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- ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY AND POTENTIAL U.S. POLICY RESPONSES [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY AND POTENTIAL U.S. POLICY RESPONSES ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 29, 2015 __________ Serial No. 114-143 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform _________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 25-879 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ____________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800 Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK, MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Sean McLaughlin, Chief of Staff David Rapallo, Minority Chief of Staff Troy Stock, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Information Technology Sarah Vance, Staff Assistant ------ Subcommittee on Information Technology WILL HURD, Texas, Chairman BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice Chair ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Ranking MARK WALKER, North Carolina Member ROD BLUM, Iowa GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TED LIEU, California C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 29, 2015................................... 1 WITNESSES Ms. Amy Hess, Executive Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Oral Statement............................................... 4 Written Statement............................................ 7 Mr. Daniel F. Conley, Suffolk County District Attorney, Massachusetts Oral Statement............................................... 16 Written Statement............................................ 18 Mr. Kevin S. Bankston, Policy Director, New America's Open Technology Institute Oral Statement............................................... 25 Written Statement............................................ 27 Mr. Jon Potter, President, Application Developers Alliance Oral Statement............................................... 43 Written Statement............................................ 45 Dr. Matt Blaze, Associate Professor, Computer and Information Science, School of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Pennsylvania 53 ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY AND POTENTIAL U.S. POLICY RESPONSES ---------- Wednesday, April 29, 2015 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Information Technology Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:32 p.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Blake Farenthold [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Hurd, Farenthold, Walker, Blum, Chaffetz, Kelly, Connolly, and Lieu. Mr. Hurd. The Subcommittee on Information Technology will come to order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Good afternoon, everyone. And thanks for attending today's hearing. And I appreciate your flexibility with time. Votes always come at the inopportune moment. In September of last year, Apple and Google, the largest mobile device manufacturers in the United States, announced that they would implement increased security measures on their products in an attempt to strengthen privacy and data security. These developments were met with concern from some law enforcement entities, such as the FBI, who were worried that this increased level of encryption would lead to an inability to access data on specific devices and that, despite obtaining a warrant, investigatory efforts could be hindered by this. As a former CIA officer, I understand and appreciate the need and desire for law enforcement to access digital information in a timely manner. However, I also understand the protections afforded to Americans provided by the Constitution, and I have taken an oath two times to protect and defend these rights. I firmly believe that law enforcement officials must gain the trust of the very people they are trying to protect in order to be successful, and I remain concerned that a government-mandated back or front door on U.S.-based mobile device manufacturers might undermine that trust. Today's hearing will involve testimony from a variety of experts and stakeholders and representatives on ways to balance law enforcement needs with privacy and security concerns. The hearing will also explore the impact of this debate on domestic privacy, American consumers, and U.S. technology manufacturers. As technology continues to evolve and encryption capabilities become a part of everyday life for all Americans, this debate will only grow larger. I believe we can find a way to protect the privacy of law-abiding citizens and ensure that law enforcement have the tools they need to catch the bad guys. I welcome the witnesses and look forward to today's discussion. Mr. Hurd. I would like to now recognize my friend and the ranking member of the subcommittee, Ms. Kelly of Illinois, for 5 minutes for an opening statement. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for appearing on today's panel. Recently companies like Apple and Google have announced plans to incorporate automatic encryption for their mobile devices. Encryption will become the default privacy feature on their mobile devices, making their content unreadable and inaccessible without the user's selected pass code. As a society, we rely on mobile devices to manage and protect many aspects of our lives, personal, professional, and financial. Privacy on our smartphones is critically important. Hackers are concerned, as is unrestricted government surveillance. According to a May 2014 study on trends in U.S. smartphone industry, Android and Apple control 52.1 and 41.9 percent share of the market. Their move towards automatic encryption will have a significant effect on the industry standard for privacy protections. The move towards automatic encryption has been criticized as seriously hindering law enforcement operations. Criminals, like noncriminals, use mobile devices to manage the many aspects of their lives, some of which can provide evidence of a crime. Today many criminal cases have a digital component and law enforcement entities increasingly rely on the content of mobile devices to further an investigation or prosecution of serious crimes of national security threats. The FBI, local law enforcement departments, and prosecutors have all expressed concern with automatic encryption. They envision a number of scenarios in which the inability to assess data kept on mobile devices will seriously hinder a criminal investigation. They do not want to be in a position to tell a victim of a crime or the family of a victim that they cannot save someone or prosecute someone because they cannot access the content of a mobile device. There is a balance to be struck here. It is important that the Government's policies approach ensures privacy protections and it is important that law enforcement, under tightly controlled circumstances, have the ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. I look forward to today's hearing and your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to continue working with you to examine policy issues related to advancement and information technology. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. I am now pleased to recognize Mr. Chaffetz of Utah, the chairman of the full committee, for an opening statement. Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the chairman. And I appreciate your passion on this topic. It affects literally every American. It affects people all across the world. I think one of the great questions that needs to be posed to our society and certainly our country as a whole is how to find the right balance between personal privacy and national security. And I, for one, am not willing to give up every bit of privacy in the name of security. So how do we find that right balance? It is not easy to find. In response to recent moves by Apple and Google mentioned by Chairman Hurd, the FBI Director Comey recommended, quote,''a regulatory or legislative fix,'' end quote, which would force companies to manufacture their mobile devices in such a way that law enforcement can access the data on those devices without a warrant or court order. I have three general concerns about Director Comey's proposal: First, it is impossible to build just a back door for just the good guys, you know, just the good guys can get this. If somebody at the genius bar can figure it out, so can the nefarious folks in a van down by the river. As Alex Stamos, Yahoo's chief information security officer, recently explained, all of the best public cryptographers in the world would agree that you can't really build back doors in crypto. That is like drilling a hole in a windshield.'' The Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology's chief cybersecurity adviser agreed, saying, quote, ``There is no way to do this where you don't have an unintentional vulnerability,'' end quote. And I worry about those unintentional vulnerabilities. We have a wide variety of experts on the panel today to help us examine some of the potential economic, privacy, security, and geopolitical consequences of introducing a vulnerability into the system. Second, we already live in what some experts have referred to as the, quote, ``golden age of surveillance,'' end quote, for law enforcement. Federal, State, and local law enforcement never had more tools at their disposal to help detect, prevent, and prosecute crime. It seems that we hear every day there is new, often-startling stories about the United States Government's ability to track its own citizens. I recognize technology can be a double-edged sword and many pose challenges for law enforcement as well, but we are certainly not going to go dark, and in many ways we have never been brighter. Third, strong encryption prevents crime and is a part of the economy. People keep their lives in their mobile phones. A typical mobile phone might hold a person's pictures, contacts, communications, finance schedule, and much more personal information, in addition to my Words with Friends, which is critical to my daily sanity. If your phone is lost or stolen, you want to know your information is protected, and encryption does that. There is a reason the world's largest technology companies are increasingly developing stronger and more frequently used encryption technology. It is not because they are anti-law enforcement. On the contrary. It is because sophisticated cyber hacks are nearly daily events. No one is immune from digital snooping, from the White House, to corporate America, to private citizens. The opportunity brought to us by the modern technologies are near limitless, but not if the system is compromised. Strong encryption helps ensure data is secure and allows companies and individuals to operate with confidence and trust. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. But we have choices to make. Do we allow the 99 percent of Americans who are good, honest, decent, hard-working, patriotic people to have encrypted phones or do we need to leave a back door open and create vulnerability for all of them? Because vulnerability is--it is all or none, folks. It is not just a little bit, not just for the good guys. And that is why we are having this hearing today. I appreciate Chairman Hurd and what he is doing. And I appreciate and thank you all for being here as witnesses today. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. I am going to hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. We will now recognize our panel of witnesses. I am pleased to welcome Ms. Amy Hess, Executive Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Branch at the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Mr. Daniel Conley, District Attorney of Suffolk County, Massachusetts; Mr. Kevin Bankston, Policy Director at New America's Open Technology Institute; Mr. John Potter, President of the Application Developers Alliance; and Dr. Matthew Blaze, Associate Professor of Computer and Information Science of the School of Engineering and Applied Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Welcome to all. Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So please rise and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Mr. Hurd. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. Thank you. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your entire written statement will be made part of the record. And, Ms. Hess, we will start with you. You are recognized for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF AMY S. HESS Ms. Hess. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Chaffetz, Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and for your continued support of the men and women of the FBI. The Bureau has undergone an unprecedented transformation in recent years to address and prevent threats to our national security and our public safety. But as those threats continue to evolve, the FBI must evolve as well. Today's FBI is a threat-focused, intelligence-driven organization, and we must continuously challenge ourselves to stay ahead of changing threats and changing circumstances. As you know, technology has forever changed the world we live in. Our phones and computers have become reflections of our personalities, interests, and our identities. And with that comes the need to protect our privacy and our data. But technology can be used by some very dangerous people, and the FBI has a sworn duty to keep every American safe from harm while simultaneously protecting their constitutional rights and preserving their civil liberties. Moreover, we recognize our national interests in promoting innovation and the competitiveness of U.S. companies in the global marketplace, as well as freedom of expression around the world. But the evolution of technology creates new challenges for law enforcement. It impacts our ability to access communications pursuant to court orders, which means those of us charged with protecting the American people aren't always able to access the information we need to prosecute criminals and prevent terrorism, even though we have the lawful authority to do so. To be clear, we obtain the proper legal authority to intercept and access communications and information, but we increasingly lack the technical ability to do so. This problem, which we refer to as ``going dark,'' is broader and more extensive than just encryption, but for the purposes of today's testimony, I will focus on the challenges of the evolving use of encryption. We encounter encryption in two overlapping contexts. The first is legally authorized realtime interception of what we call data in motion, such as phone calls, emails, and text messages in transit. The second concerns legally authorized access to data stored on our devices or what we call data at rest. First let me address court-ordered interception of data in motion. In the past, there were a limited number of communication carriers conducting electronic surveillance and it was more straightforward. We developed probable cause to believe a suspected criminal was using a target phone to commit a felony. We then obtained a court order for a wiretap on that phone. And under the supervision of a judge, we collected the evidence we needed for prosecution. Today there are countless providers, networks, and means of communicating. We have laptops, smartphones, and tablets. We use multiple networks and any number of apps. And so do those conspiring to harm us. They use the same devices, the same networks, and the same apps to make plans, target victims, and concoct alibis. Thousands of companies now provide some form of communication service, but most do not have the ability to isolate and deliver particular information when urged to do so by a court. Turning to court-ordered access to data at rest, we know that encryption of stored data is not new, but it has become increasingly prevalent and sophisticated. And the challenge to law enforcement and national security officials has been heightened with the advent of default encryption settings and stronger encryption standards. In the past, the consumer had to decide whether to encrypt data stored on his or her device and take action. But with today's new operating systems, a device and all of the user's information on the device can be encrypted by default. Further, companies have developed encryption technology which makes it impossible for them to decrypt data on devices they manufacture, even when lawfully ordered to do so. Although there are certainly good reasons to support these new uses of encryption, such decisions regarding system design have a tremendous impact on our ability to fight crime and bring perpetrators to justice. Like the general population, criminals are increasingly storing such information on electronic devices and, if these devices are encrypted, the information they contain may be unreadable to anyone other than the user. The process of obtaining a search warrant authorized by a court of law to seek evidence of a crime could be an exercise in futility. To be clear, we in the FBI support and encourage the use of secure networks and sophisticated encryption to prevent cyber threats. We know that adversaries will exploit any vulnerability they find, but we believe that security risks associated with the implementation of lawfully authorized access are better addressed by developing solutions during the design phase rather than resorting to a patchwork solution after the product or service has been deployed. Just as we have an obligation to address threats to national security and public safety, we likewise have an obligation to consider the potential impact of our investigations on civil liberties, including the right to privacy. We must always act within the confines of the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. We also believe that no one in this country should be beyond the law. The notion that a suspected criminal's closet could never be opened or his phone could never be unlocked, even with properly obtained legal authority, is troubling. We will, of course, use every lawfully authorized technique we have to protect the citizens we serve, but having to rely on those other tools could delay criminal investigations, preclude us from identifying victims and coconspirators, risk prematurely alerting suspects to our investigative interests, and potentially put lives in danger. Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the FBI's priorities and the challenges of ``going dark.'' The work we do would not be possible without the support of Congress and the American people. I look forward to your questions. [Prepared statement of Ms. Hess follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Ms. Hess. Now we recognize Mr. Conley for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF DANIEL F. CONLEY Mr. Conley. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee, my name is Dan Conley, and I'm the District Attorney in Boston and a member of the National District Attorneys Association, the largest association of prosecutors in America. Thank you for the invitation to testify today here today on this critical issue. Last year, when Apple and Google announced their new operating system, they touted that the technology would not allow law enforcement, even with a court order, to access information on its mobile devices. In America, we often say that none of us is above the law. But when corporate interests place crucial evidence beyond the legitimate reach of our courts, they are, in fact, granting those who rape, defraud, assault, or even kill a profound legal advantage over victims in society. So I'm here today to ask Congress to intervene. As a prosecutor, my most important duty is to ensure that evidence we present in court is gathered fairly, ethically, and legally. If it's not, if a search is improper, a court will suppress that evidence and exclude it. We, as Americans, enjoy a presumptive right to privacy that may only be abridged under clearly defined circumstances, such as when there are specific articulable facts that would lead a judge to believe that the place to be searched will yield evidence of a crime. In decades past, these places were car trunks and safety deposit boxes. Today they are mobile devices. We undertake those searches to solve crimes. We don't wander to Web sites where people visit or aggregate data about people's personal health, wealth, or shopping habits. That, frankly, is the purview of companies like Apple and Google. Their nominal commitment to privacy rights would be far more credible if they were forbidding themselves access to their customers' interests, search terms, and consumer habits. But, as we all know, they are taking full advantage of their customers' private data for commercial purposes while building an impenetrable barrier around evidence in legitimate court- authorized investigations. For over 200 years of American jurisprudence, our courts have balanced the rights of individuals against society. But, in this case, in one fell swoop, Apple and Google have upended it. They have created hiding places not merely beyond the reach of law enforcement, but beyond the laws that define our Nation. Let me give you an idea of what this means in practical terms. In every big city, there's a mass transit system and a disgraceful practice of snapping photographs up women's skirts has taken place. If the offender's phone cannot be searched pursuant to a warrant, then the evidence won't be recovered and this practice will be an unchargeable crime. This isn't even the worst of it. Three years ago we were investigating a child pornography case. We just thought a teacher was trading child pornography. Turns out, after we got a warrant and examined his mobile devices, he was not only collecting photographs, he was actually abusing children. After a multijurisdictional investigation, he's serving 45 years in prison. If those devices were encrypted today, he would be free to continue what he's doing on our streets. Human trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation of children is also aided and abetted by the same technology with victims, including children, advertised for sale on Web sites accessed through handheld devices. With these operating systems, those devices would become warrant-proof and the evidence they contain unreachable by investigators. Now, I don't believe Apple or Google set out to design an encryption system to protect human traffickers, but this is the result. When we talk about warrant-proof encryption, it is the perpetrators of every violent sexual or financial crime in which handheld technology is used who benefit. This isn't rhetoric. This is reality. Like most Americans, I am a customer of these companies and I hold my privacy interest dear, and I understand and I strongly encourage the use of secure encryption technology to prevent hacking, theft, and fraud. And I think most people recognize that there must be a balance struck between individual's privacy rights and the legitimate interests of our society to bring dangerous criminals to account. Apple and Google need to recognize this as well. I will conclude today by pointing out that, for the past several weeks, in Boston and around the country, individuals have all been following the trial of one of the individuals who was a terrorist in Boston 2 years ago and, through his actions, left four people dead and hundreds more grievously injured. Cell phone evidence, much of it volunteered by people, but some of it obtained by warrant, was critical to understanding what happened, how it happened, and who did it. Were law enforcement blocked from obtaining that evidence, the apprehension of those responsible for the Boston Marathon bombings might have been very much in doubt. So, again, I don't think Apple or Google intended to create a safe space for terrorists to do their deeds. But make no mistake. This is the result and those are the stakes. I therefore respectfully urge Congress to help us find a reasonable, balanced solution that protects privacy while also ensuring that there are reasonable means to gain lawful access to crucial evidence. I thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Conley follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Conley. Now I would like to recognize Mr. Bankston for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF KEVIN S. BANKSTON Mr. Bankston. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member Kelly, members of the subcommittee. District Attorney Conley is absolutely right that encryption is one of the most critical law-and-order issues of our time. However--and with respect and thanks for his and the FBI's work to keep us all safer--he has got it exactly backward. Strong encryption is absolutely critical to the preservation of law and order in the digital age much more than it is a threat to it. Some have framed this debate as a choice between safety and privacy, but that is a false choice. The debate over whether to allow strong encryption without back doors is really a choice between safety and safety, a little more safety against some isolated crimes or much more safety for many more people against countless other concrete criminal and national security threats, be they street criminals looking to steal our phones and laptops, ID thieves and fraudsters and Russian hackers and corporate spies trying to steal our most valuable data, or foreign intelligence agencies trying to compromise our most sensitive national security secrets. The ultimate question isn't what will make law enforcement's job easier in some investigations. The ultimate question is what will prevent more crime, which will make law enforcement's job easier overall and will keep us all safer. The answer to that question is more strong encryption, not less. I won't deny that encrypted devices or end-to-end encrypted communications will, in some cases, inconvenience law enforcement. Notably, however, the Government has yet to provide a single specific example where such encryption has posed an insurmountable problem. That's likely because there are often a variety of other ways for law enforcement to get the evidence that it needs. The FBI is concerned that it's ``going dark.'' But, all in all, the digital revolution has been an enormous boon to law enforcement, what some have called a golden age of surveillance. More and more of our interactions with others and with the world are moving into the digital realm, being quantified and recorded, an unprecedented and exponentially growing cache of sensitive data about all of us, and most of it available to law enforcement. Think about the massive archives of private email and instant messages and text messages and photos and videos and the vast public records of our social network activities, most of which didn't exist or weren't available just 15 years ago, most of which are stored in the Internet cloud and are easily accessible to law enforcement, and much of which is backed up from the very same encrypted phones that the Government is concerned about. Think of all the new metadata revealing when and with whom all those messages were exchanged, where and when those photos and videos were taken. And think especially about all that new location data generated by our cell phones and by our mobile apps, creating extensive records of our movements regardless of whether those phones are encrypted or not. Think about all of that when law enforcement says it is going dark. I would counter that, by most measures, they are going bright. And in those few cases where they are in the dark and they truly need the data on an encrypted device, even then there are options. They can in many cases ask the Court to compel the owner to decrypt the device under threat of contempt or even remotely hack into the device over the Internet, a technique that is somewhat worrisomely being used more and more often. Admittedly, I have some serious constitutional concerns about both of those law enforcement techniques, but I am much more concerned that, in order to address those rare cases, law enforcement seems to want Congress to take steps that would undermine everyone's security rather than targeting an individual suspect. Make no mistake. Attempting to mandate encryption back doors will undermine everyone's security, as Professor Blaze will testify. That is the unanimous conclusion of every technical expert that has spoken publicly on this issue. And, as Mr. Potter will make clear, surveillance backdoor mandates would also undermine our economic security and prompt international customers and many American consumers and even many of the bad guys that we're trying to stop to turn away from the compromised products and services offered by U.S. companies. It's true now, just as it was true during the so-called crypto wars of the 1990s, weakening encryption is a bad idea. That is why a majority of the House of Representatives at the time, including four current members of this Oversight Committee, including Ranking Member Cummings, co-sponsored Chairman Goodlatte's Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, which would have reaffirmed Americans' right to make, use, and distribute strong encryption products without back doors. That is why a majority of the House just last year voted for the Sensenbrenner-Massie-Lofgren Amendment that would have prohibited the NSA from demanding or even asking that companies weakenthe security of their products. And that is why this Congress should similarly reject any short-sighted backdoor proposals in favor of preserving our long-term national and economic security. Thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions, in particular, any questions about the 10 specific arguments laid out in my written testimony. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Bankston follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Bankston. Mr. Potter, 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF JON POTTER Mr. Potter. Thank you, Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, members of the subcommittee. The 3-year-old App Developers Alliance includes more than 200 companies and more than 35,000 individuals worldwide. Thank you for inviting me to speak today about the challenges app developers and our digital industry partners face if we are required to both protect privacy and provide Government with privacy-breaching back doors. First, it is important to highlight that protecting digital data through innovative security-based products is unquestionably good for businesses and consumers. In contrast, back doors make apps less secure and less trustworthy. Second, we must remember that data protection is not only about civil liberties and privacy. Encryption prevents cybercrime, which threatens fundamental economic interests that operate digitally, including health care, transportation, banking, and manufacturing. Encryption also prevents identity theft, which has been consumers' top complaint to the Federal Trade Commission for 15 consecutive years. Third, nearly every digital business wants to be global, but mandatory government back doors may spark a trade war and imprison businesses in their home country. Fourth, Government's conflicting messages about data protection create uncertainty about business expectations. Uncertainty creates risk, inhibits growth and job creation, and especially harms startups and small business. Handling customer data securely is an essential business commitment. Customers worldwide demand this. The media routinely report on data breaches and organized cybercrime. In response, and strongly encouraged by government agencies, including the FBI, developers have prioritized security. Given the magnitude of cybercrime and of government resources committed to fighting it, law enforcement criticism of encryption is perplexing. For several years law enforcement has routinely encouraged and even required encryption to protect sensitive data. Until recently, the FBI Web site recommended all organizations, quote, ``encrypt data so the hacker can't read it,'' end quote. Quizzically, that recommendation was deleted from the FBI Web site just a few weeks ago. In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission continues to advise that, quote, ``encryption is the key to securing personal information online.'' Government mixed messages about privacy and security, slow product development, inhibit investors, worry customers, and harm all companies, especially startups. Every digital business opportunity is global. So the worldwide impact of mandatory government back doors is important. Unauthorized U.S. Government collection of global communications has created international outrage and backlash that is already costing American companies billions of dollars. Mandating back doors that weaken encryption will exacerbate global distrust, and we should expect two reactions. First, international governments will demand their own security back doors. Second, U.S.-based apps will be deemed noncompliant with international privacy laws and be locked out of those markets. Developers will have to build many versions of apps to serve many markets with different law enforcement demands and privacy laws or risk being blocked from those markets. Building multiple versions of any product increases costs and runs contrary to every rule of digital business. Additionally, for good reason, some might be concerned if other countries or particular countries demand their own back doors. If markets become inaccessible to U.S. Apps because of mandatory back doors, then a digital trade war could break out. The App Developers Alliance membership is global because apps create jobs and deliver value globally. Closed markets may benefit some of our members in the short term, but the large majority of our members recognize that encryption and privacy trade war is substantially negative. Finally, the basics of technology, security, and privacy are critical. Any security opening creates vulnerability. You can't build a back door that only the good guys can walk through. Hackers know it. The FBI knows it. And increasingly customers know it. Forced insecurity harms consumers in all industries, but it especially harms startups and small innovators because building back doors that are only slightly ajar is technically challenging and very expensive. There are situations that justify law enforcement access to our cell phones, to our apps, to the cloud, but there are many legal methods to accomplish this with court approval. Congress must insist that law enforcement and national security agencies utilize these processes. This is fundamental to America's civilian government. In closing, please remember that encryption technologies are a market response to well-founded consumer, commercial, and government demand. When an app developer builds a thriving business model around security and consumer trust only to be told the FBI wants the product to be secure, but not too secure, this disrupts the marketplace. It is bad for innovation, for business, and for consumers. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Potter follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Potter. Dr. Blaze, 5 minutes to you. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BLAZE, Ph.D. Mr. Blaze. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a technologist, I am finding myself in the very curious position of participating in a debate over the desirability of something that sounds wonderful, which is a security system that can be bypassed by the good guys, but that also reliably keeps the bad guys out. And we could certainly discuss that. But as a technologist, I can't ignore a stark reality, which is simply that it can't be done safely. And if we make wishful policies that assume and pretend that we can, there will be terrible consequences for our economy and for our national security. So it would be difficult to overstate today the importance of robust, reliable computing and communications to our personal, commercial, and national security. Modern computing and network technologies are obviously yielding great benefits to our society, and we are depending on them to be reliable and trustworthy in the same way that we depend on power and water and the rest of our critical infrastructure today. But, unfortunately, software-based systems, which is the foundation on which all of this modern communications technology is based, are also notoriously vulnerable to attack by criminals and by hostile nation-states. Large-scale data breaches, of course, are literally a daily occurrence, and this problem is getting worse rather than better as we build larger and more complex systems. And it's really not an exaggeration to characterize the state of software security as an emerging national crisis. And the sad truth behind this is that computer science, my field, simply does not know how to build complex large-scale software that has reliably correct behavior. This is not a new problem. It has nothing to do with encryption or modern technology. It has been the central focus of computing research since the dawn of the programmable computer. And as new technology allows us to build larger and more complex systems, the problem of ensuring their reliability becomes actually exponentially harder with more and more components interacting with each other. So as we integrate insecure, vulnerable systems into the fabric of our economy, the consequences of those systems failing become both more likely and increasingly serious. Unfortunately, there is no magic bullet for securing software- based systems. Large systems are fundamentally risky, and this is something that we can, at best, manage rather than fix outright. There are really only two known ways to manage the risk of unreliable and insecure software. One is the use of encryption, which allows us to process sensitive data over insecure media and insecure software systems to the extent that we can. And the other is to design our software systems to be as small and as simple as we possibly can to minimize the number of features that a malicious attacker might be able to find flaws to exploit. This is why proposals for law enforcement access features frighten me so much. Cryptographic systems are among the most fragile and subtle elements of modern software. We often discover devastating weaknesses in even very simple cryptographic systems years after they are designed and fielded. What third-party access requirements do is take even very simple problems that we don't really know how to solve and turn them into far more complex problems that we really have no chance of reliably solving. So backdoor cryptography of the kind advocated by the FBI might solve some problems if we could do it, but it's a notoriously and well-known difficult problem. We have found subtle flaws even in systems designed by the National Security Agency, such as the Clipper Chip two decades ago. And even if we could get the cryptography right, we'd be left with the problem of integrating access features into the software. Requiring designers to design around third-party access requirements will basically undermine our already tenuous ability to defend against attack. It's tempting to frame this debate as being between personal privacy and law enforcement. But, in fact, the stakes are higher than that. We just can't do what the FBI is asking without seriously weakening our infrastructure. The ultimate beneficiaries will be criminals and rival nation-states. Congress faces a crucial choice here: To effectively legislate mandatory insecurity in our critical infrastructure or to recognize the critical importance of robust security in preventing crime in our increasingly connected world. Thank you very much. [Prepared statement of Mr. Blaze follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Dr. Blaze. I would now like to recognize my fellow Texan, Blake Farenthold, for 5 minutes. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Could we get the slide up? I think it was Mr. Potter that pointed out the FBI had some recommendations on their Web site about encryption that was recently taken down. I want to read the two that are highlighted. And, Ms. Hess, I want to get a couple questions for you on that. ``Depending on the type of phone, the operating system may have encryption available. This can be used to protect the user's personal data in case of a loss or theft.'' And it also says, ``Pass code-protect your mobile device. This is the first layer of physical security to protect the contents of this device.'' These are now off of the FBI Web site. Why did the FBI take down this guidance? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. Actually, we decided to provide a link to that information. That same information actually appears through the link to IC3. Mr. Farenthold. And you agree that that is probably good advice. You still advise people it is a good idea to encrypt their data? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. We fully support encryption. Mr. Farenthold. All right. Now, Dr. Blaze, you talked about the good guys versus the bad guys. Who is a good guy today may not always be a good guy. I mean, that definition of good guy, bad guy--I mean, it is overly simplistic. Who are the good guys? Who are the bad guys? And who makes that decision? Mr. Blaze. That is certainly true. And I think, even if we can draw a line between who we want to have access and who we don't, which is, of course, an impossible task in practice, we'd still be left with the problem that we wouldn't be able to provide access. Mr. Farenthold. And, Mr. Bankston, let's talk a little bit about a golden key. That is one of the things that folks are looking at. Wouldn't that become the biggest hacker target in the world if it were known there were a golden key and what we have today that might be deemed secure as computing power increases might become a lot easier to break? Mr. Bankston. Yes, Congressman. That is absolutely the case. I think that, as Professor Blaze made clear, attempting to build such a system would add incredible levels of complexity to our system such that it would inevitably, as the cybersecurity coordinator at NIST said recently, lead to unanticipated vulnerabilities. And that doesn't even count the possibility of bad actors obtaining the keys. Even if you were to split those keys apart, as the NSA director has suggested, you have to put that key together somewhere, and wherever you do do that is going to be a critical target for anyone who wants to compromise our security. Mr. Farenthold. Yeah. I have got a very limited time. I don't mean to cut you off. I am just trying to get some broad general answers. We can get down to the weeds in another opportunity. Is there anybody on the panel who believes we can build a technically secure back door with a golden key? Raise your hand and I will recognize you if you think that can be done. All right. Let the record reflect no one on the panel thinks that that can be done. All right. Let's talk a little bit about if we were to go ahead and do it. The United States--let's assume they are a good guy and we agree to put in a back door for them. All of a sudden we want to sell this same product in another country. So China wants a back door. North Korea wants a back door. Basically, every country is going to want a back door. Does anybody disagree with that statement? I see no hands coming up for that one either. So we then are good. So do we put all of these back doors into every system, making it that much more difficult, or do we then say, ``All right. Well, this phone is sold in the United States. We are going to put a U.S. back door in''? Well, that doesn't help our intelligence community abroad. And if I wanted to avoid that, I would go to the Cayman Islands, which I would assume would have better privacy laws--I don't know--there would be some haven country--and buy my phone there. Would it then be seized by Customs? I mean, I don't see a practical way to implement this. I am now appointing you to the NSA. You are the head of the NSA. Anybody got a way we can do what we want to do? Raise your hand if you have got any suggestions that you think we can do it. Mr. Conley. Mr. Conley. Yeah. I am no expert. I am probably the least technologically savvy guy in this room, maybe. But there are a lot of great minds in the United States. I'm trying to figure out a way to balance the interests here. It is not an either-or situation. And Dr. Blaze said--you know, he's a computer scientist. I'm sure he's brilliant. But, jeez, I hate to hear talk like, ``That cannot be done.'' I mean, think about if Jack Kennedy said, ``We can't go to the moon. That cannot be done.'' He said something else, ``We're going to get there in the next decade.'' So I would say to the computer science community let's get the best minds in the United States together on this. We can balance the interests here. Mr. Farenthold. And I appreciate that because I am a proud American as well. But I think what we are saying today is--it would be the equivalent of President Kennedy saying, ``We will be able to get to the moon in 10 years and nobody else will ever be able to get there ever.'' I think that is the distinction I would like to draw there. It is not like we are saying we can't develop a secure system, but we are also saying that can we really develop a secure system that will be secure for any length of time that somebody smarter might not be able to hack 5 years down the road or so. Anyway, I see I am already out of time. I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Votes have been called on the House floor. And what we are going to do is go to Ranking Member Kelly for questions, and then we will recess and reconvene 10 minutes after votes. I would now like to recognize my good friend, Ms. Kelly from Illinois. Mr. Connolly. Would my friend Ms. Kelly yield just for a second? Because I may not be able to come back. I just want to welcome Mr. Potter, who is an old friend and colleague of mine. And I wish to welcome Mr. Conley, though I wish he would learn how to spell his name. Thank you very much. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Bankston, a core component to what we are doing here today is examining what we can do to protect the privacy of consumer data and not serve as a barrier to law enforcement communities' ability to do work that keeps us safe. I know I have heard from a number of folks on both sides of the data privacy issue. And so my question is: Is there such a thing as creating a back door that is only for the good guys? Mr. Bankston. I am also not a technical expert. I am a policy expert. But based on what every expert in the field has said not only in the current debate, but also 20 years ago in a many-multi-year debate over exactly this issue, the answer is a clear no and, in fact, a unanimous no. Ms. Kelly. Also, could the existence of a back door created in the interest of public safety actually serve as a Trojan horse that cybercriminals exploit to their advantage? Mr. Bankston. Absolutely. Any back door is going to necessarily weaken the security of a system in a way that another actor, someone with worse interests than our own Government trying to protect us, could exploit. Ms. Kelly. Any other comments about that? Ms. Hess. Yes, ma'am. First off, when we are discussing solutions, what we found in the past is that, if solutions are developed on the front end of a design, they're ultimately more secure than something that is patched on to the back end of an existing solution, of an existing network, or an existing device. That we also found with respect to what Mr. Bankston refers to 20 years ago when a law was enacted that, essentially, most thought would decrease security of systems, and that turned out not to be the case. To the contrary. Companies actually developed more secure ways of being able to still conduct the surveillance that we were able to enact back 20 years ago. Mr. Bankston. If I may respond to that, I assume Assistant Director Hess is referring to CALEA, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, which actually explicitly provided that the phone companies subject to its intercept capabilities were under no obligation to prevent or assist in the decryption of encryption that was done by their users or even encryption that they offered where they did not hold the keys. So protection for encryption and, in fact, end-to-end encryption was protected explicitly in CALEA. Ms. Kelly. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. The gentlelady yields back. I would like to recognize the chairman of the committee, Chairman Chaffetz, for 5 minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. And I again thank you all for being here. There are some important questions that face us. Ms. Hess, you have a very important role within the FBI, and we appreciate the work that you are doing. But it was said earlier--and I want to ask you and give you a chance to respond to it. But does encryption actually help prevent crime, in your opinion? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir, it does. Mr. Chaffetz. But the policies that the FBI is advocating, specifically the Director, don't necessarily fall in line with that, do they? I struggle with what the Director is asking for because--are you going to have encryption? Not encryption? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. I think the distinction comes from the idea that we are not supportive or in favor of encryption, and that is not true. That is not accurate. We actually want encryption. It secures our networks. It obviously assists us in providing security and blocking the cyber threats. However, all we're asking for is a way for us to be able to, with a lawful order, be able to get information from the company so that the provider would be able to provide in readable form the potential evidence that we would need in an investigation. Mr. Chaffetz. So you want encryption, but a key. And doesn't that key by its very definition create a vulnerability? Ms. Hess. In today's world, sir, I think that there is no such thing as absolute security in either the physical or the digital world. What we are asking for is not to lower those standards by developing some type of lawful intercept or lawful access capability but, rather, to come up with a way that we may be able to implement perhaps multiple keys or some other way to be able to securely access the information--or, actually, rather, be able to be provided with the information. Mr. Chaffetz. And that is the concern, is that, if you create a key--let's pretend it is a key to your house. You can go down to Ace Hardware and make a copy of it. Right? Somebody is going to be able to figure it out. You can get a locksmith who can go and open up your front door. And the same principle--unless there is some new technology that we don't know about, that is the concern. And that is the disconnect from what we hear from the FBI and the reality of-- do you create the hardest, strongest encryption possible, which means not having a key? And, again, I know we won't necessarily solve it all right here in this debate. But I have got to ask you something else before I run out of time. One of the keen concerns that I have--and I have sponsored a bill called the GPS Act--deals with geolocation. There is a debate and discussion about metadata versus content, for instance, in emails. If you and I are trading emails, you have heard the Department of Justice argue that the fact that I communicated with you is just the metadata. It is not the content of what we were talking about. Does the Department of Justice believe that your geolocation is content or do they just think that that is metadata? Ms. Hess. Well, sir, first off, for geolocation information, we do obtain a search warrant for that information. Mr. Chaffetz. Always? Ms. Hess. But I---- Mr. Chaffetz. Always? Ms. Hess. I would have to ask that we maybe brief you about that in more detail at a later time. But at the same time, to address your issue about metadata and geolocation information, clearly those certainly are useful tools, usual techniques, for us to be able to paint the picture of what happened in an investigation, but they are not wholly inclusive of all the evidence we may need to be able to show intent, for example, with the content of the communication. Mr. Chaffetz. I understand the need. And I don't have a problem if you have probable cause or get a warrant or even articulable suspicion. What I have a problem with is you tracking geolocation at will. And I think Americans have a reasonable right to privacy. So post-Jones, what I still struggle to understand from the Department of Justice is: What is their guidance? What are their rules of the road? I mean, I would like to know if you all track my wife or not. Do you do that? I know you can. My question is: Do you do it? And you are giving me a, ``Well, I am not''--I mean, clarify that for us. It is not a yes or a no. That is the concern. I am not getting a yes or no from you. Ms. Hess. I would answer in response to that question that, certainly, to obtain any type of information, we would go through lawful process. Mr. Chaffetz. Is lawful process your ability to track geolocation without getting a warrant? Ms. Hess. Currently we do get a warrant, is my understanding. Mr. Chaffetz. And I amasking: Do you always get a warrant to track geolocation? The answer is no, isn't it? Ms. Hess. There's exigent circumstances. That is correct. Mr. Chaffetz. Okay. So describe those circumstances. At what level? What is the threshold? What is the guidance? Ms. Hess. So, first, I believe it would depend on the type of data that we are talking about---- Mr. Chaffetz. Geolocation. Ms. Hess. --and the type of geolocation data, whether that's GPS data or whether that's some type of other geolocation type of data. I again would request that we could certainly brief you on this in more detail. Mr. Chaffetz. Yeah. I want you to brief the American people. This is why I am going to continue asking these questions. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. And we have a vote on the floor. But this is one of the deep questions I have for the Department of Justice. Believe me, you are not the first person that can't clearly answer this, and I think people have the right to know what that answer is. Is the Government tracking their geolocation? And right now I think the answer unfortunately is, yes, they are. And certainly they are at times without a warrant and without articulable suspicion. With that, I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Votes have been called on the House floor. We will recess and reconvene 10 minutes after voting. [Recess.] Mr. Hurd. The Subcommittee on Information Technology will reconvene. I would like to now recognize my colleague from California and fellow recovering computer scientist, Ted Lieu, for 5 minutes. Mr. Lieu. As a recovering computer and science major, it is clear to me that creating a pathway for decryption only for good guys is technologically stupid. You just can't do that. But I am more interested now in knowing, if this were to happen, what would the effect of this be on global companies and global app developers. And, Mr. Potter, in your testimony, you raise concerns that device pathway will introduce technological vulnerabilities to mobile application. What effect would the pathway have on the global application developers' market? Mr. Potter. Thank you for that question, Congressman Lieu. Today every app developer thinks that their marketplace is global, their opportunity is global. The Google Play Store is global. The Apple devices are global. The challenge is in Europe we have a very different privacy regime than we have in the United States. And Europe has already made--European leaders have already spoken quite bluntly that, if they strengthen their privacy laws, it will, in fact, harm U.S. companies and create business opportunities for European companies. So European leaders in the privacy area are very concerned about--and they've been pretty blunt about it--Facebook, Amazon, Google, collecting data and things like that and what do they do with the data. And they are extraordinarily distressed with the U.S. Government vacuuming up data throughout the world, including listening to phone calls of some of their leaders. The combination of that, of the political angst and the business stress, creates a very easy opportunity for them to simply say that any company that has a back door particularly to the U.S. Government, which at least in the minds of European leaders, does not have a great history of using those back doors with discipline, creates a vulnerability that is unlawful under European privacy law; and, therefore, you'd be banned from the European market. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I appreciate that. I am going to reserve the balance of my time to make a statement. It is primarily directed at Mr. Conley. I respect your public service. I take great offense at your testimony today. You mention that unaccountable corporate interests such as Apple and Google are essentially protecting those who rape, defraud, assault, and kill. I think that is offensive. It is a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem. Why do you think Apple and Google are doing this? It is because the public is demanding it, people like me, privacy advocates, a public that doesn't want an out-of-control surveillance state. It is the public that is asking for this. Apple and Google didn't do this because they thought they would make less money. This is a private sector response to government overreach. Let me make another statement that somehow these technology companies are not credible because they also collect private data. Well, here is the difference. Apple and Google don't have coercive power. District attorneys do. The FBI does. NSA does. And, to me, it is very simple to draw out the privacy balance when it comes to law enforcement and privacy. Just follow the damn Constitution. And because the NSA didn't do that and other law enforcement agencies didn't do that, you are seeing a vast public reaction to this. Because of NSA, your colleagues have essentially violated the Fourth Amendment rights of every American citizen for years by seizing all of our phone records, by collecting our Internet traffic. That now is spilling over to other aspects of law enforcement. And if you want to get this fixed, I suggest you write to NSA and the FBI should tell the NSA ``Stop violating our rights'' and then maybe you would have the public much more on the side of supporting some of what law enforcement is asking for. And then let me just conclude by saying I do agree with law enforcement that we live in a dangerous world and that is why our Founders put in the Constitution of the United States of America--that is why they put in the Fourth Amendment, because they understand that an Orwellian, overreaching Federal Government is one of the most dangerous things that this world can have. I yield back. Mr. Conley. Do I get to respond to that? Mr. Hurd. The gentleman yields back. I would like to recognize my colleague, Mr. Blum from Iowa, for 5 minutes. Mr. Blum. Thank you, Chairman Hurd. I would like to welcome today the panelists. I appreciate your insights on this topic. And I also would like to acknowledge law enforcement. I know it is not easy what you do, and I am so appreciative of the amazing job that your departments do. And I love the Thin Blue Line. So thank you so much for what you do. Ms. Hess, my questions are probably addressed to you. I just want to make sure I understand this. Law enforcement wants to force the private sector to build a back door, if you will, or backdoor key into cell phones, into software, things such as that. Is that correct? Ms. Hess. Sir, I would actually phrase that from the sense that we are simply asking for information that we seek in response to a lawful order in a readable format. How that actually happens should be the decision of the provider. Mr. Blum. So you are not asking for a backdoor key into the encrypted software or cell phone? Ms. Hess. If we don't have the key, but, yet, the provider can get us that information by maintaining the key themselves, then that would be obviously a legitimate way to respond to our lawful order. Mr. Blum. Okay. And what you are asking for only would be used if a warrant is issued. Is that correct? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. Everything we are discussing today. Yes, sir. Mr. Blum. And what we are discussing today would arguably make law enforcement's job quicker, easier to apprehend the bad guys, as we said. Is that correct? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. Mr. Blum. I am a software developer myself, and I am also a homebuilder. So I would just like to give you an analogy as I understand this. Isn't this analogous to the Government asking or requiring homebuilders to put a video camera in every room of every new home that they build with the guarantee or the promise that the Government won't turn it on, ``Don't be concerned. The Government will not turn this camera on unless we get a warrant''? And that would make law enforcement's job easier, correct, and quicker if there is a crime in the home? Isn't this analogous to that? Because you are saying, ``Trust us. We will only do this if we need to do it.'' Ms. Hess. Sir, I think the analogy may be better described as if we should need to know what is going on in that home. Then, as long as the company can respond quickly. Now, that may mean that they wire the home, but it certainly doesn't mean they necessarily have to have the cameras installed as long as they can do that quickly. On the other hand, if they can come up with a different way to tell us what is going on inside that home and do it quickly in a timely manner that is quickly available to us when needed, then whatever way they come up with would be acceptable. Mr. Blum. Because what troubles me is law enforcement tends to agree with--and I will paraphrase here--but that there is a reasonable standard of privacy, Fourth Amendment rights, when one is in their own home. I think most people in law enforcement would agree with that. But when it comes to our cell phone conversations, our emails, anything that is electronic and data, it seems like this reasonable right to privacy isn't there. The people in my district in Iowa feel the same way. Would you address that, please. Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. I would like to. I believe that is inaccurate. Certainly you do have a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is why what we are referring to today and discussing here today requires a warrant. Whether that is realtime communications or the data stored on that device, it still would require a warrant. And that is the threshold under the Constitution. Mr. Blum. Thank you. And this next question is for anyone on the panel. Does law enforcement have other ways, other ways, other than what you are asking for, to access the necessary data needed in, let's say, 99 percent of the criminal cases? Are there other ways of doing this? Because it seems like we are always given, as citizens, the dichotomy of liberty and giving up liberty and freedom for safety. And I believe in American exceptionalism. I believe we can have both. Aren't there other ways law enforcement can do this? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir. I would like to address that. I also believe that we can balance liberty and security and public safety. I would say that there are certainly--when law enforcement is stymied by a particular obstacle in an investigation, we will seek all other ways to get the information we need. But those other ways may delay us in getting that information. They may not be timely solutions. They may not be encompassing solutions to where we might be able to identify other victims or other coconspirators or the vast nature of the crime or the impact of the crime, and that is what concerns us, to be able to get that information quickly. Mr. Blum. And I am out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. But, once again, I would like to thank law enforcement for the amazing job that you do. Thank you very much. Mr. Hurd. The gentleman yields back. I would like to recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. I have got questions for everyone. So we will start with you, Dr. Blaze. Can you tell us a little bit about your background, quickly, your degrees, how long have you been involved as a computer scientist in cryptology. Mr. Blaze. I am computer scientist. My specialty is in computer security and cryptography and the applications of cryptography to building large-scale systems. As a particular focus of my research area, I have been concerned with surveillance technologies and some of the issues at the intersection of technology and public policy. In this issue, 20 years ago I discovered some flaws in the previous U.S. Government proposal, the Clipper Chip. Mr. Hurd. And you are at a university that the department is pretty well known worldwide when it comes to cryptology and computer science. Is that correct? Mr. Blaze. I would like to think so. Mr. Hurd. And I know you are a modest man. So I don't mean to ask an indelicate question. But you are considered an expert when it comes to cryptology and encryption? Mr. Blaze. I suppose so. Mr. Hurd. So in your expert understanding, is there any way to do a split-key approach to encryption? Mr. Blaze. There are things we can do, like splitting the key between multiple locations, that can reduce some aspects of some of the risks in a system like this. Mr. Hurd. But it does create additional vulnerabilities---- Mr. Blaze. That is right. Mr. Hurd. --that anyone who has technical capability would be able to take advantage of? Mr. Blaze. That is right. We can move the risks around from one part of the system to another, but there are still fundamental problems that we don't know how to solve. Mr. Hurd. And this was ultimately part of the problem with the Clipper Chip from the 1990s? Mr. Blaze. That is right. There were a number of problems with the Clipper Chip proposal, but that was one of them. Mr. Hurd. Thank you, sir. Mr. Potter, as a politician, I am always told don't answer hypothetical questions, but I am going to pose a hypothetical question to you. If there were a back door or a front door put into applications or programs of U.S. businesses, how do you think-- the impact that would have on businesses in China, Russia and Iran? Mr. Potter. I have to anticipate, sir, that those governments would ask for their own back door. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Mr. Bankston, we are going to save you for last. Mr. Conley, if you have a properly issued warrant to go into someone's house and there is a safe in that house that is locked, what happens? Mr. Conley. The safe will be taken out and it would be broken into. Mr. Hurd. Okay. So in your testimony you mentioned that Google--and I believe we can infer Apple--stated that its new operating system would make its mobile devices inaccessible to law enforcement officials even with a warrant signed by a judge. Is that correct? Mr. Conley. That is correct. Mr. Hurd. So if you had a properly issued warrant, would you not be able to get that device? Mr. Conley. You could get the device. You couldn't get the information off the device if it is running iOS 8. Mr. Hurd. So iOS 8--the default setting is a five-digit PIN. Correct? Mr. Conley. Is it five? It is a pass code of some sort. Mr. Hurd. Dr. Blaze, I am a little rusty when it comes to-- so that is 5 factorial over 5. Right? And it would take, what, 13,000 possible iterations of a potential five-digit PIN? Actually, it is a four-digit PIN, I believe what it is, four- digit PIN. Mr. Blaze. Yes. Mr. Hurd. So that is 4 factorial over 4, which is even less than 13,000. Mr. Blaze. 10 to the 4th. So about 10,000. Mr. Hurd. For a brute-force method with today's technology, is that difficult? Mr. Blaze. That is well within the range of a brute-force attack. Mr. Hurd. And how long would that take, roughly? Mr. Blaze. On modern computing hardware, essentially no time at all. Mr. Hurd. So would you agree that that is the equivalent of taking a safe out of a home and using some safe-cracking skills? This would be the digital equivalent? Mr. Blaze. No. This would be much easier than that. Mr. Hurd. Because you are good. You know? I think my colleagues from Texas A&M would probably be able to do it, too. Now, my next question is to you, also, Mr. Conley, on the up-skirting example that you used, if you had surveillance on someone doing up-skirting, the fact that they are putting a camera to try to take pictures of someone, would that not be enough to arrest them? Mr. Conley. That would not be enough. In order to commit the crime, you have to have taken the photo, and there would be no way to prove it. There would be no way to prove that the actual photo was taken, what it was taken of. So we could not successfully prosecute that case without the photograph, in my opinion. Mr. Hurd. Excellent. I would like to yield to my colleague from California, Mr. Lieu. Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do have some more questions along the lines of how easy it would be to defeat one of these pathways. So let's say we pass law that says: Okay. The Apple iPhone now has to have this pathway only for good guys. What is to keep a terrorist--and this is for Dr. Blaze--for example, from saying, ``Even though I like their multi-colored Apple iPhones, I am going to switch to Samsung phones?'' Is there anything stopping that from happening? Mr. Blaze. No. Fundamentally, the ease of loading application software and the wide variety of platforms that we have make it very simple for somebody who is determined to use unbreakable encryption to do so. It might not be as easy or as inexpensive as we would like it to be, but there are no fundamental barriers to it. Mr. Lieu. And currently, right now, there is nothing preventing two people anywhere in the world from downloading an encryption program to encrypt end to end those two communications that would make this pathway essentially meaningless. Is that correct? Mr. Blaze. That is right. Now, there may be vulnerabilities on the computers that run that software, and, in fact, there likely would be for the reasons that I discussed in my written testimony. But the encrypted messages themselves in transit would be effectively impossible in practice to decrypt. Mr. Lieu. And is it your understanding that sometimes terrorists now resort to something as simple as just writing something on a piece of paper so they are off the grid? Mr. Blaze. Well, I am not an expert on terrorists, but I would imagine that paper-and-pencil technology is well within their---- Mr. Lieu. And we don't say that companies who make paper shredders are somehow protecting terrorists. Correct? Mr. Blaze. I have never heard that said. Mr. Lieu. So let's talk a little about computer code. It is true, isn't it, that computer code is neutral, that is, the code cannot tell if the person reading the code or accessing the code is Asian or the leader of Hamas or the FBI director or gay or a woman or a man? As long you have got the key to that encryption, you get in the system. Correct? Mr. Blaze. That is right. Mr. Lieu. The NSA, would you agree, has one of the most secure systems in the world? Mr. Blaze. I think they have enormous expertise. Mr. Lieu. Curious, isn't it, that we now know so many secrets about the NSA not because of technology, but because we have human beings? And so another aspect of all of this is you would be asking the American public to trust all the human beings in the Federal Government who could be looking at private data. And it turns out, right, that sometimes human beings do things you don't want them to do, such as this one person who now disclosed all these secrets of the NSA, even though that is one of the most secure systems in the world? Mr. Blaze. The operational aspects of maintaining any kind of large-scale secure system are enormously daunting, as I think the NSA discovered 2 years ago. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. I would like to recognize the ranking member, my good friend Ms. Kelly from Illinois, for 5 minutes. Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Ms. Hess and Mr. Conley, when you are not doing your job, you are citizens of our society. So how do you reconcile the need for this data with people's privacy interests in their data? Because you are a person, too, and then you are in law enforcement. So how do you reconcile this? Ms. Hess. Yes, ma'am. I will start. I certainly obviously value my privacy. I want to make sure that my system is as secure as possible. And I think that goes back to the points that certainly the FBI is trying to make, which is that we support encryption. We want secure networks. It is just this inability that, for example, if I was committing criminal activity, that that information would be completely inaccessible. So in the safe example, we would never be able to access what is inside that safe, and that, I think, is more to the point of the question because certainly we do value privacy and certainly the safeguards of the Constitution. Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Mr. Conley. As I mentioned in my remarks, too, I value my privacy as much as the next person. Just to give you an example, recently my computer at home was infiltrated by somebody. And so anytime I click onto a link, I get bombarded with all sorts of merchandising messages and so forth. Somewhat innocuous, but it is clear that my computer was infiltrated. So I went out and bought some security software and loaded it onto my computer. So I am certainly very cognizant of the need to protect my privacy. I do all my banking and so forth on this. My position has always been just very simple, that we ought to not be able to completely hide valuable evidence of a crime that is being committed or has been committed to hold individuals accountable for their actions. And that is what I am advocating for, some sort of balancing of the interests here so that everyone's right to privacy is acknowledged and glorified, really, but at the same time law enforcement is not completely kept in the dark about these sorts of things. Ms. Kelly. I appreciate all of your testimony. And, obviously, encryption of data, from what I am hearing, should be conducted in a way that respects both law enforcement and private consumers' interests. So, again, I want to thank the chairman for holding this very important hearing. Mr. Conley. Mr. Chairman, you had asked the question about the pass code and about brute force. And far be it from me, I suppose, to challenge Dr. Blaze on brute force. But my iPhone is owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and it has seven digits. My pass code is not four, but seven. So I suppose the exponential issue there is considerably larger, obviously, with seven digits. And I am told that, after 10 attempts to break into my--using my pass code, that is it. I am blocked out and there is some erasure that goes on. So at least up to this point in this hearing, I believed that there is no brute-force technology out there available that could allow law enforcement to break into somebody's handheld device. And I also ask this question: Can this issue be bifurcated in some way so that big corporate computer networks and so forth can remain encrypted without any sort of golden key, but devices like this, mobile devices, which are now the tools of terrorists and criminals, can be accessed on probable cause after a magistrate issues a warrant? Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Conley. And to answer that question, when I left the CIA, I spent about 5 years helping build a cybersecurity company. We did penetration testing, technical vulnerability assessments. And I would always offer my clients--a lot of times we worked with banks, and I would offer my clients the option of, ``You pay our fee or we get to keep what we take.'' Nobody took us up on the last one because we never not got in. So the tools, the technical capabilities, are out there. That is something that--having a conversation about how do we get the right tools and expertise to law enforcement may be a conversation where that may be a positive thing that comes from this conversation. Mr. Conley, last question for you, sir, or sets of questions. In the up-skirting example, are there up-skirters in Boston that haven't been caught because they have used encryption? Mr. Conley. Well, this encryption technology is nearly brand new. So I am not aware of any cases yet. You know, when we caught an up-skirter in Massachusetts, we realized actually there was no statute that made it a crime. So the Massachusetts legislature quickly took up this issue and made it a crime, meteoric. Mr. Hurd. As it should be. Mr. Conley. As it should be. Mr. Hurd. As it should be. And, also, to you, I appreciate your work and what you do. You know, 9 years I was an undercover officer overseas collecting intelligence on threats to the homeland. I collected that intelligence to help law enforcement and help folks like you and your colleagues put these bad guys away. You do this at a threat to your own life. You do this at a threat to your family. And I thank you for that. But, also, you know, because of the role you play and the importance you play, I actually hold you all up to a higher standard as well, and I am always proud to stand side by side with you all. Ms. Hess, question for you. What is the FBI asking for? Ms. Hess. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I would say that certainly what we are asking for, first and foremost, is exactly what we are doing here today and just the opportunity for the American public to consider these issues and to weigh the risks. Because clearly we recognize that there is no absolute security, again, in either the physical or the digital world. Everything may present a vulnerability. There may already be vulnerabilities in place. But for law enforcement to not have the ability to accept or to receive the information that we might need in order to hold those accountable who conduct heinous crimes or who will conduct terrorist attacks, that's the question that I think we need to balance in the American public. And just by having that conversation will help us, I think, to make better informed decisions. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. And, Ms. Hess, does the FBI have any information or data that suggests that the inherent vulnerabilities that have been discussed about dual encryption is that there is a way to do it? Ms. Hess. We certainly believe and share Mr. Conley's hope that there is some type of innovative solutions out there, that we might be able to see government and industry work together to come up with--certainly they won't be bulletproof, as has been said earlier, but certainly more secure ways of being able to get law enforcement what it needs, yet at the same time provide layers and layers and layers of security so that the providers can provide the customer what they need as well. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Mr. Bankston, in your written testimony, you talked about the President's Review Group. Can you characterize quickly for me what the President's Review Group was. Mr. Bankston. The President's Review Group was a panel of experts picked by the President, five of them, to review the NSA's intelligence activities, including a former CIA director and a former anti-terrorism czar of the White House. They concluded that it should be the policy of the United States to promote rather than undermine the use of strong encryption. Mr. Hurd. And you highlighted Recommendation 29. Mr. Bankston. Number 29. Mr. Hurd. And I would like to read that. And I do appreciate all of you all's written testimony. But you had a lot of great information here. Mr. Bankston. Thank you. Mr. Hurd. And Recommendation 29 that President Obama's Review Group provided was that they recommend, regarding encryption, the U.S. Government should fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards; number two, not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software; and, number three, increase the use of encryption and urge U.S. companies to do so in order to better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud and other storage. I think that is a pretty good recommendation. And I would like to close my remarks with some of the quotes from Ms. Hess' written testimony: ``Following the rule of law and upholding civil liberties and civil rights are not burdens. They are what make all of us safer and stronger.'' I couldn't agree more with that. And, again, I started in the CIA in October of 2000. And on September 12, I was the fourth employee in the unit that prosecuted the war in Afghanistan and helped infiltrate Americans into Afghanistan to bring Al Qaeda and the Taliban to justice for their acts of terrorism on our shores. And if somebody would have told me on September 13 that it would be 14 years prior to an attack happening on our homeland again, I would have said you are absolutely crazy. And the reason nothing has happened these last 14 years is because our men and women in the intelligence community, in law enforcement, are acting as if it is September 12, 2001, every single day. The velocity that that requires, the dedication, the countless hours of sacrifice, is incredible, and I applaud everyone for that. But that is why I hold everyone in the law enforcement intelligence community to a higher standard and that upholding civil liberties and civil rights are not burdens. They are what make all of us safer and stronger. And this is a good conversation, but I would recommend or comment that any other future proposals or comments that are going to come before this body will be carefully scrutinized by this committee, by many of our colleagues, because we can protect our country and our civil liberties at the exact same time, and that is what we must do. So I want to thank all of you all for your time today and this conversation. I think it is always helpful. This has helped me better understand my opinions on this topic. And I would like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to appear before us today. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]