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- SECURING OUR SKIES: OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION CREDENTIALS [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] SECURING OUR SKIES: OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION CREDENTIALS ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC ASSETS OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 3, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-103 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform _____________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 23-402 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ________________________________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK, MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Massachusetts BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director Michael Kiko, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets Ari Wisch, Counsel Michael Ding, Counsel Willie Marx, Clerk ------ Subcommittee on Transportation & Public Assets JOHN L. MICA Florida, Chairman MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois, Ranking JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR. Tennessee Member JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky MARK DESAULNIER, California GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin, Vice BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania Chair C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on February 3, 2016................................. 1 WITNESSES Mr. Darby LaJoye, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Operations, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Oral Statement............................................... 5 Written Statement............................................ 8 Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Oral Statement............................................... 17 Written Statement............................................ 19 Ms. Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation Oral Statement............................................... 32 Written Statement............................................ 34 Ms. Kathleen M. Carroll, Vice President, Government Affairs, HID Global (On Behalf of the Security Industry Association ``SIA'') Oral Statement............................................... 38 Written Statement............................................ 40 APPENDIX TSA's responses to the Committee's Questions for the Record, Submitted by Chairman Mica..................................... 58 TSA Warehouse Information by Quarter FY12, Submitted by Chairman Mica........................................................... 71 SECURING OUR SKIES: OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION CREDENTIALS ---------- Wednesday, February 3, 2016 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Mica, Duckworth, and DeSaulnier. Mr. Mica. I call this hearing of the Transportation and Public Assets Oversight Subcommittee to order, and I welcome everyone this morning. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. We do expect some votes pretty quickly into the beginning of this session, so we'll try to get our opening statements made, and then we will hear from our witnesses. And the order will be after we've heard from all the witnesses to go back and have questions offered to the witnesses. So I'll start with my opening statement. And, again, welcome, everyone. We have an important responsibility in transportation oversight, and that's to make certain that the laws and all of the caveats that we set forth for public agencies, particularly for security and safety, are complied with by agencies. And the purpose of this hearing is 15 years after 9/11 we want to look at credentialing, we want to look at vetting of employees, and we want to look at what poses the biggest risk as far as security to our Nation's aviation system. Unfortunately, even 15 years--2001, this is 2016--15 years later we still seek a system that has not complied with the laws that we have passed multiple times with the requests we've had, and we see failures. One of the biggest failures is the most recent report that we had. And the DHS, Department of Homeland Security inspector general found that 73 individuals with links to terrorism passed TSA's vetting process. They were not properly vetted. These are people that work at our airports. These are people that have access to aviation equipment, to airplanes. Even TSA employees are not properly vetted. And, unfortunately, we've also found through that report that tens of thousands of incomplete records are even lacking full names. They had 14,000 immigrants listed in the database that did not have alien registration numbers, and 75,000 of these records lacked passport numbers. Again, this is not acceptable. When we passed the aviation security bill, and in subsequent legislation I tried to get a--we used to have a folded piece of paper for an airline pilot license. An airline pilot has access to the controls, flying the plane. I can tell you today, after numerous enactments of laws and edicts and meetings, we still have a pilot's license. And I borrowed this one from our ranking member. She's a pilot, Ms. Duckworth. We asked that the pilot's license have a photo of the pilot on it. The only photo on this license are the Wright brothers, Orville and Wilbur. Orville and Wilbur, I blew it up here. Okay? It's a joke. We asked that this also has some biometric capability. Anything in your wallet has a better electronic strip and capability than this license. Now, you say it's too difficult to do with the pilots that we have. This is a Mickey Mouse. This happens to be Minnie Mouse pass to Disney World, and I borrowed this. My wife was there the other day with her sister visiting. They take your thumb print, and they know when you enter, who enters, who leaves. This is Minnie Mouse, and this is Mickey Mouse, the FAA pilot license. So this is what we have, people going into the airports, people who, secure areas, either working for TSA or airports, not properly vetted, a responsibility of TSA. We have pilots who are flying planes, we don't know who they are. You cannot tell. Again, the frustration level has just peaked with me, because time and time again we've gone in, we've passed edicts, laws, for compliance. Now, this particular Mickey Mouse, Disney World pass has a biometric for a thumb, and that we're told by FBI it possibly could be compromised. But we have nothing. I've tried to get not only a thumb, but also iris, and it took a dozen years to get a standard in place. We'll find out where they are. Because between iris and thumb, which some European nations, some of the defense agencies, some nuclear facilities, some other government facilities, both in the United States and outside, have the capability to do both, and then we're sure of who is entering and who is leaving. But I'm telling you, this is one of the most frustrating things that we've seen. We've seen examples of employees with accomplices, for example, in New York, were able to smuggle more than 150 guns on half a dozen flights between Atlanta and New York City. Just a few weeks ago, the FAA suspended a program allowing safety inspectors to bypass TSA checkpoints after one was caught with a firearm in a bag he was carrying. So, again, we have examples of the Transportation inspector general opened nearly 70 pilot license fraud cases since 2011, just the last few years, including a foreign national who hacked into FAA's record system, stole the pilot's identity, and to illegally obtain a license and crashed an airplane. We had recently one of our oversight agencies found hundreds and thousands of IDs missing, not accounted for, SIDA badges, TSA badges, airport identity badges, badges that some of the officers wear, everything you could imagine stolen or missing or unaccounted for. None of this is acceptable. So we have other examples we can cite where it has been done, both the private sector, other government agencies, Canada to the north. And, again, I cited Disney World as a good example. So with that, I will yield to our ranking member, Ms. Duckworth, welcome her, and give her back her FAA Mickey Mouse pilot license with Orville and Wilbur. And you are much better looking than either of those dudes. I yield. Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm also much more alive as well. Mr. Mica. I visited their gravesite, and they are there, they're very much dead. Ms. Duckworth. Yes. Well, thank you so much for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I am somewhat astonished that the inspector general for the Department of Transportation could not find the time to be here. But we'll deal with that at another time. Our Nation's 440 airports are complex mazes of public and secure spaces. Chicago O'Hare, for example, which served more than 34 million passengers in 2014 alone, has 8 active runways, 189 gates, nearly 23,000 parking spaces, and approximately 167,000 square feet of concession space. In addition to being responsible for screening all passengers who come into the airport to board a flight, the TSA must oversee the procedures that airports implement to ensure that all controlled areas, such as passenger loading areas, cargo and baggage handling areas, and perimeter areas, are accessed only by authorized personnel. The first step in this process is identifying the individuals who should have access to secured areas and the level of access that they should be given. Now, our Nation has different models for issuing access credentials in the various transportation modes. In the aviation realm, each airport issues its own set of access credentials. And before an airport can issue a badge allowing access to a controlled area, a person to be credentialed must be screened against terrorism databases and pass a check of lawful authority to work in the United States conducted by the TSA using data collected by each airport. They must also complete a criminal history records check. This check is then conducted by the FBI using fingerprints and data collected by the airports, but the results are adjudicated by each individual airport to determine whether an individual has a disqualifying conviction. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General has repeatedly found numerous flaws and lapses in the management of this complicated, multiagency process. In 2011, the IG determined that airports issued badges to individuals despite omissions and even inaccuracies in the records used to conduct the background checks. In some cases, airports even issued badges to individuals who have not undergone security threat assessments at all. This finding was troubling enough, yet what truly concerns me is that just last year, 4 years after that very alarming 2011 finding, the DHS inspector general found that airports continue to lack accurate quality controls necessary to ensure criminal background checks are properly adjudicated. They found systemic problems with the credentialing process also. For example, unlike tourism screenings, which are continually updated on a near real-time basis, criminal records checks are conducted only once every 2 years. Between checks, airports have to rely on the willingness of the credentialed person to self-report any disqualifying arrests or convictions. This dangerous loophole must be closed. Officials have also uncovered airport employees illegally using stolen or fraudulent credentials. In 2007, more than 100 vendor employees at O'Hare were caught using stolen badges to access secured areas at the airport. In one instance, an uncleared individual rummaged through a box of active security badges to select one that looked most like him and matched his likeness. Other incidents have involved cleared personnel who misused the access granted to them. Following a 2014 incident involving the smuggling of over 100 guns, some of which were loaded onto multiple flights between Atlanta and New York, TSA asked its Aviation Security Advisory Committee to recommend ways of strengthening the control of employees' access to secured airport areas. This committee made 28 recommendations in April. Fewer than half of those have been implemented. America's airports are vital hubs that support billions of dollars in commerce and connect Americans from coast to coast. Yet, their importance also makes them high-value targets to our enemies that seek to harm Americans, weaken our economy, and instill fear throughout the populous. The front gates to our Nation's commercial aviation system must be worthy of all they defend. We must ensure that anyone passing through the gates, including airport employees, do not pose a threat to our Nation's security. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how TSA will strengthen its coordination with airport authorities across the country to implement critical security recommendations and dramatically enhance how we control access to secured areas. Congress has an important role to play in this effort, and if additional authorities over oversight actions are needed, I would like to use this afternoon to examine those potential reforms. Again, I thank the chairman for this very timely and important hearing, and I yield back. Mr. Mica. Well, thank you. And the title of this, I guess, was originally ``Securing Our Skies: Oversight of Aviation Credentials.'' I think a more fitting title, after hearing our opening statements, would be ``Aviation Credentials in Chaos.'' That might sum it up better. I thank you for your opening statement. And we will hold the record open, with your agreement, for 5 legislative days for members who would like to submit a written record. Mr. Mica. And as I said, we'll probably be in and out because of the vote schedule this afternoon. I would like to now recognize our panel of witnesses. I'm pleased to welcome Darby LaJoye, deputy assistant administrator for the Office of Security Operations at the Transportation Security Administration within DHS; the Honorable John Roth, who is the inspector general for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Margaret Gilligan, and she is the associate administrator for aviation safety at the FAA within the Department of Transportation. Welcome back. Kathleen Carroll, who is vice president of government affairs at HID Global, speaking on behalf of the security industry. So those are our witnesses. Some of you have been here before. I know the inspector general has. This is an investigation in an oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do swear in all of our witnesses. If you'll stand now, please, raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee of Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the truth? And all the witnesses, the record will reflect, answered in the affirmative. Let's go first, from TSA representative, Mr. LaJoye. You're welcome and recognized, sir. We do give you about 5 minutes. If you have additional information you want submitted for the record, just request and we'll put it in. Thank you. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF DARBY LAJOYE Mr. LaJoye. Good afternoon, Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss TSA's role in airport access control and aviation worker credentialing. TSA ensures airport access control is executed in partnership with airports, air carriers, and other Federal agencies. Collectively, we employ a risk-based approach that includes vetting and credentialing of airport and airline employees, development and execution of security plans, TSA inspections, assessments, and testing of access control, along with random screening of aviation workers. TSA requires airport and airline employees to successfully complete a security threat assessment prior to receiving an access credential to a secure area of an airport. The assessment includes a daily check against the Terrorist Screening Database, ensuring there are no known ties to terrorism when applicants apply for a credential and throughout the term of a worker's airport employment. TSA also verifies all individuals have lawful presence and have not committed a disqualifying offense in the past 10 years. TSA recognizes the value of conducting frequent criminal history record checks and has established a requirement for airports or airlines to do so every 2 years for all credential holders. Later this month, we will begin to a pilot a new FBI automated capability called Rap Back, providing employers with current information on criminal activity committed by credential holders. We recognize the value of automated access to additional intelligence-related data to inform TSA's vetting decisions. Working closely with DHS and the interagency partners, we've recently received approval for automated access to additional data addressing a key IG recommendation. We expect to begin receiving automated access in the coming weeks. While TSA is responsible for conducting vetting of aviation workers, airport operators are responsible for issuing and managing the credentials that allow an individual access to airports' sterile or secure areas. TSA requires airport operators to conduct recurring comprehensive audits of all airport-issued credentials and to maintain records of those audits for 1 year, subject to TSA inspection. Individuals who are responsible for reporting lost or stolen credentials, and airport ID systems must be capable of immediately denying access to any lost or stolen credentials. If the percentage of unaccounted-for or lost credentials reaches a certain threshold, the airport must reissue all credentials in that access category. TSA also requires airport operators to control entry to nonpublic areas of the airport and provide for detection and response to unauthorized presence in these controlled areas and to aircraft. To enforce these standards, our inspectors conduct assessments and audits and employ a progressive methodology that provides for a range of enforcement measures, from helping stakeholders with corrective actions to issuing fines. We've made progress in addressing the insider threat at America'sairports, which were highlighted by the Atlanta gun- smuggling incident in 2014. In addition to new vetting and regulatory measures, TSA and airport authority resources are deployed on a random basis to screen airport and airline workers throughout the day. In 2015, we increased the number of employee screenings from 2 million to nearly 13 million, and 90 percent of airports have reduced access points, resulting in nearly 500 fewer nationwide. Finally, under the leadership of Administrator Neffenger, TSA has renewed its commitment to security effectiveness. In late May, after reviewing the DHS IG's covert testing results, TSA began implementing a range of measures to address the shortfalls noted. We have refocused on our primary security mission, retrained our entire workforce, improved processes and procedures, enhanced our technology, implemented new measures of effectiveness, and analyzed systemic issues. Notably, we have begun to employ a doctrinal approach to counterterrorism leading to screening improvements across the agency. In January, we began to send all new hire officers to basic training at the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. This will drive consistency, professionalism, dedication, and connectedness to a common agency culture. Also, thanks to the help of Congress, we halted FY '16 staff reductions, providing appropriate officers to pursue screening effectiveness. The administrative intent is to place mission first, invest deliberately in a well-trained and disciplined workforce, and deliver mission excellence. We are confident that the agency is better positioned today to deter, detect, and disrupt threats against our aviation system, and we will continue to pursue a range of improvements to protect the traveling public. I am proud to represent TSA's hard-working nationwide team of officers, inspectors, explosive specialists, air marshals, and a dedicated network of professional staff who support them. I look forward to answering your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. LaJoye follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Mica. Thank you so much. We'll go now to the inspector general, Mr. Roth. You're welcome and recognized. STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH Mr. Roth. Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Duckworth, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here this afternoon to testify. Since 2004, we have published more than 120 audit and inspection reports about TSA's programs and operations. Our work includes evaluations of passenger and baggage screening, TSA PreCheck, acquisitions, equipment deployment, and maintenance. We have also used covert testing to determine whether unauthorized and potentially dangerous individuals and items could gain access to secure airport areas. The audit I am discussing this afternoon looked at how well TSA vets airport workers who have unrestricted access to secure areas of the airport. While we found that TSA's efforts to screen against the terrorist watch list were generally effective, we found that TSA did not have access to the complete terror watch list, known as the TIDE database. As a result, we identified 73 airport workers contained within that database who had been cleared to work in sensitive areas. TSA officials recognize that not receiving the full database represents a weakness in its program and informed us that TSA could not guarantee that it can consistently identify all questionable individuals without receiving these categories. Fortunately, at the request of DHS, the National Counterterrorism Center, working as part of the interagency process, has changed their policy as a result of this audit, and TSA now or will soon have access to this information. TSA is considerably challenged, however, when it comes to verifying workers' criminal histories and immigration status. First, TSA does not currently vet airport workers' criminal histories after they are initially cleared to work, but rely on individuals to self-report disqualifying crimes. As a result, individuals could lose their job if they report these crimes, so they have little incentive to do so. Under the law, the 450 commercial airports maintain the ultimate authority to review and determine whether an individual's criminal history contains disqualifying crimes under Federal law. TSA officials informed us that airport officials rarely or almost never document the results of their reviews electronically. Thus, TSA cannot systematically determine whether individuals have been convicted of disqualifying crimes. Instead, TSA performs annual manual inspections of commercial airport security operations, including the review of documents that aviation workers have submitted when applying for credentials. However, due to the large workload involved, particularly at larger airports, this inspection process looked at as few as 1 percent of all aviation workers' applications. We also found weaknesses in the verification process for an individual's authorization to work in the United States. Airport operators are required to ensure that aviation workers are authorized to work in the United States before they send their information to TSA for review. However, our review of TSA data showed that TSA has denied credentials to over 4,800 people because they could not show their lawful status to work. This occurred even after or even despite the fact that these individuals had been previously cleared by the airports as being authorized to work in the United States. Lastly, the records TSA uses for vetting individuals is not reliable, as it contains incomplete or inaccurate data. For example, we found that there were 87,000 active aviation workers who did not have Social Security numbers listed, even though Social Security numbers are the best way to match individuals to existing records. An additional 75,000 records listed individuals with active aviation worker credentials as citizens of non-U.S. countries, but did not include passport numbers. Of those records, over 14,000 individuals also did not list alien registration numbers. TSA did not have appropriate checks in place to reject such records from vetting. Without complete and accurate information, TSA risked credentialing and providing unescorted access to secure airport areas for a worker who could potentially harm the Nation's air transportation system. We made six recommendations in our report. TSA has agreed with all of our recommendations and has provided target completion dates for corrective action. We are satisfied with TSA's corrective actions to date, but we will continue to follow up on implementation of these actions. Mr. Chairman, thanks again for inviting me here to testify. I look forward to discussing your work with you and other members of the subcommittee. [Prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Mica. Thank you. We will recognize FAA representative Margaret Gilligan. Welcome back, and you're recognized. STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Chairman Mica. Thank you, Ranking Member Duckworth and members of the subcommittee. I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today on the issue of oversight of aviation credentials. I know this is an issue of significant interest to Chairman Mica because we have appeared on this issue under your leadership before, sir. The mission of the FAA is ensuring the highest levels of safety for the millions of passengers flying every day. The agency is charged with the oversight of airlines and aircraft manufacturers, the safety of our Nation's airports, and training our air traffic controllers. Taken together, we operate the safest and most efficient airspace system in the world. The FAA issues 23 different types of airman certificates, including those to pilots, mechanics, dispatchers, flight attendants, and air traffic controllers. There are more than 800,000 active pilot certificate holders alone. A pilot certificate is a credential attesting to the training and competence of the pilot. It is the same as a lawyer who must have evidence of admission to the bar or a doctor who is board certified in a specialty. In all these cases, the credential is not used as identification media, and it does not impart security access to courtrooms, to operating rooms, or to airports. A pilot never uses his or her pilot certificate to gain access to airport areas. Instead, he or she uses the security credential issued by the airport, as required by TSA. Since 2002, FAA has taken actions to enhance the security of pilot certificates. We require pilots to carry a valid government-issued photo ID in addition to a pilot certificate whenever they're flying. This allows an FAA inspector or others to confirm both the pilot's identity and his or her pilot qualification. The FAA phased out paper certificates and incorporated tamper- and counterfeit-resistant features, including microprinting, a hologram, and a UV-sensitive layer. In 2010, FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to require a photo on pilot certificates and to improve the process for getting a student pilot certificate. While we were preparing that final rule, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act required that the pilot certificate accommodate fingerprints, iris, and comply with specific security standards. Unfortunately, our 2010 proposal did not include those security requirements, and to allow the pilot community as well as the general public to comment on the full statutory mandate, we needed to draft a new proposal. However, at the same time, the security and intelligence communities determined that allowing student pilots to operate an aircraft as pilot in command prior to being vetted was an unacceptable security risk. The administration committed to closing that security gap, and last month, FAA published a final rule requiring student pilots to appear before an FAA inspector or other authorized designee to verify the student's identity. The student pilot certificate will be issued once TSA completes its vetting. We recognize that the 2012 legislation included specific direction on airman certificates, and we regret that we are not further along in the process of implementing those provisions. But as our 2013 report to Congress outlined, there are major challenges to implementing the congressional direction. While the National Institute for Standards and Technology has issued standards for the collection of iris images, there are no approved GSA products--there are no GSA-approved products for the collection or use of iris biometrics. Before we require collection of biometrics, we need to understand where and how they would be used. There are no requirements that airports use iris or other biometric information for authorizing access at airports. So neither FAA nor TSA have estimated the costs to develop and install such an infrastructure at nearly 550 airports eligible for Federal grant funds or the more than 5,000 airports that are open to the public. As part of our rule to require biometrics, we will have to estimate what the costs of that infrastructure system will be to the airports and to the taxpayer. In our report to Congress and in the preliminary work we have done on the rule, we estimated that the new certificates will cost more than a billion dollars over 12 years. As both Congress and the administration are committed to minimizing the costs to the public of Federal actions, that cost estimate alone may be our biggest challenge. The reality is that to include biometric information on pilot certificates drives costs and may not be the most effective way to meet our security objectives. FAA has worked with TSA to develop options to accomplish the congressional direction. We will work to publish a proposal, although demonstrating benefits to justify a billion or more dollars in costs will be very difficult, and we will keep Congress informed on our progress. That concludes my remarks, sir, and I'll be happy to answer any questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. Gilligan follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Mica. Thank you. And we'll hold the questions. Let's get to Ms. Carroll, who's vice president of HID Global. Welcome, and you're recognized. STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN M. CARROLL Ms. Carroll. Good afternoon, Chairman Mica and Ranking Member Duckworth. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how private industry can contribute to and support all stakeholders in securing our Nation's airports. I am testifying on behalf of the Security Industry Association, a nonprofit international trade association representing more than 600 companies. I am the chair of SIA's Government Relations Committee, and I also chair the Privacy and Public Policy Working Group at the IBIA. We believe that to confront the ever-evolving threats to aviation security, all stakeholders should be working more closely with private industry. We recognize that TSA has been working diligently toward solutions that further enhance security in the Nation's airports. To that end, TSA requested that the Aviation Security Advisory Council analyze the adequacy of existing security measures and recommend additional measures to improve employee access controls. One of those recommendations included biometric confirmation of identity for badge issuance. Biometrics are already in use at several airports across the Nation, including BWI and San Francisco. These biometric deployments enhance security by tying the badge to the holder of the badge. Biometric technology has improved substantially in recent years, and industry continues to invest in further advancements. There are several key measures to help ensure optimum performance of a biometric system that should be included in any standard that TSA establishes. One is false acceptance rates, which sets the level of security. Another is the false rejection rate, which delivers a good customer experience. You can't have one without the other. Another key measure is liveness detection, which eliminates spoofing. For example, liveness detections would solve the worry around the biometrics that were stolen during the OPM breach. Biometric information is worthless if it isn't usable. With liveness detection, the only way it is usable is if the living human being presents their biometrics. Beyond biometrics, the security industry suggests that airport worker credentials follow a federated model. Many airport employees work at multiple airports and often need to go through the vetting process and carry a badge for each airport. In a federated model, such as the U.S. Government's Personal Identity Verification program, each Federal employee is vetted to an acceptable and known process across all Federal agencies. PIV credentials use the Public Key Infrastructure as one of several security features so that the credential can be trusted for access to all government buildings and computer networks. PKI also allows for instant revocation of a credential across all these systems from a central location. A federated credential system would significantly enhance airport security, be more convenient for airport employees, and reduce the costs of having to issue multiple credentials. As the ASAC and TSA have recognized, the best security relies on a risk-based approach, and one that is layered so that a breach in any one layer does not compromise security. The use of CCTV cameras, physical access control systems, and physical barriers are just some of the layers in use at airports today. The ASAC report also recommends an audit process that reconciles a badge holder's work schedule with the access control system to identify anomalies or irregularities, such as an employee using his or her badge at the airport outside their normal work hours. Unfortunately, this looks into the past and will not detect such anomalies in real time when a security breach might be occurring. The security industry has developed identity management systems that serve as systems of record for every airport worker and will detect anomalies or deviations from normal work patterns in real time. These systems will alert airport security if anomalies deviations occur so they can be investigated immediately if necessary. Equally important, such identity management systems, which are being used by several major airports throughout the country, are structured so that they enforce all TSA guidelines for badging and meet airport security policy as determined by each airport. These same systems can conduct audits recommended by the ASAC to ensure that an authorized signatory is in compliance with badging requirements. In the future, as TSA explores the use of social media to track and assess emerging threats that may pose a risk to aviation, identity management systems could prove to be a valuable tool in automating this vital undertaking. It's important to remember that the credential is just one piece of the security solution. The infrastructure must be in place to authenticate and authorize badge holders in an always- connected environment. I want to thank the committee again for including the security industry in this important discussion. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to improve the aviation and airport security nationwide. I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. Carroll follows:] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Mica. Well, thank you. We now have 9 minutes left in this vote. I have to depart. And we will not be convened before 2 o'clock, and probably sometime between 2 and 2:10 we will reconvene. So you are free to disappear until then. But we will proceed with questions at that time. The subcommittee stands in recess. [Recess.] Mr. Mica. We will call the subcommittee back to order, and thank you for your patience while we conducted our votes. We have heard from all four witnesses, and now we'll proceed with some questions. Well, let's see, Ms. Gilligan, you have been here before. As you cited today, you said you made apologies for not having some of this done and trying to get things done. April 14, 2011, you testified before us, Congress, the Transportation Committee. I know FAA has not acted on these directions as quickly or as comprehensively as this committee intended. So was yesterday Groundhog Day? Ms. Duckworth. Yes. Mr. Mica. We keep hearing the same thing over and over. Did you want to respond? Ms. Gilligan. Well, Mr. Mica, as I noted in my testimony this morning, we do understand that you are very frustrated with this. Having said that, as I also testified, there are tremendous challenges in moving this forward, not the least of which is the amount of costs that it's likely to drive. And that's why we are going to try to work with TSA, and quite honestly now, with Ms. Carroll's organization. Mr. Mica. With Ms. Carroll's organization? Ms. Carroll, don't you have examples where this can be done fairly cost- effectively? Most of these pilots' licenses only cost--the cost is minimal. I know Disney can't be paying a fortune for their card. Ms. Carroll. Well, it depends. I mean---- Mr. Mica. How much would a card be? Ms. Carroll. A card? Mr. Mica. A range. A range. Ms. Carroll. Okay. Depending on what kind of electronics are in there, what kind of security features, $2.50. Mr. Mica. Well, again, I want to know who has the card and who is getting access. We don't know that now. Ms. Carroll. Who get--that gives---- Mr. Mica. Who is in possession of the card and who is gaining the access? Are we identifying who the person is? And do we have that information embedded in the card? Ms. Carroll. For certain programs, yes, sir, we do. Mr. Mica. They already have that. You already produce some of that, don't you? Ms. Carroll. We do. We make the U.S. green card, sir. Mr. Mica. Does that have a fingerprint? Ms. Carroll. It does not have the fingerprint. Mr. Mica. It doesn't? Well, it sure as hell should. That's another waste of money. We sat with these people after 9/11, State Department and others. They are all producing garbage IDs. I mean, I am going to put Ms. Duckworth on staff. She has a 1904 pilot's license, 1904 pilot's license she pulled up. It has a picture, it has the name, it has the signature. It has a physical description. Now here it's not embedded. And then it has the fingerprints. 1904. Here is Amelia Earhart's picture, all identifying information. I'm pretty sure the other side is fingerprints. And here we are in 2016, 15 years after 9/11, we don't know who's going in and who's coming out. There is no way to ensure it. The TWIC card, we should do another hearing on that, Transportation Worker Identification. They spent half a billion, $500 million total? It's just incredible. Now they have to come with a driver's license. They have a card, but it doesn't have a reader. We still don't have a reader, do we, at the ports, to read them? Does anyone know? DHS know? Mr. LaJoye. Not as of yet. Mr. Mica. Not as of yet. See? Fifteen years. And Mickey Mouse, or at least I called the FAA card Mickey Mouse, but the Minnie Mouse one, we know who it is. You spoke a little bit about identity management systems, okay, but they're in very few airports or many airports? What's the status? Ms. Carroll. There are 21 airports. Boston Logan---- Mr. Mica. Out of 450. Ms. Carroll. Yeah, 21 out of 450, right. Mr. Mica. Are they all the largest category, in the largest category? Ms. Carroll. DFW, Sea-Tac. Mr. Mica. Pretty much---- Ms. Carroll. Yeah, pretty much the bigger ones, yes, sir. Mr. Mica. But they're not everywhere? Ms. Carroll. No, sir. Mr. Mica. That's troubling, even when you have the systems. And that's interesting that the systems also can identify erratic---- Ms. Carroll. Yes, sir. It can detect anomalies in patterns of access and where people go, and it automatically alerts security if there is an anomaly. So, for example---- Mr. Mica. But there's no requirement, and they have voluntarily put them in place. Ms. Carroll. Yes, sir. Mr. Mica. But, again, we have seen that these folks target our soft areas. So you have 21, so we have another 430 locations that you can--you don't have that in place. Iris. Where are we on iris, Ms. Gilligan? Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir, I think as you know, the National Institute for Standards and Technology did issue a standard for the collection of iris. Mr. Mica. Right. But you said there was no GSA---- Ms. Gilligan. Right, at this point. One of the requirements in the statute was that the system be linked to PIV requirements, and GSA has apparently---- Mr. Mica. Information, what is PIV requirements? Ms. Gilligan. Ms. Carroll used it earlier, sir. I don't know what it stands for. Ms. Carroll. So I'm not a real technology expert, I'm more of a policy person, but the PIV card is the credential that follows the standard developed by NIST. It's a FIPS 201 standard. And so it was developed for all Federal employees so that they had--- Mr. Mica. Right. So that's the standard. Ms. Carroll. That's the standard, right. Mr. Mica. But we have--we don't have that in place. Ms. Gilligan. There are no systems--to your earlier point-- there are not yet any approved vendors of systems to be able to read and take advantage of the iris biometric. Mr. Mica. But you developed--I didn't mean to interrupt, but I do. Actually, I'm from New York originally. This is interesting, guys, listen. I read these old books--I collect old books--usually before 1800, printed in America. And they are little capsules of time and space. Somebody wrote them on what they observed at that time and space. This doesn't count against my time. Turn it off. So I am reading this book, and this is back in the 1790s, and it's a guy that came from England, and he wrote his memoirs. He says: I am in New York now visiting. He said people in New York have a habit of interrupting people when they're talking. And that's over 200 years ago. I do the same thing. It's just--I think it's in the DNA or maybe the water system. I'll give you one more quick one, and this is an aside since it's a small group. I got another book, a guy visited here 1828. Listen to this. He came to the House of Representatives. He's from England. He says, I have come to the Chamber of the House of Representatives, and he says, it's a strange body that meets there. He says, the Members stand up, he says, there's no one in the room, he says, and they give a speech, and the stenographer takes it down. Obviously, for the consumption of their constituents back home. This is before C- SPAN. This is 1828. Then his other observation, in 1828, he says, I am here in the United States visiting, and he says, 1828 is an election, they elect the chief magistrate of the United States. They used to call them that. He says, and in this year everything circles around who shall be the next chief elected executive of the United States and nothing else gets done. Do things change much? That was a terrible aside, but I thought I could share that with you all. There are some prerogatives as chairman. But, again, not much has changed on this. I don't know what to do. It's troubling too to hear--you talked about TSA setting standards for IDs. Who talked about that? Carroll? Ms. Carroll? Ms. Carroll. Yes, sir, the ASAC recommended that the---- Mr. Mica. But they haven't. Ms. Carroll. Well, the recommendation just came out. Mr. Mica. But they haven't. Ms. Carroll. Set standards, no. Mr. Mica. How about that? Let's do a letter too, as a result of the hearing, staff, I won't dictate it now, we would like you to set standards for this credentialing. But that's not done yet. It just came out. Ms. Carroll. Yeah. I mean the recommendation to set the standards. But I mean, you know, the FIPS 201 standards, and NIST has done significant work on setting standards for biometrics as well. Mr. Mica. But it's all out there, but they have to adopt it. And then what was troubling is no full use of all the databases. And I think that's being corrected now. Is that right, LaJoye? Mr. LaJoye. Yes, sir, it is. Mr. Mica. And I don't like to ask this, but you started giving us some numbers, like there is 70--well, there's 87,000 with no Social Security number in the base? Mr. Roth. That's correct. Of the 900,000 names that we pulled, there are about 87,000, or about 10 percent, had no Social Security number in the database. Mr. Mica. And then 75,000, what was that figure? Mr. Roth. The 75,000, if I recall, was no passport number. And then a subset of that had no alien identification number. Mr. Mica. So they could technically have people who are aliens working, without us knowing about it, at the airports? Mr. Roth. Yeah. The issue we had with TSA's data set was that there wasn't an ability, any assurance that the data could be used. So when you run it against the terrorist database or you run it---- Mr. Mica. And the 73 that you found, were they airport workers, TSA workers, combination of the above, or people who just got into secure areas? Mr. Roth. They would be airport workers that held a secure identification badge, in other words to be able to go into the secure areas of the airport next to the aircraft, checked baggage, that kind of thing. Mr. Mica. I don't know why TSA can't contract--it's not that expensive--with someone who can do sort of a nonstop criminal check. Do you know any reason? We can talk to the administrator about that. That's a big gap too. And the self- reporting, as the IG pointed out, doesn't cut it, the last thing they want to do. Do you think that's possible, Mr. LaJoye? I know you don't set policy, but---- Mr. LaJoye. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of the things that we've recognized, along with the ASAC, is we are piloting the Rap Back program with the FBI that would allow us to get recurrent vetting with criminal records history checks similar to what we do with TSDB today. So that pilot is going to start in March, and we are hopeful that we can roll it out before the end of the year. Mr. Mica. A couple of other quick ones before I yield. The employee assessment is only done every 2 years. Is that correct? Or is that just for employment and then---- Mr. LaJoye. Again, that's an interim measure we put in place, you know, until we have---- Mr. Mica. But you've been hiring people without that employee and putting them to work without that assessment completed. Is that not correct? Mr. LaJoye. Well, again, we put out, it was a few months ago, the requirement. We knew we wanted to work with the ASAC to get to the FBI Rap Back. But in the meantime, knowing it would take some amount of time, months, better part of a year to get that across the airports, we did require that they go out and conduct criminal history records checks at the renewal point or every 2 years thereafter. Mr. Mica. One of my sheriffs called me and said he had fired a couple of deputies for really serious offenses and misconduct. He said the next thing you know they were over in Daytona Beach as TSA screeners. He asked me what's going on and I couldn't tell him. But they, as we've checked, they hadn't been cleared, hadn't been properly vetted, but they could get a job. How quickly, Ms. Gilligan, how quickly does FAA revoke a license after disqualifying information is received? Ms. Gilligan. We issue the revocation based on a request by TSA that they have made a determination that someone holds a pilot certificate and is a risk to national security. So as soon as we receive the notification the process--the action is taken by our counsel's office. Mr. Mica. But they could still use that ID with another form of ID and you'd never know who that person was. Ms. Gilligan. No. When the pilot certificate is revoked, they are required to turn it in. And if they don't, we pursue that, so that we do--retrieve the pilot certificate when it's been revoked. Mr. Mica. I want to give everyone a chance. Ms. Duckworth, we will go to you. I have more questions, unfortunately. Go ahead, Ms. Duckworth. Ms. Duckworth. I just want to follow up on that Ms. Gilligan. When you said the pilot certificate is revoked you retrieved it. What about when it's changed or they get a new certification? Ms. Gilligan. I'm sorry, I was responding specifically to Mr. Mica's question. We have a process where TSA notifies us if they have determined, after someone has gotten a pilot certificate, that they now pose a risk to national security, and based on that notification we revoke that certificate. Separately, any time a pilot gets a new rating or raises to a new level, they must present themselves to an inspector or to another designated--usually a flight instructor or other designated representative, have their photo ID. Our folks will then confirm that they demonstrate that they have met the requirements to become a commercial pilot, for example, or that they have passed their type rating in a 737, whatever it may be. And that information is transmitted then to the registry and the new certificate is issued. Ms. Duckworth. Right. But you don't take--you don't recover their old certificate with the old information. Ms. Gilligan. I don't--apologize, ma'am, I actually don't know the answer to that. I thought they turn--I thought they give their old certificate when they get their new one. Ms. Duckworth. I have both my old one and my new one. Ms. Gilligan. Okay. Then you're right. Ms. Duckworth. So something to take a look at. So I'd like to take a look at the credentialing process and effectiveness and security lapses. My whole point today is just to make sure you guys get the resources and the support you need to do what you need to do to keep our people safe. And if there is something that we find out today where you need congressional help, legislative help, you need appropriations, you need something, let us know. That's really what I am interested in, to make sure you get the resources to do what you need to do. And so, Mr. Roth, there are many issues to be discussed today, but the central one is this. In 2011, that inspector general's report concluded that individuals who pose a threat may obtain airport badges and gain access to secured areas. Do you believe that individuals who pose a threat may still be able to obtain airport badges and gain access to secured areas today? Mr. Roth. Yes, I do, for a number of reasons. One is, as I highlight in my testimony, the TSA, as a regulator who has to regulate the 450 airports who make the determination with regard to criminal history, for example, can only do a fraction of the regulation that they probably need to do to check on how well the airports are adjudicating some of the criminal history. That would be one thing. The second is that TSA's database is very, very filled with errors, and it is going to be difficult to do any kind of matching between TSA's database and, for example, the criminal history databases or even the terrorist watch list databases. And third, the way the legislation works, it's really a box-checking exercise. You've either been convicted or not convicted of certain offenses. If you have not been convicted of those offenses, you are free to get--and you have you the ability to work in the United States--you have unrestricted access to the most secure areas within the airport. It's functionally the same level of security clearance that an individual with PreCheck would have. It isn't a holistic: We will look at this person and determine whether or not he is a threat to aviation security. Rather, if he is convicted of a certain level of crimes, he doesn't get it. Or if he is convicted, he doesn't get it. If he isn't convicted, then he gets it, regardless of what could be in his background. Ms. Duckworth. So what do you think are the most important outstanding recommendations that your office has made to TSA that have yet to be implemented? Mr. Roth. We are in the process of--we made six recommendations. Two of those have been closed, one of which was the most serious one, in our view, which was the lack of TSA having all the information in the TIDE database. So that's been worked out. There are a number of ones in which they are working towards getting a solution towards it. So we are satisfied that they are making progress in the right direction. The difficulty, as I see it, is that TSA is working in a system where airports have certain authority and TSA has certain authority, and any time you have a split in authority like that, it's going to be very difficult to ensure that things don't fall through the cracks. Ms. Duckworth. Mr. LaJoye, do you have any comments on that? Or what do you need to help you to be able to meet all six of those recommendations? Mr. LaJoye. Well, I think at this point, Ranking Member, to the IG's point, it's just a matter of putting some technical fixes in place with data quality, is how I would characterize it. This is an intensely manual process, as you can imagine. And so errors in data, you know, inhibits our ability at times to effectively vet. And so to the extent to which we can, you know, incorporate some logic into a system to cut down on data entries, we have gone out and we have changed our national inspection manual for all of our inspectors. When they go to a badging office, look at the original documents. So there is a number of things we are putting in place. But with respect to the IG's open comments, I think at this point it's just a matter of putting the technical fixes in place. Ms. Duckworth. And do you have a plan for those technical fixes? Do you have the support you need to put those technical fixes into place? And what is that timeline? Are you saying that--you know, the IG is saying you are on your way to meeting those, but on your way could be 6 months or it could be 6 years. Mr. LaJoye. I think we're acting deliberately, sensitive to the fact that there is the cyber issues, you know, we have to-- with respect to privacy. And so I couldn't characterize it as years. I'd characterize it more as months. And, again, getting back to our office I could get you specific timelines on some of them, but I can assure you there is a deliberate plan to close these in short order. Ms. Duckworth. I would love to see, and if it's all right with the chairman, a report back as to the timeline as to when they will be closing all six of the recommendations from the IG. Mr. Mica. Okay. And we can ask the staff to follow up with questions. There will be questions submitted. And if we can get a response for the record. Mr. LaJoye. Absolutely. Mr. Mica. Without objection, we will do that. Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Mica. Okay. Well, a couple more questions here. There is obviously a huge number of lost or stolen credentials. You found a lot of that, Mr. Roth? Mr. Roth. In our earlier audit we did find a number of essentially lost credentials. We are currently doing an audit of the SIDA badge process to see whether or not that has improved. Hopefully, we will have that audit out later this year. Mr. Mica. And even if you had the pilot's license, which has no photo on it, has no biometric way to tell that that's the individual, and another form of ID, which might not have any form of biometric, we still don't know who's entering. Is that correct? Mr. Roth. My understanding is that the way the SIDA badge works in a large majority of the circumstances---- Mr. Mica. Right now I'm talking about the pilot's license. Mr. Roth. That I cannot comment on. Mr. Mica. It's a fact, Ms. Gilligan. We don't know, we have no way of knowing because we still have this, as I've termed it, Mickey Mouse pilot's license. We have no biometric. We don't know who those people are. And then if it's a stolen or lost one--we had a hearing some years ago on credentials. I never realized how you can duplicate credentials. And college kid and students are incredible at reproducing these IDs. But we really don't know who that individual is unless there is a biometric. Ms. Gilligan. But at this point the pilot certificate is not used to gain access in any situation. Mr. Mica. I know. It can't be. They can use a driver's license. But the whole purpose was for us to know who is in control of the aircraft, who the pilot is. We have had at least one instance, we saw the European, sometimes some things happen with people who have taken control of aircraft or gained access with false credentials. Do we know with--the other thing is vetting people. I think you can screen them through metal detectors, but you need to be reviewing these individuals that are working behind a secure area--or in secure areas. And we don't do a very good job of that. TSA has failed in vetting some of those folks, right, Mr. Roth? Mr. Roth. That's correct. To be more accurate, it's the airport. Mr. Mica. What worries me after this hearing is you have just said we have got thousands of people working there. We don't even know--well, 10 percent of them we don't have Social Security numbers of. Then we have 75,000 that you mentioned, 14,000 no passports. They could be aliens. One of my concerns is--I've seen some of the big airports on the East Coast, Chicago, they do employ a lot of folks from different nationalities, no offense, and they should be able to work. But there are people we don't know about as far as their background, and then we're not vetting them. We don't know about Egypt, what took place there yet, do we, Mr. LaJoye, with that? They thought that the plane that was taken down supposedly by ISIS was an inside airport job. Do we know that? Mr. LaJoye. Well, I think that's probably worth a closed session discussing any particulars we have on that, but I am not prepared to comment beyond that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. But a lot of things indicated it was an inside job. And the other thing too is everything we have done with TSA is always a reaction; 9/11. We finally put in some standards. You know, everybody says private screening failed. It wasn't private screening that failed, it was the Federal Government that didn't put any standards in for the screeners. And part of that they got--the government got lobbied, don't put anything that would cost the airlines another penny. So it was the failure--it was the failure of the government to put in policies for what could not be brought onboard. There was no Federal prohibition to box cutters. I remember when we looked at it after 9/11, the direction to pilots, and we actually read from the manual for dealing with hijacking, was to land the plane in Havana and contact the Swiss consul there. That was the instructions, to cooperate, basically, with the hijackers and then land the plane there. That was the government's instructions to the pilot. So the government failed. And the government to me is failing to take steps. Everything we've done, the metal detectors, the shoe bomb, they saw a flaw in those. So what did we do? Of course I remember going to Italy, where they made most of the--we brought--we actually brought the metal defector capability down lower to the floor. But today most people take--have to take off their shoes unless you've got PreCheck or some situation. That's a result of Richard Reid and his-- going after the diaper bomber explosives. Now we have the body scanners. It's always a reaction. And here, again, I think they can easily determine what our most vulnerable points are. Liquid bombing, a vulnerable point, now we all have to take our liquids out. So it's always after the fact. Is there any progress you can report, speaking of liquid bombs? There is equipment that we went to purchase, and that sat around for a while, that could detect liquids that posed a risk, and that equipment was dumbed down or not used. Is there any current effort to buy that equipment or deploy that equipment, Mr. LaJoye? Mr. LaJoye. Well, again, there is various pieces of technology with respect to liquids. Some of it we do employ, some of it we have not yet deployed. We could perhaps give you a full briefing on the various different pieces of technology that are available. Mr. Mica. I can tell the committee and staff. We looked at it, we had a whistleblower, equipment was sold to them, had that capability. They neither could train their people or operate it. So basically they disarm ability of the equipment to detect that. So we still--we can't bring things on to this day. But that equipment is available. Let me look here. Renewal and lost. Okay. I heard that you can--can you renew your--I am going to say license, you keep saying certificate--but can you renew that license by either electronic request or by phone? Ms. Gilligan. The pilot certificate is not renewed. It doesn't need to be renewed. But as Member Duckworth mentioned, most pilots add additional capabilities to their certificate over time. Any time you---- Mr. Mica. So it's just permanent? It's never--okay. Go ahead. Ms. Gilligan. Well, any time you are getting---- Mr. Mica. So embedded in it would be only the information about additional capability of flying, say, certain aircraft or, like, civil versus commercial---- Ms. Gilligan. Right. Mr. Mica. --versus cargo or whatever, or big planes, small planes. Ms. Gilligan. That's right. Every time someone adds a capability to their credential---- Mr. Mica. That's interesting, because provided by Ms. Duckworth, again, incredible research--in fact, maybe we could divide some of the staff money to add it on to your pay for the work you've done on this one. But this even has license renewals here---- Ms. Gilligan. That would likely have been the medical. So pilots do renew their medical certificate. Mr. Mica. Inspector's endorsement. That's what it says. And the renewal. We don't have that--there is no renewal. Ms. Gilligan. We don't require renewal. Mr. Mica. Okay. Okay. Just, again, and lost, you have any information on lost or stolen credentials, Mr. Roth? Mr. Roth. Again, the airports have an obligation when a SIDA badge is reported lost or stolen or that employee quits, leaves, to turn it off. Mr. Mica. And they are required to notify TSA? Mr. LaJoye. They're required to notify the airport, Mr. Chairman, where then the airport is required to immediately deactivate the badge. Mr. Mica. But do you get a notification on them? Mr. LaJoye. We would not if it's a lost or stolen badge. Again, that would happen to the airport. Now, we do inspect, right, because every airport they have thresholds they can't exceed. So we went back---- Mr. Mica. There is a law or regulation that says when 7 percent of the credentials are compromised they have to reissue all new. Is that---- Mr. LaJoye. We can--I mean, I can brief you specifically on what the requirements are, but it's lower than what you just cited, Mr. Chairman. But we went back over a 5-year period, understanding this is an area where the majority of airports are really very compliant because the cost of noncompliance is steep. It's exceedingly expensive for them to rebadge their population. So we went back over 5 years, almost 450 airports, and we only had 23 instances of airports having to rebadge any part of their population. So, again, this is really an area where the airports have a high level of compliance with respect to maintaining control of those lost and stolen badges. Mr. Mica. So you're basically relying mostly on a driver's license for identification, right? Mr. LaJoye. I'm referring to SIDA badges that are lost. Mr. Mica. Well, let's say for a passenger--or for a pilot, because the pilot has an ID that doesn't have a picture and information. Ms. Gilligan. But, Mr. Chairman, the pilots do have SIDA badges. Mr. Mica. Yes. Ms. Gilligan. Pilots are vetted through the airport system, just as all employees are. Mr. Mica. But they're all different, as we've heard. Ms. Gilligan. There are differences. And as I think Ms. Carroll makes the case, there is value in looking at how to perhaps refine that process. But I don't want to leave the impression that pilots aren't---- Mr. Mica. And some of this too is--I can't blame you all totally because I have seen what happens. The airports lobby for keeping everything they're doing, and they don't want to change it, my God, you can't change it. The airlines are just as bad. Oh, no, they can't do this. You can't require that. There can't be standardization. They're just as bad. And then some of you are left in the lurch. So I'll give you that much credit. But we still have credentials, as I called it, in chaos. And somehow it's gotten us to this stage, but it's in spite--we have been very lucky and fortunate so far. I try to stay a little bit ahead of the curve. I think we need to have a sitdown with the new Administrator again. He was good to come in at the beginning. I know he's trying to institute some changes and reforms, things that make sense. But I think there are some of these items that we need to go over. I think we probably should look at some of the results-- sometimes we do these hearings and nothing gets done. But what we might do, staff on both sides, make a list of some of these items. And then they have we have authorizers, Mr.--from New York--Katko, he is an authorizer. He has also passed a couple of bills. We are not an authorizing committee. We are investigation and oversight. But if we just look at these and do nothing, not much comes as a positive result. So if we could, staff, let's put together, work with the minority, the things that we have uncovered here today that we could. And if you get a chance, we will sit down with the Administrator and see where we could do more. FAA, we'll have another Groundhog Day in a couple of years and we'll hear that they're on their way. But they also have some constraints, I know. And then the private sector has the solutions. Don't you have the solutions, Ms. Carroll? Ms. Carroll. Yes, sir, we do. And all we want to do is help in whatever way we can. Mr. Mica. You are doing both the fingerprint and iris. You have that capability? Ms. Carroll. Yes, sir. Mr. Mica. You have readers for both? Ms. Carroll. We have readers for all, yes, sir. And we have the systems to overlay. Mr. Mica. I think the staff, when we were putting this together, 15 years ago I was at some of the European airports, and they had the finger and iris in operation. That's 15 years ago. Ms. Carroll. Well, sir, just a point of clarification. In the United States, especially, fingerprints seems to be the default because they have to do criminal background checks and things like that. And so most of our databases for criminal background checks are fingerprints. And so that seems to be-- especially for workers. Mr. Mica. For a passenger. Like I have PreCheck. Ms. Carroll. Perfect. Iris is a good solution for passengers because of the---- Mr. Mica. I think CLEAR might have that. Does CLEAR have that? Ms. Carroll. I'm not sure. I'm not sure. Yeah. Mr. Mica. They may have. And we've looked at turning that over to the private sector, all of the people who could qualify for PreCheck or credentialing, and then let TSA keep some of the rest of the mix. But, again, we don't know who is getting on. We don't know where the credentials are. The credentials are lacking information. Let's see if I have got any final questions. We will be submitting, as I said, some questions for you to respond to. One last question about--we rely quite a bit on a driver's license. The Feds have set some REAL ID standards, I guess, and I guess there are still some States in noncompliance. Where are we with that, Mr. LaJoye? Mr. LaJoye. Some of the initial enforcement of that will begin in 2018, and final enforcement will begin in 2020, Mr. Chairman, you know, at the point---- Mr. Mica. I'm sorry? 2000--give me the---- Mr. LaJoye. Some of the initial enforcement of the REAL ID- compliant driver's license to gain access to the checkpoint will begin in 2018, with final enforcement beginning in 2020 on that. Mr. Mica. But we're still 2 years out. But you're accepting the flawed IDs now. Mr. LaJoye. Well, again, I mean, it's---- Mr. Mica. It's noncompliant. Yes. I mean, yes, you are. Mr. LaJoye. Well, again, we will start enforcement of that in 2 years. It gives time for States to---- Mr. Mica. We can pick out the States you should enforce it. Ms. Duckworth. Like Illinois. Mr. Mica. Illinois. And then final for Ms. Gilligan. When does FAA expect to establish a pilot records database? Ms. Gilligan. We're working closely, actually, sir, with one of the representatives from the family groups from Colgan who has a technical background. Mr. Mica. This is way, way back. Ms. Gilligan. The requirement for the pilot records database was in the FAA Extension and Safety Act of 2010. Mr. Mica. And what year is this? Ms. Gilligan. 2016. So we are working to establish--we have done a pilot program. We do understand what is required. The dilemma is that there are a number of kinds of records that airlines have kept over the years, including paper records and microfiche and---- Mr. Mica. But you can set standards---- Ms. Gilligan. Yes, sir, but---- Mr. Mica. --for the records. Have you? Ms. Gilligan. Set standards for the records? Mr. Mica. For what is required as far as keeping for a database. Ms. Gilligan. Yes, we have informed the airlines---- Mr. Mica. And then it can be electronically transmitted. Ms. Gilligan. We have informed the airlines of the records that they need to maintain in accordance with the statute, and that began in 2011 after the passage of the statute. Mr. Mica. But yet we still don't have a database. Ms. Gilligan. We have not been able to establish the integrated database at this point. Mr. Mica. Again, it's just very, very, very, very, very, very frustrating. Anything else, Ms. Duckworth? Ms. Duckworth. Not at this time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Mica. Okay. I will ask the staff to go through and see what questions we want to submit. We appreciate your response for the record. We leave leave the record open for--instead of 5 days, let's change it to 10 days, because we'll submit a bunch of questions to them that have not been answered here. Mr. Mica. We appreciate your participation. Our intent is to try to do better. And we have a responsibility for oversight and making certain we move this process forward and keep us safe and secure. There being no further business before the subcommittee, this subcommittee hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 2:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]