DATA CENTERS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS: MODERNIZING DHS'S SRMA ROLE FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS AND IT SECTORS

Committee on Homeland Security · Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection House April 29, 2026

Witnesses (4)

  • Mr. Robert Mayer, Senior Vice President, Cybersecurity & Innovation, USTelecom--The Broadband Association:
  • Mr. Samuel S. Visner, Chair, Board of Directors, Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
  • Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, USN (Ret.), Senior Director and Senior Fellow, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies:
  • Mr. Scott C. Algeier, Executive Director, Information Technology--Information Sharing and Analysis Center:

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- DATA CENTERS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS: MODERNIZING DHS'S SRMA ROLE FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS AND IT SECTORS

[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 DATA CENTERS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 NETWORKS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS: 
 MODERNIZING DHS'S SRMA ROLE FOR THE 
 COMMUNICATIONS AND IT SECTORS
=======================================================================

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
 PROTECTION

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 APRIL 29, 2026

 __________

 Serial No. 119-46

 __________

 Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
 

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
64-504 WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
 
 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

 Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Vice Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
 Chair Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Shri Thanedar, Michigan
August Pfluger, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Timothy M. Kennedy, New York
Elijah Crane, Arizona LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Nick LaLota, New York Julie Johnson, Texas, Vice Ranking 
Andrew Ogles, Tennessee Member
Sheri Biggs, South Carolina Pablo Jose Hernandez, Puerto Rico
Gabe Evans, Colorado Nellie Pou, New Jersey
Ryan Mackenzie, Pennsylvania James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
Brad Knott, North Carolina Analilia Mejia, New Jersey
Vince Fong, California Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Matt Van Epps, Tennessee Al Green, Texas
David P. Joyce, Ohio
 Keighle Joyce, Staff Director
 Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
 Sean Corcoran, Chief Clerk
 ------ 

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

 Andrew Ogles, Tennessee, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois, 
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Ranking Member
Nick LaLota, New York Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Vince Fong, California LaMonica McIver, New Jersey
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York (ex James R. Walkinshaw, Virginia
 officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
 (ex officio)
 Roland Hernandez, Subcommittee Staff Director
 Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
 
 C O N T E N T S

 ---------- 
 Page

 Statements

The Honorable Andrew Ogles, a Representative in Congress From the 
 State of Tennessee, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity 
 and Infrastructure Protection:
 Oral Statement................................................. 1
 Prepared Statement............................................. 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
 From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
 Homeland Security:
 Oral Statement................................................. 3
 Prepared Statement............................................. 4

 Witnesses

Mr. Robert Mayer, Senior Vice President, Cybersecurity & 
 Innovation, USTelecom--The Broadband Association:
 Oral Statement................................................. 6
 Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Samuel S. Visner, Chair, Board of Directors, Space 
 Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
 Oral Statement................................................. 11
 Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, USN (Ret.), Senior Director and 
 Senior Fellow, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, 
 Foundation for Defense of Democracies:
 Oral Statement................................................. 14
 Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Scott C. Algeier, Executive Director, Information 
 Technology--Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
 Oral Statement................................................. 26
 Prepared Statement............................................. 28

 
 DATA CENTERS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS: MODERNIZING DHS'S SRMA ROLE FOR THE 
 COMMUNICATIONS AND IT SECTORS

 ---------- 

 Wednesday, April 29, 2026

 U.S. House of Representatives,
 Committee on Homeland Security,
 Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and 
 Infrastructure Protection,
 Washington, DC.
 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock 
a.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Andy 
Ogles [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
 Present: Representatives Ogles, Fong, LaLota, Ramirez, 
Magaziner, and McIver.
 Also present: Representative Thompson.
 Mr. Ogles. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection will come to 
order. Without objection, the Chair may declare the committee 
in recess at any point.
 The purpose of this hearing is to assess the Department of 
Homeland Security's role as a Sector Risk Management Agency, or 
SRMA, for the communications and information technology sectors 
and to assess whether that role is keeping pace with the 
evolving threat environment facing America's digital 
infrastructure. This hearing will examine how infrastructure 
such as hyperscale data centers, telecommunications networks, 
subsea cable systems, and space-based communication platforms 
fit within the existing critical infrastructure sector 
construct and whether the Department's resources and 
authorities sufficiently support its SRMA role for these 
sectors.
 Now, we will be having a vote series called here shortly, 
so I will reserve my opening statement until after that series 
so that we can get to the witnesses' statements.
 [The statement of Chairman Ogles follows:]
 Statement of Chairman Andrew Ogles
 Wednesday, April 29, 2026
 Good morning. Thank you all for being here, and thank you to our 
witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today.
 Today's hearing is about whether the framework the Federal 
Government relies on to secure America's most critical digital 
infrastructure is keeping pace with the threats we face and the 
technology we now depend on.
 The answer, unfortunately, is no.
 For years, the United States has organized critical infrastructure 
security around designated sectors and Sector Risk Management Agencies 
(SRMA). That framework was built to ensure the Federal Government has 
clear lines of responsibility, specialized expertise, and regular 
coordination with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure.
 But the digital infrastructure that supports our economy, our 
government, and our national security has changed dramatically.
 The systems that carry internet traffic, host Federal workloads, 
process financial transactions, support military operations, and 
connect Americans to essential services are increasingly concentrated 
in hyperscale data centers, subsea cable systems, telecommunications 
networks, and commercial satellites. These systems are privately owned, 
globally distributed, deeply interconnected, and strategically vital.
 Our adversaries understand that. They are already targeting them.
 Earlier this year, Iranian drones reportedly struck data centers in 
the Middle East that are owned and operated by an American company, 
forcing facilities off-line and disrupting banking and payment systems 
across the region. Iranian state media stated that one of the 
facilities was targeted because of its role in supporting U.S. military 
and intelligence activities.
 That should get our attention. If a major data center is attacked, 
disrupted, or taken off-line, the consequences can reach far beyond one 
company or one sector.
 Yet our current framework does not provide a clear, unified 
approach to data center security. It does not clearly answer which 
Federal agency is responsible for understanding the risk, coordinating 
with industry, or leading the response when this infrastructure is 
targeted.
 The same problem exists with subsea cables.
 Roughly 99 percent of international internet traffic travels 
through undersea cable systems. These cables carry the communications, 
financial transactions, cloud traffic, and Government data that connect 
the United States to the rest of the world.
 They have also become a target. Since 2022, multiple subsea cables 
in the Baltic Sea and near Taiwan have been cut or damaged.
 If a major subsea cable route affecting U.S. connectivity is 
attacked, the Federal Government should know who is in charge. Right 
now, that answer is not clear enough.
 Space-based systems raise the same concern.
 Commercial satellites now support communications, navigation, 
emergency response, military operations, financial networks, 
transportation, and countless other services. Space is no longer a 
niche national security domain reserved for Government systems. It is 
part of the operating environment for modern critical infrastructure.
 At the same time, our adversaries are developing and using 
counterspace capabilities. China has built a large intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance satellite network that can support 
targeting of U.S. forces. Russia has demonstrated anti-satellite 
capabilities and attacked satellite communications at the outset of its 
invasion of Ukraine.
 Space is already contested. But space is not currently designated 
as a critical infrastructure sector, and there is no SRMA responsible 
for commercial space infrastructure resilience.
 That gap needs to be examined. We also need to look hard at the 
performance of the existing framework in the wake of Salt Typhoon.
 Salt Typhoon was not just another cyber incident. It was one of the 
most consequential nation-state intrusions into U.S. telecommunications 
infrastructure in American history.
 This campaign exposed serious questions about visibility, 
information sharing, Federal coordination, and the security 
expectations placed on companies that operate the cellular networks 
Americans rely on every day.
 If the Federal Government cannot identify, communicate, and respond 
effectively when a foreign adversary compromises core 
telecommunications infrastructure, then we need to ask whether the 
current model is working as intended.
 That does not mean we should weaken the role of DHS or CISA. To the 
contrary, this hearing should help us understand how to strengthen 
DHS's role, through CISA, as the SRMA for both the Information 
Technology and Communications sectors.
 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about where the 
current framework is working, where it is falling short, and what 
changes Congress should consider to strengthen the security and 
resilience of these systems.
 Thank you.

 Mr. Ogles. That said, I now recognize--you want me to 
recognize you, sir?
 Mr. Thompson. Sure.
 Mr. Ogles. I recognize the Ranking Member of the full 
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for 
his opening statement.
 Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
understand the sequencing of votes this morning is interrupting 
part of the activities of the committee.
 I want to welcome our newly-minted Ranking Member, Mrs. 
Ramirez, to the committee and this is her maiden voyage. We 
appreciate her leadership on the full committee and as a former 
very interested person in a lot of things. We are glad to have 
you. So I would like to thank the witnesses also for 
participating in today's hearing.
 In October 2024, we all learned about Salt Typhoon's 
successful breach of the U.S. telecommunications network. 
Chinese state-backed hackers had successfully gained access to 
the sensitive communications of some of the most high-profile 
individuals in our country and accessed data on a vast number 
of Americans. Undetected for months or even years, this wide-
ranging incident demonstrated the sophistication of PRC hackers 
and the vulnerabilities in our own critical infrastructure.
 At the time, many thought Salt Typhoon would be a wake-up 
call about the needs to prioritize cybersecurity and invest in 
improving our cyber defenses. The Biden administration 
immediately took steps to better understand the incident and 
strengthen our defenses by launching a Cyber Safety Review 
Board investigation into the incident and the FCC proposed 
cybersecurity requirements for telecommunications providers.
 Unfortunately, starting on January 20 of last year, 
President Trump's vendetta against CISA, coupled with DOGE's 
slash-and-burn approach to dismantling the Federal Government, 
has taken priority over our national security. Under President 
Trump's leadership, CISA has forced roughly 1,000 employees, 
almost a third of its staff, out. The Cyber Safety Review Board 
has been disbanded, leaving Congress and the public largely in 
the dark about how Salt Typhoon's telecommunications breach 
occurred.
 Key public-private collaboration forums, like the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Committee, or CIPAC, has 
been shut down. A Republican-controlled Congress has repeatedly 
failed to pass a long-term reauthorization of the Cyber 
Information Sharing Act of 2015 despite broad bipartisan 
support for doing so, leaving the private sector in limbo as to 
whether the law's liability protections will remain in place 
going forward. Now as we face new threats, like rapidly-
advancing frontier AI models and the war with Iran, CISA's 
capacity to partner with critical infrastructure and fulfill 
its Sector Risk Management Agency's responsibility is 
significantly diminished. We must work to right this ship 
before it is too late.
 I appreciate the witnesses for being here today to share 
their perspectives from the private sector on what more is 
needed from CISA and Congress to better defend the 
communications and information technology sectors. We all rely 
on these sectors every day and breaches of communications and 
IT networks put Americans' privacy and our national security at 
risk. We must act quickly to rebuild CISA's capacity to serve 
as the Sector Risk Management Agency that these sectors need 
and CISA must reestablish the public-private partnerships that 
are necessary for the Government and critical infrastructure to 
productively collaborate to secure the homeland.
 I hope we can have a candid conversation today about the 
current status of CISA's SRMA work and how CISA can better 
support critical infrastructure. For CISA to serve the 
communications and information technology sectors properly, it 
will need to have sufficient staffing and resources to respond 
to the evolving threat landscape. I am glad that CISA is 
looking to hire over 300 individuals in the near future, but I 
worry if qualified applicants will be interested in serving at 
an agency that has seen its morale destroyed by a hostile 
administration. Additionally, CISA must develop the capacity 
and leadership to not just manage day-to-day activities, but to 
carry out meaningful planning and operations that address new 
threats and technology that will require restored partnerships 
with critical infrastructure.
 I know the witnesses here today have devoted their careers 
to improving our national security and have long histories of 
working with CISA and other Federal agencies to better secure 
our critical infrastructure. I look forward to their testimony 
on what more CISA and this subcommittee can do to strengthen 
the security of the communications and the information 
technology sector so vital to this country.
 I thank the witnesses for being here, Mr. Chair, and I 
yield back.
 [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
 Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
 April 29, 2026
 In October 2024, we all learned about Salt Typhoon's successful 
breach of U.S. telecommunication networks. Chinese state-backed hackers 
had successfully gained access to the sensitive communications of some 
of the most high-profile individuals in our country and accessed data 
on a vast number of Americans. Undetected for months or even years, 
this wide-ranging incident demonstrated the sophistication of PRC 
hackers and the vulnerabilities in our own critical infrastructure.
 At the time, many thought Salt Typhoon would be a wake-up call 
about the need to prioritize cybersecurity and invest in improving our 
cyber defenses. The Biden administration immediately took steps to 
better understand the incident and strengthen our defenses by launching 
a Cyber Safety Review Board investigation into the incident, and the 
FCC proposed cybersecurity requirements for telecommunications 
providers.
 Unfortunately, starting on January 20 of last year, President 
Trump's vendetta against CISA--coupled with DOGE's slash-and-burn 
approach to dismantling the Federal Government--have taken priority 
over our national security. Under President Trump's leadership, CISA 
has forced out roughly 1,000 employees or almost a third of its staff. 
The Cyber Safety Review Board has been disbanded, leaving Congress and 
the public largely in the dark about how Salt Typhoon's 
telecommunications breach occurred.
 Key public-private collaboration forums, like the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, or CIPAC, have been shut 
down. A Republican-controlled Congress has repeatedly failed to pass a 
long-term reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 
of 2015 despite broad bipartisan support for doing so, leaving the 
private sector in limbo as to whether the law's vital liability 
protections will remain in place going forward.
 Now, as we face new threats, like rapidly-advancing frontier AI 
models and the war with Iran, CISA's capacity to partner with critical 
infrastructure and fulfill its sector risk management agency 
responsibilities is significantly diminished. We must work to right 
this ship before it's too late.
 I appreciate the witnesses for being here today to share their 
perspectives from the private sector on what more is needed from CISA 
and Congress to better defend the communications and information 
technology sectors. We all rely on these sectors every day and breaches 
of communications and IT networks put Americans' privacy and our 
national security at risk.
 We must act quickly to rebuild CISA's capacity to serve as the 
sector risk management agency that these sectors need, and CISA must 
re-establish the public-private partnerships that are necessary for the 
Government and critical infrastructure to productively collaborate to 
secure the homeland. I hope we can have a candid conversation today 
about the current status of CISA's SRMA work and how CISA can better 
support critical infrastructure.
 For CISA to serve the communications and information technology 
sectors properly, it will need to have sufficient staffing and 
resources to respond to the evolving threat landscape. I am glad that 
CISA is looking to hire over 300 individuals in the near future, but I 
worry if qualified applicants will be interested in serving at an 
agency that has seen its morale destroyed by a hostile administration.
 Additionally, CISA must develop the capacity and leadership to not 
just manage day-to-day activities but to carry out meaningful planning 
and operations that address new threats and technology. That will 
require restored partnerships with critical infrastructure. I know the 
witnesses here today have devoted their careers to improving our 
national security and have long histories of working with CISA and 
other Federal agencies to better secure our critical infrastructure.
 I look forward to their testimony on what more CISA and this 
subcommittee can do to strengthen the security of the communications 
and information technology sectors that are so vital to our security.

 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson.
 Before we proceed, I would like to also take a moment to 
formally welcome Ranking Member Ramirez as the Ranking Member 
of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection 
Subcommittee. The subcommittee has often been a setting for 
bipartisanship and collaboration and I look forward to working 
with you going forward as we examine and address key issues of 
cyber and national security.
 Just as I am going to reserve my opening statement till 
after the vote series, would you like to do the same?
 Mrs. Ramirez. Yes.
 Mr. Ogles. The Ranking Member is going to reserve her 
opening statement as well, and then we will proceed forward. 
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
 I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses 
before us today on this important topic. Pursuant to committee 
rule VIII(C), I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise 
their right hands.
 [Witnesses sworn.]
 Mr. Ogles. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have 
answered in the affirmative. Thank you and please be seated.
 I would like to formally introduce our witnesses. Again, 
thank you for being here and my humble apologies for the 
disruption and flow--make sure that is not me, OK--of the 
proceedings. We will get to votes and we will come back as 
quickly as possible.
 Mr. Robert Mayer is senior vice president of the 
cybersecurity and innovation at USTelecom--The Broadband 
Association with responsibility for leading cyber and national 
security policy and strategic initiatives. He is the current 
chair of the Communications Sector Coordinating Council and 
serves as co-chair of the Department of Homeland Security's ICT 
Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force. Mr. Mayer has 
previously served as the top telecommunications official for 
New York State, held various regulatory consulting and analyst 
roles, and served in the U.S. Air Force supervising 
intelligence and communications operations.
 Mr. Sam Visner is the chair of the board of directors for 
the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center. He also 
serves as security director of Netcracker Technology, which he 
represents as a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Communications Sector Coordinating Council. Mr. Visner is the 
former director of MITRE's National Cybersecurity FFRDC, or 
NCF, and served as chief of Signals Intelligence Programs at 
the National Security Agency.
 Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery is senior director of the 
Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, CCTI, and a senior 
fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. At CCTI, 
he leads efforts to advance U.S. national and economic 
security, counter cyber threats, and combat adversary cyber-
enabled economic warfare campaigns. RADM Montgomery also 
serves--also leads, rather--CSC 2.0, an initiative focused on 
implementing the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission. Prior to these roles, he was the policy director 
for the Senate Armed Service Committee and served for 32 years 
in the U.S. Navy.
 Mr. Scott Algeier is the founder, president, and CEO of 
cybersecurity consulting firm Conrad, Inc.; executive director 
of the Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center, IT ISAC; and executive director of the Food and 
Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis Center. He has 
spent the past 20 years at the intersection of cybersecurity 
policy and operations. Previously, Scott was manager of 
homeland security at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, where he 
coordinated the U.S. Chamber's critical infrastructure 
protection, cybersecurity, and disaster management public 
policy initiatives.
 I want to thank each of our distinguished witnesses. The 
amount of experience you have on this panel represents a couple 
hundred years and for that we thank you for your time here.
 So with that, I now recognize Mr. Mayer for 5 minutes to 
summarize his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAYER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CYBERSECURITY 
 & INNOVATION, USTELECOM--THE BROADBAND ASSOCIATION

 Mr. Mayer. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, 
Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member Ramirez, and Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
I'm Robert Mayer, senior vice president of cybersecurity and 
innovation at USTelecom and chair of the Communications Sector 
Coordinating Council. I also serve as co-chair of the 
Department of Homeland Security's ICT Supply Chain Risk 
Management Task Force.
 Today I will focus my remarks on 3 areas: our partnership 
with the Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency, CISA, 
the importance of sustaining and modernizing authorities for 
public-private coordination, and the need for greater 
visibility and coherence in the ICT supply chain.
 For over 6 decades, the communications sector has worked 
hand-in-hand with the Federal Government to help protect the 
systems Americans rely on every day. That partnership has 
become even more critical as cyber threats have grown more 
persistent, sophisticated, and far-reaching. Some of the most 
meaningful advances in communications security have come from 
sustained operational engagement between Government and 
industry through efforts like the President's National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee, NSTAC; the Joint Cyber 
Defense Collaborative, JCDC; and the Enduring Security 
Framework, ESF. We look forward to supporting the Critical 
Infrastructure Fortify program, which will deepen structured 
engagement between CISA, allied partners, and industry to help 
critical infrastructure organizations rapidly respond during 
periods of degradation.
 We should also build on proven mechanisms for collaboration 
while advancing durable programs, such as the proposed Alliance 
of National Councils for Homeland Operational Resilience, or 
ANCHOR, Initiative to support continuous engagement between 
Government and industry on cybersecurity and resilience. This 
commitment must also extend beyond Federal coordination. 
Strengthening resilience requires investment across the broader 
ecosystem that critical infrastructure depends on, including 
support for State and local cybersecurity preparedness. That is 
why it is essential that Chairman Ogle's bipartisan PILLAR Act 
move swiftly through Congress to help strengthen cybersecurity 
capabilities at the State and local level.
 Congress can also help by delivering robust communications 
infrastructure through streamlined permitting processes and 
accelerate broadband deployment. Equally important is 
modernizing broadband networks. Continued investment in next 
generation infrastructure, such as fiber deployment and data 
center connectivity, enhances both performance and security of 
the communications networks.
 Congress and multiple administrations have taken important 
steps to address legitimate national security concerns tied to 
the supply chain ecosystem, particularly as geopolitical 
threats have intensified. But too often these efforts develop 
across multiple agencies and authorities in parallel rather 
than in coordination. Greater alignment across agencies, 
clearer lines of authority, and more transparency in how supply 
chain-related risks are identified and managed would help 
industry respond more effectively to emerging threats while 
strengthening broader national security objectives.
 As the President's Cyber Strategy for America strongly 
emphasized, strengthening the partnership between Government 
and industry and modernizing the frameworks that support 
coordination will bring greater coherence to cybersecurity 
policy and operations. We look forward to working with our 
Government partners as we build a more secure and resilient 
foundation for the systems that our Nation depends on every 
day.
 Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Mayer follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Robert Mayer
 April 29, 2026
 Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Ogles and 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today.
 I am Robert Mayer, senior vice president of cybersecurity and 
innovation at USTelecom and chair of the Communications Sector 
Coordinating Council. I also serve as the co-chair of the Department of 
Homeland Security ICT Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force.
 USTelecom represents companies that build, operate, and secure the 
communications networks that underpin the American economy and support 
every sector of critical infrastructure. As communications networks and 
information technology systems become increasingly interconnected, 
ensuring their security depends on strong coordination, clear roles, 
and trusted public-private partnerships.
 I will focus my remarks on 3 areas: our partnership with the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the importance of 
sustaining and modernizing authorities for public-private coordination, 
and the need for greater visibility and coherence in the Information 
and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) supply chain.
 our partnership with the cybersecurity and infrastructure security 
 agency
 The communications sector maintains a strong and longstanding 
partnership with Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
(CISA), the Federal Government's lead civilian agency for cybersecurity 
and critical infrastructure coordination. This collaboration reflects a 
broader tradition of partnership between the telecommunications 
industry and the U.S. Government that spans over 6 decades. That spirit 
of collaboration continues today as USTelecom and its members work 
closely with partners across the Federal Government to strengthen the 
security and resilience of America's communications infrastructure.
 As cyber threats grow more sophisticated and interconnected, 
today's adversaries increasingly target entire digital ecosystems 
rather than isolated networks or individual points of failure, 
exploiting the complexity and interdependence of modern infrastructure 
to gain persistent access into critical systems. In this environment, 
resilience can no longer be fragmented or reactive. Meeting these 
evolving threats requires collaboration that is agile, operationally 
coordinated, and deeply integrated across Government and industry, 
supported by strong public-private partnerships and cross-sector 
coordination already taking place across the critical infrastructure 
community.
 One of the strongest examples of this collaborative model in 
practice is the President's National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee, which has been a force multiplier for 
communications security because it puts industry expertise directly 
into national decision making. Instead of disconnected policy, it 
produces recommendations grounded in how networks actually operate, 
which leads to smarter resilience planning and more realistic security 
standards. That connection has helped ensure that when crises hit--
whether cyber or physical--communications systems are better prepared 
to stay on-line and recover quickly.
 This model of operational collaboration has also proven highly 
effective through initiatives such as the Enduring Security Framework 
which has strengthened the sector by giving companies access to high-
level threat insight they wouldn't otherwise have. That intelligence, 
combined with direct collaboration with Government experts, has led to 
stronger protections around key technologies like 5G and supply chains. 
We believe the Enduring Security Framework, in particular, deserves to 
be continued and supported as CISA advances its mission in partnership 
with industry.
 To meet this moment, we must build on what has already proven 
effective: deep public-private collaboration, including our long-
standing partnership with CISA, while modernizing the foundations that 
support resilient cybersecurity and secure technological innovation. 
That means investing not only in advanced tools and capabilities, but 
also in the digital and physical infrastructure needed to support 
secure AI deployment across critical sectors. Central to that 
foundation is connectivity. Streamlined and predictable permitting 
processes are essential to accelerate broadband deployment, 
particularly in rural and underserved communities. Expanding high-speed 
connectivity is not just an economic priority; it is a national 
security imperative. Without resilient, ubiquitous broadband 
infrastructure, the benefits of AI-driven defense capabilities and 
next-generation cryptography cannot be realized at scale, leaving 
vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit.
 Equally important is modernizing broadband networks. Continued 
investment in next-generation infrastructure--such as fiber 
deployment--enhances both the performance and security of 
communications networks. Modern networks are inherently more adaptable, 
allowing providers to deploy security updates more quickly, segment and 
manage traffic more effectively, and integrate advanced protections 
directly into network operations. These capabilities improve overall 
resilience, support rapid threat detection and response, and ensure 
that communications infrastructure can evolve alongside emerging 
technologies like AI and quantum-resistant encryption.
 CISA's role as an enabler of the public-private partnership is 
essential. As a convener with cross-sector visibility, CISA supports 
information sharing, facilitates collaboration, and helps align efforts 
across Government and industry. A key component of this partnership is 
the legal framework that supports information sharing. The long-term 
reauthorization of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 is 
therefore critical. This statute provides the foundation for trusted, 
voluntary sharing of cyber threat information and underpins many of the 
collaborative efforts that exist today.
 But resilience cannot stop at the Federal level. USTelecom also 
supports Chairman Ogle's bipartisan PILLAR Act to reauthorize CISA's 
State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which extends CISA's 
collaborative model beyond the Federal level by strengthening 
cybersecurity capabilities across State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
governments. By providing resources to enhance planning, coordination, 
and resilience, the program helps ensure a more consistent and aligned 
approach to cybersecurity across the broader ecosystem that 
communications networks rely on.
 The challenges facing our digital infrastructure are no longer 
confined to any single network, company, or sector. Defending against 
increasingly sophisticated threats requires sustainable partnerships 
and a shared understanding of how critical systems function in the real 
world. The collaboration between CISA and the communications sector has 
helped build that foundation and strengthening it will be essential to 
ensuring that the infrastructure connecting and securing the Nation 
remains resilient in the face of rapidly-evolving threats.
 sustaining and modernizing public-private coordination authorities
 The United States benefits from a long-standing tradition of 
public-private collaboration in securing critical infrastructure. That 
collaboration is not incidental; it is built on legal authorities, 
institutional frameworks, and mission-driven relationships that have 
developed over time. As the threat environment becomes more dynamic and 
interconnected, there is a need to ensure that these authorities remain 
fit for purpose. Mechanisms for collaboration must be able to support 
not only strategic dialog, but also timely, operational engagement.
 Existing frameworks--such as those historically supported through 
advisory structures like the Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Advisory Council--have demonstrated the value of providing a trusted 
environment for Government and industry to share information and 
coordinate on security challenges. At the same time, the pace and 
complexity of today's threat landscape call for capabilities that are 
more persistent, more agile, and more directly aligned with operational 
needs.
 To that end, there is a clear opportunity to build on these 
foundations by modernizing how coordination occurs. One approach is the 
development of a standing capability--referred to conceptually as the 
Alliance of National Councils for Homeland Operational Resilience, or 
``ANCHOR''--that would support continuous engagement between Government 
and industry on cybersecurity and resilience.
 Such a capability should move beyond episodic or incident-driven 
interaction and instead provide a durable framework for collaboration. 
It should enable real-time information exchange, joint planning, and 
coordinated response, while also supporting longer-term efforts to 
identify and mitigate systemic risk.
 Importantly, this type of modernization should not be about 
creating new layers of bureaucracy. It should be about ensuring that 
existing authorities and partnerships are structured in a way that 
reflects current operational realities. CISA is the appropriate entity 
to support this kind of effort. Its existing role, relationships, and 
experience position it to facilitate sustained collaboration in a 
manner that is both effective and trusted by industry. Initiatives such 
as the forthcoming ``Critical Infrastructure (CI) Fortify'' program, a 
collaborative effort between CISA and allied partners designed to help 
critical infrastructure organizations maintain operations during 
periods of geopolitical conflict, will build on structured 
collaboration between Government and industry.
 These efforts show that when operational expertise and coordinated 
planning come together, they can produce meaningful outcomes on complex 
cybersecurity challenges. The task before us is to ensure that these 
partnerships are not episodic responses to emerging threats, but 
enduring foundations for long-term resilience.
 icts supply chain--the need for visibility and coordination
 The security of the Information and Communications Technology and 
Services supply chain is a critical priority for the communications 
sector and for the Nation as a whole.
 Over the past several years, there has been significant bipartisan 
interest in addressing risks associated with the ICTS supply chain. 
Congress and successive administrations have taken important steps to 
respond to cyber and geopolitical challenges, including those 
associated with the People's Republic of China. These efforts reflect 
serious and legitimate national security concerns.
 At the same time, these initiatives have developed across multiple 
agencies and authorities, often in parallel rather than in 
coordination. Today, several parts of the Federal Government assert 
jurisdiction over different aspects of the ICTS ecosystem, including 
the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, the 
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Acquisition Security 
Council, the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council, and the Department 
of War, alongside various Congressional directives.
 While each of these efforts is grounded in valid objectives, the 
cumulative effect is a regulatory environment that can be fragmented 
and, at times, difficult to navigate. This fragmentation presents a 
number of practical challenges. In some cases, there are overlapping or 
unclear lines of jurisdiction, where similar technologies, services, or 
entities may be evaluated under different authorities and standards. 
There are also instances where determinations affecting ICTS products 
or services are not accompanied by sufficient transparency. Without 
clear explanations, it can be difficult for companies to understand the 
basis for decisions or to take appropriate steps to mitigate identified 
risks.
 Operational uncertainty is another concern. Changes in how 
equipment, companies, or transactions are treated--particularly when 
those changes are not uniform across agencies--can disrupt planning, 
investment, and supply chain decisions. This is especially significant 
in a sector where infrastructure investments are long-term and capital-
intensive.
 In addition, companies are often required to navigate a complex set 
of compliance obligations that may not be fully aligned. This increases 
costs and administrative burdens, and it can complicate efforts to 
maintain secure and resilient supply chains. These challenges have real 
consequences. They can slow the deployment of secure technologies, 
create inefficiencies, and, in some cases, make it more difficult to 
achieve the underlying national security objectives.
 Greater visibility into ICTS-related risks, combined with more 
consistent coordination across agencies, would help address these 
issues. Industry benefits from timely, actionable information that 
supports effective risk management and informed decision making.
 Congress can play an important role in encouraging continued 
interagency coordination, promoting consistency in implementation, and 
supporting greater transparency in how ICTS-related risks are 
identified and managed. Aligning existing authorities--rather than 
adding new, overlapping requirements--will help ensure that security 
objectives are achieved in a manner that is predictable, effective, and 
sustainable.
 conclusion
 In closing, the increasing interconnection of communications and 
information technology systems requires a governance approach that 
emphasizes coordination, clarity, and partnership. Our experience 
demonstrates that when Government and industry work together within a 
clear and durable framework, we can effectively address complex and 
evolving threats. Strengthening our partnership with CISA, modernizing 
the authorities that support public-private collaboration, and 
improving coordination in the ICTS supply chain will help ensure that 
the United States remains secure and resilient.
 Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your 
questions.

 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Mayer.
 I now recognize Mr. Visner for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF SAMUEL S. VISNER, CHAIR, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, SPACE 
 INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER

 Mr. Visner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member 
Ramirez, Mr. Thompson, and Members of the Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Protection. Thank you 
for the opportunity to speak before your subcommittee and share 
with you my thoughts on the protection of the swiftly evolving 
telecommunications, information technology, and space 
ecosystems, all of which are vital to our national and economic 
security.
 Having failed retirement, I have the honor to serve as the 
chair of the board of directors of the Space Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center, or ISAC. We were founded in 2019 
and our principle--we are the principal information-sharing 
platform for industry and between industry and Government 
regarding threats to our space systems. While our initial focus 
was on cyber threats to these systems, we look at a wide range 
of threats, including cyber jamming, spoofing, supply chain 
challenges, space, weather, and more.
 The Space ISAC and other ISACs, as you know, are led by and 
funded principally by our industry and academic members; the 
ISAC partners, however, with the public sector. We have in 
place MOUs with several U.S. Government agencies, as well as 
space and cybersecurity government authorities in Australia, 
Canada, France, Greece, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and the United 
Kingdom, and more partnerships are in progress, including a 
recent MOU we signed with NATO.
 We set up in 2023 an operational watch center in Colorado 
Springs, one that monitors threats to space systems using a 
wide range of data from our members, partners, and open 
sources, and we use the DHS Traffic Light Protocol to control 
the dissemination of that reporting. We've also announced 
global hubs in Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom. As these global hubs become operational and as we 
build watch center components in these countries, the ISAC will 
gain 24/7, follow the sun coverage of space systems 
environment, threats to that environment, and incidents that 
affect the security and resilience of that environment. 
Information about these and other space ISAC developments can 
be found at the link that I've been placed into my written 
testimony.
 We also convened task forces and working groups to examine 
and propose challenges and approaches to key space system 
security challenges, including space system governance, 
analysis, quantum security, and now the security assists lunar 
operations and other domains.
 The ISAC has grown rapidly. We have over 120 members. We're 
a member of the National Council of ISACs in the United States 
and the E.U. Council of ISACs as well.
 From this foregoing I hope to make clear a few key points. 
First, the speed and scope with which we have operated and will 
continue to operate reflect our view that all critical 
infrastructures depend on space. While in 2019 there were about 
2,000 active satellites, today we count over 14,500 with 
estimates ranging from 30,000 to as many as 60,000 by 2030. 
Surface and air transportation systems depend on space-based 
navigation. Maritime fleets use space systems for navigation as 
well as communications. Space systems provide timing data for 
our power grid. Space-based remote sensing is vital to farming, 
including what we call precision agriculture, which allows--
which uses space-based systems to pinpoint areas for 
cultivation and fertilization.
 Financial systems depend on space infrastructure with 
satellite technology providing precision timing for transaction 
time stamps, GPS for global synchronization and secure data 
connectivity, even for remote ATMs and high-frequency trading. 
Space-based communications leak remote locations and commercial 
space systems are being used by our Government for national 
security and civil government. Industry now leads Government in 
the number of space-based imagery platforms. Global 5G networks 
using thousands of satellites are providing worldwide 5G IT 
backplane. So Space ISAC's members and partners regard space 
systems absolutely as critical.
 Second, much of the space systems' domain is comprised of 
unique infrastructure, including manufacturing, launch, ground 
segment, user segment, and now CIS lunar operations. These 
infrastructures are growing rapidly and our members and 
partners believe we can brook no delay in the protection, 
security, and resilience of these supply chains. CIS lunar 
operations are going to have their own unique infrastructures, 
including their own navigation satellites, and planning for the 
security of these new infrastructures should start now.
 Next, space system missions are evolving. We're likely to 
see CIS lunar and asteroid mining, new commercial space 
stations, energy production, orbital cloud, and data centers. 
All of these, securing all of these will pose their own 
challenges.
 I'm going to abbreviate my comments because we are running 
out of time. From the--we believe that the security of these 
systems must be a global endeavor. To that end, the Space ISAC 
has been from its inception a global effort that includes our 
allies and partners. We should remind each other that prior to 
Russia's attack on Ukraine, the first thing they did the day 
before they crossed that border was, in fact, an attack on a 
commercial space-based satellite communication system. We have 
continued to track and report to our members and partners 
attacks by our adversaries on the space systems on which, on 
which we depend.
 Let me at this point abbreviate my comments and thank you 
very much. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Visner follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Samuel S. Visner
 Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before your subcommittee and share with you my 
thoughts on the protection of the swiftly-evolving telecommunications, 
information technology, and space ecosystems, all of which are vital to 
our national and economic security.
 I have the honor to serve as the chair of the board of directors of 
the Space Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or Space ISAC. 
Founded in 2019, the Space ISAC is the principal information-sharing 
platform for industry--and between industry and Government--regarding 
threats to our space systems. While our initial focus was on cyber 
threats to these systems, we look at a wide range of threats, including 
cyber, jamming, spoofing, supply chain challenges, space weather, and 
more.
 The Space ISAC, like other ISACs, is led by and funded principally 
by its industry and academic members. The ISAC partners, however, with 
the public sector. We have in place MOUs with several U.S. Government 
agencies, as well as space and cybersecurity government authorities in 
Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Germany, Israel, Taiwan, and the 
United Kingdom, and more partnerships are in progress, including a 
recent MOU with NATO.
 We set up in 2023 an operational watch center in Colorado Springs, 
one that monitors threats to space systems using a wide range of data 
from our members, partners, and open sources. We use the DHS Traffic 
Light Protocol to control the dissemination of our reporting.
 We've also announced global hubs in Australia, Canada, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom. As these global hubs become operational and as we 
build watch center components in these countries, the Space ISAC will 
gain 24/7, follow-the-sun coverage of the space systems environment, 
threats to that environment, and incidents that affect the security and 
resilience of that environment. Information about these and other Space 
ISAC developments can be found at the following link--place into my 
written testimony. https://spaceisac.org/newsroom/ We also convene 
working groups and task forces to examine and propose approaches to key 
space system security challenges, including space systems governance, 
analysis, quantum security, the security of cislunar operations, and 
other domains.
 The Space ISAC has grown rapidly with over 120 members and we are 
also a member of the National Council of ISACs in the United States, as 
well as the E.U. Council of ISACs.
 From the foregoing, I hoped to make clear a few key points.
 First, the speed and scope with which we have operated and will 
continue to operate reflect our view that all critical infrastructures 
depend on space. While in 2019, there were approximately 2,00 [sic] 
active satellites, today we count over 14,500, with estimates ranging 
from 30,00 [sic] to as many as 60,000 satellites by 2030.
 Surface and air transportation systems used space-based navigation. 
Maritime fleets also use space systems for navigation, as well as 
communication. Space systems provide timing data for our power grid.
 Space-based remote sensing is vital to farming, including what we 
call ``precision agriculture,'' in which space-based systems help 
pinpoint areas for cultivation and fertilization. Financial systems 
depend on space infrastructure, with satellite technology providing 
high-precision timing for transaction time stamps, GPS for global 
synchronization, and secure data connectivity, particularly for remote 
ATMs and high-frequency trading. Space-based communications link remote 
locations, and commercial space systems are being used increasingly by 
our Government for national security and civil government services. 
Industry now leads Government in the number of space-based imagery 
platforms; global 5G networks, using thousands of satellites, are 
providing a world-wide, 5G IT ``backplane.'' So, the Space ISAC's 
members and partners regard space systems as critical.
 Second, much of the space systems domain is comprised of unique 
infrastructure, including manufacturing, launch, ground segment, and 
user segment systems. These infrastructures are growing rapidly; the 
Space ISAC and its members and partners believe we can brook no delay 
in the protection, security, and resilience of these supply chains. In 
addition, cislunar operations will be supported by their own unique 
infrastructures, including their own navigation satellites, and 
planning for the security of these new infrastructures should start 
now. In fact, the Space ISAC's cislunar affinity group is already 
working to define the security challenges associated with cislunar 
systems.
 Third, our space systems represent a large and growing component of 
our national economy and that of allies and partners. Estimates vary, 
but we can expect to see at least $1T in space systems industry 
activity by, and possibly before 2030. And this number, does not by any 
means consider the value of activity in other sectors, such as 
transportation, that use space system.
 Next, new space system missions are evolving. We are likely to see 
cislunar and asteroid mining, new, commercial space stations 
(particularly as the ISS approaches decommissioning), energy 
production, and orbital cloud and data center services. Securing each 
of these missions, or lines of business, will pose its own challenges. 
As we build a new, global IT eco-system, one that encompasses space-
based 5G networks, agentic AI-enabled systems that both collect and 
analyze imagery on orbit--and provide terrestrial users with suggested 
course of action, such as how best to get emergency relief to disaster 
victims--we will need to understand the threats posed to these systems, 
and how these systems can be secured and made resilient.
 Cislunar operations, including mining, exploration, and even 
settlement, are becoming the focus of intense international rivalry, 
and will also need security.
 Finally, the protection of our space systems--all of our space 
systems--is a global endeavor, one that requires to concerted effort of 
the United States, its allies, and partners.
 To that end, the Space ISAC has been from its inception a global 
effort to include allies and partners with which we share values and, 
in some cases, space systems.
 For example, our efforts with Australia and the United Kingdom 
reflect the overall collective security logic of AUKUS Pillar 2, with 
which we are aligned. Our efforts with other, like-minded countries, 
reflect the global nature of the space systems environment, and our 
mutual interdependence of the United States and its allies and partners 
on each other's space systems. Let's not forget that the attack by 
Russia on Ukraine was presaged a day before boots crossed the Ukrainian 
border by an attack on a commercial space system on which Ukraine 
depends, an attack that also disrupted electrical power in Germany and 
could have affected U.S. users, too.
 The Space ISAC itself tracked and reported to its members and 
partners on a satellite system in geospatial orbit that maneuvered 
against the blocked the transponders of commercial communication 
satellites, one of many incidents on which we share information. As the 
United States works with its allies and partners in the collective 
defense of our space systems, we can also encourage the development of 
better behavioral norms. Adopted broadly, even our adversaries might 
well be compelled to recognize, and even possibly adopt these norms.
 I am aware that debate is under way in the Government regarding 
national space governance and how best to work with industry in support 
of the security of our space systems.
 I am not here to recommend a Government space systems security 
architecture, though I do believe a national R&D strategy and effort 
that unites industry, Government, academia, and other stakeholders to 
identify, resource, and tackle space systems security and resilience 
challenges is warranted, if not overdue. Such a strategy, possibly 
coordinated with allies, and partners, could advance our ability to 
protect these systems, even as is brings together worthy efforts being 
undertaken in industry, academia, the IEEE, the National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology, and other stakeholders.
 Let me add, in addition, that the Council on Foreign Relations 
Securing Space Task Force, of which I am a member, issued in 2025 a 
report \1\ that noted: ``U.S. space assets are increasingly vulnerable 
to attacks by China, Russia, and other potential adversaries--attacks 
that could come from the ground, the air, or space itself.'' The report 
recommended that ``the President should instruct relevant cabinet 
officers that the United States is to lead the world in space.'' The 
report added: ``the President should structure the National Security 
Council staff to support the President in this role and the national 
effort to lead in space.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ See: https://www.cfr.org/task-force-reports/securing-space/
introduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In the mean time, the Space ISAC is moving ahead swiftly, 
coordinating, analyzing, and sharing as quickly as possible information 
needed to secure our space systems, critical to our national and 
economic security. Our efforts recognize the vital importance of our 
space systems. We're not waiting. Nor should our country.
 Thank you again for this opportunity to share our progress and 
views. I look forward to your questions.

 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Visner.
 I now recognize Rear Admiral Montgomery for 5 minutes to 
summarize his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL MARK MONTGOMERY, USN (RET.), SENIOR 
 DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON CYBER AND TECHNOLOGY 
 INNOVATION, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

 Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Chairman Ogles, Ranking Members 
Thompson and Ramirez, and distinguished Members of the 
subcommittee. On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of 
Democracies, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
 The subject of this hearing is timely. Our Nation is under 
attack in cyber space. Our adversaries are increasingly seeing 
our communications networks as a U.S. vulnerability. China 
particularly is conducting operational preparation of the 
battlefield, activities that attack and put malware into our 
systems. They also do espionage and intellectual property theft 
against companies in critical infrastructure.
 At the same time, we appear to be reducing our investments 
in cyber defense. I think America's national cyber resilience 
rests on three legs. The first is a capable Federal Government 
able to mitigate, thwart, deter, and punish attackers. The 
second is an informed private sector properly resourced to 
defend itself from these attacks. Third is a robust public-
private collaboration together that facilitates the collective 
defense of the U.S. economy and national security.
 Surprisingly, over the past year, the administration's 
reduced funding for key offices and decommissioned 
collaboration mechanisms such as CIPAC, which I think are 
critical to our cyber defense. But honestly, Congress hasn't 
done much better.
 While this committee has shown important leadership on 
cybersecurity issues, unrelated partisan fights and inter-
chamber disagreements have blocked the passage of important 
legislation. While we fumble this ball, our adversaries are 
advancing. As I said, China continues to pre-position 
destructive capabilities in our critical infrastructure. They 
use covert compromised networks strategically and at scale to 
conduct their malicious campaigns.
 Countering these threats is going to require reinforcing 
the three legs of that national cyber resilience table. A 
critical component of that reinforcement is what this committee 
is looking at today, how the Federal Government fulfills its 
commitments to the private sector. Most specifically, how does 
DHS support the resilience of the rapidly-expanding involving 
components of the communications and information technology 
sectors, data centers, telecommunications networks, and space-
based systems? If our Nation does not properly secure these 
assets, our adversaries will steal, corrupt, and disrupt the 
data and communications that allow our economy to function.
 You know, data centers and cloud infrastructure are 
becoming more vital to the American economic prosperity in our 
society due to their important role in enabling on-line 
services and telecommunications networks. The explosion of AI 
innovation has catapulted debates about the construction of 
data centers in the national spotlight. But I believe the cyber 
and physical resilience of those data centers merits an equal 
level of attention.
 The proliferation of these data centers is also increasing 
the demand for electricity and it's also leading to 
digitization of the grid. We got to make sure that in the 
pursuit of cost savings we don't embed Chinese-made components 
in and critical control layers of the grid.
 Now, understanding these sorts of risks and prioritizing 
mitigations requires a collaboration between the hyperscalers, 
the energy providers, and the Federal Government, and within 
the Government between the Department of Energy and CISA.
 Now, over the past year there have been some bright spots. 
The FCC has supercharged its efforts to ban Chinese state-owned 
emerging technology from critical infrastructures. 
Specifically, the FCC leveraged its regulatory authority to 
prohibit the sale of Chinese-made connected devices in the 
United States. This is vital national security work, but it 
should not diminish what CISA needs to do as the Sector Risk 
Management Agency for the communications sector.
 In fact, banning Chinese telecommunications equipment is 
important. But in the case of Salt Typhoon that Ranking Member 
Thompson mentioned, the access vector was American Cisco 
routers. So really critical infrastructure is not just about 
who manufactures the hardware, but also about whether the 
manufacturers and the operators properly maintain it. In this 
regard, the administration's recent dissolving of CIPAC and 
disbanding of the Cyber Safety Review Board were both unhelpful 
actions. I'm concerned that these failures are symptomatic of a 
greater problem in CISA's ability to carry out its SRA duties 
for the communications sector writ large.
 Within that sector it's the security of the satellite 
communications and other space-based assets. It gives me the 
greatest heartburn. As Sam mentioned, one of the first volleys 
in the Ukraine war was a Russian cyber attack against an 
American satellite communications company. You know, the 
consequences of failing to protect U.S. space systems and 
ceding space superiority to adversaries would be detrimental to 
national security. That's why I continue to endorse designating 
space systems as a U.S. critical infrastructure sector so that 
space-based assets receive the policy, attention, and risk 
management support they deserve. I also support making NASA the 
Sector Risk Management Agency.
 You know, we need to act now as our adversaries pursue 
these deliberate efforts to erode U.S. space superiority. In my 
written testimony I provided 6 good recommendations. I'll just 
say the one that I really want to emphasize is fully funding 
CISA and ensuring that CISA conducts an effective force 
structure assessment.
 Thank you for the invitation to testify and I look forward 
to your questions.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Montgomery follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Mark Montgomery
 introduction
 Chairman Ogles, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the 
subcommittee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
 The subject of this hearing is timely. Our Nation is under attack 
in cyber space. Our adversaries increasingly see this as a U.S. 
vulnerability, and China specifically is conducting ``operational 
preparation of the battlefield'' activities as well as espionage and 
intellectual property theft against our companies and critical 
infrastructure. At the same time, we appear to be reducing our 
investments in cyber defense.
 National cyber resilience rests on 3 legs: a capable Federal 
Government able to mitigate, thwart, deter, and punish attackers; an 
informed private sector capable of defending itself from debilitating 
attacks; and robust public-private collaboration that facilitates rapid 
information transfer, a shared understanding of the threat landscape, 
and collective defense of the U.S. economy and national security.
 Over the past year, the Trump administration has reduced funding 
for key offices and decommissioned collaboration mechanisms critical to 
both the first and the third pillars. But Congress has not done much 
better. While this subcommittee and the broader Homeland Security 
Committee have shown important leadership on cybersecurity issues, 
advancing numerous critical cybersecurity provisions, unrelated 
partisan fights and inter-chamber disagreements have blocked the 
passage and implementation of important legislation and left the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)--our national 
civilian cyber defense agency--operating at less than half its 
capacity.
 As we have fumbled the ball, our adversaries have advanced down the 
field. China continues to pre-position destructive capabilities within 
our critical infrastructure. Just last week, the United States, its 
Five Eyes partners, and other U.S. allies warned that China's cyber 
operators are using covert, compromised networks ``strategically, and 
at scale'' to conduct their malicious campaigns.\1\ Russia is maturing 
its kinetic and cyber anti-satellite capabilities to blind its 
adversaries. North Korea has infiltrated Fortune 500 companies by 
compromising the IT services industry. And Iran is launching not only 
cyber attacks but also drone and missile strikes against data centers 
in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Cybersecurity 
Advisory, ``Defending against China-nexus covert networks of 
compromised devices,'' April 23, 2026. (https://www.cisa.gov/news-
events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-113a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Countering these threats requires reinforcing the legs of the 
national cyber resilience table. A critical component of that 
reinforcement is before this committee today: how the Federal 
Government fulfills its commitments to the private sector. Most 
specifically, how does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
support the resilience of the rapidly expanding and evolving components 
of the communications and information technology sectors: data centers, 
telecommunications networks, and space-based systems?
 In addition to outlining the challenges our Nation faces in cyber 
space and the unique threats to these industries, my testimony lays out 
6 recommendations for this subcommittee and your colleagues in Congress 
to improve CISA's ability to work with owners and operators to secure 
the physical and virtual infrastructure that underpins America's 
national security and economic prosperity.
 the challenges
 America's adversaries understand that holding U.S. critical 
infrastructure at-risk undermines our national security, economic 
prosperity, and public health and safety. They are taking advantage of 
our persistent under-investment in defense and resilience.
Adversarial Threats
 Adversary infiltration of digital networks and the industrial 
processes they control is the most acute threat to the safety and 
security of the American citizenry and to the American way of life. Of 
the adversaries committed to endangering that which the United States 
holds dear, none looms larger than the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Recent years have stripped away any remaining illusions about Beijing's 
ambition to displace the United States as the world's dominant power 
and about the depth and breadth of China's infiltration into American 
critical infrastructure--particularly through malicious cyber campaigns 
such as Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon.
 The Chinese state-sponsored Volt Typhoon campaign is a calculated 
act of digital pre-positioning: CCP-linked hackers burrowed stealthily 
into U.S. systems--transportation networks, energy grids, and water 
utilities--not to strike immediately but to lie dormant until Beijing 
decides the moment is right.\2\ As a military man, I call this 
``operational preparation of the battlefield.'' Senior U.S. 
intelligence officials have made clear that these implanted 
capabilities are designed to be activated during a future crisis, with 
the goals of disrupting military logistics, inciting societal panic, 
and slowing Washington's ability to respond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \2\ ``Chinese Government Poses `Broad and Unrelenting' Threat to 
U.S. Critical Infrastructure, FBI Director Says,'' Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, April 18, 2024. (https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/
chinese-government-poses-broad-and-unrelenting-threat-to-u-s-critical-
infrastructure-fbi-director-says); Christopher Wray, ``The CCP Cyber 
Threat to the American Homeland and National Security,'' U.S. House 
Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and 
the Chinese Communist Party, January 31, 2024. (https://www.fbi.gov/
news/speeches-and-testimony/the-ccp-cyber-threats-to-the-american-
homeland-and-national-security).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Meanwhile, Salt Typhoon is a direct assault on American and allied 
communications networks. Operated by the CCP's Ministry of State 
Security, the group has conducted a pervasive cyber espionage campaign 
in the United States and other Western allied nations.\3\ The campaign 
successfully infiltrated at least 9 U.S. telecommunications networks 
and internet service providers, including AT&T, Verizon, and T-
Mobile,\4\ among other things, compromising networks that support law 
enforcement and the intelligence community in their work conducting 
court-approved wiretaps under the Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement Act.\5\ Among the stolen data were audio recordings of 
phone calls between high-ranking U.S. Government officials.\6\ The 
exact number of compromised telecommunications companies remains 
unconfirmed, but the FBI warned earlier this year that the threat posed 
by Salt Typhoon is ``still very, very much on-going.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury 
Sanctions Company Associated with Salt Typhoon and Hacker Associated 
with Treasury Compromise,'' January 17, 2025. (https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2792); Greg Otto, ``Malware 
linked to Salt Typhoon used to hack telcos around the world,'' 
CyberScoop, November 25, 2024. (https://cyberscoop.com/salt-typhoon-us-
telecom-hack-earth-estries-trend-micro-report).
 \4\ Sarah Krouse and Dustin Volz, ``T-Mobile Hacked in Massive 
Chinese Breach of Telecom Networks,'' The Wall Street Journal, November 
15, 2024. (https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/t-mobile-
hacked-in-massive-chinese-breach-of-telecom-networks-4b2d7f92).
 \5\ Martin Matishak, ``US adds 9th telecom company to list of known 
Salt Typhoon targets,'' The Record, December 27, 2024. (https://
therecord.media/nine-us-companies-hacked-salt-typhoon-china-espionage).
 \6\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release, ``Treasury 
Sanctions Company Associated with Salt Typhoon and Hacker Associated 
with Treasury Compromise,'' January 17, 2025. (https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2792); Greg Otto, ``Malware 
linked to Salt Typhoon used to hack telcos around the world,'' 
CyberScoop, November 25, 2024. (https://cyberscoop.com/salt-typhoon-us-
telecom-hack-earth-estries-trend-micro-report).
 \7\ Derek B. Johnson, ``FBI: Threats from Salt Typhoon are `still 
very much on-going,' '' CyberScoop, February 19, 2026. (https://
cyberscoop.com/fbi-salt-typhoon-ongoing-threat-cybertalks-2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 America's other adversaries are also on the march--Russia, Iran, 
and North Korea continue their persistent and pervasive cyber campaigns 
against the United States and our allies and partners. Russia is 
pummeling democratic, pro-American Ukraine with missile and cyber 
attacks while harboring criminal gangs that extort American hospitals, 
as the committee heard last week.\8\ North Korea--which functions less 
like a conventional nation-state and more like a criminal enterprise 
with a flag--has established a niche in large-scale cryptocurrency 
theft. Its operatives have penetrated Fortune 500 companies by stealing 
identities, leveraging artificial intelligence, and posing as IT 
workers.\9\ Iran is targeting industrial control systems, and Tehran's 
attacks are causing ``operational disruption and financial loss,'' the 
FBI and other Federal agencies warned earlier this month.\10\ Over the 
course of the war, the Islamic Republic also used its drone and missile 
arsenal to damage American data centers in the region--a particularly 
troubling development given the importance of this infrastructure for 
America's artificial intelligence investment and trade priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \8\ Cynthia Kaiser, ``Online Scams, Crypto Fraud, and Digital 
Extortion: An Examination of How Transnational Criminal Networks Target 
Americans,'' Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Border Security 
and Enforcement and the House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection, April 21, 2026. (https://homeland.house.gov/
hearing/online-scams-crypto-fraud-and-digital-extortion-an-examination-
of-how-transnational-criminal-networks-target-americans).
 \9\ Matt Kapko, ``North Korean Operatives have infiltrated hundreds 
of Fortune 500 companies,'' CyberScoop, April 30, 2025. (https://
cyberscoop.com/north-korea-workers-infiltrate-fortune-500).
 \10\ U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 
Cybersecurity Advisory, ``Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit 
Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure,'' 
April 7, 2026. (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-
advisories/aa26-097a).
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 America's communications networks are also vulnerable to criminal 
sabotage. In September, the U.S. Secret Service dismantled a SIM farm 
in the New York City area that officials said could have overwhelmed 
and shut down the city's telecommunications networks, including 
emergency services.\11\ While the investigation is on-going and the 
network was likely criminal, law enforcement warned it may have a 
nation-state nexus.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ Joseph De Avila and James Fanelli, ``Secret Service Thwarts 
Telecom Threat in NYC Area Ahead of U.N. General Assembly,'' The Wall 
Street Journal, September 23, 2025. (https://www.wsj.com/politics/
national-security/un-secret-service-electronic-device-network-
8d30e7de).
 \12\ Shawn Chen and Julie Walker, ``How `SIM farms' like the one 
found near the U.N. could collapse telecom networks,'' Associated 
Press, September 23, 2025. (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-
sim-farms-like-the-one-found-near-the-un-could-collapse-telecom-
networks).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Self-Imposed Weaknesses
 Thwarting America's adversaries in cyber space would be hard enough 
given America's exposure through highly-networked, but insecure, 
systems and our adversaries' investments in malicious cyber activities. 
Indeed, I have testified before this committee in the past that no 
Presidential administration has properly invested in the cybersecurity 
of our national critical infrastructures. But it is my assessment that 
over the past year, the Federal Government has undercut its own 
capabilities even further. This is despite the fact that this 
President's National Security Strategy made it clear that threats to 
the homeland--including cyber threats--were a priority that needed to 
be addressed.
 Last year, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem 
suspended the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 
(CIPAC) as part of Trump's general restructuring of Biden-era advisory 
councils across the Federal Government. Readjustments of membership on 
advisory councils are expected at the transition to a new 
administration, but CIPAC was different. It was a convening authority 
that gave Federal agencies, critical infrastructure companies, and 
trade groups a way to hold strategic conversations on sensitive 
information about cyber and physical vulnerabilities. It provided an 
essential bridge between Government and private companies by offering 
legal protection and a convening body for Sector Coordinating Councils 
to meet with the Government.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \13\ Mark Montgomery and Johanna Yang, ``Stop Gutting America's 
Cyber Defense Agency,'' The Hill, March 26, 2025. (https://thehill.com/
opinion/cybersecurity/5214315-stop-gutting-americas-cyber-defense-
agency).
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 After CIPAC's suspension, leaders across critical infrastructure 
sectors canceled meetings and refused to share findings from a cyber 
working group--limiting the private-public cooperation necessary to 
ensure critical infrastructure is prepared to face adversarial cyber 
attacks.\14\ Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, industry representatives urged DHS to move forward with 
CIPAC's intended replacement, the Alliance of National Councils for 
Homeland Operational Resilience (ANCHOR).\15\ But since January, there 
have been no updates. We have now gone more than a year without a tool 
that is critical for Government support for public-private 
collaboration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \14\ Eric Geller, `` `Suspended animation': US government upheaval 
has frayed partnerships with critical infrastructure,'' Cybersecurity 
Dive, June 25, 2025. (https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/critical-
infrastructure-cybersecurity-partnerships-disruption-trump-government-
industry/751589).
 \15\ Mark Montgomery and Aarushi Garg, ``Cyber Information Sharing 
Must Be Fixed or Our Adversaries Reap the Benefits,'' Threat Beat, 
February 1, 2026. (https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/02/01/cyber-
information-sharing-must-be-fixed-or-our-adversaries-reap-the-benefits-
2).
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 This administration has undermined the capabilities of its own 
civilian cyber defense agency. President Trump created CISA, but his 
administration, through the actions of both DOGE and DHS itself, seems 
bent on weakening it. Its workforce decisions have resulted in a 
vacancy rate of 40 percent in key mission areas, according to CISA's 
own assessment.\16\ And just this month, we learned that the 
President's fiscal year 2027 budget proposal calls for an additional 
$707 million reduction in funding for CISA's work.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \16\ Lily Hay Newman, ``Fears Mount That US Federal Cybersecurity 
Is Stagnating--or Worse,'' WIRED, December 31, 2025. (https://
www.wired.com/story/expired-tired-wired-federal-cybersecurity).
 \17\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency Budget Overview Fiscal Year 2027 
Congressional Justification,'' April 2025. (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/2026-04/26_0403_ocfo-budget-cisa.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 This proposed cut has a direct bearing on CISA's ability to serve 
as a sector risk management agency (SRMA). Five years ago, Congress 
expanded the responsibilities of Federal agencies to help critical 
infrastructure owners and operators identify and mitigate threats, 
evaluate risks, and respond to incidents.\18\ These agencies, dubbed 
SRMAs, need expertise in both the cyber threat landscape and in the 
operation of the sector for which they are responsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \18\ Mary Brooks, Annie Fixler, and Mark Montgomery, ``Revising 
Public-Private Collaboration to Protect U.S. Critical Infrastructure,'' 
CSC 2.0, June 7, 2023. (https://cybersolarium.org/csc-2-0-reports/
revising-public-private-collaboration-to-protect-u-s-critical-
infrastructure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 DHS is the SRMA or co-SRMA for 10 of the 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors and has delegated the execution of these duties for 9 sectors 
to CISA.\19\ In this role, CISA is supposed to identify risks to the 
sector and coordinate with other relevant agencies, owners and 
operators, and State, local, Tribal, and territorial entities to ensure 
sector security. It is nigh impossible to do this work when the 
department halves the budget of its own risk management activities and 
reduces its stakeholder engagement capabilities by $58 million--a 65 
percent cut.\20\ Last year, press reporting confirmed that the agency 
had essentially shuttered its Stakeholder Engagement Division, reducing 
its staff by as much as 95 percent.\21\ While CISA officials claim that 
they are still able to fulfill their mission, in my 40 years in the 
Navy and in Government, I never once had a subordinate say, ``I could 
do my job better if you cut my budget and staff by half.'' We would 
NEVER consider such a reduction to the Nation's military cyber defense 
agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \19\ ``Sector Risk Management Agencies,'' Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, accessed April 24, 2026. (https://
www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/
critical-infrastructure-sectors/sector-risk-management-agencies).
 \20\ Nick Anderson, ``The Fiscal Year 2027 Budget for the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,'' Testimony before 
the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 
April 16, 2026. (https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP15/20260416/
119152/HHRG-119-AP15-WState-AndersenN-20260416.pdf).
 \21\ Eric Geller, ``CISA's international, industry and academic 
partnerships slashed,'' Cybersecurity Dive, October 22, 2025. (https://
www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cisa-stakeholder-engagement-division-
layoffs-critical-infrastructure-international/803433).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Prior to this latest round of budget and staffing cuts, CISA and 
the other SRMAs long struggled to execute their duties. A 2023 
Government Accountability Office report found that SRMAs had 
insufficient funding to execute their mission.\22\ If you ask subject-
matter experts within DHS--to the extent that the Department has 
retained its critical infrastructure experts--I suspect they would 
report that they are even more critically underfunded and understaffed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \22\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Time Frames to Complete DHS Efforts Would 
Help Sector Risk Management Agencies Implement Statutory 
Responsibilities,'' February 2023, page 23. (https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-23-105806.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Multiple GAO reports recommend that CISA and other SRMAs develop 
methods for determining how well sectors are implementing standards and 
procedures, noting that most agencies have not done so.\23\ Since 2010, 
GAO has made 106 public recommendations related to Federal and critical 
infrastructure cybersecurity.\24\ Dozens remain outstanding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \23\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Agencies Need to Assess Adoption of 
Cybersecurity Guidance,'' February 9, 2022. (https://www.gao.gov/
products/gao-22-105103).
 \24\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Cybersecurity High-
Risk Series: Challenges in Protecting Cyber Critical Infrastructure,'' 
February 7, 2023. (https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106441).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Among the most critical infrastructure sectors under CISA's watch 
are the communications and information technology sectors. These two 
sectors are uniquely important. They are interconnected with and serve 
as the underlying infrastructure for other sectors. Each encompasses a 
wide range of services, and over the past decade since the Executive 
branch last updated the definitions of critical infrastructure sectors, 
they have undergone some of the most dramatic technological changes of 
all the critical infrastructure sectors.
 Arguably, technological innovation has muddled the distinction 
between the communications and information technology sectors. They are 
increasingly intertwined and encompass similar assets. Data centers and 
cloud infrastructure, for example, fall in part under both sectors. 
Recognizing the connectivity between the sectors back in 2018, DHS 
created a task force on information and communications technology 
supply chain management. It was co-chaired by CISA and the Information 
Technology and Communications Sector Coordinating Councils. The task 
force was charged with ``devising realistic, actionable, and risk-
based'' solutions to the challenges facing the two sectors, but it 
expired in January of this year and is in a holding pattern awaiting 
DHS action.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \25\ ``Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain 
Security,'' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, accessed 
April 24, 2026. (https://www.cisa.gov/topics/information-
communications-technology-supply-chain-security); Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, Press Release, ``CISA Announces Renewal 
of the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk 
Management Task Force,'' February 6, 2024. (https://www.cisa.gov/news-
events/news/cisa-announces-renewal-information-and-communications-
technology-supply-chain-risk-management-task).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 I applaud the subcommittee for looking at the 3 unique and critical 
components of both these sectors: data centers, telecommunications 
networks, and space-based systems. If our Nation does not properly 
secure these assets, our adversaries will steal, corrupt, and disrupt 
the data and communications that allow our economy to function.
 data centers
 Data centers and cloud infrastructure are becoming more vital to 
American economic prosperity and our society writ large due to their 
important role in enabling internet systems, telecommunications 
systems, and many on-line services. The explosion of AI innovation has 
catapulted debates about the construction of data centers into the 
national spotlight. The cyber and physical resilience of these 
facilities merits the same level of attention.
 Data centers are sites that house and manage the IT infrastructure 
and data used to build, run, and deliver applications and services.\26\ 
The number of data centers is increasing, and many are owned by major 
cloud service providers that provide remote access to their services. 
Hyperscale data centers (known as hyperscalers) are data centers that 
are big enough to handle large workloads through an optimized network 
infrastructure. Hyperscalers are especially useful for artificial 
intelligence, automation, and the handling of big data.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \26\ Stephanie Susnjara and Ian Smalley, ``What is a data center?'' 
IBM, accessed February 24, 2026. (https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/
data-centers).
 \27\ Phill Powell and Ian Smalley, ``What is a hyperscale data 
center?'' IBM, accessed April 24, 2026. (https://www.ibm.com/think/
topics/hyperscale-data-center).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The proliferation of data centers is increasing the demand for 
electricity and leading to the digitization of the grid. A modern grid 
has the ability to be more responsive to demand fluctuations and more 
resilient against cyber attacks, but not if we embed Chinese-made 
components at critical control layers. Understanding risks and 
prioritizing mitigations requires collaboration between hyperscalers, 
energy providers, and the Federal Government, as well as between the 
Department of Energy and CISA.
 The data center industry itself is concentrated. The top 3 
providers--Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud 
Platform--together account for 63 percent of the market share.\28\ The 
reliance of critical services on concentrated infrastructure introduces 
security concerns. For example, close to 70 percent of all global 
internet traffic runs through data centers in Northern Virginia.\29\ An 
October 2025 internal disruption to domain name service protocols 
impacting one Amazon Web Services region caused outages across consumer 
apps, core Amazon operations, financial platforms, and enterprise 
services--including Amazon.com, Venmo, Coinbase, Snapchat, and 
more.\30\ The outage also impacted multiple communications and 
transportation providers, including AT&T, Delta Airlines, Lyft, Signal, 
Spectrum, and Zoom.\31\ Even global banks were affected.\32\ An outage 
lasting less than a day may have cost the global economy billions of 
dollars.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \28\ Cody Slingerland, ``21+ Top Cloud Service Providers Globally 
in 2026,'' CloudZero, March 3, 2026. (https://www.cloudzero.com/blog/
cloud-service-providers).
 \29\ Katherine Hafner, ``Data centers keep growing in Virginia--and 
so does energy demand,'' WHRO, November 14, 2024. (https://www.vpm.org/
news/2024-11-14/meta-google-amazon-dominion-energy-data-centers-
virginia-power-demand).
 \30\ Matt Pusatory and Matt Gregory, ``AWS outage puts Northern 
Virginia data centers in the spotlight,'' WUSA9, October 20, 2025. 
(https://www.wusa9.com/article/tech/amazon-web-services-outage-puts-
northern-virginia-data-centers-spotlight/65-9e547d6c-1669-40dd-8cd1-
c175f- 
45ce563#:?:text=Ripple%20effect,and%20Venmo%20temporarily%20halted%20tra
nsactions).
 \31\ Michael Grothaus, ``AWS outage hits much of the internet, 
impacting a long list of websites and apps, from Reddit to 
McDonald's,'' Fast Company, October 20, 2025. (https://
www.fastcompany.com/91425038/aws-outage-today-list-of-websites-hit-us-
east-1-amazon-down).
 \32\ Liv McMahon, ``Amazon apologises to customers impacted by huge 
AWS outage,'' BBC (UK), October 23, 2025. (https://www.bbc.com/news/
articles/cvgvnp77dy9o).
 \33\ Jon Tran, ``The Cloud is Falling: AWS Outage and Why it 
Matters,'' The Chertoff Group, October 22, 2025. (https://
chertoffgroup.com/aws-outage-why-it-matters).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 And this outage was a simple misconfiguration. Had the service been 
sabotaged by malicious actors, the disruption would have been longer 
and worse.
 Iran is already testing its hand at this. In March 2026, Iran 
targeted 2 Amazon Web Services data centers in the Middle East, 
claiming the attack sought to ``identify the role of these centers in 
supporting the enemy's military and intelligence activities.''\34\ 
While the attack on one center did not substantially disrupt services, 
the second strike led to civilian impacts for millions of people in 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi who were unable to access transportation, food 
delivery, and financial services due to the outage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \34\ Daniel Boffey, `` `It means missile defence on data centres': 
drone strikes raise doubts over Gulf as AI superpower,'' The Guardian 
(UK), March 7, 2026. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/07/it-
means-missile-defence-on-data-centres-drone-strikes-raises-doubts-over-
gulf-as-ai-superpower).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Let me repeat: Iran used drones to attack an American company to 
attempt to degrade our military capabilities. While the strikes failed 
in their stated mission, Moscow and Beijing are no doubt watching. Both 
are more likely to launch cyber attacks than missile strikes on the 
U.S. homeland, but both are also increasing the size and sophistication 
of their missile systems.
 telecommunications
 Over the past year, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has 
reinvigorated its national security mission. This has been the single 
most important administration effort to deal with emerging technology 
challenges from China. The FCC has long managed an effort to remove 
Huawei and ZTE equipment from U.S. networks and has banned state-owned 
Chinese telecommunications companies from providing services in the 
United States.\35\ Over the past year, the FCC has further leveraged 
its regulatory authority to prohibit the sale of Chinese-made connected 
devices in the United States over national security concerns. This is 
vital national security work, but it does not diminish what CISA must 
do as the SRMA for the communications sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \35\ Federal Communications Commission Wireline Competition Bureau, 
``Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program 
Sixth Report,'' June 30, 2025. (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-412591A1.pdf); U.S. House of Representatives Select 
Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, Press Release, ``House 
Committee Subpoenas Chinese Telecom Giants After Refusal to Disclose 
CCP and Military Links,'' April 24, 2025. (https://
chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-committee-
subpoenas-chinese-telecom-giants-after-refusal-disclose-ccp).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Banning Chinese telecommunications equipment is important, but in 
the case of Salt Typhoon, the access vector was Cisco routers. This 
American-made equipment contained vulnerabilities that Chinese hackers 
exploited. Critical infrastructure is not just about who manufactures 
the hardware but also about whether the manufacturers and the operators 
properly maintain it.
 Indeed, Salt Typhoon remains the most pressing threat to the 
American telecommunications industry. In early 2025, CISA warned that 
there had been no confirmation that Salt Typhoon had been fully evicted 
from compromised networks.\36\ The FBI has since also stated publicly 
that the threat is on-going.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \36\ Mark T. Hoske, ``How to mitigate the ongoing Salt Typhoon 
telecom hack: CISA,'' Control Engineering, February 12, 2025. (https://
www.controleng.com/how-to-mitigate-the-ongoing-salt-typhoon-telecom-
hack-cisa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Mitigating the Salt Typhoon threat has been hampered by Government 
failures. Four years ago, CISA conducted a study on cyber 
vulnerabilities in telecommunications systems. Despite pledging to 
Congress that it would release the findings, CISA has yet to do so.\37\ 
A joint public-private study on Salt Typhoon has similarly been buried. 
At the same time that the Trump administration dissolved CIPAC, it also 
disbanded the Cyber Safety Review Board.\38\ The board--comprising 
representatives from Government and from private industry--had been in 
the middle of investigating the Salt Typhoon hacks. Dissolving the 
board leaves dire lessons unlearned and the American public still 
unaware of the degree to which their communications were compromised. 
The subcommittee has a critical obligation to determine the status of 
this work and when the American people can expect to see the findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \37\ Tim Starks, ``CISA says it will release telecom security 
report sought by Sen. Wyden to lift hold on Plankey nomination,'' 
CyberScoop, July 29, 2025. (https://cyberscoop.com/cisa-says-it-will-
release-telecom-security-report-sought-by-sen-wyden-to-lift-hold-on-
plankey-nomination).
 \38\ David Jones, ``DHS disbands existing advisory board 
memberships, raising questions about CSRB,'' Cybersecurity Dive, 
January 22, 2025. (https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/dhs-disbands-
advisory-board-csrb/737976/).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 I am concerned that these failures are symptomatic of a greater 
problem in CISA's ability to carry out its SRMA duties for the 
communications sector. A 2021 GAO study concluded CISA's SRMA work for 
the communications sector needed significant improvement.\39\ In 
particular, GAO warned that while CISA had programs to support the 
communications sector, it had not assessed the effectiveness or 
comprehensiveness of this effort. That recommendation remains open, 
meaning to this day, CISA does not know if the agency is actually 
useful to the sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \39\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the Effectiveness of its 
Actions to Support the Communications Sector,'' November 23, 2021. 
(https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104462).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 GAO also urged CISA to update the ``sector-specific plan'' for the 
communications sector--the plan that lays out how the Government will 
perform its SRMA duties to help critical infrastructure owners and 
operators identify and mitigate threats, evaluate risks, and respond to 
incidents. To this day, the most recent publicly-available sector-
specific plan dates to 2015.\40\ Suffice it to say, many things have 
changed in the past 10 years. Back in 2021, CISA conceded to GAO that 
updating the plan was already 2 years behind schedule and that 
``certain elements of the plan [were] out of date.''\41\ In September 
2025, CISA finally provided GAO with a copy of the new plan. It 
appears, however, that the new Risk Management Plan is not available 
publicly on-line. What good is an updated plan if owners and operators 
cannot easily find it?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \40\ ``Communications Sector,'' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, accessed February 24, 2026. (https://www.cisa.gov/
topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-
infrastructure-sectors/communications-sector).
 \41\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the Effectiveness of its 
Actions to Support the Communications Sector,'' November 23, 2021. 
(https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104462).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 space-based systems
 Within the communications sector, it is the security of satellite 
communications and other space-based assets that gives me the greatest 
heartburn. After all, one of the first volleys in the Ukraine war was a 
Russian cyber attack against an American satellite communications 
company.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \42\ UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, Press 
Release, ``Russia behind cyber-attack with Europe-wide impact an hour 
before Ukraine invasion,'' May 10, 2022. (https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/russia-behind-cyber-attack-with-europe-wide-impact-an-
hour-before-ukraine-invasion).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 CISA's interactions with satellite communications companies give it 
just a fraction of the picture of what is happening hundreds of miles 
above us. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has largely 
been unchallenged in outer space, but that is changing quickly. Moscow 
and Beijing are becoming more invested in space because they know that 
those who can exert influence beyond Earth hold unparalleled power on 
it. Space systems underpin critical commercial and Government 
functions, not just satellite communications but also missile defense. 
The Global Positioning System is integral to everything from crop 
irrigation to grid synchronization to global financial transactions.
 China and Russia have both asserted that commercial space systems 
can be legitimate military targets,\43\ and they are acting on this 
doctrine. America's adversaries possess counterspace weapons with 
capabilities ranging from temporarily disabling satellites to 
manipulating trajectories or onboard processes to complete kinetic 
destruction of the satellite.\44\ Our adversaries are prepared to use 
cyber attacks, electronic jamming and spoofing, anti-satellite 
missiles, and co-orbital systems to degrade our capabilities. Just last 
year, then-Vice Chief of Space Operations General Michael Guetlein 
warned that our near-peer adversaries are ``practicing dogfighting in 
space with satellite-on-satellite'' operations.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \43\ Sandra Erwin, ``Russia escalates rhetoric on commercial 
satellites, calls them `legitimate targets for retaliation,' Space 
News, October 27, 2022. (https://spacenews.com/russia-escalates-
rhetoric-on-commercial-satellites-calls-them-legitimate-targets-for-
retaliation); U.S. Department of Defense, ``Annual Report to Congress: 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of 
China 2025,'' 2025, page 21. (https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/
2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-
DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF#page=21).
 \44\ Emmanouil M. Karatarakis, ``America's Intelligence Satellites 
are Proliferating: Their Protection is Not, With Exceptions,'' The 
Cipher Brief, January 30, 2026. (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/
americas-intelligence-satellites-are-proliferating-their-protection-is-
not-with-exceptions).
 \45\ Audrey Decker, ``China is practicing `dogfighting' in space, 
Space Force says,'' Defense One, March 18, 2025. (https://
www.defenseone.com/threats/2025/03/china-practicing-dogfighting-space-
space-force-says/403863).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 This extraterrestrial competition will only intensify. Three years 
ago, China announced plans to send a crewed mission to the moon before 
2030 to rival NASA's Artemis program.\46\ The next year, Moscow and 
Beijing announced a joint program to construct a lunar base by 2035, 
again competing with U.S. time lines. The two countries signed an 
agreement to build a lunar nuclear power plant, challenging NASA's 
plans to launch a reactor by the early 2030's. NASA warned last year 
that if our adversaries beat us to the punch, they will, in essence, 
``declare a keep-out zone which would significantly inhibit the United 
States.''\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \46\ Emmerson Overell, ``Houston, Americans Are Headed Back to the 
Moon,'' Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 27, 2026. (https:/
/www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/27/houston-americans-are-headed-back-to-
the-moon).
 \47\ Sam Skove, ``Duffy to announce nuclear reactor on the moon,'' 
Politico, August 4, 2025. (https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/04/
nasa-china-space-station-duffy-directives-00492172).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The consequences of failing to protect U.S. space systems--and 
ceding space superiority to adversaries--would be detrimental to 
national security.\48\ CISA's narrow insights into satellite 
communications do not provide it with the perspective to understand the 
full scope of risks to space-based assets. This is why I, along with my 
colleague Frank Cilluffo, continue to endorse designating space systems 
as a U.S. critical infrastructure sector so that these assets that are 
vital to U.S. national security, economic prosperity, and public health 
and safety receive the policy attention and risk management support 
they deserve.\49\ Today, governance and support is fragmented across 
CISA, NASA, Commerce, the Pentagon, and other Federal agencies and 
State authorities.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \48\ Mark Montgomery, Craig Singleton, Jack Burnham, and Sophie 
McDowall, ``Space Modernization for the 21st Century,'' Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies, October 28, 2025. (https://www.fdd.org/
analysis/2025/10/28/space-modernization-for-the-21st-century).
 \49\ Frank Cilluffo, Mark Montgomery, Sharon Cardash, and Kelsey 
Shields, ``Time to Designate Space Systems as Critical 
Infrastructure,'' CSC 2.0, April 14, 2023. (https://cybersolarium.org/
csc-2-0-reports/time-to-designate-space-systems-as-critical-
infrastructure); Georgianna Shea and Humza Khan, ``Critical Orbit: The 
Case for Designating Space as National Critical Infrastructure in the 
Cyber Age,'' CPI TechReg Chronicle, July 30, 2025. (https://
www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/30/critical-orbit-the-case-for-
designating-space-as-national-infrastructure-in-the-cyber-age).
 \50\ Anne Wainscott-Sargent, ``It's Unanimous: Space Already 
Functions as Critical Infrastructure,'' Via Satellite, April 7, 2026. 
(https://interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/april-may-2026/its-
unanimous-space-already-functions-as-critical-infrastructure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Despite the fact that in a 2021 report--a report demanded by 
Congress--CISA acknowledged that space systems should be designated as 
a critical infrastructure sector,\51\ the Biden administration failed 
to act. This Congress and the Trump administration have an opportunity 
to secure American space-based systems by designating them as critical 
infrastructure. Failing to do so will have serious national security 
consequences as our adversaries pursue deliberate efforts to erode U.S. 
space superiority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \51\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``FY 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Act Section 9002(b) Report,'' November 12, 2021, 
page 44 (https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/
Section_9002_NDAA_Report_FINAL_508c.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 recommendations
 Ensuring the resilience of America's communications and IT 
infrastructure is essential for our Nation's continued prosperity. 
While private companies must invest in their own cybersecurity, they 
cannot reinforce America's cyber resilience alone. Critical 
infrastructure owners and operators need competent Government partners. 
Core to that partnership is the SRMA structure. Congress can ensure 
that CISA is resourced and structured correctly for this mission.
1. Fully fund CISA for its SRMA and national coordinator mission and 
 require CISA to conduct a force structure assessment.
 Last year, the President's budget proposed cutting 17 percent of 
CISA's funding, putting the agency's budget at about $2.3 billion.\52\ 
Congress disagreed with such a dramatic cut, and appropriators were on 
track earlier this year to provide CISA with $2.6 billion.\53\ This 
year, the President's budget again proposes to cut CISA's funding, this 
time by over $700 million \54\--leaving what the former Chairman of 
this committee, Rep. John Katko, used to say should be a $5 billion 
agency \55\ with just over $2 billion to execute its mission. Congress 
should once again reject the President's dramatic cuts to CISA and fund 
the agency to meet its mission as both the SRMA for 9 sectors as well 
as the national coordinator for critical infrastructure resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \52\ Eric Geller, ``Trump proposes major cut to CISA's budget, 
citing false `censorship' claims,'' Cybersecurity Dive, May 2, 2025. 
(https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/trump-cisa-budget-cuts-
disinformation/747047); Weslan Hansen, ``House Panel Softens CISA 
Budget Cut to 4.6 percent,'' MeriTalk, June 11, 2025. (https://
www.meritalk.com/articles/house-panel-softens-cisa-budget-cut-to-4-6).
 \53\ Tim Starks, ``Congressional appropriators move to extend 
information-sharing law, fund CISA,'' CyberScoop, January 20, 2026. 
(https://cyberscoop.com/congressional-appropriators-move-to-extend-
information-sharing-law-fund-cisa).
 \54\ Jiwon Ma, ``America's Cyber Strategy Has a Budget Problem,'' 
The Cipher Brief, April 23, 2026. (https://www.thecipherbrief.com/
americas-cyber-strategy-budget-problem).
 \55\ Jory Heckman, ``Katko calls for $5B CISA budget to reflect its 
`quarterback' status,'' Federal News Network, March 22, 2021. (https://
Federalnewsnetwork.com/cybersecurity/2021/03/katko-calls-for-5b-cisa-
budget-to-reflect-its-quarterback-status).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Reasonable people can disagree about the precise funding level CISA 
needs, but Congress needs an objective answer. As such, lawmakers 
should request a force structure assessment of the agency to determine 
its ability to fulfill statutory requirements. In Section 1745 of the 
fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act,\56\ Congress 
demanded CISA conduct just such an assessment. For 3 years, the Biden 
administration tried and failed to do this assessment, leaving the 
incoming Trump administration with no roadmap for agency development, 
and from there, things only got worse. Lawmakers should demand this 
assessment again. Armed with that information, Congress and the White 
House can determine how CISA should be organized and what level of 
funding is appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \56\ William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4138. (https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395/text/statute).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Request an update from DHS on its efforts to replace CIPAC.
 Since January, the Department has provided no concrete updates on 
its plans to replace CIPAC. At that time, some press reporting 
indicated that the ANCHOR plan was on the Secretary's desk for final 
approval. I suspect that was an overly optimistic description of its 
status, but nonetheless, less than 8 weeks later, Secretary Kristi Noem 
was out. Newly-confirmed Secretary Markwayne Mullin should update 
Congress on his plans to undo the damage his predecessor did by 
dissolving CIPAC. This subcommittee should request a briefing from the 
department and ensure the mechanism DHS implements provides for maximum 
collaboration and trusted information sharing among private and public 
entities.
3. Demand that the White House nominate a CISA director.
 For the past 15 months, CISA has operated without a Senate-
confirmed director. Sean Plankey was extremely qualified and would have 
made a fine director. After it became abundantly clear that the Senate 
would not confirm him--because of unrelated issues to do with the Coast 
Guard--he withdrew his nomination last week. The White House should 
promptly announce a new nominee and work with the Senate to confirm 
that individual as soon as possible. Members of this committee should 
remind their Senate counterparts and the White House that without a 
confirmed director, the Nation's civil defense agency cannot execute 
the administration's strategy to ``act swiftly, deliberately, and 
proactively to disable cyber threats to America.''\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \57\ ``President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America,'' The White 
House, March 2026. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/
03/president-trumps-cyber-strategy-for-america.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Designate space systems as critical infrastructure and NASA as its 
 SRMA.
 Congress should designate space systems as critical infrastructure. 
This is not about regulating the industry but rather about making sure 
that the Federal Government is organized and on mission to support the 
identification and mitigation of risks to the sector. It would 
establish a formal structure with clearly-defined roles and 
authorities, improve understanding of threats, and enhance private-
public collaboration.
 Critics argue that such a designation is too complex due to cross-
sector entanglement, but that is precisely why it is necessary. Space 
systems encompass the ecosystem from the ground to orbit, including 
sensors, signals, data, payloads, and supply chains. ``Space-based 
assets are part of the Nation's critical infrastructure and are 
increasingly integrated into daily life,'' CISA's executive assistant 
director for infrastructure security, Steve Casapulla, noted earlier 
this month.\58\ Congress should make this official, establishing space 
as the 17th critical infrastructure sector and signaling to adversaries 
that Washington considers these systems essential and that it will 
defend them accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \58\ Anne Wainscott-Sargent, ``It's Unanimous: Space Already 
Functions as Critical Infrastructure,'' Via Satellite, April 7, 2026. 
(https://interactive.satellitetoday.com/via/april-may-2026/its-
unanimous-space-already-functions-as-critical-infrastructure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Alongside this designation, Congress should assign the SRMA duties 
to NASA. Managing risk in this sector requires expertise in national 
security, economic analysis, science and technology, and space 
operations--areas in which NASA has deep experience. NASA should serve 
as the central coordinating authority, supported by additional funding 
to scale its capacity. Two subgroups should operate under NASA: one 
focused on the military and the intelligence community and another on 
civilian satellite communications. The Pentagon would continue to lead 
within its domain, while CISA--as SRMA for communications--would 
continue to engage with the latter. Congress should not, however, 
assign NASA a regulatory role. Existing regulatory frameworks already 
govern space systems; adding another layer would likely increase 
inefficiency rather than security.
5. Require CISA to explain its assessment of the distinction between 
 the communications and IT sectors.
 Decade-old sector-specific plans mean that Congress--and the 
American people--do not know how CISA assesses the risks to and the 
makeup of the communication and IT sectors. Congress should require 
CISA to provide an assessment of the position of data centers and cloud 
infrastructure within the current critical infrastructure sector 
frameworks. These systems are possibly the fastest-growing component of 
the IT sector while becoming increasingly inseparable from the 
communications sector. Understanding CISA's current approach and 
collaborative work across the IT and communications sectors to secure 
data centers can inform Congress as to whether stronger support is 
needed to improve the resilience of these systems.
6. Require SRMAs to update sector-specific plans or sector risk 
 management plans biennially and DHS to update the National 
 plan.
 Since 2021, CISA's efforts to update the communications sector-
specific plan--and the risk management plans for the other sectors--
have been repeatedly delayed by efforts to update the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Disgracefully, the last 
finalized version of the NIPP we have is from 2013. Over the decade-
and-a-half since then, DHS has attempted in fits and starts to update 
the national plan, pledging in 2024 to release the first biennial 
National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan the following year.\59\ 
Needless to say, it hasn't. The Trump administration announced a much-
needed review of all critical infrastructure policies, including 
National Security Memorandum 22, which set forward biennial deadlines 
for new sector and national plans.\60\ If the Executive branch cannot 
keep to its self-imposed deadlines, Congress needs to step in. 
Lawmakers should amend the legislation creating the tasking for SRMAs 
to include a requirement to update sector plans biennially and for CISA 
to issue a national plan--as well as the National Cyber Incident 
Response Plan--every 2 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \59\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Memorandum, ``Strategic 
Guidance and National Priorities for U.S. Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience (2024-2025),'' June 14, 2024. (https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/24_0620_sec_2024-strategic-
guidance-national-priorities-u-s-critical-infrastructure-security-
resilience.pdf); Jen Easterly, ``A Plan to Protect Critical 
Infrastructure from 21st Century Threats: Purpose of the National 
Infrastructure Risk Management Plan,'' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, May 29, 2024. (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/
plan-protect-critical-infrastructure-21st-century-threats).
 \60\ Executive Order 14239, ``Achieving Efficiency Through State 
and Local Preparedness,'' March 19, 2025. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/2025/03/achieving-efficiency-through-state-and-
local-preparedness).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 conclusion
 Americans need food, water, and electricity to live. Our economy 
needs data and the internet. The military needs a networked 
transportation system to have the mobility to get to the fight. The IT 
and communications sectors are not just critical infrastructure but 
also essential infrastructure to each of these missions--public health 
and safety, economic prosperity, and national security. Their 
resilience against cyber and physical threats requires robust 
collaboration between the Government and private companies. Washington 
has been failing to live up to its side of the arrangement for decades. 
Congress must take action to change that.
 Thank you for the invitation to testify. I look forward to your 
questions.

 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Admiral.
 I now recognize Mr. Algeier for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT C. ALGEIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INFORMATION 
 TECHNOLOGY-INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER

 Mr. Algeier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Thompson. Thank you, Ranking Member Ramirez. Members of 
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
 As mentioned, my name is Scott Algeier. For nearly 21 years 
I have served as the executive director of the Information 
Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center. The IT ISAC 
is a not-for-profit, nonpartisan industry association formed in 
2000 with a simple premise that we're all stronger together. At 
a time when well-resourced and highly-skilled nation-state 
actors are targeting industry, the IT ISAC helps companies make 
informed risk management decisions through voluntary threat 
intelligence sharing. Our members span almost every segment of 
the IT sector that propels today's global economy.
 The IT ISAC has long considered CISA to be a key partner. 
We value the relationships we have built with CISA. We have 
always engaged in an honest and nonpartisan way and will 
continue to do so.
 The threats facing critical infrastructure have never been 
more serious and the ability to defend against them are 
strained. Capabilities, partnerships, and programs that 
industry depend on have been reduced or eliminated. Engagement 
with industry on operational threat intelligence matters is 
also reduced. The good news is that there is a path to renew 
and strengthen CISA. This could be achieved through the 
following actions.
 Implement a replacement for CIPAC. When CIPAC--when DHS 
disbanded CIPAC, it removed the legal framework that enabled 
and protected strategic engagement between CISA and industry. 
As a result, most of the work with CISA is at a standstill. Our 
adversaries have not paused. They have not stopped. They are 
continuing to attack with impunity.
 Provide for a long-term extension of the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2015. CISA 2015, is a critical tool 
that provides liability, antitrust, and FOIA protections for 
sharing cyber threat intelligence. It is important to maintain 
a trusted legal framework that incentivizes and protects 
companies who voluntarily share threat intelligence.
 Confirm our assistant director. While this is not the 
purview of the House, the absence of a Senate-confirmed 
director creates a leadership gap and makes it harder for CISA 
to advocate for resources and priorities. While Nick Anderson 
is doing an admirable job as acting director, the agency will 
benefit from having a Senate-confirmed director.
 Prioritize resources through collaboration. Resources, 
time, money, and people are limited and must be leveraged to 
maximum effect. Collaboratively developing priorities can help 
industry and Government allocate resources more effectively.
 Analyze the impacts of CISA staff funding reductions. 
Changing staffing levels based on organization priorities is a 
common management practice, but to ensure CISA can maintain its 
vital core functions, it should engage with industry partners 
to understand the impact reductions are having and evaluate 
whether any adjustments are warranted.
 Enhance analytical engagement with industry. CISA should 
designate cybersecurity analysts to support specific sectors. 
The analysts would build relationships with sector ISACs and 
their members to know and understand the specific industries 
and threats to them. This will create trusted relationships, 
better analysis, and improve threat intelligence.
 Create common situational awareness. CISA currently sends 
alerts on specific incidents, but this is a whack-a-mole 
approach that is not suitable for a sustained capability that 
provides near-real-time strategic and tactical threat 
intelligence. It doesn't create shared situational awareness to 
inform decision making.
 Vulnerability management modernization. Our vulnerability 
disclosure and patch management processes are already 
struggling with today's pace of disclosures. AI threatens to 
further stress this. CISA can convene relevant communities to 
address this. Refining CIRCIA, the IT ISAC and the IT Sector 
Coordinating Council have expressed concern that the proposed 
CIRCIA regulations were too broad and would result in it 
receiving more information than it could process. Limiting 
CIRCIA's scope and scale to more closely align with legislative 
intent will not only reduce the reporting burden on industry, 
but help CISA develop and distribute more meaningful threat 
intelligence. We applaud CISA for planning a series of town 
halls to receive additional input.
 Implement effective partnership principles. In 2012, the IT 
Sector Coordinating Council identified 12 partnership practices 
that lead to successful outcomes. CISA should review and renew 
these. I would like to reiterate our support and appreciation 
for everyone at CISA who works tirelessly to protect our 
country.
 I thank you all for the opportunity and welcome any 
questions you have.
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Algeier follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Scott C. Algeier
 April 29, 2026
 Chairman Ogles and Members of the committee, thank you very much 
for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Scott Algeier and I 
have spent over 25 years at the intersection of cybersecurity policy 
and operations. I am the founder, president, and CEO of cybersecurity 
consulting firm Conrad, Inc., executive director of the Information 
Technology--Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC), and 
executive director of the Food and Agriculture--Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center.
 I am also a member of the executive committee of the IT Sector 
Coordinating Council and past vice chair of the National Council of 
ISACs. I previously served as executive director of the Industry 
Consortium for Advancement of Security of the Internet (ICASI), and as 
manager for homeland security at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
 It is an honor to be here today.
 about the it-isac
 Founded in 2000, the mission of the Information Technology--
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) is to grow a diverse 
community of companies that leverage information technology and have in 
common a commitment to cybersecurity. We serve as a force-multiplier 
that enables collaboration and sharing of relevant, actionable cyber 
threat information, effective security policies, and practices for the 
benefit of all.
 The premise of the IT-ISAC is simple--we're stronger together. At a 
time when well-resourced and highly-skilled nation-state actors are 
targeting industry, the IT-ISAC provides a forum for companies to share 
threat intelligence, increase situational awareness, and identify 
appropriate mitigations. We help companies make informed risk-
management decisions.
 Our membership base spans almost every segment of the IT sector, 
including data centers, cloud and Critical SaaS providers, 
semiconductor manufacturers, hardware and software companies, AI, and 
other technologies that propel the global economy. Members regularly 
exchange threat intelligence, discuss common security challenges, 
analyze threats, and share effective practices and have access to the 
following benefits:
 Access to 330+ Adversary Attack Playbooks mapped to the 
 MITRE ATT&CK Framework, enabling members to share and learn 
 tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of 
 compromise (IoCs).
 Ransomware Tracker that contains 15,000+ reported ransomware 
 incidents, including those specific to the IT and food and 
 agriculture sectors.
 A Threat Intelligence Platform with access to industry-
 leading threat analysis and automated indicator sharing.
 Daily Threat Reports, weekly newsletters, and incident-
 specific reporting as needed, offering timely analysis to 
 assist with informed risk management.
 Special Interest Groups (SIGs), facilitating discussion 
 among members on security topics and industry segments.
 The IT-ISAC is governed by a board of directors composed of dues-
paying member companies and does not receive any funding from any 
Government entity.
 cyber threat environment
 The country faces an unprecedented array of cyber risks. Networks 
are interconnected across the globe. The pace of technological change 
is exploding. Corporate budgets are constrained. Threat actors are 
collaborative, highly-skilled, and well-financed. In fact, the 
economics favor the attackers. It is much more expensive to defend than 
it is to attack.
 The IT-ISAC's 2025 IT Sector Cyber Threat Report available at 
https://www.it-isac.org/resources reveals some interesting trends. 
About 45 percent of the actors we observed in 2025 were nation-state 
actors. About 8 percent were ideologically motivated, generally (but 
not always) aligned with nation-state actors. The remaining 47 percent 
were ransomware operators or other cyber criminal gangs seeking 
financial gain. These are percentages of observed threat actors, and 
not percentages of observed attacks.

 Actors based in China account for 29 percent of the actors we 
observed. China strives for long-term persistence. They are known to 
hide on networks for months or even a year or more before being 
detected. We must assume that China-based actors have undetected access 
to critical Government and private-sector networks and be prepared for 
the possibility that they intend to use this access to cause 
disruptions or damage.
 Over 48 percent of all threat actors we observed in 2025 were based 
in Russia. Russia is teeming with talented nation-state actors and 
cyber criminals. Russia has also demonstrated its capability and intent 
to launch disruptive attacks against critical infrastructure across the 
globe. In addition, we are seeing signs that Russian-affiliated actors 
have aligned with Iranian actors, amplifying Iranian-affiliated attacks 
and targeting companies in solidarity with Iran.

 Iran is highly capable in the cyber domain. About 11 percent of 
observed threat actors active in the sector are based in Iran. Although 
the line between a nation-state actor and an affiliate actor can be 
blurry, Iran hosts a range of actors who operate with the blessing of 
the Iranian authorities. These threat actors have previously attacked 
critical infrastructure companies across the Middle East and within the 
United States. Iranian-aligned actors are continuing their attacks 
during the current conflict.
 Finally, in terms of nation-states, 6.5 percent of observed actors 
are based in North Korea. North Korea deploys highly-skilled actors to 
both steal sensitive information as well to fund their military. The 
now famous Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) fake worker 
scams are highly organized, well implemented, and provide millions of 
much-needed dollars to fund their government. Despite increased 
attention these attacks are receiving, they continue to be successful.
 Beyond nation-state actors, ransomware actors continue to target 
companies across the critical infrastructure sectors. While most 
ransomware actors are not affiliated with nation-states, some nation-
state actors do deploy ransomware. We are also seeing nation-state 
actors collaborate with ransomware operators.
 The IT-ISAC's recently-released Annual Ransomware Report (https://
www.it-isac.org/resources), is based on 6,351 ransomware incidents we 
tracked in 2025. Of these, 746 attacks were observed in the IT sector, 
accounting for 11.8 percent of the total. This is a sharp increase from 
the 3,562 incidents we tracked in 2024 (over 78 percent growth), 300 of 
which were observed in the IT sector.

 Observed number of attacks on critical infrastructure from the IT-
ISAC 2025 Ransomware Report.
 It must also be noted that artificial intelligence (AI) is making 
the attackers not only more efficient but also better. Threat actors 
use AI to improve the quality, quantity, and scale of their attacks. 
With the use of AI, attacks that took humans multiple days to complete 
can now be conducted within hours. While AI is being used for network 
defense, the advantage is with the attackers, at least for the moment. 
The capabilities announced by Anthropic of its Claude Mythos model 
risks breaking the traditional models that govern coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure and patch management. These models operate at 
the scale and speed of humans, not at the scale of AI.
 collaborating with cisa
 The IT-ISAC and CISA share the common mission of defending against 
today's threats while planning for the risks of the future. The IT-ISAC 
has long partnered with CISA on a range of operational, policy, and 
planning initiatives. We are committed to helping CISA succeed because 
when CISA succeeds, the country succeeds.
 As part of our commitment, we are part of the Joint Cyber Defense 
Collaborative (JCDC). While we find the Known Exploited Vulnerability 
Catalog to be helpful and appreciate the indicators and alerts we 
receive from the JCDC, overall, the JCDC represents a missed 
opportunity. One key potential value of the JCDC is to collaborate 
across sectors. The JCDC is actively sharing across sectors, but we 
have not been part of any cross-sector collaborations through the JCDC.
 In contrast, the private sector continues to demonstrate how cross-
industry collaboration drives value. The IT-ISAC worked with 9 other 
members of the National Council of ISACs, including the Space ISAC, to 
release a public advisory on threats posed by Iranian threat actors. 
The feedback on it was overwhelmingly positive. While we appreciate 
this, our advisory incorporated only open-source intelligence and is 
something CISA could have easily developed or coordinated.
 Improving analytic collaboration is essential. There is a great 
need for an integrated capability that provides industry and Government 
common situational awareness, one that enables CISA and industry to 
jointly identify, analyze, and mitigate threats. In the past, this has 
been referred to as a ``Cyber Weather Map.'' Previous efforts to build 
this capability had faltered, and it was claimed that JCDC would serve 
this purpose. However, the JCDC was built largely without broad 
industry engagement, so it is not surprising that the JCDC has not 
achieved this capability.
 The IT-ISAC continues to welcome the opportunity to share threat 
intelligence with CISA and collaborate on the development of analytic 
products. Our desire is to provide CISA analysts with an understanding 
of the trends, actors, and TTPs we are observing and compare those with 
what CISA is seeing. This will provide focus to our sharing--instead of 
throwing indicators at each other, we can curate indicators related to 
specific threats or information needs.
 Renewing the Cyber Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015) is 
critical to enabling this. Renewal will sustain threat intelligence 
sharing and operational collaboration. Industry has come to depend on 
the legal certainty CISA 2015 provides and has established internal 
sharing policies based on it. Losing these protections will create 
uncertainty and be needlessly disruptive. It could disrupt the flow of 
threat intelligence industry shares with each other, and almost 
certainly will reduce what is shared with CISA. Who wants to 
voluntarily share sensitive security information with the Government if 
it is subject to Freedom of Information Act requests? At a time when 
industry and Government both are under sustained attack, Government 
policy should be to encourage the voluntary sharing of cyber threat 
intelligence.
 The IT-ISAC has a strong relationship with CISA's Stakeholder 
Engagement team. The team had been helpful in connecting us with 
various elements within CISA to drive further engagement. We met with 
the Stakeholder Engagement team no less than once per month, and they 
were always responsive whenever we needed them. Unfortunately, as a 
result of the shutdown, these calls were suspended.
 Recognizing this, however, there is much more engagement with the 
Stakeholder Engagement team can accomplish more. There are serious 
security challenges that need to be addressed, new risks that need to 
be understood and mitigated, and contingencies that need to be planned 
for. This work is normally done through the Stakeholder Engagement team 
under the CIPAC framework. However, in February 2025 CISA paused its 
engagement with industry, then DHS disbanded CIPAC in March 2025, 
suspending all working groups and projects between industry and CISA.
 For over a year, we have been hearing that CISA will reinstate the 
protections of the CIPAC framework through a new council. This is 
encouraging. However, industry has not been consulted on the 
development of this new council and we have few details on it. Further, 
there are questions as to whether CISA maintains the capacity to 
adequately manage and support the work of the new council once it is 
activated.
 In addition, the on-going shutdown is impacting engagement with 
CISA, in areas that do not require CIPAC protections. As one example, 
CISA was working to understand interdependencies related to data 
centers and wanted to meet with our Data Center Special Interest Group. 
However, these meetings have not taken place since the CISA team doing 
the work was furloughed during the shutdowns.
 improving the cisa partnership
 One of our biggest challenges in cybersecurity is resources. There 
simply are not enough people, time, or money to do what needs to be 
done. We therefore must allocate our limited resources to maximum 
effect. An effective partnership will enable industry and Government to 
make informed decisions on how to allocate those resources.
 However, too often the Government's concept of partnership is that 
it makes the policy and industry implements it. Instead of discussing a 
problem together to identify solutions, the Government model too often 
is to propose a solution itself and offer industry a short time frame 
to provide feedback. The Government also determines what feedback it 
will incorporate. When the product is released, the Government promotes 
its ``engagement'' with industry. This does build trust or lead to good 
security outcomes,
 It does not have to be this way. In 2012, the IT Sector 
Coordinating Council conducted a study to identify what makes a 
partnership successful. It examined various initiatives that succeeded, 
and various initiatives that did not. This work identified 12 practices 
that were common among successful outcomes. I no longer have access to 
the original report, but Larry Clinton at the Internet Security 
Alliance captured these practices in an article that appeared in the 
Journal of Strategic Security \1\ in 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ Larry Clinton, ``Best Practices for Operating Government-
Industry Partnerships in Cyber Security,'' Journal of Strategic 
Security 8, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 53-68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/
26465215.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 When the report was released, these practices were widely endorsed. 
DHS committed to formally incorporating them into their management of 
the partnership. They also expressed their intent to have other Sector-
Specific Agencies (now known as Risk Management Agencies) adopt them. 
Ultimately, that commitment was not implemented, and these lessons have 
largely been forgotten. But at a time when CISA is looking to reset its 
engagement with industry, CISA should review and adopt these practices 
as their guideposts for engaging with industry.
 The report identified the following practices:
 Senior-level commitment to the partnership process 
 communicated to staff and upper echelons.
 Involvement at the priority/goal and objective phases of 
 projects, not just implementation.
 Use of the process identified in the NIPP (National 
 Infrastructure Protection Plan) for involving industry.
 Reaching out to stakeholders early on, ideally at the 
 ``blank page'' stage.
 Continuous and regular interaction between Government and 
 industry stakeholders.
 Providing adequate time for stakeholder review (equivalent 
 to Government review).
 Establishing co-leadership of programs.
 Consensus partnership decision making.
 Communicating genuine interest in stakeholder input e.g. via 
 co-drafting.
 Adequate engagement from Federal agencies beyond DHS.
 Government follow-through on partnership-related decisions.
 Adequate and competent support services (Clinton, 2015).
 A key lesson from this is that the process impacts the outcome. If 
the process is designed to receive broad input, identify consensus, and 
engage industry and Government as equals, it will likely succeed. If 
industry believes their input matters and is taken seriously, they will 
engage. If they believe the outcome is predetermined and that their 
input does not matter, they will not.
 strengthening cisa
 The good news is that there is a path to renew and strengthen CISA. 
This could be achieved through the following actions:
 Implement a Replacement for CIPAC.--On March 7, 2025 CISA 
 disbanded the CIPAC, removing the legal framework that enabled 
 and protected strategic engagement between CISA and industry. 
 As a result, most work with CISA is at a standstill. The Sector 
 Coordinating Councils have not met with their Sector Risk 
 Management Agencies in over a year. Meanwhile, our adversaries 
 have not paused or stopped. They are attacking with impunity.
 Provide for a Long-Term Extension of the Cybersecurity 
 Information Sharing Act of 2015 (CISA 2015).--CISA 2015 is a 
 critical tool, as it provides liability and anti-trust 
 protections for sharing cyber threat intelligence within 
 industry. It also provides FOIA protections to cyber threat 
 information voluntarily shared with the Government. It is 
 important to maintain a trusted legal framework that 
 incentivizes and protects companies who voluntarily share 
 threat intelligence.
 Confirm a CISA Director.--While this is not the purview of 
 the House, it is worth noting that the nominee for CISA 
 director recently withdrew from consideration after having his 
 nomination languish for over a year. The absence of a Senate-
 confirmed director creates a leadership gap and makes it harder 
 to advocate for resources and priorities. While Nick Andersen 
 is doing an admirable job as acting director, the agency will 
 benefit from having a Senate-confirmed director.
 Prioritize Resources Through Collaboration.--The list of 
 things we want to do to improve our collective security is 
 infinite. The list of things we can do is finite. Resources--
 time, money, and people--are limited and must be leveraged to 
 maximum effect. Collaboratively developing priorities can help 
 industry and Government allocate resources more effectively.
 Analyze the Impacts of CISA Staff and Funding Reductions.--
 Changing staffing levels based on organizational priorities is 
 a common management practice. However, the size of the CISA 
 reductions have caused many to wonder whether CISA can maintain 
 its vital core functions. CISA should engage with its partners 
 to understand what impact the reductions are having and 
 evaluate whether any adjustments are warranted.
 Enhance Analytic Engagement with Industry.--CISA can improve 
 its engagement with the critical infrastructure sectors by 
 designating specific cybersecurity analysts to support specific 
 sectors. These analysts would build relationships with sector 
 ISACs and their members to know and understand their 
 industries, share threat intelligence specific to that sector, 
 and receive threat intelligence and requests for information 
 shared by industry. They would be an analytic point of contact 
 for specific sectors.
 Under this concept, one analyst could support multiple sectors (for 
 example, one analyst could cover IT, Communications, and 
 Space).
 Create Common Situational Awareness.--The JCDC currently 
 engages with industry by sending alerts on specific incidents 
 through Slack. On occasion, they will stand up working groups 
 to address specific issues. But this ``whack-a-mole'' approach 
 is not a substitute for a sustained capability that shares, in 
 near-real time, strategic and tactical threat intelligence that 
 informs decision making. One potential goal could be to build a 
 threat intelligence dashboard that is accessible to the 
 industry and Government.
 Vulnerability Management Modernization.--Our vulnerability 
 and patch management processes are already struggling to keep 
 up with today's pace of disclosures. At the same time, the time 
 between the disclosure of a vulnerability and its exploitation 
 has decreased from weeks and days to hours. Threat actors are 
 exploiting vulnerabilities before organizations can deploy 
 patches. AI threatens to further stress, if not disrupt, our 
 vulnerability disclosure and patch management models. CISA can 
 play an important role in convening the relevant communities to 
 address this.
 Refining Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical 
 Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA).--CIRCIA was passed in 2022 with 
 draft regulations being proposed by DHS in April 2024. The IT-
 ISAC and the IT Sector Coordinating Council expressed concern 
 that the proposed regulations were too broad and would result 
 in CISA receiving more information than it could process. 
 Limiting CIRCIA's scope and scale to more closely align with 
 legislative intent will not only reduce the reporting burden on 
 industry but will help CISA develop and distribute more 
 meaningful threat intelligence. We applaud CISA for planning a 
 series of town halls to receive additional input.
 Implement Effective Partnership Principles.--Managing a 
 partnership takes work. In 2012 the IT Sector Coordinating 
 Council conducted a study that identified 12 practices that, if 
 followed, lead to successful outcomes. These have largely been 
 forgotten, but at a time when CISA is looking to reset its 
 engagement with industry, CISA should adopt these practices as 
 their guideposts for engaging with industry.
 conclusion
 The IT-ISAC has been partnering with the Government for 26 years. 
We value our partnership with CISA and are committed to and vested in 
its success. There is no doubt that CISA is facing some headwinds, but 
through these headwinds are opportunities. We appreciate the work we do 
with CISA and are determined to do what we can to help it succeed.
 We look forward to continuing our work with CISA and others across 
Government to ensure the digital infrastructure that propels the global 
economy is secure and resilient. Please feel free to contact me at 
[email protected] if you have any questions or if I can be of any 
assistance.
 Thank you again for the opportunity.

 Mr. Ogles. Thank you, Mr. Algeier.
 As they have called votes, we will take a brief recess and 
reconvene promptly thereafter. Again, thank you to the 
witnesses for your patience. Pursuant to committee rules, the 
committee stands in recess.
 [Recess.]
 Mr. Fong [presiding]. We are going to reconvene this 
committee hearing. I know the votes are still on-going, so we 
are going to jump right into questions. So I will recognize 
myself for 5 minutes of questioning and then I will turn it 
over to the Ranking Member for her questions as well.
 Thank you all for being here. Thank you for the information 
that you provided. My first question is to Mr. Mayer. How can 
CISA better facilitate intelligence and information sharing 
with the private sector, especially when it comes to the 
communications and information technology sectors? I read your 
testimony, but can you get--can you dive down a little more 
specific?
 Mr. Mayer. Sure. So I would say that over the last 2 years, 
we've seen a marked increase in the quality and the frequency 
of intelligence briefings, Classified briefings. Information on 
all of the major attacks were discussed in those environments. 
We shared with CISA what we were seeing on our networks. They 
were sharing with us what the intelligence community was 
seeing. I think we've made a lot of progress in that area.
 I think one area that deserves greater attention is the 
ability to convey that information to the local and regional 
providers in the communications sector. There are hundreds of 
such providers and getting very quick information is very 
important to them. But I also will say that CISA has done a 
better job in terms of releasing cybersecurity advisories at 
the unclassified level and that has been very helpful as well 
as.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you. I will go to Admiral Montgomery. With 
the rapid increase in reliance on hyperscale data centers, 
which enable cloud services like Amazon Web Services, what 
safeguards are necessary to ensure these facilities are 
protected against adversarial threats? What are the 
consequences of leaving these facilities vulnerable?
 Mr. Montgomery. Yeah, thanks for asking that. It's exactly 
my greatest concern is that in our rush to build them or to 
have the environmental discussions about them, we're missing 
the really important physical and cybersecurity discussions. We 
have to make sure that they're both physically secure. But then 
we--and there, I think about drone attacks, as you probably 
have been briefed in the recent conflict with Iran, the 
Iranians directly attacked U.S.-owned data centers within our 
partners.
 But the second part, cybersecurity. This has to do with 
both the supply chain of the parts you have in the data center, 
making sure that they're not from countries of concern like 
China. But second, that you're doing the proper level of--
you've set up the proper standards for security on them and 
that you have the proper operational environment.
 One thing I'd recommend is there should be a strong 
consideration of whether data centers and cloud need to be a 
separate critical--national critical infrastructure. There's 
been a push for that in the past. It fell short with the cloud. 
But now that you have the data centers as well, and we can all 
see the dynamic, the large role they're going to play in the 
United States, possibly an independent national critical 
infrastructure that handles data center and clouds separate 
from communications.
 Mr. Fong. So you may have answered my next question, but 
the United Kingdom has designated data centers as critical 
national infrastructure. Do you believe that the United States 
should follow suit? I will open that question up to the rest 
the of the panel, but Admiral.
 Mr. Montgomery. I do. In fact, of the things we're talking 
about today, data center, space, and telecommunications, I 
think they're 3 separate critical infrastructures. So I don't 
know if Sam joins me with this, but I think space is a critical 
infrastructure and I think data centers are a critical 
infrastructure.
 Mr. Fong. Mr. Mayer, I will start with you and we will go 
on down the row.
 Mr. Mayer. Yeah. Look, given the exponential growth in data 
centers, we're going to see more of that. Connectivity is going 
to be a major aspect to that, so there are links to the 
communications sector. But I think given the scrutiny that is 
required to make sure that those data centers are secure, there 
would be a benefit, I think, in having them work together as a 
unique coordinating council.
 Mr. Fong. Mr. Visner.
 Mr. Visner. Thank you. Thank you for the question, 
Congressman. I'd have to agree. If you take a look at what's 
happening with data centers, the infrastructure that data 
centers are building and that they're going to be driving with 
energy, you're going to have massive data centers, 
hyperscalers, data centers that are going to be powered 
independently by small and modular nuclear reactors. That 
infrastructure is going to become an important part of the 
national landscape. It's going to employ thousands of people. 
It's going to contribute hundreds of billions and eventually 
trillions of dollars to the national economy.
 Our national defense will depend on these data centers. Our 
economic security will depend on these data centers. Much of 
our critical infrastructure, particularly as we use AI-enabled 
smart cities and infrastructures that they're going to depend 
on these data centers. So finding a way to regard them as part 
of our critical infrastructure and to protect them accordingly, 
I think is sine qua non. I think it's absolutely required.
 Mr. Fong. Mr. Algeier.
 Mr. Algeier. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 
I would like to just note that the data center community is 
currently represented within the information technology ISAC. 
We have a number of data center providers who are members. 
We've formed a--what we call a special interest group for the 
data center providers, so that they can communicate with other 
data center providers and share threat intelligence, share 
mitigation practices, share policies on both cyber and physical 
security. So the data centers are integrated already into the 
critical infrastructure discussions and we--they--we serve them 
through the information technology ISAC.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you. Thank you very much.
 I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentlewoman from 
Illinois, Mrs. Ramirez, for 5 minutes of questions.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chair. I want to thank the 4 
witnesses for being here. I know that it has been a little 
untraditional having the votes in between our committee 
session.
 I want to also thank Chairman Ogles for his warm welcome 
today. I look forward to the work that we do in this 
subcommittee, particularly as we improve the cybersecurity 
posture of Federal networks and critical infrastructure.
 Since today is my first hearing after being appointed to 
the Ranking Member of the Cybersecurity Infrastructure 
Protection Subcommittee, I do think it is important for me to 
share my perspective on this work. Under this administration, 
it is clear that the security of our communities, information, 
Federal networks, and critical infrastructure have not been 
prioritized in the way that they should. Between the security 
failures of DOGE, the abuses of immigrant families' data, and 
the decimation of CISA's workforce and resources, my colleagues 
here have demonstrated a lack of interest in safeguarding our 
Nation's cybersecurity and our residents' civil rights and 
privacy.
 In neglecting necessary oversight, Republicans have 
deregulated emerging technologies, allowed bad actors to profit 
from violations of our civil rights, and consented to the 
weaponization of Government systems. It is more critical than 
ever that we assert our Congressional authority and that we 
disrupt the dereliction of duty and blatant corruption making 
us all less safe.
 So I am clear, there is a lot of work that we have to do, 
especially in the subcommittee. I am ready to roll up my 
sleeves and get to work to protect the data, the rights and 
privacy, to defend CISA's mission. To do so, I want to talk a 
little bit about where we are.
 You see, it is ironic to talk about modernizing DHS's 
Sector Risk Management Agency when Trump has been on a 
vindictive campaign to dismantle CISA, the very agency he 
established, but started attacking the minute it became an 
obstruction to his interest. CISA serving as a Sector Risk 
Management Agency requires adequately resourcing and staffing 
the agency's critical infrastructure. That includes checks and 
balances and policy solutions that make us all more secure. So 
I want to establish some facts.
 Since January 2025, CISA has lost nearly one-third of its 
workforce through terminations, involuntary assignments, or 
deferred resignations that workers were harassed into 
accepting. The Stakeholder Engagement Division, which conducts 
CISA sector risk management work, was cut nearly in half. 
Between January 2025 and December 13, 2025, CISA's Stakeholder 
Engagement Division, SED, lost 96 of its 189 employees. When 
you look at that math, that is half of the workforce. During 
the Republican shutdown last year, CISA attempted to illegally 
fire additional staff at SED.
 Under the President's proposed budget of 2027, funding for 
SED's International Affairs Council management and strategic 
relations units would be eliminated--eliminated--only leaving 
said Sector Risk Management Agency unit still funded. These 
facts make it clear, we are not just talking about a personnel 
loss. We are actually talking about a loss in institutional 
knowledge, sector-specific expertise, and trusted relationships 
that we have built over time.
 So my question is for Mr. Montgomery. How has the loss of 
key CISA personnel affected the agency's ability to execute its 
Sector Risk Management Agency responsibilities? In particular, 
Mr. Montgomery, can you talk to me about how the loss of 
individuals with institutional knowledge undermines CISA's 
ability to carry out its mission?
 Mr. Montgomery. First, congratulations on your selection as 
Ranking Member.
 I share your concerns about the loss of personnel. You 
know, I served 36 years in the military and I never once had a 
subordinate say to me, sir, the right way forward is to cut 35 
percent of my people and I'll get the mission done. I'm sorry, 
I love--I do like Nick Anderson, the acting director, but I 
believe we're doing him a great disservice with these personnel 
cuts.
 Having said that, how it specifically impacts is without 
the Stakeholder Engagement Division, you don't have the ability 
to set up the information-sharing agreements, to do the 
engagement with the sector. You know, when I said there's 3 
legs to the, to the National Cyber Resilience, it's how the 
Government does, how the private sector does, and how we 
collaborate together. It's that collaboration together that 
gets lost.
 I'd emphasize the removal of the CIPAC, the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, and most 
importantly the removal of the multi-State ISAC and the loss of 
its funding, that's how we get funding down to our public 
utilities and our local hospitals. Because I'm very concerned 
that the lack of that, these are two--these organizations in 
rural hospitals and in underserved communities where the 
medical centers don't have the money to pay for the basic IT 
services themselves. So without those programs running 
properly, I think the most likely to be ill-served are our 
underserved communities and our rural public health utilities.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. I will ask a follow-up question 
the next round. Thank you.
 Mr. Fong. We are going to do a second round of questions, 
so I will start my--with myself.
 I wanted to follow up with you, Admiral Montgomery, and 
others can jump in as well, on you mentioned the supply chain 
risk with components manufactured by the PRC, including chips, 
power systems, and cooling infrastructure. How would you or is 
it possible to harden our supply chain and become less reliant 
on the PRC for these parts and components?
 Mr. Montgomery. Thanks for asking. I did a report and 
testified to Congress last year to the China Select Committee 
about something called ``Illuminations,'' where we illuminated 
180 U.S. weapon systems, the vast, vast majority of which had 
Chinese parts only 2 or 3 levels down the supply chain. So even 
our military has a hard time with this.
 In my testimony I mentioned the Federal Government 
Communications Commission. Among the many things it's doing one 
of the things that I could really support is the national 
security effort to remove China from our emerging technologies. 
So when you ask how do we get our supply chain right, we have 
to decide what are emerging technologies. You know, 5G drones, 
LiDAR, cellular modems. You know we need to get the--we need to 
not have Chinese state-owned enterprises providing products to 
the U.S. military and to the dot-gov.
 So what I've noticed Congress does is they first pass a law 
to remove these components from the dot-mil. Then the next year 
we pass a law to remove them from the dot-gov and then the next 
year we'd move them from the critical infrastructure. That's a 
nice sequenced way.
 If I were to recommend an area to do it right now it's 
cellular modems which are in all our operational technology, 
communicate back and forth to their point of origin, which 
tends to be China. I'm not sure we want our cranes, our 
tractors, our planes all communicating back to China each night 
with different material. Even if it's innocuous at first, it 
could become completely sensitive later.
 Mr. Fong. Does anyone else want to chime in?
 Mr. Visner. I'd like to. Thank you.
 I agree with Admiral Montgomery's comments, but I want to 
add a point. If you take--if one takes a look at the space--at 
space systems, at the whole ecosystem, it's very much a 
commoditized industry now. Going back in time to the early days 
of NASA, you know, where'd you get this? You know, where'd you 
get this part? I want to see the factory. Where'd you get the 
bolt? I want to see the people who made the bolt. Where'd you 
get the steel? I want to see where the steel was made. Where'd 
you get the iron ore? I want to see the vein of iron. So you 
had a great deal of visibility.
 That's not true anymore, necessarily. We have a global 
supply chain, it's not just China, for space systems. Since 
we're going to be depending not only on our space systems, but 
on those produced by allies and partners, better technology and 
better means to find vulnerabilities in space systems 
regardless of where they're manufactured.
 I think one of the other panelists here talked about, well, 
there were problems with domestically-manufactured routers in 
which we found vulnerability. So it's not just, yes, we should 
be worried about Chinese infiltration of the supply chain, but 
we also need better technology and better understanding of how 
vulnerabilities can be introduced into any of our systems, 
particularly given the commoditized nature of this, where you 
don't necessarily have the same level of visibility.
 I think we're all aware of what's happening right now with 
the undetected vulnerabilities in operating systems which are 
now only being uncovered, you know, by the Mythos tool. We need 
to understand that we're likely to have vulnerabilities that 
have existed in some of these systems for many years. The 
commoditization of the supply chain is a challenge that we're 
not going to be able to overcome simply by eliminating one 
country. We might. That will help, but it won't be enough, the 
means to detect vulnerabilities and to mitigate them on 
anything that's manufactured wherever it occurs. That's one of 
the reasons why I've been pushing for a national R&D strategy 
on cybersecurity and particularly one for an R&D strategy on 
the security of our space systems.
 Thank you.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you. Mr. Mayer, I will give you 36 seconds.
 Mr. Mayer. Yeah, I'll be real quick. As I mentioned in my 
testimony, there has to be coherent policy across the 
Government agencies with respect to supply chain risk 
management. Right now, we have Commerce BIS, we have the FCC, 
we have CISA, we have Federal Acquisition Security Councils. We 
want to see a coherent approach to supply chain. We also want 
to see the intelligence community be more forthcoming with us 
with respect to supply chain risks that they've identified.
 Last, I would say the DHS ICT task force that I co-chair 
has been an excellent venue for working with our IT partners, 
the entire comms sector, including the vendors, as well as 
Government participation. We did, for example, work on a 
hardware bill of materials to identify what the criteria needs 
to be for evaluating your supply chain.
 So there's a lot of activity that can be rationalized, but 
it should continue with coordination with the IT sector, the 
comm sector, and Government participants.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you. I let you go a little bit over, but 
let me go back to the second round.
 Let me yield and recognize the Ranking Member again for 5 
minutes of questions.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. I want to come back to Admiral 
Montgomery. In the first round we talked a little bit about the 
impact that the cut in workforce has had on CISA. Now, I want 
to also ask you to comment on how the administration's actions 
cutting CISA more broadly undermine its ability to support 
SRMA's that are building capacity, building capacity like EPA 
and the Department of Agriculture. Can you talk a little bit 
more about that?
 Mr. Montgomery. Yeah. Thank you. You know, one of the 
responsibilities is that CISA should be the national 
coordinator for our resilience effort. In the cuts that have 
occurred, their ability--I would not have given them high 
grades previously on their ability to work with EPA, Health and 
Human Services, Agriculture. You know, those are the 3, the 
water, health care, and food and agriculture are 3 of our 
worst-performing critical infrastructures and yet 3 of the most 
important to public health and safety. So they were poor 
before. It has only gotten worse under this.
 As I said, it's a combination of cutting the people and 
then cutting the programs. In Congress you all have the State 
and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program, which you've been unable 
to reauthorize for an extended period of time. When you combine 
those 3 efforts together, the cutting of the multi-State ISAC, 
the cutting of the personnel, and the cutting of the 
cybersecurity--the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant 
Programs, there's no way that these small public utilities who 
don't have 2 wood nickels to rub together normally in their 
budget for cybersecurity are able to make the proper 
investments to protect those utilities against ransomware and 
against nation-state actors. So our public health and safety at 
the very core, at our most vulnerable level is weak.
 Mrs. Ramirez. Yeah. Well, thank you, Admiral. Look, I hear 
you loud and clear and this has been a concern for us here in 
the committee for a while now.
 Cutting people, cutting programs in a time where we should 
be investing in the Infrastructure of CISA is really 
detrimental to the security and safety of every single person 
in this country. So I am committed as Ranking Member, this new 
Ranking Member, to make sure that CISA is resourced and it's 
capable of working with the critical infrastructure owners and 
operators so that we can keep our network secure. I look 
forward to the work that we do in the subcommittee in the 
upcoming months.
 With that, I want to thank the witnesses for being here 
today, and I want to yield back to the Chairman.
 Mr. Fong. I now want to recognize my colleague from Rhode 
Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his 5 minutes of questions.
 Mr. Magaziner. Thank you to the Chair. To the new Ranking 
Member, congratulations.
 I have to say, cybersecurity is one of the issues here in 
Congress where I think there is the biggest disconnect between 
the rhetoric and the reality. The rhetoric is always very 
positive, that this is a bipartisan issue, that everyone agrees 
that we need to do more to protect our country against cyber 
threats from state actors, from international criminal 
organizations, and the like. But the reality is that the 
administration, with the complicity of the Majority party in 
Congress, continues to cut our cyber defense capabilities at 
the worst possible time and, in fact, even does things that 
undercut our defenses.
 So I just want to make sure everybody who is watching at 
home understands that the Trump administration has already 
eliminated a third of the entire CISA workforce, 1,000 
employees. These are the people whose job is to keep our 
country safe from cyber attacks. Has proposed an additional 800 
cuts at CISA in their fiscal 2027 budget.
 The leadership at CISA has been a mess under the 
administration. The last acting director was a disaster. He 
failed a counterintelligence polygraph test. He was caught 
uploading sensitive Government documents into ChatGPT before he 
ultimately was removed from his position. Now, the next guy, 
the appointee, just withdrew himself from consideration because 
he couldn't get confirmed by the Senate. So the administration 
is not acting like they are taking cybersecurity seriously.
 Frankly, our colleagues in the Majority are not doing 
anything about it either. The rhetoric is there. The rhetoric 
is always very positive. But the reality has been woefully 
lacking. So I will ask all 4 of our expert witnesses here, do 
any of you think that the huge staffing cuts at CISA are making 
our country safer?
 Mr. Montgomery. I'll go ahead and start, because I already 
said no.
 First, I want to do, say, your predecessor, Representative 
Jim Langevin, absolutely did, with Representative Mike 
Gallagher from Wisconsin, a significant amount of bipartisan 
work, both in this committee and in the House Armed Services 
Committee. So it is absolutely achievable. Whether it can get 
done now, I would leave to your judgment.
 I do want to say that Nick Anderson, the current acting 
administrator, is a humble professional cyber leader at CISA 
and I think he'll do well. But you're absolutely right. As I 
said, 35 years in the military, nobody ever came up to me and 
said the next move is cut 35 percent of my workforce and I'll 
do better.
 Mr. Magaziner. Yeah.
 Mr. Montgomery. So, no, they're not going to do better with 
a 35 percent cut. They've got that 300 percent addition that 
Ranking Member Thompson mentioned in his opening remarks is 
just a down payment on what we need to do to recover CISA, to 
get it to a place where it's useful.
 I want to say one other thing. You know my, I graded the 
Biden--I'm a lax grader at Georgetown, but I would, I still 
would give the Biden administration a D and I'd give this 
administration an F on their performance at CISA. It's 
completely unacceptable that our civilian cyber defense 
agency's treated like this. We would never treat the National 
Security Agency or U.S. Cyber Command the same way.
 Mr. Magaziner. Yeah, I agree. Just because I have limited 
time, I have to move to a different topic. So I still have not 
had anyone give me a good reason why we should allow the 
administration to sell the H200 AI chips, the Nvidia chips, to 
China, like, to a country that is actively engaging in cyber 
warfare against us and we are apparently now selling them the 
tools to do it.
 So I will ask you all, would anyone like to take a crack at 
explaining why we should allow these chips to be sold to China? 
There's no good--no one has been able to give me a good answer. 
There is no good answer. Congress is not powerless here. We 
could pass a bill to stop it today. As a matter of fact, a bill 
already passed out of committee over in Foreign Affairs, but it 
has been sitting on Speaker Johnson's desk for months. We ought 
to do something about this.
 With that, I am just about out of time. But I do want to 
elevate the point I think it was Mr. Visner made. You know, the 
Mythos technology from Anthropic, we are still learning about 
it, but I think it does speak to the need to have some sort of 
a consumer safety test for AI products before they are released 
to the market. Because Anthropic is doing the right thing by 
voluntarily holding back on releasing it until the big players 
can be warned about what their vulnerabilities are, but they 
didn't have to do that. There was no law that required them to. 
So there is a, I think, a desperate need for Congress to step 
up and ensure that there is some safety in these products 
before they go to market.
 With that, I will yield back.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you.
 We will do one last round of questions and then we will 
conclude this hearing.
 Let me go to Mr. Visner. You know, clearly there is an 
intense threat environment when it comes to our space systems. 
What specifically is missing from the current U.S. approach to 
space infrastructure security? What changes to law, policy, or 
Federal organization would meaningfully improve our ability to 
defend these systems?
 Mr. Visner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. I 
don't know that I'm going to be in a position to propose any 
legislative remedies, but there are some things that I think we 
ought to do.
 First, we need to recognize that space systems are in fact 
critical to every aspect of our national security, every aspect 
of our economic security, and every aspect of the security of 
our critical infrastructure. We need to say so. We need to say 
so to ourselves, we need to say so to our people, we need to 
say so to our partners and our allies, and we need to say so to 
our adversaries as well, that this is a line you may not cross. 
That's a first thing.
 I would refer you as well to a report done last year by the 
Council on Foreign Relations. I was a member of the Task Force 
that produced that report. It's called ``Securing Space.'' It 
said that the White House should, in fact, declare that space 
is a top priority for this country. It recommended that the 
White House convene a space summit in the first year of the 
administration or as soon as possible. It also said that we 
ought to launch an assessment of the vulnerability of space, 
vulnerability, remediation, deterrence that included the 
participation of the Department of War, the intelligence 
community, the private sector, representatives of civil space 
organizations, academia.
 I would add, by the way, that it certainly should include 
DHS, which despite the decrement in its staffing, there have 
been people at DHS, at CISA who have worked very closely with 
the Space ISAC and with the space systems domain and have shown 
a great deal of interest. So I do think that before we do 
anything else, we ought to get our act together.
 One of the things that I would ask that we look at is the 
National Security Council could play a role in coordinating the 
various stakeholders in the Federal Government to coordinate 
space system security. That would include the National Space 
Council, which I think could and hopefully will be 
reconstituted. That's something I think that could be done. 
Thank you.
 Mr. Montgomery. Sir, can I add one thing to that? You 
actually----
 Mr. Fong. Absolutely, Admiral.
 Mr. Montgomery. Congressman Lieu has twice tabled a bill to 
make space a critical infrastructure and a bipartisan bill. You 
should retake that bill up and pass it.
 That--if Congress wants to impact things, you force the 
Government to make it a national critical infrastructure. Treat 
it that way. The challenging part will be across Congressional, 
you know, kind-of not partisanship, but parochialism about who 
should be the Sector Risk Management Agency. My strongest 
recommendation is NASA. Representative Lieu left it to the 
Government to determine.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you for that. I will stay with you, 
Admiral. You also mentioned the threat to subsea cable 
infrastructure. We did have a hearing on that previously by the 
full committee. How serious is this threat? How would a 
successful attack on a major cable route affect connectivity? 
How would it impact national security, the financial system and 
the Government's ability to operate? I would just like to hear 
your perspective on this.
 Mr. Montgomery. I'm glad you mentioned that. It's 
absolutely the most significant kinetic threat to the 
communications network. In other words, if I went after the 
satellites, I could attack ground stations, I could take out 5 
percent of data flow. If I went after the submarine cables and 
cut the cables, I could cut 95 percent of data flow. So it's 
obviously critical that we defend these.
 They are generally undefended assets. We know both Russia 
and China are aggressively designing weapons systems to attack 
them. Less sophisticated countries, like Iran or North Korea, 
can drop anchors on those cables. That does less damage, but 
can still have an effect.
 So my recommendation, sir, is that we take a look at how we 
defend those cables, how we empower the Coast Guard to do it. 
Then I would step even one farther back. What is the supply 
chain for those cables? To ensure that there isn't a 
preexisting flaw inserted in them.
 So I'm glad you brought that up. It's well worth the 
Congress' attention.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. I will conclude my 
questioning.
 I will recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. 
McIver.
 Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much, Chairman and Ranking 
Member.
 Look, AI data centers are reshaping American cities and 
they may be doing more harm than good. For many, an AI data 
center in your area means a decline in quality of life. It can 
mean higher utility costs, sometimes up to 300 percent more a 
month. It means air pollution already causing up to 100 million 
a year in health damages and a strain on water supply with 
numerous reports of contaminated well water.
 This reality is especially true for lower-income 
communities and communities of color. My neighbors back home 
know this very well. A planned data center in Kenilworth, New 
Jersey, in my district, has received major pushback just in a 
few--in the last couple of days from the community. These 
constituents deserve to be heard.
 That is why I introduced the AI Data Center Site Selection 
Transparency Act of 2026. This bill would ensure communities 
are informed at least 180 days in advance before any major step 
toward developing an AI data center. So communities have a real 
chance to organize, raise concern, and demand accountability. 
It will be impossible to regulate AI data centers if they are 
forced onto people with no community input, which makes things 
a lot worse. We know that the future is coming quickly and we 
need to make sure people are prepared to thrive, not ignored or 
harmed.
 With that, Mr. Montgomery, first of all, I want to thank 
each of the witnesses for your testimony today and for coming 
here to be with us even in our tricky schedules here in this 
place. Mr. Montgomery, as AI data centers rapidly expand across 
the country, how should we be thinking about ensuring both the 
cyber and physical security of these facilities as they are 
built within our communities?
 Mr. Montgomery. Thank you for that question. Of course, I'm 
never going to be opposed to transparency, so that's always a 
good thing.
 What we've--what I've argued for here is that we need to 
make data centers and cloud an independent critical 
infrastructure, one with which a Federal agency is charged with 
coordinating across other agencies to make sure that sort of 
transparency is clear, that the--whoever the agency in charge 
is understands what the Department of Energy is setting for 
standards, what the Homeland Security is setting for standards, 
when they're on military bases what the Department of Defense 
is setting for standards, and we have consistency across those.
 Then most importantly, it sets what are the physical 
standards in terms of--and it might be in terms of pollution, 
but it also could be in terms of physical security and what the 
cyber standards are for the security of that, whether it's the 
actual cybersecurity or the supply chain. So if we do that and 
make it a independent critical infrastructure sector, I think 
we'll begin to get the kind of transparency, consistency, and 
security that you're demanding.
 Mrs. McIver. Got it. Thank you so much for that. You have 
also noted that the cyber and physical resilience of these 
facilities merits the same level of attention. We've already 
seen real-world risks, including reported attacks on data 
centers abroad that disrupted essential services for millions. 
Given those vulnerabilities, what baseline security standards 
or planning considerations should be in place before a data 
center is approved or constructed?
 Mr. Montgomery. Well, I think the physical security ones 
would begin with stand-off distances so--that you traditionally 
have for military facilities against explosive devices. We're 
going to have to start thinking about drone security for these 
as we look at what's happened not just in Iran, but in your own 
State.
 Mrs. McIver. In New Jersey, yeah.
 Mr. Montgomery. In your State of New Jersey. Then we're 
going to, as I mentioned earlier, we're going to need cyber 
standards, both in terms of the supply chain and the actual 
operational technology running on the systems.
 Look, I would hope that NIST, which is also--we've talked 
about funding challenges. I think NIST's Cybersecurity Division 
has been cut too far, but it needs to become more involved in 
this and start setting a NIST 800 series for data centers to 
establish the proper level of cybersecurity on those centers.
 Mrs. McIver. Thank you so much for that, Mr. Mongomery.
 With that, I yield back.
 Mr. Fong. Thank you very much. I want to congratulate the 
new Ranking Member. I look forward to working with you.
 I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and the 
Members for their questions. Members of the subcommittee may 
have some additional questions for the witnesses and we would 
ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to 
committee rule VII(E), the hearing record will be held open for 
10 days.
 Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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