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- COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS' HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY [Senate Hearing 119-499] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 119-499 COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS' HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ WASHINGTON, DC __________ JUNE 17, 2026 __________ Serial No. 119-32 Printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-351 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING RICK SCOTT, Florida, Chairman DAVE McCORMICK, Pennsylvania KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York JIM JUSTICE, West Virginia ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama MARK KELLY, Arizona RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin RAPHAEL WARNOCK, Georgia ASHLEY MOODY, Florida ANDY KIM, New Jersey JON HUSTED, Ohio ANGELA ALSOBROOKS, Maryland ---------- McKinley Lewis, Majority Staff Director Claire Descamps, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Opening Statement of Senator Rick Scott, Chairman................ 1 Opening Statement of Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Ranking Member......................................................... 3 PANEL OF WITNESSES Joshua Hodges, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 4 Leland R. Miller, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 7 Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 8 Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 10 APPENDIX Prepared Witness Statements Joshua Hodges, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 30 Leland R. Miller, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 34 Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 37 Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 43 Questions for the Record Reva Price, Commissioner, Chair Emeritus, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C.................... 49 Chris Slevin, Commissioner, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C............................. 51 Statements for the Record Testimony of David Gryska........................................ 55 Testimony of John R. Prufeta..................................... 63 COUNTING THE COST: COMMUNIST CHINA'S TOLL ON OLDER AMERICANS' HEALTH, FINANCES, AND SECURITY ---------- Wednesday, June 17, 2026 U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:29 p.m., Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Rick Scott, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Scott, Tuberville, Johnson, Moody, Husted, and Gillibrand. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SCOTT, CHAIRMAN The Chairman. The Special Committee on Aging will come to order. The Chinese Communist Party is not a trade competitor that plays by different rules. It's not a diplomatic challenge to be managed through the right mix of engagement, pressure. It's a country whose government has made a strategic goal of weakening the United States, and that's the nicest way you can say it, deciding that senior citizens are a legitimate target. This hearing will cover the concrete, measurable harms that are being done to America's seniors by a government in Beijing led by the Communist Party, who views our country's most vulnerable as economic opportunity. The list of dangers that Communist China presents has grown as they become more aggressive. Those threats now impact every square inch of American life. Let's start with fentanyl and other illicit drugs. America has lost hundreds of thousands of people to deadly drugs. Since 2013, China has been the primary source of fentanyl, and the precursor chemicals that drug cartels use to manufacture it and kill American citizens, thanks to Communist China. We hear a lot about young Americans dying from fentanyl poisonings, and they are, but seniors are a growing share of the victims. Older Americans living with chronic pain, veterans managing injuries, and patients seeking alternative sources for its medications due to rising costs are dying because Communist China profits from their death, and because the CCP has chosen again and again to look the other way. China has made some announcements about controlling precursor exports. We've heard those before and rarely do they hold up their end of the bargain. They never hold up their end of the bargain. Now, let's talk about the pills themselves, legal ones that seniors depend on every day. As you heard in this Committee time and again, over 90--over 90 percent of the prescriptions filled at American pharmacies are generic drugs. The active pharmaceutical ingredients are APIs, and most of those drugs come from China or India. For many critical medicines, China isn't just a major supplier, they're the only supplier. There is no domestic alternative standing by. If Beijing decides tomorrow to restrict drug imports, as it has explicitly threatened to do in the CCP state media, American seniors will feel it in weeks. According to a CPA report, Communist China supplies 87 percent of U.S. antibiotic API imports, and over 80 to 90 percent of global API production. We cannot fuel the military if China stopped exports. We saw how China withheld PPE during COVID. This is a real problem. China has leverage. Communist China knows it has leverage, and our Committee's investigative work has made it clear that they are not shy about reminding us. That is why legislation like the CLEAR LABELS Act is important. It's time Americans truly know where their drugs come from. We would have never let the Soviets have this kind of leverage over us during the cold war. We should be taking this issue just as seriously now. No sane country would act like this when their opponent wants to destroy them. We have to wake up. That's why we're pushing the Federal Government every day to support domestic manufacturing and leverage the full buying power of the government to support our domestic drug makers, and I want to thank the ranking member for her actions here. Here's another way Communist China hurts our seniors: relentless scams. In 2024, Americans over 60 lost nearly five billion to financial scams. That's not just a crime statistic, but a coordinated campaign run at industrial scale by organized criminal enterprises with direct ties to actors operating under the protection of or at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. We held a hearing earlier this year on foreign scam compounds. These are physical facilities, physical facilities in Southeast Asia where traffic workers are forced to run fraud operations targeting Americans around the clock. I'm sure you've gotten a scam call before. I actually get them every day. Who hasn't? These AI-generated voice clones, deepfake video calls, grandparent, romance, and investment scams all look and sound entirely legitimate until all of a sudden, the money is gone. These sophisticated, well-funded criminals have focused on seniors because they have the retirement savings and are less likely to report what happened to them. Congress needs to act now and pass legislation targeting these bad actors before even more Americans lose their life savings to these thugs. The SCAM Act passed this Senate. The STOP Scammers Act is waiting. We need the rest of Congress to act with the same urgency that our seniors deserve. Finally, I'd like to talk about data, because everything else becomes more dangerous when the Chinese Communist Party knows your medical history, your financial accounts, your daily routine, and the names of your grandchildren. Communist China is systemically acquiring the personal, financial, and health data of older Americans through connected devices, digital health platforms, data broker purchases, and cyberattacks on American institutions. We saw this with BGI, the Beijing Genomics Institute, potentially acquiring genomic data from U.S. patients. That led to the passage of the BIOSECURE Act, which prohibited federal agencies and federally funded groups from utilizing biotechnology equipment and services from biotechnology companies of concern. For too long, Washington has treated all these issues as individual problems. I believe it's time we take a comprehensive approach to fighting Communist China's growing threat. The legislation mentioned today in my opening is just the beginning, but the breadth of that work cannot be captured in an opening statement. Today, I'm posting online a list of bills I've sponsored or co-sponsored that speaks to the threats we examine--we're examining this hearing with a plain-English summary of what each one does, and I know the ranking member is all over this. You deserve to know where your Senator stands, and I ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to look at that list and ask themselves the same question I ask every day: what are we waiting for? The bottom line here is that America has enemies, whether we like it or not, and we need to act like it. Communist China wants to destroy our way of life. Fifty years ago, we would never have given the Soviets the kind of leeway we give China: the access they have to our economy and our information, the dependence they enjoy from our supply chain. We need to get serious about this before it's too late. Now, I'd like to recognize the ranking member, Gillibrand, for her opening statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, RANKING MEMBER Senator Gillibrand. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I appreciate today's hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. Today's hearing gives the Committee the unique opportunity to study several issues that impact the lives of older Americans through the same lens: how are the actions from China influencing these outcomes? We will discuss how Chinese Government turns a blind eye to scam compounds that target Americans, leading to financial losses to the tune of billions of dollars for our citizens hard-earned money, not to mention the emotional toll on the victims that they face after falling prey to a scam. To address this crisis, I've introduced bipartisan legislation with Chairman Scott called the National Strategy for Combating Scams Act, and that would require the FBI to create a unified governmentwide strategy to tackle surging scam operations. This bill is a first step to combat scams domestically and complements the work of our colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to crack down on foreign scam centers, including by pushing to pass the bipartisan Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization Act. I'm also eager to continue our discussion on Chinese dominance of the global supply chain for pharmaceuticals and the economic, national, and health security implications of this dominance. This is a refrain that Chairman Scott and I continue to repeat throughout this entire Congress to help Americans understand our health care system is at grave risk, in no small part, due to the exposure to China for key starting materials and active pharmaceutical ingredients for our generic pharmaceuticals. This is not just a health security issue but a national security issue. In the case of a crisis or conflict between us and China, our country cannot be reliant on China for the bulk of our essential medicines like antibiotics or the ingredients we need to make them. I'm proud of the work of this Committee that we've done to shed light on the issue. We've introduced bipartisan legislation called the CLEAR LABELS Act and have dedicated our time to shining a light on this problem that has for too long been pushed aside by Congress. China has weaponized the supply chain, established choke points in medicine, foundational semiconductors, and printed circuit boards that are critical to all types of electronics. One of the things that should worry us most and should immediately spark congressional action is China's top to bottom efforts to dominate the next generation of biotechnology. It should be a wakeup call to all of our members that China may surpass us in a few years, not decades, in the critical technology area. Biotech is not a future inflection point, but a present one. I look forward to collaborating with the commissioners as well as my colleagues across the aisle as we work together to understand and tackle China's influence in all of these spheres. The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. First off, I want to thank all the witnesses for what you do every day, and I know it's bipartisan, and you guys do a great job. Our first witness is Joshua Hodges, a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, appointed by Speaker Mike Johnson. He brings nearly two decades of national security and foreign policy experience across the White House, Congress, the Executive branch, international development, and the private sector. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of the National Security Council, where he led U.S. Efforts to expose and counter China's maligned activity across the Americas and the Caribbean, serving as the U.S. Government's lead on regional economic strategies designed to reduce dependency on China-backed financing. Most recently he served as National Security Advisor to Speaker of the House Mike Johnson during the 118th Congress, the most senior national security staff position in the House, where he helped shape congressional responses to support for Israel, Russian aggression, U.S.-China strategic competition, and security threats at the southern border. Thank you for being here, and please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF JOSHUA HODGES, COMMISSIONER, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Hodges. Chairman Scott Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee, I'm grateful for this Committee's sustained attention to these issues, and for your recognition that the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party is not only a geopolitical one, but a direct threat here at home. Today's hearing on counting the cost and the impact on seniors' health, financial security, and privacy could not be more timely and the legislation that both of you mentioned is absolutely vital. Twenty-five years ago, Congress established the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission with a mandate to examine, to investigate, and to report to Congress, in an integrated, way how the People's Republic of China's actions affect American economic and national security. As you can imagine, in that time, our mandate has stayed constant, but the overlap in our work has increased dramatically. Our independent bipartisan commissioners represent a wide range of views, with each of the leaders of the House and Senate appointing three commissioners each. We provide Congress with an annual report and other research and analysis to make policy recommendations for legislative and administrative actions, much of which is aligned with the legislation you were referencing earlier. The central finding I want to convey today is this the Chinese Communist Party is engaged in a deliberate, systematic campaign to build new leverage and choke points across multiple domains, from upstream raw material inputs, to industrial processing and manufacturing to downstream applications, and certainly, across frontier technologies that that will define the next generation of economic and national power. The CCP also seeks to eliminate American production capability across sectors that Americans depend on for their health, financial security, and daily lives. The Commission's 2025 annual report documented this playbook in detail what the report describes as, "China Shock 2.0." The pattern is straightforward: China identifies critical input, deploys state-backed overcapacity and below-cost pricing to drive Western and allied producers out of the market, and then owns the supply chain permanently. The Commission's hearing series has examined several facets of this strategy from commodity derivatives, market data collection architecture, scam networks targeting older Americans, and supply chain choke points eroding America's security. Each hearing has revealed different instruments, each instrument a part of a strategy, and Beijing is focused aggressively on establishing firm leverage over the technologies that will dominate the future, as you referenced earlier, including biotechnology, commercial space, and artificial intelligence. What the Commission has formally-- beyond what the Commission has formally examined, it's worth flagging concerns raised by the American industry, and recently exposed in Europe that I believe warrant this Committee's attention. In line with its choke hold ambitions and leverage, China appears to be targeting specialty chemical supply chains that most Americans have never heard of, but that flow directly into the products keeping older Americans alive. These chemical compounds are used to produce IV tubing, pacemaker leads, surgical implants, and other essential household products increasingly dominated by Chinese producers who often use below-cost pricing to drive Western manufacturers out of the market. In fact, the Defense Department has confirmed that for some of these materials, there are no functional substitute within a 10-to-15-year horizon. Combined together with our reliance on pharmaceuticals, we are dangerously close to a possible supply disruption on medical devices and prescription drugs, and Washington has not yet connected those dots adequately, so we appreciate your legislation to address this. As part of the Commission's efforts to look over the horizon, we held a series of hearings since 2024 that highlight aggressive activity to not only catch up to the U.S. but to overtake us. The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology concluded last year that the United States has a three-year window to retain, or in some cases, regain biotechnology leadership or risk ceding profound military, geopolitical, and economic advantages to China. The consensus from the community--from the business community about this is that that timeframe is even shorter than that, through--that two-year time period. China is no longer a fast follower in biotechnology. In certain domains, biopharmaceutical innovation is now leading--it is now leading. Why is this relevant? Older Americans are the population's most exposed to every sector I've described. They're the heaviest users of generic drugs whose ingredients China controls. They are the patients with pacemakers and surgical implants containing materials and components from supply chains increasingly dependent on China. Separately, the energy and infrastructure vulnerabilities most directly relevant to this community's constituents have not yet received adequate legislative attention. Chinese manufacturing components in the American grid infrastructure may contain remote monitoring capabilities, and, in some cases, remote access pathways. A deliberate power disruption would fall hardest on older Americans dependent on home medical equipment, oxygen concentrators, insulin refrigeration, cardiac devices, dialysis machines, the list goes on. For this population, a grid failure is not an inconvenience, it's a medical emergency. The central challenge is in awareness. The problem is that we in Washington continue to treat these as separate issues across different jurisdictions, addressing each in isolation rather than looking at all of it together. I'm very pleased to hear that you're working across jurisdiction with other committees to actually get this moving forward and address it in a holistic way. Thank you for your time today to discuss the Commission's annual reports and our hearings and recommend the annual report findings for each of you if you haven't had a chance to look at that. Thank you for having us today. The Chairman. Thank you. Our next witness is Leland Miller, a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, reappointed by Speaker Mike Johnson. He is the co- founder and CEO of China Beige Book, where for more than 15 years, he has run the world's largest private microeconomic survey of China's economy and financial system. He is one of the most widely cited independent authorities on China's economy, trade dynamics, and U.S.-China technology competition in the country. Before founding China Beige Book, Commissioner Miller was a capital markets attorney practicing out of New York and Hong Kong. Thank you for being here. Please begin your testimony. STATEMENT OF LELAND R. MILLER, COMMISSIONER, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Miller. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. On April 30, I co-chaired a hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission titled, "Taking a Bigger Byte: China's Expanding Strategy for Data Dominance." What our witnesses described and what I want to convey today, is that Beijing has stopped treating data as a commercial byproduct and now treats it as an instrument of state power, and that ordinary Americans, including our oldest and most vulnerable citizens, are increasingly the raw material. The starting point is legal architecture. China's national security law, national intelligence law, and data security law together compel any Chinese company to hand its data to the state on demand, in secret, with no independent court able to refuse, and no transparency to reveal when it happens. The obligations run one way. As one witness put it, Beijing's operating principle is to control the outflow of data from China while expanding the inflow from everywhere else. A data set does not have to hold national security value when it is collected. The value can emerge once the state fuses it with other data in its possession. Three mechanisms make this concrete for Americans. First, our networks. Chinese-State sponsored actors and the campaign known as Salt Typhoon penetrated the core of America's telecommunications carriers and reached call records data: who is calling whom, from where, and when for vast numbers of Americans. The FBI has assessed that China's hacking program is larger than that of every other major nation combined. Second, our commercial data. Sensitive information about Americans' precise location, financial stress, health indicators, and family and professional networks is openly bought and sold through the data broker market, and absorbed through apps, payment systems, and connected devices. None of it requires a hack. It can be purchased. Increasingly, these data streams come from products Americans carry, wear, or drive every day. Modern smartphones, connected vehicles, fitness trackers, smart home devices, and other Internet connected products continuously generate detailed records of where people travel, who they meet, what they buy, how they communicate, and even patterns in their physical activity and health. In many cases, supposedly anonymous data sets can be reidentified and linked across multiple sources, allowing disparate pieces of information to be fused into highly detailed portraits of individual lives. What appears commercially mundane in isolation becomes strategically valuable when aggregated at scale and combined with other sources of data. Third, our health and our biology. Witnesses were direct that Beijing regards genomic and clinical data as a strategic national resource and is investing heavily to acquire it. Not only genetic sequences, but treatment histories and health records. Artificial intelligence is the force multiplier that ties all of this together. Bulk data that was once too voluminous for any human analyst to use can now be fused automatically into detailed profiles of individuals, what one witness called, "the move from observation to prediction." This is where the risk to older Americans becomes acute. Older Americans hold a disproportionate share of the Nation's wealth, carry the longest medical histories, and are the heaviest users of the health system, which means the financial, genomic, and clinical data Beijing prizes is in large part theirs. The same capability that lets an adversary build a targeting profile of a government official also lowers the cost of precision, fraud, and social engineering against an 80-year- old, tailored, convincing, and delivered at scale, and the records most exposed to the harvest now decrypt later strategy our witnesses described collecting encrypted data today to break it with tomorrow's quantum computers are precisely the long lived medical and financial records that follow an older American for the rest of their life. The central lesson of our hearing is that Washington still treats privacy, telecommunications security, critical infrastructure resilience, and artificial intelligence as separate problems. Beijing does not. It is assembling a single decision advantage architecture and it is doing so faster than our policy is adapting. The Commission has not yet developed its recommendations in this space. That will not happen until our report comes out in November. Speaking now in my personal capacity, I would respectfully urge this Committee to act on that integrated view to place a national security data regime covering geolocation, health, genomic, financial and telecommunications data on durable, statutory footing to harden the telecommunications and data broker ecosystems that make American data purchasable, in the first place, and to treat the protection of older Americans financial and medical data as the homeland security matter has become. Thank you again for the opportunity to share these observations. I look forward to your questions. The Chairman. Thanks, Mr. Miller. Now, I'll turn it over to Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I want to introduce our next witness, Reva Price. Ms. Price is a commissioner for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. She was reappointed by House Democratic Leader, Hakeem Jeffries, for a term expiring December 31, 2026. Previously, Ms. Price was the Director of Outreach and Senior Advisor to former Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and has spent over 20 years working for nonprofit organizations in Washington, DC. engaging in both domestic and international affairs. You may begin. STATEMENT OF REVA PRICE, COMMISSIONER, CHAIR EMERITUS, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. Ms. Price. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the evolving threat of Chinese-linked scam centers. My remarks draw on the U S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's recent work, including two reports, "Travel to Southeast Asia," and, "Recommendations for Congress to Protect American Savings and the U.S. National Interests." I hope this testimony provides additional information to the important hearing and discussion this Committee held on this topic earlier this year. The FBI's Internet Crimes Complaint Center, known as IC3, documents that Americans reported losing $17.7 billion to online scams in 2025, a 29 percent increase from 2024. This figure is striking, yet likely captures only a fraction of the total amount lost due to underreporting and let me note, Chairman Scott, that your ReportScams.gov Act introduced just this week, would go a long way toward getting a more accurate number. It is important to note that nearly a quarter of these funds were stolen from citizens over age 60. As you are aware, these online scams often take the form of investment or confidence schemes that can be traced to Chinese criminal syndicates overseas. Chinese criminal networks operate industrial scale scam centers that steal tens of billions of dollars annually. This is a massive criminal enterprise rivaling the global drug trade in scale and sophistication. For example, while estimates vary, scam centers in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos alone generated approximately $44 billion, about 40 percent of those countries combined GDP. Many of these Chinese criminal syndicates have spread throughout Southeast Asia with at least implicit backing from elements of the Chinese Government. In some cases, known criminal groups have invested in projects linked to China's Belt and Road Initiatives alongside China's state-owned enterprises. We also have seen criminal leaders who appear to have gotten a pass by promoting messaging and other activities aligned with Chinese Communist Party priorities. At the same time, Beijing has used the scam crisis to expand its regional influence. Under the guise of cracking down on scams, China has pressured countries to agree to a greater role for Chinese security forces and has had success in Laos, Cambodia, and even U.S. ally, Thailand. This inside-out strategy gives China greater leverage over the internal security apparatus of other countries. Chinese security forces have also confiscated electronic devices with Americans personal data from raids on scam compounds. Initially, many scams targeted Chinese citizens in so called pig butchering scams, the local colloquialism for winning a victim's trust to ultimately convince them to hand over a large sum of money. To its credit, China has cracked down on these operations, but it has done so selectively, largely turning a blind eye to scam centers victimizing foreigners. As a result, the Chinese criminal syndicates have been incentivized to shift toward targeting Americans in foreign butchering scams. To illustrate this point, in 2024, losses from online scams in China declined by about 30 percent, while losses in the United States increased by roughly 40 percent. The problem is also evolving rapidly. Scam operations are now being turbocharged by artificial intelligence. AI allows criminals to create more convincing personas, tailor content and operate across languages, all at scale. At the same time, cryptocurrency is increasingly used both to defraud victims and to launder illicit proceeds. Scam centers are also spreading beyond Southeast Asia, including to the Pacific Islands and parts of Africa. Congress and the administration have taken initial steps to combat these scams, but the problem continues to grow and we need to do much more. The Commission has proposed 11 recommendations and considerations for Congress to help combat these threats. I would refer the Committee to my written testimony which lists them all in some detail and hope we will have time during the conversation today to discuss them more fully. In conclusion, scam centers run by Chinese criminal organizations threaten both the financial well-being of all Americans, seniors in particular, as well as broader U.S. national security. As long as these networks can earn higher profits with lower risk by targeting Americans, they will continue to do so. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Our next witness is Chris Slevin. Mr. Slevin became a commissioner for the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission after his appointment by House Democratic Leader, Hakeem Jeffries. Previously, Mr. Slevin was chief of staff to the former Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, where he led the U.S. Department of Commerce through the Agency's expanded role in technology and national security, including the CHIPS and Science Act. You may begin. STATEMENT OF CHRIS SLEVIN, COMMISSIONER, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Slevin. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, members of the Committee. I'll focus my remarks on the pharmaceutical supply chain. First, the Commission applauds the work this Committee is doing to call attention to the vulnerable situation the country faces when the building blocks of our medicines are made in China. As this Committee has outlined well, we have an uncomfortable reliance on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients and key starting materials. China's strategy is an integrated, state-directed effort to become indispensable at every stage: raw materials, APIs, contract research, the early clinical trials, and biologics. This strategy parallels China's playbook in sectors like EVs and batteries. China's weaponization of supply chains is not theoretical. China has made controlling global supply chains an explicit strategic goal. The drug supply chain is a prime example of that strategy succeeding. China's used export controls on critical minerals as we've seen, gallium, germanium, rare earth magnets, as economic pressure tools since 2023. In 2025, China expanded that toolkit with new rounds of heavy rare earth elements, triggering price spikes, temporary factory closures in allied nations and in the U.S. Of course, medicines have a human health dimension that minerals do not but the message from what we've seen on rare earths is clear: China is building the legal and institutional architecture to restrict access to whatever it chooses to, whenever it chooses. China isn't just dominating U.S. supply chains, it's embedding itself into drug manufacturing across Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. By doing so, it's positioning itself as the indispensable supplier to every country the U.S. might turn to for alternatives. Congress knows this scenario from telecom. This is the Huawei playbook in pharmaceuticals, and it warrants the same urgency in response. India supplies roughly half of all U.S. generic drugs, but it relies on China for most of the building blocks, the KSMs. The Commission visited India earlier this year. Among our findings the Indian government has had some success in reducing reliance on Chinese APIs using its production-linked incentive program to help reshore manufacturing to India. China, however, is now targeting these incentive programs and those manufacturers with below-cost predatory pricing. It is the same playbook we have seen it use on solar, on EVs, and its restricting exports on certain pharma manufacturing equipment to India. Again, the Commission will further explore these issues and provide recommendations to Congress this fall. In the meantime, I'd like to direct the Committee's attention to three specific recommendations the commission made on these issues last year. One, fix the data problem first. The FDA has acknowledged and the Commission's 2025 report confirms that the U.S. Government does not have reliable data on actual volumes of API imports from China or the full proportion of U.S. drug consumption dependent on Chinese imports inputs. You cannot use trade tools without data. You can't file an anti-dumping case if you can't measure ingredient imports. The CARES Act required manufacturers to report drug volumes, which is a good start, but not where the ingredients come from. We need to close that gap. The chairman and ranking member's proposal to require greater transparency through country-of- origin labeling is also a critical step in this. Two, use the government's buying power as a demand signal. Durable demand turns the ship and begins to rebuild a viable U.S. generics manufacturing sector. Congress should explore procurement and reimbursement authorities for medicines built on non-China starting material materials, including price floor commitments that protect domestic producers against below-cost Chinese competition. Your Committee's report outlining the need for a federal buyers' market is a strong proposal consistent with the Commission's recommendations. Finally, treat this as industrial policy, not just drug policy. Consider CHIPS Act-style financing, support for domestic API and generics manufacturing, and advanced manufacturing incentives. Forty years of offshoring will not be reversed by guidance documents and study requirements. This requires the scale of commitments that Congress brought to semiconductors. Again, we thank you for the attention you're giving to these issues, to understand these critical vulnerabilities, how they can be weaponized, and what we can do to reverse them. Thank you again, we look forward to your questions. The Chairman. Thank you, each of you, for being here. Let me turn it over to Senator Tuberville. Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Commissioners, for being here. Mr. Slevin, let's start where you just finished. How safe do we feel about the ingredients in pharmaceuticals from China, and how can we depend on that safety? Mr. Slevin. It's hard to know without the data, which is, I think, the primary recommendation that this commission has made thus far on the issue. It's hard to know what to correct for if we don't have the data and if we don't have the visibility into the supply chains and into inspections. The FDA has authority to inspect overseas. It's hard to execute on that. The unannounced visits to factories are hard to execute on, so there is reason the Commission is concerned. Senator Tuberville. We just pretty much take it for granted that they're going to do the right thing, right? Because we don't make it much here, right? Mr. Slevin. That's right. The last several decades, we've seen the production increasingly offshored, and so the proximity that our agencies have to inspect unannounced is more difficult to execute when the vast majority of facilities are overseas, particularly in China. Senator Tuberville. Thank you. Mr. Miller, China is known for its investment fraud and scam centers. What do these criminal enterprises look like? Is the Chinese Communist Party or syndicates with their protection or approval, are they approving these? Mr. Miller. I will give a little bit of an overview, and I welcome my colleague who's our expert on the scam centers to add on. I think that during our trip to Southeast Asia, we were blown away by the scope of these centers. They take up not just floors of buildings, but buildings and sometimes entire city blocks. They're very mobile, so sometimes when something is shut down, they can pick up and relocate down the block to the other side of the city and they are done with the implicit, at least, approval of the governing authorities in these South Asian countries, and often the Chinese Communist Party. These entities are becoming more and more sophisticated. They're integrating AI. The things that they were doing five years ago doesn't touch the types of approaches they're using now in terms of voice alterations and other intricate ways of getting at people's personal histories, bringing them aboard, and doing the pig butchering that my colleague was talking about in her testimony. Senator Tuberville. Ms. Price, would you like to add to that? Ms. Price. Yes. We have not found direct evidence of the Chinese Government's role in the Southeast Asian--the direct role of the government's involvement, but there are links, as I mentioned in my testimony. There are indications of them looking the other way. There are people in these syndicates who do other work with the Chinese Government, so there's a wink and a nod, so to speak, but direct government involvement, the FBI hasn't reported that publicly. Senator Tuberville. Seems like every time I call for customer service, it comes from India. Is that correct? Are they as much complicit? Ms. Price. We didn't see any connection with those in India and the scam centers, but there are scam centers all over the world. Mr. Hodges. To add on to that, sir, if you'll permit me. One other thing that we have witnessed is that whenever these scam centers are directed toward Chinese citizens, there is this sort of surprising ability to turn that off and target it, and so, again, it's not a direct linkage or evidence, but it is sort of an associated linkage that we've noticed. Senator Tuberville. Mr. Miller, it seems like we're either denying it or agreeing with it that China is ahead of us in crypto. What's the consequences of that if we don't adjust one way or the other? Mr. Miller. China has a very interesting mentality toward crypto and the broader crypto universe. You know, technically crypto is banned in the mainland, but Hong Kong, which is obviously China as well, at this point, is a hotbed of crypto innovation. I think it's the mindset of the policymakers in Beijing that they can keep the dirtier side of crypto ring- fenced away from mainland China, but they can go into some of the more innovative side of crypto in Hong Kong. I think we need to be keeping a very close watch on this. This is something that our Hong Kong chapter has put particular focus on over the last two years. Senator Tuberville. Are we ahead or behind them? Mr. Hodges, you might want to---- Mr. Hodges. Yes. One thing to add to that, sir, and again, this isn't--we haven't issued this as a formal recommendation or committee product yet. One of the areas where we started to look into is their efforts to use crypto overseas as a method of data collection. It's very well known that Chinese apps soak up data, and one thing we're starting to dig into is: are there Chinese apps using crypto in third-party countries that's going to give them access to those individuals' data, and again, make it harder for the United States to work with those governments or those populaces? Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Husted. Senator Husted. Thank you, Chairman Scott. I Appreciate the witnesses being here today. There's one report out recently, and I believe one of you may have alluded to the fact that there are nearly 700 pharmaceuticals today in America that we couldn't make without China's acquiescence to send us, at least, some part of the supply chain for the production of those pharmaceuticals. Mr. Slevin, I guess I'll start with you. What would happen if they just completely cut us off? Mr. Slevin. It would be alarming, to say the least. You know, that is the dire scenario that one can kind of imagine. There's also just the more subtle moves of restricting licensing, slowing the export that would--you know, it speaks to the leverage. Senator Husted. I'm speaking more---- Mr. Slevin. Yes. Senator Husted [continuing]. of the human consequence. We would have--these are drugs that we're here to talk about, you know, as Aging Committee, but these are drugs that people rely on for their lives on a daily basis. Right? Mr. Slevin. It would be an extremely dire situation that I think would make this issue rocket up to number one for the Congress to address. Mr. Miller. Senator, if I could add to that. Senator Husted. Yes. Mr. Miller. I co-chaired the Commission's hearing on Beijing's weaponization of supply chains back in 2024. One of the big frustrations we had in the buildup to that hearing was that we had our staff for months, and months, and months trying to get all the information they could, classified, unclassified, everything you can think of on key starting materials and APIs so that we could put in our report, and prepare our witnesses for what the actual exposure was so we could ask them about it. We found out that we do not have that information. It's not just we don't, nobody has that information and this is something that we've seen constantly over the course of the last couple years. We've traveled to India, and we've asked them for their data on this, and they don't know. We've worked with the administration, various agencies in the administration. The administration does not know, they don't have it. No one in the administration has what our vulnerabilities are. When we were drafting our--when we were working on our hearing and we were drafting our chapter, we were putting in ranges, wide ranges. I think this goes back to the problem that we do not have transparency into where China's position is in terms of the pharmaceutical universe. We know that the vast majority of active pharmaceutical ingredients are produced by China and India. When you peel back that onion and you look at what type of vulnerability India's APIs have to Chinese key starting materials, the answer is a lot, but we couldn't get an answer. What we do know is, that they are concentrated in some of the things we care about the most: antibiotics, heparin, insulin, oncology, medicine. We know the problem is huge. I think the frustration we've had, and I know that others know that Congress has had as well, is that we cannot get to the bottom of what these supply chains actually look like, which has made it very difficult, in turn, for Congress to make good policy. Senator Husted. We know it would be alarming. It would be catastrophic. It would--but we don't even really have a full understanding of what the scope of the problem would be? Mr. Miller. We do not. I actually went through, and I was checking it this morning to see if any new data have come out. There's just no good data on this at all, and I think this is a very big problem with--you can't scope out a solution to a problem when you don't have visibility into the solution. Senator Husted. This is happening now in a Nation where pharmaceuticals were invented. We started the whole process of developing, researching, developing medicines that would improve people's lives, save people's lives. America dominated this. Then, somehow, when we decided that getting things cheaper from anybody that would sell them to us cheaper, and letting China into the WTO, that we were going to throw out all of those--all of the things that made us secure and just say: we'll let you do it. Now we find ourselves in a position on pharmaceuticals, on rare earth, on telecom, supply chain, on chips, where literally we have no leverage against China. Thus, our economic and national security, and the lives of our citizens are threatened because we were asleep at the wheel as a Nation, and did nothing to track and prepare for this. Is that a fair conclusion? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, I think it is. I'm very happy you brought up the words, "national security," because I think the major misstep that we have made for decades now is seeing pharmaceuticals and other critical inputs into our economy as economic matters. Where can we get the cheapest prices? That's all we cared about. I think there's a recognition right now. It's certainly a big issue when we interact with Congress, that some things are so important that they need to be put in a separate bucket. Not the economics bucket, the national security bucket. When they're put in the national security bucket, they have a different profile. Instead of trying to find the lowest cost producers, we need to find secure supply chains. We need to de- risk these supply chains from potential adversaries. I think that that mentality has started to permeate. We're just getting to the start of it. We started it with critical minerals. We're just starting to touch this issue in pharmaceuticals. Senator Husted. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to have these folks here today, and---- Mr. Hodges. Sir, if you'll permit me to add 10 seconds---- Senator Husted. Yes---- Mr. Hodges [continuing]. of words on this? Senator Husted [continuing]. sure. Please. Mr. Hodges. Part of the structural constraints with this have been that the U.S., for far too long, has looked at the commercial viability instead of the strategic value. That's something we've started to raise with the executive branch. We're also wanting to have conversations with you all on because it's the strategic value and these needs that you're talking about, the dynamic and sort of the paradigm shift there has to change. Senator Husted. Well, thank you. Thanks, for all the witnesses. It's clear that this is a problem. We got here, bad trade deals, too much regulation, taking our eye off the ball, and I guess, hopefully, this will serve as a wakeup call that we reverse those failed strategies. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Husted. Now, Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. In the 2025 annual report to Congress, the Commission wrote extensively on China's willingness to weaponize critical supply chain as a way to leverage their global power. While instances of these choke points being purposefully squeezed are not uncommon, they shed light on the world's dependence on China's supply chain. While China dominates in upstream materials such as active pharmaceutical ingredients, printed circuit boards, and foundational semiconductors, they do not yet dominate in the frontier of technology and pharmaceuticals. For all the witnesses, which supply chains should we prioritize strengthening in the short-and long-term? Are there differences in how we should approach securing the supply chain for current technologies and emerging technologies that will become more important for American power in the future, and what tradeoffs should we consider? Chris, do you want to start? Mr. Slevin. Thanks, Senator. Sticking with the topic of antibiotics, I'd say generic antibiotics, we make zero right now in this country. It's imperative that we quickly look at some of the work that this Committee has taken on, particularly as it relates to purchasing power. How to make the economics work, and to do that, you know, looking at the government as a major purchaser, looking at long-term purchasing agreements to make those economics work. Senator Gillibrand. Reva? Ms. Price. Thank you. I would also answer pharmaceuticals as a starting point, but, in addition, other areas or other components that allow for remote access into critical infrastructure would be another place. Senator Gillibrand. What do you mean by remote access into critical infrastructure? Ms. Price. If our energy infrastructure relied on component parts that could be accessed remotely from other places, that would raise serious concerns to me. Senator Gillibrand. Understood. Leland? Mr. Miller. I'm a little bit--thank you, Senator. I'm a little bit biased here because the hearing that you referred to, we spent a lot of time trying to work out what our top five priorities would probably be, and they are some of the ones you mentioned earlier. I think the world has understood critical minerals and rare earth magnets are a today issue, pharmaceuticals being very top of the list after that, foundational semiconductors, printed circuit boards, and I would add batteries to that. Senator Gillibrand. Batteries. Joshua? Mr. Hodges. I'd second everything that was already mentioned with pharmaceuticals, especially the batteries component. In addition to that, as I mentioned earlier, I think part of the issue isn't just looking at this at individual products that we need to be making, but structurally, the capacity, the strategic value in the long--near-term and long- term. I mentioned earlier sort of the chemical precursors. There's everyday household products that if the trajectory continues to move forward--this is my opinion, not a commission opinion. If the current trajectory continues to go in that direction, within two years, we're probably not going to be able to make most of these products here at home, so everything that was just outlined, I absolutely agree with. In addition to that, I would say chemical precursors and the ability to actually produce things here in the United States. Senator Gillibrand. What are some of the areas or industries where China is especially reliant on the United States? What are some of the regional and global consequences if we sought to tighten or limit our own supply chains in order to exert pressure on China? Chris? Mr. Slevin. Advanced semiconductors comes to mind, and it's pretty, you know, well known this Congress has taken a great interest in monitoring the tools we have in the government to restrict and to track. I think that the leads that we have on AI are frankly attributable to the advanced semiconductors that we design and make here, so that would be what I would suggest at the outset. Senator Gillibrand. Reva? Ms. Price. I don't think I have anything else to add to what Chris said. Senator Gillibrand. Leland? Mr. Miller. I would love to talk all day about advanced semiconductors, but since Chris already did, I would just add passenger jets. It's another thing that we--the Chinese have not been able to figure out over the course of many decades. Senator Gillibrand. Joshua? Mr. Hodges. In addition to, I share the sentiment, Chris and I have talked a lot about this. In addition to that, though, I would say quantum computing. It's an area where we're currently--we've got the lead. China's looking to gain from us on that, and--yes, I think I'll just stop there. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Hodges and Mr. Miller, how should Congress direct U.S. financing entities to prioritize funding for critical industries, including pharmaceuticals, that everyday Americans rely on? Mr. Hodges. Yes, thanks for the question. This is an area where, in my private capacity, I've engaged with businesses overseas and part of the issue we have here is understanding the problem. When the Chinese roll in and they're trying to work with--whether it's--Chris mentioned, the South African countries, Latin American countries, they show up with an entire delegation, with other businesses, sort of the whole package and cart in order to try to incentivize engagement and to pull them away from the United States and that's what we're up against when we're talking about leveraging sort of U.S. financing opportunities. What we've got to get better at here in the United States and I know Congress just passed, I think it was in December, the sort of expanded DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act, which I think has strengthened DFC, but those tools need to continue to be sharpened. They need to continue working better sort of across Exim and DFC and one of the recommendations we had last year was sort of an economic statecraft effort across the U.S. Government to make things more competitive. Mr. Miller. I would urge--I would urge Congress to look at this not just an issue of what China has leverage over, but what are the national security interests that we care about the most to prioritize. When we went through our exercise trying to figure out which of our supply chains were most vulnerable, we worked through the worst-case scenarios. For pharmaceuticals, the idea that we would be in a potential situation in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Chinese Government could say that we're not going to allow troops or American citizens to have antibiotics, or cancer drugs, or insulin, et cetera. When we moved down foundational semiconductors, we looked at China's trajectory on that, where China has been building up more capacity expansion than all the other countries in the world combined. We're looking down the road at 2030, where China could control, and then crank out, and then underprice, and absolutely hollow out the world's foundational semiconductor industry, which would put us in a bind very similar to printed circuit boards. I think the exercise is partly looking at what Beijing has leverage over, but it's, in large part, figuring out what are our national security priorities and what are the worst-case scenarios that we need to eliminate. I Think that's how we can start a list. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator Moody. Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member. When I saw that you were calling a hearing on, "Counting the cost: Communist China's Toll on Older Americans' Health, Finances, and Security," I immediately thought of the evolution of technology and the just mass increase we're seeing in cyber targeting scam schemes against our seniors. I mean, it's just unbelievable the explosion, not only in the number of incidents that we're seeing, but the types of scams that we're seeing, and the technology, and how it's enabling more and more complex, sophisticated--realistic I think is the best word-- scams. Many people are falling for them from every socioeconomic level, every educational level. If I told you some of the stories where people lost their life savings, accomplished smart people lost their life savings, it would leave you wondering what we're going to do about this issue and I really think we need to start paying attention because if anything, those types of things affect health, finance, and security. All three of those things are affected when that happens, and so, I was very excited about this hearing today because I think so many older Americans are paying the price for Communist China's predatory actions. One of the things I have particular familiarity with as Florida's attorney general was the scams that use technology. Some involved crypto. We would often have to go overseas to shut down websites and other types of things. It really became obvious quickly that we did not have, within the local governments, or police agencies, or sheriff's departments, the sophistication to really bring the large cases and that we had to do something on a statewide basis. When I was attorney general, I created a cyber fraud task force on a statewide level, and so we had to train up, not just the lawyers to understand what they were dealing with and the laws that they could use to go after these people and sometimes, we had arguments with the feds on what laws we could use, but we had to train our investigators, and then keeping those people, once we got them to the proficiency level to actually make a difference, that was a challenge as well. I found it was incredibly--we were the first in the Nation to do that on a statewide level, and it was so effective. All of the other states would ask us, how did you do this? How are you training? It was absolutely necessary, because when you looked at the numbers, the FBI's 2025 Internet Crime Report showed that cyber enabled crimes defrauded Americans of nearly $21 billion, with the largest portion of that money being lost due to use of cryptocurrency and artificial intelligence scams and then when you looked at how much it was increasing year over year, no matter how much we were becoming aware of it and focusing on it, the complaints that the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center, IC3, received in 2024 compared to 2025, it increased nearly 150,000 more people reaching out for help. That's to the Federal Government. Online scammers from China are not lone actors. They're usually syndicates and they orchestrate the theft of billions of dollars and usually it's from thousands of victims and they target citizens from other countries like the United States. When I saw as attorney general that these were evolving and that many of the seniors felt like they were not even going to be able to stand the chance, and we created the State Cyber Fraud Unit, it was so helpful because some of the monetary losses that we started to see did not trigger federal jurisdiction or where they would start prioritizing it. Once we started aggregating them and digging in, we realized it was so much larger than we originally thought it would have. Right now, I don't believe we have the manpower in the Federal Government to even chip away at the number of scams that we're seeing against older Americans. I know this because we are trying to deal with the--we were trying to deal with the overflow. I think it's incredibly important to build teams like we did in the State of Florida, the Cyber Fraud Enforcement Unit, in other states, so that they can work in tandem with the Federal Government, especially when the scams are coming from overseas, like in China. That's the only way we're going to get enough manpower. I mean, I'll ask you, Ms. Price, do you believe right now, currently we have enough manpower in traditional law enforcement agencies within the Federal Government to make a dent on the number of scams we're seeing against our seniors? Ms. Price. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership on this issue. No, is the short answer. One of the recommendations that the Commission made last fall was that we needed a better national public awareness campaign, but we also needed to enhance law enforcement training on scams. As you stated, state and local law enforcement agencies are often the first point of contact between those who have been--had funds stolen but those local law enforcement agencies don't have the knowledge, the background, or the training on these particular areas, so. Senator Moody. In your testimony--and, Mr. Chairman, may I have just another minute? In your testimony, you were explaining how China uses an inside out strategy when it comes to its scam centers, meaning China selectively cracks down on scam centers targeting Chinese citizens while allowing ones that target U.S. Citizens to flourish and we kind of saw this in the--so it blatantly incentivizes Chinese nationals to target other people outside their own country. We saw that because you noted in 2024, China reported a 30 percent decrease in money loss due to scams, while the United States saw a 40 percent increase in that same year. Is that kind of what you were getting at when you were talking about how China incentivizes people to scam others? Ms. Price. Right. The criminal elements just moved to an easier target because once China clamped down on their ability to defraud their--citizens of China, it was easier for them to go overseas, so that's what they did. Senator Moody. To try and bolster our manpower, that--and you can't just have anybody that day one takes oath to wear a badge and go against the bad guys. They're not going to know how to go after these complex cases. It takes significant training---- Ms. Price. Yes. Senator Moody [continuing]. in these cyber investigations, so today, I introduced the STOP Scams Against Seniors Act, which will help support similar efforts like in Florida, these Elder Justice Task Force. We called ours a Cyber Fraud Enforcement Unit, whatever a state chooses to call their statewide team but they will be specifically aimed to combat scams against seniors at that level and include locals as well, when we can, to complement what's already being done at a federal level. Is that legislation that you think, that coordination between the states and the Federal Government, is absolutely essential to increase the manpower? Ms. Price. Yes. That was in our recommendation, that we needed that. The administration has taken some very important steps in the last few months, but specifically the Task Force on Scam Centers, the Strike Force on Scam Centers. We actually believe that that needs to be codified. We have to make sure that they have the resources and the funding that's necessary to do all of this work on the local level and on the national level. Senator Moody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moody. Commissioner Hodges, fentanyl has been a plague on the American people. Addiction knows no ethnic, racial, socioeconomic status, gender, age boundaries. Can you detail China's connection to the fentanyl supply chain? Mr. Hodges. Yes, sir. Thank you. This is obviously a very important issue, one that has affected the lives of many families through the loss of life, as well as just a devastation on a wide scale, and so, the connection we've seen here is that using the southern border, we've got numerous different routes into the United States. It's widely believed, based off of evidence that we've seen, and that's also just publicly available, that the Chinese are actively involved in this at various different levels. While I don't believe that the President of China is ordering this, it's something that they're aware is happening, and it's definitely in coordination with the cartels. That's something--again, that's my personal opinion, and it's continuing to have widespread, negative-- devastating effects on families here in the United States on a daily basis. The Chairman. It's all intentional on their part. Mr. Hodges. That's my belief, yes. The Chairman. Commissioner Miller, you have tracked Communist China's economic coercion toolkit for years. Beijing has explicitly threatened in state media to cutoff pharmaceutical exports to the United States. In your assessment, how credible is that threat, and under what geopolitical conditions would Communist China actually pull that trigger? Mr. Miller. Thank you, Senator. I believe that the threat is credible, but I also don't think that the threat has to be something that China will actually follow through on. It just has to be looming out there and the reason I say this is that as long as China is able to weaponize supply chains that are important to Americans, they are going to have leverage over our economy. If the United States is considering certain policy actions, it's considering involvement in an Asian theater that China cares about, the question doesn't have to be whether China will actually pull the button. When we are making our decisions back at home, the U.S. Government will have to factor in the possibility that China has a lever to pull that could be catastrophic to Americans and catastrophic to our military. I would answer your question, sir, by saying I think the threat is credible, but the threat doesn't actually have to be followed through on. It simply has to be out there, and it'll affect our policies. The Chairman. It's a deterrent. Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Commissioner Price, the Commission has documented CCP-linked scam compounds operating across Southeast Asia, as you talked about, using trafficked labor to run--to run fraud operations against Americans around the clock. In your own assessment, does the Chinese Government have the ability to shut these operations down, and what is the most accurate characterization of their willingness to do so? Ms. Price. Well, we've seen them shut down some of these, especially those against their own people. That's the step number one, by going--trying to make arrangements and agreements with some of these countries to help them with their policing, they're basically saying: hey, we can do this. Let us into your country and we'll help you close these down, so that would be my second response. The Chairman. Commissioner Slevin, the CCP's acquisition of Americans personal and health data is not a future threat. It's happening right now, every day. In your assessment, what does Communist China already have, and what is it doing with it right now, and what is the danger to Americans? Mr. Slevin. As Commissioner Miller noted, we held a hearing on this a couple of months ago. Among the takeaways is a coordinated data collection that is integrated into the AI and innovation flywheel that China is making rapid progress on. I think when it comes to issues around robotics, which we haven't really talked about here, there is the integration of data from its own citizens, certainly. Certainly, of what is being collected among U.S. citizens, going into the flywheel of further innovation. The Chairman. Did you see the little fly? Did you see that article about the little fly that they--the robot? Mr. Slevin. No. The Chairman. It's about the size of a fly. Senator Gillibrand. What does it do? The Chairman. You said what? Senator Gillibrand. What does it do? The Chairman. It can, you know, just--I think so far what they said is it had--have a camera on it, but it's the size of a fly. Senator Gillibrand. It's so Hollywood. The Chairman. Yes, so for any of you, the Department of War recently added Chinese company, WuXi AppTec, to the 1260H list, which are companies identifying as Chinese military companies. Are you familiar with the company and what do they do? Mr. Miller. I can start. Yes, sir, WuXi AppTec is a very interesting entity. It's not a company per se. It's sort of an outsourcing platform for China's pharmaceutical R&D, drug manufacturing, drug discovery, et cetera. I think that it has become more and more integrated into the way our pharmaceutical companies do their--build their supply chains, and do their research, and build their drugs and we don't have a really good idea of how deep this is, or how deep the reliance is, although we know their presence is everywhere. I think that the larger issue to deal with when we're looking at something like WuXi, or we're looking at China's role in biotech's and biopharmaceuticals, is that China's beating the hell out of us right now, sir. What we saw in 2020 was the share of pharmaceutical licensing deals that were going to China were just very small, three to five percent or so. Every year, you can just see the chart, it went five percent, 15 percent, 25 percent, 35 percent, 40 percent. We're on track for over 40 percent, possibly much more of pharmaceutical deals to be taken by western pharmaceutical giants in the West and be brought to China and transferring know how, expertise, capital, et cetera, building up China as an innovation hub for its attempt to become a biotech power. The reason that this is so worrisome is that I think that as China's share of licensing deals increased, the refrain was: this is good, it's good for patients, it lowers costs, gives pharmaceutical giants some ability to move faster and all these things are true but I think it has started to become an issue that Congress needs to look at very, very closely. Because when you're talking about 40 percent of pharmaceutical licensing deals being moved over to China, with the trajectory that this could be going much farther up, this is something that has become--has risen to a national security issue. While some people will argue that 40 percent isn't that much, if we have numbers in two or three years that are 70 percent or 80 percent, I think there'll be very few people who don't think that is deserving of Congress's attention. I would suggest that the trajectory on this is downright scary. The Chairman. Do you think WuXi should be added to the companies of concerns under the BIOSECURE Act? Mr. Miller. I do. Now, this is something that our commission hasn't weighed in on collectively, so I'm speaking in my personal capacity but I think that during BIOSECURE, one of the issues was, would there be named entities in the legislation, or would there be a designation by the executive of which companies--after some investigation, which companies should be deemed working with the Chinese military? This has happened recently. I think that when you have a situation where you have a pharmaceutical giant that has been labeled by the U.S. Government as being part of the military ecosystem, then I think that that's sort of a prima facie case that WuXi AppTec should be--should be included on that list. The Chairman. Older Americans are engaged with digital health tools, telephone--telehealth platforms, remote monitoring devices, and connected medical equipment in an accelerating rate. Are you concerned of data from medical devices such as CGMs, ECG monitors, or even common health wearables are stored in Chinese servers rather than domestic servers, is there a danger in that? Anybody want to talk about that? Mr. Miller. Sure, I'll continue, and please, anyone add on? Yes, I think that the danger from data is something that we're just starting to get our arms around. Traditionally, we knew about the threats from Chinese cyber. They would hack our systems, and steal our data, and we knew all about that. In an era of Big Data, and in an era of artificial intelligence, the utility of things that are--data, that seems very mundane. In our hearing, we were talking about tire pressure on a car, not just where the car was going, or a gas tank meter, or anything else. Even the smallest little details could be things that could build a composite picture of where people are going. Medical histories, other things, wearables, you could tell people's health conditions. You'll be able to build a composite picture of a person, and then a network, and then of an organization. We're just starting to understand the degree to which this is vulnerable to China's approach and as I said in my testimony, China is not looking at this the way the United States is. The United States still sees these discrete issues. You know, it's a consumer issue, it's a privacy issue. For China, it's a national security issue related around data as a strategic resource and as artificial intelligence get better, and as quantum computers eventually come into the picture and are able to take some of these data, these enormous data bases that we've, you know, saved now and we're going to decrypt later, the ability for the Chinese to be able to build pictures of patterns of life and patterns of life for organizations is going to become enormous, and we should get to wrap our heads around that. The Chairman. Does HIPAA secure users? Mr. Slevin. Pardon? The Chairman. Does HIPAA help? Does it mean the fact that we're not supposed to share health data, does it help to stop this? Mr. Miller. That's a good question. I don't know. Yes, I'm not aware of that. The Chairman. How about all the Medicare, VA, Medicaid, TRICARE? Should that be--should that data be overseas in China? Mr. Miller. I think that we've come to the conclusion, bit by bit here, that we need to keep control of our data, because all of this data is important. You know, there could be something like your Fitbit, or something that measures your heart rate while you're sleeping seems completely irrelevant to what the Chinese would want to---- The Chairman. Garmain watch. Senator Gillibrand. Yes. Mr. Miller. The watches we wear, the smartphones. Mr. Hodges. From a national security perspective, both sort of across the United States, and then sort of geopolitically, as Leland is pointing out here is, every data point becomes a new tool that they can use to create either a psychological operation against--and with the advent of AI, and sort of the expansive nature of the different robust tools they have inside the United States. Someone was mentioning Salt Typhoon earlier. They have access to cell phone data. They have access to credit card data. They have access to your health data. Each of these data points collectively provides them with targets of opportunity on how to get involved with people and mess with people on a daily basis, or an individual basis, including on a societal basis. It's very, very much of concern. The Chairman. You guys are down a couple commissioners. When's that going to change? Ms. Price. We're down two commissioners. We're waiting for an appointment by Senator Thune and from Senator Schumer. We had hoped--had hoped it would happen last January. The Chairman. Ranking Member Gillibrand. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to hear everybody's thoughts on AI, whether AI can be useful in targeting these scams, finding these scams, decoding these scams, identifying, blocking. I'd like to understand from your perspective what opportunities you see in AI, and obviously, there's going to be enormous challenges with AI, so you can start with either one. Reva, you can start. Ms. Price. Okay. I'm not going to pretend to be an expert on how the engineers make AI work, but we know that using scam centers as an example, last fall, there were numerous reports of how much social media in the U.S. was providing advertising or space for advertising for these scam centers. In the last few months, the technology companies have sort of seen the light. They created an industry accord against online scams and fraud in March. Meta, Microsoft, others signed on. They've recently spoken with the Strike Force and talked about how much they've been able to crack down on their own platforms. The fact that they can crack down on their own platforms, that they know how to identify it, and that they've actually said in their industry accord that they are going to work on new ways to do so, gets me to the answer of, yes, they know--they can go a very, very long way. We also know that there is a framework for identifying some of these scams in AI. The U.K., Australia, and Taiwan have each some sort of ad verification requirement to prevent false and fraudulent content, so it leads me to believe the technology is there. I'll let someone who understands how the technology is made take it from there. Mr. Hodges. To expand a little bit to an area that I know is of interest to the Committee, but I think it is very relevant to this question, and I think actually Reva brought up the issue of energy grid and infrastructure concerns earlier. This is an area where AI can absolutely be put to good use, and it's an area where artificial intelligence, right now, if you get the right model, and you train it to go in look at these systems, identify vulnerabilities, identify the components of concern. In some cases, the AI is getting sophisticated enough where it can go in and rewrite the malware so it's no longer harmful. Not only identify it until you have a problem, but actually go in and change it so you don't have to go in and rip things out and replace it at the hardware level. You could change it at the software level. That's just one area. Again, I know the Committee's concerned about the energy grid infrastructure. It's an area where I think there's tons of value, in going back to the scam centers and sort of the technical piece here is I do think that there are tools that could be leveraged by the IC, by law enforcement, to utilize AI, to go target on an offensive basis, go out and sort of bring down some of those systems overseas. Again, that's a policy debate for you-all to have with the executive branch, but there are opportunities there. Mr. Miller. If I could just bring it up to 50,000 feet very quickly. We know what Xi Jinping is concerned about, what he's focused on, because he gave us his playbook back in 2015 called, "Made in China 2025," and that AI was first among many of the technologies that he believes will allow China to win the Fourth Industrial Revolution. AI is even more important than that because AI is an enabler technology. It will make quantum better, it will make biotech better, it will make robotics and automation better, so I would say the focus on AI, there's a lot of focus back home. We read the paper. You can't get an article that's not AI. There's just as much focus over in China right now, and how they can win that competition. Mr. Slevin. Only would add to that. The way we define the competition, I think it is still evolving. You know, as a country with the premier frontier models, we focus on AGI. This Congress talks a lot about AGI. I think that in China, we're seeing just the focus on adoption as being really vital and among its public, among its--among its companies and other users. I think that it's an important factor for policymakers to consider is how to promote adoption, safe adoption. The Chairman. You talked about these scam centers. Is China making money. Are they getting--are they getting kickbacks from these scam centers? Ms. Price. I don't have evidence that shows that, but we do know that they've worked with crime syndicates, and the crime syndicates have been involved in efforts like Belt and Road and others, so you can draw the line. The Chairman. A lot of seniors have money in 401ks. Twenty, twenty-five percent of that money is invested in Chinese companies because of how this works. Is investing in a Chinese company the same as investing in South Korean company? Mr. Hodges. Leland is definitely the expert here, but I'm going to jump ahead just because this is an area that's near to my heart. Absolutely not, sir and it's my opinion, and I think the Commission has previously had recommendations on this, but investments into China, especially with dual-use technology, as we just saw from the recent listing by the Department of War, you're essentially helping fuel the advance of the Chinese military and the CCP that is at a later date potentially going to put American soldiers' lives at risk, so absolutely, it's not the same. The Chairman. What are we not talking about enough? Mr. Miller. When we're talking about investment into China, the outbound investment conversation, we have been focusing almost entirely on active investment. What our venture capital firms are doing or what our private equity firms are doing, and usually in very narrow buckets, so AI quantum, advanced semiconductors. The other part of this, and this is something the Commission had a hearing on in 2024, and we've had some recommendations on, is taking a closer look at portfolio investment, which is also known as passive investment. The problem with all these billions of dollars of capital going to China is that, as you said, there are no private companies, no truly private companies in China. The state-- because of civil-military fusion, if the government wants something, the government will take something. I think we have an inability to know what percentage, what share of this capital, from what companies, is going to help the Party or to help the military. One of the issues that we have is that retirees are often invested in funds, unknowingly, in or have a large share of their capital parked in Chinese companies that may or may not be funding a military operation that they may one day be fighting against. It's been a very big problem and there are obviously major financial issues to deal with, there's macroeconomic issues, in order to rectify this problem. I would suggest that one thing that the major problem here is that is that retirees and other investors have no transparency whatsoever that their funds--that their money is actually parked in these funds that do invest in these Chinese companies, and they're often sanctioned Chinese companies that are still in these stock market indexes or mutual funds. I would suggest that the idea of having some sort of transparency around it, perhaps with a label on a fund saying this fund invests in Chinese-sanctioned companies, write it in big bold letters to the extent that Congress or administration is not able to move quickly on something related to portfolio investment. There are ways of giving greater transparency around this issue, and it would give the ability of people who are having their money sent over there unknowingly to know: maybe I don't want to park my money with that company or in that fund because I know it's doing something that I might not like The Chairman. Anybody else? All right. I want to thank you all. Thank you for what you're doing. Thank you for what the Commission's doing. I want to thank the ranking member for being such a great partner in dealing with this issue. The threats we've talked about today don't have a partisan focus, and our approach to solving them shouldn't either. I want to remind seniors and families watching that the Senate Aging Committee operates a fraud hotline for anyone who believes they have been targeted or victimized. That number is 1-855-303-9470. If any seniors have additional questions for the witnesses or statements to be added, the hearing record will be open until next Wednesday at 5:00 p.m. Thank you. Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] ======================================================================= APPENDIX ======================================================================= Prepared Witness Statements ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= Questions for the Record ======================================================================= U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Counting the Cost: Communist China's Toll on Older American's Health, Finances, and Security" June 17, 2026 Questions for the Record Reva Price Senator Raphael Warnock Question: According to the Federal Trade Commission, financial fraud was more prevalent in Georgia than in any other state in 2023, with 437 incidents per 100,000 individuals. In 2023, Georgians aged 60 and older reported losses of over $92 million to the Federal Bureau of Information's Internet Crime Complaint Center. To address this issue, I co-introduced S. 2019, the Task Force for Recognizing and Averting Payment Scams Act, which would establish a multi-agency task force to examine fraud trends and lead prevention efforts. Last Congress, I also introduced the Empowering States to Protect Seniors from Bad Actors Act, which would create a new grant program to protect senior investors. How would multi-agency coordination and federal grant programs focused on investigating fraud protect Georgia seniors from financial scams? Response: Yes - multi-agency coordination focused on investigating fraud would go a long way toward protecting Georgia seniors and all Americans from financial scams. This is why the USCC's 2025 Annual Report to Congress recommended the creation of an interagency task force to combat scam centers. The Administration's establishment of the Scam Center Strike Force late last year was a positive step toward enhancing multi-agency coordination around combatting scam centers, but Congress can continue the momentum of these efforts, as discussed below: Congress should codify a task force into law, which will ensure that it is permanent, accountable to Congress, and focused on the national security risks posed by Chinese criminal networks in Southeast Asia involved in the scam crisis. The Commission's 2025 recommendation on scam centers also called for creation of a national public awareness campaign and for enhancing law enforcement training on scams. <There continues to be a significant victim reporting gap. State and local law enforcement agencies are often the first point of contact when Americans fall victim to scam centers, but most departments lack the training and resources to identify these cases as part of transnational criminal operations linked to China. Too often, cases are filed as isolated fraud incidents and never reach the federal investigators who could connect them to broader scam center networks. Congress should also consider directing the Scam Center Strike Force to establish information-sharing mechanisms and training programs, particularly for departments serving communities with large elderly populations in Georgia and around the country, that enable state and local agencies to identify, document, and refer scam center-linked cases to federal authorities. Regarding grant programs, the Commission did not propose a recommendation concerning funding levels but the need for sufficient resources to establish a successful task force is implied. However, the Commission did recommend that Congress consider a victim restitution program, which would help make vulnerable seniors whole: When scam center assets are successfully recovered, Congress should consider directing that the proceeds be prioritized for victim restitution rather than flowing into the general Assets Forfeiture Fund. These are stolen savings, disproportionately taken from elderly Americans, and victims should be first in line when assets are recovered. Question: A recent Government Accountability Office report identified the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the best federal agencies to lead a government-wide strategy on anti-scam efforts. However, President Trump fired two members of the five-member FTC in March 2025, and this administration has attempted to eliminate the CFPB. What steps should Congress take to ensure these federal agencies have the capacity to combat domestic and international scams, fraud, and financial exploitation targeting older adults? Response: The Commission's 2025 recommendation did not propose a specific agency lead the inter-agency effort to combat Chinese- linked scam operations. However, you correctly identify the cross-coordination with appropriate staffing needed to address this multifaceted issue across multiple governmental entities that could and should play a role in protecting Georgians and all Americans. Our relevant considerations for Congress on inter-agency coordination include: A call for greater cooperation between the U.S. government and financial intermediaries to detect and stop these scams, particularly relating to cryptocurrency. Given their increasing use by criminal organizations to move large sums of money rapidly outside of the United States, Congress should also consider whether existing regulation of cryptocurrency ATMs is sufficient. Most regulation occurs via state-level money transmitter or money services laws, which typically include provisions on enforcing anti-money laundering regulations but vary in scope and rigor. Federal regulation or guidance could strengthen oversight of cryptocurrency ATM operators. Relatedly, given the scale of the scam center problem, the U.S. anti-money laundering regime may be ill-equipped for the challenge of stopping transnational crime syndicates from exploiting cryptocurrency to launder the billions of dollars they steal from Americans each year. Congress should consider if U.S. anti-money laundering policies should be updated in light of the growth of scam centers and consider ways to expand cooperation with allies and partners to coordinate enforcement across borders. The U.S. government's seizure of approximately $15 billion in Bitcoin from the Prince Group demonstrates that scam center proceeds can be identified and recovered through blockchain analysis. Congress should consider establishing a reward program that incentivizes cryptocurrency tracing firms and other private sector actors to identify and report stolen assets linked to scam center operations, modeled on existing whistleblower frameworks at the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. Scam centers rely on spoofed phone calls, SMS phishing campaigns, and social media platforms to make initial contact with potential victims. Congress should consider requiring telecommunications carriers and social media platforms to implement stronger verification and detection measures targeting scam center-linked activity. Existing anti-spoofing frameworks such as STIR/SHAKEN (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited/Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs)-which require carriers to verify that caller ID information is legitimate before a call reaches the recipient- have helped combat domestic caller ID spoofing but were not designed to address the international calls, text messages, and social media outreach that scam centers predominantly use to target Americans. Congress should consider expanding the scope of these frameworks to close these gaps. Chinese criminal networks have responded to crackdowns in Southeast Asia by globalizing their operations. In order to stop new clusters of scam centers from emerging in other regions, the United States should act proactively to make disrupting the development of scam centers beyond Southeast Asia a priority for U.S. diplomacy, intelligence gathering, security cooperation, and foreign assistance. Scam centers run by Chinese criminal organizations threaten the wellbeing of Americans and the security of the United States. The U.S. government should treat the scam crisis, alongside the fentanyl epidemic, as a priority issue in bilateral negotiations with Beijing and the governments of countries where scam centers operate. U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging "Counting the Cost: Communist China's Toll on Older American's Health, Finances, and Security" June 17, 2026 Questions for the Record Chris Slevin Senator Raphael Warnock Question: Biomedical research is critical to bolstering domestic pharmaceutical innovation and manufacturing infrastructure. Despite its importance in strengthening the domestic drug supply chain, the Trump Administration has made deep cuts to scientific research in the United States, including funding for the National Institutes of Health, causing nearly 75 percent of U.S. scientists, including Chinese and Chinese-American researchers, to consider leaving the country. How can Congress strengthen the domestic pharmaceutical supply chain through increased investment in biomedical research? Response: The Commission's recent work on these interrelated issues shows that the U.S. vulnerability sits upstream: as much as a quarter of the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in American drugs may trace back to China, directly or through India, and the exposure is greater still for key starting materials (KSMs). Scientific research investment - in particular to the NIH - is central to changing that, because the United States will not win back commodity drug chemistry on cost alone and needs new manufacturing technologies to compete. In its 2024 Annual Report, the Commission recommended that Congress support significant federal investment in biotechnology at every stage, from basic research through product development and market deployment, including equipment manufacturing capacity. In 2025, the Commission recommended that Congress make a resilient bioeconomy industrial base a strategic national objective, and that it expand CHIPS and Science Act authorities to fund national research and development hubs in key strategic sectors. That report also stated that the United States must sustain investment in basic and applied research to keep its technological lead. Research must be paired with greater transparency into the supply chain, as well as demand, which is why the Commission also recommended expanding FDA authority to require reporting of the volume and ultimate origin of APIs and KSMs, including Chinese content routed through third countries, and directing CMS to explore procurement and reimbursement tools such as price floor commitments. The Commission examined these issues further in 2026, including on its visit to India, and will issue additional recommendations in this year's Annual Report, which we will be sure to update you and the Committee on. Question: What steps can Congress take to recruit and retain the best and brightest scientists, including those from China, so that the United States continues attracting top talent to the biomedical ecosystem? Response: The Commission has not issued a recommendation specific to immigration or the recruitment of foreign scientists, so part of this answer reflects my own view. The Commission's 2025 Annual Report warned that the United States faces a future in which it depends on China for the most cutting-edge biotechnology innovations, and that outcome will be decided largely by where the world's best researchers choose to work. The Commission's recommendations treat workforce as part of industrial strategy: in 2025 it called for support for workforce development and education in key strategic sectors. In the quantum context, it called for expanded fellowships and talent exchange programs with allies, a model Congress could apply to biomedical science. On security, the Commission's 2024 recommendation called for prior approval and ongoing oversight of Chinese involvement in biotechnology companies operating in the United States, including involvement with U.S. colleges and universities. That approach targets entities and transactions, and in my view research security should focus on conduct and affiliations rather than national origin, so that it protects American research without driving away loyal and productive scientists. I also believe Congress should provide predictable research funding and a clear path for top scientists trained here, including those from China, to stay and build their careers in the United States. ======================================================================= Statements for the Record ======================================================================= [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]