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[House Hearing, 119 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ======================================================================= (119-35) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 13, 2026 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house- transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/ transportation __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 64-676 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026 ======================================================================= COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman Rick Larsen, Washington, Ranking Member Eleanor Holmes Norton, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, District of Columbia Arkansas, Jerrold Nadler, New York Vice Chairman John Garamendi, California Daniel Webster, Florida Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaomas Massie, Kentucky Andre Carson, Indiana Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Dina Titus, Nevada Brian Babin, Texas Jared Huffman, California David Rouzer, North Carolina Julia Brownley, California Mike Bost, Illinois Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Bruce Westerman, Arkansas Mark DeSaulnier, California Brian J. Mast, Florida Salud O. Carbajal, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota Greg Stanton, Arizona Tim Burchett, Tennessee Sharice Davids, Kansas Dusty Johnson, South Dakota Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Troy E. Nehls, Texas Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Tracey Mann, Kansas Marilyn Strickland, Washington Burgess Owens, Utah Patrick Ryan, New York Eric Burlison, Missouri Val T. Hoyle, Oregon Mike Collins, Georgia Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio, Mike Ezell, Mississippi Vice Ranking Member Kevin Kiley, California Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Vince Fong, California Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Tony Wied, Wisconsin Christopher R. Deluzio, Pennsylvania Tom Barrett, Michigan Robert Garcia, California Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska Nellie Pou, New Jersey Robert P. Bresnahan, Jr., Kristen McDonald Rivet, Michigan Pennsylvania Laura Friedman, California Jeff Hurd, Colorado Laura Gillen, New York Jefferson Shreve, Indiana Shomari Figures, Alabama Addison P. McDowell, North Maxwell Frost, Florida Carolina David J. Taylor, Ohio Brad Knott, North Carolina Kimberlyn King-Hinds, Northern Mariana Islands Mike Kennedy, Utah Robert F. Onder, Jr., Missouri Jimmy Patronis, Florida Vacancy ------ 7 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Chairman Salud O. Carbajal, California, Ranking Member Daniel Webster, Florida Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Brian J. Mast, Florida Marilyn Strickland, Washington Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Nicholas J. Begich III, Alaska John Garamendi, California Addison P. McDowell, North Laura Gillen, New York, Carolina, Vice Ranking Member Vice Chairman Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Jimmy Patronis, Florida Officio) Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio) CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE Hon. Addison P. McDowell, a Representative in Congress from the State of North Carolina, and Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement..... 1 Prepared statement........................................... 2 Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 3 Prepared statement........................................... 4 Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement........... 5 Prepared statement........................................... 6 WITNESSES Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement................. 8 Prepared statement........................................... 9 Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, oral statement............... 12 Prepared statement........................................... 13 APPENDIX Post-Hearing Questions for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from: Hon. Rick Larsen............................................. 41 Hon. Salud O. Carbajal....................................... 41 Hon. Laura Gillen............................................ 42 Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Laura Gillen.................. 42 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] January 12, 2026 SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Drugs, Thugs, and Fish: Examining Coast Guard Law Enforcement Efforts'' _______________________________________________________________________ I. PURPOSE The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet on Tuesday, January 13, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building to hold a hearing on the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions. Members will hear testimony from the Coast Guard regarding its law enforcement missions, including efforts to interdict the illegal entry of drugs and migrants along the maritime border, and to deter illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. II. BACKGROUND The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard or Service) is uniquely positioned as the only armed service capable of performing maritime law enforcement operations.\1\ Under its authorities, the Coast Guard is actively engaged in missions pertaining to drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and the protection of natural resources from malign activity, like IUU fishing.\2\ The Coast Guard performs these mission sets within the territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of the United States, on the high seas, and in foreign territorial waters when operating under agreements with allies and partner nations.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 14 U.S.C. Sec. 522. \2\ Id. \3\ U.S. Coast Guard, Force Laydown, available at https:// www.uscg.mil/About/Force- Laydown/ #::text=The%20Coast%20Guard%20also%20has,assets%2C%20and%20deployable %20specialized%20forces. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From fiscal year (FY) 2019 to FY 2024, the Coast Guard intercepted and seized 873.5 metric tons of cocaine, worth approximately $23.6 billion.\4\ The Service also detained 288 drug smugglers for prosecution in FY 2024.\5\ More recently, the Coast Guard offloaded a record breaking 49,010 pounds of cocaine from multiple at-sea seizures, valued at $362 million in November 2025.\6\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Interdicting Illicit Drug Trafficking: A View from the Front Lines before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 119th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2025) (testimony of Rear Admiral Adam A. Chamie, U.S. Coast Guard). \5\ Id. \6\ Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Continues to Break Records, Offloading Over $362 Million in Illicit Drugs Interdicted in Eastern Pacific Ocean (Nov. 19, 2025), available at https:// www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4337528/coast-guard-continues- to-break-records-offloading-over-362-million-in-illicit-d/. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to drug seizures, one of the Coast Guard's most important roles in protecting the homeland is countering illegal maritime migrations. The 2025 National Security Strategy noted the importance of the Coast Guard's presence in the Western Pacific to ``thwart illegal and other unwanted migration'' \7\ among other tasks. Illegal maritime migration also remains a significant problem in the Caribbean. During FY 2023, the Coast Guard interdicted 17,771 migrants transiting maritime routes.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Nov. 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf. \8\ Dep't of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2025, Congressional Justification available at https:// www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/2025/ USCG%20FY%202025%20Congressional%20Justification.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict bad actors and enforce local and international laws has made it an important tool in countering Chinese malign and grey-zone activity in the Indo-Pacific, such as IUU fishing. The Coast Guard is an essential tool in protecting the tens of millions of jobs in the global fishing industry which generates hundreds of billions of dollars annually.\9\ The Coast Guard is the only agency explicitly referenced by name in the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, cementing the importance of Coast Guard abilities and authorities in supporting the United States' National security interests.\10\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ U.S. Coast Guard, Western Pacific Region Resourcing Strategy, at 3 (Dec. 9, 2025). \10\ The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy, (Feb. 2022), available at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- III. DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION The Coast Guard is the lead and only Federal maritime law enforcement agency with the authority and capability to enforce National and international law on the high seas, including for both drug and migrant interdiction operations.\11\ The Coast Guard is constrained in conducting these missions by limited assets.\12\ Drug and migrant source countries are often hundreds of miles away from United States coastlines, requiring detection and monitoring efforts to occur across vast expanses of time and distance. While the Coast Guard attempts to use historic trends, intelligence, and advanced monitoring technologies to maximize the deployment of its assets, it is constantly forced to prioritize certain vectors and lapse coverage for others.\13\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Liana W. Rosen, Cong. Rsch. Serv. RL34543, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, 24 (Mar. 19, 2015), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34543/24. \12\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-106695, Maritime Security: Coast Guard and CBP Efforts To Address Prior GAO Recommendations on Asset and Workforce Needs (Mar. 23, 2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106695.pdf [hereinafter GAO Maritime Security]. \13\ Id.; see also Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border: Testimony Before the S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm., 114th Cong. (July 15, 2015) (testimony of Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, USCG Assistant Commandant for Response Policy), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp- content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Brown-2015-07-15.pdf. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DRUG INTERDICTION Illicit maritime drug shipments are carried by noncommercial means, such as small ``go-fast'' vessels with multiple outboard engines, semisubmersible vessels, fishing vessels, and sailing vessels, as well as by commercial vessels, such as container ships.\14\ The majority of known maritime drug flow is conveyed via noncommercial means through the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone--the waters off the coasts of Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea.\15\ The Coast Guard uses cutters, boats, aircraft, and unmanned monitoring systems in a layered approach to combat drug cartels as they transport illicit drugs in the maritime domain.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ U.S. Coast Guard Report to Congress: Counter-Drug Operations, (Aug. 14, 2020), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ publications/uscg_-_counter-drug_ operations.pdf [hereinafter Counter-Drug Operations]. \15\ Id. \16\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The objectives of Coast Guard drug interdiction efforts are to: (1) maintain a strong interdiction presence to deny smugglers access to maritime routes and deter trafficking activity; (2) strengthen ties with source and Transit Zone (Eastern Pacific and Caribbean) nations to increase their willingness and ability to reduce the production and trafficking of illicit drugs within their sovereign boundaries, including territorial seas; and (3) support interagency and international efforts to combat drug smuggling through increased cooperation and coordination.\17\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ U.S. Coast Guard Rep. to Cong.: Coast Guard Interdiction of Illicit Drugs in Transit Zones, (2022), (on file with Comm.) [hereinafter Transit Zones]. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Coast Guard facilitates international maritime counternarcotics operations with partner nations that permit Coast Guard officers to stop, board, and search suspicious vessels.\18\ The United States government is party to 41 maritime counterdrug bilateral agreements or operational procedures to coordinate detection, monitoring, interdiction, and apprehension activities.\19\ The Coast Guard's law enforcement, legal, and regulatory expertise are in high demand from Central American partners, whose navies more closely resemble the Coast Guard, focusing primarily on maritime law enforcement.\20\ Coast Guard personnel act as attaches, liaisons, maritime advisors, and drug interdiction specialists at embassies around the world.\21\ International training teams and deployed units provide training, engage in joint operations, and may even embark ship riders to facilitate enforcement.\22\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ Id.; see also U.S. Coast Guard, Partnerships and Stakeholders, available at https://www.uscg.mil/About/Partnerships/. \19\ Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 14. \20\ Id. \21\ Id. \22\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Annually, the Coast Guard removes approximately ten percent of the cocaine flowing through maritime transit routes while indications show the majority of the remaining 90 percent is typically not intercepted before reaching the shore.\23\ According to a recent GAO report, the Coast Guard has failed to meet its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure for the previous 10 years.\24\ The report further found that the Coast Guard's asset limitations and workforce challenges lead to tradeoffs that hinder mission performance, driven in part by the Coast Guard's recapitalizing challenges. To support Service's mission performance, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act provided nearly $25 billion to recapitalize surface, air and shoreside assets.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Transit Zones, supra note 17. \24\ U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-26-107440, Actions Needed To Improve Maritime Migrant Interdiction (Jan. 2026) (This draft GAO report has not yet been published online but is on file with Comm.). \25\ P.L. 119-21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- United States Southern Command, through the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), is responsible for targeting and detections, while the Coast Guard is the primary force provider of surface assets used as law enforcement platforms and presence.\26\ The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 70501-70507, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2285, are the primary criminal statutes utilized in the counter-drug mission.\27\ Recognizing the harm caused by these activities in the United States or to United States citizen or interests, these laws apply extraterritorially so that persons who are interdicted aboard suspected drug smuggling vessels in international waters may be prosecuted in the United States.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ Transit Zones, supra note 17. \27\ See Counter-Drug Operations, supra note 14. \28\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- By leveraging its unique authorities and collaborating across United States agencies and with international partners, the Coast Guard prevents more cocaine from entering the United States than all other Federal agencies combined.\29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Transit Zones, supra note 17. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ILLEGAL MIGRATION In 2022, the Coast Guard saw one of the deadliest years for illegal migration in recent history when approximately 65 people perished while trying to reach the United States.\30\ In 2023, illegal maritime migration, and consequently Coast Guard interdictions, continued to reach increasingly high levels due to major economic and social turmoil unfolding in the Caribbean and South American countries, which continue to spur illegal maritime migrations today.\31\ Overall, most maritime migration is illegal and can occur along hundreds of miles of coastline, which is difficult to continuously patrol and requires ample resources. While there are several prevailing vectors of unauthorized maritime migration into the United States, maritime routes from Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic on the east coast, and Mexico on the west coast, have historically accounted for the highest annual interdiction attempts.\32\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Operation Vigilant Sentry: Stopping Illegal Migration at Sea, (Jan. 27, 2023), available at https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/3280774/operation- vigilant-sentry-stopping-illegal-migration-at-sea/ [hereinafter Vigilant Sentry]. \31\ Transit Zones, supra note 17. \32\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Illegal maritime migration takes place over long expanses of water and is slow and hazardous.\33\ Maritime migration efforts are typically unorganized, utilizing homemade ``rustic'' vessels like makeshift rafts constructed with debris and tarps, locally made sail freighters, or other modified modes of transportation engineered to float.\34\ These vessels are almost always severely overloaded with people. For example, a 50-foot sail freighter may have ``anywhere from 150-300 people aboard these overcrowded, unsafe vessels.'' \35\ These makeshift vessels are neither seaworthy nor safe, often incapable of withstanding heavy seas and sinking even in benign weather.\36\ For example, in 2004, a group of Cuban Nationals were attempting to sail to the United States in a 1959 Buick car fashioned into a boat when they were intercepted at sea by the Coast Guard.\37\ The Cuban Nationals had little to no navigation or lifesaving equipment.\38\ Accordingly, not only does illegal maritime migration have law enforcement implications, the Coast Guard must be prepared to provide humanitarian assistance or participate in search and rescue operations. Individuals interdicted at sea are either repatriated to their country of origin or departure, pursuant to agreement, or brought to the United States to face prosecution.\39\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ Id. \34\ Id. \35\ Id. \36\ Id. \37\ Cubans Sailing Vintage Car Caught off Florida, NBC, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4163593. \38\ Id. \39\ Vigilant Sentry, supra note 30. [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Figure 1. Cubans sailing vintage car caught off Florida.\40\ DRUG/MIGRANT INTERDICTION CAPACITY & METRICS OF SUCCESS To\\ better reflect its performance, the Coast Guard implemented new drug interdiction measures and as of July 2025 is also developing new migrant interdiction performance measures.\41\ Despite this, the Coast Guard continues to be the Nation's primary maritime force to combat transnational criminal organizations engaging in illicit drug and migrant operations, secure maritime borders, and safeguard commerce throughout the Western Hemisphere.\42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\ Id. \41\ GAO-26-107440, supra note 24 at 16-17. \42\ Transit Zones, supra note 17. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- IV. IUU FISHING Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing is one of the greatest threats to ocean health and directly contributes to the collapse or decline of fisheries that are critical to economies, food sources, and ecosystems worldwide.\43\ Illegal fishing encompasses fishing activities that contradict state, Federal, and international laws and regulations.\44\ Unreported fishing includes fishing activities that are not reported or are misrepresented in contravention of relevant laws.\45\ Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activity undertaken by flagless vessels, or that occurs in areas outside of regulated fish stocks and outside of applicable laws and regulations to conserve living marine resources.\46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Agencies Release Joint U.S. Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, available at https://www.uscg.mil/IUUFishing/. \44\ Nat'l Oceanic Atmospheric Admin., Understanding Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, available at https:// www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/understanding-illegal-unreported-and- unregulated-fishing. \45\ Id. \46\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Twenty percent of fish caught around the world originate from IUU fishing, resulting in tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue to legal fishers, and harming the management of marine fish stocks.\47\ By virtue of its size, scale, and range, China is the largest IUU offender.\48\ China accounts for more than a third of the world's seafood production, and Chinese vessels make up nearly 40 percent of the world's distant-water fishing fleet.\49\ China's distant-water fishing fleet is subsidized by the Chinese Government, with an estimated $7.2 billion in subsidies going to the sector in 2018.\50\ Chinese vessels are responsible for numerous IUU fishing violations, including fishing in other nations' exclusive economic zones and incorrectly reporting fishing activity. Chinese vessels often operate in disputed territorial waters, with competition over fishery resources driving some of the disputes.\51\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Supra note 47. \48\ Bruce Vaugh & Ben Dolven, Cong. Rsch. Serv. (R47065), China's Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress, (Apr. 12, 2022) available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ pdf/R/R47065. \49\ Id. \50\ Id. \51\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Coast Guard monitors and works to mitigate illegal fishing through domestic efforts, like the United States Interagency Working Group. The United States Interagency Working Group was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92), which directed additional efforts to combat IUU fishing, including coordination with international organizations, diplomatic engagement, and support to improve law enforcement capabilities in priority regions.\52\ In 2022, the Working Group issued the National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2022-2026) noting the importance of continuing to build ``real law enforcement and diplomatic consequences for those operating outside of accepted maritime rules-based order.'' \53\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, 133 Stat. 2005. \53\ U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Upregulated Fishing (2022-2026), available at https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2022-10/ 2022_NationalStrategyReport_USIWGonIUUfishing.pdf --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2023, the National Academy of Sciences released an assessment on emerging issues that require Coast Guard action. The report notes that as illegal fishing increases, the Coast Guard will need to improve its data collection, work with non- governmental organizations, and deploy assets to areas where they will be most effective.\54\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory Needs 186 (2023), available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/ catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-an-assessment-of-emerging- challenges-and-statutory-needs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the next decade, the Coast Guard intends to focus its IUU efforts in three areas. These include expanding and strengthening bilateral and multilateral partnerships to maximize IUU enforcement efforts; countering predatory and irresponsible state behavior, including that of China; and expanding targeted intelligence to drive enforcement options.\55\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ U.S. Coast Guard, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook, (Sept. 2020), available at https://www.uscg.mil/ Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_ 2020_FINAL.pdf#page=39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. WITNESSESS LRear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, United States Coast Guard LHeather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Programs, United States Government Accountability Office DRUGS, THUGS, AND FISH: EXAMINING COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ---------- TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2026 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Addison P. McDowell (Vice Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. McDowell. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to declare a recess at any time during today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at today's hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so ordered. As a reminder, if Members insert a document into the record, please also email it to DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov. I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening statement for 5 minutes. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADDISON P. McDOWELL OF NORTH CAROLINA, VICE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION Mr. McDowell. Thank you, everyone, for joining the subcommittee today to discuss the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions. Specifically, we want to highlight the amazing work our Coast Guard members do to stop drugs and illegal aliens along our maritime border, and the Service's efforts to limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, fishing. To do that, I would like to welcome our witnesses, Rear Admiral David Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence for the United States Coast Guard; and Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Justice and Homeland Security Programs for the Government Accountability Office. The Coast Guard is our premier maritime guardian. Every day, Coast Guard cutters, small boats, aircraft, and boarding teams are protecting Americans from threats. The Coast Guard leads America's efforts to control, secure, and defend the Nation's maritime border, starting at the United States southern border where President Trump declared a national emergency. Illicit maritime activity is a national security threat with impacts far beyond our shores. The Coast Guard is essential to preventing dangerous drugs from poisoning our communities, boatloads of migrants from landing on our shores or perishing at sea on unseaworthy makeshift vessels, and countering Chinese efforts to plunder our fish stocks. In November, Coast Guard cutter Stone broke a record, offloading over 49,000 pounds of illicit narcotics seized in 15 interdictions valued at more than $362 million. This marked the most cocaine seized by a single cutter in one patrol in Coast Guard history. At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increasing levels of maritime migration by protecting our shores and securing and defending 260 miles of the Rio Grande River. The Coast Guard's unparalleled expertise is essential to deter, interdict, and defeat threats to our communities. In 2020, the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. IUU fishing robs nations of their fish stocks, their food, and it costs legal fishing operators tens of billions of dollars a year in revenue. China is the world's worst offender of this harm. The Chinese Communist Party provides billions of dollars in subsidies to its distant-water fishing fleet, which plunders fishing stocks worldwide. Despite its best efforts, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict drugs, aliens, and IUU fishing has long been hindered by a lack of resources and personnel. Through the $25 billion generational investment that Congress authorized in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, we have helped change the tide with new vessels and aircraft coming online. But there is more to be done. In light of this subcommittee's oversight role over the Coast Guard, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the Coast Guard is doing well, where it can be better, and what it is doing to strengthen its capabilities. In that same respect, I also look forward to hearing the Government Accountability Office's evaluation of the Coast Guard's mission performance. I appreciate our witnesses both joining us here today. [Mr. McDowell's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Addison P. McDowell of North Carolina, Vice Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Thank you, everyone, for joining the Subcommittee today to discuss the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions. Specifically, we want to highlight the amazing work our Coast Guard members do to stop drugs and illegal aliens along our maritime border, and the Service's efforts to limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. To do that, I'd like to welcome our witnesses: Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence for the United States Coast Guard; and Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director of Justice and Homeland Security Programs for the Government Accountability Office. The Coast Guard is our premier maritime guardian. Every day, Coast Guard cutters, small boats, aircraft, and boarding teams are protecting Americans from threats. The Coast Guard leads America's efforts to control, secure, and defend the nation's maritime border, starting at the United States southern border where President Trump declared a national emergency. Illicit maritime activity is a national security threat with impacts far beyond our shores. The Coast Guard is essential to preventing dangerous drugs from poisoning our communities, boatloads of migrants from landing on our shores or perishing at sea on unseaworthy makeshift vessels, and countering Chinese efforts to plunder our fish stocks. In November, Coast Guard Cutter STONE broke a record, offloading over 49,000 pounds of illicit narcotics, seized in 15 interdictions, valued at more than $362 million. This marked the most cocaine seized by a single cutter in one patrol in Coast Guard history. At the same time, the Coast Guard is addressing increasing levels of maritime migration by protecting our shores and securing and defending 260 miles of the Rio Grande River. The Coast Guard's unparalleled expertise is essential to deter, interdict, and defeat threats to our communities. In 2020 the Coast Guard declared that IUU fishing replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. IUU fishing robs nations of their fish stocks, their food, and costs legal fishing operators tens of billions of dollars a year in revenue, and China is the world's worst offender. The Chinese Communist Party provides billions of dollars in subsidies to its distant-water fishing fleet, which plunders fishing stocks worldwide. Despite its best efforts, the Coast Guard's ability to interdict drugs, aliens, and IUU fishing has long been hindered by a lack of resources both in physical assets and personnel. Through the $25 billion generational investment Congress authorized in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, we have helped change the tide with new vessels and aircraft coming online. But, there is more to be done. In light of this subcommittee's oversight role over the Coast Guard, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what the Coast Guard is doing well, where it can do better, and what it is doing to strengthen its capabilities. In that same respect, I also look forward to hearing the Government Accountability Office's evaluation of the Coast Guard's mission performance. Mr. McDowell. And I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Carbajal for an opening statement for 5 minutes. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman McDowell. I would like to yield to our ranking member, if it is okay, of our broader T&I Committee, Mr. Larsen. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Ranking Member Carbajal, and thank you, Chairman McDowell, for calling this very timely hearing. Every day, the women and men of the Coast Guard coordinate and execute law enforcement operations to halt illicit activities, to protect lives, and to safeguard the interests of the U.S. Through partnerships with other Federal agencies and with international allies and partners, Coasties interrupt and intercept individuals breaking U.S. and international laws. The Coast Guard has been enforcing maritime laws for 250 years, and it shows. From drug and migrant interdiction to IUU fishing enforcement, nobody does it better. Recently, the Coast Guard has intercepted and seized several shadow fleet oil tankers in the Caribbean. By violating international law, these vessels and their operators became subject to search and seizure by the Coast Guard. This is a longstanding Coast Guard authority. To ensure a safely executed mission, Coast Guard personnel work closely with other agencies. And while recent operations have received public attention--and I will have a few questions about it--it's not uncommon for the Coast Guard to exercise this authority in these venues. There are hundreds of dark fleet commercial vessels operating in violation of fishing laws, labor laws, and, in some cases, trafficking people and narcotics. While the administration has chosen to target oil tankers, we can't forget these other serious maritime crimes. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, otherwise known as IUU fishing, is when vessel operators violate national or international laws, regulations, or management schemes designed to ensure the sustainability of fish stocks. Most of these cases are found in areas like Oceania or Alaska, in and around the Aleutians. So we have a--certainly a direct interest in IUU fishing. Not only does this put a strain on fish stocks, but it also undermines hard-working fishers who abide by the law, including many of those folks in my district. The Coast Guard's role in addressing and preventing IUU fishing not only protects U.S. interests, it assists partners and ally nations. In fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Coast Guard set its interdiction goal at 40 percent of the detected fishing vessels conducting IUU fishing within the U.S. exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. Each of those years, the Service interdicted 21 percent of detected vessels, with the majority of detections and interdictions occurring at the time in the Gulf of Mexico. Over the same period, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected 274 fishing vessels on the high seas or within the EEZ of a foreign nation, resulting in 75 violations. So with more resources, I am hopeful we can improve those numbers. Today, we are going to hear some good news stories about the Coast Guard enforcement activities. But as we discuss those successes, I do want to hear, as well, how the Coast Guard is ensuring that other core missions, like search and rescue, are not neglected. In closing, I would be remiss if I did not talk about the sacrifice that comes with military service. Each servicemember has dedicated his or her life to protecting the country, and recent operations demonstrate the risk associated with that. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on ways to improve the lives of Coasties serving at sea who are conducting these law enforcement missions, and how we can continue to support and improve the Service. And with that, I yield back. [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Thank you, Chairmen McDowell and Ezell, for calling this timely hearing. Every day, the women and men of the Coast Guard coordinate and execute law enforcement operations to halt illicit activities, protect lives and safeguard the interests of the United States. Through partnerships with other federal agencies and international allies, Coasties interrupt and intercept individuals breaking U.S. and international laws. The Coast Guard has been enforcing maritime laws for 250 years--and it shows. From drug and migrant interdiction to IUU fishing enforcement, nobody does it better. Recently, the Coast Guard has intercepted and seized several shadow fleet oil tankers in the Caribbean. By violating international law, these vessels and their operators became subject to search and seizure by the Coast Guard--a longstanding Coast Guard authority in these venues To ensure a safely executed mission, Coast Guard personnel work closely with other agencies. While recent operations have received public attention, it is not uncommon for the Coast Guard to exercise this authority. There are hundreds of ``dark fleet'' commercial vessels operating in violation of fishing laws, labor laws and, in some cases, trafficking people and narcotics. While the Administration has chosen to target oil tankers, we cannot forget other serious maritime crimes. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing--otherwise known as IUU fishing--is when vessel operators violate national or international laws, regulations or management schemes designed to ensure the sustainability of fish stock. Most of these cases were found in areas like Oceania or Alaska, in and around the Aleutians. WE certainly have a direct interest in IUU fishing. Not only does this put strain on fish stocks, but it also undermines hardworking fishers who abide by the law, including many who live in my district. The Coast Guard's role in addressing and preventing IUU fishing not only protects U.S. interests; it assists partner and ally nations. In fiscal years 2023 and 2024, the Coast Guard set its interdiction goal at 40 percent of the detected fishing vessels conducting IUU fishing within the U.S. exclusive economic zone, or ``EEZ.'' Each of those years, the Service interdicted 21 percent of the detected vessels, with the majority of detections and interdictions occurring in the Gulf of Mexico. Over this same period, the Coast Guard boarded and inspected 274 fishing vessels on the high seas or within the EEZ of a foreign nation, resulting in 75 IUU fishing violations. With more resources, I'm hopeful that we can improve on those numbers. Today, we are going to hear some good news stories about Coast Guard enforcement activities. As we discuss those successes, I want to hear, as well, how the Coast Guard is ensuring that other core missions, like search and rescue, are not neglected. In closing, I would be remiss if I did not talk about the sacrifice that comes with military service. Each servicemember has dedicated his or her life to protecting the country and recent operations demonstrate the risk associated with that. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on ways to improve the lives of Coasties serving at sea who are conducting these law enforcement missions and how we can continue to support and improve the Service. Mr. McDowell. I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Carbajal for an opening statement for 5 minutes. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman McDowell, for you and Chairman Ezell calling today's hearing. The U.S. Coast Guard is the Nation's premier multimission law enforcement agency. As the only uniformed service to conduct both homeland security and defense missions, the importance of the Coast Guard cannot be understated. One of the reasons why the Coast Guard is so successful is their unique status as both a branch of the military and a law enforcement agency. When the Coast Guard conducts counterdrug missions, they not only successfully stop, board, and search vessels suspected of trafficking illegal narcotics, but they also detain individuals who often provide critical intelligence on the drug trafficking organizations that put them on the vessels in the first place. The critical piece of the puzzle is only made possible by the precise and professional actions of our Coast Guard boarding teams. Upholding American constitutional values and international rule of law is exactly why the Coast Guard is so successful. Another unique aspect of the Coast Guard is its ability to enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries to help bolster law enforcement efforts for both the United States and its partners. This real-time engagement with other countries not only helps preserve rules-based order in the maritime domain, but it also helps the U.S. engage in strategic soft power diplomacy across the world. While the Coast Guard continues to put up recordbreaking numbers of drugs seized and migrants rescued at sea, the numbers behind its budget have not increased at an equal rate. There is no doubt that we have seen an increased demand on Coast Guard law enforcement efforts, but we cannot forget the personnel who make these missions possible. I am very concerned that the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill will not appropriately fund the Coast Guard Operations and Support Account. Coast Guard assets don't run themselves. As GAO has noted, insufficient asset readiness coupled with workforce shortages hinder the Coast Guard's impact. We must address this issue. The Coast Guard's international collaboration is imperative. The Coast Guard is also a party to bilateral and multilateral agreements and conventions to protect natural resources and fish stocks from exploitation around the globe. Further, the Coast Guard works hand in hand with NOAA to protect and enforce our domestic fisheries, which is a multibillion-dollar industry. This mission cannot be overlooked as well. Finally, while I have a serious concern about the administration's actions in Venezuela, I am encouraged by the Coast Guard's actions to enforce the law at sea. The Coast Guard's recent detention and seizure of dark fleet vessels operating outside of international laws highlights the risks inherent in a flag-of-convenience system. American-flagged vessels are owned by Americans, crewed by American mariners, and follow American laws. We should be doing everything we can to encourage other countries to follow suit. I look forward to today's hearing and the opportunity to celebrate the accomplishments of the Coast Guard. I am proud to champion the Service and dedicated Coasties who prove, day in and day out, that the Coast Guard is truly a global force for good. With that I yield back, Mr. Chair. [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairmen McDowell and Ezell, for calling today's hearing. The U.S. Coast Guard is the nation's premier, multi-mission law enforcement agency. As the only uniformed service to conduct both Homeland Security and Defense missions, the importance of the Coast Guard cannot be understated. One of the reasons why the Coast Guard is so successful is their unique status as both a branch of the military and as a law enforcement agency. When the Coast Guard conducts counter-drug missions, they not only successfully stop, board, and search vessels suspected of trafficking illegal narcotics, but they also detain individuals who often provide critical intelligence on the drug trafficking organizations that put them on that vessel in the first place. This critical piece of the puzzle is only made possible by the precise and professional actions of our Coast Guard boarding teams. Upholding American constitutional values and the international rule of law is exactly why the Coast Guard is so successful. Another unique aspect about the Coast Guard is its ability to enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries to help bolster law enforcement efforts for both the U.S. and its partners. This real-time engagement with other countries not only helps preserve rules-based order in the maritime domain, but it also helps the U.S. engage in strategic soft power diplomacy across the world. While the Coast Guard continues to put up record-breaking numbers of drugs seized and migrants rescued at sea, the numbers behind its budget have not increased at an equal rate. There's no doubt that we've seen an increased demand for Coast Guard law enforcement efforts, but we cannot forget the personnel who make these missions possible. I am very concerned that the DHS appropriations bill will not appropriately fund the Coast Guard operations and support account-- Coast Guard assets don't run themselves. As GAO has noted, insufficient asset readiness coupled with workforce shortages hinder the Coast Guard's impact. We must address this issue. The Coast Guard's international collaboration is imperative. The Coast Guard is also a party to bilateral and multilateral agreements and conventions to protect natural resources and fish stocks from exploitation around the globe. Further, the Coast Guard works hand in hand with NOAA to protect and enforce our domestic fisheries, which is a multibillion-dollar industry. This mission cannot be overlooked. Finally, while I have serious concerns about the Administration's actions in Venezuela, I am encouraged by the Coast Guard's actions to enforce the law at sea. The Coast Guard's recent detention and seizure of dark fleet vessels operating outside of international laws highlights the risks inherent in a ``flag of convenience'' system. American flagged vessels are owned by Americans, crewed by American mariners and follow American laws. We should be doing everything we can to encourage other countries to follow suit. I look forward to today's hearing, and the opportunity to celebrate the accomplishments of the Coast Guard. I am proud to champion the service and the dedicated Coasties who prove day in and day out that the Coast Guard is truly a global force for good. With that, I yield back. Mr. McDowell. Well, briefly I would like to take a moment to explain the lighting system to our witnesses. There are three lights in front of you: Green means go; yellow means you are running out of time; and red means please wrap it up. I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in writing. Without objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered. As your written testimony has been made part of the record, the subcommittee asks that you please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. With that, Admiral Barata, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your testimony. TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID C. BARATA, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS POLICY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD Admiral Barata. Good morning, Chairman McDowell, Ranking Member Larsen, Ranking Member Carbajal, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions. As a military service, a Federal law enforcement agency, and a member of the intelligence community, the Coast Guard represents a vital and unique instrument of national power. We control, secure, and defend our maritime borders and their approaches; facilitate commerce vital to economic prosperity and strategic mobility; and maintain readiness to respond to crises and contingencies that often arise with little or no warning. Transnational criminal organizations and designated terrorist organizations exploit the maritime environment to move deadly drugs towards the United States. In response, your Coast Guard is on the front lines and deployed around the world as a sentinel against those who would do us harm. Last year, our crews' and our partners' tremendous collective efforts yielded historic results, removing more than 500,000 pounds of cocaine and denying criminal networks access to over $3.4 billion in revenue. This is more than double the amount we removed in 2024, and nearly triple that of 2023. We are also intensely focused on interdicting the precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, leveraging our broad authorities and effective partnerships to detect and interdict fentanyl and precursor materials before they can harm Americans. The Coast Guard also confronts persistent illegal migration in the maritime environment. We employ cutters, aircraft, and advanced unmanned systems to control, secure, and defend our maritime borders. We face this threat on the Texas and Mexican border, along the Rio Grande Valley, the maritime approaches to California, and the Southeastern United States and the Caribbean. Smuggling organizations and aliens use a variety of craft, from hopelessly overloaded vessels to high-speed boats and jet skis, to crude, homemade rafts in their attempts. In response, the Coast Guard maintains a robust, forward-leaning posture to deter and interdict these voyages. In 2025, we interdicted or deterred over 11,700 individuals, a 120-percent increase over 2024. Along the Rio Grande, Operation River Wall has already supported the apprehension or deterrence of over 230 individuals attempting to illegally cross since it commenced in August of last year. The Coast Guard also leads the world in combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, or IUU fishing. This requires us to overcome an aging fleet and the sheer vastness of geography. But our efforts are crucial to stemming the growing threat that IUU fishing poses to the United States economy and global food security. Malign state-supported actors exploit weak governance, undermine world markets, and create instability through a number of illicit activities. Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and IUU fishing are all examples of this exploitation in the maritime domain. Similarly, dark fleet oil tankers subvert the rules-based order by operating substandard vessels with obscured nationality and ownership, and false locations and documentation. These actions endanger seafarers and the environment, and provide revenue streams to transnational criminal organizations. The Coast Guard directly confronts these evolving threats both near and far from U.S. shores, delivering an exceptional return on investment to the American people. Through the continued tremendous support of the Congress, especially this subcommittee, we are recapitalizing our aging fleet with more capable cutters, aircraft, boats, and autonomous systems, and transforming our talent management to build a larger, more capable workforce, as well as pursuing comprehensive modernization through Force Design 2028. To sustain these efforts and to protect the Nation's maritime interests, we will continue to work closely with the Congress to support increased and recurring funding for the Service, including operations, assets, and personnel readiness. Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the Coast Guard men and women. I look forward to your questions. [Admiral Barata's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard Introduction Good afternoon, Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's efforts to deliver peace through strength to control, secure, and defend America's borders. The United States is a maritime nation. With more than 95,000 miles of shoreline, 361 commercial ports and 25,000 miles of navigable waterways, the maritime domain fortifies our national security and economic prosperity. Over 90 percent of overseas trade enters or leaves the United States by sea, facilitating more than $5.4 trillion in maritime commerce annually. The security of this domain is not optional--it is foundational to our national security. The Coast Guard is the Nation's leading agency in this domain. In the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard serves as the Nation's finest maritime fighting force. We are one of the six Armed Services, a federal law enforcement agency, and member of the Intelligence Community. The Coast Guard controls, secures, and defends the U.S. border and maritime approaches with 53,000 people and a 2025 budget of $13.5 billion; ensures the safe and secure flow of commerce vital to economic prosperity; and responds to crises and contingencies that often come with little or no warning. The Coast Guard leverages unique authorities, specialized capabilities, and enduring partnerships with international, federal, state, local, and tribal leaders to operationalize a layered approach to secure our maritime border and protect the American People from foreign terrorists, transnational criminals, and other maritime threats. In response to the national emergency at the southern border, the Coast Guard rapidly surged forces and assets to defend U.S. territorial integrity and advance national security objectives. Coast Guard commanders continuously prioritize and strategically reallocate aircraft, cutters, and specialized law enforcement teams to areas of highest operational need. Last year alone, the Coast Guard tripled the deployment of resources dedicated to border security, disrupting maritime threats before they could reach the United States. Under the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, the Coast Guard is changing and growing to meet the needs of Americans. This effort is Force Design 2028, a bold blueprint to build a stronger, more agile and responsive fighting force. Under the leadership and vision of DHS Secretary Noem, this effort directly enhances our ability to enforce the law, secure maritime approaches, protect commerce, and respond to crises. By expanding our workforce and deploying advanced assets and technologies, the Coast Guard is better postured to secure our Nation's maritime borders and sovereign interests against these persistent threats. Maritime Drug Interdiction Maritime drug trafficking remains one of the most direct threats to U.S. homeland security and public safety. Transnational criminal organizations depend on the maritime domain to move cocaine, methamphetamine, fentanyl precursors, and other illicit substances towards the United States. The Coast Guard is often the only agency with the authority, capability, and presence to act at sea where they interdict more illicit drugs than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined. As directed by the President, the Coast Guard is on the front lines securing the global supply chain against drug trafficking and reducing the availability of illicit drugs that devastate American communities. Narco terrorists exploit maritime routes to move drugs, generate enormous profits and fuel violence, instability, and crime. These revenues are increasingly leveraged by hostile actors and transnational networks to fund human trafficking, weapons smuggling, sanctions evasion, and other malign activities that destabilize regions and drive illegal migration. The Coast Guard's role in countering these organizations is both a law enforcement and a national security imperative. Since January 2025, the Coast Guard has seized over 511,000 pounds of cocaine from the maritime domain--representing over 189 million potentially lethal doses and an estimated value exceeding $3.8 billion--during operations in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean, the two primary drug transit corridors. This all-time historic high more than doubles the cocaine removed in FY 2024 and nearly triples the removals from FY 2023. Estimates indicate that the Coast Guard counter-drug and law enforcement operations save American taxpayers over $10 billion in avoided costs, including over $2.3 billion in healthcare costs from cocaine interdictions alone. These results are driven by increased operational presence, improved detection, and decisive law enforcement action. The southern border is not the only route for illegal trafficking; the Great Lakes and northern border are also vulnerable due to their complex geography and limited law enforcement presence. The U.S. Coast Guard does not have enough resources to effectively counter drug trafficking in these areas. Combating fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals remains one of the Administration's top priorities, and the Coast Guard has taken significant action in this effort. Fentanyl has been the leading cause of U.S. drug-related deaths since 2016, accounting for approximately 70% of drug overdose deaths in 2023, with Mexican narco terrorists being the primary source of the synthetic opioid flow into the U.S. Accordingly, the Coast Guard leverages its broad authorities to seek out and interdict both fentanyl and its illegal precursor chemicals. On January 31, 2025, our Commandant, Admiral Lunday directed immediate action to bolster these operations, focusing on interdicting precursor chemicals and disrupting the revenue streams that fund fentanyl trafficking. Illegal Migration The Coast Guard also secures the Rio Grande River, a 220-mile river border from the Gulf of America to West Texas, part of the U.S. southern border, and the maritime approaches to San Diego. These areas continue to experience a sustained and above-average rate of illegal maritime migration. This vector presents a persistent threat characterized by continuous smuggling attempts and is targeted through the Coast Guard's Operation Border Trident and Operation River Wall, both of which seek to achieve 100% control of the southern maritime border. Trafficking organizations in this region primarily utilize high-speed boats, jet skis and other personal watercraft, and additional makeshift watercraft. Although a variety of nationalities are encountered, the overwhelming majority of those interdicted are Mexican nationals. The maritime approaches to the southeastern U.S. are also a primary vector for illegal maritime migration. Most of the migrants encountered originate in Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, or the Dominican Republic, utilizing established transit corridors. Cuban and Haitian migrants typically journey toward Florida, either directly or through the Bahamas. Meanwhile, Dominican and some Haitian groups often cross the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. They attempt these journeys on a wide array of vessels, from coastal freighters and high-speed ``go-fast'' boats to dangerously crude, homemade rafts. The National Security Strategy established a focus to control migration, stop drug flows, and strengthen stability and security on land and sea in the Western Hemisphere. Under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard maintains a robust and forward-leaning posture to combat illegal immigration. In 2025 we interdicted, deterred, or transported 11,713 aliens illegally attempting entry. This was 120% more than in 2024. Our persistent presence both serves to deter departures from countries of origin and enables a rapid response to suspicious vessels, in close coordination with our international, federal, state, and local partners. To enhance this posture, we utilize advanced unmanned systems, such as surface drones and small aerial drones launched from our over-the-horizon boats, to provide persistent surveillance and support shore patrols. Countering Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing The Coast Guard sets the standard for combating IUU fishing--a pervasive security, economic, and environmental threat accounting for an estimated $50 billion in lost global revenue annually. For more than 150 years, the Coast Guard has been the lead U.S. agency for at-sea enforcement of fisheries laws. The Coast Guard leverages its authorities and capabilities to improve both domestic and international fisheries enforcement, holding bad actors accountable, and adapts its operations as fish stocks migrate and technology improves the ability to find and harvest catch. Malign, state-supported actors undermine U.S. markets, threaten global food security, and create instability that is exploited by terrorists and transnational criminals, including human traffickers. These actors exploit our partner nations, many of whom lack the resources to secure their own waters. This growing threat increases the demand for U.S. Coast Guard presence and partnership. While our cooperative patrols with such allies as Australia and Japan are effective, our partners require greater technical support and training. We work to meet these demands, but do so with an aging fleet, strained logistics across a vast geography, and limited forward basing options. This situation presents a risk to our other core missions and underscores the need for a sustainable, long-term solution. Our current force structure, primarily based on the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and Guam, cannot meet the growing and persistent demand from across the region for more Coast Guard operational presence. Conclusion Maritime drug trafficking, illegal migration, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing are distinct challenges, but they share a common feature: each exploits the maritime domain to evade law enforcement and accountability. Through its unique and enduring law enforcement authorities, the Coast Guard directly confronts these threats--securing and defending the Nation's borders and maritime approaches every day. These threats are evolving, and the demands placed on the Coast Guard continue to increase. The Coast Guard's layered security model-- leveraging forward presence, elite capabilities, an exceptional workforce, and unmatched legal authorities--allows us to address risks far from U.S. shores before they reach our homeland. The changes underway through Force Design 2028 are already accelerating enduring change and showing measurable results. By empowering our workforce and enhancing the ways we conduct our patrols and inspections, recent operations resulted in the seizure of more than 511,000 pounds of cocaine valued at more than $3.8 billion. These outcomes demonstrate both the effectiveness of our authorities and the return on investment they provide. Since 1790, in peace and in war, a ready Coast Guard has been an indispensable element of national security. With continued congressional support, the Coast Guard will remain prepared to meet today's challenges and build a more resilient and capable Service for decades to come. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to your questions. Semper Paratus. Mr. McDowell. Thank you. Now to Ms. MacLeod. You are recognized for 5 minutes for your testimony. TESTIMONY OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Ms. MacLeod. Chairman McDowell, Ranking Member Larsen, Ranking Member Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's work examining Coast Guard law enforcement efforts. These efforts, including drug and migrant interdiction and prevention of illegal fishing, are vital to confronting illicit maritime activities. My testimony today will not be a surprise to anyone on this committee. GAO's work has identified persistent challenges Coast Guard faces related to vessel and aircraft availability, acquisitions, and staffing shortfalls that hinder the Service's ability to meet its growing mission demands. We have made dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard to help address these issues. Addressing our open recommendations pertaining to the Coast Guard's assets and workforce would help ensure that the Service is efficiently using its resources to carry out its law enforcement missions. In 2025, the Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize operation and capabilities. This additional funding could help the Coast Guard address longstanding challenges that we have identified. Related to vessel and aircraft availability, the condition of the Coast Guard assets has been in a state of decline for decades. Our work has shown a concerning trend that the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing at the same time that their availability is decreasing. For example, in June, we reported that the availability of the cutters that the Coast Guard relies on for its law enforcement missions declined. We also reported that increasing maintenance challenges have led to cutters missing patrol obligations. We made five recommendations in that report to help address cutter challenges. These readiness challenges are not limited to its cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft generally did not meet its availability target. Coast Guard officials attributed this to maintenance and repair challenges. We made five recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and number of helicopters needed to meet its mission demands. Our work has also noted that acquisition program delays have been a longstanding challenge for the Service and continue to affect the availability of Coast Guard assets. For example, the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the Offshore Patrol Cutter and the Polar Security Cutter, are intended to support law enforcement missions like drug interdiction and prevention of illegal fishing. But we found that, combined, these two programs are billions of dollars over their initial cost estimates and years behind schedule. We have made dozens of recommendations on how Coast Guard can better manage acquisition programs for new vessels and aircraft. The final challenge I would like to highlight is Coast Guard staffing shortfall and poor workforce planning. In recent years, the Coast Guard has raised concerns that its mission workload has outpaced its workforce levels. Staffing gaps, particularly in specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can hinder drug interdiction and other law enforcement missions. While the Service recruited more enlisted servicemembers than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in prior years. In April 2025, we reported that, even with the increase in recruiting, the Service remained short of its enlisted workforce target. As a result, Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary to meet its operational demands at that time. We made three recommendations to help address these challenges, including that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its retention initiatives. In conclusion, while the Coast Guard plays a vital role in confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities, it faces significant challenges in carrying out these missions. Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help ensure the Coast Guard is effectively and efficiently using resources to carry out these critical missions and protect our maritime borders. This completes my prepared statement, and I am pleased to respond to any questions you may have. [Ms. MacLeod's prepared statement follows:] Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Law Enforcement Mission Challenges Highlights What GAO Found The Coast Guard employs assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel to conduct law enforcement operations. In prior work, GAO identified longstanding challenges that have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its law enforcement mission demands. GAO made recommendations to help address asset availability, acquisitions, and workforce challenges, which the Coast Guard has yet to fully address. The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades. In June 2025 GAO found that the Medium Endurance Cutters availability to conduct missions declined from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard address maintenance challenges and operational availability issues with these cutters, which it relies on for law enforcement missions. The Coast Guard's declining asset availability is exacerbated by persistent and longstanding challenges managing its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and aircraft. In November 2025, GAO found that continued delays and cost overruns with the Offshore Patrol Cutter program--one of its highest priority acquisitions--is likely. GAO made four recommendations to address these issues. GAO has identified longstanding staffing shortfalls and poor workforce planning, which have challenged the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission needs. For example, in June 2025, GAO reported that cutter crew vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, according to the most recent Coast Guard data at the time. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its workforce retention initiatives, among other recommendations. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic criminal organizations as a significant threat tothe public, law enforcement, and national security. The Coast Guard is the nation's lead federal maritime law enforcement agency. It received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities. The Coast Guard is a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It conducts maritime law enforcement, including: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and other missions (which include fisheries law enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing). This statement discusses Coast Guard challenges GAO previously identified related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is based primarily on six GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 2026. What GAO Recommends GAO previously made 24 recommendations to the Coast Guard in the reports covered by this statement to help address challenges related to vessel and aircraft availability, acquisition delays and cost overruns, and staffing shortfalls. DHS generally agreed with the recommendations. As of January 2026, two of the recommendations have been implemented. GAO continues to monitor the agency's progress in implementing the remaining recommendations. __________ Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of theSubcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work examining Coast Guard law enforcement activities and challenges. The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security--is the nation's lead federal maritime law enforcement agency. The service is responsible for conducting 11 statutory missions, including maritime law enforcement missions such as drug interdiction and migrant interdiction, among other missions (which include fisheries law enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing).\1\ According to the Coast Guard, its presence--vessels, aircraft, and specialized forces--serves as an enforcement mechanism and deterrent to illicit activity that contributes to instability throughout the Western Hemisphere.\2\ Figure 1 shows the Coast Guard using its assets to conduct law enforcement missions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 468(a). \2\ The Coast Guard maintains Deployable Specialized Forces units with the capabilities needed to deploy with specialized training to handle counterdrug, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime environment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 1: Coast Guard Vessels and Aircraft Interdict Smuggling Vessels; Interdicted Migrants on Coast Guard Cutter [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Source: U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photos. GAO-26-108847 The U.S. government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement, and the national security of the U.S. Given the challenges the federal government faces in responding to the drug misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse to our High Risk List.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2021). We issue an update to the High-Risk List every two years at the start of each new session of Congress. The most recent update was issued in February 2025. See GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- My statement today discusses challenges the Coast Guard faces related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is based primarily on GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 2026. This includes a report we are issuing today on maritime interdiction.\4\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ See GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions, GAO-26-107440. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2026). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For the reports we cite in this statement, among other methodologies, we analyzed Coast Guard policies, documentation, and data, and interviewed officials from agency headquarters and selected field units. More detailed information on our scope and methodology, including analyzing data and determining a sufficient level of reliability for our reporting, can be found in the reports we cite in this statement. For this statement, we also reviewed information on the status of agency implementation of selected recommendations through January 2026. (See appendix I for related open recommendations.) We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Several Challenges Hinder Coast Guard Law Enforcement Efforts To Confront Illicit Maritime Activities, Which the Service Has Yet To Fully Address Our prior work has identified several longstanding challenges that have hindered the Coast Guard's ability to meet its law enforcement mission demands. These include: (1) availability of vessels and aircraft, (2) acquisition of new assets, and (3) staffing shortfalls and workforce planning.\5\ We have made recommendations to help address these challenges. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2024). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vessel and Aircraft Availability The Coast Guard's vessels and aircraft have faced availability challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades.\6\ Overall, the total number of operational hours generally decreased, and the total estimated operating expenses generally increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, as shown in figure 2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Vessel and aircraft availability challenges hinder the Coast Guard's ability to meet mission demands. For example, in January 2026, we reported that during fiscal years 2015 through 2024, the Coast Guard generally did not meet its drug or migrant interdiction goals. We also found that the service did not fully share information about lessons learned from maritime migrant interdiction with federal partners. We made two recommendations to DHS to address these issues and will monitor Coast Guard actions to fully address them. See, GAO-26-107440. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessel and Aircraft Operational Hours and Estimated Operating Expenses, Fiscal Years 2015 2024 [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-26-108847 Note: Coast Guard operational hours include the use of aircraft, cutters, and boats for its 11 statutory missions. See 6 U.S.C. Sec. 468(a). They do not include the time personnel may spend on missions without using vessels or aircraft. We do not include hours expended for support activities or for training. According to the Coast Guard, the service estimates its operating expenses for each mission by (1) multiplying operations and maintenance costs for supporting a vessel or aircraft by the operational hours and (2) using survey data to estimate additional personnel costs for nonvessel or aircraft-based operations. In June 2025, we reported that the operational availability of the Coast Guard's Medium Endurance Cutters, which the Coast Guard relies on for its law enforcement missions, declined from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024.\7\ We also reported that the Coast Guard was experiencing increasing cutter maintenance challenges, and that those increasing challenges, such as equipment failure and resulting unplanned maintenance, have led to cutters missing patrol obligations. For example, Coast Guard operational reporting documents stated that unplanned maintenance, among other things, had significantly reduced the capacity of Medium Endurance Cutters to conduct missions. Further, due to delays in receiving critical parts needed for repairs, the Coast Guard cannibalized cutters by moving working parts between cutters. According to Coast Guard data, there were 194 cannibalizations completed across the cutter fleet from February 2022 to September 2024; 145 of these involved National Security Cutters--which mostly support the drug interdiction mission. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter and Maintenance Workforce Challenges, GAO-25-107222 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result, in June 2025 we made five recommendations to address cutter maintenance and workforce challenges. For example, we recommended that the Coast Guard should systematically collect and assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may have caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as appropriate. In its agency comments, DHS agreed with this recommendation and described steps the Coast Guard plans to take to improve its processes to document, develop, and validate the efficacy of a new cutter maintenance metric, which it plans to use to develop the recommended assessment. DHS estimates completing these efforts by June 2027. We will continue to monitor the status of this and the other recommendations. The Coast Guard's asset readiness challenges are not limited to its cutters. In April 2024, we reported that the Coast Guard's aircraft generally did not meet its 71 percent availability target during fiscal years 2018 through 2022.\8\ Coast Guard officials attributed the aircraft fleet generally not meeting availability targets to maintenance and repair challenges. As a result, we made five recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess the type and number of helicopters, and aviation workforce size, needed to meet its mission demands. In response, in August 2025, the Coast Guard told us an analysis of alternatives and a fleet mix analysis is being ordered. It anticipates completing these steps by December 2027. We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these recommendations, as well as the other recommendation that remains unaddressed.\9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ GAO, Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed, GAO-24-106374 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2024). We further reported that the Coast Guard was embarking on a significant operational change from a largely short-range helicopter fleet to a medium-range fleet. However, we reported that its related planning efforts raised serious questions, including how the medium-range helicopters will interact with cutters for its drug interdiction operations. \9\ The Coast Guard has addressed one of the five recommendations. In April 2024, we found that the U.S. Coast Guard's air stations do not have complete data for the Coast Guard to assess service-wide readiness. We recommended that the Coast Guard should establish procedures to uniformly collect and maintain air station readiness data. The Coast Guard concurred with this recommendation and in April 2025 updated its operational reporting manual to, among other things, help standardize the collection of air station readiness data. The manual requires air stations to report periods when they cannot meet readiness requirements and provides examples on how to do so. By issuing updated guidance requiring air stations to uniformly collect and maintain aircraft readiness data, the Coast Guard can help ensure it has complete and accurate information on Coast Guard-wide air station readiness. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Acquisition Programs We have previously reported that the Coast Guard's declining asset availability is exacerbated by persistent challenges it faces managing its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and aircraft. For example, in September 2024 we reported on the declining availability of the Coast Guard aircraft fleet and found that the Coast Guard's cutter program faces persistent challenges including capability gaps from schedule delays.\10\ Furthermore, officials told us that they would not be able to increase mission activity without acquiring more assets, but acquisition delays have been a longstanding challenge for the service. Furthermore, according to officials, the acquisition process is lengthy, as it can take several years from initial request to final delivery of an asset.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Persistent Challenges Hindering Efforts to Counter Illicit Maritime Drug Smuggling, GAO-24-107785 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2024). \11\ GAO-26-107440. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- One of the Coast Guard's highest priority programs--the Offshore Patrol Cutters--has experienced delays that will exacerbate maritime capability gaps.\12\ According to the Coast Guard, it urgently needs Offshore Patrol Cutters to replace aging cutters that conduct law enforcement and search and rescue operations.\13\ However, in November 2025, we reported that the Coast Guard's plan to acquire 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters was delayed by more than 5 years.\14\ Notwithstanding delays, ship design remains incomplete, and continued delays and cost overruns are likely.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ In June 2023, we found that the Coast Guard's management of its Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisitions continued to face challenges we had previously identified. We made five new recommendations to the Coast Guard, including that it develop a technology maturation plan and update its acquisition policy to require programs to complete routing of distributive systems as part of functional design prior to lead ship construction. Two of the recommendations have not yet been fully addressed. See, GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 20, 2023). \13\ Admiral Linda L. Fagan, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 118th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2024. \14\ GAO, Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships, GAO-26-107583 (Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2025). \15\ The Coast Guard plans to acquire the 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters in four phases. In July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated two of four ships from the first phase contract for default. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a result, we made four recommendations in November 2025, including that the program stabilizes design before starting construction of additional ships. Incorporating the knowledge gained from testing--as well as other shipbuilding leading practices--into the procurement process could help the Coast Guard make better investment decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future ship deliveries. While the agency agreed with two of the four recommendations, we maintain that all four recommendations are warranted and will continue to monitor their implementation. Staffing Shortfalls and Workforce Planning Our prior work has also shown that staffing shortfalls and poor workforce planning have affected the Coast Guard's ability to meet its mission needs, including for drug interdiction and other law enforcement missions. While the service recruited more enlisted service members than it lost in fiscal year 2024, it experienced net enlisted staffing losses from fiscal years 2019 through 2023. In April 2025 we reported that even with the increase in recruiting, the service remained approximately 2,600 service members, or 8.5 percent of its total enlisted workforce, short of its enlisted workforce target at the end of fiscal year 2024.\16\ As a result, the Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary to meet its operational demands. We made three recommendations, including that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its retention initiatives. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendations, and we continue to monitor their implementation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service Member Retention Issues, GAO-25-107869 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2025). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Further, in June 2025, we reported that cutter crew and support position vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, according to Coast Guard data.\17\ Multiple Coast Guard officials told us at that time that due to cutter personnel shortages, cutters often deploy without a full crew, leaving the remaining crew to take on the responsibilities of missing staff. We also previously reported on Coast Guard resource shortfalls and incomplete workforce planning for its aviation workforce, which the service relies on to support its drug interdiction mission. For example, as of April 2024 the Coast Guard had not assessed and determined necessary staffing levels and skills for a large portion of its aviation workforce, including all 25 of its air stations and its major aircraft repair facility.\18\ As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires to meet its mission needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation. It stated the Coast Guard would conduct workforce analyses for all of its air stations by June 2026. We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address this recommendation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ GAO-25-107222. Specifically, our analysis showed that 1,104 cutter crew and support positions were vacant (about 13 percent) in fiscal year 2024. This is an increase from fiscal year 2017, in which 401 cutter crew and support positions were vacant (about 5 percent). \18\ GAO-24-106374. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation. We also made four other recommendations in the report and the Coast Guard concurred with all four. As of August 2025, four of the five recommendations remain open. We will continue monitoring Coast Guard's efforts to address these recommendations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In summary, the Coast Guard's law enforcement missions are vital to confronting and mitigating illicit maritime activities. The Coast Guard received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities.\19\ We have identified longstanding challenges with the Coast Guard's management of its programs and tradeoff decisions among its mission priorities and have made recommendations to help address these challenges. Addressing our 20 open recommendations pertaining to the Coast Guard's assets and workforce would help ensure that the service efficiently uses its resources to carry out its law enforcement missions and interests.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Pub. L. No. 119-21, tit. IV, Sec. 40001, 139 Stat. 72, 127 (2025). \20\ We made 24 recommendations in the reports covered by this statement. The Coast Guard implemented two of these recommendations, twenty remain open, and two are no longer valid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chairman Ezell, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. Appendix I: Related Open Recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security as of January 2026 Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve Maritime Interdictions. GAO-26- 107440. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2026. Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the Commandant of the Coast Guard implements performance measures for the migrant interdiction mission that effectively measure the service's efforts. Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the Operation Vigilant Sentry task force implements a process to identify and address lessons learned following real-world events and exercises with all relevant federal partner agencies, and shares relevant information with those partners. Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships. GAO-26-107583. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2025. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program demonstrates that the stage 2 design is stable prior to authorizing construction of additional stage 2 OPCs by (1) completing basic and functional design, including routing of major distributive systems that affect multiple zones of the ship, in a 3D model with reliable vendor-furnished information and (2) successfully testing an integrated prototype of the davit in a realistic environment, consistent with shipbuilding leading practices. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Navy, should develop a memorandum of agreement to clarify and document agreement on how the evaluation of deficiencies and ongoing surveillance of Austal's EVM system will be coordinated between the Coast Guard and SUPSHIP throughout the duration of the OPC program. Recommendation: The DHS Secretary should ensure that the DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to revise the OPC acquisition program baseline to include cost goals for each stage. Recommendation: The DHS Secretary should ensure that the DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to document a plan for acquiring stage 3 OPCs that identifies (1) how results from operational testing of OPC stages 1 and 2 will be incorporated into stage 3 procurement activities, such as developing the request for proposals, and contingency plans if this testing is delayed; and (2) how leading practices for ship design will be incorporated into stage 3. Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Address Cutter Maintenance and Workforce Challenges. GAO-25-107222. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2025. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should systematically collect and assess data on instances where previously deferred maintenance may have caused cutter equipment failures and develop mitigation strategies as appropriate. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should complete Ship Structure and Machinery Evaluation Boards for all cutter types at the intervals prescribed by policy. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should systematically collect and assess data on which parts and systems across the cutter fleet are or will become obsolete and develop mitigation strategies as appropriate. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should systematically collect and assess data on cutter days lost due to unplanned maintenance issues. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should regularly collect and analyze data on staff availability for cutter crew and support personnel positions, including which cutter workforce positions are temporarily empty across the cutter fleet, and use this information to inform personnel assignments. Coast Guard: Enhanced Data and Planning Could Help Address Service Member Retention Issues. GAO-25-107869. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2025. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and Analytics implements additional mechanisms to increase response rates for its Career Intention Survey. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Office of Workforce Requirements, Systems, and Analytics analyzes the potential for nonresponse bias in its Career Intention Survey results. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Talent Management Transformation Program Integration Office develops a clear plan, including how retention initiatives align with strategic objectives and time frames and milestones for implementation, to track progress and gauge program performance. Coast Guard: Aircraft Fleet and Aviation Workforce Assessments Needed. GAO-24-106374. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2024. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a process to regularly evaluate Coast Guard-wide air station readiness data. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should assess the type of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet its mission demands, as part of an analysis of alternatives. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should assess the number of helicopters the Coast Guard requires to meet its mission demands, as part of a fleet mix analysis. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should assess and determine the aviation workforce levels it requires to meet its mission needs. Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to Mature Technology and Design. GAO-23-105805. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2023. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that OPC program officials develop a technology maturation plan for the davit prior to builder's trials. This plan should identify potential courses of action to address davit technical immaturity, including assessing technology alternatives should the current davit continue to face development challenges, and a date by which the Coast Guard will make a go/no-go decision to pursue such a technology alternative. Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that OPC program officials test an integrated prototype of the davit in a realistic environment prior to stage 1 builder's trials. Mr. McDowell. Thank you. I would now like to begin questioning, and I will recognize myself for questions for 5 minutes. I want to thank you again for being here with us today, and just want to give a very heartfelt thank you to the members of the Coast Guard, and especially to the Stone. It is incredible work, and our country thanks you for that. The Coast Guard recognizes illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as the leading global maritime security threat. And it is no coincidence that the largest perpetrator of this illicit activity is China, whose many, many violations include fishing in other nations' exclusive economic zones and incorrectly reporting fishing activity. Can you, Admiral Barata, can you characterize the economic harm that these violations--or to either of you, can you characterize what this IUU fishing--how it harms the United States, and explain what steps are being taken to prioritize that threat? Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. Good morning again. So IUU is a threat to both the global economy and the U.S. economy. The illegal catch that is brought in to the United States devalues the work that our domestic LMR, living marine resources, the fish stocks that we sell to our own folks, and impacts over $150 billion that our fishermen bring to the global domestic product. So from our standpoint, it is a very difficult issue to deal with. As we look at the number of fleets that are out there, the distant-water fleets, there are about 6,000 that we know are registered with China and almost 17,000 that we think are registered in other flags that are conducting this type of work. The difficulty is that, as we get into some of these island nations where those EEZs exist that are not the U.S. EEZ, many of these island nations do not have the ability, they don't have the expertise, they don't have the capabilities, the small boats. And so the work that we do through multilateral agreements to carry shipriders aboard our vessels, to sell them equipment to do it themselves, to enforce on their behalf as we are out there under these treaties, it gives them the opportunity to help enforce in their own exclusive economic zones. Mr. McDowell. Just curious, what species are they targeting the most to harvest? Admiral Barata. It is actually a full range of species. About 10 percent of the stocks that we bring in, the seafood that we bring in to the U.S., we estimate to be from--as part of this trade ourselves. Mr. McDowell. Wow. Admiral Barata. But it is obfuscated, as they land it in different countries. They do transshipments on mother ships, and so it is very hard to track where the fish are actually coming from. Mr. McDowell. Got you. The One Big Beautiful Bill, as I mentioned earlier, included an investment of nearly $25 billion in the Coast Guard for new cutters, helicopters, modernized shore infrastructure, maritime surveillance systems, and much more. What benefit will these additional resources bring to the Coast Guard's law enforcement efforts, and how quickly will we see these benefits realized? Admiral Barata. Chairman, it is a generational, maybe a historic change for the Coast Guard to get this type of windfall. And the Big Beautiful Bill, it's assets, the things that Ms. MacLeod talked about. It allows us to recapitalize across our cutter fleet, it allows us to add to our icebreaking fleet, which also--where the fish stocks are going, as well. Technology, autonomous systems, it allows us to build out Cape May and maybe a new training center to bring more Coast Guard people, which for us is the lifeblood of everything that we do. So thank you very much for the support of this subcommittee. We can't thank you enough. It is much needed, and we will put that money to good use. I will tell you, the Coast Guard is 100 percent focused on obligating those funds in a timely manner and putting those assets in place. Mr. McDowell. Ms. MacLeod, to you, the Offshore Patrol Cutter is one of the Service's highest acquisition priorities. When delivered, this new class of ships will play an important role for the Coast Guard's law enforcement efforts. Can you discuss very quickly the importance of this program and your assessment of its progress? Ms. MacLeod. Yes, the Coast Guard has identified this as one of its most important programs. The progress has been slow, challenging, and underwhelming at times. They continue to struggle with this acquisition, and I think taking the lessons learned from this acquisition could be applied to future funds, including those authorized in the Big Beautiful Bill that you mentioned. Mr. McDowell. Thank you. My time has expired. I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Larsen for 5 minutes. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to start with Admiral Barata, and I don't need a lot of detail, but I think it is important for us to understand authorities under which Coast Guard is boarding these oil tankers. If you could, just briefly discuss the right-to-visit boarding as--but that only gives you the legal authority to board. But what is the authority under which you are acting in order to board? I think that is important to understand, as well. Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, briefly, we are using customary international law, first and foremost, to conduct the right-of-visit boardings. And once aboard, if we can establish that the vessel is without nationality, we can either get flag- state consent, or in the cases that they are without nationality, we can determine that they are under U.S. jurisdiction. And so that is kind of our opening point---- Mr. Larsen of Washington [interposing]. Yes. Admiral Barata [continuing]. To use title 14, sir. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Sure, yes, title 14. But on that point, to establish the nationality, is it like pulling them over because of a broken tail light and then you check on nationality? Or is that established first by the State Department in an interagency process and then you target that particular tanker? Admiral Barata. So for us, on the high seas, we do this very routinely on almost every vessel that is out there, multiple countries, multiple vessels. It is under the law of the sea. It is customary for us to engage either a right of approach or a right of visit and just determine what the vessel status is, what the nationality is, what their intentions are. In these cases, we have gotten some indication that their nationality is not accurate by either a database that we have, intelligence background that we have, working with the Department of State, and working with their own flag states. We are seeing that there is a lot of these tankers that are just using false flags without notifying the flag state. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, and not to get into detail because you probably can't here--maybe we can talk to you all later in a different setting--but there is use of Coast Guard and other intelligence assets to maybe narrow the focus a little bit so it is not every tanker, it is specific tankers? Admiral Barata. Yes. And obviously, we are cued by the fact that these tankers are operating in Venezuela. And every vessel should be operating in its automatic identification system, and every vessel should be flagged so that we can tell these things. And yes, we work through our intelligence and other open source means to just determine that there is some anomalous information that is being provided. And so that does kind of trigger us. Mr. Larsen of Washington. I just want to establish that, because you kind of do the same thing if you are doing drug interdiction or migrant interdiction or---- Admiral Barata [interrupting]. Absolutely. Yes, Ranking Member. Mr. Larsen of Washington. It is the same process. Admiral Barata. The same process. Mr. Larsen of Washington. This focus is on these tankers. Admiral Barata. Yes, absolutely. Mr. Larsen of Washington. I don't want to simplify it too much. I am sure there's nuance, but---- Admiral Barata [interrupting]. Yes, sir. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, thanks. Ms. MacLeod, I want to shift a little bit. So yes, we provided the Coast Guard $25 billion over the next 10 years through the reconciliation bill, and Coast Guard exceeded recruitment goals last year, I think, as well. So there are platforms, there are people. But over the last couple of years, the Coast Guard has retrenched a little bit in terms of sites, in terms of--because of recruitment, because of the lack of people, to move people away from current Coast Guard sites and assets from them. Is there a plan now that we are going to build replacement and additional platforms and recruit more people--have you looked at whether or not the Coast Guard has a plan now to move back to places that they have retrenched from over the last couple of years? We have got to put these people somewhere and these platforms somewhere. Ms. MacLeod. Yes, we have certainly examined the funding related to the bill, as well as Force Design 2028. It is ambitious for the Coast Guard to be able to achieve those goals. We haven't seen from the Coast Guard yet specific plans on how it will execute that funding or achieve those recruitment goals. Certainly, they have made efforts in expanding their recruitment efforts through the different offices and different technologies, which is encouraging, but we haven't seen them measure the results of those efforts yet. That remains an open recommendation from us, and so we will wait and see what happens there. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Right. Ms. MacLeod. Yes. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Admiral Barata, back to you with the same question. You have gotten the dollars for the platforms, and we will watch, we will definitely be watching that. You are recruiting. But under Admiral Fagan--those were all great goals, and you are achieving them as well--but she also had to take actions because of the lack of recruitment previously to shrink the footprint a little bit of the Coast Guard. What is the plan to put people and platforms back to those places? Admiral Barata. So, as part of Force Design 2028, I think as Ms. MacLeod mentioned, it is ambitious, but we are excited about it. We have reorganized the Coast Guard in several ways, which includes a group to focus just on people, which includes recruiting. And as you hinted at, over the last few years, we have seen a 3,000-person shortfall across the enlisted workforce. And so the first thing we need to do is get those folks into the Service and then expand by another 15,000. And so those are part of our goals to use to crew those ships, to return those stations where we had to take some of those operators and place them elsewhere for our most demanding needs. But we have a plan in place. We are happy to come and talk to the subcommittee about what that plan looks like, sir. Mr. Larsen of Washington. Great. Thank you very much. Mr. McDowell. The chairman now recognizes Mr. Webster for 5 minutes. Mr. Webster of Florida. I thank the witnesses for being here today and your testimony. I really appreciate that. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate that, too. Admiral Barata, the Coast Guard began to ramp up the deployment of unmanned aircraft systems, and I guess it was for a cost-effective approach to provide persistent airborne surveillance capabilities across the National Security Cutter fleet. And it has validated a mission need for land-based UAS to significantly enhance ocean surveillance in support of the Service's operations. How is the Coast Guard currently utilizing drones as a kind of a force multiplier for the agency's law enforcement missions? And how do we hope to see them in the future, use them in the future, how do we use to progress what has already started? Admiral Barata. Congressman, good morning. Good to see you as always, sir. So the Big Beautiful Bill gives us quite a bit of funding for all types of autonomous systems which we kind of break down into long range, mid range, and short range. Some of the short- range drones we have found to be great force multipliers at a lot of our local patrol boats and our shore-based units to do any number of things, especially, for instance, where we don't have an air station or we don't have a helicopter or an aircraft available to us to help with search and rescue in some cases, to help with pollution response. When I was the district commander down in the Heartland District, we had a wellhead that had let loose, and it was spilling oil, and we worked with NOAA to put drones in the air to kind of reposition the boom--as the oil was spilling and was progressing into the marsh--to protect sensitive areas. So if you think about, you know, just a local unit arriving in a government vehicle and not having the ability after--for instance, on the Mississippi River, where there are a number of barges that maybe have crashed and sunk, to kind of put a drone in the air and take a look and see what the expanse of that is, what the damage looks like to the bridge and other things. Those are the type of things that if we put this technology in the hands of some of our innovative young people who are really excited about this--you know, we have a program where we actually qualify folks from the unit, and so, many of these units are--these kids are volunteering. There are 8 or 10 kids at a time who are--I say kids; these are petty officers who are 27, they are much younger than me, so--but they are taking the ball and running with it, and we are pretty excited about that capability. Mr. Webster of Florida. So they are in the air, and they can see and you can see what is going on? Is there more to it than that? Is there more than just reconnaissance by them, or is there some other use? Admiral Barata. No, Congressman, we are using it to inform our operations. And so, for us, awareness informs the operational commander and allows us to deploy assets, change tactics, reach out to agencies in some cases, or even call assets off if we can determine that--for instance, we get a lot of false reports about things, you know, hey, maybe there is a kayak floating out in the middle of the bay. Instead of launching a helicopter, we might be able to launch something like a drone, look and see that it is something that is just a piece of flotsam that does not really have somebody on it, and kind of discount that as a SAR case. Mr. Webster of Florida. So how would the development of a robust UAS program allow the Coast Guard to better accomplish its mission? Multipart mission, actually. Admiral Barata. Congressman, it is going to reap us untold benefits, I think. We have talked about the far reaches of the Pacific, we have talked about vessels trying to track those things. We are using our autonomous systems in any number of ways. One of our programs called Coastal Sentinel, which is going to be an array of radars and ISR systems, it is going to have unmanned waterborne systems, air systems. That is going to allow us to have pervasive maritime domain awareness and understand the threats that are on the border, conduct search and rescue, sea pollution spills, all of these things. And so, for us, that is the future. And what we want to do is allow those systems to do some of the work where we might not need a human being, and free up the Coast Guard experts to do just what only they can do. That is our goal. Mr. Webster of Florida. Director MacLeod, GAO reported--it concludes that while intended to be of short duration, the Coast Guard has sort of surged operations to counter maritime migration surges for 3 years. To do this, they have reallocated vessels and aircraft personnel. What is the long-term solution? [Pause.] Mr. McDowell. Please answer quickly, and---- Mr. Webster of Florida [interrupting]. Oh, I am sorry. Yes, I didn't mean to say Rear Admiral Barata. Mr. McDowell. You can go ahead and answer. Ms. MacLeod. Okay, okay. I think, if I heard you properly, you were talking about the surges and the Coast Guard efforts related to that. I think each of the Coast Guard efforts in times of surge, whether it is a migrant surge or a response to drug flow, just recognizing that there are tradeoffs among these missions. And as the Coast Guard turns its efforts to one, something is happening in the other area. And being able to understand the impact of those efforts on the other missions is an important effort for the Coast Guard. Thank you. Mr. McDowell. Thank you. I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral Barata, prior to the invasion of Venezuela, we saw confirmed reports that U.S. military forces carried out strikes on vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific that the Department of Defense said were involved in drug trafficking. Given that maritime drug interdiction and law enforcement are a core mission of the United States Coast Guard, can you explain to this committee how the Coast Guard and the Department of Defense coordinated on these actions, especially in terms of legal authorities and ensuring compliance with international and United States law, or not? Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, in regards to the kinetic strikes on the drug smuggling vessels down there, I would have to refer that to the Department of War. The Coast Guard was not part of those actions at all. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Barata, we have received reports that the Coast Guard has experienced a degradation in information-sharing from traditionally reliable international partners. How important are our allies in the success of drug interdiction in the long run? Admiral Barata. They are vital to our success, and I think many people on the subcommittee, members of the subcommittee, are familiar with JIATF South, the work that is done out of Key West, the Joint Interagency Task Force down there led by the military and coordinated. Sixty percent of the work that is done in JIATF is assisted by partners, whether that's bilateral agreements, joint boardings, or assisted boardings. For us, the Coast Guard, title 14 is the key for a lot of this drug enforcement that takes place as a potential violation of U.S. law. And so, as Ms. MacLeod has highlighted, sometimes we do not have the cutters in place to do that, but we can do some of these boardings with a tactical law enforcement team. And so we get a lot of assistance from our partners in doing this type of work. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I have had the opportunity to visit the JIATF South and have witnessed firsthand all the work that is being done down there. Ms. MacLeod, your statement mentions 20 open recommendations since 2023 pertaining to maritime law enforcement operations. Which recommendations are the most urgent to improving the Coast Guard's ability to interdict drugs, interdict migrants, and thwart illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing? Ms. MacLeod. All of our recommendations are important, and I would just note that the Coast Guard has agreed with the vast majority of recommendations that we have been making in these areas. I think a couple of areas that it comes down to--and I will highlight just one--is data and information. So the Coast Guard needs better data to be able to make these decisions about mission tradeoffs. And by having such information, it could improve their performance, as mentioned, where the cutters are, where the people are doing these workforce analyses to understand the priorities amongst its limited workforce, and could assist in the surge operations when they do come. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I know that's like asking a parent, ``Pick your favorite child.'' Admiral Barata, would vessel safety, economic security, and national security improve if the flags-of-convenience system were abolished? Admiral Barata. Ranking Member, I think it's a difficult question. Like in the cases of the vessels that we are dealing with right now, these dark vessels, there is a difference between, say, an open registry and a false flag. In these cases, what we have found is four of the five vessels just were under a false flag, they either were not registered at all or they had not notified the country that they claimed to be flagged under that they were there. And so when we worked through the Maritime Operational Threat Response process, when we went back to the Department of State, they reached back to that country and just tried to validate the status the country was completely unaware that they had. Or the country had no registry that was open to other vessels. So, I think what we are seeing here in this case, there's about 100-200 shadow fleet tankers that have a connection to Venezuela. I don't think that would get after that problem. I think there are some ways to get after that issue. But if the vessels are not going to be held accountable, then the registry itself won't, because we are upholding--for us, for instance, the Coast Guard does a lot of work as a port state. We validate these vessels are inspected, that they have their documentation, and these things. The vessels that we are going aboard right now have nothing. They have all false documents, sir. Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time, so I am just going to read my last question to the record. If you could, answer it later. Admiral Barata, it has been reported that the Coast Guard is hiring vessel inspectors to assess and repair seized tankers. We know that the Service is already short 150 vessel inspectors, which has meant a less-than-ideal vessel inspection schedule for small passenger vessels. If you could--for the record, later--submit an answer to: How will the shortage, coupled with the new priority of inspecting seized tankers, affect the frequency of inspections of small passenger vessels? If you could answer that later, that would be great. [The preceding question for the record and response is on page 41.] Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. Mr. McDowell. I now recognize the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Mast, for 5 minutes. Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate it. Admiral, thank you for being here. Thank you for being here, ma'am. I want to stick with the ghost ships and maybe extend a little bit of the conversation that we were just having, understand a little bit more of the risk profile about these ghost ships that are illegally moving Iranian oil. So, just number one, when we talk about that risk profile, compare/contrast it to a traditional ship that you might board, check out their certifications, things like that in terms of spill probability, hull integrity, crew competency, things like that. Give me a brief compare and contrast to something that is a legal operating vessel. Admiral Barata. Well, again, we haven't seen many of these. These vessels we are seeing right now are probably the first couple that we have gotten aboard. But I will tell you, they are very---- Mr. Mast [interrupting]. Say that again. The first couple you have gotten aboard? Admiral Barata. Yes. Mr. Mast. Is that what you said? Yes. Admiral Barata. Yes. Typically, the shadow fleet operates between China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, Cuba. We don't access it. The U.S. Coast Guard doesn't normally see them because they are not allowed to enter U.S. ports. But the one in particular that we boarded, the skipper was extremely substandard. It was extremely overloaded. The cargo systems were not functioning properly. Mr. Mast. How overloaded? How substandard? Admiral Barata. Extremely, extremely. Yes, very substandard. They had loaded cargo into areas where they shouldn't, they are not normally allowed to load cargo. They pressed those up. But the cargo systems themselves were not working, the firefighting system was not operating properly. Just basic firefighting, lifesaving issues. Mr. Mast. It is fair to say these are not the newest, latest, and greatest? Admiral Barata. No, these are old. These are old ships. The value on these tankers is the cargo. The vessels themselves are not in good shape. Mr. Mast. Okay. Tell me about insurance carried on these, if they are moving oil and one of these ghost fleet vessels goes out there and has a spill versus something that is otherwise a normal operating vessel. Admiral Barata. As we have gotten aboard, all the documentation has been false. And so, everything that we would normally require on a tanker to even operate in the United States--insurance, P&I club, COFR, all of those things--we presume that they don't have it, and so we are treating it as if they don't. Mr. Mast. So you are saying these ghost fleet vessels, maybe they carry fraudulent documents, but they are nothing more than fraudulent in your experience? Is that---- Admiral Barata [interrupting]. What we have seen so far is that all the documents they have had are not in compliance with international standards. Mr. Mast. Now, my understanding is--and please correct me or educate me on this--it might be an--we might label it for our purposes an Iranian ghost fleet vessel. But that doesn't mean this is an Iranian-flagged ship. What is the difference between where they are flagged and where their actual beneficial ownership is? Where do you find that coming into play? Admiral Barata. What we have found is that they are making multiple claims of ownership, multiple claims of flags. So we do---- Mr. Mast [interrupting]. Where are those claims of ownership, typically? Admiral Barata. It has been varied. The flags that they have been claiming have been in West African countries that don't have the ability to validate those things on the international level, those type of things. The owners themselves are obscured to us. The vessels that have been seized by the Department of Justice, I would have to refer you to those if they have access to the owners. Mr. Mast. Distinguish between these terms, if you can-- again, help educate me on this. A vessel's registered owner versus the beneficial owner versus the operator versus the charterer. Walk me through those different terms and why they matter. Admiral Barata. I would have to get back to you on that, sir. We normally in the Coast Guard deal with the owner- operator, the primary representative of the vessel in order-- when we are taking official action. The nuance of some of those, I can get back to you on, sir. Mr. Mast. So would you categorize this as certainly an environmental issue that these ghost ships are operating, an environmental issue for the gulf? Admiral Barata. Well, we are working to mitigate it. I think the amount of cargo that is aboard some of the vessels-- these are 1,000-foot, very large crude carriers--VLCCs, as we call them--that are too large to enter into U.S. port. And so what we are doing is we are putting our marine inspectors aboard in order to mitigate that. We are working to put salvage experts aboard. We have tugs aboard. We have folks trying to work to fix the equipment aboard. Mr. Mast. So to summarize it--and if I miss something, let me know--but you said crews typically have a level of incompetence, or untrained, or just don't have the experience on these ghost fleets. That is fair to say? Admiral Barata. The crews themselves, I wouldn't want to categorize how they have been operating the vessels. I would say the vessels themselves are substandard. We have not evaluated the crews. Mr. Mast. Okay. Thank you for your time. My time has expired. Thank you for the answers. Admiral Barata. Thanks, Congressman. Mr. Mast. And all the best. Semper paratus. Mr. Ezell [presiding]. The gentleman yields. Ms. Strickland. Ms. Strickland. Oh, he's back. Thank you, Chairman Ezell and Ranking Member Carbajal, for holding this hearing. I first want to focus on force laydown and the Coast Guard's commitment to maintaining capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. A December 2025 Coast Guard report confirms that the Hawaii-homeported cutter Harriet Lane, which has been central to conducting maritime law enforcement and expanding maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific, will likely be relocated due to home port limitations. Rear Admiral Barata, can the Coast Guard commit to ensuring that critical Coast Guard assets remain in the Pacific? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning. Ms. Strickland. Good morning. Admiral Barata. So the Harriet Lane, obviously, is--they are located out there, have been doing tremendous work. We have been very happy with them, and we are trying to push as many cutters as we can into the Indo-Pacific. And so we are still working on that. The Harriet Lane will not leave the Pacific, we guarantee that. We are just looking for a place that suits the operations and the families that can accommodate her. Ms. Strickland. Great, thank you. And we must maintain a credible U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific to deter CCP coercion and honor our commitments to those nations. I am going to pivot a bit now, and I want to talk about the bigger picture of the Department of Homeland Security's actions. The Coast Guard operates under the jurisdiction of DHS. First of all, the American people deserve to feel safe wherever they are--at home, in their neighborhoods--and the work that you do is integral to that. This administration was voted in on the promise that it would deliver safety for all Americans. DHS broke that promise the moment they started marching into American cities and turning their guns on innocent citizens under the pretense of protecting communities. When people want to be part of the Coast Guard, there are strict recruiting standards. You have to pass a background check. You have to be qualified. The training is extensive. From what we are seeing with the latest recruiting efforts, that is not the case with ICE agents. At every turn, they are choosing the most reckless response possible, and then refusing to be held accountable for it. They took no accountability when a SWAT team dropped down from a Black Hawk and stormed Chicago in an apartment building raid that led to no criminal charges; no accountability when agents shot two people during a traffic stop in Portland; and no accountability whatsoever when a masked ICE agent shot a 37-year-old woman in Minneapolis in the face; no accountability when the administration then stonewalled State and local law enforcement trying to conduct a fair fact-finding investigation. Americans, regardless of political affiliation--Democrats, Independents, and Republicans--are outraged at this administration's complete overreach and assault on the rights of the American people. But this was never about immigration for them. This is domestic terrorism. American lives have become an afterthought to this administration's ultimate goal of scaring people, declaring martial law, and using ICE as the President's personal police force. They are going around Congress, they are disrespecting the rule of law, they are disrespecting our role as a check and balance. And the American people deserve so much better. I yield back, Mr. Chair. Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. Mr. Begich, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My questions are going to be directed to Rear Admiral Barata. How often are you seeing foreign vessels operate in ways designed to avoid enforcement against IUU, and how are they doing this? Admiral Barata. Congressman, quite often. It is kind of ubiquitous. They are doing it in a number of ways to kind of obfuscate where they are at. They don't identify themselves or they--we found that the technology to kind of project your location is very pervasive in other spots. And sometimes in some cases they are clumping in together. In other cases, what they do is they will take illegal catch to a mother ship and they will put it into a transshipment so that we don't know which vessel was loading it and those things. And so, in a lot of ways--and then they are landing it in countries that are friendly to them that need the money or need the catch, and so they will bring it in there. But those are-- we see it all the time. Mr. Begich. What would you say is the single biggest enforcement gap that you face in stopping illegal fishing in U.S. waters or near U.S. interests? Admiral Barata. In U.S. waters--and it's the same problem, I think, that we have in the rest of the world--is that you need to know where they are at. You need awareness of where those things are. And so, in the far reaches of the Pacific, some of the things that we are going to need is some satellite assistance in order to compare the location of those vessels against their actual location. And then we are going to need data and artificial intelligence to kind of help us suss out which vessels are operating illegally. Mr. Begich. When you are trying to measure whether you have been successful at inhibiting IUU activities, what are the metrics that you use to capture that? Is it boarding? Seizures? Disruption? How do you sort of characterize that? Admiral Barata. We look at it in a couple of different ways. Metrics are hard, but I think it depends on the fishing fleet. For instance, in the Gulf of America, where we are doing the lancha boardings down there near the Mexican border, and we have had luck prosecuting some of those operators under the Lacey Act just in the last year alone. We are measuring the deterrent effect there. And what we have seen is that prosecuting and having some of these mariners plead guilty has had a deterrent effect. In other locations out in the Pacific, the number of boardings we do, you know, can we spring upon them? Can we kind of shoo them out of other countries' EEZs? So those are better metrics for us and those bigger fleets and the far reaches. Mr. Begich. Now, as you may know, I am from the State of Alaska. We have more coastline than the rest of the United States combined in Alaska, a difficult area to patrol and monitor. But up in the Arctic, what would you think a credible deterrence presence would require? Admiral Barata. As you say, sir, we love Alaska, it is beautiful up there, but some of the most challenging conditions that we operate in for a number of reasons. The weather is one, but time, speed, distance is another one. And so, in answer to your question, I think we would need a couple of things. We need cutters up there, a presence. Presence matters, especially when our adversaries are up there. Aircraft, ISR, the ability to do that. We need some land-based stations and those things. And so the ability to be there when we need to be there--which I would think is year-round--at least we are getting there. But at least when vessels are there and when our adversaries are there, to know what they are doing and then to do something about it. Mr. Begich. Well, and I appreciate you saying that. As we have discussed already this morning, the budget reconciliation bill that passed last year has significant--historic, really-- investments in Coast Guard, both in terms of new vessels and in programmatic funding. And hopefully, we will be able to get some of that deployed in Alaska on a permanent basis to help you and your mission for deterring IUU fishing activities off of Alaska's coast. At the end of the day, Alaska provides 60 percent of the Nation's seafood catch, and we want to make sure that our fishing families and those who rely on them are well protected and they have a strong economic interest to continue to harvest that food off of Alaska's coast. So we appreciate your support in that mission. We love our Coast Guard, and we thank you for your service. And with that, I yield back. Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes of questioning. Mr. Garamendi. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I want to go in a different direction here. I was reading, Ms. MacLeod, your document, and it raises in my mind the very serious issue of maintaining the various vessels that the Coast Guard has. Noting the fall-off in availability that you so clearly put in your report, I want to move to the issue of: Where will these vessels be maintained? We have got a problem in California. The Mare Island facility is the oldest Navy base on the west coast, and there are four drydocks there. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard made a decision to not bring the icebreaker Healy to Mare Island, even though it was the low bid by over $1 million. They used a process called best value to jimmy up some sort of expenses that put the Mare Island drydock at a disadvantage. Now there needs to be a serious discussion, some of which I have already done with the Commandant and with the Coast Guard, about just what is this best value game that is being played. Going forward, it isn't going to do us any good to go back and debate the Healy, and whether it should or should not be at Mare Island. But Mare Island is a critical national asset for the Coast Guard, as well as for the U.S. Navy, and I don't like the game that has been played, and I want to make sure that the Coast Guard is open and honest about future opportunities for Mare Island to successfully bid for Coast Guard work. Quality and price are the key issue here. So apparently, Mare Island Dry Dock Company had the low price except for this best value game. So going forward, I want to be sure that the Coast Guard understands the critical nature of work being brought to Mare Island. Oh, by the way, the Alameda station is about 10 miles away, and so there is a nexus there. I am not asking you for this issue to be discussed today at this hearing, but I want to make it very clear that I do not like the way the Coast Guard has operated. There will be other bids and opportunities for Mare Island, as well as other facilities on the west coast. But the Coast Guard and the Navy must recognize that the Pacific is one very, very big ocean, and that the Coast Guard needs to make sure that all of the facilities available on the west coast, whether it is San Diego or the Northwest or California in the San Francisco Bay area, have an opportunity to bid. Now, with that, I want to go to one of the questions that has been on my mind forever, and that is the maintenance of the vessels. This does tie back to Mare Island and to other opportunities for maintenance programs. Ms. MacLeod, in your evaluation of the decline of availability of Coast Guard vessels, did you spend time looking at the maintenance issues, how the maintenance programs operate or don't operate? Could you please discuss that? Ms. MacLeod. Yes, we did in some ways. And we examined the issues around maintenance in terms of the workforce and obsolescence of parts, I would say, were two of our biggest areas that we found. Some of the cutters that are due for maintenance are being pushed to operate out in a surge operation due to the limited capacity of the assets and workforce shortages. And secondly, in terms of parts obsolescence, some of these cutters can't operate because of malfunctioning parts, and then they are taking the part from a different cutter---- Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Excuse me for interrupting. Is there a system within the Coast Guard to identify all of those issues, cutter by cutter, class by class? And in other words, is there a maintenance reporting system set up so that the Coast Guard knows what the problems are and what they then can do to solve the problem? Ms. MacLeod. We have a recommendation in that area. We found various systems, from the local level all the way up within the Coast Guard. Mr. Garamendi. Could you please provide me with detailed information on your evaluation, and the system or the lack of systems that the Coast Guard has, vessel class by vessel class? Thank you so very much. I yield back. Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. I recognize myself now for 5 minutes, and I want to thank you all for being here today and providing us with this valuable information. Admiral, last fall during Operation Pacific Viper, the Coast Guard seized more than 150,000 pounds of cocaine in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. This is more than 57 million potentially lethal doses. In November, Coast Guard cutter Stone broke the record for the most cocaine seized by a single cutter in a single patrol in Coast Guard history, offloading over 49,000 pounds of illicit narcotics worth $362 million. What do you give the credit to for these recordbreaking numbers? Admiral Barata. Chairman, good morning. Good to see you, sir. I think this is a result of, one, that we put some capacity down there and as a result of the President declaring that national emergency on the southern border, with a focus on illicit drugs and fentanyl. The other one is that we have gotten quite good at this, and I think what we have shown is that when we have the assets in place--an asset like the National Security Cutter that has an armed helicopter on the back of it, that has a law enforcement trained tactical team, the right small boats, communications, overhead satellites, ISR coordination with JIATF South and our partners--that we can really get after this problem set. Mr. Ezell. Good. What other law enforcement success has the Coast Guard seen, specifically in the Arctic? Admiral Barata. In the Arctic? We just talked with Mr. Begich about the importance of that area. I think, one example that comes to mind is last summer there were five Chinese research vessels that were operating on our extended continental shelf, and a combination of the Healy, the Waesche, and the newly commissioned Storis were able to challenge them under the rules-based order and then have them evacuate that area. Mr. Ezell. Very good. Chinese vessels tend to be the largest offenders of IUU fishing. How does the United States Coast Guard confront these vessels, given the aggressive Chinese Coast Guard? And what does the Coast Guard do to counter Chinese IUU fishing efforts? Admiral Barata. We undertake a number of ways. The first and foremost is our presence out there. We have 11 cutters out there. We have two more Fast Response Cutters that are making their way out to the Pacific. They are highly capable. We have also found that the Coast Guard is the right size to go to these small island nations. And familiarity with those folks, training them, bringing their shipriders aboard, selling them equipment in some cases so that they can operate themselves, but equipping them so that when the Coast Guard is not there, that they can take action on those Chinese fishing fleets as they see fit in their own backyards. Mr. Ezell. Very good. Ms. MacLeod, the GAO has completed its report examining the Coast Guard's ability to meet mission goals in drug and migrant interdictions, how migration surges impact other missions, and Coast Guard coordination with Federal partners. Can you walk us through these findings? Ms. MacLeod. Yes. So in our report that was issued today, we provided 10-year trends in drug and migrant interdiction, along with other Coast Guard missions. I think how it bears out is when the Coast Guard is focusing on one mission, it is taking away from the other missions. And so the balance of missions is a tricky position for the Coast Guard. When we found that they were not meeting their own performance metrics in the drug and migrant interdiction mission, that has to be looked at within the context of when they are shifting things to other missions. Without having the data to support where those metrics should be set or the context, it is difficult to understand exactly how they are laying out their assets and workforce to meet the performance metrics that they have established. Mr. Ezell. Thank you. What are the biggest take-aways on how the Coast Guard can improve mission performance in these areas, Ms. MacLeod? Ms. MacLeod. Yes, I think our information comes down to being able to measure your performance in these areas, and that comes from the data that underlies the information that the Coast Guard is examining. Mr. Ezell. Thank you, and I yield back to Ms. Gillen. Ms. Gillen. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for your service to our country and for appearing here today. So I am proud to represent the extraordinary men and women of Coast Guard Station Jones Beach in the Fourth Congressional District of New York, where they conduct essential law enforcement missions along our South Shore and are a critical part of Coast Guard Sector Long Island Sound. So Long Island is home to some of the busiest and most congested waterways in the country. And unfortunately, when boaters are unlicensed or they break the law, accidents can happen and tragedies happen. In 2005, 11-year-old Brianna Lieneck was killed and her family was severely injured off the coast of Long Island when a boater without a license crashed into their vessel. According to 2023 Coast Guard data, 75 percent of boating deaths occur on vessels operated by individuals who have not received boating safety training or boaters who are unlicensed. I am a cosponsor of bipartisan legislation named in Brianna's memory to require the Coast Guard to study and report to Congress on recreational vessel operator education and training. Rear Admiral, what are the steps that the Coast Guard is currently taking to reduce accidental boating deaths and to deter individuals from operating vessels without required licenses and trainings? And how can we in Congress help you serve that mission further and reduce deaths? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good morning, and thank you for recognizing our men and women at Station Jones Beach and Sector Long Island Sound, a really, really beautiful part of the country, part of the birthplace of the Coast Guard up there in the Northeast District. A very complex problem set. There are so many recreational boaters that are out there. We take a lot of steps working with not only our own Coast Guard Auxiliary volunteer force, but also all the boating law administrators at the local level to administer grant funds to educate as many boaters as possible. For us, that is lifesaving work. We call that preventative SAR. If we can get somebody out there, if we can educate a boater, have the right equipment aboard the vessel, we think they have a chance to get home. If they know how to do a voyage plan, 9 times out of 10, we can go find them with the equipment that we have. And if we start adding in personal locator beacons, we can put a helicopter right on top of your head, and that is our goal, from the equipment standpoint. From the education standpoint, we work closely with the States. And obviously, we are a maritime country. People love their boats. To require licenses has always been a very, very complex question. But educating as many people as we can is a part of our mission. Ms. Gillen. Thank you. Thank you. And just before last year, Federal law limited the Coast Guard's ability to go after bad actors by requiring that drug smugglers be on board a vessel while the crime was committed. This hindered the Coast Guard's ability to go after operators of unmanned or autonomous vessels, or criminals who stow drugs on ships without the knowledge of the crew. I was proud to join my Republican colleague, Congressman Addison McDowell, to co-lead and help pass bipartisan legislation into law last year to clarify that the focus should be on the location of the crime, regardless of the location of the criminal. The bill also requires the Coast Guard to make naloxone available on all Coast Guard installations, including Station Jones Beach. Again, Rear Admiral, this question is for you. Can you explain how these commonsense changes will strengthen the Coast Guard's ability to go after bad actors, fight drug trafficking, and save lives? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, for us, any opportunity, any authority that allows us to continue to prosecute these cases is welcome and is useful to our effort. And from the standpoint of the drug smugglers themselves, to get after the transnational criminal organizations at their very heart, in many cases, some of the crewmembers aboard are the poorest, they are the least complicit part of the crime. And so, I think for us to put that in place so that we can go after the real masterminds of these crimes, and that will give us an opportunity to really impact their funds, revenues, as well as them, putting them in jail at some point. Ms. Gillen. Thank you. I don't have much time, Ms. MacLeod. I just wanted to ask you--thank you for your very thorough report. It seemed like a theme of it was that you need more staffing, you have a real shortfall. Would you be able--I will put my question in the record. If you could, just give us some advice on how Congress can support you to increase staffing levels and support the Coast Guard. I would love to have that from you, thank you. [The preceding question for the record and response is on page 42.] Ms. Gillen. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. Van Drew for his round of questioning. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman. I love the title of this hearing: ``Drugs, Thugs, and Fish.'' Who would put that--if you weren't involved in the Coast Guard or one of these industries, you wouldn't know exactly how that all comes together. But it is good to see both of you again. I appreciate you being here. Just to go over a few things that have been touched on, we know the Coast Guard does what nobody else can do: enforces the law at sea, defends our maritime border, defends our legitimate commerce, defends the fishing industry. People don't realize very often that are not involved in this process how important that piece of it is, too. We have had a record number of drug interdictions, as you know, and the Coast Guard is being asked to do more than ever was asked in this area. And by the way, I wanted to emphasize, it was important. I heard some other Members mention some concerns they had. Once the drugs are in our children's bodies, we have already lost, we have got a problem. Forgetting the financial aspect of what it does to America, the billions upon billions of dollars in treatment, in social work, in medical care, in lost hours of work and a job, of destroying people's lives. So it is up to us to ensure that before that gets into America, that we stop it, whether it is on land, whether it is on sea, whether it is drug cartels, whether it is corrupt politicians. I applaud what is happening when we are working hard to prevent this from coming over. I do not see how anybody can ever defend drug cartels or those that would poison, especially, the young people of this great Nation. So the work that you do in that area is important. All of it is important. It is all important. But that is particularly at this time. It is good to see you all again, like I said. There are some asset gaps still, and we are doing better, and record amounts of money are coming into the Coast Guard, and that is good. Finally, for God's sake, finally. How many years have we been in this very committee room talking about this? What could we do, if anything, to even increase success in drug interdiction? Are there some areas that you think we are still not addressing as well as we could? Both for you to answer that question. Rear Admiral, why don't we start with you? Admiral Barata. Congressman, so for us, I think it comes down to the assets and the people, and I think the Big Beautiful Bill is a great start to that. The Coast Guard has got to come through on our obligation to deliver these assets and to build out the shore infrastructure like Cape May so that we can bring more recruits through and man these---- Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. And if I could just jump in for a second, because I have always got to say this, what is it, 85 percent of all the recruits are trained in Cape May, New Jersey? It happens to be in my district. And we are going to do amazing things there, as you know. Thank you. Admiral Barata. We may have to recalculate the number based on the number of people we are moving through there right now, Congressman. So---- Dr. Van Drew [interposing]. Okay. Admiral Barata. But I think that is one. The other thing I would say is, for us, the Big Beautiful Bill is a start. There is a lot of acquisitions money that is in there. There is some depot-level maintenance to avoid going into the same cycle-- that Ms. MacLeod helps us highlight--of maintenance. We need a lift in our annual budget in order to maintain--pay for the personnel, the sustainment, the maintenance, and the re- equipping. As software goes obsolete, as parts go obsolete, we need that continued support from the Congress, as well. Dr. Van Drew. So Chairman, that is something we might keep in mind and work--all of us together--on that issue. And we always hear all these terrible things about the Big Beautiful Bill. I don't agree, and I am trying not to be partisan here. Record amounts of money going into the Coast Guard and many other areas, as well, including our airports, FAA, et cetera. So I think that there is a lot of good there, as well. When you say, real quickly, you might need to recalculate with the numbers going through as far as training, could you just give me a brief snapshot? Admiral Barata. So last year, we put about 5,600 people through. Our annual throughput is normally about 4,200, and we had been historically low the last several years before that. So, as we build out Cape May, we put new gyms, new barracks, and more things---- Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. Again, let me thank you so much. Chairman, just so we know, under this administration, the work that we have all done where we had--basically, folks were demoralized, they weren't joining, and now we have people coming back to the Coast Guard and our military branches. I am proud to be part of it and joining up, and with these record numbers of increases all across the board, including in the Coast Guard. And that is why I wanted you to just articulate that. And finally--and then I know I have to stop, I have no time left--the CVC policy letter, the--how it impacts our fishing industry, please do not forget about that. I am like a dog on a bone. It matters to our fishermen. Admiral Barata. Congressman, we will give you an update on that. I think we have some good news for you. Dr. Van Drew. Good. I appreciate that. Will you contact my office? Admiral Barata. Absolutely. Dr. Van Drew. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ezell. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes Ms. Scholten for 5 minutes of questioning. Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Chair Ezell and Ranking Member Gillen, Carbajal, and welcome to our witnesses. The Coast Guard serves as an integral role in enforcing maritime law, including detecting and intercepting illicit activities and substances. Notably, I would like to commend the Coast Guard for recently intercepting a Russian vessel linked to Hezbollah's illicit financing network. This is exactly the kind of topnotch work we expect from our fearless Coasties, and you made us proud in that mission. It is no surprise that I think the Coast Guard is the best at what it does. Just last year, the Service broke its drug interdiction record, seizing over half a million pounds of narcotics. Simply put, the Coast Guard carries out its law enforcement duties well, and intercepts these harmful drugs better than any other entity. While fulfilling this mission, the Coast Guard also takes the suspected drug smugglers into custody. Typically, the Federal prosecutors at the Department of Justice then leverage these cases to dig up intelligence about the larger drug operation, ultimately limiting the flow of drugs into our community. As a former DOJ attorney myself, I am deeply concerned about the fact that Attorney General Bondi has directed prosecutors to stop bringing charges against low-level offenders. Now we are seeing individuals captured by the Coast Guard being repatriated. Rear Admiral Barata, can you speak to how important these Federal investigations are for information gathering? Additionally, please touch on how does the Coast Guard approach taking suspected smugglers into custody--their approach to doing that, how does that better serve our national security interests rather than killing the traffickers in the water, as we have unfortunately seen the Department of Defense do? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, so the counterdrug mission, that part of it, once we are doing the prosecution, we follow that normal process through the Maritime Operational Threat Response, the MOTR process. Ms. Scholten. Yes. Admiral Barata. We go back to the Department of Justice. And in some cases, if their policy changes, as it has recently, there is still intrinsic value in us getting these drugs off the street---- Ms. Scholten [interposing]. Yes. Admiral Barata [continuing]. As has been highlighted here, and then conducting those interviews with them, going through the materials that they have available to them, the cell phones that they have aboard, and using that to help disrupt the flow of drugs as they come in. We also take biometrics off the smugglers. And so, whether or not they are put back into the system or they are prosecuted, those drugs are not making their way to the street. There is a deterrent effect to some of the kinetic strikes that are going on in some of the drug smugglers that we have seen. Whether that is going to be short term or long term remains to be seen. Ms. Scholten. But the kinetic strikes, the killings--I mean, let's be clear here--you are not collecting biometrics from those individuals or getting additional detailed information about their plans, as you would when you are arresting other individuals. Admiral Barata. We are not. Ms. Scholten. My next question: While drug and migrant interdiction are clearly critical parts of the Coast Guard's mission, I also want to ensure that Congress' unprecedented investment in the Service also supports its other functionalities. Back home in Muskegon and Grand Haven, also known as Coast Guard City, U.S.A., the Coast Guard search and rescue operations are always top of mind for families who come to enjoy the beach or, even when they are not supposed to, climb Lake Michigan's beautiful ice formations. Rear Admiral Barata, with a reinvigorated push towards its law enforcement efforts, how will the Coast Guard ensure there isn't a disinvestment in other mission-critical areas, particularly as the Service is about 8 percent short of enlisted personnel needs right now? Additionally, can you ensure that stations like those in my district will not be closed with the current administration's emphasis on drug seizures? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, good news on the recruiting front. I think our ranks are continuing to swell as we bring people through Cape May. So I think that is, for us, how we restaff some of the stations that we had to destaff, we are making decisions on that right now. But obviously, the Great Lakes, our lifesaving mission will not go away. The Commandant has been very clear that that is our touchstone, that is our North Star, and we will--we are committed to that mission and---- Ms. Scholten [interposing]. Fantastic. Admiral Barata [continuing]. To the people of the Great Lakes. Ms. Scholten. And our stations in Grand Haven and Muskegon are safe? Admiral Barata. Yes, absolutely. Ms. Scholten. Fantastic. Okay, west Michiganders and citizens--oh, I recognize I am running out of time. We are having too much fun here, so--oh, thank you, thank you. Okay, great. I will get to my last question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. West Michiganders and citizens across the Nation rely on Federal agents and servicemembers to thoughtfully and carefully fulfill their law enforcement duties, a responsibility I know Coasties do not take lightly. I wonder--you know, last week, we watched in horror as Renee Good, a mother, a U.S. citizen who was shot and killed by an ICE agent. A thorough Federal investigation is absolutely necessary to provide Renee Good's three children and her community with the answers that they need as they grieve this tragedy. Rear Admiral Barata, while I would never ask you to speak on behalf of another Federal agency, can you please reassure American citizens that the Coast Guard has a clear use of force policy? We know that oftentimes the Coast Guard is called in to situations such as this, as well. And further, can you please touch on how the Coast Guard trains its servicemembers to best protect themselves and civilians while carrying out law enforcement activities? Admiral Barata. Congresswoman, thanks for the opportunity to kind of highlight how some of our law enforcement specialists. And I think what we saw over the last month or so on some of these Venezuelan tankers where we have had some of our high- end operators going aboard, and we have also seen our tactical law enforcement teams, but all the way down to our maritime law enforcement specialists around the country, they are trained in a standardized way. They are trained in our use of force policy, and for us, we are very proud of the work that they do and our interactions with the public. Ms. Scholten. Thank you. Thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Ezell. The gentlelady yields. Admiral and Ms. MacLeod, I want to thank you for being here today. Admiral, I want to encourage you to use the appropriated funds that have been given to the Coast Guard. And the next time I see you, I am going to ask you, so make sure that you go after that money. And one other thing I would like to say is, I was very much responsible for getting rid of the low bid, and I would encourage the Coast Guard to continue to use the best opportunities for all their work getting done, because so many times we have seen over the years a low bid is not the best bid. So continue to get the best job done so we can have the best ships and everything fixed in a timely manner. Admiral Barata. Yes, Chairman, and we look forward to seeing you at the commissioning of the Olivia Hooker later this month. Mr. Ezell. Yes, sir. I want to thank you all again for being here today. Are there any further questions by any other Members? You sure, Ms. Scholten? Okay. Seeing none, that concludes our hearing today. I would like to thank each one of our witnesses for your testimony. This subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] Appendix ---------- Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Rick Larsen Question 1. Admiral Barata, how is the Coast Guard ensuring that the IUU fishing mission is a priority given the current strain on resources? Answer. We continue to conduct all of our missions, including IUU fishing, to protect U.S. national security interests and counter IUU fishing operations. For example, Coast Guard Cutter Harriet Lane recently completed an 81-day patrol and exercised bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements with Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and the Republic of Marshall Islands. With these partner nations, Harriet Lane completed 31 fisheries boardings resulting in 20 violations of their domestic laws by foreign-flagged fishing vessels. Post-Hearing Questions for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal Question 1. Admiral Barata, during the hearing, I asked about vessel inspectors but did not have enough time left for an answer. It has been reported that the Coast Guard is hiring vessel inspectors to assess and repair seized tankers. We know that the Service is already short 150 vessel inspectors, which has meant a less-than-ideal vessel inspection schedule for small passenger vessels. How will the shortage, coupled with the new priority of inspecting seized tankers, affect the frequency of inspections of small passenger vessels? Answer. The Coast Guard does not anticipate any change in the frequency of small passenger vessel inspections. Question 2. Admiral Barata, in response to Ranking Member Larsen's question during the hearing, you stated that the Coast Guard will be looking ``to return those stations where we had to take some of those operators'' in regards to the 15,000 enlisted personnel recruiting goal and restaffing stations impacted by FY24 and FY25 Force Realignment. Question 2.a. Can you elaborate more on what stations could see a return to previous staffing levels or operating status? Answer. As we move ahead with Force Design 2028, we are examining the entire Coast Guard force structure and posture and our operating concepts to determine future need. For example, we are in the process of restoring Station Pascagoula, MS, on the Gulf Coast to full response operations this year. Question 2.b. Does the Coast Guard plan to return all Force Realignment impacted stations to full operational and staffing levels prior to FY24? Answer. No. We continue to evaluate each location based on operational demands, our recent recruiting successes, and planned workforce growth. Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Rear Admiral David C. Barata, Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and Capabilities, and Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Laura Gillen Question 1. Admiral Barata, in response to Ranking Member Larsen's question during the hearing you stated that the Coast Guard will be looking ``to return those stations where we had to take some of those operators'' in regards to the 15,000 enlisted personnel recruiting goal and restaffing stations impacted by FY24 and FY25 Force Realignment. Does this include Station Jones Beach? Answer. The Coast Guard has not made any decisions regarding Station Jones Beach. As we move ahead with Force Design 2028, we are examining the entire Coast Guard force structure and posture and our operating concepts to determine future need. Post-Hearing Question for the Record to Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office, from Hon. Laura Gillen Question 1. Ms. MacLeod, during the hearing I asked about Coast Guard staffing shortages but was unable to get an answer in the remaining time. Following up, could you provide some advice on how Congress can support an increase to staffing levels and support the Coast Guard? Answer. The Coast Guard needs to fully analyze its entire workforce to identify its needs. GAO has made a number of recommendations that the Coast Guard conduct adequate workforce planning (GAO-20-223). While the Coast Guard has agreed with longstanding GAO recommendations and increased its workforce planning analyses from 4 percent to almost 27 percent of its workforce, the Service still had not conducted workforce planning for approximately 73 percent of its workforce as of June 2025. If increased staffing levels are a priority, Congress could direct the Coast Guard to fully analyze its workforce needs within a specified timeframe, which could help the Service avoid unnecessary overlaps or gaps in critical skills and capabilities needed for a modern workforce. For example, in November 2019 we reported that the Coast Guard might not have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and number of operations conducted by its deployable specialized forces (GAO-20-33). In April 2025, GAO reported that even with increased recruiting, the Service was approximately 2,600 servicemembers (8.5 percent) short of its enlisted workforce target at the end of fiscal year 2024 (GAO-25-107869). Without adequate workforce planning, the Coast Guard lacks assurance that it has the right mix of personnel--who have capabilities needed to combat maritime threats--in the right units. [all]