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- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET: OVERSIGHT [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET: OVERSIGHT ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 4, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-132 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 25-500 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director Sean Hayes, Healthcare, Benefits and Administrative Rules Subcommittee Staff Director Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on February 4, 2016................................. 1 WITNESSES Mr. Mark Merritt, President and Chief Executive Officer, Pharmaceutical Care Management Association Oral Statement............................................... 6 Written Statement............................................ 9 Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Accompanied by Keith Flanagan, Director, Office of Generic Drug Policy, U.S Food and Drug Administration Oral Statement............................................... 17 Written Statement............................................ 19 Mr. Howard B. Schiller, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. Oral Statement............................................... 37 Written Statement............................................ 39 Ms. Nancy Retzlaff, Chief Commercial Officer, Turing Pharmaceuticals LLC Oral Statement............................................... 50 Written Statement............................................ 52 Mr. Martin Shkreli, Former Chief Executive Officer, Turing Pharmaceuticals LLC Oral Statement............................................... 64 APPENDIX 1. Representative Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter Statement for the Record......................................................... 128 2. Representative Doug Collins Statement for the Record.......... 132 3. Balto to Chaffetz and Cummings, submitted by Mr. Collins...... 135 4. 2015-12-15 Macklem to Duncan - Prescription Drugs............. 140 5. 2016-02-04 NCPA Statement for the Record...................... 142 6. Letters submitted by Mr. Cummings 2011-04-21 Frese-UMD to Cummings................................. 147 2015-10-22 152 Orgs to Open Appeal to Turing Pharmaceuticals..... 148 2016-01-21 Bakken-IDSA to Chaffetz and Cummings.................. 151 2016-01-22 FairPricingCoalition to Chaffetz and Cummings......... 157 2016-01-25 Kosnett Durrani-CA PoisonControl to Cummings.......... 160 2016-01-25 Stacy-HumanRights to Chaffetz and Cummings............ 163 2016-01-26 Talente-MS to Chaffetz and Cummings................... 165 2016-01-29 Weingarten-AFT to Chaffetz and Cummings............... 168 2016-02-02 Schauben Kaminski-AAPCC to Chaffetz and Cummings...... 171 2016-02-03 Coukell-Pew to Chaffetz and Cummings.................. 173 2016-02-03 Del Rio-HIVMA to Chaffetz and Cummings................ 175 2016-02-03 Penner-NASTAD to Chaffetz and Cummings................ 184 2016-02-04 Burack-ConsumersUnion to Chaffetz and Cummings........ 211 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET: OVERSIGHT ---------- Thursday, February 4, 2016 House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:02 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, Walberg, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Lummis, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Hice, Carter, Grothman, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Duckworth, Kelly, Lawrence, Lieu, Watson Coleman, DeSaulnier, Boyle, Welch, and Lujan Grisham. Chairman Chaffetz. Welcome, everybody. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. The chairman is responsible, under the rules of the House and the rules of the committee, to maintain order and preserve decorum in the committee room, and I will do that. We have an important hearing today. We have had an important week. We have had a number of hearings that have been very important. Today, we are talking about the cost of health care in our country, because it is growing at an unsustainable rate. The Congressional Budget Office reported the Federal Government will spend $1 trillion--trillion--on Medicare and Medicaid and other health care programs. The CBO also reported that, in 10 years' time, that cost will double to roughly $2 trillion. The cost for prescription drugs are a substantial portion of the Federal health care expenditures. In 2014, the Federal Government paid out just over $77 billion in Medicare Part D prescription drug benefits. Clearly, it is very difficult to sustain this. One way that affects the cost of prescription drugs is to increase access to generic drugs and drugs that have been on the market for some time. Our committee is very fortunate to have one pharmacist. I think there is one pharmacist in the United States Congress. He happens to sit on our panel. I would like to yield a minute to Mr. Buddy Carter from Georgia. Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am disgusted that we are here today to talk about drug price increases. As a pharmacist for over 30 years, I have owned and operated numerous pharmacies in Southeast Georgia. As the only pharmacist in Congress, I know free-market principles are the best way to provide quality, affordable health care to the American people. But what was done here is different. Perverse business practices were employed to exploit a patient group trying to do nothing more than to extend their lives. None of the witnesses here today have had to look into the eyes of someone who is trying to make a decision between buying groceries and buying medication. No one here today has seen the look on a mother's face when she realizes that she can't afford to buy her child's medication. I have. But as a health care professional, I have worked with these people in order to make sure that they can get their medications, and to make sure that my business and my employees stay afloat. So some here today may hide behind their shareholders or their corporate boards and say that this is just free-market principles. But I, for one, don't agree with that. I will tell you that you can meet your shareholders' needs, that you can meet your board's needs, and still take care of the American public. But then again, I am not sure that those who are hiding behind their shareholders and their boards really care about that. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. The FDA, the Food and Drug Administration, is responsible for approving applications to manufacture generic drugs, but it is drowning in a backlog of applications. In an attempt to deal with the backlog, Congress passed unanimously out of the House by voice vote, and with only one dissenting vote in the Senate, as I recall, the Generic Drug User Fee Act in 2012. The act promised shorter wait times but required applicants to pay $1.5 billion in user fees over a 5-year period. Despite these fees and their promises, the FDA still has a backlog of more than 3,700 generic drug applications. The basic premise here I think is one of basic economics. If you have somebody who rapidly increases or dramatically increases the price of a prescription drug, that is going to invite more competition. But if that competition can't get the approval from the FDA, then there is no competition, and the price will be inelastic, and it will continue to rise. So most of my questions today are actually for the FDA and what they are doing to accelerate that process. I believe that the FDA has failed to meet its statutory responsibility and is dramatically behind in its processing. A good example of how valuable a shortened FDA review process has become is the program that offers priority review vouchers. Because the FDA review process can be so time- consuming, drug companies have been paying outrageous sums for these vouchers. Last year, one of these vouchers sold for $350 million, but these vouchers only speed up the process by roughly 4 months. That means at least one applicant was willing to pay $2 million a day just for an additional 120 days. Given these facts, it is pretty obvious our current review process for generic drug applications is too slow. Along with the FDA, we have representatives from two drug manufacturers. Turing Pharmaceuticals purchased the prescription drug Daraprim and raised the price per pill from $13.50 to $750. Valeant Pharmaceuticals' CEO is also here to explain how his company bought heart drugs Nitropress and Isuprel, and raised their prices 525 percent and 212 percent, respectively. All three of these drugs lacked any generic competition, even though the patent had expired and they are available for generic versions. I look forward to hearing from all witnesses today. I also want to thank Ranking Member Cummings, who has been very passionate on this issue and very insistent that we have this hearing. And I think I am glad that we did this together. I now yield the time and recognize Mr. Cummings for 5 minutes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. From the depths of my heart, I thank you again and again for holding this hearing. The issue has been my number one--number one--investigative priority for several years. I am so grateful that we are holding this hearing today and that drug companies, the FDA, and other stakeholders have been called here. Thank you also for sending joint document requests to these companies, Turing and Valeant. They both refused my previous requests and obstructed our ability to investigate their actions. The fact is we would not have the documents we have today without your action, and I thank you again for that. We have now obtained more than 300,000 pages of internal documents from these companies after they stonewalled. They include emails, analysis on revenues and profits, communications with hospitals and other providers, and public relations strategy documents. Earlier this week, I circulated two memos summarizing these documents. I now ask unanimous consent that they be made part of the official hearing record. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. Cummings. These new documents provide an insider's view into how drug company executives are lining their pockets at the expense of some of the most vulnerable families in our Nation. Their basic strategy has been to buy drugs that are already on the market and then raise the prices astronomically for a temporary period of time before other competitors enter the market. These companies did not invest funds to research or developed these drugs. They bought them; jacked up the prices; took as much money as they could out of the pockets of patients, hospitals, and others; and put those funds into their own coffers. I call this money blood money. How much money are we talking about? Valeant reported gross revenues of more than $547 million on Nitropress and Isuprel, just two drugs. That is more than a half billion dollars in 1 year coming out of the pockets of hardworking Americans. The company reported profits of $351 million on just these two drugs in 2015 alone. These stunning returns by Valeant CEO J. Michael Pearson, on the Forbes list of billionaires, according to press reports, these massive profits allowed Mr. Schiller, who is here today on behalf of Valeant, to collect a salary of $400,000 per month--per month--out of the pockets of our constituents. For Turing, the company reported $98 million in revenue for Daraprim in 2015 with manufacturing costs of only $1 million. Yet, Turing actually tried to claim that it took a $44 million loss last year. The company reported that it spent $22 million on research and development. This money apparently went to donations to unnamed entities, ``contributions to foundations,'' and vague ``other research and development costs.'' But the documents we have obtained indicate that these expenditures were just as much about PR as R&D. Like a Ponzi scheme, it appears that Turing may be using revenues from Daraprim to research and identify the next drug it will acquire and then impose similarly massive price increases on future victims. It is not funny, Mr. Shkreli. People are dying, and they are getting sicker and sicker. Based on the documents obtained by the committee, we know exactly what these companies will say as part of their public relations strategy. They will try to distract from their massive price increases by talking about their R&D. They will downplay their massive profits by claiming that they help patients who can't afford their exorbitant prices. The testimony from the drug companies today will be the same. But the difference now is that we have been behind their smokescreen. These tactics are not limited to a few bad apples. They are prominent throughout the entire industry. Lannett, Pfizer, Horizon, Teva, Amphastar, Allergan, Endo, all of these companies have taken significant price increases on their drugs. The reason I care so much about this issue is because it directly--directly--affects my constituents and the constituents of every member of this committee, every Member of this Congress. The people in my district are not on the Forbes billionaire list. They do not buy Wu-Tang Clan albums for $2 million. They can't liquidate assets to free up millions of dollars. They work hard. They get the early bus. And many take home decent salaries. But like many Americans, they struggle every single month to support their families and to pay for the increasing costs of housing, education, and health care. They live from paycheck to paycheck, and sometimes from no check to no check. Hardworking American families should not be forced to pay increases of 10 percent, 100 percent, or 1,000 percent, just to subsidize the lavish lifestyles of hedge fund managers and corporate executives. As I conclude, I hope we can also talk about solutions today. For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has sent letters to the FDA and FTC proposing stronger regulatory action to crack down on companies that engage in price gouging. I think this is an interesting approach that could be significant in bipartisan support. On the legislative side, I have introduced the Prescription Drug Affordability Act with Senator Bernie Sanders. One provision in this bill would allow HHS to negotiate drug prices for Medicare. This is something that even Donald Trump supports. There is significant bipartisan agreement on the need to address this crisis. According to the nonpartisan Kaiser Family Foundation, rising prescription prices are the top health care concern for all Americans, including Democrats, Republicans, and independents. I hope today's hearing is the beginning of a sustained effort to address this issue in a bipartisan way. It should be addressed in a bipartisan way that brings much-needed relief to American families. Again, Mr. Chairman, I truly and sincerely thank you for this hearing. Mr. Chairman, may I ask unanimous consent to take care of some business before we continue? Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, since I started this investigation several years ago, I have literally been inundated with letters from families, hospitals, and patient groups begging--not asking, begging--for relief from these astronomical price increases. I have 12 letters here that I would like to include in the official record of today's hearing, and they have been signed by more than 100 different organizations. Obviously, I won't go through all of them, but some of them include the American Association of Poison Control Centers, the American Federation of Teachers, the California Poison Control System, Consumers Union, Fair Pricing Coalition, HIV Medicine Association, Infectious Diseases Society of America, Human Rights Campaign, National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, National Multiple Sclerosis Society. Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is one more letter I would like to submit, and it is one of the first letters I received on this issue way back in 2011 when I started this journey. This is a heartfelt letter I received from Brenda Frese, the coach of the women's basketball team at the University of Maryland. Coach Frese's son was diagnosed with leukemia and treated with a drug called cytarabine. Now, the interesting thing is what the coach wrote: ``My son, Tyler, would not be alive today if we did not have access to the drugs that rid his body of cancer. Every family should have access to these drugs, and it is a shame that they are either not available or only available to the highest bidder.'' I kept that letter with me for the past 5 years, and it has motivated me every day on this journey. So I ask unanimous consent that all of these letters be included in the record. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. [The information follows:] Mr. Cummings. With that, I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. [The information follows:] Chairman Chaffetz. We will now recognize our witnesses. We are now pleased to welcome our panel. Mr. Mark Merritt is the president and chief executive officer of the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association. Dr. Janet Woodcock is the director of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research of the United States Food and Drug Administration. Ms. Woodcock is accompanied by Mr. Keith Flanagan, director of the Office of Generic Drug Policy at the United States Food and Drug Administration, whose expertise might be needed during questioning. By prior arrangement, we are going to release and excuse Dr. Woodcock at roughly 10:30 a.m., as she is testifying at another committee. In order to accommodate this, we are squeezing it in. We appreciate your participation in both hearings, but you will be excused at 10:30, as we previously had agreed upon. She will be replaced by Mr. Keith Flanagan, and we will swear him in at the same time. Mr. Howard Schiller as the interim chief executive officer of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International. I appreciate you being here. Ms. Nancy Retzlaff is the chief commercial officer at Turing Pharmaceuticals. And we have Mr. Martin Shkreli, former chief executive officer of Turing Pharmaceuticals. We appreciate you being here. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before they testify. We will also be swearing in Mr. Flanagan. If you would please all rise and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Thank you. Please be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, we would appreciate you limiting your oral statements to 5 minutes. Mr. Merritt, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF MARK MERRITT Mr. Merritt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and other members of the committee. I am Mark Merritt, president and CEO of the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association, the group representing America's pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs. PBMs administer drug benefits for more than 260 million Americans with health coverage through employers, unions, Medicare Part D, FEHBP, State Government plans, and other sources. Over the next decade, PBMs are projected to save $654 billion, or up to 30 percent, on drug costs, while still offering consumers broad choice and access. PBMs reduce drug costs in several ways. They negotiate price concessions from drug manufacturers, negotiate discounts from drugstores. They offer more affordable pharmacy options, including home delivery. They encourage the use of generics and more affordable brand medications. They manage high-cost specialty medications. And they improve accountability up and down the pharmacy supply chain. PBMs are perhaps most notable for their role in administering Medicare Part D plans. Since its launch, Part D has come in under CBO projections year after year, delivering countless choices to patients, and been perhaps the most popular health program in America. As the GAO reports, one way Medicare Part D plans reduce costs is through their ability to negotiate prices with drug manufacturers and pharmacies. PBMs do that by pitting competing drugs and drugstores against one another and using differential copays and other tools to encourage patients to choose the more affordable options. Competition is the key, as you can see from a recent high- profile example of high-priced drugs that treat hepatitis C. According to news reports, the price of these drugs has been cut nearly in half over the past year as new brand competitors have entered the marketplace. PBMs will demand even greater discounts as other competitors enter the space. The pricing tactics we are here to discuss today are just one piece of a much larger puzzle, and that is important to note. They highlight how you can't separate drug company pricing strategies from marketing strategies to promote those drugs. Many drug companies use marketing strategies to reduce awareness and resistance to higher prices, the higher prices that ultimately increase the cost of care. One of the most prevalent of these tactics is the use of bait-and-switch copay assistance programs to encourage patients to ignore generics and start on the most expensive brand instead. Unlike programs for the poor and uninsured, copay assistance programs specifically target patients with drug benefits and encourage them to bypass less expensive drugs for higher cost branded drugs. Copay coupons are different than normal coupons for groceries and other products where consumers pay 100 percent of the cost and get 100 percent of the benefit because copay coupons pay only the cost of the copay, say $25 or $50, in order to make the third-party payers that offer coverage--the employers, unions, and others--to pay hundreds or thousands more for the most expensive brands on the formulary. Such practices are considered illegal kickbacks in Federal programs and have long been under scrutiny by the HHS Office of the Inspector General. However, copay marketing programs are widespread in the commercial marketplace, and they play a key role in increasing costs there. Now that I have outlined the problem, what can policymakers do about it? Well, there are a few solutions. First, we do need to accelerate FDA approvals of me-too brands against competitors that face no competition. Second, we need to accelerate FDA approvals of generics to compete with off-patent brands that face no competition. Of course, I defer to Dr. Woodcock on how to do this. She is, certainly, the expert on this, and I know it is not an easy task. Third, Congress should create a government watch list of all the off-patent brands that don't face competition, so potential acquirers are aware that policymakers are monitoring these situations. Finally, copay coupons should be considered illegal kickbacks in any Federal program or program that receives Federal subsidies. Thank you very much, and I look forward to any questions you might have. [Prepared statement of Mr. Merritt follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Dr. Woodcock, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF JANET WOODCOCK Dr. Woodcock. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and members of the committee. I am Janet Woodcock. I am head of the drug center at the FDA. We regulate generic drugs as well as brand drugs. The Hatch-Waxman legislation that established the generic drug program has been extraordinarily successful. Today, about 88 percent of prescriptions that are given out or dispensed in the United States are generic drugs, saving the public an estimated almost $1.7 trillion recently. In the last decade, the generic drug industry grew very rapidly and globalized its operations. FDA's generic drug review program did not grow significantly and fell behind both in our review and our inspection capacity. And a large backlog accrued. To resolve this, in 2012, Congress enacted the Generic Drug User Fee Act, reflecting a negotiated agreement between the generic drug industry and the FDA. This was a 5-year program during which industry would pay $300 million per year in fees and FDA would attempt to meet a progressively more difficult series of performance measures over that time. In the 3 years since that was enacted, FDA has met or exceeded all GDUFA performance goals. This has been a formidable task. In these 3 years, we have been managing over 6,000 generic applications, 2,500 that were piled up at the start of the program and almost 3,000 that have been submitted in the 3 years since the program started. But the good news is over 90 percent of these applications have received review at the FDA or review communications, and over 1,700 have been approved or tentatively approved. Tentative approval means they are waiting for their patent exclusivity to expire. Over 1,000 have been sent back to industry because they had deficiencies. This means there are only about 600 applications out of the 6,200 that are awaiting review, and many of these have been submitted recently. The generic drug backlog was a big problem. It was caused by rapid growth in industry submissions not matched by corresponding investment in the FDA generic review program. This was ultimately fixed by the user fee act that was passed by Congress, but it takes some time for us to dig out of this hole. And it will take a bit more time before we are fully caught up. Nevertheless, applications that have been submitted in the past 2 years, 2014 and fiscal year 2015, have a 15-month review clock that we expect to make. And by this October, we will have a 10-month review clock. So an application submitted this October or beyond, we would expect to completely finish the review and get back to the sponsor in 10 months. It is the older applications that we need to clean up, and we are working very hard and very successfully at doing that. The purpose of Hatch-Waxman was to introduce high-quality, FDA-approved competition into the market to improve access for patients. Sixty-five percent of drugs have generic competition right now, and another 24 percent are still protected by patents or exclusivity, so they are not yet eligible for generic competition. Ten percent have no protection, either patent or exclusivity, but lack generic competition and lack applications submitted to the FDA. Two percent have applications with the FDA awaiting approval. Those are all expedited. We expedite all first generics, and those are all moving through the process and getting review and so forth. Under the GDUFA system, we have the potential to get on the market very fast, because these first generics are prioritized and all applications will have a 10-month review clock. Now I am, as you said, scheduled to testify at a second hearing this morning beginning at 10:30, and I may need to depart before all committee questions have been answered, so Mr. Keith Flanagan, who is director of the Office of Generic Policy, will be able to answer any technical questions about the generic program after I leave. So I thank you very much for your attention, and I look forward to answering your questions. [Prepared statement of Dr. Woodcock follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Schiller, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF HOWARD B. SCHILLER Mr. Schiller. Chairman Chaffetz, Congressman Cummings, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I have been with Valeant since 2011, first as CFO, then on the board, and now as interim CEO. Over this time, Valeant has grown substantially. Today, we are a large, innovative pharmaceutical company that employs 22,000 people around the world, including 6,000 in the United States. We have about 1,800 products, including 200 prescription drugs in the U.S. We are a leading dermatology, gastroenterology, ophthalmology, and consumer health care company. Our flagship brands, like Bausch + Lomb, Jublia, and CeraVe, are known to many Americans. We have a large U.S. presence, including 16 manufacturing sites, and we are making significant investments in the United States. In Rochester, New York, alone, we have invested more than a quarter of $1 billion to upgrade the plant and added nearly 200 jobs. And we expect to invest $500 million more over the coming years and add 630 jobs. We have heard very clearly Congress' and the public's concerns about drug prices and the industry generally, and Valeant's increases in prices, including for two of our drugs, Nitropress and Isuprel, and we are responding to those concerns. We created a volume-based rebate program providing up to a 30 percent discount for Nitropress and Isuprel. And we just launched a 20-year partnership with Walgreens that will provide a 10 percent average price reduction for branded dermatology and ophthalmology products, and a price reduction for up to 95 percent on branded drugs where there is a generic. These steps are in addition to the existing patient- assistance programs, which help ensure that out-of-pocket expenses don't prevent eligible patients from receiving the medicines they need. We expect to spend more than $1 billion in 2016 on patient assistance. I would like to specifically address the pricing of Nitropress and Isuprel, which are cardiac drugs used in hospital procedures, which there is a fixed rate of reimbursement by payers. These are not drugs purchased by patients in a pharmacy. When we acquired them, we commissioned an outside pricing consultant to review the market. They concluded that Nitropress and Isuprel were clinically very valuable to hospitals and patients, and that the fixed reimbursement rates allowed for significant price increases without eliminating a hospital's profits. Based on these findings, we implemented significant price increases. Since then, we have experienced about a 30 percent reduction in volume as hospitals moved to alternative drugs. The volume discounts we implemented will help address the needs of those hospitals that are large users of these drugs. Now let me say a word about commitment to research and development. Valeant's R&D results make us a leader in the industry. Our productivity drugs approved for R&D dollars spent is 7 times higher than the average of the 15 companies with the most new drug approvals. In just the last 2 years, Valeant has launched 76 new prescription drugs, generic drugs, medical devices, and other products in the United States. And there is more to come from our robust U.S. pipeline, which has more than 200 active programs. We expect approvals this year of a significant novel treatment for glaucoma and a biologic for the treatment of moderate to severe plaque psoriasis. We believe that R&D should focus on outputs and should not be judged by spending alone. Nonetheless, our R&D spending is significant, expected to exceed $400 million in 2016. We have 43 R&D facilities with 1,000 R&D employees worldwide. In addition to internal development, we have followed the successful model of the technology industry by acquiring valuable R&D assets. Mr. Chairman, where we have made mistakes, we are listening and we are changing. Our Walgreens partnership is a key step forward, but we have more to do. Through internal development and acquisitions, we developed a portfolio of world-class franchises. Like other pharmaceutical companies, we will sometimes adjust our prices but our price increases in the future will be well within industry norms and much more modest than the ones that drew your legitimate concerns. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to answering your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Schiller follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Ms. Retzlaff, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF NANCY RETZLAFF Ms. Retzlaff. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to provide Turing's perspective on the issues before this committee today. Turing is a small research-focused pharmaceutical company founded just 1 year ago. We invest in developing and commercializing important drug treatments for patients who suffer from serious and often neglected diseases. Daraprim is our principal current product. It is a prescription drug used to treat a serious parasitic infection called toxoplasmosis, which most often affects patients with compromised immune systems. Daraprim was on the market for more than 60 years before Turing acquired it last August. In the preceding 5 decades, there was no significant pharmaceutical innovation in the treatment of toxoplasmosis, and Daraprim remains the only FDA- approved treatment for this disease. Perhaps that is not surprising, since only about 3,000 patients are prescribed Daraprim each year. Daraprim presented an investment opportunity for Turing because it was priced far below its market value in comparison to other similar drug treatments for rare and serious diseases. After considering the pricing of comparable drugs, the value Daraprim provides in the treatment of a potentially life- threatening disease, a small patient population for Daraprim, and the mandatory discounts and rebates that applied to many who receive the drug, Turing made the decision to raise the wholesale list price, or WAC, for Daraprim to $750 per pill. As Turing's chief commercial officer, I was comfortable with that decision, first, because of our company's commitment to ensure access to Daraprim for every single patient who needs the drug, regardless of ability to pay; and, second, because of our commitment to invest a large portion of net revenues generated from Daraprim in R&D for new and improved drug treatments. Let me address patient access. Most fundamentally, in terms of cost, it is important to realize that the wholesale list price of a drug is not the same as the price paid by patients, hospitals, health plans, or government programs. To our knowledge, no patient needs to pay $750 per pill for Daraprim. In fact, about two-thirds of patients get the drug through government programs that receive a discounted price of one penny per pill. Beyond the discounts available through government programs, Turing has taken several additional steps to ensure affordable access to Daraprim. We fund a patient assistance program that offers Daraprim free of charge to qualified uninsured patients with incomes at or below 500 percent of the Federal poverty level, well above industry standard for patient assistance eligibility. We provide copay support to help insured patients meet their copay obligations. And we fund a bridge program to give those with commercial insurance a supply of Daraprim at no charge, if there are delays in coverage. In response to concerns about cost, and after consulting with key stakeholders, Turing announced in November that we would discount the price of Daraprim to hospitals by up to 50 percent. That is especially important because hospitals are the first to treat 80 percent of patients with the most common form of toxoplasmosis. We have also begun offering Daraprim to hospitals in a smaller, 30-pill bottle, which can help to ensure availability and lower the cost burden for hospitals. There have been challenges with patient access, particularly in the first weeks after Turing acquired the drug. To the best of our knowledge, most of those challenges involved deficiencies in distribution that were unrelated to our pricing of Daraprim. Since then, we have worked hard to improve and expand the distribution system, including through the engagement of a new specialty distributor providing streamlined access to more than 90 percent of hospitals. Of course, Turing expects to generate profits from Daraprim, but our net income is not simply passed on to shareholders. Turing is committed to bringing innovation to the treatment of neglected diseases. We invest nearly 60 percent of net revenue into R&D, a percentage far higher than most other companies. Thirty-six of our 139 employees are dedicated to R&D. And our pipeline of research includes candidates for innovation. We are proud of our investment in innovation, just as we are as proud of our commitment to patient access. I believe the decisions made by the company have been appropriate and strike the right balance between patient access, innovation, and shareholder value. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Ms. Retzlaff follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Shkreli, you did not provide the committee any written testimony. Do you wish to make an opening statement? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I will not be giving an opening statement. Chairman Chaffetz. I want to ask you a few questions. What do you say to that single, pregnant woman who might have AIDS, no income, and she needs Daraprim in order to survive? What do you say to her when she has to make that choice? Would do you say to her? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your question. Chairman Chaffetz. You were quoted as saying, on Fox 5 in New York, you were quoted as saying, ``If you raise prices, and you don't take that cash and put it back into research, I think it is despicable. I think you should not be in the drug business. We take all of our cash, all of our extra profit, and spend it on research for these patients and other patients who have terrible, life-threatening, life-ending illnesses.'' Did you say that? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your question. Chairman Chaffetz. Do you think you have done anything wrong? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your question. Chairman Chaffetz. I would like to yield time to Congressman Gowdy of South Carolina. Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is it pronounced ``Shkreli''? Mr. Shkreli. Yes, sir. Mr. Gowdy. See there, you can answer some questions. That one didn't incriminate you. I just want to make sure you understand that you are welcome to answer questions and not all of your answers are going to subject you to incrimination. You understand that, don't you? Mr. Shkreli. I intend to follow the advice of my counsel, not yours. Mr. Gowdy. I just want to make sure you are getting the right advice. You do know that not every disclosure can be subject to the Fifth Amendment assertion, only those that you reasonably believe could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence. Mr. Shkreli. I intend--I intend to use the advice of my counsel, not yours. Mr. Gowdy. Do you also understand that you can waive your Fifth Amendment right? You gave an interview to a television station in New York where, if I understood you correctly, you couldn't wait to come educate the Members of Congress on drug pricing. And this would be a great opportunity to do it. So do you understand you can waive your Fifth Amendment right? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your question. Mr. Gowdy. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am vexed. He has been willing to answer at least one question this morning. That one did not subject him to incrimination. I don't think he is under indictment for the subject matter of his hearing. So the Fifth Amendment actually doesn't apply to answers that are not reasonably calculated to expose you to incrimination. And even if it did apply, he is welcome to waive it. And I listened to his interview, and he didn't have to be prodded to talk during that interview. He doesn't have to be prodded to tweet a whole lot, or to show us his life on that little Web cam he's got. So this is a great opportunity, if you want to educate the Members of Congress about drug pricing or what you call the fictitious case against you. Or we can even talk about the purchase of--is it Wu-Tang Clan? Is that the name of the album? The name of the group? Mr. Shkreli. On the advice of counsel, I invoke my Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and respectfully decline to answer your question. Mr. Gowdy. Mr. Chairman, I am stunned that a conversation about an album he purchased could possibly subject him to incrimination. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman is correct. I understand that Mr. Shkreli is under indictment, but it is not the intention to ask him questions about that topic. Mr. Gowdy. So if I understand it correctly, we are not going to ask him questions that are going to be on the subject matter of his current pending criminal charges. And if we were to get close to one or in a gray area, he is welcome to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege there. And if we stay away from the subject matter of this indictment, some could argue he has a legal obligation to answer, under Kastigar v. United States. But he, certainly, has the right to do so, as he did in the television interview and as he does quite frequently on social media. Chairman Chaffetz. Correct. Mr. Brafman. Mr. Chairman, may I be recognized for a moment? Chairman Chaffetz. No. No, you are not allowed to. Under the House rules, you have not been sworn in. Mr. Brafman. I understand, but he is making ---- Chairman Chaffetz. You are not recognized. You are not recognized, and you will be seated. The gentleman from South Carolina is correct. We were trying to provide an opportunity to have a candid discussion about issues related to drug pricing. We now recognize Mr. Cummings for any questions he may have. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, let me say for the record that I completely support your decision to bring Mr. Shkreli to make sure that he asserted his Fifth Amendment right before this committee. Normally, Democrats on our committee have accepted the assertions of a witness's attorney that his or her client is going to take the Fifth. But in this case, Mr. Shkreli made a number of public comments himself, raising legitimate questions about his intentions. Honestly, I did not know whether he was even going to show up today, so it is nice to see you. But now that he has invoked his constitutional rights, of course, I will respect his decision. To Mr. Shkreli, since I have you in front of me, after trying to get you in front of this committee for so long, let me say this. I want to ask you to--no, I want to plead with you to use any remaining influence you have over your former company to press them to lower the price of these drugs. You can look away if you like, but I wish you could see the faces of people, no matter what Ms. Retzlaff says, who cannot get the drugs that they need. By the way, it is the taxpayer--somebody is paying for these drugs. Somebody is paying. It is the taxpayers who end up paying for some of them. And those are our constituents. People's lives are at stake, because of the price increases you imposed and the access problems that have been created. You are in a unique position. You really are, sir. Rightly or wrongly, you have been viewed as the so-called ``bad boy of pharma.'' You have a spotlight, and you have a platform. You could use that attention to come clean, to right your wrongs, and to become one of the most effective patient advocates in the country, and one who can make a big difference in so many people's lives. I know you are smiling, but I am very serious, sir. The way I see it, you can go down in history as the poster boy for greedy drug company executives, or you can change the system. Yes, you. You have detailed knowledge about drug companies and the system we have today, and I truly believe--I truly believe--are you listening? Mr. Shkreli. Yes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I truly believe you could become a force of tremendous good. Of course, you can ignore this, if you like. But all I ask is that you reflect on it. No, I don't ask, Mr. Shkreli. I beg that you reflect on it. There are so many people that could use your help. May God bless you. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Shkreli, it is your intention to decline all answers to the questions and invoke your Fifth Amendment right? Mr. Shkreli. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. Given that the witness has indicated that he does not intend to answer any questions, and out of respect for his constitutional rights, I ask now that the committee excuse the witness from the table. Without objection, so ordered. We will pause for a moment as Mr. Shkreli is escorted out. We will continue and now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings has been around this committee for a long time. I don't think I have ever seen the committee treated with such contempt. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would like to know if, based on his response today and his actions, if he could be held in contempt. Chairman Chaffetz. It is not my intention to hold him in contempt. We had heard multiple statements from Mr. Shkreli prior to this hearing, everything from I can't wait to school Congress to I will invoke my Fifth Amendment rights. It is important for us to have a person like that come explain that and answer those questions in person. I wish he would have answered those questions. We had no intention of asking him things for which he was under indictment. But I will entertain any suggestions that there might be. But at this point, no. Mr. Mica. Well, at some appropriate time, I may move to hold the gentleman in contempt. It is very sad, you know? Mr. Cummings said he may be the poster child for greed and unfair pricing. It is a very serious matter. While he is the focus of attention, and he is the villain, we have a lot of blame to go around. The pricing for drugs from all of these companies has skyrocketed. Some of the information I have is that prices have more than doubled for 60 drugs in the past year. And a survey of about 3,000 brand-name prescription drugs found that prices have more than doubled for 60 and at least quadrupled for 20 since 2014. Is that correct, Dr. Woodcock? Dr. Woodcock. Congress has not really invested any authority for FDA on pricing. Mr. Mica. On pricing. Yes, we know that. Dr. Woodcock. We do not follow that. Mr. Mica. And you said about 88 percent of the drugs that are consumed out there are generic today? Dr. Woodcock. That are dispensed by pharmacists are generics, that is correct. Mr. Mica. And the situation with their pricing, has that increased or decreased? What did you testify to? Dr. Woodcock. The HHS recently released a report that showed for Medicare about two-thirds of the drugs over the last several years, the generic drugs, decreased, the prices had decreased. But there are a few where prices have increased. So there is a group that has increased. And this may have to do with the amount of competition for those drugs. Mr. Mica. One of the problems is the approval process, and you spoke of getting drugs out there. When you have competition, the price can come down. You have made some progress you cited today. Ms. Retzlaff, is the company you work for owned by Mr. Shkreli? Ms. Retzlaff. He is a shareholder, yes--a shareholder. Mr. Mica. Does he own what share? Do you know? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm not sure what share he owns of the company, but I can check that out. Mr. Mica. Well, you described a little bit different scenario on what has been publicized as Daraprim's cost. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Mica. It is pretty sad that your shareholder would take that attitude. At least you did explain to the committee some of the pricing. But again, there are other companies and drugs. Alcortin A, a 1,860 percent increase. Is that correct? Does anyone know? That is not your drug, is it? So it is another manufacturer who is just as guilty. Maybe not as arrogant, but just as guilty. But millions of Americans depend on medication. I brought mine, and I am pretty fortunate. I have coverage. But a lot of people's lives depend on it. Mine is not that situation. But what we have seen here is an unprecedented arrogance, and what we see is a situation where people who need these drugs are denied these drugs because of pricing and lack of competition. And I think we are going to see more of this, because people take advantage of the system. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Maloney, for 5 minutes. Ms. Maloney. When you read the emails between Valeant and Turing, after you finish, you would not describe your business as a business, but as an exploitation machine. Your basic business model was to buy a company, fire people to save money, and then jack up prices to reach revenue goals. You set a revenue goal, and then you jacked up the price. Now, Ms. Retzlaff, when you talk about discounts, it is really disingenuous when you raise the prices 5,000 percent. So my first question to Mr. Schiller is, when you were jacking these prices and sending your emails back and forth, did you ever think about the impact on patients, on hospitals, on public health payers? Did you ever think about it? And how can you justify raising prices by thousands of percent on lifesaving orphan drugs for which there are no competing manufacturers, no generic, no manufacturers. People are going to die if they can't get the drug. Did you ever think about how hiking the price on Daraprim, which is important in treating life-threatening infections and AIDS, did you ever think about the people who would not be able to afford it? Did you ever think about it? Or the impact on the hospitals and the payers? Your memos just show, the internal memos, you just said this is the price we need to make, this is the goal and the profits we need to make. Mr. Schiller. I can't comment on Daraprim. It is not our drug. But I will ---- Ms. Maloney. Well, then let me ask you another question, since you mentioned that it is from someone else. How is Valeant's conduct any different than the conduct of Mr. Shkreli's company? Is the conduct of your company and your business model any different? Mr. Schiller. Well, I'm not that familiar with their company, other than reading newspaper articles. But as far as Valeant is concerned, Valeant is a global company. We operate in 100 countries. We have over 1,800 products. Ms. Maloney. We are not looking at the company. We are looking at you strategy, which from your own memos, that I would like to place into the record, show the business model was to set a goal, a revenue goal, the profit you would make, and that was all you did. Now yesterday, in response to questions that were put forward by this committee and memos about Valeant's price increases, your company said Mr. Pearson made an inaccurate statement during Valeant's first quarter of 2015 earnings conference call where they were clearly setting the goal, and let's raise the price to that goal. In light of this, why should this committee have confidence in the accuracy of your testimony today? Mr. Schiller. Well, the statement you are referring to I think related to an email that I sent to Mr. Pearson, which was 100 percent correct. Our SEC filings were 100 percent correct. I can't tell you what Mr. Pearson's intent was, what question he thought he was answering. But as a company, yesterday, we chose to clarify, make sure it was clear, and we put out that press release. Ms. Maloney. Well, he talked about increasing prices on Isuprel in July 2015 to meet goals of revenue. Well, did you increase the price of Isuprel on July 2015? Mr. Schiller. I believe yes. Ms. Maloney. You did increase the price. So on May 21, 2015, you wrote an email to him stating, Pearson, and I quote, ``Last night, one of the investors asked about price versus volume for Q1. Excluding Marathon, price represented about 60 percent of our growth. If you include Marathon, price represents about 80 percent.'' So, Mr. Schiller, price increases represented 80 percent of your company's growth for the first quarter of 2015. Is that correct? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. Ms. Maloney. And most of your growth is attributed to one strategy, and that is increasing the price of your drugs. In all of your memos, the only strategy I saw was: Let's increase the price of the drugs to increase revenue. That was your strategy, correct? Mr. Schiller. No, in the past, there were examples where we blocked older drugs. Ms. Maloney. Okay, I would like you to place that in the record, any strategy that was different from just increasing prices. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman for her time. Her time is now expired. Ms. Maloney. I just would like to say, Mr. Chairman, increasing revenue and profits was their strategy, regardless of cost and impact. It is a terrible example of American business, and, I would say, the American people are tired of paying the price for it. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman. Ms. Maloney. Thank you for this hearing, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. We will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes. Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Woodcock, I have a report here from Tufts University, their Center for the Study of Drug Development. It is dated November 2014. It says cost to develop and win marketing approval for a new drug is $2.6 billion and average out-of- pocket cost is $1.395 million. What do you say about that, $2.6 billion? And it says it takes an average of 10 years to get a drug to market? What do you have to say about that? Is that anyplace close to being accurate? Dr. Woodcock. Well, the economics community has various estimates of these costs, so those costs are in dispute. But it is agreed that it costs a great deal of money, and it takes a long time to get an innovative drug to the market. Some of the recent advances in science are shortening this time frame for targeted therapies and breakthrough therapies. However, in general, that time frame is accurate, and it does take a large investment to first find and then develop a new drug. Mr. Duncan. Don't you see that if a small company or an individual comes up with some miraculous drug, that they would be forced to sell out to some big drug giant to get a drug to market with those kinds of costs? That is what many people think has led to this overconsolidation of the drug business, how it has ended up in the hands of a few big giants. Dr. Woodcock. Well, the industry is changing rapidly because of the new science. Last year, we approved--a large proportion of our new drugs were orphans and a number of them came from small companies, so it is doable. And the drug development paradigm is in flux, because of the new scientific findings. Mr. Duncan. Mr. Merritt, what do you say about that? Mr. Merritt. Well, as Dr. Woodcock says, the market has been changing toward more specialized drugs that are developed differently and marketed differently than drugs traditionally have been. I know, from our perspective, we know the best way to get costs down is through competition. So the more products we can get on the market, the faster we can get them on the market, whether they are competing me-too brands or generic competitors, the better it is for consumers and the employer unions and government programs that we serve. Mr. Duncan. We all believe that there should be some testing to make sure that drugs are safe, but you can go ridiculously overboard on anything. And it seems to me that when it is taking 10 or 12 years to get a drug to market, and it is costing $2.6 billion as the Tufts study says, that that is going a little bit overboard. Mr. Schiller, I have a very detailed letter from one of my constituents that I would like to place in the record. But she sends to me her costs of a drug that your company put out, Aplenzin. And her costs, for 30 pills in December 2013, a total annual cost of $13,566. The cost per pill was $37. Less than 2 years later, the cost for the same pills had gone to the $106.74, a 224 percent increase in 2 years' time. And also, I have a letter from another individual, a state representative in Tennessee, who says that the average pharmaceutical company averages spending over 20 percent on research and development, but that your company averages less than 3 percent. What do you say about this 224 percent increase in less than 2 years' time, and the 3 percent on research and development? Mr. Schiller. Sure. When we price our drugs, we try to take into account the clinical value, the alternative therapies, patient access, among other factors. It is not an exact science. In a number of cases, we have been too aggressive. We are also trying to manage a bottom line to be able to invest in our research and development pipeline, and make investments in expanding our manufacturing. I mentioned Rochester, New York, where we are going to put another half billion dollars to increase the capacity in that facility as well, as patient access. And patient ---- Mr. Duncan. My time is running out. Let me just add that I think you need to do much more to hold down these costs. But I would also like to say that, in all my time in Congress--I have served on four committees, been here 28 years. I have seen hundreds of witnesses and some very heated confrontations. I have never seen an individual act with such arrogance as Mr. Shkreli a while ago, with such childish, smart-alecky smirks, even turning away from Ranking Member Cummings to pose for pictures while the ranking member was speaking. I think it was just totally ridiculous. I can tell you this, his lawyer better advise him a little bit, because a jury would love to convict somebody if he acts that same way while he is on trial. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize Ms. Norton for 5 minutes. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It may have been Mr. Shkreli's antics that drew the kind of attention that gets us this very important hearing today. And I understand your testimony, Mr. Merritt, about competition and encouraging patients to go to less expensive drugs. I also appreciate what you said about more specialized drugs. And let me say this about pharmaceuticals. I think pharmaceuticals, the work of our companies, is most extraordinary. It has not only saved lives, kept people out of the hospital, so I want you to know that I think there is great appreciation for the industry here, even for what is often given as the reason for the price of drugs. We do understand R&D. We do understand that more of the R&D is done here than done abroad. And then, of course, it costs less abroad, all of that. And I think Dr. Woodstock's last testimony in response to a question made it clear that the government understands it. That understood, let us go to a kind of paradigm here, Daraprim. This is a lifesaving drug that is used for parasitic or, indeed, what could be fatal parasitic infection. It is known, Ms. Retzlaff, who took over from Mr. Shkreli, it is known as toxoplasmosis. It is used by cancer patients, by patients with HIV. It has a relatively small patient market. Now, Ms. Retzlaff, Turing purchased this drug. I just said that I give all credit to the industry for R&D, but it is true, Ms. Retzlaff, is it not, that you did not do the R&D for Daraprim? You purchased Daraprim? Ms. Retzlaff. It is true, yes, we purchased Daraprim. Now, Daraprim was on the market for 60 years, and even after 60 years, it is still the only FDA-approved treatment for toxoplasmosis. Ms. Norton. Now, isn't it interesting that for 60 years somehow, a company had been able to manufacture this drug for $13.50 per tablet, but when you purchased it, the tablet overnight went to $750 per tablet. To do the math, Ms. Retzlaff, that is a 5,000 percent increase. Is there any conceivable justification for a company that had nothing to do with the R&D, taking over a company, and then overnight raising the price so that it is, let's be fair, out of reach for patients and even some hospitals? What is your justification for that? Ms. Retzlaff. My justification is that there has been no new innovation, no new treatments, which we believe are critically needed. And we are reinvesting much of the revenue ---- Ms. Norton. How much are you ---- Ms. Retzlaff.--60 percent. Ms. Norton. So you bought it. You immediately began to reinvest. And the reinvestment was so large that you had to increase for those who are now using--not talking about future users--who are now using the drug, you needed to increase it 5,000 percent? Ms. Retzlaff. And we are also investing in other serious and neglected diseases. Ms. Norton. Now, in spite of--yes, you are putting it all on this one lifesaving drug? Ms. Retzlaff. It is not uncustomary for pharmaceutical companies to use revenues from one product to fund multiple programs. Ms. Norton. Well, it certainly isn't. But why is it when the committee--I drew some of the testimony from the committee. The documents obtained by the committee indicated that, in response to this very widespread concern about this huge increase, Turing employed a public relations strategy to try to divert attention to patient assistance programs and research and development efforts. In other words, instead of keeping the price so that it could be purchased by patients in hospitals, you went to what I think even some of your testimony was about, and that is to patient assistance programs to try to obscure the price. Is that your strategy for raising prices and then essentially trying to obscure those raises by telling people that is all right, we will give you a 50 percent increase-- sorry, discount. But to the rest of you, we are using this money ourselves for R&D? Is that your strategy? Ms. Retzlaff. No, it is not. Our intent behind our public relations strategy was to correct any miscommunication. Again, as I said in my testimony, two-thirds of patients, the most vulnerable toxoplasmosis patients, can access our product for a penny a pill. That is two-thirds. Twenty-three percent are covered by commercial insurance. For those patients, we capped their copays at $10. We are absolutely committed, and always have been, to ensuring every single patient who needs Daraprim gets it. Chairman Chaffetz. That ain't true, but we will talk some more about that. We will now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing. I think we can all agree on the importance to pursue lifesaving treatments and cures to illnesses like cancer, et cetera, that affect our communities, our neighbors, our families, our friends. We can also agree that we want individuals to have access to these treatments at an affordable price. The question, of course, today is, how do we do that? Unfortunately, under the President's health care law, we have seen drug costs spike. We have all heard that back in our districts. Congress needs to push back. It needs to create an environment that promotes innovation, increases competition, which will bring down costs and increase access to prescription drugs. We have our fault in the process. But so far, we have acted to approve more than $2 billion in additional funding for NIH--a good thing--the first big raise in over 12 years to boost medical research. Additionally, the House, we the House, have acted responsibly and passed 21st Century Cures Act, which reforms the FDA approval process. It would accelerate the discovery and development of treatments and cures. The Senate has not allowed that to go through yet or the President to push for it. So, Dr. Woodcock, it is my understanding, and I guess I just want to delve a little more deeply into your responses so far, it is my understanding that the FDA currently has a backlog of over 4,000 new drug applications, at a median process rate of over 42 months. Can you explain to our committee why your agency is so far behind? Dr. Woodcock. We were far behind when we started the Generic Drug User Fee program. At this point, the number of applications where the manufacturer hasn't heard from us, where we haven't picked them up, is 600. We have approved and ---- Mr. Walberg. Let me understand. They haven't heard from you, but I guess we are talking approvals. Dr. Woodcock. Well, in the past generic program, before we reformed it, generic drugs went through four cycles of review and back to the company and review. This is a very inefficient process. We are trying to streamline that process, so we can get it right the first time. The company sends in an application, it is an approvable application. Under that scenario, as I said, this year, 15 months. Starting in October, 10 months. We still have to deal with the backlog, which we are cranking out approvals of the backlog. But they started in 2012. When the program starts, they are already 40 months old. They are not going to get any younger. So for the backlog applications, when we approve them, their time to approval will be more than 40 months. But these newer ones, we have approved drugs in 10 months, under the new program, generic drugs. Mr. Walberg. Well, I wish you well on that, and that is the direction we want to see going, because we very clearly have seen here--we have seen efforts in the pharmaceuticals as well to try to get away from that perception. But we have also seen that they have used this backlog to really capitalize on a system that allows them to pillage the market. Dr. Woodcock. The drugs under discussion have been on the market for decades, times when there were no backlogs and there was still no generic competition to them. There are other reasons that, for a very small segment of generic drugs, the 88 percent is out there, but for a small segment of generic drugs, there is no generic competition. When we, at the end of the first GDUFA program, will have eliminated this backlog and be in a steady-state type of activity, there will still be problems with drugs that don't have generic competition, because there are other reasons for that. Mr. Walberg. Probably expediting that will ultimately help have more competition as well. Let me ask you about biosimilars. Do you think that biosimilars can play a part in addressing affordability and patient access to the drugs they need? Dr. Woodcock. Absolutely. And that is what they are intended to do, and we are very vigorously enacting that program. We've had a very vigorous response to the legislation that Congress passed. Mr. Walberg. So it is bumping up there. Do you believe that patient and health care professional confidence in biosimilars is essential for savings from biosimilars to occur? Dr. Woodcock. I believe that is the number one issue. We just recently completed with generics some studies of seizure drugs, because, after all these years, the neurologists still didn't believe that the generics were equivalent. Those studies showed no difference between the generics and brand name seizure drugs. Mr. Walberg. Well, your efforts in moving that forward will assist that, I am sure, so thank you. Dr. Woodcock. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to follow up on the gentleman from Tennessee's line of questioning. I thought it was very good. The costs are prohibitive in terms of trying to develop some of these drugs. In Massachusetts and in the Boston area, we have been blessed. We have had 29 IPOs, small pharmaceutical companies, come to market in the last 2 years. So we do have some growth in the industry. And so those few big players are not dominating like they were before, so that is good for change. But in the case of Turing here, they just bought the drug, didn't do a lick of research. Bought the drug, and as the gentlelady from the District of Columbia pointed out, the next day went from $13.50 a pill to $750 a pill overnight. And that is disgraceful. There is not a lot of shame at the table today, but this is disgraceful. It was well known that the impact would be great harm on the public. So, Ms. Retzlaff, after you in August increased the price of the drug by 5,000 percent for people who had no alternative, on August 18, Tina Ghorban, a Turing employee, sent an email that you were CCed on regarding the increase in the price. And she wrote, and I quote, ``There are patients waiting now for product who have a $6,000 copay.'' Now, you just said, and you are under oath--you are under oath. You are subject to perjury charges, if you don't answer correctly. She is saying that these patients had a $6,000 copay, and you are saying they never had to pay more than a penny for a pill. Ms. Retzlaff. So allow me to provide some context. Yes, she did say there was a $6,000 copay. However, we paid the majority of the copay. The patient did not pay ---- Mr. Lynch. Everything but a penny? Ms. Retzlaff. We paid the copay up to $10. Mr. Lynch. Okay. I am glad to get you on the record on that. Ms. Retzlaff. I can show you the data. Mr. Lynch. This email also shows that you were aware that your Daraprim price increase was resulting in incredibly high copays. Isn't that correct? Ms. Retzlaff. It's correct, which is why we introduced a very generous copay program to ensure the price increase did not hurt patients. Mr. Lynch. So this is another email from Ms. Ghorban. She sent another email to you and the director of special pharmacy development at Walgreens asking whether Turing would, and I quote, ``grant an exception for those patients with a copay over the approved amount of $10,000.'' Ms. Retzlaff. Our policy was to ensure that the price increase did not impair access for patients. So, yes, we subsidized that copay. Mr. Lynch. You didn't want to impair access so you raised the price to $750 a pill. Ms. Retzlaff. The access issues with Daraprim had nothing to do with the price. To our knowledge, they were based on gaps in the distribution network, which, by the way, we inherited from the previous manufacturer. Mr. Lynch. I reclaim my time. She asked the question because there was patient in North Carolina who had a copay of $16,830. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Lynch. That is what the patient was being asked for. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, and we paid that down for the patient. Mr. Lynch. Four days later, on August 24, the same outrageous copay was reflected in an internal Turing presentation on patient access, and this is your presentation: Patients with commercial private insurance experience increased copays and delays in claims approval and rejections. One has a 50 percent coinsurance resulting in a copay of $16,830. That is your own company and your own presentation on what the patient is being charged. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Again, we put that in the presentation to inform leadership that that--those were the subsidies that we were offering patients. Mr. Lynch. So I think we have a solution here. I think we have a solution. Congress has the power. I would suggest in our pharmaceutical regulatory procedure, our regulations, that we adopt a poison pill amendment that when anybody acts like Turing is acting in increasing the price from $13.50 to $750 a pill, Congress can suspend the exclusivity period for you to produce that drug. We can eliminate it the next day and contract with DARPA, our government research labs, to produce your drugs at no cost to the consumer. That is what we can do. The problem is that it will impact the good companies that are actually doing research, not the hedge funds that come in and buy a company and pump up the prices. Ms. Retzlaff. If I may, we are ---- Mr. Lynch. I didn't ask you a question. I didn't ask you a question. I am telling you what we can do. If Congress has the willpower, we can do that. Unfortunately, it will hurt a lot of good companies. And you are trashing--you are trashing--the pharmaceutical industry that is doing a great job on a lot of different drugs, from organ transplants to cystic fibrosis. Good researchers who are out there doing great work, you are trashing that industry. And you are going to cause us to have to put heavy, heavy regulations on good companies. And you are probably going to choke off other drugs that will come into the pipeline. So look at the impact you are having. Ms. Retzlaff. May I speak? Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Lynch. Thank you for your indulgence. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. We are going to excuse Dr. Woodcock, per our previous arrangement. We will allow her to hopefully make her next hearing without any hesitation. As we change this nameplate, we will now have Mr. Flanagan join us, also from the FDA, as was previously introduced and was also sworn in. So he, too, is under oath. We have Dr. DesJarlais, who is now recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, panel. Mr. Schiller, could you explain to us a little further how you determined the new price for Isuprel and Nitropress? Mr. Schiller. Sure. After we signed the contract to purchase the assets, we reengaged a pricing consultant that had been engaged previously by the prior owners. They made a presentation to the head of our neurology division where this product was going to sit. The conclusion was that, given the reimbursements for the procedures where Isuprel was used, which were as high as $12,000 or $14,000, in some cases, that there was significant opportunity to increase the price of Isuprel without impacting--without making it unprofitable for the hospitals. Mr. DesJarlais. Excuse me. Why were cardiology drugs put with neurology? Mr. Schiller. It's--I apologize. It's our neurology and other division. So it is our neurology and we have another a number of other smaller therapeutic categories that are underneath that. Mr. DesJarlais. Both of these drugs are generic, right? They have lost their patents? Mr. Schiller. They have lost their patents, but there is not generic competition. Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. So this isn't a drug that a patient can go to their doctor and say, ``Hey, Doc, I need some Nitropress. I need some Isuprel.'' Is that correct? Mr. Schiller. It's in a hospital setting, part of a procedure, or in a clinic. Mr. DesJarlais. Right. So it is not the patient that is getting out their wallet and paying for this drug. They are actually in a hospital and either their blood pressure is going through the roof and the doctor has really no other choice but to use your drug. In several cases, this comes in a vial, right? And you raised the price of Nitropress 252 percent, is that right? $257 for a 2 mL vial to $805? Mr. Schiller. Correct. Mr. DesJarlais. So if you are laying there in the ICU, and your blood pressure is going sky-high, the doctor doesn't ask you if you want to pay for this drug. He just has to use it. And whatever you charge the hospital for, they have to pay it, right? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. It is used in emergency situations. Mr. DesJarlais. And Isuprel, the same way? It is not a pill. This is a vial. And you raised the price 525 percent from $215 to $1,346 a vial? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. Mr. DesJarlais. And you don't asked the doctor, ``Hey, I need some Isuprel.'' You have an arrhythmia in your heart and things are circling the drain in a hurry, the doctor doesn't have a choice. He is kind of over a barrel, because there is no other competition here, so he has to get that drug. He doesn't have another choice. Mr. Schiller. Well, there are substitutes, and the volumes have gone over down over 30 percent since we acquired those drugs. Mr. DesJarlais. So you are saying that you raised one 212 percent and one 525 percent, but you have been so gracious as to drop the price 30 percent? Mr. Schiller. Well, we have gone to the hospitals that have the largest users, they have large cardiac departments, who would be the most impacted, to make sure that they have a significant discount. I think also, when you look at our overall portfolio, we have tried to address the issue of price by reducing the prices on our dermatology and ophthalmology products by 10 percent, and by dramatically increasing the amount of patient ---- Mr. DesJarlais. Well, that is probably falling on deaf ears. I did pick up on something in your opening statement when you said the patient doesn't really pay this, so they don't really feel the sting. But I don't think anyone who has been a patient comes up from the hospital--they know they get a really big bill. And somewhere in that bill is Isuprel or Nitropress, if it was used. So the patient does end up paying for that drug in the end, correct? Mr. Schiller. It is paid as part of the procedure, so somebody at the end pays it. I would add, though, that these types of transactions, Isuprel and Nitropress, in the past, we have purchased some drugs like this, where there was no generic competition. We raised the price, as you mentioned. We were too aggressive and we are not ---- Mr. DesJarlais. Maybe way too aggressive. Mr. Schiller. We are not going to be looking for those kinds of acquisitions going forward. Mr. Schiller. Yes. Ms. Retzlaff, you also kind of did the same thing with your drug. It is a unique drug and people don't have much of a choice. In your opening statement, it sounded like maybe you were doing people a favor. You were giving it to them for a penny, or they were getting it free. You are making a lot of money. I mean Mr. Shkreli wouldn't even answer a question, he was so ashamed of himself. And you are basically saying that you are doing these people a favor, you are knocking off their $10 copays and all that. But the bottom line is that your company made a heck of a lot of money on this drug, and there is only a handful of patients who need it. Don't you think that maybe you can do a little better? Ms. Retzlaff. We didn't make a lot of money on the drug, actually. Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. Ms. Retzlaff. I believe the committee has our financial statements. I don't want to share that information, because it is confidential. But you will see that Turing is operating at a loss. Mr. DesJarlais. I would just say that people are really hurting right now. They are seeing increased premiums. They are seeing increased deductibles. And this type of thing doesn't help. It is like if one gas station has gas and all the other ones run out, that gas station can jack the price and people have to pay it. But they are not going to think much of that gas station. I think you guys are at risk of the same thing. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I ---- Mr. DesJarlais. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlemen. We will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch, for 5 minutes. Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling this hearing to go over this astonishing and unsustainable situation with the price of prescription drugs. A couple things. One, Ms. Retzlaff, if Springfield Hospital in Vermont wanted to buy Daraprim, what would they have to pay you? Ms. Retzlaff. So we have introduced a hospital discount program. Mr. Welch. Yes. Give me a number. What would they have to pay? Ms. Retzlaff. So for a 100-count bottle, it would be roughly $35,000. For a 30 count-bottle, it would be roughly $11,000. Mr. Welch. So how much does that come to a pill? So $1,100 a bill? Ms. Retzlaff. So $750 is the list price. We are offering discounts up to 50 percent for hospitals. Mr. Welch. $1,100 is the discount? Ms. Retzlaff. No, no, no. $1,100 is not the discount. It is 50 percent off of $750. Mr. Welch. Okay, so if Springfield Hospital ---- Ms. Retzlaff. It is $375. Mr. Welch. So if Springfield Hospital wanted to buy a pill, it would be $350? Ms. Retzlaff. Correct. Mr. Welch. All right. What about if I had Blue Cross Blue Shield and it was covered? What would Blue Cross Blue Shield pay? Ms. Retzlaff. So that would depend on what the copayment and coinsurance was. About 25 percent of patients on Daraprim have commercial insurance. So in the examples that were mentioned above, the patient would be asked to pay a copay of say $5,000, in which case we would pay down that copay, so they didn't have to pay any more than $10 out-of-pocket. Mr. Welch. So your financial statement, you are saying, if I had to buy that, and I had a $5,000 copay, you would pay all of it except a penny? Ms. Retzlaff. Except $10. Mr. Welch. Except $10. And we can confirm that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, you can. Mr. Welch. All right. What if they had--what if they were on Obamacare? What would be the cost for that pill? Ms. Retzlaff. On Obamacare, so, well, if they are a Medicaid patient, for instance ---- Mr. Welch. Well, Medicaid, tell me Medicaid and tell me Medicare. Ms. Retzlaff. Medicaid patients, so for Medicaid patients, as well as patients that are treated through the 340B programs, they can get the medicine for one penny per pill, and that actually represents two-thirds of Daraprim's business. Mr. Welch. And so who pays the rest of that, if the patient gets it for one penny? Ms. Retzlaff. That is the price. Nobody pays. Mr. Welch. All right. Why isn't it possible to just have a price where anybody who wants to know what that price is can go to a Web site and see? Do you do that? Do you provide that? Ms. Retzlaff. We provide, as you know, a list price, but the list price does not reflect the price that patients pay, that hospitals pay, that other government programs pay. Mr. Welch. Let me ---- Ms. Retzlaff. From a government program perspective, there are often mandatory, statutory rebates, which is why it costs a penny. Mr. Welch. Reclaiming my time, the list price is just a starting point. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. That is correct. Mr. Welch. So most people have no idea what the actual price will be after you go through the gymnastics that you just described. Ms. Retzlaff. That is correct. That is the way pharmaceutical pricing works in the industry. Mr. Welch. That is a mess in the industry. We have had a lot of outrage at the outrageous conduct here, and none--we can't underdo it. But the bottom line here is, we have a broken market. And there is a real challenge for us, as members who represent the public who are getting hammered with this, to deal with that broken market. I think Mr. Duncan has a really good idea. Anything we can do with the FDA to streamline, we should do that. But on the other hand, you have market power without competition, and it is resulting in ripoffs, most glaringly represented by Mr. Shkreli. I hope, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, we can have an action plan to include what Mr. Duncan is talking about. It would streamline getting the drugs to the market. It would deal with these ripoff approaches where the companies are oftentimes extending the life of the patent to prevent generic competition, doing me-too evergreening to imitate a drug that is on the market with slight changes that don't really increase the efficacy but increase the cost. Work on Mr. Stivers' bill to get generics to markets faster. And, actually, let's have some transparency in pricing. There is all this talk about how much cost goes into research, and that is a legitimate cost. We all support it. Incidentally, taxpayers, $30 billion to NIH, we mutually support. That is our contribution. But the bottom line here is that we know prescription drugs are life-extending and pain-relieving. They are good. But we are getting killed with the price. Mr. Cummings. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. Welch. I do yield. Mr. Cummings. Five seconds. Hospitals are getting killed, too, big time. Mr. Welch. And employers trying to do the right thing. So I guess my time is up, but I think we have a lot more work to do. And I thank the ranking member and the chairman of the committee for setting up this hearing. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Welch. I just have one item to submit for the record, if I can, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection. I'm not sure what it is. Mr. Welch. It concerns regarding the pharmacy benefit management industry, a paper by Applied Policy. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. Without objection, so ordered. [The information follows:] Chairman Chaffetz. We will now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 minutes. Mr. DeSantis. I will yield back my time. Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Walker. Let's recognize Mr. Walker for 5 minutes. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time today. I thank you folks are being here and testifying on this panel. I want to go back a little bit, Ms. Retzlaff, and talk a little bit about what you said about shareholders. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Walker. As far as Mr. Shkreli, you said that he is a shareholder, but you were unaware as far as how much he owned in the shares? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I can't remember off the top my head. That's correct. Mr. Walker. Okay, according to our information, he is your largest shareholder of Turing. Would you dispute that? You are just not aware of that? You don't know? Ms. Retzlaff. I knew he was a major shareholder. I wasn't aware that he was the largest shareholder. Mr. Walker. Okay, as far as code of conduct, you know, most organizations--I recently remember the LA Clippers with Donald Sterling got set down because of the way he behaved. I was a minister for 20 years. There are codes of conduct that we have to follow. Is that ever part of the discussion, as far as the outrageous conduct that he is representing your company? Do you have anything in your bylaws or constitution, if you will, that would prevent somebody from being so outlandish in his behavior? Ms. Retzlaff. Thank you for the question. So, first, as you know, Mr. Shkreli is no longer the CEO of the company. And, subsequently, our chief commercial--or our chief compliance officer just published a code of conduct for the organization, which, again, is customary for pharmaceutical companies. Mr. Walker. But you just said he just published it. When was the date that he just published it? Ms. Retzlaff. She published it a few weeks ago. I can't remember the exact date. Mr. Walker. And was that code of conduct published to push back a little bit on Mr. Shkreli's behavior? Ms. Retzlaff. Again, Mr. Shkreli is no longer a party to the organization. The code of conduct was put in place to ensure that, you know, our current employees behaved in a manner that reflected our values. Mr. Walker. Would you find it--I mean, I don't know. For me, I just find it odd that all of a sudden you have a code of conduct. But you say, as far as you know, there is no link with her institution of this code of conduct with the behavior of Mr. Shkreli? Ms. Retzlaff. Turing is a very young company. We are just a year old. We brought on our chief compliance officer not long ago. We are still in the process of putting together all of our policies and procedures, and we just happened to get the code of conduct out a few weeks ago. Mr. Walker. A mere 5 days after acquiring Daraprim, Mr. Shkreli was sending emails about the timing of the price increase. In emails dated August 12, Mr. Shkreli asked when the price of Daraprim will be updated in Red Book, which is a compendium of drug pricing used by health care, as we all know. Ms. Retzlaff. Right. Mr. Walker. He said: I need an answer ASAP. It took 3 days too long the last time I did it--what he is referring to. When he says the last time I did this, was he referring to the 2,000 percent price hike of Thiola that he implemented at his former company, Retrophin? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm not sure, but I'd be happy to check that out. Mr. Walker. So when could you get that information back? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I can get that information back to you. Mr. Walker. By the end of the week, next week? Ms. Retzlaff. Sure, absolutely. Mr. Walker. I appreciate that. I do want to come back and make sure I am clear with something with the FDA, Mr. Flanagan, if I could. Earlier Dr. Woodstock said there were 600 manufacturers waiting to hear back from the FDA on approval. My question is, is that 600 manufacturers part of the backlog? Are those all new? There is 40 months' backlog that you are waiting to get to, and you are trying to reduce it from 15 months to 10 months. Can you explain what number and what column? Who are the new manufacturers versus the old ones? Can you use the microphone, too, please? Mr. Flanagan. So, Representative, let me see if this answers most of the question. There is basically two big buckets of work. An incoming submission, something that comes in right now, that is going to get a 15-month goal state. Beginning in October, it will have a 10-month goal. Then there is a big pot of much older submissions. A lot of those had been at FDA before the user fee agreement started. Mr. Walker. Sure. When we say ``big pot,'' can you give me a number value of what a big pot is? Mr. Flanagan. Yes, sir. It was 2,866 Abbreviated New Drug Applications in October 2012. Mr. Walker. And those rank back as far as 40 months or nearly 3.5 years? Mr. Flanagan. So those were like 40 months after October 2012. And many of those had been very long pending at FDA before the user fee agreement even started, like 2011, 2010, 2009. So now, when we clear out the backlog, the way that everyone wants, any time we approve one of those old ones that has been sitting around, the approval time is very high. Mr. Walker. Sure. And what makes you think you are going to go from 15 months to 10 months? My time has expired, but if you can answer that? And I will yield back. Thank you. Mr. Flanagan. We made very substantial improvements to the program, like rebuilt the factory, and it is described in Dr. Woodcock's written testimony. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, Lord Almighty. Mr. Flanagan, just to try to understand how pharmacological, pharmaceutical research works, basic research, a lot of it is done by the government, isn't it? Mr. Flanagan. Yes. Representative, I am here ---- Mr. Connolly. I understand. But, I mean, your understanding of where research is done as a precursor to the development of approved drugs, it is usually done by the government, is it not? Mr. Flanagan. I'm really a technical expert just concerning the Generic Drug User Fee Act. I'm sorry, I'm just not the right person to answer that kind of question. Mr. Connolly. Ms. Retzlaff--have I got that name right? Ms. Retzlaff. You have. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. You, in testimony, in response to Ms. Norton's question, about how could you go from $13.73, whatever it was, per pill, to $750 in your new company--and you have had a hell of a first year as a company. It is a model for everyone. You said, well, we need to use it, that revenue, to help finance research on other life-threatening conditions, for drugs that address other kinds of diseases and life-threatening conditions. That was your testimony. Ms. Retzlaff. Other conditions as well as toxoplasmosis, yes. Mr. Connolly. Is it your testimony that the company you bought this drug from was not doing that? Ms. Retzlaff. The company we bought the drug from was not doing any research, pharmaceutical innovation research, for toxoplasmosis. Mr. Connolly. Are you doing basic research? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. We are doing early research right now on toxoplasmosis. Mr. Connolly. Well, but you said other conditions as well. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Yes, we have a ---- Mr. Connolly. So can you provide the committee with a list of these basic research efforts that this revenue is financing? Ms. Retzlaff. I believe we can. I'm not involved in the day-to-day operations of research and development, but I can, certainly, check with our president of research and development. Mr. Connolly. But it is your testimony on behalf of your company, that that is what you are doing with this revenue. Ms. Retzlaff. That is correct. Mr. Connolly. And that was the rationale, or part of the rationale, for jumping the price up 5,000 percent. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I believe we've provided the committee with our research and development spend. Is that correct? Mr. Connolly. Well, I am being a little bit more specific. Ms. Retzlaff. Okay. Mr. Connolly. In answer to Ms. Norton's question, I would like to see that correlation. I would like to see where that revenue is, in fact, going from this increase. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Connolly. Because that was your testimony, that it is funding other good things. Ms. Retzlaff. That is correct. Mr. Connolly. And the only way, presumably, we can do that is this $5,000 price increase. Let me ask you a question, a corny question. In your company, in Turing, did the public interest ever come up in terms of, by jacking up the price, we really could affect access, we could have unintended consequence on people's health, especially since the sacred trust we have is a drug no one else produces? It is only drug for this condition that exists on the planet, and we just bought it, we control it, and we just increased the price by 5,000 percent. Was there any discussion at the corporate level about the morality, the ethics, of that, in terms of impact on people's health and lives? Ms. Retzlaff. So as I said in my testimony, I was comfortable with that price increase, first, because of the company's commitment to invest generously in patient access programs. Those are important. We didn't want the price increase to disadvantaged patients in any way. And second, the company's commitment to reinvest into research and development. And I will just say that we believe that there is a need for a new and better treatment for toxoplasmosis. Mr. Connolly. Would you agree, whatever your motivation and your altruistic instincts, that from a public relations point of view, it didn't work out so well? Ms. Retzlaff. We had challenges from a public relations point of view, and I believe it is because there was a lot of misinformation, and there continues to be a lot of misinformation out there. Mr. Connolly. Well, I would suggest to you, and I know he is no longer your CEO, but when you have an individual behave the way Mr. Shkreli did when he was CEO, and in a public appearance today, and in his tweets, he has put a pretty ugly face in front of the public in terms of the industry, its motivation, its profit motivation, its concern for patients, any sense of ethical responsibility. And I would echo what Mr. Lynch said. It has unfairly damaged a whole industry, because of the practice of one CEO at one company. I just think--I would hope--it would cause a very profound re-examination about the practice of jacking up prices the way Turing did with this one. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Merritt, isn't it true that your organization, PBMs, pharmacy benefit managers, isn't it true that three of your member companies control over 75 percent of the PBM market? Mr. Merritt. I don't have exact numbers, but there are ---- Mr. Carter. I have it. It is 78 percent, to be exact. Mr. Merritt. Yes. Mr. Carter. Seventy-eight percent are controlled by three different companies. Mr. Merritt. Yes, and they get discounts for their customers, too. Mr. Carter. Mr. Merritt, are you aware of the term MAC, maximum allowable cost? Mr. Merritt. Yes. Mr. Carter. You are aware that. And you understand that that is a PBM-generated list of drugs that determines the maximum amount that an insurance sponsor will pay for a medication. In other words, they tell the pharmacy what you are going to pay. Mr. Merritt. Yes, it was actually created ---- Mr. Carter. That is what MAC is. Mr. Merritt. It was created by Medicare, not PBMs. Mr. Carter. And there are no two MAC lists that are the same. Each PBM generates their own separate list, correct? Mr. Merritt. Right, kind of like PSAOs have their own list for how much they ---- Mr. Carter. They choose the products they want on it, and they are the ones who dictate that. So, on the other side, PBMs also have a MAC list on how much they will charge the insurance company, and that is a different MAC list. Is that correct? Mr. Merritt. Sometimes. All the different companies are different. Mr. Carter. All the different companies are different, but they have one list here that they are going to reimburse the dispenser at. They have another list here that they are going to charge the insurance company that they are representing. So you have two different lists here. Don't you find that somewhat awkward? And don't you find that to be a situation where a PBM could distort the market greatly? Mr. Merritt. No, because that is a decision negotiated in a contract between a client and a PBM, and there are a million different kinds of contracts, including those. And if the client thinks it is in their interest to have that ---- Mr. Carter. But the point is, Mr. Merritt, that you are deciding what you are going to reimburse the dispenser for it, and you are deciding what you are going to charge the insurance company for it. Therein lies the difference. Are you familiar with the term spread pricing? Mr. Merritt. Yes. Mr. Carter. You are familiar with that? Mr. Merritt. I am. Mr. Carter. And you understand what spread pricing is? Mr. Merritt. Yes. Mr. Carter. That is when the price of the drug goes up. It costs the pharmacy more to buy it, but yet, you are still reimbursing at the lower rate. For instance, in Turing, when Daraprim was $13.50 a pill, if you had it on the MAC at $13.50, if you didn't increase that MAC and she went up to $750 a pill, you would still be reimbursing that dispenser $13.50, yet you would be charging the insurance company $750. Mr. Merritt. No. Mr. Carter. That is spread pricing. That is what is happening, because you are not increasing--you are not updating--the PBMs are not updating their MAC lists. Mr. Merritt. That is inaccurate. MAC lists are updated ---- Mr. Carter. That is accurate. If that is inaccurate, the let me ask you, Mr. Merritt, why is it that just recently--and let me quote here. At a recent hearing of the Judiciary Committee, one of your largest member companies, who I notice aren't here today, and I am very disappointed by that. I am sorry that you have to represent them. We invited them, I believe, Mr. Chairman. They decided not to come. Anyway, at the Judiciary Committee, one of your largest member companies testified in December that they have teams of people who constantly update MAC lists. Is that correct? Mr. Merritt. I don't know about that specific company, but industrywide, PBMs update MAC lists regularly. Mr. Carter. They update them regularly, and that was the testimony in the Judiciary Committee. If that is true, don't you find it somewhat odd that CMS found it necessary to mandate, to require, that these MAC lists be updated every 7 days and that 26 States have passed laws requiring PBMs to update their MAC lists? Don't you find that somewhat odd, if you have teams of companies doing this? Mr. Merritt. You just don't know why that happened. Drugstores want higher payments, and they lobbied for those changes and got them. Mr. Carter. Drugstores just want to get paid what they are paying for it. When companies go up from $13.50 to $750, that is a problem, when we are only getting reimbursed--when they are only getting reimbursed $13.50. That is where the spread pricing comes in. I noticed that the profits of the PBMs have increased enormously over the past few years, in fact, almost doubled. I find that very disturbing, particularly when you are talking about spread pricing. Mr. Merritt. Going back to Turing ---- Mr. Carter. Let me ask you something, Mr. Merritt, and I want to switch gears here real quick, okay? Just let me ask you something. As you know, I formerly owned three independent retail pharmacies. I had a family member who got a prescription filled at my pharmacy. She got it filled at my pharmacy. Later on that night, she got a call at home from the insurance company, encouraging her to use mail-order pharmacy, a mail-order pharmacy that is owned by the PBM. Now don't you find that a conflict of interest, when a PBM not only owns the pharmacy, but they are reimbursing here, they are setting the reimbursement? Is that not a conflict of interest? How can it not be a conflict of interest? Mr. Merritt. The Federal Trade Commission looked into that and said there are no conflicts and these benefit patients. Mr. Carter. Mr. Merritt, that is a conflict of interest. I have actually had experiences where I have adjudicated a claim--for those of you who do not know, adjudicate means my computer calls his computer. It tells me what they are going to pay me. I have adjudicated a claim, and it told me they weren't going to pay for it. They weren't going to cover it. While this patient was still in my lobby, they got a call from the PBM saying, hey, you can use our mail-order pharmacy. That is a conflict of interest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlemen. We will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for calling this hearing. I am obviously concerned about these price increases on a number of levels, but one of the levels is as a former hospital director myself. Mr. Schiller, because Isuprel and Nitropress are hospital- administered drugs, hospitals, it is hospitals that are bearing the biggest burden of your price increases. Am I correct in that? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. Mr. Cartwright. So last year, the Cleveland Clinic reported that price increases for Isuprel and Nitropress added $8.6 million to its budget. And Isuprel and Nitropress are both heart medications. Am I correct in that? Mr. Schiller. Correct. Mr. Cartwright. Given the choice between paying higher prices and risking the lives of their patients, most hospitals choose to knuckle under and pay the price. Am I correct in that? Mr. Schiller. I assume that is correct, yes. Mr. Cartwright. So by raising the price of these medications exponentially, you are forcing hospitals to make that decision between their budgets and, essentially, their patient's life and well-being, almost like holding the hospitals own patients as hostages against them. Of course, Valeant was not the first company to raise prices. Valeant actually bought Isuprel and Nitropress from a company called Marathon Pharmaceuticals, correct? Mr. Schiller. Correct. Mr. Cartwright. And Marathon Pharmaceuticals acquired the drugs in 2013 from another manufacturer. Marathon also raised prices in the 2 years it owned Isuprel and Nitropress by about 400 percent each. Marathon's price, its increase, had a net impact to the Cleveland Clinic at that time of $2.8 million. And the Cleveland Clinic is not alone in bearing the burden of rising prescription drug prices. Johns Hopkins Hospital up in Baltimore sustained an impact of $20 million last year, of which $4 million was attributed to price increases for injectable drugs like Isuprel and Nitropress. These price increases hurt hospitals in ways that reach far beyond the immediate care of patients. They also divert much needed funding from research and other programs and technologies that improve care. Look, the truth is hospitals are struggling in this country. We have to keep hospitals alive. There is no greater impact to your health care than when your local community hospital has to close. I have seen this. They trim their budgets. They trim their budgets. They absorb these price increases. They absorb the cost of uninsured care. And they absorb it, and they absorb it, and they absorb it until they can't absorb it anymore, and they can't cut back nursing and staff anymore, and patients lives become endangered, and they have to close. There is no greater impact to you than when your local hospital closes. So when you are having a heart attack, it is not a 10- or 15-minute drive to the hospital. It is a 40- or 50-minute drive to the hospital. And that can be the difference between life and death. So, Mr. Schiller, I understand from information your company has provided to this committee that Valeant has spent a ``nominal amount of money on research and development for Isuprel and Nitropress.'' Am I correct in that? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. Mr. Cartwright. Well, that is the usual vindication of these exponential drug price increases, that we need to do this because it is funding research. But you have admitted there is a nominal amount of money on research and development for Isuprel and Nitropress, the very drugs that are experiencing this exponential price increase. Let me ask you this, Mr. Schiller. Isn't it also true that one of the ``key elements'' of your company's operating philosophy is, and I quote, ``Do not bet on science. Bet on management.'' Have I quoted that correctly? Mr. Schiller. That is a quote from Mike Pearson. I don't know what the date is on that. But I would say that this company has changed quite a bit. Mr. Cartwright. Mike Pearson is at your company? Mr. Schiller. Yes, he is. Mr. Cartwright. And you have turned over a new leaf since him? Is that it? Mr. Schiller. No. I think if Mike were here, if you look at his quotes over the last year or 2, he has changed the way he has described the company, and our focus and emphasis on research and development. I would also add, in the pharmaceutical industry, it is very rare to trace a dollar of revenue to a dollar of R&D. It is almost ---- Mr. Cartwright. Mr. Schiller, I understand that shareholder return is your primary concern and objective, but I say it is unconscionable to deprive hospitals of the resources they need to fulfill their primary objectives --caring for patients and developing new and better treatments for the future. Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you bringing this hearing and calling all of this information to light, and I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for 5 minutes. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Retzlaff, you testified that your $750 drug, nobody pays that. Some people get it for a penny. Some people get it for $20. How much am I paying for that? Because the rest of that is either coming from the Federal Government in Medicare, Medicaid; State Governments; or it is coming from an insurance company that is being funded by the premiums that I pay, and hopefully will never need that drug. So I mean, you make it sound like nobody is getting hurt by this, but everybody in this room is actually getting hurt by these prices, are they not? Ms. Retzlaff. So there are only 3,000 patients in the United States that are treated with Daraprim. Twenty-five percent of them are covered by commercial insurance. Mr. Farenthold. Right. So that is my insurance rates, which have gone greatly up under Obamacare. Ms. Retzlaff. So the overall impact, in terms of the budget for any health care plan, is very, very small. It is in the pennies. Mr. Farenthold. All right, but you guys are potentially setting another trend in the industry. Buy these orphan drugs and jack up the price, or go and buy a generic manufacturer that is the only manufacturer of a generic drug, which brings me to the FDA. You are saying you are getting down to 10 and 15 months, but you have basically created a 10- and 15-month monopoly for anybody who is a single source of a generic drug to do that kind of price increase and name their price for that drug. Is that not correct, Mr. Flanagan? Mr. Flanagan. Can you ask the question a different way? Can you clarify, please? Mr. Farenthold. All right. So the amount of time it takes the FDA to approve a generic drug manufacturer, if there is only one manufacturer in the generic market, they basically have the 15 months it takes--and I am going to argue that number with you. They have an exclusive ability to sell that drug for 15 months at $1 million a pill, if they choose to do that. Mr. Flanagan. Right. Mr. Farenthold. So what takes so long to do this? I am not an expert in what is involved in approving a place to manufacture drugs. I assume if you can manufacture XYZ drug in a place, you have a clean facility, there are no roaches on the assembly line. If you want to add another product, why should it take 15 months to get that approved? I assume you can test whatever drug they make and see if it is what they say. What else is involved there? And if they do screw up making it, 1-800-BAD-DRUG is going to bankrupt the company. Mr. Flanagan. So, basically, to review a generic drug, there is the scientific and technical review, bioequivalence, chemistry, and manufacturing controls, stuff like that. Mr. Farenthold. How much of this is really necessary and how much of it is regulations that are what color is the toilet paper? Mr. Flanagan. So the reason we have 88 percent prescription penetration in the United States is because when you or your family go to the pharmacy to get a generic drug, that you can be confident that it is the same as the brand. A review ---- Mr. Farenthold. Why does it have to take 15 months? How difficult is it to get their output, analyze it, and see what it is? I can't believe that takes 15 months. The TSA can, in a matter of seconds, tell whether or not I have an explosive in my bag by just swiping something on it. I mean, isn't there technology there that will make it faster and better? Why aren't we using it? Every day you delay getting a competitor on the market is a day companies can screw the consumer. All right, so let me ask you one other question on your numbers. Before at a time when Dr. Woodcock was testifying, my B.S. detector went off when she said, oh, we have our number of applications way down. But she also mentioned that a great many of them were, and I think her words were returned due to technical defect. So are you artificially decreasing your numbers and wait time as a result of somebody turning something in without a t crossed or i dotted? Mr. Flanagan. No. Mr. Farenthold. All right, so give me an example of what one of those technical defects is going to be. I see it with the VA all the time in the casework I do. ``Well, you don't have this piece of paper, or you don't have that. You go to the back of the line.'' My fear is that we have a bureaucracy at work here that is costing the taxpayers money, and the amount we have to reimburse Medicare and Medicaid for. And it is costing the insured money based on higher rates they have to pay for their premiums. And the taxpayers are having to pay premium supplements under Obamacare. Mr. Flanagan. Mr. Chairman, do I have time ---- Mr. Farenthold. Yes, you have the time to answer. I am done after this question. Chairman Chaffetz. Please, answer the question. Mr. Flanagan. So you asked for two examples. One example would be if the application doesn't show that the generic drug would be bioequivalent to the brand. So we want to make sure it is going to work the same as the brand. Another example would be that if the facility it is manufactured in is substandard and can't produce a safe, quality drug. Mr. Farenthold. Again, the amount of time this takes is, I think, criminal. And add to that we have a tort system with plenty of attorneys willing to go after any company that screws up even the slightest. This has to be fixed. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman makes a good point, and I plan to ask some further questions on this. But we will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for 5 minutes. Mr. Cummings. Ms. Retzlaff, when Turing--and I am going to remind you that you are under oath, by the way--when Turing increased the price of Daraprim by more than 5,000 percent on August 11, 2015, you were hoping to avoid attracting attention from the media and the public. Is that right? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, of course. Mr. Cummings. Yes, you were. Despite your best efforts, the price increase soon became a major news story. On October 8, an outside consultant sent an email to a member of Turing's board of directors laying out a PR strategy--I am sure you paid a lot for PR here--for Turing to respond to this unwanted attention. The consultant suggested that the board remove Mr. Shkreli as CEO and, and I quote, ``as early as next week.'' The consultant also suggested that Turing reduce the price of Daraprim. Is that correct? Come on, talk to me. Ms. Retzlaff. I believe that is correct, yes. Mr. Cummings. You don't know? You have these memos in regard--do you have an answer for me? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, that is correct. Mr. Cummings. All right, so, okay. So he wrote, and I quote, ``The price drop has to be significant and tied to something. ...This cannot be seen as something that appears to be as arbitrary as the price hike in the first place.'' Do you remember that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. All right. The consultant recommended that Turing issue a press release announcing ``a package of assistance programs for patients.'' Do you remember that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. Did you follow those instructions? Ms. Retzlaff. Not all of them. Mr. Cummings. All right. We are going to talk about that. The consultant also recommended that Turing ``specifically tie profits from Daraprim to the research and development of a new and more effective treatment for Daraprim patients.'' Do you remember that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. And that is exactly what you are doing today. And the consultant also suggested a long-term strategy of ``forcing a focus on Turing as a research and development company, not a pharma-hedge fund hybrid.'' Do you remember that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Retzlaff, this email was forwarded to you by a board member. Do you recall receiving it? Ms. Retzlaff. I believe I did, yes. Mr. Cummings. Okay. It seems that Turing followed most of the consultant's advice with one glaring exception. You never lowered the price of Daraprim. Let me read another email you received from a Turing marketing executive on October 2, 2015, since you are so concerned about patients and discounts. She wrote, and I quote, ``The cause of the inpatient hospital issue is pretty clear now--it's price.'' She continued to quote, and this is what she said, ``We all realize that we need a solution ASAP, but we also don't want to commit to something beyond the smaller pack that will potentially debilitate the business and risk future revenues.'' Do you remember that? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Retzlaff, this email indicates that Turing was aware that its price increase had created issues for inpatient hospitals, as Mr. Cartwright was just saying. It also indicates that Turing was unwilling to do anything to risk future revenues, including actually lowering the price for everyone. Is that fair? Is that a fair reading? Ms. Retzlaff. No, it is not a fair reading. Mr. Cummings. Well, give me what is a fair reading. Ms. Retzlaff. So, yes, we did learn that price seemed to be an issue with hospitals. So then, in November, we actually announced a discounting program for hospitals of up to 50 percent. And then, based on feedback from hospitals, we also introduced a smaller count bottle, to alleviate their financial burden. Mr. Cummings. I am glad you said that. Now let's move on. Let me read an excerpt from an email that Ed Painter, Turing's head of investor relations, said to Patrick Crutcher, the director of business development, on September 26, 2015. Mr. Painter asked if there was a lower price Turing could announce that would discourage generics from entering the market and generate positive PR. Mr. Crutcher replied, and I quote, ``It's best we don't PR something like that unless it's something we're willing to commit to doing.'' He added, ``Only thing to PR is the PAP and R&D.'' Mr. Painter replied jokingly, and this is the quote--and maybe you can interpret this for me. Maybe it is millennial talk, I don't know. But it says, ``My Rs bangen D and my PAP can't rap.'' Ms. Retzlaff, do you know what that meant, what he was saying? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm sorry, I do not. Mr. Cummings. But this was sent to you. You didn't read it? You didn't ask him? Ms. Retzlaff. I read it, but I don't what that last sentence means. Mr. Cummings. Okay. There are very real issues for people with compromised immune systems. And this email indicates that, despite the promises of lowering the price internally, Turing has no desire to actually fix what it has broken. And the thing that really gets to me, Mr. Shkreli, who just sat there, your former CEO--is that right? Ms. Retzlaff. That is right. Mr. Cummings. He walked out of this hearing a few minutes ago, and before he probably got out of the door, he sends a tweet calling everybody on this committee imbeciles. Did you know that? Ms. Retzlaff. I was not aware of that. Mr. Cummings. So instead, you all spent all of your time strategizing about how to hide your price increase behind positive PR and coming up with stupid jokes--no, no, no--while other people were sitting there trying to figure out how they were going to survive. Ms. Retzlaff. No, that is not true. Mr. Cummings. I have said it before. This is about--a lot of this is about blood money. And, Mr. Schiller, one question for you. You said, and I quote, a few minutes ago, you said, ``In some cases, we have been too aggressive in increasing prices.'' Do you remember saying that? Mr. Schiller. Yes, I did. Mr. Cummings. Now, just so that we can be effective and efficient in what we do, are you all going to be reducing prices? Mr. Schiller. We have looked across our portfolio, and we have reduced prices. Mr. Cummings. Are you going to continue to reduce prices? Mr. Schiller. We're ---- Mr. Cummings. You said that you are learning your lesson. You said that Pearson apparently now has a new attitude. I want people watching this to know that they are not being ripped off. Mr. Schiller. We looked across our portfolio. We took a 10 percent reduction in two of our largest business units, our dermatology division and our ophthalmology division. We reduced by 10--up to 30 percent, Nitropress and Isuprel. We increased our patient assistance programs. We're going to continue to look at ways to improve access at affordable prices. At the same time, manage our business so we can invest in R&D, and manufacturing in places like Rochester and Greenville, South Carolina. We have made mistakes. We grew very quickly. We are acknowledging those mistakes. We are going to change. We are going to be a responsible corporate citizen and part of the health care community. And we have made changes. Mr. Cummings. So you are going to continue to make those changes? You will continue to make changes? Mr. Schiller. We are always going to look to do the right thing, but we have made significant changes. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I now recognize myself. Ms. Retzlaff? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. The proper role of Congress is not to micromanage a private company. It is not my role. And I do believe in the right to profit. I think profit is a motivator that does a lot of good. But I also do believe that it is imperative that people tell the truth, that they are ethical, that they not mislead the public, that they properly represent the truth. Would you disagree with that or agree with that? Ms. Retzlaff. I agree with that. Chairman Chaffetz. All right, let me show you video. This is just a couple weeks ago. This is, I believe, on channel 5. This is Mr. Shkreli. [Video shown.] Chairman Chaffetz. Is that true? Ms. Retzlaff. We invest 60 percent of our net revenues into research and development. Chairman Chaffetz. That is not all of it, is it? Ms. Retzlaff. He may have meant profits. He may have misquoted, but we ---- Chairman Chaffetz. No. He said, ``We take all of our cash, all of our extra profit.''What is ``extra profit''? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm not sure what he meant by extra profit. What he could--what he could've meant is that once we deal with expenses, just operational, administrative expenses, then we take that money and we reinvest in R&D. Chairman Chaffetz. Are you really testifying that you are losing money? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. I think you have seen our financial statements. Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. You are not losing money. You are raking it in hand over fist as fast as you can. Let me ask you about some of that. Ms. Retzlaff. Sure. Chairman Chaffetz. And first, let me ask you, are you planning another price increase? Ms. Retzlaff. No, I am not. Chairman Chaffetz. That is not what the documents show. We will release them to the media, and you can fight that one in the public. But based on this--do we know who Adam Stone is? Ms. Retzlaff. He's an investor. Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. And he wrote to Mr. Martin Shkreli. He wanted the public relations to calm down. He wanted the politicians to slow down a little bit. Mr. Shkreli said, ``We can wait a few months for sure.'' That sounds like a planned price increase to me. Ms. Retzlaff. What was the timing of that email? Chairman Chaffetz. December. Ms. Retzlaff. December. Well, subsequent to that, Mr. Shkreli is no longer the CEO. So I will have final call on those business decisions. Chairman Chaffetz. And we will see what happens with that. The company has been in business how long? Ms. Retzlaff. We started operations in February of last year. Chairman Chaffetz. So about a year. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, close to a year. Chairman Chaffetz. And within the first year, you have given out raises? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, we have. Chairman Chaffetz. Given out bonuses? Ms. Retzlaff. I don't believe we've given out bonuses as of yet. Chairman Chaffetz. Your spreadsheet says 30 percent across- the-board, everybody gets a bonus. Ms. Retzlaff. But we haven't paid out any bonuses. Chairman Chaffetz. We have this document from the agenda of October 14, 2015. One person had a pay increase of $250,000 to $600,000, correct? Ms. Retzlaff. Correct. Chairman Chaffetz. Another person had a pay increase of $275,000 to $600,000, correct? Ms. Retzlaff. Correct. Chairman Chaffetz. Another person had a pay increase of $160,000 to an annual salary of $800,000, correct? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm sorry, what was that one? Chairman Chaffetz. It went from an additional $160,000 to $800,000. Ms. Retzlaff. I'm not aware of that one. Chairman Chaffetz. We will release it. You can look at it. It is from your agenda in October. Now, again, people can make a profit. They can pay exorbitant salaries. But don't come before the American people and cry and shed a tear and say, ``Well, we are not making any money.'' And don't have the person who is the major investor into the company come and say we invest all of our cash into research and development. We have emails here that show they are not even sure if they are going to invest in research and development. A person wanted to check off and make sure that was even part of the plan. And it sounds like a contrived PR plan in order to do that. Do you know who Metro Yacht Charters is? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, I do. Chairman Chaffetz. Why would you know them? Ms. Retzlaff. I believe we rented Metro Yacht Charters for a sales force meeting. Chairman Chaffetz. Yes, for party, $23,000. Did you spend money on fireworks? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. Did you spend money on a cigar roller for the yacht night, 800 bucks? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, we did. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, so don't tell me that you are losing money. Don't try to pretend and tell us that this $750 is justified when you have a woman who has AIDS and what is she supposed to do? Is she supposed to tweet Martin and try to get that for a penny? Is that how that works? Ms. Retzlaff. No, that doesn't work--that is not how it works. Chairman Chaffetz. It doesn't work, I get it. Ms. Retzlaff. That is not how it works. Chairman Chaffetz. So who pays the $750? Ms. Retzlaff. You know, $750 is paid primarily by commercial insurers. That represents the minority of patients, about 25 percent. Again, that is a very small number of patients. There are only 3,000 patients. Chairman Chaffetz. But it generates a lot of revenue, doesn't it? And who pays those insurers? Are they just the big, bad insurance companies that are raking in all these profits? Who are these insurers? Who pays them their money who then have to pay you? Ms. Retzlaff. I suppose it is big companies that are insuring their employees, for the most part. Chairman Chaffetz. No, it is people. Ms. Retzlaff. And, again, because there are so few patients treated with Daraprim, the impact on their budgets, the budget impact, is very, very small. It is in the pennies. Chairman Chaffetz. What is your first year revenue? Ms. Retzlaff. This year's revenue? Our gross sales were $98. Our net sales were $20. Chairman Chaffetz. They were what? $20 million, right? Ms. Retzlaff. $20 million, yes. Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. And this is one drug that just services about 3,000 people. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. And then you wonder why the average person who is trying and scraping by, and they see their insurance rates go up double digits, screaming high, it is because of people like you. That is why they are going up. It is one of the key reasons. Ms. Retzlaff. I will add, and I think I need to be clear here, that Turing is a specialty pharmaceutical company. We are 139 employees, 36 of which are dedicated to R&D. We are absolutely committed to taking that revenue that we generate from Daraprim and investing it in next-generation treatments, as well as other neglected diseases. That is a fact. Chairman Chaffetz. I think that is legitimately part of what you are doing, but what Mr. Shkreli is saying publicly, what you are putting out to the public, to say that you are losing money, it is not true. And if you are going to continue to lie to the American people, the Congress is going to continue to probe. I can investigate under the House rules, the House of Representatives, the Oversight Committee can investigate anything at any time. Ms. Retzlaff. Right. I am being truthful. I am looking at our income statement right now and our operating profit for 2015. Chairman Chaffetz. I have additional questions. I have gone far past my time. Let's recognize the gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Lawrence, for 5 minutes. Ms. Lawrence. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to, before I start my questions, just state that heart disease and stroke kill one in three women, more than all the cancers combined. I personally experience the miracle of medicine and the need when my husband had a heart attack. So I really want to talk about R&D. In the 2014 proxy statement filed with the SEC, Valeant reported that one of the key elements of the company's operating philosophy is, and I quote, ``Do not bet on science. Bet on management.'' And it has been reported, financial reports, that Valeant R&D was equal to only 3 percent of sales between 2014 and 2015. Mr. Schiller, is this correct? Three percent of sales is R&D? Mr. Schiller. This past year, it would have been about 4 percent of total sales, but a big chunk of our portfolio are consumer products or generics, which don't require R&D. If you look at our branded pharmaceuticals, the number is 8 percent. And then last year, if you look at what we spent to acquire late-stage projects, which we later commercialized, it was over $1 billion. So we have a significant commitment. We have over 200 active programs in R&D. We expect this year to get approval for a significant new glaucoma drug and a new biologic for the treatment of moderate to severe plaque psoriasis. And we have projects in phase 1, 2, and 3, which we hope would bring fruit and new products in the future. There is tons of risk associated with it, but that comes with the territory. And we will continue to invest in that portfolio. Ms. Lawrence. Three percent for R&D. You said it was $1 billion? What is 3 percent? Mr. Schiller. If you look at our total revenue, we spent around 4 percent of revenue. But again, we have a very significant percentage of our revenue which is consumer products or generics, where there is no R&D required. So it is about 8 percent on our branded pharmaceutical business, which does require R&D. And then in addition, we spent $1 billion on acquiring late-stage products last year, over $1 billion. Ms. Lawrence. Committee staff received an email from Dr. Benjamin Levine, who is conducting NIH-funded research on exercise intolerance and heart failure. Isuprel--Isuprel, am I saying that correct? Mr. Schiller. Isuprel. Ms. Lawrence. Isuprel is a drug that stimulates the beta receptors of the heart, natural pacemakers, and causes the heart rate to go up using the same biological pathways. Now, Dr. Levine uses this drug to conduct his research and has been impeded in meeting his commitments to NIH because of the increase of cost of this drug. He has attempted to reach out directly to your company to no avail. Here we have a doctor who is focused on doing real research for people's lives. Mr. Schiller, what should Dr. Levine do so that he can use this drug in his research to fulfill the requirements, to perhaps extend the lives of individuals? What do you recommend? Mr. Schiller. I'm not aware of that, but now that you have made me aware of it, if you would give me his number, I will call him tomorrow and make sure that we help him wherever we can, make sure that it is in a compliant fashion. Ms. Lawrence. Because, sir, you have to know the connection, your research that you are funding. But also, if you are increasing the drugs that are being used in research, you must recognize the impact you are having. Mr. Schiller. Well, of course, we do. And if there is ever a situation where we need to do something about access, that is something we are going to do. So I am happy to talk to him tomorrow and see if we can rectify that situation. I am assuming it is all compliant. I am assuming we can take care of that tomorrow. Ms. Lawrence. I just want to say this, before my time runs out. In America, while we are a leader in the world of R&D and medical research in some areas, we have turned the focus from medicine being a part of healing of people to a profit-making industry. Every business should make a profit, but it has turned from profit to greed. And this is why this is so important to me. I know there are senior citizens who are making decisions between food and drugs, the medicine that they need to live. And then there is someone in your industry that is buying a yacht. And I want you to be able to be part of the American economy and pay salaries that will allow a basic and even an advanced, based on education, quality-of-life. But we are at the point where greed is not acceptable in America, and I am very concerned about that. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has expired. We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing, and, further, thanking the staff for bringing this to the attention of the American people. It was obviously the work of this committee, both majority and the minority, where we have highlighted this issue. But it is truly an issue that must be addressed. And the best way to address it is to put companies that do the kind of, to use a tweeted-out word, imbecile pricing strategy, is to put you out of business. So the barrier to putting you out of the business, obviously, Mr. Flanagan, the FDA plays a role in that. And let me tell you why I am concerned, because I hear from a number of stakeholders that they are afraid to even give me the details for fear of retribution from FDA, in terms of the potential approval process that we go through. And the reason why companies like this can compete is because there is no one to compete against them. They are small little drugs, orphan drugs. They are things that for the average company don't pay. For the big pharmaceutical company, it doesn't pay. But there are a thousand--I mean, to have $20 million sales, $90-some million sales that was just testified, lots of companies that would be willing to take that on, smaller companies. So Dr. Woodcock gave her testimony. Did you agree with all of her testimony, Mr. Flanagan? Mr. Flanagan. Yes, sir. Mr. Meadows. Okay. So you agreed with her. She testified also in the Senate just a few days ago. Are you familiar with her testimony there? Mr. Flanagan. Yes, sir. Mr. Meadows. So I guess the question, with that Senate testimony, we are talking about all the progress we are making and how we are 90 percent, and we made great progress. But I look at her testimony, and it looks like you have only approved 25 percent of the applications over a 3-year period. Do you call that a winning percentage? Mr. Flanagan. So right now, it usually ---- Mr. Meadows. Yes or no, a winning percentage? Twenty-five percent over 3 years, is that a good track record? Mr. Flanagan. I can't answer the question yes or no. It usually takes, on average, four review cycles to approve a generic drug submission. So it is not that way for the brand side. On the brand side, there is about a 90 percent ---- Mr. Meadows. I am talking about generics. So let's look at this. If you would put up the first slide for me, one of the concerns I have is with the ambiguity, and we have this particular letter, which actually is a letter from Dr. Woodcock. It says that, in terms of the application process, that with certain types, that they will go ahead and allow that application to be filled out with less than 12 months of stability data. It says, generally, we will allow it to happen with 6 months. And on ANDA drugs, we will actually allow the application process to be started with 3 months of stability. Would you agree with that? Mr. Flanagan. I'm actually not the expert on stability. That is out of the Office of Pharmaceutical ---- Mr. Meadows. So you are an expert on ---- Mr. Flanagan. It is a different office than me. Mr. Meadows. All right. I thought you were the technical expert, is what you just said a few minutes ago. Mr. Flanagan. Unhappily, just in my little space. Mr. Meadows. Okay. So would you agree that this is typically the way the FDA does business, that they give faster approval for generics in the application process? Mr. Flanagan. I don't think that our approval ---- Mr. Meadows. Okay, let me cut to the chase. I have 1 minute left. Put up the other slide, which actually--go on to the case 2 slide, if you would? Here is my concern. I have a number of stakeholders throughout North Carolina and across the country who are willing to compete with these two companies, and they are willing to provide the drug to compete with them. And they have been told by the FDA, ``Well, we have to get a little bit more information. We have to wait for 12 months of stability data,'' instead of going with their own internal data. If you look, it says a company initially submitted 3-month-long term, accelerated process for three batches. Can you do that consistently for all of these that want to compete with these kinds of companies? Mr. Flanagan. So I understand your question, it is the same issue. The stability issues are out of the Office of Pharmaceutical Quality, which is just a different office. Mr. Meadows. All right. So let me close with this, is there anything the FDA can do to make sure that we can speed up the process, so we can compete with companies who are willing to price gouge on a regular basis? Can you speed up your process, Mr. Flanagan? Mr. Flanagan. Mr. Chairman, can I answer? I don't know how the rules work. Chairman Chaffetz. Please, yes. Mr. Flanagan. So two things. First is if a submission comes in the door and it is for a product for which there isn't generic competition or for which there is a drug shortage, we consider those to be priorities, and we expedite their review, like a ---- Mr. Meadows. Well, that is interesting, because I have a letter that basically is from Dr. Woodcock that would just that shortage is not part of your decision-making process. So you are saying her letter is wrong? Mr. Flanagan. Well, I would need to see the letter. We for sure consider drugs ---- Mr. Meadows. We will follow up on a number of other questions. I am way beyond my time. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman's time is expired. We do expect votes on the floor soon, so we will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan Grisham, for 5 minutes. Ms. Lujan Grisham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate you holding this hearing, and, quite frankly, I share my colleagues' outrage. I think outrage is actually too soft a word, given what we have heard today, what we knew before today, what we still don't know after today, about what is really going on to make sure that there is fair pricing, protected access from the patient's perspective to lifesaving drugs and treatments. I want to talk a little bit in my statement and get to my question about FDA approval and making sure that we do everything we can here to give the right opportunity so that we are focused on the right thing here, which are patients. That is the right thing to focus on here. But in all the emails that you have had members read to you--and I have the email of my own, if I have time, that I am going to read--that make it very clear, particularly from Turing, that FDA approval and that R&D, that none of those issues were issues that caused the price gouging that we are talking about today. So as we sort of figure out what we can do better, I am really interested in what we ought to be doing to make sure that there is real accountability into an entire industry that has made it their practice to put profits and not small profits, outrageous profits, before the patient. And, actually, Ms. Retzlaff, you, certainly, indicated that really it is not patients who pay. It is hospitals and insurance companies. There are a lot of people that don't love insurance companies and hospitals, so we will just shift, try to shift the focus. Where do you suppose the majority of their reimbursements come from, Ms. Retzlaff? Ms. Retzlaff. Again, as I said, there are so few patients treated with Daraprim, and only about--very few that are covered by commercial insurance. The overall ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. When you are dying ---- Ms. Retzlaff. The overall impact is very, very small. And to our knowledge, no commercial insurers ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. I am going to interrupt you. So when 3,000 people have their HIV/AIDS drugs shifted someplace else, and my copays go up, and my out-of-pocket costs go up, my hospital access goes up, and this country is under-bedded in the hospitals--and do you know who is paying them? Medicare and Medicaid and veterans and TRICARE. And guess who pays for those? I do. Every member in this audience does. Every member of this committee does. I cannot believe that your indication here is that the cost really, in terms of the number of people who are impacted, is so small that that is really not the issue. It is the issue. Let's talk about a couple other drugs. Let's talk about another company. Let's talk about Gilead. Let's talk about hepatitis C drugs, Sovaldi and Harvoni, which retail at $84,000 and $94,000, respectively, for a 12-week course. So we can treat with this drug. We can cure hepatitis C. But because of profit, we are not going to cure it. Instead, we are going to create an environment where people are going to have to have liver transplants. So I see a pattern here that is incredibly frightening for the overall aspect of getting a handle on health care costs and clearly is a shift from protecting patients in this design. And it is not a result of R&D. We have many emails from your company that would indicate that directly. We just passed 21st Century Cures, which is another indication that Congress is very interested in making sure that innovation and research and development, and that the FDA approval without minimizing patient safety, is as streamlined as we can. And yet, that is not an indication, at least not as a result of this hearing, that that is really an issue about how we determine what drug costs are. Greed is how we determine what drug costs are. So here is my question. Given what you have stated today, and given the questions and emails that we have provided during this hearing about Turing, would you say that the practices at Turing are the same practices for all pharmaceutical companies? Or is this just really an issue for your company? Ms. Retzlaff. Turing Pharmaceuticals is a research-based pharmaceutical company that invests, is committed to developing and commercializing treatments for rare and neglected diseases. As I said in my testimony ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. So this is not the practice of everyone else. This is just your practice. Ms. Retzlaff. I cannot speak on behalf of other companies. But what I can tell you is that we are an ethical pharmaceutical company. As I said in my testimony, I was comfortable with the price increase of Daraprim provided the company was willing, and it was, to invest in ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. I am going to reclaim my ---- Ms. Retzlaff.--generously in patient assistance programs-- if I may finish ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. This is how this works in this hearing. I get to reclaim my time. Ms. Retzlaff.--and research. Ms. Lujan Grisham. The issue is that I think it is clear today that that is not your intent or your motive. We have provided plenty of information here that would not just suggest but clearly identify the opposite of that. Ms. Retzlaff. I disagree with you ---- Ms. Lujan Grisham. Mr. Chairman, thanks for exposing these issues. Ms. Retzlaff.--respectfully. Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5 minutes. Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go realquickly to you, Mr. Flanagan, regarding the generic backlog and what Mr. Meadows was talking about. Can you provide a little bit more clarity as to how the FDA is prioritizing applications to expedite the review process? Mr. Flanagan. Yes, sir. So there's a policy that's available online. You can find it on the Web site. Basically, certain categories of submissions, like first generics that could potentially open the market to competition, drugs that can mitigate shortage, PEPFAR or HIV drugs, and a couple other specific categories ---- Mr. Hice. So it is based on the disease, the prioritizing, is that what you are saying? Mr. Flanagan. The PEPFAR ones are based on the disease. The shortage is just based on whether--kind of whether there's a shortage out there in providers. And first generics depends on whether the market has already been, you know, opened up to generics. Mr. Hice. So there is no real standard policy. Mr. Flanagan. There is a standard policy. Mr. Hice. All right. How long is four review cycles? Mr. Flanagan. It is hard to answer that question, because it depends on how long it takes the applicant to respond back to us. Mr. Hice. Okay. The targeted action dates, they are assigned, and yet they are aspirational, noncommittal. What is the point of having a targeted action date, if it basically means nothing? Mr. Flanagan. Well, industry very strongly requested them for the following reason. So we have this new user fee program. Beginning in year three of it, you get a goal date that tells you when we are going to act on your submission. But for everything prior to year three, there were no goal dates. Industry needed some kind of information so they could plan product launches and conduct other types of business planning, and they strongly requested that we disclose to them what are aspirational ---- Mr. Hice. But is it true that these dates really are virtually meaningless, because there is no commitment there? Mr. Flanagan. No. Mr. Hice. All right. Well, according to what you said, they are aspirational. They are noncommittal. And it appears we have months and months and months, 15 months-plus before we ever get these prioritized and get something going, so the targeted action dates basically are meaningless. Mr. Flanagan. Well, again, Congressman, industry strongly requested that we do this ---- Mr. Hice. We are all requesting something be done. That is the problem. You have these targeted dates, but the backlog is not getting any better. It is getting worse. Mr. Flanagan. No. The target action dates say when we are going to take action on each of the submissions in the backlog. It is a way of organizing the backlog and disclosing to all the companies who have submissions in there, here is when we think we are going to move on your submission. Mr. Hice. Okay, Mr. Chairman, I would like--I have other questions, but I would like to yield the remainder of my time to my colleague from Georgia, Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. Ms. Retzlaff, when Turing bought Daraprim, was it a specialty medication then? No, it was not. Ms. Retzlaff. It depends on how you define a specialty medication. Mr. Carter. No. I define a specialty medication as one that is available only through specialty pharmacies. You said yourself that access to Daraprim was a problem when the price went up. Ms. Retzlaff. When we--when we ---- Mr. Carter. I reclaim my time. When the price went up, it became distributed only through specialty pharmacies. I cannot, at my pharmacy ---- Ms. Retzlaff. That is not true. Mr. Carter. It did. You created a specialty medication, and you did it intentionally, because you had a limited market of only 3,000 patients, and you knew you weren't going to be able to make a profit unless you went up on that drug, and it became a specialty medication. You abused the system, is what you did. A PBM owns a specialty pharmacy, and now you are using it only through specialty pharmacies. Ms. Retzlaff. May I correct ---- Mr. Carter. Ms. Retzlaff, Mr. Schiller, let me tell you, I have been practicing pharmacy for many years. I have spent my adult life dispensing medications to help people get well. I find it repulsive what you have done. I have seen advances in medicine that have been amazing to me. Since I started practicing, we have had advances that are just amazing, and I have always been amazed at the pharmaceutical companies. And when you come in and you rape the public, and you give this a black eye, I find it repulsive. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your staff for bringing this hearing here, and for all those involved. You have been most cooperative, and I thank you for this. Ms. Retzlaff. May I correct a statement? Chairman Chaffetz. Sure. Go ahead. Ms. Retzlaff. So when we purchased Daraprim, it was already in a closed distribution model, so we inherited that model from the previous manufacturer. And subsequent ---- Mr. Carter. Then why did you say that access to Daraprim was a problem when the price went up? You said that yourself. Ms. Retzlaff. Access to Daraprim was a problem because of the distribution model that we inherited from the previous manufacturer. That is what I said. And subsequent to that, we have made--we have taken action. We have added ---- Mr. Carter. You said, when the price went up, it became a problem. Ms. Retzlaff. I don't believe that price was the driver of the access problem. Mr. Carter. That is not what you said earlier. Mr. Chairman, earlier ---- Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman. Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I want to follow up on Mr. Carter's line of questioning, because I think I don't quite understand now. Before you acquired the drug ---- Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Ms. Watson Coleman.--was there a problem with access to it? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, there was. Ms. Watson Coleman. So your desire to acquire this drug, for which there was supposedly a problem with access, does that mean that those people who were suffering from--what is it?-- infections associated with HIV and AIDS did not have access to it the way they needed it? Ms. Retzlaff. So in June, that was 3 months before we acquired the asset, the previous manufacturer did what they-- they went to a specialty distribution model. They closed distribution. Ms. Watson Coleman. That was 3 months before you purchased it. Ms. Retzlaff. Three months before we purchased it. After -- -- Ms. Watson Coleman. What was going on before those 3 months? Was it still that closed distribution? Ms. Retzlaff. No, it wasn't. It was broader distribution. Ms. Watson Coleman. So was that as a result of perhaps conversations with your company in anticipation of your company buying the drug? Ms. Retzlaff. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. Ms. Watson Coleman. How are we to believe that? Ms. Retzlaff. Absolutely not. There is plenty of proof that arrangement with the specialty pharmacy originated, in fact, not with the previous manufacture but the manufacturer before that. Ms. Watson Coleman. Walgreens, which is the closed distribution, right? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Ms. Watson Coleman. Walgreens informed you all they were concerned about access, this drug's access to other patients, to other pharmacies, et cetera. Is that correct? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Ms. Watson Coleman. What did you all do in response to that? Ms. Retzlaff. So we have added a specialty distributor that addresses--that eliminates a lot of the red tape and distributes the product to roughly 90 percent of hospitals. We are in the process of adding additional specialty pharmacies to the network. We have worked with the different State ADAPs to make sure that all the processes are in place, so they can access Daraprim seamlessly. These are the most vulnerable patients, by the way, who are covered by ADAP. Ms. Watson Coleman. So once you acquired this drug and you increased the costs associated with this drug--which still eludes me why this was done other than to make somebody very, very, very wealthy--you all anticipated that there was going to be push back from human rights organizations, from advocacy organizations. So from what I have read, and I believe some of this is obviously from internal memos, it didn't seem that your company was at all concerned about ensuring that people who needed this drug could have access to it. It was about managing the message for your company. Ms. Retzlaff. No, that is not true. In fact, the actions-- the actions we took reflect differently. We put in place multiple patient access programs ---- Ms. Watson Coleman. Yes. It seems that you all ---- Ms. Retzlaff.--to ensure that they had access. Ms. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much. It seems to me that you all responded to a whole bunch of pressure. And you have your serious issues that you have to contend with now. Your company has a very bad physical, public image right now, if you care to know that. I come from a State, New Jersey. We have large pharmaceutical companies. We have large universities. We do a lot of R&D. And the people that engage in research and development, they are not trying to make somebody a billionaire. They are trying to cure people. That is not even the issue here, because you all weren't trying to do R&D. You were manipulating access to a medicine that already showed the benefits of treating a very dangerous disease. And with that, I yield my time back to you, sir. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. We now recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth, for 5 minutes. Ms. Duckworth. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both you and the ranking member for your collaborative efforts to raise this issue today. I want to start off by talking about a couple in my district. They are 73 and 74 years old, respectively, and they are stretched every single month to cover their expenses. The wife is diabetic, and she has a number of medical conditions, and for 2016, will probably lead to an out-of-pocket prescription price tag of around $4,600. Her husband's out-of- pocket expenses for prescriptions are going to be about $1,900 a year. Now, since they retired, they are seriously anxious about their finances, how they are going to continue to afford to pay for their health care. And get this, the wife feels endlessly guilty because her medications are the most expensive. And even with some coverage, they, together, face overwhelming pressure of having to manage the family's budget, which after medical expenses is only about $20,000 a year. This is to pay their home loan, property taxes, as well as food and utilities. This is a crisis that is far too common across the country. And when I hear about stories like this from my constituents in the Eighth Congressional District, and then I hear about $200,000 bonuses for executives at a pharmaceutical company that purposely shut down distribution of a lifesaving drug so that they could make that money, it disgusts me. It is absolutely disgusting. The Valeant and Turing witnesses who have testified today have used many different tactics to downplay the harmful effects of their price increases. They want to shift the blame, and they want to shift the attention and say that, ``Oh, the patient population is so small that the price increases don't affect the larger health care system. And individuals that pay on the more mainstream drugs, you're not being affected. It is just those 3,000 people, because there are only a few of them. And it is actually the large insurance companies, not individual patients, that bear this burden.'' But let me tell you, every one of us pay those insurance companies. My entire office is in Obamacare. We pay those insurance companies. So this hearing has really shown that this is hardly the case. And, Ms. Retzlaff, isn't it true that Turing's price increase led to astronomically higher copays for many of your privately insured patients? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, it did. But through our copay program, we capped them at $10. Ms. Duckworth. Really. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, that's true. Ms. Duckworth. Well, you know, your internal memo identified that one patient had an insurance copay raised, up to a 50 percent increase, to $16,000. And others have copays ranging from $1,000 to $6,000. Ms. Retzlaff. Correct. Ms. Duckworth. Ms. Retzlaff, is it true that some doctors treating patients in hospital settings were forced to switch to secondary alternative therapies because they could not access Daraprim? Ms. Retzlaff. I suppose that's true, but in response to that, we have discounted Daraprim by 50 percent and introduced a smaller bottle to better meet their needs. That seems to have resolved the issue. Ms. Duckworth. Well, you know, doctors are saying that they had to switch, and it was not their preference for what they would treat their patients. Ms. Retzlaff. Again, in the hospital setting, we are offering discounts now so that Daraprim can be available for those patients. Ms. Duckworth. Can you confirm that before Turing owned Daraprim, it was widely available, covered by most insurance, and affordable, before you owned it? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, it was covered by most insurance. I don't know what you mean by widely available. Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Mr. Schiller, isn't it true that your price increases and on Isuprel and Nitropress have cut into hospital budgets? Mr. Schiller. Yes, it, certainly, would have hit--cut into their budgets. The price increases were meant to stay underneath the reimbursements for the bundled rates, but it would've, certainly, hit their budgets. Ms. Duckworth. Yes, it absolutely did. In fact, at Johns Hopkins Hospital, their chief pharmacy officer in Baltimore said these expenses deplete important savings and result in less funding for research programs and technologies that improve care. This is Daniel Ashby. And he further says that the high cost threatens patient access to critical treatments and creates financial burdens on low- and middle-income patients. Mr. Schiller, these are only two of the many drugs your company owns and has increased the price on. Is that correct? Mr. Schiller. That is correct. Ms. Duckworth. How many other drugs have you increased the price of? Mr. Schiller. I don't know offhand. Ms. Duckworth. So you have so many that you don't even know how many other drugs you have jacked up the prices on, everyday, hardworking Americans who are suffering from diseases. I mean, that boggles the mind. You are coming to testify before Congress, and you don't even know how badly you have socked it to the American public. Mr. Schiller. We have 1,800 products around the world. Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Mr. Schiller. We, certainly, raised the price on some, and the number that you all have mentioned. We have acknowledge mistakes. We have also acknowledged that, going forward, we would no longer be looking for those opportunities to purchase these older drugs. When I took over at the beginning of this year, we froze all price increases. Ms. Duckworth. Have you returned the price increases back to where they before where you raised them? That is the important question. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. The time is expired. There is a vote on the floor. The committee is going to go into recess with the intention of coming back no sooner than 12:15. The committee stands in recess until that time. [Recess.] Chairman Chaffetz. The committee will come to order. We will resume now. Thank you for your patience and understanding. Votes happen, and I appreciate your understanding that. Dr. Woodcock has rejoined us. We appreciate you being here. We know you were testifying with us, testified in another hearing, and now you are back. I appreciate you toggling back and forth. In consultation with the minority, we are going to go ahead and start. We are now going to recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Will Hurd, for 5 minutes. Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question, Ms. Retzlaff, when you all made the decision to go from $13.50 to $750 a pill, who made that decision? Ms. Retzlaff. The final decision was made by the former CEO. Mr. Hurd. All by himself? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, he made the final call. Mr. Hurd. There was no conversation? You didn't know in advance? You all found out after the fact? He made the decision and told you all? Ms. Retzlaff. No, there were, certainly, conversations about it. Mr. Hurd. Who was involved in those conversations? Ms. Retzlaff. The senior leadership team. Mr. Hurd. Which would be? Ms. Retzlaff. Myself, our president of R&D ---- Mr. Hurd. And that person's name? Ms. Retzlaff. Dr. Eliseo Salinas. Mr. Hurd. Okay. Ms. Retzlaff. Our chief people officer, which would have been Peter Myall. Let's see, I'm not recalling all ---- Mr. Hurd. Can you furnish us a list of the people who were involved in that conversation? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, yes. I will, certainly, do that. Mr. Hurd. Because, to be frank, I don't think you should be the only one enjoying the fun up here answering these conversations. Did anyone raise their hand and say, ``Y'all, this may not be a good idea''? Ms. Retzlaff. So I think the conversations we had were around ensuring that if the price went up, that we would have the appropriate programs in place to ensure that no patients were left behind. Mr. Hurd. So nobody thought an increase of 5,000 percent was a bad idea? Ms. Retzlaff. And--and we provided that we had the mechanisms in place to ensure patients did not suffer from the price increase; and second, that we were absolutely committed to investing in R&D for next-generation toxoplasmosis treatment, which we are doing currently. Mr. Hurd. So help other people on the backs of those folks who had a 5,000 percent increase. Interesting. Mr. Schiller, my question for you, when you all made the decision to go from $215 to $1,356, a 525 percent increase, on the drug Isuprel, who made the decision? Mr. Schiller. Our neurology and other division, where these products sat, initially did the review. Mr. Hurd. The review of the price? Mr. Schiller. The review of the pricing, the market for that drug. Mr. Hurd. And who are those people? Give me some names. Mr. Schiller. Well, Steve Sembler is the gentleman who ran that division at that time. Mr. Hurd. So he made the decision by himself? Mr. Schiller. No, he brought--he organized a meeting for senior management, which Mike Pearson and myself were included in that meeting, where it was discussed and the price was decided. Mr. Hurd. Did anybody raise their hand and say, ``Y'all, an increase of 525 percent may not be a good idea''? Mr. Schiller. There is always discussions and dissent, but the bottom line is that the decision was made and ---- Mr. Hurd. So was the decision made at an actual meeting? Was there everybody vote, all those in favor, say aye, opposed, nay? Mr. Schiller. It definitely was not a meeting where there was a vote. I can't recall how the final decision was made. But as I have mentioned, we acknowledge that it was too aggressive and ---- Mr. Hurd. So can you send us a list by next week of all the people that were involved in making the decision? Mr. Schiller. I can try. If that list exists, I can get it to you. Mr. Hurd. Best effort. And, Ms. Retzlaff, again, in the next week, it would be great to have a list of people involved in that. Also, Mr. Schiller, for Nitropress, going from $257 to $800, a 212 percent increase, were the same individuals involved in making that decision? Mr. Schiller. It was the same meeting. Mr. Hurd. Excellent. I yield the balance of my time to the chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I actually would like now to recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for 5 minutes. Mr. Palmer. Mr. Schiller, how large is Valeant's work force? Mr. Schiller. Twenty-two thousand people, plus or minus. Mr. Palmer. How many do you have engaged in R&D? Mr. Schiller. There are roughly 1,000 people. Mr. Palmer. How much do you spend on your own in-house R&D? Mr. Schiller. This year, we will spend in excess of $400 million. Mr. Palmer. How many products are in Valeant's development pipeline? Mr. Schiller. We have over 200 active programs, 100 of which we would consider significant. And we expect and hope to get an approval for a novel glaucoma drug and a biologic for the treatment of moderate to severe psoriasis ---- Mr. Palmer. I don't need a list. I just want to get an idea of how much you are investing in R&D versus what you are doing in terms of buying other branded drugs. There is some suggestion that you operate your models more along the lines of a hedge fund in that regard. How would you respond to that? Mr. Schiller. I would disagree with that characterization. We have, as I mentioned, 22,000 people. We operate in 100 countries. We have 1,800 products. We have a vibrant R&D effort. We have 16 manufacturing facilities in the United States that we are investing heavily in. And we have launched 76 products in the last 2 years, and invest heavily in patient assistance programs. So I think we are just like any other pharmaceutical company. Mr. Palmer. I want to raise some questions to Dr. Woodcock. Where there is no competition, prices are high. I think we all understand that. Do you agree that you have all these generic drugs in the pipeline, that if we can get those 4,000 generic drugs into the marketplace, it would have an impact on pricing? Dr. Woodcock. Yes. Mr. Palmer. Well, let me ask you this. Does the FDA prioritize reviews for first generic drugs? There is an issue that the FDA blames sloppy applications for the current backlog. Have you considered compiling a preferred providers list of generics to try to move some of these drugs up and get them approved quicker? Dr. Woodcock. We fast track all first generics, so we give them special attention. We move them through. We recognize the consequences. In the last several years, a first generic, there might be 14 applicants who would be the potential first generic. We don't know who is going to get over the finish line first, so we expedite that class of filings, that set of applications. Mr. Palmer. Well, 10 years ago, the median approval time for a generic drug was about 16 months. And now it is 42 months. It is almost four times as long. Can you explain why that takes so long, if these are generic drugs are coming from a brand drug that has already been approved? Dr. Woodcock. Yes. As I said in my oral testimony, we were a victim of our own success. Eighty-eight percent of dispensed prescriptions are generics, so there are thousands of generics on the market, and they have been very successful. But the industry grew as a response to that, just like a factory that had a great product. And we got many, many more applications, but our resources against that workload did not grow and we built up a backlog. As a result, we were able to negotiate the user fee program with the industry to provide the resources to get it done. But we had that backlog. And that 42 months is a reaction to that, because we had 2,500 applications waiting when we started the user fee program, and that was 40 months ago. They are not going to get any younger when we approve them. They are at least 40 months. The new ones have a much shorter clock. Mr. Palmer. You are talking about the first generic drugs or the new applications? Dr. Woodcock. The new applications. The first generics in that 2,500 are very few, and we are expediting those. Mr. Palmer. Okay. Of the current backlog, can you tell me what percentage of those are first generics? Dr. Woodcock. Very, very, very--it depends on how you define the backlog. If you're talking about the 2,500 that were there when we started the user fee program, it is a very small percentage. Mr. Palmer. Well, you had 1,400 submissions in fiscal year 2014, but only approved 409 of those, so you are adding to that. Dr. Woodcock. Under the agreement, that has a 15-month clock for getting back to the sponsor. So we are planning to meet those goals and get back to the sponsor and complete the review in 15 months. Now, because generics typically have multiple cycles of review, the time to approval may be longer. In my testimony, I think you see that in the prescription drug world, the new drug world, we are up to 95 percent last year, first cycle approval. But that took a lot of work and effort to get it right the first time. That is what we need. We need a ``right the first time'' application. Then starting in October, when we get those, we will approve them in 10 months. Mr. Palmer. And you expect to do that in what time frame? When do you expect to be at 10 months approval? Dr. Woodcock. The applications submitted October 1, 2016, and beyond, if they are right the first time, they will get approved in 10 months. If they are deficient, they will get an answer in 10 months to tell them what they have to do. We get some where we go out and we find that the bioequivalence data has been falsified or some of the manufacturing has been falsified. So we have to have time to make sure that these meet the standards for the U.S., because people are going to be forced to take these, if we approve them. They have to be right. Mr. Palmer. My time has expired, but I have one last quick question. Is the FDA catching up or falling further behind? Dr. Woodcock. We are definitely catching up. We are doing a great job. Mr. Palmer. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. I have some unanimous consent requests. The first one is a statement from Congressman Doug Collins of Georgia. Without objection, I will enter this into the record. So ordered. [The information follows:] Chairman Chaffetz. I also have Congressman Duncan who has a letter of December 15, 2015, that he had received from a Joy Macklin. I ask unanimous consent to enter that in the record. Without objection, so ordered. [The information follows:] Chairman Chaffetz. Congressman Blum also has a statement for the record. Without objection, we will enter his as well. So ordered on that. Chairman Chaffetz. I have a few questions as we start the second round here. Dr. Woodcock, again, thank you for joining us. Since the passage of the Generic Drug User Fee Act of 2012 has passed, the intention here was to generate roughly $1.5 billion. This is user fee money coming out. In the Office of Generics, the people working on this, tell me what has happened to the staffing level since 2012. Dr. Woodcock. Well, across the program, we have hired over 1,000 people. Chairman Chaffetz. Working specifically on the approval process for generics? Dr. Woodcock. That is correct. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, can you give us the very specific number. I would really like to see that line. Not right here in this hearing, as a follow-up. I just really want to be able to see that. Dr. Woodcock. I need to understand your question. I don't understand your question. Chairman Chaffetz. I want to see which offices they are actually working in and what they are doing, if you could break that down. I don't expect you to do it verbally of the top your head. What I am suggesting is, as a follow-up to this hearing, can you provide the committee that information? Dr. Woodcock. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay, perfect. I want to get into these priority review vouchers. These were intended to incentivize treatment for rare pediatric and tropical diseases. The vouchers were supposed to shorten the FDA review time by roughly 4 months. But companies have figured out how valuable these are. I think it demonstrates the frustration with the FDA and the timing. Recently, there was one voucher in August that was sold for $350 million. That means, roughly, they were willing to pay-- they thought it was a good business transaction to pay roughly $2 million a day just to get in line a little bit quicker. I am concerned that not everybody can buy their way to the front of the line. But this does demonstrate how backlogged and how problematic the demand is at the FDA. Does FDA have the necessary authority to prevent the alleged abuse of the PRV system? Do you think there is any abuse of the PRV system? Should they be sold the way they are being sold? Dr. Woodcock. Again, this is an economic issue. It was intended to incentivize development. These recent vouchers applied to products that were already being in development because it's early. Chairman Chaffetz. But they don't have to actually sell those drugs. They don't have to actually market those drugs. Correct? Dr. Woodcock. Correct. They need to be approved. Chairman Chaffetz. Again, so they could be used for a variety of different things. They don't necessarily--because if you develop one, you are going to get this priority review voucher, but you can use the priority review voucher for something other than that category, correct? Dr. Woodcock. Yes. And that is what has been done. And I do have to comment on what you said. The priority review vouchers are applied to novel drugs. They have nothing to do with the generic drug review process. That program is completely on time. And the reason people use priority review vouchers is to move in front of competitors and reach the marker faster than a competitor who may be developing a drug in the same space, because for a new drug, a novel drug, being first on the market--and I know nothing about this--but apparently, it must have a great deal of value. So it does not apply to generic drugs or the generic drug process. Chairman Chaffetz. But you can see how this could be manipulated. Do you see any evidence of manipulation here? Dr. Woodcock. I don't know--it depends on how you define manipulation. Chairman Chaffetz. Well, are they eating these up in order to get the voucher with no real intention of actually marketing, producing, or investing in the smaller drug? Dr. Woodcock. The companies that we have awarded vouchers to have fulfilled the requirements of the statute for being eligible to be awarded a priority review voucher. Chairman Chaffetz. The worry is that the statute is inadequate. It has provided the market a way that people can get in line sooner. They are willing to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in order to do so. We are concerned about spurring innovation and actual drug development. Dr. Woodcock. It was supposed to--the existence of the PRV was supposed to spur those developers of tropical diseases or rare pediatric diseases to enter that space because they would get this reward at the end for ---- Chairman Chaffetz. I think that is one our questions. Are they actually spurring innovations? Should there be limitation on the resale of those vouchers? Again, when you have a difficult disease that affects such a small population, it is difficult--not everybody can just act altruistically. There has to be some degree of profit motivation. But this rise has gone from tens of millions dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars just to get that 4-month edge. When I see $350 million transactions for a 4-month edge, that catches a lot of people's attention. I am just asking the FDA if they see it fulfilling its original mission? And are you seeing any abuse? Dr. Woodcock. All right. Well, there are two sides to this. Is it stimulating development in rare pediatric diseases or tropical diseases? I think it is too early to say, because it takes a long time to develop one of these products. Chairman Chaffetz. So let me read a quote here real quick. I am sorry to cut you off, but I have gone past my time. John Jenkins, the director of FDA's Office of New Drugs, has publicly criticized the PRV program as diverting ``time and resources away from other important public health work, such as reviewing other applications for potentially much more serious conditions or drafting of guidance documents on issues related to drug development.'' Is he, in your opinion, right or wrong? Dr. Woodcock. Yes, that is true. But we have to implement-- this program is established by Congress, and we will implement it. Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. I appreciate that. We are going to continue to have this discussion, because I do think it is not going to solve all problems, but it is an interesting thing. My basic concern here is Turing or Valeant or any other company has the right, I believe, to come in and enter the marketplace. But when you have a rapid rise in pricing, a dramatic rise in pricing, natural economics would suggest that that would create opportunity for others to come in and create more of a balance to the true market pricing, if there was competition. But if they can't get through the process with the FDA in order to enter the marketplace and compete with somebody who was rapidly rising the price of goods, then the market factors are out of balance. And I think it is incumbent upon us to accelerate the process, so that if somebody is taking advantage of price elasticity, the only way to make it more elastic is to provide some competition. What I don't want to do is have government controls or government price controlling, but it is difficult when you see patients who are suffering and they don't have access and they don't know how to go through the convoluted process. They look at that equation and say, you know, ``Do I buy food for my kids or do I just suffer myself?'' So that is why it is so pertinent. I have gone well beyond my time. We will now recognize Mr. DeSaulnier for 5 minutes. Sorry, I was thinking DesJarlais over here. We have a DesJarlais and a DeSaulnier, so I apologize. Mr. DeSaulnier. That is all right. As long as you said from California, I am fine. Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman from California. Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you, both to the chair and the ranking member, for having this hearing. I just want to say, just as an observer and as somebody who is not young, the history of this industry, I think it is fascinating. And, certainly, the gentleman to my left, given his professional experience, Mr. Carter understands this better than I do. But as an observer, 30, 40 years ago, people invested in pharmaceutical companies because it was a relatively low rate of return, but it was a different culture. I, certainly, don't think that the addition of more capital into this industry is necessarily a bad thing, and meeting with people in the public sector in my district in the Bay Area and the private sector, particularly at UCSF, and hearing all the amazing things we are on the verge of doing, whether it is cancer or cardiovascular disease, because of some of these investments, but also because of the public investment. But the concern I have is that although your companies and an individual are getting a lot of press in an extreme example, that in a transition of the pharmaceutical industry, although there has been benefit to increased capital into the marketplace, that this is more a symptom of an overall culture problem. And if I was a free marketeer, which to some degree I can be, you would be a symbol of what is wrong with my philosophy, because as Madison once said, if people were angels, there would be no need for government. And this is an example of, certainly, less than angelic behavior. So, Ms. Retzlaff, I would just ask you to sort of comment on, we have examples of the quotes. For instance, a Reuters headline, ``Pfizer hikes U.S. prices over 100 drugs''; the Washington Post, ``Prescription drug prices jumped more than 10 percent in 2015"; from Bloomberg, ``Everyone is hiking drug prices,'' is a quote from your former CEO. So you have PR that the ranking member has talked about, that you have emails on. There are emails from your former CEO, who refused to speak on the record here. It is my impression that you are doing what companies to do, in terms of controlling what was a bad episode in your company. But it seems like you are on a track to maybe repeating the same mistake because of market pressures, but that is also indicative to the whole industry. So tell me that you have learned your lesson and that there is a place where shareholders can be satisfied, but that consumers can be fairly full of confidence that this isn't going to repeat itself. Because it, certainly, seems like, following some of the comments by the ranking member, that you may retire, but we are set up for failure again here again, that this is just a symptom of a larger problem. Ms. Retzlaff. Right, so you weren't here, but Turing is a research-based pharmaceutical company. We have 139 employees. Thirty-six are dedicated to research and development. The increased revenues from Daraprim, 60 percent of them, actually, are reinvested into research and development, which is critical for a pharma company, and I believe essential. And then we also invest very aggressively and generously in patient access programs. So our goal with patients is to ensure that they don't incur any incremental, out-of-pocket costs, because of our price increase. Another thing I will note is that almost two-thirds of patients who are on Daraprim benefit from government program pricing, which is one penny per pill. Those are your most vulnerable patient populations. What I will say is I am proud of the work that we are doing for toxoplasmosis. It is the second-leading cause of death in the United States due to foodborne illness. Seven hundred and fifty patients still die each year. Not all patients respond to Daraprim. Some of them don't tolerate it. Daraprim is not active on the--or doesn't behave on the parasite when it is in its dormant phase. You know, many people go blind ---- Mr. DeSaulnier. Can I ask you to wrap up, because I don't want to use on my time? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. So, you know, I don't believe my company has done anything wrong. I believe that the decisions we made struck the right balance between the need to ensure patient access, innovation, as well as shareholder value. Mr. DeSaulnier. I don't think you answered my question partially. So, Mr. Schiller, I will try with you. There are a lot of people in your industry that do practice what I would describe as responsible consumer practices, historically. Yours, I would not include in that group. But they have market pressures that, if you have a higher return on investment, because of these practices that would skirt what I think is in the best interest of the consumers, they are forced to come down to a level in the marketplace. So tell me how your company is never going to be in this situation again, absent, as best you can, from a public relations response. Personally, how are you going to look back and tell your grandkids that you were part of a solution? Mr. Schiller. So we grew very, very quickly. We did a lot of good things. We made a lot of mistakes. In the past, we have looked for situations with older drugs, where there wasn't generic competition, where we could increase revenue by increasing price. You should not expect that those are opportunities that we will be looking for in the future. We have taken aggressive steps in terms of our partnership with Walgreens where we are reducing our prices by 10 percent on average in two of our largest franchises, dermatology and ophthalmology prescription drugs. We went to a 30 percent volume-based discount structure on Isuprel and Nitropress. We significantly increased our patient assistance program. Going forward, as it has been in the past, our focus is going to be on developing our franchises around dermatology, gastrointestinal diseases, ophthalmology, women's health, and some of our other smaller franchises. We will continue to invest in R&D, and bring innovative products to the market, and continue to invest in expanding our manufacturing. Mr. DeSaulnier. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those responses. I would say that although I understand why you respond that way, it does suggest to me that the cultural changes I think we need within your company, your industry, I hesitate to have confidence that you have actually learned the necessary lessons that I think you need to learn for the chairman's question about avoiding more government regulation. So with that, I will return to you. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Thank you. We will now recognize the gentleman, again, from Georgia, Mr. Carter, for 5 minutes. Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow up on a couple questions from colleagues earlier. Dr. Woodcock, you weren't here, but one of my colleagues, Representative Meadows from North Carolina, was asking about the process of drug approval in the FDA. And I would like to ask you something, or like for you to clarify something. It is my understanding that FDA can expedite a new drug application, abbreviate a new drug application, to help with the drug shortage problems, if there is such a thing. But I understand, right now, that you are putting more emphasis on the approval and the quality standards, which we all applaud. But you can, in fact, approve a drug if, indeed, there is a drug shortage there, and that has been done before. There has been precedent with that. Now, let me ask you, you could address an issue of drug shortage with compounding, could you not? Yes or no? Dr. Woodcock. We wouldn't overtly do that but the compounders could potentially may offer ---- Mr. Carter. Dr. Woodcock, you ---- Dr. Woodcock. Yes. Mr. Carter. You control the list of ingredients that they are allowed to compound, correct? Dr. Woodcock. Yes. Mr. Carter. So you could add one to that, if there was a drug shortage. In fact, you have done that before in the past. You set precedent with that, correct? Dr. Woodcock. I don't know about ---- Mr. Carter. If you will, in 2012, the FDA waived its authority of an enforcement action against a compounded version of a hormone cream--yes, I see your staff nodding here--that is prescribed to lower the risk to women of premature birth, when the approved version became too expensive. This could have helped us in this situation. This could have helped the American public in this situation. Dr. Woodcock. The situation you refer to was enforcement discretion. Usually when a new drug is approved, then other versions are not supposed to be marketed and ---- Mr. Carter. But through compounding, we could have addressed this issue of the drug shortage because of a significant price increase. And that has been done before. There is precedent there. Dr. Woodcock, just one other thing, through the omnibus that was recently passed by Congress, we instituted a rule on office use compounding. I know that there was language in the bill that directed the FDA to issue guidance on that. Can you give me an idea, are you still working on that? Do you have any idea when that will be? Dr. Woodcock. We are working on a set of guidances to implement the recent statutory changes, and I would hope that they would come out within this year in draft. Mr. Carter. Okay, thank you for that. Another question that was asked by one of my colleagues from New Mexico, Ms. Retzlaff--and in fact, she just repeated again. She asked you a question, and you stated that Turing is a research pharmaceutical company. How many drugs has Turing taken from research to development? How many drugs have you--microphone. Ms. Retzlaff. We have 13 products in development right now. We are a new company. We are ---- Mr. Carter. You are new company, so have had none, but you are calling yourself a research pharmaceutical company. I think it is a stretch to even call you a pharmaceutical company, because I think it is a shell of a company. And I will tell you that when a company that calls themselves a research pharmaceutical company only puts in 5 percent of their profits back into research and development, I think that that proves the point that they are, indeed, not one. And I know what you have said, that no, 60 percent. Yes, when things went south, you increased it to 60 percent, to increase your public relations. But before that, it was only 5 percent. So I beg to differ with you on that. Now, you said that your drug Daraprim was being distributed through specialty pharmacies. Any of those special pharmacies owned by PBMs? Ms. Retzlaff. I think Walgreens. Mr. Carter. The answer is yes. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Carter. Yes, they are, which brings us to the PBM problem, which is a great problem that we have in our country, particularly in the medical field. Mr. Merritt, I want to ask you, over the past week or so, there has been much in the press about a problem between one of the largest health insurers and one of the largest PBMs in our country, that they cannot reach negotiations. They are trying to negotiate. They cannot reach a deal in a $3 billion settlement. If that is the case with one of the largest PBMs and one of the largest insurance companies, how do you expect a small pharmacy, a small, independent pharmacy, to stand a chance against a giant PBM when one of the largest insurance companies in the world can't even negotiate with you? Mr. Merritt. Well, on that particular issue, that is a dispute, a contract dispute, between two companies. But I do know that pharmacies, independent pharmacies ---- Mr. Carter. Can you imagine a contract dispute between a company that is one of the smallest in the United States and one of the giant PBMs? Mr. Merritt. That is true, but drugstores, independent drugstores, typically work with PSAOs that are a part of giant companies, and they negotiate with PBMs on behalf of independent drugstores. Mr. Carter. Mr. Merritt, I am really concerned about the current marketplace, because I believe it creates perverse incentives for PBMs to shut out independent pharmacies at the expense of the American public. And I say that because, as competition decreases, price is going to increase. That is what we are finding now. That is one of the worst things about the Affordable Care Act. Look at how many health insurance companies we have left. Only three or four. That is what is going to lead us to destroy what I believe is the greatest health care system in the world. Now, Mr. Merritt, I know that you are not specifically the problem. I know that you represent an association. But I can tell you, we have to have transparency in the PBM world. Now, Representative Collins just introduced a letter for the record, and I can tell you he has a bill that deals with transparency. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this is something that we will continue to deal with in this committee. It is vitally important that we do. And, again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, the ranking member, and all your staff, for this hearing today. Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. We will now recognize the ranking member. Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want the witnesses to know that I fully support Mr. Carter in his efforts, because I have a lot of people in my district that are very, very concerned about that issue. And, Mr. Carter, I plan to join you in your efforts, because you are absolutely right. Not going on, Mr. Schiller, I have been interested in Isuprel and Nitropress since Marathon Pharmaceuticals, the company that owned these drugs before you, dramatically increased their prices by roughly 400 percent each. The Johns Hopkins Hospital--by the way, which is smack dab in the middle of my district, 5 minutes from where I live-- their hospital budget was significantly impacted by Marathon's price increases. That is why I wrote a letter to Marathon asking about the drugs in October 2014. Then in February 2015, your company came along and jacked up the prices of these critical medicines even more, 525 percent and 212 percent. Your price increase stretched the Hopkins pharmacy budget even further. You have testified today that Valeant is offering a 30 percent discount to some hospitals that use these products. From what we have heard, it is unclear whether hospitals are actually able to access this discount. But even if they are, a 30 percent discount on a 500 percent price increase hardly makes a dent. You are a businessman, Mr. Schiller. Does that sound like a good deal to you? Mr. Schiller. What we try to do is address the issue from a portfolio point of view. Mr. Cummings. Do you realize how much that hurts Hopkins? I don't know whether you heard the testimony, the questions of Mr. Cartwright a little bit earlier. These hospitals are suffering big time. And that means for some of them, they are not like Johns Hopkins, one of the best in the world. But they are suffering big. My father, who only had a third grade education, a former sharecropper, used to say, and I didn't understand it then, but I understand it now. He said, ``Somebody is going to pay. Somebody has got to pay.'' And hospitals are paying big time. Now going back to you, Ms. Retzlaff, I am very concerned about the documents the committee has obtained showing that your company was more concerned about managing the PR backlash of your price increase then ensuring patients had access to Daraprim. An internal Turing presentation--and again, these are not my documents; these are your documents--from 2015, stated, and I quote--listen to this; this is incredible to me. ``HIV patient advocacy may react to price increase. ...HIV community is highly organized, sensitive, and action-oriented.'' ``Significant price increases that disproportionately affect this community could result in backlash from patient advocacy groups, particularly if payers increase cost sharing with patients.'' I am concerned about this because in the district that I live in, the ZIP Code has one of the worst HIV situations in the world--in the world. And so that is why you are going to hear me talk about this. It would be legislative malpractice for me not to. It appears Turing was aware this price increase was going to adversely affect the HIV/AIDS community, yet the company still chose to increase the price by 5,000 percent. You can sit here now until forever and tell me about all your little discounts, $1, and all this. You are raising the price, all right? So, Ms. Retzlaff, did anyone at Turing stop and think about the effect this price increase would have on such a vulnerable population, beyond the anticipated bad PR? Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, we did, and we took action on it. So that is why, again, and it's important, that we participate in Medicaid 340B. We offer Daraprim to the most vulnerable patients at one penny per pill. Mr. Cummings. You were worried about the AIDS community, weren't you? Ms. Retzlaff. Absolutely. Mr. Cummings. Oh, yes. You were really worried. You were worried about the PR, not the patients, the PR. Ms. Retzlaff. We were worried that there would be misinformation in the public domain, and that is exactly what happened. So our efforts from a PR perspective were intended to correct the misinformation and make sure that patients understood that we have these programs in place that they could access Daraprim at a very affordable price. Mr. Cummings. Well, one thing, there was a memo from October 12, 2015, and this should give advocacy groups like the Human Rights Campaign--I am sure it is going to invigorate them to continue to fight for the people that they represent. But this is a quote, it says, the Human Rights Campaign ``has been vocal and in the media about the pricing issue and is potentially the most vocal organization able to garner media coverage. While their motivation is primarily political given their actions we feel it would be important to get a meeting with CEO Chad Griffin in an attempt to slow their aggressive stance and work with them to better understand the company.'' So you thought it was political that they were trying to make sure that people suffering from AIDS get the proper medication that they need. So it is a political problem? Ms. Retzlaff. No. We thought we needed to engage all important stakeholders to make sure they were aware that the most vulnerable patients suffering from toxoplasmosis, over two-thirds of Daraprim's use, can access that product at a penny per pill. Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Schiller, I just have a--I just have a few more questions, Mr. Chairman. I know you are trying to close this down. It has been reported that in 2014 Valeant led the industry in price hikes, raising prices on 62--so you acted like it was just a few drugs you raised prices on--62 of its drugs by an average of 50 percent. In 2015, Valeant continued that pattern with the highest average increase in the industry, 65 percent across 50 drugs. According to CMS data compiled by CQ Roll Call, five of the 10 brand name drugs that had the largest price increases between April 2013 and July 2015 are Valeant drugs. Of those five drugs, two increased by more than 500 percent. One increased by over 600 percent, and one by 800 percent. And one skyrocketed over 1,000 percent in just 15 months. One drug, in particular, Glumetza, a drug used to treat patients with type 2 diabetes, increased by a whopping 800 percent over a mere 6-week period. Is that true, Mr. Schiller? Mr. Schiller. I'm not familiar with all those numbers, but directionally, that is true. Mr. Cummings. The massive price jump was so preposterous that it caused pharmacy benefit manager Express Scripts to announce on January 29, 2016, that it intended to remove Glumetza from its formulary. And this is what they said. They said, ``To protect clients and patients from wasteful, unnecessary drug spending, Express Scripts will exclude Glumetza from our 2016 national preferred formulary pending FDA approval of a generic equivalent.'' I asked you a little bit earlier--and you danced around it very nicely, you did a great dance--what were you going to do-- you admitted under oath that you all had gone too far. I am asking you, are you going to tell the public, which is watching this, by the way, what you are going to do further. You talked about what you have done. What are you going to do, because as far as I am concerned, we still have problems? Mr. Schiller. First of all, you are right. We made some mistakes. I acknowledge ---- Mr. Cummings. You said that before. I got that. Mr. Schiller. I knowledge that. We have frozen all price increases other than for our gastrointestinal drugs this year, and it's been ---- Mr. Cummings. Whoa, whoa, whoa. How long will that price freeze last? Until what? The end of the year? Mr. Schiller. I can't commit. I mean, we raised it at the board level, and at the board level, we decided to freeze any price increases that had been proposed for 2016. We also rolled out our Walgreens program where we took a 10 percent average price discount off of ophthalmology and dermatology drugs. The 30 percent volume discount on Isuprel and Nitropress has been rolled out. And any of the significant users of that will be availing themselves of the 30 percent price increase--price decrease. Going forward, we are not going to be looking for those opportunities, such as Isuprel and Nitropress. Our focus is going to be on our core franchises, as it always has been, around dermatology, ophthalmology, gastro, women's health, consumer health care. And that is where our focus is going to be, on our pipeline, on our manufacturing, and delivering innovative drugs. We have to do a better job of getting the balance right, between being shareholder-friendly, being a good corporate citizen, and being a good partner in the health care system. And we will work very hard to get that balance right. Mr. Cummings. Take you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate--Mr. Chairman, I have to say this. I really cannot tell you how much I appreciate this hearing. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. Chairman Chaffetz. We now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Maloney. Ms. Maloney. Thank you. I join the ranking member in thanking you for this hearing. It is an important one. Mr. Schiller, how much compensation have you received since joining Valeant, including salary, bonuses, stock-based compensation? Is it more than $20 million, including your current stock holdings? Mr. Schiller. It is. Ms. Maloney. So basically, how much is it? Mr. Schiller. I have not added it up. In 2014, it was $27 million. I am incredibly fortunate and well compensated. Ms. Maloney. Well, if you could get it back to us in writing, we would appreciate it. Mr. Schiller. We will do so. Ms. Maloney. Now, throughout this hearing, everyone is citing consultants as the cover, I would say, of increasing prices. Would you please identify those consultants, Mr. Schiller? Mr. Schiller. First of all, while we mentioned consultants, we do not want to cast blame on anyone. We accept responsibility for our own actions. The consultants we referred to for Nitropress and Isuprel I believe was a firm called MME. Ms. Maloney. Could you get back to us in writing the consultants that you used in all of these price hikes in your business? Also, Ms. Retzlaff, what consultants did you use for these price hikes? Ms. Retzlaff. We didn't use any consultants. Ms. Maloney. Okay. I was stunned by the internal documents that actually the majority secured. In particular, an exchange with Mr. Pearson, where he shows in three different graphs that the increase in earnings for your company, Mr. Schiller, was almost completely and totally price increases. And I refer to the Q15. He cites everything except the U.S. grew a total of $26 million. So these other firms overseas didn't grow your growth, according to his graph. The remaining $305 million in growth came totally from the United States. He goes on further. He says, out of this, he says, $61 million of that growth came from volume, where as the remaining $244 million of growth came from price increases. My question is, how do you justify these price increases, particularly on drugs that are the sole source of treatment, there is no other manufacturer? How do you justify these price increases? And did you ever think about the impact on patients, on hospitals, on other providers, on the government, on the taxpayers? You say, very blithely, that this is going to be covered by health care or Medicaid or Medicare or whatever. That comes from the American taxpayer. And the copayments, many people tell me their copayments have gone to thousands of dollars, which they cannot afford. How do you justify that? How does your company justify that? Mr. Schiller. When we have decided on prices for drugs in the past, we have taken in a number of factors, including clinical value, alternative therapies, and patient access, which is obviously critical. Ms. Maloney. May I add that in our memos that we got from you, that patient access was decreased after these price increases, that major hospitals, like Mass General in Boston, a major hospital, couldn't even get access to these drugs. They weren't covered by any other form. People could not get treatment. Mr. Schiller. I am not aware that people weren't able to get access to Isuprel and Nitropress, if that is what you're referring to. Ms. Maloney. I will send you the memos that we read. I started reading them last night, and I couldn't go to sleep. I tell you, I don't even think this is a hearing. This is a scandal, an absolute abuse of power, abuse of the pharmaceutical industry. And it is a scandal. I would like the permission to put into the record additional questions in writing for you to answer for us, both of you. And I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. As we wrap up here, Mr. Schiller, tell me again the factors that you take into consideration when pricing a drug. Mr. Schiller. It is a number of factors, including clinical value, alternative therapies, patient access, and, obviously, it is quite subjective. In some of these situations that we have talked about, we have clearly gotten it wrong. Chairman Chaffetz. Anything else? I'm just trying to make a little checklist. Anything else on that list? Mr. Schiller. That ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Ms. Retzlaff--I'm sorry if I'm not pronouncing your name properly--but what considerations does Turing take in place when considering the pricing of the drug? Ms. Retzlaff. So, I think, first, you take into account the value of the medicine, or the clinical value of the medicine. We took into--we take into account the size of the patient population, other products in the category, the need to invest in innovation, the assessment of whether or not there are mandatory rebates and things like that associated with the product. And then I think I mentioned innovation, and the need to fund patient access programs. Chairman Chaffetz. Can I just tell you candidly--again, I am a conservative guy. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Chairman Chaffetz. I want people to make a profit. But you know why I feel like you are both lying to us? You didn't write in there--you didn't say profit. And if you don't include that as a factor in how you price a drug, you are lying. You are not telling the full and complete truth. You can tell me about access and all the other things, but profit is a motivator. I happen to not think it is an evil thing, but I think you are purposely avoiding it. I don't think you are telling the full and complete truth. We want people to make money. You can't be in business and not make money. Ms. Retzlaff. May I make a comment? Chairman Chaffetz. Sure. Ms. Retzlaff. Of course, we expect to make a profit. Chairman Chaffetz. Then when you price a drug, is that part of the consideration? Ms. Retzlaff. It is part of the ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Then why didn't you list it out? Ms. Retzlaff. Again, we expect to make a profit. I think what is critical, and I did mention it in the form of the need for innovation, because in a research-based pharmaceutical company ---- Chairman Chaffetz. And I don't believe you. Ms. Retzlaff.--we reinvest that into research. Chairman Chaffetz. That is not the history of Turing. You have ---- Ms. Retzlaff. Turing is a brand-new company. Chairman Chaffetz. Exactly. And it is a better model to understand, because Valeant has literally over 1,000 different items. They have a long history here. Ms. Retzlaff. Right. Chairman Chaffetz. And we can be fairly critical of certain things, but when you have a drug that is acquired that has been on the market since I believe 1953 or so ---- Ms. Retzlaff. Something like that. Chairman Chaffetz.--then you start to understand what happened here. And, again, when it gets abused and it goes too far and you are taking advantage of and you lie to the public, you go on television--and I am not saying you personally, but I am saying that the person who owns the plurality of the company here lies, it appears as if you are cheating the American people. And I think you are both being disingenuous and incomplete in your answer, and I want you to reconsider in the future. Profit is, of course, a motivator. It is, of course, part of your calculation. You don't have CFOs that sit in there and don't calculate out the profit line. You don't go out and rent yachts and fireworks and all that kind of stuff unless you are able to jack up the price. And what I am worried about is you are out there marketing a drug that is now $750 and you are telling me, ``Oh, well, the majority of the people, they can just discount that down to a dollar.'' Who is paying the 750 bucks? Suckers. And you know the suckers are? The American public, because we all pay our insurance premiums, we do the right things, we go to the hospitals, we pay our bills, and your--your--extravagance is something we all have to pay for. Ms. Retzlaff. It's pennies. Chairman Chaffetz. Pennies. Ms. Retzlaff. Pennies. Chairman Chaffetz. Pennies. Ms. Retzlaff. It's pennies, and I actually think ---- Chairman Chaffetz. And that is why it makes us sick. Ms. Retzlaff. And I actually think ---- Chairman Chaffetz. Don't tell me that it is pennies, because you are right, you have a drug that affects less than 3,000 people out of 330 million people. But you multiply what you are doing out over the long course of everybody else, and you are taking advantage of the system. And that is why, again, the pressure comes back to the government and the FDA to increase the competition, so that there is a proper balance here. You can find the right amount of profit, not have Congress dictate or set up price controls. And that is why we will continue to do this. This has been a very fruitful and enlightening hearing. I appreciate it. Did the ranking member want to--yes? Mr. Cummings. A few questions. Ms. Retzlaff, you have a research department? Ms. Retzlaff. A research department? Mr. Cummings. Yes. You said you are spending all this money on research. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, yes. We have an R&D department. Mr. Cummings. All right--no, no, no. Research. Ms. Retzlaff. Research. Mr. Cummings. Okay, I am going to get to development in a minute. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. Mr. Cummings. Research. How many people, how many scientists do you have in the research department? Ms. Retzlaff. We have 36 people in our research department of the 139 employees. Mr. Cummings. You have 36 ---- Ms. Retzlaff. Thirty-six ---- Mr. Cummings. Whoa, whoa, whoa. You have 36 scientist types? Ms. Retzlaff. Thirty-six people in research and development. Generally having a science background is a requirement to work in R&D. Mr. Cummings. So you have 36 science-type folk doing research. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes, we do. Mr. Cummings. So of the money that you are spending on R&D, how much of that, what percentage of that is development? Again, we have separated it. I am putting development to the side and putting research over here. Ms. Retzlaff. Yes. I don't know--I don't know if I have that exact number, but I think I can go back to our president of R&D and get you that information. Mr. Cummings. How soon can I get that? Ms. Retzlaff. As soon as possible. I can call him when we are finished here. Mr. Cummings. All right, we will get it by--Mr. Schiller, just one question for you. Do you all ever meet with the hospital associations, because there are a lot of hospitals, probably almost every hospital in this country, that need those drugs that we were talking about, that you have gone up on so much, that are suffering. Do you all meet with hospitals? It probably affects everybody. I know it affects Hopkins. So you know if it affects Hopkins, it is affecting a lot of other hospitals. Do you meet with them? Do you at all? Mr. Schiller. We--I have not personally. The head of the division where those drugs sit has reached out to all the major users of Nitropress and Isuprel, and had discussions. We have also reached agreement with the large group purchasing organizations that buy for the hospitals to make sure that those who need the discount are getting the discount. Mr. Cummings. When you say those who need the discount, you mean to tell me that there are some people who come up and say, ``Hey, we can spend those millions extra. It is no big problem. We don't need the discount.'' Is that what you are trying to tell me? Mr. Schiller. No. That was a poor choice of words. Mr. Cummings. Well, why don't you tell me what you mean? Mr. Schiller. We wanted to make sure that the heavy users of Isuprel and Nitropress did not have a big burden from the price increase. That is why we tiered it toward heavy volume users, so the largest users will get a 30 percent discount. Lighter users would get a smaller discount. Mr. Cummings. Well, if you have a hospital that is a small hospital but needs those drugs desperately, then they don't get as much of a discount. Maybe some small town in South Carolina or wherever, as opposed to a Hopkins, right? Mr. Schiller. They--we ---- Mr. Cummings. So in other words, it might hurt them even more. Hopkins is a big, international hospital, and they are complaining big time. So they would qualify, I guess, for the big hospital discount, right? Come on, man. Mr. Schiller. I don't know off--I would assume so, but I can't tell you specifically. Mr. Cummings. So my point is that you know--and then I am finished with this, Mr. Chairman. But Mr. Cartwright I think made some good points about these hospitals. Our community hospitals, hospitals doing the best they can with what they have, and this is all cutting into their bottom line. But the chairman is absolutely right. You know, I absolutely have no problem with folk making money. But when it gets to a point where basically it is about greed, so that-- what did you make? $26 million? What was it, 26, Mr. Schiller? Mr. Schiller. It was 27. Mr. Cummings. And what about you, Ms. Retzlaff? Ms. Retzlaff. I'm sorry? Mr. Cummings. How much money do you make? That is what I asked you. Ms. Retzlaff. I'm with a private company. I don't know that I have to disclose that. Mr. Cummings. Okay. All right. Well, I am sure you are making a nice sum. Ms. Retzlaff. Not as much as Mr. Schiller. Mr. Cummings. Yes, I am sure. Well, guess what, the people in my district are making like $30,000 a year, $40,000 a year. Probably the money that you spend in a day or a week, they make in a year. Yet and still they have to get drugs to stay alive. So are you in contact with Mr. Shkreli? Ms. Retzlaff. On occasion, yes. Mr. Cummings. Okay. Again, I want to thank you all for being here. Bye-bye. Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. It has been very illuminating. The committee stands adjourned. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 1:22 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]