COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS' HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY

Senate Aging (Temporary Special) Committee Senate June 17, 2026

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[Senate Hearing 119-499]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 S. Hrg. 119-499

 COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST
 CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS'
 HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

 UNITED STATES SENATE

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 WASHINGTON, DC

 __________

 JUNE 17, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-32

 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
 
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-351 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
 
 SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

 RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman

DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia
ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey
JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland
 ---------- 
 McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director
 Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director
 
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 

 Page

Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1
Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking 
 Member......................................................... 3

 PANEL OF WITNESSES

Joshua Hodges, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 4
Leland R. Miller, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 7
Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and 
 Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 8
Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 10

 APPENDIX
 Prepared Witness Statements

Joshua Hodges, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 30
Leland R. Miller, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 34
Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and 
 Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 37
Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 43

 Questions for the Record

Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and 
 Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 49
Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
 Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 51

 Statements for the Record

Testimony of David Gryska........................................ 55
Testimony of John R. Prufeta..................................... 63

 
 COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST
 CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS'
 HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, June 17, 2026

 U.S. Senate
 Special Committee on Aging
 Washington, DC.
 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:29 p.m., Room 
216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of 
the Committee, presiding.
 Present: Senators Scott, Tuberville, Johnson, Moody, 
Husted, and Gillibrand.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR 
 RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN

 The Chairman. The Special Committee on Aging will come to 
order.
 The Chinese Communist Party is not a trade competitor that 
plays by different rules. It's not a diplomatic challenge to be 
managed through the right mix of engagement, pressure. It's a 
country whose government has made a strategic goal of weakening 
the United States, and that's the nicest way you can say it, 
deciding that senior citizens are a legitimate target. This 
hearing will cover the concrete, measurable harms that are 
being done to America's seniors by a government in Beijing led 
by the Communist Party, who views our country's most vulnerable 
as economic opportunity.
 The list of dangers that Communist China presents has grown 
as they become more aggressive. Those threats now impact every 
square inch of American life. Let's start with fentanyl and 
other illicit drugs. America has lost hundreds of thousands of 
people to deadly drugs. Since 2013, China has been the primary 
source of fentanyl, and the precursor chemicals that drug 
cartels use to manufacture it and kill American citizens, 
thanks to Communist China.
 We hear a lot about young Americans dying from fentanyl 
poisonings, and they are, but seniors are a growing share of 
the victims. Older Americans living with chronic pain, veterans 
managing injuries, and patients seeking alternative sources for 
its medications due to rising costs are dying because Communist 
China profits from their death, and because the CCP has chosen 
again and again to look the other way. China has made some 
announcements about controlling precursor exports. We've heard 
those before and rarely do they hold up their end of the 
bargain. They never hold up their end of the bargain.
 Now, let's talk about the pills themselves, legal ones that 
seniors depend on every day. As you heard in this Committee 
time and again, over 90--over 90 percent of the prescriptions 
filled at American pharmacies are generic drugs. The active 
pharmaceutical ingredients are APIs, and most of those drugs 
come from China or India. For many critical medicines, China 
isn't just a major supplier, they're the only supplier. There 
is no domestic alternative standing by. If Beijing decides 
tomorrow to restrict drug imports, as it has explicitly 
threatened to do in the CCP state media, American seniors will 
feel it in weeks.
 According to a CPA report, Communist China supplies 87 
percent of U.S. antibiotic API imports, and over 80 to 90 
percent of global API production. We cannot fuel the military 
if China stopped exports. We saw how China withheld PPE during 
COVID. This is a real problem. China has leverage. Communist 
China knows it has leverage, and our Committee's investigative 
work has made it clear that they are not shy about reminding 
us. That is why legislation like the CLEAR LABELS Act is 
important. It's time Americans truly know where their drugs 
come from. We would have never let the Soviets have this kind 
of leverage over us during the cold war.
 We should be taking this issue just as seriously now. No 
sane country would act like this when their opponent wants to 
destroy them. We have to wake up. That's why we're pushing the 
Federal Government every day to support domestic manufacturing 
and leverage the full buying power of the government to support 
our domestic drug makers, and I want to thank the ranking 
member for her actions here.
 Here's another way Communist China hurts our seniors: 
relentless scams. In 2024, Americans over 60 lost nearly five 
billion to financial scams. That's not just a crime statistic, 
but a coordinated campaign run at industrial scale by organized 
criminal enterprises with direct ties to actors operating under 
the protection of or at the direction of the Chinese Communist 
Party. We held a hearing earlier this year on foreign scam 
compounds. These are physical facilities, physical facilities 
in Southeast Asia where traffic workers are forced to run fraud 
operations targeting Americans around the clock.
 I'm sure you've gotten a scam call before. I actually get 
them every day. Who hasn't? These AI-generated voice clones, 
deepfake video calls, grandparent, romance, and investment 
scams all look and sound entirely legitimate until all of a 
sudden, the money is gone. These sophisticated, well-funded 
criminals have focused on seniors because they have the 
retirement savings and are less likely to report what happened 
to them. Congress needs to act now and pass legislation 
targeting these bad actors before even more Americans lose 
their life savings to these thugs. The SCAM Act passed this 
Senate. The STOP Scammers Act is waiting. We need the rest of 
Congress to act with the same urgency that our seniors deserve.
 Finally, I'd like to talk about data, because everything 
else becomes more dangerous when the Chinese Communist Party 
knows your medical history, your financial accounts, your daily 
routine, and the names of your grandchildren. Communist China 
is systemically acquiring the personal, financial, and health 
data of older Americans through connected devices, digital 
health platforms, data broker purchases, and cyberattacks on 
American institutions.
 We saw this with BGI, the Beijing Genomics Institute, 
potentially acquiring genomic data from U.S. patients. That led 
to the passage of the BIOSECURE Act, which prohibited federal 
agencies and federally funded groups from utilizing 
biotechnology equipment and services from biotechnology 
companies of concern.
 For too long, Washington has treated all these issues as 
individual problems. I believe it's time we take a 
comprehensive approach to fighting Communist China's growing 
threat. The legislation mentioned today in my opening is just 
the beginning, but the breadth of that work cannot be captured 
in an opening statement. Today, I'm posting online a list of 
bills I've sponsored or co-sponsored that speaks to the threats 
we examine--we're examining this hearing with a plain-English 
summary of what each one does, and I know the ranking member is 
all over this.
 You deserve to know where your Senator stands, and I ask my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to look at that list and 
ask themselves the same question I ask every day: what are we 
waiting for? The bottom line here is that America has enemies, 
whether we like it or not, and we need to act like it. 
Communist China wants to destroy our way of life. Fifty years 
ago, we would never have given the Soviets the kind of leeway 
we give China: the access they have to our economy and our 
information, the dependence they enjoy from our supply chain. 
We need to get serious about this before it's too late.
 Now, I'd like to recognize the ranking member, Gillibrand, 
for her opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR 
 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER

 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
today's hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. Today's hearing 
gives the Committee the unique opportunity to study several 
issues that impact the lives of older Americans through the 
same lens: how are the actions from China influencing these 
outcomes? We will discuss how Chinese Government turns a blind 
eye to scam compounds that target Americans, leading to 
financial losses to the tune of billions of dollars for our 
citizens hard-earned money, not to mention the emotional toll 
on the victims that they face after falling prey to a scam.
 To address this crisis, I've introduced bipartisan 
legislation with Chairman Scott called the National Strategy 
for Combating Scams Act, and that would require the FBI to 
create a unified governmentwide strategy to tackle surging scam 
operations. This bill is a first step to combat scams 
domestically and complements the work of our colleagues on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to crack down on foreign 
scam centers, including by pushing to pass the bipartisan Scam 
Compound Accountability and Mobilization Act.
 I'm also eager to continue our discussion on Chinese 
dominance of the global supply chain for pharmaceuticals and 
the economic, national, and health security implications of 
this dominance. This is a refrain that Chairman Scott and I 
continue to repeat throughout this entire Congress to help 
Americans understand our health care system is at grave risk, 
in no small part, due to the exposure to China for key starting 
materials and active pharmaceutical ingredients for our generic 
pharmaceuticals.
 This is not just a health security issue but a national 
security issue. In the case of a crisis or conflict between us 
and China, our country cannot be reliant on China for the bulk 
of our essential medicines like antibiotics or the ingredients 
we need to make them. I'm proud of the work of this Committee 
that we've done to shed light on the issue. We've introduced 
bipartisan legislation called the CLEAR LABELS Act and have 
dedicated our time to shining a light on this problem that has 
for too long been pushed aside by Congress.
 China has weaponized the supply chain, established choke 
points in medicine, foundational semiconductors, and printed 
circuit boards that are critical to all types of electronics. 
One of the things that should worry us most and should 
immediately spark congressional action is China's top to bottom 
efforts to dominate the next generation of biotechnology. It 
should be a wakeup call to all of our members that China may 
surpass us in a few years, not decades, in the critical 
technology area. Biotech is not a future inflection point, but 
a present one.
 I look forward to collaborating with the commissioners as 
well as my colleagues across the aisle as we work together to 
understand and tackle China's influence in all of these 
spheres.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. First off, I want 
to thank all the witnesses for what you do every day, and I 
know it's bipartisan, and you guys do a great job. Our first 
witness is Joshua Hodges, a commissioner on the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, appointed by Speaker 
Mike Johnson. He brings nearly two decades of national security 
and foreign policy experience across the White House, Congress, 
the Executive branch, international development, and the 
private sector.
 He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director of the National Security Council, where he led U.S. 
Efforts to expose and counter China's maligned activity across 
the Americas and the Caribbean, serving as the U.S. 
Government's lead on regional economic strategies designed to 
reduce dependency on China-backed financing.
 Most recently he served as National Security Advisor to 
Speaker of the House Mike Johnson during the 118th Congress, 
the most senior national security staff position in the House, 
where he helped shape congressional responses to support for 
Israel, Russian aggression, U.S.-China strategic competition, 
and security threats at the southern border.
 Thank you for being here, and please begin your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HODGES, COMMISSIONER,

 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW

 COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

 Mr. Hodges. Chairman Scott Ranking Member Gillibrand, and 
members of the Committee, I'm grateful for this Committee's 
sustained attention to these issues, and for your recognition 
that the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party is not 
only a geopolitical one, but a direct threat here at home. 
Today's hearing on counting the cost and the impact on seniors' 
health, financial security, and privacy could not be more 
timely and the legislation that both of you mentioned is 
absolutely vital.
 Twenty-five years ago, Congress established the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission with a mandate to 
examine, to investigate, and to report to Congress, in an 
integrated, way how the People's Republic of China's actions 
affect American economic and national security. As you can 
imagine, in that time, our mandate has stayed constant, but the 
overlap in our work has increased dramatically.
 Our independent bipartisan commissioners represent a wide 
range of views, with each of the leaders of the House and 
Senate appointing three commissioners each. We provide Congress 
with an annual report and other research and analysis to make 
policy recommendations for legislative and administrative 
actions, much of which is aligned with the legislation you were 
referencing earlier.
 The central finding I want to convey today is this the 
Chinese Communist Party is engaged in a deliberate, systematic 
campaign to build new leverage and choke points across multiple 
domains, from upstream raw material inputs, to industrial 
processing and manufacturing to downstream applications, and 
certainly, across frontier technologies that that will define 
the next generation of economic and national power. The CCP 
also seeks to eliminate American production capability across 
sectors that Americans depend on for their health, financial 
security, and daily lives.
 The Commission's 2025 annual report documented this 
playbook in detail what the report describes as, "China Shock 
2.0." The pattern is straightforward: China identifies critical 
input, deploys state-backed overcapacity and below-cost pricing 
to drive Western and allied producers out of the market, and 
then owns the supply chain permanently.
 The Commission's hearing series has examined several facets 
of this strategy from commodity derivatives, market data 
collection architecture, scam networks targeting older 
Americans, and supply chain choke points eroding America's 
security. Each hearing has revealed different instruments, each 
instrument a part of a strategy, and Beijing is focused 
aggressively on establishing firm leverage over the 
technologies that will dominate the future, as you referenced 
earlier, including biotechnology, commercial space, and 
artificial intelligence. What the Commission has formally--
beyond what the Commission has formally examined, it's worth 
flagging concerns raised by the American industry, and recently 
exposed in Europe that I believe warrant this Committee's 
attention.
 In line with its choke hold ambitions and leverage, China 
appears to be targeting specialty chemical supply chains that 
most Americans have never heard of, but that flow directly into 
the products keeping older Americans alive. These chemical 
compounds are used to produce IV tubing, pacemaker leads, 
surgical implants, and other essential household products 
increasingly dominated by Chinese producers who often use 
below-cost pricing to drive Western manufacturers out of the 
market.
 In fact, the Defense Department has confirmed that for some 
of these materials, there are no functional substitute within a 
10-to-15-year horizon. Combined together with our reliance on 
pharmaceuticals, we are dangerously close to a possible supply 
disruption on medical devices and prescription drugs, and 
Washington has not yet connected those dots adequately, so we 
appreciate your legislation to address this.
 As part of the Commission's efforts to look over the 
horizon, we held a series of hearings since 2024 that highlight 
aggressive activity to not only catch up to the U.S. but to 
overtake us. The National Security Commission on Emerging 
Biotechnology concluded last year that the United States has a 
three-year window to retain, or in some cases, regain 
biotechnology leadership or risk ceding profound military, 
geopolitical, and economic advantages to China.
 The consensus from the community--from the business 
community about this is that that timeframe is even shorter 
than that, through--that two-year time period. China is no 
longer a fast follower in biotechnology. In certain domains, 
biopharmaceutical innovation is now leading--it is now leading. 
Why is this relevant? Older Americans are the population's most 
exposed to every sector I've described. They're the heaviest 
users of generic drugs whose ingredients China controls. They 
are the patients with pacemakers and surgical implants 
containing materials and components from supply chains 
increasingly dependent on China.
 Separately, the energy and infrastructure vulnerabilities 
most directly relevant to this community's constituents have 
not yet received adequate legislative attention. Chinese 
manufacturing components in the American grid infrastructure 
may contain remote monitoring capabilities, and, in some cases, 
remote access pathways. A deliberate power disruption would 
fall hardest on older Americans dependent on home medical 
equipment, oxygen concentrators, insulin refrigeration, cardiac 
devices, dialysis machines, the list goes on. For this 
population, a grid failure is not an inconvenience, it's a 
medical emergency.
 The central challenge is in awareness. The problem is that 
we in Washington continue to treat these as separate issues 
across different jurisdictions, addressing each in isolation 
rather than looking at all of it together. I'm very pleased to 
hear that you're working across jurisdiction with other 
committees to actually get this moving forward and address it 
in a holistic way.
 Thank you for your time today to discuss the Commission's 
annual reports and our hearings and recommend the annual report 
findings for each of you if you haven't had a chance to look at 
that. Thank you for having us today.
 The Chairman. Thank you. Our next witness is Leland Miller, 
a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, reappointed by Speaker Mike Johnson. He is the co-
founder and CEO of China Beige Book, where for more than 15 
years, he has run the world's largest private microeconomic 
survey of China's economy and financial system. He is one of 
the most widely cited independent authorities on China's 
economy, trade dynamics, and U.S.-China technology competition 
in the country. Before founding China Beige Book, Commissioner 
Miller was a capital markets attorney practicing out of New 
York and Hong Kong.
 Thank you for being here. Please begin your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF LELAND R. MILLER, COMMISSIONER,

 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW

 COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

 Mr. Miller. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and 
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify. On April 30, I co-chaired a hearing of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission titled, "Taking a 
Bigger Byte: China's Expanding Strategy for Data Dominance." 
What our witnesses described and what I want to convey today, 
is that Beijing has stopped treating data as a commercial 
byproduct and now treats it as an instrument of state power, 
and that ordinary Americans, including our oldest and most 
vulnerable citizens, are increasingly the raw material.
 The starting point is legal architecture. China's national 
security law, national intelligence law, and data security law 
together compel any Chinese company to hand its data to the 
state on demand, in secret, with no independent court able to 
refuse, and no transparency to reveal when it happens. The 
obligations run one way. As one witness put it, Beijing's 
operating principle is to control the outflow of data from 
China while expanding the inflow from everywhere else. A data 
set does not have to hold national security value when it is 
collected. The value can emerge once the state fuses it with 
other data in its possession.
 Three mechanisms make this concrete for Americans. First, 
our networks. Chinese-State sponsored actors and the campaign 
known as Salt Typhoon penetrated the core of America's 
telecommunications carriers and reached call records data: who 
is calling whom, from where, and when for vast numbers of 
Americans. The FBI has assessed that China's hacking program is 
larger than that of every other major nation combined.
 Second, our commercial data. Sensitive information about 
Americans' precise location, financial stress, health 
indicators, and family and professional networks is openly 
bought and sold through the data broker market, and absorbed 
through apps, payment systems, and connected devices. None of 
it requires a hack. It can be purchased. Increasingly, these 
data streams come from products Americans carry, wear, or drive 
every day. Modern smartphones, connected vehicles, fitness 
trackers, smart home devices, and other Internet connected 
products continuously generate detailed records of where people 
travel, who they meet, what they buy, how they communicate, and 
even patterns in their physical activity and health.
 In many cases, supposedly anonymous data sets can be 
reidentified and linked across multiple sources, allowing 
disparate pieces of information to be fused into highly 
detailed portraits of individual lives. What appears 
commercially mundane in isolation becomes strategically 
valuable when aggregated at scale and combined with other 
sources of data.
 Third, our health and our biology. Witnesses were direct 
that Beijing regards genomic and clinical data as a strategic 
national resource and is investing heavily to acquire it. Not 
only genetic sequences, but treatment histories and health 
records. Artificial intelligence is the force multiplier that 
ties all of this together. Bulk data that was once too 
voluminous for any human analyst to use can now be fused 
automatically into detailed profiles of individuals, what one 
witness called, "the move from observation to prediction."
 This is where the risk to older Americans becomes acute. 
Older Americans hold a disproportionate share of the Nation's 
wealth, carry the longest medical histories, and are the 
heaviest users of the health system, which means the financial, 
genomic, and clinical data Beijing prizes is in large part 
theirs. The same capability that lets an adversary build a 
targeting profile of a government official also lowers the cost 
of precision, fraud, and social engineering against an 80-year-
old, tailored, convincing, and delivered at scale, and the 
records most exposed to the harvest now decrypt later strategy 
our witnesses described collecting encrypted data today to 
break it with tomorrow's quantum computers are precisely the 
long lived medical and financial records that follow an older 
American for the rest of their life.
 The central lesson of our hearing is that Washington still 
treats privacy, telecommunications security, critical 
infrastructure resilience, and artificial intelligence as 
separate problems. Beijing does not. It is assembling a single 
decision advantage architecture and it is doing so faster than 
our policy is adapting. The Commission has not yet developed 
its recommendations in this space. That will not happen until 
our report comes out in November. Speaking now in my personal 
capacity, I would respectfully urge this Committee to act on 
that integrated view to place a national security data regime 
covering geolocation, health, genomic, financial and 
telecommunications data on durable, statutory footing to harden 
the telecommunications and data broker ecosystems that make 
American data purchasable, in the first place, and to treat the 
protection of older Americans financial and medical data as the 
homeland security matter has become.
 Thank you again for the opportunity to share these 
observations. I look forward to your questions.
 The Chairman. Thanks, Mr. Miller. Now, I'll turn it over to 
Ranking Member Gillibrand.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I want to 
introduce our next witness, Reva Price. Ms. Price is a 
commissioner for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission. She was reappointed by House Democratic Leader, 
Hakeem Jeffries, for a term expiring December 31, 2026. 
Previously, Ms. Price was the Director of Outreach and Senior 
Advisor to former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and has spent over 20 
years working for nonprofit organizations in Washington, DC. 
engaging in both domestic and international affairs. You may 
begin.

 STATEMENT OF REVA PRICE, COMMISSIONER, CHAIR

 EMERITUS, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY

 REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

 Ms. Price. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and 
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify on the evolving threat of Chinese-linked scam centers. 
My remarks draw on the U S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission's recent work, including two reports, "Travel to 
Southeast Asia," and, "Recommendations for Congress to Protect 
American Savings and the U.S. National Interests." I hope this 
testimony provides additional information to the important 
hearing and discussion this Committee held on this topic 
earlier this year.
 The FBI's Internet Crimes Complaint Center, known as IC3, 
documents that Americans reported losing $17.7 billion to 
online scams in 2025, a 29 percent increase from 2024. This 
figure is striking, yet likely captures only a fraction of the 
total amount lost due to underreporting and let me note, 
Chairman Scott, that your ReportScams.gov Act introduced just 
this week, would go a long way toward getting a more accurate 
number. It is important to note that nearly a quarter of these 
funds were stolen from citizens over age 60. As you are aware, 
these online scams often take the form of investment or 
confidence schemes that can be traced to Chinese criminal 
syndicates overseas.
 Chinese criminal networks operate industrial scale scam 
centers that steal tens of billions of dollars annually. This 
is a massive criminal enterprise rivaling the global drug trade 
in scale and sophistication. For example, while estimates vary, 
scam centers in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos alone generated 
approximately $44 billion, about 40 percent of those countries 
combined GDP. Many of these Chinese criminal syndicates have 
spread throughout Southeast Asia with at least implicit backing 
from elements of the Chinese Government. In some cases, known 
criminal groups have invested in projects linked to China's 
Belt and Road Initiatives alongside China's state-owned 
enterprises. We also have seen criminal leaders who appear to 
have gotten a pass by promoting messaging and other activities 
aligned with Chinese Communist Party priorities.
 At the same time, Beijing has used the scam crisis to 
expand its regional influence. Under the guise of cracking down 
on scams, China has pressured countries to agree to a greater 
role for Chinese security forces and has had success in Laos, 
Cambodia, and even U.S. ally, Thailand. This inside-out 
strategy gives China greater leverage over the internal 
security apparatus of other countries. Chinese security forces 
have also confiscated electronic devices with Americans 
personal data from raids on scam compounds.
 Initially, many scams targeted Chinese citizens in so 
called pig butchering scams, the local colloquialism for 
winning a victim's trust to ultimately convince them to hand 
over a large sum of money. To its credit, China has cracked 
down on these operations, but it has done so selectively, 
largely turning a blind eye to scam centers victimizing 
foreigners. As a result, the Chinese criminal syndicates have 
been incentivized to shift toward targeting Americans in 
foreign butchering scams. To illustrate this point, in 2024, 
losses from online scams in China declined by about 30 percent, 
while losses in the United States increased by roughly 40 
percent.
 The problem is also evolving rapidly. Scam operations are 
now being turbocharged by artificial intelligence. AI allows 
criminals to create more convincing personas, tailor content 
and operate across languages, all at scale. At the same time, 
cryptocurrency is increasingly used both to defraud victims and 
to launder illicit proceeds. Scam centers are also spreading 
beyond Southeast Asia, including to the Pacific Islands and 
parts of Africa.
 Congress and the administration have taken initial steps to 
combat these scams, but the problem continues to grow and we 
need to do much more. The Commission has proposed 11 
recommendations and considerations for Congress to help combat 
these threats. I would refer the Committee to my written 
testimony which lists them all in some detail and hope we will 
have time during the conversation today to discuss them more 
fully.
 In conclusion, scam centers run by Chinese criminal 
organizations threaten both the financial well-being of all 
Americans, seniors in particular, as well as broader U.S. 
national security. As long as these networks can earn higher 
profits with lower risk by targeting Americans, they will 
continue to do so.
 Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Our next witness is Chris 
Slevin. Mr. Slevin became a commissioner for the U.S. China 
Economic and Security Review Commission after his appointment 
by House Democratic Leader, Hakeem Jeffries. Previously, Mr. 
Slevin was chief of staff to the former Secretary of Commerce, 
Gina Raimondo, where he led the U.S. Department of Commerce 
through the Agency's expanded role in technology and national 
security, including the CHIPS and Science Act. You may begin.

 STATEMENT OF CHRIS SLEVIN, COMMISSIONER,

 U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW

 COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

 Mr. Slevin. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member 
Gillibrand, members of the Committee. I'll focus my remarks on 
the pharmaceutical supply chain. First, the Commission applauds 
the work this Committee is doing to call attention to the 
vulnerable situation the country faces when the building blocks 
of our medicines are made in China. As this Committee has 
outlined well, we have an uncomfortable reliance on China for 
active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials. 
China's strategy is an integrated, state-directed effort to 
become indispensable at every stage: raw materials, APIs, 
contract research, the early clinical trials, and biologics. 
This strategy parallels China's playbook in sectors like EVs 
and batteries.
 China's weaponization of supply chains is not theoretical. 
China has made controlling global supply chains an explicit 
strategic goal. The drug supply chain is a prime example of 
that strategy succeeding. China's used export controls on 
critical minerals as we've seen, gallium, germanium, rare earth 
magnets, as economic pressure tools since 2023.
 In 2025, China expanded that toolkit with new rounds of 
heavy rare earth elements, triggering price spikes, temporary 
factory closures in allied nations and in the U.S. Of course, 
medicines have a human health dimension that minerals do not 
but the message from what we've seen on rare earths is clear: 
China is building the legal and institutional architecture to 
restrict access to whatever it chooses to, whenever it chooses.
 China isn't just dominating U.S. supply chains, it's 
embedding itself into drug manufacturing across Africa, Latin 
America, and Southeast Asia. By doing so, it's positioning 
itself as the indispensable supplier to every country the U.S. 
might turn to for alternatives. Congress knows this scenario 
from telecom. This is the Huawei playbook in pharmaceuticals, 
and it warrants the same urgency in response.
 India supplies roughly half of all U.S. generic drugs, but 
it relies on China for most of the building blocks, the KSMs. 
The Commission visited India earlier this year. Among our 
findings the Indian government has had some success in reducing 
reliance on Chinese APIs using its production-linked incentive 
program to help reshore manufacturing to India. China, however, 
is now targeting these incentive programs and those 
manufacturers with below-cost predatory pricing. It is the same 
playbook we have seen it use on solar, on EVs, and its 
restricting exports on certain pharma manufacturing equipment 
to India. Again, the Commission will further explore these 
issues and provide recommendations to Congress this fall.
 In the meantime, I'd like to direct the Committee's 
attention to three specific recommendations the commission made 
on these issues last year. One, fix the data problem first. The 
FDA has acknowledged and the Commission's 2025 report confirms 
that the U.S. Government does not have reliable data on actual 
volumes of API imports from China or the full proportion of 
U.S. drug consumption dependent on Chinese imports inputs.
 You cannot use trade tools without data. You can't file an 
anti-dumping case if you can't measure ingredient imports. The 
CARES Act required manufacturers to report drug volumes, which 
is a good start, but not where the ingredients come from. We 
need to close that gap. The chairman and ranking member's 
proposal to require greater transparency through country-of-
origin labeling is also a critical step in this.
 Two, use the government's buying power as a demand signal. 
Durable demand turns the ship and begins to rebuild a viable 
U.S. generics manufacturing sector. Congress should explore 
procurement and reimbursement authorities for medicines built 
on non-China starting material materials, including price floor 
commitments that protect domestic producers against below-cost 
Chinese competition. Your Committee's report outlining the need 
for a federal buyers' market is a strong proposal consistent 
with the Commission's recommendations.
 Finally, treat this as industrial policy, not just drug 
policy. Consider CHIPS Act-style financing, support for 
domestic API and generics manufacturing, and advanced 
manufacturing incentives. Forty years of offshoring will not be 
reversed by guidance documents and study requirements. This 
requires the scale of commitments that Congress brought to 
semiconductors. Again, we thank you for the attention you're 
giving to these issues, to understand these critical 
vulnerabilities, how they can be weaponized, and what we can do 
to reverse them.
 Thank you again, we look forward to your questions.
 The Chairman. Thank you, each of you, for being here. Let 
me turn it over to Senator Tuberville.
 Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Commissioners, for being here. Mr. Slevin, let's start where 
you just finished. How safe do we feel about the ingredients in 
pharmaceuticals from China, and how can we depend on that 
safety?
 Mr. Slevin. It's hard to know without the data, which is, I 
think, the primary recommendation that this commission has made 
thus far on the issue. It's hard to know what to correct for if 
we don't have the data and if we don't have the visibility into 
the supply chains and into inspections. The FDA has authority 
to inspect overseas. It's hard to execute on that. The 
unannounced visits to factories are hard to execute on, so 
there is reason the Commission is concerned.
 Senator Tuberville. We just pretty much take it for granted 
that they're going to do the right thing, right? Because we 
don't make it much here, right?
 Mr. Slevin. That's right. The last several decades, we've 
seen the production increasingly offshored, and so the 
proximity that our agencies have to inspect unannounced is more 
difficult to execute when the vast majority of facilities are 
overseas, particularly in China.
 Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Miller, China is known 
for its investment fraud and scam centers. What do these 
criminal enterprises look like? Is the Chinese Communist Party 
or syndicates with their protection or approval, are they 
approving these?
 Mr. Miller. I will give a little bit of an overview, and I 
welcome my colleague who's our expert on the scam centers to 
add on. I think that during our trip to Southeast Asia, we were 
blown away by the scope of these centers. They take up not just 
floors of buildings, but buildings and sometimes entire city 
blocks. They're very mobile, so sometimes when something is 
shut down, they can pick up and relocate down the block to the 
other side of the city and they are done with the implicit, at 
least, approval of the governing authorities in these South 
Asian countries, and often the Chinese Communist Party.
 These entities are becoming more and more sophisticated. 
They're integrating AI. The things that they were doing five 
years ago doesn't touch the types of approaches they're using 
now in terms of voice alterations and other intricate ways of 
getting at people's personal histories, bringing them aboard, 
and doing the pig butchering that my colleague was talking 
about in her testimony.
 Senator Tuberville. Ms. Price, would you like to add to 
that?
 Ms. Price. Yes. We have not found direct evidence of the 
Chinese Government's role in the Southeast Asian--the direct 
role of the government's involvement, but there are links, as I 
mentioned in my testimony. There are indications of them 
looking the other way. There are people in these syndicates who 
do other work with the Chinese Government, so there's a wink 
and a nod, so to speak, but direct government involvement, the 
FBI hasn't reported that publicly.
 Senator Tuberville. Seems like every time I call for 
customer service, it comes from India. Is that correct? Are 
they as much complicit?
 Ms. Price. We didn't see any connection with those in India 
and the scam centers, but there are scam centers all over the 
world.
 Mr. Hodges. To add on to that, sir, if you'll permit me. 
One other thing that we have witnessed is that whenever these 
scam centers are directed toward Chinese citizens, there is 
this sort of surprising ability to turn that off and target it, 
and so, again, it's not a direct linkage or evidence, but it is 
sort of an associated linkage that we've noticed.
 Senator Tuberville. Mr. Miller, it seems like we're either 
denying it or agreeing with it that China is ahead of us in 
crypto. What's the consequences of that if we don't adjust one 
way or the other?
 Mr. Miller. China has a very interesting mentality toward 
crypto and the broader crypto universe. You know, technically 
crypto is banned in the mainland, but Hong Kong, which is 
obviously China as well, at this point, is a hotbed of crypto 
innovation. I think it's the mindset of the policymakers in 
Beijing that they can keep the dirtier side of crypto ring-
fenced away from mainland China, but they can go into some of 
the more innovative side of crypto in Hong Kong. I think we 
need to be keeping a very close watch on this. This is 
something that our Hong Kong chapter has put particular focus 
on over the last two years.
 Senator Tuberville. Are we ahead or behind them? Mr. 
Hodges, you might want to----
 Mr. Hodges. Yes. One thing to add to that, sir, and again, 
this isn't--we haven't issued this as a formal recommendation 
or committee product yet. One of the areas where we started to 
look into is their efforts to use crypto overseas as a method 
of data collection. It's very well known that Chinese apps soak 
up data, and one thing we're starting to dig into is: are there 
Chinese apps using crypto in third-party countries that's going 
to give them access to those individuals' data, and again, make 
it harder for the United States to work with those governments 
or those populaces?
 Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 The Chairman. Senator Husted.
 Senator Husted. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I Appreciate the 
witnesses being here today. There's one report out recently, 
and I believe one of you may have alluded to the fact that 
there are nearly 700 pharmaceuticals today in America that we 
couldn't make without China's acquiescence to send us, at 
least, some part of the supply chain for the production of 
those pharmaceuticals. Mr. Slevin, I guess I'll start with you. 
What would happen if they just completely cut us off?
 Mr. Slevin. It would be alarming, to say the least. You 
know, that is the dire scenario that one can kind of imagine. 
There's also just the more subtle moves of restricting 
licensing, slowing the export that would--you know, it speaks 
to the leverage.
 Senator Husted. I'm speaking more----
 Mr. Slevin. Yes.
 Senator Husted [continuing]. of the human consequence. We 
would have--these are drugs that we're here to talk about, you 
know, as Aging Committee, but these are drugs that people rely 
on for their lives on a daily basis. Right?
 Mr. Slevin. It would be an extremely dire situation that I 
think would make this issue rocket up to number one for the 
Congress to address.
 Mr. Miller. Senator, if I could add to that.
 Senator Husted. Yes.
 Mr. Miller. I co-chaired the Commission's hearing on 
Beijing's weaponization of supply chains back in 2024. One of 
the big frustrations we had in the buildup to that hearing was 
that we had our staff for months, and months, and months trying 
to get all the information they could, classified, 
unclassified, everything you can think of on key starting 
materials and APIs so that we could put in our report, and 
prepare our witnesses for what the actual exposure was so we 
could ask them about it.
 We found out that we do not have that information. It's not 
just we don't, nobody has that information and this is 
something that we've seen constantly over the course of the 
last couple years. We've traveled to India, and we've asked 
them for their data on this, and they don't know. We've worked 
with the administration, various agencies in the 
administration. The administration does not know, they don't 
have it. No one in the administration has what our 
vulnerabilities are.
 When we were drafting our--when we were working on our 
hearing and we were drafting our chapter, we were putting in 
ranges, wide ranges. I think this goes back to the problem that 
we do not have transparency into where China's position is in 
terms of the pharmaceutical universe. We know that the vast 
majority of active pharmaceutical ingredients are produced by 
China and India. When you peel back that onion and you look at 
what type of vulnerability India's APIs have to Chinese key 
starting materials, the answer is a lot, but we couldn't get an 
answer. What we do know is, that they are concentrated in some 
of the things we care about the most: antibiotics, heparin, 
insulin, oncology, medicine.
 We know the problem is huge. I think the frustration we've 
had, and I know that others know that Congress has had as well, 
is that we cannot get to the bottom of what these supply chains 
actually look like, which has made it very difficult, in turn, 
for Congress to make good policy.
 Senator Husted. We know it would be alarming. It would be 
catastrophic. It would--but we don't even really have a full 
understanding of what the scope of the problem would be?
 Mr. Miller. We do not. I actually went through, and I was 
checking it this morning to see if any new data have come out. 
There's just no good data on this at all, and I think this is a 
very big problem with--you can't scope out a solution to a 
problem when you don't have visibility into the solution.
 Senator Husted. This is happening now in a Nation where 
pharmaceuticals were invented. We started the whole process of 
developing, researching, developing medicines that would 
improve people's lives, save people's lives. America dominated 
this. Then, somehow, when we decided that getting things 
cheaper from anybody that would sell them to us cheaper, and 
letting China into the WTO, that we were going to throw out all 
of those--all of the things that made us secure and just say: 
we'll let you do it.
 Now we find ourselves in a position on pharmaceuticals, on 
rare earth, on telecom, supply chain, on chips, where literally 
we have no leverage against China. Thus, our economic and 
national security, and the lives of our citizens are threatened 
because we were asleep at the wheel as a Nation, and did 
nothing to track and prepare for this. Is that a fair 
conclusion?
 Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, I think it is. I'm very happy you 
brought up the words, "national security," because I think the 
major misstep that we have made for decades now is seeing 
pharmaceuticals and other critical inputs into our economy as 
economic matters. Where can we get the cheapest prices? That's 
all we cared about.
 I think there's a recognition right now. It's certainly a 
big issue when we interact with Congress, that some things are 
so important that they need to be put in a separate bucket. Not 
the economics bucket, the national security bucket. When 
they're put in the national security bucket, they have a 
different profile. Instead of trying to find the lowest cost 
producers, we need to find secure supply chains. We need to de-
risk these supply chains from potential adversaries. I think 
that that mentality has started to permeate. We're just getting 
to the start of it. We started it with critical minerals. We're 
just starting to touch this issue in pharmaceuticals.
 Senator Husted. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the 
opportunity to have these folks here today, and----
 Mr. Hodges. Sir, if you'll permit me to add 10 seconds----
 Senator Husted. Yes----
 Mr. Hodges [continuing]. of words on this?
 Senator Husted [continuing]. sure. Please.
 Mr. Hodges. Part of the structural constraints with this 
have been that the U.S., for far too long, has looked at the 
commercial viability instead of the strategic value. That's 
something we've started to raise with the executive branch. 
We're also wanting to have conversations with you all on 
because it's the strategic value and these needs that you're 
talking about, the dynamic and sort of the paradigm shift there 
has to change.
 Senator Husted. Well, thank you. Thanks, for all the 
witnesses. It's clear that this is a problem. We got here, bad 
trade deals, too much regulation, taking our eye off the ball, 
and I guess, hopefully, this will serve as a wakeup call that 
we reverse those failed strategies. Thank you.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Husted. Now, Ranking 
Member Gillibrand.
 Senator Gillibrand. In the 2025 annual report to Congress, 
the Commission wrote extensively on China's willingness to 
weaponize critical supply chain as a way to leverage their 
global power. While instances of these choke points being 
purposefully squeezed are not uncommon, they shed light on the 
world's dependence on China's supply chain. While China 
dominates in upstream materials such as active pharmaceutical 
ingredients, printed circuit boards, and foundational 
semiconductors, they do not yet dominate in the frontier of 
technology and pharmaceuticals.
 For all the witnesses, which supply chains should we 
prioritize strengthening in the short-and long-term? Are there 
differences in how we should approach securing the supply chain 
for current technologies and emerging technologies that will 
become more important for American power in the future, and 
what tradeoffs should we consider? Chris, do you want to start?
 Mr. Slevin. Thanks, Senator. Sticking with the topic of 
antibiotics, I'd say generic antibiotics, we make zero right 
now in this country. It's imperative that we quickly look at 
some of the work that this Committee has taken on, particularly 
as it relates to purchasing power. How to make the economics 
work, and to do that, you know, looking at the government as a 
major purchaser, looking at long-term purchasing agreements to 
make those economics work.
 Senator Gillibrand. Reva?
 Ms. Price. Thank you. I would also answer pharmaceuticals 
as a starting point, but, in addition, other areas or other 
components that allow for remote access into critical 
infrastructure would be another place.
 Senator Gillibrand. What do you mean by remote access into 
critical infrastructure?
 Ms. Price. If our energy infrastructure relied on component 
parts that could be accessed remotely from other places, that 
would raise serious concerns to me.
 Senator Gillibrand. Understood. Leland?
 Mr. Miller. I'm a little bit--thank you, Senator. I'm a 
little bit biased here because the hearing that you referred 
to, we spent a lot of time trying to work out what our top five 
priorities would probably be, and they are some of the ones you 
mentioned earlier. I think the world has understood critical 
minerals and rare earth magnets are a today issue, 
pharmaceuticals being very top of the list after that, 
foundational semiconductors, printed circuit boards, and I 
would add batteries to that.
 Senator Gillibrand. Batteries. Joshua?
 Mr. Hodges. I'd second everything that was already 
mentioned with pharmaceuticals, especially the batteries 
component. In addition to that, as I mentioned earlier, I think 
part of the issue isn't just looking at this at individual 
products that we need to be making, but structurally, the 
capacity, the strategic value in the long--near-term and long-
term.
 I mentioned earlier sort of the chemical precursors. 
There's everyday household products that if the trajectory 
continues to move forward--this is my opinion, not a commission 
opinion. If the current trajectory continues to go in that 
direction, within two years, we're probably not going to be 
able to make most of these products here at home, so everything 
that was just outlined, I absolutely agree with. In addition to 
that, I would say chemical precursors and the ability to 
actually produce things here in the United States.
 Senator Gillibrand. What are some of the areas or 
industries where China is especially reliant on the United 
States? What are some of the regional and global consequences 
if we sought to tighten or limit our own supply chains in order 
to exert pressure on China? Chris?
 Mr. Slevin. Advanced semiconductors comes to mind, and it's 
pretty, you know, well known this Congress has taken a great 
interest in monitoring the tools we have in the government to 
restrict and to track. I think that the leads that we have on 
AI are frankly attributable to the advanced semiconductors that 
we design and make here, so that would be what I would suggest 
at the outset.
 Senator Gillibrand. Reva?
 Ms. Price. I don't think I have anything else to add to 
what Chris said.
 Senator Gillibrand. Leland?
 Mr. Miller. I would love to talk all day about advanced 
semiconductors, but since Chris already did, I would just add 
passenger jets. It's another thing that we--the Chinese have 
not been able to figure out over the course of many decades.
 Senator Gillibrand. Joshua?
 Mr. Hodges. In addition to, I share the sentiment, Chris 
and I have talked a lot about this. In addition to that, 
though, I would say quantum computing. It's an area where we're 
currently--we've got the lead. China's looking to gain from us 
on that, and--yes, I think I'll just stop there.
 Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hodges and Mr. Miller, how should 
Congress direct U.S. financing entities to prioritize funding 
for critical industries, including pharmaceuticals, that 
everyday Americans rely on?
 Mr. Hodges. Yes, thanks for the question. This is an area 
where, in my private capacity, I've engaged with businesses 
overseas and part of the issue we have here is understanding 
the problem. When the Chinese roll in and they're trying to 
work with--whether it's--Chris mentioned, the South African 
countries, Latin American countries, they show up with an 
entire delegation, with other businesses, sort of the whole 
package and cart in order to try to incentivize engagement and 
to pull them away from the United States and that's what we're 
up against when we're talking about leveraging sort of U.S. 
financing opportunities.
 What we've got to get better at here in the United States 
and I know Congress just passed, I think it was in December, 
the sort of expanded DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act, 
which I think has strengthened DFC, but those tools need to 
continue to be sharpened. They need to continue working better 
sort of across Exim and DFC and one of the recommendations we 
had last year was sort of an economic statecraft effort across 
the U.S. Government to make things more competitive.
 Mr. Miller. I would urge--I would urge Congress to look at 
this not just an issue of what China has leverage over, but 
what are the national security interests that we care about the 
most to prioritize. When we went through our exercise trying to 
figure out which of our supply chains were most vulnerable, we 
worked through the worst-case scenarios. For pharmaceuticals, 
the idea that we would be in a potential situation in the 
Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Chinese Government 
could say that we're not going to allow troops or American 
citizens to have antibiotics, or cancer drugs, or insulin, et 
cetera.
 When we moved down foundational semiconductors, we looked 
at China's trajectory on that, where China has been building up 
more capacity expansion than all the other countries in the 
world combined. We're looking down the road at 2030, where 
China could control, and then crank out, and then underprice, 
and absolutely hollow out the world's foundational 
semiconductor industry, which would put us in a bind very 
similar to printed circuit boards.
 I think the exercise is partly looking at what Beijing has 
leverage over, but it's, in large part, figuring out what are 
our national security priorities and what are the worst-case 
scenarios that we need to eliminate. I Think that's how we can 
start a list.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
 The Chairman. Senator Moody.
 Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member. 
When I saw that you were calling a hearing on, "Counting the 
cost: Communist China's Toll on Older Americans' Health, 
Finances, and Security," I immediately thought of the evolution 
of technology and the just mass increase we're seeing in cyber 
targeting scam schemes against our seniors. I mean, it's just 
unbelievable the explosion, not only in the number of incidents 
that we're seeing, but the types of scams that we're seeing, 
and the technology, and how it's enabling more and more 
complex, sophisticated--realistic I think is the best word--
scams.
 Many people are falling for them from every socioeconomic 
level, every educational level. If I told you some of the 
stories where people lost their life savings, accomplished 
smart people lost their life savings, it would leave you 
wondering what we're going to do about this issue and I really 
think we need to start paying attention because if anything, 
those types of things affect health, finance, and security. All 
three of those things are affected when that happens, and so, I 
was very excited about this hearing today because I think so 
many older Americans are paying the price for Communist China's 
predatory actions.
 One of the things I have particular familiarity with as 
Florida's attorney general was the scams that use technology. 
Some involved crypto. We would often have to go overseas to 
shut down websites and other types of things. It really became 
obvious quickly that we did not have, within the local 
governments, or police agencies, or sheriff's departments, the 
sophistication to really bring the large cases and that we had 
to do something on a statewide basis.
 When I was attorney general, I created a cyber fraud task 
force on a statewide level, and so we had to train up, not just 
the lawyers to understand what they were dealing with and the 
laws that they could use to go after these people and 
sometimes, we had arguments with the feds on what laws we could 
use, but we had to train our investigators, and then keeping 
those people, once we got them to the proficiency level to 
actually make a difference, that was a challenge as well.
 I found it was incredibly--we were the first in the Nation 
to do that on a statewide level, and it was so effective. All 
of the other states would ask us, how did you do this? How are 
you training? It was absolutely necessary, because when you 
looked at the numbers, the FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report 
showed that cyber enabled crimes defrauded Americans of nearly 
$21 billion, with the largest portion of that money being lost 
due to use of cryptocurrency and artificial intelligence scams 
and then when you looked at how much it was increasing year 
over year, no matter how much we were becoming aware of it and 
focusing on it, the complaints that the FBI's Internet Crime 
Complaint Center, IC3, received in 2024 compared to 2025, it 
increased nearly 150,000 more people reaching out for help. 
That's to the Federal Government.
 Online scammers from China are not lone actors. They're 
usually syndicates and they orchestrate the theft of billions 
of dollars and usually it's from thousands of victims and they 
target citizens from other countries like the United States. 
When I saw as attorney general that these were evolving and 
that many of the seniors felt like they were not even going to 
be able to stand the chance, and we created the State Cyber 
Fraud Unit, it was so helpful because some of the monetary 
losses that we started to see did not trigger federal 
jurisdiction or where they would start prioritizing it. Once we 
started aggregating them and digging in, we realized it was so 
much larger than we originally thought it would have. Right 
now, I don't believe we have the manpower in the Federal 
Government to even chip away at the number of scams that we're 
seeing against older Americans. I know this because we are 
trying to deal with the--we were trying to deal with the 
overflow.
 I think it's incredibly important to build teams like we 
did in the State of Florida, the Cyber Fraud Enforcement Unit, 
in other states, so that they can work in tandem with the 
Federal Government, especially when the scams are coming from 
overseas, like in China. That's the only way we're going to get 
enough manpower. I mean, I'll ask you, Ms. Price, do you 
believe right now, currently we have enough manpower in 
traditional law enforcement agencies within the Federal 
Government to make a dent on the number of scams we're seeing 
against our seniors?
 Ms. Price. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership on this 
issue. No, is the short answer. One of the recommendations that 
the Commission made last fall was that we needed a better 
national public awareness campaign, but we also needed to 
enhance law enforcement training on scams. As you stated, state 
and local law enforcement agencies are often the first point of 
contact between those who have been--had funds stolen but those 
local law enforcement agencies don't have the knowledge, the 
background, or the training on these particular areas, so.
 Senator Moody. In your testimony--and, Mr. Chairman, may I 
have just another minute? In your testimony, you were 
explaining how China uses an inside out strategy when it comes 
to its scam centers, meaning China selectively cracks down on 
scam centers targeting Chinese citizens while allowing ones 
that target U.S. Citizens to flourish and we kind of saw this 
in the--so it blatantly incentivizes Chinese nationals to 
target other people outside their own country. We saw that 
because you noted in 2024, China reported a 30 percent decrease 
in money loss due to scams, while the United States saw a 40 
percent increase in that same year. Is that kind of what you 
were getting at when you were talking about how China 
incentivizes people to scam others?
 Ms. Price. Right. The criminal elements just moved to an 
easier target because once China clamped down on their ability 
to defraud their--citizens of China, it was easier for them to 
go overseas, so that's what they did.
 Senator Moody. To try and bolster our manpower, that--and 
you can't just have anybody that day one takes oath to wear a 
badge and go against the bad guys. They're not going to know 
how to go after these complex cases. It takes significant 
training----
 Ms. Price. Yes.
 Senator Moody [continuing]. in these cyber investigations, 
so today, I introduced the STOP Scams Against Seniors Act, 
which will help support similar efforts like in Florida, these 
Elder Justice Task Force. We called ours a Cyber Fraud 
Enforcement Unit, whatever a state chooses to call their 
statewide team but they will be specifically aimed to combat 
scams against seniors at that level and include locals as well, 
when we can, to complement what's already being done at a 
federal level. Is that legislation that you think, that 
coordination between the states and the Federal Government, is 
absolutely essential to increase the manpower?
 Ms. Price. Yes. That was in our recommendation, that we 
needed that. The administration has taken some very important 
steps in the last few months, but specifically the Task Force 
on Scam Centers, the Strike Force on Scam Centers. We actually 
believe that that needs to be codified. We have to make sure 
that they have the resources and the funding that's necessary 
to do all of this work on the local level and on the national 
level.
 Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moody. Commissioner 
Hodges, fentanyl has been a plague on the American people. 
Addiction knows no ethnic, racial, socioeconomic status, 
gender, age boundaries. Can you detail China's connection to 
the fentanyl supply chain?
 Mr. Hodges. Yes, sir. Thank you. This is obviously a very 
important issue, one that has affected the lives of many 
families through the loss of life, as well as just a 
devastation on a wide scale, and so, the connection we've seen 
here is that using the southern border, we've got numerous 
different routes into the United States. It's widely believed, 
based off of evidence that we've seen, and that's also just 
publicly available, that the Chinese are actively involved in 
this at various different levels. While I don't believe that 
the President of China is ordering this, it's something that 
they're aware is happening, and it's definitely in coordination 
with the cartels. That's something--again, that's my personal 
opinion, and it's continuing to have widespread, negative--
devastating effects on families here in the United States on a 
daily basis.
 The Chairman. It's all intentional on their part.
 Mr. Hodges. That's my belief, yes.
 The Chairman. Commissioner Miller, you have tracked 
Communist China's economic coercion toolkit for years. Beijing 
has explicitly threatened in state media to cutoff 
pharmaceutical exports to the United States. In your 
assessment, how credible is that threat, and under what 
geopolitical conditions would Communist China actually pull 
that trigger?
 Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator. I believe that the threat 
is credible, but I also don't think that the threat has to be 
something that China will actually follow through on. It just 
has to be looming out there and the reason I say this is that 
as long as China is able to weaponize supply chains that are 
important to Americans, they are going to have leverage over 
our economy. If the United States is considering certain policy 
actions, it's considering involvement in an Asian theater that 
China cares about, the question doesn't have to be whether 
China will actually pull the button. When we are making our 
decisions back at home, the U.S. Government will have to factor 
in the possibility that China has a lever to pull that could be 
catastrophic to Americans and catastrophic to our military.
 I would answer your question, sir, by saying I think the 
threat is credible, but the threat doesn't actually have to be 
followed through on. It simply has to be out there, and it'll 
affect our policies.
 The Chairman. It's a deterrent.
 Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
 The Chairman. Commissioner Price, the Commission has 
documented CCP-linked scam compounds operating across Southeast 
Asia, as you talked about, using trafficked labor to run--to 
run fraud operations against Americans around the clock. In 
your own assessment, does the Chinese Government have the 
ability to shut these operations down, and what is the most 
accurate characterization of their willingness to do so?
 Ms. Price. Well, we've seen them shut down some of these, 
especially those against their own people. That's the step 
number one, by going--trying to make arrangements and 
agreements with some of these countries to help them with their 
policing, they're basically saying: hey, we can do this. Let us 
into your country and we'll help you close these down, so that 
would be my second response.
 The Chairman. Commissioner Slevin, the CCP's acquisition of 
Americans personal and health data is not a future threat. It's 
happening right now, every day. In your assessment, what does 
Communist China already have, and what is it doing with it 
right now, and what is the danger to Americans?
 Mr. Slevin. As Commissioner Miller noted, we held a hearing 
on this a couple of months ago. Among the takeaways is a 
coordinated data collection that is integrated into the AI and 
innovation flywheel that China is making rapid progress on. I 
think when it comes to issues around robotics, which we haven't 
really talked about here, there is the integration of data from 
its own citizens, certainly. Certainly, of what is being 
collected among U.S. citizens, going into the flywheel of 
further innovation.
 The Chairman. Did you see the little fly? Did you see that 
article about the little fly that they--the robot?
 Mr. Slevin. No.
 The Chairman. It's about the size of a fly.
 Senator Gillibrand. What does it do?
 The Chairman. You said what?
 Senator Gillibrand. What does it do?
 The Chairman. It can, you know, just--I think so far what 
they said is it had--have a camera on it, but it's the size of 
a fly.
 Senator Gillibrand. It's so Hollywood.
 The Chairman. Yes, so for any of you, the Department of War 
recently added Chinese company, WuXi AppTec, to the 1260H list, 
which are companies identifying as Chinese military companies. 
Are you familiar with the company and what do they do?
 Mr. Miller. I can start. Yes, sir, WuXi AppTec is a very 
interesting entity. It's not a company per se. It's sort of an 
outsourcing platform for China's pharmaceutical R&D, drug 
manufacturing, drug discovery, et cetera. I think that it has 
become more and more integrated into the way our pharmaceutical 
companies do their--build their supply chains, and do their 
research, and build their drugs and we don't have a really good 
idea of how deep this is, or how deep the reliance is, although 
we know their presence is everywhere.
 I think that the larger issue to deal with when we're 
looking at something like WuXi, or we're looking at China's 
role in biotech's and biopharmaceuticals, is that China's 
beating the hell out of us right now, sir. What we saw in 2020 
was the share of pharmaceutical licensing deals that were going 
to China were just very small, three to five percent or so. 
Every year, you can just see the chart, it went five percent, 
15 percent, 25 percent, 35 percent, 40 percent. We're on track 
for over 40 percent, possibly much more of pharmaceutical deals 
to be taken by western pharmaceutical giants in the West and be 
brought to China and transferring know how, expertise, capital, 
et cetera, building up China as an innovation hub for its 
attempt to become a biotech power.
 The reason that this is so worrisome is that I think that 
as China's share of licensing deals increased, the refrain was: 
this is good, it's good for patients, it lowers costs, gives 
pharmaceutical giants some ability to move faster and all these 
things are true but I think it has started to become an issue 
that Congress needs to look at very, very closely. Because when 
you're talking about 40 percent of pharmaceutical licensing 
deals being moved over to China, with the trajectory that this 
could be going much farther up, this is something that has 
become--has risen to a national security issue.
 While some people will argue that 40 percent isn't that 
much, if we have numbers in two or three years that are 70 
percent or 80 percent, I think there'll be very few people who 
don't think that is deserving of Congress's attention. I would 
suggest that the trajectory on this is downright scary.
 The Chairman. Do you think WuXi should be added to the 
companies of concerns under the BIOSECURE Act?
 Mr. Miller. I do. Now, this is something that our 
commission hasn't weighed in on collectively, so I'm speaking 
in my personal capacity but I think that during BIOSECURE, one 
of the issues was, would there be named entities in the 
legislation, or would there be a designation by the executive 
of which companies--after some investigation, which companies 
should be deemed working with the Chinese military? This has 
happened recently.
 I think that when you have a situation where you have a 
pharmaceutical giant that has been labeled by the U.S. 
Government as being part of the military ecosystem, then I 
think that that's sort of a prima facie case that WuXi AppTec 
should be--should be included on that list.
 The Chairman. Older Americans are engaged with digital 
health tools, telephone--telehealth platforms, remote 
monitoring devices, and connected medical equipment in an 
accelerating rate. Are you concerned of data from medical 
devices such as CGMs, ECG monitors, or even common health 
wearables are stored in Chinese servers rather than domestic 
servers, is there a danger in that? Anybody want to talk about 
that?
 Mr. Miller. Sure, I'll continue, and please, anyone add on? 
Yes, I think that the danger from data is something that we're 
just starting to get our arms around. Traditionally, we knew 
about the threats from Chinese cyber. They would hack our 
systems, and steal our data, and we knew all about that. In an 
era of Big Data, and in an era of artificial intelligence, the 
utility of things that are--data, that seems very mundane.
 In our hearing, we were talking about tire pressure on a 
car, not just where the car was going, or a gas tank meter, or 
anything else. Even the smallest little details could be things 
that could build a composite picture of where people are going. 
Medical histories, other things, wearables, you could tell 
people's health conditions. You'll be able to build a composite 
picture of a person, and then a network, and then of an 
organization.
 We're just starting to understand the degree to which this 
is vulnerable to China's approach and as I said in my 
testimony, China is not looking at this the way the United 
States is. The United States still sees these discrete issues. 
You know, it's a consumer issue, it's a privacy issue. For 
China, it's a national security issue related around data as a 
strategic resource and as artificial intelligence get better, 
and as quantum computers eventually come into the picture and 
are able to take some of these data, these enormous data bases 
that we've, you know, saved now and we're going to decrypt 
later, the ability for the Chinese to be able to build pictures 
of patterns of life and patterns of life for organizations is 
going to become enormous, and we should get to wrap our heads 
around that.
 The Chairman. Does HIPAA secure users?
 Mr. Slevin. Pardon?
 The Chairman. Does HIPAA help? Does it mean the fact that 
we're not supposed to share health data, does it help to stop 
this?
 Mr. Miller. That's a good question. I don't know. Yes, I'm 
not aware of that.
 The Chairman. How about all the Medicare, VA, Medicaid, 
TRICARE? Should that be--should that data be overseas in China?
 Mr. Miller. I think that we've come to the conclusion, bit 
by bit here, that we need to keep control of our data, because 
all of this data is important. You know, there could be 
something like your Fitbit, or something that measures your 
heart rate while you're sleeping seems completely irrelevant to 
what the Chinese would want to----
 The Chairman. Garmain watch.
 Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
 Mr. Miller. The watches we wear, the smartphones.
 Mr. Hodges. From a national security perspective, both sort 
of across the United States, and then sort of geopolitically, 
as Leland is pointing out here is, every data point becomes a 
new tool that they can use to create either a psychological 
operation against--and with the advent of AI, and sort of the 
expansive nature of the different robust tools they have inside 
the United States. Someone was mentioning Salt Typhoon earlier. 
They have access to cell phone data. They have access to credit 
card data. They have access to your health data. Each of these 
data points collectively provides them with targets of 
opportunity on how to get involved with people and mess with 
people on a daily basis, or an individual basis, including on a 
societal basis. It's very, very much of concern.
 The Chairman. You guys are down a couple commissioners. 
When's that going to change?
 Ms. Price. We're down two commissioners. We're waiting for 
an appointment by Senator Thune and from Senator Schumer. We 
had hoped--had hoped it would happen last January.
 The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to 
hear everybody's thoughts on AI, whether AI can be useful in 
targeting these scams, finding these scams, decoding these 
scams, identifying, blocking. I'd like to understand from your 
perspective what opportunities you see in AI, and obviously, 
there's going to be enormous challenges with AI, so you can 
start with either one. Reva, you can start.
 Ms. Price. Okay. I'm not going to pretend to be an expert 
on how the engineers make AI work, but we know that using scam 
centers as an example, last fall, there were numerous reports 
of how much social media in the U.S. was providing advertising 
or space for advertising for these scam centers.
 In the last few months, the technology companies have sort 
of seen the light. They created an industry accord against 
online scams and fraud in March. Meta, Microsoft, others signed 
on. They've recently spoken with the Strike Force and talked 
about how much they've been able to crack down on their own 
platforms. The fact that they can crack down on their own 
platforms, that they know how to identify it, and that they've 
actually said in their industry accord that they are going to 
work on new ways to do so, gets me to the answer of, yes, they 
know--they can go a very, very long way.
 We also know that there is a framework for identifying some 
of these scams in AI. The U.K., Australia, and Taiwan have each 
some sort of ad verification requirement to prevent false and 
fraudulent content, so it leads me to believe the technology is 
there. I'll let someone who understands how the technology is 
made take it from there.
 Mr. Hodges. To expand a little bit to an area that I know 
is of interest to the Committee, but I think it is very 
relevant to this question, and I think actually Reva brought up 
the issue of energy grid and infrastructure concerns earlier. 
This is an area where AI can absolutely be put to good use, and 
it's an area where artificial intelligence, right now, if you 
get the right model, and you train it to go in look at these 
systems, identify vulnerabilities, identify the components of 
concern.
 In some cases, the AI is getting sophisticated enough where 
it can go in and rewrite the malware so it's no longer harmful. 
Not only identify it until you have a problem, but actually go 
in and change it so you don't have to go in and rip things out 
and replace it at the hardware level. You could change it at 
the software level. That's just one area.
 Again, I know the Committee's concerned about the energy 
grid infrastructure. It's an area where I think there's tons of 
value, in going back to the scam centers and sort of the 
technical piece here is I do think that there are tools that 
could be leveraged by the IC, by law enforcement, to utilize 
AI, to go target on an offensive basis, go out and sort of 
bring down some of those systems overseas. Again, that's a 
policy debate for you-all to have with the executive branch, 
but there are opportunities there.
 Mr. Miller. If I could just bring it up to 50,000 feet very 
quickly. We know what Xi Jinping is concerned about, what he's 
focused on, because he gave us his playbook back in 2015 
called, "Made in China 2025," and that AI was first among many 
of the technologies that he believes will allow China to win 
the Fourth Industrial Revolution. AI is even more important 
than that because AI is an enabler technology. It will make 
quantum better, it will make biotech better, it will make 
robotics and automation better, so I would say the focus on AI, 
there's a lot of focus back home. We read the paper. You can't 
get an article that's not AI. There's just as much focus over 
in China right now, and how they can win that competition.
 Mr. Slevin. Only would add to that. The way we define the 
competition, I think it is still evolving. You know, as a 
country with the premier frontier models, we focus on AGI. This 
Congress talks a lot about AGI. I think that in China, we're 
seeing just the focus on adoption as being really vital and 
among its public, among its--among its companies and other 
users. I think that it's an important factor for policymakers 
to consider is how to promote adoption, safe adoption.
 The Chairman. You talked about these scam centers. Is China 
making money. Are they getting--are they getting kickbacks from 
these scam centers?
 Ms. Price. I don't have evidence that shows that, but we do 
know that they've worked with crime syndicates, and the crime 
syndicates have been involved in efforts like Belt and Road and 
others, so you can draw the line.
 The Chairman. A lot of seniors have money in 401ks. Twenty, 
twenty-five percent of that money is invested in Chinese 
companies because of how this works. Is investing in a Chinese 
company the same as investing in South Korean company?
 Mr. Hodges. Leland is definitely the expert here, but I'm 
going to jump ahead just because this is an area that's near to 
my heart. Absolutely not, sir and it's my opinion, and I think 
the Commission has previously had recommendations on this, but 
investments into China, especially with dual-use technology, as 
we just saw from the recent listing by the Department of War, 
you're essentially helping fuel the advance of the Chinese 
military and the CCP that is at a later date potentially going 
to put American soldiers' lives at risk, so absolutely, it's 
not the same.
 The Chairman. What are we not talking about enough?
 Mr. Miller. When we're talking about investment into China, 
the outbound investment conversation, we have been focusing 
almost entirely on active investment. What our venture capital 
firms are doing or what our private equity firms are doing, and 
usually in very narrow buckets, so AI quantum, advanced 
semiconductors. The other part of this, and this is something 
the Commission had a hearing on in 2024, and we've had some 
recommendations on, is taking a closer look at portfolio 
investment, which is also known as passive investment.
 The problem with all these billions of dollars of capital 
going to China is that, as you said, there are no private 
companies, no truly private companies in China. The state--
because of civil-military fusion, if the government wants 
something, the government will take something. I think we have 
an inability to know what percentage, what share of this 
capital, from what companies, is going to help the Party or to 
help the military.
 One of the issues that we have is that retirees are often 
invested in funds, unknowingly, in or have a large share of 
their capital parked in Chinese companies that may or may not 
be funding a military operation that they may one day be 
fighting against. It's been a very big problem and there are 
obviously major financial issues to deal with, there's 
macroeconomic issues, in order to rectify this problem.
 I would suggest that one thing that the major problem here 
is that is that retirees and other investors have no 
transparency whatsoever that their funds--that their money is 
actually parked in these funds that do invest in these Chinese 
companies, and they're often sanctioned Chinese companies that 
are still in these stock market indexes or mutual funds.
 I would suggest that the idea of having some sort of 
transparency around it, perhaps with a label on a fund saying 
this fund invests in Chinese-sanctioned companies, write it in 
big bold letters to the extent that Congress or administration 
is not able to move quickly on something related to portfolio 
investment. There are ways of giving greater transparency 
around this issue, and it would give the ability of people who 
are having their money sent over there unknowingly to know: 
maybe I don't want to park my money with that company or in 
that fund because I know it's doing something that I might not 
like
 The Chairman. Anybody else? All right. I want to thank you 
all. Thank you for what you're doing. Thank you for what the 
Commission's doing. I want to thank the ranking member for 
being such a great partner in dealing with this issue. The 
threats we've talked about today don't have a partisan focus, 
and our approach to solving them shouldn't either.
 I want to remind seniors and families watching that the 
Senate Aging Committee operates a fraud hotline for anyone who 
believes they have been targeted or victimized. That number is 
1-855-303-9470. If any seniors have additional questions for 
the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record 
will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Thank you.
 Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
 [Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 
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 APPENDIX

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 Prepared Witness Statements

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 Questions for the Record

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 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

"Counting the Cost: Communist China's Toll on Older American's Health, 
 Finances, and Security"

 June 17, 2026

 Questions for the Record

 Reva Price

 Senator Raphael Warnock

 Question:

 According to the Federal Trade Commission, financial fraud 
was more prevalent in Georgia than in any other state in 2023, 
with 437 incidents per 100,000 individuals. In 2023, Georgians 
aged 60 and older reported losses of over $92 million to the 
Federal Bureau of Information's Internet Crime Complaint 
Center. To address this issue, I co-introduced S. 2019, the 
Task Force for Recognizing and Averting Payment Scams Act, 
which would establish a multi-agency task force to examine 
fraud trends and lead prevention efforts. Last Congress, I also 
introduced the Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad 
Actors Act, which would create a new grant program to protect 
senior investors.
 How would multi-agency coordination and federal grant 
programs focused on investigating fraud protect Georgia seniors 
from financial scams?

 Response:

 Yes - multi-agency coordination focused on investigating 
fraud would go a long way toward protecting Georgia seniors and 
all Americans from financial scams. This is why the USCC's 2025 
Annual Report to Congress recommended the creation of an 
interagency task force to combat scam centers.
 The Administration's establishment of the Scam Center 
Strike Force late last year was a positive step toward 
enhancing multi-agency coordination around combatting scam 
centers, but Congress can continue the momentum of these 
efforts, as discussed below:

 Congress should codify a task force into law, which will 
ensure that it is permanent, accountable to Congress, and 
focused on the national security risks posed by Chinese 
criminal networks in Southeast Asia involved in the scam 
crisis.

 The Commission's 2025 recommendation on scam centers also 
called for creation of a national public awareness campaign and 
for enhancing law enforcement training on scams.

 <There continues to be a significant 
victim reporting gap. State and local law enforcement agencies 
are often the first point of contact when Americans fall victim 
to scam centers, but most departments lack the training and 
resources to identify these cases as part of transnational 
criminal operations linked to China. Too often, cases are filed 
as isolated fraud incidents and never reach the federal 
investigators who could connect them to broader scam center 
networks.

 Congress should also consider directing the Scam Center 
Strike Force to establish information-sharing mechanisms and 
training programs, particularly for departments serving 
communities with large elderly populations in Georgia and 
around the country, that enable state and local agencies to 
identify, document, and refer scam center-linked cases to 
federal authorities.

 Regarding grant programs, the Commission did not propose a 
recommendation concerning funding levels but the need for 
sufficient resources to establish a successful task force is 
implied. However, the Commission did recommend that Congress 
consider a victim restitution program, which would help make 
vulnerable seniors whole:

 When scam center assets are successfully recovered, 
Congress should consider directing that the proceeds be 
prioritized for victim restitution rather than flowing into the 
general Assets Forfeiture Fund. These are stolen savings, 
disproportionately taken from elderly Americans, and victims 
should be first in line when assets are recovered.
 Question:

 A recent Government Accountability Office report identified 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) as the best federal agencies to lead a 
government-wide strategy on anti-scam efforts. However, 
President Trump fired two members of the five-member FTC in 
March 2025, and this administration has attempted to eliminate 
the CFPB.
 What steps should Congress take to ensure these federal 
agencies have the capacity to combat domestic and international 
scams, fraud, and financial exploitation targeting older 
adults?

 Response:

 The Commission's 2025 recommendation did not propose a 
specific agency lead the inter-agency effort to combat Chinese-
linked scam operations. However, you correctly identify the 
cross-coordination with appropriate staffing needed to address 
this multifaceted issue across multiple governmental entities 
that could and should play a role in protecting Georgians and 
all Americans.
 Our relevant considerations for Congress on inter-agency 
coordination include:

 A call for greater cooperation between the U.S. government 
and financial intermediaries to detect and stop these scams, 
particularly relating to cryptocurrency. Given their increasing 
use by criminal organizations to move large sums of money 
rapidly outside of the United States, Congress should also 
consider whether existing regulation of cryptocurrency ATMs is 
sufficient. Most regulation occurs via state-level money 
transmitter or money services laws, which typically include 
provisions on enforcing anti-money laundering regulations but 
vary in scope and rigor. Federal regulation or guidance could 
strengthen oversight of cryptocurrency ATM operators.

 Relatedly, given the scale of the scam center problem, the 
U.S. anti-money laundering regime may be ill-equipped for the 
challenge of stopping transnational crime syndicates from 
exploiting cryptocurrency to launder the billions of dollars 
they steal from Americans each year. Congress should consider 
if U.S. anti-money laundering policies should be updated in 
light of the growth of scam centers and consider ways to expand 
cooperation with allies and partners to coordinate enforcement 
across borders.

 The U.S. government's seizure of approximately $15 billion 
in Bitcoin from the Prince Group demonstrates that scam center 
proceeds can be identified and recovered through blockchain 
analysis. Congress should consider establishing a reward 
program that incentivizes cryptocurrency tracing firms and 
other private sector actors to identify and report stolen 
assets linked to scam center operations, modeled on existing 
whistleblower frameworks at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Internal Revenue Service.

 Scam centers rely on spoofed phone calls, SMS phishing 
campaigns, and social media platforms to make initial contact 
with potential victims. Congress should consider requiring 
telecommunications carriers and social media platforms to 
implement stronger verification and detection measures 
targeting scam center-linked activity. Existing anti-spoofing 
frameworks such as STIR/SHAKEN (Secure Telephone Identity 
Revisited/Signature-based Handling of Asserted information 
using toKENs)-which require carriers to verify that caller ID 
information is legitimate before a call reaches the recipient-
have helped combat domestic caller ID spoofing but were not 
designed to address the international calls, text messages, and 
social media outreach that scam centers predominantly use to 
target Americans. Congress should consider expanding the scope 
of these frameworks to close these gaps.

 Chinese criminal networks have responded to crackdowns in 
Southeast Asia by globalizing their operations. In order to 
stop new clusters of scam centers from emerging in other 
regions, the United States should act proactively to make 
disrupting the development of scam centers beyond Southeast 
Asia a priority for U.S. diplomacy, intelligence gathering, 
security cooperation, and foreign assistance.

 Scam centers run by Chinese criminal organizations 
threaten the wellbeing of Americans and the security of the 
United States. The U.S. government should treat the scam 
crisis, alongside the fentanyl epidemic, as a priority issue in 
bilateral negotiations with Beijing and the governments of 
countries where scam centers operate.

 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

"Counting the Cost: Communist China's Toll on Older American's Health, 
 Finances, and Security"

 June 17, 2026

 Questions for the Record

 Chris Slevin

 Senator Raphael Warnock

 Question:

 Biomedical research is critical to bolstering domestic 
pharmaceutical innovation and manufacturing infrastructure. 
Despite its importance in strengthening the domestic drug 
supply chain, the Trump Administration has made deep cuts to 
scientific research in the United States, including funding for 
the National Institutes of Health, causing nearly 75 percent of 
U.S. scientists, including Chinese and Chinese-American 
researchers, to consider leaving the country.
 How can Congress strengthen the domestic pharmaceutical 
supply chain through increased investment in biomedical 
research?

 Response:

 The Commission's recent work on these interrelated issues 
shows that the U.S. vulnerability sits upstream: as much as a 
quarter of the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in 
American drugs may trace back to China, directly or through 
India, and the exposure is greater still for key starting 
materials (KSMs).
 Scientific research investment - in particular to the NIH - 
is central to changing that, because the United States will not 
win back commodity drug chemistry on cost alone and needs new 
manufacturing technologies to compete. In its 2024 Annual 
Report, the Commission recommended that Congress support 
significant federal investment in biotechnology at every stage, 
from basic research through product development and market 
deployment, including equipment manufacturing capacity.
 In 2025, the Commission recommended that Congress make a 
resilient bioeconomy industrial base a strategic national 
objective, and that it expand CHIPS and Science Act authorities 
to fund national research and development hubs in key strategic 
sectors. That report also stated that the United States must 
sustain investment in basic and applied research to keep its 
technological lead.
 Research must be paired with greater transparency into the 
supply chain, as well as demand, which is why the Commission 
also recommended expanding FDA authority to require reporting 
of the volume and ultimate origin of APIs and KSMs, including 
Chinese content routed through third countries, and directing 
CMS to explore procurement and reimbursement tools such as 
price floor commitments. The Commission examined these issues 
further in 2026, including on its visit to India, and will 
issue additional recommendations in this year's Annual Report, 
which we will be sure to update you and the Committee on.

 Question:

 What steps can Congress take to recruit and retain the best 
and brightest scientists, including those from China, so that 
the United States continues attracting top talent to the 
biomedical ecosystem?

 Response:

 The Commission has not issued a recommendation specific to 
immigration or the recruitment of foreign scientists, so part 
of this answer reflects my own view. The Commission's 2025 
Annual Report warned that the United States faces a future in 
which it depends on China for the most cutting-edge 
biotechnology innovations, and that outcome will be decided 
largely by where the world's best researchers choose to work.
 The Commission's recommendations treat workforce as part of 
industrial strategy: in 2025 it called for support for 
workforce development and education in key strategic sectors. 
In the quantum context, it called for expanded fellowships and 
talent exchange programs with allies, a model Congress could 
apply to biomedical science. On security, the Commission's 2024 
recommendation called for prior approval and ongoing oversight 
of Chinese involvement in biotechnology companies operating in 
the United States, including involvement with U.S. colleges and 
universities. That approach targets entities and transactions, 
and in my view research security should focus on conduct and 
affiliations rather than national origin, so that it protects 
American research without driving away loyal and productive 
scientists.
 I also believe Congress should provide predictable research 
funding and a clear path for top scientists trained here, 
including those from China, to stay and build their careers in 
the United States.
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 Statements for the Record

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