DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure · Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation House January 13, 2026

Witnesses (2)

  • Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard
  • Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office

From the witness list in the published hearing record.

Full text of the official published hearing record. Extracted from the source document — verify against the official record for citation.

- DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

[House Hearing, 119 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

 DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST 
 GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
=======================================================================

 (119-35)

 HEARING

 BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON
 COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

 OF THE

 COMMITTEE ON
 TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

 ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

 SECOND SESSION

 __________

 JANUARY 13, 2026

 __________

 Printed for the use of the
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
 
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

 Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
 transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
 transportation
 
 __________
 
 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
64-676 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
======================================================================= 
 
 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

 Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
 Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member
 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
 District of Columbia Arkansas,
Jerrold Nadler, New York Vice Chairman
John Garamendi, California Daniel Webster, Florida
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaomas Massie, Kentucky
Andre Carson, Indiana Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Dina Titus, Nevada Brian Babin, Texas
Jared Huffman, California David Rouzer, North Carolina
Julia Brownley, California Mike Bost, Illinois
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Salud O. Carbajal, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Greg Stanton, Arizona Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah
Patrick Ryan, New York Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Mike Collins, Georgia
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio, Mike Ezell, Mississippi
 Vice Ranking Member Kevin Kiley, California
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Vince Fong, California
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Tony Wied, Wisconsin
Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan
Robert Garcia, California Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska
Nellie Pou, New Jersey Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr., 
Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan Pennsylvania
Laura Friedman, California Jeff Hurd, Colorado
Laura Gillen, New York Jefferson Shreve, Indiana
Shomari Figures, Alabama Addison P. McDowell, North 
Maxwell Frost, Florida Carolina
 David J. Taylor, Ohio
 Brad Knott, North Carolina
 Kimberlyn King-Hinds,
 Northern Mariana Islands
 Mike Kennedy, Utah
 Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri
 Jimmy Patronis, Florida
 Vacancy
 ------ 7

 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

 Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Chairman
 Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member
Daniel Webster, Florida Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Brian J. Mast, Florida Marilyn Strickland, Washington
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan
Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska John Garamendi, California
Addison P. McDowell, North Laura Gillen, New York,
 Carolina, Vice Ranking Member
 Vice Chairman Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
Jimmy Patronis, Florida Officio)
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

 CONTENTS

 Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v

 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Addison P. McDowell, a Representative in Congress from the 
 State of North Carolina, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on 
 Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement..... 1
 Prepared statement........................................... 2
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
 Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
 Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 3
 Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
 State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
 Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement........... 5
 Prepared statement........................................... 6

 WITNESSES

Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations 
 Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for 
 Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement................. 8
 Prepared statement........................................... 9
Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
 Government Accountability Office, oral statement............... 12
 Prepared statement........................................... 13

 APPENDIX

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. 
 Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and 
 Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. 
 Coast Guard, from:
 Hon. Rick Larsen............................................. 41
 Hon. Salud O. Carbajal....................................... 41
 Hon. Laura Gillen............................................ 42
Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Heather MacLeod, 
 Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government 
 Accountability Office, from Hon. Laura Gillen.................. 42

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 January 12, 2026

 SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

 TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
 FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
 RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Drugs, Thugs, and Fish: 
Examining Coast Guard Law Enforcement Efforts''
_______________________________________________________________________

 I. PURPOSE

 The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet 
on Tuesday, January 13, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 Rayburn 
House Office Building to hold a hearing on the Coast Guard's 
law enforcement missions. Members will hear testimony from the 
Coast Guard regarding its law enforcement missions, including 
efforts to interdict the illegal entry of drugs and migrants 
along the maritime border, and to deter illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

 II. BACKGROUND

 The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard or Service) is 
uniquely positioned as the only armed service capable of 
performing maritime law enforcement operations.\1\ Under its 
authorities, the Coast Guard is actively engaged in missions 
pertaining to drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and the 
protection of natural resources from malign activity, like IUU 
fishing.\2\ The Coast Guard performs these mission sets within 
the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of the 
United States, on the high seas, and in foreign territorial 
waters when operating under agreements with allies and partner 
nations.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ 14 U.S.C. Sec. 522.
 \2\ Id.
 \3\ U.S. Coast Guard, Force Laydown, available at https://
www.uscg.mil/About/Force-
Laydown/
#::text=The%20Coast%20Guard%20also%20has,assets%2C%20and%20deployable
%20specialized%20forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 From fiscal year (FY) 2019 to FY 2024, the Coast Guard 
intercepted and seized 873.5 metric tons of cocaine, worth 
approximately $23.6 billion.\4\ The Service also detained 288 
drug smugglers for prosecution in FY 2024.\5\ More recently, 
the Coast Guard offloaded a record breaking 49,010 pounds of 
cocaine from multiple at-sea seizures, valued at $362 million 
in November 2025.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ Interdicting Illicit Drug Trafficking: A View from the Front 
Lines before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
119th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2025) (testimony of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie, 
U.S. Coast Guard).
 \5\ Id.
 \6\ Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Continues to Break 
Records, Offloading Over $362 Million in Illicit Drugs Interdicted in 
Eastern Pacific Ocean (Nov. 19, 2025), available at https://
www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4337528/coast-guard-continues-
to-break-records-offloading-over-362-million-in-illicit-d/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In addition to drug seizures, one of the Coast Guard's most 
important roles in protecting the homeland is countering 
illegal maritime migrations. The 2025 National Security 
Strategy noted the importance of the Coast Guard's presence in 
the Western Pacific to ``thwart illegal and other unwanted 
migration'' \7\ among other tasks. Illegal maritime migration 
also remains a significant problem in the Caribbean. During FY 
2023, the Coast Guard interdicted 17,771 migrants transiting 
maritime routes.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United 
States (Nov. 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.
 \8\ Dep't of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Budget Overview, 
Fiscal Year 2025, Congressional Justification available at https://
www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/2025/
USCG%20FY%202025%20Congressional%20Justification.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Finally, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict bad actors 
and enforce local and international laws has made it an 
important tool in countering Chinese malign and grey-zone 
activity in the Indo-Pacific, such as IUU fishing. The Coast 
Guard is an essential tool in protecting the tens of millions 
of jobs in the global fishing industry which generates hundreds 
of billions of dollars annually.\9\ The Coast Guard is the only 
agency explicitly referenced by name in the 2022 Indo-Pacific 
Strategy, cementing the importance of Coast Guard abilities and 
authorities in supporting the United States' National security 
interests.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \9\ U.S. Coast Guard, Western Pacific Region Resourcing Strategy, 
at 3 (Dec. 9, 2025).
 \10\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy, (Feb. 2022), available 
at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/
U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 III. DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION

 The Coast Guard is the lead and only Federal maritime law 
enforcement agency with the authority and capability to enforce 
National and international law on the high seas, including for 
both drug and migrant interdiction operations.\11\ The Coast 
Guard is constrained in conducting these missions by limited 
assets.\12\ Drug and migrant source countries are often 
hundreds of miles away from United States coastlines, requiring 
detection and monitoring efforts to occur across vast expanses 
of time and distance. While the Coast Guard attempts to use 
historic trends, intelligence, and advanced monitoring 
technologies to maximize the deployment of its assets, it is 
constantly forced to prioritize certain vectors and lapse 
coverage for others.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \11\ Liana W. Rosen, Cong. Rsch. Serv. RL34543, International Drug 
Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, 24 (Mar. 19, 2015), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34543/24.
 \12\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106695, Maritime 
Security: Coast Guard and CBP Efforts To Address Prior GAO 
Recommendations on Asset and Workforce Needs (Mar. 23, 2023), available 
at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106695.pdf [hereinafter GAO 
Maritime Security].
 \13\ Id.; see also Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and 
Strategies for the Maritime Border: Testimony Before the S. Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Comm., 114th Cong. (July 15, 2015) 
(testimony of Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, USCG Assistant Commandant 
for Response Policy), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-
content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Brown-2015-07-15.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DRUG INTERDICTION

 Illicit maritime drug shipments are carried by 
noncommercial means, such as small ``go-fast'' vessels with 
multiple outboard engines, semisubmersible vessels, fishing 
vessels, and sailing vessels, as well as by commercial vessels, 
such as container ships.\14\ The majority of known maritime 
drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial means through the 
Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--the waters off the coasts of 
Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea.\15\ The Coast 
Guard uses cutters, boats, aircraft, and unmanned monitoring 
systems in a layered approach to combat drug cartels as they 
transport illicit drugs in the maritime domain.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \14\ U.S. Coast Guard Report to Congress: Counter-Drug Operations, 
(Aug. 14, 2020), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/uscg_-_counter-drug_
operations.pdf [hereinafter Counter-Drug Operations].
 \15\ Id.
 \16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The objectives of Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts are 
to: (1) maintain a strong interdiction presence to deny 
smugglers access to maritime routes and deter trafficking 
activity; (2) strengthen ties with source and Transit Zone 
(Eastern Pacific and Caribbean) nations to increase their 
willingness and ability to reduce the production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs within their sovereign boundaries, 
including territorial seas; and (3) support interagency and 
international efforts to combat drug smuggling through 
increased cooperation and coordination.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \17\ U.S. Coast Guard Rep. to Cong.: Coast Guard Interdiction of 
Illicit Drugs in Transit Zones, (2022), (on file with Comm.) 
[hereinafter Transit Zones].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Coast Guard facilitates international maritime 
counternarcotics operations with partner nations that permit 
Coast Guard officers to stop, board, and search suspicious 
vessels.\18\ The United States government is party to 41 
maritime counterdrug bilateral agreements or operational 
procedures to coordinate detection, monitoring, interdiction, 
and apprehension activities.\19\ The Coast Guard's law 
enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in high demand 
from Central American partners, whose navies more closely 
resemble the Coast Guard, focusing primarily on maritime law 
enforcement.\20\ Coast Guard personnel act as attaches, 
liaisons, maritime advisors, and drug interdiction specialists 
at embassies around the world.\21\ International training teams 
and deployed units provide training, engage in joint 
operations, and may even embark ship riders to facilitate 
enforcement.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \18\ Id.; see also U.S. Coast Guard, Partnerships and Stakeholders, 
available at https://www.uscg.mil/About/Partnerships/.
 \19\ Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 14.
 \20\ Id.
 \21\ Id.
 \22\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Annually, the Coast Guard removes approximately ten percent 
of the cocaine flowing through maritime transit routes while 
indications show the majority of the remaining 90 percent is 
typically not intercepted before reaching the shore.\23\ 
According to a recent GAO report, the Coast Guard has failed to 
meet its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure 
for the previous 10 years.\24\ The report further found that 
the Coast Guard's asset limitations and workforce challenges 
lead to tradeoffs that hinder mission performance, driven in 
part by the Coast Guard's recapitalizing challenges. To support 
Service's mission performance, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act 
provided nearly $25 billion to recapitalize surface, air and 
shoreside assets.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \23\ Transit Zones, supra note 17.
 \24\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-26-107440, Actions Needed 
To Improve Maritime Migrant Interdiction (Jan. 2026) (This draft GAO 
report has not yet been published online but is on file with Comm.).
 \25\ P.L. 119-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 United States Southern Command, through the Joint 
Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), is responsible for 
targeting and detections, while the Coast Guard is the primary 
force provider of surface assets used as law enforcement 
platforms and presence.\26\ The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 70501-70507, and the Drug Trafficking 
Vessel Interdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2285, are the primary 
criminal statutes utilized in the counter-drug mission.\27\ 
Recognizing the harm caused by these activities in the United 
States or to United States citizen or interests, these laws 
apply extraterritorially so that persons who are interdicted 
aboard suspected drug smuggling vessels in international waters 
may be prosecuted in the United States.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \26\ Transit Zones, supra note 17.
 \27\ See Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 14.
 \28\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 By leveraging its unique authorities and collaborating 
across United States agencies and with international partners, 
the Coast Guard prevents more cocaine from entering the United 
States than all other Federal agencies combined.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \29\ Transit Zones, supra note 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ILLEGAL MIGRATION

 In 2022, the Coast Guard saw one of the deadliest years for 
illegal migration in recent history when approximately 65 
people perished while trying to reach the United States.\30\ In 
2023, illegal maritime migration, and consequently Coast Guard 
interdictions, continued to reach increasingly high levels due 
to major economic and social turmoil unfolding in the Caribbean 
and South American countries, which continue to spur illegal 
maritime migrations today.\31\ Overall, most maritime migration 
is illegal and can occur along hundreds of miles of coastline, 
which is difficult to continuously patrol and requires ample 
resources. While there are several prevailing vectors of 
unauthorized maritime migration into the United States, 
maritime routes from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic on 
the east coast, and Mexico on the west coast, have historically 
accounted for the highest annual interdiction attempts.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \30\ Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Operation Vigilant Sentry: 
Stopping Illegal Migration at Sea, (Jan. 27, 2023), available at 
https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3280774/operation-
vigilant-sentry-stopping-illegal-migration-at-sea/ [hereinafter 
Vigilant Sentry].
 \31\ Transit Zones, supra note 17.
 \32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Illegal maritime migration takes place over long expanses 
of water and is slow and hazardous.\33\ Maritime migration 
efforts are typically unorganized, utilizing homemade 
``rustic'' vessels like makeshift rafts constructed with debris 
and tarps, locally made sail freighters, or other modified 
modes of transportation engineered to float.\34\ These vessels 
are almost always severely overloaded with people. For example, 
a 50-foot sail freighter may have ``anywhere from 150-300 
people aboard these overcrowded, unsafe vessels.'' \35\ These 
makeshift vessels are neither seaworthy nor safe, often 
incapable of withstanding heavy seas and sinking even in benign 
weather.\36\ For example, in 2004, a group of Cuban Nationals 
were attempting to sail to the United States in a 1959 Buick 
car fashioned into a boat when they were intercepted at sea by 
the Coast Guard.\37\ The Cuban Nationals had little to no 
navigation or lifesaving equipment.\38\ Accordingly, not only 
does illegal maritime migration have law enforcement 
implications, the Coast Guard must be prepared to provide 
humanitarian assistance or participate in search and rescue 
operations. Individuals interdicted at sea are either 
repatriated to their country of origin or departure, pursuant 
to agreement, or brought to the United States to face 
prosecution.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \33\ Id.
 \34\ Id.
 \35\ Id.
 \36\ Id.
 \37\ Cubans Sailing Vintage Car Caught off Florida, NBC, available 
at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4163593.
 \38\ Id.
 \39\ Vigilant Sentry, supra note 30.

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Figure 1. Cubans sailing vintage car caught off Florida.\40\

DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION CAPACITY & METRICS OF SUCCESS

 To\\ better reflect its performance, the Coast Guard 
implemented new drug interdiction measures and as of July 2025 
is also developing new migrant interdiction performance 
measures.\41\ Despite this, the Coast Guard continues to be the 
Nation's primary maritime force to combat transnational 
criminal organizations engaging in illicit drug and migrant 
operations, secure maritime borders, and safeguard commerce 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \40\ Id.
 \41\ GAO-26-107440, supra note 24 at 16-17.
 \42\ Transit Zones, supra note 17.
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 IV. IUU FISHING

 Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is one of the 
greatest threats to ocean health and directly contributes to 
the collapse or decline of fisheries that are critical to 
economies, food sources, and ecosystems worldwide.\43\ Illegal 
fishing encompasses fishing activities that contradict state, 
Federal, and international laws and regulations.\44\ Unreported 
fishing includes fishing activities that are not reported or 
are misrepresented in contravention of relevant laws.\45\ 
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activity undertaken by 
flagless vessels, or that occurs in areas outside of regulated 
fish stocks and outside of applicable laws and regulations to 
conserve living marine resources.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \43\ U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Agencies Release Joint U.S. Strategy 
for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, available 
at https://www.uscg.mil/IUUFishing/.
 \44\ Nat'l Oceanic Atmospheric Admin., Understanding Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, available at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-illegal-unreported-and-
unregulated-fishing.
 \45\ Id.
 \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Twenty percent of fish caught around the world originate 
from IUU fishing, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in 
lost revenue to legal fishers, and harming the management of 
marine fish stocks.\47\ By virtue of its size, scale, and 
range, China is the largest IUU offender.\48\ China accounts 
for more than a third of the world's seafood production, and 
Chinese vessels make up nearly 40 percent of the world's 
distant-water fishing fleet.\49\ China's distant-water fishing 
fleet is subsidized by the Chinese Government, with an 
estimated $7.2 billion in subsidies going to the sector in 
2018.\50\ Chinese vessels are responsible for numerous IUU 
fishing violations, including fishing in other nations' 
exclusive economic zones and incorrectly reporting fishing 
activity. Chinese vessels often operate in disputed territorial 
waters, with competition over fishery resources driving some of 
the disputes.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \47\ Supra note 47.
 \48\ Bruce Vaugh & Ben Dolven, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (R47065), China's 
Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress, 
(Apr. 12, 2022) available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R47065.
 \49\ Id.
 \50\ Id.
 \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 The Coast Guard monitors and works to mitigate illegal 
fishing through domestic efforts, like the United States 
Interagency Working Group. The United States Interagency 
Working Group was established in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92), which 
directed additional efforts to combat IUU fishing, including 
coordination with international organizations, diplomatic 
engagement, and support to improve law enforcement capabilities 
in priority regions.\52\ In 2022, the Working Group issued the 
National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing (2022-2026) noting the importance of 
continuing to build ``real law enforcement and diplomatic 
consequences for those operating outside of accepted maritime 
rules-based order.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \52\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. 
L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 2005.
 \53\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, National 5-Year 
Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Upregulated Fishing 
(2022-2026), available at https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2022-10/
2022_NationalStrategyReport_USIWGonIUUfishing.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In 2023, the National Academy of Sciences released an 
assessment on emerging issues that require Coast Guard action. 
The report notes that as illegal fishing increases, the Coast 
Guard will need to improve its data collection, work with non-
governmental organizations, and deploy assets to areas where 
they will be most effective.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \54\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs 186 (2023), available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/
catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-an-assessment-of-emerging-
challenges-and-statutory-needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Over the next decade, the Coast Guard intends to focus its 
IUU efforts in three areas. These include expanding and 
strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships to 
maximize IUU enforcement efforts; countering predatory and 
irresponsible state behavior, including that of China; and 
expanding targeted intelligence to drive enforcement 
options.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \55\ U.S. Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
Strategic Outlook, (Sept. 2020), available at https://www.uscg.mil/
Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_
2020_FINAL.pdf#page=39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 V. WITNESSESS

 LRear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant 
for Operations Policy and Assistant Commandant for 
Intelligence, United States Coast Guard
 LHeather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice Programs, United States Government Accountability 
Office

 
 DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

 ---------- 

 TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2026

 House of Representatives,
 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
 Transportation,
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
 Washington, DC.
 The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in 
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Addison P. 
McDowell (Vice Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
 Mr. McDowell. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation will come to order.
 I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
 Without objection, so ordered.
 I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
 Without objection, so ordered.
 As a reminder, if Members insert a document into the 
record, please also email it to [email protected].
 I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADDISON P. McDOWELL OF NORTH 
 CAROLINA, VICE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND 
 MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

 Mr. McDowell. Thank you, everyone, for joining the 
subcommittee today to discuss the Coast Guard's law enforcement 
missions. Specifically, we want to highlight the amazing work 
our Coast Guard members do to stop drugs and illegal aliens 
along our maritime border, and the Service's efforts to limit 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing.
 To do that, I would like to welcome our witnesses, Rear 
Admiral David Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy 
and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence for the United States 
Coast Guard; and Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Justice and 
Homeland Security Programs for the Government Accountability 
Office.
 The Coast Guard is our premier maritime guardian. Every 
day, Coast Guard cutters, small boats, aircraft, and boarding 
teams are protecting Americans from threats. The Coast Guard 
leads America's efforts to control, secure, and defend the 
Nation's maritime border, starting at the United States 
southern border where President Trump declared a national 
emergency.
 Illicit maritime activity is a national security threat 
with impacts far beyond our shores. The Coast Guard is 
essential to preventing dangerous drugs from poisoning our 
communities, boatloads of migrants from landing on our shores 
or perishing at sea on unseaworthy makeshift vessels, and 
countering Chinese efforts to plunder our fish stocks.
 In November, Coast Guard cutter Stone broke a record, 
offloading over 49,000 pounds of illicit narcotics seized in 15 
interdictions valued at more than $362 million. This marked the 
most cocaine seized by a single cutter in one patrol in Coast 
Guard history.
 At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increasing 
levels of maritime migration by protecting our shores and 
securing and defending 260 miles of the Rio Grande River. The 
Coast Guard's unparalleled expertise is essential to deter, 
interdict, and defeat threats to our communities.
 In 2020, the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced 
piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. IUU 
fishing robs nations of their fish stocks, their food, and it 
costs legal fishing operators tens of billions of dollars a 
year in revenue. China is the world's worst offender of this 
harm. The Chinese Communist Party provides billions of dollars 
in subsidies to its distant-water fishing fleet, which plunders 
fishing stocks worldwide.
 Despite its best efforts, the Coast Guard's ability to 
interdict drugs, aliens, and IUU fishing has long been hindered 
by a lack of resources and personnel.
 Through the $25 billion generational investment that 
Congress authorized in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, we have 
helped change the tide with new vessels and aircraft coming 
online. But there is more to be done.
 In light of this subcommittee's oversight role over the 
Coast Guard, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about 
what the Coast Guard is doing well, where it can be better, and 
what it is doing to strengthen its capabilities. In that same 
respect, I also look forward to hearing the Government 
Accountability Office's evaluation of the Coast Guard's mission 
performance.
 I appreciate our witnesses both joining us here today.
 [Mr. McDowell's prepared statement follows:]

 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Addison P. McDowell of North Carolina, Vice 
 Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
 Thank you, everyone, for joining the Subcommittee today to discuss 
the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions. Specifically, we want to 
highlight the amazing work our Coast Guard members do to stop drugs and 
illegal aliens along our maritime border, and the Service's efforts to 
limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.
 To do that, I'd like to welcome our witnesses: Rear Admiral David 
C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Assistant 
Commandant for Intelligence for the United States Coast Guard; and Ms. 
Heather MacLeod, Director of Justice and Homeland Security Programs for 
the Government Accountability Office.
 The Coast Guard is our premier maritime guardian. Every day, Coast 
Guard cutters, small boats, aircraft, and boarding teams are protecting 
Americans from threats.
 The Coast Guard leads America's efforts to control, secure, and 
defend the nation's maritime border, starting at the United States 
southern border where President Trump declared a national emergency.
 Illicit maritime activity is a national security threat with 
impacts far beyond our shores. The Coast Guard is essential to 
preventing dangerous drugs from poisoning our communities, boatloads of 
migrants from landing on our shores or perishing at sea on unseaworthy 
makeshift vessels, and countering Chinese efforts to plunder our fish 
stocks.
 In November, Coast Guard Cutter STONE broke a record, offloading 
over 49,000 pounds of illicit narcotics, seized in 15 interdictions, 
valued at more than $362 million. This marked the most cocaine seized 
by a single cutter in one patrol in Coast Guard history.
 At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increasing levels 
of maritime migration by protecting our shores and securing and 
defending 260 miles of the Rio Grande River. The Coast Guard's 
unparalleled expertise is essential to deter, interdict, and defeat 
threats to our communities.
 In 2020 the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced piracy 
as the leading global maritime security threat.
 IUU fishing robs nations of their fish stocks, their food, and 
costs legal fishing operators tens of billions of dollars a year in 
revenue, and China is the world's worst offender. The Chinese Communist 
Party provides billions of dollars in subsidies to its distant-water 
fishing fleet, which plunders fishing stocks worldwide.
 Despite its best efforts, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict 
drugs, aliens, and IUU fishing has long been hindered by a lack of 
resources both in physical assets and personnel. Through the $25 
billion generational investment Congress authorized in the One Big 
Beautiful Bill Act, we have helped change the tide with new vessels and 
aircraft coming online. But, there is more to be done.
 In light of this subcommittee's oversight role over the Coast 
Guard, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the 
Coast Guard is doing well, where it can do better, and what it is doing 
to strengthen its capabilities.
 In that same respect, I also look forward to hearing the Government 
Accountability Office's evaluation of the Coast Guard's mission 
performance.

 Mr. McDowell. And I would now like to recognize Ranking 
Member Carbajal for an opening statement for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman McDowell. I would like to 
yield to our ranking member, if it is okay, of our broader T&I 
Committee, Mr. Larsen.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
 MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, and thank you, Chairman McDowell, for calling this 
very timely hearing.
 Every day, the women and men of the Coast Guard coordinate 
and execute law enforcement operations to halt illicit 
activities, to protect lives, and to safeguard the interests of 
the U.S. Through partnerships with other Federal agencies and 
with international allies and partners, Coasties interrupt and 
intercept individuals breaking U.S. and international laws.
 The Coast Guard has been enforcing maritime laws for 250 
years, and it shows. From drug and migrant interdiction to IUU 
fishing enforcement, nobody does it better.
 Recently, the Coast Guard has intercepted and seized 
several shadow fleet oil tankers in the Caribbean. By violating 
international law, these vessels and their operators became 
subject to search and seizure by the Coast Guard. This is a 
longstanding Coast Guard authority. To ensure a safely executed 
mission, Coast Guard personnel work closely with other 
agencies. And while recent operations have received public 
attention--and I will have a few questions about it--it's not 
uncommon for the Coast Guard to exercise this authority in 
these venues.
 There are hundreds of dark fleet commercial vessels 
operating in violation of fishing laws, labor laws, and, in 
some cases, trafficking people and narcotics. While the 
administration has chosen to target oil tankers, we can't 
forget these other serious maritime crimes.
 Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, otherwise 
known as IUU fishing, is when vessel operators violate national 
or international laws, regulations, or management schemes 
designed to ensure the sustainability of fish stocks. Most of 
these cases are found in areas like Oceania or Alaska, in and 
around the Aleutians. So we have a--certainly a direct interest 
in IUU fishing. Not only does this put a strain on fish stocks, 
but it also undermines hard-working fishers who abide by the 
law, including many of those folks in my district.
 The Coast Guard's role in addressing and preventing IUU 
fishing not only protects U.S. interests, it assists partners 
and ally nations.
 In fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Coast Guard set its 
interdiction goal at 40 percent of the detected fishing vessels 
conducting IUU fishing within the U.S. exclusive economic zone, 
or EEZ. Each of those years, the Service interdicted 21 percent 
of detected vessels, with the majority of detections and 
interdictions occurring at the time in the Gulf of Mexico. Over 
the same period, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected 274 
fishing vessels on the high seas or within the EEZ of a foreign 
nation, resulting in 75 violations. So with more resources, I 
am hopeful we can improve those numbers.
 Today, we are going to hear some good news stories about 
the Coast Guard enforcement activities. But as we discuss those 
successes, I do want to hear, as well, how the Coast Guard is 
ensuring that other core missions, like search and rescue, are 
not neglected.
 In closing, I would be remiss if I did not talk about the 
sacrifice that comes with military service. Each servicemember 
has dedicated his or her life to protecting the country, and 
recent operations demonstrate the risk associated with that.
 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on ways 
to improve the lives of Coasties serving at sea who are 
conducting these law enforcement missions, and how we can 
continue to support and improve the Service.
 And with that, I yield back.
 [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
 Thank you, Chairmen McDowell and Ezell, for calling this timely 
hearing.
 Every day, the women and men of the Coast Guard coordinate and 
execute law enforcement operations to halt illicit activities, protect 
lives and safeguard the interests of the United States.
 Through partnerships with other federal agencies and international 
allies, Coasties interrupt and intercept individuals breaking U.S. and 
international laws.
 The Coast Guard has been enforcing maritime laws for 250 years--and 
it shows. From drug and migrant interdiction to IUU fishing 
enforcement, nobody does it better.
 Recently, the Coast Guard has intercepted and seized several shadow 
fleet oil tankers in the Caribbean. By violating international law, 
these vessels and their operators became subject to search and seizure 
by the Coast Guard--a longstanding Coast Guard authority in these 
venues
 To ensure a safely executed mission, Coast Guard personnel work 
closely with other agencies. While recent operations have received 
public attention, it is not uncommon for the Coast Guard to exercise 
this authority.
 There are hundreds of ``dark fleet'' commercial vessels operating 
in violation of fishing laws, labor laws and, in some cases, 
trafficking people and narcotics. While the Administration has chosen 
to target oil tankers, we cannot forget other serious maritime crimes.
 Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing--otherwise known as IUU 
fishing--is when vessel operators violate national or international 
laws, regulations or management schemes designed to ensure the 
sustainability of fish stock.
 Most of these cases were found in areas like Oceania or Alaska, in 
and around the Aleutians. WE certainly have a direct interest in IUU 
fishing.
 Not only does this put strain on fish stocks, but it also 
undermines hardworking fishers who abide by the law, including many who 
live in my district.
 The Coast Guard's role in addressing and preventing IUU fishing not 
only protects U.S. interests; it assists partner and ally nations.
 In fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Coast Guard set its interdiction 
goal at 40 percent of the detected fishing vessels conducting IUU 
fishing within the U.S. exclusive economic zone, or ``EEZ.''
 Each of those years, the Service interdicted 21 percent of the 
detected vessels, with the majority of detections and interdictions 
occurring in the Gulf of Mexico.
 Over this same period, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected 274 
fishing vessels on the high seas or within the EEZ of a foreign nation, 
resulting in 75 IUU fishing violations. With more resources, I'm 
hopeful that we can improve on those numbers.
 Today, we are going to hear some good news stories about Coast 
Guard enforcement activities. As we discuss those successes, I want to 
hear, as well, how the Coast Guard is ensuring that other core 
missions, like search and rescue, are not neglected.
 In closing, I would be remiss if I did not talk about the sacrifice 
that comes with military service.
 Each servicemember has dedicated his or her life to protecting the 
country and recent operations demonstrate the risk associated with 
that.
 I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on ways to 
improve the lives of Coasties serving at sea who are conducting these 
law enforcement missions and how we can continue to support and improve 
the Service.

 Mr. McDowell. I would now like to recognize Ranking Member 
Carbajal for an opening statement for 5 minutes.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
 RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
 TRANSPORTATION

 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman McDowell, for you and 
Chairman Ezell calling today's hearing.
 The U.S. Coast Guard is the Nation's premier multimission 
law enforcement agency. As the only uniformed service to 
conduct both homeland security and defense missions, the 
importance of the Coast Guard cannot be understated.
 One of the reasons why the Coast Guard is so successful is 
their unique status as both a branch of the military and a law 
enforcement agency. When the Coast Guard conducts counterdrug 
missions, they not only successfully stop, board, and search 
vessels suspected of trafficking illegal narcotics, but they 
also detain individuals who often provide critical intelligence 
on the drug trafficking organizations that put them on the 
vessels in the first place.
 The critical piece of the puzzle is only made possible by 
the precise and professional actions of our Coast Guard 
boarding teams. Upholding American constitutional values and 
international rule of law is exactly why the Coast Guard is so 
successful.
 Another unique aspect of the Coast Guard is its ability to 
enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other 
countries to help bolster law enforcement efforts for both the 
United States and its partners. This real-time engagement with 
other countries not only helps preserve rules-based order in 
the maritime domain, but it also helps the U.S. engage in 
strategic soft power diplomacy across the world.
 While the Coast Guard continues to put up recordbreaking 
numbers of drugs seized and migrants rescued at sea, the 
numbers behind its budget have not increased at an equal rate. 
There is no doubt that we have seen an increased demand on 
Coast Guard law enforcement efforts, but we cannot forget the 
personnel who make these missions possible. I am very concerned 
that the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill 
will not appropriately fund the Coast Guard Operations and 
Support Account. Coast Guard assets don't run themselves.
 As GAO has noted, insufficient asset readiness coupled with 
workforce shortages hinder the Coast Guard's impact. We must 
address this issue.
 The Coast Guard's international collaboration is 
imperative. The Coast Guard is also a party to bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and conventions to protect natural 
resources and fish stocks from exploitation around the globe. 
Further, the Coast Guard works hand in hand with NOAA to 
protect and enforce our domestic fisheries, which is a 
multibillion-dollar industry. This mission cannot be overlooked 
as well.
 Finally, while I have a serious concern about the 
administration's actions in Venezuela, I am encouraged by the 
Coast Guard's actions to enforce the law at sea.
 The Coast Guard's recent detention and seizure of dark 
fleet vessels operating outside of international laws 
highlights the risks inherent in a flag-of-convenience system. 
American-flagged vessels are owned by Americans, crewed by 
American mariners, and follow American laws. We should be doing 
everything we can to encourage other countries to follow suit.
 I look forward to today's hearing and the opportunity to 
celebrate the accomplishments of the Coast Guard. I am proud to 
champion the Service and dedicated Coasties who prove, day in 
and day out, that the Coast Guard is truly a global force for 
good.
 With that I yield back, Mr. Chair.
 [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
 Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
 Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairmen McDowell and Ezell, for 
calling today's hearing.
 The U.S. Coast Guard is the nation's premier, multi-mission law 
enforcement agency. As the only uniformed service to conduct both 
Homeland Security and Defense missions, the importance of the Coast 
Guard cannot be understated.
 One of the reasons why the Coast Guard is so successful is their 
unique status as both a branch of the military and as a law enforcement 
agency. When the Coast Guard conducts counter-drug missions, they not 
only successfully stop, board, and search vessels suspected of 
trafficking illegal narcotics, but they also detain individuals who 
often provide critical intelligence on the drug trafficking 
organizations that put them on that vessel in the first place.
 This critical piece of the puzzle is only made possible by the 
precise and professional actions of our Coast Guard boarding teams. 
Upholding American constitutional values and the international rule of 
law is exactly why the Coast Guard is so successful.
 Another unique aspect about the Coast Guard is its ability to enter 
into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries to help 
bolster law enforcement efforts for both the U.S. and its partners. 
This real-time engagement with other countries not only helps preserve 
rules-based order in the maritime domain, but it also helps the U.S. 
engage in strategic soft power diplomacy across the world.
 While the Coast Guard continues to put up record-breaking numbers 
of drugs seized and migrants rescued at sea, the numbers behind its 
budget have not increased at an equal rate.
 There's no doubt that we've seen an increased demand for Coast 
Guard law enforcement efforts, but we cannot forget the personnel who 
make these missions possible.
 I am very concerned that the DHS appropriations bill will not 
appropriately fund the Coast Guard operations and support account--
Coast Guard assets don't run themselves.
 As GAO has noted, insufficient asset readiness coupled with 
workforce shortages hinder the Coast Guard's impact. We must address 
this issue.
 The Coast Guard's international collaboration is imperative. The 
Coast Guard is also a party to bilateral and multilateral agreements 
and conventions to protect natural resources and fish stocks from 
exploitation around the globe. Further, the Coast Guard works hand in 
hand with NOAA to protect and enforce our domestic fisheries, which is 
a multibillion-dollar industry. This mission cannot be overlooked.
 Finally, while I have serious concerns about the Administration's 
actions in Venezuela, I am encouraged by the Coast Guard's actions to 
enforce the law at sea.
 The Coast Guard's recent detention and seizure of dark fleet 
vessels operating outside of international laws highlights the risks 
inherent in a ``flag of convenience'' system.
 American flagged vessels are owned by Americans, crewed by American 
mariners and follow American laws. We should be doing everything we can 
to encourage other countries to follow suit.
 I look forward to today's hearing, and the opportunity to celebrate 
the accomplishments of the Coast Guard. I am proud to champion the 
service and the dedicated Coasties who prove day in and day out that 
the Coast Guard is truly a global force for good.
 With that, I yield back.

 Mr. McDowell. Well, briefly I would like to take a moment 
to explain the lighting system to our witnesses.
 There are three lights in front of you: Green means go; 
yellow means you are running out of time; and red means please 
wrap it up.
 I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
 Without objection, so ordered.
 I also ask unanimous consent that the record of today's 
hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have 
provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them 
in writing.
 Without objection, so ordered.
 I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record 
of today's hearing.
 Without objection, so ordered.
 As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the subcommittee asks that you please limit your oral remarks 
to 5 minutes.
 With that, Admiral Barata, you are recognized for 5 minutes 
for your testimony.

 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 
 FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ASSISTANT 
 COMMANDANT FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND HEATHER 
 MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. 
 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

 TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 
 FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ASSISTANT 
 COMMANDANT FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD

 Admiral Barata. Good morning, Chairman McDowell, Ranking 
Member Larsen, Ranking Member Carbajal, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today on the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions.
 As a military service, a Federal law enforcement agency, 
and a member of the intelligence community, the Coast Guard 
represents a vital and unique instrument of national power. We 
control, secure, and defend our maritime borders and their 
approaches; facilitate commerce vital to economic prosperity 
and strategic mobility; and maintain readiness to respond to 
crises and contingencies that often arise with little or no 
warning.
 Transnational criminal organizations and designated 
terrorist organizations exploit the maritime environment to 
move deadly drugs towards the United States. In response, your 
Coast Guard is on the front lines and deployed around the world 
as a sentinel against those who would do us harm.
 Last year, our crews' and our partners' tremendous 
collective efforts yielded historic results, removing more than 
500,000 pounds of cocaine and denying criminal networks access 
to over $3.4 billion in revenue. This is more than double the 
amount we removed in 2024, and nearly triple that of 2023.
 We are also intensely focused on interdicting the precursor 
chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, leveraging our broad 
authorities and effective partnerships to detect and interdict 
fentanyl and precursor materials before they can harm 
Americans.
 The Coast Guard also confronts persistent illegal migration 
in the maritime environment. We employ cutters, aircraft, and 
advanced unmanned systems to control, secure, and defend our 
maritime borders. We face this threat on the Texas and Mexican 
border, along the Rio Grande Valley, the maritime approaches to 
California, and the Southeastern United States and the 
Caribbean.
 Smuggling organizations and aliens use a variety of craft, 
from hopelessly overloaded vessels to high-speed boats and jet 
skis, to crude, homemade rafts in their attempts. In response, 
the Coast Guard maintains a robust, forward-leaning posture to 
deter and interdict these voyages. In 2025, we interdicted or 
deterred over 11,700 individuals, a 120-percent increase over 
2024. Along the Rio Grande, Operation River Wall has already 
supported the apprehension or deterrence of over 230 
individuals attempting to illegally cross since it commenced in 
August of last year.
 The Coast Guard also leads the world in combating illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing, or IUU fishing. This 
requires us to overcome an aging fleet and the sheer vastness 
of geography. But our efforts are crucial to stemming the 
growing threat that IUU fishing poses to the United States 
economy and global food security.
 Malign state-supported actors exploit weak governance, 
undermine world markets, and create instability through a 
number of illicit activities. Maritime drug trafficking, 
illegal migration, and IUU fishing are all examples of this 
exploitation in the maritime domain.
 Similarly, dark fleet oil tankers subvert the rules-based 
order by operating substandard vessels with obscured 
nationality and ownership, and false locations and 
documentation. These actions endanger seafarers and the 
environment, and provide revenue streams to transnational 
criminal organizations. The Coast Guard directly confronts 
these evolving threats both near and far from U.S. shores, 
delivering an exceptional return on investment to the American 
people.
 Through the continued tremendous support of the Congress, 
especially this subcommittee, we are recapitalizing our aging 
fleet with more capable cutters, aircraft, boats, and 
autonomous systems, and transforming our talent management to 
build a larger, more capable workforce, as well as pursuing 
comprehensive modernization through Force Design 2028. To 
sustain these efforts and to protect the Nation's maritime 
interests, we will continue to work closely with the Congress 
to support increased and recurring funding for the Service, 
including operations, assets, and personnel readiness.
 Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the 
Coast Guard men and women. I look forward to your questions.
 [Admiral Barata's prepared statement follows:]

 
 Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant 
 for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for 
 Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard
 Introduction
 Good afternoon, Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to be here 
today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to deliver peace 
through strength to control, secure, and defend America's borders.
 The United States is a maritime nation. With more than 95,000 miles 
of shoreline, 361 commercial ports and 25,000 miles of navigable 
waterways, the maritime domain fortifies our national security and 
economic prosperity. Over 90 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves 
the United States by sea, facilitating more than $5.4 trillion in 
maritime commerce annually. The security of this domain is not 
optional--it is foundational to our national security. The Coast Guard 
is the Nation's leading agency in this domain.
 In the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard serves as 
the Nation's finest maritime fighting force. We are one of the six 
Armed Services, a federal law enforcement agency, and member of the 
Intelligence Community. The Coast Guard controls, secures, and defends 
the U.S. border and maritime approaches with 53,000 people and a 2025 
budget of $13.5 billion; ensures the safe and secure flow of commerce 
vital to economic prosperity; and responds to crises and contingencies 
that often come with little or no warning.
 The Coast Guard leverages unique authorities, specialized 
capabilities, and enduring partnerships with international, federal, 
state, local, and tribal leaders to operationalize a layered approach 
to secure our maritime border and protect the American People from 
foreign terrorists, transnational criminals, and other maritime 
threats.
 In response to the national emergency at the southern border, the 
Coast Guard rapidly surged forces and assets to defend U.S. territorial 
integrity and advance national security objectives. Coast Guard 
commanders continuously prioritize and strategically reallocate 
aircraft, cutters, and specialized law enforcement teams to areas of 
highest operational need. Last year alone, the Coast Guard tripled the 
deployment of resources dedicated to border security, disrupting 
maritime threats before they could reach the United States.
 Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, the 
Coast Guard is changing and growing to meet the needs of Americans. 
This effort is Force Design 2028, a bold blueprint to build a stronger, 
more agile and responsive fighting force. Under the leadership and 
vision of DHS Secretary Noem, this effort directly enhances our ability 
to enforce the law, secure maritime approaches, protect commerce, and 
respond to crises. By expanding our workforce and deploying advanced 
assets and technologies, the Coast Guard is better postured to secure 
our Nation's maritime borders and sovereign interests against these 
persistent threats.
 Maritime Drug Interdiction
 Maritime drug trafficking remains one of the most direct threats to 
U.S. homeland security and public safety. Transnational criminal 
organizations depend on the maritime domain to move cocaine, 
methamphetamine, fentanyl precursors, and other illicit substances 
towards the United States. The Coast Guard is often the only agency 
with the authority, capability, and presence to act at sea where they 
interdict more illicit drugs than all other federal law enforcement 
agencies combined.
 As directed by the President, the Coast Guard is on the front lines 
securing the global supply chain against drug trafficking and reducing 
the availability of illicit drugs that devastate American communities. 
Narco terrorists exploit maritime routes to move drugs, generate 
enormous profits and fuel violence, instability, and crime. These 
revenues are increasingly leveraged by hostile actors and transnational 
networks to fund human trafficking, weapons smuggling, sanctions 
evasion, and other malign activities that destabilize regions and drive 
illegal migration. The Coast Guard's role in countering these 
organizations is both a law enforcement and a national security 
imperative.
 Since January 2025, the Coast Guard has seized over 511,000 pounds 
of cocaine from the maritime domain--representing over 189 million 
potentially lethal doses and an estimated value exceeding $3.8 
billion--during operations in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, the 
two primary drug transit corridors. This all-time historic high more 
than doubles the cocaine removed in FY 2024 and nearly triples the 
removals from FY 2023.
 Estimates indicate that the Coast Guard counter-drug and law 
enforcement operations save American taxpayers over $10 billion in 
avoided costs, including over $2.3 billion in healthcare costs from 
cocaine interdictions alone. These results are driven by increased 
operational presence, improved detection, and decisive law enforcement 
action.
 The southern border is not the only route for illegal trafficking; 
the Great Lakes and northern border are also vulnerable due to their 
complex geography and limited law enforcement presence. The U.S. Coast 
Guard does not have enough resources to effectively counter drug 
trafficking in these areas.
 Combating fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals remains one 
of the Administration's top priorities, and the Coast Guard has taken 
significant action in this effort. Fentanyl has been the leading cause 
of U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 
70% of drug overdose deaths in 2023, with Mexican narco terrorists 
being the primary source of the synthetic opioid flow into the U.S.
 Accordingly, the Coast Guard leverages its broad authorities to 
seek out and interdict both fentanyl and its illegal precursor 
chemicals. On January 31, 2025, our Commandant, Admiral Lunday directed 
immediate action to bolster these operations, focusing on interdicting 
precursor chemicals and disrupting the revenue streams that fund 
fentanyl trafficking.
 Illegal Migration
 The Coast Guard also secures the Rio Grande River, a 220-mile river 
border from the Gulf of America to West Texas, part of the U.S. 
southern border, and the maritime approaches to San Diego. These areas 
continue to experience a sustained and above-average rate of illegal 
maritime migration. This vector presents a persistent threat 
characterized by continuous smuggling attempts and is targeted through 
the Coast Guard's Operation Border Trident and Operation River Wall, 
both of which seek to achieve 100% control of the southern maritime 
border. Trafficking organizations in this region primarily utilize 
high-speed boats, jet skis and other personal watercraft, and 
additional makeshift watercraft. Although a variety of nationalities 
are encountered, the overwhelming majority of those interdicted are 
Mexican nationals.
 The maritime approaches to the southeastern U.S. are also a primary 
vector for illegal maritime migration. Most of the migrants encountered 
originate in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or the Dominican Republic, utilizing 
established transit corridors.
 Cuban and Haitian migrants typically journey toward Florida, either 
directly or through the Bahamas. Meanwhile, Dominican and some Haitian 
groups often cross the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands. They attempt these journeys on a wide array of vessels, from 
coastal freighters and high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to dangerously 
crude, homemade rafts.
 The National Security Strategy established a focus to control 
migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on 
land and sea in the Western Hemisphere. Under the direction of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard maintains a robust and 
forward-leaning posture to combat illegal immigration. In 2025 we 
interdicted, deterred, or transported 11,713 aliens illegally 
attempting entry. This was 120% more than in 2024. Our persistent 
presence both serves to deter departures from countries of origin and 
enables a rapid response to suspicious vessels, in close coordination 
with our international, federal, state, and local partners. To enhance 
this posture, we utilize advanced unmanned systems, such as surface 
drones and small aerial drones launched from our over-the-horizon 
boats, to provide persistent surveillance and support shore patrols.
 Countering Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
 The Coast Guard sets the standard for combating IUU fishing--a 
pervasive security, economic, and environmental threat accounting for 
an estimated $50 billion in lost global revenue annually. For more than 
150 years, the Coast Guard has been the lead U.S. agency for at-sea 
enforcement of fisheries laws. The Coast Guard leverages its 
authorities and capabilities to improve both domestic and international 
fisheries enforcement, holding bad actors accountable, and adapts its 
operations as fish stocks migrate and technology improves the ability 
to find and harvest catch.
 Malign, state-supported actors undermine U.S. markets, threaten 
global food security, and create instability that is exploited by 
terrorists and transnational criminals, including human traffickers. 
These actors exploit our partner nations, many of whom lack the 
resources to secure their own waters. This growing threat increases the 
demand for U.S. Coast Guard presence and partnership. While our 
cooperative patrols with such allies as Australia and Japan are 
effective, our partners require greater technical support and training.
 We work to meet these demands, but do so with an aging fleet, 
strained logistics across a vast geography, and limited forward basing 
options. This situation presents a risk to our other core missions and 
underscores the need for a sustainable, long-term solution. Our current 
force structure, primarily based on the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and 
Guam, cannot meet the growing and persistent demand from across the 
region for more Coast Guard operational presence.
 Conclusion
 Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing are distinct challenges, but they 
share a common feature: each exploits the maritime domain to evade law 
enforcement and accountability. Through its unique and enduring law 
enforcement authorities, the Coast Guard directly confronts these 
threats--securing and defending the Nation's borders and maritime 
approaches every day.
 These threats are evolving, and the demands placed on the Coast 
Guard continue to increase. The Coast Guard's layered security model--
leveraging forward presence, elite capabilities, an exceptional 
workforce, and unmatched legal authorities--allows us to address risks 
far from U.S. shores before they reach our homeland.
 The changes underway through Force Design 2028 are already 
accelerating enduring change and showing measurable results. By 
empowering our workforce and enhancing the ways we conduct our patrols 
and inspections, recent operations resulted in the seizure of more than 
511,000 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $3.8 billion. These 
outcomes demonstrate both the effectiveness of our authorities and the 
return on investment they provide.
 Since 1790, in peace and in war, a ready Coast Guard has been an 
indispensable element of national security. With continued 
congressional support, the Coast Guard will remain prepared to meet 
today's challenges and build a more resilient and capable Service for 
decades to come.
 I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to 
your questions. Semper Paratus.

 Mr. McDowell. Thank you. Now to Ms. MacLeod.
 You are recognized for 5 minutes for your testimony.

 TESTIMONY OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
 JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

 Ms. MacLeod. Chairman McDowell, Ranking Member Larsen, 
Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee, thank 
you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's work 
examining Coast Guard law enforcement efforts. These efforts, 
including drug and migrant interdiction and prevention of 
illegal fishing, are vital to confronting illicit maritime 
activities.
 My testimony today will not be a surprise to anyone on this 
committee. GAO's work has identified persistent challenges 
Coast Guard faces related to vessel and aircraft availability, 
acquisitions, and staffing shortfalls that hinder the Service's 
ability to meet its growing mission demands. We have made 
dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard to help address 
these issues. Addressing our open recommendations pertaining to 
the Coast Guard's assets and workforce would help ensure that 
the Service is efficiently using its resources to carry out its 
law enforcement missions.
 In 2025, the Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion for 
various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize 
operation and capabilities. This additional funding could help 
the Coast Guard address longstanding challenges that we have 
identified.
 Related to vessel and aircraft availability, the condition 
of the Coast Guard assets has been in a state of decline for 
decades. Our work has shown a concerning trend that the cost of 
maintaining these assets is increasing at the same time that 
their availability is decreasing. For example, in June, we 
reported that the availability of the cutters that the Coast 
Guard relies on for its law enforcement missions declined. We 
also reported that increasing maintenance challenges have led 
to cutters missing patrol obligations. We made five 
recommendations in that report to help address cutter 
challenges.
 These readiness challenges are not limited to its cutters. 
In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft 
generally did not meet its availability target. Coast Guard 
officials attributed this to maintenance and repair challenges. 
We made five recommendations, including that the Coast Guard 
assess the type and number of helicopters needed to meet its 
mission demands.
 Our work has also noted that acquisition program delays 
have been a longstanding challenge for the Service and continue 
to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets. For example, 
the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
and the Polar Security Cutter, are intended to support law 
enforcement missions like drug interdiction and prevention of 
illegal fishing. But we found that, combined, these two 
programs are billions of dollars over their initial cost 
estimates and years behind schedule. We have made dozens of 
recommendations on how Coast Guard can better manage 
acquisition programs for new vessels and aircraft.
 The final challenge I would like to highlight is Coast 
Guard staffing shortfall and poor workforce planning. In recent 
years, the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission 
workload has outpaced its workforce levels. Staffing gaps, 
particularly in specialized units like tactical law enforcement 
teams, can hinder drug interdiction and other law enforcement 
missions.
 While the Service recruited more enlisted servicemembers 
than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in prior 
years. In April 2025, we reported that, even with the increase 
in recruiting, the Service remained short of its enlisted 
workforce target. As a result, Coast Guard was operating below 
the workforce level it deemed necessary to meet its operational 
demands at that time. We made three recommendations to help 
address these challenges, including that the Coast Guard 
develop a clear plan to support its retention initiatives.
 In conclusion, while the Coast Guard plays a vital role in 
confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities, it 
faces significant challenges in carrying out these missions. 
Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help ensure 
the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently using resources 
to carry out these critical missions and protect our maritime 
borders.
 This completes my prepared statement, and I am pleased to 
respond to any questions you may have.
 [Ms. MacLeod's prepared statement follows:]

 
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
 Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
 Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Law Enforcement Mission 
 Challenges
 Highlights
What GAO Found
 The Coast Guard employs assets--including aircraft and vessels--and 
personnel to conduct law enforcement operations. In prior work, GAO 
identified longstanding challenges that have hindered the Coast Guard's 
ability to meet its law enforcement mission demands. GAO made 
recommendations to help address asset availability, acquisitions, and 
workforce challenges, which the Coast Guard has yet to fully address.
 The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced 
availability challenges and have been in a state of decline for 
decades. In June 2025 GAO found that the Medium Endurance Cutters 
availability to conduct missions declined from fiscal year 2020 through 
fiscal year 2024. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard address 
maintenance challenges and operational availability issues with these 
cutters, which it relies on for law enforcement missions.

 The Coast Guard's declining asset availability is 
exacerbated by persistent and longstanding challenges managing its 
planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and 
aircraft. In November 2025, GAO found that continued delays and cost 
overruns with the Offshore Patrol Cutter program--one of its highest 
priority acquisitions--is likely. GAO made four recommendations to 
address these issues.

 GAO has identified longstanding staffing shortfalls and 
poor workforce planning, which have challenged the Coast Guard's 
ability to meet its mission needs. For example, in June 2025, GAO 
reported that cutter crew vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 
through fiscal year 2024, according to the most recent Coast Guard data 
at the time. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan 
to support its workforce retention initiatives, among other 
recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study
 The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic 
criminal organizations as a significant threat tothe public, law 
enforcement, and national security.
 The Coast Guard is the nation's lead federal maritime law 
enforcement agency. It received nearly $25 billion in supplemental 
funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and in support of 
efforts to modernize operations and capabilities. The Coast Guard is a 
component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It conducts 
maritime law enforcement, including: drug interdiction, migrant 
interdiction, and other missions (which include fisheries law 
enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing).
 This statement discusses Coast Guard challenges GAO previously 
identified related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is 
based primarily on six GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 
2026.
What GAO Recommends
 GAO previously made 24 recommendations to the Coast Guard in the 
reports covered by this statement to help address challenges related to 
vessel and aircraft availability, acquisition delays and cost overruns, 
and staffing shortfalls.
 DHS generally agreed with the recommendations. As of January 2026, 
two of the recommendations have been implemented. GAO continues to 
monitor the agency's progress in implementing the remaining 
recommendations.
 __________
 Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of 
theSubcommittee:
 I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work examining Coast 
Guard law enforcement activities and challenges. The Coast Guard--a 
multi-mission, maritime military service within the Department of 
Homeland Security--is the nation's lead federal maritime law 
enforcement agency. The service is responsible for conducting 11 
statutory missions, including maritime law enforcement missions such as 
drug interdiction and migrant interdiction, among other missions (which 
include fisheries law enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (IUU) fishing).\1\ According to the Coast Guard, its 
presence--vessels, aircraft, and specialized forces--serves as an 
enforcement mechanism and deterrent to illicit activity that 
contributes to instability throughout the Western Hemisphere.\2\ Figure 
1 shows the Coast Guard using its assets to conduct law enforcement 
missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 468(a).
 \2\ The Coast Guard maintains Deployable Specialized Forces units 
with the capabilities needed to deploy with specialized training to 
handle counterdrug, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime 
environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 1: Coast Guard Vessels and Aircraft Interdict Smuggling Vessels; 
 Interdicted Migrants on Coast Guard Cutter
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Source: U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photos. GAO-26-108847

 The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the 
transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and 
smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement, 
and the national security of the U.S. Given the challenges the federal 
government faces in responding to the drug misuse crisis, in March 
2021, we added national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover 
from drug misuse to our High Risk List.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \3\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to 
Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk 
List every two years at the start of each new session of Congress. The 
most recent update was issued in February 2025. See GAO, High-Risk 
Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve 
Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 My statement today discusses challenges the Coast Guard faces 
related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is based 
primarily on GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 2026. This 
includes a report we are issuing today on maritime interdiction.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \4\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime 
Interdictions, GAO-26-107440. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For the reports we cite in this statement, among other 
methodologies, we analyzed Coast Guard policies, documentation, and 
data, and interviewed officials from agency headquarters and selected 
field units. More detailed information on our scope and methodology, 
including analyzing data and determining a sufficient level of 
reliability for our reporting, can be found in the reports we cite in 
this statement. For this statement, we also reviewed information on the 
status of agency implementation of selected recommendations through 
January 2026. (See appendix I for related open recommendations.)
 We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 Several Challenges Hinder Coast Guard Law Enforcement Efforts To 
 Confront Illicit Maritime Activities, Which the Service Has Yet To 
 Fully Address
 Our prior work has identified several longstanding challenges that 
have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its law enforcement 
mission demands. These include: (1) availability of vessels and 
aircraft, (2) acquisition of new assets, and (3) staffing shortfalls 
and workforce planning.\5\ We have made recommendations to help address 
these challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \5\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent 
Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug 
Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vessel and Aircraft Availability
 The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability 
challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades.\6\ Overall, 
the total number of operational hours generally decreased, and the 
total estimated operating expenses generally increased from fiscal year 
2017 through fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \6\ Vessel and aircraft availability challenges hinder the Coast 
Guard's ability to meet mission demands. For example, in January 2026, 
we reported that during fiscal years 2015 through 2024, the Coast Guard 
generally did not meet its drug or migrant interdiction goals. We also 
found that the service did not fully share information about lessons 
learned from maritime migrant interdiction with federal partners. We 
made two recommendations to DHS to address these issues and will 
monitor Coast Guard actions to fully address them. See, GAO-26-107440.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessel and Aircraft Operational Hours and 
 Estimated Operating Expenses, Fiscal Years 2015 2024
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-26-108847

 Note: Coast Guard operational hours include the use of aircraft, 
 cutters, and boats for its 11 statutory missions. See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 
 468(a). They do not include the time personnel may spend on missions 
without using vessels or aircraft. We do not include hours expended for 
 support activities or for training. According to the Coast Guard, the 
 service estimates its operating expenses for each mission by (1) 
multiplying operations and maintenance costs for supporting a vessel or 
aircraft by the operational hours and (2) using survey data to estimate 
 additional personnel costs for nonvessel or aircraft-based operations.

 In June 2025, we reported that the operational availability of the 
Coast Guard's Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Coast Guard relies on 
for its law enforcement missions, declined from fiscal year 2020 
through fiscal year 2024.\7\ We also reported that the Coast Guard was 
experiencing increasing cutter maintenance challenges, and that those 
increasing challenges, such as equipment failure and resulting 
unplanned maintenance, have led to cutters missing patrol obligations. 
For example, Coast Guard operational reporting documents stated that 
unplanned maintenance, among other things, had significantly reduced 
the capacity of Medium Endurance Cutters to conduct missions. Further, 
due to delays in receiving critical parts needed for repairs, the Coast 
Guard cannibalized cutters by moving working parts between cutters. 
According to Coast Guard data, there were 194 cannibalizations 
completed across the cutter fleet from February 2022 to September 2024; 
145 of these involved National Security Cutters--which mostly support 
the drug interdiction mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \7\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter and 
Maintenance Workforce Challenges, GAO-25-107222 (Washington, D.C.: June 
25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 As a result, in June 2025 we made five recommendations to address 
cutter maintenance and workforce challenges. For example, we 
recommended that the Coast Guard should systematically collect and 
assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may have 
caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as 
appropriate. In its agency comments, DHS agreed with this 
recommendation and described steps the Coast Guard plans to take to 
improve its processes to document, develop, and validate the efficacy 
of a new cutter maintenance metric, which it plans to use to develop 
the recommended assessment. DHS estimates completing these efforts by 
June 2027. We will continue to monitor the status of this and the other 
recommendations.
 The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its 
cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft 
generally did not meet its 71 percent availability target during fiscal 
years 2018 through 2022.\8\ Coast Guard officials attributed the 
aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability targets to 
maintenance and repair challenges. As a result, we made five 
recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and 
number of helicopters, and aviation workforce size, needed to meet its 
mission demands. In response, in August 2025, the Coast Guard told us 
an analysis of alternatives and a fleet mix analysis is being ordered. 
It anticipates completing these steps by December 2027. We will 
continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these 
recommendations, as well as the other recommendation that remains 
unaddressed.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \8\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce 
Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2024). We 
further reported that the Coast Guard was embarking on a significant 
operational change from a largely short-range helicopter fleet to a 
medium-range fleet. However, we reported that its related planning 
efforts raised serious questions, including how the medium-range 
helicopters will interact with cutters for its drug interdiction 
operations.
 \9\ The Coast Guard has addressed one of the five recommendations. 
In April 2024, we found that the U.S. Coast Guard's air stations do not 
have complete data for the Coast Guard to assess service-wide 
readiness. We recommended that the Coast Guard should establish 
procedures to uniformly collect and maintain air station readiness 
data. The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and in April 
2025 updated its operational reporting manual to, among other things, 
help standardize the collection of air station readiness data. The 
manual requires air stations to report periods when they cannot meet 
readiness requirements and provides examples on how to do so. By 
issuing updated guidance requiring air stations to uniformly collect 
and maintain aircraft readiness data, the Coast Guard can help ensure 
it has complete and accurate information on Coast Guard-wide air 
station readiness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Acquisition Programs
 We have previously reported that the Coast Guard's declining asset 
availability is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing 
its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels 
and aircraft. For example, in September 2024 we reported on the 
declining availability of the Coast Guard aircraft fleet and found that 
the Coast Guard's cutter program faces persistent challenges including 
capability gaps from schedule delays.\10\ Furthermore, officials told 
us that they would not be able to increase mission activity without 
acquiring more assets, but acquisition delays have been a longstanding 
challenge for the service. Furthermore, according to officials, the 
acquisition process is lengthy, as it can take several years from 
initial request to final delivery of an asset.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent 
Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug 
Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2024).
 \11\ GAO-26-107440.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 One of the Coast Guard's highest priority programs--the Offshore 
Patrol Cutters--has experienced delays that will exacerbate maritime 
capability gaps.\12\ According to the Coast Guard, it urgently needs 
Offshore Patrol Cutters to replace aging cutters that conduct law 
enforcement and search and rescue operations.\13\ However, in November 
2025, we reported that the Coast Guard's plan to acquire 25 Offshore 
Patrol Cutters was delayed by more than 5 years.\14\ Notwithstanding 
delays, ship design remains incomplete, and continued delays and cost 
overruns are likely.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \12\ In June 2023, we found that the Coast Guard's management of 
its Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisitions continued to face challenges we 
had previously identified. We made five new recommendations to the 
Coast Guard, including that it develop a technology maturation plan and 
update its acquisition policy to require programs to complete routing 
of distributive systems as part of functional design prior to lead ship 
construction. Two of the recommendations have not yet been fully 
addressed. See, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter 
Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 
(Washington, D.C.: Jun. 20, 2023).
 \13\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 
testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2024.
 \14\ GAO, Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key 
Knowledge Before Buying More Ships, GAO-26-107583 (Washington, D.C.: 
November 25, 2025).
 \15\ The Coast Guard plans to acquire the 25 Offshore Patrol 
Cutters in four phases. In July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated two of 
four ships from the first phase contract for default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 As a result, we made four recommendations in November 2025, 
including that the program stabilizes design before starting 
construction of additional ships. Incorporating the knowledge gained 
from testing--as well as other shipbuilding leading practices--into the 
procurement process could help the Coast Guard make better investment 
decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future ship 
deliveries. While the agency agreed with two of the four 
recommendations, we maintain that all four recommendations are 
warranted and will continue to monitor their implementation.
Staffing Shortfalls and Workforce Planning
 Our prior work has also shown that staffing shortfalls and poor 
workforce planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 
mission needs, including for drug interdiction and other law 
enforcement missions. While the service recruited more enlisted service 
members than it lost in fiscal year 2024, it experienced net enlisted 
staffing losses from fiscal years 2019 through 2023. In April 2025 we 
reported that even with the increase in recruiting, the service 
remained approximately 2,600 service members, or 8.5 percent of its 
total enlisted workforce, short of its enlisted workforce target at the 
end of fiscal year 2024.\16\ As a result, the Coast Guard was operating 
below the workforce level it deemed necessary to meet its operational 
demands. We made three recommendations, including that the Coast Guard 
develop a clear plan to support its retention initiatives. The Coast 
Guard agreed with our recommendations, and we continue to monitor their 
implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help 
Address Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 23, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Further, in June 2025, we reported that cutter crew and support 
position vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal 
year 2024, according to Coast Guard data.\17\ Multiple Coast Guard 
officials told us at that time that due to cutter personnel shortages, 
cutters often deploy without a full crew, leaving the remaining crew to 
take on the responsibilities of missing staff. We also previously 
reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce 
planning for its aviation workforce, which the service relies on to 
support its drug interdiction mission. For example, as of April 2024 
the Coast Guard had not assessed and determined necessary staffing 
levels and skills for a large portion of its aviation workforce, 
including all 25 of its air stations and its major aircraft repair 
facility.\18\ As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard assess 
and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires to meet its 
mission needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation. It stated the 
Coast Guard would conduct workforce analyses for all of its air 
stations by June 2026. We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's 
efforts to address this recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \17\ GAO-25-107222. Specifically, our analysis showed that 1,104 
cutter crew and support positions were vacant (about 13 percent) in 
fiscal year 2024. This is an increase from fiscal year 2017, in which 
401 cutter crew and support positions were vacant (about 5 percent).
 \18\ GAO-24-106374. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation. 
We also made four other recommendations in the report and the Coast 
Guard concurred with all four. As of August 2025, four of the five 
recommendations remain open. We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's 
efforts to address these recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 In summary, the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions are vital to 
confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. The Coast Guard 
received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 
for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize 
operations and capabilities.\19\ We have identified longstanding 
challenges with the Coast Guard's management of its programs and 
tradeoff decisions among its mission priorities and have made 
recommendations to help address these challenges. Addressing our 20 
open recommendations pertaining to the Coast Guard's assets and 
workforce would help ensure that the service efficiently uses its 
resources to carry out its law enforcement missions and interests.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 \19\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, Sec. 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127 
(2025).
 \20\ We made 24 recommendations in the reports covered by this 
statement. The Coast Guard implemented two of these recommendations, 
twenty remain open, and two are no longer valid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Appendix I: Related Open Recommendations to the Department of Homeland 
 Security as of January 2026
Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-26-
107440. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2026.

 Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should 
ensure the Commandant of the Coast Guard implements performance 
measures for the migrant interdiction mission that effectively measure 
the service's efforts.
 Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should 
ensure the Operation Vigilant Sentry task force implements a process to 
identify and address lessons learned following real-world events and 
exercises with all relevant federal partner agencies, and shares 
relevant information with those partners.

Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before 
Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2025.

 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program demonstrates that 
the stage 2 design is stable prior to authorizing construction of 
additional stage 2 OPCs by (1) completing basic and functional design, 
including routing of major distributive systems that affect multiple 
zones of the ship, in a 3D model with reliable vendor-furnished 
information and (2) successfully testing an integrated prototype of the 
davit in a realistic environment, consistent with shipbuilding leading 
practices.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in 
collaboration with the Navy, should develop a memorandum of agreement 
to clarify and document agreement on how the evaluation of deficiencies 
and ongoing surveillance of Austal's EVM system will be coordinated 
between the Coast Guard and SUPSHIP throughout the duration of the OPC 
program.
 Recommendation: The DHS Secretary should ensure that the 
DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to revise 
the OPC acquisition program baseline to include cost goals for each 
stage.
 Recommendation: The DHS Secretary should ensure that the 
DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to document 
a plan for acquiring stage 3 OPCs that identifies (1) how results from 
operational testing of OPC stages 1 and 2 will be incorporated into 
stage 3 procurement activities, such as developing the request for 
proposals, and contingency plans if this testing is delayed; and (2) 
how leading practices for ship design will be incorporated into stage 
3.

Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and Workforce 
Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2025.

 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
systematically collect and assess data on instances where previously 
deferred maintenance may have caused cutter equipment failures and 
develop mitigation strategies as appropriate.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
complete Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Boards for all cutter 
types at the intervals prescribed by policy.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
systematically collect and assess data on which parts and systems 
across the cutter fleet are or will become obsolete and develop 
mitigation strategies as appropriate.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
systematically collect and assess data on cutter days lost due to 
unplanned maintenance issues.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
regularly collect and analyze data on staff availability for cutter 
crew and support personnel positions, including which cutter workforce 
positions are temporarily empty across the cutter fleet, and use this 
information to inform personnel assignments.

Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service 
Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 
2025.

 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and 
Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response rates 
for its Career Intention Survey.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and 
Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its Career 
Intention Survey results.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program Integration 
Office develops a clear plan, including how retention initiatives align 
with strategic objectives and time frames and milestones for 
implementation, to track progress and gauge program performance.

Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed. 
GAO-24-106374. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2024.

 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air station 
readiness data.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet its 
mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet its 
mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires to meet 
its mission needs.

Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to 
Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2023.

 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that OPC program officials develop a technology maturation plan 
for the davit prior to builder's trials. This plan should identify 
potential courses of action to address davit technical immaturity, 
including assessing technology alternatives should the current davit 
continue to face development challenges, and a date by which the Coast 
Guard will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a technology 
alternative.
 Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should 
ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype of the 
davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1 builder's trials.

 Mr. McDowell. Thank you. I would now like to begin 
questioning, and I will recognize myself for questions for 5 
minutes.
 I want to thank you again for being here with us today, and 
just want to give a very heartfelt thank you to the members of 
the Coast Guard, and especially to the Stone. It is incredible 
work, and our country thanks you for that.
 The Coast Guard recognizes illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing as the leading global maritime security 
threat. And it is no coincidence that the largest perpetrator 
of this illicit activity is China, whose many, many violations 
include fishing in other nations' exclusive economic zones and 
incorrectly reporting fishing activity. Can you, Admiral 
Barata, can you characterize the economic harm that these 
violations--or to either of you, can you characterize what this 
IUU fishing--how it harms the United States, and explain what 
steps are being taken to prioritize that threat?
 Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. Good morning again.
 So IUU is a threat to both the global economy and the U.S. 
economy. The illegal catch that is brought in to the United 
States devalues the work that our domestic LMR, living marine 
resources, the fish stocks that we sell to our own folks, and 
impacts over $150 billion that our fishermen bring to the 
global domestic product. So from our standpoint, it is a very 
difficult issue to deal with. As we look at the number of 
fleets that are out there, the distant-water fleets, there are 
about 6,000 that we know are registered with China and almost 
17,000 that we think are registered in other flags that are 
conducting this type of work.
 The difficulty is that, as we get into some of these island 
nations where those EEZs exist that are not the U.S. EEZ, many 
of these island nations do not have the ability, they don't 
have the expertise, they don't have the capabilities, the small 
boats. And so the work that we do through multilateral 
agreements to carry shipriders aboard our vessels, to sell them 
equipment to do it themselves, to enforce on their behalf as we 
are out there under these treaties, it gives them the 
opportunity to help enforce in their own exclusive economic 
zones.
 Mr. McDowell. Just curious, what species are they targeting 
the most to harvest?
 Admiral Barata. It is actually a full range of species. 
About 10 percent of the stocks that we bring in, the seafood 
that we bring in to the U.S., we estimate to be from--as part 
of this trade ourselves.
 Mr. McDowell. Wow.
 Admiral Barata. But it is obfuscated, as they land it in 
different countries. They do transshipments on mother ships, 
and so it is very hard to track where the fish are actually 
coming from.
 Mr. McDowell. Got you. The One Big Beautiful Bill, as I 
mentioned earlier, included an investment of nearly $25 billion 
in the Coast Guard for new cutters, helicopters, modernized 
shore infrastructure, maritime surveillance systems, and much 
more. What benefit will these additional resources bring to the 
Coast Guard's law enforcement efforts, and how quickly will we 
see these benefits realized?
 Admiral Barata. Chairman, it is a generational, maybe a 
historic change for the Coast Guard to get this type of 
windfall. And the Big Beautiful Bill, it's assets, the things 
that Ms. MacLeod talked about. It allows us to recapitalize 
across our cutter fleet, it allows us to add to our icebreaking 
fleet, which also--where the fish stocks are going, as well. 
Technology, autonomous systems, it allows us to build out Cape 
May and maybe a new training center to bring more Coast Guard 
people, which for us is the lifeblood of everything that we do. 
So thank you very much for the support of this subcommittee. We 
can't thank you enough. It is much needed, and we will put that 
money to good use.
 I will tell you, the Coast Guard is 100 percent focused on 
obligating those funds in a timely manner and putting those 
assets in place.
 Mr. McDowell. Ms. MacLeod, to you, the Offshore Patrol 
Cutter is one of the Service's highest acquisition priorities. 
When delivered, this new class of ships will play an important 
role for the Coast Guard's law enforcement efforts. Can you 
discuss very quickly the importance of this program and your 
assessment of its progress?
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes, the Coast Guard has identified this as 
one of its most important programs. The progress has been slow, 
challenging, and underwhelming at times. They continue to 
struggle with this acquisition, and I think taking the lessons 
learned from this acquisition could be applied to future funds, 
including those authorized in the Big Beautiful Bill that you 
mentioned.
 Mr. McDowell. Thank you. My time has expired. I would now 
like to recognize Ranking Member Larsen for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to 
start with Admiral Barata, and I don't need a lot of detail, 
but I think it is important for us to understand authorities 
under which Coast Guard is boarding these oil tankers.
 If you could, just briefly discuss the right-to-visit 
boarding as--but that only gives you the legal authority to 
board. But what is the authority under which you are acting in 
order to board? I think that is important to understand, as 
well.
 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, briefly, we are using 
customary international law, first and foremost, to conduct the 
right-of-visit boardings. And once aboard, if we can establish 
that the vessel is without nationality, we can either get flag-
state consent, or in the cases that they are without 
nationality, we can determine that they are under U.S. 
jurisdiction. And so that is kind of our opening point----
 Mr. Larsen of Washington [interposing]. Yes.
 Admiral Barata [continuing]. To use title 14, sir.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Sure, yes, title 14. But on that 
point, to establish the nationality, is it like pulling them 
over because of a broken tail light and then you check on 
nationality? Or is that established first by the State 
Department in an interagency process and then you target that 
particular tanker?
 Admiral Barata. So for us, on the high seas, we do this 
very routinely on almost every vessel that is out there, 
multiple countries, multiple vessels. It is under the law of 
the sea. It is customary for us to engage either a right of 
approach or a right of visit and just determine what the vessel 
status is, what the nationality is, what their intentions are.
 In these cases, we have gotten some indication that their 
nationality is not accurate by either a database that we have, 
intelligence background that we have, working with the 
Department of State, and working with their own flag states. We 
are seeing that there is a lot of these tankers that are just 
using false flags without notifying the flag state.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, and not to get into detail 
because you probably can't here--maybe we can talk to you all 
later in a different setting--but there is use of Coast Guard 
and other intelligence assets to maybe narrow the focus a 
little bit so it is not every tanker, it is specific tankers?
 Admiral Barata. Yes. And obviously, we are cued by the fact 
that these tankers are operating in Venezuela. And every vessel 
should be operating in its automatic identification system, and 
every vessel should be flagged so that we can tell these 
things.
 And yes, we work through our intelligence and other open 
source means to just determine that there is some anomalous 
information that is being provided. And so that does kind of 
trigger us.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. I just want to establish that, 
because you kind of do the same thing if you are doing drug 
interdiction or migrant interdiction or----
 Admiral Barata [interrupting]. Absolutely. Yes, Ranking 
Member.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. It is the same process.
 Admiral Barata. The same process.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. This focus is on these tankers.
 Admiral Barata. Yes, absolutely.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. I don't want to simplify it too 
much. I am sure there's nuance, but----
 Admiral Barata [interrupting]. Yes, sir.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, thanks.
 Ms. MacLeod, I want to shift a little bit. So yes, we 
provided the Coast Guard $25 billion over the next 10 years 
through the reconciliation bill, and Coast Guard exceeded 
recruitment goals last year, I think, as well. So there are 
platforms, there are people. But over the last couple of years, 
the Coast Guard has retrenched a little bit in terms of sites, 
in terms of--because of recruitment, because of the lack of 
people, to move people away from current Coast Guard sites and 
assets from them.
 Is there a plan now that we are going to build replacement 
and additional platforms and recruit more people--have you 
looked at whether or not the Coast Guard has a plan now to move 
back to places that they have retrenched from over the last 
couple of years? We have got to put these people somewhere and 
these platforms somewhere.
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes, we have certainly examined the funding 
related to the bill, as well as Force Design 2028. It is 
ambitious for the Coast Guard to be able to achieve those 
goals. We haven't seen from the Coast Guard yet specific plans 
on how it will execute that funding or achieve those 
recruitment goals. Certainly, they have made efforts in 
expanding their recruitment efforts through the different 
offices and different technologies, which is encouraging, but 
we haven't seen them measure the results of those efforts yet. 
That remains an open recommendation from us, and so we will 
wait and see what happens there.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Right.
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Admiral Barata, back to you with 
the same question. You have gotten the dollars for the 
platforms, and we will watch, we will definitely be watching 
that. You are recruiting. But under Admiral Fagan--those were 
all great goals, and you are achieving them as well--but she 
also had to take actions because of the lack of recruitment 
previously to shrink the footprint a little bit of the Coast 
Guard. What is the plan to put people and platforms back to 
those places?
 Admiral Barata. So, as part of Force Design 2028, I think 
as Ms. MacLeod mentioned, it is ambitious, but we are excited 
about it. We have reorganized the Coast Guard in several ways, 
which includes a group to focus just on people, which includes 
recruiting.
 And as you hinted at, over the last few years, we have seen 
a 3,000-person shortfall across the enlisted workforce. And so 
the first thing we need to do is get those folks into the 
Service and then expand by another 15,000. And so those are 
part of our goals to use to crew those ships, to return those 
stations where we had to take some of those operators and place 
them elsewhere for our most demanding needs. But we have a plan 
in place. We are happy to come and talk to the subcommittee 
about what that plan looks like, sir.
 Mr. Larsen of Washington. Great. Thank you very much.
 Mr. McDowell. The chairman now recognizes Mr. Webster for 5 
minutes.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. I thank the witnesses for being 
here today and your testimony. I really appreciate that.
 Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate that, too.
 Admiral Barata, the Coast Guard began to ramp up the 
deployment of unmanned aircraft systems, and I guess it was for 
a cost-effective approach to provide persistent airborne 
surveillance capabilities across the National Security Cutter 
fleet. And it has validated a mission need for land-based UAS 
to significantly enhance ocean surveillance in support of the 
Service's operations. How is the Coast Guard currently 
utilizing drones as a kind of a force multiplier for the 
agency's law enforcement missions?
 And how do we hope to see them in the future, use them in 
the future, how do we use to progress what has already started?
 Admiral Barata. Congressman, good morning. Good to see you 
as always, sir.
 So the Big Beautiful Bill gives us quite a bit of funding 
for all types of autonomous systems which we kind of break down 
into long range, mid range, and short range. Some of the short-
range drones we have found to be great force multipliers at a 
lot of our local patrol boats and our shore-based units to do 
any number of things, especially, for instance, where we don't 
have an air station or we don't have a helicopter or an 
aircraft available to us to help with search and rescue in some 
cases, to help with pollution response.
 When I was the district commander down in the Heartland 
District, we had a wellhead that had let loose, and it was 
spilling oil, and we worked with NOAA to put drones in the air 
to kind of reposition the boom--as the oil was spilling and was 
progressing into the marsh--to protect sensitive areas.
 So if you think about, you know, just a local unit arriving 
in a government vehicle and not having the ability after--for 
instance, on the Mississippi River, where there are a number of 
barges that maybe have crashed and sunk, to kind of put a drone 
in the air and take a look and see what the expanse of that is, 
what the damage looks like to the bridge and other things. 
Those are the type of things that if we put this technology in 
the hands of some of our innovative young people who are really 
excited about this--you know, we have a program where we 
actually qualify folks from the unit, and so, many of these 
units are--these kids are volunteering. There are 8 or 10 kids 
at a time who are--I say kids; these are petty officers who are 
27, they are much younger than me, so--but they are taking the 
ball and running with it, and we are pretty excited about that 
capability.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. So they are in the air, and they 
can see and you can see what is going on? Is there more to it 
than that? Is there more than just reconnaissance by them, or 
is there some other use?
 Admiral Barata. No, Congressman, we are using it to inform 
our operations. And so, for us, awareness informs the 
operational commander and allows us to deploy assets, change 
tactics, reach out to agencies in some cases, or even call 
assets off if we can determine that--for instance, we get a lot 
of false reports about things, you know, hey, maybe there is a 
kayak floating out in the middle of the bay. Instead of 
launching a helicopter, we might be able to launch something 
like a drone, look and see that it is something that is just a 
piece of flotsam that does not really have somebody on it, and 
kind of discount that as a SAR case.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. So how would the development of a 
robust UAS program allow the Coast Guard to better accomplish 
its mission? Multipart mission, actually.
 Admiral Barata. Congressman, it is going to reap us untold 
benefits, I think. We have talked about the far reaches of the 
Pacific, we have talked about vessels trying to track those 
things. We are using our autonomous systems in any number of 
ways.
 One of our programs called Coastal Sentinel, which is going 
to be an array of radars and ISR systems, it is going to have 
unmanned waterborne systems, air systems. That is going to 
allow us to have pervasive maritime domain awareness and 
understand the threats that are on the border, conduct search 
and rescue, sea pollution spills, all of these things.
 And so, for us, that is the future. And what we want to do 
is allow those systems to do some of the work where we might 
not need a human being, and free up the Coast Guard experts to 
do just what only they can do. That is our goal.
 Mr. Webster of Florida. Director MacLeod, GAO reported--it 
concludes that while intended to be of short duration, the 
Coast Guard has sort of surged operations to counter maritime 
migration surges for 3 years. To do this, they have reallocated 
vessels and aircraft personnel. What is the long-term solution?
 [Pause.]
 Mr. McDowell. Please answer quickly, and----
 Mr. Webster of Florida [interrupting]. Oh, I am sorry. Yes, 
I didn't mean to say Rear Admiral Barata.
 Mr. McDowell. You can go ahead and answer.
 Ms. MacLeod. Okay, okay. I think, if I heard you properly, 
you were talking about the surges and the Coast Guard efforts 
related to that.
 I think each of the Coast Guard efforts in times of surge, 
whether it is a migrant surge or a response to drug flow, just 
recognizing that there are tradeoffs among these missions. And 
as the Coast Guard turns its efforts to one, something is 
happening in the other area. And being able to understand the 
impact of those efforts on the other missions is an important 
effort for the Coast Guard. Thank you.
 Mr. McDowell. Thank you. I now recognize the ranking member 
of the subcommittee, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
 Admiral Barata, prior to the invasion of Venezuela, we saw 
confirmed reports that U.S. military forces carried out strikes 
on vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific that the 
Department of Defense said were involved in drug trafficking. 
Given that maritime drug interdiction and law enforcement are a 
core mission of the United States Coast Guard, can you explain 
to this committee how the Coast Guard and the Department of 
Defense coordinated on these actions, especially in terms of 
legal authorities and ensuring compliance with international 
and United States law, or not?
 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, in regards to the kinetic 
strikes on the drug smuggling vessels down there, I would have 
to refer that to the Department of War. The Coast Guard was not 
part of those actions at all.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Barata, we have received 
reports that the Coast Guard has experienced a degradation in 
information-sharing from traditionally reliable international 
partners. How important are our allies in the success of drug 
interdiction in the long run?
 Admiral Barata. They are vital to our success, and I think 
many people on the subcommittee, members of the subcommittee, 
are familiar with JIATF South, the work that is done out of Key 
West, the Joint Interagency Task Force down there led by the 
military and coordinated. Sixty percent of the work that is 
done in JIATF is assisted by partners, whether that's bilateral 
agreements, joint boardings, or assisted boardings.
 For us, the Coast Guard, title 14 is the key for a lot of 
this drug enforcement that takes place as a potential violation 
of U.S. law. And so, as Ms. MacLeod has highlighted, sometimes 
we do not have the cutters in place to do that, but we can do 
some of these boardings with a tactical law enforcement team. 
And so we get a lot of assistance from our partners in doing 
this type of work.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I have had the opportunity to 
visit the JIATF South and have witnessed firsthand all the work 
that is being done down there.
 Ms. MacLeod, your statement mentions 20 open 
recommendations since 2023 pertaining to maritime law 
enforcement operations. Which recommendations are the most 
urgent to improving the Coast Guard's ability to interdict 
drugs, interdict migrants, and thwart illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing?
 Ms. MacLeod. All of our recommendations are important, and 
I would just note that the Coast Guard has agreed with the vast 
majority of recommendations that we have been making in these 
areas.
 I think a couple of areas that it comes down to--and I will 
highlight just one--is data and information. So the Coast Guard 
needs better data to be able to make these decisions about 
mission tradeoffs. And by having such information, it could 
improve their performance, as mentioned, where the cutters are, 
where the people are doing these workforce analyses to 
understand the priorities amongst its limited workforce, and 
could assist in the surge operations when they do come.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I know that's like asking a 
parent, ``Pick your favorite child.''
 Admiral Barata, would vessel safety, economic security, and 
national security improve if the flags-of-convenience system 
were abolished?
 Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, I think it's a difficult 
question. Like in the cases of the vessels that we are dealing 
with right now, these dark vessels, there is a difference 
between, say, an open registry and a false flag. In these 
cases, what we have found is four of the five vessels just were 
under a false flag, they either were not registered at all or 
they had not notified the country that they claimed to be 
flagged under that they were there. And so when we worked 
through the Maritime Operational Threat Response process, when 
we went back to the Department of State, they reached back to 
that country and just tried to validate the status the country 
was completely unaware that they had. Or the country had no 
registry that was open to other vessels.
 So, I think what we are seeing here in this case, there's 
about 100-200 shadow fleet tankers that have a connection to 
Venezuela. I don't think that would get after that problem. I 
think there are some ways to get after that issue. But if the 
vessels are not going to be held accountable, then the registry 
itself won't, because we are upholding--for us, for instance, 
the Coast Guard does a lot of work as a port state. We validate 
these vessels are inspected, that they have their 
documentation, and these things. The vessels that we are going 
aboard right now have nothing. They have all false documents, 
sir.
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time, so I am just 
going to read my last question to the record. If you could, 
answer it later.
 Admiral Barata, it has been reported that the Coast Guard 
is hiring vessel inspectors to assess and repair seized 
tankers. We know that the Service is already short 150 vessel 
inspectors, which has meant a less-than-ideal vessel inspection 
schedule for small passenger vessels. If you could--for the 
record, later--submit an answer to: How will the shortage, 
coupled with the new priority of inspecting seized tankers, 
affect the frequency of inspections of small passenger vessels?
 If you could answer that later, that would be great.
 [The preceding question for the record and response is on 
page 41.]
 Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
 Mr. McDowell. I now recognize the chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Mast, for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it.
 Admiral, thank you for being here. Thank you for being 
here, ma'am. I want to stick with the ghost ships and maybe 
extend a little bit of the conversation that we were just 
having, understand a little bit more of the risk profile about 
these ghost ships that are illegally moving Iranian oil.
 So, just number one, when we talk about that risk profile, 
compare/contrast it to a traditional ship that you might board, 
check out their certifications, things like that in terms of 
spill probability, hull integrity, crew competency, things like 
that. Give me a brief compare and contrast to something that is 
a legal operating vessel.
 Admiral Barata. Well, again, we haven't seen many of these. 
These vessels we are seeing right now are probably the first 
couple that we have gotten aboard. But I will tell you, they 
are very----
 Mr. Mast [interrupting]. Say that again. The first couple 
you have gotten aboard?
 Admiral Barata. Yes.
 Mr. Mast. Is that what you said? Yes.
 Admiral Barata. Yes. Typically, the shadow fleet operates 
between China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba. We don't access 
it. The U.S. Coast Guard doesn't normally see them because they 
are not allowed to enter U.S. ports.
 But the one in particular that we boarded, the skipper was 
extremely substandard. It was extremely overloaded. The cargo 
systems were not functioning properly.
 Mr. Mast. How overloaded? How substandard?
 Admiral Barata. Extremely, extremely. Yes, very 
substandard. They had loaded cargo into areas where they 
shouldn't, they are not normally allowed to load cargo. They 
pressed those up. But the cargo systems themselves were not 
working, the firefighting system was not operating properly. 
Just basic firefighting, lifesaving issues.
 Mr. Mast. It is fair to say these are not the newest, 
latest, and greatest?
 Admiral Barata. No, these are old. These are old ships. The 
value on these tankers is the cargo. The vessels themselves are 
not in good shape.
 Mr. Mast. Okay. Tell me about insurance carried on these, 
if they are moving oil and one of these ghost fleet vessels 
goes out there and has a spill versus something that is 
otherwise a normal operating vessel.
 Admiral Barata. As we have gotten aboard, all the 
documentation has been false. And so, everything that we would 
normally require on a tanker to even operate in the United 
States--insurance, P&I club, COFR, all of those things--we 
presume that they don't have it, and so we are treating it as 
if they don't.
 Mr. Mast. So you are saying these ghost fleet vessels, 
maybe they carry fraudulent documents, but they are nothing 
more than fraudulent in your experience? Is that----
 Admiral Barata [interrupting]. What we have seen so far is 
that all the documents they have had are not in compliance with 
international standards.
 Mr. Mast. Now, my understanding is--and please correct me 
or educate me on this--it might be an--we might label it for 
our purposes an Iranian ghost fleet vessel. But that doesn't 
mean this is an Iranian-flagged ship. What is the difference 
between where they are flagged and where their actual 
beneficial ownership is? Where do you find that coming into 
play?
 Admiral Barata. What we have found is that they are making 
multiple claims of ownership, multiple claims of flags. So we 
do----
 Mr. Mast [interrupting]. Where are those claims of 
ownership, typically?
 Admiral Barata. It has been varied. The flags that they 
have been claiming have been in West African countries that 
don't have the ability to validate those things on the 
international level, those type of things. The owners 
themselves are obscured to us. The vessels that have been 
seized by the Department of Justice, I would have to refer you 
to those if they have access to the owners.
 Mr. Mast. Distinguish between these terms, if you can--
again, help educate me on this. A vessel's registered owner 
versus the beneficial owner versus the operator versus the 
charterer. Walk me through those different terms and why they 
matter.
 Admiral Barata. I would have to get back to you on that, 
sir. We normally in the Coast Guard deal with the owner-
operator, the primary representative of the vessel in order--
when we are taking official action. The nuance of some of 
those, I can get back to you on, sir.
 Mr. Mast. So would you categorize this as certainly an 
environmental issue that these ghost ships are operating, an 
environmental issue for the gulf?
 Admiral Barata. Well, we are working to mitigate it. I 
think the amount of cargo that is aboard some of the vessels--
these are 1,000-foot, very large crude carriers--VLCCs, as we 
call them--that are too large to enter into U.S. port. And so 
what we are doing is we are putting our marine inspectors 
aboard in order to mitigate that. We are working to put salvage 
experts aboard. We have tugs aboard. We have folks trying to 
work to fix the equipment aboard.
 Mr. Mast. So to summarize it--and if I miss something, let 
me know--but you said crews typically have a level of 
incompetence, or untrained, or just don't have the experience 
on these ghost fleets. That is fair to say?
 Admiral Barata. The crews themselves, I wouldn't want to 
categorize how they have been operating the vessels. I would 
say the vessels themselves are substandard. We have not 
evaluated the crews.
 Mr. Mast. Okay. Thank you for your time. My time has 
expired. Thank you for the answers.
 Admiral Barata. Thanks, Congressman.
 Mr. Mast. And all the best. Semper paratus.
 Mr. Ezell [presiding]. The gentleman yields. Ms. 
Strickland.
 Ms. Strickland. Oh, he's back. Thank you, Chairman Ezell 
and Ranking Member Carbajal, for holding this hearing. I first 
want to focus on force laydown and the Coast Guard's commitment 
to maintaining capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
 A December 2025 Coast Guard report confirms that the 
Hawaii-homeported cutter Harriet Lane, which has been central 
to conducting maritime law enforcement and expanding maritime 
domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific, will likely be relocated 
due to home port limitations. Rear Admiral Barata, can the 
Coast Guard commit to ensuring that critical Coast Guard assets 
remain in the Pacific?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning.
 Ms. Strickland. Good morning.
 Admiral Barata. So the Harriet Lane, obviously, is--they 
are located out there, have been doing tremendous work. We have 
been very happy with them, and we are trying to push as many 
cutters as we can into the Indo-Pacific. And so we are still 
working on that. The Harriet Lane will not leave the Pacific, 
we guarantee that. We are just looking for a place that suits 
the operations and the families that can accommodate her.
 Ms. Strickland. Great, thank you. And we must maintain a 
credible U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific to deter CCP coercion 
and honor our commitments to those nations.
 I am going to pivot a bit now, and I want to talk about the 
bigger picture of the Department of Homeland Security's 
actions. The Coast Guard operates under the jurisdiction of 
DHS.
 First of all, the American people deserve to feel safe 
wherever they are--at home, in their neighborhoods--and the 
work that you do is integral to that. This administration was 
voted in on the promise that it would deliver safety for all 
Americans. DHS broke that promise the moment they started 
marching into American cities and turning their guns on 
innocent citizens under the pretense of protecting communities.
 When people want to be part of the Coast Guard, there are 
strict recruiting standards. You have to pass a background 
check. You have to be qualified. The training is extensive. 
From what we are seeing with the latest recruiting efforts, 
that is not the case with ICE agents. At every turn, they are 
choosing the most reckless response possible, and then refusing 
to be held accountable for it. They took no accountability when 
a SWAT team dropped down from a Black Hawk and stormed Chicago 
in an apartment building raid that led to no criminal charges; 
no accountability when agents shot two people during a traffic 
stop in Portland; and no accountability whatsoever when a 
masked ICE agent shot a 37-year-old woman in Minneapolis in the 
face; no accountability when the administration then 
stonewalled State and local law enforcement trying to conduct a 
fair fact-finding investigation.
 Americans, regardless of political affiliation--Democrats, 
Independents, and Republicans--are outraged at this 
administration's complete overreach and assault on the rights 
of the American people. But this was never about immigration 
for them. This is domestic terrorism. American lives have 
become an afterthought to this administration's ultimate goal 
of scaring people, declaring martial law, and using ICE as the 
President's personal police force. They are going around 
Congress, they are disrespecting the rule of law, they are 
disrespecting our role as a check and balance. And the American 
people deserve so much better.
 I yield back, Mr. Chair.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. Mr. Begich, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
 Mr. Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions are going to 
be directed to Rear Admiral Barata.
 How often are you seeing foreign vessels operate in ways 
designed to avoid enforcement against IUU, and how are they 
doing this?
 Admiral Barata. Congressman, quite often. It is kind of 
ubiquitous. They are doing it in a number of ways to kind of 
obfuscate where they are at. They don't identify themselves or 
they--we found that the technology to kind of project your 
location is very pervasive in other spots. And sometimes in 
some cases they are clumping in together. In other cases, what 
they do is they will take illegal catch to a mother ship and 
they will put it into a transshipment so that we don't know 
which vessel was loading it and those things.
 And so, in a lot of ways--and then they are landing it in 
countries that are friendly to them that need the money or need 
the catch, and so they will bring it in there. But those are--
we see it all the time.
 Mr. Begich. What would you say is the single biggest 
enforcement gap that you face in stopping illegal fishing in 
U.S. waters or near U.S. interests?
 Admiral Barata. In U.S. waters--and it's the same problem, 
I think, that we have in the rest of the world--is that you 
need to know where they are at. You need awareness of where 
those things are.
 And so, in the far reaches of the Pacific, some of the 
things that we are going to need is some satellite assistance 
in order to compare the location of those vessels against their 
actual location. And then we are going to need data and 
artificial intelligence to kind of help us suss out which 
vessels are operating illegally.
 Mr. Begich. When you are trying to measure whether you have 
been successful at inhibiting IUU activities, what are the 
metrics that you use to capture that? Is it boarding? Seizures? 
Disruption? How do you sort of characterize that?
 Admiral Barata. We look at it in a couple of different 
ways. Metrics are hard, but I think it depends on the fishing 
fleet. For instance, in the Gulf of America, where we are doing 
the lancha boardings down there near the Mexican border, and we 
have had luck prosecuting some of those operators under the 
Lacey Act just in the last year alone. We are measuring the 
deterrent effect there. And what we have seen is that 
prosecuting and having some of these mariners plead guilty has 
had a deterrent effect.
 In other locations out in the Pacific, the number of 
boardings we do, you know, can we spring upon them? Can we kind 
of shoo them out of other countries' EEZs? So those are better 
metrics for us and those bigger fleets and the far reaches.
 Mr. Begich. Now, as you may know, I am from the State of 
Alaska. We have more coastline than the rest of the United 
States combined in Alaska, a difficult area to patrol and 
monitor. But up in the Arctic, what would you think a credible 
deterrence presence would require?
 Admiral Barata. As you say, sir, we love Alaska, it is 
beautiful up there, but some of the most challenging conditions 
that we operate in for a number of reasons. The weather is one, 
but time, speed, distance is another one.
 And so, in answer to your question, I think we would need a 
couple of things. We need cutters up there, a presence. 
Presence matters, especially when our adversaries are up there. 
Aircraft, ISR, the ability to do that. We need some land-based 
stations and those things. And so the ability to be there when 
we need to be there--which I would think is year-round--at 
least we are getting there. But at least when vessels are there 
and when our adversaries are there, to know what they are doing 
and then to do something about it.
 Mr. Begich. Well, and I appreciate you saying that. As we 
have discussed already this morning, the budget reconciliation 
bill that passed last year has significant--historic, really--
investments in Coast Guard, both in terms of new vessels and in 
programmatic funding. And hopefully, we will be able to get 
some of that deployed in Alaska on a permanent basis to help 
you and your mission for deterring IUU fishing activities off 
of Alaska's coast.
 At the end of the day, Alaska provides 60 percent of the 
Nation's seafood catch, and we want to make sure that our 
fishing families and those who rely on them are well protected 
and they have a strong economic interest to continue to harvest 
that food off of Alaska's coast. So we appreciate your support 
in that mission.
 We love our Coast Guard, and we thank you for your service.
 And with that, I yield back.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Garamendi for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Mr. Garamendi. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I 
want to go in a different direction here.
 I was reading, Ms. MacLeod, your document, and it raises in 
my mind the very serious issue of maintaining the various 
vessels that the Coast Guard has. Noting the fall-off in 
availability that you so clearly put in your report, I want to 
move to the issue of: Where will these vessels be maintained?
 We have got a problem in California. The Mare Island 
facility is the oldest Navy base on the west coast, and there 
are four drydocks there. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard made a 
decision to not bring the icebreaker Healy to Mare Island, even 
though it was the low bid by over $1 million. They used a 
process called best value to jimmy up some sort of expenses 
that put the Mare Island drydock at a disadvantage. Now there 
needs to be a serious discussion, some of which I have already 
done with the Commandant and with the Coast Guard, about just 
what is this best value game that is being played.
 Going forward, it isn't going to do us any good to go back 
and debate the Healy, and whether it should or should not be at 
Mare Island. But Mare Island is a critical national asset for 
the Coast Guard, as well as for the U.S. Navy, and I don't like 
the game that has been played, and I want to make sure that the 
Coast Guard is open and honest about future opportunities for 
Mare Island to successfully bid for Coast Guard work. Quality 
and price are the key issue here.
 So apparently, Mare Island Dry Dock Company had the low 
price except for this best value game. So going forward, I want 
to be sure that the Coast Guard understands the critical nature 
of work being brought to Mare Island.
 Oh, by the way, the Alameda station is about 10 miles away, 
and so there is a nexus there.
 I am not asking you for this issue to be discussed today at 
this hearing, but I want to make it very clear that I do not 
like the way the Coast Guard has operated. There will be other 
bids and opportunities for Mare Island, as well as other 
facilities on the west coast. But the Coast Guard and the Navy 
must recognize that the Pacific is one very, very big ocean, 
and that the Coast Guard needs to make sure that all of the 
facilities available on the west coast, whether it is San Diego 
or the Northwest or California in the San Francisco Bay area, 
have an opportunity to bid.
 Now, with that, I want to go to one of the questions that 
has been on my mind forever, and that is the maintenance of the 
vessels. This does tie back to Mare Island and to other 
opportunities for maintenance programs. Ms. MacLeod, in your 
evaluation of the decline of availability of Coast Guard 
vessels, did you spend time looking at the maintenance issues, 
how the maintenance programs operate or don't operate? Could 
you please discuss that?
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes, we did in some ways. And we examined the 
issues around maintenance in terms of the workforce and 
obsolescence of parts, I would say, were two of our biggest 
areas that we found. Some of the cutters that are due for 
maintenance are being pushed to operate out in a surge 
operation due to the limited capacity of the assets and 
workforce shortages. And secondly, in terms of parts 
obsolescence, some of these cutters can't operate because of 
malfunctioning parts, and then they are taking the part from a 
different cutter----
 Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Excuse me for interrupting. 
Is there a system within the Coast Guard to identify all of 
those issues, cutter by cutter, class by class?
 And in other words, is there a maintenance reporting system 
set up so that the Coast Guard knows what the problems are and 
what they then can do to solve the problem?
 Ms. MacLeod. We have a recommendation in that area. We 
found various systems, from the local level all the way up 
within the Coast Guard.
 Mr. Garamendi. Could you please provide me with detailed 
information on your evaluation, and the system or the lack of 
systems that the Coast Guard has, vessel class by vessel class? 
Thank you so very much.
 I yield back.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. I recognize myself now for 
5 minutes, and I want to thank you all for being here today and 
providing us with this valuable information.
 Admiral, last fall during Operation Pacific Viper, the 
Coast Guard seized more than 150,000 pounds of cocaine in the 
Eastern Pacific Ocean. This is more than 57 million potentially 
lethal doses. In November, Coast Guard cutter Stone broke the 
record for the most cocaine seized by a single cutter in a 
single patrol in Coast Guard history, offloading over 49,000 
pounds of illicit narcotics worth $362 million. What do you 
give the credit to for these recordbreaking numbers?
 Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. Good to see you, 
sir.
 I think this is a result of, one, that we put some capacity 
down there and as a result of the President declaring that 
national emergency on the southern border, with a focus on 
illicit drugs and fentanyl. The other one is that we have 
gotten quite good at this, and I think what we have shown is 
that when we have the assets in place--an asset like the 
National Security Cutter that has an armed helicopter on the 
back of it, that has a law enforcement trained tactical team, 
the right small boats, communications, overhead satellites, ISR 
coordination with JIATF South and our partners--that we can 
really get after this problem set.
 Mr. Ezell. Good. What other law enforcement success has the 
Coast Guard seen, specifically in the Arctic?
 Admiral Barata. In the Arctic? We just talked with Mr. 
Begich about the importance of that area. I think, one example 
that comes to mind is last summer there were five Chinese 
research vessels that were operating on our extended 
continental shelf, and a combination of the Healy, the Waesche, 
and the newly commissioned Storis were able to challenge them 
under the rules-based order and then have them evacuate that 
area.
 Mr. Ezell. Very good. Chinese vessels tend to be the 
largest offenders of IUU fishing. How does the United States 
Coast Guard confront these vessels, given the aggressive 
Chinese Coast Guard?
 And what does the Coast Guard do to counter Chinese IUU 
fishing efforts?
 Admiral Barata. We undertake a number of ways. The first 
and foremost is our presence out there. We have 11 cutters out 
there. We have two more Fast Response Cutters that are making 
their way out to the Pacific. They are highly capable.
 We have also found that the Coast Guard is the right size 
to go to these small island nations. And familiarity with those 
folks, training them, bringing their shipriders aboard, selling 
them equipment in some cases so that they can operate 
themselves, but equipping them so that when the Coast Guard is 
not there, that they can take action on those Chinese fishing 
fleets as they see fit in their own backyards.
 Mr. Ezell. Very good. Ms. MacLeod, the GAO has completed 
its report examining the Coast Guard's ability to meet mission 
goals in drug and migrant interdictions, how migration surges 
impact other missions, and Coast Guard coordination with 
Federal partners. Can you walk us through these findings?
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes. So in our report that was issued today, 
we provided 10-year trends in drug and migrant interdiction, 
along with other Coast Guard missions. I think how it bears out 
is when the Coast Guard is focusing on one mission, it is 
taking away from the other missions. And so the balance of 
missions is a tricky position for the Coast Guard.
 When we found that they were not meeting their own 
performance metrics in the drug and migrant interdiction 
mission, that has to be looked at within the context of when 
they are shifting things to other missions. Without having the 
data to support where those metrics should be set or the 
context, it is difficult to understand exactly how they are 
laying out their assets and workforce to meet the performance 
metrics that they have established.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you. What are the biggest take-aways on 
how the Coast Guard can improve mission performance in these 
areas, Ms. MacLeod?
 Ms. MacLeod. Yes, I think our information comes down to 
being able to measure your performance in these areas, and that 
comes from the data that underlies the information that the 
Coast Guard is examining.
 Mr. Ezell. Thank you, and I yield back to Ms. Gillen.
 Ms. Gillen. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses 
for your service to our country and for appearing here today.
 So I am proud to represent the extraordinary men and women 
of Coast Guard Station Jones Beach in the Fourth Congressional 
District of New York, where they conduct essential law 
enforcement missions along our South Shore and are a critical 
part of Coast Guard Sector Long Island Sound.
 So Long Island is home to some of the busiest and most 
congested waterways in the country. And unfortunately, when 
boaters are unlicensed or they break the law, accidents can 
happen and tragedies happen. In 2005, 11-year-old Brianna 
Lieneck was killed and her family was severely injured off the 
coast of Long Island when a boater without a license crashed 
into their vessel.
 According to 2023 Coast Guard data, 75 percent of boating 
deaths occur on vessels operated by individuals who have not 
received boating safety training or boaters who are unlicensed. 
I am a cosponsor of bipartisan legislation named in Brianna's 
memory to require the Coast Guard to study and report to 
Congress on recreational vessel operator education and 
training.
 Rear Admiral, what are the steps that the Coast Guard is 
currently taking to reduce accidental boating deaths and to 
deter individuals from operating vessels without required 
licenses and trainings?
 And how can we in Congress help you serve that mission 
further and reduce deaths?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning, and thank you 
for recognizing our men and women at Station Jones Beach and 
Sector Long Island Sound, a really, really beautiful part of 
the country, part of the birthplace of the Coast Guard up there 
in the Northeast District.
 A very complex problem set. There are so many recreational 
boaters that are out there. We take a lot of steps working with 
not only our own Coast Guard Auxiliary volunteer force, but 
also all the boating law administrators at the local level to 
administer grant funds to educate as many boaters as possible. 
For us, that is lifesaving work. We call that preventative SAR. 
If we can get somebody out there, if we can educate a boater, 
have the right equipment aboard the vessel, we think they have 
a chance to get home. If they know how to do a voyage plan, 9 
times out of 10, we can go find them with the equipment that we 
have. And if we start adding in personal locator beacons, we 
can put a helicopter right on top of your head, and that is our 
goal, from the equipment standpoint.
 From the education standpoint, we work closely with the 
States. And obviously, we are a maritime country. People love 
their boats. To require licenses has always been a very, very 
complex question. But educating as many people as we can is a 
part of our mission.
 Ms. Gillen. Thank you. Thank you. And just before last 
year, Federal law limited the Coast Guard's ability to go after 
bad actors by requiring that drug smugglers be on board a 
vessel while the crime was committed. This hindered the Coast 
Guard's ability to go after operators of unmanned or autonomous 
vessels, or criminals who stow drugs on ships without the 
knowledge of the crew.
 I was proud to join my Republican colleague, Congressman 
Addison McDowell, to co-lead and help pass bipartisan 
legislation into law last year to clarify that the focus should 
be on the location of the crime, regardless of the location of 
the criminal. The bill also requires the Coast Guard to make 
naloxone available on all Coast Guard installations, including 
Station Jones Beach.
 Again, Rear Admiral, this question is for you. Can you 
explain how these commonsense changes will strengthen the Coast 
Guard's ability to go after bad actors, fight drug trafficking, 
and save lives?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, for us, any opportunity, any 
authority that allows us to continue to prosecute these cases 
is welcome and is useful to our effort.
 And from the standpoint of the drug smugglers themselves, 
to get after the transnational criminal organizations at their 
very heart, in many cases, some of the crewmembers aboard are 
the poorest, they are the least complicit part of the crime. 
And so, I think for us to put that in place so that we can go 
after the real masterminds of these crimes, and that will give 
us an opportunity to really impact their funds, revenues, as 
well as them, putting them in jail at some point.
 Ms. Gillen. Thank you.
 I don't have much time, Ms. MacLeod. I just wanted to ask 
you--thank you for your very thorough report. It seemed like a 
theme of it was that you need more staffing, you have a real 
shortfall. Would you be able--I will put my question in the 
record. If you could, just give us some advice on how Congress 
can support you to increase staffing levels and support the 
Coast Guard. I would love to have that from you, thank you.
 [The preceding question for the record and response is on 
page 42.]
 Ms. Gillen. Thank you. I yield back.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Van Drew for his round of questioning.
 Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman. I love the title of this 
hearing: ``Drugs, Thugs, and Fish.'' Who would put that--if you 
weren't involved in the Coast Guard or one of these industries, 
you wouldn't know exactly how that all comes together. But it 
is good to see both of you again. I appreciate you being here.
 Just to go over a few things that have been touched on, we 
know the Coast Guard does what nobody else can do: enforces the 
law at sea, defends our maritime border, defends our legitimate 
commerce, defends the fishing industry. People don't realize 
very often that are not involved in this process how important 
that piece of it is, too.
 We have had a record number of drug interdictions, as you 
know, and the Coast Guard is being asked to do more than ever 
was asked in this area.
 And by the way, I wanted to emphasize, it was important. I 
heard some other Members mention some concerns they had. Once 
the drugs are in our children's bodies, we have already lost, 
we have got a problem. Forgetting the financial aspect of what 
it does to America, the billions upon billions of dollars in 
treatment, in social work, in medical care, in lost hours of 
work and a job, of destroying people's lives. So it is up to us 
to ensure that before that gets into America, that we stop it, 
whether it is on land, whether it is on sea, whether it is drug 
cartels, whether it is corrupt politicians.
 I applaud what is happening when we are working hard to 
prevent this from coming over. I do not see how anybody can 
ever defend drug cartels or those that would poison, 
especially, the young people of this great Nation. So the work 
that you do in that area is important. All of it is important. 
It is all important. But that is particularly at this time.
 It is good to see you all again, like I said. There are 
some asset gaps still, and we are doing better, and record 
amounts of money are coming into the Coast Guard, and that is 
good. Finally, for God's sake, finally. How many years have we 
been in this very committee room talking about this?
 What could we do, if anything, to even increase success in 
drug interdiction? Are there some areas that you think we are 
still not addressing as well as we could? Both for you to 
answer that question.
 Rear Admiral, why don't we start with you?
 Admiral Barata. Congressman, so for us, I think it comes 
down to the assets and the people, and I think the Big 
Beautiful Bill is a great start to that. The Coast Guard has 
got to come through on our obligation to deliver these assets 
and to build out the shore infrastructure like Cape May so that 
we can bring more recruits through and man these----
 Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. And if I could just jump in 
for a second, because I have always got to say this, what is 
it, 85 percent of all the recruits are trained in Cape May, New 
Jersey? It happens to be in my district. And we are going to do 
amazing things there, as you know. Thank you.
 Admiral Barata. We may have to recalculate the number based 
on the number of people we are moving through there right now, 
Congressman. So----
 Dr. Van Drew [interposing]. Okay.
 Admiral Barata. But I think that is one. The other thing I 
would say is, for us, the Big Beautiful Bill is a start. There 
is a lot of acquisitions money that is in there. There is some 
depot-level maintenance to avoid going into the same cycle--
that Ms. MacLeod helps us highlight--of maintenance. We need a 
lift in our annual budget in order to maintain--pay for the 
personnel, the sustainment, the maintenance, and the re-
equipping. As software goes obsolete, as parts go obsolete, we 
need that continued support from the Congress, as well.
 Dr. Van Drew. So Chairman, that is something we might keep 
in mind and work--all of us together--on that issue.
 And we always hear all these terrible things about the Big 
Beautiful Bill. I don't agree, and I am trying not to be 
partisan here. Record amounts of money going into the Coast 
Guard and many other areas, as well, including our airports, 
FAA, et cetera. So I think that there is a lot of good there, 
as well.
 When you say, real quickly, you might need to recalculate 
with the numbers going through as far as training, could you 
just give me a brief snapshot?
 Admiral Barata. So last year, we put about 5,600 people 
through. Our annual throughput is normally about 4,200, and we 
had been historically low the last several years before that. 
So, as we build out Cape May, we put new gyms, new barracks, 
and more things----
 Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. Again, let me thank you so 
much.
 Chairman, just so we know, under this administration, the 
work that we have all done where we had--basically, folks were 
demoralized, they weren't joining, and now we have people 
coming back to the Coast Guard and our military branches. I am 
proud to be part of it and joining up, and with these record 
numbers of increases all across the board, including in the 
Coast Guard. And that is why I wanted you to just articulate 
that.
 And finally--and then I know I have to stop, I have no time 
left--the CVC policy letter, the--how it impacts our fishing 
industry, please do not forget about that. I am like a dog on a 
bone. It matters to our fishermen.
 Admiral Barata. Congressman, we will give you an update on 
that. I think we have some good news for you.
 Dr. Van Drew. Good. I appreciate that. Will you contact my 
office?
 Admiral Barata. Absolutely.
 Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
 I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes Ms. 
Scholten for 5 minutes of questioning.
 Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Chair Ezell and Ranking Member 
Gillen, Carbajal, and welcome to our witnesses.
 The Coast Guard serves as an integral role in enforcing 
maritime law, including detecting and intercepting illicit 
activities and substances. Notably, I would like to commend the 
Coast Guard for recently intercepting a Russian vessel linked 
to Hezbollah's illicit financing network. This is exactly the 
kind of topnotch work we expect from our fearless Coasties, and 
you made us proud in that mission.
 It is no surprise that I think the Coast Guard is the best 
at what it does. Just last year, the Service broke its drug 
interdiction record, seizing over half a million pounds of 
narcotics. Simply put, the Coast Guard carries out its law 
enforcement duties well, and intercepts these harmful drugs 
better than any other entity.
 While fulfilling this mission, the Coast Guard also takes 
the suspected drug smugglers into custody. Typically, the 
Federal prosecutors at the Department of Justice then leverage 
these cases to dig up intelligence about the larger drug 
operation, ultimately limiting the flow of drugs into our 
community. As a former DOJ attorney myself, I am deeply 
concerned about the fact that Attorney General Bondi has 
directed prosecutors to stop bringing charges against low-level 
offenders. Now we are seeing individuals captured by the Coast 
Guard being repatriated.
 Rear Admiral Barata, can you speak to how important these 
Federal investigations are for information gathering?
 Additionally, please touch on how does the Coast Guard 
approach taking suspected smugglers into custody--their 
approach to doing that, how does that better serve our national 
security interests rather than killing the traffickers in the 
water, as we have unfortunately seen the Department of Defense 
do?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, so the counterdrug mission, 
that part of it, once we are doing the prosecution, we follow 
that normal process through the Maritime Operational Threat 
Response, the MOTR process.
 Ms. Scholten. Yes.
 Admiral Barata. We go back to the Department of Justice. 
And in some cases, if their policy changes, as it has recently, 
there is still intrinsic value in us getting these drugs off 
the street----
 Ms. Scholten [interposing]. Yes.
 Admiral Barata [continuing]. As has been highlighted here, 
and then conducting those interviews with them, going through 
the materials that they have available to them, the cell phones 
that they have aboard, and using that to help disrupt the flow 
of drugs as they come in. We also take biometrics off the 
smugglers. And so, whether or not they are put back into the 
system or they are prosecuted, those drugs are not making their 
way to the street.
 There is a deterrent effect to some of the kinetic strikes 
that are going on in some of the drug smugglers that we have 
seen. Whether that is going to be short term or long term 
remains to be seen.
 Ms. Scholten. But the kinetic strikes, the killings--I 
mean, let's be clear here--you are not collecting biometrics 
from those individuals or getting additional detailed 
information about their plans, as you would when you are 
arresting other individuals.
 Admiral Barata. We are not.
 Ms. Scholten. My next question: While drug and migrant 
interdiction are clearly critical parts of the Coast Guard's 
mission, I also want to ensure that Congress' unprecedented 
investment in the Service also supports its other 
functionalities.
 Back home in Muskegon and Grand Haven, also known as Coast 
Guard City, U.S.A., the Coast Guard search and rescue 
operations are always top of mind for families who come to 
enjoy the beach or, even when they are not supposed to, climb 
Lake Michigan's beautiful ice formations.
 Rear Admiral Barata, with a reinvigorated push towards its 
law enforcement efforts, how will the Coast Guard ensure there 
isn't a disinvestment in other mission-critical areas, 
particularly as the Service is about 8 percent short of 
enlisted personnel needs right now?
 Additionally, can you ensure that stations like those in my 
district will not be closed with the current administration's 
emphasis on drug seizures?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good news on the recruiting 
front. I think our ranks are continuing to swell as we bring 
people through Cape May. So I think that is, for us, how we 
restaff some of the stations that we had to destaff, we are 
making decisions on that right now.
 But obviously, the Great Lakes, our lifesaving mission will 
not go away. The Commandant has been very clear that that is 
our touchstone, that is our North Star, and we will--we are 
committed to that mission and----
 Ms. Scholten [interposing]. Fantastic.
 Admiral Barata [continuing]. To the people of the Great 
Lakes.
 Ms. Scholten. And our stations in Grand Haven and Muskegon 
are safe?
 Admiral Barata. Yes, absolutely.
 Ms. Scholten. Fantastic. Okay, west Michiganders and 
citizens--oh, I recognize I am running out of time. We are 
having too much fun here, so--oh, thank you, thank you. Okay, 
great. I will get to my last question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 West Michiganders and citizens across the Nation rely on 
Federal agents and servicemembers to thoughtfully and carefully 
fulfill their law enforcement duties, a responsibility I know 
Coasties do not take lightly. I wonder--you know, last week, we 
watched in horror as Renee Good, a mother, a U.S. citizen who 
was shot and killed by an ICE agent. A thorough Federal 
investigation is absolutely necessary to provide Renee Good's 
three children and her community with the answers that they 
need as they grieve this tragedy.
 Rear Admiral Barata, while I would never ask you to speak 
on behalf of another Federal agency, can you please reassure 
American citizens that the Coast Guard has a clear use of force 
policy? We know that oftentimes the Coast Guard is called in to 
situations such as this, as well.
 And further, can you please touch on how the Coast Guard 
trains its servicemembers to best protect themselves and 
civilians while carrying out law enforcement activities?
 Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, thanks for the opportunity 
to kind of highlight how some of our law enforcement 
specialists.
 And I think what we saw over the last month or so on some 
of these Venezuelan tankers where we have had some of our high-
end operators going aboard, and we have also seen our tactical 
law enforcement teams, but all the way down to our maritime law 
enforcement specialists around the country, they are trained in 
a standardized way. They are trained in our use of force 
policy, and for us, we are very proud of the work that they do 
and our interactions with the public.
 Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
 Thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
 Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. Admiral and Ms. MacLeod, 
I want to thank you for being here today.
 Admiral, I want to encourage you to use the appropriated 
funds that have been given to the Coast Guard. And the next 
time I see you, I am going to ask you, so make sure that you go 
after that money.
 And one other thing I would like to say is, I was very much 
responsible for getting rid of the low bid, and I would 
encourage the Coast Guard to continue to use the best 
opportunities for all their work getting done, because so many 
times we have seen over the years a low bid is not the best 
bid. So continue to get the best job done so we can have the 
best ships and everything fixed in a timely manner.
 Admiral Barata. Yes, Chairman, and we look forward to 
seeing you at the commissioning of the Olivia Hooker later this 
month.
 Mr. Ezell. Yes, sir.
 I want to thank you all again for being here today. Are 
there any further questions by any other Members?
 You sure, Ms. Scholten? Okay.
 Seeing none, that concludes our hearing today. I would like 
to thank each one of our witnesses for your testimony. This 
subcommittee stands adjourned.
 [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

 Appendix

 ---------- 

 Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, 
Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant 
 Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Rick Larsen

 Question 1. Admiral Barata, how is the Coast Guard ensuring that 
the IUU fishing mission is a priority given the current strain on 
resources?
 Answer. We continue to conduct all of our missions, including IUU 
fishing, to protect U.S. national security interests and counter IUU 
fishing operations. For example, Coast Guard Cutter Harriet Lane 
recently completed an 81-day patrol and exercised bilateral maritime 
law enforcement agreements with Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and 
the Republic of Marshall Islands. With these partner nations, Harriet 
Lane completed 31 fisheries boardings resulting in 20 violations of 
their domestic laws by foreign-flagged fishing vessels.

Post-Hearing Questions for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, 
Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant 
 Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O. 
 Carbajal

 Question 1. Admiral Barata, during the hearing, I asked about 
vessel inspectors but did not have enough time left for an answer. It 
has been reported that the Coast Guard is hiring vessel inspectors to 
assess and repair seized tankers. We know that the Service is already 
short 150 vessel inspectors, which has meant a less-than-ideal vessel 
inspection schedule for small passenger vessels. How will the shortage, 
coupled with the new priority of inspecting seized tankers, affect the 
frequency of inspections of small passenger vessels?
 Answer. The Coast Guard does not anticipate any change in the 
frequency of small passenger vessel inspections.

 Question 2. Admiral Barata, in response to Ranking Member Larsen's 
question during the hearing, you stated that the Coast Guard will be 
looking ``to return those stations where we had to take some of those 
operators'' in regards to the 15,000 enlisted personnel recruiting goal 
and restaffing stations impacted by FY24 and FY25 Force Realignment.
 Question 2.a. Can you elaborate more on what stations could see a 
return to previous staffing levels or operating status?
 Answer. As we move ahead with Force Design 2028, we are examining 
the entire Coast Guard force structure and posture and our operating 
concepts to determine future need. For example, we are in the process 
of restoring Station Pascagoula, MS, on the Gulf Coast to full response 
operations this year.

 Question 2.b. Does the Coast Guard plan to return all Force 
Realignment impacted stations to full operational and staffing levels 
prior to FY24?
 Answer. No. We continue to evaluate each location based on 
operational demands, our recent recruiting successes, and planned 
workforce growth.

 Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, 
Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant 
 Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Laura Gillen

 Question 1. Admiral Barata, in response to Ranking Member Larsen's 
question during the hearing you stated that the Coast Guard will be 
looking ``to return those stations where we had to take some of those 
operators'' in regards to the 15,000 enlisted personnel recruiting goal 
and restaffing stations impacted by FY24 and FY25 Force Realignment. 
Does this include Station Jones Beach?
 Answer. The Coast Guard has not made any decisions regarding 
Station Jones Beach. As we move ahead with Force Design 2028, we are 
examining the entire Coast Guard force structure and posture and our 
operating concepts to determine future need.

 Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Heather MacLeod, Director, 
 Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
 from Hon. Laura Gillen

 Question 1. Ms. MacLeod, during the hearing I asked about Coast 
Guard staffing shortages but was unable to get an answer in the 
remaining time. Following up, could you provide some advice on how 
Congress can support an increase to staffing levels and support the 
Coast Guard?
 Answer. The Coast Guard needs to fully analyze its entire workforce 
to identify its needs. GAO has made a number of recommendations that 
the Coast Guard conduct adequate workforce planning (GAO-20-223). While 
the Coast Guard has agreed with longstanding GAO recommendations and 
increased its workforce planning analyses from 4 percent to almost 27 
percent of its workforce, the Service still had not conducted workforce 
planning for approximately 73 percent of its workforce as of June 2025.
 If increased staffing levels are a priority, Congress could direct 
the Coast Guard to fully analyze its workforce needs within a specified 
timeframe, which could help the Service avoid unnecessary overlaps or 
gaps in critical skills and capabilities needed for a modern workforce. 
For example, in November 2019 we reported that the Coast Guard might 
not have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and 
number of operations conducted by its deployable specialized forces 
(GAO-20-33). In April 2025, GAO reported that even with increased 
recruiting, the Service was approximately 2,600 servicemembers (8.5 
percent) short of its enlisted workforce target at the end of fiscal 
year 2024 (GAO-25-107869). Without adequate workforce planning, the 
Coast Guard lacks assurance that it has the right mix of personnel--who 
have capabilities needed to combat maritime threats--in the right 
units.

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