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- FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MITIGATION [House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MITIGATION ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ APRIL 20, 2016 __________ Serial No. 114-157 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov http://www.house.gov/reform _________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 26-066 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017 ____________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800 Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001 COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California MICK, MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin WILL HURD, Texas GARY J. PALMER, Alabama Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director Mike Flynn, Counsel Sean Brebbia, Senior Counsel William Marx, Clerk David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Information Technology WILL HURD, Texas, Chairman BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice Chair ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Ranking MARK WALKER, North Carolina Minority Member ROD BLUM, Iowa GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TED LIEU, California C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 20, 2016................................... 1 WITNESSES Mr. Sanjeev Bhagowalia, Deputy Assistant Scretary for Information Systems and Chief Information Officer, Department of Treasury Oral Statement............................................... 5 Written Statement............................................ 8 Mr. Steven C. Taylor, Chief Information Officer, Department of State Oral Statement............................................... 16 Written Statement............................................ 18 Mr. Andy Ozment, Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications, Department of Homeland Security Oral Statement............................................... 21 Written Statement............................................ 23 Mr. Richard Barger, Chief Intelligence Officer, ThreatConnect, Inc. Oral Statement............................................... 32 Written Statement............................................ 34 APPENDIX Report titled, ``Liberty and Security in a Changing World,'' submitted by Mr. Lieu.......................................... 64 LA Times article titled, ``4.5 Million Smartphones Were Lost or Stolen in U.S. in 2013,'' submitted by Mr. Lieu................ 65 Letter for the Record submitted by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP... 66 Questions for the Record for Mr. Steven Taylor, submitted by Mr. Hurd........................................................... 69 Questions for the Record for Mr. Steven Taylor, submitted by Mr. Farenthold..................................................... 83 Questions for the Record for Mr. Andy Ozment, submitted by Mr. Farenthold..................................................... 87 Questions for the Record for Mr. Andy Ozment, , submitted by Ms. Kelly.......................................................... 91 Questions for the Record for Mr. Steven Taylor, submitted by Mr. Connolly....................................................... 101 FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY DETECTION, RESPONSE, AND MITIGATION ---------- Wednesday, April 20, 2016 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Information Technology, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Will Hurd [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. Present: Representatives Hurd, Chaffetz, Farenthold, Walker, Blum, Kelly, Connolly, and Lieu. Mr. Hurd. The Subcommittee on Information Technology will come to order. And without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time. Good morning, everyone. Every day, Federal agencies face a barrage of attacks on their information systems from a number of different actors. Attacks on both the public and private sectors consistently reveal one common truth: No one is immune. In December of last year, Juniper Networks announced that malicious code had been placed in its ScreenOS software leaving a gaping vulnerability in one of its legacy products. This particular vulnerability may have allowed outside actors to monitor network traffic, potentially decrypt information, and even take control of firewalls. Within a matter of days, the company provided its clients, which include various U.S. intelligence entities and at least 12 Federal agencies, with an emergency security patch. DHS and other law enforcement agencies acted swiftly to notify Federal agencies of the breach in Juniper's security advisory. Both of their actions may have averted a potentially devastating breach of sensitive data. This is just one sophisticated example of the attacks that U.S. companies and their Federal clients face on a daily basis. In January of this year, the committee sent letters to the heads of 24 Federal agencies requesting an inventory of systems running the aforementioned software. Additionally, the committee asked for an update of their progress in installing the corresponding security patch. Of the 12 agencies affected, 3, including the Department of Treasury, took longer than 50 days to fully install patches and mitigate the threat posed by this vulnerability. This is absolutely unacceptable. The inability of Federal agencies to maintain a comprehensive view and inventory of their information systems and to respond to Congress in a timely manner cannot be the status quo. Last December, Congress passed landmark information-sharing legislation, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which creates a voluntary cybersecurity information-sharing process to encourage public and private sector entities to collaborate and share information. Moreover, the bill established the Department of Homeland Security as the sole portal for companies to share information with the Federal Government. With their newly codified role, I look forward to working with Dr. Ozment and DHS on how to strengthen their own posture and ensure that they possess the necessary technical tools to detect and mitigate threats and disseminate threat information within the Federal Government. Only by fostering this framework where government and private entities are able to freely share knowledge of security vulnerabilities, threat indicators, and signatures can we be sure that our network defenses are getting the best intelligence available. In addition, we must continue to learn from the private sector. Industry leaders like ThreatConnect and FireEye are consistently pushing the envelope in what is possible in cybersecurity. The government should not seek to compete with them, but rather they should harness these engines of innovation, learn from them, and safely cooperate with them under the guidance of good sense and personal liberty. I hope that this hearing will serve as a starting line for a larger conversation on attribution. Various international groups and state-sponsored actors are constantly attempting to steal military secrets and expose the personally identifiable information of American citizens and we cannot stand idly by while this happens. I believe that attribution is a form of deterrence. This hearing presents an opportunity to learn how Federal agencies can improve their overall cybersecurity postures, share more timely and relevant information, and work with the private sector in a way that benefits all involved, while respecting the institutions of commerce and privacy. I welcome our witnesses and look forward to hearing your testimony today. I would like to yield to the chairman from the great State of Utah, Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman. And Mr. Hurd, I thank you for your leadership on this issue. You are such a valuable part of our team in making this happen. But to those that are in the Federal Government, we've got to up our game. I was elected the same time as President Obama was. Starting in 2009, if you look at the expenditure on the IT budget, the Federal Government has spent more than $525 billion on IT and it doesn't work. It doesn't work. And so I see that the President has a proposal, he needs another $3 billion. As if $525 billion wasn't enough, he needs $528 billion in order to actually solve these problems. I have a hard time believing that we're just 3 more billion away from actually solving this. I understand the predicament that we're in because as best I can see on a macro level, we are spending about 70 percent of our $80-plus billion a year now on legacy systems. And it is difficult, to say the least, on making that transition from those legacy systems to newer, more progressive, more secure networks and using the basic software. I got to review a document from the Department of Justice. Was on WordPerfect. WordPerfect was a great company back in 1990. They were a Utah company, and had a good product, but they still are using WordPerfect at the Department of Justice. And I'm sorry, with all due respect to Corel, it maybe is not the most up to speed and very difficult to share with others. And it just begs the question of why in the world we continue to have to teach people how to use COBOL. We have some that I have heard are using punch cards still. I mean, it's unbelievable how far behind we are. And yet, I don't think it's for a lack of funding. It is just unexcusable for, in my mind--it is just inexcusable, I should say--inexcusable that we need a patch and it takes 50 days to do it. Fifty, really? Come on. Patching a vulnerability should be priority one and should be done within the day. There is no excuse for waiting nearly 2 months to patch what is known as a vulnerability. At the Department of Education, it's something Mr. Ozment, I hope, would look at personally, because the inspector general was able to go into the Department of Education and look into their system, surf around for 3 days, and come out undetected, despite their deploying EINSTEIN, which begs the question of, with all due respect to the inspector general, I'm guessing they are good, but they are probably not as good as the Russians, the Chinese, the others that do this type of thing for a living. And so I do agree with Mr. Hurd that one of the things we have to talk about is how to fight back. And attribution, just flat-out acknowledgment and pointing the finger at who is doing what, might be a form of deterrent. But I do think it's one of the big questions--we won't answer it today--but I do think it's a big question for those of us in Congress, how do you fire back? You know, if somebody fired a weapon on us we could fire back at them. But if they're attacking us online, how do we fight back? And I don't know the answer to that. But we need all of your help here today. We have got a lot on the line, a lot of personal information, a lot of vulnerabilities for the country itself. And so we thank you for your expertise and your commitment. We want to be part of the solution, not part of the problem, not just fire arrows. We are supposed to be oversight, but then government reform. And we can, I think, help you solve these problems, because this is the first time in the Congress we have actually had a subcommittee focused on just information technology. And so we are going to highlight the problems, but our next step is, how do we solve those? And, collectively, we need to come together in a bipartisan way and help you accomplish that and achieve that. So that's the spirit in which we do this. I thank the gentleman. Thank you for the time. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Chairman. And now this subcommittee in 17, 18 short months has done, I think, a lot of good work in government reform and identifying the problem. And part of that is because of the bipartisan nature in which we do that. And we are able to do that because of the leadership of the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Information Technology, Ms. Kelly from Illinois, and I would like to recognize her for her opening statement. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on how Federal agencies detect, respond, and mitigate the growing number of cyber threats they encounter each year. And thank you to our witnesses for being here. The Federal Government and the private sector are facing a volume of cyber attacks that just a few years ago would have been unimaginable. According to a new report by security firm Symantec, 54 zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in 2015, more than twice as many as in 2014. Compared to the previous year, in 2015, the instances of ransomware increased by 35 percent. We need to ensure that the Federal Government has the resources necessary to respond to these vulnerabilities and threats. Agencies are spending up to three-quarters of their information technology budgets maintaining legacy systems that were never designed to deal with today's cybersecurity risks. Adding to the problem is the increasing difficulties agencies are having in filling more than 10,000 vacant cyber positions across the Federal Government. As Tony Scott, the chief information officer for the Federal Government, has said, and I quote, ``We have a broad surface area of old, outdated technology that is hard to secure, expensive to operate, and on top of all of that, the skill sets needed to maintain those systems are disappearing rather rapidly.'' But we are making progress in fixing that. I, along with my colleagues on this subcommittee and Ranking Member Cummings, were original cosponsors of Congressman Steny Hoyer's Information Technology Modernization Act. The act would authorize the creation of an Information Technology Modernization Fund to help Federal agencies upgrade their aging information technology systems. Over the first 10 years the fund would help facilitate upgrades to $12 billion worth of civilian IT programs and make sure the Federal Government has the most effective, secure IT infrastructure possible. Legislation like the ITMA sends a clear message that Congress understands the challenges facing our Nation's Federal IT systems. But there is more to be done. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today when their threat response processes in place, and I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, to do what's needed to ensure that we keep the Federal Government secure from the growing number of cyber threats. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. I would like to thank the ranking member for her comments. We will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement. Mr. Hurd. Now I'd like to recognize our panel of witnesses. I'm pleased to welcome Mr. Sanjeev Bhagowalia. He's the deputy assistant secretary for information systems and chief information officer at the Department of Treasury. Mr. Steven Taylor, chief information officer at the Department of State. Dr. Andy Ozment, assistant secretary for cybersecurity and communication at the Department of Homeland Security. And Mr. Richard Barger, chief intelligence officer at ThreatConnect Incorporated. I would like to welcome you all. And pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So please rise and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Thank you. Please be seated. And let the record reflect the witnesses answered in the affirmative. In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes, and your entire written statement will be made part of the record. Mr. Bhagowalia, we will start with you, and you are recognized for 5 minutes. WITNESS STATEMENTS STATEMENT OF SANJEEV BHAGOWALIA Mr. Bhagowalia. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Treasury's approach to the detection and mitigation of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Treasury relies on technology to meet our mission of serving the American taxpayers and acting as a steward of the national economy. Cybersecurity is one of the top priorities of Treasury, not only for the CIO, but also for the Department and bureau senior leadership. We are continuously and incrementally improving in management oversight over the IT environment, including cybersecurity. We are leveraging synergy opportunities across the enterprise through authorities in law, like FITARA and FISMA, to more effectively use our people, policy, processes, technology, and governance in cyberspace. Detecting and mitigating vulnerabilities in our environment before they are exploited by our adversaries is an essential component in Treasury's ``defense-in-depth'' strategy. I have divided my testimony into two parts. The first part will explain how we tackle vulnerability mitigation of the Department, and the second part will outline how we participate in the governmentwide Federal cybersecurity community. Part one, vulnerability detection, reporting, response, and mitigation within Treasury. As you know, Treasury is a large, geographically and technically diverse enterprise with bureaus having widely varying missions requiring widely varying IT environments. While Treasury bureaus are empowered to make IT decisions necessary to execute their individual missions and carry out operational security functions within their environments, the Treasury CIO is accountable to ensure that those decisions properly consider security implications and evaluate risk and vulnerabilities. Treasury has aligned our departmental cybersecurity strategy with the five-part NIST national Cybersecurity Framework and the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, CNAP, to ensure common objectives across the enterprise. Vulnerability detection. IT companies, government agencies, security researchers, and others identify thousands of security weaknesses each year. Critical vulnerabilities are a far smaller number, in hundreds. Vulnerability detection requires a multidimensional approach involving asset management, automated tools, monitoring of communication channels, and human analysis. The foundation of good comprehensive vulnerability detection is strong asset management. To this end, Treasury has policies in place requiring bureaus to perform regular asset and vulnerability inventory scans using automated tools. Treasury maintains a central Department-wide security operations center that operates around the clock. It's called the SOC. The SOC monitors classified and unclassified government channels, as well as open source and industry channels, for news of critical vulnerabilities. In response, reporting, mitigation of known vulnerabilities, we follow the maxim that cybersecurity is about risk management. Bureau IT organizations undertake risk analysis for each vulnerability and schedule testing and patch deployment as appropriate. A risk analysis may result in several mitigation approaches, such as patching, instituting compensating security controls, and migrating to a new software or hardware solution. Treasury and its bureaus start by remediating vulnerabilities on assets with the greatest risk exposure first and then moving systematically to remediate the remaining assets. The recent Juniper vulnerability offers an example of this process in action. Table 1 in my written testimony illustrates how 57 affected devices across Treasury were remediated from a time and risk perspective. Treasury coordinated an enterprisewide response to the Juniper vulnerability within a couple of hours of receiving the information from open source vendor channels and DHS. Treasury fixed 25 percent of the patches within a day, 84 percent within a week, and 86 percent within 2 weeks, and 93 percent 7 weeks. But if you look at it from a risk lens, we fixed 40 out of the 57 devices, representing 100 percent of high-risk devices, within 6 days. Of the remaining 17 low-risk devices, 13, or 76 percent, were completed by February 4, and the remaining 4 devices were completed over the next 10 days. A detailed analysis determined that the configuration posed low risk of the exploitation of the vulnerability because the devices were not directly connected to the Internet, were not directly affected by the vulnerability, and each had multiple layers of compensating controls in place. So a challenge faced by large agencies in complying with governmentwide mandates to address particular vulnerabilities is the need to balance operational and security risk. In many cases the device must be patched as part of a complex operational system with several legacy components that may not be compatible with the security fix. So we respectfully request and suggest that factor should be considered in reporting. Could we have done it a little bit faster? Yes. Part two, Treasury's role in governmentwide vulnerability detection, response, and mitigation. I would like to thank DHS for the leadership role in coordinating Federal cybersecurity. Treasury fully participated in the EINSTEIN program and looks forward to EINSTEIN 3A. The CDM program led by DHS will help us move as the entire U.S. Government from federated compliance to integrated continuous monitoring and mitigation. Treasury is an enthusiastic participant in the CDM program. We expect CDM will improve situational awareness regarding vulnerabilities and will move us to better automation of tracking in real time. In conclusion, while Treasury has established a solid procedural and operational foundation to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, our adversaries are constantly changing their methods. I see two opportunities where congressional support could aid our efforts. First, hiring and retaining cybersecurity staff remains a challenge. We ask for continued support to streamline hiring and offering appropriate incentives to attract and retain that talent. Second, we ask for some consideration in the fiscal year 2017 budget request for a cybersecurity enhancement account which will enable us to keep pace with the rapidly evolving adversaries through targeted and accountable spending. Thank you for your attention to this important matter. I appreciate this opportunity to testify today, and I will be glad to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Bhagowalia follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, sir. Mr. Taylor, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF STEVEN C. TAYLOR Mr. Taylor. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, distinguished members, thank you for inviting me to testify about the Department of State's cybersecurity program. The Department of State, as the lead U.S. foreign affairs agency, has over 70,000 employees in our 275 overseas and 30- plus domestic locations. Like all government agencies and businesses, particularly organizations the size of the Department, we face a dilemma. The Department relies on the Internet and email to conduct our day-to-day operations, communicating with U.S. and foreign citizens and organizations about a wide variety of issues. We use these tools to support passport and visa applications, to communicate about foreign policy initiatives, and to conduct the day-to-day business of the Department. We also know that email and the Internet are avenues through which our networks and databases can be attacked. As a breach of our own unclassified email system in 2014 demonstrated, our adversaries see information handled by the Department and many other U.S. Government agencies as a desirable target. Annually, we experience millions of attempts to breach our networks and gain possession of our information. Protecting our information as we face increasingly sophisticated, frequent, and well-organized cyber attacks is a top priority for the Department of State. The Bureaus of Information Resource Management and the Diplomatic Security share the role of defending our networks through our joint security operations center and through collaborative long-range planning. Alongside our partner Federal agencies, we've developed increasingly robust defenses as the sophistication and intensity of these threats increases. The foundation of our cybersecurity framework is the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, or FISMA, along with OMB guidance and the National Institute for Standards and Technology guidelines. But we go far beyond these guidelines to protect our network and data while protecting privacy and civil liberties. The Department of Homeland Security serves as a first line of defense by filtering our traffic through the EINSTEIN system which detects and blocks cyber attacks on Federal agencies and through its trusted Internet connections and continuous diagnostics and mitigation initiatives. In addition, we monitor our networks with an extensive defensive toolset. We also make great efforts to educate our network users so that they, themselves, are defending our systems. Annually, the Department of State employees must complete security and privacy awareness training. In addition, network users must answer a security challenge question prior to logging on to the systems each and every day. We amplify the effectiveness of our defenses through partnerships with US-CERT, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, U.S. Digital Services, and other agencies in the private sector. Our partners in the intelligence community, DHS, and other agencies in the private sector perform penetration testing to ensure our defenses are capable of withstanding persistent attacks. They also provide us with a steady stream of information about probable sources, methods of attack, and recommended countermeasures. We recognize that intrusion is possible even with the best defenses. Today we train and prepare for a wide range of cyber threats. Some can be contained by removing a hard drive, while others may require that we take a system offline. We are constantly working with our partners to defend against the known and evolving threats. Looking to the future, we are creating a safe zone between our data and the Internet through segmentation of our networks, by reengineering our business practices, and leveraging cloud services. The most powerful and promising tools for our defense are effective risk management, our public and private partnerships, clearly defined agency roles, effective information sharing, employee education, and of course next generation technology. We appreciate the support on cybersecurity issues, and we look forward to working with Congress and our partners to defend our critical information and systems. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Taylor follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Taylor. Dr. Ozment, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF ANDY OZMENT Mr. Ozment. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Recent compromises clearly demonstrate the challenge facing the Federal Government in protecting our systems and networks against sophisticated, agile, and persistent threats. Addressing these threats is an important shared responsibility. Today I will focus on how we protect Federal civilian departments and agencies. It is important to note that each agency is responsible for managing its own cybersecurity risk under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, or FISMA 2014. My organization assists agencies in performing that risk management through four lines of effort. First, we provide cybersecurity protections where it is effective and cost efficient. This baseline is principally provided by two programs. The EINSTEIN program detects and blocks cyber attacks outside of agency perimeters, and the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM program, provides tools for agencies to identify and prioritize vulnerabilities within their networks. Second, we measure and motivate agencies to implement best practices through risk assessments and targeted guidance. Third, we serve as a hub for cybersecurity information sharing between the government and the private sector through automated means whenever possible. And fourth, we provide incident response assistance to agencies. The committee is well aware that cybersecurity vulnerabilities are all too common. My organization serves a key role in helping agencies resolve significant vulnerabilities. Upon learning of a new vulnerability, our first priority is to rapidly promulgate actionable information to our partners. When the vulnerability is particularly critical, we hold an emergency interagency coordination call. These calls allow DHS to quickly convey key information to chief information security officers across the Federal civilian government. Additionally, we share information through secure portals managed by our National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, or NCCIC. After disseminating information about a significant vulnerability, DHS at times collects information about governmentwide remediation progress. This information is used for two purposes: to understand the prevalence of a particular vulnerability across government and to drive individual agencies to more quickly implement required mitigations. Currently, this data-collection process is largely manual, but the CDM program will fundamentally change this paradigm. Through the CDM program, DHS will provide civilian agencies with tools to monitor their internal networks. CDM will allow us to shift from current manual methods of collecting vulnerability data to automated data collection. We have provided CDM Phase 1 tools to 97 percent of the Federal civilian government. Agencies are now deploying these Phase 1 tools on their networks. But this is not a simple or easy process. Deploying new technologies across 23 agencies and over 2 million users is a significant undertaking. We will see incremental progress over the next year and expect the first agency data to be available in early fiscal year 2017. It is also important to note what CDM will not do. The first phase of CDM will detect vulnerabilities in workstations, servers, network infrastructure, and operating systems in devices like routers. But other devices, like printers, will be identified by these tools, but will not be assessed for vulnerabilities. Perhaps most importantly, CDM relies on individual agencies to rapidly deploy these sensors across their networks and to use CDM data to, in fact, address the identified vulnerabilities. Even after learning of a vulnerability, agencies have varied capabilities to fix the problems. We can also provide agencies with technical assistance and consultation upon request. These services help agencies mitigate complex vulnerabilities and design more secure systems and assets. We appreciate the help of Congress in passing several key statutes for Federal cybersecurity over the past 2 years, including modernizing FISMA and enacting the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. This year, the fiscal year 2017 President's budgets funds several activities that will significantly enhance our ability to manage vulnerability detection and mitigation across the Federal civilian executive branch. First, the fiscal year 2017 budget funds a further acceleration of the CDM program and a new CDM phase focused on securing high-value data on agency networks. Second, the budget provides resources for additional personnel to help agencies remediate complex vulnerabilities or to design more secure systems. Finally, the budget funds more proactive assessment teams using the same techniques as malicious hackers, known as red teams. With the help of Congress, we will continue driving towards additional automation and deploy the resources required to support expedited remediation. This must be a shared effort. DHS, our partner agencies, and Congress must join together to ensure that vulnerabilities are rapidly mitigated before sensitive information or government services are placed at risk. Thank you. [Prepared statement of Mr. Ozment follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Dr. Ozment. Mr. Barger, you are recognized for 5 minutes. STATEMENT OF RICHARD BARGER Mr. Barger. Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. My name is Rich Barger. I'm the chief intelligence officer and cofounder of ThreatConnect, a Virginia-based security company. I lead our research team. It's responsible for tracking existing and emerging threats, to ensure that our software platform is uniting security teams, their processes, and their technologies to bring together a cohesive unity of effort so that organizations can more efficiently conduct intelligence-driven security operations. ThreatConnect was founded in 2011 and our platform launched in 2013. Since then, we have seen 40 percent of the Fortune 100 use our platform and amassed over 9,000 global users. Today my testimony will focus on fragmentation as the root cause behind our continuing struggle to detect, respond to, and mitigate modern threats. The four key areas I will discuss are people, processes, technologies and community. Our customers within both public and private sectors often express the same problem, but they do so in different ways. Fragmentation across their security operations is both their biggest frustration as well as their biggest risk. Whether they are a global financial services firm, a U.S. energy company, or a Federal agency, the fissures that exist across people, processes, and technologies create the very footholds into our networks that give malicious actors access to our finances, sensitive personal data, and corporate intellectual property. Now, it's important to understand that information security is heavy work. There is no easy button. There is no silver- bullet solution. Today's network defenders face a gargantuan task of protecting networks that were not originally designed with security in mind. In terms of security teams and practitioners, as we increase our numbers of individuals and teams required to work together, organizational agility, transparency, and situational awareness will often suffer, making us our own worst enemy. Too often as an organization's domain expertise and institutional memory is scattered across these diverse teams, share drives and emails, it is often rendered functionally inaccessible. Fragmentation also exists across the executive staff, from C-suites to boards. There is a communication deficit which negatively impacts leadership's ability to interpret and prioritize core challenges and subsequently leads to ineffective decisionmaking. This brings us to process. There is no one-size-fits-all approach. Enterprises, much like snowflakes, are made of the same elements but uniquely configured. Different business objectives drive different business processes and multidisciplinary security operations reflect a company's overarching sector, vertical, legal, and regulatory requirements. In a lot of cases the answer to, ``Why do you do it this way?'' is simply, ``We've always done it this way.'' It's much easier to advocate for a new tool or more head count. Optimizing process seems mundane and intelligible by comparison. But this is the dirty little secret. Developing coordinated intelligence-driven processes is the linchpin to identify, protect, and respond to threats in an efficient, measurable way. In terms of technology, security teams worldwide feel that they spend too much time wrangling their various security solutions. Instead, they should be delivering that much-needed breathing room for these overburdened teams. Instead, these solutions often consume additional resources, and many are not designed to be interoperable. Better orchestration of security systems creates a combined-arms approach that allows the sum of the parts to yield mutually supporting effects against threats. The first three areas, people, processes and technologies, are internal to the enterprise. The last source of fragmentation is at the community level, outside the enterprise. Sharing today centers around atomic indicators of compromise. Now, this is a good start, but we need to do more of it and we need to also include sharing of the recipes that created the indicators in the first place. So let's continue to evolve today's baseline sharing practices to our broader goal of cross-sector coordination and collaboration. In conclusion, the disconnect between expectation and reality that fragmentation presents is a catalyst which is elevating the priority of enterprise security within the corporate structure. This rise must continue, and organizations must be properly incentivized to look at enterprise security as a critical business function. The security professionals of tomorrow must be educated and enabled to meet the current demand of security talent, and the market must drive the need for interoperable security technologies. The gap between compromise and detection is not closing, and that is why we are committed to reducing that thorny reality of fragmentation across both public and private sector security operations. I thank you for your time, and I look forward to any of your questions. [Prepared statement of Mr. Barger follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Hurd. Thank you, sir. And I would like to recognize first, for the first set of questions, my colleague from the great State of Texas, Mr. Farenthold. He is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I'm going to start with you, Mr. Ozment. The FBI for years has been pushing for encryption backdoors so they can easily access device content. However, security experts, including Ash Carter and NSA Director Admiral Rogers, as well as former leaders from the intelligence community, have all said that encryption is essential to national security, cybersecurity, and economic security. What is your take on the call for back doors? Do you think that makes us safer or less safe, and why? Mr. Ozment. Thank you, sir. The administration has highlighted a number of times that this is a very complicated issue with legitimate and important perspectives on both sides of the issue. We do have law enforcement concerns and the need to access data from malicious adversaries, whether they be terrorists or criminals, to deter and catch those individuals responsible for malicious actions. At the same time, from a cybersecurity perspective, we want more broad and secure encryption and other technologies to be widely disseminated. I would reflect the administration's position here that we do need a national conversation on this issue, and I think it's important that Congress has taken this issue up and has focused on it. Mr. Farenthold. All right. Mr. Barger, do you have a take on that? Mr. Barger. So the encryption issue is a very, very complicated subject. I would encourage the government to consider how they should be able to conduct investigations in striking a balance between privacy and also the need---- Mr. Farenthold. We see in the case of the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone that the FBI hired a hacker to break into, and they, the FBI, won't tell us how they did it. Haven't they discovered a cyber vulnerability in iPhones that needs to be disclosed so it can be patched? Mr. Barger. Well, I don't necessarily know the situation, the sources and methods which they applied to that, but it seems that they have found a creative workaround to the environmental conditions in which they were forced to operate and have been able to carry their investigation forward. Whether or not that was used for a specific vulnerability, I wouldn't know. Mr. Farenthold. All right, let's shift a little bit here to the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act. And since DHS is kind of the hub, as you say, for that, what kind of success are we having on that? Are you tracking how many attacks have been shared that way and whether companies are actually applying the information that's being shared there? Do we have some numbers on any successes or failures there? Mr. Ozment, that's clearly in your alley. Mr. Ozment. Thank you, Representative. So we have, as you know, that Congress passed this act in December of 2015, and gave DHS some fairly aggressive deadlines. I'm proud to report that we did meet those deadlines and the Secretary of Homeland Security formally certified that the system was live on March 17 of this year. We will grow the system incrementally. We are not going to reach all of the American economy in just a few months. I'm very happy with our rate of growth to date. We have 14 non- Federal entities currently connected to our server and 82 who are in the process of connecting the server who have signed our terms of use. So there's clearly an interest in doing this. It does require the other participant to build some IT infrastructure on their side. So it's like we've built a phone system and we have a phone. They also have to acquire a phone before they can call us. Mr. Farenthold. So you've been up and going a month now. Is that correct? Roughly a month? Mr. Ozment. That's right. Mr. Farenthold. So have there been any threats shared? I mean, do you have a number? Mr. Ozment. We have shared over 2,000 indicators to the private sector and we have received additional indicators that the private sector did not allow us to share onward to other companies but that we did share internally within the Federal Government. It is important to note that an indicator does not equal an incident. And so a company or government agency can learn about an indicator from a failed attack just as they can learn from a successful attack. So these do not all represent incidents. They represent ``be on the lookout for this bad guy'' activity. Mr. Farenthold. And one of the big concerns with the act was the sharing of personally identifiable information. How much personally identifiable information are we seeing coming and going with this? Mr. Ozment. We have multiple layers of protection to protect privacy. First, companies are required to vet what they share themselves. We have some automated mechanisms to prevent inappropriate or incorrect information from being shared. And then there are a few types of information that would require human review. The way that we block in an automated way inappropriate information from being shared is that we just don't accept it, so it's not even possible to send it to us. So I can't tell you how many of those blocks have occurred. I can tell you that our human review has not identified any inappropriate information, to my knowledge. Mr. Farenthold. I will dive into this a little bit deeper if we get a second round of questioning. I see my time has expired. Mr. Hurd. Ms. Kelly, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. According to its Web site, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, US-CERT's role is to, and I quote, ``leads efforts to improve the Nation's cybersecurity posture, coordinate cyber information sharing, and proactively manage cyber risk to the Nation.'' Dr. Ozment, can you explain what that means? Mr. Ozment. Absolutely. So the US-CERT is a part of the NCCIC, our National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. They have three broad roles shared by my larger organization. First is to promulgate best practices, help companies and Federal agencies understand what do they need to do to protect themselves? Second, is to share information about what the adversaries are doing so that those companies and agencies can adapt their defenses to the changing behavior of our adversaries. And third is to respond to incidents. US-CERT will respond to incidents, whether in the private sector or Federal Government or State, local, and tribal and territorial governments. We do that either by going on site, which we try to minimize because of the expense and overhead of doing it, or we can help remotely, sometimes just by analyzing the malicious software that was used in an intrusion, other times by giving more customized help to the situation. We prioritize the victims that come to us for help based upon our national risk. But we really encourage companies to reach out to the Federal Government, whether law enforcement or through us doesn't matter, we will connect it on the back end, and let us know about incidents so that we can come and help. Ms. Kelly. So if an government agency's computer is hacked and you say that part of your effort is to respond, does that include forensic analysis? What all does that include when you respond? Mr. Ozment. That's right. It includes--well, let me take a step back. Our role is different from law enforcement, and by analogy, every cyber incident is like an arson in the physical world. You want to have both the police and the firefighters responding to the incident. Our role is similar to that of the firefighter. We want to help a victim figure out where is the bad guy on their network, how do they get him off the network, work together to push that bad guy off the network, and then improve their defenses so that they are not just compromised again immediately thereafter. Then we take--well, all throughout that process, we take what we learn in this one incident and we broadcast it to other sectors, other companies, other agencies so that everybody can learn from the incident and make sure that they are themselves not victimized by the same approach that the adversary used in this case. Ms. Kelly. Okay. Now let's turn to government contractors. As you know, the biggest cyber intrusions of 2015 involved government contractors. Anthem is the largest provider of health insurance to government employees and it was hacked. KeyPoint is a provider of background investigation services and it was hacked, leading to the breach of OPM's network. What role did US-CERT play in the company's responses to those major cyber attacks? Mr. Ozment. I want to be careful not to speak to individual companies because we keep the confidentiality of our customers, if you will. But we have responded to attacks at both private sector companies, contractors, and Federal Government agencies. Depending on the situation, our role has been to analyze the malicious software, figure out, how did they break in and what did they once they got there? It has been to provide remediation advice: Here are the types of security measures you can put in place to ensure that this doesn't happen again. And to help them kick the bad guy off their networks. In an incident you often find a malicious actor, or you see traces of them on, say, one computer, and that's how you figure out that you've been compromised. But if you just kick them off that one computer, you can't be confident that you fully removed them from your network. So the first thing you have to do is look throughout your network, watch the bad guy, stay silent and watch the bad guy, see who they are talking to and where else they are on your network. You have to do that for a period of time so that you can be confident that when you kick them off you've gotten them entirely off your network, and we help victims with that as well. Ms. Kelly. Okay, thank you. Mr. Barger, when talking about the type of information forensics can provide, could it include information on the identity of future victims as well as how those victims might be attacked? Mr. Barger. Absolutely. Being able to gather information about an attacker, how they move, basically their genetic makeup, their capabilities, their intent, these fingerprints, essentially, can be telltale traces of how they do what they do. And to Dr. Ozment's point, you can leverage that intel gain and loss for everything that they show you. You can harness that information to then democratize that across your customer base and better understand who it is, what they're after, why they're after it, and over time that develops a great picture when you can get feedback from various other individuals or organizations that are affected by it to develop a much clearer information intelligence picture. Ms. Kelly. Okay, thank you. Looks like I have run out of time. Mr. Hurd. The distinguished gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel, for being here today. Jumping right into questions for Dr. Ozment here, what participation rates have you seen from the private sector? Can you speak to that just for a moment? Mr. Ozment. Yes. We have, as you would expect, varying participation based on both the sector and also the program that we're talking about. We have a very wide uptake of the bulletins and advisories that we send out advising companies about security risks and mitigations. We have something like 100,000 individuals signed up to receive those. And these tend to be the security individuals operating within a company. Mr. Walker. Right. What engagement have you seen from the Federal sector? Mr. Ozment. Federal sector, we also have pretty universal participation in our programs. And it is worth highlighting that as of about a year ago Federal departments and agencies are required to report incidents to US-CERT, part of my organization. Mr. Walker. Sure. Mr. Bhagowalia, is that correct? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir. Mr. Walker. All right. How effective has the Department of Homeland Security been in notifying your agency or notifying other government agencies? Mr. Bhagowalia. I think they have been very effective and things are improving. As you know, the threats have been coming at us in increasing frequency over time. Obviously, as the threats keep on coming at us, we work together with them, but we also work with other intelligence community agencies. Together, it's a community basically working together to make sure we are improving. Mr. Walker. Thank you. Mr. Barger, kind of the same question. How effective has DHS been in notifying the private entities? Mr. Barger. I can't think of, like, one security company that probably doesn't leverage the information that DHS puts out, whether it be on specific vulnerabilities or active threats. In many cases, that information serves as a seed in which we leverage and then continue to leverage private sector sources and methods to gain a better understanding of what we-- -- Mr. Walker. The world of cybersecurity is fairly new for all of us in the last decade or so. And to use your analogy, Dr. Ozment, you were talking about an arson situation where you guys are the firefighters. But also, you guys are kind of the end all, kind of the central authority when it comes to all of this. Can you speak a little bit, because I'm concerned that if you're going to be the central authority in this, I do believe, to go back to your analogy, that it's not just the firefighter's part, the investigation part, but what role do you have in the policing of it as well? Because I don't want there to be any gaps here, because I do feel like you have a role to maybe funnel information to both segments. Would you mind taking a minute to speak to that? Mr. Ozment. Absolutely. This is a team sport, both in the private sector and in government, and so we do partner very closely with Federal law enforcement agencies, particularly the FBI, the Secret Service, and Homeland Security investigators. Those agencies do prosecute cybercrimes and are very aggressive in reaching out to victims to help them figure out who did this and ideally prosecute the perpetrator. And we often--we find out about incidents and with the permission of the victim we share that with law enforcement. They do the same. And so we may not find out directly from a victim. We may find out because the victim talked to law enforcement who then told us. Mr. Walker. The larger point is, we want to make sure that we are getting this right since this is relatively new, and your role with the law as the law says, CISA says, you guys are the central authority in this. So it's very important that the communication is exactly where and what it needs to be and to whom this information needs to go to. You know, we don't want this to be the IRS or the EPA where there's decades of dysfunction. We have a chance at the ground level to make sure that the proper channels of communication to all the various departments or players in this is very important. I guess that's why I'm emphasizing this. I have got one more thing before I yield back. This could be to Mr. Taylor. Mr. Bhagowalia may want to respond as well. Modern cybersecurity best practices require a much different approach to information security than the Federal Government has done before, as we talked about this as being brand new. Placing a premium on information sharing, continuous network monitoring, and ensuring continuity of operation plans, these, I guess, plans are in place when a breach or degradation does occur. So here's the question, okay? How are your departments modernizing to keep pace with these best practices and shifts in approach? Mr. Barger, would you address that? Mr. Barger. In terms of the---- Mr. Walker. Best practices shift in approach when it comes to this information. Mr. Barger. The best practices in terms of vulnerability management where sharing? Mr. Walker. Sharing information, yes, networking. Mr. Barger. So communities have different looks and feels, different participants, different requirements, and so being able to understand who your audience is, what their needs and their requirements are, helps foment more user growth, user engagement and participation in that community. So not a one- size-fits-all approach in that regard. Mr. Walker. Well, my time has expired, so I will yield back to the chairman. Thank you. Mr. Hurd. I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Lieu, for his 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mr. Ozment, are you familiar with this document commissioned by the administration called ``Liberty and Security in a Changing World'' in 2013? It's a report and recommendations of the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies? Mr. Ozment. I am familiar with it, sir, yes. Mr. Lieu. And I'm going to read to you recommendation 29, which says, ``We recommend that, regarding encryption, the U.S. Government should fully support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards; not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software; and increase the use of encryption and urge U.S. companies to do so in order to better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.'' Do you agree with that recommendation? Mr. Ozment. Sir, the issue of encryption is a really challenging one. And as administration officials have highlighted a number of times, we have to weigh the balances of our law enforcement and counterterrorism needs with our desire and need to improve cybersecurity across the private sector and government. So we are calling for a national conversation on this topic so that we can plot a way forward together essentially. Mr. Lieu. So do you agree or disagree with recommendation 29? Mr. Ozment. I think it is more complicated than one can simply agree or disagree to. I think we do--it is a decision-- -- Mr. Lieu. Let's be pretty specific. Do you believe that the U.S. Government should not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software? Do you disagree with that? MrOzment So, sir, I think in the--there's a lens here that any attempt--there are some people who perceive that any attempt to have court-ordered access to devices would be viewed as weakening software. If that's what you're referring to, that's really where I do think we need to have a national conversation to figure out what are our goals as a Nation. Mr. Lieu. I'm going to, with the permission of the chair, enter this document into the record. I just note that this document was really written from the angle of U.S. national security, and I think the proper frame for this debate is there is apparently some disagreement within the administration between law enforcement and U.S. national security. And my own view is we should not sacrifice U.S. national security, nor our economy, so that some law enforcement investigations can be made easier. Now, let me ask you another question. Are you familiar with Signalling System No. 7 in a cell phone network, also known as SS7, and the flaws associated with it? Mr. Ozment. Yes. Mr. Lieu. And as you may know, hackers of foreign governments that can exploit SS7 can listen to phone conversations of cell phones as well as acquire text messages in real time. Do you agree with that? Mr. Ozment. There are vulnerabilities that allow those accesses. Yes, sir. Mr. Lieu. Do you have a recommendation how to fix that? Mr. Ozment. These vulnerabilities were really first publicly highlighted in 2014. I think it's important to note that they are design vulnerabilities. So essentially, as the system is designed, you cannot fix it, per se. What you can do is carriers can monitor their networks for suspicious activity and then block that suspicious activity. When these vulnerabilities were disclosed, we reached out immediately to the carriers. We are not a regulator. We do work with the carriers through a voluntary partnership. The carriers have assured us that they are taking this seriously and are looking for malicious activity. But, frankly, I do share your very deep concern about this and I was concerned by the fact that the hackers you collaborated with on ``60 Minutes'' were so readily able to exploit that network. And so we are using this opportunity, frankly, to reach back out to the carriers and really push them to highlight progress. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Would you agree that if a person using a cellphone had end-to-end encryption for the text messages or end-to-end encryption for their voice data, that that would mitigate this problem? Mr. Ozment. It would mitigate some aspects of this problem. If that were implemented, the other aspects, such as the ability to track location, would not be impacted. Mr. Lieu. Got it. Thank you. I forget, Mr. Chairman, if I requested to enter this into the record? Did I ask that? Maybe I did. Mr. Hurd. Without objection. Mr. Lieu. Okay. Thank you. And with that, I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Dr. Ozment, how long have you been at DHS? Mr. Ozment. I have been at DHS for approximately 2 years now. Mr. Hurd. Well, I would like to thank you for your service. I know the job that you have is difficult, and I think you have had an exemplary time at DHS, and I'm looking forward to continuing to working with you in the next few months. My question, I would like to drill down on the Juniper breach. The ScreenOS, there were several versions that were hacked, 6.30 version 17 through version 20. Were any of the versions that were vulnerable to the breach, were they supported by Juniper? Were security patches supported by Juniper, are you aware? Mr. Ozment. I'm not entirely sure. I believe that at least a number of those were out of service and no longer supported, certainly not all of them. Mr. Hurd. So when something is out of service, that means the vendor does not provide patch updates, or this is saying, ``Hey, you are operating on your own. We are not responsible for keeping this up to speed.'' Is that correct? Mr. Ozment. That's correct. Mr. Hurd. Mr. Bhagowalia, my question for you. Fifty-seven devices had the Juniper vulnerability. Is that correct? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir, they were affected by the release versions in question in the ScreenOS, yes. Mr. Hurd. And do you agree that the vulnerable versions of the ScreenOS software that is provided by Juniper is not supported by a vendor, the security updates were not supported by the vendor? Mr. Bhagowalia. We didn't know about whether it is supported by the vendor, but we, obviously, the moment we got the information---- Mr. Hurd. No, no, look, I'm not questioning about the--we can talk about the four devices that you thought were low vulnerability. My question is, why were you using versions of Juniper software ScreenOS that was no longer supported by the vendor? And if I'm not mistaken, please correct me if I'm wrong, the vendor stopped supporting that software in 2014, 2013, 2014. Why was the Department of Treasury still using software that wasn't being supported by the vendor? Mr. Bhagowalia. I would have to get back to you on the exact details as to how many of those devices were late on that version that was not supported with 2014. We, obviously, work continuously with not only DHS, but with the vendor itself---- Mr. Hurd. Well, but DHS doesn't have anything to do with supporting---- Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir. Mr. Hurd. --patching for a software. Mr. Bhagowalia. No, it doesn't, but we are sharing---- Mr. Hurd. And the vendor has made it very clear that they are not going to continue to support that software. So what are you working with the vendor on? Mr. Bhagowalia. The vendor usually works with us to kind of figure out if there are any challenges with particular versions of software and so on and so forth. We have not looked at it or been advised of any particular devices there that were behind. But nevertheless the point is, we should, obviously, be---- Mr. Hurd. You are the CIO for Treasury, correct? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir, I am. Mr. Hurd. How much software are you using in the Department of Treasury that is not supported by a vendor? Mr. Bhagowalia. We keep tabs on a lot of the legacy versions, that is---- Mr. Hurd. Do you have a number? How many systems are you running---- Mr. Bhagowalia. We have 329 systems, sir, overall in Treasury. Mr. Hurd. Okay. And how many of the 329 systems that you are running are systems provided by a vendor that is no longer supporting that version of the software that you're using? Mr. Bhagowalia. It's a small percentage. I'll have to get back the exact number. Mr. Hurd. Please get back with a specific number. Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir, I will. Yes, sir. Mr. Hurd. Threat mitigation--threat assessment--or damage assessment is probably the most accurate number--of the 54 systems that were using the Juniper's software ScreenOS, what did the hackers, attackers, have you done a damage assessment on what was possibly stolen? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, we've obviously looked at the devices, and which there were two versions. Obviously, one had the administrative access and one had the VPN. We looked at both of those devices and seen whether there was anything going on in those devices themselves. We looked at the risk analysis of that. We also, obviously, made sure that those devices did not have any lateral movement and other things like that. We're doing more in this area. We're putting some other countermeasures just to double-check, for example, using third parties to see if there's anything else going on in there. Mr. Hurd. So you identified 17 of the 56 systems as high threat? Is that correct? Fourteen? Mr. Bhagowalia. No, sir, 40 of the devices, out of an overabundance of caution, we put at high risk. Only 4 out of the 57 were really connected facing the Internet. The rest were internal facing. Mr. Hurd. Of those four that were facing the Internet, what kind of systems--what kind of information was traversing those systems? Mr. Bhagowalia. So one was--it was like, for example, it was on an isolated Internet connection at one of the locations, like Mint. Another location---- Mr. Hurd. Right. So the Mint, like where we make money? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir, but it was not connected to the corporate LAN. It was sitting outside in a public-facing sort of Internet. Mr. Hurd. But it's still connected to the Internet, right? So are you implying that that's not a significant vulnerability? Mr. Bhagowalia. No, sir, we don't. We take cybersecurity very seriously. Mr. Hurd. So in your damage assessment, who did you think potentially took this information? Mr. Bhagowalia. Well, there was no information that we are aware of that has been taken, and we have looked at it very carefully. We, obviously are obviously concerned if there's anything that's an external attempt. But there were multiple layers of security in terms of what we were watching. And out of the version that we had, nothing was taken. Mr. Hurd. So you don't think anything was taken. But based on this vulnerability, you don't have to exfil data, right? If you're able to read--if you're able to decrypt encrypted information, then if you're capturing that encrypted network, the encrypted traffic traversing the network, you don't have to exfil it. So how would you know if something was taken or not? Mr. Bhagowalia. So, for example, the four devices that are in question, they do not participate in the VPN connection at all. So there's no risk to that. So even if that was taken out, there was no issue there. They are connected between three levels of firewalls, in addition to what's already at Juniper. They are configured in such a way without giving the configuration away. Since admins have special access to that, we were pretty confident, and we did a detailed risk analysis, and that's why we took a little bit of time to kind of, to your question, to really look into detail and make sure there's nothing going on. We absolutely appreciate a concern. We've also read your article, and we also know that this vulnerability was quite serious. We looked at it, and there was nothing that we can see. But we're also going further and making sure that we're bringing in other experts. And so far one of the vendors--one of the vendors who was going to be briefing today, Mandiant, we think is very, very good, is one of the other folks, and amongst others, that we're looking at bringing in. Mr. Hurd. Well, my time has expired, but there will definitely be several more rounds of question. I would like now to recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, on what is, I think, one of the most important topics we can be addressing here in Congress with respect to our future. Mr. Taylor, can you explain what the Consular Consolidated Database is, briefly? Mr. Taylor. Thank you for the question, sir. Briefly---- Mr. Connolly. Well, because I've only got 5 minutes. Mr. Taylor. I appreciate that, sir. The Consular Consolidated Database is a number of databases, actually. I think the total is around 18. It handles various activities, such as visa issuance, passport issuance, and that sort of thing. It manages our consular workload. Mr. Connolly. So hundreds of millions of records? Mr. Taylor. Hundreds of millions of records, sir. Mr. Connolly. Hundreds of millions of records. Would you agree, Mr. Taylor, that makes it a juicy cyber target? Mr. Taylor. We've identified it certainly as a target and as a critical system for the Department. Mr. Connolly. And on March 31 of this year there was a report that an internal review revealed lots of vulnerabilities in the CCD? Is that correct? There was an ABC News report that said you did. Mr. Taylor. Right. The ABC News report was referring to, sir, the process that we go through for all our significant systems, which is penetration testing and a host of other types of tests that we run against our system on a regular basis. So through that process, yes, in fact, we identified vulnerabilities. That's the point and purpose of the penetration testing. And we're well on our way to reconciling those and remediating it. Mr. Connolly. In response to the ABC story, the Department officially sort of took issue with those reports on the severity of the vulnerability and referred to it, the vulnerability of the CCD, as in the lowest threat category. Can you put that in perspective? I mean, how many categories are there at the State Department in terms of threat, cyber threat? Mr. Taylor. If I could, sir, I'd rather try to answer the question through the way we look at risk mitigation, and that's to look at the probability as well as the potential damage associated with the threat. The probability was very low, but, obviously, clearly, given the type of private information that's available on that system and the quantity, even with a low risk, we take that very, very seriously. In fact, I mean, we meet on this on a weekly basis with the under secretary and with the deputy secretary and with the senior leadership in Consular Affairs to track the progress against our remediation efforts. Mr. Connolly. Okay. Well, the reason I think it's important is because one of the concerns I've got with respect to cyber throughout the Federal Government is you look for--if I were a hacker or up to no good, I'd look to low-hanging, vulnerable fruit. And we, this committee, this subcommittee, has found lots of that in what might look ostensibly like an attractive target, Department of Education. Huge database, lots of information in it, and potentially ripe for the picking. Which is why we think implementation of FITARA is so important and because we've got to sharpen up our ability and make wise investments and so forth. Let me ask you while I've got you, Mr. Taylor, I've just gotten back from China, and on this particular trip there were probably 20 Members of Congress, Senators and House Members, Republicans and Democrats. I mean, everybody was told when we got there, you do understand that any device you bring will be compromised, period. Is it routine for the Department of State to provide counsel to Members of Congress when they're traveling to places that have a known reputation with respect to cyber? Mr. Taylor. Thank you, sir, for the question. I understand the question, but to be honest, it's a little outside of my wheelhouse. I'm not sure if those briefings take place. I would expect that Congress would receive those briefings either through our Diplomatic Security or another entity in State. It really isn't within the purview of the CIO responsibilities to do that. Mr. Connolly. I mean, you work for the State Department. Mr. Taylor. I do, sir. Mr. Connolly. Yeah. Well, maybe you can take it back with somebody whose purview it is. Mr. Taylor. Yes. Mr. Connolly. But it just worries me that a whole branch of government is unwittingly putting itself at risk. And remember I've got messages here from the State Department, from the White House, from lots of other Federal agencies, all of which, if I bring this to Beijing, is going to be compromised. Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. And it just seems to me a prudent measure for the executive branch to--if it isn't--to be more proactive in not only discouraging, but strongly providing guidance, quite explicit guidance, to Members of Congress, rather than having it be on our own. I mean, what could go wrong with 535 individuals and their spouses traveling hither and yon with devices that are official that could be compromised? Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. Mr. Connolly. It might be outside your purview, Mr. Taylor, but we both work for the U.S. Government and are concerned about U.S. security, and we're talking about cyber, and this is a big issue I think in your wheelhouse. So I would appreciate your cooperation in going back to whoever's purview it is in the Department and maybe beefing up our protective preemptive measures. Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. I understand the question, and I will certainly take that back. Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Now I'd like to recognize Mr. Blum for 5 minutes. Mr. Blum. Thank you, Chairman Hurd. And I'd like to thank the panelists for appearing here today to talk about this most important issue. Mr. Barger, in your testimony you state that information is less a technical issue and more of a cultural issue. To me, this gets at the very importance of building trusting relationships. I'm from the private sector and trust is so important. Without trust, it's hard to run an effective business, trust between employer and employee, trust between the company and its vendors, trust between the company and its customers. Trust to me is ultra-important. And it gets to the importance of your statement of building trusting relationships between parties to ensure effective information-sharing practices. In your opinion, is there a trust deficiency between the private sector and the public sector when it comes to the sharing of threat intelligence? Mr. Barger. In terms of efficiencies, I believe sharing in general within public sector as well as within the private sector is still somewhat new, and everyone's feeling around the edges to figure out how to best approach it. I think the Information Sharing Act of 2015 kind of helped break the ice and give folks a renewed interest and focus in that area. In terms of private sector sharing, we find organizations are still challenged internally with communicating effectively, let alone some of the more advanced moves of sharing across parties or Bank A sharing with Bank B. But there's interest to get there. I think DHS and some of their initiatives are good starting points where there's a centralized area where folks can go. The private sector has a thirst for information, and so as much information you can send our way is always appreciated. Mr. Blum. There is a willingness in the private sector, I agree, and I hear that time and time again. Is there something the government, the public sector, can be doing to help facilitate this? Because there is that willingness, I agree with you. Mr. Barger. I think timeliness of reporting can help. I think there's optics and perceptions as to how much value information is coming out of the government in terms of the flash to bang. There's many cases where the private sector will be a little--a few steps ahead of the government in terms of sharing some information, and then several weeks or months later you'll get an FBI flash bulletin or a DHS report which echoes some of the same details you already know. However, there's also instances where, like I pointed out earlier, where the information that may come out of DHS or FBI will serve as a feed or will shore up a loose end that the private sector may have not have necessarily figured out or understand fully, but that then fills in some of the blanks. Mr. Blum. I hear from the private sector also sometimes the government is viewed as a black hole. And they deploy a fair number of assets, time, people's talent, to obtain information, share it with the government, and never hear back, never hear back. And that to them is a problem, and I'd say it probably is a problem. You know, was the problem resolved? Was it helpful or not? They just want to hear back. Any ideas there on what we can do to have a two-way communication street here versus, ``Give me, give me, give me, and, hey, don't ask what happened with it''? Mr. Barger. Correct. I am part of that group of folks who shared information into the black hole, if you will, and have wondered, was this effective, do you need more? But what happens is over time, when you don't hear back, you just say, really, what's the point of me continuing this if I don't really see the value? Mr. Blum. Exactly. Exactly. Mr. Barger. So having a thumbs-up or a thumbs-down or quick ``got it'' is always helpful and I think lends to what you're talking about is improving that sharing relationship and that trust. Mr. Blum. Very good. I'll yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hurd. I'd like to recognize Mr. Lieu for another round of questions. Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Question for Mr. Barger, sir. Are you familiar with the SS7 flaw? Mr. Barger. I am not. Mr. Lieu. Okay. That's fine. I will now go to Mr. Ozment. In February of this year, The New York Times published an article quoting Defense Secretary Ash Carter, and he is quoted in there regarding back doors as saying the following: ``Just to cut to the chase, I'm not a believer in back doors or a single technical approach. I don't think it's realistic.'' Do you agree with his statement? Mr. Ozment. I think part of the challenge here is an argument about what constitutes a back door or not. You know, I think what I have heard from law enforcement agencies is that they hope for a solution that allows them court-ordered access without introducing vulnerabilities. I think if you are to enter---- Mr. Lieu. Let me just stop you there. Do you believe it's technologically possible to put in a back door only for the good guys? Mr. Ozment. I think there are solutions that add--that make that possible. Mr. Lieu. Just give me one. Mr. Ozment. However, to get to our point, I think any time you add a solution, you add complexity. And every time you add complexity, you increase the risk of compromise. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Do you know how many smartphones were lost or stolen in the U.S., let's say, in 2013? Mr. Ozment. I do not. Mr. Lieu. Okay. According to an article in the LA Times, about 4.5 million smartphones were lost or stolen. If hackers could hack into a smartphone, they could access all sorts of data on Americans. Wouldn't you agree that it would be important that if government finds a flaw in smartphone encryption that they let the manufacturer know about it so we can protect American consumers if their cell phones are lost or stolen? Mr. Ozment. There is a process for deciding whether or not to disclose vulnerabilities that the government finds. My organization's role in this process is to advocate for the broad sharing of vulnerabilities, because that does increase the cybersecurity of our Nation. There are other perspectives that have to be viewed in that process, law enforcement intelligence perspectives, but the administration has gone on record to highlight that the process, the strong default, is to share information to increase the security of devices and systems. Mr. Lieu. So through this process the way the FBI was able to hack the recent iPhone in the San Bernardino case, that may be released to Apple at some point. Am I understanding that correctly? Mr. Ozment. If the FBI did, in fact, use a vulnerability it would go through this process and could potentially result in a release. But I don't know of the specifics of this, whether or not the FBI used a vulnerability in this case, so I would have to defer to the FBI on that. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Before I forget, Mr. Chair, could I enter into the record this article, ``4.5 million smartphones were lost or stolen in the U.S. in 2013,'' from the Los Angeles Times? Mr. Hurd. Without objection. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Mr. Barger, let me ask you a similar question. Do you agree with Defense Secretary Ash Carter's statement that we should not have back doors in encryption? Mr. Barger. I think that, again, introduces a very complex conversation. I think that we need strong encryption. As a member of industry, I would be very concerned and challenged, I guess, with any sort of approach by the government to weaken anything or weaken security or encryption of any sort of product or solution that we delivered. So I would say no. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And with that, I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Mr. Farenthold from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much. I would like to follow up on a line of questioning the chairman had about legacy systems. We talked about some of the legacy and unsupported systems in the IRS. We've had hearings where various government agencies are still running pre-Windows 98 or Windows 98, again, not supported by Microsoft, the security patches are not coming up. Dr. Ozment, do you have any idea the scope of this problem? Mr. Ozment. I think this is a major problem for the Federal Government. It's something that is concerning to me. I'll tell you that we do scan agencies externally, so the systems they have connected to the Internet, and we look for critical vulnerabilities. We do consider an unsupported device to be a critical vulnerability. And some of our most challenging discoveries in that process are unsupported devices, particularly at smaller departments and agencies who may lack the resources or the expertise to upgrade these very legacy systems. I think this is a major risk for the government. And I do believe that any approach that we can take to upgrading and replacing legacy systems is a good approach. Mr. Farenthold. And the National Institute of Standards publication 800-40 lays out guidance for agencies on enterprise patch management and states that it would be, quote, ``ideal'' to deploy patches immediately so as to minimize the timeframe systems that are vulnerable. You know, obviously, immediately isn't possible. We've got a couple--we've got the State Department and Treasury Department here. How good are you guys at getting this out? I mean, what is immediately for you? A security patch comes out, how long does it take you to get it out, Mr. Taylor? Mr. Taylor. So our security patches, we look at it two ways, critical threat patches and typical required patches. So for our critical patches--we begin immediately, I want to be clear about that--we have a 3-day timeline to deploy a patch worldwide, to all locations worldwide. We meet that with approximately 98 percent success rate. Mr. Farenthold. And how are you all doing at Treasury? Mr. Bhagowalia. We obviously take the most critical patches first, sir, and we move on it. And as you saw in my testimony, we fix those in 5 days, 6 days. For the rest of the enterprise, we work with the bureaus to make sure those critical patches go first. As far as the medium and low patches, they take a little bit more time. And we also are, obviously, looking at operational risk, making sure those systems are a continuing mission. And then we schedule that, and then the report, the bureau CIO's report, back to us. So the answer is it's ongoing. As to exact numbers, I can get back to you and give you the exact numbers. Mr. Farenthold. All right. And, Dr. Ozment, in May of 2015, it's my understanding that the Secretary issued a binding operational directive requiring all agencies to mitigate critical vulnerabilities on their Internet-facing devices within 30 days. That seems like an awful long time to me, but before I go criticizing how long it is, how much success do we have getting them done in 30 days? Mr. Ozment. I would agree with you that it is a somewhat generous amount of time. I would highlight that, to the points that my colleagues have made, the criticality of the patch and the type of system will dictate timing. There are systems that are more complicated than your normal desktop operating system that do take additional time. And since we were doing a one- size-fits-all policy, we had to be somewhat generous. Even with that somewhat generous timeframe, when we started, when we released this directive, there were over 360 Internet-facing systems with critical vulnerabilities in them. I view that as the backlog, what we started with, because of course new vulnerabilities are discovered all the time. We reduced that backlog, not as rapidly as I would like for the government to have reduced it, but we are now down--we have, obviously, eliminated that backlog. Even right now we have 39 vulnerabilities across the government that are critical but have been unpatched for more than 30 days. There is good news in that, which is when we started we were over 360, and, clearly, not enough attention was being paid on it. Mr. Farenthold. I mean, are these some obscure operating system or ultracomplicated software or are we just not running Windows update? Mr. Ozment. The majority of these are now legacy systems at small agencies that are struggling to manage their IT and to find the budget to replace these legacy systems. These have been the toughest nuts for us to crack. Mr. Farenthold. All right. I am loathe to ask what you think Congress could do to help with that, because I suspect the answer will be: Give us more money. But is there something besides give us more money that we can do in Congress? And then I'll yield back after your answer. Mr. Ozment. You know, I would like to highlight that Congress has been incredibly helpful to date. The recent legislation passed in both 2014 and 2015 has been very important. This type of attention is very important. I do think that one of the challenges that agencies consistently have is when you replace a legacy system, you often have to operate that system for a period of time even as you're paying to build the new system. So you do functionally need to pay for two things at once for a period of time. The IT modernization bill sponsored in part by Representative Kelly, the ranking member, would really assist with that, because it would essentially give you that fund to temporarily support the building of a second system even as you operate the original, older system. Mr. Farenthold. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. The ranking member from Illinois is recognized for 5 more minutes. Ms. Kelly. Thank you. Mr. Bhagowalia---- Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Kelly. --Mr. Taylor, this question is for both of you. As the people with ultimate responsibility for the security of your agencies' computer networks, I imagine that you would welcome any information that would help you with cyber defense. If a company that plays a critical role in your agencies' mission was hacked, would knowing how that hack happened help you to do your job? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes. We work with a lot of vendors, and we, obviously, work very closely with them. I believe the cyber climate, the way things are in the prevailing world, we work together as a team and we look out for each other. We are all in the boat together. And that's the way we want to manage this. We share information also across not only the government, not only with DHS, but with the law enforcement and the intelligence community. I myself Came from the law enforcement intelligence community. And I can tell you that--and I have come from industry--we are in a different world now, and the adversary is growing in sophistication, volume, brazenness, and impact and frequency. So if that's the case, the only way we can do this together is to work together and make this thing happen. So absolutely, ma'am. Ms. Kelly. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor. Thank you for the question. Partnership is the basis of our cyber defense. We learned that in 2014 when we had our challenges with our unclassified email. We reached out to DHS. We reached out to NSA. We get wonderful support from the FBI. We support and established a joint operations center for cyber. So we have folks from interagency there sitting with us 24/7, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. We receive threat and mitigation information from just a host of partners. It would not be possible for the Department of State or any other agency to successfully defend our systems without support, without continuing information, both threat information and mitigation information, private sector and public. We recognize that. As I said, that's a keystone for us. Ms. Kelly. What means do you have--and this is for both of you--to learn about the details about a hack of one of your contractors? How do you learn about that? Mr. Bhagowalia. We work very, very closely, first of all, with our vendors in terms of our governance, that they have to tell us what's going on, and I think in that regard, we watch that. We monitor classified and unclassified channels, including vendor community, from our security operations center that looks for that. We work with the US-CERT, NCCIC, and DHS, who gives information to us. We work on the Federal CIO Council where we are all sharing information as a sort of a network of CIOs and also CISOs. We also work within our folks and our staff who have sort of an organic network. And I don't want to underplay the importance of that organic network that's looking and looking out. So I think we're doing a pretty good job there. Ms. Kelly. And, Mr. Taylor, you would agree with---- Mr. Taylor. Absolutely. We actively maintain our relationship with our vendors. I travel regularly, we meet with them regularly. Ms. Kelly. Okay. Thank you. Ms. Ozment, just two quick yes or noes. Are government contractors required to share detailed forensic analysis about attempted or successful cyber attacks, yes or no? Mr. Ozment. Not in general. There may be some specific contracts where that's required. Ms. Kelly. Okay. Are government contractors required to notify the FBI if they are the victims of a successful cyber attack? Yes or no? Mr. Ozment. Again, not in general. There may be specific contracts. Ms. Kelly. Are there examples where US-CERT has offered its services to government contractors who were hacked and the company declined the offer? Mr. Ozment. Not to my knowledge. I don't believe so. Ms. Kelly. Okay. All right then. Thank you. And I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Mr. Bhagowalia, some very basic questions, and I apologize for not knowing the answer to this. At Treasury, what floor does the Secretary of Treasury sit? Mr. Bhagowalia. Main Treasury, third floor, sir. Mr. Hurd. And where do you sit? Mr. Bhagowalia. I sit in one of the buildings next to the Main Treasury. Mr. Hurd. Do you have budgetary and operational control? I'm assuming there's a CIO specifically for IRS, right? Mr. Bhagowalia. There's a separate CIO for IRS, sir. Mr. Hurd. Does that person report to you? Mr. Bhagowalia. No, he does not. Reports to the Commissioner. But he has a dotted line under FITARA that I have given him some CIO commitments that he has to report with me and work with me. Mr. Hurd. But isn't part of FITARA to empower you to have control over the entire organization? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir. The Department has the authority, and I'm working very closely with the bureau's CIOs to make the mission happen. Mr. Hurd. CDFI, what is that? Mr. Bhagowalia. It's one of the consolidated funds that is a smaller program that sits within the departmental offices. Mr. Hurd. So earlier this year or late last year, we sent a letter, this committee sent a letter to every agency asking for an update or asking for a review of legacy hardware and legacy software. And thank you, you get back to us. And I know I asked a question earlier about old systems. I have eight pages worth of information. Some of the software, when we asked when was the last date of support, the answer was ``unknown'' because the vendor is no longer in business. Some of the other software stopped being supported in 2007. And then we asked the question: If no longer supported by vendor, how is it supported? The reply was: Unsupported, IRS assumes expired product risk. Now, I'm not going to go through each one of these. But my question is, do you, as the CIO of Treasury, have the authority to go through, identify which one of these are high risk, and figuring out why and moving away from unsupported software? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, the bureau CIO and I do, I have the authority, and we look at using what they call critical POAM item, and they have to report to me as to whether they are testing and is there enough security, that there's any vulnerability, if there's anything critical. And they have signed to that and I can--I, obviously, check and verify that. If they have not done that, I have the authority to turn it off and so do they. And, obviously, this particular system I'll have to take a look at---- Mr. Hurd. No, look, we're going to get into a much larger conversation at some other point about this. But some of these systems that stopped being supported in 2013 deal with software to manage cell phone communications, right? So this is--to me, that would be a high priority vulnerability or a system that should be of high priority to ensure that--and, again, the Federal Government shouldn't be in the business of providing support to products. We should be upgrading and buying the latest version. So I'm more interested in making sure you have the authorities in order to solve these problems. Dr. Ozment, how much, you know, with the new cybersecurity rules that DHS has, how much influence do you all have in telling another department or agency, ``Hey, guys, you all need to sort this out''? Mr. Ozment. The new authorities that Congress has provided us and, frankly, the congressional attention on this issue have really dramatically helped us more deeply engage with departments and agencies. We focus on working collaboratively with those departments and agency, essentially because when they trust us, we can accomplish more together. And we also look at OMB holding agencies accountable. And together, we really work to improve---- Mr. Hurd. Dr. Ozment, do you have a list of all the unsupported software that's being used across the 24 CFO agencies? Mr. Ozment. I do not, but I'll be honest with you, I want that--I will have that when CDM phase one is deployed. Mr. Hurd. Copy. Mr. Ozment. And I want an automated list of that. I don't want a manual data---- Mr. Hurd. Good. Copy. Mr. Barger, should enterprises be concerned with using software that is no longer supported by a vendor? Mr. Barger. They should. Unfortunately, organizations over time will set up systems that just become systems of record, that they just cannot pull these systems out, that they age within the organization, both within public and private sector. It's not just one sector or the other. So it's a very hard to necessarily pull them out. If you consider some medical devices are FDA regulated, so if you were to patch them, in some cases you change that regulation. And so there's these very nuanced details in accepting risk in and around these nuanced systems of record that could be supporting command and control or medical systems. And so there can be creative workarounds that are put in place, be it policies or solutions, that can help manage that risk a little better. Mr. Hurd. No, thank you for that. And my next question kind of shifting gears slightly. Can you do--can an enterprise do proper damage assessment without understanding who the threat actor was? Mr. Barger. So as a former analyst, I am always appreciative of as much information as possible so that I can use that and form the basis to make better decisions. So I think maybe to your point around attribution, that sort of information, always helps to understand what the adversary's motivations are, because that can frame how I respond and subsequent decisions down the line, be it technical or nontechnical type response. Mr. Hurd. So would this be a fair statement, that understanding who the attacker is, we would better--we can do better damage assessment? Mr. Barger. Absolutely. It's an integral part. I mean, one of the first questions everybody asks when you're the bearer of bad news and there's a breach is: Who did it? Or why? The boss always wants to know that. And so understanding that can, again, help frame how you respond and the decisionmaking cycle afterwards. Mr. Hurd. When it comes to the Juniper ScreenOS breach, do you have opinions on who was responsible? Mr. Barger. These are personal opinions and not necessarily rooted in fact, but just reading, casually reading---- Mr. Hurd. The record reflects that. Mr. Barger. Roger. Okay. So if you look at the type of vulnerabilities potentially introduced for the term in which they're reporting that, I could think of a handful of nation- state entities that would leverage key weakening and an administrative back door for core infrastructure. And that core infrastructure is kind of one of those more strategic areas of the domain, if you will, the contested domain, that if you lay up in there, you can do quite a bit in terms of---- Mr. Hurd. So let's talk about the nature of the Juniper ScreenOS breach. Source code was manipulated, correct? Mr. Barger. From what I understand, correct. Mr. Hurd. And code was inserted in the source code used for ScreenOS. Is that your understanding? Mr. Barger. From what I understand, correct. Mr. Hurd. How difficult is it to do that? Mr. Barger. I would imagine if it were, for me, putting on a bad guy hat, that I would have to have a significant understanding of how that system works as well as a very robust quality assurance capability to make---- Mr. Hurd. But when you're designing software protecting-- ensuring that your source code cannot be seen, is a pretty-- that's a pretty key--that's a key software development. Mr. Barger. Correct. That's what I was driving at, is that there had to have been a robust team that would be able to make sure that that implant or that key weakening was not detected for the term that's being reported. Mr. Hurd. Could Juniper have protected its source code better? Mr. Barger. I don't know enough about their development process and their internal security to be able to say that, but---- Mr. Hurd. So based on your experience and your--this is your personal observation--it was a state actor--it was an entity supported by a nation-state? Mr. Barger. I would certainly think that a criminal or ideological group probably wouldn't have necessarily the resources or the motivation to leverage that type of attack. Mr. Hurd. Why are--and maybe, Dr. Ozment, this is a better question directed to you--who is responsible in the Federal Government for attribution? Mr. Ozment. We look to the intelligence community, so the Director of National Intelligence for attribution. Mr. Hurd. So DNI is the one responsible for making attribution. Even in a case when it's a breach of a private sector entity? Mr. Ozment. That's right. Mr. Hurd. But that private sector entity could make it aware, right? Because if a private sector company is hacked, they usually--they will bring in--they'll probably reach out to some Federal Government agencies, whether it's DHS--it should be DHS now, after the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. They're going to bring you in. They're probably going to hire another company that does incident response and threat mitigation. But are there barriers from having the company that's hacked from articulating who they believe was responsible for the breach? Mr. Ozment. No. Any company could point to anybody if they had a view on the perpetrator. Mr. Hurd. Why--and this is my opinion now--I feel like in this case of the Juniper ScreenOS hack people have been reticent to do attribution, even general attribution. Do you have an opinion on that, Dr. Ozment? And, Mr. Barger, I'm going to ask you the same question. Mr. Ozment. You know, I don't, other than to say that the government has historically been--has used attribution in a fairly relatively few cases. And so I don't view it as unusual that the government has not attributed this particular incident. That's it. Mr. Hurd. Copy. I will now recognize my friend from California, the distinguished gentleman, Mr. Lieu, for another round of questions. Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My understanding is that Juniper was invited to testify, but they refused to come. I just want to note for the record that I--well, let me first ask questions. Mr. Ozment, is Juniper a government contractor? Mr. Ozment. I don't know for sure. I would assume that they are. I do want to highlight that they're a victim here and that from our perspective we ask all IT vendors to give us advanced notice when they are making a major patch so that we can amplify their patch announcement and make sure that it reaches the public and private sector, that everybody who knows needs to know about it. In this case they did notify us in advance that they were developing a major patch. I think they did a very responsible job of this, and I salute them for working hard to make sure that all of their customers were aware of this vulnerability and helping us amplify their message as well. Mr. Lieu. I note for the record that Juniper had their systems breached. I find it disrespectful that they did not come here to testify and it insinuates that they have something to hide. So let me ask some questions for Mr. Bhagowalia. I'm trying to understand your agency's response to the breaches of Juniper. My understanding is that within 1 week, 48 out of 57 affected systems on Treasury's network were patched. Is that correct? Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir. Mr. Lieu. But for the other nine, it took, from my understanding, another 2 months. What's the reason that it took that amount of time? Mr. Bhagowalia. We made a risk-based decision, and we found that out of those devices--first of all, anything--only 4 of those 57 were Internet facing. Everything inside had many layers of firewalls. We found that of those devices, a certain amount had--did not even have the VPN vulnerability as such. So we looked at that and made a risk-based decision as one of the bureaus to delay the patch. And the others were mitigated in terms of compensating controls that they had in place. So it was done a little bit later. Obviously, in retrospect, one could look at balancing mission and risk, and we could have gone a little faster, but it was basically a low risk for the devices that were done after the first week. Mr. Lieu. So when I patch something on my computer it's, I don't know, a few minutes. Are these very complicated patches? Are these something that takes a long time? I'm trying to understand why it just wouldn't have been done rather quickly. Mr. Bhagowalia. Yes, sir. Let me just say, as an engineer, we obviously, obviously, look at first what is the risk analysis as to what the thing is. We understood the details of this once we were told what the thing was and exactly what the vendor was saying and what DHS told us. We went and looked at what the risk analysis is, is it in our network? We looked at where they were facing. A lot of these configurations, without giving them away, we have multiple layers of firewalls and protection and proxying and all kinds of various means that allows sort of a maze of things that we do to basically confuse anyone from getting in. And third, you know, five of those device didn't have the VPN vulnerability. So even if there was nothing to decrypt, we actually covered that. So it just, if you look at it in isolation, obviously, one can only always look at something being a little faster, but we always balance operational risk. Because think of it has a neighborhood, gated community, and then you get in, and then you've got multiple layers of firewalls and a backbone network that had one or two of these devices between many layers just to get into that. And beyond that, there were various firewall subdivisions and these were deeply imbedded inside those firewall divisions. So to get to those would require a lot of compromise before someone gets in. So we looked at that, and based on that, it was made--a risk-base decision was made. And in addition to that, I would just add that we are actively using other kinds of red teaming, should I say, penetration testing, and we are also looking at some hunt operations to make sure there's nothing in there. We are aware of some of these nation-states, and I think in this case we have not seen anything. Mr. Lieu. Thank you. Ms. Ozment, you're familiar with the ransomware attacks on hospitals, some of which were in southern California? Mr. Ozment. I am, sir. Mr. Lieu. And do you have a sense of how many hospitals have been hit with ransomware attacks in the last year or last few months? Mr. Ozment. I don't have those numbers in hand, but we have certainly seen an increase in ransomware, not just the health sector, but across the Nation. Mr. Lieu. If this is something we could follow up with your office to see if you could let us know about how many attacks we're experiencing? Mr. Ozment. Absolutely, sir. Will do. Mr. Lieu. Great. Thank you. And then let me just conclude with a comment. In this case, Juniper made firewalls to try to prevent important information from going to foreign governments. Juniper is not the victim in this case, as the witness from DHS had said. The U.S. Government and the American people are, and we need to view this in a whole different lens, that when products are made to try to protect the U.S. Government and they fail, the companies that made those products are not the victims. They failed. And I think we just need to put this in proper perspective. The victims here are the U.S. Government, the American people. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Hurd. Thank you. Dr. Ozment, is DHS MPPD built and organized to deal with the problems of the future? Mr. Ozment. It is not, sir. And we have proposed a reorganization that we would very much appreciate support of the Congress in performing that reorganization. Mr. Hurd. And, again, I'd just like to point out, I think, when it comes to the Juniper breach, I think DHS played an important and key role in organizing the government's response to this. I still have a problem with attribution. And, Dr. Ozment, can attribution play a deterrence role? Mr. Ozment. I think it absolutely can. You know, depending on the circumstances, actual attribution could be used to play a deterrence role. In other circumstances the threat of attribution may play a deterrence role. I do think it depends on the particular actor and the dynamics of the relationship, but it can absolutely be a tool for deterrence. Mr. Hurd. Copy. Mr. Bhagowalia, would you like to know who was responsible for or have some idea of attribution for this Juniper breach? Mr. Bhagowalia. Absolutely, sir. You know, we have, obviously, been reading all the news and watching various channels, but we'd love to know. Mr. Hurd. Now, Mr. Taylor, I know the Department of State wasn't affected, because you didn't have any of the ScreenOS software running on there. But does anybody on the panel like to make any comments on attribution? Mr. Barger. Mr. Barger. To your point about attribution serving as a deterrent, we conducted research into a specific series of attacks that had been targeting entities within the South China Sea for quite some many years and put out an attribution product with the assistance of some of our partners. And, basically, after this attribution product was released, we basically saw no more activity from it. Not to say that they are done forever, but I do believe that it can slow down, mitigate active threats as well as enter into the adversary's decisionmaking cycle as to how important this sort of thing is on the world stage and how to recognize those. Mr. Hurd. I appreciate that. And, Mr. Taylor, we have--I have extended my time on too many occasions, but I'd like to let you know that there was a report that the Department recently--Department of State recently detected a vulnerability within its own systems, and we're going to provide you all with some questions that we would like to have answered on the record. And one of those questions is I hope that information has been shared with DHS in order to communicate that across the rest of the Federal infrastructure. Mr. Hurd. Barring no further business, I'd like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to appear before us today. And if there's no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] APPENDIX ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]