild America's supply chain. So, thank you to 
our witnesses for being here today. It should be very 
interesting, and I turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking 
Member Reed.

 STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

 Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good 
morning to our witnesses. Thank you for appearing today on a 
matter that is of great importance to this country, and, 
indeed, the free world. Over the past several decades, the 
United States has steadily lost its leadership in critical 
minerals from World War II, through the 1980's, we led the way 
in critical mineral production and lithium-ion battery 
manufacturing. But over time, American industry shifted from 
that production overseas, primarily to Asia, in pursuit of 
savings. The consequence of those decisions are now very 
apparent.
 Today, China dominates the processing and refining of the 
materials that make our most advanced weapon systems function, 
from the rare earth elements, and radar, and missile guidance 
systems, to the battery chemistry powering the next generation 
of drones. The Department of Defense (DOD) accounts for less 
than 1 percent of total U.S. critical mineral demand, but an 
enormous range of critical military platforms depend on it.
 Congress has worked to address this issue through 
successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). We have 
increased resources for the National Defense Stockpile, 
encouraged end-of-life recycling of weapon systems, qualified 
domestic vendors, and restricted procurement from unreliable 
foreign entities. Those efforts matter, but what has been 
missing is a coherent, overarching national strategy that 
aligns the Department of Defense, Commerce, Energy, and 
Interior, as well as our allies around a common framework. 
Without that, we risk patching holes rather than building 
something durable.
 I'd like to know how our witnesses regard such a strategy 
and what efforts are currently underway. I do have one major 
concern regarding the Defense Department's current strategy, 
and that is the use of equity investments under the Defense 
Production Act. In July of last year, the Department announced 
that it acquired a 15 percent equity stake in MP Materials, a 
rare earth mining company in California, at a cost of $400 
million, making the U.S. military one of that company's largest 
shareholders.
 Since then, the Department has made equity investments in a 
number of critical mineral companies. I have questions about 
the legal basis, financial terms, and strategic rationale for 
these transactions. The legal basis in particular appears 
questionable. The Department has argued that the Defense 
Production Act provides the authority for these investments.
 However, while the Defense Production Act does authorize 
the purchase of industrial resources for government use, it 
does not mention equity investments at all. The fact that the 
Trump administration's Office of Management and Budget has 
subsequently requested a legislative proposal to explicitly 
authorize equity investment, suggests that the Administration 
itself recognizes the current authority is uncertain, and that 
should give us pause.
 Further, the Department committed to purchasing magnets 
from MP Materials at $110 per kilogram for 10 years beginning 
in 2028, the committee has not received an explanation of how 
that price was determined or why that duration was appropriate. 
We have also heard from other domestic producers that this 
arrangement affects their ability to compete, which raises 
broader questions about market effects and unintended 
consequences of government intervention.
 Finally, I understand that a small team was dispatched to 
evaluate the MP Materials' transaction, including outside 
consultants, but this committee has had very limited visibility 
into that review. I have concerns about potential conflicts of 
interest given the financial interest that certain stakeholders 
appear to have in this transaction.
 The committee's interest is straightforward. We want to 
understand whether this transaction, and the equity investment 
model, and use of price floors more broadly represent the most 
effective and legally sound way to rebuild domestic critical 
minerals capacity, and I look forward to a substantive 
discussion with our witness today. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member. 
Now, Secretary Cadenazzi, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. CADENAZZI, JR., ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY

 Mr. Cadenazzi. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 
Department of War (DOW) strategy and actions to secure 
resilienT supply chain for critical minerals. This issue is 
fundamental to our national security, and the technological 
superiority of our military.
 I'm joined here today by Mr. Jeff Frankston, our acting 
deputy assistant secretary of war for industrial base 
resilience. A career member of the Senior Executive Service, 
Jeff is my technical expert on supply chain resilience, the 
Defense Production Act, and the Industrial Base Fund. We are 
thankful for the talents and selfless patriotic service of Jeff 
and our entire civilian workforce. Thank you, Jeff.
 As the assistant secretary of war for industrial base 
policy, I'm responsible for guiding the Department's efforts to 
cultivate and sustain industries that meet America's needs, and 
the growing demand for U.S. capabilities from our allies and 
partners around the world.
 The strength of the United States Armed Forces built upon a 
foundation of advanced technology, our fifth-generation 
aircraft, precision-guided munitions, satellite constellations, 
and next-generation naval vessels, all depend on a reliable 
supply of rare earth element, and minerals including; gallium, 
antimony, germanium, and dozens of others. For decades, we have 
outsourced and offshore mining and processing, creating a 
strategic vulnerability of the highest order.
 Today, our primary strategic competitor, China, controls 
the global supply chain for numerous critical minerals. On 
heavy rare earths alone, China controls 95 percent of global 
output, with the United States importing almost 100 percent of 
what we use, 90 percent of that coming from China. This control 
provides Beijing with the ability to weaponize these supply 
chains, threatening to disrupt our defense industrial base 
(DIB), and compromise military readiness in a crisis. This is 
not a theoretical risk; it is a clear and present danger to our 
national security.
 The Department of War considers the reclamation of our 
critical mineral independence a strategic imperative, and calls 
it out as such, and the Acquisition Transformation Strategy, 
published this past November, Congress also clearly recognizes 
the need as the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, 
classified critical minerals as strategic assets vital for 
national defense and economic security.
 Since the beginning of the Administration, the Office of 
Industrial Base Policy has been at the very center of these 
initiatives. The team is working night and day to rebuild 
American critical mineral supply chains. In this time, we have 
invested $975 million in minerals through Title III of the 
Defense Production Act and the Industrial Based Fund.
 The Department of War has developed a comprehensive multi-
year strategy to address this vulnerability head on. Our 
approach is founded on four key pillars designed to create a 
secure, resilient, and sustainable supply chain ecosystem. 
Pillar one, is our commitment to reshore and onshore the 
production of critical minerals. We continue to map Defense 
industry to independent--or dependence on China, and are 
focused on removing those dependencies from our supply chains. 
Congress providing $5 billion in the One Big Beautiful Bill 
Act, specifically for critical minerals, is a significant 
investment and one we very much appreciate.
 We are also leveraging authorities granted by Congress, 
particularly under Title III of the DPA and the Industrial Base 
Fund, to catalyze investment in domestic exploration, mining, 
and processing. We partner with our colleagues in the Office of 
Strategic Capital to offer loans, loan guarantees, and debt 
financing options. This expands our collaboration and 
cooperation with the interagency and international partners on 
bringing mineral supply chains to friendly shores.
 Through these tools, we're sending a clear and sustained 
demand signal to the industrial base. We are working across the 
entire value chain, from mine to frontline, to build our 
resilience. For example, the MP Materials deal helps secure a 
domestic source of rare earth elements, and the Department 
continues to take action in concert with our interagency 
partners to decisively secure the U.S. rare earth supply chain. 
The Korea zinc effort will build a smelter in the U.S. to 
produce 13 different non-ferrous metals, including; germanium, 
gallium, and antimony-metals used in space, power generation, 
advanced optics, and munitions, among other uses. Additionally, 
$184 million in prior investments will provide high performance 
magnets, germanium, crystal, and other critical mineral 
derivatives and capabilities.
 Next, while we prioritize domestic production, we recognize 
that no single nation can achieve complete self-sufficiency. 
Therefore, our second pillar focuses on building robust, 
transparent, and reliable supply chains with our closest allies 
and partners. This friend-sharing approach diversifies our 
sourcing away from high-risk geopolitical areas and compliments 
our pillar one efforts to build new end-to-end sources of 
supply, foster secure, and reliable transport and logistics 
networks, and transform the global market into one that is 
secure, diversified, and resilient. We are actively working 
with partners to jointly invest in secure supply from 
responsible mining and processing operations across the globe.
 For our third pillar, the Department is aggressively 
investing in research and development to mitigate demand for 
the most heavily contested minerals. Our scientists at the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and other 
service research labs are pioneering the pioneering the 
development of next generation materials and novel 
manufacturing techniques that can reduce or eliminate the need 
for certain rare earth and other critical inputs.
 Simultaneously, we are funding the development of advanced 
recycling technologies. For example, we invested $29.9 million 
in ElementUSA to recover gallium and scandium from waste 
residue left over from alumina refining. By creating a robust 
circular economy, we can reclaim valuable materials from our 
own waste streams, from spent batteries, to decommissioned 
electronics, turning our liability into a strategic asset and a 
secure domestic source of supply.
 As our final pillar, we are modernizing the National 
Defense Stockpile to ensure it serves as an effective buffer 
against near-term supply chain shocks. We are conducting a 
rigorous data-driven analysis of our strategic requirements for 
a 21st century contested environment, and are taking action to 
acquire materials that face the most acute supply chain risks. 
Congress stepped up to help us with this effort, providing $2 
billion in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. This modernized 
stockpile will provide the insurance we need as we execute our 
long-term strategy of rebuilding the domestic industrial base.
 The committee asked for an update on recent and planned 
deals, and I am pleased to report significant progress. I will 
highlight two recent examples. We have finalized a landmark 
agreement with a Canadian partner to secure a long-term supply 
of gallium derived from new non-traditional mining techniques, 
reducing reliance on Chinese sources for this critical 
semiconductor material. The Department also recently entered 
into a joint research and develoment (R&D) agreement with 
Australia to co-fund the development of substitutes for 
dysprosium, and terbium, and high-performance magnets.
 In closing, I want to emphasize that establishing secure 
and resilient critical mineral supply chains is a generational 
challenge, but it is a challenge we must and will meet. The era 
of complacency is over. The Department of War, in concert with 
industry, our allies, and partners, and with the vital support 
of this committee, is committed to executing this strategy with 
urgency and resolve. Securing these supply chains is not merely 
an economic issue, it is a foundational element of our national 
defense.
 Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your 
questions.
 [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Cadenazzi and Mr. 
Frankston follows:]

 Joint Prepared Statement by The Honorable Michael Cadenazzi and Mr. 
 Jeffrey Frankston, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
 Industrial Base Resilience
 Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to address a 
matter of profound importance to the United States: the security and 
resilience of U.S. Supply Chain's Critical Minerals.
 The very foundation of our National Defense, our economic 
prosperity, and our technological leadership rests upon a reliable 
supply of essential materials. For decades, we made the intentional 
decision to outsource these capabilities. This led to the erosion of 
our industrial strength and placed our security in the hands of nations 
that do not share our interests. Today, I am here to report that the 
Department of War, in concert with our partners across the Government 
and in the private sector, is taking decisive action to reverse this 
trend and restore American industrial sovereignty.
 The term ``Critical Minerals'' is not an abstract economic 
classification, it is a roll call of the essential building blocks of 
modern warfare. The neodymium iron boron magnets in the guidance fins 
of a Tomahawk missile, the cobalt in the high-performance alloys of an 
F-35's jet engine, the gallium arsenide in the advanced radar systems 
that protect our fleet, the nickel in the batteries that power our 
soldiers' communications gear--these are not commodities; they are 
capabilities. They represent the margin of victory in a potential 
conflict.
 For too long, we have treated these vital inputs as simple 
commodities, subject to the whims of global markets. We have watched as 
the complex, capital-intensive, and often challenging work of mining, 
separating, and processing these minerals has migrated overseas. The 
result, is a strategic vulnerability of the highest order. Today, the 
United States is over 90 percent import-reliant for around 25 critical 
minerals, and over 50 percent reliant on foreign sources for more than 
50. A significant and, in some cases, dominant share of the global 
processing capacity for these and other minerals is consolidated within 
China's borders.
 This is not a hypothetical risk. China has demonstrated its 
willingness to weaponize its dominance of Supply Chains. Its temporary 
suspension of rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, was a shot across 
the bow for the entire industrialized world. The more recent export 
controls on gallium and germanium, and intrusive licensing requirements 
imposed on numerous other materials, are a stark reminder that Beijing 
views its control over these resources as a lever of geopolitical 
power, to be used to coerce and constrain its rivals. We cannot, and we 
will not, allow the operational readiness of the United States Armed 
Forces to be held hostage by the strategic calculus of an adversary.
 The challenge is immense, but so is our resolve. The Department of 
War has developed and is actively implementing a comprehensive, long-
term strategy to mitigate these risks. Our approach is not one of 
autarky or isolationism, but of strategic resilience. It is built upon 
four mutually reinforcing pillars: first, aggressively revitalizing our 
domestic production capabilities; second, strengthening our alliances 
and ``friend-shoring'' Supply Chains with trusted partners; third, 
driving innovation in substitution and recycling to reduce demand; and 
fourth, modernizing the National Defense Stockpile to serve as a 
strategic buffer against disruption.
 Today, I will detail our progress in each of these areas, 
highlighting the powerful tools we are deploying--including the Defense 
Production Act (DPA) and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment 
(IBAS) program--and the strategic investments we are making to secure 
our industrial future.
 The first and most crucial pillar of our strategy is the 
revitalization of a robust, end-to-end domestic Supply Chain. The U.S. 
is blessed with significant geological endowments of many critical 
minerals. The fact that we are import-reliant is not a consequence of 
geology, but of policy and economics. For decades, a combination of 
burdensome and under-resourced permitting processes, unfair competition 
from state-subsidized foreign entities, and a lack of sustained 
investment has hollowed out our domestic industrial base. We are now 
systematically rebuilding it.
 Our primary tools in this effort are the authorities granted under 
Title III of the DPA, the funding provided under the IBAS program, and 
the loan authorities granted to the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). 
These allow the Department to move beyond the role of a mere customer 
and act as a strategic partner with industry, de-risking private 
investment and catalyzing the development of capabilities that the 
market, on its own, has failed to provide. Additionally, we are working 
with interagency partners and key international partners and allies in 
addressing joint critical mineral opportunities.
 The MP Materials partnership that was signed last year for rare 
earth magnet Supply Chains, while transformational, is just one 
component of a much broader portfolio of investments aimed at onshoring 
critical mineral production:
 Gallium is an essential mineral for integrated circuits, 
solar cells, and radar systems, among many other key defense and 
industrial applications. Although we have more to do, DOW's recent 
$29.9 million award to recover gallium and scandium from alumina 
processing waste will help reduce our 100 percent dependency on foreign 
sources for gallium.
 Germanium is a major supply constraint in our defense 
optics Supply Chains. DOW's recent awards in this area will greatly 
improve capacity at multiple nodes of our domestic germanium supply 
chain to include recycling, metal refining, and germanium crystal 
growth.
 Graphite for Anodes: Batteries need anodes as well as 
cathodes. The U.S. is currently 100 percent import-reliant for battery-
grade graphite, with most coming from China. To remedy this, we have 
invested $35.3 million to accelerate development of a vertically 
integrated graphite anode supply chain in Alaska, linking a large, 
high-grade graphite deposit with an advanced processing facility.
 Titanium for Aerospace and Armor: The U.S. has long been 
a leader in titanium technology but has become increasingly reliant on 
foreign sources for titanium sponge, the primary metal input. Our $47.1 
million investment is supporting the scale-up of a breakthrough 
technology that can produce high-quality titanium powder directly from 
minerals or from scrap, reducing costs and energy consumption while 
strengthening the domestic supply chain for this critical aerospace and 
armor material.
 These are just a few examples. Since the beginning of the 
Administration, the IBAS program and DPA authorities have channeled 
$975 million into 15 projects aimed at expanding the domestic 
production of strategic and critical materials. We are also very 
grateful to Congress for the $5 billion provided for minerals in the 
One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA).
 We are actively seeking new opportunities to invest in everything 
from antimony and tungsten to manganese and beryllium, addressing 
vulnerabilities across the entire spectrum of the Department's needs.
 While our primary focus is on revitalizing domestic production, we 
recognize that complete self-sufficiency is neither achievable nor 
desirable. Our second pillar, therefore, is to build a resilient 
network of trusted international partners--a concept we refer to as 
``friend-shoring.'' The goal is to create a collective industrial base 
among allied nations, diversifying our Supply Chains away from 
geostrategic rivals and ensuring multiple, redundant sources of supply.
 Our closest allies are also our most important partners in this 
endeavor. These are nations that share our commitment to free markets, 
the rule of law, and responsible and sustainable practices.
 Australia: Our partnership with Australia is a 
cornerstone of our friend-shoring strategy. Australia possesses some of 
the world's largest and highest-grade deposits of rare earths, lithium, 
cobalt, and other critical minerals. We are working closely through the 
Australia--United States Critical Minerals and Metals Taskforce to 
align our investment strategies, promote joint ventures between our 
respective companies, and accelerate the development of new mines and 
processing facilities in Australia that can directly feed into the 
United States Defense Industrial Base.
 Canada: The deep integration of the United States and 
Canadian Defense Industrial Bases makes Canada a natural and essential 
partner. The United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical 
Minerals, signed in 2020, provides a robust framework for collaboration 
on securing supply chains for a wide range of minerals, including 
nickel, potash, uranium, and cobalt. We are working with our Canadian 
counterparts to map our complementary geological resources and 
processing capacities and to identify opportunities for joint 
investment to create a more resilient North American industrial 
ecosystem.
 Our friend-shoring strategy is not just about securing 
raw materials, it is also about collaborating with downstream 
manufacturing partners like Japan and South Korea. These nations are 
world leaders in the production of advanced technologies like 
batteries, semiconductors, and permanent magnets. By partnering with 
them, we can ensure that as we and our other allies bring new upstream 
resources online, there is a secure and reliable downstream demand 
outside of the People's Republic of China, completing the ``mine-to-
metal'' or ``mine-to-battery'' supply chain among trusted allies.
 The third pillar of our strategy focuses on the demand side of the 
equation. In addition to increasing the supply of Critical Minerals, we 
must also work to reduce our long-term dependence on them. We are 
pursuing this through a two-pronged approach: investing in the 
development of substitute materials and creating a robust circular 
economy through advanced recycling.
 Every material for which we can design a substitute is a material 
we no longer need to source from a contested supply chain. The 
Department of War, through its world-class research and development 
enterprise, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), the O.ce of Naval Research (ONR), and the Air Force and Army 
Research Laboratories (AFRL, ARL), is at the forefront of this effort.
 The Environmental Microbes as a BioEngineering Resource 
(EMBER) program will develop a biotechnology-based separation and 
purification strategy for Rare Earth Elements (REEs) from under-
utilized domestic sources such as phosphate mine waste, acid mine 
drainage, and electronics recycling processes. The program aims to 
deliver multiple capabilities such as the separation of REE mixtures 
into individual elements using aqueous processes; inter-conversion of 
REE salts/oxides to facilitate production of manufacturing-ready forms 
(e.g., halides, phosphates, nitrates); and new assays for high-
throughput analysis of REE-containing cells and biomolecules.
 Cobalt-Free Battery Chemistries: The Department is a 
major investor in the development of next-generation battery 
technologies. A key focus of this research is reducing or eliminating 
the use of cobalt, a material whose supply chain is plagued by 
geopolitical risk and ethical concerns. We are supporting research into 
a range of alternative chemistries, from high-manganese cathodes to 
lithium-sulfur and solid-State batteries, that promise to deliver equal 
or greater performance without reliance on cobalt.
 Hypersonic Materials: The intense heat and stress 
experienced by hypersonic vehicles demand exotic materials and alloys. 
We are funding research into ceramic matrix composites (CMCs) and new 
superalloys that can withstand these extreme environments, reducing our 
reliance on traditional materials like tungsten and rhenium.
 The second prong of our demand-side strategy is recycling, or what 
is often termed ``urban mining.'' The accumulated stock of end-of-life 
military hardware, consumer electronics, and industrial equipment 
represents a vast, untapped domestic reserve of critical minerals. We 
are investing in the technologies and infrastructure needed to mine 
this resource.
 A past $4.2 million investment in Nebraska is a prime example. This 
project is developing and expanding production of terbium oxide from 
recycled fluorescent light bulbs. Terbium is a vital rare earth for 
many magnets in defense systems and is in short supply as it makes up 
less than 1 percent of total rare earth content in most deposits. By 
developing a recycling solution for this rarest of rare earths, this 
project is providing key and timely capability to the defense 
industrial base.
 Similarly, we are funding research and pilot projects to develop 
efficient and economical methods for recovering cobalt, lithium, and 
nickel from spent lithium-ion batteries, and for extracting rare earths 
from the permanent magnets in old hard drives, electric motors, and 
defense equipment. Our goal is to create a true circular economy, where 
the materials from today's systems become the feedstock for tomorrow's 
capabilities, and to complement the need for new mining.
 The final pillar of our strategy is the modernization of the 
National Defense Stockpile (NDS). The NDS was created in the aftermath 
of World War II to provide a strategic reserve of raw materials to 
sustain the Nation through a prolonged conflict. However, the nature of 
warfare and the structure of our industrial base have changed 
dramatically since the 1940s.
 Therefore, we are undertaking a fundamental reimagining of the NDS 
to make it a more dynamic and effective tool for 21st century national 
security.
 Our new approach to the NDS has several key elements:
 Moving Down the Value Chain: We are increasingly focused 
on the acquisition of higher-purity, processed materials further 
downstream in our supply chains. In the case of rare earths, for 
instance, this means ensuring the acquisition of separated high-purity 
oxides, metals, and alloys--and even finished components like magnets--
rather than just unrefined concentrates. This ensures we are 
stockpiling the materials that represent the true bottlenecks in the 
supply chain.
 Dynamic Requirements and Authorities: The list of 
materials and quantities required for the NDS must be a living 
document, constantly updated to reflect changes in military technology, 
geopolitical risk, and the status of the domestic industrial base. We 
are working with Congress to secure dedicated, no-year funding for the 
National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund, and operationalizing the 
flexible authorities already granted by Congress to take advantage of 
time-sensitive acquisitions to better mitigate immediate risk and 
ensure as well as enable offtake agreements to send a reliable demand 
signal to industry to ensure we have the materials necessary to 
withstand the increasingly frequent shocks to the Defense Industrial 
Base caused by adversarial economic practices.
 We are grateful for the $2 billion provided for the NDS by the 
OBBBA and urge Members of this Committee to continue to support 
resourcing this national asset. A well-funded, modern NDS is one of the 
most cost-effective insurance policies our Nation can buy.
 The Committee has asked for an update to the `chiclet chart' that 
details how China's influence puts systems at risk--and shows 
graphically how the Department is addressing this. An updated copy of 
this chart is included with this written testimony.
 Our strategy and investments are focused on turning red into green 
on this chart. In concert with our interagency partners, we are 
actively progressing projects and negotiations related to all these 
minerals. It is clear we have a great deal of work to do to reverse 
thirty-plus years of counterproductive industrial policy.
 We do not have 30 years to resolve this issue. My team is working 
tirelessly to address this. I could not be prouder of their work.
 It is clear we must continue to accelerate our efforts. I look 
forward to working with the Committee on this vital issue.
 Rebuilding our Critical Minerals Supply Chains is a generational 
undertaking. It will not be accomplished overnight. It will require 
sustained investment, sustained focus, and a sustained partnership 
between the government, industry, and our allies. The investments we 
are making today will take years to mature into fully operational, at-
scale capabilities. There will be setbacks along the way. Our 
adversaries will not stand idly by; they will continue to use their 
market power to try to undermine our efforts.
 But we will not be deterred. The security of our Nation and the 
future of our industrial strength are at stake. The Department of War 
is committed to this mission for the long haul. We are using every tool 
at our disposal to onshore, ``friend-shore,'' innovate, and stockpile 
our way to a more resilient future. We are making America a hard target 
for economic coercion and ensuring that our warfighters will never 
depend on the goodwill of an adversary for the tools they need to 
defend our Nation.
 I thank the Committee for its continued support of our efforts and 
for its leadership on this vital national security issue. I welcome 
your questions.

 Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Frankston, 
and you're recognized.

 STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY FRANKSTON, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDUSTRIAL BASE RESILIENCE

 Mr. Frankston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to 
everything that Mr. Cadenazzi just mentioned, one of the things 
that I want to emphasize is the full and unified interagency 
cooperation on this effort. This is a subject area that is not 
new, but has been turbocharged in the collaboration and 
cooperation as we work together across each of the interagency 
partners to identify the gaps, to have common targets, common 
understanding of our both domestic challenges, and then, in 
particular, from our perspective, Department of War needs. We 
work together on a daily, if not hourly basis, across the 
interagency with our international partners, with industry, to 
identify the gaps and challenges here.
 Our office oversees the policy for the National Defense 
Stockpile, as Honorable Cadenazzi mentioned. This is a key 
aspect that is a direct opportunity for our country to build a 
resilient capability. The stockpile is one of the major 
statutory pieces that we have taken the funding to implement a 
direct challenge--or to address a direct challenge on how we're 
addressing critical minerals.
 I look forward to answering the rest of the Committee's 
questions.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Well, Secretary 
Cadenazzi, you say the era of complacency is over. Mr. 
Frankston, you say that this issue is not new. I've been on 
this committee since 2008. Maybe I should be ashamed of myself. 
How is it that China, if they had persisted in their threat to 
cutoff exports, could've brought us to our knees? How do we get 
to this point, Mr. Secretary?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're engaged in a long-term 
competition with our primary strategic competitor in China. 
They've engaged in malign adversarial efforts to manipulate 
markets to secure control, change supply, and to undermine our 
own efforts to maintain a domestic market that's been coupled 
with natural economic incentives to outsource to the lowest 
supplier, the lowest cost provider, which China often is as a 
result of their lack of compliance with environmental and 
standard kind of work laws that we would have in the West, 
particularly in the States.
 Therefore, they've demonstrated a willingness to go ahead 
and create and invest these capabilities, undercutting our 
ability to sustain this. We've taken action in part, at times 
we've invested, but it's been inadequate to the scale of the 
threat posed by China in this time. Therefore, I think the 
issue, the opportunity we have before us today is to go ahead 
and take a demonstrated committed effort, well-resourced and 
aligned across both parties, with the support of this committee 
and the Congress, to go ahead and fundamentally reshape those 
markets. We believe our investments and efforts at this front 
are our starting point.
 Chairman Wicker. Well, I understand. We have no question of 
and no choice, but to go forward as quickly as we can. I'm not 
pointing the finger at anybody in particular, and I think I 
acknowledged that I'm a bit nonplussed about this, but we've 
been hearing for several administrations that China is our 
pacing threat. It just seems to me that collectively, we should 
have been tackling this a long time ago.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I can't speak to the previous 
efforts, but it's clear that the position we're in right now is 
inadequate to the needs of the Nation with regards to both our 
domestic economic performance and national security.
 Chairman Wicker. Okay. Now, you're going to be asked about 
this new approach. Of course, we deal with the industry a lot, 
but the idea of equity is something that there are going to be 
questions about on both sides of the dais. Why is it the way to 
go, in your judgment, on this issue of critical minerals?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, the issue of--or the opportunity 
that equity provides us is that it's a catalyst for private 
investment and a more aggressive way of reconciling what has 
been a failed market-based approach to address this national 
security need. We have invested small amounts of money. We 
provided grants, we've tried to incentivize through tax 
incentives and things like that----
 Chairman Wicker. How far back did we start trying that?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. How far back--sorry, Senator?
 Chairman Wicker. You say we've tried other approaches.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. I believe we tried consistently for the past 
10 or 15 years, if you sort of read the press. I'm sure there 
are more significant investments that I'm not aware of, but 
it's pretty clear that the things that have been done have been 
inadequate to the scale, and have not resulted in the outcomes 
that we've wanted. I think that's the measure is on an outcome 
basis. As of last year, and currently, our dependence on China 
for rare earths remains significantly high, and so, the 
acquisitions in the past have not met our needs. We think that 
the----
 Chairman Wicker. But if conflict had broken out in the last 
couple of years, last year, between the United States and 
China, which of course we certainly hope we can avoid by being 
strong enough, it would've brought us to our knees. Well, could 
you help us understand--well, do you agree with my statement 
there?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it's very clear that the 
willingness of China to turn off the spigot on rare earths last 
year, represented a significant threat to national security, 
and would've been debilitating to both domestic industry and to 
the defense industrial base.
 Chairman Wicker. Specifically?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. I think there are many systems which are 
highly dependent upon rare earths and other elements, which 
would've been struggled to get access to those outside of the 
National Defense Stockpile, which thankfully, we have a 
significant amount stored away that probably would've carried 
us through for a period of time.
 Presumably, we would've engaged in aggressive action to 
unlock mining both domestically and with partners to mitigate 
those gaps. We would've fundamentally shifted the production 
curve in a way that would've prevented that for the long haul, 
but in the short term, there definitely would've been a crunch 
that would've impacted our ability to produce the weapon 
systems we need.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Reed.
 Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 
me commend you in holding this hearing, because as you've 
indicated, we have not paid the kind of attention in the 
Congress that we should have, nor have the Administration, so 
thank you.
 Mr. Cadenazzi, we've heard from various companies in the 
minerals market that an equity stake and a 10-year price floor 
for MP Materials, where the government literally picking 
winners and losers puts other companies at a competitive 
disadvantage. How can other domestic companies remain 
competitive when DOD invests so heavily in one company and 
provides that company a competitive advantage, like a 
guaranteed price floor.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, at the time, the MP Materials deal, 
we felt was necessary to meet the needs of the moment, that is 
to immediately stimulate rare earth's investment and demand. 
The company, MP, has been invested in by the government in the 
past for the past 15 years. We've, at various times, attempted 
to move the needle on domestic rare earth production using that 
particular firm and location.
 At the time, we felt the need to go ahead and move forward 
with a more aggressive model that would lock in the equity 
stake, and create the offtake agreements and the price floors. 
The price floors are determined by a set of open-market 
analyses reflecting our best understanding of what an open, 
Western market would look like, as opposed to the manipulated 
Chinese price floor. As we've seen since that time, prices 
domestically have actually increased to the point where they're 
roughly, in some reports, around $110 per kilogram, which is 
where the price floor is at.
 So, we think we've successfully created the mechanism to 
generate more transparent and market-based pricing mechanisms. 
That's to everyone's benefits. We've also crowded in additional 
investments, we've seen additional companies committed to 
spending in this space, and that all is a beginning point for 
us to create a more liquid and robust domestic market for rare 
earths.
 Senator Reed. I've also been informed that MP Material 
mines rely on in their production process on a heavy rare earth 
element or elements from an unknown third-party source. Can you 
tell us what that--who that third party is and what country it 
is located in?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're in the process of working 
through right now to go ahead and identify additional sources 
for rare earths to improve their processing capabilities. 
There's an optimal mix of light and heavy rare earths, and I 
think I defer to Jeff on this that we were working to go ahead 
and strike supply with. So, we've struck additional deals with 
a Brazilian company, and we're in discussions with a Saudi 
Arabian company to provide access to additional raw materials.
 Senator Reed. Who is providing the material to MP Materials 
now? What country, what third-party country?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. There's Serra Verde is the company in 
Brazil, we've struck an agreement with. We're in the process of 
negotiating that. Then, Modern, in Saudi Arabia, is the other 
company.
 Senator Reed. Thank you. As I requested yesterday on a 
phone call with the Chairman, could you provide us the term 
sheets for the deal? We'd like to look in detail at what has 
been transpired, and I think you indicated that it is winding 
its way up through the process, but if you could give it a 
little boost, I'd appreciate that.
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 Mr. Cadenazzi. Ranking Member, absolutely. We've submitted 
our request for it to be approved. It is in review now.
 Senator Reed. Now, China is going to try to triangulate, 
circulate, get around this. With the price level, could they 
simply reduce their prices and cause DOD to commit significant 
dollars to MP Materials or in general, how are they going to 
frustrate you?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Ranking Member Reed, I think part of our 
approach is to create a more solid Western demand signal, so 
that's where something like the preferential trade zone, which 
is in a market zone willingly, voluntary commitment by our 
allies and partners to all operate in a way where we agree on 
price floors that essentially are set in a collaborative manner 
by countries that are worried about Chinese-maligned 
manipulation of markets, and that we collectively can agree on 
establishing price floors that will not allow them to 
manipulate it because we'll voluntarily agree to pay initially 
a higher price, but as demand decreases on their end and 
increases on ours, the prices should level into what we hope is 
a more transparent and reasonable global market pricing that 
will work to our benefits in the long haul.
 Senator Reed. Finally, the MP Materials deal relies on 
future appropriations which calls into the question of does it 
comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act? Have you analyzed that and 
determine it won't?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Reed, I've not personally conducted 
analysis in this. We've relied upon the Office of General 
Counsel and our legislative affairs teams to help us in moving 
forward. From an industrial-based policy standpoint, we've 
submitted requests for funds to go ahead and pay the quarterly 
payments that we expect are necessary to meet our offtake 
agreements. Going forward, we've planned that through the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and we expect that we'll 
continue to barring any changes in policy.
 Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Cadenazzi.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member. Senator 
Sullivan.
 Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate you 
calling for this hearing.
 Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. Look, this issue 
is infuriating for me because so much of the challenges we face 
as a country are self-inflicted. I work in a bipartisan way on 
this committee a lot, but I will tell you part of the answer is 
how did we become so reliant on China and other adversaries of 
our critical minerals?
 One reason is that there's a huge difference in this town 
between Republicans and Democrats on who wants to develop our 
mines and processing that is a fact. My colleagues on the other 
side of the isle, and they need to look at--they need to look 
at this issue straight in the eye because so many of them are 
afraid of the far-left environmental groups. They have 
prioritized shutting down mining and not developing critical 
minerals in America, and especially in my State.
 Let me provide a few examples. My State is estimated to 
have 56 out of the 60 critical minerals our country needs. Let 
me repeat that. In Alaska, the U.S. Geological Survey has said 
56 out of the 60 critical minerals that we need to compete for 
our industrial base, especially in the military, reside in my 
State. But a core element of the far left once they get into 
power, is to shut down Alaska. That's a fact.
 This is the Joe Biden 70 executive orders (EOs), what we 
call the last frontier lockup. When he got into power, he 
issued 70 executive orders. Let me list them right here, okay. 
By the way, 10 of were--10 of them were on his inauguration 
day. So, this was a plan, 70, many of which dealt with shutting 
down critical minerals. Crazy, crazy, okay?
 On this Committee, my colleagues probably remember the 
Ambler Mining District, the Road to the Ambler Mining District, 
one of the biggest critical mineral deposits in America. We 
debated it on this committee, and to my colleague's credits, 
and I want to thank them on this committee. We won that 
amendment, vote of mine, to have access to the Ambler Mining 
District, which Joe Biden shut down one of these. I think the 
vote was 21 to 6. Great victory, in the NDAA, 2 years ago. What 
happened? Chuck Schumer made it a priority, so did Hakeem 
Jeffries, and the Biden administration, to strip that provision 
out in the committee.
 So, this is not rocket science. The far left on the other 
side of the aisle has kept my State from producing what the 
country needs. It's not rocket science, and it still happens 
right now. So, let me ask and I appreciate the focus of this 
committee, but this frustrates the heck out of me because it's 
not just, of course, killing thousands of jobs in Alaska, which 
nobody seems to care about. It's empowering our adversaries. 
So, I appreciate the Trump administration's focus.
 By the way, the President, again, reversing Biden, who 
reversed the President in his first term, did issue an order on 
the Ambler Mining District. So, we're going to start working on 
that. But let me ask you two gentlemen on another topic that 
we're working on in the EPW Committee, major permitting reform, 
NEPA reform, to make it more efficient, timely, and certain to 
develop mines.
 Isn't that also important? By the way, it's another issue 
that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle blocked for 
decades. I've worked on that issue for more than 10 years. Is 
that important, Mr. Secretary, and how important would it be to 
get major NEPA permitting reform done?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Sullivan, absolutely. Environmental 
restrictions have been a major point of contention for mining 
development production. At every turn, we've looked at 
opportunities to develop resources on the industrial base, for 
example, on military land, which offers some alternatives for 
how we could implement environmental risk constraints. The 
Defense Production Act does provide some remediation efforts 
for application of environmental standards. We'd be keen to 
work with this committee and the Congress on opportunities, 
where appropriate, to go ahead and work on----
 Senator Sullivan. Well, I think it's going----
 Mr. Cadenazzi.--new environment reforms.
 Senator Sullivan.--to be really important, even though it's 
not directly in this Committee, for you guys to weigh in on the 
importance of the permitting reform. This matters to energy, it 
matters to everybody. We're doing a lot, and it's bipartisan so 
far. I'm going to submit for the record some questions on some 
of the investments the Department of War has made in Alaskan 
mining. I appreciate that very much.
 Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, one final 
quick question. I appreciated the 8(a) meeting. That's a very 
important issue for my constituents in terms of lethality, 
flexibility, warfighting, keeping the intellectual property 
(IP) that the Pentagon gets to keep when they do those kinds of 
programs. Limiting 8(a) opportunities, in my view, would be a 
gift to the primes, the big primes. Can you give me an update 
on how that's going? I appreciate the meeting, but that's a 
really important one for me.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. 8(a) issues in the audit 
associated with that continue to be a major priority for the 
Office of Small Business Programs within industrial-based 
policy. We continue to focus on issues associated with fraud 
within the program primarily, and we're really excited about 
finding new opportunities to bring new entrants into the space, 
particularly through the 8(a) programs in the future.
 Senator Sullivan. Would you agree that a lot of them is 
particularly as we talked about, my constituents bring a focus 
on lethality, flexibility, and make the Pentagon more lethal as 
I presented to you guys.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. I agree, Senator Sullivan. Absolutely.
 Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman Wicker. Senator Sullivan, we probably need to put 
copies of those two posters in the record at this point. So----
 Senator Sullivan. Gladly, Mr. Chairman,
 Chairman Wicker.--unless there's objection, that is so 
ordered.
 
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 Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen.
 Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't object to 
putting those in the record, but I do object, Senator Sullivan, 
to your blanket attack on Democrats as being the reason that 
critical minerals aren't----
 Senator Sullivan. I said one of the reasons, one of the 
reasons. It is.
 Senator Shaheen. Wow.
 Senator Sullivan. There's no doubt in my mind.
 Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen is----
 Senator Sullivan. I live it every day.
 Chairman Wicker. Senator Shaheen is recognized. We'll take 
a second round.
 Senator Shaheen. Well, I think a better way to address this 
issue would be forced to work together, and to not name-call, 
and try and educate people on why this is so critical, as you 
have been trying to do. So, I would hope that you----
 Senator Sullivan. I would welcome the chance to.
 Senator Shaheen.--wouldn't just decide because I have a D 
after my name, I'm not going to be supportive of critical 
minerals.
 Senator Sullivan. I'm not saying everybody, and you've been 
great on this, Senator Shaheen.
 Senator Shaheen. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you 
both for joining us. I want to go back to the equity investment 
question that Senator Reed and Senator Wicker both raised 
because it's not clear to me what the criteria is that you're 
looking at and making an equity investment. So, can you outline 
what that is, and then explain whether you're focusing more on 
extraction or processing in terms of those investments?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. There's no criteria in 
such that we're looking for equity investments as a deliberate 
approach. I think the way I would view it and describe it, 
ma'am, is that what we want to do is achieve the outcomes of 
improved investment, performance, and production within the 
mining space particularly. Therefore, we're talking to 
companies about what would make them more successful over the 
long haul. In some cases, we've taken equity associated with 
direct DOW investment through the Integrated Budget and 
Accounting System (IBAS) and DPA programs----
 Senator Shaheen. I'm not being clear, I think. So, what 
determines whether you think a particular company is a good 
choice----
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Oh.
 Senator Shaheen.--for that equity investment, and how do 
you determine that criteria? Then, how do you decide whether 
you've been successful or not?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. So, thank you for 
clarifying that. So, we conduct a robust diligence process. So, 
we actually have brought in--we have an internal effort through 
our global investment and economic security team to do FOCI, 
and intelligence analysis, and counterintelligence analysis. We 
couple that with external market analysis to understand the 
production rates of this particular mine or whatever it might 
be associated with their place in the market. We then add in 
additional experts from both internal to the government within 
Jeff's team or within another, our partners with an OSC, and 
other agencies to determine whether or not we think this mine 
can meet the targets that we have. That is generally an 
increase in production from one number to another, and then--
ma'am, sorry.
 Senator Shaheen. Did you have something else you wanted 
add?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. No, I just want to say, then we couple that 
all together, and we make a reasonable business case analysis, 
we hope is, that determines what the right mix of direct 
investment and/or debt may be to meet those requirements for 
the country.
 Senator Shaheen. Then, can you answer the extraction versus 
processing question?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. We're not overly indexed on--our goal is to 
go ahead for every one of the critical minerals we've 
identified, which is 20-plus critical minerals, we're creating 
what we call a value chain, which goes from the mine all the 
way through production, refining, to recycling. The goal is to 
go ahead and provide an adequate number of investments at each 
of those places, whether directly through the DOW, through our 
partner agencies, or through private capital to make sure that 
we're investing appropriately in--across each of those 
elements.
 Senator Shaheen. Can you tell me, my understanding is that 
the biggest issue here is not China's control of the actual 
critical minerals themselves, it's the processing that they do 
that nobody else is doing. So, why--how are we focusing on the 
processing in ways that allow us to build that supply that 
we're going to need?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. I actually--I'll let Mr. Frankson weigh in 
on that one.
 Mr. Frankston. Thank you, sir. Senator, for each critical 
mineral that we look at, as Honorable Cadenazzi pointed out, we 
build a supply chain map across the board from the raw material 
to the finished product and look at each stage with a domestic 
focus specifically on Department of War requirements, but then 
building that into the broader domestic requirement piece.
 One of the key aspects is where does China or other 
competitors' control over their particular critical mineral? 
So, it's a different story for each one, but each one we target 
is how do we make this investment along the entire supply chain 
so that we're not making an isolated investment in one stage of 
the process, and that it has a feeding and receiving mode in 
terms of the rest of the supply chain, so that we build an 
integrated domestic and joint partner capability.
 Senator Shaheen. So, are we investing in any processing 
capability?
 Mr. Frankston. Yes, ma'am.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, absolutely. The goal is to go ahead 
and work across the entire supply value chain, and that 
requires having raw material inputs, processing, and the 
ability to go ahead and move that further into the supply 
chain.
 Senator Shaheen. Can you tell us what companies are doing 
that processing and the difference between what they're doing 
versus what China's doing? Because again, my understanding is 
one of the challenges is that China is able to do the work 
without any requirements that affect their workforce.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, yesterday, we provided your 
offices, the whole Committee, a copy of an antimony value 
chain, which breaks that down in detail as an example of the 
type of analysis we're doing. It gets into the details of 
companies and production rates. We'll be happy to go ahead and 
provide additional insight into those value chains, which gets 
into that, and we'll provide specific comments on the companies 
that are performing that we're looking to invest in those 
sectors going forward.
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 Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman Wicker. Yes, Senator Kaine.
 Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to our 
witnesses.
 I wish Senator Sullivan was still here. Just one comment 
about his concluding remarks that Democrats have been blocking 
permitting reform. For decades, I think Democrats have been 
working hand in hand with Republicans on permitting reform 
issues. My understanding from Democrats on the relevant 
committees were that those issues were closing, and there was a 
real possibility of finding a path forward that was bipartisan.
 But President Trump's decision to wage war on clean energy, 
especially a concerted effort to wage war against offshore wind 
projects, which have been repeatedly rebuffed in courts, but 
that has not stopped the President from attacking offshore 
wind, has caused the permitting reform efforts to grind to a 
halt.
 It seems to me in this area of critical minerals or energy, 
self-sufficiency, if we're going to be all of the above, we 
should be all of the above and not just all of the below: oil, 
gas, and coal. My State has been affected dramatically by 
President Trump's actions. We want permitting reform, but we 
don't want permitting reform that takes clean, American, 
domestic energy off the table.
 To my witnesses, thank you so much for being here today, 
and for your work, and for your testimony. I was in Australia 
last week for a visit connected to AUKUS, and appreciate some 
of the testimony earlier about AUKUS Pillar 1. Australia 
produces half, about half of the world's lithium, but 
historically, has relied on China for refining. What specific 
steps is the DOD taking to ensure Australia refining and 
separation capacity scales fast enough to reduce reliance on 
Chinese processing?
 This question builds upon a positive meeting that the 
President and the Australian Prime Minister had in October 
where they announced a bilateral partnership to escalate 
Australian critical mineral production and refining.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. We're excited to be 
partnered with our Australian colleagues. We've invested in 
Alcoa in a partnership with the Japanese as well in Australia 
recently. Lithium is not something that we're terribly focused 
on within the DOW. It is not on our critical list there. 
There's too many problems, and so we've decided that we need to 
make some choices. That is something we believe we have 
adequate supply from global sources, from domestic production, 
from our partners, and allies, that for the moment, the DOW 
itself does not require as much focus on it. So, we've 
prioritized other minerals; vitrium, germanium, gallium within 
that.
 Senator Kaine. Let me build on that. Appreciating the 
comment you made about lithium, but the general issue of 
refining capacity is an important one. It's not just where the 
critical minerals, how can we extract them and get them to 
market? China has sort of locked up a lot of the world's 
refining capacity. So, in developing a critical mineral 
strategy that we can rely on, with a supply chain that we can 
rely on, what is the DOD doing to focus on the refining issue 
as a component of those minerals that you're concerned with?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator. It's a major priority 
for us. We're working across, again, the value chain to make 
sure that for all of the critical elements that the DOW has 
identified, that we are investing adequately in each element to 
include mining, production, refining, and recycling, and in an 
adequate way. I'll turn it over to Jeff for any specific 
comments on refining.
 Mr. Frankston. Yes. Thank you, sir. Senator, Australia is a 
fantastic partner ally on multiple fronts, but especially when 
it comes to minerals, just given what their country is blessed 
with and what is in the ground.
 From a processing standpoint, we look for opportunities 
with all partners and allies to build a domestic capability 
through the Defense Production Act. Australia is actually 
considered a domestic source, and so we are working on a number 
of different fronts, as Honorable Cadenazzi mentioned, on Alco 
of Australia, that is a trilateral investment with Australia 
and Japan.
 But we have other open opportunities. Just 2 weeks ago, we 
held a Defense Industrial Base consortium call for submissions 
of papers and proposals from industry across the world that 
includes Australia, and it's at all stages of production, and 
we welcome any participation, any cooperation, any 
collaboration that directly aligns with the President's 
agreement signed with Australia last year.
 Senator Kaine. One last question, back to lithium. A few 
weeks ago, the DOD announced that 25 vendors had been invited 
to compete in phase 1 of a drone dominance program. Lithium-ion 
batteries are a critical enabling technology for drones, but 
China does control much of the upstream supply chain for 
processing battery materials. What are the requirements for the 
drone dominance vendors to source battery or other materials 
from the U.S. or allied suppliers?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. The batteries issue is a 
critical one, not just for drones, but for the entire supply 
chain for the Defense Department, Department of War. So, 
minerals that go into those batteries are available, we think, 
for lithium, more or less.
 There's challenges associated with some of the 
alternatives. So, there are alternative chemistries for 
batteries. We have a large team that works within Industrial 
Base Policy on batteries issues. We convened a whole-of-
government effort 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, to go ahead and 
look at batteries opportunities and the threat from China's 
control of markets on batteries.
 So, we're working with our colleagues to go ahead and 
identify alternative sources and chemistries, and then to work 
with the teams that are driving drone adoption to identify the 
right mix of controls on access to battery, raw materials, and 
on technologies going forward.
 Chairman Wicker. Senator Kelly.
 Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Cadenazzi? Did 
I get that right?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
 Senator Kelly. Mr. Frankston, thank you both for being 
here. I want to ask you about how we supply semiconductors to 
the defense industrial base. As you both know, semiconductors 
doing a lot of stuff used by our military and semiconductor 
technology advances rapidly Moore's Laws says processing power 
doubles every 18 months. The DODs procurement programs do not 
operate at that same kind of speed, and the end result is some 
of our most advanced weapon systems are relying on chips that 
are old sometimes outdated, sometimes decades behind the state-
of-the-art technology. Historically, DOD has relied on a small 
number of trusted foundries which are fabs that not only 
serve--you know, they serve government customers.
 So, would you both agree that this approach has not 
succeeded at protecting DOD's access to the best chips in the 
world for its most important programs?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we've perennially under invested in 
the technology and the engineering necessary to migrate our 
systems to go ahead and leverage the most current state-of-the-
art chips. As a result, we do have a legacy infrastructure, 
which produces a large number of the chips that meet our needs, 
which are essentially based upon older technology. So, I concur 
entirely.
 Senator Kelly. So, it sounds like an area where we could 
put some focus on and try to fix.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator, it's a challenge.
 Senator Kelly. So, and we've worked on this committee for 
years to try to solve this issue by placing production lines 
that meet DOD security requirements in commercial fab 
facilities so DOD can get those leading chips without 
compromising in any security. These programs, there's a couple 
of them, one is the Secure Enclave, the other is the 
Microelectronics Commons, and these programs, they've been 
stood up, and they're fully funded, and they're getting ready 
to produce some chips.
 There's just one problem here. Major DOD programs are still 
choosing to have the old, outdated foundries produce the chips, 
not the new ones. So, would you both agree that there are 
meaningful strategic advantages to sourcing leading edge chips 
for our major programs?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I concur in the need for us to go 
and continuously improve the security of our chip 
infrastructure and the chips themselves, and that the tools 
that are in place under a Secure Enclave, et cetera provide us 
new alternatives to deliver upon that in the future.
 Senator Kelly. Why haven't we used those alternatives?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. So, there's price considerations and 
engineering considerations with migrating from the current chip 
infrastructure to new chips and new security models. I think 
inherently, it's a cost issue that programs have been 
incentivized to sort of, you know, go short shrift on this, and 
not pay the bill, and that we need to incentivize them to pivot 
to actually investing in the infrastructure changes necessary 
to take full advantage of this for the future.
 Senator Kelly. Can you give it--can you give an example of 
like how much more does a chip coming out of the Secure Enclave 
cost for like a weapon system, like percentage-wise?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I'm not sure I can comment 
thoughtfully on the cost of chip. We can get back to you on 
that. I think there's a bigger issue of the certification cost 
for these new systems. When you change the chips, you often 
have to requalify systems and their performance. It becomes a 
cost driver for tests, for engineering. There's a whole bunch 
of ancillary pieces that go into it, and the bill gets pretty 
large, millions of dollars, into the tens of millions of 
dollars to go ahead and make these changes, unfortunately.
 Senator Kelly. How about for new weapon systems? Something 
that's brand-new?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. The challenge we had is that, often, the 
firms that deliver these weapons systems are incentivized for 
ease of access and approval to leverage infrastructure that's 
already approved and tools that are already approved. So, 
therefore, to go ahead and launch a new weapons platform with a 
brand-new security or information technology (IT) 
infrastructure, whatever that might be, or microelectronics 
infrastructure, is often cost-prohibitive and not incentivized 
by the programs themselves.
 Senator Kelly. But we funded the Secure Enclave and the 
Microelectronics Commons. Are they not approved?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I believe that they are, and that 
we're in the process of migrating to that, those requirements 
over the next 5 years or so. However, I do think there's going 
to be a bit of a tail and a lag, and particularly a bill 
associated with how we make that migration work.
 Senator Kelly. Well, we could--what could we do to make 
that migration happen more quickly?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I think we'd be keen to work with 
you and the committee on authorities and changes to policy that 
would help us drive those changes, and an understanding of the 
costs associated with that to make it work going forward.
 Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I yield back my 6 seconds.
 Chairman Wicker. Quite generous of you. Senator Hirono.
 Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Before I begin my questions, I would like to note that we 
all acknowledge both the Democrats and the Republicans 
acknowledge the importance of critical minerals and our over 
reliance on China. At the same time, though, there are 
environmental concerns with mining these resources, and I just 
want to put on the record my opposition to this regime's 
attempt to reverse a 20-year ban on mining near Minnesota's 
boundary waters.
 While access to critical minerals supplies domestically are 
important, we can't just toss out the kinds of environmental 
concerns that have to do with contamination of local lakes and 
rivers, as is the case in the Minnesota situation. So, 
environmental requirements are important. We don't just toss 
those things out because we want to mine critical minerals.
 Oh, I--you've been asked, Mr. Secretary, a number of 
questions relating to the $400 million in equity that we have 
with MP Materials, and I made a note that you said that we 
pursued equity ownership to address failed marketplace efforts. 
I don't know what that means, because you can argue that 
there's failed market marketplace efforts to justify equity 
shares, and I suppose any number of private entities.
 It's really hard for us to determine whether that is an 
accurate depiction of the reasons for it or not, but this is 
very unusual for the government to acquire equity shares, and, 
you know, there are issues relating to competition or the lack 
thereof when we get an equity share in a private entity. So, I 
just want to raise my concerns.
 There's also an issue whether or not the Defense Production 
Act even gives the authority under the Act for the U.S. to 
achieve equity shares. There's a question if that authority is 
deemed not existent, I don't know what that does to the equity 
shares, $400 million. Does that mean that that deal has to be 
unwound? It reminds me very much of the Supreme Court's 
decision on the unconstitutionality of the tariffs and the 
billions of dollars that are--that there're going to be 
arguments about returning all of that.
 Let me turn to something that I think we--I think it is 
very positive on this issue of critical minerals, and that has 
to do with recycling of critical minerals from end-of-life 
equipment. So, I'm glad to see that in your testimony, you 
refer to recycling as one of the ways that we're going to 
address our need for critical minerals, and especially, 
obtaining critical minerals from spent lithium-ion batteries.
 I wanted to ask you, what progress are you making in this 
area of recycling, and are you preparing any demonstration 
projects to scale these recycling technologies up?
 Mr. Frankston. Thank you, Senator. A great example of our 
recycling capabilities is through the Defense Logistics Agency 
through their germanium recycling program. They have taken 
night vision optics that have been decommissioned after periods 
of use, and have been able to harvest back the materials. So, 
they have a ready supply of ready material for the warfighter, 
for the Defense Industrial Base as a reserve into our----
 Senator Hirono. So, I'm sorry, I am running out of time, 
but I want to make sure that you are--both of you are very 
committed to shoring up the recycling aspects of critical 
minerals, and that you are spending the kind of money that we 
need in R&D for this purpose. Are you, one, committed to 
recycling, and, two, do you have--I had a question as to 
whether or not you have any demonstration projects to show us 
your progress in this area.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we're absolutely committed. We 
recognize that recycling would be a critical source of supply 
for us for the long haul, and there are multiple demonstration 
projects underway within the Research and Engineering (R&E) 
portfolio, Research and Engineering portfolio. We'll go ahead 
and come back to you on the report what those projects are.
 [The information referred to follows:]

 [Information has been retained in the Committee's files]

 Senator Hirono. Are you making it clear to the private 
sector that they also can participate in the developing the 
kind of recycling of critical minerals from spent materials----
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely----
 Senator Hirono.--so they can put their energies and brain 
power to enabling us to recycle?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Absolutely, Senator. We put out our 
requirements often to the market and hope that we can bring the 
best of breed capabilities back for us to leverage in these 
decisions, in these analyses.
 Senator Hirono. Mr. Chairman, can I just ask one short 
question about a provision we put in last year's NDAA?
 Chairman Wicker. Yes, ma'am.
 Senator Hirono. So, section 1412 of the fiscal year 2026 
NDAA requires the Defense Logistics Agency to report to Senate 
Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) on best practices to expand the strategic 
material recovery and reuse program by March 1, 2026, that is 
right around the corner. Is that report on schedule?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, the Defense Logistics Agency is a 
separate agency, field agency within acquisition sustainment. 
I'll bring that request back to Honorable Duffy, who's the 
Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and we 
will find out.
 Senator Hirono. This is an issue, you know. I mean, you 
recycling is a very important part of the testimony you gave, 
and yet, you're not the one that's able to tell us whether this 
report is going to be on time or not. But I appreciate your 
conveying it to the appropriate entity and DOD. Thank you.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you for agreeing to do that, Mr. 
Cadenazzi. Senator Banks.
 Senator Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Cadenazzi, can you speak to the specific importance of 
the Department of War's equity investments and how they played 
a role in supporting the Department's critical mineral supply 
chain security. In other words, what is uniquely helpful about 
equity stakes relative to other kinds of support that we would 
use?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator. We believe that given 
the frailty of many of our minerals markets, that equity is a 
necessary component to go ahead and drive alignment of the 
companies, make a clear commitment from the government that 
we're interested, and we're committed to not just the market 
but the company in question, hence the rigorous diligence that 
we conduct on that company and its performance that we can then 
crowd in private capital, which will allow us to go ahead and 
expand our operations, and leverage less taxpayer money to go 
ahead and achieve our ends, but also signal a real change in 
how we plan to operate and the demand signal for that 
particular component or mineral going forward.
 It's been vital. It's been very successful thus far. It 
forges a true partnership with the company in question, and 
allows us to plan for the long haul. Again, our goal in this is 
not equity outcomes for return on investment (ROI) for economic 
or financial returns. Those funds would return to the taxpayer. 
Our goal is to improve mineral production and the availability 
of those minerals to the Department of War, and more broadly, 
to the Nation.
 Senator Banks. Has the Department ever used equity 
investment tool before?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Prior to the current Administration, I 
believe we used tools like warrants during, say, the 2008 
financial crisis.
 Senator Banks. So, there is a precedent?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. It has happened in the past. Different 
format, but yes.
 Senator Banks. Yes. Can you talk about how we might use it 
in the future?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we believe that where opportunities 
exist for the government to supplement our spending with 
external capital, that equity is a powerful tool for us to 
incentivize the investment of our partners in industry, private 
capital markets, and to accelerate the pace at which we're able 
to go ahead and generate new production capacity.
 We'd anticipate using this as an alternative to other 
financing mechanisms where we've tended to offer grants to 
companies to facilitize, for example, where we might want to go 
ahead and offer an incentive for them to self facilitize, or 
alternatively, for us to take an equity stake going forward.
 Senator Banks. Are there additional authorities that you 
need as we head into NDAA season that might help you provide 
equity investments in other sectors, too?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. We recognize that there was a robust 
discussion last fall with regards to equity language in the 
2026 appropriations, an authorization bill that did not reach 
fulfillment. We're eager to continue those discussions to make 
sure that we're all in alignment on the appropriate use and 
controls on the application of equity.
 Senator Banks. Can you walk us through consequences for the 
Department when the Chinese first expanded their rare earth 
export controls last October. What did that do to us.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it was absolutely a crisis. I came 
in after that, and so I think having discussed with the team, 
the commitment to national security and the minerals front has 
been very vigorous since. I didn't discuss minerals at all with 
the committee when I was confirmed or my committee discussions 
last fall, but this has become a major topic.
 We spend a substantial amount of time and the Congress's 
money to go ahead and work on these minerals issues, and we're 
really excited about the impact we're having on the space. We 
believe we're--over the past 14 months, the Administration has 
already started to bend the needle substantially on 
availability, and we're looking forward to more impact over the 
next few years.
 Senator Banks. What does it mean to America and to the 
Department specifically to be reliant upon our biggest 
adversary?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Well, it's unacceptable from a national 
security standpoint that our primary strategic competitor can 
go ahead and turn off the spigot on a mineral which we 
absolutely require for the production of nearly every weapons 
platform.
 Senator Banks. Mr. Chairman, that's all I have. Thank you. 
I yield back.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Thank you, Senator.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much. Senator Reed, you're 
recognized.
 Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
 Just two quick questions, if I may. Secretary Cadenazzi, 
we've talked about equity. This is an issue that's not going to 
go away but there are other tools that are available, direct 
grants many other tools. So, why was equity chosen above these 
other approaches?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, we believe that, at this time, to 
go ahead and incentivize enough private capital, provide a 
clear signal to the market that the DOW itself is interested in 
solving these problems, which are outsized relative to our 
normal focus on it, that equity is a necessary tool for us to 
make that commitment.
 We also think it provides a tool to recoup our investment 
over time. That is, the taxpayer will be repaid through a 
successful investment if the market works out as we believe it 
will, which is we invest in a company, we solve our national 
security problem with access to that particular mineral, that 
our equity stake will actually pay back the taxpayer for that 
return.
 We think that's a great deal for the taxpayer as it's going 
to go ahead and meet both of our needs within the Department 
and the country's needs for the future.
 Senator Reed. Now, let me ask just another question. This 
is all critical in terms of the legal basis for all of these 
actions, and can we be assured that we will get, promptly, the 
DOD legal opinion on these equity deals that go through all the 
nuances we've spoken about this morning?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, I believe that the Department's 
Office of General Counsel (OGC) has worked on providing those 
legal justifications to the Congress, and we'll go ahead and 
submit that request back again.
 Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
 Chairman Wicker. Do you have any idea how much longer that 
will take, Mr. Secretary?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Chairman Wicker, I do not. I'm not a lawyer, 
and I'm not in OGC, but I will go ahead and ask the team there 
to give us a timeline.
 Chairman Wicker. Senator Reed.
 Senator Reed. No, I--you're just trying to claim the veil 
of innocence by claiming you're not a lawyer. Okay, I get it. 
The investments, the equity investments, are such that raise 
issues that I hope we can see analyzed in these legal opinions. 
For example, what obligation do you have as a shareholder to 
the company and to--versus what obligation to have to the 
United States? That's a key distinction. I know the present 
investments in the former or preferred stock that's convertible 
into common stock, but there's still that whole notion of 
distention between a stockholder and a government agent, and 
that's something I hope will be captured in these opinions. 
Have you seen that discussion?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, absolutely understand the concern. 
We've established these deals to provide for performance 
outcomes. Our goal is not economic returns. We're not trying to 
excise long-term ownership of these companies. The goal is not 
to have a stake forever. The goal is to achieve our outcome, 
execute some sort of exit strategy as appropriate to the 
moment, and then continue on with the next set of problems for 
the DOW. Ideally, we wouldn't be spending much time on 
minerals. We feel compelled to do so as a result of the 
situation in the market.
 Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and 
Mr. Frankston, for your very, very clear and--testimony. I 
appreciate it very much. Do you have questions?
 Chairman Wicker. Let me ask you this Secretary Cadenazzi, 
are we expanding the--your workforce enough? We had understood 
that in your team they were working some of the longest hours 
in the building. How is that coming along?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. In the One Big Beautiful Bill, Chairman 
Wicker, we received several million dollars, $20 million, I 
believe, in funds for workforce expansion, specifically within 
Jeff's team, in industrial base resilience. We've worked 
incredibly hard to go ahead and fill those roles and begin the 
expansion. It's been taking some time for the money to flow in, 
but think I'll turn over to Jeff.
 Chairman Wicker. Well, the money didn't arrive quite as 
quickly as perhaps----
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Not as much as I wanted Senator. Yes.
 Chairman Wicker. Right.
 Mr. Frankston. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Just in the last few weeks, we've brought on about four or five 
people alone on my team to work across a number of key sectors. 
So, the resourcing provided from this committee, from yourself, 
from this team has been phenomenal. We are building our 
capability to grow across all sectors, but in particular, focus 
on critical minerals.
 We just brought in a third expert to help us, and we're 
going to be bringing in more to cover in some of these smaller 
sectors and some of the underlying sub-tier and enabling things 
like chemicals for leaching for critical minerals, looking at 
recycling, looking across all these areas. So, we are very much 
appreciative and looking forward to bringing on more personnel.
 Chairman Wicker. Well, I'm glad you're appreciative. 
Sometimes, those ponies going from one side of the river to the 
other are a little slow getting across the bridge. Senator 
Warren.
 Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 So, when you sign a contract, you expect to get what you 
paid for at the price and on the date that was spelled out in 
the contract. But not for DOD. When DOD signs contracts to buy 
equipment for hundreds of billions of dollars, giant defense 
contractors often deliver late, years late, and billions of 
dollars over budget.
 So, recently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
found that in fiscal year 2024, DODs major weapons programs 
were 18 months behind schedule and would cost $50 billion more 
than budgeted just the year before. $50 billion in 1 year. That 
is not an oops. That is two times what the Federal Government 
spent on childcare that year. Now, General Dynamics oiler ship 
program, an extra $1 billion dollars, Raytheon's air and 
missile defense radar, another $6 billion, Northrop Grumman 
Sentinel Program, $36 billion over budget, and all are at least 
3 years behind schedule. Now, DOD is ramping up investments in 
critical minerals, and you got to worry, are we just going to 
see the same thing again?
 So, Mr. Cadenazzi, you are the principal DOD advisor on 
industrial base policy. Does it help or hurt our national 
security when DOD signs a contract for the equipment it needs, 
and it actually gets it years later and for billions of dollars 
more?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator, it's absolutely brutal when that 
happens. I think everyone in the Department agrees that the 
performance of the industrial base and our contractors that are 
delivering weapon systems has been unsatisfactory overall for 
an extended period of time, hence the aggressive effort we've 
been making to go ahead and focus on manufacturing and the DIB, 
to make sure that we start to go ahead and get the outcomes 
which are expected for us to meet the requirements of the 
warfighter.
 Senator Warren. Yes. Well, I got to say unsatisfactory 
might be the understatement of the day. Look, if you bought 
something and then the company said pay us more and we'll give 
it to you a year later, you'd report them to the authorities. 
But Defense contractors are a year late and over budget, and 
what happens? They break in taxpayer dollars, and then they 
shell out billions of dollars to their shareholders and to 
their executives.
 So, in 2024, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop 
Grumman each spent $3 billion on stock buybacks and dividends. 
Their executives, you'll be happy to know, did just fine, too. 
Raytheon's, CEO earned $18 million, General Dynamic, CEO made 
$23 million, and Northrop Grumman made $24 million.
 So, Mr. Cadenazzi, does it help or hurt our national 
security when giant contractors spend billions of dollars on 
stock buybacks and CEO payouts at the same time that they are 
failing to deliver weapons on time and on budget?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Senator Warren, we agree that companies 
investing in share buybacks, dividends, and oversized executive 
compensation relative to their poor performance is a concern. 
We are not happy with it, hence the EO that came out regarding 
warfighter outcomes, hence our incredible focus on trying to 
drive and improve outcomes from these companies going forward, 
and making it clear that we think that the misalignment of 
capital and the unwillingness to invest first in warfighter 
performance and system performance and delivery rates readiness 
is a more important thing relative to these other financial 
incentives. We recognize that they're have market expectations 
to meet, their first expectation needs to be delivering for the 
warfighter.
 Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate this, but you know, 
we're just really reaching a point where enough is enough. A 
recent Trump administration executive order announced a plan to 
prohibit buybacks, dividends, and excessive compensation for 
companies that fail to deliver to our warfighters. It's a good 
start, but defense contractors are already bragging to their 
shareholders that they're not going to change. So, obviously, 
they're not very afraid of you at this point.
 When asked if Northrop Grumman would continue paying 
dividends, the CEO said, ``Yes, yes, 100 percent. Yes.'' 
Raytheon, which the President called out as a problem, said 
they, ``remain committed to the dividend.'' So, let me just 
ask, I'm out of time here so I can do this for the record, but 
Mr. Cadenazzi, would DOD benefit from changes in the law to 
give this executive order more teeth and show companies that 
we're actually serious?
 Mr. Cadenazzi. Yes, Senator.
 Senator Warren. Good.
 Mr. Cadenazzi. We appreciate the opportunity to work with 
you and the committee on that issue.
 Senator Warren. You know, I don't say this often, but I 
think the Trump administration has hit the nail on the head on 
the problem here, but Congress needs to codify these tools to 
ensure that contractors prioritize delivering on time and on 
budget, not just lining their own pockets. So, thank you very 
much, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman Wicker. Thank you very much, and I agree, Senator, 
with that sentiment. This concludes today's hearing. Questions 
of the record will be due within 2 business days of the 
conclusion.
 Chairman Wicker. We're adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

 [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

 Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
 lithium
 1. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, if lithium supply is 
disrupted, what specific mission impacts do you expect first: readiness 
rates, training throughput, spares availability, surge production?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. As demand for batteries continues to rise, 
lithium consumption and strain on upstream nodes of the battery supply 
chain will continue to increase. The U.S. currently lacks separation 
and processing capacity, and the increased demand for both raw and 
processed lithium products in the event of lithium supply chain 
disruption may first lead to impacts to surge production and spares 
availability, and eventually readiness rates.

 2. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, which programs are most 
exposed, and what is the Department's current `days of supply' posture 
for defense-relevant battery inputs?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW relies on lithium-ion batteries across 
all warfighting domains, meaning that no single program is the most 
exposed.

 3. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the most fragile 
node: mining, conversion to battery-grade chemicals, cathode/anode 
materials, or cell manufacturing?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The upstream segments of the battery supply 
chain continue to be at high risk to the Department. The mining and 
midstream segments are challenging as the U.S. does not currently have 
domestic production of critical battery materials (flake graphite, 
fluorspar, manganese oxide and sulfate, cobalt sulfate, and electrolyte 
salts and solvents). My team is working across the interagency to map 
and inform investments in critical nodes across the battery value chain 
to ensure a whole of government approach to securing the supply chain.

 4. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, does the Department of War 
(DOW) have a defense qualification pathway for domestically produced 
battery-grade lithium chemicals so suppliers can become approved 
faster?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is exploring defense 
qualification pathways for domestically produced battery-grade lithium 
chemicals for faster approval of suppliers.

 5. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you have a projected 
date DOW will be able to source battery-grade lithium chemicals from a 
trusted domestic supply chain?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Using Defense Production Act Title III 
authorities, the DOW has invested in increasing lithium production 
capacity in the U.S. The Department is also closely coordinating with 
interagency partners who also support domestic lithium production. Gaps 
remain in the upstream, but my office is working on implementing 
Section 842 of the fiscal year 2026 NDAA, which prohibits the 
Department from procuring battery cells and cell components from 
foreign entities of concern beginning in fiscal year 2028.
 project vault
 6. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, Project Vault is a key 
portion of the Administration's plan to address the vulnerabilities in 
our critical minerals supply chain. Establishing stockpiles is a 
necessary and critical step, but we will need to do more than just 
warehouse critical mineral to address the vulnerabilities across our 
defense industrial base. How does Project Vault plan to ensure that 
these purchases complement--not substitute for--domestic processing and 
manufacturing capacity?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Project Vault complements domestic 
manufacturing by providing the stability needed for private investment. 
By guaranteeing a reliable reserve of raw materials, we reduce the risk 
of foreign supply disruptions that discourage investment in U.S. 
companies In short, Project Vault gives American manufacturers the 
confidence to build and expand processing and manufacturing 
capabilities here at home.

 7. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you believe that Project 
Vault will prioritize defense needs ahead of commercial uses? If not, 
should it?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Project Vault is designed to bolster our 
domestic industrial base. Its goal is to ensure that American 
manufacturers, both defense and commercial, have reliable access to the 
materials they need. By strengthening our overall economic security, we 
enhance our national security.
 supply chain
 8. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, have you identified single 
points of failure for defense-critical minerals? If so, please provide 
them.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively tracking single-
source risks and other vulnerabilities across our critical mineral 
supply chains. Mitigating these potential single points of failure is a 
top priority, and we are using all available DOW authorities, from 
investment to stockpiling, and working with industry to support their 
own de-risking, to build a more resilient and secure industrial base. 
While risks vary from supply chain to supply chain, in general the 
Department is tracking numerous vulnerabilities in mid-stream 
processing of critical minerals.

 9. Senator Cotton. Secretary Cadenazzi, do we have an end-to-end 
trusted supply chain--separation, metal/alloy, and magnet 
manufacturing--at meaningful scale for rare earth magnets in the United 
States today? If not, what are the key areas of concern?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. While we have elements of that supply chain in 
the U.S., we are focused on developing a fully domestic, end-to-end 
capability. The Department is making targeted investments to ensure we 
can process rare earth materials and manufacture magnets entirely 
within the United States to meet our national security needs.

 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
 unleashing alaska's extraordinary resource potential
 10. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, during 
his term, President Biden passed 70 executive orders that restricted 
Alaska's ability to extract its own natural resources despite an acute 
need for them on both commercial and national security grounds. These 
executive actions have slowed down or completely hindered resource 
extraction and critical infrastructure projects important not just to 
the State but to the Nation as a whole. On the first day of his 
presidency, January 20, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order 
entitled Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. The 
order in part reads as follows:
``Section 3 Specific Agency Actions
 a. The heads of all executive departments and agencies, including 
but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the Secretary of 
Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and 
Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise all lawful 
authority and discretion available to them and take all necessary steps 
to:
 (i) rescind, revoke, revise, amend, defer, or grant exemptions 
from any and all regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and 
any other similar agency actions that are inconsistent with the policy 
set forth in section 2 of this order, including but not limited to 
agency actions promulgated, issued, or adopted between January 20, 
2021, and January 20, 2025; and
 (ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG [liquefied 
natural gas] potential, including the permitting of all necessary 
pipeline and export infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, 
giving due consideration to the economic and national security benefits 
associated with such development . . .
 Section 3(d) in addition to the actions outlined in subsection (a) 
of this section, the Secretary of the Army, acting through the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, shall render all 
assistance requested by the Governor of Alaska to facilitate the 
clearing and maintenance of transportation infrastructure, consistent 
with applicable law. All such requests for assistance shall be 
transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Interior, and 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy for approval prior to 
initiation.
 Section 3(e) the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, 
under the direction of the Secretary of the Army, shall immediately 
review, revise, or rescind any agency action that may in any way 
hinder, slow or otherwise delay any critical project in the State of 
Alaska.''
 Will you commit fully to the intent of the President's executive 
order referenced above where the Department of the Army and the U.S 
Army Corps of Engineers will play a vital role?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Yes, the Department is fully 
committed to achieving the goals of the President's Executive Order, 
Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential. One of the 
Department's fundamental goals is to ensure secure and resilient 
critical mineral and energy sectors. We are open to all economically 
viable opportunities that support that mission. This certainly includes 
the development of domestic resources, like those in Alaska, which are 
vital to our national security. We look forward to working with our 
partners across the government and with the State of Alaska to review 
all available options to achieve that goal, consistent with applicable 
law.

 11. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the 
Alaska LNG Project, a proposed 800-mile natural gas pipeline to 
transport natural gas from the Alaska North Slope to the Kenai 
Peninsula for the purposes of in-State energy security and the export 
of liquified natural gas (LNG) to our Asian allies is a priority of the 
President of the United States. Executive Order 14153 entitled 
``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' in Section 2 
Policy states, ``It is the policy of the United States to . . . 
prioritize the development of Alaska's liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
potential, including the sale and transportation of Alaskan LNG to 
other regions of the United States and allied nations within the 
Pacific region.''
 Section 3(ii)(a) of President Trump's Executive Order 14153 
entitled ``Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential'' 
directs ``The heads of all executive departments and agencies, 
including but not limited to the Secretary of the Interior; the 
Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Oceans and Atmosphere; and the Secretary of the Army acting through 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Public Works, shall exercise 
all lawful authority and discretion available to them and take all 
necessary steps to (ii) prioritize the development of Alaska's LNG 
potential, including the permitting of all necessary pipeline and 
export infrastructure related to the Alaska LNG Project, giving due 
consideration to the economic and national security benefits associated 
with such development.''
 Furthermore, in President Trump's March 4, 2025 Address to a Joint 
Session of Congress he stated ``My Administration is also working on a 
gigantic natural gas pipeline in Alaska, among the largest in the 
world, where Japan, South Korea and other nations want to be our 
partner with investments of trillions of dollars each. It's never been 
anything like that one. It will be truly spectacular. It's all set to 
go.''
 How do you see the Department of Defense's interest and role in 
this project?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. A resilient domestic energy 
sector is required for national security. In partnership with the 
interagency, the Department will support the President's goal of 
American energy dominance with all means at its disposal to include 
infrastructure development and support for expedited permitting.

 12. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, one of 
the results of President Biden's energy policies and the ``lock up'' of 
my State through his executive orders is an energy emergency affecting 
our national security that is unfolding on some Alaska bases. I have 
spoken with Secretary Hegseth about this issue and explained to him 
that there has been a number of instances where commanders of bases 
like Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER) in Anchorage had to tell 
servicemembers and their families to turn-down their heat, unplug 
personal property, and turn-off certain critical systems that sustain 
the base. This was done to preserve electricity and avoid brown-outs in 
the region. Would U.S. national security be enhanced if there was a 
reliable source of clean-burning Alaskan natural gas available to 
supply the energy needs of these bases?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Warfighters and their 
families should have access to reliable, abundant energy, both for 
their well-being and the security of the Nation. Leveraging domestic 
energy resources enhances energy resilience and independence, reducing 
the vulnerability of military installations to disrupted supply chains 
or foreign energy dependencies. By ensuring a continuous, secure, and 
reliable power supply for base operations and critical infrastructure, 
local domestic natural gas can directly produce sustained operational 
readiness, force projection capabilities, and uninterrupted mission 
execution.

 13. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, will 
you commit to working with the State of Alaska and me to secure 
reliable resources, including energy resources and critical minerals, 
for Alaska military bases?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The resilience of our 
military installations, particularly in a strategic location like 
Alaska, is a key focus for the Department. We welcome any opportunity 
to work with you and the State of Alaska to explore options for 
enhancing the security and reliability of our energy and resource 
supply chains.

 14. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, a 
number of important military construction (MILCON) projects are held up 
by overly burdensome environmental regulations. My home State of Alaska 
is particularly hard hit by these regulations as the building season is 
very short and the costs to build there extremely high. Will you commit 
to reviewing environmental regulations put in place by the Department 
of Defense (DOD) to accelerate the pace of environmental reviews for 
critical MILCON projects and to let Congress know how it can help?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Yes, we are committed to 
working to accelerate the pace of environmental reviews for critical 
MILCON projects. To implement the president's Executive Order 14154, 
``Unleashing American Energy,'' the Military Departments rescinded 
their National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations and OSW 
provided Department-wide guidance to expedite environmental review 
under NEPA of many MILCON projects. We strongly support efforts to 
speed up these reviews and are actively working on additional process 
improvements to do so. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work 
with Congress on this important issue.

 department of defense critical minerals strategy
 15. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, your 
joint written statement mentions the Department of Defense's strategy 
to revitalize domestic production of critical minerals. Given the 
immense critical mineral resources in Alaska and a number of critical 
mineral projects in State such as Graphite Creek and projects within 
the Ambler Mining District, can you explain how these efforts and the 
$2 billion investment in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction 
Fund will translate into strategic success against China?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our strategy leads to 
strategic success by directly reducing China's leverage over our supply 
chains. We are pursuing a multi-pronged approach: the $2 billion for 
the National Defense Stockpile provides an immediate buffer against 
supply disruptions and market manipulation, while investments in 
domestic projects, like those in Alaska, build the long-term, secure 
production capacity we need for lasting independence. By combining 
stockpiling today with investment in domestic mining for tomorrow, we 
are building a resilient industrial base that is no longer dependent on 
a strategic competitor.

 16. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
will the Department determine which domestic projects are mature enough 
to support the National Defense Stockpile, and how can Congress help 
ensure strategically important Alaska projects are not overlooked as 
these priorities are implemented?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department uses a 
rigorous due diligence process to determine project maturity. We assess 
factors like the project's technical readiness, the viability of its 
resource, its financial stability, and its path to permitting. We 
prioritize projects that are advanced enough to reliably deliver 
materials at scale. For Congress's role, your continued partnership is 
essential. By ensuring robust funding for our investment authorities 
and the National Defense Stockpile, and by continuing to highlight 
promising projects in strategically vital areas like Alaska, you help 
ensure we have the resources and awareness to act decisively and build 
the secure domestic supply chains our Nation needs.

 17. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
establishing U.S. supply chains for critical minerals will require 
sustained investment over the next 5 to 6 years, if not longer. The 
Working Family Tax Cuts Act (H.R. 1) set aside $5 billion for 
investments in critical mineral supply chains through the Industrial 
Base Fund. The Department of Defense has already, and so wisely so, 
invested in Alaska. Why, in your professional opinion, is it 
strategically important for the Department to prioritize projects in 
Alaska as part of this push to reduce reliance on foreign sources?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is 
prioritizing critical mineral projects that will make significant 
progress toward mitigating supply shortfalls and foreign reliance 
wherever they may reside in our Nation. Alaska's wealth of minerals 
resources is certain to be an important part of these efforts.

 18. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, what 
are ways that the Department is looking at improving those supply 
chains?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is looking to 
use all authorities, including those available under Title III of the 
Defense Product Act and the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment 
program, and all means at its disposal, including investments, equity 
purchases, loans, offtakes, and other strategic partnerships to improve 
mineral capabilities at all nodes of the supply chain.

 19. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, are 
there any authorities that you need that Congress can provide? How 
should Congress measure whether DOD's critical mineral investments are 
actually moving projects closer to production?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. We are grateful for the 
powerful and flexible authorities Congress has already provided, and we 
would welcome a more in-depth discussion on that topic in the future. 
As for how Congress should measure our success, we believe it must be 
based on tangible outcomes, not just dollars spent. The ultimate metric 
is the demonstrable increase in the capacity of U.S. and allied sources 
to meet U.S. national demand and defense demand, which directly 
translates to a measurable reduction in our reliance on adversarial 
nations for the materials critical to our security.

 20. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, one of 
the critical roles of your position is building relationships with 
Industry. What processes have you put in place to ensure that project 
sponsors receive timely communication from DOD regarding where their 
submissions stand, what additional information may be needed, and what 
the next step in the review process will be?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Office of Industrial 
Base Policy has a team dedicated to engaging with industry partners to 
ensure timely communication and coordination with all of our subject 
matter experts.

 21. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, will 
you commit to ensuring there is a clear point of contact for project 
sponsors and for congressional offices seeking status updates on 
pending matters?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. DOW's congressional Affairs 
team are committed to ensuring timely communication with Congress.

 22. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
China's dominance in antimony production and processing (accounting for 
36 percent of the world total in 2025 according to the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS)), combined with its willingness to use export 
restrictions as a strategic lever, underscores the national security 
risk posed by continued U.S. reliance on foreign sources for this 
material (reaching 91 percent according to the USGS). Antimony is 
essential for a range of defense and energetics applications, yet 
domestic supply and processing capacity remain limited. We have also 
heard from domestic developers that one challenge is not only securing 
support through existing authorities, but also determining where 
project submissions stand within the review process and which office is 
responsible for next steps. What steps is the Department currently 
taking to strengthen domestic antimony supply and processing capacity 
through available authorities, including the Defense Production Act 
(DPA) and National Defense Stockpile-related tools?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is 
aggressively tackling our antimony vulnerability on two fronts. First, 
we are bolstering the National Defense Stockpile (NDS), as shown by the 
recent $245 million contract between the Defense Logistics Agency and 
U.S. Antimony Corporation to replenish antimony metal ingots in the 
NDS. Second, we have used investment authorities like Title III of the 
Defense Production Act (DPA) to directly fund domestic mining and 
refining projects.

 23. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
tungsten and tantalum are essential to a wide range of defense 
applications, including advanced munitions, armor systems, electronics, 
aerospace components, and high-performance alloys. Yet, the United 
States remains almost exclusively dependent on foreign sources--
particularly strategic competitors--for mining, processing, and 
refining capacity associated with these minerals. This dependence 
presents a clear vulnerability to the resilience of the defense 
industrial base and broader national security supply chains. Given the 
strategic importance of tungsten and tantalum to U.S. military 
readiness and technological competitiveness, please describe the 
Department's current strategy to strengthen domestic and allied supply 
chains for these materials. Specifically, what concrete steps has the 
Department taken to invest in domestic mining, processing, and refining 
capacity for tungsten and tantalum, including through DPA authorities, 
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment programs, or other 
initiatives?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's approach to 
bolstering domestic tantalum and tungsten supply chains combines near-
term risk mitigation with long-term industrial base development. For 
tantalum, we have already taken action to bolster our strategic reserve 
as evidenced by the Defense Logistics Agency's contract with Global 
Advanced Metals to purchase tantalum ingots for the National Defense 
Stockpile. The Department has also invested to support domestic 
tungsten mining and processing. These concrete actions are designed to 
systematically reduce our foreign dependence and build a secure, 
resilient supply chain for these essential defense materials.

 24. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, to 
what extent is the Department coordinating with other Federal 
agencies--including the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce--
to support exploration, permitting, processing innovation, recycling, 
and workforce development relevant to these materials? Please provide 
specific examples of ongoing or planned programs, timelines for 
implementation, and any measurable outcomes demonstrating progress 
toward a more secure tungsten and tantalum supply chain.
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. We work closely with our 
partners at the Departments of Energy, Interior, and Commerce, among 
others, on the full spectrum of critical mineral challenges. This 
includes everything from streamlining the permitting process and 
funding innovative processing technologies to developing a skilled 
workforce. Our goal is to ensure a unified, whole-of-government 
approach to building a secure supply chain for critical materials like 
tungsten and tantalum, and we believe this close collaboration with our 
interagency partners is the only way to achieve lasting success.
 defense production act title iii projects in alaska
 25. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
Graphite One's Graphite Creek project in Alaska is a proposed mine 
anchored by the largest known graphite deposit in the United States and 
one of the largest globally. In July 2023, Graphite One received a 
$37.5 million DPA title III award to accelerate its feasibility study 
and has since entered the FAST-41 permitting process, with 
environmental review and permitting currently targeted for completion 
by September 2026. Alaska Range Resources, another U.S. company in 
Alaska, was awarded $43.4 million in October 2025 to build a domestic 
antimony trisulfide supply chain in the State. Alaska Silver USA, 
another U.S. company in my State, holds a number of critical silver, 
zinc, gallium, and lead deposits. Do you recognize the immense 
strategic value of Alaskan natural resources, and particularly the 
importance of these project to the U.S. industrial base?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our support for these 
projects and continuing efforts to identify and facilitate Alaskan 
based projects demonstrates the Administration's recognition of the 
importance of Alaskan resources to U.S. industry and national security.

 26. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, can 
you commit to supporting timely execution of existing DPA grants to 
onshore the production of U.S. critical minerals and reduce 
dependencies on critical mineral supply chains from adversarial nations 
and keeping my office informed of major milestones, delays, or changes 
in status affecting these projects?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department remains 
committed to making investments to onshore the production of critical 
minerals at the speed of relevance and will continue to provide 
information on the status and progress of such investments when 
appropriate.

 27. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, we 
have heard from some developers of critical mineral projects in Alaska 
that, after submitting materials to the Department for DPA title III 
support, that they have had challenges determining the status of their 
submissions and whether additional information is needed. Can you 
commit to working with myself and my staff, to improve visibility into 
these processes by (1) identifying the appropriate point of contact for 
project submissions; (2) ensuring timely status updates to 
congressional offices upon request; and (3) providing general feedback 
on whether a project is advancing, requires additional information, or 
is no longer under active consideration?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Vendors that submit requests 
for DPA Title III funding are provided with points of contact regarding 
their submission, and the Department remains committed to providing 
status updates to vendors through these channels, as soon as such 
updates are available. The Department is also committed to providing 
timely status updates to the Congress whenever requested.
 defense production act and critical minerals
 28. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, Alaska represents a wealth of 
critical minerals. In the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA), the Secretary of Defense was tasked with providing a way 
forward to address all critical mineral shortfalls. This came after a 
2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that of the 99 
materials for which there is a current shortfall, over 90 percent had 
either zero or one domestic supplier. In 2024, the previous 
Administration went to Australia and the United Kingdom and offered to 
purchase minerals from there rather than source them domestically. So, 
in 2024, I got an amendment into the NDAA that said that domestic 
sources, namely the U.S. and Canada, would be the primary source of 
development, and then, only if unable to source domestically, then we 
could go to those other countries. What are the risks to continued 
reliance on foreign, and often un-friendly, sources for these critical 
minerals?
 Mr. Frankston. Continued reliance on foreign nations can put the 
entire defense and industrial supply chain at risk, which is especially 
critical in times of conflict. We are moving to eliminate these risks 
to production which have resulted from offshoring manufacturing and raw 
material processing for so long. Building resilient domestic supply 
chains is a generational undertaking and will require sustained efforts 
and commitment across the government.

 29. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, how can Congress help 
``onshore'' or, at the very least, ``friendly shore'' some of these 
material sources?
 Mr. Frankston. We are fully committed to ensuring we onshore 
materials supply chains domestically or friend shore with trusted 
partners and allies. We appreciate Congress's supportive policy and 
resourcing. We will use these authorities and appropriations in 
combination with continuous assessment of domestic supply chain growth 
opportunities. Finally, we will combine the authorities we oversee, DPA 
Title III and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) funding, 
with interagency appropriations and authorities' instruments. This 
approach will succeed but will take time to rebuild lost industries and 
capacities.

 30. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, I also got a provision in the 
2025 NDAA that required the Secretary of Defense to consult with the 
head of any agency responsible for development of an ``environmental 
document'' for a project that would result in an increase in 
availability of strategic and critical minerals. These environmental 
impact studies have been weaponized against my State to block 
development and limit economic opportunity at a cost to our national 
security. Will you commit to me to ensuring the DPA stays focused on 
defense and on improving our domestic industrial base?
 Mr. Frankston. The Department reiterates its commitment to 
developing pathways to mineral and manufacturing security with the 
authorities at our disposal and funds appropriated by Congress. 
Permitting processes and environmental reviews have been accelerated 
and streamlined with additional expertise brought in-house to the 
Office of Industrial Base Policy. We will work to ensure each project 
receives appropriate expertise and attention in order to maximize 
success.
 8(a) contracting
 31. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the 
Small Business Act 8(a) program, created by Congress, provides a 
contract vehicle through which sole source and set aside contracts can 
be awarded to small businesses owned by Alaska Native corporations, 
Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian 
organizations. These corporations are tied to political relationships, 
not racial classifications. They also are some of our most efficient 
contractors, earning stellar Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System marks. Last many of these small businesses employ 
veterans at rates far exceeding the national average, allowing our 
Nation's finest to continue to serve after they take off the uniform. 
Will you commit to me to work to preserve and strengthen 8(a) 
contracting for the Department of the Defense?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed 
to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in 
the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance 
with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, 
domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric.

 32. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, I 
recently toured a Small Business Administration (SBA) 8(a) contracting 
operation and saw firsthand the value 8(a) brings to the Federal 
customer in terms of cost and efficiency while delivering mission-
critical solutions that increase our national security and warfighter 
readiness. 8(a) contracts represent the best ``bang for the buck'' for 
taxpayers, giving contracting officers additional flexibility while 
also maximizing efficiency by reducing red tape. Do you see the value 
in increased efficiency in flexibility brought from initiatives such as 
the 8(a) program?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed 
to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in 
the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance 
with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, 
domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric.

 33. Senator Sullivan. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, rapid 
response capabilities are essential to enable our warfighters to win on 
the battlefield. At the same time, our defense contractors must rapidly 
respond to the needs of our military to make the U.S. military more 
lethal. Flexible and efficient contracting through the SBA 8(a) program 
is one trusted way to do this. Please explain how you will ensure that 
proven, dependable, and cost-effective 8(a) programs remain in place 
and supported by the Department of Defense.
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is committed 
to executing the statutory SBA 8(a) program, so long as participants in 
the program continue to serve warfighting needs, are in full compliance 
with the program, and are offering solutions that are merit-based, 
domestically sourced, and warfighter-centric.
 protecting the u.s. industrial base
 34. Senator Sullivan. Mr. Frankston, the United States defense 
industrial base has always been a major target for foreign espionage--
especially by major adversaries like China and Russia. One concerning 
trend the last few years is the very real threat of sabotage of 
industrial base assets by foreign agents. We saw attempts attributed to 
Russia to sabotage critical defense industrial base infrastructure in 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries since 2022. Germany and 
the United Kingdom for instance both saw fires and explosions break out 
at ammunition and missile facilities linked to the War in Ukraine. We 
saw an assassination plot against the Chief Executive Officer of 
Rheinmettal, a major German arms supplier, and fires set by explosive 
devices that went off at DHL logistics hubs in Germany, England, and 
Poland bound for aircraft. If confirmed, will you commit to doing an 
assessment of the security of the U.S. defense industrial base against 
the types of plots I just described and report back to Congress as soon 
as possible about ways we could better protect these critical nodes?
 Mr. Frankston. The security of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) 
represents a paramount and enduring priority. The protective measures 
and threat assessments are integral components of the Department's 
security, counterintelligence, and law enforcement programs, which are 
executed in close partnership with other Federal agencies and with our 
industrial partners. We understand that our commercial sector DIB 
partners are also interested in more information on these issues. We 
are committed to working with the National Defense Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center to share and publicize lessons learned and best 
practices with DIB partners, including through DOW's role as DIB Sector 
Risk Management Agency. While our commitment is absolute, we are 
contending with an exponential growth in the criticality of the systems 
and technologies we must protect, while simultaneously confronting an 
unprecedented increase in the pace, scale, and sophistication of 
threats from our adversaries--challenges that will demand significant 
resources and reforms to address. With this hard truth in mind, I will 
commit to arrange for the appropriate officials to provide this 
Committee a briefing on our ongoing efforts.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
 rare earth elements in north dakota
 35. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, North Dakota has one of 
the world's largest deposits of lignite coal with 800 years of supply 
at current consumption. Industry is operating four mines today, 
producing 30 million tons annually. Collaborative efforts led by 
researchers at the University of North Dakota (UND) have identified and 
demonstrated high concentrations of desirable rare earth and critical 
mineral elements associated with these lignite deposits, including 
gallium, which according to public reporting the DOW has made some 
investments to develop, as well as others, such as dysprosium, 
germanium, neodymium, praseodymium, scandium, and terbium. Lignite is 
also highly suitable for making synthetic graphite. UND, in 
partnership, also made exceptional progress in how to extract rare 
earth elements which is substantially easier than other mineral 
resources. Are you familiar with UND's work aligned with President 
Trump's Executive Orders, including 14241 and 14156, to increase 
American mineral production?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We are aware and appreciate of the important 
initiatives being conducted by the University of North Dakota. 
Developing unconventional resources and new processing technologies is 
a key part of our strategy to reduce foreign dependence and secure our 
supply chains. The Department is always looking to support promising 
efforts to unlock domestic sources of critical minerals, especially for 
materials like gallium, rare earths, and graphite. The Department is 
always interested in learning more about this type of work and how it 
can contribute to our national security objectives. We appreciate the 
important work being performed by UND and other universities and 
research institutions in the United States to further research and 
development in this technology area.

 36. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department entered 
into an agreement at Mountain Pass (MP), recognizing the importance of 
domestic critical minerals and rare earths. Will the Department look at 
similar projects developing domestic lignite rare earths that 
complement MP well by supplying the heavy rare earths MP lacks for the 
production of the highest-value permanent magnets?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We continue to identify domestic projects that 
address gaps along the mining to production continuum. Establishing and 
sustaining secure feedstock sources for both current investments and 
future efforts, as well as incentivizing private investment in these 
nodes, is key to the national strategy to ensure domestic content for 
mine-to magnet requirements.

 37. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, given the extent of this 
domestic resource, relative ease of extraction, and ability to produce 
it without needing to permit new mines--where does North Dakota factor 
into your work building a robust and resilient critical minerals supply 
chain?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Investment opportunities submitted to the 
Department are evaluated across the same criteria and potential to 
contribute to the solutions required at a given point in time. We 
invite all qualified vendors to submit to relevant funding 
opportunities and solicitations, including vendors based in North 
Dakota.

 38. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do demonstration 
projects, working toward commercialization, fit into the Department's 
domestic critical mineral and rare earth acquisition strategies?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Demonstration projects are a vital bridge in 
our investment strategy, connecting laboratory-scale innovation to the 
industrial-scale production our Nation needs. By using our investment 
authorities, such as Title III of the Defense Production Act and the 
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment, to support these 
demonstration projects, we help prove out new technologies and de-risk 
the pathway for the much larger private investment required for full 
commercialization, ultimately turning promising concepts into reliable 
domestic supply chains.
 processing rare earth elements
 39. Senator Cramer. Secretary Cadenazzi, North Dakota could also 
play an integral role in processing these minerals. Securely located in 
the middle of the North American continent, North Dakota continuously 
has the lowest electricity prices in the country, excess natural gas 
supply, ample water resources, and robust transportation networks. 
Talon Metals Corp, working to provide domestic nickel production has 
come to recognize this and identified North Dakota coal country for its 
new minerals processing facility. What is the Department looking for in 
deploying resources to develop the refining/processing piece of a 
domestic critical minerals supply chain?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. When deploying resources for domestic 
processing and refining, the Department prioritizes projects that 
demonstrate a clear, competitive, and sustainable path to commercial-
scale production. Ultimately, our goal is to partner with projects that 
present a sound business case capable of attracting significant private 
investment, ensuring our support serves as a catalyst to build a 
resilient and economically viable domestic supply chain that will last 
for generations.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Tommy Tuberville
 china's refinement dominance
 40. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi, as you are well aware, 
these critical minerals have become a key bargaining chip when it comes 
to geopolitical negotiations with China, especially during the mineral 
refinement phase. China controls the processing of 50 percent of the 
supply of 21 different minerals along with 90 percent of rare earth 
elements. We saw China display this economic power over a year ago when 
the Communist Party banned the export of several types of these 
essential minerals. Do you believe the United States has done enough to 
ensure China cannot continue to weaponize its dominance of critical 
mineral processing to disrupt our national security and halt our own 
production processes?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department's goal is to reduce, and where 
possible, eliminate our dependency on a strategic competitor. This is a 
generational challenge, and we are treating it with the urgency it 
demands. Through the Defense Production Act, the Office of Strategic 
Capital, and a revitalized National Defense Stockpile, we are using 
every tool at our disposal to invest in domestic production, de-risk 
private investment, and build a resilient supply chain from mine to 
magnet. We have made significant progress, but our work is far from 
over.
 domestic mineral processing supply chain capabilities
 41. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi, I know we have the 
resources to compete with China; they are literally underneath my 
backyard. Alabama alone is home to deposits of over 50 different 
critical minerals that are essential for building next-generation 
military technologies. Decades of America Last policies resulted in our 
country losing the capacity to process critical minerals, with many of 
these refineries taking their capabilities and jobs overseas. 
Thankfully under President Trump and Secretary Hegseth's leadership, 
the DOW is rebuilding refinement capabilities to support our military, 
bringing back American jobs, and breaking China's grip on critical 
minerals. How does the DOW plan to prioritize securing certain critical 
minerals that are used in important components of weapons like tactical 
missiles and interceptors that are built in Alabama?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Our prioritization strategy is driven directly 
by the needs of the warfighter and the systems they depend on. We map 
critical mineral supply chains to pinpoint the exact mineral inputs 
that present the greatest risk. The minerals that are essential to 
high-priority weapon systems are, by definition, our highest priority 
for investment, stockpiling, and domestic development. By focusing on 
securing the supply chains for our most vital defense capabilities, we 
are inherently prioritizing the needs of key industrial hubs like 
Alabama.
 project vault
 42. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Frankston, the U.S. Strategic Critical 
Minerals Reserve will finally have the resources to store materials 
through ``Project Vault'' for American industries. This marks a 
significant shift. The U.S. is finally treating critical mineral supply 
chains as both a national security and industry priority rather than 
just another market issue. Mr. Frankston, given the urgency to bulk up 
the U.S.'s critical minerals, how quickly does Project Vault need to 
progress in order to have a secure and dependable supply of minerals 
outside of Chinese control?
 Mr. Frankston. The Department is moving with the urgency this 
national security threat demands. Project Vault is designed to provide 
an immediate buffer, insulating our domestic industry from Chinese 
market manipulation and supply shocks, while our longer-term 
investments in domestic mining and processing come online. Our goal is 
to secure a dependable supply of minerals as quickly as possible, and 
we are treating every day as critical in the race to eliminate this 
strategic vulnerability.
 reconciliation money allocated in july
 43. Senator Tuberville. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
investments in critical minerals are one of the single largest funding 
allocations in the One Big Beautiful Bill that the Senate passed in 
July. The total amount of funding for critical mineral production and 
capital assistance for supply chain development stands at over $7.5 
billion dollars. That is $7.5 billion dollars of U.S. taxpayer money 
that was allocated for critical minerals alone. President Trump, 
Secretary Hegseth, and private industry are depending on the Federal 
Government to quickly and efficiently utilize these funds. Secretary 
Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, do either of you have any idea when this 
reconciliation funding will become available or what the holdup is in 
making this funding available?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Those funds are available 
and the DOW has started obligating them and has submitted periodical 
obligation information to Congress.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Budd
 rare earth magnet supply chains
 44. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, I was pleased to see the 
Office of Strategic Capital's conditional loan commitment with Vulcan 
Elements and ReElement Technologies, and I've been encouraged by 
Vulcan's efforts in North Carolina to build a fully domestic rare earth 
magnet supply chain. Can you walk us through what the Department is 
getting in return for this deal, specifically in terms of domestic 
capacity, timelines, and any other outcomes?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The $620 million loan commitment to Vulcan 
Elements will enable the company to expand its production of rare earth 
magnets at their existing North Carolina facility and begin 
construction of a neighboring magnet production facility. The project 
will onshore critical rare earth magnet metallization and production 
capabilities with the capacity to produce 10,000 metric tons of 
neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) rare earth magnets by 2028. The Department 
uses high-purity NdFeB magnets in precision munitions and guidance 
systems and rare earth magnets also have a variety of commercial use 
cases in the semiconductor, automotive, energy, and robotics sectors.

 45. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did the Department 
determine that a combination of a loan commitment from Office of 
Strategic Capital and support from Department of Commerce was the right 
balance to reduce supply chain risk for these materials?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department of War and the Department of 
Commerce's assessment of the importance of these investments were 
reached independently. As these transactions proceeded, the departments 
coordinated efforts. As a general matter, companies have diverse 
capital needs. Debt financing for specific projects can be paired with 
other forms of support, including Federal incentives and equity, that 
provide investment stability and additional capital without increasing 
the level of debt service for an early stage company.

 46. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does this investment 
move us away from reliance on China for these rare earth magnets, and 
what metrics will the Department use to determine whether this 
partnership has been successful?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Today, China has a 91 percent market share for 
rare earth elements feedstock, processing, and rare earth magnets. In 
October 2025, China also implemented strict export controls on supplies 
to the United States which presents a significant national security 
risk. The Department expects this project, at fruition, to guarantee a 
stable, reliable domestic source of rare earth magnets and therefore 
remove our reliance and allies' reliance on an adversary for these 
critical materials. The Department will reference Vulcan Elements' 
projected output from its new and upgraded facilities, as well as 
offtake of its rare earth magnets, as measurements of success in its 
investment in Vulcan Elements.
 allies and partners
 47. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, I think we all want to 
reshore 100 percent of critical mineral production and processing, but 
we need our allies and partners in the near-term. Can you explain where 
our current gaps are and how we are leveraging allies and partners to 
fill those gaps?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Robust international partnerships are 
essential to our strategy. To address critical mineral gaps, we are 
actively co-investing with trusted allies and partners to build 
diverse, secure, and reliable supply chains outside the control of our 
strategic competitors. This approach allows us to mitigate risk 
immediately while we continue the long-term work of reshoring these 
critical industrial capabilities here at home. The Department 
encourages Canadian, U.K., and Australian companies to participate in 
the Defense Industrial Base Consortium, which provides both solicited 
and unsolicited pathways for submitting projects for Industrial Base 
Policy funding consideration.

 48. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is the Administration 
assessing deals with foreign partners in terms of their long-term 
viability versus being a stop-gap while we reboot domestic 
capabilities?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Each potential investment or transaction with 
foreign partners is assessed on the contribution to solving gaps 
identified in the Department's review of strategic mineral requirements 
as well as the viability of the project and expected performance over 
time. We are holding investments and partnerships to the highest 
standards of financial and strategic due diligence to protect our 
current resources and future production potential.
 supply chain awareness
 49. Senator Budd. Secretary Cadenazzi, on supply chain 
transparency, does the Department know with a high degree of confidence 
which weapons systems and warfighting platforms have minerals or parts 
originating or processed in China? If not, what additional authorities, 
resources, or tools are needed to give the Department fully supply 
chain awareness?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. As the Industrial Base Policy office maps out 
the mineral supply chain nodes and shortfalls, we are developing 
further insight into the specific weapons systems and platforms most 
challenged by reliance on hostile nations' imports.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Eric Schmitt
 critical minerals prioritization
 50. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, does the DOW's evaluation 
criteria for Federal investment favor projects that can produce 
multiple critical minerals over those producing only a single critical 
mineral? If so, what level of preference do multi-mineral projects 
receive?
 Mr. Frankston. Investments are evaluated on their potential to 
address key shortages and requirements and, in some cases, production 
of a mineral as a byproduct will be a more efficient and cost-effective 
solution. In those cases, and others when it makes sense, multi-mineral 
production can make a project more attractive. However, single mineral 
production or processing is often important, especially to address a 
critical or immediate shortfall. DOW prioritizes its investments based 
on meeting defense requirements, not to the number of different 
minerals produced by any given project.

 51. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, does 
the DOW's evaluation and assessment criteria for Federal investment 
give preference to projects with shorter timelines to production, and 
if so, what level of preference do these projects receive?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Timelines are a part of the 
evaluation and assessment process for each project, but are taken in 
context of technical merit, financial viability, and operator 
credibility. All else being equal, the faster time to production is 
likely to be selected. Usually, the evaluation requires weighing many 
aspects leading to the strongest overall contributor to national 
defense.

 52. Senator Schmitt. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, is the 
DOW coordinating with relevant Federal agencies to emphasize the 
importance of national security of critical mineral projects and how 
environmental regulations may be unreasonably preventing progress on 
reshoring domestic production?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. A whole-of-government 
approach is central to the Department's strategy. We are in constant 
coordination with our partners across the Federal Government to ensure 
that the national security imperative of building secure domestic 
supply chains is a shared priority. We have a streamlined path to 
execution that meets environmental regulatory intent while reducing 
administrative burden and delays. This includes rescinding DOW National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations and implementing 
Department-wide NEPA guidance that will accelerate or even exclude 
certain projects from environmental review.
 critical minerals hub
 53. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, Herculaneum, Missouri has the 
potential to host an intermodal Mississippi River port that could 
function as a national critical minerals hub. Is a potential project 
like this something the DOW would consider partnering with the State of 
Missouri and local private equities to work on a project of this 
magnitude?
 Mr. Frankston. We encourage companies in Missouri to explore 
opportunities within DOW and other departments for partnership--
including joining the Defense Industrial Base Consortium and 
Cornerstone Consortium, both operated through the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy. We closely 
review all proposals for optimal outcomes for the warfighter, the DIB, 
and the taxpayer.

 54. Senator Schmitt. Mr. Frankston, is there any information you 
can share with me regarding potential DOW investments in Missouri that 
are being considered? If so, is there any information you can share on 
where the Department is in their evaluation and assessment of these 
potential projects?
 Mr. Frankston. The DOW recently closed a call for critical minerals 
proposals through the Defense Industrial Base Consortium. We received 
533 submissions, which are undergoing review. Any submissions received 
from Missouri-based organizations as part of that call will be fairly 
evaluated alongside all other submissions. We are not aware of 
outstanding prior submissions through DPA Title III or Cornerstone.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Sheehy
 deep-sea mining
 55. Senator Sheehy. Secretary Cadenazzi, both the Fiscal Year 2025 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA 
included report language directing Defense Industrial Base Policy to 
complete a feasibility study for domestic refining of deep seabed 
critical mineral intermediates and develop a roadmap for the United 
States to source and process critical minerals sourced from deep-sea 
mining. Following these congressional directives, Executive Order 14285 
instructed your department to support domestic processing capabilities 
for seabed mineral resources and explore the use of grant and loan 
authorities for this purpose. How does the Department, whether through 
the Industrial Base or Office of Strategic Capital, plan to deliver on 
these commitments to facilitate domestic nodule processing in support 
of American national mineral security?
 Secretary Cadenazzi We are fully committed to executing the 
directives outlined in the recent NDAAs and Executive Order 14285 as 
part of our broader mission to secure diverse and resilient supply 
chains for critical minerals. We will evaluate opportunities in the 
deep-sea sector using the same rigorous criteria and tools we apply to 
all potential critical mineral projects. This includes leveraging the 
full range of our investment authorities, from Industrial Base Policy 
programs to loans from the Office of Strategic Capital, to support 
promising domestic processing capabilities for these resources where it 
aligns with our national security objectives.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
 recycling
 56. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, earlier this month, I 
visited Phoenix Tailings in Exeter, New Hampshire, which is working to 
make critical minerals out of existing mining waste. Given the 
shortages we face in many of these materials, I think trying to work 
from existing supplies that are in the United States is valuable here. 
Can you explain why critical mineral recycling, in particular, is so 
valuable for national security?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Critical mineral recycling is very valuable 
for national security because it allows us to create a new, domestic 
source of supply from materials that are already within our borders. By 
efficiently extracting essential minerals from existing waste streams, 
we can turn a liability into a strategic asset. This approach directly 
reduces our vulnerabilities by diversifying our supply base, shortening 
supply chains, and insulating us from the geopolitical risks associated 
with foreign mines and processors, strengthening our ability to produce 
what we need, when we need it.
 secure minerals act
 57. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, China has successfully 
executed a long-term strategy to dominate global critical minerals 
markets giving China significant leverage over the United States and 
key industries. If the United States wants to elevate itself as a 
global leader in critical minerals, this will require a multi-faceted 
approach. In addition to their direct defense applications, critical 
minerals are also vital to other manufacturing industries like the 
automotive industry. Can you discuss why it's important for other 
industries to have access to reliable and secure critical minerals 
supply chains in terms of our national security?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Our national security is inextricably linked 
to our economic security. The defense industrial base does not exist in 
a vacuum. It is built upon the broader commercial industrial base, 
including vital sectors like the automotive industry. These commercial 
markets provide the scale necessary to sustain domestic production, 
drive innovation, and support a skilled workforce that our defense 
sector can draw upon. If our key commercial industries are vulnerable 
to supply chain coercion by a strategic competitor, it weakens our 
entire economy, erodes our ability to surge production in a crisis, and 
ultimately compromises our ability to defend the Nation. Therefore, 
ensuring all our key industries have access to secure supply chains is 
a national security imperative.

 58. Senator Shaheen. Secretary Cadenazzi, my bill, the SECURE 
Minerals Act (S. 3659), which I introduced with Senators Young, Rounds, 
Sheehy, Cortez Masto and King, would establish a Strategic Resilience 
Reserve. That Reserve would invest in domestic and allied production 
capacity for critical minerals and supporting more secure and robust 
critical minerals supply chains for key industries, including autos, 
tech, energy and defense, thereby reducing reliance on China and 
strengthening our economic and national security. Do you think such an 
effort to invest in the long-term supply of critical minerals across 
the economy would be helpful for national security?
 Secretary Cadenazzi The Department agrees with the fundamental 
intent of the SECURE Minerals Act: a sustained, whole-of-economy 
investment in our critical mineral supply chains is essential for 
national security, and we must protect our domestic producers from 
adversarial price manipulation. While we share the goal, we do have 
concerns that the specific Reserve mechanism as drafted could introduce 
unintended market and financial risks that might undermine its 
effectiveness. The Department is already leveraging tools like direct 
investment and offtake agreements to achieve these ends, and we are 
eager to work closely with you and your staff to refine the approach 
and build the most effective and durable solution to this critical 
national security challenge.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
 Defense Production Act Awards
 59. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, 
under this Administration, the Office of the Deputy Secretary has been 
engaged in the process of DPA awards to an unprecedented extent. A 
single person does not have the ability to address all of the 
vulnerabilities in the defense industrial base. Therefore, how is the 
Department allocating funding and authorities between the DPA title III 
office, the Industrial Base Analysis & Sustainment Program, Office of 
Strategic Capital, and other relevant parties to address supply chain 
activities? Who is authorized to make decisions in cases of overlapping 
authority or interest?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department coordinates 
authorities and allocates funding in accordance with established 
chains-of-command.

 60. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
is the Department using the offices responsible for the industrial base 
to conduct due diligence and oversee DPA awards?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department relies on its 
Industrial Base Policy (IBP) offices to run structured due-diligence 
and oversight for both Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III and 
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) awards. In short, these 
offices provide the analytical backbone, financial vetting, and 
programmatic monitoring that ensure taxpayer funds strengthen critical 
supply chains rather than introduce risk.

 61. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, the 
Department has dramatically expanded its involvement in private sector 
critical minerals activity through direct investments, expanded 
contracting, and funding vehicles through offices like the Office of 
Strategic Capital. How are you ensuring these investments have 
positive, diffuse effects across the entire industry so that the 
Department is not just ``picking winners'' and creating either 
monopolies or supply chain choke points?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department is actively 
ensuring its investments in private sector critical minerals have 
broad, positive effects by leveraging flexible contracting and 
fostering a competitive environment. We utilize the Other Transaction 
Authority (OTA) to engage a wide array of non-traditional vendors and 
small businesses, moving beyond a limited pool of incumbent 
contractors. Our process, facilitated through vehicles like the Defense 
Industrial Base Consortium (DIBC) and the Cornerstone Other Transaction 
Agreement, begins with competitively solicited white papers from 
vendors. These submissions are rigorously reviewed based on technical 
merit, ensuring that the most innovative and promising solutions are 
selected, which prevents the creation of monopolies and promotes a 
diverse industrial base.
 This merit-based selection is further strengthened by continuous 
market intelligence gathering by our Industrial Base Experts. These 
experts actively perform market research by attending conferences, 
conducting site visits, and networking with leaders in critical 
sectors. This proactive engagement guarantees the Department is not 
simply ``picking winners'' but is making informed decisions to select 
the best possible vendor for each award. This comprehensive strategy 
ensures our investments bolster the entire industry, creating a 
resilient and diffuse supply chain free of single points of failure.

 62. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
can other domestic companies remain competitive when the DOD invests so 
heavily in one company and provides that company a competitive 
advantage like a guaranteed price floor?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's significant 
investments, which might include mechanisms like a guaranteed price 
floor, are not intended to ``pick winners'' or create monopolies. 
Instead, they are strategic actions taken to establish or reshore a 
critical industrial capability that is vital for national security but 
may be nascent, fragile, or non-existent domestically. In many cases, 
these capabilities are not commercially viable without initial 
government support, especially when competing against foreign entities 
that are heavily subsidized by their own governments. The investment 
serves as a catalyst to ensure a secure domestic supply, effectively 
creating a market where one might not otherwise exist.
 Our goal is to foster a self-sustaining ecosystem. The initial 
investment in one company is often a necessary first step to de-risk a 
sector and prove its viability, which in turn attracts further private 
capital and encourages other companies to enter the market. We use 
competitive solicitations for new projects and continually survey the 
market for emerging vendors. The success of an initial partner is 
designed to pave the way for a broader, more competitive industrial 
base, not to create a permanent sole-source environment. 
Interdepartmental Coordination. For example, since the start of fiscal 
year 2026, the Warfighting Investments, Resourcing, and Execution 
(WIRE) Office has invested in 31 (IBAS: 18, DPAP: 13) companies, 
including both new and continuing investments. This includes 
investments in 8 (IBAS: 2, DPAP: 6) companies specifically for 
strategic and critical materials projects.
 interdepartmental coordination
 63. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
does the Department coordinate with other U.S. Government agencies 
investing in critical minerals, like the Department of Energy Loan 
Programs Office or the CHIPS Program Office?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. Our coordination is constant 
to ensure a unified, whole-of-government effort. This close 
collaboration allows us to leverage each agency's unique authorities 
and expertise to build comprehensive financial solutions for companies, 
combining loans, grants, and other investments to most effectively de-
risk projects and accelerate the rebuilding of our domestic critical 
mineral supply chains.

 64. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, are 
there certain parts of the supply chain where the Department of Defense 
is effectively competing with other cabinet agencies? If so, how do you 
each participate in the interagency to ensure strategic defense 
priorities are met without disadvantaging domestic-facing agencies?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War 
coordinates closely within the interagency process to harmonize our 
collective whole-of-government approach to this matter.
 trusted foundry program
 65. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, 
commentary during the hearing suggested that the Department's Trusted 
Foundry model for microelectronics procurement is outdated. However, 
mature node microelectronics manufacturing remains purpose-built to 
address end uses and is essential to the majority of the Department's 
needs, including for advanced multi chip modules and leading edge 
systems for reasons that include technical capabilities, cost, 
performance, reliability, packaging requirements, and long term 
sustainability. Both the Trusted Foundry and the Secure Enclave 
programs should complement each other to strengthen trust based 
microelectronics production by identifying risks well beyond the wafer 
level, while also addressing the cost basis challenges that come from 
serving a relatively small national security customer base. Therefore, 
please explain, how the Department evaluates the continuing national 
security value of trusted manufacturing for mature node 
microelectronics, particularly where these nodes remain integral to 
best serve the majority of end uses, spanning traditional systems to 
advanced packaging architectures and modern heterogeneous designs.
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department has continued 
to engage with industry to better understand our supply chains to help 
us identify risks. The work of the Defense Microelectronics Activity 
(DMEA) and its Trusted Access Program Office (TAPO) is of critical 
importance to ensuring warfighters have access to safe and secure 
microelectronics. DMEA's stewardship of the Department's Trusted 
Foundry network is a key enabler of this mission. For the rest of 
Fiscal Year 2026, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for 
Industrial Base Policy's Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment 
(IBAS) program will fund the Trusted Foundry. We also continue to 
engage with Secure Enclave to discuss microelectronics resourcing 
across the Department. We understand that secure access to 
microelectronics is important to national security.

 66. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
does the Department assesses the technical interdependence and 
complementary solutions between leading edge nodes and mature nodes 
microelectronics components in current and next generation defense 
systems?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department assesses the 
technical landscape of microelectronics as a highly interdependent 
ecosystem where both leading-edge and mature nodes are not just 
complementary, but essential for the functionality of current and next-
generation defense systems. The Department's strategy is not to 
prioritize one over the other, but to ensure secure and reliable access 
to the full spectrum of microelectronics technologies.

 67. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, 
whether the Department believes the Trusted Foundry accreditation model 
should be updated, expanded, or modernized, rather than diminished, to 
support today's expanding semiconductor manufacturing base including 
modular and heterogeneous chip architectures, which mostly require the 
capabilities only available from mature node sizes.
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department's position is 
that the Trusted Foundry model must be updated, expanded, and 
modernized to support today's rapidly evolving semiconductor landscape. 
The Trusted Foundry model as we know it is being expanded through 
several key initiatives under the T&AM program.

 68. Senator Gillibrand. Secretary Cadenzzi and Mr. Frankston, how 
does the Secure Enclave complements and strengthens Trusted Foundry by 
improving supply chain visibility, foreign ownership screening, and 
risk scoring for small node sizes across trusted and non-trusted 
suppliers?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Trusted Foundry, managed 
by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), establishes a 
foundation of trust by accrediting suppliers across the 
microelectronics lifecycle, from design to packaging and testing. This 
accreditation ensures a secure ``chain of custody'' and protects 
against tampering and unauthorized access. The Secure Enclave builds 
upon this foundation by providing substantial direct funding to expand 
domestic manufacturing of leading-edge, secure semiconductors for 
government and military applications. The Trusted Foundry provides the 
established framework and standards for trust, while Secure Enclave 
provides the critical investment to onshore and advance the 
manufacturing capabilities necessary to meet those standards.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
 critical mineral recycling
 69. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, I have consistently 
supported DOD efforts to increase recycling of critical minerals from 
end-of-life equipment, so I was happy to see this as a key pillar of 
DOD's larger strategy. Your testimony specifically references research 
and pilot projects to recover critical minerals from spent lithium-ion 
batteries and other end-of-life equipment. Are you coordinating with 
the Department of Energy, such as the ReCell battery recycling program 
at Argonne National Laboratory?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Close coordination with our interagency 
partners is fundamental to our success, especially in a technology-
driven area like recycling. We work closely with experts across the 
government, including at the Department of Energy and its national 
laboratories, to ensure we are aligned on strategy, leveraging the best 
available science, and avoiding any duplication of effort. This 
collaborative approach is essential to our shared national goal of 
building a secure, circular economy for these vital materials.
 ally/partner coordination
 70. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, our allies and partners 
are critical to shoring up the critical mineral supply chain. While 
DOD's strategy acknowledges that point, unfortunately, this President 
continues to publicly berate our allies on the world stage, undermining 
important relationships. Secretary Cadenazzi, how have DOD's strained 
relations with traditional partners and allies hindered efforts at 
negotiating deals in this space?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The President has given us a clear mandate to 
revitalize the U.S. industrial base with an America First approach. 
However, America First has always recognized that our allies and 
partners support and enhance our national security and economic 
resilience. Our allies share our deep concerns about the PRC's 
dominance of the world's critical minerals market, and our engagements 
on this topic have been positive and highly productive. We are actively 
working through multilateral frameworks like the Minerals Security 
Partnership and bilateral agreements and arrangements to diversify and 
secure our collective supply chains. These collaborative efforts 
demonstrate that our alliances are robust and essential to countering 
shared economic and security challenges. The Department continues to 
pursue outcomes-oriented cooperation with allies to improve the 
resilience of our collective defense industrial base and encourage 
meaningful burden-sharing, as outlined in the National Defense Strategy 
and Acquisition Transformation Strategy.

 71. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, is the DOD working with 
the State Department or other interagency partners to facilitate 
coordination on critical mineral supply chains? If so, how?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Close coordination with the State Department 
and our other interagency partners is a cornerstone of our entire 
strategy. The State Department leads our crucial diplomatic 
engagements, working with allies and partners around the world to build 
diverse, resilient supply chains for critical minerals. This 
international collaboration is an essential complement to our domestic 
investment and stockpiling efforts, ensuring we have a unified, global 
approach to securing the resources vital to our national security.
 investments in substitute materials
 72. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, in addition to increasing 
supply and access to critical minerals, DOD must also invest in efforts 
to reduce our long-term dependence on them. New technologies like 
cobalt-free batteries and biotechnology-based solutions come to mind. 
Secretary Cadenazzi, what steps is the Department taking to reduce our 
dependence on critical minerals, and how can this Committee help you 
and your team?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Developing new technologies and substitute 
materials is certainly part of the transition to more secure domestic 
sources. Many traditional investment programs focus on developing 
proven or producing assets into useful domestic suppliers. In the case 
of early stage technologies and substitute materials, which are 
typically lower on the ``Technology Readiness Level (TRL)'' and 
``Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)'' measures, offices such as the 
Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering 
engaging with federally Funded Research and Development Centers and 
National Laboratories help energize those pipelines via engagements 
with the private sector and academic institutions.
 fiscal year 2026 national defense authorization act requirements
 73. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA 
contained section 842 that prohibits the Department of Defense from 
``procuring advanced batteries and cells whose functional cell 
components and technology, whether as end items or embedded within 
warfighting and support systems, are not owned, sourced, refined, or 
produced from a foreign entity of concern'' starting in 2028. As we all 
know, Chinese domination of the critical minerals and materials market 
is not only an economic concern to the United States but a national 
security one as well. Reliance on advanced battery materials from China 
puts our security and war fighters at risk. What is the Department's 
plan to meet the requirements of section 842, and what policy or 
funding support can Congress provide to allow DOD to meet this goal?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department developed guidance and an 
implementation plan for Section 842, working closely with the 
Department of Energy to understand best practices for Foreign Entity of 
Concern (FEOC) policy implementation. The Department hosted an industry 
day to communicate the implementation plan and solicit industry 
feedback to ensure the DOW's implementation will be clear and 
effective. The Office of Industrial Base Policy is working with the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Acquisition to implement 
Section 842 into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS).
 section 303 authorities and criteria
 74. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, the DPA 
has historically been used to provide grants, loans, and advance-
purchase commitments to support the domestic production of critical 
materials. However, in recent years, the DOD has used the Act to 
acquire sizable equity stakes in select companies, such as MP Materials 
and Trilogy Metals, marking a significant departure from past 
precedent. What specific criteria does the Department use to determine 
which companies qualify for equity investments under section 303 of the 
DPA?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes, 
regulations, and the purpose of the DPA--strengthening the domestic 
industrial capacity essential to national defense utilizing the most 
``cost-effective, expedient, and practical alternative''--to meet the 
identified need.

 75. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, is there 
a formal competitive process, and if so, what metrics are used to 
assess whether equity--rather than a grant or loan--is the appropriate 
tool?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and 
regulations.

 76. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, how does 
DOD evaluate market impact and potential distortion of domestic 
competition before selecting a single firm for preferential treatment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and 
regulations.

 77. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston, what 
safeguards are in place to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure 
that political considerations play no role in these investment 
decisions?
 Secretary Cadenazzi and Mr. Frankston. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and 
regulations.

 industrial base policy--office of strategic capital coordination on 
 critical minerals financing
 78. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, at the hearing, you 
emphasized that rebuilding U.S. critical mineral supply chains requires 
coordinated action across Government and the private sector. In that 
context, the Department's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) has made 
major conditional loan commitments, including a joint $700 million 
conditional loan commitment to expand domestic NdFeB magnet production, 
as well as an earlier $150 million loan tied to DOD's agreement with MP 
Materials. What is Industrial Base Policy's (IBP) formal role (if any) 
in OSC's critical-minerals lending decisions (requirements setting, 
portfolio prioritization, diligence,etc) particularly for large 
conditional commitments like the Vulcan/ReElement package?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Industrial Base Policy 
collaborates closely with the Office of Strategic Capital on DOW 
critical mineral decisions.

 79. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what standing governance 
bodies exist to align IBP, OSC Research and Engineering, and other 
relevant Office of the Secretary of Defense components on critical 
minerals investment priorities?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department and other relevant Agencies 
maintain regular coordination from the working level through Department 
and Administration leadership to weigh the technical, financial, and 
strategic merits of critical minerals investments, and to ensure use of 
the most expedient and beneficial funding streams and authorities that 
lead to a fair return to the American taxpayer. This level of 
interagency cooperation and investment analysis supports the best 
outcomes for efforts across the Government.

 80. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, does IBP maintain (or 
participate in) a DOD-wide ``investment map'' of critical mineral nodes 
to identify the highest-leverage gaps for DOD loans and other programs?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively developing 
comprehensive supply chain maps for each critical mineral, from mine to 
end-use, and IBP is deeply involved in this process. The express 
purpose of this data-driven analysis is to identify the specific nodes 
and chokepoints that present the greatest risk to our defense 
industrial base. This detailed mapping forms the very foundation of our 
investment strategy, allowing us to precisely target our authorities at 
the highest-leverage gaps to build the most resilient supply chains 
possible.

 81. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, does IBP have any role or 
engagement on how OSC loans are coordinated with other DOD industrial 
base and critical minerals authorities and funding streams (e.g., DPA 
title III, industrial base sustainment lines, service-level supply 
chain investments)?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP leadership and staff--as appropriate--work 
directly and regularly with OSC both at strategic planning and 
committee meetings and in working teams for deal structuring and 
execution. We provide technical and subject matter expertise across a 
range of commodities, defense articles, and authorities to ensure 
smooth and effective coordination.
 aukus and industrial base policy support
 82. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, the AUKUS [Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States] partnership is a critical 
enabler for a trilateral and interoperable industry base. Previously, 
IBP has played an important role is advancing the Pillar I and II 
deliverables, particularly for engaging with industry partners. What is 
IBP's formal role in AUKUS implementation for Pillar I and Pillar II 
(policy, strategy, execution support, governance), and what offices and 
teams within IBP are responsible?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. My team, primarily under the new Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of War for International Armaments Cooperation 
(IAC), is the A&S lead for AUKUS. Our formal role focuses on strategy, 
policy, and execution support for the trilateral industrial base.
 Strategy and Policy: We work with DOW stakeholders to 
develop and align policies that remove barriers to industrial 
collaboration and shape the strategic environment for AUKUS success.
 Execution Support: Our primary focus is enabling 
industry-to-industry collaboration. We engage directly with our 
trilateral industry partners to facilitate AUKUS projects through 
platforms like the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum (ACIF). 
IAC also oversees the 5 Points MOU, which enables the development of 
new cooperative projects arrangements to support AUKUS.
 Governance: AUKUS Pillar II oversight with the partners 
has been led by OUSW(Policy), in partnership with OUSW(A&S) and 
OUSW(R&E).

 83. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are IBP's current top 
industrial base priorities for enabling AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. AUKUS is a unique opportunity to drive 
acquisition acceleration and true partnership. Our top priorities are 
centered on creating a unified, resilient, and innovative trilateral 
industrial base. For AUKUS Pillar II, which my team focuses on, this 
means we are focused on:
 1. Co-development, Co-production, and Co-sustainment: Moving 
beyond simply purchasing equipment to jointly creating and maintaining 
next-generation capabilities.
 2. Integrating Multi-National Capabilities: Ensuring our systems 
are interoperable to act as a genuine force multiplier.
 3. Accelerating Technology Transition: Using joint testing and 
evaluation to rapidly field promising solutions in the Indo-Pacific 
theater.
 Our overarching goal is to foster a well-informed trilateral 
industrial base that collaboratively solves operational problems and 
delivers integrated capabilities at speed and scale.

 84. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is IBP coordinating 
across the Department and the services to advance the trilateral 
industrial base ecosystem between the AUKUS partners?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We are in lockstep with the Department of 
State to message and implement export control reforms, which are 
fundamental to enabling the seamless collaboration required between our 
AUKUS partners' defense industrial sectors.
 We are at the center of a Department-wide effort to streamline 
AUKUS industry engagement and deliver capabilities more efficiently. We 
work closely with the Services to identify and resolve industrial base 
constraints for Pillar II priorities.

 85. Senator Hirono. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the key 
challenges, and how can Congress provide support for continued 
industrial base development?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Thank you for Congress' continued, robust 
support. Consistent with President Trump's direction for AUKUS to move 
``full steam ahead,'' the Department is moving expeditiously to ensure 
its success.
 The primary challenge is ensuring that our regulatory framework 
matches our strategic intent. We have made a monumental leap forward 
with the AUKUS license-free environment, as established by ITAR 
exemption Sec. 126.7. Our main task now is maximizing its use by 
industry. We are actively messaging the significant opportunities this 
exemption creates.
 As we implement our Acquisition Transformation Strategy, we will 
continue to lean forward to ensure the Excluded Technologies List (ETL) 
remains narrowly focused on only the most sensitive technologies. This 
year's NDAA-required ETL review, which we are undertaking with the 
Department of State, is a key part of this effort.
 To illustrate the potential of the expedited AUKUS licenses 
submitted last year, about 80 percent would have been eligible for the 
exemption. The continued support of Congress in championing these 
reforms and encouraging industry adoption is the most critical support 
you can provide.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
 domestic gallium supply
 86. Senator Kaine. Secretary Cadenazzi, gallium is a critical input 
for advanced defense technologies, yet the United States remains 
heavily dependent on foreign sources for its supply. How are the 
Department of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency identifying and 
advancing execution-ready gallium projects with technical developers, 
academic and commercial partners, and what additional authorities, 
resources, or partnership models are needed to evaluate research and 
accelerate research-to-manufacturing efforts that can rapidly 
transition into domestic production?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is leveraging a whole-of-
government approach to address our gallium vulnerability, working in 
close partnership with technical experts, interagency, and commercial 
partners. We actively identify and support promising projects, using 
our investment authorities to help accelerate them from the research 
and development phase into at-scale manufacturing. The authorities 
Congress has provided are powerful, but the speed and scale at which we 
can rebuild this critical supply chain and mitigate risk will always be 
a function of the resources available to execute our strategy.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
 china
 87. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, my understanding is that 
China has acted aggressively to invest in supply chain nodes in the 
United States and our allies. How is China disrupting the tungsten 
molybdenum supply chain? Please provide an unclassified answer as well 
as a classified response.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. China leverages its position as the dominant 
global producer of materials like tungsten and a major player in 
molybdenum to disrupt supply chains. Through state-directed actions, 
including the strategic use of export controls and other non-market 
practices, it creates price volatility and supply uncertainty. This 
strategy discourages long-term investment in alternative sources and 
reinforces a global dependency that poses a clear and direct risk to 
our industrial base and national security.
 The Department is willing to provide the Committee with a 
classified response on this matter in the appropriate setting.
 tungsten
 88. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, if our primary adversary 
restricted the export of tungsten or molybdenum tomorrow, what would be 
the impact on the Department's supply chain in terms of programs 
affected?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. An export restriction on tungsten or 
molybdenum would have a significant impact across a wide range of our 
most critical defense programs. Tungsten is essential for our kinetic 
capabilities, including armor-penetrating munitions, while molybdenum 
is a key alloying agent for the high-strength steels and superalloys 
used in advanced armor, rocket nozzles, and aerospace components.

 89. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, if our primary adversary 
restricted the export of tungsten or molybdenum tomorrow, what would be 
the impact on the Department's supply chain in terms of months of 
supply?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. An immediate and total restriction from a 
primary adversary would pose a significant challenge. The National 
Defense Stockpile, combined with existing industry inventories, 
provides a near-term buffer against initial shocks. However, a 
prolonged, large-scale embargo would create difficulties for numerous 
defense industrial base partners and critical weapons programs.
 mining
 90. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what steps can the 
Department of Defense take to support rebuilding the industrial base 
beyond just mining investments?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Our approach is to evaluate the supply chain 
risk at each node of the minerals supply chain, including mid-and down-
stream, to determine the most appropriate mitigation approach, 
including investments, loans, stockpiling, international partnerships, 
or another means.

 91. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the ability for the 
United States to domestically convert tungsten powder into defense 
parts?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The United States possesses a mature, though 
specialized, industrial base with the capability to convert tungsten 
powder into finished defense components. Several domestic companies can 
fabricate this powder into critical parts for a variety of 
applications, including armor-penetrating munitions and high-
performance, wear-resistant materials. Our primary vulnerability, 
however, is not in this final manufacturing step, but further upstream. 
The domestic industry remains heavily reliant on foreign sources for 
the initial tungsten concentrates and intermediate materials needed to 
produce the powder in the first place. Therefore, the Department's 
strategy is focused on strengthening the entire domestic supply chain 
to ensure a secure, end-to-end capability.

 92. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, would it benefit the 
Department to resource the defense industrial base in order to 
establish the ability to domestically process tungsten through the 
conversion of ammonium paratungState to tungsten carbide?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively using its 
investment authorities to bolster this exact capability because 
building a secure, end-to-end domestic tungsten supply chain is a 
national security imperative.
 list of critical minerals
 93. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, section 844 of the Fiscal 
Year 2026 NDAA prohibits procurement of molybdenum, gallium, or 
germanium from non-allied foreign nations and authorizes production 
from recovered material. We also know that molybdenum is required for 
defense and kinetic systems. Would the Department of Defense support 
adding molybdenum to the USGS list of critical minerals?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department does not make the final 
determination for the U.S. Geological Survey's list. However, 
molybdenum is an essential alloying agent for the high-strength steels 
and superalloys that are foundational to many of our most advanced 
defense systems, including armor and aerospace components. Given its 
importance and the fact that potential adversaries have already 
demonstrated a willingness to use export controls on molybdenum 
products, we believe treating molybdenum as a critical input is a 
prudent step to ensure the long-term security and resilience of our 
defense industrial base.
 floor price guarantees
 94. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, does the Department have a 
mechanism to provide `floor price guarantees' for domestic producers of 
critical minerals throughout the supply chain (not just mining) to 
protect them against intentional predatory pricing from foreign state-
owned enterprises?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department reviews each investment to 
ensure that they will support the DIB and withstand adversarial actions 
and assesses all necessary measures. This is part of the larger whole-
of-governmental effort to ensure viability and success of domestic 
critical minerals supply chains.
 workforce
 95. Senator King. Secretary Cadenazzi, what can industry do with 
the Department to re-establish the domestic metallurgical expertise 
that we've outsourced for the last 3 decades?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Ordinarily, outside the Organic Industrial 
Base (OIB), the development and maintenance of industrial skills, 
including metallurgical expertise, is the responsibility of industry, 
not the government. Nevertheless, because of government inattentiveness 
and misdirection over the last three decades, industrial skills across 
many key sectors within the defense industrial base (DIB) have 
atrophied. In response, the department has established many workforce 
development programs to assist in re-growing those skills including a 
coordinated effort from my organization.
 IBP's Workforce development efforts target four main gaps-- 
recruiting & awareness, training, hiring & retention, and data 
analytics--with metallurgical skills and training a key focus of a 
number of our efforts.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
 critical minerals
 96. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, you said in your written 
testimony that one of your office's primary tools are loan authorities 
granted to the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). OSC recently 
announced a $620 million loan to Vulcan Elements, a magnet company that 
is backed by 1789 Capital, a venture capital firm where Donald Trump 
Jr. is a partner. Were there any conversations or communications 
between any DOD officials and Donald Trump Jr. or individuals 
representing Mr. Trump, Jr. about Vulcan Elements specifically, or the 
production of rare earth and critical minerals generally, prior to 
OSC's decision to award the loan to Vulcan Elements?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is under 
the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research & Engineering 
(OUSW(R&E)). OUSW(A&S) and IBP work closely with OSC on a variety of 
transactions and investments in the industrial base. OSC is not aware 
of any conversations or communications between DOW officials and Donald 
Trump, Jr. or 1789 Capital, or individuals representing Mr. Trump, 
concerning the Vulcan Elements investment or concerning the production 
of rare earth elements and critical minerals generally.

 97. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if you are aware of any 
conversations or communications referenced in the previous question, 
please detail the participants[s], date[s], and content[s] of the 
communications[s] or conversation[s].
 Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC is not aware of any conversations or 
communications between DOW officials and Donald Trump, Jr. or 1789 
Capital, or individuals representing Mr. Trump, concerning the Vulcan 
Elements investment or concerning the production of rare earth elements 
and critical minerals generally.

 98. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did DOD's OSC office 
decide to award Vulcan Elements its $620 million loan for the 
production of magnets?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) export 
controls on magnets and other REEs have posed ongoing threats to 
American economic and national security that necessitate swift action 
to protect our supply chains. While President Trump's recent trade 
negotiations successfully rolled back the majority of the Chinese 
Communist Party's rare earth element (REE) restrictions, it is in 
America's best interest to build a stable, domestic magnet supply chain 
for our future economic and national security. OSC decided to approve a 
conditional loan commitment to Vulcan Elements based on the 
Department's analysis of opportunities to further secure domestic 
magnet production in a sector with limited domestic options.
 Vulcan's current rare-earth element processing and magnet 
production facilities provide it with the necessary foundation to 
quickly build and expand additional manufacturing to meet U.S. magnet 
demand in a short timeframe. OSC's assessments of national security 
impact, bankability, and credit risk were based on engagement with 
Department experts (in this instance, the Office of Industrial Base 
Policy, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Navy, 
and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, among others) and 
independent robust market standard legal, financial, environment, 
technical, operational and commercial due diligence informed its 
decision to proceed with the loan to Vulcan.

 99. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for 
the OSC's loan to Vulcan Elements a competitive process?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The selection of an individual company does 
not imply the rejection of another company since selection is based 
upon assessments of an individual loan applicant and/or project's 
creditworthiness and mission alignment rather than the type of 
competitive process governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In 
fact, OSC has provided or is in the process of providing loans to 
several other businesses in the magnet supply chain, some of which are 
competitors to Vulcan. This is all in an effort to bolster the domestic 
magnet supply chain. The process for offering a conditional loan 
commitment to a company depends upon eligibility and credit 
underwriting standards that follow guidance articulated in statute and 
overarching policies such as those laid out in OMB Circular A-129 
(Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables).

 100. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if so, what were the 
criteria used to determine which company would receive DOD's OSC $620 
million loan?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 101. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many companies 
competed for DOD's OSC loan to Vulcan Elements?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 102. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was Vulcan Elements the 
highest rated competitor in the award process for DOD's OSC loan?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 103. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if Vulcan Elements was 
not the highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and 
why did they not receive the loan?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 104. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department of 
Commerce recently announced a $1.6 billion investment deal with USA 
Rare Earth to help produce a supply of critical minerals. What 
involvement did DOD have in the Department of Commerce's investment 
into USA Rare Earth?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The investment letter of intent that was 
announced with USA Rare Earth plans to use DoC and DoE authorities to 
support the development of the project. The DOW works closely across 
the USG with interagency partners to align planned investments to best 
support supply chain security. There is no current plan to use DOW 
authorities to support this transaction.

 105. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, reporting indicates that 
USA Rare Earth was also invited to an interagency meeting at the 
Pentagon prior to the award. What was the nature of DOD's involvement 
in this meeting?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW closely coordinates with interagency 
partners on critical minerals deals.

 106. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, please provide the date, 
list of attendees, and any transcripts, notes, or written material from 
the meeting between USA Rare Earth and the Departments of Defense, 
Commerce, and Energy.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Engaging with industry participants is an 
instrumental part of IBP's analysis of critical mineral supply chains, 
and IBP regularly engages with existing and emerging critical minerals 
producers. The Department of War met with representatives of USA Rare 
Earth on August 19, 2025. The meeting purpose was to gain an updated 
understanding of USARE's plans for building a permanent magnet supply 
chain.

 107. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, DOD's OSC office recently 
awarded rare earth company MP Materials a $150 million loan. How did 
DOD's OSC office decide to award MP Materials its $150 million loan.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC provided its $150 million loan to MP 
Materials as part of a wider Department investment in the company to 
secure the domestic mine-to-magnet value chain which produces permanent 
magnets with numerous commercial and defense applications.
 The MP Materials mine at Mountain Pass, California, is one of the 
only domestic operational rare earth mines and central to the decision 
to approve a loan application for the company. This asset represents 
the best opportunity for the U.S. to inject light rare earths into the 
domestic market. There is no other operational rare earth mine in the 
Nation that can produce this material at the scale required for the 
U.S. industrial base.
 In addition to the OSC loan, a $400 million equity investment was 
funded through Defense Production Act funds, with offtake rights and a 
price floor for neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr), a key material used in 
magnet production. Additional sources of private capital also invested 
to support the expansion of MP's facilities.
 OSC's loan is intended to facilitate the expansion of MP's 
production facilities to provide for the processing and separation of 
samarium oxide, a heavy rare earth element.

 108. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for 
OSC's loan to MP Materials a competitive process?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC's statute does not require a competitive 
process to select borrowers for loans. The selection of an individual 
company does not necessarily imply the rejection of another company 
since selection is based upon assessments of an individual loan 
applicant and/or project's creditworthiness and mission alignment 
rather than the type of competitive process governed by the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. The process for offering a conditional loan 
commitment to a company depends upon eligibility and credit 
underwriting standards that follow guidance articulated in statute and 
overarching policies such as those laid out in OMB Circular A-129 
(Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables).

 109. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was MP Materials the 
highest rated competitor in the award process for DOD's OSC loan?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 110. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if MP Materials was not 
the highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and why 
did they not receive the loan?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. See above.

 111. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, DOD has obtained equity 
stakes in MP Materials, ReElement Technologies, Trilogy Metals, and 
Vulcan Elements. Please provide the following information related to 
DOD support for the aforementioned companies: Transaction amount; The 
statutory authority and available funding DOD relied on to make the 
investment; Expiration of Federal support to these companies or 
projected timeline of DOD support; and Term sheet outlining the Federal 
Government's financial ownership
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department of War is fully committed to 
the faithful execution of applicable statutes and regulations.
 defense contractors
 112. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does defense 
contractors' prioritization of stock buybacks over capital investments 
impact the warfighter?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Prioritizing stock buybacks over capital 
investments can limit funding available for internal research, 
development, and production capacity expansion. This can ultimately 
slow modernization efforts, restrict supply chain resilience, and delay 
the delivery of advanced capabilities to the warfighter.

 113. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you support providing 
contracting officers cost and pricing data they need to negotiate fair 
deals for the military?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes. Ensuring contracting officers have access 
to accurate, timely cost and pricing data is essential to negotiating 
fair and reasonable prices, preventing price gouging, and responsibly 
stewarding taxpayer resources.

 114. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does access to a 
program's cost or pricing data enhance DOD's readiness?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Access to this data ensures the Department 
pays fair prices, which maximizes our purchasing power. By eliminating 
overpayments, we can use those funds toward acquiring more equipment, 
improving sustainment, and funding critical training, directly 
enhancing overall readiness.

 115. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are DOD's most 
effective tools to enhance competition in the defense industrial base?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We are focused on scaling up existing mid-tier 
companies so they can transition into competing for larger 
acquisitions. Through our umbrella organization, the Office of 
Industrial Base Growth, we are expanding and strengthening the defense 
industrial base for companies of all sizes. As a vital and unchanged 
part of this broader organization, our Office of Small Business 
Programs continues to actively grow the number of small businesses 
entering and advancing in the defense sector. By lowering barriers to 
entry and providing targeted support through our Office of Industrial 
Base Growth, we are cultivating a robust pipeline of small and other 
non-traditional companies that will drive long-term competition, 
innovation, and supply chain resilience.

 116. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do antitrust agencies 
benefit from DOD's expertise in assessing potential mergers and 
acquisitions?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes. The Department provides antitrust 
agencies with critical, specialized subject matter expertise regarding 
how potential defense-sector mergers could impact specific military 
supply chains, future competition, innovation, and overall national 
security.

 117. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in April 2025 IBP told 
the GAO that ``their ability to conduct [Mergers and Acquisitions] 
(M&A) reviews is limited by resource and budget constraints'' but that 
if sufficiently resourced ``IBP officials intend to track . . . major 
defense suppliers to determine if any are engaging in M&A activity that 
needs to be reviewed and update the list annually.'' What is the status 
of IBP resources to track major defense suppliers engaging in M&A 
activity that needs to be reviewed?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We are continuously evaluating Industrial Base 
Policy (IBP) resources and prioritizing existing funds to track 
critical defense suppliers. While resource constraints continue, the 
GIES team is identifying contractors of concern in real time. Overall, 
we are actively working within the current budget constraints to 
optimize our tracking capabilities while assessing long-term resource 
needs to fully execute this mission.

 118. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in April 2025 IBP told 
the GAO that it was ``in the process of drafting and coordinating a new 
DOD Instruction, which would provide further guidance on conducting M&A 
assessments.'' What is the status of this instruction, and when do you 
expect it will be complete?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP continues to work this draft instruction 
through the issuance process. The Department cannot provide a specific 
completion date at this time but looks forward to consulting with the 
congressional defense committees as the process advances.

 119. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, when will IBP have 
sufficient staff to implement the GAO's recommendation to monitor the 
effects of concluded mergers or acquisitions in cases in which DOD 
identified risks during its assessment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is actively assessing staffing 
requirements and working to align personnel within IBP to implement 
GAO's recommendations. We anticipate steadily improving our post-merger 
monitoring capabilities as we integrate these functions into our 
strategic resourcing plans over the upcoming budget cycles.

 120. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what methods is DOD using 
to enhance competition in the defense industrial base?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. As stated on a previous question, we are 
focused on scaling up existing mid-tier companies so they can 
transition into competing for larger acquisitions. Through our umbrella 
organization, the Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are expanding 
and strengthening the defense industrial base for companies of all 
sizes. As a vital and unchanged part of this broader organization, our 
Office of Small Business Programs continues to actively grow the number 
of small businesses entering and advancing in the defense sector. By 
lowering barriers to entry and providing targeted support through our 
Office of Industrial Base Growth, we are cultivating a robust pipeline 
of small and other non-traditional companies that will drive long-term 
competition, innovation, and supply chain resilience.
 workforce
 121. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does DOD benefit from 
defense contractors retaining a skilled workforce?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The ongoing need for skilled workers requires 
defense contractors to retain those who are successful because that is 
the only way to attain production and maintenance goals while also 
supporting on-the-job training and skills capture for new workers, 
thereby reducing costs for both recruitment and training. All of these 
benefits improve the efficiency of the DIB.

 122. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do defense sector 
labor and skill shortages impact military readiness?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Labor and industrial skill shortages, in 
particular, affect every aspect of the defense industrial base, which 
manufactures and sustains every ship, aircraft, satellite, vehicle, and 
all the miscellaneous support equipment the Services rely on to win the 
next conflict. Although there are shortages in some engineering 
disciplines too, the greatest and growing need is in the skilled 
trades, like welders and machinists.
 research and development
 123. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in 2020, DOD conducted a 
study that found the defense industry spent 5.2 percent of its revenue 
on R&D from 2010 to 2019, compared to the 6.2 percent it spent on R&D 
from 2000 to 2009. In contrast, the defense industry spent 6.4 percent 
of its revenue on stock buybacks and dividends from 2010 to 2019, an 
increase from the 3.7 percent it spent on buybacks from 2000 to 2009. 
Please provide updated estimates of defense contractors funds spent on 
buybacks, dividends, and research and development, from 2020 to 2025.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is reviewing this matter and is 
working to prepare an updated response and will deliver when it is 
available.
 department of defense investments
 124. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, you said DOD consults 
outside experts in determining which companies should receive DOD 
investments. Which outside companies and individuals has DOD consulted 
with on investments in 2025 and 2026?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department consults outside experts as 
needed in due diligence and other matters. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and 
regulations.

 125. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, when DOD consults with 
outside experts in determining which companies should receive DOD 
investments, how does the department protect against receiving advice 
from experts that might have conflicts of interest?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Maintaining the integrity of the investment 
process is paramount, and the Department employs a multi-layered 
approach to protect against conflicts of interest across its 
components, including within the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). For 
any experts or organizations engaged in a formal advisory capacity, 
robust safeguards are in place, including mandatory conflict of 
interest disclosures and non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which are 
standard practice when handling sensitive proprietary data. OSC, in 
particular, mirrors the rigorous due diligence of the private 
investment community, ensuring its partners meet the same exacting 
standards for transparency and disclosure that are expected in venture 
capital.

 126. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many DOD staff and 
contractors does IBP have to assess potential DOD investments?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Office of Industrial Base Policy staff and 
contractors are not all directly assigned to assess potential DOW 
investments, but collaboration routinely occurs across the 
organization. Collectively, IBP has 110 civilian staff and 253 
contractors.

 127. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, is there a competitive 
process for assessing which companies should receive DOD investments?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Yes.

 128. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, is there a rating process 
for assessing which companies should receive DOD investments? What is 
that process, if so?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Proposals are evaluated based on how a 
capability aligns with critical Defense Industrial Base (DIB) needs, 
the urgency of the investment to mitigate supply chain risks, and the 
strategic impact of the project, such as the need to onshore a 
capability or expand the domestic supply chain.

 129. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, has your office been 
contacted by or consulted 1789 Capital or any of its employees or 
investors?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact.

 130. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does DOD advise the 
OSC and other procurement officials on their ethics obligations, 
including limits on engaging with companies closely tied to 
Presidential administrations?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The integrity of the Department's investment 
process is the bedrock of our entire strategy. The Department of War is 
fully committed to the faithful execution of applicable statutes and 
regulations.

 131. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, were any DOD officials 
involved in contract or loan decisions related to companies owned by 
1789 Capital or any other company in which Donald Trump Jr. has a 
financial interest?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact.

 132. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, please list all meetings, 
calls, and correspondence DOD officials have had with 1789 Capital 
employees from November 5, 2024, to present day.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. I am not aware of such contact.

 133. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how did DOD decide to 
award L3Harris a $1 billion direct equity investment for the production 
of rocket motors?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 134. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was the award process for 
L3Harris' $1 billion investment award a competitive process?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 135. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if so, what were the 
criteria used to determine which company would receive DOD's $1 billion 
direct investment for rocket motors?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 136. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how many companies 
competed for DOD's $1 billion investment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 137. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, was L3Harris the highest 
rated competitor in the award process for DOD's $1 billion direct 
investment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 138. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if L3Harris was not the 
highest rated competitor, which company was rated higher, and why did 
they not receive the $1 billion investment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is working to prepare a 
response to the L3Harris investment and will provide a response to 
Congress as soon as it is available.

 139. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, would DOD benefit by 
having tools to ensure that investments into defense companies increase 
capabilities, and are not corporate giveaways?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Every dollar invested, particularly through 
mechanisms like Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and the efforts of 
the Office of Strategic Capital, is tied directly to the development 
and delivery of specific, measurable capabilities. These are not 
``corporate giveaways''; they are structured, milestone-driven 
agreements designed to achieve critical national security outcomes.

 140. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, under current laws, is 
there any law or restriction that would prevent companies receiving DOD 
investment funds from using those funds toward stock buybacks and 
dividends?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The core principle guiding every investment is 
that public funds must be used for their designated public purpose: to 
build, expand, and scale a specific capability critical to national 
security. OSC's investments, which often resemble private-sector loans 
or venture capital, are governed by detailed term sheets and investment 
agreements. These legal documents explicitly define the ``use of 
proceeds,'' restricting the funds to specific purposes like capital 
expenditures, research and development, and scaling operations. Any 
deviation from this, such as diverting funds to a stock buyback, would 
be a clear violation of the investment agreement, triggering default 
clauses and other legal remedies.

 141. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, if no law or restrictions 
exist, would you support restrictions on companies that receive loans 
or other DOD investment funds on stock buybacks?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The core principle guiding every investment is 
that public funds must be used for their designated public purpose: to 
build, expand, and scale a specific capability critical to national 
security.

 142. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what policy framework 
does DOD use to decide whether to use equity, debt, or competitive 
awards for financing critical industries?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Our approach is to evaluate the supply chain 
risk at each node of the minerals supply chain to determine the most 
appropriate mitigation approach to address the risk, including 
investments, loans, stockpiling, international partnerships, or another 
means.

 143. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, describe how deployment 
of equity investments for critical industries helps the U.S. defense 
industrial base and furthers national security. Please describe the 
drawbacks of equity investments compared to other financial tools 
available to DOD.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department's careful use of equity 
investment is in furtherance of the overall mission to advance the 
defense industrial base. As with all authorities available to the 
Department, careful application of the use of this authority in 
conjunction with the overall mission is considered to ensure the 
overall policy goal is achieved. However, equity investments, like 
other financing, carry risks. Equity is a more patient capital that is 
more appropriate for early stage companies or ones in immature or 
limited markets and include a higher exposure to financial risk and 
potential loss of capital if a company underperforms. Risk mitigation 
begins before capital is deployed with (i) strategic sector targeting, 
(ii) enhanced due diligence including FOCI risk assessments, (iii) 
covenants and other contractual risk mitigant provisions. These risks 
are further mitigated by employing specialized and experienced staff to 
actively manage and monitor investment employing specialized and 
experienced staff to actively manage and monitor investment.

 144. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in light of DOD's recent 
focus on critical minerals, what other critical and emerging sectors 
does DOD plan to deploy strategic capital toward?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW intends to support the growth of the 
defense industrial base across all necessary sectors, including 
manufacturing, energy storage, and other industrial sectors.

 145. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the current 
ethics and anti-corruption guardrails for political appointees that are 
decisionmakers in investment decisions such as support for MP 
Materials?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Maintaining the public's trust is paramount, 
and every investment decision, including our partnership with MP 
Materials, is subject to a rigorous and comprehensive ethics review 
process.

 146. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, do you support strong 
ethics and anti-corruption guardrails for political appointees that are 
decisionmakers in investment decisions such as support for MP 
Materials?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The integrity of the Department's investment 
process is the bedrock of our entire strategy. Every decision made must 
be held to the highest and most rigorous ethical standards to ensure it 
is based solely on the strategic needs of the Nation. These guardrails 
are a fundamental requirement of public service and are essential for 
maintaining the public's trust and ensuring the responsible stewardship 
of taxpayer dollars.

 147. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, has the DOD consulted 
with the Federal Trade Commission regarding the Federal Government's 
investments in critical industries and impacts on long-term market 
competition?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department regularly engages with 
interagency partners on critical minerals matters.
 pharmaceutical supply chains
 148. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, in 2025 the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering identified six 
critical technology areas that would define the future of American 
military superiority, including biomanufacturing. Does OSC have any 
priorities related to biomanufacturing or pharmaceutical supply chain 
resiliency? Please describe them.
 Secretary Cadenazzi. OSC engages with companies in a number of the 
Under Secretary's critical technology areas, including those that focus 
on biomanufacturing and pharmaceutical supply chains. To date, its 
initial engagements have focused on companies seeking to scale the 
production of key starting materials and active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and have been conducted in close coordination with other 
offices in the Department and in other agencies tasked with this 
vitally important mission. OSC's statute lists biochemicals within 
covered technology categories eligible to receive investment from the 
Office.

 149. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how can DOD leverage the 
OSC to invest in pharmaceutical supply chain resiliency to support the 
warfighter?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. In instances where the Department is best 
suited to lead efforts to support biomanufacturing, OSC is positioned 
to provide loan guarantees and direct loans to help companies scale 
production and attract private capital to facilitate further expansion 
in biomanufacturing (which is one of the Covered Technology Categories 
where OSC is approved to provide funding). Such investments, which 
would conform with OSC's mandate to invest in dual-use products made by 
companies with robust commercial customer bases, would support the 
warfighter by shoring up a robust ecosystem beyond the control of the 
Chinese Communist Party and other non-allied suppliers.

 150. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what are the dangers of 
overreliance upon foreign suppliers for pharmaceutical products?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Overreliance on foreign suppliers for 
essential pharmaceuticals creates a grave national security 
vulnerability. This dependence gives potential adversaries the ability 
to weaponize our supply chains, directly threatening the health of our 
military and the stability of our Nation in a time of crisis. 
Specifically, prolonged drug shortages directly degrade our ability to 
treat warfighters, return them to the fight, and maintain combat 
effectiveness.

 151. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how would increasing the 
domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, including finished drugs, 
active pharmaceutical ingredients, and key starting materials improve 
supply chain resiliency?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The DOW supports expanding domestic 
pharmaceutical production. To mitigate the strategic risk of foreign 
supply disruptions, the DOW advocates leveraging its purchasing power 
alongside other Government Agencies (OGAs) to rebuild onshore 
manufacturing, ensuring a resilient supply of critical medicines to 
sustain combat operations and provide routine care to beneficiaries.

 152. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how would increasing the 
domestic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals, including finished drugs, 
active pharmaceutical ingredients, and key starting materials protect 
our national security and help ensure that service members have access 
to critical care?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. A secure, domestic pharmaceutical supply chain 
is a foundational element of national security. It guarantees that our 
servicemembers' access to critical care can never be held at risk or 
used as a weapon against us by a foreign adversary. Establishing a 
robust domestic manufacturing base would mitigate these risks by 
offering greater supply chain transparency, enhanced regulatory 
oversight, and the agility to scale production during national 
emergencies.

 153. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, how do pharmaceutical 
supply chain challenges, drug shortages, or access to unsafe 
pharmaceuticals increase costs for DOD?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Supply chain challenges and shortages directly 
increase costs by forcing us to purchase higher-priced alternative 
medicines and expensive emergency procurements. Moreover, the threat of 
unsafe pharmaceuticals adds significant expense through increased 
surveillance and the potential for direct medical and operational costs 
to the force.

 154. Senator Warren. Secretary Cadenazzi, what other costs to DOD 
occur as a result of pharmaceutical supply chain challenges, drug 
shortages, or access to unsafe pharmaceuticals?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Supply chain vulnerabilities present an 
unacceptable operational cost, directly degrading readiness and Service 
Member safety. Beyond direct readiness impacts, pharmaceutical 
shortages severely degrade clinical care by forcing the MHS to rely on 
less effective alternative therapies, which increases the risk of 
adverse outcomes.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Tammy Duckworth
 authorities
 155. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department of 
Defense has national security waiver authorities in title 10 U.S.C. 
Sec. 4863 and title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 4872 to authorize use of samarium 
material from foreign nations, despite the inability to determine where 
it was mined in the 20th century. Why has the Department of Defense not 
used those authorities to date?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The use of a national security waiver is an 
authority the Department reserves for extraordinary circumstances, and 
the Department is prepared to utilize this authority where necessary 
for national security. Our primary strategy is not to rely on waivers 
but to proactively build secure, resilient, and trusted supply chains. 
This approach provides a lasting solution to our supply chain 
vulnerabilities, rather than a temporary fix.
 coordination with u.s. geological survey and the department of energy
 156. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, the USGS recently 
added ``metallurgical coal'' to its list of critical minerals. Given 
that U.S. consumption of metallurgical coal has declined for decades 
and most production is now exported, what is the Department of 
Defense's rationale for considering metallurgical coal critical to 
national security, and what specific defense needs justify its 
inclusion on the USGS critical minerals list?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. While the Department does not have oversight 
of the U.S. Geological Survey's final determinations, we support the 
inclusion of metallurgical coal as a critical mineral as it is 
essential for producing primary steel in a blast furnace. Our national 
security depends on our enduring capability to produce steel for our 
foundational defense systems, such as warships to tanks. The 
designation as critical is not merely about consumption volume but 
about the material's irreplaceability in a process fundamental to our 
defense readiness and the risk a supply disruption would pose.

 157. Senator Duckworth. Secretary Cadenazzi, how does the 
Department of Defense coordinate with USGS and the Department of Energy 
to ensure that designations of ``critical'' minerals reflect actual 
defense needs rather than market or export considerations?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department works closely with DOI, USGS, 
and DOE on the classification of critical materials and impacts for 
defense needs.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
 158. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Defense Logistics 
Agency has identified that war reserve materiel does not include 
sufficient batteries or tactical energy storage to support early phases 
of conflict, which becomes a readiness risk in contested logistics 
environments. How will the IBP office deploy its funding authorities to 
address supply chain constraints for minerals and raw materials 
necessary to scale domestic battery production for drones and other 
autonomous platforms?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP is already heavily invested in minerals 
and materials for battery production. The increased use of drones and 
other autonomous platforms has heavily increased demand for batteries 
and tactical energy storage for these systems. More recently, IBP 
concentrated on utilizing investment authorities, such as Title III of 
the Defense Production Act and Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment 
(IBAS), for standardization and increased production capacity for 
batteries for small unmanned aerial systems (UAS)/drones and other 
autonomous platforms.

 159. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, what is the IBP office's 
role in supporting the build-out of small-scale critical minerals 
refineries on military bases?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. IBP is supporting the Presidential directive 
for promoting critical mineral processing on military bases in close 
coordination with the military services.

 160. Senator Rosen. Secretary Cadenazzi, how will the Department of 
Defense solicit input from across the interagency and the private 
sector to prioritize critical minerals that need urgent U.S. Government 
attention due to supply chain constraints?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Our prioritization is driven by a continuous 
and robust dialog with our expert partners across the interagency and 
with industry, ensuring we have the most current understanding of 
supply chain risks. We are now moving to formalize this collaboration 
by establishing the Strategic and Critical Materials Board of 
Directors. Once stood up, this Board will provide a dedicated forum for 
senior leaders from government and the private sector to advise the 
Department on prioritizing investments, stockpiling, and policy actions 
to address the Nation's most urgent material threats.
 __________
 Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
 permanent magnets
 161. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, the Department needs to 
move aggressively to identify and use non-Chinese sources of rare earth 
materials, especially heavy rare earths such as samarium. Some of our 
allies, notably the French, have stockpiled samarium materials for 
decades. However, this stockpile may contain a minute amount of Chinese 
material that was mined over 20 years ago and thus cannot be certified 
to be in compliance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement 252.225-7009 and 252.225-7052. This stockpile is a critical 
resource that the defense industrial base needs to access to. Congress 
has given the Department the ability to waive requirements under these 
regulations for reasons of national security in both title 10 U.S.C. 
4863 and 4872, and made those national security waivers cross-apply. 
Does the Department intend to use this authority to allow for use of 
French-stockpiled samarium in the near future?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department would like to thank Congress 
for providing us with the national security waiver authority, and we 
view it as a critical tool for ensuring our warfighters have what they 
need. As a matter of strategy, our primary focus remains on 
incentivizing and building new, fully compliant supply chains, as this 
provides the only true long-term security.
 However, we also recognize that we must be pragmatic in addressing 
the immediate needs of the industrial base. We are always evaluating 
how to best use all the authorities Congress has given us, especially 
when it involves strategic resources held by our closest allies. We 
will continue to balance the urgent requirements of today with our 
long-term strategy of building a resilient industrial base that is free 
from adversarial leverage.
 battery supply chain
 162. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, advanced batteries are 
increasingly foundational to the performance and endurance of equipment 
used by the U.S. military. This includes drones, telecommunications 
equipment, energy storage systems (ESS), and other technology worn by 
the warfighter. While increased domestic production of critical 
minerals is desperate needed, the U.S. is ceding economic and national 
security advantages if the midstream of the battery supply chain is not 
developed. The critical minerals produced domestically will be shipped 
abroad for processing and production into anodes and cathodes. We must 
ensure that the Federal Government's support for critical materials 
translates into the growth of complete and integrated domestic supply 
chains, from mining and processing of materials through the 
manufacturing of derivative products. Secretary Cadenazzi, outside of 
critical minerals, how is DOD working to secure the full value chain 
for the domestic battery industry, specifically the midstream?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. We need to expand domestic capacity in the 
midstream of the battery supply chain. It is critical to establish 
domestic processing and component production capacity in conjunction 
with critical mineral production to avoid shipping our raw materials 
abroad only to import finished products. To achieve this, my team is 
using Defense Production Act Title III and Industrial Base Analysis and 
Sustainment (IBAS) authorities. In partnership with the Department of 
Energy, we will invest in anode, cathode, electrolyte, and separator 
production, along with cell and pack manufacturing.
 distressed vendors and supply chains
 163. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, we all recognize how 
difficult it is to stand up domestic critical mineral processing and 
manufacturing capabilities. These are capital-intensive industries with 
high upfront costs. In many cases, private companies are operating at a 
disadvantage compared to foreign competitors--particularly Chinese 
firms that benefit from sustained State support. As a result, some of 
the firms we need to rely on to rebuild these defense-critical 
capabilities may be at risk for exiting the market. Does the DOD 
currently have visibility into which critical mineral suppliers are at 
risk of financial distress or exiting the market?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. Shortages of this type have come to the 
Department's attention. That is why we have been working across 
offices, suppliers and agencies to formalize efforts to identify these 
shortfalls and distress situations to respond appropriately.

 164. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, how is the DOD identifying 
and supporting distressed or financially vulnerable vendors in critical 
mineral and defense supply chains? What mechanisms exist to prevent the 
loss of those capabilities before they create supply chain disruptions 
for essential components?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department maintains regular contact with 
a variety of vendors in the critical mineral and defense areas to 
ascertain and address current and future industry needs, including 
financial vulnerability and market distress.
 abandoned mine cleanup
 165. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, one issue I've worked on 
for a long time is cleaning up abandoned hardrock mines--which are all 
over the western United States. Many of these mines were developed to 
serve the needs of the military--these sites are called Defense-Related 
Uranium Mine (DRUM) sites. Communities want these mines cleaned up. And 
there are now technologies available that can do that by taking the 
waste rock at these sites, removing the uranium and other hazardous, 
and leaving the safe, inert material behind. That material could then 
be used for DOD needs. Has the Department evaluated whether pairing 
remediation of these legacy DRUM sites with recovery of residual 
uranium could simultaneously protect communities from these hazardous 
mines and strengthen domestic supply chain resilience?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department is always looking for creative 
ways to enhance our supply chain resilience, and the concept of 
accomplishing environmental remediation with reclamation of a strategic 
asset is compelling. We would welcome the chance to work with other 
agencies to explore the feasibility of such a synergistic approach.

 166. Senator Kelly. Secretary Cadenazzi, has DOD or the Department 
of Energy conducted a formal assessment of the potential contribution 
of residual uranium in DRUM surface materials to long-term defense 
supply needs? If not, what steps would be required to undertake such an 
assessment?
 Secretary Cadenazzi. The Department would be an active and eager 
participant with DOE in such a study.

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